Let's assume that a Martian (human being)\(^1\) comes down to Earth and wishes to remain here for the rest of his life. He would be confronted with the choice of society in which he would live ever after. After describing to him the form of political societies that exist on Earth, we would then ask him to decide upon which society he would wish to live. Even if this question made no sense to him, his answer would nevertheless be haphazard and accidental, because he would have no basic understanding\(^2\) of what it means to be a citizen of a society and of what constitutes the essence of political society. Corresponding problems — on a smaller scale, however — could arise if we asked citizens (or members) of various tribal or closed primitive and traditional societies to name the state, apart from their own, in which they would necessarily prefer to spend\(^3\) the rest of their life. By all means, the political societies they would choose to be members of, would undoubtedly be related to their experiences, their way of life, as well as to the theoretical and other models that they would have accepted (if such models existed in their minds) as to what constitutes the essence of political society. If this last case could exist, it would definitely be related not only to the particular way of life of each person, but mainly to the form of life that was prevalent in the society the citizens in question came from, and, in particular, to the form of the inner structure of the political society in question. For instance, the citizens who would choose a society that can form theoretical, as well as practical models which its citizens can modify reject or accept accordingly, can only be citizens of a political society which allows for free inquiry, investigation, expression of views and theories and for the scientific attitude towards and philosophical outlook on the world.
Furthermore, if someone asked the citizens of the society in question (i.e. citizens of an advanced scientific and technological thought and of a multi-dimensional form of life) about the kind of political society we are heading for nowadays, quite a few (amongst them those most advanced, technologically wise) might answer that the political society we are heading for is that of the universal city \textit{(cosmopolis)} and that the prevalent concept of what a citizen is, is that of the universal citizen \textit{(cosmopolites)}. This is proved by the widespread concept of the "global village" nowadays, which is naturally very closely related with the development of electronic technology and, as a consequence of that, with the possibility of rapid communication between even the most isolated and remote parts of our planet.

However, is this really how things are, or is there a conceptual confusion and an unacceptable expansion of analogies?

Belonging to the "global village" means being able to communicate and, in part, electronically transact with people or organisations which do not necessarily belong to one's own political society. This communication and transaction undoubtedly takes place under certain formal rules and principles which theoretically might be capable of being generally applied; but this does not happen in reality, because only a very small minority of people of the technologically advanced societies participate in the global village. Moreover, participation in the global village does not seem to be equivalent with the participation of man as a citizen in a society that could be called \textit{cosmopolis}, since — as Weldon\textsuperscript{5} has shown — such a participation and situation requires the enforcement of certain political, as well as moral models, through the \textit{power} of the global state or of the \textit{cosmopolis}.

But what really is the concept of \textit{cosmopolis} or of \textit{cosmopolites}? If we are to grasp the true meaning of the concepts in question, we may have to comprehend the concept of \textit{polis} first. It is absolutely necessary that we distinguish between \textit{polis} and the mere \textit{collections} and \textit{getting-together} of people in a place, and contrast it with other forms of collectivity, just as Aristotle does in his \textit{Politics}.\textsuperscript{6} At this point, however, I would rather mention another instance — for reasons of economy of speech and because of its topical character — which is found in the work of Dio Chrysostom\textsuperscript{7} (a distinguished \textit{sophist}, orator and philosopher of the \textit{imperial} age) and not in Plato or Aristotle, and
which deals with when the Ionian city of Olbia (which was built on the right bank of the river of Dneiper) constituted a political society or a republic. In his thirty-sixth Borysthenetic speech (Oratio Borystheniticus), Dio poses the question of whether Olbia (which had recently been seized by the barbarian Scythians and had lost its Greek residents) remains a polis and whether its residents are still citizens (polites). The answer is that Olbia is no longer a political society because its new residents do not know how to transact, they are crude and there are no laws to be observed any more. Therefore, according to Dio, who echoes the Stoic views to a great extent, polis as political society only exists when valid financial and commercial exchanges and transactions take place in a habitation, when it is characterised by the existence of cultural refinements (αστειότητες), when there is order imposed by the law and in general when the law is prevalent. Only in such a political society can man be a citizen.

The answer to the next question: "Which is the best city (ariste polis)" is again naturally in accordance with the views of the Stoics, i.e. that the best (ariste) polis is that in which the best in terms of virtue, that is the Wise Men, co-exist and govern. Therefore, Stoicism which belongs to the Hellenistic era (which in turn leads to the expansion of the concept of polis and favours the imperial view point about the imposition of common legal and moral models relevant to the "political" governing of wide areas of the world back then) seems to lay theoretically the essential and sufficient presuppositions which are necessary for the constitution of the ideal of "polis" as a political society with a new meaning. The sufficient conditions can be defined through the adoption of the Heraclitean-inspired Stoic teaching about common logos (reason). Living according to Logos which conditions everything, the Stoic philosophers are therefore capable of being citizens of any polis of the world, that is of being cosmopolitan (cosmopolites) and the political ideal of Stoicism is the cosmopolis, the cosmopolitanism or — more specifically — the megalopolis, which is identical to cosmos (the world) or the sky as cosmos according to Clement of Alexandria. This, of course, does not mean that each person belonging to the political societies of the Hellenistic and Roman world is a cosmopolites. The cosmopolis is not a specific area where people live, but an ideal which may exist in any area granted that the essential and sufficient presuppositions are fulfilled. Likewise, some peoples' capability to live according to virtue (that is, according to nature and to the ever-ruling logos) entitles them to be called citizens of any city of the world where the conditions mentioned
prevail, in particular to be called citizens of the one and only city which is this world, the proper society according to nature, which is called megalopolis. In "megalopolis" the wise man, acting according to what nature orders is "cosmopolites" right from the beginning. This concept is analogous to considering scientists and scholars as such to belong to the community of scientists and scholars, because, regardless of the place or the country they live in, they know the scientific method and the way of investigating various issues they deal with. So, polis, with its original meaning, is an ideal community which is built upon the common acceptance of moral and social models; Gods and people alike can belong in this city on condition that they possess reason. Secondly, polis is a society according to Dio, as long as the majority of people that inhabit the same place are internally structured as a political system governed by laws. According to the Stoics, the earth cities which differ in size, ethics, forms of systems of governments and laws have to be regarded as prosthakeae (additions) which people incur in a republic constructed according to nature. According to Philo, this situation is a result of the greediness and infidelity among people living in them, that is qualities which lead them astray from the proper, according to nature, society and make them regard as law what they consider to be of their best interest in societies which share the same views. For this reason, all the republics and the laws of the earth-cities are considered to be deviant by the criteria of nature.

This view, which recognises the priority of natural law, undoubtedly stresses the value of cosmopolis and not that of polis (in its historic form) and causes man to alienate himself from the societies considered to be built upon demes (people), regarding them as devious. Therefore, the citizen of the Hellenistic city, withdrawn into himself and retired from his close political and social environment, cannot identify himself with the citizen of the classical Greek city. Although the typical characteristics of the city seem to be retained for the most part, there is, however, change in the quality of the nature and intensity of the citizen's participation in the public affairs, and as to the city being principally a coherent and internally structured political society having important and decisive responsibilities. Zeno's Republic seems to have been the starting point for such considerations and speculations and has led, even unintentionally, to a reassessment of the Greek classical political philosophy and to the prevalence of the concepts of the law of Nature.
Apart from this, another mocking meaning had been given to the concept of *cosmopolites*, a meaning which is mainly related to the views of the Cynic Philosophers, as they were expressed by Diogenes the Cynic. Diogenes is reported to be a *cosmopolites*, according to the Stoic sources, and, moreover at the same time, to be supporting the prevalence of law. The Cynics, however, reject law and the idea of *polis* in general, so the concept of *cosmopolites*, which is attributed to them, must have had a different meaning. The fact that Diogenes has thought to be a *cosmopolites*, as the following extracts from Diogenes Laertius shows:

> without polis, without residence, deprived of homeland poor and wandering, having provided only one day's food for himself

must be correlated with another passage which stresses the following:

> a tower or a roof is not my country but the whole land is a city and a home, I am ready to live with you.

So, what we have here is a different negative form of cosmopolitanism, according to which the Cynic philosopher rejects every city and belongs only to the world. This negative form of cosmopolitanism in the Cynics, in combination with the views of the Stoics, undoubtedly shows the departure of the citizens from the city and leads to the acceptance of the citizens' tendency to feel familiar with wider wholes and with entities or people who live according to the principles of natural law.

In view of the proceeding examination of the concepts of "global village" and "positive" and "negative cosmopolitanism", the following conclusions can be drawn:

Participating in the global village through the cybernet is not equivalent or similar to being a *cosmopolites* according to the Stoic viewpoint. Moreover, the downright rejection of the participation and the abdication of the involvement with the important issues of the city in general, as the Cynic philosophers perceive it, is a negative form of cosmopolitanism which may be correlated with subsequent views which see things from a different perspective, regard the solidarity towards human beings in general and in abstraction; it is not directed towards specific citizens of any political society. The adoption of such an attitude gradually leads to a spiritual desolation and lack of friendships, to a miserable wandering life, to people uprooted and
wandering here and there in the neighbourhoods of the world, just as they settle in a place, exactly as the Cynics did.

Equally parasitic is the positive notion about cosmopolitanism; both the positive and the negative notions become meaningful only in relation to the meaning of polis perceived as a political community with a structured governing system. Both the positive and the negative notions of cosmopolitanism presuppose that the Stoic and the Cynic cosmopolites alike have spent many years of their life in the city, in order to be able, later on, to transcend or reject it. Only within the city is it possible for either of them to form life models and criteria of rationality. The positive cosmopolites expect us to transcend the city as being devious, as it entails situations which do not correspond with the polis according-to-nature, while, the negative cosmopolitanism rejects the city as supposedly opposed to the natural condition of man and proceeds to a metaphysical choice as to what constitutes the telos of human life. This attitude would be meaningful only as a protest against the exaggerations that the indiscriminate increase in human needs, the refinement and the luxury found in the political society can cause. In addition to that, communication in the global village is one-dimensional and it is a kind of virtual information. It is not a direct, warm and many-sided kind of communication, nor can one find there the presuppositions for genuine, personal involvement. In the cybernet, as well as in the city governed by logos (the cosmopolis of the Stoics), the spreading and the expansion of communication as a virtual and remote model, lead to an emotional drying and to the creation of situations which are emotionally poor. This is particularly true in the negative cosmopolitanism.

Even the positive cosmopolitanism of our days occasionally seems to be like eclecticism. The eclecticist believes he has the right to take the best of other people's labour and build his own way of life with their materials. But this effort is morally unacceptable and in many ways logically impossible, since it is almost impossible for different or even opposite ways or forms of life to be coherent and harmonious. For this reason the Stoics sought to lay the foundations of the concept of "cosmopolis", as well as of the lawful earthly republic upon the supposedly common model of reason. Justifiably, despite its importance and insightfulness, this Stoic view cannot be accepted, since we cannot distinguish between the prevalent form of rationality, that rules the whole world (if there is such a rationality in the first place) and the other forms of rationality unless we conventionally presume that the various calculi are what we call logicalitas. Such a
conventional strict rationality (i.e. the *logicalitas*) however, cannot be *relevant to* the morality and the social and political rules that condition the forms of life formed in the political society, despite the fact that it conditions every theoretical and practical human function. We are therefore obliged to examine this problem not in a superficial, external way, but by considering the ways and forms of life that arise and develop in political societies themselves, in the republics of people, despite the fact that they are well aware of what is going on around them. So, the *polis* as a historical, cultural and political entity is given priority over any other conception of the political phenomenon, as Plato and Aristotle alike have rightly stressed.

The great majority of nations and peoples nowadays still orientate themselves steadily towards collectivities of a specific form like the tribe, the city, the city-state, the nation, the league, union of states (e.g. The USA) or of nations and peoples (e.g. The European Union).

The people who live in these groups feel, to a small or a large extent, familiar with the collectivities they are part of, despite the fact that they are capable of transcending these situations (for the reasons already explained). The extent and the intensity of the commitment of the citizens towards the *republic* and the form of solidarity prevalent in it depends on the historic city and the cultural form of each specific republic. More specifically, it depends on the necessary conditions of forming this republic and the *sufficient conditions* that are prevalent or projected in it. The *sufficient conditions* naturally bring about a qualitative change in the republics. That is why, from an archological perspective, we believe that the Platonic and Aristotelian views on the model of political society are very important and topical. According to this model the *polis* (as a political society) has priority as a whole over the entities that constitute it as separate parts (*Politics* 1253a18-19b). This does not mean that the individuals lose their value and substance. On the contrary, the *polis* exists only because people can achieve in it self-realisation and work to meet their *telos* of life in it. The citizens are connected with the city and, theoretically, they can all participate in the public affairs. As Aristotle says, it is necessary to assume responsibility of a *judge* and *hold public office* and be held responsible for whatever they do.\(^27\) In the city, necessary conditions are, and should prevail as such, those conditions that lead to the fulfilment of the *basic* needs of all citizens, to the prevalence of law and order, to the safety of life, the protection of the citizens' honour, the guaranteeing of the contracts and transactions among citizens.
and to the right of all citizens to education. The sufficient conditions have to do with the priority given to the common good of the republic and the correct structure and hierarchy of an evaluating system of principles in it, like the principle of equality of citizens, the principle of equality before the law (isonomia), the principle of freedom, of justice and meritocracy, of an open society which allows free activity and inquiry and the predominance or the priority of truth in the political society which is mainly related to and achieved through philosophical dialectic.

The governing of collectivities by the principle of a virtuous life and of the common good, and the conditioning of peoples' actions by the ideals of a virtuous way or form of life is something considered to be the basis of the utterly virtuous life in the Greek classical political philosophy, a kind of life according to which the conduct of people is socially and politically defined by the principal virtues of courage, sophrosyne, wisdom which all culminate in the virtue of justice. The Christian era will add the virtue of Love, which gives great importance to the relationship between one person and another (with the neighbour), as well as to the collectivity within the bounds of which this person takes action (towards the Assembly of the people I Ecclesia, the republic, the state, the Nation, etc.).

According to Dostoyevski, however, love towards humanity in *in abstracto* and totally in a general way is reduced to something deprived of true meaning. What is sought for is the love for the neighbour, that is for each particular person. From this perspective, the solidarity advocated by the classical Greek philosophy within the city — expanded through the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and redefined through the meaning of Love which must include all four fundamental virtues of the classical political and moral philosophy of Greeks — takes on a new content, according to which our sympathy for the other person (regardless of sex, race or nationality) constitutes the new, metaphysical notion of the idea of good citizenship.

Nonetheless, this kind of archological perception of the political phenomenon does not invalidate the priority of the corporations, does not foster any kind of individualism, nor does it lead to a form of negative cosmopolitanism. It leads to an expansion of horizons as to what constitutes the essence of political society. So, within the bounds of political society — perceived either as city or as a wider collectivity (state, nation, Common Market, European Union, etc.) — each person forms, with the help of education, his way of life in
accordance with the collective cultural a priori in which he functions, while at the same time he seeks eudaimonia which consists in his ability to freely unfold his potentials and to participate in every political and cultural creation, thus leading a virtuous life.

The form of culture, that is the element of the main linkage of the man-citizen to the city, is the citizens' way of life as much as is the way of governing the republic. Amongst the many acceptable forms of government, the solidarity of the citizen requires that kind of system in which the common good in combination with virtuous life, truth and justice are predominant: In practice, that may mean solidarity towards a true meritocratic and free form of democracy in which the prevalent qualities are those of justice, freedom, truth and love.

What has to be stressed at this point is which specific aspects of freedom prevail. This is very important for the inner structure of the republic, because it might overthrow the principle of virtuous and good life and justice. If, for instance, the market freedom which stresses the importance of profit through competition is the main principle or priority, then everything is evaluated on the basis of this criterion and the ideal of truth, justice and love (friendship) which ensures the concept, unity and cohesion of the republic and the solidarity of the citizen towards the citizenship gradually fades away. The unbridled financial freedom of capitalism and the consequent course of events inevitably becomes the enemy of justice. Justice seeks some form of social commitment, some form of socialism within the bounds of which the idea of the virtuous and good life can be put into practice, and the virtuous forms and ways of life can be given priority.

Nowadays, by viewing things from a global perspective, we are in a situation of tension and conflict between capitalism and justice, a situation which favours the financially powerful and serves the few, against the equality and the democracy of the many. Capitalism does not want to be fair or just (it represents the epithymitikon -the desiring part- of the soul). It is therefore adverse by definition and in essence to the true political democracy where the principle of the statesman per se prevails — as opposed to that of capitalism which fights against justice and equality. That is why solidarity and sympathy, on the part of the citizen, towards such social and political systems gradually declines. The citizen seems to retire into himself and democracy seems to be reduced into a word without content, into a form of authoritarian and despotic governing of peoples.
We therefore live in an age that the correct social and political models seem to be overthrown by the power of technology which favours the vast, world-wide, aggressive actions of vehement capitalism. Perhaps this explains why we tend to accept some form of negative cosmopolitanism; what goes on around us does not seem to concern us directly; we do feel however that this attitude eventually hurts us a lot.

Our wound is deepened by our loneliness and also by the fact that there is no fixed framework within which the values of our life can become evident and be appreciated. This in turn can lead to an εὐόαίμονα βίο (happy life) *per se* arising only from within the collectivity within which we live. Nowadays, however, it is a universal request that the freedom of market maintained world-wide and that the principles of open society are in force. These principles ensure the priority of the political and common good.

For this reason there doesn't seem to be a way out of this latent or even obvious conflict unless we return to the classical political models of the Greek philosophy, bring back the priority and predominance of the *political per se* over *homo economicus* (who is governed by his obsession of profit) and set some limits and barriers to the illicit speculative capitalist which seeks to ravage everything and steal happiness from the majority of people (and citizens of various nations and states) for the sake of a delusive *happiness* and bleak misery of the few, who are thirsty for power, commanding presence and who however are unlikely to quench their thirst since, according to Aristotle, "unlimited is the nature of desire".

The fact that the classical political philosophy of the Greeks stresses the priority of the city as a political society over the entities that constitute it and the predominance of the principles of justice for the regulation of the relationships among the entities is an invaluable, moral and political principle for every era. There can be no other principle leading to the prosperity of the citizen, if it is not built upon the (natural, logical and evaluating) priority of the citizenship. Without this basis there can be no healthy relationships among citizens, nor can self-centredness or the pursuit of individual interest be transcended. The regulation of human relationships within the frame of the political society through the principle of virtuous life and justice is the climax of the moral and political philosophy of the Greeks. It is therefore natural that any person would wish to be a citizen of such a republic and that his commitment towards it would be unconditional and in full contrast
with the view of the Cynics who advocated the rejection of any form of republic. However, the Cynics' objections seem to have had, as we said, some meaning.

What is it, then, that the Cynics had pointed out with their objections? It seems that the philosophy of the Cynics is the most serious and radical reaction to those aspects of civilisation which destroy nature. They contrast nature with the republic in a radical way and go on to refuse that they are citizens of a citizenship, because they believe that they overcome the problem this way. The problem, however, cannot be overcome in this way nor in the way of the Stoic philosophers have thought who were led to a hierarchy of the beings of the world (scala naturae).

This problem was going to be solved in our times with the usage and the expansion of the content of the term "political society" (or of the community, in brief). The just order of things of the political community concerned the relationship among citizens. What is sought nowadays is the proportionate expansion of the concept of community and justice to include in it, as beings (which will be governed by the principles of the political society), all the living beings and the natural systems, like lakes, rivers, mountains, the soil and Earth in general. This expansion requires the acceptance of the principle of bio-diversity and the change of our anthropocentric system of values, since justice will no longer be viewed only as a relationship among people, but also as a relationship between man and the other beings and the ecosystems that they constitute. It is plausible that such a new perception of the relationship of the world’s beings is considered to be one more sufficient condition towards the structuring of a right republic in which one could wish to belong. Therefore, there would inevitably be an expansion of the content of the term "citizenship". The citizen of such a society would undoubtedly regard the prevalence of the ecological justice as a sufficient condition. Viewing things, however, from a non-anthropocentric perspective makes these requests not sufficient conditions, but necessary ones. Similar views existed in ideas of the Greek political philosophers, even though they were not explicitly expressed. This is obvious in Plato’s words in Timaeus where it is claimed that after the discussion about the polis the previous day, it is only proper to place society within a historic framework,32 that is within the world, and that Timaeus’ discussion of the subject begins with the creation of the world (cosmos) and ends with his findings about man’s nature.33 Besides, Timaeus considers the world a unified living organism,34 in a way a living community (a
part of which is also the political society) and that the world is beautiful, more particularly, it is the "ever best beautiful world".  

Apart from this, the classical Greek political philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) as well as the Stoics seem to have accepted the principle of the protection of nature as the whole, a part of which is the political community, while at the same time they went on to rate the beings and the situations belonging to it. Similarly, they perceived the relationship between man and nature as analogous to that between man and the city (or, in general, between man and community). As modern scholars of ecological philosophy point out, the devastation of biocentric "isocracy" and ecological fascism and the danger of ecological anthropocentricism are avoided in the light of this perception.

This view on ecological justice — which includes the principle of the conservation of bio-diversity, as well as doing justice to and compensating these Third World countries which cannot afford to accept the new ecological morality without degrading their citizens — is the main request for the expansion of the concept of the just city and of the term "citizenship" in our time, a time of global communication, rapid technological developments and serious problems caused by the intense ecological crisis.

So, the main issue is how to combine things in an evaluating way, so that — within the new framework of global community and transaction — there can be a proper structuring of the relationships of the citizens among them, with the collectivities they belong to, as well as with nature and the beings included in it, a nature which is the solid basis of everything and which — accordingly perceived as a human community or as an expansion of the human political society — requires our own change of moral attitude, our own assumption of responsibility and intensive care for its salvation. All the more so, this should take place in such a way that the ideal of a good and virtuous life lived according to justice and within a well-governed free, democratic, open political society does not vanish, but prevails instead.
Notes
1. He would be a human who would grow up on Mars or on another planet from an early age (say, since he was five years old) and he would be there, along with other people, for more than 20 years on a space mission.
2. Supposedly, the mature older people who would also be members of the mission team would not have given him any description of what Earth and the societies on it are like.
3. We could imagine cases in which, say, various groups of primitive people would be forced to move to remote parts of the world in order to avoid the devastation (of the war or of terminal diseases), that is to other states (e.g. the United States) where they would have to choose once and for all which state they would rather live in.
4. The possibility of communication between remote areas of our planet (as well as with extra-terrestrial areas, during the space missions, for instance) — however direct and virtual this communication may be — annihilates distances, facilitates contact and, occasionally, certain transactions among people who are aware of the features of such a communication. The world thus becomes a global village. Moreover, the possibility of simple transactions and interactions among various states causes political scientists to examine the principles that should be in force if the term "cosmopolitan governance" is to be meaningful. Cf. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Polity Press, Oxford 1995, p. 267. However, even since 1946, T. D. Weldon had made references to the hyper-state, the world state, the existence of which would be possible if it was proved that, since this could be the democratic state, the political faith in it far much exceeds in importance any other political faith (e.g. in the Organic state). This state would make its existence possible if it formed and lay down certain morals. Universal morals cannot exist if there is not a state to lay them down (see T. D. Weldon, 1962, *States and Morals*, John Murray, London, pp. 285-286.
7. Dio Chrysostom (or Prousaeus) lived from 40 to 117 A.D., during the time of emperors Bespassianus, Domitianus, Nervas and Traianus. He had a friendly relationship with Nervas and Traianus. In the time of Domitianus he was exiled to the East, where he had the opportunity to describe the catastrophes caused to the Greeks of the Black Sea by the barbarian Scythians. In his 36th speech (Borysthenetic Speech) he describes the events in the city of Olbia (or Borysthenes), the destructions caused by the barbarian Skythans to the Ionian city of Dneiperus in question, just as the barbarian Getae had done about 150 years before that time.
9. Naturally, these ideas have been adopted to the spirit of the imperial years, although they are of Stoic origin. What Traianus' friend, with his superb oratorical skill and Greek education, cares about is the existence of earthly cities which fulfil, even in part, some of the criteria of the pre-eminent, paradigm city or cosmopolis. These societies, that is, should be conditioned by virtue, order and the predominance of a system of just laws. Therefore, what renders a city a society is not its size or the fertile place in which it is situated, but its people's living according to the law (a kind of law which should be in accordance with divine law and common sense). From this perspective, the populous city of Ninevi, conditioned by unlawfulness is not a "polis", whereas a small habitation on a rocky island could be "polis" (36th Borysthenetic Speech, §20. See H. von Arnim, 1898, *Leben und Werke des Dio Von Prusa*, Berlin; and C. P. Jones, 1978, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, Cambridge, Ma.).
Fragm. 337: "We speak the truth by calling that leader not only the first of men but also a universal citizen" [Philo of Alexandria, *ibid*, Vol. I, §142].

11. See Arnim, SFV, III, fragm. 323.

12. *Fragm.* 323: "Because in this "megalopolis" there is one universal society and one, universal law".

13. *Ibid.*, fragm. 327: "Because the Stoics, too, call the sky 'polis'..."

This view, which is in line with the Christian beliefs, is echoed in Apostle Paul (because we do not have a firm city here, but we pursue the future one). *Ibid.*, fragm. 323.


Maybe the term "prostheke" causes confusion, because it does not imply that the city according to nature needs complementing as something inadequate, instead it is perceived as an unequalled model, while the earth cities are considered to follow chronologically and to have sprung from bad words and motives.

16. *Ibid.*, fragm. 323: "They call 'law' whatever is considered to be in the interest of the communities which share the same beliefs."

17. "You claim that all the existing laws and societies have failed in their purpose."


19. See Diogenes Laertius, VI, 63 [asked where he came from, he answered: "(I am) cosmopolites"]. Obviously Diogenes Laertius' intention is to present the Cynic Diogenes as a forerunner of Stoicism (see M. Schofield, *ibid.*, p. 133.


22. Diogenes Laertius, VI, 98.


24. The fact that the ancient Greek thought had pointed out the problem in question is examined in "Ecology and Environmental Economics" by Athanassios Kanellopoulos (Karabopoulou, Athens 1985, pp. 57-68) where the stress is on the avoidance of luxury ("Do not pursue luxuries") and of expenses in vain.

25. Namely, the cosmopolitanism in question would define the necessary and sufficient elements in order for any earth-city to be governed well. In this earth-city, the virtuous (good) citizen would be able to lead his life without losing his virtue — the latter perceived according to the classical Greek aretology [see K. Boudouris (ed.), *The Moral Philosophy of the Greeks*, (In Greek) Athens 1996].

26. See Dio Chrysostom's attempt to define the terms that render the city a political society within a historic framework (M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, *ibid.*, p. 62).

27. See Aristotle's *Politics* 1275a22-23: "polites (citizen) is only he who can be a judge and can hold public office".

28. Namely, through a viewpoint that accepts the expansion of the political horizon and, according to Dio Chrysostom's view, pursue the defining of the terms which render an earth-city right or similar to the right *cosmopolis* (universal city). Besides, as Athanassios Kanellopoulos has pointed out, the first detachment and emancipation of the concept of republic from political, geographical and constitutional terms takes place in the time of Kleisthenes (See "Lectures 1989-1991" by Athanassios Kanellopoulos, Ekphrotiki Estia Publishers, Athens 1992, p. 95).

29. According to Ath. Kanellopoulos (*ibid.*, p. 95) the term "common market" was originally mentioned by Aristotle (*About Wondrous* ) in order to characterise the customs Union on the coasts of the Black Sea).
30. See G. Soros’ views *The Crisis of World Capitalism,* (In Greek) New Frontiers, Livanis 1999, pp. 175, 179-183) who — though not adverse to capitalism — seems to believe, however, that the principles of the classical political philosophy (regarding the priority of the community and the common good and the demand for an open society) should be globally accepted as our guidelines. Cf. the views of P. Leivadas («Global Community in the New Century», from the Greek newspaper «Βήμα» 1/1/1999, pp. 36-37).

31. That is why thinkers and philosophers (like John Cobb, Herman Dally and others) are against the abolishment and setting-aside of nation-states and, in general, of the communities as economic and commercial entities; because, as a result of their abolishment or alteration, stock exchange speculation is reinforced, the needs of the population on Earth are unjustifiably increased and, moreover, because it is not possible to allocate responsibilities and ministrations towards the solution of the ecological problem.

33. Ibid., 27a1-6.
34 *Timaeus* 30c-31b3, 32dl-33bl.
35. *Timaeus* 29a5.


38. See Eric Katz, *Nature as Subject,* Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 1997, pp. XVIII-XXIV, 171, 173, where it is stressed that we should adopt the Environmental Ethics in the form of the communal (not of the organic) holism.