

# **DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This article explores defence diplomacy with reference to South Africa. Although the use of military means for diplomatic purposes is an established practice in South Africa, it is argued that as defence foreign relations, South African defence diplomacy approximates a military adjunct to diplomacy rather than a distinct type of diplomacy. At one level, its importance in a changing environment and use for foreign and security policy purposes are recognised in principle, whereas, at another level, defence diplomacy has become an overarching term for defence foreign relations. As a result, defence diplomacy does not receive the recognition it deserves. Conceptually, this is due less to the precarious relationship between various foreign policy instruments, and more to an underestimation of the nature, scope and utility of defence diplomacy. Practically, and due in part to conceptual ambiguity, this underestimation is reinforced by a lack of integration with foreign and defence policy and corresponding military policy and strategy, as well as by defence diplomacy being restricted to its military-defence policy context rather than enhanced by its diplomatic-foreign policy context. These conclusions are based on a brief exposition of the relationship between the military and diplomatic instruments of foreign policy; an account of the nature and scope of defence diplomacy and related concepts; an overview of what accordingly constitutes South African defence diplomacy; and a concluding assessment and evaluation of its future prospects and constraints.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Two recent events in South Africa drew attention to the phenomenon of defence diplomacy. The first, which received extensive media coverage, was the goodwill visits to Cape Town in October 2008 of a naval contingent of the United States of America (US) comprising the aircraft carrier, USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, and the missile cruiser, USS *Monterey*, and of a training vessel from Chile, the *Esmeralda*. Whereas the high-profile US visit was controversial and drew criticism and protest from environmental, anti-nuclear, anti-war and anti-US groups, the low-key Chilean visit was of interest to local 'tall-ship' enthusiasts and crew members who wanted to visit FIFA 2010 World Cup venues. In the same month, South Africa's naval vessel, SAS *Spioenkop*, docked in China as the first African naval vessel in Chinese territorial waters. As part of a three month deployment, the six nation visit is set to strengthen military and diplomatic ties with Asia.<sup>1)</sup>

The second event, mostly unnoticed, was the release of the Department of Defence's *Annual Report 2007-2008*.<sup>2)</sup> Unlike any of its predecessors, the strategic contextualisation of this report explicitly links defence to foreign policy and specifically emphasises strategic defence co-operation through defence diplomacy. Although representing divergent examples, these events nevertheless confirm the growing recognition of diplomacy by military means. Apart from accentuating the linkage of military and diplomatic instruments of foreign policy, this trend also points to the ubiquitous nature of military instruments and their non-coercive and co-operative use as a particular type of diplomacy.

This article explores defence diplomacy with reference to South Africa. The contention is that although the use of military means for diplomatic purposes is an established practice, South African defence diplomacy approximates a military adjunct to diplomacy rather than a particular type of diplomacy. As a result, defence diplomacy arguably does not receive the recognition it deserves. Defence diplomacy — in an era of globalisation where politics is often equated with economics — compares poorly with economic diplomacy as a distinct type of diplomacy, and with the purposive manner in which the Department of Foreign Affairs, along with other state departments such as Trade and Industry and Finance, articulate and conduct

South Africa's economic diplomacy. It is furthermore contended that the lesser profile of South African defence diplomacy has both conceptual and practical (if not pragmatic) origins. Conceptually, its understatement is due less to the precarious relationship between the different foreign policy instruments, and more to an underestimation of its scope and utility. Practically, and due in part to the conceptual ambiguity, this underestimation is reinforced by defence diplomacy being restricted by its military-defence policy context rather than enhanced by its diplomatic-foreign policy context.

To investigate these assumptions and as a preliminary exploration, this article provides, firstly, a brief exposition of the relationship between the military and diplomatic instruments of foreign policy; secondly, an account of the nature and scope of defence diplomacy and related concepts; thirdly an overview of what accordingly constitutes South African defence diplomacy; and finally, a concluding assessment and evaluation of its future prospects and constraints.

## **2. THE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY**

Paradoxically, the concept 'defence diplomacy' fuses two apparently incommensurable extremes, namely violent-coercive (armed force) and pacific-persuasive (diplomatic) means to pursue policy objectives.<sup>3)</sup> This 'incommensurability' originates from the traditional distinction between four categories of instruments to implement foreign policy once formulated, namely political, economic, cultural (propaganda) and military techniques.<sup>4)</sup> Accordingly, as the political technique of the first resort, diplomacy is the traditional, peaceful and most direct instrument of foreign policy, practised by official representatives authorised to act on behalf of the governments of states or other recognised entities. In addition, diplomacy is also an instrument in the utilisation of other techniques. As a technique of last resort, the military instrument involves the use of military means. Although associated with the coercive use of armed force (offensive, defensive or deterrent) in a situation of war (conventional or unconventional), it also includes military approximations short of war, such as military threats, military intervention, military aid and assistance, and the pacific use of the military in peace support operations.

Apart from being functionally distinct, these techniques are also ranked in an escalating order. In accordance with international norms and legal prescriptions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and the limitation of the use of force (for example in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter), they escalate in sequence from diplomatic, through economic and propaganda to military measures, that is from peaceful to violent measures. The practical situation is more complex. Firstly, various techniques are simultaneously used in combination and depending on the situation, with varying degrees of non-coercive (persuasive) or coercive (punitive) effect. Their individual or combined use is dictated by circumstances, resource availability, moral and legal constraints, and political intent, will and commitment.<sup>5)</sup> Secondly, the functional distinction is based on intrinsic differences (being either military or diplomatic but not both), but these are also questioned. In practice activities overlap and involve the pacific-cooperative use of military means in a political-diplomatic mode (for example the deployment of military contingents in peace support operations) and/or the coercive-conflictive use of diplomatic means involving armed force in the military mode (for example by communicating a declared nuclear alert).

At a deeper level of conceptualisation, focusing on diplomacy rather than foreign policy, the fourfold typology is equally applicable and similarly subject to the conflation of functional domains. This is evidenced by the distinction between political, economic, defence (or military) and public (or propaganda) diplomacy. In practice a similar overlap exists, evidenced by the pacific-cooperative use of military means in a political-diplomatic mode (for example service attachés and military training as defence diplomacy activities) and the coercive use of diplomacy involving armed force in the military mode (for example limited naval actions as naval diplomacy activities).

From the aforesaid it is evident that military means can be used in three ways, namely in a military mode, for example the coercive use of armed force; in a political mode, for example the supportive use of military means in the form of peace support missions as an adjunct to diplomacy; and in a diplomatic mode, for example defence diplomacy. Considering the conceptual hierarchy that exists between international relations, foreign policy, diplomacy and different types of diplomacy, an analysis of defence diplomacy and related

concepts is required to clarify the military-diplomatic conundrum and to situate these concepts at the military-diplomatic nexus.

### **3. DEFENCE DIPLOMACY**

The meaning of defence diplomacy — although to an extent self-explanatory — is embedded in theory and practice.

#### **3.1 Conceptual clarification**

As a point of departure, diplomacy, defence diplomacy and related concepts need to be clarified. A brief overview of diplomacy suffices. Although familiar and often used, the concept diplomacy has no definitive and unambiguous meaning.<sup>6)</sup> The definitions of diplomacy bridge the state-centric and multi-centric (realist-pluralist) divide and range from "the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation";<sup>7)</sup> to "a technique of state action, ... the most direct technique of state action ... (and) an instrument in the utilization of other techniques";<sup>8)</sup> to "the process of conducting communication among states through officially recognized representatives ... (as) a major dimension of a state's foreign policy".<sup>9)</sup>

Accordingly, diplomacy has at least three different connotations.<sup>10)</sup> Firstly, in a global context and as the master institution of international relations, diplomacy constitutes a pacific approach to the management of international relations in pursuit of order and justice. As a particularly human and humane institution, it also represents a way of acting that has a civilising effect on the conduct of states and other international actors. Secondly, in a foreign policy context, diplomacy is the master instrument to implement foreign policy, as well as an instrument in the utilisation of other techniques. In practice diplomacy is thus used to maximise the national interest of states and to pursue foreign policy goals and objectives. In this respect diplomacy is also associated with the administrative branch and bureaucratic framework of government that implement foreign policy. Finally, in an interaction context, diplomacy is a communication process between international actors, be they state or non-state, or sovereignty bound

or sovereignty free actors. As such, diplomacy is negotiation — the master process of international relations.

Diplomacy related military activities are an accepted and long-established part of routine military matters, predating the contemporary era. Over time, these activities have gained more recognition. In the 1980s, for example, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of United Kingdom (UK) explicitly envisaged the pursuit of interests by political-military means that included "military assistance, advice, training, loan of personnel, and provision of equipment to friendly countries whose security benefits from our help".<sup>11)</sup> In a more coherent and ambitious context, the concept defence diplomacy gained acceptance and official recognition in the *Strategic Defence Review*, 1998 of the UK.<sup>12)</sup> As such it represents a particular 'type' (or 'dimension') of diplomacy, distinguishable on account of its domain (security), intrinsic nature (military) and functionality (coercive or non-coercive use of force).<sup>13)</sup> In this respect, the designation of defence diplomacy is similar to that of economic diplomacy — the latter pertaining to welfare, economics and matters such as trade and finance. The concept is not prevalent in literature on diplomacy, being more peculiar to the security, defence and military fields and related literature.<sup>14)</sup>

In a narrow context, defence diplomacy is defined as the "use of military personnel, including service attachés, in support of conflict prevention and resolution. Among a great variety of activities, it includes providing assistance in the development of democratically accountable armed forces".<sup>15)</sup> This corresponds with the original 1998 definition used in the *Strategic Defence Review* — although defined as the 'Defence Diplomacy Mission' — namely "(t)o provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution".<sup>16)</sup>

In a broader context, it has been described as "the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad".<sup>17)</sup> In a similar vein — emanating from and encapsulating post-Cold War shifts in patterns of peacetime military co-operation — Cottey and Foster's inclusive definition of defence diplomacy (alternatively international defence diplomacy) relates it to "the peacetime use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence

ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy" and more specifically to "military cooperation and assistance".<sup>18)</sup> Although these definitions provide a generic understanding of defence diplomacy, the discussion (to follow) of why, how and to what effect it is used, is more instructive of its nature and scope.

Defence diplomacy must not be confused with the related concepts of military diplomacy, naval diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy and coercive diplomacy; concepts that also occupy space at the military-diplomatic nexus. Military diplomacy, although infrequently used, is (in a South African context) interchangeable with defence diplomacy. Based on the assumption that "(d)efence is the function of diplomacy", military diplomacy has accordingly been described as "the (defence ministry's) vital component to assist the (foreign affairs ministry) in achieving government's foreign relations objectives".<sup>19)</sup> To the extent that the concepts are differentiated — based on the literal meanings of the terms defence and military — military diplomacy excludes the broader security concerns, purposive intent and related (civilian) infrastructure of defence diplomacy and pertains exclusively to the functional domain of the military and armed forces.

An even narrower meaning relates military diplomacy to the use and classification of military personnel as diplomatic agents, with specific reference to service attachés whose interests are limited to a particular field, who are members of the resident legation and who enjoy diplomatic status. As regards service (or armed forces) attachés, a distinction is usually made between military (army), air, naval and assistant attachés. Although the term military attaché signifies an army attaché, it is sometimes used as a substitute for the term service attaché by denoting all the branches of the armed service. The term defence attaché is similarly used, but specifically denotes the senior service attaché at a diplomatic mission. Service attachés report to both their defence ministry and foreign affairs ministry.<sup>20)</sup> As part of a permanent diplomatic mission, service attachés should not be confused with *ad hoc* military missions independent of the resident legation.<sup>21)</sup> Service attachés, however, are agents of defence (or military) diplomacy and not a particular type of diplomacy.

Naval diplomacy, although predating the 20<sup>th</sup> century and still in use, re-emerged during the Cold War as a result of the 1970s Soviet naval expansion and nascent sea power, and Western maritime-strategic responses to this perceived threat.<sup>22)</sup> As diplomacy at sea,

naval diplomacy refers to the use of naval forces in pursuit of political objectives, thus to the use of sea power in a political rather than a military mode. Accordingly, it has been defined as the "employment of naval power directly in the service of foreign policy. Like all forms of diplomacy it is intended to influence thoughts and actions of foreign decision-makers".<sup>23)</sup> In this respect, naval diplomacy is an adjunct of defence diplomacy. However, since it can be practiced in a co-operative manner (goodwill visits, base access) and in a coercive form (to threaten or impose violent sanctions), naval diplomacy is more complex than it appears to be.

On the one extreme, naval diplomacy is amongst others associated with goodwill visits and access diplomacy (alternatively basing or basing-access diplomacy); the latter being the geostrategic use of diplomacy by major powers to ensure access to "all types of bases and facilities, ... aircraft overflight rights, port visit privileges ... and the use of offshore anchorages, within sovereign maritime limits".<sup>24)</sup> On the other extreme, it may involve gunboat diplomacy, namely "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state".<sup>25)</sup> Although naval diplomacy (as a defence diplomacy supplement) is in principle based on the use of naval forces for purposes of co-operation and non-coercive suasion rather than armed coercion, its extension in the form of gunboat diplomacy includes the use of armed force.<sup>26)</sup> Gunboat diplomacy — a concept presently eschewed — although a form of naval diplomacy, is in fact not an adjunct of defence diplomacy but of coercive diplomacy.<sup>27)</sup>

Coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of force, as opposed to co-operative diplomacy, involves supposedly 'bloodless' military acts or the coercive use of armed force in support of diplomacy and the pursuit of political objectives. Although often linked to and having identical elements as routine naval diplomacy activities, it nevertheless extends well beyond naval and gunboat diplomacy.<sup>28)</sup> Accordingly, it is seen as a "euphemism for the threat or use of force against an opponent in order to foster a more cooperative frame of mind".<sup>29)</sup> More specifically, by paraphrasing the definition of gunboat diplomacy, coercive diplomacy is defined as "a resort to specific threats or to injurious actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure ad-



vantage, or to avert loss, in furtherance of an international dispute or else, against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state".<sup>30)</sup> Although differing from deterrence, coercive diplomacy is inextricably linked to relationships of implicit coercion where co-operative initiatives have failed.<sup>31)</sup> It is, however, distinct from and not to be confused with defence diplomacy.<sup>32)</sup>

### **3.2 Context and distinctive features**

Despite the conceptual clarification, ambiguity persists about the position of the various types of diplomacy on the political-military spectrum, and about the extent to which they represent different modes of actions at the military-diplomatic nexus. Accordingly, three observations are made.

Firstly, the foreign policy role of armed forces depends on the functional imperative of their peaceful, co-operative and persuasive (albeit not necessarily peacetime) use or their non-peaceful, conflictive and coercive (albeit not necessarily non-peacetime) use. Whereas the former includes defence diplomacy, the latter excludes it but may include coercive diplomacy (as well as coercive naval diplomacy activities and gunboat diplomacy). The latter, therefore, involves the use of the military instrument distinct from but in conjunction with or supportive of non-military instruments (such as diplomacy) and, if all else fails, as the final arbiter or *ultima ratio*.<sup>33)</sup>

Secondly, defence diplomacy arguably represents a transition from the military to the political domain. As a dimension of diplomacy and as a political instrument, it involves the use of military means and related institutions (but not armed force) in a political rather than a military mode. As such it erodes the separation of military and diplomatic instruments. Nonetheless, as Cottey and Foster contend, defence diplomacy remains "not an alternative to the more traditional roles of armed forces or to other foreign and security policy instruments, but rather a supplement to them".<sup>34)</sup> The military-diplomatic transition is incomplete and defence diplomacy settles uncomfortably at the military-diplomatic nexus albeit as a type of diplomacy rather than a type of armed force (see *Table 1*).

Thirdly, defined as military co-operation and assistance, defence diplomacy transcends its former Cold War constraints of "international realpolitik, balance-of-power politics and the pursuit of

narrowly-defined national interest".<sup>35)</sup> To the extent that it involves peacetime co-operative activities as a tool of foreign and security policy, it is intrinsically diplomatic in nature. This is implicit in the notion that "(d)efence diplomacy will be one of our main peacetime activities in support of Britain's foreign and security policy objectives ... (involving) (b)oth military and civilian personnel".<sup>36)</sup> As such defence diplomacy enhances diplomacy as the master institution to manage international relations and diplomatic negotiation as the master process of international relations.

**Table 1: Diplomacy at the military-diplomatic nexus**

<b>CO-OPERATION-SUASION</b>			
<b>DIPLO- MATIC MODE</b>	<p><b><i>Influence</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Latent suasion (deference)</li> <li>- Preventive diplomacy</li> <li>- Defence (military) diplomacy</li> <li>- Naval diplomacy (non-coercive eg goodwill visits)</li> </ul>	<p><b><i>Deterrence</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military presence through basing-access diplomacy</li> <li>- Diplomatic communication of threat of force and force projection</li> </ul>	<b>MILI- TARY MODE</b>
	<p><b><i>Suasion</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Diplomatic sanctions</li> <li>- Naval diplomacy (non-coercive eg 'quarantine')</li> </ul>	<p><b><i>Compelling</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coercive diplomacy               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Naval diplomacy (coercive eg limited naval action)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Gunboat diplomacy</li> </ul>	
<b>CONFLICT-COERCION</b>			

### 3.3 Objectives

To the extent that "all those involved in defence ... have a role to play as ambassadors for peace and security worldwide",<sup>37)</sup> defence diplomacy serves specific foreign and security policy objectives. Firstly, as a process of global and regional strategic engagement, it fosters and sustains co-operative relationships with former or potential enemies. Thus, by preventing conflict-inducing conditions and

building trust, it facilitates conflict prevention. The assumption is that defence diplomacy and military co-operation politically symbolise the sustainability of broader co-operation; introduce transparency into defence relations; build and reinforce perceptions of common interests; change the mind-set of partners; support defence reform; and induce co-operation in other areas. Secondly, by establishing civilian control over armed forces, defence diplomacy promotes democracy and good governance. This pertains to the areas of civilian political control over the military; democratic political control over defence policy; legislative oversight; rule of law, human rights and justice; and civil society engagement. As the most political objective, co-operation with civil-military involvement includes conferences and seminars on democratic control; advice on governance issues linked to visits; participation of partner personnel at own headquarters; involvement in review processes; and participation in multilateral exercises involving civil-military co-operation. Thirdly, defence diplomacy is a means to enhance the peace support capacities of partner states. This takes the form of peacekeeping training and education; multilateral peacekeeping exercises; and providing equipment to states for peacekeeping operations.<sup>38)</sup> Since these objectives are mostly European-centric and post-Cold War specific, the list is not exhaustive.

To the extent that defence diplomacy serves national policies, manages and directs defence foreign relations, and supports other diplomatic initiatives of government, it can further country-specific policy objectives. In the context of the global South for example, and at a global level, the objective is the forging of lateral South-South strategic partnerships and support of non-aligned solidarity, as a counter to the North-South divide and the purported marginalisation of the South. At a regional level, the objective is the pursuit of regional and subregional security in a very specific manner by focusing on co-operative security; by assisting multilateral and hybrid peace support operations; by assisting military assistance operations, thereby contributing to post-conflict reconstruction; and by advancing and institutionalising multilateralism. At a domestic (but also at a subregional) level, the objective, amongst others, is security sector reform.

Considering the aforesaid, four observations are made. Firstly, these objectives emerged from a re-examination of the organising principles according to which the post-Cold War (and post-9/11) international environment should be managed.<sup>39)</sup> Secondly, in contrast

to Cold War power politics, they subscribe to and enhance the "humanitarian principles of 'soft' power and human security", and represent a nuanced and 'appropriate' response to the challenges that confront the present generation.<sup>40)</sup> Thirdly, although European-centric in origin, these objectives are generic, inclusive and flexible, and therefore adjustable to changing circumstances and needs. Finally, and based on the latter feature, they are not area-specific and can be applied in all regions and sub-regions of the world.

### **3.4 Activities**

Within the ambit of military co-operation and assistance, defence diplomacy includes a broad range of activities. These activities, being neither new nor original, hinge on their context and purpose and vary from state to state. For example, the activities of the UK 'Defence Diplomacy Mission'<sup>41)</sup> initially included support to arms control negotiations; the provision of an arms control implementation organisation; arms control inspections; assistance in weapons destruction programmes; the provision of contributions to Partnership for Peace programmes; the provision of advice and training; conducting exercises with and visits to friendly countries; and the work of attaché, liaison and exchange posts.<sup>42)</sup> To target these activities, they were related to three 'Military Tasks', namely arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence and security building measures; outreach through bilateral assistance and co-operation, focused on specific regions and states; and other defence diplomacy activities covering those military assistance activities with overseas military forces and defence communities not covered under outreach.<sup>43)</sup> Subsequent listings, however, excluded the arms control initiatives and shifted the emphasis to MOD training courses and education programmes; the provision of loan service personnel, short term training teams, and civilian and military advisers; visits by ships, aircraft and other military units; visits by ministers and by military and civilian personnel; staff talks, conferences and seminars; exchanges of military and civilian personnel; and exercises.<sup>44)</sup>

With specific emphasis on military co-operation and assistance, US programmes related to defence diplomacy include international military education and training; non-combat and non-technical training in areas such as defence management, civil-military relations and

military justice; foreign military interaction involving a wide range of military-to-military contacts with other states; foreign military financing in the form of grants and loans; joint combined exchange training of special forces; foreign military sales, namely government-to-government sales of weapons to other states; programmes that allow the transfer of weapons or training to other states in emergency circumstances or to dispose of surplus military equipment; and the enhancement of the ability of other states to contribute to international peacekeeping missions.<sup>45)</sup>

Based on these and past examples, Cottey and Forster identify the following activities, namely bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior and military defence officials; the appointment of defence attachés to foreign countries; bilateral defence co-operation agreements; the training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel; the provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and technical areas; contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits; the placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries' defence ministries or armed forces; the deployment of training teams; the provision of military equipment and other material aid; and bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes.<sup>46)</sup>

South African defence diplomacy activities, as reported, have varied considerably over time. They can, however, be consolidated into six representative categories, namely representation through defence attachés; bilateral and multilateral interaction, including agreements and meetings to enhance specific foreign policy objectives, participation in regional structures to enhance multilateralism, co-operation and interoperability, and the preparation and maintenance of pledged force structure elements; foreign visits, especially as a confidence-building measure, including ship visits; foreign military training and learning, including the training of and learning opportunities for the benefit of foreign military students in South Africa; equipment donation and transfer to foreign recipients, as well as foreign aid assistance; and specific defence diplomacy actions ranging from post-conflict reconstruction actions to participation in international parades and tattoos.<sup>47)</sup>

In summary, although not all-inclusive and region or country specific, the listed activities overlap. As a rule, excluding policy spe-

cific activities, defence diplomacy includes representation through defence attachés; bilateral and multilateral military agreements and interaction, along with participation in regional and global institutions; military-to-military contacts, visits and exchanges; military and related training and learning; and the provision of military equipment and material aid. However, although inextricably linked and contributing to conflict prevention, it is noted that "(d)efence diplomacy does not include operational deployments and is therefore complementary to preventive, coercive and peace support operations as a means of conflict prevention".<sup>48)</sup> As previously indicated (see section 2 above), these operational deployments relate to the supportive use of military means — in a political mode — as an adjunct to diplomacy and not as defence diplomacy.

## **4. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY**

South Africa's defence diplomacy, although not always designated as such, is not a recent phenomenon and has been practiced by both the former South African Defence Force (SADF) and the post-1994 South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The development, policy context and activities of South African defence diplomacy provide an indication of its nature and scope.

### **4.1 Development**

As a point of departure, it is noted that defence foreign relations and representation through defence attachés were present in the SADF and South African foreign policy prior to the 1994 political transition. Post-1994, also bearing in mind that the term only emerged in the late-1990s, defence diplomacy manifested in the rudimentary form of 'military foreign relations' or the 'foreign relations' of the then National Defence Force (NDF).<sup>49)</sup> This included various activities subdivided into the broad categories of foreign relations, visits, multilateral cooperation, protocol and foreign attachés. However, as a legacy of the pre-1994 dispensation, 'military foreign relations' resorted under the Intelligence Division of the NDF, more specifically the Directorate Foreign Relations.<sup>50)</sup> The limited purpose of the Directorate Foreign Relations was "to further the foreign relations of the NDF in accordance with international obligations and conventions".<sup>51)</sup> After the

establishment of the SANDF the term 'military foreign relations' was retained and 'foreign relations', including the aforesaid activities, remained the responsibility of the Directorate Foreign Relations as a subdivision of the Intelligence Division.<sup>52)</sup> The slightly broadened purpose of the Directorate Foreign Relations was "to promote and manage the foreign relations of the SANDF in accordance with international obligations and conventions".<sup>53)</sup> Although SANDF foreign relations were not explicitly linked to foreign policy (objectives), the military-political linkage was implicit.

Following the introduction of the concept of defence diplomacy in Europe, the local arrangement prevailed but in 2001 referred to as the Directorate Foreign Liaison under the Defence Intelligence (DI) Division.<sup>54)</sup> Although the Directorate's purpose was still to provide a foreign relations service, but now to the Department of Defence (DOD), it was amongst others specifically "responsible for the execution of policy related to the development and maintenance of good relations with both SADC (Southern African Development Community) countries and countries that have been classified as strategic partners".<sup>55)</sup> Apart from the more explicit link to foreign policy priorities, the 'foreign liaison' in pursuit of policy objectives was also aligned with defence diplomacy objectives. The report on foreign liaison was, however, limited to representation of attachés, visits and bilateral co-operation.<sup>56)</sup>

A major organisational change was effected during the 2001-2002 financial year when the (again 'renamed') Defence Foreign Relations (DFR) functions were transferred in February 2002 from DI to the Corporate Staff Division (CSD) under the Chief of Corporate Staff (CCS), along with the appointment of a Chief of Defence Foreign Relations.<sup>57)</sup> The latter was tasked "to establish DFR so that the SANDF and MOD can be provided with an integrated Defence Foreign Relations function".<sup>58)</sup> In 2002, only international relations with reference to attachés, visits and multilateral meetings were reported on.<sup>59)</sup> More notable was the first-time use (as far as could be ascertained) in 2003 of the terms 'military diplomacy' and more specifically 'defence diplomacy' in a DOD Annual Report. In the *Annual Report 2002-2003* the former was referred to as a mission priority and the latter was mentioned in the context of "changes and developments of international affairs and defence diplomacy (that) affect the execution of Defence Foreign Relations (DFR) respons-

ibilities".<sup>60)</sup> However, only attachés, visits and student exchange were reported on.<sup>61)</sup>

Since 2003, 'defence diplomacy' has become an accepted term and has been used in DOD Annual Reports (except in a sub-programme context for the 2005-2006 financial year). As a SANDF (and not a Defence Secretariat) responsibility, and as a subprogramme of the Defence Administration Programme, DFR was reported on under the heading of 'Defence Diplomacy'. In this respect, the purpose of DFR was to manage and direct the defence foreign relations function and to provide related services for the DOD.<sup>62)</sup> Since 2006 (commencing with the report on the 2005-2006 financial year), subsequent DOD Annual Reports all included an Appendix on 'Defence Diplomacy'. These appendices provided detailed information on defence diplomacy activities that were extensively broadened to include the list previously indicated in respect of South Africa. More specifically, DOD outputs to government in respect of defence diplomacy were listed as the deployment of defence attachés; the servicing of defence-related Memorandums of Understanding (MOU); and participation in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) defence structures.<sup>63)</sup> In 2007 it was also reported that an overarching Defence Foreign Relations Strategy, awaiting approval, had been developed to "provide long-term guidance with respect to the defence foreign relations function in the Department (of Defence)".<sup>64)</sup>

At an organisational level, the point of departure is that the "Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is the primary mechanism for conducting government's international affairs. Military (as defence) diplomacy is DoD's vital component to assist DFA in achieving government's foreign relations objectives".<sup>65)</sup> Since the 2002 transfer of DFR functions from DI to CSD (see above), the organisational arrangement remained unchanged and within the Defence Administration Programme, DFR remained the responsibility of the SANDF as directed by the Chief of the SANDF.<sup>66)</sup> However, in 2007 it was reported that "the exponential increase in defence diplomacy" had necessitated the Minister of Defence's approval of the creation of a Defence Foreign Relations Division as part of DOD Central Staff.<sup>67)</sup> The organisational structure of this division was not finalised in 2007.<sup>68)</sup>

In 2008, although the Department of Defence Organisational Design included the Defence Foreign Affairs Division under DOD



Secretary of Defence as part of DOD Central Staff,<sup>69)</sup> it was noted — as a risk factor — that the "placement of DFR in the DOD ... is still outstanding".<sup>70)</sup> The linked intention to "realign the DFR structure in order to be able to function optimally and be able to structure it according to strategy and functions" was similarly indicated as "(n)ot achieved. The ... structural alignment is still outstanding".<sup>71)</sup> As a related development, it was also reported that the Minister of Defence had in January 2008 approved the creation of a new division in the Defence Administration Programme, the Defence International Affairs Division. It will "report to the Secretary for Defence and will provide strategic direction to the Department's foreign diplomacy initiatives".<sup>72)</sup> Accordingly, and in contrast to the implementation orientated DFR functions, the task of the Defence International Affairs Division seems more related to policy formulation, co-ordination and supervision.

These South African developments point to three trends. Firstly, they confirm the inextricable link between foreign affairs and the military, in the context of defence foreign relations and related functions. Secondly, they indicate how defence foreign relations have become associated with the contemporary notion, nature and scope of defence diplomacy. Thirdly, they necessitated organisational and structural readjustment within the DOD to align division functions and programmes with increased defence diplomacy activities. The scope of South Africa's defence diplomacy attests to the latter.

## **4.2 Context and objectives**

As a subset of its foreign policy, South African defence policy and defence strategy recognise the use of the SANDF as an instrument of politics and endorse the centrality of defence diplomacy initiatives in strategic defence co-operation. This noticeable shift of emphasis to foreign policy and defence diplomacy in the recent *DOD Annual Report 2007-2008*, contrasts sharply with the main themes of previous annual reports.<sup>73)</sup>

South Africa's defence diplomacy objectives correlate strongly with its stated foreign policy priorities. Rephrased in a defence context, the DOD supports "Government initiatives for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict at regional and continental levels".<sup>74)</sup> Bearing strategic changes in Africa and the shift to non-

traditional security in mind, DOD missions include, amongst others, the objective of "(c)ontributing to global security through the promotion of regional and continental security and supporting Government diplomatic initiatives through regional and global defence cooperation and participation in peace missions".<sup>75)</sup> This is aligned with cabinet priorities through DOD participation in the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPC) Cluster.

Accordingly, the Defence Strategy (directed by the National Strategic Direction 2014) strategically focuses the DOD, amongst others, to "(p)romoting regional security through, among other measures, participation in peace missions and defence foreign relations; (and) (s)upporting the Government's diplomatic drive and initiatives in Africa through participation in multinational organisation".<sup>76)</sup> The diplomatic activities related to these objectives are obviously aligned and correlated with the active force employment in support of peace, security and stability missions in Africa.<sup>77)</sup>

### **4.3 Activities**

Since the aim is to profile South Africa's defence diplomacy activities and not to present a detailed account thereof, note is taken of the following:

#### **(a) *Defence attachés***

As uniformed 'ambassadors for peace', in-country defence attachés are regarded as the 'first line' and "key instruments in defence diplomacy and building South African defence relations abroad".<sup>78)</sup> In 1994, the NDF was represented in 21 states. By 2008 this representation had increased to 36 SANDF defence attachés deployed in 32 states and organisations (the UN), with further non-residential accreditation in 30 other states and organisations (the AU). The Military Attaché and Advisor Corps (MAAC) representation in South Africa had increased from nine countries in 1994 to 72 members from 44 states accredited to the SANDF, with two non-resident accreditations.<sup>79)</sup> The increases are mainly attributable to the post-Cold War establishment of relations with African and East European countries, as well as the forging of strategic partnerships within a South-South and non-aligned context.

In the South African context, the main functions of the defence attaché are representation and liaison; to establish and maintain contact with defence forces of countries of accreditation; to be familiar with relevant DOD matters in order to provide considered advice and opinions on military-to-military relations between the DOD and countries of accreditation; to plan, co-ordinate and control all visits of DOD members to the host country; to support visiting delegations to South Africa; and to establish and maintain relations with MAAC members, "paying particular attention to the African group".<sup>80)</sup> Serving defence attachés convene periodically at Defence Attaché Conferences where they are informed about the latest developments in foreign and defence policies and the Defence Foreign Relations Strategy.<sup>81)</sup> A Defence Foreign Relations Course — covering defence foreign relations functions and defence diplomacy and involving personnel from the DOD, DFA and academic institutions — is also presented to officers nominated to be considered as defence attachés and advisors.<sup>82)</sup>

### **(b) *Defence bilateral and multilateral interaction***

Bilateral and multilateral interaction has become the cornerstone of South Africa's defence diplomacy, especially to the extent that these interactions serve as a vehicle to advance foreign policy objectives relating to regional and global defence co-operation, and to participation in peace support missions in particular. The interaction includes defence bilateral and multilateral structures meetings, ranging from national level to service-related interaction. At a bilateral level this involves, amongst others, defence committee and joint commission meetings on bilateral defence relations and defence-to-defence discussions and co-operation. At a multilateral level this includes, amongst others, activities related to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) goals, the Africa Renaissance objectives, the Africa Agenda and the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Ministerial Trilateral Commission; and participation in regional structures such as the AU, SADC, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and the African Standby Force (ASF) SADC Brigade. The interaction also includes various agreements and MOUs entered into, involving issues ranging from bilateral defence co-operation,

through the status of military and civilian personnel, to defence training and technical co-operation.<sup>83)</sup> Although not listed under this category, South Africa's obligations towards the ASF, the SADC Brigade and the permanent Plan Element (established in Gaborone, Botswana), and the availability of SANDF personnel and forces, are also noted under defence diplomacy.<sup>84)</sup>

Apart from advancing strategic engagement and fostering co-operative relationships with former or potential adversaries, these defence bilateral and multilateral interactions also promote the peace support capacities of partner states and (sub-)regional defence and security arrangements. In addition, they contribute to global and regional security by focusing on co-operative security; by advancing and institutionalising multilateralism at regional and subregional levels; and by forging lateral South-South strategic partnerships and supporting non-aligned solidarity.

### **(c) *Foreign visits***

From the outset, foreign visits have been pivotal to South African defence diplomacy, and have remained an effective tool contributing to confidence-building. The frequency of these visits vary considerably over time, but for the 2008 review period it was reported that the DOD had undertaken 642 visits abroad and received 111 foreign visits to South Africa.<sup>85)</sup> The significance of these figures is evident if compared to 171 outbound and 41 inbound visits reported for the 1994 review period, and to 371 outbound and 190 inbound visits reported for the 2001 review period.<sup>86)</sup> The international visits by the Minister of Defence and the Deputy Minister of Defence, although reported separately, also serve defence diplomacy purposes and can be included in this category.<sup>87)</sup>

The nature and focus of these visits cover a broad spectrum.<sup>88)</sup> Apart from enhancing the image of South Africa, their value is noted as the strengthening of defence co-operation; working visits to deployed forces; goodwill visits to enhance bilateral relations; attending conferences, seminars and meetings to share expertise and to obtain knowledge and skills; attending multilateral forums and providing capacity; training to enhance interoperability and foster sound relations; study tours to obtain specific knowledge and skills; goodwill visits to defence projects to ensure standards and user re-

quirements; attendance of commemoration ceremonies; and visits to support security sector reform.<sup>89)</sup>

Although sometimes deemed to be a separate defence diplomacy activity, ship visits to international ports form a subcategory of foreign visits. The South African Navy (SAN) contributes significantly in this respect, both as a host and in 'showing the flag'. For the 2008 review period, the SAN paid six visits to foreign ports whereas 25 foreign ships visited SAN ports.<sup>90)</sup> The frequency and regional representation of these visits vary annually, although the more recent geographical distribution confirms a lateral South-South and African emphasis.

#### **(d) *Foreign training and learning opportunities***

Foreign military training and learning opportunities, although not unrelated to foreign visits, also form part of South Africa's defence foreign relations. However, being programme specific, foreign military training and learning — especially in respect of the training and learning of SANDF members abroad — was not always reported as a DFR activity. This practice changed as the report for the 2003 review period indicated that 27 foreign students attended senior SANDF courses, and that of the 2005 review period also included opportunities utilised by DOD members.<sup>91)</sup> For the 2008 review period, it was reported that 320 foreign military students were trained at SANDF training institutions, while 308 SANDF members utilised foreign learning opportunities.<sup>92)</sup> Apart from honouring bilateral agreements, these opportunities also provided SANDF members the opportunity to be trained in scarce skills and to obtain specific knowledge.

#### **(e) *Equipment transfer and foreign aid assistance***

Equipment donation and transfer was first reported as a DFR activity in the report on the 2005 review period, when reference was made of the transfer of two harbour patrol boats donated to Mozambique in accordance with an earlier decision.<sup>93)</sup> Subsequent equipment donation and transfer, as reported, was limited to SADC members and involved equipment of lesser significance.<sup>94)</sup> Foreign aid assistance is not listed as a DFR activity, but reported separately. However, con-

sidering the context and objectives of defence diplomacy, foreign aid assistance made in kind by the DOD to foreign recipients, obviously generates defence diplomacy dividends. In this respect, note can be taken of donations valued at R43 million to Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>95)</sup> This assistance is also related to the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) that granted foreign assistance to the value of R7,5 million to the DRC in 2007.<sup>96)</sup>

### **(f) *Specific defence diplomacy actions***

As previously indicated, specific diplomacy actions can vary considerably and range from post-conflict reconstruction actions to participation in international parades and tattoos. Most of these actions can be linked to and may even form part of the previous categories. As far as post-conflict reconstruction activities are concerned, they are related both to foreign assistance and to the general military assistance operations and accompanying operational force employment that involves South Africa. Other activities mostly concern human security issues and relate more to collateral roles and residual functions than to defence diplomacy activities.<sup>97)</sup>

## **5. CONCLUSION**

The question is whether defence diplomacy is a passing fad or 'normal' military affairs? The answer varies, depending on the state(s) under consideration. However, although defence diplomacy emerged in the 1990s as a response to a changed international environment that also acknowledged the utility of military means, it has become a fixture of contemporary international relations.

At a theoretical level, conceptual clarity and intellectual coherence exist in respect of defence diplomacy, its relation to associated concepts, its distinction from coercive diplomacy and its position at the military-diplomatic nexus. At a practical level and based on the UK example, defence diplomacy has been positioned within a policy-strategy-mission-task-activity hierarchy. As such, it encapsulates an approach to foreign and security policy; is focused on strategic objectives derived from and integrated with policy; is elevated to a military mission in its own right; and is linked to specific military tasks

involving a broad range of defence diplomacy activities.

Accordingly, at the diplomatic level, defence diplomacy represents a supplementary approach to manage international affairs; serves as an instrument of foreign policy and facilitates the use of other instruments; and provides a platform for interaction and negotiation. In addition, it bridges the divide between the diplomatic and military instruments by effecting a transition towards the political mode. Defence diplomacy thus transcends the use of military means in the political mode as an adjunct to diplomacy, and constitutes the use of military means in the diplomatic mode as a distinct type of diplomacy.

Although the concept of defence diplomacy only entered the South African policy vocabulary much later, the use of military means for political and diplomatic purposes is neither new nor unrecognised. The fact that it is presently emphasised — more in principle as a context and point of departure for defence policy and strategy than as a key driver thereof — points to its local recognition and salience. However, the constraints and prospects of South African defence diplomacy need to be considered.

At a conceptual level, the South African understanding (or definition) of defence diplomacy and its position in policy and strategy are not sufficiently clear. This problematises its distinction from and relationship to related concepts, processes and means, but also compromises the intellectual coherence of its 'fit' into foreign policy and into defence and corresponding military policy and strategy. This has practical implications for the use of defence diplomacy and defence diplomacy activities. In order to enhance the use of defence diplomacy, note can be taken of how it was introduced, prioritised and coherently integrated in the UK example with reference to an objective-linked approach, a military mission, specific military tasks and related activities. The apparent lack of policy and strategic coherency in the South African context — to the extent that this conclusion is inferred from defence documents in the public domain — can be attributed to the manner in which the concept of defence diplomacy is used and to the defence diplomacy activities it is associated with.

Considering defence diplomacy developments in South Africa, an ambiguity is apparent. At one level, its importance in a changing environment (regional in particular) and in the pursuit of foreign and security policy objectives, is recognised in principle. At another level

— apart from not being specifically defined and sufficiently integrated into the policy and strategy framework — it appears as if defence diplomacy has become an overarching term for defence foreign relations, rather than a particular type of diplomacy. Thus, defence foreign relations — for the most defence diplomacy activities — have been conflated with defence diplomacy. Although defence diplomacy per definition includes defence foreign relations, defence foreign relations do not necessarily translate into or constitute defence diplomacy. This conflation relegates defence diplomacy to a secondary role.

It could be argued that what constitutes major power defence diplomacy is too ambitious for South Africa, even if the country is ranked an emerging middle power. However, closer scrutiny of the practical situation does not necessarily support this. It is evident that the frequency and quantity of diplomatic activities or actions have increased, but not their scope. Most of these activities, some of which can be considered to be routine or part of daily military business, fall within the domain of defence foreign relations and have merely been re-designated defence diplomacy. Capacity could become a problem if defence diplomacy is extended to a military mission with related tasks. However, if properly funded, institutionalised and strategically positioned, a scaled down defence diplomacy could be sustainable. Consideration of this would require a more incisive analysis.

What may, however, seriously affect perceptions of defence diplomacy is not so much the desecuritisation of defence diplomacy, since it is intrinsically securitised, but rather the militarisation of diplomacy and by implication of foreign policy. This is in part due to South Africa's pre-1994 experience, but more specifically to a bias against military-diplomacy interaction if not subject to effective civilian control. However, if subject to democratic control, good governance practices and transparency, defence diplomacy can be a valuable asset. Defence diplomacy engagement and the co-operation it induces are forms of demilitarisation and the ethical use of military means.

Other limitations should also be noted. At an organisational level, the institutionalisation of defence diplomacy (as DFR) remains a problem — one that has been recognised as a risk. Although DFR is presently subject to organisational changes not fully implemented, this is indicative of some uncertainty regarding the priority and location thereof. Also, apart from being less comprehensive than other



international examples, South Africa's defence diplomacy (as DFR) underemphasises democratisation as an objective although the latter tends to be more implicit than explicit. Specifically evident is the absence of military exercises as a listed DFR activity or, as indicated, a key defence diplomacy activity. Although in the South African context reported as part of force employment programmes, these joint inter-departmental and multilateral exercises and training support<sup>98)</sup> form part of broader defence diplomacy initiatives, although not listed as DFR. The separate listing of joint exercises does point to the need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to defence diplomacy. Finally, the evaluation and assessment of defence diplomacy outcomes are problematic. Although activities can be quantified, their impact and effectiveness are difficult but not impossible to gauge.

Much, however, is to be said in favour of South African defence diplomacy. Since regional peace and security and democratisation are cornerstones of South African foreign policy, there is scope for the extension of the ancillary use of defence diplomacy. As such, defence diplomacy provides scope and opportunity for public diplomacy, for transgovernmental diplomacy, as well as for polyilateral diplomacy engaging civil society and non-state actors. Also, the policy objectives of defence diplomacy correspond with and are supportive of 'developmental diplomacy' using developmental peace support missions, of economic diplomacy and of preventive diplomacy. Considering South Africa's sensitivity to possible accusations of regional hegemony, defence diplomacy also counters military predominance and a bias against the use of military means in a regional context, by emphasising the 'soft power' utilisation thereof. The naval diplomacy component of defence diplomacy also extends South Africa's 'beyond the horizon' geostrategic reach.

In conclusion, the use of military means for diplomatic purposes is an established practice in South Africa. Considering the nature and scope of South Africa's defence diplomacy, albeit in the form of 'business as usual' defence foreign relations, it is concluded that South African defence diplomacy still approximates a military adjunct to diplomacy rather than a particular type of diplomacy. As a result, defence diplomacy arguably does not receive the recognition it deserves. Conceptually, defence diplomacy has become a convenient generic term to reflect secondary outputs provided by the DOD to government, rather than a dedicated military mission and/or

task-related programme coherently integrated with defence and military policy and strategy. Its practical dimensions, being extensive and significant, nevertheless do not relegate South African defence diplomacy to the backwaters of defence. However, the stage has not been reached in South Africa where, in its true sense and in respect of ideal-type implementation, the political use of military means has become a type of diplomacy and not an adjunct to diplomacy.

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60. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, RP 145/2003, Pretoria, 2003, respectively p 9 and p 55.
61. *Ibid*, p 55.
62. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 85. Defence foreign relations are not the exclusive responsibility of the division and subprogramme as indicated. Within the Administrative Programme, the development, formulation, co-ordination, monitoring and adapting of defence policy, strategy and plans in accordance with national policy — by implication also involving defence foreign relations — form part of the subprogramme Policy and Planning (Defence Policy, Strategy and Planning Division) which is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defence. Since this article focuses on defence diplomacy (as implementation), the policy and planning dimensions of defence foreign relations are excluded from the discussion. Details of this subprogramme are reported in *Ibid*, pp 29-38.
63. *Ibid*, p 9.
64. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, p 41.
65. Republic of South Africa, Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, *op cit*.
66. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp 84-86.
67. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, p 40.
68. *Ibid*.
69. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 4. The actual and planned strengths of the Defence Foreign Relations Division on 31 March 2008 were, respectively, 85 and 96. *Ibid*, p 17.
70. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 86.
71. *Ibid*.
72. *Ibid*, p 4.
73. *Ibid*, pp xi-xii. This observation is based on foreign policy and defence diplomacy initiatives being the point of departure and core themes of respectively the "Foreword" by the former Minister of Defence, M G P Lekota, and the "Strategic Overview" by the former Secretary for Defence,

Director-General J B Masilela, and the Chief of the SANDF, Gen G N Ngwenya in the *Annual Report 2007-2008*.

74. *Ibid*, p 1.
75. *Ibid*. See also Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, pp 1-4.
76. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 6.
77. In this respect, approximately 2 500 SANDF members were employed in six peace support and six general military assistance operations. For more detail, see *Ibid*, p 89.
78. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, p 161 and p 2 respectively.
79. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report Financial Year 94/95*, *op cit*, p 26; and Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp 205-206.
80. Republic of South Africa, Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, *op cit*. For a discussion of US defence attachés, see Clark, D O (Col), "Soldiers in mufti: US military attachés", *ISSUP Strategic Review Strategiese Oorsig*, Vol 7, No 3, August 1985, pp 25-32.
81. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 84.
82. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, p 40; and Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 85. In 2007, the unit standards for the Defence Attaché Advisor and Defence Foreign Relations course were submitted to the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) for accreditation.
83. For example, see Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp 206-207. The Defence Diplomacy appendices to the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 Annual Reports can similarly be consulted for detailed information.
84. *Ibid*, p 207.
85. *Ibid*.
86. Respectively: Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report Financial Year 94/95*, *op cit*, p 26 and *Annual Report 2000-2001*, *op cit*, p 43.
87. See for example Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp xvi-xvii.
88. For example, a more detailed overview is presented in Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, pp 219-220.
89. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp 207-208.



90. *Ibid*, p 208. For a discussion of the historical and recent contribution of the SAN to defence and more specifically (non-coercive) naval diplomacy, see: Potgieter, T D, "The geopolitical role of the South African Navy in the South African sphere of influence after the Second World War", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol 24, No 1, 2002, pp 91-128; and Edmonds, M and G Mills, *op cit*, especially the chapter on "The SAN in support of foreign policy", pp 103-123.
91. Respectively: Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op cit*, p 55; and the *Annual Report 2004-2005*, *op cit*, p 38.
92. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, p 208.
93. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2004-2005*, *op cit*, p 39.
94. See, for example, Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2005-2006*, *op cit*, p 163.
95. For detail, see Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, Appendix C on Foreign Aid Assistance, Table C1, p 213.
96. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2006-2007*, *op cit*, p 171.
97. For detail, see Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2007-2008*, *op cit*, pp 208-209.
98. For detail, see *Ibid*, pp 98-99.