

# Shifting ideas of sustainable peace towards *conversation* in state-building

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## Abstract

This article offers reflections on the meaning of peace and peace-building in Africa and proposes a reframing of the state-building problematic. It argues for a shift in analytical lens by providing alternative ways of looking at state-building in order to explore a different approach to peace-building. Thus, the paper re-centres the notion of *conversation* in the processes of building peace and state. This concept of conversation requires a shifting of the debate from a focus on which institutions, liberal or otherwise, and which policies are most effective for peace, to how inter-elite and society-elite conversation gives rise to, or fails to bring about particular ensembles of institutions and policy outcomes. We analyse the role of political settlement in shaping the nature and outcome of these conversations. We suggest that the pursuit of peace must account for the depth of *conversation* about the presence, absence or desire for peace as well as accompanying perspectives of state-building across the target society.

**Keywords:** Peace; elite-society conversation; peace-building; state-building; political Settlement

## Introduction

The pursuit of sustainable peace in the last six decades has been shaped by four main ideas. The first strand advances the Democratic Peace thesis, that democracies do not wage war against each other, an idea at the core of which was Immanuel Kant's notion of perpetual peace.<sup>1</sup> The second constitutes Galtung's expansive (re)formulation of the idea of peace and violence within a state by foregrounding violence embedded in the structures of a seemingly peaceful social order. The third idea is that when states such as the ones discussed in this paper, descend into large-scale violence, peacemaking and peace-building interventions must aim at helping them realise a liberal democratic order. Finally, the idea that achieving lasting peace after the termination of civil war and armed conflict depends on the way in which that conflict ends has preoccupied scholarly attention.

This article offers reflections on the meaning of peace and peace-building and the continuing relevance of the ideas mentioned earlier to the pursuit of peace in Africa. In this regard, it examines how the notion and praxis of peace have evolved through the last six decades, since African states became independent dominions. Literature on peace-building has grown by accretion in this period as have peace-building activities in Africa in the last three decades. This article therefore examines the central ideas and approaches that have shaped responses to situations of violent conflict with a particular focus on Africa. It clarifies the meanings that are ascribed in this volume, to terms such as state-building and political settlement, which have underlined peace-building discourse and application in recent decades, not least in

Africa. How must we think about these terms and concepts in relation to the pursuit of sustainable peace in Africa? More importantly, this article argues for a shift in analytical lens by providing alternative ways of looking at state-building in order to explore a different approach to the subject of peace-building. The paper seeks to re-centre the notion of *conversation* in the processes of building peace and state. We argue that if the pursuit of peace is to have a meaningful chance of success, then it must account for the depth of *conversation* about the presence, absence or desire for peace and accompanying perspectives across the target society. What this concept of conversation requires is part of the central discussion in this paper.

## Origins and evolution of ideas of peace

Most prominent, in the evolution of the idea of peace and the underpinning social order, perhaps has been the development from the idea of *perpetual peace* outlined by Immanuel Kant<sup>2</sup> to Johan Galtung's notion of peace as the absence of violence.<sup>3</sup> Perpetual peace among nations, Kant reasoned, requires a republican system in which citizens through their inalienable natural rights as human beings and equal beings, create a set of laws – a republican constitution to which they all subscribe and which forms the basis for governing the state. Since decision about waging war in such systems is made by the very people who would bear its cost, war might become a rare occurrence. Hence, a 'federation of free states' that would determine the law of nations ultimately holds the possibility of perpetual peace.<sup>4</sup>

Galtung's excursion on peace and violence in his seminal 1969 piece on *Violence, Peace and Peace Research* more than a century and half after Kant's *perpetual peace*, reinforce and intersect with Kant's ideal of perpetual peace. Galtung understood peace as the absence of war – more specifically the absence of violence. But that violence was not only about physical or direct violence but also *structural* or *indirect* violence.<sup>5</sup> The absence of the first produces *negative peace*, while the absence of the latter produces *positive peace*.<sup>6</sup> Hence, '[a]n extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace'.<sup>7</sup> Galtung was clear that structural violence does not cause direct physical harm, but is built into the structures of society, and 'shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances'.<sup>8</sup> As such, this pursuit of a frame for just and durable peace in society is consistent with Kant's own search for perpetual peace. An egalitarian society arguably breeds peaceful co-existence and stability and a potential visioning of a common future while societies that achieve this would reflect deeply on the issue of conflict with other societies.

Much of the ideals advanced by Kant and later by Galtung, remains a work in progress. Neither the 'federation of free states' nor a world of republican systems has been realised in the vast majority of states of which those in Africa are still evolving. Neither is this realisable under existing global conditions in a post-Cold War world. In the last three decades, Africa has seen some of the worst expressions of violent conflict, few between states such as Eritrea and Ethiopia and a larger number within states as demonstrated by the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudans, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Genocide in Rwanda. All of these places have experienced varying degrees of peace-building intervention mostly by the UN but also African regional organisations. Progress has nonetheless been realised in patches. War between states is reduced but remains a feature outside of Western democracies while many societies are characterised by pervasive violence. In the last two decades, peace has been most prominently conceived of as an ideal form of 'Liberal Peace' sometimes understood today as a process of post-conflict intervention and a move to peace-building.<sup>9</sup>

## Liberal peace-building

The subject of liberal peace-building has been the most prominent narrative of peace in the post-Cold War period. As sources and dynamics of violent and armed conflicts have been evolving in this period, so have ideas of peace and response to conflict. Outbreaks of violent intra-state conflicts in the period since 1990 and the resultant humanitarian tragedy in a number of conflict situations in former Yugoslavia and Africa – including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda among others – drew global attention to the need to find peaceful resolution. Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992,<sup>10</sup> and its sequel in 1995 were a result of the UN's attempt to find a framework for bringing about stable peace in situations of armed conflict in Africa and other regions where the sheer magnitude of human suffering provoked global outcry. Implementation of *Agenda for Peace* created fertile ground for the evolution of ideas of liberal peace. Boutros-Ghali's initial conceptualisation of peace-building in *Agenda for Peace* reflected a sequential approach and at the same time served to build a consensus around the concept of 'liberal peace'. Returning war-affected societies to stable peace would entail a multi-level effort to build governance from local to international levels through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and peace enforcement.<sup>11</sup>

This eventually materialised in what has come to be known as the 'liberal peace'. Oliver Richmond, in the *Transformations of Peace*, breaks down the constituent parts of the liberal peace theory into the following – democratisation, human rights, civil society, rule of law and liberalisation most visibly reflected in free market reform and development – what Richmond refers to as the 'technology of the liberal peace-building process'.<sup>12</sup> Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond analyse four main threads of 'evolved thinking' on peace and peace-building that constitute elements of liberal peace – victor's peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and civil peace – which they sum up into the 'conservative' and 'orthodox' models of liberal peace.<sup>13</sup> The conservative model consists of 'top-down' approaches to peace-building and it is underlined by practices of coercion, domination and hegemony.<sup>14</sup> The orthodox model, on the other hand, is sensitive to 'local ownership' in the building of liberal institutions although still inherently top down. It projects peace 'as being state led ... representing top down and bottom up at the same time ... with emphasis on the former'.<sup>15</sup> It is not inconsistent with the conservative model in that it sees the provision of security as a starting point and proceeds to undertake peace-building 'based on international assumption of technical superiority over its subjects via the claim of normative universality of the liberal peace'.<sup>16</sup> Its added value is the bottom-up approach, which places emphasis on social justice.

While this is a useful way of approaching the range of activities the international community undertakes in countries where intervention occurs, it conflates the interest behind these activities under the banner of peace. This raises the question, for example, as to whether victor's peace is really peace. Both models of liberal peace miss how peace and peace-building should be approached in countries where external engagement is minimal. Peace is thus understood in terms of what the international community does rather than what it actually achieves. The notion of hybrid peace, everyday peace and peace formation, discussed below, are a useful complement to this.

This being the case, on the surface, the idea of liberal peace is not inconsistent with the earlier Kantian ideal or indeed, Galtung's notion of absence of violence and social injustice. While it is difficult to dispute a claim for people to have equal rights in a society where the

rule of law prevails, this has evolved into a template-based one-size-fits-all paradigm that is aimed at bringing peace and democracy to war-affected societies. Hence, contemporary approaches in peace-building have largely focused on ‘packaging’ efforts and accumulating ‘best practices’ meant to transition post-conflict states from war to peace based on itemised programmes and timelines to be achieved in a specific timeframe.<sup>17</sup> This has come to characterise institutional approaches of the United Nations and its partners. Rather than an approach, which facilitates a return (although not guaranteed), to the non-violent pursuit of the state and/or nation-building process and related *conversations*, the need to end violence has tended to become an end in itself.

The liberal peace as the dominant peace-building strategy has, however, continued to evolve from an initial emphasis on immediate democratisation and marketisation, to institutionalisation<sup>18</sup>; and from an externally led template-based formulaic approach to peace, to recognition of the need for contextual sensitivities and engagement with local actors.<sup>19</sup> However, the liberal character of the peace that international actors aspire to build has remained intact,<sup>20</sup> and the idea that there is no viable alternative to liberal peace<sup>21</sup> continues to challenge thinkers of peace-building discourse.<sup>22</sup> Mac Ginty’s<sup>23</sup> notion of *Everyday Peace* encompassing norms and ‘ritualised social practices’ aimed at coping with and possibly transforming the totalising, polarising and reifying currents involved in war, is too micro and highly localised to be considered an alternative to the liberal peace. Any viable alternative needs to show how state institutions should be constituted by, and rendered reflective of the values and interests of social forces (groups) and yet at the same time deliver the basic (Weberian) functions expected of these institutions.

Richmond’s notion of *Peace Formation* offers a useful alternative to the liberal peace framework, even if tends to co-opt local actors to its agenda when it engages with the local context. Peace formation refers to a range of *local* agencies that seek to challenge the structural power of the state, the international geopolitical system that drives local violence and that seek to re-shape both the state and the international system according to their value, need, sociopolitical and historical circumstance.<sup>24</sup> However, as useful a framework as this is, its presumption of local agencies as non-elitist, might be problematic especially when it is mobilised to influence the state and the international system and thus imbue it with a form of legitimacy and sustainability. The presumption of state structure as a source of structural violence may not always hold true either. Power can sometimes be an agent of transformation even when it is used for domination. Hence, it might be important to focus on how and under what condition transformative power emerges, restructures the state, and entrenches an alternative order. Moreover, what is considered local has unified common values, orientation and interest, aggregation and compromise of which would become essential.

### **State-building as peace-building**

Without overlooking the evolution of the liberal peace praxis, it is apparent that it inextricably connects peace and peace-building with the idea of state and state-building. This may not be problematic in and of itself since it is an inescapable fact of history that there is no ‘ungoverned’ social order. However, to equate that governance arrangement with a state, no matter how the latter is presented, as the only viable source of authority in contemporary times, is probably an unjustified leap. And to think of that state in terms of its (neo)liberal incarnation, as contemporary peace-building aspires to do, is even worth challenging. Outcomes of efforts at achieving peace through forging a liberal state in situations where a liberal order is neither feasible nor desirable (at least from the viewpoint of actors at the

domestic level) have been less than satisfying and often resulting in non-liberal outcomes. At any rate, state and peace (building) are so inextricably connected that even critiques of liberal peace have sought alternatives to liberal peace in alternative political orders.<sup>25</sup>

This liberal approach – of state-building as peace-building – is no doubt informed by the idea that states that experience armed conflict are inherently weak. Contemporary ideas of state-building have not only been predominantly founded on European experiences,<sup>26</sup> but they have since the end of the Cold War and later post 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, gone through a conceptual and pragmatic evolution by adopting aphoristic concepts such as ‘collapsed states’, to their subsequent corollaries, ‘failed states’ and ‘weak states’.<sup>27</sup> Further research claiming empirical ground increased this proclivity to associate state-building with peace-building by connecting violent conflict with the lack of state capacity.<sup>28</sup> At times based on econometric analysis, these studies associate conflict primarily in terms of the human, financial and organisational feasibility of rebellion, which among others, is determined by the availability of exploitable resources, the existence of large pool of illiterate youth, and weakness of the state. These works demonstrated the centrality of state-building for peace-building.

The basis of state-building as peace-building is also embedded, in part, in the understanding of the state that views it in terms of its capability to perform functions or its ability to achieve specific outcomes. The two functions and outcomes, which are important to highlight here are usually founded and advanced on a *Weberian* philosophy of coercive and non-coercive functions of the state.<sup>29</sup> The coercive functions are considered as the state’s capacity to successfully claim the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence and thus possess the capability to enforce extractive functions such as revenue collection, taxation or exploiting resources, maintain law and order, and provision of security within a given territory.<sup>30</sup> The non-coercive functions, mainly characteristic of modern states, are described in terms of the state’s provision of social goods and services, the durability and efficacy of a state’s governance structures and its social and economic redistributive functions.<sup>31</sup> These concepts are widely held with reference to ideas of state-building in Africa in theory as well as in practice.<sup>32</sup>

The implication of all of this is that when violent conflict occurs, it is associated with state weakness and thus the solution to that conflict must of necessity be found in constructing the state. To be certain, in Africa, this logic is not entirely unfounded as African states were weak in both dimensions of Weberian Statehood. The challenge, however, lies in the fact that a particular kind of state, namely a liberal state that is devoid of many of liberalism’s progressive elements, is proposed as a panacea for armed conflict.<sup>33</sup> Liberal states cannot be built as conceived by liberal state builders and even the most sophisticated attempts at doing so ends up building a state that remotely resembles a liberal state.<sup>34</sup>

Such an approach ignores the path, time, sequences of events and processes (which are path dependent) that led to the emergence of liberal states. The historically evolving inter-elite, elite-society, and elite-outsiders *conversation*, invariably involved in such processes, lend themselves to a segmented and fragmented, reinforcing and contradicting set of institutions with all their complexity. These complex and context-specific paths, however, are overlooked because of the dominance of the ‘liberal way of seeing’ that assesses state and peace-building experiences in terms of (un)becoming more or less liberal,<sup>35</sup> a dominance as argued by Sabaratnam that has (dis)oriented the thinking of even the critique of liberal peace.<sup>36</sup> Thus, shifting the analytical lens may increase the visibility of alternative ways of looking at actual

state and peace-building practices that could potentially give rise to a different approach to peace and state-building and hence the need to approach the subject from a different perspective.

The mainstream literature, though, on certain occasions acknowledges the possibility of tension and parallelism between peace and state-building. It predominantly sees peace-building in terms of crafting and institutionalising architectures of peace.<sup>37</sup> Even the most systematic and sympathetic assessment of the peace-building enterprise focuses on dynamics of democratisation and marketisation and ends up recommending institutionalisation before democratisation, an idea that later has been carried through by the World Bank and the UN.<sup>38</sup> In its *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*, the Bank underscored the need for 'inclusive institutions' that deliver 'citizens' security' and the UN affirmed this in its *Sustainable Development Goals*. These run parallel to the many state failure and fragility indexes developed to measure fragility and thus vulnerability for violence, and it is not uncommon for the literature on state-building to introduce their subject through the discussion of conflict.<sup>39</sup> Hence, peace-building has rarely been presented as a separate agenda from which institutions upholding it (the state) evolve, though it also seeks to address some consequences of war related to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants, Transitional Justice and reconciliation.<sup>40</sup>

### **Inter-elite and elite-society relationship and 'conversation' as a missing link**

The argument for strengthening institutions for peace is neither problematic nor unsound (which also has a long pedigree in political science<sup>41</sup>), but it overlooks the deeper issues involved in the process of institutionalisation at the core of which is the difficulty of charting a non-violent inter-elite and elite-society (or society-elite) conversation. It underestimates the fact that ultimately institutionalisation is centrally about the messy political processes involved in inter-elite and elite-society 'conversation'. The fact that peace-building might better be understood as shifting such conversation in non-violent directions is less appreciated. Though the critical literature focusing on hybrid political order attempts to overcome some of these shortcomings by showing how state institutions are not operating as presumed,<sup>42</sup> it does not sufficiently historicise and contextualise the emergence and functioning of state institutions. The centrality of inter-elite and elite-society conversation in the course of building sustainable and peaceful states means that the conventional assumptions linking peace-building and state-building need to be problematised.

Arguably, such problematisation balances the tendency to privilege the technical over the political, power over agency, the external and the international over the internal and the local. It also brings certain concepts and themes such as political settlement, nation-building, political and economic community, legitimacy and conversation to the foreground. The study that motivated this article and others sought to shift the debate from a focus on which institutions, liberal or otherwise, and/or which policies are most effective for peace, to how inter-elite and society-elite conversation gives rise to or fails to bring about particular ensembles of institutions and policy outcomes.<sup>43</sup> It also sought to demonstrate the role of political settlement in shaping the nature and outcome of these conversations. Accordingly, we aim to reframe the state-building and peace-building problematique by re-centring the notion of *conversation* in the processes of building peace and state. We suggest that the pursuit of peace must account for the depth of *conversation* about the presence, absence or desire for peace and accompanying perspectives across the target society.

The concept of *conversation* advanced in this paper is intended to expand thinking about peace and peace-building beyond the dominant liberal form. It has its basis in the breadth of conceptualisation of conversation in Europe's long eighteenth century. We draw from analyses of aspects of the concept and practice of conversation in Europe in that period to advance an expanded notion of conversation to broaden our understanding of the nature of peace-related conversation across society.<sup>44</sup> In particular, we build on earlier analysis, which has sought to link aspects of the expanded concept of conversation in the long eighteenth century to state-building and peace-building in Africa.<sup>45</sup> Essentially, the notion of conversation adopted here extends beyond its every day meaning and usage and goes far beyond overt dialogues and includes wide-ranging forms of interaction occurring within and among groups in society. This conceptualisation also accommodates the possibility that such interaction might invariably assume violent and non-violent forms.

Jurgen Habermas's view of the 'public sphere' is perhaps the best-known work on conversation in the long eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup> In this account, conversation focuses on the polite sociability that occurs in the 'conversible' spaces of coffee-houses and salons where 'bourgeois subjects' convened to exchange ideas freely and as equals. Halsey and Slinn cite Terry Eagleton's apt description of the significance of this conversible world: 'These gentlemen spoke on their own authority on what the period characterized as matters of "general ethical humanism, indissociable from moral, cultural and religious reflection."'”<sup>47</sup> In Habermasian logic, the public sphere produced critical discourse that kept a watchful eye on state authority and political spaces – all of which arguably, evolved into modern democratic culture. However, Habermas's notion of the public sphere is often criticised for its exclusionary nature. It is difficult to challenge claims that this male-dominated egalitarian ideal is fundamentally flawed and insensitive to gender and class difference in the larger society.<sup>48</sup> Notwithstanding the valid criticism, Habermas continues to be cited among the original influences on the idea of conversation in the public sphere in the long eighteenth century. The public sphere, at least in Europe, has come to assume a variety of forms in largely democratic systems.

To be sure, the concept of conversation in the eighteenth century was not only about the Habermasian ideal. Other conceptualisations move away from this in a number of ways. There are those, which challenge the rational, polite sociability inherent in that ideal. Conversation is not always polite. Attention has been drawn, for example, to other aspects of conversation that were considered crude, subversive and sexual among other things.<sup>49</sup> There is also abundant evidence from the same period, of other contributions to the conceptualisation of conversation within a variety of disciplines. Some of those whose works had been linked to Habermas's public sphere, such as Shaftesbury and Hume, made distinctive contributions that were located outside the idea of a 'bourgeois public sphere'. Shaftesbury, for example, sought to make philosophy an avenue to improve human interaction and participation in communal life.<sup>50</sup> At the core of this is the idea that there is an interaction between the reader and the philosophical text and that pedagogy is embedded within this. Similarly, David Hume's work emphasised the relationship between the reader and philosophical text with a charge that philosophical debate should assume conversation mode such that philosophers would be grounded in conversation in order to acquire the 'facility of thought and expression'<sup>51</sup> In this sense, the 'learned' and the 'conversible' worlds are intricately linked. As Halsey and Slinn note, 'the Learned reflect on, refine and distil the empirical material of conversation to produce knowledge; the sociable world must be raised from idleness and triviality by its interactions with the Learned'.<sup>52</sup>

While many of these ideas had begun to fade by the end of the long eighteenth century, the idea of ‘conversation paintings’ has carried over from eighteenth-century conversation literature. The link between visual arts including portraiture, for example, also advanced the concept of conversation as not just occurring between animate objects but also between inanimate objects. In the same vein, the notion of polite sociability is one that does not always ring true where visual arts and portraiture are concerned. Ludmilla Jordanova in discussing the connection between portraiture and conversation reveals how sometimes a painter’s conversation can be rude and harsh or how a portrait could exhibit rudeness.<sup>53</sup>

However, in the effort to re-examine the continuing relevance of the concept of conversation in the long eighteenth century, Peter De Bolla’s reflections on ‘Portraiture as Conversation’ play a particularly useful role for the purposes of the discussion in this paper.<sup>54</sup> He sees the distinctiveness of the concept of conversation in ‘the fact that it can be said to occur only when something addressed in conversation, whether animate or inanimate, talks back, and when what that thing says is heard’. When transposed to the interactions within human community, there is a strong tendency to see and count only the animate and explicit. Yet the interactions in society, which depict either a peaceful or disordered state of affairs are not just about the overt and animate. Things that are not overtly spoken and things that are inanimate which are located at the site of human interaction convey important messages about the state of affairs and they matter in the overall scheme of peace and conflict. Thus, the focus on the animate as well as inanimate as part of conversation is an idea that bears strong relevance in thinking about the pursuit of peace in society.

The question that remains though, is the extent to which the concept of conversation from eighteenth-century Europe can serve as a framework for understanding peace and peace-building in the twenty-first century, particularly in Africa. How can such concepts travel without carrying with them the accompanying exclusions that both characterised societal interactions in the originating society as well as the inequity that underpinned Europe’s relationship with the colonies? Arguably, the British and European societies in which conversation was conceptualised and practised have advanced and indeed evolved into democratic spaces by and large, but many of the exclusions that remain a critique of the eighteenth century remain in social-economic practice. However, to the extent that these exclusions constitute a major challenge to peace and stability in the former colonies upon which the so-called democratic cultures of European societies were imposed, it is worth investigating the nature of conversation that exists in those African settings. Furthermore, by focusing on the concept and its analytical value rather than the practice in the originating society, there is potential to extract greater value from its examination in another context.

Thus, in proposing a concept of conversation that bears relevance to today’s independent Africa, we find resonance in other conversational forms expressed in the long eighteenth century, which move away from the Habermasian ideal as they are essentially not about ‘bourgeois subjects’ in the conversible spaces of the salons and coffee houses that reinforce social exclusion. In refining this borrowed concept, conversation in the context of peace and state-building occurs in a set of generic and non-generic forms, and involves individuals, groups and entities engaging in ‘talking’ and ‘talking back’ about a thing or an issue, through a range of actions and inaction, producing a recognisable or distinct narrative. In this expanded notion of conversation, one could contemplate that talking and talking back through action including music, artefacts, theatre, protests and even violence; and through inaction such as silence, are part of conversation in peace and conflict.

When can we say that conversation is about peace or state-building? We argue that peace-related conversation is not only about building peace but is also essentially about the normative and institutional underpinning of the peace – whatever its type – and hence state-building. In essence, state-building must be seen as a continuum in which conversation in multiple forms is occurring across society. Peace-building is invariably an integral part of conversation taking place in that continuum, which sometimes assumes a violent nature. It is difficult at best to impose peace-building as a distinctive activity outside of the conversation in this continuum.

State institutions that are embedded in society are a product of prior conversation and hence the need to view (de)institutionalisation as it contextually manifested and historically evolved. Once emerged out of violent or non-violent conversations, institutions in turn would shape the kind of conversation a society is to have, and the kind of peace or war that follows from it. While the conventional approach tends to see this latter aspect as privileging state-building for peace-building (with all the attendant shortcomings discussed in the previous section), our approach seeks to explicate the other side of the process. While the liberal approach starts from the presumption that a particular ensemble of institutions usher in peace,<sup>55</sup> our approach starts from the assumption that inter-elite and elite-society conversations are the sources of institutions. Hence, institutions themselves are to be explained in the particular nature of societal conversation though they subsequently shape it. Legitimate institutions are products of and are underpinned by a particular kind of conversation and peace, the properties of which are an empirical matter. One label of these ensembles of institutions and their underpinning normative order, as utilised in the literature, is *hybrid state and peace*. Notwithstanding that hybridity has also been critiqued as inadequate in understanding the African state in several respects, in this paper, its reality is taken as sufficient ground to rethink the state-building and liberal peace-building approaches. This suggests that what state-building and peace-building entail should not be tightly defined in advance.

With this caveat, we approach state-building in terms of supporting and facilitating conversation that leads to a legitimate set of institutions and strengthening the effectiveness of existing institutions governing the collective life of the society. Peace-building entails facilitating conversations that minimise what a society (not external peace builders) considers as violent, and building what a society inter-subjectively agrees to be peace. Hence, building peace is all about charting conversation(s) among contending actors and society in non-violent ways, and the end of that is not simply how war is to be ended and peace restored. It is also about the transformation of normative and institutional pillars that follows from charting such conversation(s). Needless to say, the notion of political settlement both in its broader and narrow conception becomes a relevant tool of analysis for such an approach.

### **Political settlement: clarifying concept, its usage and role in peace-building**

There are two common yet different conceptualisations of political settlement. The first, most common in development scholarship, views it as implicit and explicit, rules ordering society and economy<sup>56</sup> based on deeper, and often unarticulated, elite consensus (about the rules of the political game) that end and/or prevent a conflict.<sup>57</sup> According to this perspective, a durable settlement distributes rights and privileges comparable to the societal power balances, ushers in sustainable economic and political outcomes,<sup>58</sup> is inclusive of major elite groups, and connects political power with economic interests.<sup>59</sup> Political settlement is dynamic and violence can be part of a settlement as well as a challenge to a settlement.<sup>60</sup> These features of

settlement render the concept extremely fluid, difficult to concretise and effectively use as an analytical tool. Second, as mostly used in the war termination literature, political settlement refers to the historical and political processes that culminate in a peace agreement and/or a transition from one political order to another.<sup>61</sup> Understood this way, a settlement can be victory-based (one side declares victory and the other admits defeat), negotiated (each side agrees to end violence and a framework on post-war governance), stalemated (ending war without post-war governance framework), and an outcome in which a war situation defuses to non-war as warring parties gradually opt to use the political process instead.<sup>62</sup>

This paper, like the underpinning study, defines political settlement as an activity or decisive action that marks the end of armed conflict or a transition from violent conflict to the pursuit of conflict by non-violent means. This decisive moment embodies, implicitly or explicitly, the terms under which conflicting parties would live together regardless of the extent to which these terms are consensual or imposed. This applies even to authoritarian regimes since every political order, however dictatorial, always depends on some sort of acceptance; there always is a possibility to subvert imposition from above no matter how grave the consequences might be. It is not presumed, at the outset, that the terms ordering collective lives would be procedurally and substantively better in negotiated settlement than victory-based ones. The only point to note is that such an arrangement, to be durable, needs to be supported by the power balance among contending actors, external influence being accounted for.<sup>63</sup>

Nonetheless, understood as the decisive event marking the end of armed conflict and the introduction of a new political order, political settlement does not simply refer to the way war terminates but also the changes in the conflicting parties and their relationship during the course of the termination. This refers to changes in the organisational, ideological and mobilisation capacity and will of warring actors, the inclusiveness of the actors and/or processes, and the level of consensus in the arrangement by means of which a transitioning society is going to live together. This understanding is informed by the assumption that the end of armed conflict is not only about the end of armed activity but is also about change in a range of organisational and political and psycho-social dynamics. Understood this way, political settlement combines elements that simultaneously exclude and include, and compare and contrast the two types of settlements. Thus, at one level, victory-based settlements are presented to be qualitatively different from negotiated ones. This would help to compare processes giving rise to the different settlements, and the extent these processes shape consequent peace-building conversations.

The normative, institutional and organisational form these conversations are manifested in, and are materialised through, are an essential aspect of a settlement that set countries on different trajectories of peace and state-building. At one level, they are the manifestation of these conversations, and at another, they are the medium through which these conversations are materialised. In other words, once in existence, they shape the kind of conversation to be had and they manifest the kind of conversation that had been going on. Arrangements that institutionalised a particular form of governance (ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, devolution in Kenya, justice management in Rwanda, resource governance in Sierra Leone), for instance, indicate the kind of conversation that was central before and during the settlement and at the same time shapes the subsequent conversations to be had. Hence, a particular settlement sets the context about what is possible, imaginable and practicable, and what is not a thinkable course of action given the (perceived) power balance among contending actors. In other words, while it facilitates certain courses of action, it inhibits others. It also determines which

actors are legitimate, to what extent and to take which course of action (either due to the leverage they command or their past conduct), and which actors are not legitimate to engage in the peace-building and state-building enterprise. Hence, we presume that different settlements would have different peace-building and state-building ramifications, and the extent different settlements determine the consequent peace-building and state-building dynamics in different countries is part of the insight sought from this study.

However, by including processes of change in organisational, relational and political dynamics in the course of the process of war termination, our definition also includes elements that dilute this stark difference and binary juxtaposition of victories based and negotiated settlements. As a transition from war to peace or from one form of conversation to the other, they both exhibit features that mark such a transition. Hence, there may not be that much difference between the two types of settlements as both ultimately embody the central issues involved in all transitions from one form of social order to the other and the difference might be a matter of degree rather than substance. Even when significant difference is observed regarding their ramifications on peace and state-building it might be the result of a specific aspect of a settlement. Some features so common in one form of transition may be present in another form to a lower degree. This not only helps one to approach the issue from a different angle but also helps one to particularise each settlement. By this, we mean, victory-based settlement may in some instances display greater resemblance to a negotiated settlement.

The rationale for this assumption hinges on the idea that there are elements of peace, co-operation and even common norms (which is why the law of war as well as norms repudiating the killing of vulnerable people, including women, children and elderly in lower-scale conflict existed) in wars, and violence in peace.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, there is negotiation in victory and victory in negotiation and this ultimately makes the difference between the two not as stark as one would expect it to be.<sup>65</sup> Thus, while our first definition captures the discontinuous aspect of change by viewing settlements as decisive moments or as ruptures, our further specification captures processes that constitute the continuous and incremental aspects of change entailed by a transition process that eventually culminates in a process qualitatively different from the one preceding and giving rise to it. The specific changes that war-to-peace transition entails, as noted above, include the extent to which the process is more or less inclusive or exclusive, the extent to which there has been a change in organisational, ideological and mobilising strategies, and the extent to which they are terminated in a consensual or imposed way. The process marking the end of the conflict could be seen in terms of the inclusive-exclusive continuum both in terms of being a replica of society and/or in terms of including contending actors. A settlement may include major armed powers or some of them or none at all, and it may exclude armed actors but include non-armed ones and vice-versa.

We preliminarily propose that negotiated settlements tend to include major warring parties but exclude societal groups and hence they are more likely to remain inter-elite bargains. Thus, state-building and peace-building conversations in the affected countries are more likely to revolve around issues that are central for the elite than the society at large. Elections, number of state institutions, and distribution of political offices, for example, might be central areas of conversation whereas social inequalities, improved livelihood, poverty reduction, healthcare, and sanitation might not be that important. We also postulate that imposed settlements would be more exclusionary of contending elites while being inclusionary of societal groups since the victorious party needs to take the constituencies of the defeated one

into account, and since, in the absence of major contenders, would not feel threatened to act otherwise. In such settlements, conversations of major state-building ramifications are likely to be within the ruling coalition that would seek to shape state-society conversation in its own image. We also submit that the inclusionary-exclusionary momentum is likely to be affected by the level of external interest in the settlement including the leverage external powers exert in the process of transition from war to peace.

Transition from war to peace or simply from one type of order to the other also entails change in the mobilising capacity and/or will of contenders. Post-settlement peace could be explained in terms of reducing incentive and will for violence by weakening contenders' capacity for violent mobilisation, addressing contenders' motive for violent mobilisation, or changing contextual factors in a manner that necessitates a shift away from ideologies that justify violence. Organisational reformation or the merging of different organisations and personnel in the security apparatus is another apparent trend in war-to-peace transition. Two extremes can be identified in this regard: one, the warring parties' security apparatus is merged together; and two, one of the warring parties retains its organisation intact while the other part(ies) organisational structure is dismantled. These two are the extremes; in actual sense, the majority of cases would fall in between. Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that the structural context within which the settlement emerged has a determining effect on peace and state-building trajectories. The level of economic growth, the quality of distribution, the political history of the nation, its geopolitical (ir)relevance are all factors that shape the nature of the settlement and processes of peace and state-building.

### **Implications of re-centring *conversation* in peace-building policy and practice**

While other papers emerging from the study offer empirical analysis of state-building conversations in countries whose conflict ended in one form of political settlement or another (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone and Cote d'Ivoire), it is worth noting here some of the implications for policy and practice. As indicated earlier, inadequate attention has been paid to the depth of conversation about peace – its form, possibility, presence or absence – and the variety of perspectives for its pursuit across society, particularly when conversations in the state-building continuum become violent. Apart from the dominance of liberal peace-building as a default stance of external intervention, the overwhelming emphasis on inter-elite conversation skews peace-building towards a particular group of protagonists, mostly leaders of warring factions, and people in official positions of authority. Sharing official power between these position holders, and assigning them leadership of governance institutions, is often the centre-piece of negotiated settlement while the issues that dominate society-wide conversation are relegated to the side-lines of peace interventions. The focus on elite negotiations and agreements rarely privileges societal conversations around the deeper issues of inequality and injustice such as sex and gender-based violence, unequal political participation, representation, and resource allocation.

This is not to say that peace-building processes have not considered questions of human rights and social justice. The challenge is that these are rarely the core subject on the peace agenda, which is typically focused on the agents of violence and protagonists in war. By the time the issues that are central to society-wide conversation are considered, the prize of war will have long been shared as part of elite deal, with resulting institutions and resources framed around the interests of the elite. Only afterwards do processes and initiatives such as truth commissions, investigations of war crimes, societal rehabilitation occur, if at all, under the management of the institutions agreed by the elite. Even so, it is not a forgone conclusion

that these issues will be entertained in the aftermath of a peace settlement. In Sierra Leone, for example, when the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement focused overwhelmingly on power-sharing, among warring elite, including blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Moses Okello, appended a disclaimer at the signing of the agreement.<sup>66</sup> To be sure, these issues might not necessarily come to the fore in conflicts that end through victory for one party and defeat for the other. Much depends on the will of the winning side. Even when the choice is made to take issues emerging from societal conversation into account, it might be perceived as ‘victors’ justice’ by a segment of society. In situations where opportunities exist for negotiated settlement, accommodating society-elite conversation however poses real challenges for how facilitators such as the United Nations and regional organisations approach a peace process.

Peace-building interventions that seek to include society-wide conversations must invariably take account of four key factors. The first concerns the range of issues around which the energies of a broad cross-section of people are convened. The state-building issues at the core of society-state conversations are wide-ranging, unlike the narrower focus of inter-elite conversations. Beyond the issues of post-violence justice and rehabilitation mentioned above – which result directly from violent inter-elite conversation – these issues often entail difficult questions of identity and power as seen, for example, in Rwanda during the decades leading to the 1994 genocide. The second is about the ‘conversable spaces’ where such conversations are occurring. When interveners look beyond the narrow confines of formal structures and elite networks, the spaces in which state-building conversations are occurring are often expansive. And they often point to the burning issues of concern to citizens, which sometimes reflect divisions in society, and might escalate to violence if the conversations are unmediated. Conversable spaces can include the arts, which depict the mood and social realities; theatre and music, which talk back to societal and state leaders alike; the streets, where mass protests or other popular action might occur in response to elite-driven policy; and religious houses where the paths of elite and ordinary citizens sometimes cross.

The third factor has to do with actors beyond recognised official leaders, who mobilise the people around violent or non-violent conversation, towards resolution or continuation of conflict. Prominent actors in the conversable spaces outside of the state and formal governance cannot easily be discounted as facilitators of violent or non-violent conversations. Young musicians in Sierra Leone, for example, contributed to mobilising people around the central issues in the post-war elections in 2007.<sup>67</sup> In Rwanda, music played the opposite role in the genocide, with Simon Bikindi, Director of the Irindiro Ballet, effectively mobilising societal sentiments against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu, thus inciting killing.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, the Christian Churches in Rwanda were implicated in the genocide.<sup>69</sup> Fourth and last are the voices that unite a broad constituency of actors towards a more coherent state-building conversation that does not prioritise violent pursuit of conflict. This factor becomes vitally important when designing a peace intervention. Typically, the non-state voices that are called upon as part of peace-building interventions are religious or traditional leaders as they are seen to command the respect of large segments of the population and wield significant influence. Yet it is often the case that leaders in other conversable spaces are also influential as seen for example, with labour unions, sports, music, youth and women’s movements. In Africa, where the mean age is about 19.5 years and the influence of youth is more visible in non-state, non-formal spaces, excluding these voices from processes that are intended to deliver outcomes for the whole of society poses a significant challenge.

Peace-building efforts must take the depth of societal conversation into consideration in order to successfully facilitate the conditions for sustainable peace. This requires a rethinking of peace-building policy and practice by global and regional institutional actors, and several questions are central to this. First, who gets to sit at the peace table? Prominent and influential actors in societal conversable spaces ought to be players in peace-building along with key parties to a conflict who would in all likelihood be vying for attention in the social space. This has not typically been the case in formal peace processes, where actors outside the state are spectators, or at best, second-order participants. Second, what bases of power are accorded prominence in the blueprint for peace-building? Formal peace-building often arrogates pre-eminent status to positional power, such that people in positions of authority in governmental and intergovernmental organisations and associated elite occupy centre stage along with the main protagonists. Local actors with personal, referent power outside of religious institutions are not participants of choice in peace-building. Yet those who represent the voices of ordinary citizens that experience fundamentally different outcomes from the elite and have differential narratives about the state, are rarely admitted into mainstream peace conversation. These actors are described elsewhere as the ‘local owners of peace’, who get overlooked by the ‘distant beholders of peace’.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, the question that arises is whether the United Nations or African Union, for example, could conceivably place current or former heads of state with socially conscious and influential musicians and leaders of youth and women’s movements as legitimate peacemakers. Third and related, what issues are privileged at the core of the negotiations for peace? If the conversations occurring in the wide-ranging conversable spaces in society are not represented in mainstream peace negotiations, it is likely that the priorities of conflicting elite will remain dominant in peace-building, thus continuing the cycle of elite peace and conflict relapse. This is why the question of who represents the voice of the local owners of peace matters. While it is understandable that peacemakers tend to privilege elite peace because of the need to reconcile parties that bear arms and redirect them towards non-violent conversation, this often occurs at great cost to inclusive peace.

All of this requires that fundamental changes are made to current institutional arrangements in order to support the outcomes of broader societal conversation rather than simply those of warring elites. The timing of peace-building, how inclusive it is, and the degree of legitimacy accorded to institutions that result from deeper societal conversation are vitally important. Interestingly, the very idea of society-state conversation is supported by the United Nations. The report of the UN Advisory Group of Experts (UN-AGE) for the review of the UN peace-building architecture in 2015 proposed a more expansive view of peace-building beyond what has been a focus largely on post-armed conflict intervention. UN-AGE proposed a ‘Sustaining Peace’ agenda which includes not only the prevention of conflict relapse but also a prevention of a lapse into armed conflict in the first instance.<sup>71</sup> As such, peace agendas stand a better chance of success if they consider ‘societal conversations’ about collective aspirations for building a harmonious nation; and this should invariably reflect the mutual aspirations of the protagonists and larger society.<sup>72</sup> The resulting UN Security Council Resolution 2282 on Sustaining Peace, underlined ‘the importance of inclusivity in order to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account’.<sup>73</sup> In essence, the idea of inclusive peace, which takes account of society-state conversations, seems to have been established by the UN, at least, in principle.

However, in reality, translating this will be immensely challenging. The very structures that deliver elite peace cannot effectively implement sustaining peace agenda without some fundamental changes. The institutional framework that will deliver success must privilege,

for example, plebiscites to determine national priorities and the basis for future governance ahead of elections to determine leaders of post-conflict society. This approach may have been more valuable in the context of South Sudan, for example, which had a chance to build a state anew.<sup>74</sup> The challenges that a different approach poses for different peace-building actors, particularly regional and global institutions such as the African Union, ECOWAS and the UN, will depend much on the extent that they are able to adapt their institutional frameworks to respond to such a proposal for legitimising society-state conversation. This will also mean that legitimacy is accorded to society-elite conversation in every aspect of the peace-building intervention, ensuring that this is embedded in the design or renegotiation of a future state. Such a significant shift is difficult to envisage without major contestation between the defenders of liberal peace and those seeking alternatives.

## **Conclusion**

When the ideas and issues discussed above are considered in relation to African states, several factors become vitally important in the pursuit of sustainable peace in that region. First, a long view of history matters not least for states that were products of colonial domination. Taking a state's historical trajectory into account provides a basis for evolving peace-building agendas as well as institutional processes most relevant to the context. State-building should thus be seen as a continuum along this trajectory. Historical methods will be useful in this regard. A key question that must be addressed in the African context is the nature of the state that succeeds in building and sustaining peace. What value is to be gained from pursuing a state with all the features of a liberal democratic order when what is needed is a peacemaking state that represents the cumulated aspirations of elites and the whole of society, while mediating the potential conflict between various groups? A long view of history also suggests that the effect of the type of settlement on peace and state-building dynamics in the target country should not be over-emphasised.

Second and related to the first, the nature of the conversation occurring all through the state-building continuum determines the extent to which the state is able to build and sustain peace across the society. Building and sustaining peace in contexts in which the very creation of these states was a potential trigger of violent conflict must of necessity ensure a return to the difficult and unresolved conversations along the state-building continuum. This underscores the need to forge consensus on the nature of the state, especially how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. All other options including the use of coercion, economic growth, even the type of settlement will not ultimately erase the need for these conversations.

Third and last, state-building conversation is far more complex than the common meaning ascribed to the term. Any attempt to build peace must embrace this complexity and seek to understand the diversity of ways in which state-building conversation occurs across target polities. What the underpinning research for this paper illustrates is the multi-dimensional character of conversation, particularly state-building conversation. It goes beyond verbal and overt dialogues, assumes diverse forms and occurs in diverse spaces beyond the formal statist settings. In looking at conversation within the context of state-building in post-colonial and post-Cold War Africa therefore, we might re-examine who is 'talking' and 'talking-back' about certain types of issues in society. These might include, for example, existential issues, where the physical or material survival of a group might be at stake; the functioning of state institutions and the degree to which they are responsive to the needs of the larger population; access to channels of power and resources. As such, when citizens create alternative systems

of response to needs deemed to have been neglected, there is an important conversation to be found therein. Every society has its generic and/or peculiar conversation, which will be at the core of their state or nation-building process. Those seeking to build and sustain peace would do well to grasp this complex nature of state-building conversations.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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### **Notes**

1. Reiss, *Kant's Political Writings*.
2. Ibid.
3. Galtung, Violence, Peace and Peace Research, 183.
4. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 7-11.
5. See note 3 above.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Galtung, Violence, Peace and Peace Research, 171.
9. For a broader discussion of shift from classical to new ideals of liberalism, see, for example, Paul, *Liberalism*; For a summary of the liberal peace thesis, see, Paris, *At War's End*, 40-51.
10. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.
11. Ibid.

12. Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 3.
13. Mac Ginty and Richmond, *Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction*.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. On a broader discussion of contemporary discourses on peace-building see, Call and Cook, *On Democratization and Peace-building*, 233-246; Call and Cousens, *Ending Wars and Building Peace*, 1-21.
18. Mac Ginty, Introduction, 6.
19. Richmond, *Peace formation*, 9.
20. Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, Just how Liberal, 364-389.
21. Paris, Saving liberal peace-building, 337-365.
22. Sabaratnam, Avatars of Eurocenterism, 263-269
23. Mac Ginty, Every day peace, 548-564.
24. Richmond, Failed state-building, 383
25. Mac Ginty and Roger, The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders, 229; Jarstad and Belloni, Introducing hybrid peace; Brown et al, Challenging state-building as peace - building, 99-115; Mac Ginty, International peace-building; Richmond, The dilemmas of a hybrid peace, 50-68; and Belloni, Hybrid peace governance, 21-38.
26. Tilly, Western State-making, 601-639.
27. The terms 'collapsed state' were earlier introduced by Zartman, *Posing the Problem of State Collapse*, 1-15; and Mazrui, *The Blood of Experience*, 28-34. On 'failed' and 'weak' states, see, Gros, *Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States*, 455-471; Rotberg, *When States Fail*. For a critique of these aphorisms, see, for example, Wai, *Neo-patrimonialism*; and Call, *The Fallacy of the failed State*, 1491-1507.
28. Collier and Hoeffler, *Greed and grievances in Civil War*, 23-55; and Fearon and David, *Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war*, 75-90
29. Weber, *From Max Weber*, 77-128.
30. See, for example, Tilly, *Western State-making*, 601-639; and Tilly, *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*, 169-191.

31. For a general discussion on characteristics of modern states see, Pierson, *The Modern State*. Brautigam, *Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries*; and Wai, Neo-patrimonialism, 27-43.
32. Some of the earlier scholars who have attempted to analyse challenges of state formation in Africa include: Sandbrook, *Hobbled Leviathans*, 707-733; Herbst, *War and the State in Africa*, 117-139; Kirby and Ward, *Modernity and the Process of State Formation*, 113-126; Discourses of state-building from and international development perspective are wide. For specific approaches in Africa of discourses, see, DFID. *The Africa conflict prevention pool*.; OECD, *Concepts and dilemmas of State-building*, 61-148; and Brzoska, *Development Donors and The Concept of Security Sector Reform*.
33. Chandler, *The uncritical critique*, 137-155.
34. Richmond, *Jekyll or Hyde*, 1-20
35. Hout, *EU state-building*, 362-374.
36. Sabaratnam, *Avatars of Eurocentrism*, 263-269.
37. Call, *Building States to Build Peace*.
38. Paris, *At war's end*.
39. See for instance the introduction of Chandler and Sisk for *Routledge handbook*, XIX-XXVII.
40. See for example, Curtis, *The limits of State-building for peace in Africa*, 79-97; Brown, *Challenging state-building as peace-building*, 99-115; Menocal, *State building for peace*, 1715-1736; Wolff, *Post-Conflict State Building*, 1777-1802; and Paris, *Saving Liberal peace-building*, 337-365.
41. Huntington, *Political Order*.
42. Mac Ginty, *International peace-building*; Richmond, *Jekyll or Hyde*, 1-20; and Belloni, *Hybrid peace governance*, 21-38.
43. This paper grew out of a research project on the role of political settlements in Africa supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, from 2013-2016. See Olonisakin and Muteru, *Reframing Narratives of Peacebuilding and State-building*, 1-16.
44. See, for example, Halsey and Slinn, *The Concept and Practice of Conversation*.
45. Olonisakin, *Conversation in State-building in Africa*, 1-12.
46. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*.
47. Eagleton, *The Function of Criticism*. Cited in Halsey and Slinn, *The Concept and Practice of Conversation*, xi

48. See, for example, Griffin, *The Essentialist Roots of the Public Sphere*, 21-39
49. Ellis, *Coffee-women, The Spectator and the public sphere*, 27-52.
50. Cooper, *Third Earl of Shaftesbury*, 232-233.
51. Hume, *Of Essay Writing*, 533-37.
52. Halsey and Slinn, *The Concept and Practice of Conversation*, ix.
53. Jordanova, *Picture-Talking, 1800-1830*, 151-169.
54. De Bolla, *Portraiture as Conversation*, 170-182.
55. Ryan, *The evolution of peace-building*, 25-35.
56. Khan, *Political Settlements*.
57. Whaites, *States in Development*.
58. see note 56 above.
59. Di John and Putzel, *Political Settlements*, 14-17.
60. Scott-Villiers et al, *Roots and Routes of Political Violence*, 1-34.
61. OECD, *From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace*.
62. Toft, *Ending Civil Wars*, 7–36; and Kreutz, *How and when armed conflicts end*, 243-250.
63. see note 56 above.
64. Keen, *War and peace*, 1-22.
65. Caroline, *Civil Wars*, 347-365.
66. Lewis, *Amnesty in Sierra-Leone Opposed*.
67. Shepler, *Youth Music*, 627-642.
68. UN News, *The United Nations War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda*.
69. Longman, *Church Politics*, 163-186.
70. Olonisakin, *Measuring Peace*, 324-328.
71. United Nations, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, 1-63.
72. *Ibid.*, 34-35.

73. UN Security Council Resolution 2282, 2016, S/RES/2282/2016.

74. Olonisakin, Crises of War-to-Peace Transition, 49-64.

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