This study investigates the role played by the British Military Intelligence Division and more
specifically, its subdivision, the Field Intelligence Department, in South Africa during the
Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902.
It starts with a brief overview of the sound work done by this division prior to the war. In
1896, an important new dispensation dawned with the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Sir John
Ardagh as Director of Military Intelligence. Despite a limited budget the Military Intelligence
Division did excellent work. Between 1896 and 1899 it prepared twelve reports with a view
to the possibility of war in South Africa. The highlight of this preparatory work was the
publication of a guide, Military notes on the Dutch republics of South Africa.
The role played by the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) in the defeats suffered
by the British during “Black Week” (10 to 15 December 1899) next receives attention, as does
the heavy storm of criticism that erupted in Britain over “Black Week”.
This criticism of the Military Intelligence Division is largely unwarranted. Given its lack
of funds and authority within the War Office it accomplished much, notably its accurate findings
on the number of Boers liable for military service, the number and types of Boer armaments
and the intentions of the Boer military leaders.
There was indeed an initial lack of accurate mapping of the probable operational area.
However, in the last eighteen months of the war the Topographical Section issued several
maps, based on existing maps and reconnaissance, compiled for the most part by intelligence
officers of the various columns. When Lord Roberts replaced Gen. Sir Redvers Buller as
commander-in-chief of the British troops in South Africa in January 1900, intelligence improved
dramatically.
The Boers’ guerrilla warfare from the mid-1900s forced Roberts to apply counter-guerrilla
tactics and split his force into smaller mobile units to gain better intelligence about Boer
assaults.
Between February 1901 and the end of the war on 31 May 1902, Lt.-Col. David Henderson
the Director of the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) made an important contribution
to the effectiveness of the intelligence system. He divided the operational area into four districts
– the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, the Cape Colony south of the Orange River, and
Kimberley. These districts were then subdivided into sub-districts. A staff officer was placed
in charge of each and was given the responsibility of collecting information on the enemy in
his sub-district. It was his duty to supply the columns with interpreters, guides, scouts and
maps. He also had to pass on relevant information received from his own agents, from columns
in adjoining districts, and from headquarters in Pretoria. The staff officer was also required
to send a telegraph to Henderson on Sunday evenings, providing a weekly summary of the
situation in his sub-district.
Where did the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) get its information other than
from its own scouts? It is clear that some Boers acted as British spies and there is also evidence
that black people provided the department with information. An important source on intelligence
activity was the private diaries and other documents that were confiscated from Boer prisoners
of war. The point also made is that even when scouts gained valuable intelligence, problems
arose with communication and this caused operations to fail.
During the guerrilla phase the number of people working for the Field Intelligence
Department (South Africa) increased dramatically, largely because the independent units now
had their own intelligence officers. The department did good work in South Africa, but the Boer intelligence system was so efficient that they were able to out manoeuver the British
troops, even when the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) had accurate intelligence
of their strength and disposition.
In conclusion, two diaries taken from Boer prisoners of war that were translated by the
Intelligence staff are analysed to determine their possible value for British intelligence.
Met hierdie studie word daar gekyk na die rol van die Britse Military Intelligence Division
en meer spesifiek sy onderafdeling, die Field Intelligence Department (FID) in Suid-Afrika,
tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog van 1899–1902. Daar word gewys op die goeie werk voor die
oorlog. Die rol wat die FID in die Britse nederlae van “Black Week” (10 tot 15 Desember
1899) gespeel het, kry vervolgens aandag. Die nederlae van “Black Week” word hoofsaaklik
toegeskryf aan die offisiere se gebrek aan waardering vir behoorlike intelligensie deur
verkenners en hul ongegronde optimisme oor die vermoëns van hul eie troepe. Met lord
Frederick Roberts se vervanging in Januarie 1900 van sir Redvers Buller as opperbevelhebber
van die Britse troepe in Suid-Afrika het taktiese intelligensie dramaties verbeter. Die Boere
se nuwe tipe oorlogvoering, naamlik ’n guerrillakryg, het nuwe eise aan die Britse oorlogspoging gestel. Lt.kol. David Henderson het as direkteur van die FID ’n groot bydrae tot die
doeltreffendheid van die intelligensiestelsel gelewer. Inligting is veral verkry van Boere wat
as spioene in die kommando’s opgetree het en swart mense. Ten slotte word die waarde vir
die Intelligensiediens bepaal van inligting uit enkele Boere-dagboeke wat in hulle hande geval
en deur hulle vertaal is.
