Abstract:
This dissertation explores the evolution of explicit deposit insurance schemes (EDIS) in Southern African countries. It emphasises the important role of banks in the economy and their vulnerability to failures despite prudential requirements and supervision. Financial safety nets are essential for failing banks, and deposit insurance is the primary mechanism to protect depositors and maintain financial system stability in the event of a bank's failure. Originating in 1933 with the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the United States of America during the Great Depression, EDIS has become a global standard.
Southern Africa, with its developing financial sector, faces many challenges including bank failures, causing depositors to lose funds. The region's high interconnectedness increases the threat of contagion if parent banks fail. The absence of deposit insurance raises the likelihood of fiscal authorities succumbing to political pressure to bailout failing banks during crises as seen during the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The GFC prompted the International Association of Deposit Insurers and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to establish the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. Issued in June 2009, these principles are used by jurisdictions as a benchmark for assessing the quality of their deposit insurance systems and identifying gaps in their deposit insurance practices.
This research aims to evaluate international best practice standards for EDIS and extract lessons from the establishment of EDIS in the USA to address gaps in the implementation of deposit insurance schemes in Southern African countries. Examining ten Southern African countries, this research investigates varied progress in EDIS adoption. Case studies, particularly Zimbabwe as a pioneer of EDIS in the region and Namibia as a recent entrant, help to identify gaps and opportunities for enhancing deposit insurance frameworks in the region.
