Completing the complete understanding argument: a rejoinder to Roberto Di Ceglie

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dc.contributor.author Lougheed, Kirk
dc.date.accessioned 2024-04-12T07:02:39Z
dc.date.available 2024-04-12T07:02:39Z
dc.date.issued 2023-04
dc.description.abstract In The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews (2020), I defend the Complete Understanding Argument for anti-theism, which says that God’s existence makes the world worse with respect to our ability to understand it. In a recent article, Roberto Di Ceglie offers three objections to my argument. I seek to rescue my argument by showing (1) that understanding can come in degrees; (2) that I’m not a consequentialist about the value of understanding; and (3) that my argument is consistent with God providing us with sufficient knowledge of important spiritual matters. Di Ceglie’s objections point to future areas for fruitful exploration but do not defeat my argument. en_US
dc.description.department Philosophy en_US
dc.description.librarian hj2024 en_US
dc.description.sdg None en_US
dc.description.uri http://link.springer.com/journal/11406 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Lougheed, K. Completing the Complete Understanding Argument: A Rejoinder to Roberto Di Ceglie. Philosophia 51, 811–819 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00574-0. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0048-3893 (print)
dc.identifier.issn 1574-9274 (online)
dc.identifier.other 10.1007/s11406-022-00574-0
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2263/95490
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Springer en_US
dc.rights © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. The original publication is available at : http://link.springer.com/journal/11406. en_US
dc.subject Axiology of theism en_US
dc.subject Anti-theism en_US
dc.subject Complete understanding en_US
dc.subject Di Ceglie, Roberto en_US
dc.subject Lougheed, Kirk en_US
dc.title Completing the complete understanding argument: a rejoinder to Roberto Di Ceglie en_US
dc.type Postprint Article en_US


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