A Novel Reply to the Knowledge Argument : Wiredu's view of Quasi-Physicalism as a positive Reply to Jackson

Abstract

In this thesis I offer a novel alternative response to Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) knowledge argument in support of non-reductive physicalism (NRP). The knowledge argument is framed as an attack on reductive physicalism (RP), as it suggests the possibility that the subjective experience (SE) of an event or phenomenon adds ‘real’ knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge. My novel response aims to enrich the current debate, dominated as it is by Western philosophy of mind, by introducing one specific African concept of mind into the debate. The concept of mind I introduce into the debate, is Kwasi Wiredu’s (1987) quasi-physicalist interpretation of the Akan concept of mind. My alternative reply specifically contributes to the debate by changing the negative ability reply to the knowledge argument, framed by Nemirow (1980, 1990) and Lewis (1983, 1988) in Western philosophy of mind, into a positive support for Jackson (1982, 1986) by introducing African voices into the debate. I demonstrate that although the unsolved mind-body problem is presented as an ongoing philosophical issue in Western philosophy, a turn to an African perspective can shine new light on the problem. The novel alternative reply to Jackson’s knowledge argument consists of an epistemological argument that subjective experience (SE) adds genuine knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge, and a metaphysical argument that subjective experience (SE) is an emergent mental property. These two arguments validate property dualism as well as the knowledge argument.