A critical realist view of psychology as a science

Abstract

The early work of Bhaskar is critically evaluated as a possible philosophy of science for psychology. His Critical Realism reacts against both positivism in natural science and hermeneutics in psychosocial science. On the one hand, he proposed a Transcendental Realism against Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The former aims to avoid the epistemic fallacy and show how natural science is possible. On the other hand, Bhaskar investigated the possibility of naturalism in social science but he managed to merely strengthen a dualist ontology. A consistent Naturalist Realism ought to account for both modes of reality. It should be based on a unitary ontology and be able to show how epistemic access to both natural and psychosocial modes is possible. In the study, a brief overview is provided to the development of psychology's image of science and how it is revealed in its struggle to unite science and practice. Its views of science and measurement are labelled as positivistic and usually social constructionism is considered as a viable alternative. An overview of positivism and its roots in empiricism is provided along with a discussion of Gergen's social constructionism. Scientific Realism, along with Semirealism, Minimal Realism and Situational Realism are examined to establish the principles of realism informing a Naturalist Realism. Before the viability of Bhaskar's philosophy of science for psychology is considered as a way to negotiate between positivism and constructionism, Kant's Transcendental Idealism is briefly discussed. Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism, what was later called Critical Realism, is evaluated against the Kantian implications for realism. The implications of a Naturalist Realism for psychology as science is then examined. Harré's discursive view of psychology and psychosocial reality provides a way of acknowledging the qualitative difference between modes of reality while holding to a concept of one (or naturalist) ontology. It is shown that discursivity is ontologically grounded making debate, argumentation and criticism possible. In the case of science, discursivity becomes critical evaluation. Causality underlies the possibility of experience in both natural and psychosocial science. It is suggested that in the case of the latter meaning might have a causal function. The limitations of Critical Realism as a philosophy of science for psychology can be overcome by a Naturalist Realism by enabling a movement beyond opposing perspectives prevalent in psychology's image of science and methodologies, such as qualitative/quantitative and positivism/constructionism