Africa’s imperial presidents : immunity, impunity and accountability

Abstract

A fundamental tenet of modern constitutionalism is that nobody, regardless of his status is above the law. Extensive powers conferred on African presidents in the independence constitutions, reinforced by ineffective mechanisms of accountability and presidential immunities led to the phenomenon of “imperial” presidents who operated outside the law and regularly abused their powers. Constitutional reforms in the 1990s saw the introduction in many African countries of constitutions which for the first time provide some prospects for promoting constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law. This paper attempts to review the extent to which these reforms have addressed the issue of presidential absolutism and the abuses that go with it. It examines some of the factors that made African presidents to be so powerful that the conventional constitutional checks and balances could not restrain their excesses. It also reviews the attempts to limit impunity through immunity provisions. It concludes that unfortunately, the 1990 reforms did not adequately address the problem of presidential absolutism. A number of ways in which presidential accountability could be enhanced and the culture of impunity ended is suggested. Because it is argued that tyranny and authoritarianism is no longer simply a national but also an international problem, it is argued that the expanding reach of international justice is bound to make life difficult for present and future African dictators. It is thus clear that African leaders can no longer expect to easily get away with any abuses of powers, especially where these lead to the commission of international crimes against their people. The different measures, both national and international that are suggested to deal with the issue of presidential lawlessness and impunity may not eliminate these problems but nevertheless act as a deterrent by sending a clear message of the strong likelihood of punishment.