Information security vulnerabilities within EMV automated fare collection, their consequence, and possible remedies

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dc.contributor.author Joubert, D
dc.contributor.coadvisor
dc.contributor.other Southern African Transport Conference (33rd : 2014 : Pretoria, South Africa)
dc.contributor.other Minister of Transport, South Africa
dc.date.accessioned 2015-06-18T08:35:38Z
dc.date.available 2015-06-18T08:35:38Z
dc.date.created 2014
dc.date.issued 2014
dc.description This paper was transferred from the original CD ROM created for this conference. The material was published using Adobe Acrobat 10.1.0 Technology. The original CD ROM was produced by CE Projects cc. Postal Address: PO Box 560 Irene 0062 South Africa. Tel.: +27 12 667 2074 Fax: +27 12 667 2766 E-mail: proceedings@ceprojects.co.za en_ZA
dc.description.abstract Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Southern African Transport Conference 7-10 July 2014 "Leading Transport into the Future", CSIR International Convention Centre, Pretoria, South Africa. en_ZA
dc.description.abstract South Africa embarked on a world first when it promulgated legislation to ensure that it future proofed fare revenue collection for its public transport system. The legislation did not get promulgated without resistance from local and international fare collection product suppliers. The promulgation is technology agnostic, and only refers to a bank issued fare medium that must be based on the Europay MasterCard Visa (EMV) standard that should contain the Automated Fare Collection (AFC) Data Structure (DS). The AFC DS in turn is defined as electronic tags that are used for recording and retrieving public transport-related data. Herein lays the vulnerability of the legislation. Card Associations (CAs), such as MasterCard, Visa, and American Express to name but a few, create bank issued media implementations that authenticate financial transactions that comply with the strict EMV specification. These CAs also provide AFC DS mechanisms that provide access to the electronic tags that are referenced within the legislation. These AFC DS access mechanisms are not governed by EMV. These mechanisms are not governed, reviewed, or audited for “fit-for-purpose” within the public transport domain either. They are provided as is and do not come with any warranty and/or guarantee that “farecalculations” will be secure, reliable, and consistent. How could they, they are not part of the calculation process. If the AFC DS electronic tags can be compromised, meaning the manipulation of the public transport data on the fare medium, then the CA have a direct impact to the correct and/or incorrect calculation of the fares. All the provided AFC data structure mechanisms provided to date can be compromised to some extent. Additional legislation that was promulgated also inhibits the use of the AFC Data Structure to its full extent as originally envisaged. This paper will briefly provide detail on some of these issues, their impact, mitigation measures, and a recommendation for a more secure implementation. en_ZA
dc.format.extent 10 pages en_ZA
dc.identifier.citation Joubert, D 2014, "Information security vulnerabilities within EMV automated fare collection, their consequence, and possible remedies" Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Southern African Transport Transport Conference 7-10 July 2014 "Leading Transport into the Future", CSIR International Convention Centre, Pretoria, South Africa. en_ZA
dc.identifier.isbn 978-1-920017-61-3
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2263/45584
dc.language.iso en en_ZA
dc.rights University of Pretoria en_ZA
dc.subject Automated fare collection en_ZA
dc.subject Electronic fare integration en_ZA
dc.subject Europay mastercard visa en_ZA
dc.title Information security vulnerabilities within EMV automated fare collection, their consequence, and possible remedies en_ZA
dc.type Presentation en_ZA


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