Abstract:
Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as
superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in
which theWittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as
a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition
is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating
‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate
the meaning that religious beliefs have in the lives of both the faithful and their critics.
I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using
examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply
this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular
Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be
called superstitious.
