Improving value for money on SANRAL's toll operations contracts

Abstract

The South African National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL) is the custodian of the 9 208km national road network in South Africa. SANRAL's mandate is to develop, maintain and operate this national economic asset. 26,3°/o of the national road network consists of toll roads. The operation and maintenance of the toll facilities are let by SANRAL through a public open tender process. The successful tenderer is then appointed by SANRAL on a contract basis as the toll road operator. The operation and management of toll facilities involve various technical and managerial disciplines, such as electrical, mechanical and civil engineering, toll collection, and operations management. Historically, toll operations contracts were fragmented into separate sub-contracts for each of the disciplines. This resulted in a substantial amount of project management input from SANRAL. In addition to SANRAL's high level of management input, it also carried the risk of fraud. SANRAL had no incentives for a toll operator to increase the toll revenues, neither did it impose any penalties for poor performance. In order to simplify the project structure, as well as to improve on the old toll contract format, SANRAL developed a new toll operations contract model, aptly named Comprehensive Toll Road Operations and Maintenance or CTROM (C-T -ROM). Amongst others, the benefits of the new contract format are: • That it simplifies SANRAL's management input by providing a single point of contact between SANRAL and a principal toll operator, under whose supervision all the sub-contractors reside. The toll operator therefore assumes the responsibility and accountability to manage the sub-contractors. • The introduction of penalties that are imposed on the toll operator, should he not perform his contractually specified duties and obligations. • The transfer of fraud risk to the toll operator. • An increase in the toll revenue by offering the toll operator a revenue-sharing incentive. The first contracts let under the CTROM format were the N2 North Coast Toll Road and the N2 South Coast Toll Road in July 2001. As these toll routes had been in operation for a while before the CTROM contracts were procured, comparisons could be made on the pre-CTROM and post-CTROM costs. Initial indications were, although there were some structural differences between the old and the new format, that these two CTROM contracts were between 7 and 13°/o more expensive than their predecessors. An extrapolation of these values to all the current CTROM contracts results in additional costs to SANRAL of between R 10m and R 20m per annum, when compared to the previously used managed contract format. The more expensive CTROM contracts have brought about significant benefits, such as the tra'nsfer of fraud risk from SANRAL to the toll operator, as well as a simpler project structure in the form of a single point of responsibility. The intention of this research report is to determine whether the increase in cost has been worthwhile, and whether there are areas for further improvement. In other words, are the more expensive CTROM contracts providing SANRAL with an associated increase in value for its money? Not only is SANRAL concerned with the prudential expenditure of its toll revenues, but it is also under legislated obligations to ensure that funds are spent in the most appropriate and efficient ways. In order to better understand value for money and related concepts, the author explores various academic theories in the form of a literature study. By building a platform from which to conduct further analyses, the author can then apply the newly found knowledge to test the hypothesis that SANRAL is not achieving optimal value for money on its CTROM contracts. Concepts and theories that are studied in the literature review include: • The legislative and institutional framework; and • Key terminology such as risk management, the public sector comparator, value for money, and performance penalties on contracts. Many of the concepts have been explored worldwide, especially in developed countries such as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, where those countries' governments actively encourage private sector investment in public infrastructure. In the analytical part of the research report, the author explores the causes of the additional costs on two of SANRAL's toll routes, namely: • The Mariannhill Toll Route, which is located on the N3 between Pinetown and Key Ridge in the province of KwaZulu-Natal; and • The N 17 Toll Route between Springs and Wemmer Pan in the province of Gauteng. The analyses suggest that the operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of the N3 Mariannhill and N 17 toll routes under the CTROM contracts are 46,3°/o and 20,4°/o more expensive than on the previous contracts. Some of the factors that could play a role in the increased cost of the CTROM contracts are: • The contract duration; • Risk transfer to the toll operator; • Penalties applied when the toll operator does not conform to the required specifications; and • Complex performance specifications. University of Pretoria Graduate School of Management MBA Research Report RPJ820 v P Suremann 91052719 October 2004 Digitised by the University of Pretoria, Library Services, 2014 The author concludes that there are a number of factors that negatively influence the cost of the CTROM contracts. The author therefore recommends that the factors that are within the control of SANRAL be changed. These improvements should bring about better value for money on SANRAL's toll operations contracts.