Abstract:
In
order
to
complement
existing
empirical
research
on
democratic
consolidation
in
Kenya
and
the
role
of
the
judiciary
in
particular,
this
mini-‐dissertation
analyses
the
relationship
between
judicial
appointment
processes
and
judicial
independence
in
Kenya.
The
escalation
of
corruption,
centralisation
and
abuse
of
power
by
the
executive,
the
lack
of
government
accountability
and
post-‐election
conflict
of
2007
is
linked
to
the
dominance
of
the
executive
and
corresponding
subservience
of
the
judiciary.
Historically,
judicial
appointments
have
been
the
ambit
of
the
President.
The
powers
given
to
the
President
to
appoint
and
remove
judges
have
resulted
in
judicial
appointments
premised
on
allegiance
to
the
executive
rather
than
on
upholding
justice
and
the
Bill
of
Rights.
To
rectify
this
deficiency,
the
2010
Constitution
has
introduced
a
merit
based
system
of
judicial
appointments
that
meets
international
standards
on
judicial
independence.
The
new
process
requires
the
President
to
limit
his
appointments
to
the
recommendations
of
a
Judicial
Service
Commission
whose
responsibility
it
is
to
shortlist
candidates
through
a
transparent
public
process.
An
analysis
of
the
selection
of
Kenya’s
sitting
Chief
Justice
and
Deputy
Chief
Justice
demonstrates
that
the
reformed
judicial
appointment
process
has
delegitimised
the
executive’s
dominance
over
the
judiciary
and
by
so
doing
has
placed
Kenya
on
the
road
restoring
judicial
independence.
