Abstract:
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine the evolution of the system of civilian Intelligence Service accountability in the UK and US with a view to comparing and identifying the similarities and differences between them. In this regard, the study provides a conceptual framework for civilian intelligence accountability as a prerequisite for credible state intelligence within a democratic framework. Although no precise model exists for holding Intelligence Services to account, it is evident that a system of checks and balances is necessary, and that the Executive cannot be the exclusive overseer of intelligence. The study examines the development of arrangements for intelligence accountability in the UK and US from the beginning of the Cold War to the end of 2009, and analyses the impact of the Cold War; the events of 9/11, and the London bombings in this regard. The study highlights that the systems for holding intelligence to account in the UK and US differ in material respects, and that 9/11 marginalised the restraining role of the system on intelligence. In this regard, the study also emphasises that intelligence failure is accompanied by concerns of intelligence effectiveness, and intelligence abuse, by concerns of intelligence propriety. The study concludes that systems for holding civilian intelligence to account are in the relatively early stages of their evolution; subject to inherent limitations, and therefore only able to provide limited constraints on the conduct of intelligence activities, and limited assurance on its propriety.
