Abstract:
This study compares and analyses South Africa’s mediation efforts in Burundi from 1999-present, and Côte d’Ivoire from 2004-2006. A thorough study of the two conflicts reveals that the conflict in Burundi was far more intractable than that in Côte d’Ivoire, with very unique factors contributing to the conflict: a high population density coupled with land scarcity, in a bifurcated dual community with a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. The Tutsi minority had ruled over the Hutu majority since pre-colonial times. The Arusha Agreement for the Reconciliation of Burundi (2000) attempted to redress these historical circumstances by introducing proportional ethnic quotas. While enabling majority rule, these however, ensured the former minority rulers retain substantial power through the agreed proportional formulae. A significant challenge with which the South African mediators were faced was that the major Hutu rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD and the Paliphehutu-FNL remained outside the peace process until 2003 and 2008 respectively. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was influenced more strongly by economic factors. Once Ivoirité was introduced in 1964, based on the patrimonialism of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny’s one party rule, groups such as migrants, northerners and Muslims formed an alliance of the excluded and rebelled against the Ivoirité government. This continues to contribute significantly to the conflict in the country. Although the Côte d’Ivoirian conflict was far more negotiable, bad faith between the government and the rebels, agreements that did not address the root causes of the conflict as well as a proliferation of external mediators resulted in a protracted peace process that has not been completely resolved. The most significant contribution by South Africa may have been President Mbeki’s determination on Article 35 of the Côte d’Ivoirian constitution that excluded personalities who did not meet the requirements of Ivoirité from standing for public office. South Africa had, as a newly democratized country prioritized conflict and post conflict resolution as a pre-cursor to promoting development on the continent, which it sees as twin pillars of the African agenda for African renewal. This study aims to investigate how it fared in particularly these two endevours as it exported the South African model of conflict resolution based on its own transformation and which outcomes can be considered more successful. In assessing how South Africa fared, the outcomes of its intervention in each of the case studies, is weighed against criteria for successful conflict resolution determined by John Stremlau and William Zartman. Copyright
