Onderweg na goeie wetenskap 3 : voorwaardes vir die beste moontlike wetenskap

Abstract

Wetenskap beklee 'n uiters belangrike plek in ons wêreld, wat besinning daaroor en pogings om dit te verbeter, verklaar. In hierdie artikel probeer ons rekenskap gee van belangrike aspekte wat in die beste moontlike wetenskap verreken moet word, en wat gebruik kan word om 'n meer aanvaarbare beoordelingstelsel aan die hand te doen. Ons vertrekpunt is wetenskapskritiek wat die wetenskap in die algemeen daarvan beskuldig dat dit met 'n verarmde voorstelling van die werklikheid waarmee dit besig is, werk. Ten einde die kritiek te kan plaas en begrond en verbeteringe te kan aanbeveel, word die volgende vyf pare teenstellende maar verbandhoudende begrippe geïdentifiseer en bespreek: navorsingsobjekte vs. werklikheid; subjek vs. mens; metode vs. denke; inligting vs. kennis; samelewing vs. gemeenskap. Ons wys in elke geval uit dat die beste moontlike wetenskap vereis dat hierdie begrippe as aanvullend verstaan moet word. Dit impliseer dat wetenskaplike denke en praktyk drastiese aanpassings sal moet ondergaan om die vereiste verryking te kan bewerkstellig.

Science is important in our society. Policy statements, planning attempts and schemes to increase the research output, however, raise questions about the idea of good science. What is "good" science? Does such a qualification have any application? Who decides? How do these external inputs affect the ideal of good science? In this article we explore conditions for ensuring the best possible science. We consider five key fields in scientific theory and practice. Each field is represented by a pair of opposing concepts, one representing the "standard" approach, the other an alternative and broader view. We argue that these concepts should be seen as complementary so that it is possible to move from the one to the other. Taking our cue from Heidegger's critique of modern science, and with the help of arguments and insights developed by a range of contemporary philosophers, we reflect on the "impoverished" effect of the standard framework on science in general with reference to the five fields identified. We relate the accepted approach to hidden metaphysical assumptions, indicate why such an approach stands in the way of achieving the best science possible, and then consider possible remedial measures so that the accepted view can be developed and "enriched".