Abstract:
David Benatar argues that one important consideration in favour of anti-natalism
is based on the fact that all humans lack cosmic meaning; we will never transcend
space and time such that we will have an impact on the entire universe, forever.
Instead of denying Benatar’s claim that we lack cosmic meaning, Thaddeus Metz
recently argues that our lack of cosmic meaning is not that significant because
we ought not to regret lacking a good that we could not have in the first place. He
explains the principle behind this idea in modal terms: “the closer the world in
which one could access a benefit, the more reasonable are attitudes such as sadness,
disappointment, regret when does not acquire it.” I argue that this principle
faces a serious counterexample in the form of death. The possible worlds in which
one doesn’t die are incredibly distant. Yet, it is appropriate to express deep sadness,
disappointment, and regret at the fact that one must inevitably face death. Metz is
wrong that we shouldn’t regret lacking a good unavailable to us in the first place. His
criticism of Benatar therefore fails. While it might be objected that immortality is
not good, my basic point still stands when considering the fact that our lives are not
significantly longer. Benatar’s claims about the significance of our lack of cosmic
meaning might not be true, but not for the reasons suggested by Metz.
