Accountability, bureaucratic discretion, and civil-military relations

Abstract

All democracies wrestle with the problem of representation. Most people intuitively understand this through electoral politics, but this connection is less clear when we consider bureaucracy. And when it comes to civil-military relations, many think about this problem in terms of “civilian control.” We present a different approach and contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we critique assumptions often used in thinking about civilian control. Second, we offer a classification system with three schools of thought on the problem of bureaucratic accountability. These are the (a) political control school (representation through the politics-administration dichotomy and compliance model), (b) responsiveness through institutional design school (representation through formal institutions), and (c) responsibility through values school (representation through informal institutions). We provide examples from scholarship and cinema for each school to aid in understanding and to facilitate teaching and learning. Third, using bureaucratic accountability as an organizing concept, we propose bureaucratic discretion as a different organizing problem or puzzle for civil-military relations scholars to consider. Furthermore, by providing an organizing concept for civil-military relations using insights from the field of public administration, we additionally lay the groundwork to encourage public administration scholars to conduct research on civil-military relations.