

THE MONUMENT THAT IS EPISTEMOLOGY
A PROPOSITION FOR ATHEISTS AND THEISTS AS ELUCIDATIONS OF
EPISTEMOLOGY IN RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

JOHAN A. VAN ROOYEN*

University of Pretoria

ABSTRACT: For scholars that are working with epistemology and the importance thereof within the context of the ongoing bickering (fighting/mudslinging) between theist and atheists, or rather between rationality and irrationality of epistemology in theology and religion, may come to view epistemology of religion and theology as a monument from where a better belief system (as an incentive) can have a better effect on the current faith systems. Therefore, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic language games should be able to form this massive, sovereign metaphysical game. This affirmation should follow the historical fact of any metaphysical promise so that such a religious custom, should suggest that not only the Judo-Christian-Islamic language games, yet, all relevant creative queries should also be evaluated as components of the single game, with a solitary position of a decree and therefore all seven headings used in this article are relevant. The author is in a short discussion with Peter Forrest regarding his article *Epistemology of Religion* (2021) in establishing a positive outlook on how different views on the epistemology of religion and theology may surpass scholars which can expand and then better the current integrity-base epistemology of theology and religions.

Intra/interdisciplinary methodology

This affirmation, therefore, focuses on queries such as, ‘is it epistemologically sustainable for *sapiens* to believe in a God’? Is it epistemologically sustainable for *sapiens* to believe in the Trinity? Or ‘is it epistemologically sustainable that *sapiens* can be an embodiment of a Deity’? It overlooks such queries as if this belief estimates a consciousness that is empirical and therefore scientific.

Moreover, this affirmation also tries to understand the bickering amongst rational idealists and mystics from the context of post-foundationalism who want to explain that faith or belief is not intended and thus it is not a planned commodity, rather it is an epistemological evolutionary process. Notwithstanding that this has a connection

*JOHAN A. VAN ROOYEN (PhD 2015, University of Pretoria) is a research associate with the Department Systematic and Historical Theology; Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Pretoria. Email: roojresearch@gmail.com

to the epistemology of theology and religion they are also the predominant subject matters in natural epistemology. This brings me to the introduction of this article where the purpose is elucidated.

KEYWORDS: epistemology; evidentialism, Wittgenstein fideism; Aquinas/Calvin effect; Plantinga.

Introduction

It must be stressed at this point that the author does not have a problem with Forrest in how he describes the epistemology of religion and theology, therefore the method and not any theoretical argument. What is eliminative regarding Forrest's (2021:1) article is that he states that evidentialism sets high benchmarks for its affirmation, hence the scope of the article:

Evidentialism, then, sets rather high standards for justification, standards that the majority do not, it would seem, meet when it comes to religious beliefs, where many rely on faith, which is more like the forecaster's hunch about the weather than the argument from past climate records.

And then he (2021:1) asks important questions, hence the objectives of the article, of:

Many others take somebody of scripture, such as the Bible or the Koran as of special authority, contrary to the evidentialist treatment of these as just like any other books making various claims. Are these standards too high? This century has seen a turn in the debate, with emphasis on the implications of disagreement, how can sincere intelligent people disagree? Should not we all suspend judgement?

Perhaps or just maybe can we believe, he is asking the right questions in these contexts as these questions are important for religious scholars as this enhances the integrity of any epistemology of religion or theology as it does not shy away but rather engage with the questions and therefore the author and article assumptions. This brings us to the elucidations in showing how the structure of the article wills us to answer these questions with Forrest.

Elucidations

Epistemology is complex considering there are a definite class of things to be weighed and valued. As the affirmation of these questions are within the scope of the epistemology of theology and religion and thus not natural epistemology is weighed therefore must have, at least, an affiliation with faith. As there is no other kind of religious beliefs for *sapiens* that can or cannot be sustained or un-sustained. In doing so the author makes use of the following headings as noted so-called truths in the epis-

temology of religion and theology (some truths of epistemology) as there are many more, as per example the 1) relevance of Newman and religious experience, 2) revelation, and tradition, to name only but two. They are, 1), *the dismissal of the knowledge in evidentialism*. 2), *evidentialism sheltered* 3), *spontaneous theology* 4), *Wittgenstein fideism* 5), *the divergence between reformed epistemology and fideism* 6), *the Aquinas/ Calvin effect and last* 7), *the epistemic religious debates* Forrest (2021:1). This affirmation, (semantically scribbled) therefore, focuses on queries such as: ‘is it sustained for John to believe in God?’ ‘Is it sustained for Daniel to believe in the Trinity?’ Or ‘is it sustained that Paul is a *sapiens* embodiment of a Deity’?

[Take cognisance that the author uses the terms theology and religion interchangeably. The reason for this is that when the author recondites what the discrepancies of the epistemologically of theology or religion could be, he from time to time uses these terms interchangeably for contextual purposes, specifically for this affirmation].

[Note that the author uses the terms believe, belief and faith interchangeably as when the author investigates certain phenomena regarding the epistemology of theology or religion he embarked on this subject matter with an interdisciplinary approach and therefore are the terms negotiated in different albeit circumspect genres in the text].

Yet, this subject matter is also religious faith, more precisely, also a matter of religious experience, as it has the same queries that can be queried of faith(s) and perhaps the vacancy of such faith(s), to the point where the basic potencies are sloppy or indifferent. As paragon Schellenberg (2009:76) has claimed that it is unsustainable to believe in an own God, un-sustained to have faith in an own God, or un-sustained just plainly to believe in a Deity-commodity. However, it is sustained for *sapiens* to have a religious demeanour of faith in a Deity, yet subsequently, and arguably, this affirmation dissipates on Western epistemology of theology and religion, which is never the equivalent of Western theology or religion’s epistemology. This brings us to the first heading namely, the dismissal of knowledge in evidentialism. The reason for this heading has to do with the affirmation which limits faith (i.e., religious faith that is affirmed with comprehensive dependence). It amounts to that if there is not a poise of knowledge in evidentialism, for that kind of faith. Let me explain in one example (Christian Theology), as there are many more and are relevant to most theistic religions:

[Please record that the author uses different references to God as Divinity as sometimes Deity or Deity-commodity. The reason for this is that when Forrest is asking these mentioned questions on the epistemology of theology and religion, he (author) does not want to be restricted in using just one such a Deity name yet would

like to emphasise what is being answered to these questions in this article with a couple or name alternatives].

A solitary capacious objection for Christian theology, as I reflect on it, is to elucidate what the factors are to perceive (know) God. Say for instance an individual believe God is out there and merge with *sapiens* by space of the Spirit, proclaiming (a) (the) veracities(s), and in the embodiment, how does the veracities utilize of what is outermost to us *sapiens* to access our reason and become compensating? Therefore, the question ought to be: Is it really a prerequisite that all our acumen be filtrated through an affirmation development in order to become (a) (the) veracity or is there a substance in the vocation of God's Spirit and Message and the being of Christ which abide outside of this directive? This brings us to the dismissal of knowledge in evidentialism.

The dismissal of knowledge in evidentialism

Evidentialism requires that no comprehensive religious faith (i.e., a religious faith detained with comprehensive dependence) is sustainable except where there is a convincing affirmation for it, or that it is self-explanatory. Therefore, the appease of religious experience has been designated not to estimate as (a) affirmation, as perhaps alike when, Descartes held that the existence of a Deity is self-explanatory, beliefs (to name only three semantically stated examples) such as John in a God, such as Daniel in the Trinity or as Paul in the divinity. Still, the single affirmation for these faiths is intended to be non-religious establishments, from where religious faiths are defined. That is why the solitary space of decisiveness is when religious faiths are sustained to determine sundry bickering's with the non-religious faiths as establishments and therefore their terminations.

[Evidentialism, is a thesis in epistemology which states that one is justified (affirmation) to believe something if and only if those sapiens have affirmation which supports their belief. Evidentialism is therefore a thesis about which beliefs are sustainable and which are not].

In this affirmation to evidentialism, it obeys the bickering's that there is a Deity, and it embodies any squabbles from religious experience as a religion or theology. These squabbles then became partially feasible with a singularity, as an ultimate embrace, of a Deity-commodity that is not self-explanatory. When this is then affirmed, no single decree can be sustained in securing full faith that there is a God. Notwithstanding this, this is also true for the exact embrace for alternative religious faiths. Moreover, it decrees that (un)sustainability have limited faith (i.e., a religious faith detained with comprehensive dependence) if there is not a poise of affirmation for that faith. This is not meant as a criticism, only a justification (affirmation) of the layer(s) (that forms part of the monument *per se*), that is limited faith when there is

not a poise of affirmation in this article. This brings us to evidentialism sheltered. The reason for explaining this here is diploid: One, due to mudslinging that is taking place between theists and atheists. And two, that a reduced comprehensive faith in an epistemological thesis conducts theism to be un-sustained, yet it is then sustained.

[The term religious experience used in this context is a neologism that the author wants to interject with a wish that it will, eventually, become a new word or expression in a language, (within this evidentialism context), or a new meaning for an existing word or expression. Again, technical in this context as then some neologisms become widely used and enter the language].

Evidentialism sheltered

The assurance, as we are not frowning upon it, is that non-theist philosophers talking regarding evidentialism is condemned or has been condemned. Primarily, due to mudslinging as Shalkowski (1989:14) recalled it: ‘... that these defenders of evidentialism tend in fact to be atheists and not agnostics, yet a careful examination of the examples used to support Ockham’s Razor. It then means that it shows that either there are ones in which there is an independent affirmation for denying the existence X or ones in which the suspension of affirmation seems to be an appropriate response, not denial.’

[Occam’s (also spelled Ockham) razor is the principle that, of two explanations that account for all the facts, the simpler (the more reductionistic) one is more likely to be correct. It is applied to a wide range of disciplines, including religion, physics, and medicine].

Secondarily, there is an additional stricture of what Plantinga (1989:115) requested, that: ‘evidentialism is self-referentially inconsistent for there is no affirmation for evidentialism.’ This is where Forrest (2017:4) deduced that this potency can be dealt with in two procedures. ‘First, it could be said that all that is being defended is the Ockhamist fragment of evidentialism and that this is not itself vulnerable to Ockham’s razor’. Or second, ‘it could be argued that deriving an epistemology from a wide range of examples is an affirmation for it’.

Yet and notwithstanding this, maybe we can wish for a new neologism to be established here when we say that a reduced affirmed faith in an epistemological thesis which conducts theism to be un-sustained, is then sustained. To us then this is illuminated when using Forrest (2021:5) paragon with synthetic algorithmic rigour:

80% confidence in an epistemology that showed that no degree of belief in theism greater than 60% was justified is incompatible with a degree of belief in theism greater than 68%. The person in question could have a degree of belief of in the conjunction of theism and the, [80% likely], the epistemology of no greater than 48%, [80% of 60%],

and a degree of belief in the conjunction of theism and the denial of that epistemology of no greater than 20% since that epistemology has a probability of 80% .

And this brings us to the next heading namely, spontaneous theology. The reason for explaining spontaneous theology in the context of this article, precisely here, has to do with that although there is a diversity which indicates the usual thesis that there is an affirmation for theism yet dispositions of a possible definitive kind, is vindicating normal faith yet not comprehensive faith.

[As a neologism the term Spontaneous Theology is used in this context rather than Natural Theology. The reason for this is that when the author refer to Spontaneous Theology it emphasises the spontaneity and impulsiveness of a sapien yearning to belong to a Deity, more decisively to his mind. However, this spontaneity must meet a certain criterion. A criterion that is set forth in this article from asking the questions at the beginning. The answers and therefore the affirmation of these questions can be spontaneous, yet it must always be epistemologically driven].

Spontaneous Theology

In the present day, it is believed that it is natural to assume that many Spontaneous Theologians have rejected, or at least stay clear from it, rejecting the scrutiny that bickering brings forth between atheists and theists. There is a perception that they do not want to *make waves* and thus not going the emotional route of bickering when they rather search for faiths that are possible. Perhaps they think that it is more rational this way around. Still, it is believed if this is the case in point, it is an error of having a classic affirmation to faith or belief and does not make such a faith truer than perhaps the epistemological or evidential path or journey, searching for the truth in this context. Eminent in this instance is Swinburne's (1979:69) Bayesian assurance on possibility.

My elucidation of Swinburne's disposition would also wish for a better elucidation. However, there is a diversity of classic thesis's that there is an affirmation for theism with the affirmation in vindicating classic faith although yet, not comprehensive faith. This brings us to Wittgenstein's fideism (in Forrest 2021) since he aptly applies an instance of correcting the problem that Buddhism and new versions of Judaism and Christianity have when they demolished their established metaphysical creeds.

Wittgenstein Fideism

Positively un-justifiably, is the criticism on Wittgenstein fideism, specifically in the context of this affirmation. Why? Due to that maybe, the most illuminative query of Wittgenstein regarding evidentialism within epistemology has to do with, as For-

rest (2021:10) remarks: ‘... that even if the underlying theory of forms of life and language games is granted, it is a historical fact itself justified by the criteria of the game of history’. Meaning, that the tradition to which most Jews, Christians and Muslims belong is a form of life with ponderous metaphysical commitments. Therefore, we can perhaps agree with the criticism on Wittgenstein’s fideism as such utterance as [there is a God] is intended as much like, [there is a star ten times more massive than the Sun] as like [there is hope]. Therefore, in concurring with Wittgenstein’s fideism when he interjects that it is only apt for religions as Zen Buddhism and for a few, comparatively new, progressive strings of Judaism and Christianity who have demolished their established metaphysical pledge?

[Wittgensteinianism or Wittgensteinian fideism is the proposition that there are a multitude of diverse language games (to designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself), and although it is apt to query the level-headedness within a language game it would be an error to query the level-headedness regarding “playing the game”]

In the context of this article, it is suggested that not only the Judo-Christian-Islamic language games yet also rational queries should be evaluated as components of this single game. However, with a solitary position of affirmation. Therefore, can we perchance wish that Wittgenstein’s fideism in all its worth must be sustained? Then when religious *sapiens* is encountering paradoxical affirmation regarding their kindliness it is a redress that *sapiens* is less willing to sporadic affirmation than to move around between comprehensive faiths in any Deity-commodity. Thus, in the weightiness of trouble and comprehensive non-faith when everything advances properly rather than to a sporadic affirmation when moving around between comprehensive faiths. This kind of orientation corresponds well with spontaneous theology adaptation of evidentialism, which were alluded to previously Biletzki and Anat (2021)

This brings us to the divergence between reformed epistemology and fideism and the reason being, is that atheists incline to try and seek to undermine by proposing a naturalistic cause for basic religious beliefs. Please take note that this is a criticism of atheists (and not Wittgenstein’s stance) in their reflective non-transparency by proposing naturalistic causes for basic religious beliefs.

The Divergence between Reformed Epistemology and Fideism

The main lone standing divergence among reformed epistemology and fideism is that the antecedent obligated justification (affirmation) opposing established criticisms, whereas the second could oppose comparable criticisms as one inept or, poor, important inducements. Caught in the criticisms are not only those (theists and atheists) stuck in bickering from those religious *sapiens* in pursuit of affirmation. Also, justification for sociology and somewhat new: ‘cognitive science that seeks to under-

mine by proposing a naturalistic cause for basic religious beliefs' Forrest (2021:8). To illuminate this as not criticisms it is viewed from the point of a layer in the monument of epistemology, I make use of the following example of Barret (2004:35) that postulates a HADD (hyperactive/hypersensitive agency detection device), implying that an emotional intercession tracking operating design is best when the aim is a relic, yet it is hyper-emotional if the relic is veracity.

This caused emotionality then explains *sapiens* dispositions *vis-à-vis* (face to face) of supernova faiths, disabling the basic core or foundations of those faiths. Also, in another example, Clark and Barret (2011:640) imply that this hyper-emotionality then should be a portion of the Transcendent design. An option, of Bayesian theistic reply, could be that HADD inflates a general elementary possibility for theism that is not at all a prominent exhausted antecedent for future evidentialism. This vindicates a portion of evidentialism, a portion reformed, a curriculum of appraising a totality of everything designed for a possibility eventuating from the outcome of the affirmation on its general possibility. Again, this is not a negative criticism, however rather a divergence between reformed epistemology and Wittgenstein fideism when the first one suggests a comprehensive mitigation of a restrictive proviso of evidentialism, while the second is solitary mitigation for a few language games, embodying religion, and theology.

Reformed epistemology should be rectified, still and notwithstanding significantly less than its enthusiasts proclaimed. That could happen if, in evidential comparatively fewer religious faiths, are established in the context of regular religious experiences that the uttermost *sapiens* of faith have. Again, an affirmation of layers within the monument. For it may, as Katz (1978:44) proclaims: '... be that the beliefs are part of the cause of the experience rather than the other way around'. This is the reason why the Aquinas/Calvin effect is now introduced, princely as this juncture where I beforenamed what Katz mentioned above, as yet another affirmation.

The Aquinas/Calvin effect

Just over two decades ago Plantinga (2000:52) sheltered a comparatively divergent justification (affirmation) of the Deity-commodity, which he calls the Aquinas/Calvin effect. This is dependent simultaneously on the theory of original sin in the request that the uttermost *sapiens* sustain a cognitive-affective indisposition, yet that it is a conclusion of Restitution where the Holy Spirit soothes *sapiens* so that they are apt to respond accordingly. And then it departs to have faith in the Christian admission in an instantaneous, non-presumed way. Through this manner, the Aquinas/Calvin effect bears the Christian metaphysics, which bears the Aquinas/Calvin effect. Perhaps, in an affirmation juncture, will it be admitted that the possibility of, y, of the Aquinas/Calvin effect due to Christian metaphysics is proportionally less than 100%,

due to antagonistic Christian designs. Still, as a result, the possibility, z , of Christian metaphysics is less than $x/(1-y)$ where x is the possibility of Christian metaphysics keeping in mind the mendacity of the Aquinas/Calvin effect. Ergo therefore from the author's point-of-view, the affirmation lies in Platinga's (2000:54) suggestion that it might be better if a solitarily y is imminent to 100% or x is not at all too tiny. This brings us to the epistemic religious debates and the reason for this is that epistemological theological and religious debates are and is for a long time troublesome.

The Epistemic Religious debate

Epistemological religious debates or dialogues are prolonged existing enigmas in the epistemology of religion and theology, yet, in this centennial, there has been immense interdigit controversy among theists and atheists as well as among supporters of sundry religions. The enigma here is palpable, as we can asked the following question from an affirmation point-of-view: How can honest apt *sapiens* oppose each other when theists and atheists, not, as adversaries, intermit decree? To be convinced, in this regard, occasionally those who bicker with one another are those who are one another's scholarly indifference. Think about the following: *Sapiens* think that π was $22/7$, and those that except this may obey an affirmation that π is an unreasonable digit may be ridiculed as unintelligent and that those *sapiens* are described as algorithmic simpletons.

This is not intended in this context to be a negative criticism as this affirmation of sustainability is that no comparable ignoramus is on societies presentation as it then becomes an ascribing latitude of social epistemic affinity. To strengthen this point Feldman 2007:14 condemned the relativist elucidation to this query, particularly that there is no consistent solitary intelligent faith demeanour to a disposed of presentation in a disposed of epistemic latitude. Feldman (2007:18-19) then further interjects that: 'He rejects unargued dismissal and reaches the conclusion that situations of epistemic parity disputants, should suspend judgement.'

Also, Peter van Inwagen (1994:34), in his autobiographical *Quam Dilecta*, requires that it be sustainable for both factions in a disagreement to invoke to what is peculiar accessible to them. Suchlike peculiarity claims, or even better, allegations of epistemic eminence that are customarily declared by aphoristic *sapiens* stressing that h/she simply does not understand the objective. Customarily, not understanding the objective necessitates a cognitive dead spot. As Forrest (2021:10) remarkably remarks: 'It is not that you know there is a point you cannot grasp, which reasonably requires some deference to those who claim to grasp it'. An individual *sapiens* is just ignoring that there is an objective. Also, perhaps here can we concurs with this 100%, and therefore regard it not as a criticism, rather as an affirmation of one such layer of what the epistemic monument is.

To summarise

The metaphor of a monument that is epistemology throughout the article suggests that the epistemic value regarding the epistemologically of theology and religion merely points to the fact that although religious *sapiens* yearn for a God or a Deity-commodity (just cognitively or, just affectively, or both), are made more probable through epistemology. All seven headings and their contents therefore can deduce that epistemology of religion or theology is a monument. The **first heading** qualifies as an epistemological dismissal of knowledge in evidentialism as it is an affirmation that there is a convincing affirmation for it and that it **IS** self-explanatory. The **second heading** evidentialism sheltered, the implication is that bickering between atheists and theists can be reduced to a comprehensive faith in an epistemological context where theism be unaffirmed and then it is affirmed when evidentialism is sheltered. Under the **third heading**, spontaneous theology, there is a paradoxical diversity of being close, yet far with (both theists and atheists) in the affirmation that there is affirmation for theism yet affirmation of a probable definitive kind, affirming normal faith yet not comprehensive faith. The **fourth heading** speaks of Wittgenstein fideism which makes it possible for both sides to adhere to different language games, yet they must accept that these different language games are surely a game that they willingly or unwillingly take part in. The **fifth heading** divergence between reformed epistemology and fideism, indicate that both factions favour epistemology of religion or theology under the umbrella of divergence between reformed epistemology and fideism. Therefore, affirming a portion of evidentialism, a portion reformed, a curriculum of appraising a totality of everything designed. Thus, the possibility that eventuates from the outcome of the affirmation on its general possibility. The **six heading** the Aquinas/Calvin effect steer us, positively as epistemological scholars to a better understanding when Plantinga underscores the fact that perhaps it will be admitted that the possibility of, γ , of the Aquinas/Calvin effect due to Christian metaphysics is proportionally less than 100%. This is a result of antagonistic Christian faiths that has equal reference to both mentioned theists and atheists. The **seventh and last heading**, epistemic religious debates underscore the aim of the article (once more) when it is said that this article wishes to encourage bickering among theists and atheists where a post-foundational mindset will better the understanding that proves faith is not intended or planned. However, that it is an epistemological evolutionary process by admitting that myriads of *sapiens*, both theists and atheists, will concur with van Inwagen (1994:38) who requires that it be sustainable for both factions in a disagreement to invoke to what is peculiar accessible to them. This is a marvelous affirmation.

Conclusion

The affirmation of epistemic theological or religious differences adheres to the calling of a Deity incentive. To explain this incentive, as the creator of a single epistemic prominence, as already mentioned elsewhere, the following example was noticed in this article: Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin effect. It is difficult to foresee, nonetheless, what should be utilised in the bickering among two faiths that are dependent on the position of any Deity's incentive or not? Just maybe the only alternative affirmation for non-bickering dispossession is well and truly just that, bickered dispossessions within a monument that is epistemic in religion or theology.

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