EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS TO COMBAT TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

By

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) (Political Sciences) in Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria, is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other institution of higher education.

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May 2024

ETHICS STATEMENT

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this thesis, has obtained the required research ethics approval/exemption for the research described in this work.

The author declares that they have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University's Code of Ethics for scholarly activities.

Ramotlhantsweng Michael Thekiso
May 2024

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"If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." – Isaac Newton

ABSTRACT

If the stability of the Southern African region is to be maintained, the ability to combat and prevent terrorism should be of utmost importance to South Africa. The lack of significant terrorist attacks in the region is likely to entice the authorities into a state of complacency, and denial, potentially resulting in a failure to take action. This may provide an opportunity for terrorists to launch attacks in South Africa, which has become a preferred destination for terrorists. The question of its readiness for a terrorist attack, therefore, becomes ever relevant.

The primary objective of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional framework to combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa as perceived by senior officers in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The study uses the institutional theory as its primary theoretical framework to assess the institutions responsible for countering terrorism. It additionally identifies South Africa's anti-terrorism legislation and relevant institutions responsible for combatting and preventing terrorism. It further evaluates the institutions' history in preventing terrorism, as well as their state of readiness in case of probable attacks. Importantly, the study measures the respondents' perceptions regarding the institutions' ability to quell a terrorist attack.

This study utilised an explanatory sequential mixed method approach, which involved surveying 280 senior officers from the SANDF. The respondents were selected using a probability sampling technique known as simple random sampling. An additional 19 academics and security practitioners were chosen using a non-probability random method, purposive sampling method. Semi-structured interviews were used for this purpose. The quantitative data was analysed using the IBM SPSS computer software's descriptive statistics. The qualitative data, on the other hand, was analysed using the thematic analysis approach. These elements were integrated and interpreted simultaneously.

The study's key finding is that there appears to be a general lack of public trust and confidence in the capacity of government institutions and the anti-terrorism policy framework to effectively combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa. This can be

attributed to the perceived high levels of corruption in certain government institutions, institutional dysfunctionality, and a general apathy towards the government. Furthermore, inadequate communication regarding terrorism may have adversely impacted the respondents' views on the government's capacity to address a terrorist threat in South Africa. This finding is suggestive of a need for a holistic approach to security sector reform in order to effectively combat terrorism in South Africa.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	11 September 2011
AFB LBWG	Airforce Base Langebaanweg
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
ANC	African National Congress
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Magreb
AS	Al Shabaab
ASWJ	Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah
ATI	Anti-Terror Institutions
ATL	Anti-Terror Legislation
AU	African Union
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BH	Boko Haram
BMA	Border Management Authority
CAR	Central African Republic
CATS	Crimes Against the State
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONT	Confidence in Response
COMT	Communications about Terrorism
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CT	Concern about Terrorism
DAP	Defence Act Personnel
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DHQ	Defence Headquarters
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (US)
DoD HQ	Department of Defence Head Quarters
DoD	Department of Defence
DoJ&CD	Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
DPCI	Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAAMLG	Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money-Laundering Group

EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FNB	First National Bank
G5 Sahel	Group of Five Sahel Countries comprising of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.
GCIS	Government Communications Information System
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displace Persons
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levante
ISIS-SP	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Sinai Province
MK	uMkhonto we Sizwe
MMR	Mixed Methods Research
MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC	National Communications Centre
NDA	Non-Disclosure Agreement
NDPP	National Director of Public Prosecutions
NDT	New Dehli Times
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NP	National Party
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
OATD	Open Access Theses and Dissertation
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OCs	Officers Commanding
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs

PCLU	Priority Crimes Litigation Unit
PDP	Pre-disposure to Terrorism
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PTS	Post-Traumatic Stress
PROCDATARA	Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act
PSAP	Public Service Act Personnel
RLM	Resistance and Liberation Movement
RQ	Research Question
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SA Army	South African Army
SAAC	SA Army College
SAAF	South African Air Force
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAMA	SA Military Academy
SAMHS	South African Military Health Services
SAMHSA	Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SAN	South African Navy
SANAI	South African National Academy of Intelligence
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANWC	SA National War College
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Services
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SAS	South African Ship
SASS	South African Secret Services
SCT	Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
SIT	Sources of Information
SSA	State Security Agency

SSR	Security Sector Reform
STF	Special Task Force
STI	School of Tactical Intelligence
TCSA	Terrorist Cases in South Africa
TD	Terrorism Definition
TI	Terrorist Incidents
TO	Terrorist Organisations
TPV	Terrorism and Political Violence
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TT	Terrorist Tactics
UN	United Nations
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNHR	United Nations Human Rights
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	UN Security Council
US(A)	United States of America
WoT	War on Terrorism
WTC	World Trade Centre

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARK AND BACKGROUND

This study, titled "*Evaluating South Africa's Policy and Institutional Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform*", offers an alternative perspective for examining and understanding the problem of terrorism and its possible preventive strategies. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) World Trade Centre (WTC) bombings in the United States of America (US), extensive research on terrorism has been conducted. This study is significant because it includes key stakeholders such as senior officers from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the South African Police Services (SAPS), the State Security Agency (SSA), and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), along with renowned experts in the field of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism research.

The clear perception and expectation are that South Africa is seen to be playing a hegemonic role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This is mostly attributed to its dominant soft and hard power, which undoubtedly surpasses that of its regional allies. According to the military power index, South Africa is regarded as the third most powerful country in Africa, after Egypt and Algeria. This translates into a significant military advantage over its SADC partners (Global Firepower, 2023a). Such dominance is also evident in the defence spending data, which depicts South Africa as 59th ranked, globally (Global Firepower, 2023b). With over 40,200 military ready-to-fight military personnel, South Africa is the second highest in the region, exceeded only by Angola with 107,000 (Global Firepower, 2023c). There is no doubt therefore, that South Africa is a dominant military power in the SADC region.

South Africa is also the region's economic powerhouse. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to stand at $405,705 billion in 2023 (CountryEconomy.com, 2023). In second place, Angola’s GDP of US$ 74,791 billion put it well behind South Africa’s. However, South Africa's GDP per capita of $6,694 ranks it fourth behind Seychelles ($14,679), Mauritius ($10,104), and Botswana ($7,251) (CountryEconomy.com, 2023). In terms of intra-SADC exports of goods as a

percentage of total SADC exports of goods in 2019, South Africa accounted for 29%, placing it in fifth place after the Kingdom of Eswatini (79.5%), Zimbabwe (60.7%), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (50.3%), and Namibia (43.8%). In relation to the share of intra-SADC imports of goods to the total imports of goods in SADC, South Africa stood at 6.3% (SADC, 2021a). The data for imports and exports indicates that South Africa receives far less from its regional counterparts than it actually provides. Thus, it is evident that there is some sort of dependence on South Africa as a pivotal state in the region.

This level of military and economic strength imposes on South Africa certain moral and social obligations towards its regional neighbours. Regional security is the most important of these obligations. As terrorism appears to be an existential threat to security, regional leaders such as South Africa are expected to contribute to the provision of security. In a region where history is intertwined, this will benefit not only South Africa but also the entire region. Examining prospective military leaders' perceptions and attitudes regarding terrorism and the government's response is therefore essential. This will inform future counterterrorism strategies and the necessity for security sector reform.

The survey questionnaires yield a thorough and all-encompassing perspective on the participants' sentiments towards terrorism in general and the specific actions taken by the South African government in reaction to it. The primary objective of this study is to assess the efficacy of the policy and institutional framework in place to counteract terrorism in South Africa. This evaluation will be based on the perspective of senior officers in the SANDF, as well as insights from academics and security practitioners. The crucial aspect is to ascertain the necessity of implementing a security sector reform.

The current literature on terrorism endeavours to explain the phenomenon through various approaches. Nevertheless, any form of progress has been hindered by the proliferation of descriptions, impeding the development of a widely accepted definition. Nevertheless, the literature has effectively explored several aspects of terrorism and other themes connected to counterterrorism. These encompass the root causes,

terrorists' intentions, strategies, tactics, patterns and trends (Silke, 2009). Several scholars, including Makinda (2007), Moten (2010) and Nkwede (2013), have examined the difficulties in defining and conceptualising terrorsim.

Notwithstanding these efforts, it is evident that several issues have not received adequate attention in the study of terrorism (Schmid & Forest, 2018). With the exception of a few studies, the existing literature remains silent on studies pertaining to the attitudes of key personnel towards terrorism and those charged with preventing it. In this instance, these refer to senior officers of the SANDF and other members of South Africa's security apparatus. Despite these apparent shortcomings, the evaluation of attitudes pertaining to terrorism and its response techniques was enriched by an existing body of literature in other parts of the world.

The nature and extent of terrorism frequently evolves into a military threat. In response to external and internal threats, most constitutions impose upon their militaries the responsibility to address such military threats. South Africa has not been immune to this arrangement. According to Section 201 (2) of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*, the SANDF may be authorised to deploy externally or internally "in co-operation with the police service" or "in defence of the Republic" (South Africa, 2022, p. 140). Internally, as stated in the *Defence Act No. 42 of 2002*, the SANDF may further be tasked to ensure the preservation of "life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations" (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2003, p. 22). Because it is likely to prompt a military response, it is clear that the threat of terrorism falls within the purview of the SANDF.

Incidentally, there are numerous examples where military responses to terrorism were much prominent. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, for example, the US and its coalition partners, mostly European, embarked on what is generally known as the War on Terror (WoT), by deploying military forces to Afghanistan with the purpose of destroying al-Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan and training camps, as well as disrupting its global operations and terrorist financing networks (Unites States. Department of State, 2001-2009).

Similarly, African nations have conducted military campaigns to combat the threat of terrorism, typified by the actions of governments of Egypt and Nigeria among others, who have launched counterterrorism and military operations against terrorists. Egypt has been engaged in a military campaign again the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) for over a decade with varying degree of success (McManus, 2020). The same is true for Nigeria, which has actively pursued the destruction of Boko Haram in West Africa (Faluyi, Khan & Akinola, 2019).

Such military responses have not only been confined to individual nation-states. Regional and sub-regional organisations have adopted a similar strategy in response to terrorism. This is typified by the examples of responses by the United Nations (UN) in the DRC (United States. Department of State, 2022), regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) in Somalia (African Union, 2022), and sub-regional organisations such as the SADC in Mozambique (Southern African Ddevelopment Community, 2021).

These initiatives emphasise the importance of the military in the anti-terrorism and counterterrorism strategies employed by numerous nation-states and international organisations. It therefore becomes crucial to examine the thought processes of those involved in combatting terrorism, particularly in the South African context. Their attitudes and perceptions regarding terrorism could shed a light on future strategies to be taken to combat terrorism.

This study utilised a mixed method research approach, employing a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches to conduct the research. More specifically, the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design was used. The data for quantitative component of the study was collected using survey questionnaires delivered to senior officers in the SANDF. This was followed by the collection of qualitative data through a series of semi-structured interviews with the prominent academics in the field of terrorism and South African officials in different government departments, especially in the security-related fields. Using IBM SPSS software, and as required by the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design, quantitative data was first collected and analysed using descriptive statistics,

while thematic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data, prior to the integration and interpretation of the data.

Due to the COVID-19 protocols in place at the time of the data collection phase of the study, senior officers in the SANDF self-administered the questionnaires. Using questionnaires to capture quantitative data was preferred because it enabled access to a large number of participants, which was crucial for ensuring the study's generalisability. The questionnaires were physically delivered to the respective SANDF units by the researcher. In some units, this was preceded by an explanation of the nature of the study and what was expected of the participants, after which the officers completed the questionnaires independently. During the brief, the ethical principles of voluntarism, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality, and no damage to participants were explained to the participants. The questionnaires were delivered to the following SANDF units and collected from them:

- SA Military Academy (SAMA) – Saldanha, Western Cape.
- South African Ship Saldanha (SAS SALDANHA) – Saldanha, Western Cape.
- Airforce Base Langebaanweg (AFB LBWG) – Langebaanweg, Western Cape.
- SA Army College (SAAC) – Tshwane, Gauteng.
- SA National War College (SANWC) – Tshwane, Gauteng.
- School of Tactical Intelligence (STI) – Potchefstroom, Northwest.
- Various Chief Directorates and Directorates of the Department of Defence Head Quarters (DoD HQ) – Tshwane, Gauteng.
- Individual Officers – Wide distribution on individual capacity.

A series of semi-structured interviews were utilised to capture the qualitative data. Similarly, in accordance with COVID-19 protocols, the majority of interviews were conducted and recorded using the Microsoft Teams computer program, while two respondents elected to provide written responses. The only face-to-face interviews were held with Maj. Gen. Xundu and Mr. Sendall, from the DoD HQ, and Brig. Gen. Radebe, from the SANDF Defence Intelligence Division. Both sets of interviewees, academics and security professionals, are regarded as authorities in the study or

writing about terrorism, as well as the formulation and implementation of policies in the field of terrorism.

This study was conceived as a direct response to the apparent dearth of research assessing knowledge and attitudes toward terrorism, as well as the perceptions of the South African government in confronting the potential threat. In so doing several key issues emanated, thus emphasising its utilitarian and academic value. The study filled a void in the literature by investigating the perceptions of the senior officers of the SANDF about terrorism in South Africa and government's response thereto. The current literature provided little contribution on this aspect of terrorism studies. Secondly, by measuring and analysing the perceptions of senior officers in the SANDF, academics, and security practitioners, the study contributed a new perspective, a triangulated prism, to the study of terrorism and its prevention strategies. Last, the study also provided avenues for future research, such as expanding the study to include the general population of South Africa.

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the study by initially discussing the background to the study. It further provides an in-depth background of terrorism in South Africa. This is followed by a discussion of the research problem, research aim, objectives, and questions. The hypotheses to be tested are then stated after the preceding discussion. In addition, the methodology used in the conduct of this study is discussed thereafter. The significance and limitations of the study are also discussed as part of this chapter. The chapter then concludes with a disposition of the study in its totality.

It is widely acknowledged that terrorism has existed in all human civilisations, and has been regarded as one of the many threats and possibly the greatest security threat facing the world. However, an agreement on two of its key features, namely its definition and origins, remains elusive (Obakhedo & Igbinovia, 2020; Chojnowski, 2017; Laquer, 2017). By 1994, 212 definitions of terrorism were already in use by governments and other institutions (Nazala, 2019, p. 114). The difficulty in determining a clear definition of terrorism is highlighted by the fact that there were already 109

definitions in use between 1936 and 1981 (Laquer, 2017). It is evident that defining terrorism has truly proven to be a Sisyphean task, with no viable solution in sight.

The question of its origins remain just as contested. Activities of the Sicarii organisation of the first century are often cited as the birth of modern terror, while some advance its origins from the French Reign of Terror of the 18th Century (Obakhedo & Igbinovia, 2020; Chojnowski, 2017). One author attempted to point to the murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich as having been the roots of modern terrorism, however, this has been largely refuted (Lutz & Lutz, 2008). The majority agree, that terrorism's roots can be traced back to the French Revolution (Obakhedo & Igbinovia, 2020; Hübschle, 2006). Despite the challenges associated with definitions and its history, the threat has remained persistent across time and has since evolved.

Arguably, the most significant and influential of contributions regarding terrorism can be found in the works of David Rapoport's theory of the Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, succinctly encapsulated in his book, Waves of Global Terrorism, from 1879 to Present. This theory has been widely applied to a range of case studies to identify the nature of these waves within the specific cases (Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2018a; Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2018b; Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2017; Rasler & Thompson, 2009; Gupta, 2008; Harrow, 2008; Radil & Pinos, 2019). This has also inspired some scholars to analyse specific data linked to terrorism using the wave paradigm. There are currently a number of interpretations, including the Right Wing Waves, the Four Waves of Global Jihad, and Waves of Political Terrorism; among others (Kaplan, 2016; Robinson, 2017). Furthermore, the concept has been established to predict the probable emergence of a new wave that may include, among others, Terrorist Semi-States, New Tribalism, Jihadist Terror Groups, and Islamophobia (Honig & Yahel, 2017; Kaplan, 2010; Celso, 2015; Jalil, 2021). Arguably, the theory appeals to scholars of terrorism because it seems to be unprejudiced toward Islam, covering all types of terrorism committed by various non-Muslim individuals and organisations (Rapoport, 2022).

In essence, Rappoport identified Four Waves of Modern terrorism, i.e. Anarchist (1st), Anti-Colonial (2nd), New Left (3rd) and Religious Waves of Terrorism (4th). Rapoport defines a wave as:

> [A]…cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterised by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships. As their names – "Anarchist," "anticolonial," "New Left," and "Religious" – suggest, a different energy drives each (Rapoport, 2004, p. 47).

While the interest in this study is on the Fourth Wave, a brief discussion on the preceding waves is crucial in placing it into context. A graphic image of the "wave" concept is depicted in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Four Waves of Modern Terrorism



Source: Moten (2010) (adapted from Rapoport's Four Waves of Modern Terrorism Theory)

The First Wave movements, known as the Anarchist Wave, emerged in the 1880s and advocated for both equality and national self-determination. The aspiration for self-determination remained a prominent rallying cry during the Second Wave (Anti-Colonial) Wave, which commenced in Ireland in 1920. The emergence of the Third (New Left) Wave in the 1960s led to the formation of several terrorist groups, all of which embraced the egalitarian principles of the French Revolution. Last and not least, the Fourth Wave, the Religious Wave, which consisted of terrorist organisations advocating religious beliefs, began in 1979 (Rapoport, 2022; 2004). The nature and characteristics of these waves are summarised in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Defining Characteristics of Four Waves of Modern Terrorism

Waves	Catalyst	Goals	Targets	Tactics	Reasons for Decline
Anarchist (1870s – 1910s)	Slow political reform, declining legitimacies of monarchies	Revolution, eliminate government oppression	Heads of State	Assassination using dynamite, bank robberies	Aggressive state opposition. Beginning of World War I
Nationalist (Anti-Colonial) (1920s – 1960s)	Versailles Peace Treaty, increased desire for self-determination	Eliminate colonial rule, create new states	Police and military	Guerrilla style hit and run attacks	Achieved goals, colonial rulers withdrew from territories
New Left (1960s – 1980s)	Vietnam War, Cold War tensions	Eliminate the capitalist system	Governments, increased focus on the US	Hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations	End of Cold War
Religious (1979 – 2020s)	Iranian Revolution, new Islamic century, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Creation of global Islamic Caliphate	US, Israel, Europe, mass transportation systems, public venues	Suicide bombings, aircrafts and vehicles as weapons	Unknown

Source: Walls (2017)

The Religious Wave, is primarily the focus of this study. While acknowledging the potential prejudice involved, it is important to recognise that Islam is the primary catalyst behind this wave. As stated by Männik (2009, p. 157) and Walls (2017, p. 17), three significant events led to this eventuality: *viz*, the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the beginning of a new Islamic century.

Between 1979 and 2001, there were several other terrorist attacks worldwide as a result of the three aforementioned events. Table 1.2 list a selected few of the most significant terrorist attacks that occurred and highlights several of its characteristics during this period. Terrorism, first showed its international nature by appearing in practically every region of the world. Second, the terrorists demonstrated their brutality by carrying out indiscriminate attacks that never made a distinction between military

and non-military targets, combatants and non-combatants as well as different nationalities. Finally, while the terrorists employed a variety of strategies, they mostly depended on bombings to carry out their activities.

These incidents served as a prelude to the events of 9/11, which somehow brought terrorism-related actions and literature back into the spotlight. On 11 September 2001, 19 terrorists with Al-Qaeda affiliations hijacked four aircrafts from various US airports. A total of 3000 people were killed when four of the planes crashed: two into the WTC buildings, one into the Pentagon, and one while *en route* to Washington D.C., when passengers tried to regain control of the aircraft from the terrorists (Hoffman, 2015). This incident, which was the largest terrorist incident to take place on American territory, cemented the idea that no nation was immune to the scourge of terrorism.

Table 1.2: Selected Terrorist Attacks: 1979-2001

Incident	Date	Place	Fatalities/ Wounded	Tactic	Suspected/Claimed Responsibility
Car bomb explodes in front of the US embassy	18 Apr ‘83	Lebanon	63/>100	Car bomb	Hezbollah
US and French embassies bombed	12 Dec ‘83	Kuwait	6/80	Bombing	Hezbollah
Truck bombing at US embassy	20 Sep ‘84	Lebanon	23	Truck bomb	Islamic Jihad Organisation
Egyptian plane hijacked to Malta	23 Nov ‘85	Greece	56		Abu Nidal Organisation
Attacks at Rome and Vienna airports	27 Dec ‘85	Italy, Austria	18/121		Abu Nidal Organisation
Terrorists hijack Pan Am 73	5 Sep ‘86	Pakistan	20/>100	Hijack/killings	Abu Nidal Organisation
Pan Am flight 103 destroyed by bomb over Lockerbie	21 Dec ‘88	UK	270	Killings	Abu Nidal Organisation
Jewish community centre bombed	18 Jul ‘94	Argentina	85/>100	Bombing	Hezbollah
Bombing at Paris St Michel Metro Station	25 Jul ‘95	France	8/157	Bombing	Hezbollah
Bombing of Khobar Tower in Dhahran	25 Jun 96	Saudi Arabia	19	Bombing	Saudi and Lebanese Hizbollah
Attack at temple of Hushepsut	17 Nov 97	Egypt	71	Killings	Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyah

Two bomb explosion at a political meeting	7 Mar '99	Bangladesh	10/75	Bombing	Harakat-ul-Jihad
Bombing of Moscow apartment building	8 Sep '99	Russia	94	Bombing	Islamic Dagesta Liberation Army
Bombing of USS Cole off Yemen coast	12 Oct '00	Yemen	17/39	Bombing	Al Qaeda
Series of bombings in Manilla	30 Dec '00	Philippines	16/30	Bombing	Abu Sayaff Group

Source: United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2015)

Since then, Islamic terrorism has become part of daily life in almost all of the world's continents. At the turn of the 21st Century, Europe bore the brunt of most terrorist attacks, typified by the major cases shown in Table 1.3 (Herre, Samborska, Ritchie, Hasell, Mathieu, Appel & Roser, 2013; Statistica Research Department, 2023). These attacks were carried out mainly by Al-Qaeda initially, but taken over by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL) with alarming brutality. Arguably, these attacks could be attributed, in part, to the role that most of these countries played in support of the WoT initiated by the US. A myriad of tactics ranging from bombings and suicide attacks, among others, were the preferred instruments of terror.

Table 1.3: Major Terrorist Attacks in Europe: 2001 – 2020s

Incident	Fatalities/ Wounded	Responsible
Madrid train bombings – 11 March 2004	193/2050	Al-Qaeda
London bombings – 7 July 2005	56/784	Al-Qaeda
Paris attacks – 7-9 January 2015	20/22	Al-Qaeda
Paris attacks – 15 November 2015	137/413	Islamic State
Brussels bombings – 22 March 2016	35/340	Islamic State
Truck attacks in Nice – 14 July 2016	87/434	Islamic State
Berlin Christmas market attack – 19 December 2016.	13/55	Islamic State
Manchester attacks – 22 May 2017	23/250	Islamic State
Barcelona attacks – 17-18 August 2017.	24/152	Islamic State

Source: Herre, *et al*. (2013); Statistica Research Department (2023)

The end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, seems to have deeply affected the nature and scale of terrorism in Africa. Denisova and Kostelyanets (2022, p. 170) postulate that international terrorism spread to Africa in the wake of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), in which mercenaries from Arab nations, including Algeria, Egypt, Sudan,

among others, fought on the side of the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union. Upon the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, these mercenaries returned to Africa, bringing along with them ideas of radical fundamentalism, which ultimately had disastrous effects on the continent (Denisova & Kostelyanets, 2022; Chellaney, 2001).

In no way does this suggest that there was no terrorism in Africa prior to the return of the Arab mercenaries. Two main cases provide evidence to this effect. For instance, while warning against attributing the Algerian civil war to the single causal return of Afghan veterans, Cilliers (2003, p. 95) is adamant that the return was one of the contributing factors. In addition, Mogire and Agade (2011, p. 474) cite the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's (PFLP) bombing of the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on 31 December 1980, which they attributed to Kenya's assistance to Israel's rescue operation to free hostages from a hijacked Air France plane at Entebbe airport in July 1976 (Mogire & Agade, 2011). It is crucial to note that both events took place long before the return of the Afghan veterans, thus implying the existence of terrorist organisations and activity in Africa, albeit at a limited scale.

The 7 August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, carried out by Al-Qaeda, is another notable pre-9/11 terrorist act on African soil, resulting in the deaths of 200 people and injuries to 5000 more (Mogire & Agade, 2011). While the mercenaries' return from Afghanistan cannot account for all of terrorist activity in Africa prior to 9/11, what is clear is that there was an intensification of terrorist activity after their return.

According to Kydd and Walter (2006), the five overarching objectives of terrorist organisations; regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and *status quo* maintenance, have persisted. These are implicitly implied in the description of terrorism's main goal as perceived by Simon-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg (2016, p. 75), which is to "disrupt ordinary life, foster fear and helplessness in the population, undermine public faith in the authorities, and ultimately, to change government policy." Terrorists have used a variety of violent tactics, often to catastrophic effect, in an effort to accomplish their objectives.

The threat that terrorism poses to global security takes many different forms. There are five obvious main categories in which terrorism's effects can be found. Socially, the immediate impact of terrorism is the tragic loss of innocent human lives (Santana-Gallego, Rosselló-Nadal, & Fourie, 2016; Moten, 2010; Abbasi, 2013). As evidenced from the examples covered in this study, indiscriminate attacks frequently result in significant human casualty rates. An extensive humanitarian crisis occurs both inside and outside the countries involved as a result of increased internal or external displacement in addition to the human casualties (Abbasi, 2013).

Second, terrorism has significant negative economic effects. Terrorism hinders economic development of the affected nations since the decline in the GDP causes a glaring negative economic growth. The high cost of doing business, brought about by the demand for higher wages, high insurance premiums, *etc*.; which in turn causes lower returns on investment, stifles economic growth (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009). One industry that is frequently negatively impacted is tourism, which in turn retards inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Coupe, 2017). In order to prevent the economic activity from coming to a standstill, governments are further burdened by the need to rebuild or repair the damaged infrastructure, which in most parts takes away much needed financial resources from other important projects.

Politically, "terrorism destabilizes political arrangements, results in confusion, leads to loss of revenue, make the political system vulnerable, especially with lack of relevant policies" (Oino & Sorre, 2014). This eventually results in negative perceptions of political governance within the country, especially since it may be seen to create ungoverned spaces within the countries (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).

Psychologically, terrorism creates a sense of uncertainty and fear among the people, especially in nations where terrorist acts are recurrent (Abbasi, 2013). Last, terrorism also plunges countries and regions into a perpetual vicious circle of violence and uncertainty. As a result of terrorism, mistrust often emanates amongst different religious groups, thus heightening the potential for sectarian violence (Abbasi, 2013).

1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Terrorism has contributed to insecurity in South Africa for significant part of its tumultuous history. Nonetheless, whether or not South Africa experienced terrorism is a matter to be understood in its political-historical context. It is to be noted however, that the nature of terrorism in pre-colonial South Africa is poorly understood because very little of it has been documented. However, as tribes moved and competed for territory, resources and power; violent crimes, intimidation campaigns, and open conflicts became the norm (McFarlane, 2003, p. 134). The Resistance and Liberation Movements (RLMs) and state terrorism, Christian and right-wing terrorism, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and vigilantism, as well as the advent of modern Islamic terrorism, are a few major terrorist-related events that best describe the character of terrorism in South Africa.

1.2.1 RLMs and State Terrorism

There is no doubt that the aphorism “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” applies more accurately to the South African context, and possibly few other post-colonial African states (Friedlander, 1981, p. 281). The antecedents of the 20th century African National Congress’ (ANC) liberation struggle can be traced back to the “colonisation of the area by white settlers, the institutionalisation of racial discrimination, and the political subordination of the black majority by the white minority” (Dudouet, 2009, p. 18). The ANC, which later gave birth to its offshoot, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), was established in 1912, as a resistance movement to apartheid in South Africa (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999, p. ii). In most part, the resistance by the ANC and other RLMs comprised of peaceful and nonviolent measures such as bus boycotts, refusal to carry passes and adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955, among others (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999, p. ii).

The Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation – abbreviated MK), the armed wing of the ANC, was subsequently founded in 1961, in direct response to the government’s resistance to enact political reforms that would result in the abolition of the apartheid system. In particular, the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960, in which 69 unarmed protesters were killed by the police and the banishment of the ANC and other

RLMs both sparked the creation of the MK (Goodwin, 2007, p. 194; Dudouet, 2009, p. 22). This was the first time since its creation that the ANC had exhibited the willingness to resort to armed violence against the apartheid machinery.

Three terrorism theories are presented by Goodwin (2007, p. 194), which advance the RLMs' justification to resort to terrorism. First of all, one theory suggests that "…[RLMs] adopt terrorism as a strategy when they are very weak and yet desperate to redress their grievances." The security system of the government was unquestionably superior to that of the MK. Due to this apparent government's greater capacity in terms of weapons, manpower, and expertise, a conventional battle with the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South African Police (SAP), would have undoubtedly been an exercise in futility.

The second theory asserts that RLMs use terrorism as a tactic in response to "state terrorism" in order to further their own agendas. That the South African government conducted state terrorism is a foregone conclusion and receives further attention in the latter section of this chapter.

Finally, according to another terrorism theory, "extreme polarization between groups" is what leads people to turn to terrorism. Polarisation was inevitable because the majortiy black, coloured, and Indian people were marginalised under the apartheid system, which essentially gave preference to the minority white population. The three propositions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They can be applied singly or collectively in the context of the ANC to support the RLM's justifications for using armed violence against the South African government.

Unlike many regular terrorist organisations whose attacks are often brutal and indiscriminate in nature, the ANC made it a point of attempting to select "legitimate targets" (Dudouet, 2009, p. 23). On several occasions it was said to have made a conscious decision not to move from defensive resistance to direct attacks against the regime in order to maintain moral superiority over their adversaries, prevent provoking brutal retaliation, and keep the door open for a negotiated and peaceful resolution (Dudouet, 2009, p. 23). According to Dudouet (2009, p. 23), the MK went to the extent

of only targeting locations that served as symbols of white dominance while taking great care to avoid killing innocent civilians. In fact, the MK even signed the Geneva Convention Protocol dealing with irregular wafare in 1980, reiterating its determination to refrain from targeting civilians and adherance to the 'humanitarian' conduct of war. Consequently, the ANC conducted a bombing campaing from the 1970s against typical targets such as "police stations, fuel storage facilities at the state-owned oil-from-coal company, Sasol (1980-1983); electric power stations; railroads; the Voortrekkerhoogte Army Headquarters (1981); and the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in December 1982" (van Wyk, 2015, p. 52). As indicated in Table 1.4, these attacks at times, led to a number of civilian deaths. Despite the civilian deaths, and perhaps with one notable exception, it was generally acknowledged that these bombings were aimed at military targets (Goodwin, 2007, p. 195). The bombing of a shopping centre was carried, according to Goodwin (2007, p. 195), by an unsupervised MK operative in contravention of MK guidelines, and the operation was sebsequently denounced by the ANC officials. The ANC was also criticised at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for not taking greater care in avoiding civilian fatalities in their operations against the government (Goodwin, 2007, p. 195).

Table 1.4: Significant Terrorism-Related Events in South Africa from 1983-2002

Year	City	Site	Injured	Dead
1982[1]	Cape Town	Koeberg Nuclear Station		
1983	Pretoria	Air Force Headquarters	217	21
1985	Amanzimtoti	Beach Front	40	5
1986	Durban	Pub	69	3
1986	Newcastle	Court	24	0
1987	Johannesburg	Court		3
1987	Johannesburg	Mil Comnd Centre	10	1
1988	Roodepoort	Bank	18	4
1988	Johannesburg	Ellis Park Stadium	37	2
1994	Johannesburg	Airport	16	0
1994	Germiston	Taxi Rank	40	10
1994	Johannesburg	City Centre	100	9
1994	Pretoria	Pub	29	2

Source: McFarlane (2003, p. 136); van Wyk (2015, p. 62)

[1] Adapted from (van Wyk, 2015)

Another feature of the liberation struggle was the emergence of the first Islamic terrorist organisations in South Africa. Al-Jihad was established in 1967 with the purpose of participating in the Arab War against Israel, but failed dismally and remained rather insignificant. The Qibla, founded in 1980, rivalled the Al-Jihad, was a Shi'ite fundamentalist organisation which was formed in Cape Town. Initially the movement aimed at promoting the Iranian revolution and propagating its strict Islamic principles among Muslims in South Africa. What is rather peculiar to the Qibla is that it "played an active role in the violence and public unrest that formed part of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa before the political changes of 2 February 1990" (Le Roux & Nel, 1998). The existence of these movements in South Africa bears testimony to the fact that none had intended to conduct attacks in South Africa, but rather propagated other agenda across the globe. In the case of the Qibla, one can argue that instead of being called terrorists they could actually fit the profile of the freedom fighters (Le Roux & Nel, 1998).

The emergence of the South African government as a perpetrator of state terrorism manifested at its inception. While the international community was on the brink of signing the Geneva Conventions in 1948 "to impose limits in war, the white voters in South Africa elected a National Party [NP] government to create a racial order called apartheid" (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999, p. ii). This administration embarked on the enactment of legislation which would effectively suppress the majority black population, coloureds and Indians. Key legislative measures to this effect were; the Population Registration Act of 1950, Group Areas Act of 1950, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, the Bantu Education Act of 1953, and the Extension of University Education Act of 1959, among others (Tutu, 1998). These acts each had debilitating effects on the standard of living for the greater majority of the population in South Africa, underscored below by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1999, p. ii):

> The apartheid regime eliminated the franchise for black South Africans, then coloureds. It devised elaborate racial classifications and a pass system for black South Africans. It …froze black South African land ownership in white areas and

> created rural homelands, or “bantustans”, which were intended to accommodate black aspirations. At the same time, the State barred black South Africans from trade unions and suppressed the black political opposition.

This so-called policy of “separate development” was justified on the grounds that “any significant concession to the other racial communities would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the domestic peace and prosperity that benefit all races” (United States. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1990, p. 5).

The apartheid regime had no qualms in exploiting the legal institutions to achieve its goals. This led to the enactment of a number of anti-terrorism laws as a means of suppressing individuals who protested the country’s discriminatory and oppressive laws and policies. Semblances of anti-terrorism laws are witnessed in the enactment of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 which effectively resulted in the outlawing of organisations such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Public Safety Act of 1953 which authorised the executive to proclaim a state of emergency, the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1953 which declared the ANC and PAC unlawful and several other unjust laws (Kokott, 2005). The Terrorism Act of 1967 was arguably, South Africa’s first direct legislative response to terrorism (South African History Online, 2020). This law essentially declared it a statutory crime to participate in terrorist activities, effectively declaring the movements such as the ANC and PAC terrorist organisations, and Nelson Mandela and his ilk, terrorists (Kokott, 2005).

The events following the Sharpeville Massacre and subsequent banishment of the RLMs, exhibited the length at which the apartheid government was willing to go to, so as to perpetuate acts of terrorism against the non-white population. Not only was the incumbent government ready to enact these laws, but were equally willing to enforce the compliance thereof. It was therefore not surprising that the perpetrators of such brutality proceeded to enhance their regime with more acts of brutality, despite widespread international condemnation, as illustrated below:

> Following the panic of 1960, the government launched a brutal campaign of persecution, spearheaded by the then Minister of Justice who had been interned during World War II for pro-Nazi sympathies, and who is the present Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster. The campaign aimed to crush all African political opposition. Detention without trial, house arrest, censorship, restrictions on movement and assembly, bannings – there were the legislative measures sanctioned by white South Africa (Michigan State University, n.d., p. 4).

McFarlane (2003, p. 135) highlights several incidents that qualified the South African apartheid government as perpetrators of state terrorism. First, the Sharpeville Massacre and related events could be said to be such an event. Second, and supported by Kwakwa (1987), South Africa's military incursion into Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among others, also qualified the government as a state terrorist due the destabilising and often brutal effects of these operations. Last, the "security forces' actions in suppressing African township political and liberation activities could also be categorised similarly, along with the detention, interrogation, and subjugation of liberation and resistance suspects" (McFarlane, 2003, p. 135).

However, and perhaps the most perverse act of state terrorism by the South African government was the creation of the police unit called the Vlakplaas Unit. Citing evidence from the TRC report, Taylor (2023, p. 304) asserts that the Vlakplaas Unit was employed as a terrorist tool to terrorise selected audiences and calm the anxities of the white electorate. The technique employed by its agents included acts of violence that, in certain cases, should be classified as state terrorism, such as abductions, detentions, and torture, as well as those more commonly connected to conventional terrorism, such as bombings and assassinations.

With the ANC's election victory in 1994, one man's terrorist, did in fact become, another man's freedom fighter.

1.2.2 Christian and Right-Wing Terrorism

Within the context of South Africa, the lines between Christian and right-wing terrorism appear blurred. Christian fundamentalism in South Africa, according to Chidester (2008, p. 350), has shown a complex and multifaceted face. While it first opposed the apartheid regime in the 1970s, it later came to legitimise it in the 1980s and continued to reject the new democratic regime that arose in the 1990s. In addition to the shared characteristics of Afrikaans language and history, Afrikaaner nationalists contend that the Calvinist religion comprised a strong glue that bound the white right in South Africa (Schonteich & Boshoff, 2003). It is for this reason that the Boeremag's sabotage campaign of late 2002 was seen to have been motivated by a philosophy built on extreme nationalism and a sense of divine purpose, "a rather lethal cocktail, given the damage religiously-inspired terrorism has caused in other parts of the world" (Schonteich & Boshoff, 2003, p. 6). Deon Crous, Kobus Pretorius and Jacques Jordaan were among the 22 members of the Boeremag that were in charge of producing the 1.5 tons of explosive for five powerful car bombs (News24, 2004).

Christian, white right fundamentalists carried out a string of bomb attacks in opposition to the anticipated political reforms, in lieu of the political winds of change that had swept South Africa in the 1990s. These included a car bombing at the former Johannesburg International Airport that left 16 people injured, a bombing at a black taxi rank in Germiston that left 10 people dead and 40 injured, a bombing inside a black bar in Pretoria that left two people dead and 29 injured, and a car bombing in the heart of Johannesburg that left nine people dead and 100 injured (McFarlane, 2003, p. 136).

According to Schonteich and Boshoff (2003, p. 5), eight bomb explosions shook Soweto, South Africa's largest black township, just after midnight on 30 October 2002, demolishing commuter train lines and a mosque. The attacks were attributed to the little known Die Boeremag. The SAPS was successful in identifying and apprehending the Boeremag suspects, thus bringing to a halt the bombing campaign before it resulted in any major loss of life.

1.2.3 PAGAD and Islamic Terrorism

In late 1995, the Cape Flats communities in Cape Town decided to form an anti-crime organisation, with a primary focus on the removal of gangsters and ending the sale of drugs in communities on the Cape Flats. This translated into the establishment of the PAGAD (South African History Online, 2016; Pillay, 2002). The majority of PAGAD's members were Muslims, despite the organisation's earlier claims to have been a multireligious organisation (Pillay, 2002). Because it felt that the South African government threatened Islamic principles, PAGAD later developed anti-government and anti-Western attitudes (South African History Online, 2016; Dixon & Johns, 2001). Additionally, it claimed to be seeking to improve the political representation of South African Muslims. As a result, what started as vigilante anti-crime campaign evolved into a socio-political movement centred on a particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism.

By 1998, PAGAD had been implicated in acts of urban terrorism in Cape Town, including nine separate explosions in 2000. The groups targeted synagogues, gay nightclubs, moderate Muslims, tourist attractions, and restaurants with ties to the West, such as the 25 August 1998 bombing of Planet Hollywood in Cape Town (South African History Online, 2016). PAGAD denied any involvement in the event following subsequent raids on the homes of several members 20 minutes after the explosion. PAGAD, having transformed from largely a vigilante group to a terror group, brought itself into loggerheads with the South African security apparatus (United States. Department of State, 1999). This presented an existential threat that needed to be eradicated. It would seem that this threat has been dealt with as this organisation has been silent in recent years. It is safe to say that this is South Africa's first Islamic terrorist group to have launched attacks in South Africa, indicating that although attacks are rare, there are still those groups that harbour the idea of conducting attacks in South Africa, given the opportunity, time and space.

1.2.4 Emergence of Islamic Terrorism

Although too few and far in-between, several notable Islamist terrorism-related events have taken place in South Africa. Amongst others, the following are noted: The Al Shabaab cell which was based in Khayalitsha township, just outside Cape Town, and

Al Qaeda operatives using various used car dealerships as their cover had planned to conduct terror attacks against US-linked interests and South African First National Bank (FNB) Stadium during the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup hosted in South Africa (Solomon, 2012). Fortunately, the plans were foiled and the would-be terrorists were arrested and convicted.

On 11 June 2016, Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie, together with two others were arrested for twice trying to leave the country for Syria to join ISIS and planning terrorist attacks against the US Embassy and other Jewish establishments (Reuters Staff, 2016). Consequently, on 08 February 2022, the pair pled guilty and were convicted for a combined period of almost 20 years in jail, but have since been released on time served (New Dehli Times Bureau, 2022).

The Imam Hussain Mosque, a Shia mosque in Durban, was attacked by three men on 10 May 2018 in what was believed to be a sectarian attack. The attackers stabbed two worshippers, slit the throat of another, and set portions of the mosque on fire, resulting in the death of one. In July 2018, law enforcement discovered five explosive devices in the Durban area. The 11 men arrested in connection with the devices and the mosque attack had ties to ISIS, according to police affidavits (United States. Department of State, 2020).

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Terrorism has always been a global security threat. However, the 9/11 New York attacks in the USA appear to be one major event that reignited the literature and subsequently had a profound effect on studies related to terrorism. For example, Silke and Ranstorp observed the exponential increase in volumes of research on terrorism after 9/11 (Silke, 2009; Ranstorp, 2009). Most of the research in this period focused on identifying trends and patterns related to terrorism, as well as trends in data-gathering, analysis, and research on terrorist tactics. In an attempt to stimulate further research on terrorism, a list of 50 unresearched or under-researched topics on terrorism was published. Among others, these included issues ranging from measuring and evaluating counter-terrorism policies, new legislation on terrorism, review of

national terrorism prevention programmes, among others (Schmid, 2011; Schmid & Forest, 2018).

It is evident from the foregoing that the perceptions of terrorism and the responses of key individuals who are or may be tasked with combating terrorism were not of particular interest to the researchers, despite the apparent lack of research in this area. Therefore, the existing research is insufficient to comprehensively address the phenomenon of terrorism and its prevention. These include the knowledge and attitudes of both current and potential stakeholders. Therefore, it is unknown what the attitudes of senior officers, other security professionals, and academics are regarding terrorism and the potential government response thereto.

1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The main aim of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy and institutional framework of South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism. The following objectives of the study were identified:

- Assess the policy and institutional framework that exist in South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism.
- Assess the state of security institutions' / apparatus' capacity or readiness to respond to terrorism.
- Evaluate how the policy framework and security institutions have fared in combatting and preventing terrorism in South Africa.
- Assess the extent to which these frameworks inspire confidence amongst senior officers within the SANDF, academics, as well as the security practitioners in South Africa's ability to combat terrorism.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS (RQ)

The following research questions guided this study in order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives:

- **RQ1**: What are the policy and institutional frameworks that exist in South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism?
- **RQ2**: What is the state of security institutions' capacity or readiness to respond to terrorism in South Africa?
- **RQ3**: How has the policy framework and security institutions fared in combatting and preventing terrorism in South Africa?
- **RQ4**: To what extent has these frameworks inspired confidence amongst senior officers within the SANDF, academics, as well as the security practitioners in South Africa?

1.6 HYPOTHESES

The preliminary stages of this research indicate some form of relationship between salience of terrorism, concern about terrorism, proximity to terrorist attacks as well as confidence in the government's ability to address the terrorist threat. The following hypotheses were to be investigated during the conduct of this study:

- H_{a1}: Low levels of salience of terrorism in South Africa is indicative of high levels of confidence in the government's ability in combatting and preventing terrorism.
    - H_{01}: Salience of terrorism in South Africa has no bearing in the levels of confidence in the government's response.
- H_{a2}: The more concerned the respondents are about terrorism in South Africa, the less confident they are in the government's ability to combat and prevent terrorism.
    - H_{02}: Concern about terrorism in South Africa has no bearing in the respondents' confidence in the government to address the threat.

- H_{a3}: Absence of proximity to terrorism manifests in a high degree of confidence in state institutions, thus implying efficacy in combatting the terrorist threat.

    - H_{03}: Absence proximity to terrorism does not necessarily manifests in a high degree of confidence in state institutions, thus it bears no bearing in the government's efficacy in combatting terrorism.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

This study utilised a mixed method design, which incorporates quantitative and qualitative research approaches. Specifically, the explanatory sequential design was utilised. This design enables the researcher to mitigate the shortcomings of both methods while also capitalizing on their benefits.

Data collection was conducted using two primary methods. On the one hand, senior officers in the SANDF were self-administered structured questionnaires with predetermined, closed-ended questions to capture quantitative data. In contrast, qualitative data was gathered through a series of semi-structured interviews between the researcher and a number of academics with a particular interest in the field of terrorism or a related field. The researcher also conducted semi-structured interviews with security professionals from various South African government institutions.

The required sample size of 259 respondents was determined through the use of the Krejcie and Morgan Table, augmented and confirmed by bin Ahmad and binti Halim as well as Raosoft.Inc (bin Ahmad & binti Halim, 2017; Krejcie & Morgan, 1970; Raosoft.Inc, 2004). A probability sampling technique, simple random sampling method, was used to determine the participants to the study. Quantitative data was collected through these means. The non-probability technique, purposive sampling, was used to collect qualitative data from a range of purposively targeted stakeholders.

The IBM SPSS computer program was used to analyse the quantitative data collected from the questionnaires. In particular, the descriptive analysis method was utilised to analyse the data. A thematic analysis method was utilised to analyse the qualitative

data collected through the semi-structured interviews. Both methods were then integrated and analysed together.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Many aspects of the studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism have been covered in the literature. These include the root causes, motives, techniques, methods, patterns and trends (Silke, 2009). Some have revealed the definitional and conceptual difficulties in describing terrorism (Makinda, 2007; Moten, 2010; Nkwede, 2013). Even with these attempts, there are issues that appear to not have received adequate attention (Schmid & Forest, 2018).

The particular significance of this study manifested in its ability to involve the major stakeholders in the practice of anti- and counterterrorism as well as those who study the phenomenon. The researcher argues that to fully comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism, the research must be all-encompassing to include how the various stakeholders view terrorism, especially in a country like South Africa, where terrorism appears to be a non-issue. By studying the perceptions of the senior officers of the SANDF, security practitioners and selected academics in South Africa, this study made an important contribution to the understanding of the general concept of terrorism. This is achieved by the study introducing different aspects of the literature as well as deepening the understanding of the phenomenon.

In light of this, the conduct of this study was deemed to require the opinions of senior officers of the SANDF and other security experts. SANDF senior officers with at least 15 years of military service were chosen as participants. These officers have held a range of tactical, operational, and/or strategic positions in addition to their roles as staff officers. They are likely to take part in a range of counterterrorism activities in South Africa and the surrounding areas as well as in the development of anti-terrorism or counterterrorism policy frameworks. Their perspectives on terrorism and the government's response to terrorism are worthy of study due to their potential involvement in the development of anti- or counterterrorism policies or operations, as they may reveal their current perspectives on the readiness of the government's response to terrorism, which is one of the study's main foci. Additionally, this could

influence the states' operational and potential future policy inclinations in relation to thwarting a terrorist attack in South Africa. These viewpoints might help determine whether or not, South Africa needs a reform of its security sector.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

In conducting this study, the researcher made several assumptions. First, it was assumed that the participants had a certain degree of information about terrorism and were not operating from a blank slate. Terrorism is not a typical conversation undertaken on a daily basis. However, with the advent of social media and other mainstream media outlets, major information about terrorism is published on a daily basis.

Second, the assumption was made that the research participants were truthful and honest with their responses. Being in the service for this long, the SANDF's senior officers are mature, intelligible and professional, which they would have been expected to portray when completing the questionnaires. It was also assumed that officers would not be duly influenced or prejudiced when completing the questionnaires and that their responses would be entirely their own. Issues such as information sensitivity, fear of victimisation and the need to conform have a potential to influence respondents' responses.

One of the key limitations, which is difficult to detect and eliminate, is that of response bias. It is always possible that some of the respondents could have provided information that they thought the researcher would have wanted and which was not necessarily their own genuine opinions. Lack of familiarity, information and context could thus have contributed to this bias. Several approaches were taken to mitigate this limitation. First, from the results of the pilot study, questionnaires were refined to address earlier complications. Questions asked did not require in-depth knowledge about the subject matter, but just general knowledge which is widely accessible throughout the media. Second, the researcher took greater care to avoid question order effects which could have affected the respondents' responses. Using the funnel approach, which is, moving from the general to the specific, the questions were ordered in such a way that no confusion would arise. Last, this also resulted in the

decision to augment this with qualitative research on the security practitioners and academics.

Another obvious limitation of the study was the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, various SANDF units would not grant access to their units. To mitigate this, the researcher had to deliver the questionnaires and allow for self-administration by the respondents. Even though clear instructions were given, there is always a potential for misunderstanding as the respondents could not clarify directly from the researcher. This could also help explain several unanswered and unreturned questionnaires, despite meeting the requirements for the sample size.

Third, due to the fluid environment of the SANDF, some of the senior officers could not be reached to participate in the study. This condition resulted in a significant underrepresentation of certain types of senior officers and an overrepresentation of others, perhaps leading to a biased perspective in the study. However, the researcher, taking into consideration the pyramidal structure of the SANDF, is convinced that those who participated were sufficient to ensure that the validity and reliability of the study were not adversely affected.

Fourth, due to what some perceived to be sensitive information that would inadvertently reveal matters of operational nature, some security practitioners denied access to semi-structured interviews. Similarly, some academics were not comfortable discussing this subject with the researcher. In both cases, and adhering to ethical considerations of volunteerism, the researcher sourced equally knowledgeable and willing participants to replace those that had initially been contacted.

In all of these limitations, the researcher took due diligence in ensuring that the validity and reliability of the study were not adversely affected, while also adhering to the ethical considerations required in the conduct of the research. Therefore, the generalisability of the study was never in jeopardy.

1.10 STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

First, **Chapter One (Introduction)** provided a concise overview of the global context of this academic enquiry. It was further complemented by a detailed background of the terrorism history in South Africa. The primary objective was to offer a succinct synopsis of the global terrorist threat. This chapter also discussed the research problem. Despite the significant emphasis given to the study of terrorism, many facets of the problem, such as attitudes and perceptions towards terrorism, as well as government responses thereto, have not been thoroughly investigated. This was followed by the delineation of the research's aim and objectives, as well as the case for the significance of the study. Next, the research questions and hypothesis were introduced. This chapter provided a description of the methodology used in the study, without offering any justification for its selection. The discussion on the limitations of the study and subsequent mitigating strategies followed. The chapter concludes with a description of the study's structure and organisation.

Chapter Two (Theoretical Framework and Literature Review) discusses the institutional theory/institutionalism as the main theoretical framework underpinning the study. The theory is used herein to evaluate the institutions that are tasked with preventing and combatting terrorism in South Africa. The chapter further highlights the seminal academic work in the study of terrorism in the global, African, and South African context. The purpose is to identify the prevailing gaps in the literature as well as to identify key variables employed in the study.

Chapter Three (Research Methodology) provides a detailed and justified explanation of the methodology used in the study. The research design and its limitations are also addressed.

Chapter Four (Presentation of Results and Findings) presents the results of the quantitative data derived from the senior officers of the SANDF through survey questionnaires. It further presents the findings of the qualitative data from the academics and security practitioners extracted through semi-structured interviews.

Chapter Five (Discussion of Results and Findings) then provides a discussion of the analysis, integration and interpretation of the results and findings presented in Chapter Four.

Finally, **Chapter Six (Conclusion)** provides a comprehensive summary and conclusion. This also entails recommendations on actions to be taken in lieu of the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the institutional theory is presented as the primary theoretical framework that serves as a foundation for this academic inquiry. It highlights the character of institutions as the foundation of institutionalism, the different approaches to institutionalism, as well as the applicability of the theory. Furthermore, the chapter surveys some of the seminal and contemporary academic works on the subject of terrorism, anti- and counterterrorism, particularly in South Africa. It then goes on to discuss a brief global historiography of terrorism. This is then followed by a discussion on the empirical literature on terrorism, leading to the generation of independent and dependent variables of the study. The focus is then shifted to the writing about terrorism on the African continent. The chapter concludes by defining some of the key concepts related to the study.

2.2 THE UTILITARIAN VALUE OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A theoretical framework is of utmost significance in the execution of any academic inquiry. According to Grant and Osanloo (2014, p.12), a theoretical framework is “the foundation from which all knowledge is constructed (metaphorically and literally) for a research study… It serves as the structure and support for the rationale for the study, the problem statement, the purpose, the significance, and the research questions” (Grant & Osanloo, 2014, p. 12). Kivunja (2018, p. 46) further describes a theoretical framework as a:

> structure that summarises concepts and theories, which you develop from previously tested and published knowledge which you synthesise to help you have a theoretical background, or basis for your data analysis and interpretation of the meaning contained in your research data.

In the same vein, Varpio, Paradis, Young, and Uijtdehaage (2020, p. 990) define a theoretical framework as:

> a logically developed and connected set of concepts and premises – developed from one or more theories – that a researcher creates to scaffold a study … In short, a theoretical framework is a reflection of the work the researcher engages in to use a theory in a given study.

To build a theoretical framework, the researcher needs to clearly describe the theories and concepts that will form the basis of the research. These theories and concepts should be logically connected and linked to the study being undertaken (Varpio, et al., 2020, p. 990). Lederman and Lederman (2015) recognise the essential role of theoretical frameworks in all types of research, including mixed methods research, which is the selected research method of this study. They then propose a practical approach to demonstrate its usefulness. The authors emphasise the necessity for all research articles, dissertations, and theses to include a solid theoretical basis in order to "justify the importance and significance of the work" (Lederman & Lederman, 2015, p. 4).

2.3 DEFINITION, APPROACHES AND APPLICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The major theoretical foundation of this study is institutional theory, commonly referred to as institutionalism (Hoefer, 2022, p. 71). This theory is highly relevant to the study since it is used herein to assess the efficiency of South Africa's policy and institutional framework in combating terrorism, specifically from the perspective of senior officers in the SANDF. By its very nature, the institutional theory posits that there exists a field of study that specifically studies and examines institutions. But what exactly constitute institutions? What do they do? How do they relate to this research? What is institutional theory's academic and utilitarian value to this study in particular? The proceeding sections seek to give explanations to these questions.

In the academic discipline of humanities, there is often a lack of consensus over the many concepts employed in the field. This has proven true to attempts to define institutions. In fact, Scott (1995, p. 235) asserts that there is "no single and universally agreed definition of an 'institution' in the institutional school of thought" while Mahmud (2017, p. 136) insists that "there is no one single way of defining institutions…" Despite

this being commonplace within this academic field, Bhasin, (2017, p. 1) recognises this conundrum as a "fundamental difficulty." Peters (2000, p. 2) acknowledges that the concept of institutionalism carries several interpretations among researchers, a view also shared by Mahmud (2017, p. 136). Likewise, the several alternative methods might be both diverse and contradictory at times. The lack of consensus over the appropriate terminology for this approach has often caused confusion, with many advancing to label it anything from neoliberal institutionalism, functionalism, and idealism (Segbers, Dyllick-Brenzinger, Hoffmann & Mauersberge, 2006, p. 15). In the context of this study, institutional theory and institutionalism are used interchangeably. However, in conceputualising institutionalism, a functional description of institutions is critical.

2.3.1 Defining Institutional Theory

Any efforts to define institutions generally and often lead to the identification of three key attributes. Institutions can be categorised as either tangible or intangible entities. Furthermore, institutions can be classified based on their formal or informal nature. Last, institutions have the capacity to acquire either a national or an international character. The explanations for all three characters are provided below.

2.3.1.1 Different Characters of Institutions

Berthod (2016, p. 2) defines institutions as "those beliefs, rules, roles, and symbolic elements capable of affecting organizational forms independent of resource flows and technical requirements". Similarly, Vargas-Hernández (2008, p. 126) describes institutions as "outlines, norms and human devised regulations that allow and constrain the behaviour of the social actors and make social life predictable and significant." In other words, institutions are those "constraints that human beings impose on themselves" (Kaufmann, Hooghiemstra, & Feeney, 2018, p.387). This is further emphasised by Heywood (2014, p. 339) who defines an institution as "a body of norms, rules and practices that shape behaviour and expectations, without necessarily having the physical character of an international organization." Simply put, institutions, in this context, are the "rules of the game" (Segbers, *et al.*, 2006). Institutions are therefore "entities that are defined by rules, norms, and social structures" (Cole, 2022). For this reason, languages and marriages, amongst others,

are considered typical examples of institutions as they are bound by some regulations during their social interactions (Leftwich, 2006, p. 1; Clemens & Cook, 1999, p. 445). While the above-mentioned descriptions denote the intangible or non-physical nature of institutions, the tangible character of institutions manifests in their ability to often exist as physical buildings. As observed by Johnson and Tallberg (2008, p. 90), "…institutions may or may not involve organizatons, which are understood as material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets."

These descriptions present institutions as having both a tangible and intangible attributes. In this context, for example, The *Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998*, while not having a physical character in a form of a physical address, can be considered part of an institution of the law as it denotes "rules and regulations", "norms" and "constraints" that seek to prohibit or control the interaction between residents of South Africa and foreign citizens within South Africa in terms of rendering foreign military assistance to potential terrorist groups or individuals. On the contrary, the physical building of the SAPS station, for example, denotes the physical or tangible character of institutions, together with its staff and other physical materials.

Institutions' second character often manifests itself in a formal or an informal manner. Friel (2017, p. 212) views the former as "devised rules" and the latter as "conventions and codes of behavior". A similar observation is made by Segbers, *et al.* (2006, p. 15) in which they conceptualise institutions as "formal and informal rules that constrain individual behaviour and shape human interaction". Formal institutions are "normally established by binding laws, regulations and legal orders which prescribe what may or may not be done" (Leftwich, 2006, p. 1; Bevir, 2009). Examples include the parliament, the presidency, the courts, government departments, political parties, constitutions, contracts, and form of government, which are a combination of state-bodies and state-enforced rules (Bevir, 2009, Kaufmann, et al., 2018, p. 387, Helmke & Levitsky, 2003, p. 4).

Informal institutions, in contrast to formal institutions, are “defined as the typically unwritten but socially shared rules and constraints that generate social behaviour expectations” (Dau, Chacar, Lyles & Li, 2022, p. 986). Informal institutions may not have explicit regulations, but they still demonstrate behavioural patterns that can be analysed in relation to flexible norms. These are typically formed by established and shared practices, norms, customs, traditions, principles, sanctions, and reward structures (Dau et al., 2022, p. 986). These practices and cultural elements are deeply ingrained in traditional social customs and can have a significant influence (Leftwich, 2006, p. 1). Informal institutions encompass a range of examples such as community groups, voting coalitions, policy networks, traditions, conventions, moral standards, religious beliefs, and other established patterns of behaviour that have stood the test of time (Bevir, 2009; Kaufmann, *et al.*, 2018, p. 387).

The aforementioned formal and informal character of institutions confer a national or domestic nature upon institutions. Nevertheless, institutions often possess a third character, an international character. It is therefore commonplace to refer to global entities such as the UN, the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the AU and similar organisations as international institutions (Zucker, 1987; Johnson & Tallberg, 2008). These are entities referred to by Heywood (2014, p. 440) as international organisations. International regimes are the institutional frameworks of international relations that encompass a collection of underlying principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making processes that shape the expectations of actors within a certain domain of international relations (Segbers, *et al.*, 2006, p. 15).

Institutionalism, therefore, is a comprehensive methodological framework that combines governance and social science (Bevir, 2009). More specifically, “institutional theory can be understood as policymaking that emphasizes the formal and legal aspects of government structures” (Bhasin, 2017, p. 1). This approach primarily centres around institutions, which are analysed using inductive, historical, and comparative techniques (Bevir, 2009). Moreover, it is argued that institutions possess the ability to influence the development and dissemination of organisational structures, design characteristics, and operational methods (Berthod, 2016). Adhering to the

norms established by these institutions assists in establishing credibility, minimising ambiguity, and improving the clarity of an organisation's actions and activities (Berthod, 2016). In the realm of international relations, institutionalism seeks to explain the mechanisms behind the cooperation and coordination among states. It also tackles the fundamental issue of instability and insecurity. According to Segbers, et al. (2006) institutionalists argue that it is possible for states to cooperate and that such cooperation can be effective.

Segbers, *et al.* (2006, p. 16) explains the basic assumptions of institutional thinkers for international relations as follows:

> Institutionalists have a similar understanding of the international system (anarchic) and the state (unitary) as realists. But they are saying that the state can be embedded in rules and act in such a way that its inherent behavior – utility maximizing strategies leading to permanent instability for everyone (security dilemma) – can be overcome by utility maximizing – leading to increasing interdependence b/w states, thereby producing stability and cooperation. A compatible way of reasoning is that states accept rules / regimes even in those cases when their short-term effects are detrimental for them because (only) this guarantees that other participants also will accept these rules in the future. So the potential negative impact of defection today – the so-called shadow of the future – ensures rule acceptance now.

2.3.2 Approaches to Institutionalism

There are typically four approaches to institutionalism: rational choice, normative, historical, and empirical institutionalism, as identified by Peters (2000), Thoenig (2003), as well as Johnson and Tallberg (2008), among others.

2.3.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism

According to Thoenig (2003), rational choice institutionalism employs ideas and theories created by the organisation's new economics to study political issues in a particular way. Rational choice institutionalism's main tenet therefore, is that institutions are collections of rules and incentives, and its constituents act in ways that

are dictated by these fundamental elements of institutional design (Peters, 2000, p.3). Furthermore, rational choice institutionalism holds that the key players in the political process are utility-maximising individuals acting in their own best interests, and that institutions develop as a result of their interdependence, strategic interaction, and collective action or contracting dilemmas. Institutions form and continue to exist for this reason: they serve crucial purposes for the various actors who are impacted by them (Johnson & Tallberg, 2008, p.5).

2.3.2.2 Normative Institutionalism

According to proponents of normative institutionalism, the best method to comprehend political behaviour is through a "logic of appropriateness" that people acquire because of their institutional participation. As a result, individuals operating within institutions behave in a certain way due of normative standards rather than a drive to maximise personal utility. The moral standards are learned through participation in one or more institutions, which serve as the primary social reservoirs of values (Peters, 2000, p. 2). Normative institutionalism's main area of interest is how institutions limit individual choice by shifting the focus away from rationality and means-ends efficiency and toward the importance of norms and values (Johnson & Tallberg, 2008, p. 6).

2.3.2.3 Historical Institutionalism

The central claim of historical institutionalism is that the structural and policy decisions taken at the institution's beginning will continue to shape its behaviour for the duration of its existence. This is known as "path dependency", the central explanatory principle for the historical institutionalists (Peters, 2000, p. 3). Because it emphasises path dependency and accounts for historical variables, historical institutionalism tends to emphasise the longevity or durability of institutions (Johnson & Tallberg, 2008, p.5). The idea that current results of public policies are not just a reflection of the preferences or interests of the greatest competitors in the market, but rather are influenced by the past and present institutional frameworks in which competition occurs, is one of the key hypotheses examined by historical institutionalism. In essence, it investigates how decisions made about policies in the past influence those made today (Thoenig, 2003).

2.3.2.4 Empirical Institutionalism

The idea of empirical institutionalism refers to a body of literature that examines the seemingly straightforward question of whether institutions affect political stability or policy choices (Peters, 2000, p. 3). The concept of institutions used in this literature embraces the formal structures of government and is more of a common sense term. This literature, albeit not only, mostly concentrated on the distinctions between presidential; and parliamentary regimes (Peters, 2000, p. 3).

2.3.3 Applications of the Institutional Theory

One of the reasons why institutional theory is so important and intriguing in the field of political science is as a result of its ability to be applied in a wide range of academic fields. This potential is much more evident in the fields of comparative politics, the study of political institutions, the formulation and evaluation of public policy, and the role of institutions during times of political transition and change.

According to Lijphart (1999), academics are able to investigate the ways in which political systems differ from nation-state to nation-state by comparing the various institutional configurations and the repercussions those configurations have upon political behaviour and outcomes. This potential also lies in its ability to examine the structure, activities, and impacts of the institutions that make up Trias Politica, for example. In addition, this theoretical framework can be utilised to determine the role that institutions play in the process of formulating and executing public policy (March, 1984). Whenever there are political shifts in administrations, the pre-existing institutions typically play a substantial role in determining the results of the political process. According to Mahoney (2010), it is because of such influence that it becomes essential to have a solid understanding of the role that institutions play during various periods in order to accurately predict and explain political events.

Within the context of this study, the significance of both the tangible and intangible aspects of institutions is highly relevant. The former is revealed in the form of identifying and assessing the physical entities or organisations in South Africa that are assigned with the responsibility of combating and preventing terrorist acts. As mandated by the Constitution and relevant acts of parliament; the SANDF, SAPS,

SSA, DHA, and the NPA, play a significant distinct and yet complementary roles in anti- and counterterrorism in South Africa, warranting a deeper assessment of their roles in this Sisyphean task.

The latter character, intangibility, will focus on the nature and performance of the policy and legislative frameworks that seek to combat terrorism. In this regard, key legislations will comprise of the *Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2002*, *Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities (PROCDATARA) Act 33 of 2004*, the *Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998*, the *Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001* and *Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020*. The focus here is to determine the frequency at which these legislations have resulted in the successful convictions of perpetrators.

Notwithstanding the importance of informal institutions, it is evident that this contribution will also focus only on the formal and legal aspects of government institutions, as an important feature identified by Bhasin (2017, p. 1). In addition to this predominantly domestic contribution, this analysis will also focus on the international character of institutions by evaluating South Africa's role within the various global and regional institutions, particularly in their efforts to combat terrorism. This role is brought to life by South Africa's commitment to the UN Counterterrorism Strategy, the AU's and SADC's counterterrorism initiatives.

2.4 BRIEF GLOBAL HISTORIOGRAPHY OF TERRORISM

There have been a significant amount of studies conducted on the subject of terrorism. However, only a small number of researchers have dedicated time to study the level of trust that key personnel have in governmental institutions to prevent terrorism, their awareness of terrorism, and their attitudes to terrorism. Similarly, the majority of recent research has not considered the effectiveness of the legal, policy, and institutional framework in different countries, particularly in the Southern African region. This is especially true for South Africa, one of the countries where there is little empirical research on the aforementioned issues.

This study was compiled using a range of primary and secondary sources. Given the vast amount of information available on the internet, the researcher made a conscious effort to primarily rely on academic books and peer-reviewed online and print journals. Credible information was also obtained from many databases, including *Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV)*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (SCT)*, *Perspectives on Terrorism* and *GoogleScholar*.

There is no doubt that 9/11 can be considered a key defining moment in the writing about terrorism globally, as this reignited the literature about terrorism. In his analysis of research published on the core terrorism studies between 1990 and 2007, Silke (2009) sought "to provide a general review of research published in the core terrorism studies." Silke (2009) observed that following the events of 9/11, "interest – and funding for – terrorism-related research had increased enormously." This rise in interest and funding was accompanied by a subsequent rise in the publication of terrorism-related books and journals. Notably, most of the research in this period focused on identifying trends and patterns related to terrorism, as well as trends in data-gathering, analysis, and research on terrorist tactics.

Similarly, Ranstorp (2009) observed that while terrorism had long been a significant concern for global security, 9/11 had a dramatic impact on the focus and priorities of terrorism research agenda. For example, during the period 2000-2001, the TPV and SCT released a total of 102 articles related to Muslim extremism or an associated Middle East terrorism topic. It was observed that there was extremely limited research on Al-Qaeda-related topics before 9/11. By 2007, approximately 50% of the articles produced (39 out of 80) were devoted to Al-Qaeda or a 9/11-related topic such as martyrdom, suicide bombings, or Muslim extremism.

Furthermore, Sinai (2012; 2014a; 2014b) consistently reviewed non-fiction and published books on terrorism and counterterrorism. In 2012, Sinai (2012) reviewed 150 books on terrorism and counterterrorism. This was followed by a review of 23 books in February 2014, followed shortly thereafter by another review of 27 books in April 2014. This bode well for the discipline as it exuded a culture of self-reflection and self-critique that is arguably absent in many academic disciplines.

In a project titled *130 Academic Theses (PhD and MA) on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Related Issues, Written in English between 1973 and 2018, by Authors with Arab and/or Muslim backgrounds*, Scrivens (2018) browsed the Open Access Theses and Dissertation (OATD) database using the search terms 'terrorism' and 'jihad'. In this project, Scrivens evaluated over 4800 entries which resulted in the eventual formulation of a list of 130. A closer scrutiny of these revealed that only five out of the 130 articles showed interest in discussing the policy or legal responses to terrorism by a handful of countries, a very important foci of this study.

This triggered authors such as Schmid and Forest to try and stimulate further research on terrorism by publishing a list of 50 un- or under-researched topics on terrorism (Schmid & Forest, 2018). According to these authors, the following six topics from the 50 were some of the deficiencies identified:

- Measuring and evaluating counter-terrorism policies: methodologies and techniques.
- Review of national terrorism prevention programmes and policies from a comparative perspective.
- Prevention of terrorism by intelligence and security services vs. prosecution and punishment of terrorists by law enforcement: dilemmas and solutions.
- The prosecution of terrorists in international comparison: national arrests, trial and conviction records compared.
- New legislation on terrorism: inventory, comparison and impact.
- Evaluations of counter-terrorism policies, including conciliatory policies.

In his latest review of studies on terrorism, Schuurman (2019) observed that the field continued to be too fixated on jihadism, and by so doing it ignored other forms of terrorism such as right-wing terrorism. Schuurman (2019) also argued that terrorism studies were largely event-driven and strongly tied to government-driven research agendas. For this reason, Schuurman (2019) asserted that the research interests were predominantly clearly influenced by dramatic developments in the terrorist threat and the government's changing counter-terrorism priorities.

2.5 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: IDENTIFYING KEY RESEARCH VARIABLES

Bryman (2016, p. 42) defines a variable as an "attribute on which cases vary" with 'cases' comprising of "people, but … can also include things such as households, cities, organizations, schools, and nations." In other words, a "variable is anything that can vary or change in value … and it is a variable because if the value of the cause change, so too will the effect" (Baglione, 2012, p. 75). In a typical research study, two or more variables are often examined (Mentz & Botha, 2012, p. 75). These variables can be distinguished either as independent or dependent variables, with the former being the variable that exerts influence or the treatment condition and the latter being the variable that is influenced and subsequently measured (Bryman, 2016, p. 42; Mentz & Botha, 2012, p. 75). The independent variable is therefore seen to have a causal influence on the dependent variable (Bryman, 2016, p. 42; Mouton, 1996, p. 94). Simply put, the independent variable refers to the "antecedent phenomenon and the dependent variable to the consequent phenomenon" (Mouton & Marais, 1990, p. 130). These two concepts are, therefore, "implicit in causal, or deterministic, models" (Babbie, 2014, p. 18).

There are few empirical research measuring respondents' opinions or perceptions of terrorism and the governments' possible responses to it, particularly in South Africa and throughout the African continent. But there is a body of knowledge that exists in other parts of the world that compensates for this deficiency, these are reflected below. In addition to shedding more light about the subject at hand, these studies also serve a purpose of determining the research variables of this study, which eventually culminates in the formulation of the conceptual framework below. The persistent themes or variables that emanate from these research projects are concern, fear or worry about terrorism; proximity to terrorism; salience of terrorism; as well as trust or confidence in government response to terrorism.

Fear or worry about terrorism continue to be a pressing matter in certain parts of the globe. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman (1993) conducted telephone interviews with persons 18 and older as part of their study, *The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion, 1988 to 1989*, to determine their thoughts on terrorism in the US. A total of 1102 (N) people were interviewed for the study. When not directly questioned about terrorism

in the US, the participants' overall security concerns regarding terrorism were quite low. Therefore, to these participants, terrorism appeared to be more a foreign phenomenon. However, when directly questioned, 98% of the respondents conceived of terrorism as a major problem, with two-thirds of them considering it to be a very serious threat. It is critical to remember that this research was carried out when there was hardly any international terrorism on US soil (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman, 1993).

During the period 28 September to 12 October 2012; La Free, Presser, Tourangeau, Adamczyket and Jay (2013) conducted a survey of 1576 individuals ,18 years of age and older, attaining a response rate of 62%, to determine their views on the salience of terrorism and their subsequent confidence in the US government's ability to prevent terrorist attacks. Approximately 15% of the sample revealed that they had thought about the prospect of terrorism in the preceding week, more than they had thought of the prospects of hospitalisation (10%), and crime victimisation (10%), among others.

Mueller and Stewart (2018) evaluated the perspectives of US participants on terrorism following 9/11. Participants in this study were asked to answer questions about their fears of becoming terrorist targets, the likelihood of a significant terrorist attack, the potential for additional attacks, their worries about significant terrorist attacks, etc. The researchers concluded that following 9/11 attacks, there was an increase in people's worries about terrorism, which then declined in the months that followed but did not considerably decline in the following years. The concern levels that were recorded at the time of the terrorist attacks simply persisted on other topics and were relatively consistent throughout the following 15 years (Mueller & Stewart, 2018).

Proximity to terrorism also has the tendency to shape the threat perception of the victims of terrorism. Proximity can be understood in terms of its personal, physical and psychological character. Personal proximity (race, nationality and/or religion) refers to the "affinity one feels with the victims of an attack … [while] physical proximity is the distance of an attack from one's home country" (Avdan & Webb, 2018, p. 91). Individuals may also be exposed to psychological proximity to terrorist attacks through, for example, loss of someone due to death or disappearance, "and reactions to such

exposures include posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms and alcohol consumption" (Hasin, Keyes, Hatzenbuehler, Aharonovich, & Alderson, 2007, p. 2268).

Researchers in the US discovered that terrorist attacks were "more traumatic for people who live near terrorist targets" but could not explain the differences in public attitudes about attacks in other countries" (Avdan & Webb, 2018). The authors argued that the threat perceptions were shaped by the personal and physical proximity to terrorist attacks (Avdan & Webb, 2018). In other words, the researchers found out that personal and physical proximity to terrorist incidents had a profound effect on the attitudes towards terrorism and the resultant empathy-gap amongst the participants (Avdan & Webb, 2018).

In another study conducted in Sweden, researchers investigated the possibility that first-hand experiences with terror increased effects compared to people located elsewhere in Sweden (Agerberg & Sohlberg, 2021). Contrary to the earlier research, the researchers asserted that there was no evidence to suggest the importance of physical proximity as "an important factor driving either emotional or attitude changes" (Agerberg & Sohlberg, 2021). While those close to the attacks considered themselves more affected, "attesting to the vividness of the experiences … we [the researchers] find no evidence of stronger rally effects, greater outgroup dislike, preferences for security policies or emotional effects." This research in essence challenged "previous theories on public opinion change in the aftermath of vivid events" (Agerberg & Sohlberg, 2021).

Baldwin, Samsa, and Ramaprasad (2008) observed the apparent long-term, global decline in public confidence in governments and related institutions. An improvement in public confidence in the events following the WTC attacks on 11 September 2001, however, countered this trend. A questionnaire was developed by Baldwin et al (2008) to gauge respondents' confidence in the ability of the various US governmental levels and law enforcement agencies to thwart terrorism in the future. The first aggregate confidence level, according to the researchers, was quite low. Nonetheless, the researchers identified three distinct confidence groups "that were characterized as optimists, pessimists, and unaffected individuals…" (Baldwin, *et al.*, 2008, p. 23). The

first group indicated that they had confidence that the government and law enforcement would, over time, gain skill and proficiency at preventing terrorist attacks (Baldwin, *et al.*, 2008, p. 23).

Sinclair and LoCicero "sought to test whether terrorism fears, and/or the impact of terror alerts, predicted overall trust in government in a sample of university undergraduates…" (Sinclair & LoCicero, 2010). The results "indicate that both general terrorism fears and the impact of terror alerts specifically, are statistically significant predictors of trust in government…" (Sinclair & LoCicero, 2010).

Allouche and Lind (2010) sought to determine the public attitudes to terrorism in Britain and the US after 9/11 and whether there was a connection between people's attitudes to terrorism and government responses to handle the perceived threat. Overall, the research revealed a persistent concern of possible terror attacks reoccuring. Additionally, there was general support towards the government to address the threat.

In a study conducted after the 22 July 2011 terror attacks in Norway, the researchers investigated the level of institutional trust in the general population and the survivors of the attacks (Nilsen, Thorensen, Wentzel-Larsen & Dyb, 2019). The research revealed that "trust in the police among survivors and parents was higher than or comparable to trust levels in the general population at the start of the research, but decreased for surviviors and parents at a later stage. Initially, trust in the justice system was higher among those directly affected than in the general population, and increased as the research progressed (Nilsen, *et al.*, 2019).

Albeit on a smaller scale, similar research addressing the salience of terrorism, concerns about terrorism, proximity to terrorism, and confidence in government responses in Africa to prevent terrorism, have been conducted. In a 2017 report titled Terrorism in Africa: A Quantitative Analysis, de Albuquerque (2017) observed the increase in the salience of terrorism across the African continent. Initially, De Albuquerque (2017) remarked that that terrorism was not necessarily a continental issue, but was rather localised at certain regions. However, in recent years, this has changed as all regions of Africa are now experiencing terrorist activities, albeit at

different degrees. As is now evident, the assertion below was made prior to the development of an Islamic insurgency in Northern Mozambique. De Albuquerque (2017) expressed the geographic spread of terrorism in Africa as follows:

> …terrorist attacks are not only unevenly spread over time, but also over region. In general, North and East Africa have more or less consistently been the primary locations of terrorist attacks over time. The number of attacks appears to have increased in East Africa, starting in 2007 and onwards. For North Africa the number of attacks started peaking in 2013. Although largely spared from terrorist attacks from 1997-2006, Central Africa saw an increase in attacks from 2006 onwards, with a particular spike starting in 2014. West Africa also experienced a relatively modest number of attacks during 1997-2006, but attacks have become incrementally more numerous following 2011. Indeed, of the different African regions, only Southern Africa appears to have been largely spared the increase in terrorist attacks experienced by the rest of the continent in 2014-2015.

According to this research, five countries – Nigeria (22%), Somalia (13%), Algeria (13%), Libya (9%) and Egypt (8%) – accounted for 65% of all attacks committed in Africa between 1997 and 2015. Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, the Tripoli Province of ISIL, and the Sinai Province of ISIL are just a few but main terrorist organisations with Islamic affiliations that had been active and had intensified attacks in 2003. For example, in 2017, Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya were among the top ten countries to have experienced the highest impact of terrorism perpetuated by Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Islamic State (IS), respectively.

Rounds Six (2014/15) and Seven (2016/18) of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted by Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2016), and Nkomo and Buchanan-Clarke (2020), respectively. Round Six focused on the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn; which included Sub-Sahara Africa's regional hotspots of extremist acitivity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific terror groups (Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region – Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria; Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in he Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun in the Sahel region -Mali; as well as Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa – Kenya and Uganda). Round Seven on the other hand,

concentrated on 34 African countries, which included five countries along the East Africa corridor that have experienced terrorist activity in recent years (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa.)[2]. The surveys asked security-related questions[3] to all the respondents in the respective countries. Afrobarometer conducted face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples of 1,200-2,400, which yielded country-level results with a margin of sampling error of +/- 2 to +/- 3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016; Nkomo & Buchanan-Clarke, 2020). Despite the two studies being four years apart, the key findings were rather similar in most respects:

- **Prioritising security in Africa.** Generally, most of the respondents cited security-related concerns as a top national problem that the respective governments should address. In the case of South Africa, approximately every one in three South Africans (31%) cited security-related concerns as a top national problem.

- **Public trust in security forces.** The level of trust in the police across all nations was significantly lower than the trust in the army. In relation to public trust in security institutions in South Africa, 35% of the respondents exhibited low trust in the SAPS compared to 54% who had trust in the SANDF.

- **Government's handling of extremist violence.** The majority of the respondents in the East African Corridor were a lot positive of how their governments were handling the terrorist threat. In fact, it is only in South Africa that 54% of the respondents thought that the government was handling extremist violence "fairly badly" or "very badly".

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[2] While Somalia has been heavily impacted by terrorism, and has been a source of terrorist activity in the region, no Afrobarometer survey has taken place in the country due to security challenges. Lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism or violent extremism, and measuring the frequency of terrorism incidents relies in part on how the term is defined. With this deficiency, in the case of South Africa for example, incidents included political killings, which had risen sharply and were political opportunities rather than ideologically motivated.

[3] In this context, "security-related issues" combines the categories of crime and security, political violence, political instability/ethnic tensions, interstate war, and civil war (Nkomo & Buchanan-Clarke, 2020).

A study by Schoeman and Cachalia (2017), titled Violent Extremism in South Africa, is a rare study that focused exclusively on South Africa. The study used publicly available documentation and qualitative semi-structured interviews to explore the threat of violent extremism in South Africa. Court documents, research on extremist groups in South Africa and media reports were studied and 40 interviews were conducted in September and October 2016. A purposive sampling approach was used, selecting respondents on the basis of their familiarity with the topics of extremism, security, and South African politics and society. These respondents included government officials, civil society members, security analysts, academics, members of the diplomatic corps and community leaders. The following were some of the key findings of the study:

- Respondents estimated that 60 to 100 South Africans had left to join the IS and that more than half had since returned. This led to fears of radicalisation, recruitment and potential attacks within the country. However, findings indicated that, while the possibility of an attack existed, the threat to South Africa was considered very low. According to the respondents, this could be attributed to South Africa's foreign policy of non-interventionism.

- Respondents also argued that domestic factors that played a role in other countries were not prevalent in South Africa. For example, the respondents argued that unlike in other states, South African Muslims were not considered immigrants but rather a part of South Africa's diverse make-up and were thus part of inclusive political decision-making structures of South Africa. These Muslims were also seen to be discouraging any form of extremism within their ranks.

- The respondents also argued that while the returnees were monitored on a regular basis, the South African government also provided support in the form of deradicalization programmes, thus deterring them from further terrorist activities.

- In terms of government responses to terrorism, the findings revealed that there was ongoing cooperation between South Africa and other governments in addressing threats, including the sharing of intelligence. However, the general sentiment amongst the respondents was that there was much room for improvement of cooperation. However, no pronouncement is made on whether or not the respondents were confident in the government institutions' efforts in averting the potential threat.

The case studies above indicate a correlation between various important variables. This interaction can be described as an inverse relationship between the independent and dependent variables, where an increase or decrease in the independent variable results in a corresponding decrease or increase, respectively, in the dependent variable. Another manifestation of this correlation can be described as directly proportional, meaning that any increase or decrease in the independent variables will lead to a corresponding increase or decrease in the dependent variable. To clarify, the studies produced independent variables that exerted either positive or negative effects on certain dependent variables. These variables are pertinent and significant to this research as they constitute the core of what will be examined. In this instance, the salience of terrorism, concern about terrorism, and proximity to terrorism appear to influence the respondents' perception of the government's capacity to address terrorism. Consequently, the study adopted the three as independent variables and the respondents' confidence in the government's ability to prevent terrorism as the dependent variable of the study. The link is illustrated in the conceptual framework (Figure 3.1), where the three independent variables (salience, concern, and proximity) are depicted alongside the dependent variable (confidence in the government's response). The study of these variables will assist in achieving the overall aim of evaluating the effectiveness of the policy and institutional framework of South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework



Numerous studies have been undertaken concerning a plethora of topics in the terrorism discourse. These encompassed a range of respondent samples with respect to the different ages, localities, races, and religions, among others. Furthermore, these studies employed an array of research methodologies and approaches to investigate a wide range of themes related to terrorism. One noteworthy observation is that, while this study took an ex-ante approach in its evaluation, it appears that the majority of the researchers preferred the ex post facto strategy, in which the terrorism and its effects are evaluated after it has taken place, as opposed to the former where an attempt is made to pre-empt it. What is also evident is that all of these studies have explored the relationships between multiple variables, some of which are not directly significant to this study, but are worth noting.

In a study into why some terrorist attacks attracted more media attention than others, Kearns, Betus and Lemieux (2019), came to the the conclusion that the perpetrator's religion was the best indicator of news coverage, with target type, being arrested, and fatalities also having an effect. According to these researchers, "attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 357% more coverage than other attacks" (Kearns *et al.*, 2019). This indicate a clear bias in terms of reporting of terrorist-related evens conducted by Muslims.

Other studies focused primarily on the the impact of terrorism on the attitudes towards outgroups such as immigrants and Muslims; with varying results. On the one hand, there are studies that suggest that terrorism adversely affects the attitudes of the respondents towards Muslims and immigrants, while on the other, the inverse is also observed. In one study, the researchers rejected the hypothesis that "fear of terrorism leads to a backlash against Muslims (Christensen & Aars, 2021). Similarly, Turkoglu and Chadefaux (2022) found that "terrorist attacks do not affect respondents' attitude toward … immigrants." This observation is supported by the findings of Agerberg and Sohlberg (2021) who could not find any evidence in their research that proximity to terrorism led to "greater outgroup dislike." On the contrary, Haner, Sloan, Cullen, Kulig, and Jonson (2019) using the structural equation modeling, "demonstrated that terrorism-related fear and worry predict support for anti-Muslim policies." Vergani, Mansouri, and Orella (2022) also discovered that "individuals with higher levels of

terrorism concern have high anti-Muslim attitudes regardless of their levels of knowledge" about Muslim people and Islam, who initially were "less likely to have anti-Muslim prejudice."

Another interesting study was conducted by Guo and An (2022) wherein the interest was in determining whether terrorism made people pessimistic. Consequently, the researchers discovered that "terrorism increases pessimism about future living conditions by 11 percentage points" (Guo & An, 2022).

While not having a direct bearing in this project, these studies demonstrate the diverse nature of the terrorism discourse, such as the inherent bias against Islam in terms of reporting of terrorist-related incidents and conflictual attitudes of the respondents against outgroups. Significantly, these studies indicate a greater avenue of potential for further research in as far as terrorism is concerned.

2.6 LITERATURE REVIEW ON TERRORISM IN AFRICA

2.6.1 Writing About Terrorism in Africa

The events of 9/11 brought the study of terrorism to the fore for many academics. In Africa, the following themes became observable in the study of terrorism: Africa's responses to the WoT, the impact of terrorism studies on regional or area studies, problems with terrorism research in Africa, as well as the evolution of Africa's policy, legislative and institutional framework in combatting and preventing terrorism.

Lutz and Lutz (2013) paid particular attention to the problems associated with researching terrorism in Africa. They observed that terrorist incidents in Africa appear to be underreported, and they attributed this to three primary reasons. First, the definitions for the inclusion of events in the databases may have missed certain activities that could qualify as terrorism and which have been prevalent in some African countries. Second, attacks by domestic groups directed against the home government or other local targets may be underreported. Last, "the lack of reported events may reflect different conditions in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa that make terrorism a less useful technique in this region of the world in comparison with other regions."

These obstacles bear some resemblance to those identified by other earlier authors. For example, Dugan, LaFre, Cragin, and Kasupski (2008) observed that depending on how one viewed these groups, either as terrorists or freedom fighters, reporting terrorist incidents may have been misleading. According to Dugan *et al.* (2008), establishing a database on terrorism faced two major problems. First, reporting on terrorism was limited to international events "where those involving a national or group of nationals from one country attacking target physically located in another country." As a result, domestic incidents of terror did not often receive the attention they deserve, and when they did, the accuracy of that information may have been questionable. Last, those who have established "prior event databases have been unable to maintain consistent data collection strategies over time" (Dugan *et al.*, 2008).

Solomon (2012, p.157) lamented the nature of information received as follows:

> The need for good and reliable information is the building block on which all counter-terrorism strategies are built. Where such information is contradictory, or unreliable because it is tainted with political correctness or where information is simply not forthcoming it results in poor analysis and failed counter-terror strategies.

This is indicative of the complexities that are involved when conducting research on terrorism in Africa. Due to what Solomon (2012, p.157) called "political correctness", it appears information may not be revealed in its entirety or at all, thus creating gaps in the information required.

A similar occurrence was reported by Mngomezulu (2015) in which he noted that in Nigeria, "whenever figures of people who had been killed were released, government sources ensured that such figures were reduced significantly so as to created the impression that government was in control of the situation." In this manner, it is evident that acts of terror in Africa are often under-reported. This was therefore more about political survival and not the expression of the truth as provided by the prevailing facts, thus making writing about terrorism in Africa a big challenge.

2.6.2 Origins and Causes of Terrorism in Africa

Several authors have investigated the origins and causes of terrorism in Africa. Some point to the internal factors while others advance an argument for external factors. However, in most cases than not, authors often appreciate the role played by both factors.

Some also invoke Rapoport's (2022) Anti-Colonial (2nd) and New Left (3rd) Waves as probably the origins of terrorism in Africa. Activities conducted by the former national liberation movements against the colonial settlers to gain independence and self-rule, were often criminalised by the governments in order to suppress any calls for freedom. In retaliation, these movements embarked on a violent campaign to make their voices heard (Lumina, 2008).

When investigating the origins and causes of terrorism, Makinda (2007) identified four waves of terrorism in Africa: Nationalist Liberation Movements (1st) Wave, Post-Independence Civil Wars (2nd) Wave, Israeli-Palestinian Problem (3rd) Wave, and Al-Qaeda Activities (4th) Wave. The first wave was largely driven by the desire for self-determination while the second wave was amongst others, a reaction to the perceived failure of governments to deliver on the political and economic benefits promised during the struggle for liberation. The third wave "was underpinned by the perceived injustices in the Palestinian territories". The last wave, was brought about by inadequate security and governance institutions (Makinda, 2007).

Botha (2007) highlighted the following internal factors that contribute to a "state's vulnerability to terrorism":

- Draconian or closed political systems.
- The overall health of governments and government control over their respective territories.
- Nationalist, separatist or ethnic motivations.
- Conflict over natural resources.
- Religion.
- Economic circumstances.

In addition, Botha (2007) mentions the geographic position, alliances and the question of identity as some of the external factors that contribute to state's vulnerability to terrorism.

Mngomezulu (2015) also identifies what he calls endogenous and exogenous factors, which he asserts make terrorism special in Africa. Among these factors are: "porous borders, ethnic and religious differences, lack of financial resources which force countries to rely on Western countries, multiplicity of political parties and many others" (Mngomezulu, 2015, p. 27). Poor administration, which can lead to disenchantment may also yield a group of people susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups. Mngomezulu (2015) views a relationship between an African country and America, which has declared WoT, as tantamount to that African country declaring war on terrorists.

Several other vulnerabilities were further expatiated on by Mills and Herbst (2007) who raised several concerns. First, Africa had several soft targets and it is an easy place to attack US, European and Israeli interests in the continent. Second, Africa had the potential of serving as a recruiting ground for terrorists. Last, Africa may "unwittingly serve as a sanctuary and source of succour for international terrorists" (Mills & Herbst, 2007).

Okereke, Iheanacho, and Okafor (2016) studied the "nature, causes and factors that facilitate and sustain the scourge of terrorism in Africa." They asserted that to fully comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism, issues of governance, religious extremism and negative extra-continental influences are crucial and are worth studying. Furthermore, Okereke *et al.* (2016) also identified "state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and under-governed spaces as facilitators of terrorism in the continent." Okereke *et al*. (2016) further observed "that the counterterrorism initiatives across the continent are constrained by several factors including the absence of adequate legal regime and operational capacities of security agencies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa."

The above-mentioned internal (endogenous) factors, in the context of Africa are further compounded by external (exogenous) factors which have brought international (transnational) terrorism to the shores of the continent.

Some scholars, attribute in part, the origins and causes of terrorism in Africa, to the return of the Afghan war veterans. In the 1990s these veterans embarked on the spread of radical fundamentalism which was initially financed from countries such as Saudi Arabia and later by terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. This indirectly resulted in the Algerian Civil War and the spread of terrorism across the northern parts of the African continent (Cilliers, 2003; Denisova & Kostelyanets, 2022; Antwi-Boateng, 2017).

2.6.3 Trends and Patterns of Terrorism in Africa

Hexham (2002) produced perhaps one of the most important works of the time, in which he conducted an in-depth study of religious extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this work, Hexham studied the phenomenon of religious extremism in different sub-regions of Africa, namely Southern Africa, East Africa and West Africa. However, Hexham looked at religious extremism holistically in that spirit mediums, Christianity and Islam became the subject of his academic enquiry, a marked shift from a typical discussion on terrorism which often seems to be prejudiced against the Islamic faith.

Forest and Giroux (2011) observed two trends of terrorism in Africa; domestic and transnational dimensions. Concerning the domestic dimension, Forest and Giroux (2011) observed that militants have often used enduring grievances to justify their recourse to violent actions. These groups were thus able to secure a location that they utilised as an operational base to plan attacks, receive support and provide a source of recruitment (Forest & Giroux, 2011). Forest and Giroux also observed that “since the mid-1990s the strategic use of terrorism in Africa has been interwoven into broader conflict systems such as insurgencies, civil wars and other forms of political violence.” Considering the transnational dimension, Forest and Giroux (2011) made the following crucial finding:

> In the last 15 years, African countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism but they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations. The 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and aeroplanes, and attacks against UN buildings in Algeria and Nigeria offer just a few examples of terrorist attacks carried out on African soil with a distinct international dimension. In such cases, terrorist groups use the 'softness' of African-based targets to attack Western – primarily European and US – and international interests. According to one report, during the first decade after the end of the Cold War between 1990 and 2002, 'Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of [international] terrorism' on the continent.

Atta-Asamoah (2009) provided clarity concerning a transnational terrorist incident. To this end, a terrorist act is considered transnational "if more than one territory can be identified with the planning, preparation, targeting, execution and effects of that act." Consequently, Atta-Asamoah (2009) observed that between 1997 and 2007 there had been more domestic incidents of terrorism in Africa than there had been international incidents. However, transnational incidents have had more fatalities than domestic incidents. In other words, the frequency of domestic incidents of terrorism is seen to be high while the fatality rates in transnational incidents are higher. For this reason, Atta-Asamoah (2009) asserted that these two categories should be treated as equally important as they both contribute to insecurity in the continent.

Wakhu (2017) introduced a new dimension to the study of terrorism in Africa by looking at ethnicity. Wakhu (2017) observed that in multi-ethnic societies there was a developing trend in that grievances that were brought about by competition over state power by a "few ethnic groups are giving rise to a new form of ethnic radicalisation likely to result in a new form of ethnic terrorism as a sustained tactic for waging conflict." This trend could be attributed to "ethnic radicalisation of urban and rural populations, increased urbanisation and urban population, increases in the capital costs of conventional warfare, increased state terrorism and developments in

information and communication." Wakhu (2017) asserted that these contemporary terrorist methods were likely to conspire to produce the new ethnic terrorism.

Whatever the trends and patterns of terrorism in Africa are, it is evident that some regions of the continent are currently on the frontlines of efforts by the global Jihadi movement to impose Sharia-based government in place of the current secular order. These organisations include Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as Al-Qaeda affiliates like Somalia's Al-Shabaab and AQIM, which is located in the Sahel and North African region. They are causing mayhem across the continent and are all motivated by extreme Islamic ideology (Antwi-Boateng, 2017).

Botha and Graham (2021) gathered and compiled data which depicted the proliferation of terrorism in Africa over the decade 2010-2020. This data was compiled from the Institute for Economics and Peace's (IEP) Global Terrorism Indexes (GTI) 2012/13-2020. Initially in 2012/13, only six countries; Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, DRC, Algeria and Kenya, were affected by terrorism. By 2020, this number had increased to 10; which now included Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Egypt, Cameroon, Niger, Mali and Mozambique. What is also observable is that for the entire decade, Nigeria and Somalia have topped the African continent in terms of number of terrorist activities experienced. Nigeria, have ranked top for all years barring for 2012/13 in which Somalia topped the continent with a number of terrorist incidents experienced. Last, the data also revealed that in Southern Africa, the Islamic insurgency in Mozambique only gained prominence in 2020.

In the GTI Reports of 2022 and 2023, which both reflects terrorism incidents of 2021 and 2022 respectively, in 2021 Somalia was ranked first in Africa in relation to terrorism in Africa relegating Nigeria to third place. Burkina Faso and Mali emerged during this period, as countries in the Sahel that has suffered from an increase in terrorists' activities. This has prompted the IEP to declare the Sahel an epicentre of terrorism in Africa (IEP, 2022; 2023).

According to the studies mentioned above, Southern Africa has been largely devoid of terrorism. However, over the years, that prognosis changed when an Islamist insurgency broke out in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique's northernmost province, on 05 October 2017 (Bekoe, Burchard & Daly, 2020). By 2022, similar attacks had spread to the nearby provinces of Nampula and Niassa (Crisis24, 2023). These attacks were committed by the Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ), an Islamist fundamentalist group practising principles similar to those of Al-Shabab in Somalia (Afriyie & Arkoful, 2021). This group apparently follows radical Islamic teachings of Kenyan and Tanzanian Islamic ideologies like Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the mastermind of the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings who was subsequently shot dead in 2012 in Mombasa, Kenya (Afriyie & Arkoful, 2021; da Silva, 2017; Bekoe, *et al.*, 2020). According to West, cited in da Silva (2017), this group started off as a religious organisation in Cabo Delgado in 2015, and became radicalised at a later stage as a result of grievances with the discovery of mineral resources in the northern provinces of Mozambique.

In a true hallmark of terrorist organisations, ASWJ has been brutal in the conduct of their activities. Although they have had several encounters with the Mozambican government forces, most attacks have been against civilians (Bekoe, *et al.*, 2020). Since its inception in October 2017, the insurgency has resulted in over 4000 deaths and approximately one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), some of whom are in remote camps that could not be reached for humanitarian assistance, thus continuing to live in conditions of squalor (Machado, 2022). In addition, women and children have borne the brunt of the ASWJ. Hundreds have been taken hostage, sold to foreign fighters, forced into marriages, and raped; while young boys have been coerced into being child soldiers or risk being beheaded should they refuse. Additionally, residences, hospitals, schools and places of worship have been destroyed by the ASWJ (Machado, 2022).

Three provinces of South Africa; Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal, share a border with Mozambique. Although the northern provinces of Mozambique are distant from these borders, the potential for refugees, IDPs and spill-over effects is always possible as a result of the porosity of the borders. Not only is the insurgency of great

concern in Mozambique, but it also threatens to affect regional stability in Southern Africa, as well as in South Africa. Among others, it is upon these factors that the terrorist threat can be seen to be posing an existential danger to the region, and South Africa in particular. In lieu of this developing security situation, on 15 July 2021, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed, comprising among troop-contributing countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania among others (SADC, 2021b).

2.6.4 Government Responses to Terrorism in Africa

States' responses to terrorism have taken place on two main fronts: international and national fronts. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the overwhelming response by African states was that of support to the US government and its citizens. This was informed partly by the fear that by attacking the US in the US, terrorists had displayed their ability to attack US interests anywhere in the world, including in Africa (Dagne, 2002; Glickman, 2003). Some African countries began to work closely with the US government, an action which could possibly lead to them becoming a target of terrorism. Despite this commitment of support, the Bush Administration believed that Africa, in general, was a "potential breeding ground for terrorism" (Dagne, 2002). Dagne (2002) specifically highlighted the role played by Sudan and Somalia in the perpetuation of terrorist activities. Dagne (2002) and Glickman (2003) were also mindful of the 1998 terrorist activities that took place at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Most strikingly, South Africa was singled out as a preferred destination for terrorists.

Despite the persistent nature of terrorism, governments have responded in a variety of ways to avert the possibility of attacks and to mitigate the effects thereof. This has included the enactment and amendment of anti-terrorism laws and policies, as well as the creation of anti-terrorism institutions (Haque, 2002). Counter- and anti-terrorism measures generally falls under three main categories: traditional methods, direct military action and pursuance of political solutions (Moran, 2021, p. 158). Traditional methods refer to those activities such as intelligence gathering and policing, which are aimed at thwarting an attack before it happens (Moran, 2021, p. 158).

The US' response to the 9/11 attacks, which took the form of a massive WoT in the Middle East, is a classic example of a direct military action. This resulted "… in Al Qaeda's expulsion from Afghanistan, the loss of its training camps, operational bases and command headquarters in that country, and the killing and capture of hundreds of Al Qaeda terrorists" (Hoffman, 2015, p. 75). Such military solutions are also evident in the responses by the Nigerian, Kenyan, Somali and Egyptian governments which have pursued terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and ISIL using their militaries as the main instrument (Blanchard, 2014; Anderson & McKnight, 2015). This measure, is evidently a strategy preferred by most governments (Al Dajani, 2015). However, in recent years, this strategy has become rather controversial and unpopular due to its susceptibility to be used as a recruitment tool for terrorists (Moran, 2021, p. 158).

Another but not often used method is the pursuance of a political solution which aims to address the underlying motivations of terrorists and those who supports them. This also includes an attempt to address the socioeconomic issues that lead to radicalisation and the resort to terrorism (Adetula, 2015). In the case of Northen Ireland, all three methods were in use (Moran, 2021, p. 158). Considering the successful conclusion of this saga in Northern Ireland, this is significant in that it highlights the need for an all-encompassing solution to a rather complicated situation.

In addition to the above-mentioned, legislative, policy and law enforcement measures have also formed key components of counter- and anti-terrorism initiatives. Legislative measures refer to the measures taken by the national assembly of governments in response to terrorism (Adetula, 2015). Such can be seen in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which was established on 25 November 2002 as a direct offshoot of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Samuels, 2023). DHS is charged with "coordinating and unifying the Nation's homeland security efforts" (United States. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Similarly, in its quest to quell the terrorist threat from Boko Haram, the Nigerian government passed anti-terrorism legislation, which was initially introduced in 2011 and 2013 (Blanchard, 2014).

Many of the states of the world have become signatories to many of the international protocols on the prevention of terrorism, such as the UN Counterterrorism Framework. These policy measures have not been ratified by all states, but are important measures undertaken by states to cooperate in counterterrorism matters. The same goes for policy frameworks undertaken under regional and sub-regional organisations such as the AU and the SADC.

Following the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, the government created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit within the Police Department of Kenya (Woldemichael, 2006). This is indicative of some of the law enforcement measures undertaken by states to combat terrorism. Such measures are also evident in large scale and significant arrests made by the government in Indonesia following the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002, having initially been in a denial mode regarding the potential for terrorism in Indonesia (Sebastian, 2003).

In the case of Nigeria, these law enforcement measures were described by Adetula (2015, p. 15) as follows:

> Such efforts would include extensive training of officers in the face of new threats such as terrorism, improved intelligence gathering and analysis and its effect on prevention if any, improvement of community policing through cooperation with the Vigilante services in northeast Nigeria, arrests, re-arrests and prosecutions of criminals including prosecution of suspected military officers aiding Boko Haram.

2.7 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

In the conduct of this study, several key, but often misunderstood concepts were prominent. These concepts are often used interchangeably to the dismay of many. As such, much controversy has been generated by the use of these terms. Therefore, notwithstanding the complexities of conceptualising and defining these terms, largely because of lack of universal consensus, it was prudent that an attempt be made for the ease of contextualisation in this study. These are radicalisation, violent radicalisation, violent extremism, religious extremism, terrorism, anti-terrorism and

counter-terrorism. This study, therefore, adopted the following explanations of the preceding concepts.

2.7.1 Radicalisation and Violent Radicalisation

Radicalisation implies a pathway from the conventional beliefs to that of a more radical stance, whether to the left or right of the political spectrum (Australian Government, n.d.). Such a connotation of the term also implies movement to extremism to discern those with extremist tendencies from the mainstream (Sotlar, 2004). At this stage, however, being radical or extreme, is not necessarily synonymous with violence.

Violent radicalisation, on the other hand, "involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008). It is not as much about the act of terrorism itself, but rather about the intent to engage in terrorist-related activities, in other words, a shift in mind-set to make violence an option in propagating for one's radical or extreme views.

2.7.2 Violent Extremism and Religious Extremism

Violent extremism manifests when "person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then acts accordingly" (Australian Government, n.d.). No specific individuals or groups can be exclusively linked or attached to any violent extremist act. This means violent extremism can be conducted by anyone individual group without any particular affiliation. For example, a disgruntled individual can decide to conduct a violent act without affiliation to terrorist groups. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2018, p. 2) links violent extremism to religious extremism, in large parts the essence of this study as follows:

> … The diversity of what may constitute 'violent extremism' has, to some extent, been shaped by the activities of terrorist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, which spread messages of hate and violence as well as religious, cultural and social intolerance. In doing so, groups engaged in violent extremism often distort and exploit religious beliefs

> [author's emphasis], ethnic differences and political ideologies to legitimise their actions as well as to recruit and retain their followers.

From this perspective, violent extremism can be seen as a wider concept while terrorism a subset thereof.

2.7.3 Terrorism

Terrorism, arguably, is among the most difficult and controversial subject to define. There have been many attempts to define the term, none resulting in the attainment of universal consensus. These attempts include the development of definitions at national, regional and international levels.

For UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1566 (2004) gave some of the features of terrorism as follows:

> … criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any at, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism … (UNSC, 2004, p. 2).

The AU defines a terrorist act as

> (a) Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death tom any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
>
> (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or

abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State (AU, 1999, p. 3).

In South Africa, terrorist activity was all encompassing to include "the use of violence by any means", "destruction to any property, natural resource…" "threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic", among others (South Africa. The Presidency, 2004).

There are many other definitions of terrorism from organisations other than states, and academics in the field. However, a universally accepted definition remains elusive. In the context of this paper, the author adopted the features that are salient to all definitions, viz. "acts of violence far reaching psychological [sic] psychological effects, innocent victims and political motives" (Vishal & Kumar, 2020, p. 1)

2.7.4 Anti-Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Though often used interchangeably, the difference between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism is subtle. While the former refers largely to a "holistic defensive approach to terrorism which seeks to understand the causes and drivers of terrorism and measures that can be taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist (criminal) acts", the latter denotes "the offensive pursuit to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism…" (Knowles, 2018).

2.7.5 Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform is "… defined as a process of transforming the security sector to strengthen accountability, effectiveness, and respect for human rights and the rule of law" (Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2023). This implies the restructuring of government institutions to combat a prevailing threat and be fit for purpose. Some of the measures taken above are indicative of security sector reform programmes. The

creation of new institutions, enhancement of law enforcement, enactment of legislation; among others, is an indication of some form of security sector reform measures undertaken to revamp the security apparatus in dealing with a terrorist threat. This is important for the context of this study in that South Africa may be faced with a choice of conducting security sector reform, depending on the terrorist threat they may face.

2.8 SUMMARY

The institutional theory was adopted and introduced in this chapter to serve as a structure and support for the main objective of this study, which is to evaluate the policy and institutional framework to combat terrorism in South Africa. In the context of this study, the institutional theory provides an academic and a theoretical lens through which the South African counterterrorism institutions can be evaluated. As institutionalism concentrates on institutions, this contribution studies those institutions using a combination of inductive reasoning and historical analysis.

The different characters of institutions find expression in the policy and legal institutions as well as the physical or material institutions that are tasked with preventing terrorism in South Africa. This manifests in the many key legislations that are designed to deter acts of terrorism in South Africa. Among these, the following are instrumental in the prevention of terrorism: the *PROCDATARA 33 of 2004*, the *Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998*, the *Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001* and *Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020*.

Similarly, such an expression also takes root in the roles of various government institutions who are the custodians of counterterrorism in the country. In addition to these tangible and intangible institutions, the main focus of this study would be on the formal and legal aspects of the institutions. For this reason, the role of the SANDF, SAPS, SSA, NPA and DHA, in their counterterrorism role, is seen as crucial and worthy of studying.

This chapter also presented the seminal and contemporary scholarly works that dealt with the subject of terrorism, especially in the context of South Africa. The chapter thus examined the main literature pertaining to the salience of, concern about, and proximity to terrorism, as well as the respondents' confidence in South African security institutions' response to terrorism. These are the variables that formed the major part of this study.

While terrorism was acknowledged to have been a serious global threat for a long time, the conceptual literature about the phenomenon seemed to have spiked as a result of the event of the bombing of the Twin Towers in New York, on 11 September 2001. However, the writings proceeded to focus on many issues that included attempts on definitions of terrorism, terrorist organisations involved, patterns of terrorism, amongst others. This preoccupation with these issues diverted attention from similar important aspects that included knowledge about terrorism, perceptions about terrorism and about how people viewed the government's response to terrorism. This glaring omission formed a critical problem to be investigated in this study, especially in relation to the evaluation of South Africa's possible encounter with terrorism.

Furthermore, what was evident, was that very few empirical studies have been conducted on the subject of terrorism in general, and terrorism in South Africa in particular. However, the studies discussed in this thesis were key to highlight this deficiency. Certain studies, conducted in the US and Sweden, examined how the proximity to terrorist attacks affects the public opinion; in other words, knowledge about and attitudes towards terrorism. In the study conducted in the US, Avdan and Webb (2018) concluded that the respondents were more likely to be empathetic towards the victims of terrorism and more likely to exhibit adverse attitudes towards the perpetrators as a result of personal and physical proximity to the incidents. However, in Sweden, Agerberg and Sohlberg (2021) could not find evidence of such a correlation. Ironically, this study focused on respondents who had first-hand experience with regards to the terrorist incidents they were quizzed about. Nevertheless, both studies were important in that they highlighted the respondents' high knowledge of terrorism and also how personal and physical proximity affected their attitudes about terrorism.

Nkomo and Buchanan-Clarke (2020), on the other hand, indicated a different perception in relation to the views of South Africans. Most prioritised security-related issues as being of major concern. The respondents in this study were of the view that the government needed to be capacitated in order to address the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, the study revealed that the respondents were not confident in the SAPS dealing with terrorism but were somewhat confident of the SANDF to deal with the threat. This is revealing in many ways. The attitudes of these respondents indicate that they are aware of what terrorism means. They also exhibit fear of terrorist incidents, as well as lack of confidence and distrust in security apparatus in dealing with terrorism. However, in an earlier study by Cachalia and Schoeman (2017), the respondents adopted more of a positive stance regarding potential terrorist attacks in South Africa and regarding the government's response to terrorism. The respondents were of the view that there was no imminent threat to South Africa as the conditions which prevailed in countries which had been attacked were not prevalent in South Africa. However, it must be noted that the study was conducted prior to the developing situation in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

Chapter Three explains and justifies the research design and methodologies employed in the conduct of this study.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Having set the groundwork in the previous two chapters with a general background of global terrorism and the literature review of the study, this chapter discusses the methodology employed in this research project. As stated previously, the primary objective of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional framework to combat and prevent terrorism. Several research questions were posed to accomplish this objective and its subsequent sub-objectives. This chapter, therefore, aims to document in sufficient detail the steps taken to ensure that other researchers can replicate the study. In addition, the chapter delves deeply into these details to ensure that selected respondents are representative of the study population and can thus be generalised thereto.

In order to achieve the main objective of this chapter, the following disposition will be followed: First, the chapter begins by discussing the methodology and design of the study. More specifically, emphasis is placed on the selection and justification of the mixed methods research, and the associated sequential explanatory mixed methods research design. Second, the researcher explains how and why the selected sample was chosen, bearing in mind the plethora of existing sampling techniques and methods. This is then followed by a discussion on the instruments of data (survey questionnaires) as well as the sources of data (semi-structured interviews). The reliability and validity testing then follows this discussion. Data analysis procedures, viz, descriptive statistics for quantitative data and thematic analysis for qualitative data; are discussed thereafter. The associated ethical considerations observed in this study are stated. Not being oblivious to the challenges of conducting research, the researcher completes this study by discussing the limitations and delimitations of the study, as well as measures taken to mitigate them.

3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

The origins of the word “research” can be traced back to Middle French word, recerche, from recercher, which means to go about seeking, which itself is derived from Old French word, recerchier (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2023). In modern terms, research is understood to be a “detailed study of a subject, especially in order to discover (new) information or reach a new understanding” (Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 1211). Research, therefore, is a “systematic process of enquiry to discover knowledge about a phenomenon” (Theletsane, 2014, p. 7). Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 74) conceive of a research design as a “plan or blueprint” of how one intends conducting the research while research methodology “focuses on the research process and the kind of tools and procedures to be used.”

Contemporary thinking about research should be an all-encompassing endeavour as “no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal factors … because each different method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, [therefore] …multi-methods must be employed” (Potter, 2012, p. 162). This study adopted a mixed method research by combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches to address the research questions posed herein. Mixed methods research is aptly defined “as the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17). This is primarily undertaken because some authors and scholars have understood that oftentimes, “circumstances or the problem under investigation demand that both approaches be used in the same study to confirm or elaborate each other” (Bless, Higson-Smith & Sithole, 2013, p. 16). For this study, mixed methods research was preferred for two primary reasons. In the first instance, and in addition to attaining the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative research methods, this approach was also meant to assist mitigate their apparent weaknesses as well (Trochim, Arora & Donnely, 2016, p. 70; Kumar, 2014, p. 14). In this way, it was foreseen that a better understanding of the research problem would emanate, as opposed to when using only one approach (Trochim, *et al.*, 2016, p. 70). Furthermore, the development, popularity, use and importance of mixed method research have been on the rise in the past decade, providing the researcher with further motivation to contribute to this ever-increasing body of knowledge (Harrits,

2011, p. 150; Wheeldon, 2010, p. 88; Harwell, 2011, p. 151; Johnson, Onuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p. 112).

Mixed methods research designs comprise of different categories which are largely distinguishable by the stage at which data is collected, analysed, or interpreted. In its basic form, mixed method research designs involve the simultaneous/concurrent or sequential collection of data as well as its integration during either of the phases or stages of the research process (Potter, 2012, p. 161; Trochim, *et al*., 2016, p. 70). A distinction is made between convergent parallel, explanatory sequential, exploratory sequential, transformative, embedded, and multiphase mixed methods research designs (Cresswell in Hafsa, 2019, p. 45). A brief description of the three major mixed methods designs is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Harvard Catalyst, 2023).

This study adopted the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design (also known as sequential explanatory design). In this mixed methods research design, quantitative data is collected first and is complemented and enhanced by the qualitative data. Therefore, quantitative, and qualitative data are collected and analysed separately, and the results thereof are integrated and interpreted together (Alavi & Hąbek, 2016, p. 64). In the context of this study, quantitative data was first collected, through administration of survey questionnaires; and analysed from the senior officers of the SANDF. This was followed up by the collection and analysis of qualitative data, achieved through semi-structured interviews between the researcher and security practitioners from different government departments, as well as academics from various universities. While a clear consensus does not exist on the question of drawing quantitative and qualitative data from the same or different respondents during mixed methods research, the general preference seems biased to for the former (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 119). However, no hard and fast rules exist regarding this. The researcher opted for the latter so as to exploit the triangulation offered by this option. On the one hand, it allowed for collection of data from three distinct cohorts (i.e., senior officers in the SANDF, security practitioners (DHA, SAPS, SANDF, SSA) and academics from different universities. On the other hand, it also allowed for collection of data though the use of different methods, survey questionnaires and semi-structured interviews.

Figure 3.1: Basic Mixed Methods Research Designs



Source: Harvard Catalyst (2023)

3.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION

During the conduct of empirical research, it is virtually impossible to reach all the desired respondents as this is likely to be "time-consuming, costly or impracticable to access the entire population" of the study (Laher & Botha, 2012, p. 86). Sampling, therefore, becomes the only feasible method to allow the researcher to generalise data through a representative sample of the required target population (Mouton, 1996, p. 110). Mugo (2002, p. 88) defines a sample as "… a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole … When dealing with people, it can be defined as a set of respondents (people) selected from a larger population for the purpose of a survey."

A sample is drawn from the study population which in turn is drawn from a target population. A target population comprises of a population to which the researcher wishes to generalise to, whereas the study population simply refers to "a convenient

subgroup of the [target] population for which appropriate sampling frames are available and we are able to sample" (Stat Mania, 2015). Figure 3.2 depicts the general sampling process usually undertaken in the conduct of a research study.

Figure 3.2: Sampling Process



Source: Stat Mania (2015)

The target population comprised of the SANDF personnel whilst the study population consisted of senior officers of the SANDF from the rank groups of Maj/Lt Cdr, Lt Col/Cdr to Col/Capt (SAN). In a report by the Ministerial Task Team on Sexual Harassment, Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse and Sexual Offences within the Department of Defence, the DoD's personnel strength was estimated to be at 61,482 of the regular forces (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2020, p. 35). This number excludes those that are Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP), PSAP session workers as well as the entire component of the reserve forces. Table 3.1 indicates the personnel strength of the regular Defence Act Personnel (DAP) per arm of service, as well as the corresponding percentage. In this context, the DAP represents the target population of this study.

Table 3.1: Target Population - DAP of the SANDF

Arm of Service	Total Personnel Strength in Numbers	Total Personnel Strength in %
South African Army (SA Army)	37,782	61
South African Air Force (SAAF)	9,799	16
South African Navy (SAN)	6,599	11
South African Military Health Services (SAMHS)	7,302	12
TOTAL	**61,482**	**100**

Source: Mapisa-Nqakula (2020)

The study population, a subset of the target population comprised of senior officers of the SANDF. Of the total number of the regular DAP (61,482), 5,924 were senior officers. Table 3.2 breaks down this number according to the respective rank groups (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2020, p. 39).

Table 3.2: Study Population - Senior Officers of the SANDF

Rank	Total	Total in %
Col/Capt (SAN)	754	13%
Lt Col/Cdr	2,362	40%
Maj/Lt Cdr	2,808	47%
TOTAL	**5,924**	**100%**

Source: Mapisa-Nqakula (2020)

A sampling frame is a list of all the institutions from the study population which are accessible to the researcher (Sarndal, Swensson & Wretman, 2003). In this instance, the sampling frame consisted of all the military units visited and where the interested individual respondents were given the questionnaires to complete. Table 3.3 shows the sampling frame together with the locations of the units, number of questionnaires administered and collected.

Table 3.3: Sampling Frame

Military Units Visited	Place	No. of Questionnaires	Dates of Administration
Aiforce Base Langebaanweg	Langebaanweg, Western Cape	70	07 Sep 21 – 21 Sep 21
South African Military Academy	Saldanha, Western Cape	50	08 Sep 21 – 20 Sep 21
South African Ship SALDANHA	Saldanha, Western Cape	11	16 Sep 21 – 23 Sep 21
Defence Headquarters	Pretoria, Gauteng	69	04 Oct 21 – 08 Oct 21
South African National War College	Pretoria, Gauteng	52	04 Oct 21 – 08 Oct 21
School of Tactical Intelligence	Potchefstroom, North West	20	06 Oct 21 – 07 Oct 21
South African Army College	Pretoria, Gauteng	325	14 Mar 22 – 18 Mar 22
Individual Voluntary Participants	Countrywide	88	Adhoc
TOTAL		**685**	

All units were selected due to their unique character, and equally similar characteristics they presented to the researcher. They comprised of members within the desired rank groups from all nine provinces of South Africa. They also comprised of different genders, levels of education and various specialities. This made it particularly attractive to the researcher as it ensured the sample would be representative and therefore enhancing the generalisability of the results of the findings. In the same way, the identified units had peculiar characteristics:

- **Airforce Base (AFB) Langebaanweg**. This is an SAAF unit responsible for the training of pilots. The greatest number of SAAF participants were drawn from this unit.

- **South African Military Academy (SAMA)**. The SAMA is a joint unit which comprises different ranks, services, and expertise. Most of the participants are highly educated, with most holding a master's degree as a minimum educational qualification.

- **South African Ship (SAS) SALDANHA**. SAS SALDANHA is a naval unit responsible for basic military training in the SAN.

- **Defence Headquarters (DHQ)**. The DHQ is an environment which comprises all ranks and uniforms at a higher level than any of the units visited.

- **South African National War College (SANWC)**. The SANWC trains the rank group of Lt Col/Cdr and prepares them to be Col/Capt (SAN) in their future appointments.

- **School of Tactical Intelligence (STI)**. The STI is an intelligence unit for the SA Army charged with, among others, providing functional training to junior officers in preparation for their roles as senior officers in the intelligence environment.

- **South African Army College (SAAC)**. The SAAC is an army training unit that trains and prepares rank group of majors for their new responsibilities in the rank group of lieutenant colonels.

- **Individual Voluntary Participants**. These participants were selected on an individual basis and not as a result of any unit they were attached to. In essence, these are friends, colleagues and acquaintances from across the country, meeting the criteria of the required sample.

Using a study population of 5,924 senior officers, a margin of error of five percent, a confidence level of 90% and a response distribution of 50%, the recommended sample size was determined to be 259 respondents. This was determined through the use of the Krejcie and Morgan Table (Table 3.4), augmented and confirmed by bin Ahmad and binti Halim as well as Raosoft.Inc (bin Ahmad & binti Halim, 2017; Krejcie & Morgan, 1970; Raosoft.Inc, 2004). Raosoft.Inc (2004) and bin Ahmad and binti Halim (2017) were used to make up for the deficiencies apparent in the Krejcie and Morgan Table (1970) due to the absence of the exact number of the study population of this study, as demonstrated by the highlighted part of the table.

Table 3.4: Krejcie and Morgan Sampling Table

N	*S*	*N*	*S*	*N*	*S*
10	10	220	140	1200	291
15	14	230	144	1300	297
20	19	240	148	1400	302
25	24	250	152	1500	306
30	28	260	155	1600	310
35	32	270	159	1700	313
40	36	280	162	1800	317
45	40	290	165	1900	320
50	44	300	169	2000	322
55	48	320	175	2200	327
60	52	340	181	2400	331
65	56	360	186	2600	335
70	59	380	191	2800	338
75	63	400	196	3000	341
80	66	420	201	3500	346
85	70	440	205	4000	351
90	73	460	210	4500	354
95	76	480	214	5000	357
100	80	500	217	6000	361
110	86	550	226	7000	364
120	92	600	234	8000	367
130	97	650	242	9000	368
140	103	700	248	10000	370
150	108	750	254	15000	375
160	113	800	260	20000	377
170	118	850	265	30000	379
180	123	900	269	40000	380
190	127	950	274	50000	381
200	132	1000	278	75000	382
210	136	1100	285	1000000	384

Note.—*N* is population size. *S* is sample size.

Source: Krejcie & Morgan, 1970

Two major sampling techniques are discernible, *viz*, probability and non-probability sampling techniques. Probability sampling technique is a “random process in which everyone in the population has an equal and independent chance of being included in the sample” while non-probability sampling technique is “non-random”, meaning that the respondents are selected due to their ability and willingness to participate in the study, thus negating the potential of having an equal chance of participating in the study (Laher & Botha, 2012, p. 87; Babbie, 2016, p. 190). As a general rule of thumb, probability sampling strategies are preferred in the conduct of research due to their random selection, which gives a greater chance of representivity and generalisability,

as opposed to the non-probability methods (Laher & Botha, 2012, p. 87). The idea is to “get a sample that is as representative as possible of the target population” (Mouton, 1996, p. 110). However, Babbie (2014, p. 186) asserts that oftentimes, social research has been undertaken under conditions which may not allow the use of probability sampling techniques, leaving the researcher with an option of using the non-probability sampling technique. Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007, p. 287) expound on the role of non-probability sampling in mixed methods research as follows:

> If the goal is not to generalize to a population but to obtain insights into a phenomenon, individuals, or events (as will often be the case in the qualitative component of a mixed methods study), then the researcher purposefully selects individuals, groups, and settings for this phase that maximize understanding of the underlying phenomenon. Thus, many mixed methods studies utilize some form of purposeful sampling.

In this study, both the probability and non-probability sampling techniques were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data respectively. A probability sampling technique, stratified random sampling method, was used to determine the respondents for the quantitative data. Stratified random sampling method involves the division of the study population into various strata. Thereafter, the random sampling method is used to determine the required sample from each stratum (Laher & Botha, 2012, p. 91). This allows the researcher to compile a representative sample which can be generalizable to the entire target population. How a sample is determined through the stratified random sampling technique is demonstrated in Figure 3.3 (Thomas, 2023). The strata in this study comprised of the rank groups Maj/Lt Cdr, Lt Col/Cdr and Col/Capt (SAN) from across all arms of services of the SANDF.

Figure 3.3: Stratified Random Sampling



Source: Thomas (2023)

Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 were further assessed to ensure that the different arms of services and their respective senior officers were proportionately represented in the sample, respectively. As seen in Table 3.1, with the SA Army comprising 61% of the SANDF and the remaining three arms of service sharing 39%, it was thus no surprise that the study's sample comprised mostly of officers from the SA Army. With the hierarchy of the SANDF and its arms of services narrowing from bottom-up, it was normal to have anticipated that the sample would yield very few senior officers in the rank group of Col/Capt (SAN) and a great deal of senior officers in the rank group Maj/Lt Cdr. These permutations are demonstrated in Table 3.5, which indicates the ideal sample elements as well as the achieved sample elements highlighted in grey.

Table 3.5: Ideal and Achieved Sample

Arm of service	Col/Capt (SAN)	Lt Col/Cdr	Maj/Lt Cdr	Total
SA Army	20	63	75	**158**
	13	**32**	**137**	**182**
SAAF	5	17	20	**42**
	8	**15**	**24**	**47**
SAN	4	11	13	**28**
	3	**14**	**14**	**31**
SAMHS	4	12	15	**31**
	5	**10**	**5**	**20**
TOTAL				**259**
				280

The qualitative sample of the study was collected using the non-probability technique; purposive sampling method, also known as the judgemental sampling method. This method relies on the researcher's experience and judgement "about which ones [respondents] will be the most useful" for the study (Babbie, 2016, p. 187). Through this method, the researcher was able to select respondents from the security practitioners and academics.

Data collection was conducted through two primary means. On the one hand, quantitative data was collected through the administration of structured questionnaires, with predetermined close-ended questions to senior officers in the SANDF. The questionnaires were hand-delivered to the various military units and colleges and collected at a predetermined date. On the other hand, qualitative data was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews held between the researcher and several academics with a particular interest in the field of terrorism or related fields. The researcher targeted those academics with expertise or scholarly interest in the subject matter of terrorism. As a result, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with academics based on their apparent expertise and interest in the subject matter, as well as with the government security officials or related institutions that would be involved in addressing a terrorist threat. Table 3.6 gives a summary of the interview schedule for both academics and security practitioners. Initially, a combined total of 30 interviewees were identified and contacted. However, due to unavailability and reasons beyond the control of the researcher, interviews were only conducted with the individuals depicted in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: Interview Schedule

Cohort	Name	Institution	Date of Interview
Academics	Prof Hussein Solomon	University of Free State	17 Feb 22
	Dr Albertus Schoeman	Sussex University	23 Feb 22
	Prof S. Africa	University of Pretoria	24 Mar 22
	Mr M. Stiles	University of Pretoria	30 Mar 22
	Dr O. van Heerden	Rhodes University	31 Mar 22
	Prof F. Very	Stellenbosch University	05 Apr 22
	Capt (SAN) (Dr) D. Putter	Stellenbosch University	11 Apr 22
	Mr M. Human	Personal Safety	29 Apr 22
	Prof G. Prevost	College of St Benedict & St John University - Minnesota	30 Mar 22
Security Practitioners	Dr M. Masiapata	Border Management Authority – Department of Home Affairs (BMA-DHA)	08 Apr 22
	Col J. Vreugdenberg	Directorate for Priority Crimes – South African Police Services (SAPS)	10 Apr 22
	Mr E. Tshilambavhunwa	Counter-Intelligence – State Security Agency (SSA)	14 Apr 22
	Mr N. Sendall	Department of Defence Headquarters (DoD HQ)	11 May 22
	Brig Gen J. Radebe	Defence Intelligence Division – South African National Defence Force (SANDF)	13 May 22
	Maj Gen T. Xundu	Department of Defence Headquarters (DoD HQ)	17 May 22
	Dr P. Jacobs	Civilian Secretariat for Police Services	25 May 22
	Mr C. Serfontein	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)	02 Jun 22
	Brig D. Scott	South African Police Services (SAPS)	08 Jun 22
	Dr D. Goncalvez	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)	09 Jun 22

3.4 INSTRUMENTATION AND SOURCES OF DATA

3.4.1 Instruments of data

Quantitative data collection was achieved through the administration of structured questionnaires, with predetermined close-ended questions to senior officers in the SANDF. The response format of the questionnaire, in most parts, comprised questions and statements based on the Likert-scale response format. The aim was to describe their perceptions; meaning their knowledge of and attitude towards potential acts of terrorism in South Africa and the government's potential response thereto. The questionnaires sought to collect the following data from the respondents:

- **Part 1: Demographic Data**. The demographic data was collected from a representative sample of the senior officers in the SANDF in order to ensure the generalisability of the results.

- **Part 2: Knowledge, Information and Attitudes about Terrorism**. This data comprised knowledge of what terrorism means in terms of a basic definition, sources of information on terrorism, terrorist organisations, terrorist tactics, and terrorist incidents in Africa in general and in South Africa in particular.

- **Part 3: South Africa and Terrorism**. This particular data sought to measure the perceptions of the senior officers of the SANDF regarding general attitudes towards terrorism in South Africa, possible factors that could predispose South Africa to terrorism, and their concern about terrorism in South Africa.

- **Part 4: South Africa's Response to Terrorism**. The focus of this data was to measure the views of the senior officers of the SANDF on the possible responses of the South African government to terrorism. These included their views on government's communication concerning terrorism, their confidence levels in the response, institutions and legal framework. In addition, the data sheds light on what the officers think the role of the SANDF should be in combatting terrorism.

The Survey Questionnaire used in this study is attached to this document as Appendix A.

3.4.2 Sources of Data

Qualitative data was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews the researcher conducted with several academics with a particular interest in the field of terrorism or related fields. The following questions, with the potential for follow-up questions, were posed to the academics in the field:

- **Question 1**: Is terrorism a credible threat to South Africa? If so, why? If not, what makes you think that?

- **Question 2**: What are your views on South African institutions' effectiveness to detect, deter, prevent and combat terrorism in South Africa?

- **Question 3**: In your assessment, does the South African government's counter-terrorism policies, institutions and legislation inspire confidence in the population of South Africa?

- **Question 4**: What are some of the things that the South African government can do to increase the effectiveness of its policies, institutions and legislation in the fight against terror?

- **Question 5**: What is your general view regarding South Africa's response to terrorism in South Africa?

The researcher also held semi-structured interviews with security practitioners of the various institutions of the South African government. The following questions were posed to the security practitioners:

- **Question 1**: Is terrorism a credible threat to South Africa? If so, why? If not, what makes you think that?

- **Question 2**: Is your institution at all concerned with the potential backlash or blowback from South Africa's participation in Mozambique, as was the case in Kenya's participation in AMISOM?

- **Question 3**: In your view, would you say the _____ (institution) has the requisite skills, education, training, experience, personnel and policies to contribute meaningfully to combatting potential acts of terrorism in the country?

- **Question 4**: In your view, would you say that South Africa's foreign policy, especially regarding relations with the West, renders it vulnerable to potential acts of terrorism?

- **Question 5**: What is your general view regarding South Africa's response to terrorism in South Africa?

3.5 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Reliability and validity are two most important concepts often used in quantitative research to objectively determine the quality of the research instrument, i.e., whether it can be used consistently and produce the same results as well as to ascertain that it measures exactly what it seeks out to measure (Mentz & Botha, 2012, p. 80). Babbie (2014, p. 146) views reliability as a "…a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, yields the same result each time." This inherently infers a measure of the internal consistency of the results given by research instruments. Validity refers to the quality of the data-gathering instrument. In essence, for a research instrument to be valid, it should be able to measure what it is supposed to measure accurately (SPSS Tests, 2018). According to Kothari (2004), validity implies the ability to draw meaningful and useful inferences from scores on the instrument.

3.5.1 Reliability Testing

In quantitative research, Cronbach's alpha is the most common measure of internal consistency and is commonly used when the researcher has multiple Likert questions in a questionnaire that forms a scale and wishes to determine the reliability of the scale (Lund Research Ltd, 2018), which was the case in this study. Using the Cronbach's alpha, the candidate tested for the internal consistency of the participants' responses. Most of the items were found to be internally consistent. This also included the tests

conducted amongst the factors. All of these, including the total combined number of items, revealed an excellent value of Cronbach's alpha, making for an excellent internal consistency of the participants' responses.

The researcher conducted item analysis on all the items in the questionnaire to determine their internal consistency, meaning their reliability. The items analysed and their respective quantities are depicted in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Factors and Items Analysed

Factor	Item	Quantity
Knowledge	Definition (TD) and Sources of Information (SIT)	6
	Terrorist Organisations (TO)	5
	Terrorist Tactics (TT)	5
	Terrorist Incidents (TI)	5
	Terrorist Cases in South Africa (TCSA)	5
Attitude	Pre-disposure to Terrorism (PDP) and Concern about Terrorism in South Africa (CT)	9
Confidence	Communications about Terrorism (COMT)	4
	Confidence in Response (CONT)	4
	Confidence in Anti-Terror Institutions (ATI)	5
	Confidence in Anti-Terror Legislation (ATL)	5

Because the quantitative portion of this study relied on survey questionnaires to collect data, the IBM SPSS computer program was employed to assess the research instrument's reliability. Due to its direct relevance to this study, and its wide usage, Cronbach's alpha was used for this purpose. Table 3.8 gives a scale of permissible and non-permissible values of the Cronbach's alpha and their utility in research as determined by George and Mallery, as cited in Saidi and Siew (2019, p. 655). These are the Chronbach's alpha's value against which this study benchmarked to determine the reliability of the survey questionnaire used.

Table 3.8: Cronbach's Alpha

Cronbach's alpha	Internal consistency
$\alpha \geq 0.90$	Excellent
$0.80 \leq \alpha < 0.90$	Good
$0.70 \leq \alpha < 0.80$	Acceptable
$0.60 \leq \alpha < 0.70$	Questionable
$0.50 \leq \alpha < 0.60$	Poor
$\alpha < 0.50$	Unacceptable

Source: George and Mallery (2003) (cited in Saidi & Siew, 2019, p. 655)

3.5.2 Validity Testing

In terms of the validity of the questions of the research instruments, Pearson's correlation matrix was used. All of the items were found to have been valid and thus all kept in the study. This test measures the strength of linear correlation among variables (SPSS Tests, 2018). As a general principle, a significance value, in other words the correlation coefficient, of less than 0.05 indicates a high correlation (making the question or instrument valid), while a significance value of greater than 0.05 indicates a weak correlation, thus making the question or instrument invalid (SPSS Tests, 2018). The obtained correlation coefficients are then compared against the critical values for Pearson's r where the degrees of freedom [df - the number of pairs of scores minus 2 (N-2)] are used in a two-tailed test, as was the case in this study. For a question or instrument to be valid, the obtained correlation coefficient should be greater than the figure depicted on the Table of Critical Values for Pearson's r.

Due to the voluminous nature of the data in this study, N = 280 with 46 items, it is virtually impossible to represent all the correlation coefficients obtained as well as the Table of Critical Values for Pearson's r for each question graphically or in a tabular form. However, after conducting the test for the Pearson's correlation coefficient, all the items were flagged as significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). Comparison of these coefficients against the above-stated critical values of Pearson's r were found to be greater than those in the latter table. This indicates that all the questions, and thus the instrument, were found to be valid.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

The IBM SPSS computer program was used to analyse the quantitative data collected from the survey questionnaires. In particular, the descriptive analysis method was utilised to analyse the data. The analysis of the qualitative data collected from the semi-structured interviews was done through a thematic analysis method. This involved the creation of themes from the responses given by the interviewees. In accordance with the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design, once both the quantitative and qualitative data had been collected and analysed separately, the interpretation thereof will happen simultaneously.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This project involved the use of human participants from the SANDF. This placed an obligation upon the researcher to ensure that the participants were not in any way exposed to any harm and that the security integrity of the SANDF was not jeopardised. For this reason, institutional authority and ethical clearance were required from the SANDF and University of Pretoria, respectively. On 15 April 2021 institutional authority was applied for and was subsequently approved and granted on 19 April 2021. This was followed by the granting of ethics clearance by the University of Pretoria, which occurred on 04 August 2021, thus, essentially setting the process in motion. Both the institutional authority and ethical clearance are attached herein as Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. This was followed by official correspondences written by the researcher to the Officers Commanding (OCs) and Commandants of the identified military units requesting permission to administer the questionnaires to the potential respondents. In almost all of the cases, verbal consent was given but a few expressed reluctance to grant access.

Polonsky and Waller, (2011) emphasise the following six factors as important ethical considerations to be observed in the conduct of research. Therefore, during the above-mentioned institutional and administrative processes, the candidate made a commitment to adhere to the following ethical considerations during the entire process of the research:

- **Voluntary Participation**. Participation in all of research process should be voluntary and at no point should the respondents feel deceived or coerced into participating in the study. In identifying the participants for the study, voluntary participation received expression through a Letter of Introduction, which also explained that the respondents, should they so wish, could withdraw from the research without any fear of a penalty or punishment. The sample of the Letter of Introduction used in this study is attached as Appendix D.

- **Informed Consent**. Informed consent implies that the participants are fully conversant with expectations in their participation in the research and that they have been informed of any potential harm, should there be a risk of any. To ensure that the principle of informed consent was adhered to, the abstract in the questionnaire provided the respondents with the necessary information regarding the nature of the study as well as the request for their permission to participate in the study. Informed Consent Form which all participants were to sign was enclosed with the Survey Questionnaire as well as the Letter of Introduction, and is herein enclosed as Appendix E and Appendix F, respectively, for Semi-Structured Interviews and Survey Questionnaires. Similarly, the interviewees were given the Informed Consent Form to complete and permission to record the interviews was requested and granted.

- **Confidentiality and Anonymity**. Anonymity requires that the researcher to not know who the respondents are while confidentiality dictates that in case they are known, their identity should remain concealed when reporting the results of the study. To achieve both anonymity and confidentiality, the questionnaires were delivered in bulk and there was no requirement for the respondents to identify themselves. Although the questionnaires were identified by a unique number, this was done only for record keeping as no number was attached to any respondent's name. Similarly, when reporting the findings of the study, no mention of the participants' names was made. While the interviewees were informed of the confidentiality and anonymity options, none of them exercised this right.

- **Potential for Harm**. Physical harm, financial harm, social harm, and psychological harm are some of the consequences that may inadvertently be experienced by the respondents in the conduct of the research. To the best ability and knowledge of the researcher, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the respondents experienced any physical, financial, social and/or psychological harm.

- **Communicating the Results**. When reporting the results and findings of the research, the researcher must take precautions to avoid plagiarism and academic fraud. Plagiarism is the act of passing someone's work as one's own without references. Academic fraud, on the other hand, relates to the intentional misrepresentation of what has been done in the research. Both these transgressions are frowned upon and must be prevented at all costs. Every material used in this study was referenced accordingly and all other evidence derived from the conduct of this study is provided in this study as appendices where possible or, would be provided if requested.

In addition, the researcher also adhered to the following issues which had the potential to give rise to ethical considerations:

- **Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA)s**. NDAs were entered into between the researcher and the language editor, Mrs Jeanne Enslin and the technical editor, Mrs Ronél Gallie. This was also achieved with Dr Sandile Mthembu and Mrs Mary Mutemi, who both assisted with the IBM SPSS computer program in the analysis of the quantitative data. Similar agreement was arranged with Mrs Gene Clarkson, who transcribed all the interviews. The proforma of the NDA is enclosed as Appendix G. This was to grant them access to this information but also to ensure that it would not be used for no other reason but in the current study.

- **Transcription of Interviews**. Permission was granted by the interviewees to record interviews by any means. The interviewees were informed that the interviews would be transcribed. The researcher committed to availing the transcribed interviews should the interviewees have interest in seeing them.

- **Access to the Published Product**. All research participants, both the quantitative and qualitative respondents, were informed that they will have access to the published dissertation on successful completion of the research project through the University of Pretoria.

- **Adherence to Institutional Requirement**. In compliance with the condition of the institutional authority granted, a draft of the completed product will be submitted to the SANDF's Defence Intelligence Division for their perusal.

3.8 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

Several challenges were experienced during the collection of the data. First, due to the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic and strict protocols thereof at a time of the data collection, particularly the prohibition of large gatherings, some of the OCs and Commandants of the military units were reluctant to grant access to their respective units. Hand-delivery and drop-off, as well as self-administration of questionnaires, became a convenient compromise for the researcher. This allowed the respondents to complete the questionnaires in their individual spaces and for questionnaires to be collected later by the researcher. While this compromise may have been ideal, it is important to note the potential drawbacks. Inasmuch as the researcher considered the questionnaire simple and with clear instructions, due to his absence, the researcher could not clarify any "ambiguities" that may have prevailed in the questionnaires (Abdulla & Raman, 2001, p. 122). Furthermore, since the questionnaires were completely self-administered, the researcher was unable to ensure that the respondents would not receive outside advice (Stover & Stone, 1974, p. 287). The contact details of the researcher were provided with the questionnaires that any ambiguities or clarity sought was within reach.

Second, even though the required sample size of 259 had been achieved, the overall picture presented a picture of a very low response rate. The researcher invited 685 respondents to participate in the study and administered all the questionnaires. A total of 364 questionnaires were completed by respondents (a response rate of approximately 53%). About 134 (approximately 20%) were not completed and 187 (about 27%) were unaccounted for. From the 364 completed questionnaires, only 280 (41%) were found to be usable for the study. This is over and above the required 259 respondents, indicating the successful mitigation of the low response rate executed by administering a large number of questionnaires.

Barring the above, it is worth noting that the researcher is aware of what could have contributed to this. Participation in research by its very nature is a voluntary endeavour. In strict observance of the ethical considerations, the researcher informed the potential respondents of this. Presumably, this led to these unintended consequences of a low rate of response. In addition, not all of the returned and completed questionnaires were completed correctly, resulting in discarding a considerable number of questionnaires. Furthermore, a considerable number of questionnaires were delivered but never returned, thus remaining unaccounted for. Reluctance, lack of knowledge of the subject matter, high mobility of the senior officers, lack of interest, busy schedules and general apathy towards them were identified as some of the reasons for the status quo.

Third, not all the required numbers, in terms of ranks, were accessible for the study. In certain instances, as shown in Table 3.5, there were shortages of ranks. However, this was mitigated by going over and above the required sample size.

Last, after making several attempts to obtain the required interviewees, with both academics and security practitioners, such attempts had to be abandoned due to the respondents being unreachable, showing a lack of interest as well as indicating their lack of expertise in the subject matter. In the latter, some of the respondents were kind enough to offer further referrals. In addition to this, the researcher identified replacements, with equally respectable credentials who were willing to render the interviews. This did not affect the quality of the responses.

3.9 SUMMARY

The chapter presented the methodological and design aspects embarked on this research project. The mixed method research approach offers the advantages of both the quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as the ability to mitigate their individual deficiencies. In particular, the choice of the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design was explained and justified. Quantitative data was collected (survey questionnaires) and analysed first, followed by the collection of qualitative data (semi-structured interviews) and analysis thereof. Both analysed data will then be integrated and interpreted together.

The target population of the study comprised of the total members of the SANDF. The study population was made of the senior officers in the SANDF. Due to the military nature of the terrorist threat and perceived role by the senior officers in the SANDF, measuring their views would be helpful in trying to determine the manner in which they will deal with the threat should it come to pass. Most importantly, these views may indicate where their inclination would be, with respect to security sector reforms. Furthermore, the experience, possible future deployments and general access to a variety of information justified the selection of the senior officers of the SANDF as the quantitative participants in this study.

Using the probability sampling technique, simple random sampling method, a sample size of 259 respondents was determined to form the main focus of this study and from whom the quantitative data would be collected through use of survey questionnaires. Further computations were conducted in order to ensure that the different strata were well represented and that the results of the study would be easily replicated and generalizable. The non-random sampling technique, purposive sampling method, was used to collect qualitative data from the academics and security practitioners through semi-structured interviews. The researcher selected the interviewees' based on his own judgement which was informed by the interviewees' daily engagement, knowledge and scholarly interest in the field of terrorism. A descriptive analysis for the quantitative data was conducted through the IBM SPSS computer program while the qualitative data was analysed using the thematic analysis method.

The chapter emphasised the researcher's adherence to the ethical considerations imperative to the conduct of a study of this nature. Lastly, the limitations and delimitations encountered were discussed, with the possible accompanying mitigation factors.

Chapter Four presents the results and findings of both the quantitative and qualitative data.

CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As a result of the mixed character of this research, this chapter presents the results of the quantitative data collected from SANDF's senior officers, followed by the findings of the qualitative data collected during semi-structured interviews with academics and security practitioners. This is consistent with the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design, which first collects and analyses the quantitative data, before augmenting it with qualitative data collection and analysis, followed by integration and simultaneous interpretation of both. First, the chapter presents the results of the quantitative data, which will include the presentation of the response rate, reliability testing results, demographic data and descriptive results. Second, the presentation of the findings of the qualitative data from the academics and security practitioners will be made.

4.2 PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE DATA

4.2.1 Response Rate

To compensate for the poor response rate, 685 people were identified and invited to participate in the study. From the 685, the respondents completed 364 questionnaires. A total of 134 questionnaires were returned incomplete, while 187 were never returned. Of the 364 completed questionnaires, 84 were determined to be either wrongly completed or to have many missing items. As a result, they were excluded from the research. This resulted in a remaining total of 280 (108%) correctly completed questionnaires, some with minor missing data. These are the questionnaires which were used in this study. This meant that the sample size was greater than the needed 259. With a response rate of over 100%, this study met and exceeded the minimum threshold of the required sample. This was considered good news for the study because a larger sample is often associated with a higher level of accuracy (Andrade, 2020, p. 102). Having exceeded the requirements for the sample size, it was envisioned that the reliability of the study would be enhanced.

4.2.2 Demographic Data

Table 4.1 represents the results and analysis of the demographic data gathered from the senior officers of the SANDF. This information is described as follows:

- **Gender**. The sample comprised of 208 (74.3%) male and 72 (25.7%) female respondents (*N*=280). While this may not have a direct bearing on the project, it is indicative of the current realities of the SANDF with a lopsided male to female ratio. This is reflected in the report of the Ministerial Task Team compiled by Mapisa-Nqakula (2020).

- **Arm of Service**. Of the 280 (*N*) respondents, 182 (65%) were from the SA Army, 47 (16,8%) were from the SAAF, 31 (11.1%) were from the SAN and 20 (7,1%) were from the SAMHS. This indicates the current configuration that highlights the SA Army as the dominant force of the SANDF, followed by the SAAF (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2020). On the other hand, due to proximity, the SAN respondents outnumber those of the SAHMS, a divergent trend compared to the former two groupings.

- **Race**. The dominant race in the sample size consisted of Africans at 183 (65.4%), followed by whites at 59 (21,1%), coloureds at 37 (13,2%) while the number for Indians stood at 1 (0,4%) (*N*=280). This represents the racial disaggregation of the SANDF (Mapisa-Nqakula, 2020).

- **Rank**. The senior officers comprised 181 (64,6%) of Maj/Lt Cdr rank group, followed by 70 (25%) Lt Col/Cdr rank group and 29 Col/Capt (SAN) rank group (*N*=280). With the hierarchy of the SANDF resembling a narrowing pyramid from bottom-to-top, it was expected that there would be far more majors/lieutenant commanders than colonels or captains (SAN).

- **Highest Level of Education**. Thirteen respondents (4.6%) from the sample indicated that they were holders of a PhD qualification, presumably from different fields of study. The number of respondents who possessed a master's degree stood at 19 (6.8%). Thirty-seven (13.2%) attained Honour's degrees. Seventy

(25%) of the respondents possessed a bachelor's degree while 53 (18.9%) were in possession of post-high school diploma. Twelve (4.3%) of the respondents had completed Grade 10, only one (0.4%) had a highest qualification of Grade 11 and a total of 75 (26.8%) had completed Grade 12 (*N*=280). Comparison of means between the education level and familiarity with terrorism revealed no significant difference between the grouped means. This implies that education is not a determinant when it comes to familiarity with terrorist activities in South Africa.

- **Religion**. In terms of religion, an overwhelming number of respondents, 248 (88.6%), indicated affiliations to various Christian denominations. This was followed by traditional religions at 16 (5.7%). Those that subscribed to Atheism and Agnostics stood at 8 (2.9%) and 5 (1.8%), respectively. The Islamic and Buddhist faiths share an equal amount of the remaining percentage at 1 (0.4%) each (*N*=280). These figures represent a nationwide pattern of religious affiliations in South Africa (Countrymeters, 2023). With a small percentage of Muslims in this sample, the research instrument was compiled in such a way that there would not be any religious bias towards the Islamic faith.

- **Province of Origin**. Most of the respondents, 134 (47.9%), were from the Gauteng Province. A total of 73 (26%) were from the Western Cape Province, 17 (6.1%) from the Limpopo Province, 14 (5%) from both the North-West Province and the Eastern Cape Province, and 6 (2.1%), 8 (2.9%) and 11 (3.9%) from the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Northern Cape Provinces respectively. Mpumalanga was the province with the least number of participants at 3 (1.1%) (*N*=280). This data affirms that the respondents were sourced nationwide, with Gauteng being the most dominant source of respondents.

The demographic variables used in this study, their quantity and composition, made it possible for the generalisation of the study.

Table 4.1: Demographic Details of the Participants (*N*=280)

Demographic Variables		Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	208	74.3%
	Female	72	25.7%
Arms of Service	SA Army	182	65%
	SA Air Force	47	16.8%
	SA Navy	31	11.1%
	SAMHS	20	7.1%
Race	African	183	65.4%
	White	59	21.1%
	Coloured	37	13.2%
	Indian	1	0.4%
Senior Officers	Maj/Lt Cdr	181	64.6%
	Lt Col/Cdr	70	25%
	Col/Capt (SAN)	29	10.4%
Highest Levels of Education	Grade 10	12	4.3%
	Grade 11	1	0.4%
	Grade 12	75	26.8%
	Diploma	53	18.9%
	Bachelor's	70	25%
	Honour's	37	13.2%
	Master's	19	6.8%
	PhD	13	4.6%
Religion	Christianity	248	88.6%
	Islam	1	0.4%
	Traditional	16	5.7%
	Buddhism	1	0.4%
	Hinduism	1	0.4%
	Atheism	8	2.9%
	Agnostic	5	1.8%
Province	Eastern Cape	14	5%
	Free State	6	2.1%
	Gauteng	134	47.9%
	KwaZulu-Natal	8	2.9%
	Limpopo	17	6.1%
	Mpumalanga	3	1.1%
	Northern Cape	11	3.9%
	North-West	14	5%
	Western Cape	73	26%

4.2.3 Reliability Results

4.2.3.1 Item analysis of definition of terrorism (TD) and sources of information (SIT)

According to Table 4.2, for the item analysis of the definition of terrorism and sources of information on terrorism, a Cronbach's alpha of 0.673 was achieved. A deletion of any of the item did not yield any significant improvement on the Cronbach's alpha. Hence all items were retained. While this is deemed as questionable by Saidi and Siew (2019), the scale was regarded as usable, a decision supported by Shi, Mo and Sun (2012).

Table 4.2: Reliability Analysis Output – Definition (TD) and Sources of Information on Terrorism (SIT)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.673	.685	6

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix						
	TD	**SIT1**	**SIT2**	**SIT3**	**SIT4**	**SIT5**
TD	1.000	.214	.416	.092	.210	.174
SIT1	.214	1.000	.345	.259	.349	.123
SIT2	.416	.345	1.000	.279	.333	.219
SIT3	.092	.259	.279	1.000	.381	.346
SIT4	.210	.349	.333	.381	1.000	.248
SIT5	.174	.123	.219	.346	.248	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
TD	16.95	13.135	.327	.193	.656
SIT1	17.87	11.502	.385	.195	.638
SIT2	16.83	11.732	.490	.294	.606
SIT3	17.44	11.337	.441	.243	.618
SIT4	16.97	11.555	.484	.252	.606
SIT5	17.53	10.972	.339	.154	.666

4.2.3.2 Item analysis of terrorist organisations (TO)

Table 4.3 revealed a Cronbach's alpha of 0.811 for item analysis of terrorist organisations. This figure is indicated as good, thus indicating a usable internal consistency among the participants' responses.

Table 4.3: Reliability Analysis Output of Terrorist Organisations (TO)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.811	.814	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	TO1	**TO2**	**TO3**	**TO4**	**TO5**
TO1	1.000	.547	.526	.433	.421
TO2	.547	1.000	.687	.548	.382
TO3	.526	.687	1.000	.554	.262
TO4	.433	.548	.554	1.000	.308
TO5	.421	.382	.262	.308	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
TO1	12.72	17.783	.621	.400	.768
TO2	12.05	16.563	.717	.559	.737
TO3	11.61	18.130	.673	.541	.756
TO4	12.25	16.289	.593	.377	.781
TO5	13.33	20.092	.423	.223	.823

4.2.3.3 Item analysis of terrorist tactics (TT)

According to Table 4.4, a Cronbach's alpha of 0.876 was achieved during the item analysis of terrorist tactics. This is indicated as good and thus shows a good reliability of responses among the participants.

Table 4.4: Reliability Analysis Output of Terrorist Tactics (TT)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.876	.880	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	TT1	TT2	TT3	TT4	TT5
TT1	1.000	.558	.659	.567	.618
TT2	.558	1.000	.629	.420	.424
TT3	.659	.629	1.000	.577	.584
TT4	.567	.420	.577	1.000	.915
TT5	.618	.424	.584	.915	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
TT1	14.08	15.428	.724	.544	.846
TT2	14.75	16.147	.599	.433	.878
TT3	14.21	15.092	.745	.575	.841
TT4	13.56	16.430	.734	.841	.845
TT5	13.52	16.250	.757	.852	.840

4.2.3.4 Item analysis of terrorist incidents (TI)

A Cronbach's alpha of 0.852, as per Table 4.5, for the item analysis of terrorist incidents was achieved. According to George and Mallery (2003) in Saidi and Siew (2019, p. 655), this is reflective of a good internal consistency among the respondents.

Table 4.5: Reliability Analysis Output of Terrorist Incidents (TI)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items	N of Items
.852	.852	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	TI1	TI2	TI3	TI4	TI5
TI1	1.000	.437	.610	.510	.553
TI2	.437	1.000	.454	.513	.544
TI3	.610	.454	1.000	.629	.501
TI4	.510	.513	.629	1.000	.600
TI5	.553	.544	.501	.600	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
TI1	11.19	22.232	.652	.460	.825
TI2	12.09	23.207	.594	.367	.840
TI3	10.99	21.686	.685	.515	.817
TI4	11.89	20.725	.706	.522	.811
TI5	11.70	21.312	.685	.488	.816

4.2.3.5 Item analysis of terrorist cases in South Africa (TCSA)

As shown in Table 4.6, the Cronbach's alpha test for terrorist cases in South Africa revealed a figure of 0.796. This is an acceptable figure and indicates a greater degree of internal consistency among the respondents.

Table 4.6: Reliability Analysis Output of Terrorist Cases in South Africa (TCSA)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.796	.798	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	TSA1	**TSA2**	**TSA3**	**TSA4**	**TSA5**
TCSA1	1.000	.522	.426	.380	.388
TCSA2	.522	1.000	.504	.382	.401
TCSA3	.426	.504	1.000	.399	.407
TCSA4	.380	.382	.399	1.000	.612
TCSA5	.388	.401	.407	.612	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
TCSA1	10.44	16.269	.564	.339	.763
TCSA2	10.05	16.080	.602	.390	.750
TCSA3	9.89	17.107	.570	.335	.760
TCSA4	10.67	17.255	.570	.416	.760
TCSA5	11.05	17.747	.589	.426	.756

4.2.3.6 Item analysis of pre-disposure to terrorism (PDP) and concern about terrorism in South Africa (CT)

As shown in Table 4.7, the Cronbach's alpha test for pre-disposure and concern about terrorism in South Africa stood at of 0.783, which is an acceptable figure. This indicates a greater degree of internal consistency among the respondents.

Table 4.7: Reliability Analysis Output of Pre-disposure to (PDP), and Concern about Terrorism in South Africa (CT)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.783	.788	9

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix									
	PDP1	**PDP2**	**PDP3**	**PDP4**	**PDP5**	**PDP6**	**PDP7**	**PDP8**	**CT**
PDP1	1,000	,347	,244	,364	,354	,232	,174	,156	,116
PDP2	,347	1,000	,283	,385	,165	,164	,144	,370	,168
PDP3	,244	,283	1,000	,535	,293	,279	,294	,473	,356
PDP4	,364	,385	,535	1,000	,329	,304	,309	,415	,338
PDP5	,354	,165	,293	,329	1,000	,172	,312	,363	,253
PDP6	,232	,164	,279	,304	,172	1,000	,356	,197	,168
PDP7	,174	,144	,294	,309	,312	,356	1,000	,405	,301
PDP8	,156	,370	,473	,415	,363	,197	,405	1,000	,420
CT	,116	,168	,356	,338	,253	,168	,301	,420	1,000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
PDP1	30.55	25.813	.402	.267	.771
PDP2	31.22	24.881	.406	.261	.773
PDP3	31.21	24.511	.561	.384	.748
PDP4	30.63	24.920	.622	.420	.743
PDP5	30.52	26.096	.448	.261	.764
PDP6	31.18	25.905	.372	.191	.776
PDP7	30.99	25.472	.459	.281	.763
PDP8	31.15	24.399	.572	.424	.747
CT	30.74	26.889	.420	.237	.768

4.2.3.7 Item analysis of communication about terrorism (COMT)

Table 4.8 indicates that the item analysis for communication about terrorism revealed a Cronbach's alpha of less than 0.5, does not meet the required threshold of usability in the study. However, due to its importance in augmenting the information in relation to the views of the respondents about how the government communicates issues related to terrorism, it was retained. With most of the items analysed meeting the threshold Cronbach's alpha, it was decided that using this item would not affect the overall reliability of the information extracted.

Table 4.8: Reliability Analysis Output of Communication about Terrorism (COMT)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items**	**N of Items**
.244	.269	4

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix				
	COMT1	**COMT2**	**COMT3**	**COMT4**
COMT1	1.000	-.055	.319	.255
COMT2	-.055	1.000	-.146	-.192
COMT3	.319	-.146	1.000	.326
COMT4	.255	-.192	.326	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
COMT1	9,53	3,261	,286	,128	-,058[a]
COMT2	10,26	5,303	-,175	,045	,560
COMT3	9,71	3,585	,271	,173	-,006[a]
COMT4	10,13	3,940	,203	,153	,095
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.					

4.2.3.8 Item analysis of confidence in response

A Cronbach's alpha test for confidence in response, as per Table 4.9, indicated a figure of 0.758 which is acceptable and indicative of a high internal consistency among the participants.

Table 4.9: Reliability Analysis Output of Confidence in Response (CONT)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.756	.762	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	CONT1	**CONT2**	**CONT3**	**CONT4**	**CONT5**
CONT1	1.000	.387	.500	.430	.275
CONT2	.387	1.000	.356	.241	.208

CONT3	.500	.356	1.000	.713	.396
CONT4	.430	.241	.713	1.000	.392
CONT5	.275	.208	.396	.392	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
CONT1	7.09	5.778	.555	.312	.701
CONT2	7.32	6.829	.393	.187	.781
CONT3	7.10	5.530	.697	.571	.622
CONT4	7.20	5.739	.591	.518	.680
CONT5	9.57	9.818	.418	.190	.758

4.2.3.9 Item analysis of confidence in anti-terror institutions (ATI)

The Cronbach's alpha test for confidence in anti-terror institutions revealed a result of 0.805, a figure indicated by George and Mallery (2003) to be good and indicative of a high internal consistency, as indicated in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Reliability Analysis Output of Confidence in Anti-Terror Institutions (ATI)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.805	.817	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	ATI1	**ATI2**	**ATI3**	**ATI4**	**ATI5**
ATI1	1.000	.479	.648	.525	.494
ATI2	.479	1.000	.436	.482	.344
ATI3	.648	.436	1.000	.531	.390
ATI4	.525	.482	.531	1.000	.390
ATI5	.494	.344	.390	.390	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
ATI1	10.31	15.334	.701	.529	.738
ATI2	10.12	13.237	.554	.316	.798
ATI3	9.77	15.306	.644	.478	.751
ATI4	10.14	15.429	.625	.396	.757

ATI5	10.93	17.248	.500	.275	.793

4.2.3.10 Item analysis of confidence in anti-terror legislation (ATL)

The Cronbach's alpha for confidence in anti-terror legislation, according to Table 4.11, was 0.934, which was excellent and indicative of a high degree of internal consistency.

Table 4.11: Reliability Analysis Output of Confidence in Anti-terror Legislation (ATL)

Reliability Statistics		
Cronbach's Alpha	**Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items**	**N of Items**
.934	.934	5

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix					
	ATL1	**ATL2**	**ATL3**	**ATL4**	**ATL5**
ATL1	1.000	.807	.791	.665	.666
ATL2	.807	1.000	.770	.670	.696
ATL3	.791	.770	1.000	.806	.754
ATL4	.665	.670	.806	1.000	.768
ATL5	.666	.696	.754	.768	1.000

Item-Total Statistics					
	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	**Scale Variance if Item Deleted**	**Corrected Item-Total Correlation**	**Squared Multiple Correlation**	**Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted**
ATL1	8.30	27.557	.814	.723	.921
ATL2	8.19	27.703	.819	.712	.920
ATL3	8.23	26.533	.882	.786	.908
ATL4	8.18	27.482	.808	.710	.922
ATL5	8.10	27.950	.800	.664	.924

4.2.3.11 Summary of reliability analysis output for all factors and items

Table 4.12 summarises the reliability analysis of all the factors and items of the research instruments. The test of the Cronbach's alpha for the knowledge, attitude and confidence factors presented figures of 0.925 (excellent), 0.783 (acceptable) and 0.901 (excellent), respectively. These indicated a very good internal consistency across the participants' responses. Furthermore, the combined Cronbach's alpha test for the all the responses stood at 0.913. This indicated an excellent internal consistency. This implies that the participants' responses can be deemed to be reliable, thus the research instrument depicted a high degree of internal consistency.

Table 4.12: Summary of Reliability Analysis Output for all Factors and Items

Factor	Item	Cronbach's Alpha
Knowledge	Definition (TD) and Sources of Information (SIT)	0.925
	Terrorist Organisations (TO)	
	Terrorist Tactics (TT)	
	Terrorist Incidents (TI)	
	Terrorist Cases in South Africa (TCSA)	
Attitude	Pre-disposure to Terrorism (PDP) and Concern about Terrorism in South Africa (CT)	0.783
Confidence	Communication about Terrorism (COMT)	0.901
	Confidence in Response (CONT)C	
	Confidence in Anti-Terror Institutions (ATI)	
	Confidence in Anti-Terror Legislation (ATL)	
Total Summary of all Combined Factors and Items		**0.913**

4.2.4 Descriptive Results

4.2.4.1 Basic and a workable definition of terrorism (TD)

The respondents were quizzed about their level of knowledge regarding the notion of terrorism. A total of 52 (18.6%) of the 280 (*N*) respondents indicated that they were extremely familiar with the concept. About 84 (30%) expressed that they were very familiar with the concept whereas 126 (45%) they were only moderately familiar with the concept. that they were extremely familiar with the concept. Another 14 (5%) reported that they were familiar with the concept while two (0.7%) indicated that they were slightly familiar with the concept. The omission of two items of data did not impact the study's reliability or validity. This data is depicted in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Familiarity with a basic and workable definition of terrorism (TD)



4.2.4.2 Most important source of information about terrorism (SIT)

Regarding their perceptions of which of the sources of information about terrorism was important, a total of 257 (91.8%) of the 280 (*N*) respondents viewed the internet as somewhat important, very important and extremely important. This was followed by 249 (89%) who deemed the TV/News Info as somewhat important/very important and extremely important. Radio featured third at 220 (78.6%), then followed by government communication/warnings at 191 (68.3%). In the last spot was the film/documentaries at 178 (63.5%). Table 4.13 gives a detailed break down of this data.

Table 4.13: Most Important Sources of Information about Terrorism (SIT)

	Source of Information	Not at all Important	Slightly Important	Sometimes Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
SIT1	Film / Documentaries	14.6%	21.8%	36.1%	18.9%	8.6%
SIT2	Internet / World wide web	1.8%	6.4%	21.4%	42.5%	27.9%
SIT3	Radio	8.2%	13.2%	32.9%	33.6%	12.1%
SIT4	Television / News Info	2.5%	7.9%	26.1%	38.9%	24.6%

SIT5	Government Communication / Warnings	15.7%	15.4%	22.9%	25.4%	20%

4.2.4.3 Awareness of different terrorist organisations in Africa (TO)

When asked about their awareness of the major terrorist organisations in the African continent, 40% of the respondents indicated that they were extremely aware of Boko Haram, while 33.9% stated that they were extremely aware of PAGAD. Thirty percent of the respondents were extremely aware of Al Shabaab while 10.4% indicated that they were extremely aware of AQIM. Only 6.1% of the respondents indicated that they were extremely aware of the ISIL, as indicated in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14: Awareness of different terrorist organisations in Africa (TO)

	Terrorist Organisations	Not at all Aware	Slightly Aware	Moderately Aware	Very Aware	Extremely Aware
TO1	AQIM	24.6%	18.2%	23.6%	23.2%	10.4%
TO2	AS	13.9%	11.4%	21.8%	22.9%	30%
TO3	BH	6.4%	7.9%	17.1%	28.2%	40%
TO4	PAGAD	24.6%	10.7%	13.9%	16.8%	33.9%
TO5	ISIL	43.9%	20%	18.6%	11.4%	6.1%

4.2.4.4 Awareness of terrorist tactics (TT)

On being quizzed about their awareness of tactics employed by terrorist organisations, the most of the respondents indicated that they were extremely aware of bombings (40%), suicide attacks (38.6%) and vehicle based attacks (22.9%), as depicted in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15: Awareness of terrorist tactics (TT)

	Terrorist Tactics	Not at all Aware	Slightly Aware	Moderately Aware	Very Aware	Extremely Aware
TT1	Vehicle-Based Attacks	9.6%	13.8%	22.5%	30.7%	22.9%
TT2	Stabbings	22.1%	20%	24.6%	22.9%	9.6%
TT3	Conventional Firearms	11.4%	15.7%	22.5%	30%	19.6%

TT4	Suicide Attacks	3.6%	7.9%	16.8%	33.2%	38.6%
TT5	Bombings	3.9%	7.5%	16.1%	31.8%	40.17%

4.2.4.5 Awareness of terrorist incidents (TI)

In relation to the awareness about terrorist incidents in Africa, 34.3% indicated that they were extremely aware of the attack on a shopping mall in Kenya. A further 25.4% indicated that they were extremely aware of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. A large number, 37.9%, indicated that they were not at all aware of the Garissa University attack in Kenya, 37.1% were not at all aware of the Christmas Massacre in Uganda. About 31.4% of the respondents indicated that they were not at all aware of the suicide truck bombings in Somalia. This data is presented in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: Awareness of terrorist incidents (TI)

	Terrorist Tactics	**Not at all Aware**	**Slightly Aware**	**Moderately Aware**	**Very Aware**	**Extremely Aware**
TI1	US Embassy Bombings – Kenya, Tanzania	16.4%	13.6%	20.7%	23.9%	25.4%
TI2	Christmas Massacre - Uganda	37.1%	19.6%	20%	12.9%	10.4%
TI3	Attack on Shopping Mall - Kenya	14.3%	12.9%	17.1%	21.4%	34.3%
TI4	Attack on University - Kenya	37.9%	14.6%	13.2%	17.1%	16.4%
TI5	Suicide Truck Bombings - Somalia	31.4%	11.1%	23.2%	16.1%	17.1%

4.2.4.6 Familiarity with terrorism-related cases in South Africa (TCSA)

When asked about their awareness of selected terrorism-related cases in South Africa, a combined total of 50.1% indicated that they were either moderately familiar, very familiar or extremely familiar. Regarding the arrest of the Thulsie Twins, 61.9% were moderately familiar, very familiar or extremely familiar. This trend carries on to the attack on a Shia Mosque. However, over 56% and 70% indicated that they were either

not all familiar or slightly familiar with the Al Qaeda suspect arrested in Iraq in 2010, and the terrorist plot which was foiled shortly before the national elections in 2004, as presented in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17: Familiarity with terrorism-related cases in South Africa (TCSA)

	Terrorist Tactics	**Not at all Familiar**	**Slightly Familiar**	**Moderately Familiar**	**Very Familiar**	**Extremely** Familiar
TCSA1	Samantha Lethwaite and SA IDs	36.8%	13.2%	18.6%	17.9%	13.6%
TCSA2	Arrest of the Thulsie Twins	23.9%	14.3%	20.4%	22.9%	18.6%
TCSA3	Attack on a Shia Mosque	13.9%	21.1%	21.8%	24.3%	18.9%
TCSA4	AQ suspect arrested in Iraq 2010	37.1%	18.9%	21.8%	15.4%	6.8%
TCSA5	Terrorist plot foiled days before SA national elections	50%	20.4%	16.4%	8.6%	4.6%

4.2.4.7 Attitudes towards pre-disposure to terrorism in South Africa (PDP)

To assess the attitudes of the participants towards South Africa's susceptibility to terrorism, they were queried on various factors including porous borders, the presence of know terrorist organisations, the perceived likelihood of being targeted, the possibility of spill-over attacks from Mozambique, lack of tighter immigration controls, incidents of xenophobic violence, and the potential for becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. Approximately 232 respondents (83%) expressed agreement or strong agreement with the notion that the absence of stricter immigration controls in South Africa renders the nation vulnerable to acts of terrorism. A total of 221 individuals (79%) expressed agreement or strong agreement with the notion that porous borers and the potential for spill-over attacks constitute a significant risk to South Africa in terms potential acts of terrorism. Approximately 177 participants, accounting for 63.3% of the respondents, indicated their inclination towards agreement or strong agreement regarding the notion that xenophobic attacks possess the capacity to render South Africa vulnerable to acts of terrorism. A slight majority of respondents, around 50%

(140), expressed agreement or strong agreement with South Africa's possible vulnerability as a result of counterterrorism operations in Mozambique, the presence of terrorist organisations in South Africa and the country's susceptibility as a target or breeding ground for possible acts of terrorism. This data is presented in a tabular format in Table 4.18.

Table 4.18: Attitudes towards pre-disposure to terrorism in South Africa (PDP)

	Attitude Towards	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderately Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
PDP1	Porous Borders	4.3%	2.9%	13.9%	24.3%	54.6%
PDP2	Known Terrorist Organisations	3.6%	9.3%	33.9%	33.2%	20%
PDP3	Potential Target	13.9%	21.1%	21.8%	24.3%	18.9%
PDP4	Spillover Attacks	1.4%	3.2%	16.1%	38.6%	40.4%
PDP5	Tighter Immigration Control	2.1%	3.9%	11.1%	32.9%	49.6%
PDP6	Role in Combatting Terrorism	4.3%	11.8%	27.1%	33.2%	23.6%
PDP7	Xenophobia Attacks	3.9%	6.4%	26.4%	35.4%	27.9%
PDP8	Potential Hotbed	3.2%	9.3%	32.9%	31.8%	22.9%

4.2.4.8 Concern about terrorism threat in South Africa (CT)

When surveyed about their level of concern regarding terrorism in South Africa, a significant proportion of the participants, specifically 92 (33%) respondents out of the sample size of 280 respondents (*N*) expressed an extremely high level of concern. A total of 115 respondents (41%) expressed a very high level of concern, while 56 (20%) reported a moderate level of concern. Approximately 14 (5%) expressed a much lower degree of fear while the three respondents, representing one percent of the sample, reported no anxiety about terrorism at all. The data reveals that a significant majority of 95% of the participants expressed varying degrees of fear, ranging from intense to moderate, over the possibility of terrorism occurring in South Africa. The data is visually represented in Figure 4.2 presented below.

Figure 4.2: Concern about terrorism threat in South Africa (CT)



4.2.4.9 Communication about Terrorism (COMT)

As indicated in Table 4.19, 86.4% moderately agreed, agreed or strongly agreed that government's communication about terrorism did not inspire confidence. When asked whether the government had an obligation to divulge any sensitive information regarding terrorism, 66.1% moderately agreed, agreed or strongly agreed. As a result, 84.2% moderately agreed, agreed or strongly agreed that there might be possible terrorist attacks or activities that have not been reported by the government. Consequently, 75.9% of the respondents suggest that the manner in which the government communicates terrorism-related information fosters distrust and uncertainty from the population.

Table 4.19: Communication about terrorism (COMT)

	Views on Communications about Terrorism	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderately Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
COMT1	Do not inspire confidence	5.7%	7.9%	26.4%	32.1%	27.9%
COMT2	No obligation to divulge sensitive information	12.1%	21.8%	35.0%	20.4%	10.7%
COMT3	Possible unreported attacks	4.3%	11.4%	32.5%	34.6%	17.1%
COMT4	Fosters distrust and uncertainty	6.8%	17.3%	44.2%	24.5%	7.2%

4.2.4.10 Confidence in terrorism response (CONT)

As shown in Table 4.20, the respondents were requested to indicate their levels of agreement with the statements relating to general response to terrorism. Between 51% to 62.5% strongly disagreed or disagreed that they had confidence in the South Africa's institutions, limited terrorist activity as indicative of the successes by the institutions and policies, the effectiveness of the anti-terror institutions and legislation as well as whether those institutions are well capacitated to combat terrorism.

Table 4.20: Confidence in terrorism response (CONT)

	Attitude	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Moderately Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
CONT1	I have confidence in SA's response to Terrorism	20.7%	31.8%	30.4%	12.9%	3.9%
CONT2	Limited activity indicates success in institutions and policies	24.3%	38.2%	27.1%	7.9%	2.1%
CONT3	SA's counter-terrorism institutions, legislation and policies are effective	17.1%	33.9%	36.1%	8.2%	3.9%
CONT4	SA's institutions are well capacitated to combat terrorism	22.5%	34.3%	28.6%	10.7%	3.2%
CONT5	The SANDF is the most effective institution to combat terrorism in South Africa	10.0%	22.9%	30.4%	18.6%	18.2%

4.2.4.11 Confidence in anti-terror institutions (ATI)

When asked to indicate their confidence in the selected anti-terrorist institutions, between 51.9% and 66.9% indicated that they were somewhat confident, fairly confident and completely confident in the SAPS-Special Task Force (SAPS-STF) (66.9%), NPA (54.3%), SSA (51.9%) and SAPS-DPP (51.4%). An underwhelming number of 23.5% indicated that they were somewhat confident, fairly confident or completely confident. A summary is depicted in Table 4.21.

Table 4.21: Confidence in anti-terror institutions (ATI)

	Terrorist Tactics	Not Confident at all	Slightly Confident	Somewhat Confident	Fairly Confident	Completely Confident
ATI1	Crimes Against State Section-DPP SAPS	23.6%	24.6%	32.5%	15%	3.9%
ATI2	State Security Agency	22.1%	25.4%	25.4%	21.1%	5.4%
ATI3	SAPS Special Task Force	12.9%	19.3%	27.9%	27.9%	11.1%
ATI4	National Prosecuting Authority	20.7%	24.3%	28.9%	17.9%	7.5%
ATI5	Department of Home Affairs	48.2%	27.1%	13.9%	7.1%	2.5%

4.2.4.12 Confidence in anti-terror legislation (ATL)

According to Table 4.22, about 20% were not aware of the various anti-terror legislations in South Africa. However, an average of about 25% indicated that they were somewhat confident of the different anti-terror legislations in South Africa.

Table 4.22: Confidence in anti-terror legislation (ATL)

	Terrorist Tactics	Not Aware	Not Confident at all	Slightly Confident	Somewhat Confident	Fairly Confident	Completely Confident
ATL1	Anti-Terrorism Bill 2002	25.7%	10.4%	23.6%	23.2%	13.6%	2.1%
ATL2	Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist Acts	22.5%	11.1%	21.1%	28.2%	14.3%	2.5%
ATL3	Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998	23.2%	12.1%%	23.2%	24.3%	12.1%	4.3%
ATL4	Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001	20.7%	15.4%	21.1%	25%	12.5%	5%
ATL5	Cyber Terrorism Act 19 of 2020	19.3%	11.8%	24.3%	25.4%	15.4%	3.6%

4.3 PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE DATA

4.3.1 Academics

The following section discusses the above-mentioned themes as derived from the academics during the semi-structured interviews:

4.3.1.1 Terrorism as a credible threat in South Africa

Any discussion that seeks to address a terrorist threat must start with a determination of whether this threat is a credible or an exaggerated one. Therefore, the question was posed to the respondents as to whether they believed terrorism was a credible threat to South Africa, or not.

Three of the nine respondents were convinced that terrorism was a credible security threat to South Africa, and that some conditions make it possible for it to thrive. South Africa's socioeconomic conditions are such that they may result in their exploitation by terrorists. Capt (SAN) (Dr) Putter suggested that "…due to the large gaps in society (income, religion, social status, race). This can easily be exploited by extremists." (Putter, 2022).

Two respondents, while not nullifying the potential for terrorism in South Africa, do not believe that the conditions for terrorism do not exist in South Africa as would be the case with those countries that have been persistently experiencing terrorism. Dr Schoeman for example, asserted that "… in South Africa's case, we don't really have anywhere where there's complete lawlessness, where there's some small insurgency going on, or anything like that" (Schoeman, 2022).

One respondent, claimed that up until the decision to join SAMIM, South Africa was low on the priority list of terrorist organisations. Professor Prevost was of the opinion that participation in SAMIM might have "…raised the question of putting South Africa in the crosshairs of irregular warfare groups in a much greater way than it have been true prior to that decision to go to Mozambique" (Prevost, 2022).

Two respondents are not convinced that South Africa presented a target for Islamic terrorists. They rather look at South Africa as being an excellent fertile ground for planning, recruitment, and covert training, among others, but never as an ideal target for future attacks.

4.3.1.2 The effectiveness of South African institutions in detecting, deterring and combating terrorism

In addressing the terrorist threat, it is imperative to, in earnest, assess the government's institutions to address the threat. Two of the respondents expressed a feeling of confidence when asked about the effectiveness of South African institutions in detecting, deterring and combating terrorism. Dr van Heerden, for example, indicated that "…our institutions are effective in all those respects, detecting, preventing and combating terrorists…" (Van Heerden, 2022).

An overwhelming six of the nine respondents had a negative outlook on the government's ability to detect, deter and combat terrorism. When asked if he thought government's institutions were compromised in this regard, Prof Solomon was unequivocal in his response: "Yes, absolutely. I think we are leaking. I think we have the wrong people in senior positions. And I'm talking about criminal elements" (Solomon, 2022). Almost all of the six respondents point out to politicisation of these institutions, lack of capacity in terms of human capital, resources and training. Some point to the government's inability to communicate to the populace issues pertaining to a terrorist threat, thus contributing to the apparent apathy among the citizens. Using an example of the intelligence organisations, Mr Human expressed his views on the matter as follows:

> …I think we have a have a good baseline for an intelligence community. I just think there's a big mistrust in things that no matter what we detect and communicate, the communications aren't going to run through, and those things aren't going to be actioned. I think a lot of the information that we get is very credible, I don't think they trust themselves so that information is not shared or actioned (Human, 2022).

4.3.1.3 Confidence in government's counter-terrorism policies, institutions and legislation to combat terrorism

When quizzed about whether the population can rest at ease, thus indicating confidence in the government's institutions to address a potential terrorist threat, the respondents presented different and often conflicting views. Five of the respondents were highly sceptical and projected a feeling of no confidence. Prof Africa for example, posited that "We are blindly going on with our lives, as though nothing is going to happen to us" (Africa, 2022). Mr Stiles also asserted that "…the population then does not live with this case and is not informed, as perhaps it should be, to create an awareness that this threat, or potential threat, exists" (Stiles, 2022).

Two respondents were of the view that the population need not "be kept up at night" as a result of a terrorist threat (Schoeman, 2022). They also indicated that South Africa had far bigger problems, and at the moment terrorism was not one of them. Although there are challenges, the institutions are very capable to address this threat. One

respondent was not sure as there were no evidence or records of dissatisfaction with the institutions of the government in as far as the response to terrorism is concerned.

4.3.1.4 Additional methods to increase efficacy in combatting terrorism

When asked to propose additional measures to increase the institutions' efficacy, all but one of the respondents, offered various insightful solutions. These can be summarised as follows:

- Establish a professional security service.
- Increased international cooperation.
- Benchmarking with other international governmental security institutions.
- Modernisation of security institutions.
- Depoliticisation of security institutions.
- Clarification of certain areas of how to apply the terrorism laws.
- Establish a mechanism for monitoring the potential backlash as a result participation in SAMIM.
- Invest in intelligence.
- Improved coordination among security agencies.

All of the respondents further recommended the publication of such policies for the public to critique. They also stated that they believed that legislation, policies and capacity-building need to be adjusted to include ways to deal with online radicalisation. Coordination between, for example, the SAPS, the management of the malls and other stakeholders to discuss modalities in case of terrorism in South Africa need to be given priority.

4.3.1.5 Opinions on South Africa's response to terrorism in general

Three respondents offered no opinions, two were slightly optimistic about the potential government response, two respondents asserted that the government of South Africa has not been tested enough to be able to formulate an objective opinion on this matter. In other words, it's only when South Africa experience a terrorist attack that an informed opinion can be developed. The other respondent was quiet sceptical of the government's response to potential acts of terror and stated that "I feel that for now,

we still are quite vulnerable, because the rebuilding work is just only getting underway" (Africa, 2022).

4.3.2 Security Practitioners

Almost similar questions were posed to the security practitioners regarding the phenomenon of terrorism in South Africa.

4.3.2.1 Terrorism as a credible threat to South Africa

Out of the 10 respondents, nine believed that terrorism presents a clear and present danger to South Africa. In fact, three of the nine indicated that ISIS has communicated prioritising South Africa as a potential target. This is summarised in the words of Col Vreugdenberg who hinted that "ISIS/ISIL did warn about retaliation attacks and issued a Fatwa to this effect" (Vreugdenberg, 2022). Mr Serfontein further expounded that "It is not, if it's going to happen, but rather when it's going to happen" (Serfontein, 2022). One respondent was not convinced that terrorism is such a serious threat, but rather viewed the socio-economic conditions as those that would probably give rise to a new form of terrorism.

4.3.2.2 Concern about a backlash against South Africa as a result of participation in SAMIM

Eight of the respondents registered a great deal of concern of a potential backlash that is presented by South Africa's participation in SAMIM. A general view shared by these respondents is the one that is expressed by Brig Scott: "…we are there now [in Mozambique], we know that we've become a viable target for ISIS where previously South Africa was used more to do things like terror financing, but no pertinent plans to actually attack South Africa" (Scott, 2022). One respondent did not believe that South Africa suddenly became vulnerable to a potential terrorist attack as a result of participation in SAMIM. In fact, Mr Sendall expressed his position as follows:

> I am not concerned about Cabo Delgado. I don't see how that would be a significant threat to us. I'm concerned about human security, because, what we're talking about is the security of the state. The state is not just made up of the state. It is made up of the people and the state and its people in business. If

> the economy is not growing, and business are not expanding, they can't employ people. In fact, our industry is de-industrialising (Sendall, 2022).

The last respondent was non-committal in his response and focused more on the actual decision to join SAMIM and not necessarily the impact that the decision would have in terms of a terrorist threat (Scott, 2022).

4.3.2.3 The ability of South African institutions to combat terrorism

Two of the respondents were positive that their institutions had the requisite skills, education, training, experience, personnel and policies to contribute meaningfully to combatting potential acts of terror in South Africa and were very capable to react promptly to any situation presented by terrorism. Four other respondents were slightly positive and appreciated that there were certain challenges that may hamper South Africa's ability to combat terrorism, viz, weakness in the intelligence organisations (Radebe, 2022; Jacobs, 2022; Scott, 2022). Four respondents expressed a position suggesting fissures in the ability of the government's institutions to address a potential threat in South Africa. Such views find expression in statement made by Dr Goncalvez to this effect:

> So that combination of political interference, lack of maintenance, the culture, a lack of ethical transformation, and the decline of governance, etc. All contributing factors which are eroding our ability to be able to have a strong security response to terrorism. And by the way, it's not just counterterrorism, it's anti-terrorism as well (Goncalvez, 2022).

4.3.2.4 South Africa's vulnerability to terrorism as a result of its foreign policies

Two respondents indicated that as a result of South African foreign policy, particularly in relation to its interaction with the West, there is always a potential of drawing attention and thus fire unto itself. This is seen in light of participation in SAMIM being a foreign policy decision. Three disagreed that this decision had the potential to make South Africa a target for the terrorists. Mr Sendall asserted that "I don't see it that South Africa is showing itself to as being a beacon of Western imperialism, to make itself a target" (Sendall, 2022). Instead, these interviewees perceived of this threat as

might be emanating against foreign business and other interests, instead of South Africa being the main object of the attack.

4.3.2.5 General perspectives on South Africa's approach to terrorism

Of the 10 respondents, two were positive of the government's ability to address a terrorist threat. Seven on the other hand were not convinced that South Africa had the ability to effectively address a terrorist threat should it arise. One was non-committal and offered no view. The above-mentioned respondents highlighted some of the reasons leading to their response. For example, Brig Scott pointed to "… the biggest deficiencies at this time is the delay of coordination when multiple departments come on to the same scene" (Scott, 2022). Additional reasons included the politicisation of security, ideological differences, corruption, capabilities, laxity in matters of security, budgetary constraints, resources, equipment and personnel.

4.4 SUMMARY

This chapter presented the results of the qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews form academics and security practitioners. This is as a result of the research design employed in this study, explanatory sequential research design, which uses the qualitative data to supplement the quantitative data discussed in the previous chapter.

In general, both the academics and security practitioners presented often similar, but also divergent views on the subject matter of potential acts of terror in South Africa. Both also highlighted the challenges experienced by the government institutions to effectively address this threat. More pertinently, some offered measures that could aid in alleviating these challenges. These were helpful in that they imply the need for a security sector reform in South Africa, a primary focus of this study.

Chapter Five discusses the results of the quantitative data and findings of the qualitative data.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives a brief disposition of South Africa's counterterrorism strategy. In absence of a published and hence known counterterrorism strategy, inferences from other pieces of legislation and institutions are made in relation to the strategy. This chapter therefore, begins by assessing the legal, policy and institutional frameworks to combat terrorism in South Africa. This involves the identification, the capacity or state of readiness and the performance of those frameworks. The major part of the chapter integrates and discusses the results and findings of the quantitative and qualitative data presented in Chapter Four. As stated in Chapter Three, quantitative data was gathered by administering survey questionnaires to the senior officers of the SANDF, who served as the primary respondents. The qualitative data obtained from academics and security practitioners from selected government security agencies further enhanced this. The sequential explanatory mixed methods researched design employed in this study, mandates the initial collection and analysis of quantitative data, followed by the subsequent gathering and analysis of qualitative data. Finally, both sets of data are combined and analysed concurrently, which is the primary emphasis of this chapter.

The contents of this chapter are thus discussed in relation to the main aim and research objectives that form the foundation of this study. To reiterate, the primary objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy and institutional framework of South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism, as perceived by senior officers of the SANDF. This objective is supported by the four research goals that are reiterated subsequently:

- Assess the policy, and institutional framework that exist in South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism.
- Assess the state of security institutions'/apparatus' capacity or readiness to respond to terrorism.
- Evaluate how the policy framework and security institutions have fared in combatting and preventing terrorism in South Africa.

- Assess the extent to which these frameworks inspire confidence amongst senior officers within the SANDF, academics, as well as the security practitioners in South Africa's ability to combat terrorism.

To accomplish the objectives set above, this chapter will be structured as follows: First, a discussion on the practical and theoretical inclinations of South Africa's counterterrorism strategy will be undertaken. This will also involve the identification of the legal, policy and institutional framework of anti- and counterterrorism framework as it exists in South Africa. Second, the chapter assesses the institutional frameworks' capacity to respond to terrorism. Third, it evaluates the institutional frameworks' performance in preventing and combating terrorism. it will assess the participants' understanding of terrorism and its related aspects. Second, it will discuss the concerns regarding the potential of terrorism in South Africa. Third, the chapter will address the factors that may contribute to South Africa's vulnerability to acts of terrorism. In the fourth instance, the researcher will address the evident divide in the dissemination of terrorism-related information between the government and the general public. Fifth, and at the heart of this chapter, it will critically analyse the security institutions and policy/legal framework implemented in South Africa to counteract terrorism. Recent performances and the state of readiness of the counterterrorism architecture will be pivotal factors in this discourse. Last, and significantly, this discussion will determine the extent to which these institutions instil confidence in the research respondents. This discussion will be conducted within the theoretical framework of institutionalism, focusing on its application to different conceptions of institutions.

5.2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

From a theoretical and a practical point of view, South Africa's response to terrorism is confusing at best. While there are specialised terrorist units that are domicile to the SAPS and NPA, thus creating an impression of having prioritised terrorism as a threat, no pronouncement on capacitating those agencies accordingly had been made. In this regard, it is seen to be adopting the treatment of terrorism as a common crime, which is contrary to the securitisation theory, which escalates the threat to higher levels.

In an article titled *Counter-Terrorism as Crime Prevention: A holistic Approach*, (Bjørgo, 2016) argued that terrorist attacks should be treated as "crime and [… governments should] make full use of our tools for crime prevention." The main and sole purpose is to diminish the capacity for reoccurrence. For this reason, Bjørgo (2016) advances an argument to approach terrorism from a crime prevention point of view and in a broad and holistic sense.

Bjørgo (2016) synthesises three models or theories to create a holistic approach towards the prevention of terrorism. First, the criminal justice method is based on the preventive effects of punishment. Second, the social crime prevention model focuses on the prevailing conditions that precipitates involvement in terrorism. Last, the situational crime prevention model seeks to alter those circumstances in which terrorist acts happen and to remove opportunities for crime. Bjørgo (2016) observes that the three theories "do not fit well together … and separately they are too narrow." Therefore, in creating a holistic approach towards the prevention of terrorism, Bjørgo (2016) extracted key preventive elements for the three models, using preventive mechanism as the basic principle. Therefore, nine different, general prevention mechanisms that can be applied to all forms of crime were identified:

- Establishing and maintaining normative barriers.
- Reducing recruitment.
- Deterrence.
- Disruption.
- Protecting vulnerable targets.
- Reducing harm.
- Reducing rewards.
- Incapacitation.
- Desistance and rehabilitation.

In this model, and in line with the institutional theory, the institutions seem to have a greater role to play in combating terrorism, in accordance with their designated mandates and capacity. It is arguable that the absence or limited terror activity in South Africa is indicative of the success of this model. However, this presupposition is refuted

by the results and findings of this study. This rebuttal indicated that despite the apparent use of this model, South Africa remains vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. This implies that some form of a change in approach must be sought. However, this research will show that the desired performance by these institutions has not been forthcoming, perhaps, making an opening for a different approach.

Such an approach can be found in Barry Buzan's Theory of Securitisation. Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka (2016) write that securitisation theory "seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created." In other words, the securitisation theory "explains how security actors mobilize their audience by leading a security discourse in order to become capable of implementing extraordinary means" (Lenz-Ramann, 2014). Theory of securitisation therefore refers to measures taken to elevate the seriousness of an issue in order to employ extraordinary means to address this threat. It means that resources, personnel and materiel will be channeled towards eradicating the particular threat. In this case, the brutality and destructive nature of terrorism, this research posits, requires extraordinary measures to ensure that it is eliminated once and for all.

5.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM INSTRUMENTS

South Africa's initial response to the events of 9/11 resembled many of the other states who condemned and denounced the attacks, and also offered both humanitarian support and the cooperation of its security agencies to the US (Solomon, 2011). However, "South Africa has never formally aligned itself with US counterterrorism policies or objectives" (Githing'u, 2021). It continued to maintain its principle of non-intervention when it came to matters of terrorism. This was despite a veiled threat by the former president George W. Bush with his "it's either you are with us or against us" speech (Bush, 2001).

5.3.1 UN Counterterrorism Instruments

The enduring nature of the terrorist threat has prompted the international community to devise means to avert and combat the threat. Certain safeguards were implemented prior to the 9/11 attacks, while others were developed after the fact. To date, the "international legal framework for counter-terrorism consists of 19 universal and regional instruments as well as numerous resolutions of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly [GA] and Security Council" (Lumina, 2008, p. 39). These protocols' objectives are indicated in their titles, and they are enumerated in Table 5.1, which further indicates South Africa's status in relation to signing, acceding, and ratifying the conventions and protocols.

Table 5.1: International Legal Instruments: South Africa's Status

No	Protocol	Adoption Date	Status
1	Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963)	14 Sept 63	Acceded 26 May 72
2	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)	16 Dec 70	Ratified 30 May 72
3	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971)	23 Sept 71	Ratified 30 May 72
4	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973)	14 Dec 73	Acceded 23 Sept 03
5	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)	26 Oct 79	Ratified 17 Sept 07
6	International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979)	17 Dec 79	Acceded 22 Sept 03
7	Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988)	24 Feb 88	Acceded 21 Sept 98
8	Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)	10 Mar 88	Acceded 08 Jul 05
9	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)	10 Mar 88	Acceded 08 Jul 05
10	Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991)	01 Mar 91	Acceded 01 Dec 99
11	International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)	12 Jan 98	Ratified 01 May 03
12	International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)	09 Dec 99	Ratified 01 May 03
13	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)	13 Apr 05	Ratified 09 May 07

14	Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005)	08 Jul 05	Ratified 17 Sept 07
15	Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (2005)	14 Oct 05	Acceded 08 Jul 05
16	Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)	14 Oct 05	Acceded08 Jul 05
17	Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (2010)	10 Sept 10	Signed 26 Sept 10
18	Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010)	10 Sept 10	Signed 26 Sept 10
19	Protocol to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (2014)	04 Apr 14	Signed 25 Sept 19

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2023); Ford (2011)

Table 5.1 shows that despite its delayed return to the international community, South Africa has made progress in abiding by the international organisations' guidelines. Three of the conventions and protocols have been signed, seven have been ratified, and nine have been acceded. Significantly, ten conventions and protocols were signed, acceded and ratified subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, demonstrating the influence those events had on South Africa's counterterrorism thought process. By 2015, South Africa was one of the 18 African states out of the 54 that had ratified most of these key legal instruments (Allison, 2015, p. 3).

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was a dominant decision-making actor before and after 9/11 attacks. Three important resolutions were passed; *UNSC Resolution 1267 of 1999*, *UNSC Resolution 1373 of 2001* and *UNSC Resolution 1540* of 2004. Resolution 1267's key determination was that all states "shall deny permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban" (United Nations Security Council, 1999, p. 2). Resolution 1540 sought to criminalise the use of weapons of mass destruction by instructing states to "refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery…" (United Nations Security Council, 2004, p. 2). Arguably, the most significant of these resolutions was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1373, shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The resolution listed a comprehensive list of duties that all member states, regardless of other more

urgent priorities or the perceived level of threat, must carry out as part of global counterterrorism campaign. These duties include criminalising the financing of terrorism, freezing the assets of terrorists, denying terrorists safe haven, and bringing terrorists to justice. Numerous counterterrorism measures were then developed at the regional, subregional, and national levels as a result of these requirements (Rosand, 2009; United Nations Security Council, 2001). In addition to strongly condemning the 9/11 attacks, UNSC Resolution 1373 effectively compelled all members of the UN to, among others,

- … work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism; …

- … prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;

- … take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision or early warning to other States by exchange of information … (United Nations Security Council, 2001).

What is most significant with these resolutions is that whatever actions that are prescribed by the UNSC are “legally binding on all UN member states” (Ford, 2011, p. 24).

While the post 9/11 global counterterrorism responses were dominated by the UNSC, the adoption of the UNGA’s UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006 (UNGA Resolution 60/288) “represented a shift in the global response” (Rosand, 2009, p. 1). It essentially broadened support from the UNGA member states, thus accepting the UN’s counterterrorism responses. This resolution identified four pillars to combat terrorism:

- **Pillar I**: Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.
- **Pillar II**: Preventing and combatting terrorism.

- **Pillar III**: Building states' capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations.
- **Pillar IV**: Ensuring human rights and the rule of law (United Nations General Assembly, 2006; Ford, 2011).

Due to its operational and secretive nature, the (United States. Department of State, 2020) suggests that South Africa's counterterrorism strategy may be modelled on the UN's counterterrorism model.

5.3.2 AU Counterterrorism Measures

Being a major player in the AU, South Africa has played a crucial role in a number of accords aimed at stopping and combating terrorism in the continent. With the adoption of the *Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination Among African States in 1992*, The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) established Africa's first continental stance on terrorism. This convention forbade the use of their territories by people or organisations that sought to harm the OAU Member States and urged the AU Member States to uphold the idea of good neighbourliness (Organisation for African Unity, 1992). Additionally, the protocol forbade "any movement using religion, ethnic or other social cultural differences to indulge in hostile activities against Member States as well as to refrain from lending any support to any group that could disrupt the stability and the territorial integrity of member States by violent means" (Organisation for African Unity, 1992).

This was followed by the adoption of the *Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations*. Significantly, it was in this declaration that the African leaders explicitly described terrorism as a criminal act by unequivocally condeming "as criminal all terrorists acts, methods and practises (*sp*)…" (Allison, 2015, p. 4; Organisation for African Unity, 1994, p. 11).

The OAU was forced to create strict measures to combat the threat following the 1998 terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania (Allison, 2015, p. 4). The *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism* was born as a result of this. One of the convention's major contribution was the definition of what a "terrorist act" is

(Organisation for African Unity, 1999, p. 3). Additionally, according to the Organisation for African Unity (1999, p.4), Member States were required to "review their national laws and establish criminial offences for terrorist acts … and make such acts punishable by appropriate penalties …" The development of a "solid and fundamental counterterrorism framework for the fight against terrorism in Africa", along with the codification of "counter-terrorism norms" and the consolidation of common standards, are considered to tbe the convetion's primary contributions to the terrorism discourse, according to Ewi and du Plessi, as cited in Allison (2015, p.4).

Slightly over a month after the 9/11 attacks, the AU adopted the *Dakar Declaration on 17 October 2001*. The declaration declared terrorism as an "unacceptable infringement of the most essential human rights and democracy" and also strongly condemned "any acts of terrorism, be it perpetrated in the African continent or in any part of the world…" (African Union, 2001).

In 2004, the AU adopted the *Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*. A significant contribution of this protocol was the inclusion of the implementation and monitoring plan, which resided with the Peace and Security Council of the AU (African Union, 2004).

With similarly forceful military operations, the AU has bolstered the aforementioned mechanisms. In order to put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency, the AU has authorised the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Multinational Joint Task force (MNJTF), an amalgamated multinational formation from West Africa, and the Group of Five Sahel Countries comprising of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (G5), an institutional framework for coordinating regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa (Okeke, 2019).

5.3.3 SADC Counterterrorism Measures

The SADC released its *Terrorism Declaration after* the events of 9/11. Declaratively, the SADC Member States agreed to "accede or ratify international instruments on combating terrorism, … fight with all means …all forms of terrorism that endanger the lives of innocent civilians … and prevent SADC Member States from being used as bases or support centres for groups or indiviudals involved in terrorist activities"

(Southern African Development Community, 2002). The declaration denounced terrorism in all its forms. In spite of these statements, the subregion nevertheless embodies changing architectures of peace and security but lacks any particular protocols or tactics addressing terrorsim (Ford, 2011). A protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition, and other associated materials, for instance, has been accepted by the SADC. Other pertinent protocols that have been enacted include those on legal affairs, mutual legal assistance and extradition, and the fight against illegal narcotics (Rifer, 2005; Ford, 2011). According to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (2001), the majority of the Member States lacked the financial and technological means to completely implement Resolution 1373 (2001), with only South Africa and Mauritius having comprehensive antiterrorism laws in place.

5.4 ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA'S COUNTERTERRORISM FRAMEWORK

Employing the institutional theory or institutionalism as this study's overarching theoretical framework, the anti-terrorism laws and counterterrorism organisations are seen herein as important institutions to combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa. Amongst others, the "state-enforced rules" or "outlines, norms and human devised regulations" are seen as intangible and formal institutions which regulate social interactions within the polity rules (Bevir, 2009, Kaufmann, *et al.*, 2018, p. 387, Helmke & Levitsky, 2003, p. 4). In this regard, South Africa's anti-terror legislation is regarded as important institutions in averting and confronting terrorism. Furthermore, the material or physical entities (SANDF, SAPS, SSA, DHA, NPA) that possess physical locations are seen as enforcers of the legislations described below.

In the face of an ever-growing terrorist threat, the institutional theory becomes ever relevant to study these institutions, particularly their effectiveness in dealing with a terrorist threat in South Africa. As stated by Bevir (2009), "Institutionalism concentrates on institutions and studies them using inductive, historical and comparative methods." Using largely inductive reasoning, and studying South African institutions' ability to combat a terrorist threat, this contribution seeks to determine whether they positively affect political stability, national security or policy choices (Peters, 2000). This assessment is conducted through a lens of the senior officers of the SANDF, and enhanced by the academics and security practitioners, in the field of counterterrorism.

5.4.1 Identifying South Africa's Anti-Terrorism Policy/Legislative Framework

South Africa is said to have a National Counterterrorism Strategy which has been implemented since 2013 but is classified due to its operational nature (United States. Department of State, 2020). This strategy is said to be based on five pillars which almost mirror the UN's Counterterrorism Strategy; understanding and prediction, prevent, mitigation, combating and response (United States. Department of State, 2020). A number of the terrorism legislation, is important in making inferences about South Africa's national counterterrorism strategy.

5.4.1.1 Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2000

Two years before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and prompted by the upsurge of violence by PAGAD in the late 1990s, *Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2000* was drafted on the request of the Minister of Safety and Security (Kokott, 2005). However, it never saw the light of day due to opposition from local and international human rights groups (Kokott, 2005). The bill "attracted widespread condemnation and vehement public opposition because of the apprehension that it was an attempt to infringe on fundamental rights and freedoms in South Africa" (Lumina, 2007, p. 46).

Consequently, the government revived the legislation and was since presented before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security in March 2003 (Lumina, 2007, p. 10). The bill essentially made a provision for "wide-ranging police powers to search vehicles and person and provided for various offences, including providing support to or membership of a terrorist organisation, hijacking an aircraft, hostage taking and nuclear terrorism" (Lumina, 2008, p. 46).

5.4.1.2 PROCDATARA of 2005

However, after prolonged period of public criticism, some amendments were made and it was reintroduced into parliament as PROCDATARA and became law on 14 February 2005 (Lumina, 2008, p. 46). The enactment of this law was a crucial precondition to meet in order to comply with the international instruments against terrorism. This was also necessitated by the apparent inadequacies that were prevalent in the then existing anti-terror laws in South Africa (Kokott, 2005, p. 10; Lumina, 2008, p. 46). UNSC Resolution 1373 therefore can be seen to have been one

of the “catalysts for South Africa to determine its domestic terror laws”, particularly at the wake of the failed Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2000 (Solomon, 2011).

5.4.1.3 The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998

On 18 September 1998, the South African government enacted the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (South Africa. Office of the President, 1998). This act was enacted with the purpose to “regulate the rendering of foreign military assistance by South African juristic persons, citizens, persons permanently resident within the Republic and foreign citizens rendering such assistance from within the borders of the Republic …” (South Africa. Office of the President, 1998). This effectively criminalised any attempts by South African nationals to join terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, among others (United States. Department of State, 2020).

5.4.1.4 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001

The *Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001* was promulgated on 03 December 2001 with the objective of establishing a Financial Intelligence Money Laundering Advisory Council to effectively address and mitigate money laundering activities. This legislation also imposes specific obligations on institutions and individuals that may be susceptible to being exploited for the purposes of money laundering (South Africa. The Presidency, 2001). The primary objective of this legislation was to suppress any form of financial assistance that could potentially be provided to or received by terrorist organisations in the execution of their acts of terrorism.

5.4.1.5 Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020

The *Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020* was officially enacted on 1 June 2021. The objective of the act was to establish criminal offenses that pertain to cybercrime, to render the publication of detrimental data communications as a punishable offense, and to institute provisions of temporary protection orders. Additionally, it aimed to enhance the regulation of jurisdiction concerning cybercrimes (South Africa. The Presidency, 2021). This action was taken in acknowledgement of the detrimental effects or possible detrimental effects of cybercrimes on individuals, organisations, and the state.

Despite the apparent importance of these legislations, approximately 25% of the participants (n=70) indicated a lack of familiarity with all of the aforementioned legislative measures. This indicates a significant level of indifference with regard to anti-terror legislation or initiatives. Based on contemporary literature, there is insufficient justification for the current state of affairs, without engaging in speculative reasoning. This indifference can be attributed, in part, to inadequate government communication and perhaps dissatisfaction with the legal system. This might be another indicator which highlights significant shortcomings in public policy engagement in South Africa. Hence, it can be inferred that the inadequate engagement in public policy is having a negative impact on the respondents' awareness on the diverse anti-terrorism laws in South Africa. The need for security sector reform to effectively respond to the possible terrorism threat in South Africa is gradually becoming apparent. However, it is crucial to emphasise the importance of enhancing public policy participation as a key aspect that should be addressed, prioritised, and enhanced.

5.4.2 Identifying South Africa's Anti-Terrorism Security Institutions

According to Section 199(1) of the *Constitution of South Africa, 1996*, the security services of South Africa comprise "of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution" (South Africa. 2022, p. 139). Each of these services has a key and unique role to play in the prevention and combatting of terrorism in the Republic. The intelligence services envisioned in the constitution refer to the SSA, Defence Intelligence Division of the SANDF and Crime Intelligence Division of the SAPS, among others, who also have a role to play in the prevention of terrorism. Furthermore, due to its dual civic and immigration functions, the DHA is also assessed in this this study as an important security actor in the prevention of terrorism. Similarly, as a single prosecuting authority in the country, the NPA is included in this study.

5.4.2.1 The South African National Defence Force

Section 199(2) of the *Constitution of South Africa, 1996*, establishes the SANDF as the "only lawful military force in the Republic" (South Africa, 2022, p. 139). Section 200(2) further obligates the SANDF to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution (South Africa, 2022, p.

140). While the above implies the execution of a mandate of external nature, its internal mandate maybe derived from cooperation with the SAPS or in defence of the Republic (South Africa, 2022, p. 140). A further internal mandate is granted by *the Defence Act No. 42 of 2002*, in which the SANDF may be employed within the Republic in order to:

- Preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations;
- Ensure the provision of essential services;
- Support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; and
- Effect national border control (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2003, p. 22).

The *Defence Act No. 42 0f 2002*, also establishes the Defence Intelligence Division of the SANDF to gather, correlate, evaluate and use strategic intelligence for the purposes of ensuring national security, amongst others; as well as use operational intelligence for the purposes of assisting the execution of operations in line with defence strategy (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2003). The Defence Intelligence Division is thus the Republic's premier foreign military intelligence organisation. While not explicitly stated, combatting, and preventing terrorism is inherently implied and an important function of the SANDF. Similarly, the appreciation, collection, processing and dissemination of foreign intelligence of military nature resides with the Defence Intelligence Division, may also include intelligence on the terrorist organisations across the globe and in South Africa.

5.4.2.2 The South African Police Services

The SAPS was established through the *South African Police Service Act No. 68 of 1995*, with a key mandate of the "preservation of the internal security of the Republic" (South Africa. South African Police Service, 1995). The general and overall mandate of the SAPS is that of crime prevention. In relation to terrorism, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) was established as an independent directorate within the SAPS in terms of Section 17C of the SAPS Act, 1995 as amended by the

SAPS Amendment Act, 2008 (Act 57 of 2008) (South Africa. The Presidency, 2009). The DPCI also comprises of the Crime Against the State Unit (CATS) which is responsible amongst others, for "detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa" (United States. Department of State, 2020).

The SAPS-Special Task Force (STF) is an elite, operational unit which is charged with handling high risk operations such as hostage rescue, armed robberies, counter-terrorism operations, *etc*. that would not ordinarily be the ambit of regular police men and women as it may require special skills and resources (SAPS-STF, 2023). Established in 1976, the STF has vast experience in various operations such as "tracing and elimination of terrorists, terrorist bases and arms caches; the rescuing of hostages out of planes, vehicles, buildings, busses and prisons; underwater searches for bodies and exhibits; protection of VIPs; provision of specialised training to other units and various rescue operations and many more" (SAPS-STF, 2023).

5.4.2.3 The State Security Agency

The SSA is South Africa's premier civilian intelligence institution, which is also charged with detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorist acts in South Africa (United States. Department of State, 2020). It was created in 2009 after the amalgamation of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), now known as the domestic branch, the South African Secret Services (SASS), now known as the foreign branch, and the South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI), National Communications Centre (NCC), and Communisation Security (COMSEC) (News24, 2009). The SSA in brief, is responsible for the collection and processing of civilian foreign intelligence of non-military nature as well as to identify domestic threats or potential domestic threats to the Republic and its people (South Africa. State Security Agency, 2023).

5.4.2.4 The Department of Home Affairs

The DHA is charged with providing services which primarily falls under two broad categories; civic services and immigration services, which are legislated accordingly under a variety of acts of parliament (South Africa. Department of Home Affairs, 2023). This implies that the department must manage citizenship and civic status, international migration, refugee protection, and the population register (South Africa. Department of Home Affairs, 2023). In order to streamline the activities of the many

government institutions found at many of South Africa's Ports of Entry, *Border Management Act No 2 of 2020* was enacted into parliament in July 2020 (South Africa. Border Management Authority, 2023). The creation of the BMA was brought about by the need to, among others, "address the associated national security risks with respect to the totality of border management controls" (South Africa. Border Management Authority, 2023). These risks maybe all encompassing to include the movement of potential terrorists and illicit arms across the borders of South Africa. Therefore, in order to identify prospective terrorists who seek to exploit South Africa's ports of entry for nefarious intentions, the DHA-BMA is an essential frontline institution.

5.4.2.5 The National Prosecution Authority

The enactment of the *National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 on 16 October 1998*, established the National Prosecuting Authority of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa. National Prosecuting Authority, 1998). The act established, in accordance with the Constitution of South Africa, a single, national and independent prosecuting authority which also made provision for the appointments by the president, of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) of the NPA and the Directors of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (South Africa. National Prosecuting Authority, 1998). The NPA has the power to, and is responsible to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, including terrorism-related cases in accordance with the South African law (South Africa. National Prosecuting Authority, 1998). According to the NPA:

> The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) was established in terms of a Presidential Proclamation [On 24 March 2003] to manage and guide investigations and prosecutions of specific crimes and offences of national and international security concern. [Amongst others] These are: Terrorism offences (i.e. contraventions of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004), which will include terror financing as well as … Transgressions of the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (South Africa. National Prosecuting Authority, 2023).

The measure of success for the NPA therefore, is on its successful prosecution of terrorism-related suspects which leads to convictions in accordance with the national anti-terror laws.

5.5 ASSESSING THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS' STATE OF READINESS TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Many of the institutions are secretive about their overall plans and strategies to combat the threat of terrorism. In an environment where terrorist attacks have not been entrenched, an assessment of their readiness becomes a gargantuan task. However, publicly available media reports and other published scholarly material indicate a state of affairs of unreadiness and incapacity to effectively combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa.

In a book titled *Jihad: A South African Perspective*, Solomon (2013, p. 55) cites a briefing of the South Africa's Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence, held at the SAS SALDANHA military base in 2002, which highlighted some of the important issues that seemed to render the SANDF not in a state of readiness to combat terrorism. Some of the issues highlighted include but are not restricted to the following:

- Alarming rate of medical unfitness of the SANDF members;
- Lack of funds resulting in the ability to deploy SANDF asserts and personnel;
- Inadequate training.
- Deplorable state of equipment (Solomon, 2013, p. 55).

With terrorism being an unpredictable security threat, the above inadequacies will definitely render the SANDF unprepared for a possible terrorist attack. However, the SANDF, through the South African Defence Review of 2015, has acknowledged the threat posed by groups such as AQIM, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, among others (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2015, p.2-10). It also recognises its roles as "the means of last resort when other instruments of state are unable to protect or defend South Africa" (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2015, p.3-6). For this reason, the SANDF "must have the capacity to cooperate with the [SAPS] and civil authorities in … countering civil threats to the constitutional order and substate threats

such as terrorism …" (South Africa. Department of Defence, 2015, p.3-6). This implies that those in the senior management of the SANDF are conversant with what needs to be done, however, implementation remains a serious point of concern.

It must be noted that in an attempt to ensure an unbiased opinion, the SANDF was not included in this study for an in-depth scrutiny by the quantitative respondents, who are all members of the SANDF. However, these individuals were asked two questions about the SANDF. The respondents had to offer a response as to whether they felt that the members of the SANDF ought to keep abreast of the development of terrorism-related incidents. Second, the respondents had to opine as to whether the SANDF was better placed to address a terrorist threat than any of the other security institutions. An overwhelming affirmative response was extracted for both questions.

Similar and other unique challenges were revealed by the findings of a council of 14 retired police commissioners, appointed by the former police National Commissioner Jackie Selebi in 2006 "to advise him on the state of the SAPS and the country's crime-fighting capabilities" (Staff Reporter, 2008). Below, are some of the key findings derived from the investigation by the council:

- Lack of national crime-combating plan;
- Inadequate basic resources;
- There is an overall shortage of detectives (3,343 nationally);
- Inadequate training;
- Lack of proper crime information and intelligence;
- Poor discipline; and
- Rampant corruption (Staff Reporter, 2008).

While these findings do not explicitly relate to counterterrorism operations, there is no doubt that, that capacity will be seriously hindered by these findings. Consequently, the SAPS' capacity or state of readiness for an eventuality of a terrorist attack can be seen to be in question. Judging by its operational nature, the SAPS-STF appears not to have been tainted by any of the political wrangling that is so common in other government institutions. It also seem to be well-trained and experienced to deal with

any of the terrorist eventuality that the country may experience. However, it is expected that it may not be immune to the austerity measures that are commonplace to all other institutions.

It has often been repeated that South Africa has become a safe haven for terrorists from all over the world. Moreover, there has been instances where known and wanted terrorists have been reported to at some point reside, transit or train in South Africa. What is more troublesome is the ability of these individuals conduct their activities without being detected, identified or even arrested. Notwithstanding the secretive nature of intelligence organisations, there are no indications as to whether the SSA have been able to track such individuals. If so, the question would be why therefore would these individuals not be arrested. In the absence of contrary information, it would appear that the SSA's readiness or capacity to detect, identify and thus to combat and prevent terrorism is seriously hampered.

That South Africa's borders are porous is an understatement. It is widely acknowledged that there are many undocumented foreign nationals residing in South Africa. Among these foreign nationals, there could be wanted terrorists who bares the capacity to harm South Africa and its interests. The establishment of the BMA, is perhaps a heartening gesture by the South African government, with high hopes that it will alleviate some of these border management ills that has been experienced in the past. One other worrying factor is the ease at which these terrorists have been able to acquire genuine South African identification documents and passports. It is rather the ease of reproducing these documents or acquiring these documents that is troublesome. Solomon (2013, p. 33) indicates that in most part these documents are not forged, but are rather genuine documents produced by the DHA. This presents another problem of corruption that is often rampant win the DHA. Such activities raise doubts as to the readiness or ability of the DHA to, within their mandate, quell potential for terrorist activity within South Africa.

The academics are not convinced of the government's effectiveness in detecting, deterring, and combating terrorism. They lament wrongful senior appointments, the politicised environment, lack of capacity and communication. Expectedly, the security practitioners were much more positive of their ability to address a terrorist threat. They

firmly believed that they had the requisite skills, education, training, experience, personnel and policies to effectively counter the menace that is terrorism. These views were shared by the senior officers of the SANDF in their responses to the survey questionnaires. There seems to be a general feeling of discontentment regarding the institutions' and legal frameworks' state of readiness in combating terrorism. According to these views, it seems, absence of terrorism-related attacks in South Africa cannot be attributed to their ingenuity in addressing the threat. It becomes evident therefore that both the quantitative and qualitative respondents impute this absence to other factors such as terrorists' disinterest in attacking South Africa as a result of its non-interventionist approach to terrorism.

Admittedly, assessing the institutions' state of readiness is a complex and a very subjective matter, and leaves much room for speculation. What is evident is that these institutions' effectiveness and readiness have not been fully tested in this regard. It is only after the incident, one might argue, that an objective assessment can be undertaken. Nonetheless, history and literature provide some form of barometer through which this assessment can be attempted.

In dealing with PAGAD, maybe the only known and recorded terrorist organisation in South Africa, the South African security institutions demonstrated their readiness, capability, and effectiveness in eliminating their threat. With the majority of its leaders and members detained, PAGAD's reputation as a dangerous terrorist group has been seriously weakened. Security institutions have kept everyone under close observation, including those who have been released (Schoeman & Cachalia, 2017).

However, with high levels of crime in the country as typified by the high rates of Cash-in-Transit heists and robberies at the various malls, which closely resembles terrorist attacks, the security institutions have been found wanting. These incidents occur with an alarming brutality and rate, bringing suspicions of corruption. The events of 8 July 2021 also bring into question the efficiency of security institutions to deal with potential acts of terror. This is addressed in following section of this chapter.

5.6 EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN PREVENTING TERRORISM

The DHA's performance as an institution has not been without controversy. The officials of the department have been accused of conducting corrupt activities by illegally issuing identity documents and travel documents to foreign nationals who did not meet the minimum standards to possess such (South Africa. Department of Home Affairs, 2022). This can inadvertently lead to complicity in terrorist activities. In 2013, Samantha Lewthwaite, a widow to one of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, and a suspected mastermind of the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya on 21 September 2013 which left 67 people dead, was spotted in South Africa spying on foreign embassies (Eye Witness News, 2013). Following the attacks in the Westgate Mall, in her apartment in Kenya, a South African passport was found (Tolsi & De Wet, 2013). Questions as to how Samantha Lewthwaite entered and left South Africa, how South Africa's identity documents and passports were in here possession, can only lead to a conclusion of the ease of forging South African documents and/or the high levels of corruption within the DHA. For this reason, the parliament has raised its concern over the number of syndicates that are continuously trying to forge South African documents and have also applauded the department's anti-corruption operations which have resulted in the arrests of some of the DHA officials (Molepo, 2022).

Even in the absence of a plethora of terrorist attacks as compared to other countries, to date, the PCLU has applied the anti-terrorism laws successfully to convict several perpetrators. For example, on 26 March 2013, Henry Okah, the Nigerian terrorist was convicted in South Africa for 24 years for the deaths of a total of 37 people and 47 injured in two car bombs which occurred on 15 March and 1 October 2010, respectively, in Abuja (News24, 2013). Recently, the Thulsie twins were convicted for attempting to join ISIL and conducting terrorist activities in South Africa, however, having spent time in jail, they pled guilty and have since been released with time served.

Despite these minute achievements, the NPA's reputation has been tarnished in recent years. Some authors have commented that the independence of the NPA and by implication, the NDPP, has become a highly politicised matter (Muntingh, Redpath & Petersen, 2017). Nowhere else is this politicisation more evident in the appointments

of the NDPPs. The law provides that the president appoints the NDPP for a non-renewable 10 year period, but still prescribes stringent conditions under which the NDPP may be impeached (Redpath, 2012). However, none of the NDPPs to date have come close to completing their terms. Basic calculations dictate that South Africa should at least be on its fourth NDPP, instead of its current nineth. Bulelani Nquka is the longest serving NDPP after the attainment of democracy in 1994 (1998-2004) while others, barring for Shamila Batohi (2019-present), have only gone as far as completing three years of service (ACJR Factsheet , 2018). This is indicative of leadership instability at the top as a result of political meddling in the affairs of the NPA. Under such a political climate, important security issues, including terrorism, might take time to be addressed due to this meddling. In fact, some scholars have attributed the NPA's decisions not to prosecute on a number of cases due to this heavy politicisation to the declining prosecution rate by the NPA (Camerer, 2020; Schönteich, 2014; Muntingh, *et al.*, 2017).

The SSA has often relied on intelligence from the US and other foreign intelligence services. This is typified by the thwarted potential acts of terror in 2010. This is nothing out of the ordinary as intelligence services often engage in intelligence exchange. Furthermore, the US have often issued occasional terror alerts to their citizens residing in South Africa, as was the case in 2016 and 2022. However, the South African government has often refuted the assessment by the US intelligence services. What is troublesome is the inability of SSA to detect the presence of Samantha Lethwaite in South Africa, despite an international warrant of arrest issued against her.

Furthermore, in June 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa established the High-Level Review Panel into the SSA whose "key objective was to enable the reconstruction of a professional national intelligence capability for South Africa that will respect and uphold the Constitution, and the relevant legislative prescripts" (Mufumadi, 2018). The key finding of the report was stated as follows:

> …our key finding is that there has been a serious politicisation and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party, resulting in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts, and turning our

civilian intelligence community into a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals.

This scathing report, was followed by yet another establishment of an Expert Panel to "lead a thorough and critical review of our preparedness and the shortcomings in our Response" (Africa, 2021). This panel was established as a result of the widespread and violent civil unrest that engulfed parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July 2021. The report by the Expert Panel revealed that most parts of the national and provincial governments, as well as the civil society, believed that there was a "major failure of intelligence" with regards to the July 2021 incidents (Africa, 2021). However, the intelligence community asserted that it had sufficiently warned the government about the prevailing dissatisfaction and the possible ramifications thereof, which were not acted upon by the institutions such as the SAPS and the SANDF, among others (Africa, 2021).

5.7 INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA

5.7.1 Awareness about Terrorism

Notwithstanding the lack of a universally acknowledged definition of terrorism, the data indicates that the senior officers possessed sufficient knowledge regarding the nature and scope of terrorism. In furtherance of a rudimentary and operational definition, to which 94.3% (262) of the 280 (*N*) respondents confirmed familiarity with terrorism, they exhibited a greater understanding of diverse terrorist organisations operating both in the continent and internationally, as well as terrorist tactics and incidents (including those that occurred in South Africa, the continent, and other regions). The provided information functioned as a diagnostic evaluation in order to ascertain the respondents' level of knowledge. The researcher was able to proceed with the study without any obstacles due to the reassurance that the respondents possessed some understanding of the subject matter. In relation to the security practitioners and academics, the researcher was also convinced that these cohorts were well acquainted with the nuances that are prevalent within the terrorism discourse.

5.7.2. Salience of Terrorism in South Africa

In its most basic form, salience refers to the importance of an issue or event. In this context, it refers to the importance of terrorism as a serious security issue among the population. Van Zuijdewijn and Sciarone (2021) observe that not much is known about the impact of terror attacks on the salience of terrorism beyond national borders. This implies that very little is known as to how terrorist attacks in the DRC and Mozambique might affect the salience of terrorism in South Africa. As stated before, South Africa's last terrorist attacks occurred during the reign of PAGAD, which has since collapsed. Despite the terrorist attacks in the DRC and Mozambique, as well as those conducted by PAGAD, which are now a distant memory, there is no scholarly evidence to suggest that terrorism is a salient issue in South Africa. The majority of the respondents, both quantitative and qualitative, do however, perceive terrorism as a credible security threat. Nonetheless, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that it has become a salient issue in South Africa, particularly judging how the government has responded to the potential threat, *i.e.* continued treatment as just another crime (Bjørgo, 2016). As a matter of fact, a number of socio-economic ills and other priorities far outweigh terrorism as a salient issue. These issues include unemployment, poverty and inequality, housing, immigration, and corruption among others.

5.7.3 Concern about Terrorism in South Africa

In relation to concern about terrorism in South Africa, the results revealed that an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned over the potential of terrorist attacks in South Africa. Similar findings were revealed during the semi-structured interviews with the academics and security practitioners where a third of the former and more than three quarters of the latter perceived terrorism in South Africa to being a credible threat to the Republic.

What is peculiar with these results and findings is that no significant terrorist event has taken place in South Africa in the post 9/11 era. It would therefore to have no basis to display such a high degree of apprehension about the potential terrorist attack. The expectation was that due to absence of any significant terror attacks in South Africa, respondents would not be as concerned with the potential attack as they were. However, in a research by Schoeman and Cachalia (2017), the findings indicated that while the respondents acknowledged that there was a possibility of terrorist attacks in

South Africa, the threat was considered low. This was attributed to a number of factors ranging from foreign policy choices (South Africa's non-interventionist policies), domestic factors; which indicated that the preconditions that often lead to radicalisation such as marginalisation, political and religious suppression or relative deprivation, were not prevalent in the context of South Africa. Furthermore, there appeared not be any overt support or sympathy from the South African Muslim community for the course advanced by Jihadist organisations (Schoeman & Cachalia, 2017). However, with the changed approach in Mozambique and the known *modus operandi* of Jihadist organisations, in terms of reprisal attacks against those countries that often play an active role in combating terrorism, it is likely that this prognosis would be amended to place South Africa in direct confrontation with terrorist organisations.

While the literature above does not explain the senior officers' high levels of concern about terrorism in South Africa, it somehow points to the uneasiness through which the threat of terrorism is perceived. The practical implications thereof are that the government must find ways to allay the fears of the populace at large. This hints to a range of security measures that needs to be taken in order to minimise the fears of the population. This may refer to, among others, visibility by law-enforcement agencies, well-communicated contingency planning and post-attack disaster management strategies. But most significantly, even though complete terrorism avoidance is a utopian goal, the South African government still has a duty to eliminate the conditions that lead to the radicalisation and subsequent engagement in terrorist activities.

Although the existing literature does not provide a comprehensive explanation for the heightened levels of anxiety among senior officers over terrorism in South Africa, it does indicate a certain degree of unease associated with the perception of this threat. The practical ramifications of this situation necessitate that the government devise strategies to alleviate the concerns of the general public. This implies the necessity of using a variety of security measures in order to mitigate the concerns of the populace. This may encompass various factors, including the level of visibility granted to law enforcement officials, the effectiveness of contingency planning that is well conveyed, and the procedures in place for managing post-attack disasters. However, it is important to note that achieving complete prevention of terrorism is an idealistic objective. Regardless, the South African government bears the responsibility of

addressing the underlying factors that may contribute to radicalisation and eventual involvement in terrorist acts.

5.7.4 Proximity to Terrorism

A basic description of proximity to terrorism refers to the closeness of terrorism in terms of space, time and/or relationship. In other words, proximity can be either personal, physical or psychological. Personal proximity (race, nationality and/or religion) refers to the "affinity one feels with the victims of an attack … [while] physical proximity is the distance of an attack from one's home country" (Avdan & Webb, 2018, p. 91). Psychological proximity refers to the exposure experienced by individuals due to a terrorist attack, for example, loss of someone due to death or disappearance, "and reactions to such exposures include posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms and alcohol consumption" (Hasin, *et al.*, 2007).

There is no evidence in this study that any of the respondents were personally or psychologically proximate to terrorism in South Africa or elsewhere in the world. Despite this apparent distance to terrorism, the respondents remained extremely apprehensive of the threat of terrorism in South Africa. However, with involvement in counterterrorism operations in the DRC and Mozambique, the apparent apprehension could be as a direct result of physical proximity, "the distance of an attack from one's home country" (Avdan & Webb, 2018, p. 91).

5.7.5 Communication about Terrorism

A significant majority of the survey participants expressed the view that the internet served as their primary means of accessing information pertaining to terrorism. While this may not be unusual in this information age, the government's importance in the dissemination of terrorist-related information seems to have received very little attention from the respondents. This observation implies a significant deficiency in the government's communication efforts towards the respondents, and by implication the general populace. This has prompted some scholars to mete out criticism against the government's ineptitude in effectively disseminating information pertaining to terrorism. The academics warn that this has the potential to engender an atmosphere characterised by indifference and suspicion, as the populace continues with their daily routines, unaware of the potential dangers posed by terrorism. Indeed, in a scenario

characterised by a lack of information and transparency, acts of terrorism have the capacity to cause far greater harm to both humans and physical infrastructure.

Several reasons can be advanced for the apparent lack of communication on this matter. Governments, and particularly their security agencies, are known to deal with sensitive issues such as terrorism, on a need-to-know basis. This means that only those that are directly involved, whether in policy formulation or in operations, are privy to such information. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon can be attributed to the inherent propensity of intelligence organisations to maintain a clandestine modus operandi. The primary objective of this practice is primarily to acquire and maintain a strategic and an operational advantage over their potential adversaries. Alternatively, this approach might also be employed to mitigate anxiety and panic stemming from potential acts of terrorism. In addition, seeing that the threat at the moment, is a matter of much speculation and largely imaginary, the government can argue that there is nothing to be communicated to the population. What is very likely, is that the security institutions choose to be silent on counterterrorism operations in order to avoid direct confrontation with the terrorist organisations as a result of deaths or arrests of terrorists in the country.

Irrespective of the causes for this ineffective communication, it is essential to underscore the importance of successfully communicating about these occurrences. Democratic governments have a responsibility to efficiently communicate information about their policies and actions to the public. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1996), citizens have a legitimate right to be informed about the policies and actions of their respective governments. Ironically, the South African government recognises the need to consistently offer information to all citizens, emphasising the responsibility to enable universal access to government-related information (South Africa. Government Communications and Information System, 2023). The GCIS further underscores the crucial need of effective communication in order to both shape public opinion and uphold the government's legitimacy (South Africa. Government Communications and Information System, 2023). For communication to be efficient and useful, it is important that the information being transmitted is both reliable and timely (OECD, 1996). Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to guarantee the delivery of clear and concise

information to keep the citizens of South Africa well-informed about the latest developments (South Africa. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2021).

Advocacy for effective government communication holds much validity during periods of crises. The effective communication of a government is crucial for establishing its legitimacy, enhancing its reputation, managing disaster, and ensuring the well-being of its population (John, Maama, Ojogiwa, Oluwaseun and Mubangizi, 2022). Based on this reasoning, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) asserted that:

> Public officials must be prepared to communicate effectively with the public and the media to deliver messages that inform without frightening and educate without provoking alarm whenever acts of terrorism, mass violence, natural or other disasters, and public health emergencies occur (SAMHSA, 2019).

The current research findings on the government's communication with the public about terrorism differ from earlier studies conducted on national disasters. In their study, John *et al.* (2022) conducted an assessment of government communications during the COVID-19 pandemic. The researchers specifically evaluated the focus and trends observed in the 483 press statements that were produced by the government and made available on South Africa's official corona virus website. The findings revealed a systematic and unwavering endeavour to deliver prompt, precise, and dependable information that empowers the overall populace. The government's primary focus during the epidemic was to manage the transmission of the virus. However, there were instances during the course of the outbreak where greater emphasis was placed on addressing socioeconomic problems related to the well-being of the populace (John *et al.*, 2022).

It is important to consider that these press announcements were supplemented with information disseminated through official social media channels, as well as radio and television broadcasts. It is also worth acknowledging that the response discussed above was prompted by a pre-existing situation, in contrast to a hypothetical scenario involving a terrorist attack. This also demonstrated the government's ability to engage in efficient contact with its citizenry when necessary. Despite lack of a terrorist attack,

it is crucial to establish and maintain proactive communication systems and process in South Africa to effectively respond to the potential danger of terrorism.

The findings pertaining to the absence of communication hold significant importance within the framework of this study due to their substantial practical consequences. The absence of formal communication regarding terrorism is anticipated to result in misconceptions regarding government's approach to manage the crisis (Schoeman & Cachalia, 2017). In addition, in the absence of awareness of terrorist operations, individuals may lack the necessary understanding of appropriate responses, designated safe areas, recommended actions, and relevant authorities to consult in the event of a terrorist incident occurring within the boundaries of South Africa. In such a scenario, individuals may lack the necessary knowledge regarding the appropriate indicators to observe and prospective culprits to be aware of. The presence of ambivalence in this situation has the potential to accidentally result in increased levels of destruction and loss of human lives, unless it is appropriately addressed and managed. The practical benefit of communicating with the general public has the potential to reveal the as a valuable source of intelligence regarding terrorism, as they may live near potential terrorists and have valuable insights to offer in this regard. Vivier, Seabe, Wentzel and Sanchez (2015) argue that government's responsiveness and accountability can be assessed by promoting information exchange and providing citizens with a platform to voice their thoughts. Hence, it is imperative for the government to give high priority to, among other things, the efficient dissemination of information pertaining to terrorism. This would subsequently assist in protecting lives and property, while also helping in the long term execution of security sector reform.

5.7.6 Confidence on Anti-Terrorism Framework

The overwhelming response to the question of whether South Africa can successfully confront terrorism is one of complete loss of confidence. The respondents expressed their lack of faith in the capacity of South African institutions and anti-terror laws to successfully tackle terrorism. Neither did they believe that absence of terrorism in South Africa is as a direct result of the institutions' initiatives. Similarly, most of the academics were highly sceptical and not confident of the government's counterterrorism ability to deal with terrorism in South Africa. Security practitioners on the other hand, presented a view of optimism and confidence in their ability to combat

terrorism in South Africa, their inherent challenges notwithstanding. Nonetheless, these results in fact, calls into question the institutions' effectiveness in combating terrorism in South Africa, thus bringing them into scrutiny in this study.

5.7.6.1 Confidence in Security Institutions

When looking directly at the institutions, the results are telling. Almost half of the respondents indicated that they had no confidence at all in the DHA. Similarly, barring for the SAPS-STF, almost a quarter of the respondents lacked confidence in the likes of the CAT (SAPS), SSA and NPA. These results were consistent with the research conducted by Nkomo and Buchanan-Clarke (2020), particularly in relation to the SAPS. The research indicated that "public trust [confidence] in the police was lowest in … South Africa (35%) …" In the case of the army, public trust stood at 54%, indicating a great deal of trust in the SANDF (Nkomo & Buchanan-Clarke, 2020).

In a politically polarised and crime-ridden nation such as South Africa, such a response would have been expected from the general populace and not necessarily from the senior officers of the SANDF. This is particularly so when one considers that issue-specific clusters are formed by various government departments and institutions to address matters of national security. In one way or the other, these are partners who collaborate on a number of issues. However, the SANDF and its employees should not be viewed in isolation from the general population. The SANDF, is, in fact, a microcosm of the general population. This means that all the treatment related to service delivery by other government institutions are also experienced by members of the SANDF. These perceptions could also be shaped by the internal political squabbles that have been prevalent in most of the government institutions.

5.7.6.2 Confidence in Anti-Terror Legislation

For the purpose of this study, the following legislations, though not exhaustive, were identified as being crucial to the prevention of terrorism in South Africa:

- Anti-Terrorism Bill (2002).
- Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.

- The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998.
- Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001.
- Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020.

There is a general attitude of apathy and lack of confidence in the anti-terror legislation. Most of the respondents were not aware of the existing legislative framework that deals with terrorism. In cases where there was knowledge, some exhibited a high degree of lack of confidence. In large part, such a state of affairs could be as a direct result the communication problems stated above and a general despondence with the legal system as a result of high levels of crime.

Judging by the results and findings of this study, and the preceding discussion above, the following determination are made about the study's research hypotheses. To recap, these are restated below:

- H_{a1}: Low levels of salience of terrorism in South Africa is indicative of high levels of confidence in the government's ability in combatting and preventing terrorism.
    - H_{01}: Salience of terrorism in South Africa has no bearing in the levels of confidence in the government's response.

In South Africa, terrorism does not seem to be a salient issue. However, it is viewed as a credible security threat irrespective. The findings about confidence in state institutions reveal that the respondents have low confidence. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis, H_{a1}, is rejected and the null hypothesis, H_{01}, is accepted.

- H_{a2}: The more concerned the respondents are about terrorism in South Africa, the less confident they are in the government's ability to combat and prevent terrorism.
    - H_{02}: Concern about terrorism in South Africa has no bearing in the respondents' confidence in the government to address the threat.

The study's findings indicated that the respondents were very concerned about the likelihood of a terrorist attack in South Africa. In relation to confidence in state institutions and anti-terror legislation, the respondents exhibited low levels of confidence. Consequently, alternative hypothesis, H_{a2}, is accepted, and null hypothesis is rejected.

- H_{a3}: Absence of proximity to terrorism manifests in a high degree of confidence in state institutions, thus implying efficacy in combatting the terrorist threat.

    - H_{03}: Absence of proximity to terrorism does not necessarily manifests in a high degree of confidence in state institutions, thus it bears no bearing in the government's efficacy in combatting terrorism.

None of the research respondents indicated any proximity, whether in terms of personal or psychological, to terrorism. It can be inferred however, that physical proximity as a result of activities in the DRC and Mozambique, may have influenced the views of the respondents. Judging by the low confidence towards the state institutions and anti-terror legislation, alternative hypothesis, H_{a3}, is rejected and null hypothesis, H_{03} is accepted.

5.8 FACTORS PREDISPOSING SOUTH AFRICA TO TERRORISM

The findings presented in this study exhibit a lack of congruence with other prior investigations undertaken on the topic in various geographical locations. What factors can account for the observed level of concern regarding terrorism among the participants? The available evidence indicates that, given the absence of documented instances of terrorism in South Africa, there are likely more precipitating factors that contribute to the country's susceptibility to prospective terrorist strikes. The subsequent section provides a comprehensive analysis of these matters.

While South Africa has not had any significant terrorist attacks since the aftermath of 9/11, the data indicates that a large majority of the respondents believe that there are specific factors that make South Africa vulnerable to potential acts of terrorism. Some of these include the porous borders in the Southern African region, involvement in the Southern African multinational counter-terrorism initiative, SAMIM, and the use of

South Africa as a safe haven for terrorists. This perspective is also held by security professionals who have expressed significant concern regarding the potential repercussions that may arise from involvement in SAMIM. In contrast, academics are indifferent towards both the aforementioned element and the prospective repercussions of South Africa's foreign policy decisions. However, they expressed great concern regarding the possibility of an attack directed at foreign corporate interests and diplomatic installations within South Africa.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that this result was not deemed wholly unexpected. Nkomo and Buchanan-Clarke (2020) claim that the porous nature of South Africa's borders and the prevalence of movement within the country may have facilitated the potential entry and exit of individuals with terrorist intentions. The assertion expressed by Schoeman and Cachalia (2017) suggests that the modern infrastructure in South Africa facilitates communication, transportation, and business activities for potential terrorists. Given these circumstances, it is unsurprising that Hamilton, Bax, and Sayed (2018) posit that porous borders in Southern Africa offer an advantageous environment for potential terrorists, who may choose to target South Africa or utilise it as a potential transit point for overseas Jihadists seeking to travel to South Africa and other destinations.

It is important to acknowledge that there exist recorded instances of individuals affiliated with Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda seeking refuge in South Africa (Dagne, 2002; Hexham, 2002; Glickman, 2003). The cited instances include individuals such as Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian individual who received training from Al-Qaeda. In 1999, he was apprehended in Cape Town due to his involvement in the US Embassy bombings. Additionally, Samantha Lewthwaite, who is associated with Al-Shabaab, has been implicated in the planning of numerous terrorist acts resulting in the loss of hundreds of lives. The White Widow, as she is notoriously known, intermittently resided in South Africa and utilised a counterfeit South African passport for travels (Hamilton, *et al.*, 2018).

The existence of porous borders and ungoverned spaces creates favorable conditions for unrestricted mobility of individuals and transit of weapons by potential terrorists, hence enabling the potential perpetration of terrorist acts. South Africa exhibits a

notable capacity for hosting a wide range of migrants, including persons possessing legitimate papers as well as those who lack proper documentation. The primary issue lies within the population of those lacking legal documentation. Migration is frequently driven by individuals who are motivated to flee the socioeconomic difficulties prevailing in their places of origin. Nevertheless, there are instances in which individuals choose to engage in migration as a means to avoid legal repercussions stemming from illegal actions committed in their nations of origin, or as a result of their affiliations with established and highly sought-after extremist groups. Similarly, individuals who maintain affiliations with terrorist organisations may develop nefarious intent to carry out acts of terrorism within the confines of South Africa.

Equally, the concerns around the possibility of a terrorist attack specifically targeting South Africa due to its involvement in SAMIM may be justified. To mitigate the the frequency of Al-Shabaab's attacks, Kenya actively engaged in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As a result, Al-Shabaab retaliated by carrying out acts of violence within the borders of Kenya, leading to a significant loss of human lives (Odhiambo, Kassilly, Maito, Onkware, Oboka, Otipi, and Nakhumwa, 2013). Nonetheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that the retaliatory attacks were not limited to Kenya alone; other AMISOM countries also experienced similar attacks, albeit to a lesser extent. The aforementioned incidents included attacks that occurred in Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Moreover, Kenya had been consistently targeted by terrorist organsaitions prior to 9/11 and the rise of Al-Shabaab. However, it may be argued that Kenya was primarily targeted due to its involvement in counterterrorism efforts against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Instances of such attacks can be observed in the case of the Norfolk Hotel attack, as well as the explosions targeting the US Embassy, among other notable incidents (Odhiambo, *et al.*, 2013).

As seen above, terrorist organisations often redirect their focus and hostility towards countries whom they perceive as providing aid or expressing support to the parties they consider to be the aggressors. Although the US has historically been a prominent target of terrorist attacks, it is vital to note that several European nations have also suffered similater fate. This can be attributed to their cooperation with and their active involvement in counterterrorism initiatives spearheaded by the US. Consequently, European cities, including Brussels, London, Madrid, and Paris, have all experienced

significant terrosits attacks as a retaliatory measure in solidarity with the US and its war on terror.

In a similar vein, the involvement of South Africa in SAMIM can be interpreted by terrorists as a distinct act of opposition to their agenda. This not only has the potential to bring South Africa at loggerheads with terrorist organisations, but may also bring about substantial and measurable repercussions for the country. The implementation of proactive measures, which include preventive and contingency planning, holds significance in order to foresee and mitigate the likelihood of a potential attack occuring in South Africa.

5.9 SUMMARY

This chapter began by highlighting South Africa's counterterrorism strategy. Admittedly, this task was complicated by the fact that while the strategy is purported to exist, it has not been shared with the public due to its operational nature. However, is said to aligned with the UN's counterterrorism framework. Furthermore, this chapter highlighted South Africa's international and regional counterterrorism commitment. This was followed by the identification and assessment of the various anti-terror institutions and legislative framework. This chapter identified the DHA-BMA, NPA, SAPS and SSA as key government institutions in the fight against terrorism in South Africa. The DHA, is mainly responsible for border control and issuance of identity documents in South Africa. The NPA is charged with prosecuting those that commits crimes against the state. The SAPS has a dual-function of investigating crimes against state as well as to conduct counter-terrorism operations should the need prevail. At the intelligence level, the SSA, is charged with providing timely and actionable intelligence in relations to attempts to detect, prevent and deter acts of terrorism in South Africa. What formed the gist of this discussion was their state of readiness for future terrorist attacks and performance in relation to past terrorist and other security issues.

This chapter also combined the quantitative results from survey questionnaires filled out by senior officers of the SANDF with the qualitative findings from the semi-structured interviews with academics and security practitioners in the field of terrorism presented in Chapter Four. The integration, analysis, and interpretation of these data

and outcomes highlighted a number of concerns that were essential to the study's research aim.

In light of the overall key findings regarding the salience of terrorism, South Africa's susceptibility to terrorism, and government's inability to communicate effectively with the public regarding terrorism-related events, it is extremely alarming that despite the absence of any significant terrorist attacks, there is still a great deal of unease and concern regarding the possibility of a terrorist attack. This can be attributed to the wide range of problems that are seen to be the catalysts for terrorist activity in South Africa. Indeed, terrorists may perceive South Africa as an enemy of Islam who must be dealt with, similar to others due to the country's perceived change in policy in relation to participation in counterterrorism operations. Even more alarming is the apparent breakdown in communication regarding terrorism between the government and the general public.

Absence of terrorism-related attacks in South Africa means that these institutions have not been fully tested to determine their efficacy. Notwithstanding that, several and notable successes were recorded against PAGAD, terrorist-related prosecutions resulted in convictions, among others. In the same vein, the persistent robberies at South African malls, alarming rates of Cash-in-Transit heists as well as the events of July 2021 cast a shadow on the institutions' ability to effectively deal with terrorism in South Africa. This could inform the reason why the majority of the respondents exhibited lack of confidence in these institutions to combat a terrorist threat in South Africa. What was glaring in this regard, was some degree of institutional dysfunctionality in all of the entities. Highly politicised climate, corruption, lack of capacity in terms of resources and personnel, have resulted in loss of confidence and trust in these institutions. Poor coordination and communication among some of these institutions could be the reason for the unfortunate events that occurred in July 2021.

The above-mentioned deficiencies point to a need for security sector reform in South Africa, especially in relation to the detection, deterrence and combatting of terrorism in South Africa. A kick-starter could be a change in a manner in which South Africa approaches counterterrorism. While treating terrorism as any other crime, the prevalent atmosphere of concern about terrorism indicated that the current approach

may not be adequate in addressing the threat. Securitising terrorism on the other hand, brings it to the forefront of policy and other law makers as it would receive the greatest amount of attention. At best, the question is not whether South Africa needs a security sector reform or not, but rather, what modalities should be put in place regarding security sector reform to combat terrorism.

Chapter Six concludes this study and addresses some of the key issues raised in this chapter.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will conclude this study by summarising the key research outcomes derived from Chapter Five. Additionally, the chapter will also make conclusions derived from the research outcomes. This will be done in order to answer the research questions of the study as well as to fulfil the stated research objectives. This will also entail a discussion on the value and contribution of the study. Limitations and delimitations of the study have been addressed in Chapters One and Three, and will thus not form any further part in this chapter. Last, the chapter will conclude by making recommendations for future research, as well as for future practice.

6.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY RESEARCH OUTCOMES

The study utilised the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design, which used the senior officers of the SANDF as primary quantitative respondents through survey questionnaires, and the academics and security practitioners as secondary qualitative respondents through semi-structured interviews to augment the data from the quantitative survey. The quantitative data was analysed using the IBM SPSS descriptive statistics while the qualitative data was analysed through a thematic analysis. The overall research outcomes are therefore a product of an amalgamation of the results of the quantitative data and the findings of the qualitative data. The research methods used herein were found to be the most effective to address the stated research questions and objectives.

The use of the mixed methods research allowed for a triangulation of data from three separate cohorts thus producing a potential for a diversity of data. In addition, generalisability of the study was made possible through the use of appropriately selected probability sampling technique of random sampling method. The overall study was therefore based on sound research process, which could be replicated and improved in future research.

This study was motivated by the apparent paucity of or limited studies that focused on the knowledge and attitudes of key personnel on terrorism-related topics, and their ensuing confidence in, or lack thereof, in the ability of the institutions of the government to effectively combat terrorism. The research aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy and institutional framework to combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa through the lens of the senior officers of the SANDF, academics from various universities as well as security practitioners charged with counterterrorism in South Africa. The study's key finding is that there appears to be a general lack of public trust and confidence in the capacity of government institutions and the anti-terrorism policy framework to successfully combat and prevent terrorism in South Africa.

The study's research objectives focused on evaluating the policy and institutional framework in place in South Africa to combat and prevent terrorism in relation to the institutions of government's capacity and readiness, current anti- or counterterrorism performance, and their capacity to inspire confidence in the research participants and the general public. These research outcomes are reflective of the knowledge, attitudes and confidence levels of the senior officers, academics and security practitioners in matters related to terrorism in South Africa and the government's response thereto. They also implicitly provide responses to the research questions posed in this study.

According to the findings of the study, there is a lot of fear about the likelihood of terrorist attacks occurring in South Africa. It must be borne in mind that this apprehension, appears not have been informed by any previous or recent terrorist attack in South Africa or neighbouring state. This made a compelling argument for the postulation of other precipitating factors that informed the fear and concern of potential terror attacks in South Africa. The findings also bemoaned the failure of the government and its institutions to properly engage the populace in dialogue about issues pertaining to South Africa's fight against terrorism, and other related information about terrorism.

Due to their specifically created missions, the study highlighted the DHA-BMA, NPA, SAPS, and SSA as significant institutions at the forefront of the war against terrorism in South Africa. While these institutions have had some degree of success against terrorism, their victories are too far and too few in between and probably reflect South

Africa's low level of terrorist activity. The findings revealed a general feeling of discontentment regarding the government institutions' and policy framework's ability and readiness to effectively detect, deter and combat terrorism in South Africa. According to the findings, this seems to have manifested in a general feeling of apathy towards the anti-terror legislation as not much was known, nor much confidence exhibited about or in the anti-terrorism legislation.

6.3 CONCLUSIONS

That there is a great deal of concern about the potential for terrorist attacks is a serious indictment on the part of the South African government. It points to the general lack of ability of the government to provide security as an obligatory public good. As emerged from the study, the current absence of terrorism in South Africa is not reflective of its ability to address the threat, but rather is a reflection of the prevalence of many social ills and poor decision making.

The evidence from studies related to terrorism indicates that it is not whether or not a terrorist attack will take place in South Africa, but rather a question of when it will take place. Such a proposition makes for great unease by the population. Lack of visible and viable strategies and awareness about terrorism creates an atmosphere of insecurity, especially in a country that already has a perpetually rising criminal problem. The government is responsible for the provision of security and elimination of factors that contribute to insecurity.

The government's aloofness and detachment from the population in relation to communication about terrorism is glaringly observable. Whether it be for operational reasons, as the guarantor of security, the government has an obligation to communicate to the population all the threats that manifests in the Republic, as was the case during the Covid-19 pandemic. But most importantly, the government should provide information to pre-empt the threat, as well as information post facto.

The policy, legal and institutional framework to combat terrorism in South Africa has been laid down. Superficially, as a result of absence of terrorist attacks in South Africa, the framework appears to provide some form of comfort from terrorism. However, this could not be farther from the truth. There is an overwhelming public distrust,

apprehension and sheer lack of confidence in the abilities of these institutions, despite earlier successes with terrorism. These are based, presumably, on the reputational damage that these institutions have suffered previously. These resulted in doubt as to whether the institutions are capacitated and resourced, well-trained and ready to prevent or react to a potential terrorist attack. The lack of knowledge about anti-terrorism legislation and policies as well as lack of confidence therein, is indicative of the failure of public policy participation. When citizens participate in the formulation of policies as required, they own the process and information, thus becoming knowledgeable about the options before them in relation to the existing legislation.

At the top of this is the political wranglings that are often prevalent in these institutions. The resultant leadership instability places these institutions at a perpetual state of anxiety and has the potential to hinder the achievement of their objectives, including the prevention of terrorism. In addition to this political meddling, issues such as corruption, the appointment of inadequately educated, trained and experienced individuals as a result of the government's policy of cadre deployments; manifests in low levels of confidence in the government's ability to combat terrorism. The concluding but important finding of this study is that the government and its institutions appear incompetent to effectively deal with terrorism in South Africa.

The implications for these findings are immense but simple. There is a great need for a security sector reform in South Africa to deal with the potential threat of terrorism. The modalities of this security sector reform are addressed in great detail under recommendations for future practice, below.

6.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

This study has contributed to the corpus of knowledge in terrorism studies by producing research outputs, filling in the gaps in the literature, using and applying relevant theories, and creating the potential for world application of the findings. First, by developing a survey questionnaire and interview schedules, the study has produced a measuring scale that can be used to measure the knowledge, attitudes, and confidence of potential respondents, as well as to assess the effectiveness of governmental institutions on countering terrorism. Second, the idea behind this study was to fill a gap in the body of knowledge regarding knowledge about terrorism,

attitudes towards terrorism and confidence in the government's ability to effectively counter terrorism. In addition, it assessed the government's institutions' readiness and capacity in this area, which was rather inconspicuous in a majority of studies. This is expected to have a significant impact since it produced new perspectives for studying terrorism. Third, this study applied relevant theories to emphasise the phenomenon of terrorism and its viable government responses. In order to understand South African counterterrorism strategies, the institutional theory was essential. An analytical framework for tracing the development of terrorism was offered by the theory of the four waves of global terrorism. The counterterrorism as a conflict prevention theses, indicated an approach which has been preferred by the South African government. The theory of securitisation offered a potential strategy Soth Africa may adopt to confront the threat of terrorism in South Africa. Finally, there is a lot of potential for practical use of these research findings. These results can be used by government institutions to identify, among others, the population's perceptions of government responses and may use these to seek areas for improvement.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings and conclusions derived and made from this research, provide avenues for possible application by practitioners and improvement by researchers. This is expressed herein as recommendations for future practice and recommendations for future research, discussed below.

6.5.1 Recommendations for Future Practice

The research recommends changes under a broad framework of security sector reform security practitioners in South Africa. What is envisaged in this reform is the following:

- **A Change in Approach to Counterterrorism**. The present South African counterterrorism strategy in South Africa reflects the idea that terrorism should be treated like any other type of crime. The violence and destructiveness of terrorism, however, show that it is not a typical crime. Its effects are not only physical, but can also have long term psychological impact to the individual and the population at large. Consequently, this study recommends the securitisation of terrorism as a national security threat. By securitising the threat, higher priority

is granted. This results in the appropriate capacity-building measures of the concerned institutions with regards to financing, human resources, materiel and training of the employees in such institutions. Securitisation highlights the possible harm caused by terrorism and sets priorities in accordance with that.

- **Establishment of Professional Security Institutions**. The re-establishment of the existing or perhaps new security institutions to meet professional standards is recommended. This implies that the government should depoliticise the security cluster or public sector by employing individuals based on merit. In other words, those that are educated, trained and skilled, as well as experienced in the field of counterterrorism, should receive priority. This also implies the enhancement of communication and coordination among the different institutions in order to ensure that counterterrorism operations are approached from a multi-agency point of view unhitched.

- **Increased International Co-operation**. While there is evidence of international cooperation between South Africa and other states, this needs to be strengthened. This is predicated on the idea that there should be a high level of cooperation among nation-states due to the transnational nature of terrorism. The focus of various intelligence organisations should be on intelligence exchange programmes, monitoring of movement of known terrorists as well as illicit financial flows. For this, appropriate reporting mechanisms should be established to ensured that verifiable, actionable, and urgent intelligence is shared.

- **Modernisation of Security Institutions**. In this era of technological advancement, security institutions and intelligence organisations should keep up or even supersede the capabilities of terrorist organisations. A situation where terrorists are more well-capacitated than the government institutions is a recipe for disaster which is likely to be felt for a long time. Modern surveillance technologies, communications systems, armament and weaponry; should be up-to-date to meet the requirements of the modern terrorist threat.

- **Reform in Government Communication Approach**. In order to ensure that the public is kept informed of the development of terrorism in South Africa, government must overhaul its communication systems to make use of the exchange of information with the population. The government should prioritise informing the citizens of the potential terrorist threat and measures to take when suspecting that a terrorist activity might take place. In the unfortunate event of the threat taking place, the South African government should explain to the population the role of various institutions in mitigating the threat. This should inherently include information regarding national disaster management, in which citizens will know precisely what to do in an event of a terrorist attack. Terrorism awareness programmes should form part of government priority to avert terrorist attacks and their destructive nature. The government must also create mechanisms through which whistleblowers will be protected in sharing information pertaining to terrorism.

6.5.2 Recommendations for Future Research

In relation to future research, the following recommendations are made:

- **Expansion of Respondents**. This research used the senior officers of the SANDF as the quantitative respondents and the academics and security practitioners as qualitative respondents. These cohorts reflect knowledgeable individuals on the subject of terrorism. Similarly, they reflect a small section of the population. The apparent importance of this study suggests the expansion of the respondents from the cohorts used here, to the larger population. Expansion to the population will result in the generalisability of the study not only to the senior officers of the SANDF, but also to normal citizens in the streets. This should help create a bigger picture of the citizen's knowledge, attitudes and confidence on matters dealing with terrorism in South Africa which may inform possible way forward for the government and its institutions.

- **Exploration of Application of Other Theories**. The subject of Political Science and Terrorism Studies is abundant with theories. In this study, institutional, counterterrorism as conflict prevention, four waves of global terrorism and

securitisation theories were used to provide structure to the study. It is recommended that other theories be explored and applied to this study for future research in order to fully determine its academic value.

- **Use of Comparative Case Studies**. Future research in this subject should explore the use of specific case studies in relation to terrorism. These studies may reveal certain commonalities experience by other countries and South Africa. Such cases may have experienced a lot of terrorist incidents from which much experience was gained. In such cases, lessons learnt may come handy for South Africa's fight against terrorism. Similarly, these comparative studies can reveal the country's state of readiness prior to experiencing terrorism as well as measures taken after terrorists attacks, as well as assessing whether these measures have been successful or not.

- **Use of Mixed Methods Research on the Same Respondents**. Lastly, this study conducted mixed methods research by combining quantitative data from the senior officers of the SANDF and qualitative data from academics and security practitioners, which allowed for a diversity of ideas. However, as mentioned previously, the preference is for both data to be derived from a carefully selected sample of the same respondents. In order to determine the utilitarian and academic value of this prescription, it is recommended that future research use the same respondents to derive quantitative and qualitative data.

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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Degree in Political Sciences

Evaluating South Africa's Policy and Institutional Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform

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Table of Contents

Abstract

If the stability of the Southern African region is to be maintained, the ability to combat and prevent terrorism should be of utmost importance to South Africa. This study acknowledges that the region has largely been impervious to terrorism. Lack of or limited terrorist activity within the region may lure the authorities into a web of complacency, denialism, leading to inaction. This in turn, may provide an opportunity for terrorists to either launch attacks in South Africa or utilise it as a recruitment and planning ground, as well as a safe haven. Recent events indicate that the *status quo* may not remain indefinitely. With South Africa fast becoming an attractive destination for terrorists, the question of its readiness for a terrorist attack becomes ever relevant. This informs entry into this study. The author shall assess the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional frameworks to combat and prevent terrorism within its shores. The study therefore proposes to evaluate the extent to which the anti-terrorism policy and security institutions inspire confidence in South Africa's ability to contain terrorist activities within the country. The study shall seek the views of academic experts and security practitioners to add to the body of knowledge in terrorism-related studies. The subjects of the study will comprise of a sample of senior officers within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), whom at some point of their careers may be required to command or execute orders to address terrorism-related activities.

Ethical Considerations

The following principles will be observed throughout the conduct of the research:

1. **Voluntary Participation:** Participation in this research is voluntary, no one is coerced or deceived into participating in the study. At any given time, the respondent may withdraw from the study without any penalty or punishment incurred.

2. **Informed Consent:** The abstract in the questionnaire seeks to provide the respondents with the necessary information regarding the nature of the study.

3. **Anonymity:** Throughout the study, the candidate researcher prefers not to know the identity of the respondents.

4. **Confidentiality:** Should the researcher know the identity of the respondents; a commitment is made not to reveal the identity of the respondents.

5. **Potential for Harm:** In the design of the questionnaire, the candidate researcher has taken all precautions to ensure that no physical harm, psychological harm, emotional harm, and social harm is experienced by the respondents.

Part 1: Demographic Data

Gender:

M	1	F	2

Arm of Service:

Army	1	Air Force	2	Navy	3	Health Services	4

Race:

African	1	White	2	Coloured	3	Indian	4

Rank:

Maj/Lt Cdr	1	Lt Col/Cdr	2	Col/Capt (SAN)	3

Highest Education Level:

Grade 10	1
Grade 11	2
Grade 12	3
Diploma	4
Bachelor's Degree	5
Honour's Degree	6
Master's Degree	7
Doctor of Philosophy	8

Province:

Eastern Cape	1
Free State	2
Gauteng	3
Kwa-Zulu Natal	4
Limpopo	5
Mpumalanga	6
Northern Cape	7
North-West	8
Western Cape	9

Religion:

Christianity	1
Islam	2
Traditional	3
Buddhism	4
Hinduism	5
Judaism	6
Atheist	7
Agnostic	8

(Research Question 1:• What is the level of knowledge of senior officers about terrorism in relation to its definition, sources of information about terrorism, terrorist tactics, terrorist organisations and incidents in South Africa and how does this affect their views of the government's response?)

Part 2: Knowledge, Information and Attitudes About Terrorism

- Please indicate your familiarity with the topic of terrorism:

(1 – Not at all Familiar; 2 – Slightly Familiar; 3 – Moderately Familiar; 4 – Very Familiar; 5 – Extremely Familiar)

Basic and a workable definition of terrorism.	1	2	3	4	5

- Please choose your most important source of information about terrorism:

(1 – Not at all Important; 2 – Slightly Important; 3 – Sometimes Important; 4 – Very Important; 5 – Extremely Important)

S/ No	Sources					
1.	Film	1	2	3	4	5
2.	Newspaper	1	2	3	4	5
3.	Internet	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Radio	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Magazine	1	2	3	4	5
6.	Television	1	2	3	4	5
7.	Area of Academic Study	1	2	3	4	5
8	Part of Job Description	1	2	3	4	5
9.	Government Communication	1	2	3	4	5

- Please rank your awareness regarding the existence of different terrorist organisations in Africa (Note: Please address all options in the question box):

(1 – Not at all Aware; 2 – Slightly Aware; 3 – Moderately Aware; 4 – Very Aware; 5 – Extremely Aware)

S/No	Terrorist Organisation					
1.	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	1	2	3	4	5
2.	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen	1	2	3	4	5
3.	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Ansar Dine	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa	1	2	3	4	5
6.	Lord's Resistance Army	1	2	3	4	5
7.	Oromo Liberation Army	1	2	3	4	5
8	Muslim Brotherhood	1	2	3	4	5
9.	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	1	2	3	4	5
10.	Egyptian Islamic Jihad	1	2	3	4	5

11.	Al-Shabaab	1	2	3	4	5
12.	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Libya Province	1	2	3	4	5
13.	Boko Haram	1	2	3	4	5
14.	Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)	1	2	3	4	5
15.	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs	1	2	3	4	5
16.	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria	1	2	3	4	5
17.	Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)	1	2	3	4	5
18.	Al-Mourabitoun	1	2	3	4	5
19.	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Sinai Province	1	2	3	4	5

- Please rank your awareness regarding the tactics of different terrorist organisations (Note: Please address all options in the question box):

(1 – Not at all Aware; 2 – Slightly Aware; 3 – Moderately Aware; 4 – Very Aware; 5 – Extremely Aware)

S/No	Tactics					
1.	Vehicle-based Attacks	1	2	3	4	5
2.	Aircraft Attacks and Hijackings	1	2	3	4	5
3.	Nuclear Weapons	1	2	3	4	5
4.	Stabbings	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Conventional Firearms	1	2	3	4	5
6.	Chemical and Biological Weapons	1	2	3	4	5
7.	Cyber Terrorism	1	2	3	4	5
8	Rocket and Mortar Attacks	1	2	3	4	5
9.	Suicide Attacks	1	2	3	4	5
10.	Bombings	1	2	3	4	5
21.	Other: Please state other:	1	2	3	4	5

- Please rank your awareness regarding the following terrorist incidents (Note: Please address all options in the question box):

(1 – Not at all Aware; 2 – Slightly Aware; 3 Moderately Aware 4 Very Aware; 5 Extremely Aware)

	Attacks								
S/No	Date	Nature	Location	Fatalities					
African									
1.	7 Aug '98	US Embassy Bombings	Kenya and Tanzania	224	1	2	3	4	5
2.	23 July '05	Bombings on an Egyptian Resort	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	88	1	2	3	4	5
3.	24-27 Dec '08	Christmas Massacre	Haut-Uele District, DRC	860	1	2	3	4	5
4.	21 Sept '13	Attack on a shopping mall	Nairobi, Kenya	71	1	2	3	4	5
5.	2 Apr '15	Attack on Garissa University	Garissa, Kenya	148	1	2	3	4	5
6.	1-2 July '15	Shooting	Kukawa, Nigeria	145	1	2	3	4	5
7.	31 Oct '15	Suspected bombing on a flight	Sinai, Egypt	224	1	2	3	4	5
8.	14 Oct '17	Suicide truck bombing	Mogadishu, Somalia	587	1	2	3	4	5
9.	24 Nov '17	Car bombing and shooting	Bir al-Abed, Egypt	311	1	2	3	4	5
10.	20 Sept '15	Bombings and suicide bombings	Maiduguri, Nigeria	145	1	2	3	4	5

- Using the scale below, please indicate your familiarity with the following selected terrorism-related cases in South Africa:

(1 – Not at all Familiar; 2 – Slightly Familiar; 3 – Moderately Familiar; 4 – Very Familiar; 5 – Extremely Familiar)

S/No	Cases					
1.	The acquisition of a South African national Identity Document and Passport by Samantha Lethwaite, a wife of one of the suicide bombers during the 7/7 attacks. She also stayed in Johannesburg for two years under an alias.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	The arrest of the Thulsie Twins who have since been awaiting trial for ISIL links, and planning attacks against the UK embassy and other Jewish establishments in South Africa – 2016.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	The arrest and subsequent conviction of the two members of the National Christian Resistance Movement (aka Crusaders - Right Wing Organisation), accused for preparing and planning to carry out terrorist attacks on government institutions and the African population in South Africa on 28 November 2019 – 2021.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	Attack on a Shia Mosque in Durban – 2018.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	The arrest of Sayfudeen Aslam Del Vecchio, his wife Fatima Patel and their Malawian boarder, Ahmad "Bazooka" Mussa, for the kidnapping and killing of British botanists Rodney and Rachel Saunders.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6.	The arrest of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian trained by al-Qaeda, in Cape Town for his role in the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 – 1999.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
7.	The arrest and subsequent conviction of a Nigerian militant Henry Okah for masterminding the 2010 car bombing which killed 12 people in Nigeria – 2013.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.	The deportation of around a dozen South Africans from Turkey for attempting to reach Islamic State territory – 2016.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9.	Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, senior member of Al-Qaeda and leader of the East African branch, is killed in Somalia and is found with a South African passport – 2013.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
10.	An al-Qaeda suspect is arrested in Iraq reportedly plotting attacks in South Africa during the Soccer World Cup – 2010.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
11.	Mohammed Yassar Gulzar, a key planner in the plot to blow up flights using liquid explosives in 2006, enters the UK from South Africa with a fake South African passport after living in South Africa for two years – 2006.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
12.	An alleged terrorist plot is reportedly foiled days before South Africa's national elections. Suspects are deported – 2004.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

(Research Question 2: What are the attitudes of senior officers towards potential acts of terror towards South Africa and the government's response thereto?)

Part 3: South Africa and Terrorism

- Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements reflecting your attitudes towards terrorism in South Africa:

(1 – Strongly Disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Moderately Agree; 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree)

S/ No	Statements	1	2	3	4	5
1.	Terrorism is not a serious threat to South Africa and thus requires no attention.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	There is no sufficient evidence to suggest that South Africa could face a terror threat in the future.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	Terrorist organisations are not immediately interested in launching terrorist attacks in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	Terrorist organisations are only interested in using South Africa as a training ground and a safe haven.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	No country is immune to the threat of terrorism, South Africa included.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6.	Porous borders have the potential to contribute to the presence of terrorists in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
7.	There are known terrorist organisations in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.	Although terrorists may not be directly interested in conducting terrorist activities against South Africa, the presence of embassies of the West and other Jewish establishments exposes South Africa to a potential attack.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9.	Each country, South Africa included, has an obligation to prepare for an eventuality of a terrorist attack.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
10.	Due to relations with the West, the US in particular, South Africa is a potential target for terror attacks.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
11.	There is always a spill-over potential of terror attacks into South Africa from the neighbouring countries, e.g. Mozambique.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
12.	Lack of tighter immigration controls might be one of the factors to contribute to terrorism in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
13.	The South African government has an obligation towards its populace to communicate any terrorist activity.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
14.	South Africa's role in combatting terrorism exposes it to a potential terror attack.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
15.	Frequent xenophobic attacks have the potential to contribute to terrorism in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
16.	South Africa is a potential hotbed for terrorism.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
17.	I believe senior officers in the SANDF should pay more attention to the problem of terrorism.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

- Please rate how concerned you are about the threat of a terrorist attack in South Africa:

(1 – Not Concerned at all; 2 – Somewhat Concerned; 3 – Moderately Concerned; 4 – Very Concerned 5 – Extremely Concerned)

1	2	3	4	5

Part 4: South Africa's Response to Terrorism

- Please indicate your level of agreement with respect to South Africa's response to terrorism.

(1 – Strongly Disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Moderately Agree; 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree)

S/ No	Statements	1	2	3	4	5
1.	South African government's communication regarding terrorism does not inspire confidence in its citizens.	1	2	3	4	5
2.	Due to the need to protect sensitive information of operational nature, I am convinced that the South African government has no obligation to divulge such information.	1	2	3	4	5
3.	There is a likelihood that certain planned terrorist attacks against South Africa have not been communicated by the government.	1	2	3	4	5
4.	There are many terrorist activities that are not reported in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5
5.	Rather than shedding light and inspiring confidence, the official line of the South African government on terrorism has fostered distrust and uncertainty.	1	2	3	4	5
6.	I have confidence in South Africa's response to the threat of terrorism.	1	2	3	4	5
7.	The South African government does not have the political will to combat the threat of terrorism head-on.	1	2	3	4	5
8.	I am well aware of the institutions that are involved in the prevention of terrorism in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5
9.	There are institutions in South Africa that inadvertently contribute to the threat of terrorism.	1	2	3	4	5
10.	The absence of and limited terrorist activity in South Africa bears testament of success to South Africa's counter terrorism policies, institutions and legislation.	1	2	3	4	5
11.	Lack of terrorist activity in South Africa indicates that the security and intelligence apparatus of the government are effective in detecting, deterring and combatting terrorism in South Africa.	1	2	3	4	5
12.	The acquisition of a fraudulent South African passport in Kenya, of the White Widow, Samantha Lethwaite (alia Natasha Faye Webb), a wife of a known terrorist, is indicative that Department of Home Affairs might be complicit in the perpetuation of terrorist attacks due to ease at which its documents can be forged.	1	2	3	4	5
13.	The arrest of the Thulsie twins on charges of having links with the IS, as well as on accusations of planning attacks on the UK embassy and other Jewish institutions inspires confidence in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations, intelligence services and the South African Judiciary system.	1	2	3	4	5

14.	The arrest and subsequent conviction of the two members of the Crusaders Right Wing organisation for planning terrorist attacks in South Africa indicates the effectiveness of South Africa's counterterrorism policies, initiatives and institutions.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
15.	South African institutions are well capacitated to combat terrorism.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
16.	South Africa's counterterrorism institutions, policies and legislation are effective in preventing terrorism.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
17.	The SANDF is the most effective institution to combat terrorism in South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
18.	I believe senior officers in the SANDF should pay more attention to the problem of terrorism.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

- Please indicate your level of confidence in the effectiveness of the following selected South African institutions to prevent and combat terrorism in South Africa.

(1 – Not Confident at all; 2 – Slightly Confident; 3 – Somewhat Confident; 4 – Fairly Confident; 5 – Completely Confident)

S/ No	Institution	Duty					
1.	Crimes Against the State Section – Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigations (SAPS)	Detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	State Security Agency (SSA)	Detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	SAPS Special Task Force	Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	National Prosecution Authority (NPA)	Prosecuting cases of terrorism and international crime	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	Department of Home Affairs	Border Control / Counter-Terrorism measures at international airports.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

- Please indicate your level of confidence in the effectiveness of the following selected South African legislation to prevent and combat terrorism in South Africa. In the event that you are not aware of the said legislation, please tick the relevant square.

(1 – Not Confident at all; 2 – Slightly Confident; 3 – Somewhat Confident; 4 – Fairly Confident; 5 – Completely Confident)

S/ No	Legislation	Not Aware					
1	Anti-Terrorism Bill (2002)	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2	Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3	The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4	Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5	Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

Part 6: Vote of Thanks

I hereby wish to express my deepest gratitude for taking part in this survey. As indicated earlier, all ethical considerations will be taken into account in the capturing and analysis of the data. I can only hope that the successful completion of the study would fill the necessary gaps in the literature as well as aid the decision makers in addressing the potential threat of terrorism to South Africa.

I thank you.

APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

Defence intelligence
Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

Telephone: (012) 315-0660
Fax: (012) 326-3246
Enquiries: Col J. Van Wyk

Defence Intelligence
Private Bag X367
Pretoria
0001
9 April 2021

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DOD): CDR R.M.G. THEKISO

1. Receipt of a request letter MA/R/103/1/8/2/3 dd 23 March 2021 to conduct research in the DOD with a Research Proposal as per requirement has reference.

2. Cdr R.M.G. Thekiso is hereby granted permission from a security perspective to conduct research in the DOD on the topic entitled **"Evaluating South Africa's Policy, Institutional and Legal Framework to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform"** as a prerequisite for an attainment of a PhD Degree in Political Science under the auspices of the Military Academy as per request.

3. After the completion of the research, the final product must be forwarded to Defence Intelligence (DI), Sub-Division Counter Intelligence (SDCI) for a final authorisation before it may be published or distributed to any entity outside the DOD.

4. Approval is however granted on condition that there is strict adherence to inter alia DODI 2/99 "Disclosure of Defence Information" and Section 104 of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2000) pertaining to protection of DOD Classified Information and the consequences of noncompliance.

5. For your attention.

(M.E. PHENDANI)
DIRECTOR DEPARTMENTAL SECURITY
SK/KS (Cdr R.M.. Thekiso)

DISTR

For Action

Commandant Military Academy (Attention: Cdr R.M.G. Thekiso)

Internal

File: DI/DDS/R/202/3/7

APPENDIX C: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Faculty of Humanities
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Humanities 100
Since 1919

4 August 2021

Dear Mr RMG Thekiso

Project Title:	Evaluating South Africa's policy and institutional frameworks to combat terrorism: implications for security sector reform
Researcher:	Mr RMG Thekiso
Supervisor(s):	Prof CA Isike
Department:	Political Sciences
Reference number:	19210818 (HUM023/0521)
Degree:	Doctoral

I have pleasure in informing you that the above application was **approved** by the Research Ethics Committee on 29 July 2021. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

Prof Innocent Pikirayi
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Research Ethics Committee Members: **Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean)**; Prof KL Harris; Mr A Bizos; Dr A-M de Beer; Dr A dos Santos; Ms KT Govinder Andrew; Dr P Gutura; Dr E Johnson; Prof D Maree; Mr A Mohamed; Dr I Naomé; Dr C Puttergill; Prof D Reyburn; Prof M Soer; Prof E Taljard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa

APPENDIX D: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Letter of Introduction and Informed Consent

Dept. of Political Science, University of Pretoria

"Evaluating South Africa's Policy and Institutional Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform"

Research conducted by:

Mr (Cdr) R.M.G. Thekiso; (Student Number 19210818)
Cell: 076 993 3471

Dear Participant

You are invited to participate in an academic research study conducted by Ramotlhantsweng Michael Gilbert Thekiso, Doctoral student from the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria.

The purpose of the study is to is to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional frameworks to combat and prevent terrorism within its shores.

Please note the following:

- This is an anonymous study survey as your name will not appear on the questionnaire. The answers you give will be treated as strictly confidential as you cannot be identified in person based on the answers you give.
- Your participation in this study is very important to me. You may, however, choose not to participate and you may also stop participating at any time without any negative consequences.
- Please answer the questions in the attached questionnaire as completely and honestly as possible. This should not take more than 60 minutes of your time.
- The results of the study will be used for academic purposes only and may be published in an academic journal. I will provide you with a summary of our findings on request.
- Please contact my supervisor, Prof C. Isike, (cell) 083 4688369, (email) christopher.isike@up.ac.za; if you have any questions or comments regarding the study.

In research of this nature the supervisor may wish to contact respondents to verify the authenticity of data gathered by the researcher. It is understood that any personal contact details that you may provide will be used only for this purpose, and will not compromise your anonymity or the confidentiality of your participation.

Please sign the form to indicate that:

- You have read and understand the information provided above.
- You give your consent to participate in the study on a voluntary basis.

_____ _____

Participant's signature **Date**

APPENDIX E: INFORMED CONSENT – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Informed Consent Form

1. Project information

1.1 Title of research project: **Evaluating South Africa's Policy and Institutional Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform**

1.2 Researcher details: **Mr (Cdr) R.M.G. Thekiso; Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria; (w) (022) 702-3166 (m) 076 9933 471 (email) Michael.thekiso@gmail.com**

1.3 Supervisor details: **Prof C. Isike; Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria; (w) (012) 420 4965 (m) 083 468 8369 (email) christopher.isike@up.ac.za**

1.4 Research study description. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional frameworks to combat and prevent terrorism within its shores. The study proposes to evaluate the extent to which the anti-terrorism policy and institutional frameworks inspire confidence in South Africa's ability to contain terrorist activities within the country. For this reason, the views of the academics in the field as well as the security practitioners would be of utmost importance for the project. The researcher seeks to interview both the academics in the field as well as the concerned security practitioners. There are no foreseen risks to the participants in this project. Meticulous care has been taken in ensuring that no operational details of the relevant security institutions are revealed during the semi-structured interviews.

2. Informed consent: Consent to take part in research

2.1 I…… voluntarily agree to participate in this research study.

2.2 I understand that even if I agree to participate now, I can withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any question without any consequences of any kind.

2.3 I understand that I can withdraw permission to use data from my interview within two weeks after the interview, in which case the material will be deleted.

2.4 I have had the purpose and nature of the study explained to me in writing and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

2.5 I understand that participation involves a semi-structured interview on the subject matter. I was also provided with a list of standard questions for the interview.

2.6 I understand that I will not benefit directly from participating in this research.

2.7 I agree to my interview being audio-recorded as well as recorded on Microsoft Teams or Zoom; or any other platform available.

2.8 I understand that all information I provide for this study will be treated confidentially.

2.9 I understand that in any report on the results of this research my identity will remain anonymous, should I prefer to be anonymous. This will be done by changing my name and disguising any details of my interview which may reveal my identity or the identity of people I speak about.

2.10 I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in the dissertation and subsequent articles emanating from the dissertation.

2.11 I understand that if I inform the researcher that myself or someone else is at risk of harm they may have to report this to the relevant authorities - they will discuss this with me first but may be required to report with or without my permission.

2.12 I understand that signed consent forms and original audio recordings will be retained in 43 Hertzog Str, SA Military Academy, Saldanha and only the researcher will have access to the data until the completion of the project.

2.13 I understand that a transcript of my interview in which all identifying information has been removed will be retained for 15 years after the completion of the project.

2.14 I understand that under freedom of information legalisation I am entitled to access the information I have provided at any time while it is in storage as specified above.

2.15 I understand that I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.

Signature of research participant

---------- ----------

Signature of participant Date

Signature of researcher

I believe the participant is giving informed consent to participate in this study

---------- ----------

Signature of researcher Date

APPENDIX F: INFORMED CONSENT - SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Informed Consent Form
(Form for research participant's permission)

1. Project information

1.1 Title of research project: **Evaluating South Africa's Policy and Institutional Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: Implications for Security Sector Reform**

1.2 Researcher details: **Mr (Cdr) R.M.G. Thekiso; Department of Political Science, University of Pretoria; (w) (022) 702-3166 (m) 076 9933 471**

1.3 Research study description. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's policy and institutional frameworks to combat and prevent terrorism within its shores. The study proposes to evaluate the extent to which the anti-terrorism policy and institutional frameworks inspire confidence in South Africa's ability to contain terrorist activities within the country. The participants of the study will comprise of a sample of senior officers within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), whom at some point of their careers may be required to command or execute orders to address terrorism-related activities. The participants will complete a questionnaire related to terrorism in South Africa. In particular, the questionnaire will seek the opinions of the participants with regards to the efficacy of the counter-terrorism policies and state of readiness of South Africa's security apparatus. There are no foreseen risks to the participants in this project. To ensure this, the questionnaires will be conducted on an anonymous bases to protect the identity of the participants.

2. Informed consent

2.1 I, No:_____Rank:_____
Name:_____
hereby voluntarily grant my permission for participation in the project as explained to me by **Mr (Cdr) R.M.G. Thekiso**.

2.2 The nature, objective, possible safety and health implications have been explained to me and I understand them.

2.3 I understand my right to choose whether to participate in the project and that the information furnished will be handled confidentially. I am aware that the results of the investigation may be used for the purposes of publication.

2.4 Upon signature of this form, the participant will be provided with a copy.

Signed: _____ Date: _____

Witness: _____ Date: _____

Researcher: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX G: NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA)

NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA)

This Nondisclosure Agreement or ("Agreement") has been entered into on the date of [DATE] and is by and between:

Party Disclosing Information: [Party DISCLOSING Information] with a mailing address of [MAILING ADDRESS] (“Disclosing Party”).

Party Receiving Information: [Party RECEIVING Information] with a mailing address of [MAILING ADDRESS] (“Receiving Party”).

For the purpose of preventing the unauthorized disclosure of Confidential Information as defined below. The parties agree to enter into a confidential relationship concerning the disclosure of certain proprietary and confidential information ("Confidential Information").

1. **Definition of Confidential Information**. For purposes of this Agreement, "Confidential Information" shall include all information or material that has or could have commercial value or other utility in the business in which Disclosing Party is engaged. If Confidential Information is in written form, the Disclosing Party shall label or stamp the materials with the word "Confidential" or some similar warning. If Confidential Information is transmitted orally, the Disclosing Party shall promptly provide writing indicating that such oral communication constituted Confidential Information.

2. **Exclusions from Confidential Information**. Receiving Party's obligations under this Agreement do not extend to information that is: (a) publicly known at the time of disclosure or subsequently becomes publicly known through no fault of the Receiving Party; (b) discovered or created by the Receiving Party before disclosure by Disclosing Party; (c) learned by the Receiving Party through legitimate means other than from the Disclosing Party or Disclosing Party's representatives; or (d) is disclosed by Receiving Party with Disclosing Party's prior written approval.

3. **Obligations of Receiving Party**. Receiving Party shall hold and maintain the Confidential Information in strictest confidence for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Disclosing Party. Receiving Party shall carefully restrict access to Confidential Information to employees, contractors and third parties as is reasonably required and shall require those persons to sign nondisclosure restrictions at least as protective as those in this Agreement. Receiving Party shall not, without the prior written approval of Disclosing Party, use for Receiving Party's benefit, publish, copy, or otherwise disclose to others, or permit the use by others for their benefit or to the detriment of Disclosing Party, any Confidential Information. Receiving Party shall return to Disclosing Party any and all records, notes, and other written, printed, or tangible materials in its possession pertaining to Confidential Information immediately if Disclosing Party requests it in writing.

4. **Time Periods**. The nondisclosure provisions of this Agreement shall survive the termination of this Agreement and Receiving Party's duty to hold Confidential Information in confidence shall remain in effect until the Confidential Information no longer qualifies as a trade secret or until Disclosing Party sends Receiving Party written notice releasing Receiving Party from this Agreement, whichever occurs first.

5. **Relationships**. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be deemed to constitute either party a partner, joint venture or employee of the other party for any purpose.

6. **Severability**. If a court finds any provision of this Agreement invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement shall be interpreted so as best to affect the intent of the parties.

7. **Integration**. This Agreement expresses the complete understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter and supersedes all prior proposals, agreements, representations, and understandings. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing signed by both parties.

8. **Waiver**. The failure to exercise any right provided in this Agreement shall not be a waiver of prior or subsequent rights.

9. **Notice of Immunity**. Employee is provided notice that an individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any federal or state trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that is made (i) in confidence to a federal, state, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal. An individual who files a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law may disclose the trade secret to the attorney of the individual and use the trade secret information in the court proceeding, if the individual (i) files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and (ii) does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order.

This Agreement and each party's obligations shall be binding on the representatives, assigns and successors of such party. Each party has signed this Agreement through its authorized representative.

DISCLOSING PARTY

Signature: _____

Typed or Printed Name: _____ Date: _____

RECEIVING PARTY

Signature: _____

Typed or Printed Name: _____ Date: _____