

**Evaluating William Gumede's Elements of Democratic Deficit as an Adverse
Feature of Liberation Movements in Government: The Case of the African
National Congress (ANC) in South Africa**

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Declaration of Originality

I, Philip van der Walt, student number U22958097, declare that the dissertation, which I hereby submit for the degree MA Political Science, at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

Ethics Statement

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this dissertation, has obtained the required research ethics approval for the research described in this work.

The author declares that they have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of ethics for scholarly activities.

Synopsis

The research in this dissertation consists of a critical literature study and evaluation of William Gumede's (2017) elements of democratic deficit as a feature of liberation movements. Examining the political culture of the ANC within the theoretical framework presented by Gumede (2017), three research questions are addressed in relation to the applicability of Gumede's framework on the political cultures of liberation movements, the impact thereof on the decline in legitimacy and voter support for the ANC in South Africa, and the primary elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by the ANC which have impacted on democratic consolidation in South Africa since 1994.

Chapter two briefly examines the formation and history of the ANC, with specific reference historical influences on the political culture of the party observed since coming to power in South African in 1994. Chapter two concludes with the conceptualisation the term political culture. Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework presented by Gumede (2017) in terms of examining the elements of democratic deficit demonstrated in the political cultures of liberation movements.

Chapter four conceptualises the decline of the ANC observed since 2014, followed by a condensed formulation of Gumede's framework with which the political cultures of liberation movements can be examined, concluding with the examination of the tension between democratic values and the political culture of the ANC, utilising the condensed formulation of Gumede's framework.

Chapter five presents the findings made in this dissertation, in relation to the research questions and identifying focus areas for future research. The findings made in this dissertation support the applicability of the framework of Gumede (2017) in terms of the democratic deficit demonstrated in the political cultures of African liberation movements. Focusing on the ANC, additional findings support the argument that not only is the ANC on a declining trajectory, but also that the decline of the ANC can be attributed directly to the elements of democratic deficit outlined by Gumede (2017).

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Abbreviations

ANC	–	African National Congress
ANCYL	–	African National Congress Youth League
ANCWL	–	African National Congress Women’s League
APLA	–	African People’s Liberation Army
ATM	–	African Transformation Movement
AU	–	African Union
BEE	–	Black Economic Empowerment
CCSA	–	Constitutional Court of South Africa
CIA	–	Central Intelligence Agency
COPE	–	Congress of the People
COSATU	–	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CR17	–	Presidential (ANC) election campaign of Cyril Ramaphosa in 2017
CR22	–	Presidential (ANC) election campaign of Cyril Ramaphosa in 2022
DA	–	Democratic Alliance
DHA	–	Department of Home Affairs
DIRCO	–	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DP	–	Democratic Party
DPCI	–	Directorate for Priority Criminal Investigations
DRC	–	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EFF	–	Economic Freedom Fighters
FF Plus	–	Freedom Front Plus
FRELIMO	–	Liberation Front Mozambique
GEAR	–	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
HRCSA	–	Human Rights Commission of South Africa
IDASA	–	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDEA	–	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEC	–	Independent Electoral Commission

IFP	–	Inkatha Freedom Party
ISANCO	–	Independent South African National Civic Organisation
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
IPID	–	Independent Police Investigative Directorate
ISS	–	Institute for Security Studies
LGE	–	Local Government Elections
MK	–	Umkhonto we Sizwe (former)
MPLA	–	People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAT	–	Department of Security and Intelligence (ANC)
NDP	–	National Development Plan
NDR	–	National Democratic Revolution
NDZ	–	Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
NEHAWU	–	National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union
NHI	–	National Health Insurance
NLM	–	National Liberation Movement
NMBM	–	Nelson Mandela Bay Metro
NPA	–	National Prosecuting Authority
NP	–	National Party
PAC	–	Pan Africanist Congress
PMSC	–	Politico-Military Strategy Committee
PP	–	Public Protector
PRASA	–	Public Rail Agency of South Africa
RET	–	Radical Economic Transformation
RDP	–	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SAA	–	South African Airways
SABC	–	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	–	South African Communist Party
SADC	–	Southern African Development Community

SADF	–	South African Defence Force (pre-1994)
SALGA	–	South African Local Government Association
SANDF	–	South African National Defence Force
SANNC	–	South African Native National Congress
SAPS	–	South African Police Service
SARS	–	South African Revenue Service
SASSA	–	South African Social Security Agency
SOE	–	State Owned Enterprise
SSA	–	State Security Agency
SWAPO	–	South West African People's Organisation
TRC	–	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	–	United Democratic Front
UDM	–	United Democratic Movement
UIM	–	United Independent Movement
UK	–	United Kingdom
UN	–	United Nations
US	–	United States of America
ZANU-PF	–	Zimbabwe National Union – Patriotic Front

Abstract

In 2022 Raymond Suttner (21 June 2022) proclaimed that ‘something has gone terribly wrong, it is correct to suggest that the ANC (and its allies) betrayed the oppressed people of South Africa’. The statement made by Suttner, comes 28 years following the end of apartheid and the democratisation of South Africa, governed by the African National Congress (ANC) ever since. The liberation movement came to power in 1994, with the promise of transforming the unequal socio-economic order of South Africa, and improving the lives and dignity of the entire population, despite race or class. In 2016 however, the decline in ANC electoral support reflected the reversal of these promises and hopes of society within the constitutional democratic system of South Africa, under ANC rule. The transition from former president Jacob Zuma to President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018 did not halt the decline of the ANC, and in the elections of 2019 as well as 2021, the ANC’s electoral support continued to decline. The outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020 and the Russian-Ukraine conflict in 2022 not only pointed out the errors of ANC governance, but also emphasised the contradictions within the party’s political culture, policies and behaviour. The global impacts of the pandemic since 2020, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as well as an increased reversal in democracy worldwide, raises questions in relation to the competency of the ANC as the ruling party in a democratic political system. What has become clearly observable over the past decade is the dualist character of the ANC, indicating a political culture that exists in direct tension with democratic values, good governance and development. It is around these hypotheses that this dissertation will explore the decline of the ANC, as a liberation movement turned government. Key arguments will be explored, including the applicability of an analytical framework within which African liberation movement governments can be studied and the impact thereof on good governance and development. Focusing on the ANC as a case study, the relationship between the decline of the ANC and the party’s political culture will be examined with the theoretical framework presented by William Gumede.

Keywords: *Liberation movements, Democracy, Democratic Consolidation, Democratic Deficit, Governance, Political Culture, African National Congress*

Chapter 1: Literature review, methodology and purpose of study

1.1 Introduction

Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the Russian-Ukraine conflict and a recent surge of democratic reversals, military coups, extremist mobilisation and armed conflicts in various developing democracies around the world, it is expected that democratic consolidation in many states will become increasingly difficult to achieve during the medium-term. Of particular concern are those regimes which Samuel P. Huntington described as ‘third wave democracies’ (1991a), which refers to democracies established between the mid-1970s and early 1990s, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and later on, in Eastern Europe. The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) reflects the recession of democracy on a global scale since 2012, measuring three dimensions in 128 countries. According to the BTI (Hartmann & Thiery, 2022), the three dimensions measured included political transformation, economic transformation and governance performance, indicating a steady decline in all three dimensions between 2012 and 2022. According to Hartmann and Thiery (2022: 11) the BTI also measured different democratic core indicators in 128 countries, namely free and fair elections, association rights, freedom of expression, separation of powers and civil rights, all of which declined on a global scale since 2012.

Considering the vast challenges in relation to human development and socio-economic transformation faced by the African continent, it is becoming increasingly important to apply renewed focus on research surrounding the challenges to democracy and consolidation of these systems in many African states, as demonstrated by various indices including those from Freedom House (17 April 2020) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2021: 2-3), which indicate democratic reversals in Sub-Saharan African states since 2006 onwards.

Democratic consolidation, as a process through which democratic regimes are developed, institutionalised and strengthened to sustainable levels of maturity, is deemed important as the history of third wave democracies in Africa suggest that democratisation

is only the transitional phase of establishing a lasting democracy in any given state. The argument is made that the reversals of many African democracies over time are caused by the process following the initial democratic transition, be it from colonialism, authoritarianism or apartheid. It is therefore also argued in this dissertation that, in order to illuminate the possible causes hindering democratic consolidation in African states, a primary variable to be examined relates to the governments leading the process once independence or liberation has been achieved.

Examining the variables associated with democratic consolidation in Africa, an important commonality identified among various African states includes the role and political behaviour of liberation movements in the establishment of independent democratic governments, between the 1970s and 1990s. Bereketgab (2018: 3) emphasises the importance of studying the role of liberation movement governments in Africa, arguing that the phenomenon of these movements coming to power in post-liberation democracies in Africa is a common occurrence since the 1970s. Gumede (2017) argues that despite various democratic mechanisms adopted and implemented by African liberation movement governments, inherent characteristics within these movements exist in tension with democratic practices, and thus it is argued in this dissertation that if the inherent characteristics of liberation movements exist in tension with democratic values and practices, then these movements in government may negatively impact the process of democratic consolidation in their respective states. Additionally, the trend surrounding African liberation movement governments indicate a declining trajectory over time, which poses various challenges in terms of democratic consolidation.

As a relevant case study to examine the impact of liberation movement governments on democratic consolidation in Africa, this dissertation will turn its attention to the consolidation of the South African constitutional democracy, emphasising the role of the African National Congress (ANC) as the dominant party since the transition from apartheid in 1994 and oldest liberation movement in Africa.

1.2 Purpose and motivation for the study

Research by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019: 1095), indicates that although there is evidence that a decline of the third wave of democratisation is currently in process (since 2009), the reversal process of democratic regimes to hybrid and autocratic regimes are significantly more gradual than observed in the past. Diamond (2015: 144-145) argues that the recession of third wave democratisation commenced in 2006, with various strategic states experiencing deteriorations of their democratic systems and human rights. Observations in terms of democratic decline requires further research, particularly in terms of providing additional academic insights surrounding the variables involved.

Considering the recession of democracy and socio-economic development on the African continent (Freedom House, 17 April 2020), the argument is made in this dissertation that despite the progress made in terms of third wave democratisation since the 1970s, renewed attention is required in the study of the consolidation of these regimes in Africa. In order to narrow the field of study however, this dissertation will focus on third wave democracies¹, governed by liberation movement parties.

A region in Africa which has produced various third wave democracies, governed by liberation movements, includes the Southern African region. It is therefore of value to consider the current political-economic situations of various SADC states. The Fragile States Index (FSI), published by the Fund for Peace (FFP) on an annual basis, studies the political, economic and governance variables in 179 countries and scores each country out of a 100. As per the methodology implemented by the FSI, the higher the score, the less stable the respective country².

¹ See Huntington (1991a).

² See Fund for Peace methodology.

Table 1: Stability ranking: Southern African states governed by liberation movements

Country	Transition	Liberation Movement	FSI Report	Global Rank out of 179 countries	Total Score out of 100
Zimbabwe	1980	ZANU-PF	2023	16th	96,9
Namibia	1989	SWAPO	2023	112th	60,3
Angola	1992	MPLA	2023	39th	86,9
South Africa	1994	ANC	2023	78th	72,0
Mozambique	1994	FRELIMO	2023	21st	94,0

Source: *Fragile States Index Report 2023, Fund for Peace (FFP)*.

From the FSI Report (2023), which measures democratic stability in terms of ten political, social and economic variables³, it is clear that South Africa and Namibia are deemed most stable from the five Southern African states examined in *Table 1*. Two out of the five states received a total score exceeding 90, ranking Mozambique and Zimbabwe at 21st and 16th most unstable states globally respectively. South Africa is ranked at 78th (72,0) however it should be considered that the ten most stable states measured by the FSI in 2023 scored between 19,5 (Ireland) and 16,0 (Finland). From this perspective both South Africa and even Namibia (60,3) have significant challenges in relation to democratic consolidation and stability. Apart from the vast challenges faced by Southern African states in consolidating their respective democracies, the FSI report of 2023 however also emphasises the following observations:

- There is no clear correlation between the time of transition and the ultimate total FSI score and global ranking by 2023 for the measured states in *Table 1*.
- All five measured states attained independence and or democracy from white minority regimes, although the liberation struggles of Mozambique and Angola

³ Variables include: Security apparatus, factionalised elites, group grievances, economy, economic inequality, human flight & brain drain, state legitimacy, public services, human rights, demographic pressures, refugees and external intervention.

involved independence from direct colonial rule by Portugal. South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe gained liberation from white settler administrations.

- Namibia, which experienced guerrilla warfare and insurgency during its liberation struggle are scored lower than South Africa, which experienced less violence during the struggle period. Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which experienced significant violence and even civil war during their liberation struggles received high scores, which indicate a correlation between violence and a lack of democratic stability.

In referring to the abovementioned observations, it is not implied that additional variables did not directly or indirectly contribute to the FSI scores of these states in 2021, however the argument made in this dissertation relates to the manner in which all these states dealt with their respective liberation struggle pasts, democratisation process and governance, especially since transitioning to democracy. In this regard, an important common variable among all five states involves the fact that upon democratisation, a liberation movement became the governing party of the newly established democratic regime. It is therefore the purpose of this dissertation to examine the phenomenon of democratic reversal from the perspective of the liberation movements that have governed various African states since the advent of the third wave of democratisation.

There are also observations made in relation to the eventual decline of liberation movements over time following transition (*Figure 1-5*). This dissertation therefore aims to also examine the relation between the lack of democratic consolidation and development under liberation movement governments in Africa, and the decline of these movements within decades after coming to power. The argument will be made that as liberation movement governments fail to implement effective transformation and development following democratisation, these movements experience a decline in support and legitimacy, which simultaneously may motivate these governments to veer further away from the initial democratic values and principles adopted upon coming to power. This in turn increasingly erodes the legitimacy and capacity of such movements to remain in

power, resulting in increasingly authoritarian measures and undemocratic behaviour considered by declining liberation movement governments.

Figure 1: National election results of ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) 1980-2018




Figure 2: National election results of SWAPO (Namibia) 1989-2019




Figure 3: National election results of MPLA (Angola) 1992-2017




Figure 4: National election results of ANC (South Africa) 1994-2019





Figure 5: National election results of FRELIMO (Mozambique) 1994-2014



Source: Figure 1-5, (Soler-Crespo, 2019: 24)

Like in many other African states, the liberation movement that is the ANC, led the democratisation of the country since the end of apartheid in 1994, however 29 years following the advent of democracy, the ANC as the dominant party in government was in a declining trajectory. The 'decline' of the ANC will be conceptualised further in the literature review, however the concept for the purpose of this dissertation refers to three aspects of decline, namely, a decline in electoral support, a decline in legitimacy to govern due to increasing trust deficit by the public, and finally, a decline in the ability and capacity of the ANC to implement its political policies and agenda due to factionalism as well as the decrease in its majority rule in national, provincial as well as local government.

The impact of the decline of the ANC on the ultimate outcome of democratic consolidation in South Africa remains under-appreciated (Thamm, 14 March 2022), and it is therefore necessary to further explore the phenomenon of ANC decline. The purpose of this research is not to make projections of the future of the ANC, but rather to provide clarity with regard to those variables involved in the current state of the ruling party's decline and the impact thereof on democratic consolidation.

For the purpose of this research the concept of democracy will refer to the traditional definition of the term, 'a political system or regime with institutions and processes of representative governance' (Dahl, 1971). In an effort to categorise the South African regime type, the definition by Samuel Huntington (1991a: 12-34; 1991b: 59-69) is utilised, which refers to 'Third Wave Democracies' as those democracies established between the 1970s and early 1990s, which includes South Africa.

The consolidation of democracy is also an important concept for the purpose of this research, and the term refers to the definition by Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) which states that a 'consolidated democracy is a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives have become institutionalised and habitual for all participants.' Diamond (1996: 33) suggests that democratic consolidation is 'the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all political actors, at the elite as well as mass levels, believe that the democratic

system is better for their society than any other realistic alternative, and fully commit to the country's constitutional system'. The concept of democratic consolidation becomes particularly relevant in exploring the impact of ANC decline on the political system of South Africa. As will be demonstrated in the literature review and later chapters, the majority support for the ANC since 1994 has led to a dominance of the party's presence and deploys in the state, government and state-owned enterprises, thus the decline of the ANC would most likely also lead to the decline of those institutions charged with implementing various political and developmental policies as well as the promotion of democracy in South Africa.

1.3 Literature review

The following literature review focuses on the primary concepts and variables related to this dissertation.

1.3.1 The trajectory of the ANC

Since 2016 the ANC has recorded observable declines in voter support, both in general elections as well as local government elections, and consequently it has become commonplace to accept that the ANC is in 'decline'. It is however important to distinguish between electoral decline and organisational decline for instance, as these concepts requires separate definitions and measurements.

The literature on the trajectory of the ANC emphasises three primary focus areas, namely, decline in **electoral support**, decline in **legitimacy** and decline in **operational capacity**. Decline in electoral support refers to the quantitative measurement of decreased voter support received by the ANC in general as well as local government elections since 1994. Decline in legitimacy refers to an increase in trust deficit displayed by supporters and the public towards the ANC to resolve socio-economic challenges faced by communities across South Africa. Thirdly, decline in operational capacity refers to the decline of the ability of the ANC to govern. A decline in operational capacity relates to the loss of majority

rule in local, provincial and national government, which in effect largely hinders the ANC from implementing its policies and agenda. Even in municipalities where the ANC was able to retain power following the 2021 local government elections through coalitions, the implication was that the ANC was forced to compromise on some of its policies and positions in councils in order to accommodate their coalition partners.

According to Booyesen (2 September 2021), ongoing factionalism and disputes within the ANC, slow progress to reform and a coinciding decrease in voter-support since 2016, suggest that the electoral dominance of the ANC is in decline. In this instance, Booyesen (2 September 2021) refers to all three the aspects of decline of the ANC examined in this dissertation, namely factionalism which relates to decline in capacity, slow reform, which refers to decline in legitimacy and finally a decline in electoral support.

In the concluding chapter of the book *Dominance and Decline: The ANC in the Time of Zuma*, Booyesen (2015a: 292) also argues that ‘the ANC’s troubles started long before the tenure of Jacob Zuma as president, but reached their zenith with him at the helm’. The argument made by Booyesen (2015a: 292) is supported by Schreiber (2018: 39), who notes a clear shift in election result trends in South Africa from 2009, in which a comparison between local and national election results spanning 1994-2009 indicated that the ANC normally received increased support during national elections, compared to the previous local elections. Schreiber (2018: 32), who views the 2016 Local Government Elections as an important confirmation of ANC decline, empirically demonstrated in the results of the elections, argues that although ‘preceding by-elections indicated that support for the ANC was declining, there was no concrete evidence that large numbers of voters would ever abstain, or vote for any other political party... but in the winter of 2016 the first chinks in the ANC’s armour began to show’.

According to Booyesen (2015a: 292), between 2005 and 2015 the ANC demonstrated ‘electoral decline, organisational decay, a weakened people’s bond, and institutions of state and government sagging under the burden of factional-political abuse’, which reflect all three levels of decline in support, legitimacy and capacity for the party as examined in

this dissertation. De Jager and Van Beek (2017: 6) also emphasise the losses of the ANC during the 2016 local government elections as an indicator that the ANC is declining in electoral support and that ‘victory for the ruling party might no longer be assured and taken for granted.’

According to Justesen and Schultz-Herzenberg (2018: 1133), the South African Local Government Elections in 2016 were ‘distinct from previous elections’, as the ANC suffered its largest decline in electoral support since 1994, receiving less than 60 percent of the total national share of votes. Following the 2016 Local Government Elections, Isike and Onapajo (2017: 15) suggested that the ‘ANC’s dominance of South Africa’s political landscape is declining with the likelihood of impacting on the performance of the party during future elections’. The arguments made in the abovementioned literature point to important observations, namely the manifestation of ANC decline in a decrease in voter support, and secondly, that the ANC’s decline noted in 2016 would most likely lead to continued losses at the polls during future elections, both national as well as local. The argument made in this dissertation relates to the notion that the 2016 election results were merely the manifestation of a deeper steady decline within the party, most likely prior to 2009.

In 2021, ANC voter support declined further, from 53.91 percent of the total votes received in 2016 to 47.52⁴ percent in 2021 (News24, 2021). This trend demonstrated a clear decline compared to the 61.95 percent of the total national vote recorded in the 2011 Local Elections (IEC, 2021). The decline in support received in 2016 and 2021 may however not have been a surprise to some, as Chipkin (2016: 220) argues that the 2009 National and Provincial Government election results already indicated that the ANC is becoming a ‘regional party, with a strong ethnic Zulu base’. Booysen (2015b: 7-34) also made very accurate projections in a 2015 research paper indicating an important decline in voter support for the ANC in metropolitan areas, despite the ANC achieving an overwhelming victory on national level in the 2014 elections.

⁴ Total percentage of votes including all valid Ward, PR and DC 40% ballots counted.

Apart from a decline in electoral support for the ANC, research published by Mkize (et al., 15 December 2021) emphasise a definitive decline in the voter turnout during the November 2021 elections. The decline in turnout, particularly in former ANC strongholds, is indicative of a decrease in trust in the ANC as well as, most worryingly, in the democratic process of elections itself (Monama, 2021). According to Mkize, Naidoo, Gotz and Seedat (15 December 2021), during the 2021 Local Government Elections only 45.86 percent of the eligible registered voters (as recorded nationally by the IEC⁵) participated in the ballot, although data of past elections in South Africa indicate that local government elections have consistently recorded lower voter turnout percentages than national and provincial elections since 1994. The research by Mkize *et al.* (15 December 2021) do however indicate that voter turnout has decreased for both general elections as well as local government election years since 2011. The data additionally indicate that between the 2016 local government elections and 2021 local government elections, a decline of 14.3 percent was recorded in terms of turnout (Mkize *et al.*, 15 December 2021). It is argued in this dissertation that the findings by Mkize *et al.* relates to a decline in legitimacy of not only the democratic process of elections, but the ANC as the governing party as well. This argument is supported by a survey by Runciman and Bekker (2021) following the 2021 local government elections, which indicated that although personal, logistical and administrative reasons for voter abstinence have been neglected in past studies, it was observed that a large proportion of registered voters who abstained from the polls in 2021, indicated the reason for abstaining being dissatisfaction with local government, service delivery, lack of trust in government and inability to choose a political party to vote for.

According to Schulz-Herzenberg (December 2020), the decrease in voter turnout between the 2014 and 2019 national elections in South Africa, demonstrates a 'stark decline in participation by the registered voters.' Between 2014 and 2019 a decrease in voter turnout (in percentage) was recorded at -7.8 percent. Schulz-Herzenberg (December 2020: 28) notes that recent research indicated that ANC supporters do not direct their dissatisfaction with the party towards voting for an alternative opposition party,

⁵ Refer to (www.elections.org.za) for election results in South Africa.

but merely abstains from voting altogether. This strengthens the argument made in this dissertation that within the South African context, abstinence from elections reflect a lack of trust in the governing party itself, the ANC. This observation within the South African voting trends is directly related to an important inherent characteristic of liberation movement governments, as will be explored in Chapter three.

Schulz-Herzenberg (2020) also presents the results of a survey in which respondents were required to firstly indicate what important matters between 2018 and 2019 the ANC led government handled poorly, while secondly indicating whether the respondent believes that any other political party could have handled the matter better than the ANC. The survey established that the majority of the respondents completed this field, while 65 percent of the respondents who indicated a matter which they believed the ANC led government handled poorly, did not think that any opposition party could have handled the matter better than the ANC.

1.3.2 The ANC as a liberation movement

In the book, *The ANC's Last Decade: How the Decline of the Party Will Transform South Africa* by Ralph Mathekga, the primary causes for the decline of the ANC are associated with the status of the party as a liberation movement, turned dominant party. Mathekga (2021) examines the formation, history and development of the ANC, as a liberation movement, as possible causes for the party's decline in the democratic system of post-1994 South Africa. The long history of the ANC is for Mathekga (2021: 7) a very rich source of information that point to the causes for the current decline of the ANC witnessed almost three decades since coming to power. Mathekga (2021: 9-10) also refers to the research of Ellis (1991: 439-447), who found that between 1960 and 1990, the period during which the ANC was banned by the apartheid government, the ANC underwent its most significant internal and ideological changes, the result of which would leave the liberation movement with a political culture which promotes centralisation of power, largely inherited from the communist influence within the movement. Mathekga (2021: 17) suggests that the ANC, although well-equipped to wage a liberation struggle against

the apartheid regime during exile, was and still is ill-equipped to lead a democratic government. According to Mathekga (2021: 17) the history of the ANC largely contributed to adopting a political culture uncondusive to govern a liberal democracy with transparency and accountability. The arguments presented by Mathekga (2021) are important in terms of examining the variables involved in the failures by the ANC led government to effectively consolidate democracy in South Africa. Additionally, what is important about Mathekga's (2021) arguments, is the requirement for further research it raises. Various questions arise in relation to the argument that the ANC is not well-equipped to govern a liberal democracy (Mathekga, 2021), and further research will be required in order to clarify the causes of this notion. Britz (2011) extensively researched the impact of the political culture of the ANC on the party's ability to govern the post-liberation democracy in South Africa, emphasising a number of important variables which have contributed to the party's challenges to implement good governance and ultimately contribute to the democratic consolidation of South Africa since 1994. Britz (2011: 129) indicates that although there has been adequate research in terms of the liberation struggles it is important for future research to focus on the impact on democratic consolidation in Southern African states governed by liberation movements.

Judith February (2018: 110) argues in the book, *Turning and Turning: Exploring the Complexities of South Africa's Democracy*, 'that the complexity of the transition from liberation movement to a modern day political party, constrained by free and fair elections and the demands of transparency and accountability, has found the ANC sorely lacking in depth and in its ability to keep the rent-seekers out'. According to February (2018: 112), the 'ANC is in serious trouble and no amount of papering over the cracks will convince otherwise'. Andrew Feinstein (Feinstein, 2007: 249), a former member of the ANC, remarked that 'the greatest manifestation of the ANC's moral decline has revolved around the leadership succession battle' in 2007. Feinstein (2007: 250) also notes that the 'struggle for power has rent the ANC and its allies asunder, and the party is now [2007] an agglomeration of factions, defined not so much by ideological or policy differences, but by personality and the pursuit of power and patronage.' Feinstein (2007: 255) concludes

that 'ultimately the decline of the ANC could come to undermine the very thing for which so many gave so much', referring to the constitutional democracy of South Africa.

Although the declining trajectory of the ANC is empirically demonstrated in the party's election results, the causes and impacts of this decline in electoral support may be less clear. Mathekga (2021: 10) offers the argument that liberation movement governments are prone to decline within approximately three decades after coming to power, as mounting pressure within democratic regimes often lead former liberation movements to 'veer away from their founding principles'. Comparing the ANC to a neighbouring liberation movement, Southall (1 February 2022) argues that South Africa is at risk of 'launching into a trajectory of Zimbabwe-like decline' due to the political crisis in the ANC. According to Southall (1 February 2022), 'factionalism, massive corruption and the capture of the state by the practice of cadre deployment have contributed to the decline in the ANC's poll ratings.' Following the arguments of Mathekga (2021) and Southall (1 February 2022), it should be considered whether there is any academic literature that support the argument of liberation movements experiencing decline over time in democratic political systems.

1.3.3 Elements of democratic deficit as a feature of liberation movements

In terms of the role of liberation movements in democratisation and transitional processes, Melber (2002: 169) suggests that 'those who were fighting against institutionalised discrimination and oppression under totalitarian structured societies, tend to resort to similar mechanisms of control once in power themselves.' Melber (2002: 165) also argues that 'post-colonial politics of the former liberation movements turned ruling parties, often display a blatant lack of democratic awareness, together with forms of neo-patrimonial systems.' This observation made by Melber (2002) is supported by Britz (2011: 60), in which it is argued that liberation movements that have become the ruling political elite often display 'anti-democratic tendencies'. Britz (2011: 138) indicates that in the deterioration of democracy in Zimbabwe, an important catalyst was caused by the ZANU-

PF losing a constitutional referendum in 2000, which the ruling party subsequently rejected in order to remain in power.

In a separate study, Melber (2002: 165) explains that although the role of liberation movements can serve as a stabilising factor in newly liberated states, it has been observed that such movements are prone to centralise political power, and instead of promoting socio-economic transformation, such liberation movements, over time, merely replace the oppressive administrations of colonial and apartheid regimes. Demonstrating the argument made by Melber, police brutality during South African protests point to the state's willingness to suppress communities by means of violence. Since 2008 South Africa has recorded a large number of incidents during which protestors were fatally injured during police intervention. Since the death of Andries Tatane, after being shot with rubber bullets and beaten with batons by police during a protest in 2013, approximately 1157 cases have been identified where the use of rubber bullets by the police during protests were included in complaints investigated by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)⁶ in South Africa (News24, 13 April 2021).

The argument by Melber (2002: 165) is an important one and provides some insight in terms of the possible root causes of the decline of liberation movements in government, following liberation. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, evidence exist to suggest that despite the various democratic efforts implemented by liberation movements at the inception of democracy, the inherent political cultures of these entities are not conducive to democratic values and best practices, often forcing liberation movements to revert back to pre-transitional practices at the expense of democratic consolidation, transformation and development. The crucial question with regard to the degeneration of liberation movements once in power, revolves around the history and inherent political culture often enshrined within these types of governments.

⁶ IPID is responsible for oversight investigations into alleged misconduct, crime and other offences by the South African Police Service against the public in South Africa.

Melber (2002: 165) further argues that a 2001 case study of the democratic regime of Mozambique conducted by Braathen and Orre (2001: 200-201), indicated that despite the fact that the former Portuguese colony has hosted three elections between 1994 and 1999, the institutionalisation of democratic values has not been observed in Mozambique, which has experienced continuous political crises since independence. Mozambique is however not the only Southern African state that have experienced difficulty in achieving sustainable democratic transformation and development. South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia all face various challenges in terms of addressing historical socio-economic disparities among their respective populations.

According to Gumede (2017: 2-19), liberation movements, once in power, demonstrate various inherent traits that lead to poor governance, a lack of transparency and accountability, as well as a rejection of democratic core values. Gumede (2017: 2-19) refers to these traits as the 'democratic deficit' of the political cultures of liberation movements. A study by Gumede (2017: 2-19) published in *Politikon*, demonstrates how these elements hinder democratic governance by liberation movements, emphasising the relation between good governance practices and the consolidation of democracy over time. According to Gumede (2017: 3), because of the fact that liberation movements often have a political hegemony following liberation, the behaviour and political culture of these entities, as governments, severely impact the political economy of the newly established democracy.

Relying on previous research by Pye and Sidney (1965), Gumede outlines 20 elements of political culture which he deems as debilitating hindrances to democratic governance by liberation movement governments. These elements range from the political behaviour of 'one partyism, discouraging internal competitive leadership elections, moral bankruptcy to elements such as fusing the party with state institutions' (Gumede, 2017: 3-18). The findings of Gumede (2017) are often reflected in literature surrounding liberation movements. According to Clapham (2012: 5), 'one common feature of liberation war is the contest for "movement hegemony", in the course of which often vicious fighting takes place between rival movements.' Clapham (2012) also suggests that 'as the years after

liberation extend into decades, and the memory of that magic moment [of liberation] fades into the distance, so a further set of challenges emerges. Though the struggle remains a vivid source of legitimacy in the minds of former fighters, for most of the population whom they govern, it becomes a rapidly wasting asset.' Clapham's (2012) argument surrounding the contest for 'movement hegemony' is important, as it should be considered whether this initial contest during pre-liberation contributes to setting the platform for internal contests and factionalism that often manifest during the post-liberation period. In other words, once the 'movement hegemony' has been established and a single dominant liberation movement emerges as the dominant party following the initial democratic transition, the various factions, once represented by opposition liberation movements, are continued among the elites, labour unions and councillors within the dominant party.

1.3.4 ANC factionalism, political contestation and neo-patrimonialism

Focusing specifically on underlying causes for the electoral decline of the ANC, often exacerbated by factionalism within the party, Cooper (2015: 155) suggests that since 2005, factionalism within the ANC, motivated by patronage, rather than ideological or policy orientation, motivated party members and leaders to replace Thabo Mbeki with Jacob Zuma, and this phenomenon is still present on national, provincial as well as branch level in the party. Cooper (2015: 155) further argues that examining the role and extent of factionalism within the ANC should not be limited to the well-researched themes of national level factionalism, or the disputes between the national ANC factions and the party's tripartite alliance partners, but such studies should also consider the factionalism detected on provincial and branch level of the ANC. The factionalism within the ANC is however not merely associated with the decline of the party itself, as examination of academic literature raises concerns with regard to recent internal conflict within the ANC relating to the security of South Africa. According to Booysen (15 July 2021), ANC factionalism is well-entrenched in state security apparatuses, indicating a possible deterioration in the constitutional democracy of South Africa. Recently published findings also suggest that the factionalism within the ANC, pose serious risks in terms of democracy, political violence and instability. This finding was emphasised in the report of

the Expert Panel into the July 2021 Civil Unrest (Africa, Sokupa & Gumbi, 29 November 2021).

Friedman (2021) argues that the widespread violence observed in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng in July 2021 were 'erroneously perceived as a revolt by the poor', while in actual fact this spate of violence was an 'assault on democracy by elites'. In his findings Friedman (2021) makes two important points in terms of the causes of the July 2021 unrest, including that ex-combatants remained armed and loyal to specific factions within the ruling party following 1994, and secondly, that corrupt political councillors on grassroots level have become threatened in the shift of reformist tides reflected in the incarceration of Jacob Zuma in July 2021.

According to Friedman (2021), the violence of July 2021 may not necessarily have been attempts to launch an insurrection and seize power from government, but rather an effort to do 'whatever they could to ensure that their networks [of corruption and patronage] survived'. The arguments by Friedman (2021) correspond with the findings of Chipkin, Vidojevic, Rau and Saksenberg (2022) in a recent study, in which it is suggested that public violence in South Africa should be viewed from a political contestation perspective, and not necessarily as a means by communities to raise service delivery grievances. The findings by Friedman (2021) and Chipkin *et al.* (2022) are also significant in demonstrating that the overall decline of the ANC may pose a risk for the consolidation of democracy on various fronts, including the decline in governance capacity and legitimacy due to unstable and conflicting coalition attempts, increasingly violent political contestation and escalating factionalism within the ruling party.

Literature surrounding the ANC raise various concerns about violence associated with political contestation within the declining party (Ndletyana, 2021). In the book *War Party: How the ANC's Political Killings Are Breaking South Africa*, Ardé provides insights into the political violence among ANC factions in the Kwa-Zulu Natal Province of South Africa, which continued since democratisation in 1994. According to Ardé (2020: 38), political violence and assassinations have by no means disappeared following the

democratisation process in 1994, and the interlinked worlds of politics, private business and organised crime have become further entrenched in Kwa-Zulu Natal politics and government. Ardé (2020: 82-83) describes how the Moerane Commission was tasked in 2016 to examine the prevalence of inter-party violence in Kwa-Zulu Natal, which mostly consisted of ANC 'comrades being at war with one another' and in which violence, according to Ardé (2020: 82-83) 'transformed from battles, to assassinations'.

Ardé (2020) also documents the key finding of the Moerane Commission Report, which was released in 2018. According to the Moerane Commission Report, 'killings [in Kwa-Zulu Natal] were on the rise because state tenders were being manipulated and exploited by politicians willing to kill for money' (Ardé, 2020: 83). The Moerane report further found that the 'political deployment of ANC cadres in government' contributed to the rise in political violence and killings in the Kwa-Zulu Natal province (Ardé, 2020: 83). According to the Moerane Commission, 'South African political parties need to build a culture of tolerance and democracy, rather than one of patronage and greed' (Ardé, 2020: 83). Ardé (2020), however, also reveals that it is not only ANC members who are victims of violence and murder, referring to the study conducted by Vanessa Burger in 2019 in which she found that 80 percent of those individuals murdered at the Glebelands Hostel in Kwa-Zulu Natal between 2014 and 2017, were opponents of ANC Ward 76 councillor, Robert Mzobe, or they were perceived to be opposed to the Jacob Zuma faction in the ANC (Ardé, 2020: 89). The Burger study (Ardé, 2020: 90) also found that there was a correlation between corruption within local government politics and political killings, and in a study indicated that in 2011, four hundred ANC branches were deemed to be irregularly constituted, including the Glebelands ANC branch.

Ardé (2020: 179) suggests that 'violence and conflict over corruption and access to patronage are increasingly coming to define the character of the ANC in Kwa-Zulu Natal.' Ardé (2020) also refers to the research conducted by Niren Tolsi regarding political violence in the ANC in Kwa-Zulu Natal. According to Tolsi, the ANC's internal democracy in Kwa-Zulu Natal has become suppressed due to violence, intimidation and irregular processes on branch level, leading to careerism and corruption becoming institutionalised

in the ANC branches (Ardé, 2020: 181). Emphasising another tactic utilised by local ANC councillors in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Ardé (2020: 192) describes how activists associated with a grouping called Abahlali from townships and informal settlements in eThekweni municipality, calling for greater distribution of land and housing to the poor, were referred to as being ‘agitators with sinister agendas’ by the ANC councillors, and between 2013 and 2019, 16 members of the Abahlali activist group have been murdered. It should, however, be considered whether the political culture of the ANC, specifically in Kwa-Zulu Natal, have remained violent following 1994 due to the inherent element of what Gumede (2017) refers to as the ‘cult of violence’ often maintained by liberation movements once in power. Gumede (2017: 14) argues that, once in power, many liberation movements fail to abandon the utilisation of violence as a political mechanism, a characteristic which even include inward violence directed against suspected traitors, counter revolutionaries and infiltrators within the party.

The cases of the political violence recorded by Ardé (2020), committed among ANC factions, appear to revolve around access to government contracts and tenders. Although political murders are not isolated to the provincial structures of Kwa-Zulu Natal, there is evidence that leadership positions within the ANC structures in the latter province are not only a fulltime career, but part of an organised crime network channelling public funds to syndicates through the proxies of public representatives in local and provincial government. In this respect, Ardé (2020) demonstrates that opposing this criminal network in Kwa-Zulu Natal ANC structures often leads to the utilisation of brutal violence and assassinations to eliminate obstacles to political power and state resources.

In terms of the accounts of Ardé (2020), the argument is made in this dissertation that political violence and murders post-1994 can be perceived as directly linked to patronage, and the increasing association of the ANC in some provinces and regions to criminal networks and criminal syndicates should be viewed from the point of view of decline of legitimacy. It is increasingly becoming evident that constitutional democratic processes are subverted in various ANC structures, making way for violence and assassinations instead. It could also be argued that this element is detrimental to democratic

consolidation as the perception exists that, should a member of public wish to enter politics in order to serve the public rather than infiltrated criminal networks, there is a clear threat of being murdered in the process. It is argued that if violence, intimidation and murder becomes a deterrent to democratic participation, the consolidation of democracy will most likely be sacrificed, an element to be examined in later chapters.

According to Bruce (2013: 13), since 1994 violence have continued to be a feature of political contestation in South Africa, despite democratisation. Bruce (2013: 18) suggests that the current form of political killings in Kwa-Zulu Natal differs from pre-1994 killings in the sense that while the violence and fatalities recorded in the province during the period 1990 to 1994 included large scale clashes between the IFP and ANC, political murders following 1994 primarily included victims who appear to have been targeted individually, most of whom held specific political positions within local government and regional political structures. Bruce (2013: 19) also found that there is no evidence that political killings since 1994 can be associated with state and/or central government security agencies, as was the case in the majority of apartheid-era political killings.

Bruce (2013: 22) argues that due to the escalated militarisation of the ANC and IFP in Kwa-Zulu Natal during the 1980s, the use of violence as a political mechanism has become accepted political culture. According to Phakathi (2019: 107), one explanation for the prevalence of political killings in Kwa-Zulu Natal since 1994 revolves around the 'pursuit of power'. The arguments by Phakathi (2019) correspond with those of Ardé (2020), in which Phakathi (2019: 108) finds that apart from political killings motivated by careerism among councillors and politicians, factionalism within the ANC at all levels of government are motivating politicians to resort to murder in order to maintain power and influence. According to Phakathi (2019: 108), 'the victory or defeat of a particular faction has dire consequences for many political leaders and business people', often manifesting in violence.

Bradshaw, Breakfast, Dlamini and Nomarwayi (2020: 1) published findings in 2020 which support the notion that internal contestation among ANC leaders in Kwa-Zulu Natal has

involved criminal enterprises and the use of political murder in order to resolve competition for resources. Considering the arguments that contention among ANC members lead to violence in order to gain access to patronage networks, the argument supported in this dissertation aims to emphasise the importance of viewing present-day political violence and murder among ANC members as a remnant of the party's political culture rather than a new phenomenon and that political killings remain part of the political culture of the ANC in some provinces, regions and branches, especially in Kwa-Zulu Natal. The 'cult of violence' adopted between the 1980s and 1990s by the ANC to wage its struggle against the apartheid state has remained a volatile part of the ANC's political culture following democratisation in 1994.

What remains evident from the preliminary examination of available literature, are concerns about recent pressures on the ruling party, as well as the institutions responsible for upholding the constitution of South Africa, and how these institutions (specifically the judiciary and law enforcement) dealt with these pressures. According to Booyesen (2 September 2021) the pressures exerted on democratic institutions may indicate a possible deterioration in the constitutional democracy of South Africa. Exploring the data of the IEC⁷ provides ample evidence of the decline of the ANC as dominant party, however it is becoming increasingly evident that it is the factionalism and political contestation within the ruling party that will most likely affect democratic consolidation in South Africa over the coming decade. A vast amount of literature documents the perception that due to the dominance of the ANC since 1994, the party has become the primary avenue to wealth, access to resources and public employment and funds.

It is, however, important to accept that the ANC is a diverse organisation, evolving through the decades of global political changes. The history of the ANC, particularly in terms of the possible origins of factionalism within the former liberation movement should be considered in terms of examining the present-day dynamics of the party.

⁷ Refer to www.elections.org.za for election results of the ANC since 1994.

Suttner (2012: 719-738) provides an in-depth view of the historical factors which have contributed to factionalism developing within the party since its formation in 1912. According to Suttner (2012: 719-738), the ANC has experienced various ideological internal conflicts since the 1920s, and the factionalism between Marxist leaders and traditional leaders in the late 1920s and 1930s, for instance, has resulted in clear divisions within the leadership of the party. The difference in terms of the argument made by Suttner (2012) is the emphasis by Cooper (2015: 155) with regard to the motivation of factionalism since 2005, referring to patronage rather than ideology as primary driver. It is argued that the ANC increasingly relied on undemocratic internal processes, cadre deployment and patronage since 1994 in order to access and maintain these patronage networks. The prevalence of neo-patrimonialism among the elite of liberation movements is not uncommon however, and according to Lodge (2014: 1), the factionalism observed in the ANC is directly associated with the increase in neo-patrimonial behaviour within the ruling party since 1994. Lodge (2014: 3) argues that the patrimonial characteristics of the ANC is becoming increasingly pronounced, to the extent that 'South Africa can hardly be viewed as an exception to the general trends observed in sub-Saharan African politics'. Lodge (2014) also makes three important findings in terms of the argument that it is specifically the historic circumstances and mechanisms employed by the ANC that contributed to the escalation of corruption and corresponding decline of the party. Lodge (2014: 1) argues that these three distinct explanations can also be associated with the increasing personalisation of power and corruption which hindered the party, particularly following the rise of Jacob Zuma within the ANC.

The first explanation, according to Lodge (2014: 1), is the possibility that the practices of corruption and personal rule, presently observed within the ANC, have a 'long history within the ANC, but were restricted during its years in exile and have begun to resurface now that the armed struggle is over'. Secondly, Lodge (2014) argues that corrupt activities by ANC members stem from the ANC's historic association with criminal networks, which have manifested since 1994. Lodge (2014: 10) refers to the research of Ellis, in which it was found that the ANC leadership raised alarms in 1980 over the prevalence of vehicle and Mandrax smuggling by their members. Lodge (2014: 10) also describes the use of

criminal syndicates in South Africa by the ANC's intelligence department under Jacob Zuma, in order to supply weapons for operation Vula, as a development that would shape the relationship between the ANC and organised crime syndicates in future.

Finally, Lodge (2014) explains that the current state of the ANC in relation to corruption relates to neo-patrimonialism, which is intrinsic to the Southern African political economy. The arguments by Lodge raise some noteworthy observations, and Lodge (2014: 7) maintains that the origins of neo-patrimonialism, entrenched within the ANC, can be 'traced to the reflexes developed during the ANC's participation and role in official institutional practices that became hubs of clientelistic undertakings during apartheid'.

Lodge (2014: 7) also examines the role of township advisory boards established during the 1950s, in which many elders in townships joined these boards for the mere fact that it provided access to allocation of public goods in townships and homelands. Obtaining positions, which could dictate the distribution of subsidised services and goods, provided the board members (some of whom were ANC members) with the opportunity to establish patronage networks within the constituencies that they represented (Lodge, 2014: 7-8). It is argued that there exist resemblances between what Lodge (2014) describes as historical reflexes of the ANC during apartheid, and what can be observed in the present-day South African political-economy. Local government, in particular, provides ample opportunities for politically influential representatives to establish patronage networks within their constituencies and access to such resources and patronage networks often lead to violent contestation among ANC members. It is emphasised by Lodge (2014) that the ANC was successful in countering the emergence of neo-patrimonial practices by ANC representatives during the 1950s and 1960s after the party adopted militant activism. Despite the evolution of the ANC since the 1950s, Lodge (2014: 5) argues that historic practices resurfaced once the armed struggle came to an end in 1994.

An important factor evident from the existing literature includes the negative impact on the development of what Weber (1978: 231) referred to as 'patrimonialism', which implies that the political system revolves around the deployment of administrators and military

staff as the 'personal retainers of the head of state'. There is, however, a debate with regard to the application of Western concepts of democracy to the African context. In this regard, Ubi and Ibonye (2019) argue that referring to patrimonial and neo-patrimonial practices by African leaders as explanation by political scientists for the failure of democracy on the continent, is flawed, as this practice has been present in African societies even during pre-colonial periods, which Ubi and Ibonye (2019) argue consisted of complex democratic societies. There, however, exist within the literature various arguments which suggest that the role of cultural traditions, such as pre-colonial patronage practices, can hardly be viewed as unique to African societies (Sen, 1999: 3-17). According to Sen (1999: 3-17), localised values, often cited as a key explanation for the rejection of democracy in Asian, Latin American and African states by some scholars, are not unique to those parts of the world, and diversity in ethnicity, culture, religion and even personal values exist in the majority of consolidated liberal-democracies across the globe.

In terms of neo-patrimonialism as described by Weber (1978: 231), a study by Reddy (2016: 1-8) emphasises the adverse impacts of cadre deployment and patronage politics practiced by the ANC in local government on service delivery and subsequently on development among South African societies previously disadvantaged by the apartheid regime. Reddy (2016: 7) concludes that 'there should be a radical shift from the policy of cadre deployment and political patronage as it violates the essential principles of good local governance' in South Africa. The argument posited in this dissertation relate to the observation that the practice of cadre deployment by the ANC stems from the party's liberation movement political culture, and as will be examined in later chapters, have severely negative impacts on democratic consolidation and development in South Africa.

In terms of a decline of operational capacity of the ANC, in June 2022 it was reported that the hosting of the provincial conference of the party in the Free State may be negatively affected by various complaints among ANC branches surrounding the leadership in the Free State. ANC members in the Mangaung region have taken legal action against the national and provincial leadership of the ANC, claiming that the Interim Provincial

Committee (PIC) in the Free State is neglecting the processes of electing new leadership in branches prior to the provincial conference (Masuabi, 10 June 2022). The Free State structures of the ANC were not the only complainants in relation to regional and provincial leadership appointments. In 2022 members from the Eastern Cape's WB Rubusana region also threatened national leadership to reverse the outcomes of the Eastern Cape provincial conference or face legal action (Madia, 9 June 2022). According to an ANC member in the Eastern Cape, Ondela Sokomani, processes leading up to the Eastern Cape conference in May 2022 'were marred by serious irregularities' (Madia, 9 June 2022). An indication of the disputes among ANC leadership in the Eastern Cape were further demonstrated by former president Thabo Mbeki during a speech following the conference. Mbeki argued that the 2022 Eastern Cape conference reflected the self-interest battles among Eastern Cape delegates, and not policy matters (Khoza, 10 June 2022). Mbeki also argued that the Eastern Cape elective conference in May 2022 consisted of 'a scramble for positions to get resources' (Khoza, 10 June 2022). These and other factional disputes from branch level to regional and provincial level have significantly impacted on the efficiency of the ANC to elect leadership in transparent and effective conferences. Legal action by ANC members following various elective conferences have become commonplace for the party. It is important to note that the remarks by Mbeki are not isolated to the Eastern Cape, as the argument is made in this dissertation that patronage networks and access to resources on various levels of government remain the primary driver for ANC members to participate and contest in leadership elections. The argument is also made that, in line with the three possible explanations by Lodge (2014) for the prevalence of corruption within the ANC, that corruption and neo-patrimonialism are merely manifestations of historic characteristics and practices implemented by the ANC prior to democratisation.

1.3.5 Socio-economic development and democratic consolidation

It is important to note that the critical impact of neo-patrimonialism demonstrated by the ANC, pose significant risks not only to democratic consolidation but to the effective socio-economic development and transformation of South Africa as well. In this instance, it is

important to consider the theories surrounding democratic consolidation and sustainable development. In the book, *State of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development*, Leftwich (2000: 4) argues that politics will inevitably determine the structure and pace of socio-economic development in developing countries. Arguments by Leftwich (2000) are also important in terms of the correlation between not only democracy and development, but also the importance of democratic consolidation, in which Leftwich (2000: 134-146) argues that development is a requirement of democratic consolidation. According to a paper by Leonard and Strauss (2003), the development and associated problems of sub-Saharan African states 'are inseparable from its politics'.

Leonard (1991) also argues that leaving aside the ideological variants of governance implemented to achieve development, there are at least four development management behavioural traits that are crucial for implementing sustainable development in Africa, including public policy making, organisational leadership, internal administration and "bureaucratic hygiene". Leonard (1991) argues that excellence in one of the four behavioural traits can be obtained through the expense of one of the others.

Focusing on the African continent, Mentan (2007) explored the correlation between sound governance practices by developing African states and the ability to achieve meaningful long-term socio-economic development. Mentan (2007) relates these arguments to the comment made by the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, during his speech at the Kennedy School of Government's ARCO Forum in 2002. Anan implored the audience that "no amount of aid, no degree of diplomacy, can produce lasting progress if it is not rooted in legitimate, rule bound institutions responsive and accountable to the people" (Mentan, 2007: 3). Similar to the debate around the universality of democracy, so too is the correlation between democracy and development debated among scholars. Adejumobi (2000) has also contributed to the contextualisation of this debate in a paper presented to the World Bank Conference in 2000. According to Adejumobi (2000: 13) 'the relationship between democracy and development is complex and varied'.

In his paper, Adejumobi (2000: 3) comprehensively outlines the two 'intellectual paradigms' in the debate, referring to the 'modernisation' theory on the one hand and the 'Marxist' theory on development in emerging economies on the other hand. There remain varying contradictions with both theories, with liberal democratic proponents arguing that democracy is an outcome of economic growth, and not a cause of economic development, while the Marxist theorists maintain that economic development should be viewed as a priority over democratic principles in order to promote socio-economic development, transformation and limiting dependence on capitalist systems (Adejumobi, 2000: 4). For Adejumobi (2000: 4) the modernisation theory has been criticised for posing a risk to socio-economic transformation, particularly in underdeveloped economies as a result of unrestrained competition for resources, while the Marxist theory often led to 'dictators of development', with very few cases where development was achieved in emerging economies that implemented the Marxist theory.

With regard to the abovementioned debate, Adejumobi (2000: 6) presents the findings of Leftwich (1996), in which he argued that it is not necessarily the regime types or mode of political governance that is important for development, but rather the nature of the 'state', in being developmental in orientation. Adejumobi (2000: 7-8) also notes that by 1999 three quarters of the countries in Africa resembled some form of democracy, however, numerous of these states consisted of superficial democracies, with merely the facade of democracy and multi-party elections, with limited socio-economic development as a result. Adejumobi (2000: 7-9) also emphasises the following three crucial elements of democracy to contribute to development, namely 'constitutionalism and rule of law, decentralisation and democratisation of local governance, as well as citizenship and human rights'. According to the literature it is around these three elements that the ANC led government in South Africa have failed, particularly in terms of corruption and patrimonialism within local, provincial as well as national government and state departments. Cadre deployment, fusing the state with the ANC party and the centralisation of power have led to a bureaucracy unable to implement development.

The variables emphasised by Adejumobi (2000), if left unattended, often lead to the establishment of superficial democratic regimes lacking consolidation, legitimacy and institutionalisation among the elite and electorate, and therefore economic growth and development will remain elusive in such political systems. Democratic regimes with limited oversight, tendencies of personal-rule and systemic corruption will hinder all progress made in terms of democratisation, halt socio-economic transformation and development, and inevitably, increase the opportunities for populism and hybrid regimes to enter the political regime.

In the book, *The Great Pretenders: Race and Class Under ANC Rule*, Harvey (2021) argues that the current state of the ANC should be measured against the backdrop of a historical assessment of race and class in South Africa. Harvey (2021) suggests that the ANC has failed in implementing effective socio-economic transformation for the majority of South Africa, who according to Harvey (2021) are comprised of the black working class. Harvey (2021) provides as explanation for this failure, the inability of the ANC to address and resolve the race-class complex within the South African political-economy, largely brought about by poor governance and policy decisions taken by the ANC before democratisation as well as the period since 1994. The arguments of Harvey revolves around his finding that the ANC has since its formation in 1912 been dominated by proponents of the black middle-class in South Africa, motivated by capitalism rather than socialist ideology aimed at uplifting the black working class (Harvey, 2021). Harvey (2021) also suggests that the ANC has incorporated organised labour, unions and Marxist opponents into the ANC in order to gain power over the majority black working class, a manoeuvre which secured electoral dominance for the ANC since 1994.

The argument made by Harvey (2021) suggests that the 'political culture' of the ANC has been shaped by historical developments, which led to the ANC being prone to disengaging from those policies that would transform the conditions of the black working class in South Africa once in power. Harvey (2021) raises important questions in relation to the 'political culture' of not only the ANC, but possibly those of neighbouring liberation movements in Africa such as ZANU-PF and SWAPO. There remains, however, a

correlation between the elements of democratic deficit raised by Gumede (2017) and the historical class-race complex assessment raised by Harvey (2021). Gumede (2017) argues that liberation movements are prone to 'exploit the struggle rhetoric' once in power, which correlates to Harvey's (2021) suggestion that the working class and labour policies are exploited by the ANC in order to gain and maintain electoral dominance before and after coming to power. Harvey (2021), however, argues that the ANC implemented various efforts in order to diminish competition from other liberation movements and labour organisations by incorporating these entities into the larger body of the ANC (Harvey, 2021). The argument that the ANC wilfully diminished competition in the period leading up to democratisation also corresponds with Gumede's (2017) finding that the liberation movements are opposed to the concept of 'opposition'.

1.3.6 Third wave democracies and the prospects for consolidation

Many concepts and attributes related to democracy, according to Przerworski (2016: 4), are currently under severe scrutiny by citizens who reside within these regimes. It is argued that there is 'widespread dissatisfaction that democracy has been unable to generate socio-economic equality, to make people feel that their political participation is effective and ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not what they have no mandate to do' (Przerworski, 2016: 4). Przerworski (2016) views democracy as universal, with universal rules, however the resources available to different societies to enter the field of democracy is not equal and not universal. Przerworski (2016: 10) points out that over the past decades, research in relation to democracy has made significant strides in understanding the fragilities and failures of this system, yet there are many things that are not understood about democratic systems, according to Przerworski (2016). The argument made in this dissertation is that although there are ample grounds to revisit the conceptualisation of democracy and democratic values, or even the universality thereof, the focus should primarily be on democratic consolidation. Much research has been done in relation to what democracy requires, the rules and political cultures of governments required, yet democracies the world over continue to fail or regress towards authoritarianism. It is therefore the aim of this dissertation to avoid

timeous conceptualisation of the concept democracy, but rather to explore aspects related to the failure thereof, particularly in Africa.

In order to explore the measurement of democratic consolidation of South Africa since 1994, it is important to consider the academic literature surrounding 'third wave' democracies, of which the South African political system forms part. According to Huntington (1991a) the first wave of global democratisation spanned from 1828 to 1922, followed by a decline in the years leading up to the second world war, with the second wave of democratisation occurring between 1942 and 1962. The third wave, according to Huntington (1991a), commenced in 1973, and rose to an observable crest in 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

According to Rakner, Menocal and Fritz (August 2007: 7), starting in the 1970s in Spain and Portugal, the third wave of democratisation spread to Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, with no observable decline in democratisation since then. Cilliers (October 2016: 12) has also contributed to the argument put forward by Huntington in a detailed article in which he argues that the third wave of democracy commenced in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, gaining momentum in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, after which various African states in particular experienced liberation from remnants of colonialism and apartheid (in South Africa). According to Cilliers (October 2016: 12-13), the third wave of democratisation in Africa led to the independence of Angola (1975), Mozambique (1976), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994). The relevance of South Africa's democracy falling within the category of the third wave will become evident in later chapters, however it is important to note that as a young democracy compared to other third wave systems, South Africa offers a valuable opportunity to explore the consolidation of the system 30 years since it was established.

There are arguments made that the third wave of democratisation has demonstrated a decline or regression since the late 1990s. Recent research by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019: 1095) indicates that, although there is evidence that a decline of the third wave of democratisation is currently in process (since 2009), the reversal process of democratic

regimes to hybrid and autocratic regimes are significantly more gradual than observed in the past. For Lührmann and Lindberg (2019: 1108), many recent regime changes from democracies towards autocratic rule involved autocratic leaders utilising clandestine measures to reverse democracy rather than implementing unlawful and sudden power grabs as in the past. The latter finding by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) relates to the perceived reversal in democratic consolidation in South Africa in recent years, as argued by Chipkin (2022) in a recent working paper. According to Chipkin (2022: 1), the democratic reversal brought about by Jacob Zuma and State Capture was 'invisible' with 'concerted attacks on the autonomy of state administrations'.

It is, however, important to note that the measurement of democratic consolidation is complex, and a variety of arguments exist on the matter. Mottair (2002: 2) argues that various ideas on benchmarks for democratic consolidation are emerging. Mottair (2002: 3) suggests that despite varying measurements of consolidation, one commonality among scholars include the exploration of measurements beyond the 'two turn over test' measurement suggested by Huntington (1991a). Mottair (2002: 3) points out that, as per the definition of Huntington (1991a), democracy is consolidated once free and fair elections are held regularly, and following a peaceful transition of power from the initial governing party or group at the inception of democratisation, to a new winner, followed again by a second peaceful transition of power to the previous party or to a new winner. Mottair (2002: 3) notes that Huntington's measurement of consolidation has received criticism due to its narrow focus on electoral requirements, referring to Diamond's (1996) argument that 'in many of the world's new democracies, competitive elections have not ensured liberty, responsiveness and rule of law.' The South African democracy, as part of the third wave, is of significant relevance considering the argument by Diamond (1996). Utilising the measurement proposed by Huntington (1991a) would imply that South African democracy is not consolidated, despite the ANC losing a provincial government as well as local councils to opposition parties and coalitions in recent years.

Mottair (2002: 3) further argues that despite the vast democratic achievements of the South African democracy since 1994, unless the necessary institutionalisation of

democracy is not widely promoted, regular elections will not ensure the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Mottair (2002: 4) emphasises various concerns regarding the manner in which the ANC's cadre deployment policy is disrupting a key aspect of democracy, that is, a capable state and strong civil society. Since Mottair (2002) published these arguments in 2002, various indicators have begun to point to the adverse effect of cadre deployment by the ANC to public and civil entities, meant to provide service delivery and development. Mottair (2002: 5) notes the risk to democratic consolidation, should the socio-economic expectations of the majority not be met in future. In this instance, recent developments, compounded by the negative effects of Covid-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, have added further pressure on the South African population, particularly the poor and middle classes. Unemployment, slow economic growth, and rising fuel and consumer prices have started to support the argument made by Mottair (2002). An additional concern raised by Mottair (2002: 6) relates to the ability of the modern state to direct economic development, arguing that whereas democratic states from the first and second waves could implement significant state intervention in order to develop their economies, the new democracies must adapt to a more competitive and privatised global economy. In this sense, exploring the consolidation of third wave democracies should take into account the variables of state intervention in certain elements such as economic development.

The definition of consolidation of democracy, according to Du Toit, Garcia-Rivero and Kotze (2002: 163), depends on the initial definition of the concept democracy. Du Toit *et al.* (2002: 163-181) provides significant insight with regard to the broad understanding of consolidation criteria required, as well as a detailed examination of the consolidation of democracy in South Africa between 1994 and 2002. Du Toit *et al.* (2002: 177) argue that the establishment and development of a political culture of political tolerance and trust in government by the public and all involved institutions is crucial in measuring the level of democratic consolidation in any democratic state.

According to the findings of Du Toit *et al.* (2002: 177), the consolidation of democracy is also a longitudinal process often spanning across more than one generation, and the

strengthening of trust and tolerance towards democracy among the citizens of a state should increase the level of consolidation of a specific democracy, while conversely, a decline in trust in democratic institutions and a decrease in political tolerance may weaken the consolidation process, increase populist mobilisation and lead to an increased apathy towards the democratic regime among the population. The findings and arguments raised by Du Toit *et al.* (2002) will be of value in terms of assessing democratic consolidation in South Africa, particularly in terms of the possible purposeful eroding of trust and tolerance in its democratic institutions caused by factionalism within the ANC.

Research conducted by Ake (1991: 34), emphasise and refute various perceptions which claim that African complexities are not compatible with Western democratic values, including pre-colonial democratic values by chiefdoms in Africa, the ethnic pluralism of African states (largely due to artificial borders created by colonialism), the negative impact of poor economic development of the establishment of democracy in many African states and the lack of education in many African states which is a requirement for the establishment of democracy. The misconceptions pointed out by Ake (1991: 34) are also criticised by Bradley (2011: 463), who agrees with Ake (1991) that all the perceptions refuted by Ake have been contradicted by examples from across the globe that achieved effective democracies despite challenges such as poverty, poor development, low education levels and even diverse populations in terms of ethnicity.

1.4 Research problem

The literature review suggests a declining trajectory of the ANC in terms of electoral support, legitimacy to govern and the capacity to govern in a democratic political system. The decline experienced by the ANC is however not unique, as can be observed among other African liberation movement governments in Southern Africa including ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia (refer to *Figures 1-5*).

Commonalities among liberation movement governments therefor suggest that the case of the ANC cannot be explored in isolation from those frameworks which assess the

underlying tension between the political culture of liberation movements and good governance, effective transformation and development. Research also emphasises the role of elements such as corruption, neo-patrimonialism and cadre-deployment, as contributing factors to the decline of the ANC, with limited attention to the origins of these practices by the ANC. It is thus clear that before proceeding to projections in future research on the decline of the ANC and the impacts thereof, additional clarity is required in terms of the political culture of the ANC party contributing to its current state of decline. A key observation from the literature review suggests that the political culture of the ANC has contributed to not only the decline of the party itself, but the state and economy which the party has governed since 1994. The phenomena of the party-state, particularly within the liberation movement governments of Southern Africa, will receive renewed attention in this dissertation.

1.5 Research questions

Exploring the relevance of the framework presented by William Gumede in examining the political cultures of liberation movement governments, the following research questions will be answered, namely is there evidence to suggest that the framework of democratic deficit of Gumede (2017) can be applied to the case of the ANC? Secondly, considering the framework of Gumede, is there a clear correlation between the current decline of the ANC and the party's liberation movement political culture? Additionally, establishing that the political culture of the ANC is a contributing factor to the decline of the party and various challenges surrounding development and governance, what are the key elements involved in the party's decline?

1.6 Research methodology

The proposed research will consist of a qualitative exploratory study, as stipulated by Babbie and Mouton (2005: 79-80) in which emerging political phenomena are explored utilising existing theoretical frameworks. The study will be conducted by means of a critical literature study of Gumede's (2017) elements of democratic deficit as a feature of

liberation movements, as theoretical framework. In examining the framework of Gumede, particular emphasis will be placed on the exploration of the tension between good governance, democratic consolidation and the inherent behaviour and practices of former liberation movements within democratic systems.

Utilising the ANC as case study, relevant party documents, government reports, academic literature and emerging academic arguments will also be evaluated in applying the framework of Gumede to the decline of the ANC in South Africa. The application of Gumede's framework to the case of the ANC will provide further insight and understanding of the concepts and variables surrounding the impact of the decline of the ANC to democratic consolidation in South Africa. The utilisation of a case study in this dissertation in conjunction with a qualitative exploratory study, is deemed effective and is based on the definition of case studies by Gerring (2004), in which he argues that a case study involves '*an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units*' (Gerring, 2004: 342). The qualitative exploratory nature of this dissertation is thus complimented by considering and studying, in detail, the ANC as a single unit (African liberation movement government) in order to gain insight into the larger class of similar units, that is African liberation movement governments.

Case studies may also offer unique insights, which may not be obtained through other qualitative approaches (Rowley, 2002: 16). In this regard, Yin (1994: 9) argues that case study research is suitable when a '*how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control*'. Following a qualitative exploratory methodology, combined with the application of the theoretical framework of Gumede (2017) to the case study of the ANC in South Africa is also adequate as the case study of the ANC has two distinct characteristics that would allow for achieving deeper insight into the larger class of liberation movement governments in Africa. The first characteristic is the long history of the ANC, as the oldest liberation movement in Africa, and secondly, the ANC was elected as the dominant party upon transition of democracy, which makes the ANC government, the youngest liberation movement government in Southern Africa since the start of the third wave of

democratisation. These characteristics allows for the study to consider a significant timeframe and history in which the ANC can be studied in relation to Gumede's arguments, and despite having had the opportunity to identify pitfalls and mistakes from other established liberation movement governments, it would be of value of this advantage prevented the ANC from making the same mistakes as other older liberation movement governments.

This research will not rely on sources such as surveys and personal interviews, and thus there are no ethical implications involved.

Chapter 2: The political culture of liberation movements in Africa: undermining good governance and democracy

2.1 Introduction

As examined in the literature review, one commonality identified among various third wave democracies in Africa include the presence of liberation movements in the establishment of post-liberation governments between the 1970s and early 1990s. In Southern Africa, liberation movements played a key role in the transitional phase from authoritarian or minority rule to democratisation and became the dominant political force in the newly established government. As indicated earlier, Melber (2003) argues that the presence and role of these liberation movements had a stabilising effect on the transition from colonialism and apartheid to democracy, which was particularly observable in those third wave democracies where negotiated settlements led to liberation such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Melber (2003) however suggests that the impact of the behaviour of these liberation movements, over time, also contributed to failures in democracy in Africa.

Examining the progress made by third wave democracies in Southern Africa, evidence indicate that liberation movements turned dominant political parties, remain central to the successes and failures in practices of good governance and democratic consolidation in their respective states (Mohamed Salih, 2018: 23). The argument is made in this dissertation that, after decades in power to implement transformation in third wave democracies, the political culture and governance of liberation movements have instead led to stagnation and reversals in democracy, often also associated with the decline of these movements. In order to explore this argument, it should be determined whether there are available frameworks that would support the abovementioned argument.

Gumede (2017) published findings on the political culture and behaviour of liberation movements in Africa, which largely contributed to democratic and developmental challenges faced by these states. It is also suggested by Idowu (2020), that ‘while

liberation movements in Africa were key structures that fought against colonialism, they have not been able to chart a functioning government for their respective states.'

According to Gumede (2017: 1), 'at the heart of governance failures of many African independence and liberation movements turned governments was, and still is, their inability to effectively transform from resistance movements into effective democratic parties.' Gumede (2017: 1) suggests that 'inherent organisational, ideological and historical inefficiencies fostered by liberation movements, often reinforce undemocratic practices once these movements are in government.' The argument by Gumede suggests that these characteristics were not necessarily adopted by the time liberation movements came to power and established democratic governments, but that these traits were rather an integral part of such movements prior to democratisation or liberation. When liberation and transitions occurred, these liberation movements found themselves in uncharted territory as the governing parties, often reverting back to practices and behaviour which served these movements and their leaders well during liberation struggles, anti-colonial conflict and even guerrilla warfare.

It is important to note that it is not argued in this dissertation that the inherent characteristics of liberation movements were not created and exacerbated by historical events, colonial administrations and/or other external forces such as globalisation. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid have been well recorded as an important contributor to democratic and developmental challenges faced by African states. Despite the undeniable impact of colonialism on African politics and development, in examining the case of Zimbabwe, Gumede (2007a: 12) suggests that, despite the lasting legacy of colonialism and slavery, 'blaming the west for Zimbabwe's recent problems is not reasonable'.

Having identified the commonality shared by many third wave democracies in Southern Africa, in that these states are predominantly ruled by liberation movements, it could be argued that the political cultures of these liberation movement governments require critical examination in finding additional clarity on the democratic and developmental

challenges faced by many African states and governments. In support of the abovementioned argument, the post-democratisation behaviour of liberation movements remains the primary focus of this dissertation, including the reaction by these movements in dealing with significant socio-economic challenges upon coming into power. The socio-economic environments, inherited from colonial and apartheid administrations, were not the doing of liberation movements, however it was expected that these movements would address many of the legacies caused by colonialism and minority rule.

Taking the historical socio-economic and political environments into account, there is evidence that suggest that despite the numerous challenges faced by liberation movements, when taking charge of government of third wave democracies, poor governance, corruption, neo-patrimonialism and personal rule among leaders and political elites have led to democratic reversals and failures in various African states, often leading to renewed violence between civil society and the state. In this chapter the argument will be made that liberation movements in Southern Africa in particular were in a position to implement effective developmental policies and practices of good governance in order to address and improve the socio-economic conditions of previously disadvantaged communities. It will also be argued that the findings presented by Gumede (2017), on the elements of democratic deficit demonstrated in the political culture of African liberation movements, provide an applicable framework with which to critically examine these elements, existing in tension with democratic values and good governance.

2.2 A brief overview of the formation and history of the ANC

According to Mathekga (2021: 7), it is ironic that it might be precisely the long history and glorious past of which the organisation is so proud that sowed the seeds of its potential decline and destruction.

Although it is of value to explore the history of the ANC, it should be noted however that the formation and history of the ANC have been well recorded in previous research.⁸ This overview will primarily focus on the most influential events and developments which impacted on the political culture of the movement prior to coming to power in 1994. Historical events and developments within and surrounding the political culture of the ANC will be dealt with in more detail in the section focusing on the elements of democratic deficit of the movement.

2.2.1 Formation by conservative African elite and traditional leaders

Various accounts of the formation and history of the ANC indicate that the organisation was not initially established as a mass movement, and represented the interests of traditional leaders and middle-class Africans in South Africa in the early twentieth century. Research indicate that in response to the segregationist legislation of Louis Botha's government, black delegates from across South Africa met in 1912 in Bloemfontein during which the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed, which was renamed African National Congress (ANC) in 1923 (Deegan, 2001: 15). Deegan (2001: 15) refers to the finding by Lodge that, despite the SANNC aiming to unite various ethnic groups and tribes in South Africa in defence of their rights, the organisation was far from being a mass movement upon its formation. Lodge (1983: 2) argues that during the 1920s the movement was primarily comprised of middle-class African men, although there were some traditional and rural leaders within the ANC during this period. Mathekga (2021: 8) also argues that although the ANC would come to capture the imagination of the masses, it was largely members of the African elite who founded the party in 1912.

The political landscape of the early 1900s did, however, play an important role in the methods and aims of the founding members of the movement, and it would be a mistake to ignore the fact that during the formation of the ANC the vast majority of the African population in South Africa had very limited political and socio-economic rights as a result

⁸ Refer to the research by Stephen Ellis, Raymond Suttner, Roger Southall, Ian Cooper, Susan Booysen and Ebrahim Harvey.

of colonialism and segregation. Literacy, access to education and the financial means to mobilise were primarily vested within the African middle-class and traditional leaders, enabling these groups to initiate mobilisation and petitioning campaigns against discrimination.

Suttner (2015: 190-191) suggests that the unsuccessful petitions made to the British monarchy by the ANC, shortly after its formation, should not be ridiculed by present-day researchers, as these methods accorded with what the movement viewed to be potentially viable during the early twentieth century. Suttner (2015: 191) however also asserts that by its formation the ANC was not a mass movement, and although the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), established in 1919, demonstrated that mass action was possible, the ANC was slow to alter its methods. The present-day claim that the ANC was formed as a movement that represented the workers and majority of Africans across the class spectrum is thus not supported by research. It is also evident that the ANC underwent various ebbs and flows during its history, often competing with other organisations representing workers, and Africans in particular.

This is demonstrated by Suttner (2012: 719), arguing that the ANC was often overshadowed by other organisations in its formative years, and there were moments in its history that the movement nearly collapsed. It is important to note that during the 1920s the ANC was still very much aligned towards the British monarchy and liberal Christian values, which is also deemed to have impacted on the willingness of the movement to adopt more radical strategies against the minority rule authorities. The role played by traditional leaders, particularly those with administrative authority over the allocation of land in former homelands, will be emphasised in a later chapter, however it is important to consider that traditional leaders became differentiated from the majority of Africans residing in former homelands due to wealth accumulation by these chieftains (Bank & Southall , 1996: 411).

2.2.2 From diplomatic petitioning for African rights, the influence of Communism to near collapse of the movement

By the late 1920s ANC president J.T. Gumede, realised the value of mass activities related to communism, as the ANC was visibly outflanked by more radical organisations and movements (Suttner, 2012: 724). Gumede was, however, soon replaced by the more conservative and traditional Pixley ka Seme, who was not willing to involve the ANC in radical behaviour against the authorities (Suttner, 2015: 191; 2012: 725). Suttner argues that T.J. Gumede's visit to the USSR and subsequent links with the communists, alarmed some sections of the ANC which led to his ousting as president of the movement (Suttner, 2012: 725). Despite the removal of Gumede by 1930, the party did become aware of the value of mass action, specifically those involving the working class.

Deegan (2001: 16) indicates that by the late 1920s the ANC has largely failed to gain support from Britain in petitioning against the discriminatory legislation implemented in South Africa, and in 1927 J.T. Gumede attempted to revitalise the movement until he was voted out of office as president of the ANC in 1930, which weakened the movement. According to Worden (1995) the ANC lost its influence between 1930 and 1940, mainly due to the 'cautious and conservative orientation by the traditional leaders and aspiring African commercial and middle-classes in the movement, providing limited links with the majority of the African population who faced rural impoverishment and urban proletarianisation' (Worden, 1995: 83). Suttner (2015: 191) notes that the early ANC must be understood as an organisation exploring new and difficult conditions and creating the ground on which later generations could build, as was the case with the emergence of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) by the early 1940s.

2.2.3 The emergence of Dr A.B. Xuma and the ANC Youth League

During the 1940s, the ANC regained some rejuvenation and in 1944 the ANCYL was formed, which included Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, who believed that Africans could only be liberated by their own efforts (Deegan, 2001: 18). One year

after the National Party came to power, the ANC adopted the ANCYL's militant Programme of Action in 1949, which largely led to the creation of a defence campaign against the NP government's oppressive legislation (Deegan, 2001: 27). Suttner credits Dr A.B. Xuma and Reverend James Calata for reorganising the ANC following the conservative presidency of Seme, providing the administrative foundation for the ANCYL to initiate the transformation of the ANC to a mass-based organisation (Suttner, 2015: 191). Suttner argues that Dr Xuma was largely responsible for establishing cooperation between the ANC and the communists, which at that time primarily consisted of white workers and European immigrants (Suttner, 2012: 726). Although the links formed in the 1940s between the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), later renamed the SACP, did not initially lead to the formation of an alliance according to Suttner (2012: 726), Xuma and the communists did agree on building organisation which assisted in creating a basis for the campaigns of the coming decade.

By the 1950s the ANC became a 'mass-based movement' (Suttner, 2012: 726) and was the dominant force within the Congress Alliance, a multi-racial umbrella which consisted of among others the ANC, the SACP, Congress of Democrats, South African Indian Congress, South African Coloured People's Organisation and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) (Deegan, 2001: 28). The adoption of the Freedom Charter also marked the first systematic statement by the ANC to create a democratic and non-racial political system in South Africa (Robertson, 1991: 221). According to Omomowo, the ANC's ideological foundation was encapsulated in the Freedom Charter of 1955, which largely contributed to the ANC becoming the central organisation around which the South African liberation struggle was fought (Omomowo, 2021: 275-276). The Marxist influence within the ANC since the 1950s is an important variable in terms of the present-day political culture demonstrated by the party, as elements such as centralised decision-making and rejection of opposition emanates from the Soviet Union communism model which were increasingly adopted by the ANC as liberation movement.

Additionally, the role of the SACP during the 1950s, which was directly linked to the Soviet Union, created some ambivalence among ANC leaders' commitment to cooperate with

communists as this also provided the NP government with ample evidence that, by association, the ANC was in fact a communist organisation plotting to violently overthrow the state (Deegan, 2001: 30). Despite the tension between traditional leaders and communists in the ANC, the Defiance Campaign against apartheid in 1952 was an important development for the movement, as this action initiated serious cooperation between the ANC and multi-racial anti-apartheid activists (Suttner, 2015: 192-193).

The cooperation between the ANC and multi-racial organisations such as the SACP, however, clashed with the Africanist advocates in the movement and led to the breakaway of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The ideological dualist characteristic of the ANC remained observable throughout the movement's history, as was observed during the late 1920s, when T.J. Gumedede was removed as president of the movement by the traditionalist conservatives. The Africanist PAC, under leadership of Robert Sebekwe, was unable to accept the ANC's willingness to cooperate with multi-ethnic organisations, while the ANC adapted to shifting its ideological stance as required. It is argued that the ANC adapted early in its history to implement its dualist characteristic in order to mobilise support among a variety of anti-apartheid movements, and this practice was continued following democratisation in 1994.

2.2.4 From passive protest to armed struggle: the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Morogoro Conference of 1969

Although the ANC by the late 1950s started to realise that passive protest against the apartheid government and state was proving unsuccessful, many ANC leaders still did not support militant and violent resistance, and it was protest action initiated primarily by the PAC in 1960 that would launch the use of armed struggle against apartheid (Deegan, 2001: 31). In March 1960, the PAC requested that its members leave their passes at home and gather at their local police stations in order to be arrested for contravention of the pass laws (Deegan, 2001: 31). When large numbers of unarmed protestors gathered at Sharpeville and Langa Police Stations, the police opened fire, killing 69 of the

individuals and wounding 186, which led to widespread strikes and protests in South Africa as well as abroad (Deegan, 2001: 31).

The massacres of Sharpeville and Langa emphasised the need for armed struggle and led to the formation of the militant wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961, with the ANC in 1994 indicating that the formation of MK was one of the movement's major strengths and pillars of struggle against apartheid (ANC, 1994). According to Deegan, within eighteen months after being established, the MK had executed 200 acts of sabotage against government property and buildings until police raided and arrested the leaders of MK in 1963 (Deegan, 2001: 32). With the core of the MK leaders sentenced to life imprisonment, the NP government gained the upper hand against the ANC and the struggle against apartheid between 1963 and 1970, resulting in the security apparatuses of the NP government significantly expanding to counter the perceived insurgency (Deegan, 2001: 32).

Suttner (2012: 729) observes that the transition from a legal mass movement to an illegal underground and banned organisation was not easy for the ANC, and as in much of ANC history, members had difficulty shifting from one mode of organisation to another. This observation by Suttner may be crucial in terms of explaining the difficulty experienced by the ANC to transition from a liberation movement and banned organisation back to a legal mass movement and political party in 1994. The argument is made in this dissertation that the perceived slow transitions observed within the ANC can be attributed to the diverse constituency of the movement, particularly in relation to the ideological and political differences between the Marxists and traditional nationalists within the movement.

Lodge (2014: 4) argues that the period between the 1950s and 1970s is important as the ANC commenced a process of embracing militant activism during which the clientelistic behaviour of some ANC- and traditional leaders were curtailed. Lodge (2014: 4), however, suggests that the continued cooperation between some traditional leaders and community representatives within black townships and colonial and apartheid

administrations laid the foundation for neo-patrimonialism to resurface within the ANC elite post-1994. In this instance the dualist relationship between Marxists and traditionalist leaders in the ANC indicate that a continuous tension existed in the operational and political practices of the movement, with some demanding more aggressive militant actions, while others feared the consequences to their patronage networks should the authorities be aggravated.

Suttner (2012: 727) indicates that in order to counter the mobilisation of the ANC during the 1950s, the NP government increasingly relied on government-salaried chiefs and other local authorities to act in goodwill towards the apartheid government. Of note is the practice through which the NP government removed uncooperative chiefs and community leaders, replacing them with more compliant African individuals to implement and maintain the policies of the apartheid government (Suttner, 2012: 727), which would motivate traditional leaders to resist militancy and overt aggression towards the apartheid state. According to a study by Brandel-Syrier, despite resolutions by the ANC to boycott township advisory board elections during the 1950s and 1960s, numerous ANC members campaigned and were elected to these boards across South Africa, often implementing various forms of patronage to gain support and votes (Brandel-Syrier, 1971: 11). Lodge (2014: 8) argues that such apartheid institutions within black communities cultivated centres of clientelistic politics and that such practices retained substantial public legitimacy throughout the 1960s.

Suttner (2015: 196) indicates that the 1969 Morogoro Conference of the ANC provided significant rejuvenation to the movement, with many members exiled and imprisoned which negatively affected the morale of the liberation struggle at the time. Following the 1976 Soweto uprisings, which was not initiated directly by the ANC, affected members of the youth left South Africa to join the ANC and PAC, although the ANC was better equipped to draw in recruits for the struggle (Suttner, 2015: 196). Ellis (1991: 444) also views 1969 as an important event for the ANC, during which the communist party's supremacy and influence within the ANC was consolidated, along with the principle of democratic centralism within the movement, destroying the prospects of real debate on

certain fundamental subjects. Mathekga (2021: 12) refers to these centralised decision-making characteristics of the ANC, indicating that it is mostly due to the movement's years spent in exile, and it has remained part of the ANC's political culture ever since. The result was that, once something is accepted as party dogma, it becomes 'almost untouchable' (Mathekga, 2021: 12).

Suttner (2012: 731) views the period between 1980 and 1990 as a time during which the relationship between the SACP and the ANC strengthened considerably, however Suttner argues that during this strengthening in relationship, the SACP accepted ANC pre-eminence in the liberation struggle, and the Communist Party lost its independent existence during this period. It is argued that the strengthening of the relationship between the SACP and the ANC during the 1980s stems from both movements' common objective of defeating the apartheid system, however by the late 1980s and particularly following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the global political agenda increasingly shifted towards the broad dualist stance of the ANC, which led to the hegemony of the ANC within the tripartite alliance. It is also argued that, by incorporating the multi-racial SACP and African workers class represented by Cosatu within the tripartite alliance, the ANC could rely on the communist paradigm within its rhetoric and canvassing of support, while simultaneously demonstrating the acceptance of liberal policies towards business by opening negotiations with large business in South Africa. The dual characteristic observed by the ANC is argued to have emanated from this tactic by the movement by the late 1980s and early 1990s.

According to Omomowo (2021: 278), another important aspect which contributed to the ANC's increasing hegemony among the South African liberation movements included the concept of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which was primarily represented by the ANC, allowing the movement to form alliances with progressive organisations which the ANC described as motive forces in the struggle against apartheid.

2.2.5 Towards ANC hegemony within the liberation struggle and negotiated settlement by the elite

The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) was at the forefront of the campaign against apartheid in the 1980s, and it is described as a pivotal movement against apartheid (Lodge & Nesson, 1991: 43). The UDF comprised of a wide variety of organisations and institutions, and although ambiguous in ideology, the UDF did support the exiled ANC's armed struggle against apartheid and, most importantly, acknowledged the ANC's leadership in the struggle (Deegan, 2001: 57-58). The ANC for its part recognised the formation and support of the UDF as a 'rebirth of a mass movement' (Deegan, 2001: 58). The developments within the ANC leading up to the formation of the UDF however provide insight in terms of the manner in which the ANC strategically aimed to realign itself within the anti-apartheid mass movements. Barrell (1992: 100) explains that by the early 1970s there have been a variety of well organised anti-apartheid movements and trade unions⁹ in South Africa, however the ANC did not view these entities as feasible alliance partners in the movement's struggle against apartheid.

By early 1979 the ANC NEC appointed the *Politico-Military Strategy Commission (PMSC¹⁰)* to consider various reports and proposals in relation to re-aligning the ANC's armed struggle efforts (directed from outside South Africa) with the growing anti-apartheid sentiments among the masses and other movements within South Africa. According to Barrell (1992: 104) the primary finding by the PMSC included the notion that the ANC required to establish a wide political base among the masses inside South Africa, and thus avoiding being isolated from the larger popular international and domestic campaign against apartheid. Proposals adopted by the ANC NEC in 1979 had a significant impact on the efforts by the ANC in the 1980s to lead the formation of the UDF in 1983. Despite the strategic decision by the ANC to focus on mass mobilisation, particularly the trade unions and workers did not replace the central objective of the ANC and its alliance

⁹ See also the workers strikes in Durban in March 1973 which had 100 000 workers participating.

¹⁰ Members of the PMSC included Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Joe Modise, Joe Gqabi and Moses Mabhida.

partner the SACP to gain full control of state power in South Africa. It is important to consider that during this period, the ANC maintained its 'militarist vanguardism' (Barrell, 1992: 104) while simultaneously turning to the masses in order to gain popular and most importantly, hegemonic support in its efforts to overthrow the apartheid regime. The argument is made that both these strategic stances adopted by the ANC, merely served as a means to an end to not only gain total power of the state, but also the resources within the borders of South Africa as well. This would contribute to explaining the ANC's eventual liberal economic stance following 1994. Once the ANC consolidated its position as the 'leader' of liberation from apartheid, the personal and economic agendas of the ANC elite could be implemented. The same argument can be made in terms of the personal aspirations of ANC leaders such as Jacob Zuma and Joe Modise who brought with them from exile, a vast network of organised crime syndicates and other aspects of the illicit economy.

Another important development included the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, which provided strong leaders and organisational structure to the UDF and civic organisations, including the ANC (Deegan, 2001: 59-60). The formation of Cosatu is deemed important, as this development resulted in the mobilisation of large labour unions under one representative federation, limiting the possibility of opposition within labour unions gaining traction against the ANC. According to Bond (2018: 110), the ANC gained internal hegemony over anti-apartheid movements during the 1980s, and by taking advantage of the apartheid regime's weakening economy, the ANC as the most probable ruling party in the event of transition, forged new alliances with big capital. In September 1985 the exiled leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, received a high profile visit from white South African business elites in Zambia, which largely contributed to the eventual transition occurring around neoliberal principles, despite the social democratic aspirations portrayed (Bond, 2018: 111). It is also suggested (Bond, 2018: 111) that, as the Soviet Union faded as an ally of the ANC by the late 1980s, the ANC elites became acutely aware that the global economic power has shifted to the West. Bond (2018: 112) argues that the post-apartheid political culture of the ANC can be traced back to the early 1990s, during which decisions were made by the

movement's leaders without meaningful consultation with the party's majority, most of whom still aspired to the Freedom Charter.

Lodge (Lodge, 2014: 10) suggests that during the 1980s there were also important developments that would have lasting impacts on the political culture of the ANC and its leaders, including the utilisation of criminal syndicates and smuggling networks by the ANC's intelligence department, led by Jacob Zuma. Lodge indicates that in 1987 the SADF's Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) utilised criminal syndicates in order to infiltrate those syndicates utilised by the ANC during that time (Lodge, 2014: 10). Lodge argues that the integration of ANC operatives and elites with criminal syndicates during the struggle established a moral acceptance of such behaviour in the cause of liberation from apartheid during the 1980s (Lodge, 2014: 10).

Suttner (2012: 733) and Simpson (2009: 507-521) argue that, apart from increasingly ill-discipline demonstrated by ANC cadres during the 1980s, the secretive negotiation between ANC leaders and the NP government created a sense of betrayal among militant elements within the ANC, particularly among members of MK. Suttner (2012: 733) further suggests that many MK members, mistakenly so, were convinced that they could secure a military defeat of the apartheid state and South African Defence Force (SADF), and many felt that they were denied the opportunity to prove this, which explains the residual militarism within the ANC to this day. It is argued that the militant characteristics observed within the ANC have remained prevalent due to the party's failure to systematically defuse the MK proponents within the party since 1994. The purpose of maintaining the militant element within the ANC is deemed to have been caused by the concern by the ANC elite that disbanding this section of its support base may lead to criticism and loss of support during the 1990s.

Suttner (2012: 734) also suggests that the period during negotiations between ANC elites and the NP government created a widening gap between the ANC leaders and the movement's mass-base. Suttner (2012: 734) argues that, although mass action would still be required during the negotiating period, ordinary members of the movement

became 'spectators rather than direct actors' in the negotiated settlement process. For Suttner (2012: 734), the demobilisation of the ANC as mass organisation post-1994, centralised the authority within the ANC led government, despite the ANC maintaining ever since that the party remains a mass-based movement of the people.

The formation and history of the ANC as a liberation movement provide various important indications of the political culture demonstrated by the present-day party. Three important observations are made in terms of the history of the movement, namely that the initial formation of the ANC was not aimed at establishing a mass movement, representing the poor and workers class of South Africa. The ANC was established by members from the African middle-class and traditional leaders in an effort to create a platform from which their interests could be promoted, largely based on cooperation with colonial administrations. Secondly, as the movement faced increasing resistance from the South African Union administration as well as the British government, some of the political elite in the movement considered adapting its strategy in order to increase its support base, noting the value in Marxist mass action by the working class. Finally, despite internal resistance from traditional leaders and conservative members of the ANC, by the 1940s a clear shift emerged with the formation of the ANC Youth League, which would change the direction of the ANC as a liberation movement. This dissertation argues that the period between 1940 and 1960 was crucial in establishing the present-day dualist characteristic of the party. It is noteworthy that even the establishment of MK could be viewed as a strategic ploy by the ANC leadership to garner popular support among the South Africa masses. By the late 1970s the weaknesses within the MK's efforts to effectively pressure the NP government and state security structures were realised by even the ANC NEC (Simpson, 2009; Suttner, 2008; McKinley, 2018) and the armed wing of the movement in the 1980s increasingly came to serve as a means to 'raising the ANC's symbolic appeal the masses' (McKinley, 2018). The activation of MK veterans during post 1994 periods by ANC leadership such as Jacob Zuma¹¹, served primarily as a symbolic gesture,

¹¹ The MKMVA played an important role in Zuma's resistance against his arrest in July 2021, however during the violence which erupted following his imprisonment, the MKMVA were not publicly observed in leading any efforts to protest against the imprisonment of Zuma.

demonstrating the threat of armed support for those ANC leaders who came under legal scrutiny¹².

Additionally, and perhaps a strategy that reflects the ANC's roots in patriarchal traditional customs and conservative middle class ideology, included the movement's embracing the chiefs and traditional leaders, including those who colluded with the apartheid government since the 1950s. Nelson Mandela largely led a reconciliation campaign between the ANC and former Homeland leaders, arguing during a public address in 1990 that that the formation of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) was a significant development towards gaining democracy in South Africa and that 'rural people should respect their chiefs, especially those who fought against apartheid' (Bank & Southall, 1996: 416). Considering the influence of Mandela on the narrative of the ANC, it could be understood that party members did not object to this compromise of the ANC to welcoming traditionalists and conservatives into the liberation efforts by the early 1990s. Tellingly, it is important to note that the ANC and its alliance partners were not willing to secure a separate invitation for CONTRALESA to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1991, which largely excluded traditional leaders from the negotiations towards democracy that would follow in 1994 as well as a national role to be played by CONTRALESA in national government following democratisation (Bank & Southall, 1996: 417). The argument in this regard is clear, in that the ANC aimed to include as many traditional leaders and most importantly, their constituencies in the rural areas, under the leadership of the ANC by the early 1990s in order to strengthen the movement hegemony of the ANC in the period leading up to negotiations and inevitable democratic elections. Despite concerns of entrenched patronage and corruption among rural traditional leaders, (Bank & Southall, 1996: 418-419) due to their cooperation with the apartheid government, the ANC was very much willing to demonstrate contradictory behaviour in accepting such leaders into the broader liberation movement of the ANC.

¹² Also note the presence of MKMVA at the initial court hearings of Ace Magashule between 2021 and 2022.

As will be argued in the rest of this chapter, many of those inherent characteristics demonstrated by the ANC which remain in tension with democratic governance in 2023, can ultimately be traced back to the long history of the movement, especially when examining the party within the framework provided by Gumede (2017).

2.3 Conceptualising the political culture of liberation movements

In the introduction to his framework, Gumede (2017) relies on the findings of White (1979), arguing that the concept of political culture is often referred to as ‘expressing the patterns of political belief and behaviour within a given political system, however political culture is not solely applicable to the whole political system, and could also refer to the political culture of the decision makers, party and even African leaders’ (Gumede, 2017: 2). Considering Gumede’s use of the definition, the concept of ‘political culture’ may be regarded as outdated in contemporary politics, however, for the purpose of this dissertation, the concept refers to those practices, procedures, behavioural traits and characteristics which have become inherent to the day-to-day operations of the entity, individual or party as a collective. It should be noted, however, that White’s (1979) definition in relation to ‘political beliefs’, as part of the political cultures of liberation movements, should not be viewed as a separate variable from the political behaviour of these movements. It is argued that those political doctrines adhered to by liberation movements, and often contained in their public rhetoric, cannot be distinguished from their inherent behaviour, that is, as a reflex or mechanism by which the liberation movement adjusts to changing environments and external as well as internal pressures.

Soler-Crespo (2019: 3) suggests that liberation movements in Southern Africa shared similar characteristics upon coming to power, including the ANC, ZANU-PF, SWAPO, FRELIMO and MPLA. According to Soler-Crespo (2019: 3), these common characteristics included a shared African nationalist ideology among liberation movements, embracing Marxism as well as the fact that all Southern African liberation movements were involved in armed struggles against white minority rule. The characteristics posited by Soler-Crespo (2019: 3), however, demonstrate a glaring

contradiction in terms of accommodating both nationalist as well as Marxist ideologies. The ANC, for instance, has a long history of incorporating traditional leaders in the movement, many of whom operate within direct contradiction with Marxist doctrine. Even in present-day South Africa, the tolerance of both monarchical traditionalists as well as communists within the ANC points to the argument that political culture in the context of liberation movements relate to behaviour, strategic manoeuvring and a means to secure and maintain movement hegemony. There is also an argument to be made in relation to the predictability of the political cultures of liberation movements.

Gumede (2017: 2) relates democratic consolidation to the concept of political culture in referring to findings by Dahlgren (2005), who suggested that ‘democratic political culture requires the underpinning of that behaviour in every-day life which promotes democratic enactment in concrete and recurring practices by the individual, group and collective, relevant for diverse situations.’ Despite the findings of Dahlgren (2005), Gumede (2017: 2) argues that although many African liberation movements and leaders have professed their support for democracy, these movements have largely been unable to internalise a set of values, norms, beliefs, and patterns of behaviour which are democratic. The argument supported in this dissertation proposes that the political cultures of liberation movement governments remain a fundamental variable in explaining the failure of these entities to establish enduring democratic systems.

Gumede (2017: 3) further suggests that it is the outcomes of a country’s leaders and citizens, in developing and instilling democratic values, that would determine the endurance of democracy in that society over time. This argument by Gumede is supported by findings presented by Tsholo (2021: 14), suggesting that the variables of accountability, government efficiency and respect for rule of law are crucial in the transition from liberation movements to political parties in governing the post-liberation state. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 234) emphasise the importance of legitimising and institutionalising democratic values and practices of good governance among all spheres and entities of the political system in order to promote democratic consolidation. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 234) also argue that the transition from authoritarian

regimes to democracies often leads to the initial establishment of democratic governance, which reflects numerous democratic institutions and practices, however this democratic government must transition to a 'democratic regime' over a period of time in order for democracy to become consolidated.

It is also important, according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 235-236), for a democratic political culture to emerge and be accepted by all involved in order to prevent superficial democratic practices. The presence of regular elections alone, while political leaders continuously undermine and subvert transparency and accountability, would not ensure the institutionalisation of democratic values (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 236). Elites in particular must accept practices of good governance in order to consolidate democracy, avoiding instability and reversals to a hybrid state (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 236). The notion that the political elite must accept practices of good governance is clear, however the argument made in this dissertation is that there is a requirement to explain why African liberation movements have not adhered to the theory surrounding good governance and democratic consolidation since coming to power. The explanation for this phenomenon primarily revolves around the political culture of liberation movements, as it would be an error to view the inherent political culture of any individual or group as a flexible mechanism that can be altered at will in a short period of time, particularly after decades of operating in exile, underground and under militant circumstances.

According to Markakis (2018: 33), many liberation movements invoke values and principles of democracy, equality and transformation during the struggle period, however once in power these movements-turned-governments tend to cling to power and invoke new values to retain legitimacy, values that often contradict those promoted during the struggle. Despite recognising the negative impact of colonialism and apartheid on present day challenges faced by African governments and liberation movements, Markakis (2018: 35) suggests that 'the assumption that 'legacies' act as constraints that impede the transition to democratic outcomes evades the question of whether there is a will to adapt to a system that may deprive these movements of power in the future.'

Markakis (2018: 33) also argues that the loss of legitimacy by liberation movements in government, does not necessarily loosen the grip of these movements on the state, and they readily resort to force to remain in power. Related to this argument by Markakis (2018), it will be argued in this dissertation that the inherent political culture of many liberation movements, including the ANC in South Africa, will inevitably lead to the decline of these movements as political parties over time within a democratic political system. Considering the significant impact of the political culture of liberation movements, not only on their own decline but the circumstances of entire populations, it is important to explore the elements of democratic deficit inherent to the political cultures of these movements.

2.4 Considering the transition from liberation movement to political party

Literature on African liberation movements indicate a perception and wide acceptance by scholars (Dudouet, 2009; Clapham, 2008; Tsholo, 2021; Soler-Crepe, 2019) that once liberation and/or independence from colonialism and apartheid were achieved, these liberation movements would and should systematically transition from liberation movements to formal political parties. The emphasis in the literature appears to be on the prerequisite for liberation movements to transition to political parties once the armed conflict or struggle is over, which would enable and strengthen the democratisation process. There exists a risk however, that this perception is portrayed as universally accepted behaviour among liberation movements and the populations they come to govern. The argument made in this dissertation is that the political cultures demonstrated by African liberation movements do not support the argument that the end of the struggle effectively signals the transition to a formal political party by these movements. The rhetoric and behaviour observed among African liberation movements turned political parties, indicate a dualism in the transition and functions of these parties following liberation or democratisation. The argument by Gumede (2017) that African liberation movements turned political parties are prone to 'abuse liberation rhetoric' or 'playing ethnic politics' are clearly observed among liberation movements such as SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, Frelimo in Mozambique as well as the ANC in South Africa since these movements came to power in their respective states. Despite the

classification of such behaviour by political parties as a democratic deficit by Gumede (2017), limited emphasis is however placed on the ability and willingness of liberation movements to reduce such rhetoric following democratisation.

The expectation that once liberation is achieved these movements must commence their transition to political parties, however, requires two important considerations. Firstly, the distinction between political party and liberation movement must be examined, and secondly, whether this dualism in transition portrayed by African liberation movements post-liberation is internalised behaviour or whether liberation movements turned political parties purposefully and wittingly exploit this dualism in order to garner support and remain in power. These considerations ultimately lead to the examination of the concept 'former liberation movement' often utilised to refer to ruling political parties such as the ANC, SWAPO and ZANU-PF in Southern Africa. For the purposes of this dissertation the concept is utilised interchangeably, meaning that a distinction is not made between 'former liberation movement' and the 'transitioned political party' established following the struggle period. The dualist approach by the ANC in continuing to view itself as a liberation movement, and not necessarily a 'former liberation movement turned political party' indicates that the party itself does not make the distinction, despite the often contradictory behaviour in which the party attempts to modernise and reform its processes and structures to resemble a modern political party.

Although literature refers to the inherent political culture demonstrated by liberation movements, often acquired in the period during which these movements were involved in liberation struggles, guerrilla warfare and underground campaigns, it is not suggested that liberation movements turned political parties are not willingly utilising the mentioned dualist characteristic of these parties long after liberation. Despite the ambiguity in behaviour detected among these parties, what is becoming clear over the past decade is that liberation movements turned political parties are in decline, indicating that these forms of political culture have a limited period in which to implement transformation, or face systematic decline. To attain a deeper appreciation of this limited lifespan of liberation movement governments, before they start to decline, it is important to consider

applying a suitable framework to the study of these movement parties and the political cultures demonstrated long after democratisation or liberation was achieved. The next chapter will assess framework posited by William Gumede (2017).

Chapter 3: William Gumede's Elements of democratic deficit as framework

3.1 Introduction

William Gumede (2017: 3) provides a variety of elements of political culture of African liberation movements which 'undermine their ability to pursue democratic governance when these movements eventually gain political power'. It is argued that these deficiencies in political culture of liberation movements 'come to resemble the political culture of the entire state in time, mainly due to the significant power and influence possessed by liberation movements upon liberation and democratisation' (Gumede, 2017: 3). Additionally, it is argued that it is precisely these deficiencies which also contribute to the eventual decline of liberation over time.

3.2 Gumede's Framework

3.2.1 One-partyism

According to Gumede (2017: 3), 'many African post-independence leaders argued that only one united party, where all different groups are represented, could drive the development and nation-building effort' following democratisation. This element of political culture relates to ethnic divisions within African states, largely caused by colonialism. Gumede (2017: 4) finds that efforts to create a one-party state has however in many instances increased ethnic and regional conflict, rather than subduing such conflict in Africa. It is important to consider the arguments made by Matshiqi (2010: 2-3), cautioning that a differentiation between one-party states and single dominant party or dominant party states must be made, especially in terms of the consolidation of these different political systems. According to Matshiqi (2010: 2-3), one-party states do not allow for competitive party systems, while dominant party states consist of multi-party systems, however a single party remains dominant for an extended period of time, usually facing limited competition from weak opposition parties. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is accepted that although some liberation movements may function within a multi-party

system, including Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, these movements tend to promote one-partyism as an ideal. This element of political culture is closely associated with other elements, such as the perception among liberation movements that the movement is the vanguard of the liberation and people, and is destined to govern indefinitely. According to Gumede (2017: 3-4), this element was widely observed in African states, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania since the 1960s. The argument in support of establishing one-party states by liberation movements, in order to promote unity and discourage ethnic conflict following democratisation, pose the risk of neglecting the consideration that liberation movements in actual fact promote one-party states or dominant party systems, such as in South Africa, for the mere purpose of controlling dissent, opposition and criticism. Matshiqi (2010: 2) raises an important question in relation to the absence of opposition to the ANC in South Africa, arguing that if the ANC faced stronger opposition in 2007, the party may have made different choices when replacing Thabo Mbeki with Jacob Zuma. Matshiqi (2010: 2) argues that the elite in the ANC were allowed to manoeuvre in favour of Zuma in 2007, as neither the party nor its members risked losing power to opposition by the next general elections of 2009.

All liberation movements in Southern Africa promote the concept of movement hegemony, as this allows centralised decision making without having to consider the risk of losing support during elections. ANC dominance in the national assembly as well as provincial and local levels of government continuously allow the ANC to implement unilateral decisions and policies, however this trend has since 2016 started to shift, with the ANC losing support in the large metros ever since. Matshiqi (2010: 4), however, makes an important point, suggesting that despite perceptions that a dominant party system cannot be consolidated as the chances of transfer of power are limited, other variables could in the absence of transferral of power also contribute to the consolidation of democracy, including factors such as a political culture of the elite in promoting transparency and accountability.

Mohamed Salih (2018: 26) suggests that the 'existence of multi-party democracy and constitutional dispensations have also not always guaranteed that citizens can freely

form, join and participate in political and civil organisations'. Mohamed Salih (2018: 26) also points out that although multi-party democracies have been adopted in Angola, Zimbabwe, Eritrea and Mozambique, these regimes are 'controlled by a dominant state-party'. An important observation made by Mohamed Salih (2018: 26) is the close relationship in liberation movement governments between the political party, the executive, legislature as well as the mass organisation that originated during the struggle period. This close relationship makes it exceedingly difficult for the formation and functioning of opposition to the liberation movement (Mohamed Salih, 2018: 26; Schreiner, 2006) upon liberation and democratisation. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 251) argue that the role of diverse political parties is significant in terms of democratic consolidation, as political parties often serve as the vehicles through which political leaders are recruited and educated to promote democratic values to local levels of government and society. It is also suggested that opposition parties often act as a means to hold the ruling party to account as well as to provide society with a diverse choice in terms of governance policy (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 251). Despite the hosting of formal free and fair elections in many Southern African states, liberation movement government actively reject the democratic role of opposition and often demonise these entities as counter revolutionary.

3.2.2 Fusion of party and state

Most likely one of the most negative elements referred to by Gumede involves the practice of replicating the liberation movement in the state through various internal deployment policies. The practice of merging the liberation movement with the apparatuses of the state have been observed for decades in Africa, and according to early research on this trait the fusion of party and state served initially as a means to transform the societies governed, justifying the merger of the movement's new party and the state (Leslie, 1960: 16). Southall (2014a: 93), however, suggests that 'the capture of the state by liberation movements once in power, has facilitated the rise of party-state bourgeoisies whose commitment to constitutionalism is more instrumental than rooted in democratic values'. This characteristic of African liberation movements should be viewed as a serious

hindrance to democratic consolidation, as the deployment of party loyalists to state departments and institutions create the existence of a so-called 'party-state' and all oversight of the functions of the state are vested within the leadership of the liberation movement ruling party instead of existing in an independent public sphere, judiciary and legislature (De Jager & Steenkamp, 2016). Gumede (2017: 7-8) argues that evolving into 'party-states' is a primary factor explaining the failure of liberation movements to 'institute broad-based democracy when they came to power. When the ruling liberation movements became corrupt, undemocratic or divided into factions, or the leadership became personalised, their governments and the state became so also, stunting democratic development and service delivery efforts.'

According to Markakis (2018: 36), in many instances during the initial periods following liberation or democratisation, liberation movements tend to infiltrate the state, including remaining former colonial administrations, in order to monopolise access to state organs and resources for the liberation movement, whereby the movement consolidates its authority and position within government. Markakis (2018: 36) also argues that the unusual method to merge the party (liberation movement) with the state aims to saturate the administration from top to bottom with party members. This also ensures that the decision-making process functions smoothly, and the liberation movement has access to state resources, including the security apparatuses, that are used as a last resort to deflect opposition to the liberation movement government (Markakis, 2018: 36). This merger of state and party, according to Markakis (2018: 36), also provides access to state owned enterprises, which could be exploited by party members for personal gain and patronage.

The arguments raised by Markakis (2018) reflect much of what tends to develop following the prolonged fusion of the movement and the state, and what may have been done with good intentions shortly following democratisation often leads to large scale looting and corruption by the party-state established by the liberation movement. The argument is made in this dissertation that the notion of fusing the state and the party in order to better transform societies previously neglected, is severely flawed. Regardless of the

justifications, such political behaviour does not conform to separation of power and is deemed uncondusive to transparent and accountable governance, as well as creating a capable development-orientated state. Much like the justification of one-partyism by liberation movement governments, it is argued that the fusion of the state and movement forms part of the deep-rooted perceptions within liberation movements that control over the state and its various resources equates to liberation for the previously oppressed. Suttner (2006: 24) argues that ‘the liberation movement is a prototype of a state within a state, one that sees itself as the only legitimate source of power’. Suttner (2008) also suggests that the notion of liberation movements depicting itself as proto-states derives from ‘a framework of ideas in which the seizure of the state was represented as the central issue of the day’ during the struggle period. For most liberation movements in Southern Africa these depictions of state power emanates primarily from Soviet Union influences during the struggle between the 1960s and 1980s, however it should also be considered that in their liberation struggles against internationally funded white minority governments, liberation movements often experienced first-hand the excessive power control the state provides, and thus total seizure and control of this arena became and remained a priority for liberation movements long after democratisation.

Melber (2021: 136) refers to the liberation movement SWAPO, and argues that public procurement and other outsourcing activities by those in control of the state agencies turned affirmative action and black economic empowerment into a self-rewarding scheme based on struggle credentials and credits among the activists of the liberation movement. This practice, noted by Melber (2021), is not unique to the Namibian government and can be observed in South Africa under ANC rule as well. The negative impact of such practices is significant however, and according to Melber (2021: 136), such practices by SWAPO have led to the fact that the ‘skewed class character of Namibia’s society changed little since independence in 1990’. Clapham (2012) notes that liberation movements very ‘rapidly transform themselves into corporate states during post liberation regimes, in which a cadre of former senior fighters joins with other established interests to constitute a monolithic power bloc, essentially serving its own members, remaining deaf to the needs and demands of ordinary people excluded from this elite’.

Melber (2021: 136) also emphasises that the 'ongoing exclusion of the impoverished and marginalized from the benefits of the country's wealth and resources is no longer only the result of the structural legacy of apartheid, as is so conveniently claimed by the new post-colonial SWAPO elite'. Clapham (2012) argues that failing to implement the level of transformation promised during the struggle, and given that the liberation movement government now controls the apparatus of state power rather than fighting against it, the movement will have a powerful temptation to use that state power to 'repress any forms of dissent'. According to Clapham (2012), the 'precise forms through which governing elites extract resources from the economy vary from case to case, however in economies that already have a strong capitalist bent, former fighters may establish their own businesses in sectors sensitive to political favours and patronage'. Some, including Harvey (2021), would suggest that liberation movements were established primarily by educated middle class Africans, and that the intention was always to gain control of the state and its resources for personal gain. This argument would imply that various ideological and political narratives may be implemented by a liberation movement in order to justify the practice of cadre deployment, however confirming that this practice was always aimed at serving the middle-class elite of the movement will require additional historical research and analysis, outside the framework of this dissertation. What is important is the fact that the practice of fusing the state with the liberation movement or party is common practice among African governments, with severe consequences for democratic consolidation and development (Leftwich, 2000).

Cadre deployment and the fusion of the state and liberation movement also have implications for establishing a capable state. According to Brierley (2020), whether civil servants are hired based on merit or political criteria, has broad implications for the state capacity and the overall health of democracy. Brierley (2020) argues that 'patronage-recruits are likely to be less competent and also not essential to the running of the state, and such practices can also perpetuate a broader clientelistic political economy'. Although this element will receive attention in the next chapter, it is important to emphasise that, if the state is going to orientate itself towards development, a capable and efficient state

will be required to implement those policies aimed at socio-economic transformation and development (Leftwich, 2000: 4).

According to Mlambo, Zubane and Thusi (2022: 14), the separation of politics from the administration of the state is an important aspect of good governance, however it is observed that in many developing regions the public sector is intertwined with politics, often resulting in corruption and political interference in the state. Mlambo *et al.* (2022: 14) also reiterate that ‘the failure to separate politics from state administration allows elites to pursue hidden agendas using public resources, and such action tends not to represent the interests of the people but those of the ruling class’. The reality is that in many cases the ruling class or political elite in such states are directly associated with the liberation movement and this creates an environment for increased neo-patrimonialism and corruption being entrenched within the political economy. In such a political system of neo-patrimonialism and personal rule ‘little distinction is made between the ruler and the state, with the ruler’s personal decisions always taking precedence over formal laws’ (Leonard & Straus, 2003: 3). According to Baker (2000: 195), political appointments, favouritism and other forms of nepotism within the state is detrimental to ‘accountability and transparency to the public’.

3.2.3 The abuses of liberation and independence rhetoric

Gumede (2017: 10) notes that many African liberation movements turned governments, are prone to continue to use independence and liberation struggle rhetoric, discourse and imagery, vital during the liberation struggle period, following independence and/or liberation. Gumede (2017: 10) also argues that liberation rhetoric, historically directed towards colonial powers, minority oppressors and/or exploitative institutions, utilised to mobilise the populace in the past, are often continued to be utilised by liberation movements once in power, particularly during instances of government failure. According to Gumede (2017: 10), ‘while brazenly autocratic, corrupt and uncaring, many African liberation movements and their leaders cynically use rhetoric of liberation struggle and communal black unity for their own enrichment.’ This argument by Gumede (2017) is

supported by those made by Mohamed Salih (2018: 27), who argues that it is often the case in post-liberation societies that ‘for the ordinary people the leaders of liberation movements still occupy a special place in their hearts and minds because of their sacrifices during the bloody liberation struggles’. According to Mohamed Salih (2018: 27), such sentiments towards liberation movements by the population often lead to complacency and in many cases the leaders of liberation movements find it difficult to ‘curtail their personal political ambitions, opting for total control’. There is an argument to be made that liberation struggle rhetoric and imagery could be utilised positively following independence, particularly in terms of forming unity within a newly established democracy. The history, sacrifices and heritage relating to the liberation struggle could, in a democratic system, serve as an instrumental reminder to the state, civil society and government of the atrocities and violence caused by autocratic oppression and colonialism. It is thus important to explore the distinction between heritage and historical imagery associated with the liberation struggle, as opposed to the ‘abuse of liberation struggle rhetoric’. The distinction to be made include determining ‘when the use of liberation rhetoric following independence, could be perceived to be abuse by the liberation movement?’

Markakis (2018: 35) argues that African liberation movements claim legitimacy to govern drawn from the struggle itself, a claim that people tacitly tend to accept initially. It is, according to Markakis (2018: 36), for this reason that liberation movements ‘strive to keep the memory of the struggle alive, and in fact to merge it with the country’s past and future’. Markakis (2018: 36) also suggests that liberation movements are prone to regard the legitimacy deriving from the struggle as open ended, rejecting any political alternative that does not derive its origins from within the movement itself. Melber (2018) argues that the situational application of militant rhetoric by liberation movements is often ‘a tool for inclusion and exclusion in terms of post-colonial national identity’. Considering the arguments made by Markakis and Melber, it becomes clear that once a liberation movement declares legitimacy to govern due to its leading role in the liberation of the population, such a government is increasingly demonstrating Gumede’s (2017) argument of ‘abuse of liberation rhetoric’.

According to Melber (2021: 136-137), solely blaming the legacy of colonialism and apartheid by liberation movements for continued poverty and exclusion of the population outside the political elite from the economy is 'misleading and shies away from the real issues at stake'. Melber (2021: 137) refers to the finding by Lyster, arguing that 'the term "previously disadvantaged" is being used to the advantage of those who already have more than enough [in Namibia], and we would do better to concentrate on efforts on the "presently disadvantaged" because only then will we make a real difference in our very economically divided society'. Gumede (2007a: 12) also suggests that liberation movement leader, Robert Mugabe, is a good example of the tendency by liberation movement leaders in Africa to continue to blame colonialism for present-day maladministration and corruption, occurring decades following independence in Zimbabwe. It could be argued that an important shortcoming demonstrated by liberation movements, and populists in particular, appears to be implementing liberation rhetoric into effective practice in order to realise socio-economic transformation among the population. This notion is emphasised by Melber (2021: 137), arguing that despite renewed focus on poverty alleviation by the SWAPO presidential candidates during the 2014 election, this rhetoric was not turned into action, and in 2021 Namibia remains one of the most unequal societies in the world, beaten most likely by South Africa. The argument is made that when liberation rhetoric is utilised following independence to enforce the legitimacy and/or deflect criticism for failures, then such behaviour should be regarded as the abuse of liberation rhetoric.

According to Bond (2018: 107), the use of radical liberation rhetoric is often observed when liberation movement governments 'panic', attempting to 'disguise how the spoils of liberation are being devoured by corrupting neo-colonial forces both within and without the nation'. Bond (2018: 107) argues that it is often during such deflection tactics that liberation movements tend to 'conjure up international threats, sometimes conjoined with ethnic fear-mongering, so as to distract attention from the party's immediate failings'. In South Africa it has become common practice for ANC leaders to blame apartheid for infrastructure and spatial challenges (News24, 2 June 2016), and although many of these socio-economic inequalities can be attributed to apartheid, the fact that there are still

public schools in South Africa with pit latrines, despite the ANC governing for twenty eight years, reflects poor service delivery and incompetence by the state and government under ANC rule. In 2020, it was estimated that there were 4 000 schools in South Africa that still relied on pit latrines (Felix, 2 August 2020). By November 2021 the number of schools utilising pit latrines were estimated at 3 392 schools, affecting 30 000 teachers and over one million learners (Jones, 3 November 2021). The argument made in this dissertation posits that using apartheid to justify certain failures in crucial service delivery, relates to the abuse of liberation and struggle rhetoric by the ANC and the party's cadres responsible for service delivery.

3.2.4 The cult of violence

Gumede (2017: 13-14) points out that in many cases, the violence inflicted on the colonised by the colonisers was adopted and internalised by liberation movements in order to respond to the forces of the colonial powers. Gumede (2017: 14) also argues that once in power, many of these liberation movements fail to abandon the utilisation of violence as a political mechanism, a characteristic which even include inward violence directed against suspected traitors, counter revolutionaries and infiltrators within the party. According to Gumede (2007a: 14), anti-colonial struggles in Africa were often violent and many liberation movements failed to divert from violence or restore a culture of non-violence after coming to power. Chigudu (2019) emphasises the role of violence implemented by liberation movements in Africa, not only during the struggle period, but post-liberation as well, particularly taking into account that the liberation movement now have control of the state and use of violence against the population, opposition and critics of the movement-party. Chigudu (2019: 212) also argues that the ruling party and liberation movement of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF, have time and again demonstrated, through the use of state security apparatuses, that the party's removal through the 'ballot box is unimaginable and if need be, state terror will be deployed to prevent the removal of the party'. Chigudu (2019: 212) cites the killing of six and wounding of 36 protestors in Zimbabwe by security forces following the 2018 elections.

Chigudu (2019: 215) further argues that elements within various liberation movements continue to foster violent aspirations, referring to the former ANC Youth League leader, Julius Malema, who remains adamant to continue to sing the struggle song “shoot the boer, kill the boer”, and does not display a different mind-set from other anti-democratic leaders in Africa. It is important to note that the type of political system in place, the strength of civil society and level of human rights will vary from state to state, however as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, it is not only the utilisation of violence but the mere threat of violence that remains key to the political culture of liberation movements, often decades following liberation. The cult of violence, as presented by Gumede (2017), also contains an additional phenomenon that is the continued use of violence as a means to resolve internal and intra-political contestation. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, this is a prevalent element in South Africa, particularly in the Kwa-Zulu Natal Province. The next chapter will demonstrate how the use of violence by the ANC is rooted in the political culture of the party, as a liberation movement.

3.2.5 The cult of the leader

Authoritative and charismatic leaders are closely associated with African states governed by liberation movements. According to Gumede (2010: 16), post-independence leaders were often placed on a pedestal, practices which laid the foundation for resulting ‘strongman’ politics, which would often increase within liberation movements once in government. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 259) indicate that it is particularly during the initial transition phases to democracy that coalitions are often forged among different liberation movements in order to secure electoral victory, however these coalitions are often established around the presence of ‘strongman’ politicians and leaders, and in many cases with the promise of patronage and clientelism to those outside the elite of the liberation movement.

Gumede (2007a: 14) argues that members of liberation movements ‘defer too readily to leaders and thus many African states retained colonial-era “insult-laws” by which criticism of the president can attract a lengthy prison sentence’. Gumede (2007a: 14) further notes

that during the presidency of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the controversial ‘insult-laws even included poking fun at Mugabe’.

According to Gumede (2017: 5) liberation movement leaders are often also reluctant to ‘step down from political office’. Clapham (2012) argues that leadership changes within liberation movements are often difficult processes, mainly due to the emphasis placed on the role of the ‘hero leader, who comes to power at a relatively young age following liberation, and therefore such a leader can stay in office for an extended period of time during post-liberation’. It is also observed that in many cases the privileged cadre that is the leader can ‘reproduce itself in the form of its own protégés or family members, who gain favoured access to top positions and are thus able to take over from their patrons or family members’ (Clapham, August 2008). In the case of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe remained in power between 1980 and 2017, and only when it became apparent that his wife, Grace Mugabe, would possibly replace Robert Mugabe as president, did ZANU-PF and the military intervene and remove him from office in 2017.

In many respects this behaviour by liberation movements relate to the ‘entitlement to rule forever’ demonstrated by various liberation movement governments and their leaders. It is important to consider the reluctance to vacate office by leaders of liberation movements not being limited to the central leader, but very often to the elite of the liberation movement in general. So, for instance, ministers, members of parliament and other political elites with struggle credentials, will often refuse to step down voluntarily, despite clear and obvious mistakes, maladministration and failures in their respective portfolios. This trait is not only observed within the public sector where liberation movement leaders hold office, but occurs within the movement itself, as is currently observed with the internal debate surrounding the ‘step-aside resolution’ within the ANC in South Africa.

Apart from the centralization of decision making and authority within a single leader or small clique within the liberation movement, the ‘cult of the leader’ poses an additional risk, the phenomenon of personal rule. As already demonstrated, the presence of neo-patrimonialism and patronage networks are elements that either existed within liberation

movements long before democratisation during the struggle period, or were inherited by the liberation movement by the preceding authoritarian or colonial administration which the movement replaced. Transitioning from a liberation movement to a political party in a democratic regime, which demands accountability, transparency and good governance practices, often emphasise the prevalence of undemocratic political behaviour by the leaders of liberation movement governments in Africa.

Melber and Southall (2006) suggest that it has become a common phenomenon in Africa for heads of state to remain in office until they are forcibly removed or eventually pass away. Melber and Southall (2006) also argue that notions of remaining in office on the claim of their indispensability to governance, remain central to 'neo-patrimonialism as a political instrument and set of personalised relations whereby rule is maintained' by African leaders. The cult of the leader is also associated with the 'entitlement to rule forever' by liberation movements. This entitlement can also be observed in the personal behaviour of liberation movement leaders, even after they are removed from office.

3.2.6 Centralisation of decision- and policy-making

An element observed among various liberation movements in Africa, according to Gumede (2017: 4), stems from the Soviet Marxist-Leninist or Chinese Communist Party influences adopted during the Cold War, which often structured the movement around a powerful leader at the head of the organisation. It is argued by Gumede (2017: 4) that in order to effectively fight colonial or apartheid regimes, liberation movements were organised in a top-down, secretive and military-like fashion, with power in the hands of either the leader or a small leadership group, centred on the leader.

The tension between democracy and this element revolves around the observation that upon assuming power in newly established governments, liberation movements are prone to maintain the practice of centralised decision-making within a small elite group, clique or very often within a single leader (Gumede, 2010: 14). It is also suggested that in systems where decision-making is centralised to a single leader or small group

associated with the liberation movement, corruption, cronyism and clientelism are prone to take root (Gumede, 2017: 4). Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 65-66) emphasise this characteristic among African 'strongman' governments, whereby clientelism becomes an institution of neo-patrimonialism, with strongman leaders often relying on the awarding of personal favours. According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 65), within the state these favours include public sector jobs and high ranking positions, while in society these favours include the awarding of licenses, contracts and access to state resources. In return for material rewards, clients to the strongman politician or leader would mobilise continued support for their patron (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 66). As will be demonstrated during the next chapter, which explores the ANC, it is an important observation that unilateral decision making occurs on various levels of government and administration, including local, regional and provincial government level, often by a deployed cadre of the ruling liberation movement. Centralised decision making is thus replicated to various levels of the movement, in a top-down structure. The argument is also made in this dissertation that it remains a misperception to assume that once a head of state eventually does leave office, these leaders lose their influence on the movement. Retired or removed leaders of liberation movements often remain in significant positions of power and authority, directly influencing policy and party behaviour. Melber and Southall (2006) illustrate this notion by referring to the Namibian presidency of Sam Nujoma, who stayed on as president of the ruling SWAPO party when he relinquished the position of head of state to 'his handpicked successor, Hifekepunye Pohamba', indicating a desire by Nujoma to continue to rule 'by remote control'.

3.2.7 The domination of liberation movements by a small clique

Liberation movements are often dominated by a group from the same ethnic origins, generation, military command structure or the same class and at liberation or independence, this clique becomes the new governing elite (Gumede, 2017). Gumede (2017: 6) suggests that due to the fact that the elite of the liberation movement were often educated and became the power-brokers under colonial systems, this group often received the majority of government and party positions after liberation or independence.

Gumede (2017: 6) also emphasises that the feature of dominant cliques within liberation movements often lead to the movements becoming 'imprisoned and dominated by entrenched leadership factions and their networks, either along regional, ethnic, generational or class lines'. According to Gumede (2017: 6), African liberation movements are essentially parties led by the elite, with poor, working class and peasant supporters, and over time the leaders and elite of liberation movements in power start to act in the interest of the elite rather than in the interest of the broader public.

There is an argument to be made that the political elite of liberation movements are not always limited to central leadership, with the hierarchy of patronage networks often extending to the provincial and regional structures of the movement. Although a small clique may form the core of the leader's cabinet or advisors, it is important to consider that most liberation movements established representation throughout all spheres of government since independence, and those mobilising continued support for the movement and leader on local, branch and provincial level often have ambitions to enter the core of the movement's clique, a matter that could contribute to factionalism developing among the competing politicians representing the movement.

3.2.8 Playing ethnic politics

According to Gumede (2017: 7), although African liberation movements often attempted to change their movements to more racial inclusive organisations, the leadership of these movements remained dominated among ethnic lines, with those 'opposition movements' joining the liberation movement before or post democratisation often being marginalised. Gumede (2017: 7) also argues that in many cases liberation movements in Africa have reinforced the 'ethnic census so successfully introduced by colonial and white-minority governments'. This element remains a devastating legacy of colonialism and apartheid, however as per the argument by Gumede (2017), it also remains an important element within the political culture demonstrated by various liberation movement governments. There is evidence for this element demonstrated in the increase in ANC support in Kwa-Zulu Natal since the election of Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC in 2007, as was

noted by Chipkin (2016: 220). According to Van de Walle (2003: 313) many liberation movements in Africa have resorted to utilising the same ethnic rhetoric utilised by colonial powers, particularly when 'liberation movements are politically in trouble'. This practice has become significantly prevalent within the ANC since 2007 as will be demonstrated in Chapter three, and Gumede (2017: 7) outlines the use of ethnic politics as a key feature among liberation movements. The abuse of ethnic mobilisation for political gain is by no means limited to Africa and governments led by liberation movements, as this political behaviour is widely observed across the globe, including Western democracies such as the US and Western European states. In the case of African liberation movements, it is important to note however that having control over the state and security apparatuses, these movements have the ability to launch violent and repressive measures against minorities and ethnic groups opposing the liberation movement government.

3.2.9 Internalising the culture of undemocratic colonial governments

This element relates to the observation that liberation movements often adopt and mirror the political, personal and social behaviour of colonial and apartheid politicians, leaders and government officials once in power. Gumede (2017: 14) argues that, in certain instances, even the lavish lifestyles adopted by colonial and apartheid leaders have been mirrored by liberation movement governments following liberation, and this obsession by many leaders of liberation movements in emulating the high profile standing of previous colonial leaders, also emulates the fact that the leaders of colonialism and apartheid did not prioritise practices that promote democracy in their power consumption behaviour.

In relation to democratic consolidation, Gumede (2017: 14) argues that the former executives of colonial and apartheid administrations possessed significant authority, with limited focus on good governance and democracy. By internalising the political culture of the previous administrations, the leaders of liberation movements were not keen to limit the authority and executive powers of the head of state, and limited attention was paid to increasing the oversight and accountability of these offices and leadership positions in the newly established democracy (Gumede, 2017: 15). The argument is made by

Gumede (2017: 15) that the leaders of liberation movements 'rarely honoured the separation of powers, independent judiciary and a system of checks and balances between government branches' despite the existence of newly adopted constitutions. It is argued in this dissertation that this element, much like the abuse of ethnic politics, is primarily a remnant of colonialism and apartheid, as the disregard for human rights, accountability and oversight were often demonstrated by colonial and apartheid politicians and state officials. Following democratisation, liberation movements are prone to demonstrate a reflex mechanism in grasping at the severely undemocratic behaviour and political culture of these former colonial regimes.

There is also an additional aspect to the element of internalising the political and social cultures of apartheid and colonialism, which include the role played by the private sector following democratisation. In this regard it is important to note that in very few cases, the private sector businesses and stakeholders leave the newly liberated state following democratisation, especially in cases where liberal economic policies are implemented by the new government. The mining sector, for instance, has been operating in Africa for more than a century, and these entities play a prominent role in advising and engaging the liberation movement government in relation to labour policies, resources and economic policies. Although adapting to the transition, many of these private sector entities may promote and advise the newly elected government to implement undemocratic behaviour against those threatening private mining interests. The role of the Gupta brothers and their business associates in South Africa during the state capture period is a good example of the impact the private sector has on liberation movement governments following independence. This dissertation will argue that certain entities within the private sector contribute significantly to the maintenance of neo-patronage and clientelism in states led by liberation movement governments. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Africa, however, considering the impact of other elements of democratic deficit already present among African liberation movements, accountability and transparency are difficult to implement effectively.

3.2.10 Members, supporters and citizens allow leaders to act as vanguard

This element, contributing to the failure by liberation movements to implement sustainable democratic governments, combines several of the previously mentioned elements. This element suggests that in many cases the ruling party leaders, most of whom boast liberation struggle credentials, are provided ample opportunity and patience by its members and supporters to shift the blame for failures, rather than accounting for promises not kept (Gumede, 2017: 15). According to Gumede (2017: 15), this element negatively impacts the willingness of supporters and members to actively participate in the political system, as the perception is created that the leadership of the movement turned political party will do what is right for the members.

Gumede (2017: 15) suggests that the notion of the liberation movement as vanguard on behalf of the poor and working class citizens, and the view that citizens, voters and members of the party should do nothing except wait on the leadership to deliver, is at the heart of many of the failures of liberation movement governments. The hopes of many African citizens could be appreciated, given centuries of oppression and colonialism, however the democratic deficit stems from the fact that 'as liberation movements came to power in Africa, their supporters were keen to overlook shortcomings. The feeling was that a new, popularly elected democratic government needed to be given an extended chance, and liberation movements were seen as the embodiment of the nation as a whole' (Gumede, 2007: 13). Various strongman political leaders in Africa have formed the nodal point of this element, creating the perception of the 'hero leader of the liberation movement' as a shepherd to the supporters and citizens.

3.2.11 Entitlement to rule forever

According to Gumede (2017: 15-16) some 'African leaders think they have the divine right to rule forever, because they delivered liberation, notwithstanding their poor records in power'. Gumede (2017: 16) explains that this sense of entitlement contributes to many African leaders and liberation movements feeling no obligation to deliver to their

supporters and citizens, because they already delivered liberation. The culture of entitlement to rule forever also contributes to the lack of any sense of accountability by the leaders of liberation movement governments, and even serves as justification for looting the resources of their countries, seeing as these leaders sacrificed during the struggle and are entitled to live in luxury following liberation (Gumede, 2017: 16). According to Chigudu (2019: 212), despite forming part of multi-party democracies since liberation, both the ANC in South Africa as well as SWAPO in Namibia operate within a culture of entitlement to rule forever and does not inspire much confidence that these parties will relinquish power peacefully when defeated by opposition in the near future. The element of entitlement is also addressed by Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2014: 3-5), arguing that in many instances, even after leaving office, many former African heads of state remain influential in the matters of the ruling party, as well as government and the state. Southall (2014a, 87) refers to the findings by Johnson (2001) who indicated that:

“According to liberation movement theology, their coming to power represents the end of a process. No further group can succeed them for that would mean that the masses, the forces of righteousness, had been overthrown. That, in turn, could only mean that the forces of racism and colonialism, after sulking in defeat and biding their time, had regrouped and launched a counter-attack” (Johnson, 2001).

Southall (2014a: 88) argues that this totalitarian mind-set demonstrated by liberation movements upon coming to power led to the perception that, because liberation movements could claim historical authority and righteousness, challenges to their rule were therefore morally and politically illegitimate. Southall (2014a: 89) also argues that because of the tendency by liberation movements to define themselves as representatives of the ‘nation and the people’, majoritarian conceptions of democracy are reinforced, which are at odds with central tenets of constitutionalism. As indicated in earlier sections, the entitlement to rule forever serves primarily as a façade to continue to utilise patronage networks for personal gain by leaders and that of family members and associates. Why such post-presidential influences by African leaders would be deemed as a democratic deficit will be demonstrated in the next chapter, emphasizing the role

played by Jacob Zuma following his resignation in 2018 during various undemocratic events in South Africa, including the serious unrest and looting of July 2021. In the case of Zuma, as will be demonstrated, legacy as liberation leader and head of state have become the mechanisms through which the former president maintains influence and power within the ANC and the South African political arena.

3.2.12 Moral bankruptcy of African liberation movements and their leaders

This element presented by Gumede (2017), was already raised in 1980, when it was argued that ‘the success of liberation-movements-turned-governments will depend on the personal moral behaviour, decency and honesty of their leaders and members’ (Cabral, 1980). According to Gumede (2017: 16), one of the reasons why most liberation movements in Africa have failed in government is because they claim justification for governing solely on the basis of their liberation legacy, rather than on the basis of accountable, moral and decent behaviour while in power. This argument by Gumede relates to other elements of democratic deficit presented, including the abuse of liberation struggle rhetoric and cult of the leader. Referring to the practice of democratic morality, Gumede (2017: 17) argues that it would appear that many liberation movement leaders have ‘de-linked their actual day-to-day behaviour from their rhetoric and promises, despite ethical leadership demanding the two to be in concert’. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 270) also argue that the transitions to democracy and consolidation ‘hinges on the way leaders exercise power’.

Measuring the morality and ethical behaviour of political leaders and political parties as a whole, poses some challenges. Arguing that some African leaders have demonstrated serious discontent for the welfare of their citizens may be demonstrated by leaders who actively abused human rights or even those who have committed crimes against humanity, while measuring levels of ‘moral bankruptcy’ of a liberation movement or political party may be less practical. This element presented by Gumede (2017) should be considered as a reflection of trust in the party and its leaders, and those variables which have impacted on the integrity and legitimacy of the party and leaders to govern.

In an analytical study of the relationship between morality and corruption in Africa, Tenamwenya (2014: 416) argues that corruption is a moral problem and once it is entrenched in society, corruption breaks the moral and social fabric of society. Osaghae (1995: 64) argues that there are specific linkages between morality and legitimacy, indicating that 'a state compels obedience when the citizens perceive it to be representing their interests and pursuing their common good, and by regarding the state as their own, the citizens are most likely to obey the state.' Osaghae (1995: 64) suggests that 'the state and its operators should be credible in the eyes of the people in order to compel voluntarily obedience from the citizens'. As per the arguments presented by Osaghae (1995: 66), democratic stability within a political system and state is also associated with the moral behaviour by government, the state and its designated agents, suggesting that a government can be stable only to the extent that the citizenry believe its moral right to be obeyed. An important argument made by Osaghae (1995: 66) is that once the legitimacy of government and the state have been compromised, stability and order can only be restored through means of state violence and increasingly autocratic measures if the government is to remain in power, albeit by violent means. It is most likely within this observation that the moral bankruptcy of liberation movements poses a threat to democratic consolidation. Various African leaders, basing their authority on liberation struggle legacy, have been compromised and implicated in undemocratic behaviour, self-rule, neo-patrimonialism and corruption, which systematically led to the decline in legitimacy of not only those compromised leaders, but the party and state keeping them in power despite serious integrity flaws exposed.

The argument made in this dissertation suggests that although amoral behaviour is not limited to politics and liberation movements, or African leadership failures, various of the elements of deficit presented by Gumede (2017) enables poor governance, abuse of power and overall moral bankruptcy to go unchecked and become entrenched within the leadership and processes of liberation movements. This behaviour by liberation movements flows into the socio-economic structure of society and, eventually, overwhelms those institutions and mechanisms meant to promote and defend democracy and development. The element of moral bankruptcy is also perceived to be one of the

primary contributors to the decline of liberation movement governments over time, particularly in terms of trust and support from voters.

3.2.13 Ambivalence to democracy

Gumede (2017: 11) argues that it is often observed that liberation movement leaders are prone to rejecting democracy, and quotes the post-independence leader of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, who stated that ‘until our war against poverty, ignorance and disease has been won, we should not let our unity be destroyed by a desire to follow somebody else’s rules [democracy]’ (Nyerere, 1968: 4). To the detriment of African societies defined by Julius Nyerere’s political philosophy, the error in this argument lies in the assumption that implementing democracy is a ‘desire or option’ in achieving development and ultimately poverty alleviation and transformation (Gumede, 2017). As examined in other sections, the argument is clear: Democracy is a ‘prerequisite’ for sustainable development, and not an option available to emerging economies aiming to exit centuries of oppression, inequality and structural violence (Gumede, 2017). Southall (2014a: 86) argues that various sources impacting on the political culture of liberation movements ‘clash with the values that underline constitutionalism’.

Gumede (2017) reinforces this argument by referring to the research by Rodrik (1998), in which he found that ‘democracy is not only compatible with growth and poverty reduction, but may be crucial to both’ (Rodrik, January 1998). In considering the rejection of democracy and good governance as Western concepts by many liberation movement leaders, Gumede (2017: 12) refers to the findings of Sen, who suggested that ‘certain values are universal, democracy is one of them: the case for liberty and political rights is not exclusively Western, it is as strong in Africa or Asia as it is elsewhere’. It is important to reiterate that democracy in this context is not necessarily associated with neo-liberal economic policies and prescripts, but rather the practice of good governance, transparency and accountability in order to provide services and realise effective transformation for the population, regardless of the central economic policy of government. In this regard, the specific form of democracy may not be as important as

the aim by government to implement 'good governance' in promotion of development and socio-economic transformation. According to Chigudu (2019: 216), the political culture of liberation movements seems to be authoritarian in nature and reluctant to engage with democracy, thus instead of promoting democracy, these movements often suppress democracy. It is the argument made in this dissertation that policies and practices implemented by developing states should be aimed towards development and transformation, which will require an efficient and capable state as well as politicians who are accountable to the population and recipients of critical services.

Southall (2014a: 85-86) argues that although upholding perceptions of majoritarian elections and superficial democracies, liberation movements come to power with a significant level of disregard for democratic values, practices and processes. As a case study, Southall (2014a: 86) indicates that in Zimbabwe, the liberation movement ZANU-PF brutally suppressed and subjugated the ZANU during the 1980s and also blatantly manipulated the electoral procedures in Zimbabwe when facing challenges by the opposition MDC party since 2000. Southall (2014a: 86) also suggests that ambiguity towards democracy by liberation movements, 'can be seen as rooted in liberation political culture'.

3.2.14 Intolerance of dissent

The failure by liberation movements to implement effective policies that would lead to socio-economic transformation among the population, is often reflected in their decline in voter support and public trust. Melber indicates that between 2014 and 2019 SWAPO in Namibia went from 80 percent to 65 percent respectively of total votes received, and this also cost SWAPO its two-thirds majority in the Namibian national assembly (Melber, 2021: 142). It is curious that despite the decline in support, SWAPO leaders did not call for introspection of the party, but rather remained steadfast in public populist rhetoric and arrogance (Melber, 2021: 142). Melber (2021: 145) indicates that in 2020, following the losses of the 2019 elections, both the president of SWAPO, the SWAPO appointed minister of defence as well as other senior SWAPO leaders blamed 'whites for being

obsessed with the idea of the black movement failing, whites declaring war on SWAPO, and that defectors from SWAPO should have their throats slit'. This clearly demonstrates the tendency among liberation movements to reject dissent among its membership and that opposing views are often regarded as poor discipline or even an attack on the leadership of the party or movement. The notion of remaining silent, despite personal objections or opposing views among liberation movement members, is argued to be a remnant of the discipline required during the struggle period, civil war or armed conflict. Although discipline is important during times of conflict, such militaristic discipline following liberation, within a democratic dispensation, appears to be selective tactics by the political elites of liberation movements, especially when under pressure or failing to deliver on liberation struggle promises. Much like the use of liberation rhetoric and populism by the elite when under pressure, it appears that demanding total obedience and discipline among the members of the party is merely a tactic to deflect criticism and opposition. Melber (2002: 163) argues that 'any opposition or dissent [against the liberation movement party] is considered to be hostile and branded as an enemy to the people and the national interest'.

Gumede (2007a: 13) indicates that during the struggle period, dissent and internal criticism were avoided by liberation movements, as this risked exposing division within the movement, which could be exploited by colonial and apartheid administrations, while Southall (2014a: 88) suggests that dissent within liberation movements is often 'translated into disloyalty to the nation, while internal democracy transmogrified into obeisance to an authoritarian leader'. The problem remains however, that decades following liberation and the advent of democracy, such behaviour increasingly erode the legitimacy of the liberation movement, as is also argued by Melber (2021: 142).

3.2.15 The culture of secrecy

According to various scholars and commentators the need for secrecy which many liberation movements required to maintain during liberation struggles, given the efforts by colonial and apartheid security forces to infiltrate and destabilise these movements, have

unfortunately remained part of the political culture of liberation movements once in power as the dominant party (Gumede, 2017). This element is one of the most debilitating elements observed within liberation movements turned dominant parties, as the contradiction between democracy (which is based on accountability, inclusive participation and transparency) and secrecy is so severe.

3.2.16 Discouraging competitive leadership elections

Much like the argument surrounding the tendency to promote one-party systems, liberation movements have avoided democratic leadership elections during the liberation struggles, largely due to leaders' fear that such practices will also promote political, ethnic and factional divisions within the movements (Gumede, 2010: 14). According to Gumede (2017: 4), the leaders were often appointed, in secret, by a small elite clique within the movement, and on those rare occasions that elections were conducted, these were more often than not uncontested. It is important to note that this behaviour adopted by liberation movements pre-independence, are not only continued when in government, but there is an argument to be made that this element of political culture is often replicated by deployed leaders of the movements within state and government departments.

3.2.17 The idea of opposition never properly took root within or outside the liberation movement

Gumede (2017) refers to the research by Osabu-Kle (2000: 19), who found that despite the fact that most traditional African societies do not condone unaccountable, autocratic and self-serving leadership, it was however found that these traditional societies remain consensus-seeking in their approach to leadership and governance. According to Osabu-Kle (2000: 19) and Schatzberg (2001: 216), open opposition to authority within traditional African societies is not encouraged. Creating an identity of representing the voice of the people, against those who wish to reverse the progress of liberation leads to opposition to ruling liberation movements being viewed as an attack on the liberation itself, with critics of the movement and party often regarded as representatives, even agents, of the

former dispensation, be it colonialism or apartheid (Gumede, 2010: 13). Much like the trait of liberation movements resorting to playing ethnic politics when under pressure, this characteristic is also often observed as a defence mechanism by liberation ruling parties when compromised by outsiders, civil society, scholars or opposition parties. In South Africa, journalists in particular have experienced accusations by ANC leaders of being ‘agents for the West, white monopoly capital or counter revolutionaries’ aiming to derail the efforts of the liberation movement’s continued struggles against imperialism and neo-colonialism. The accusations are often launched towards journalists following difficult and compromising questions posed to the ruling party. According to Southall (2014b: 53), African liberation movements have demonstrated a tendency to ‘identify themselves as the embodiments of the nation, with the consequence that these movements tend toward the de-legitimation of and labelling those opposing them as aliens or traitors’. Southall (2014b: 53) also emphasise that such behaviour by liberation movements can have ‘disastrous implications for human rights, opposition movements and ethnic minorities’.

3.2.18 Fractured and irrelevant opposition parties

This element is not so much an inherent characteristic displayed by liberation movements, but a consequence of the political-economic environment from which liberation movements developed during colonialism and apartheid. It is, however, an element that contribute to the difficulty experienced by liberation movements to promote consolidation in newly established democratic regimes.

According to Gumede (2008; 2017), emerging opposition parties in newly established democracies are often either remnants of the colonial dispensation or it is relatively easy for liberation movement ruling parties to publicly associate such opposition parties with the colonial or apartheid agenda, thereby discrediting opposition parties among the electorate considering to alter their electoral support.

Gumede (2017: 8) also indicates that in those liberated states where opposition parties remained active and part of the larger political system, the liberation movement turned

ruling party perceived opposition parties as ‘bogeymen to blame for delivery failures in government, led by the liberation movement’. The argument by Gumede (2017) implies that the role and effectiveness of opposition parties to hold the ruling party to account are often directly affected by the rhetoric and public narrative promoted by the liberation movement party-state. This phenomenon is perceived to become intensified by liberation movement parties as the newly established political system matures or ages. This dissertation also argues that as failures, abuse and poor governance by the liberation movement government become increasingly apparent to the voters and civil society, the formation, coalitions and pressure by opposition parties may also increase, and it is during such periods that it is expected that embattled liberation movement parties will consider the use of increasingly authoritarian and populist measures to stifle the opposition.

Gumede (2017: 9), however, refers to the argument by Logan (2008: 4), who suggests that ‘opposition parties in Africa that do eventually come to power have offered little alternatives to the independence or liberation movements.’ Gumede (2017: 9) also argues that opposition parties in such African systems are often ‘outrightly populist, rather than presenting clear-headed pragmatic policy proposals’ as was observed in Zambia when Frederick Chiluba campaigned on populism against the ruling regime of Kenneth Kaunda, however when in power Chiluba offered very little alternatives and success compared to the government of Kaunda. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, in 2005 overruled the democratic vote of his own party after the majority of his party voted to participate in senatorial elections during that year, which led to a break away from the MDC and formation of a new opposition party led by MDC secretary-general Welshman Ncube, and Gumede (2017: 9) illustrates through this case how opposition parties in Africa are often fractious and pose limited competition to ruling liberation movements.

3.2.19 The bridling of civil society

Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 253) argue that in order for democratic values to be institutionalised, civil society must be diverse, representative and participatory in nature, as civil society organisations and institutions, including the media are often the entities

that would provide effective platforms for the citizens and electorate to perform political participation between elections. Gumede (2017: 8-9) suggests that many governments led by liberation movements perceive civil society organisations and other entities as appendages of the party, primarily due to the fact that many African liberation movements and their leaders emerged from civil society organisations, unions, professional associations and religious groups. Gumede (2010: 31) also argues that upon coming to power, liberation movement parties demanded loyalty and unwavering unison to the cause and the policies of the liberation movement. This observation relates to the tendency by liberation movements to promote one-partyism following liberation, as Gumede (2017: 3) points out that unquestioning obedience and support for the liberation movement party is justified by these movements to maintain unity and cohesion within the newly founded state. It is, however, not difficult to assess the manner in which such behaviour could lead to increasingly stringent measures implemented by the liberation movement party-state to suppress opposition and criticism from civil society.

3.2.20 Internal operations of many African liberation movements are undemocratic

The final element presented by Gumede (2017: 17) relates to the internal processes and procedures of liberation movements, and the inability of these movements to alter such mechanisms once in power to reflect a more democratic demeanour. The argument in this case is clear, that 'unless African liberation movements internalise the values of democracy in the way they run and organise their parties and governments and in their everyday behaviour, quality democracies will remain a distant dream for their citizens.' Gumede (2007b: 23) argues that the ANC, like many other African liberation movements, are finding it difficult to elect its leaders through democratic internal elections. Dorman (2006: 1086) argues that in the process of struggling for liberation, political practices may be generated that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success. It is not difficult to assign the undemocratic internal processes of liberation movements to the legacy of the movements' development and adopted practices during the struggle period. As was demonstrated in the examination of other elements of deficit, this dissertation argues that the political culture of 'centralising decision-making, the cult of

the leader, the dominance of the movement by a small clique and discouraging competitive leadership elections within the movement as a mechanism to prevent factionalism and disunity during the struggle period' have all contributed to the internal operations of liberation movements remaining undemocratic following liberation and independence. This dissertation also argues that upon coming to power and facing the transition from liberation movement to formal political party, many African liberation movements neglected implementing effective measures and strategies in order to adjust the internal processes and procedures of the movement-turned-party. In South Africa, for instance, the matter of internal leadership elections of the president of the ANC party only received significant attention in 2007, thirteen years following the democratisation of South Africa.

Gumede (2017: 17), however, raises an important consideration with regard to the abovementioned element, which suggests that in order to establish effective political parties, African states must ensure that minimum democratic standards are set for all political parties and civil organisations that aim to participate in the democratic system of each respective regime. The challenge for the South African context, as well as various other liberation movement dominant party democracies, reside in the fact that the internal procedures of the dominant party will have a direct impact on the democracy of national and local government.

Table 2: Gumede's Elements of Democratic Deficit

Gumede's framework	Condensed formulation	External elements	Key attributes¹³
One-partyism	One-partyism, intolerance of dissent and rejection of opposition and civil society	The presence of fractured and irrelevant opposition parties in the new political system governed by the liberation movements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adverse posture towards opposition and civil society and their democratic function • Closed debates and discourse • Limited policy adjustment • Limited oversight and accountability
The idea of opposition never properly took root within or outside the liberation movement			
Intolerance of dissent		The bridling of civil society within the newly established democracy	
Discouraging competitive leadership elections			
Entitlement to rule forever			

¹³ Key attributes refer to the primary manifestations of the involved condensed element in the table.

Members, supporters and citizens allow leaders to act as vanguard	Entitlement to rule forever, as the vanguard of liberation, on behalf of the people		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevalence of personal rule among leadership • Promotes strongman politics
Fusion of party and state	Fusion of state and party (from policy control mechanism to neo-patrimonialism to factionalism)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weakened state • Service delivery failures • Promotes corruption and neo-patrimonialism • Promotes factionalism • Prevalence of political violence • Challenges in terms of development and transformation • Hinders good governance • Promotes parallel economies • Promotes nepotism, and cronyism
The abuses of liberation and independence rhetoric	Abuse of liberation rhetoric, exploitation of ethnic politics and the 'cult of violence' (re-creating the 'other' as response to criticism)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotes populism • Adverse to social cohesion • Promotes tribalism • Promotes intolerance and political violence
Playing ethnic politics			
The cult of violence			
The cult of the leader	The 'cult of the leader' and the domination of liberation movements by a small clique, with a centralised decision-making authority		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unilateral policy decision-making • Limited accountability by leaders • Prevalence of personal rule among leadership • Promotes strongman politics
The domination of liberation movements by a small clique			
Centralisation of decision and policy-making			
Moral bankruptcy of African liberation movements and their leaders	Moral bankruptcy, ambivalence to democracy, secrecy and internalising the undemocratic culture and practices of colonialism and apartheid		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adverse to legitimacy of government and state • Lack of transparency • Repressive behaviour by party-state • Distorts social-compact • Service delivery failures
Ambivalence to democracy			
Internal operations of many African liberation movements are undemocratic			
The culture of secrecy			
Internalising the (political and social) culture of undemocratic colonial governments			

Source: Schematic representation by author of this dissertation, summarising the elements of democratic deficit in the political cultures of liberation movements presented by Gumede (2017).

3.3 Conclusion

Southall (2014a: 97) argues that liberation movements represent an ambiguous heritage of struggle, which is simultaneously emancipatory (in that liberation movements strived to free oppressed peoples from minority rule, colonialism and apartheid) as well as repressive (in that liberation elites come to claim for themselves the right to interpret the will of the people). It is within this ambiguity in political culture of liberation movements that the inherent tension between these movements' political behaviour and the prerequisites of democratic values, good governance, accountability, transparency and developmental policies exists. When summarised, the elements of democratic deficit observed within the political cultures of liberation movements, as presented by Gumede (2017), emphasise the importance of good governance practices and the establishment of a capable state to implement socio-economic transformation in newly established developing states. It could be argued, regardless of whether a particular political system can be defined as a neo-liberal democracy that establishing a state and government that are development-orientated would still enhance the structural transformation required to alleviate poverty, inequality and provide basic services to the majority of the population. Leonard and Straus (2003: 104) argue that the features commonly associated with personal rule are maintained by the weakness of African states, primarily a remnant of colonial rule. In relation to democracy, development and consolidation of such regimes, the argument could be made that liberation movements in Africa indeed demonstrate a political culture or elements thereof, which are detrimental to democratic consolidation. Considering the impact of these elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by the ANC since 1994, and the correlation between the political culture of the party, as a liberation movement, and the decline of the party over recent years, it could also be argued that the inherent characteristics displayed by the ANC, most of which predates democratisation, have become the root of the party's decline over recent years.

One of the ANC's most significant deficits revolves around the fusion between the ANC, its cadres and the state. Institutions on national, provincial as well as municipal level have all become intertwined with the ANC, which implies that those characteristics

contradicting good governance within the ANC, have become replicated and entrenched in most if not all state institutions and mechanisms mandated to provide services to the population. It could also be argued that due to this fusion of the party and the state, the failure of the latter is perceived as the failure of the ANC by voters and the party's supporters, who once provided the ANC an overwhelming majority in government.

From the elements presented by Gumede (2017), there is an important aspect that requires additional attention, namely the observation in South Africa that the political culture of the ANC is largely replicated within the behaviour and culture of newly established political parties or breakaway parties.

Prior to proceeding to the next chapter, however, it is important to point out that the elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017) contain at least two elements which could be considered as external to liberation movements' political culture, impacting on the performance, reaction and behaviour of liberation movements in government. Gumede (2017) argues that democratic deficits in which liberation movements manoeuvre include the presence of 'fractured and irrelevant opposition parties' as well as 'the bridling of civil society'. These elements, although it may over time be exacerbated by the political culture and behaviour of liberation movements in government, could be argued to have been present prior to the liberation movement coming to power, as part of the political-economic environment of the government, populace and state inherited by the liberation movement upon coming to power. It is thus argued that variables such as inequality based on ethnicity, neo-patrimonialism within the state and former colonial administration, underdevelopment, education levels, and infrastructure with which the liberation movement is confronted upon coming to power, and transitioning to a formal political party to govern the newly established democracy, are regarded as outside the doing of liberation movements, entrenched during centuries of colonialism.

The two 'external elements' impacting on the political culture of the ANC will, however, be discussed in Chapter four, which will focus on those elements of democratic deficit

deemed to be inherent to the political culture of the ANC. In order to provide a more concise account of these elements, this study will however proceed by categorizing the elements presented by Gumede. The argument is that there exists within the elements presented by Gumede, certain commonalities which would allow for formulating a more concentrated and focused framework of democratic deficits within the political cultures of liberation movement governments in Africa.

Chapter 4: Elements of democratic deficit and the political culture of the ANC: applying the framework of William Gumede

4.1 Introduction

The African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994, after South Africa's first inclusive democratic election. This transition from minority rule apartheid to democracy would effectively make South Africa one of the youngest third wave democracies, governed by the oldest liberation movement in Africa. During the 1980s and early 1990s the ANC consolidated its authority among a variety of liberation movements and civil society organisations participating in the struggle against apartheid and cemented a strong position to contend for political power once the transition to democracy would occur. The period leading up to the democratisation of South Africa witnessed various important events in Africa as well as globally. By 1990 Namibia achieved its transition to independence and democracy, which further isolated the apartheid government within the SADC region.

By 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and with it, the Soviet Union collapsed, bringing to an end the global geo-political and economic manoeuvring of the Cold War, a development that would not only impact global economic policy and trade, but also the ANC's liberal democratic direction in policy-making post-1994. With the global sentiment leaning towards liberal free trade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ANC increasingly found itself in an ideological dilemma. The movement had two alliance partners on its left to consider, while simultaneously attempting to maintain sound relationships with pro-capitalist stakeholders in the private sector, mining industry and global financing arena. The efforts by the ANC to incorporate both the Marxists as well as the traditionalists among the anti-apartheid arena created the foundation on which the ANC would be obligated to promote a variety and often contradicting array of political-economic ideologies. During the 1980s the ANC continued to engage alternative South African political movements within the United Democratic Front (UDF), domestic stakeholders, labour unions and the international community in order to establish a suitable platform for

pending negotiations to bring apartheid to an end and, importantly, to establish the ANC as a united representative party for the majority of South African workers and citizens alike. The outcome of these engagements would consolidate the formation of the tripartite alliance between the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The ANC would, however, remain the political driving force of the alliance by the early 1990s and thus became the governing party following the democratic elections of 1994.

Despite the movement hegemony achieved by the ANC by the early 1990s, the movement failed to establish any significant military threat to the NP government within South African borders (McKinley, 2018: 13). The ANC increasingly risked entering the negotiations on the back foot, forced to make more compromises than promoting resolutions that would promote long-held doctrines such as those contained in the Freedom Charter. Although it could be argued by 1994, that the success or failure of the ANC-led government would most likely depend on the ability of the liberation movement to effectively transition to a political party, it is not clear that this distinction was ever made by the ANC itself upon transition to democracy. It was clear that disengaging from pre-1994 practices and elements of the political culture of the party as a liberation movement, which existed in tension with the values of democracy and good governance during the struggle period, would be crucial in strengthening and consolidating democracy in South Africa over the decades to follow 1994. This is a realisation that even existed since the late 1980s, and various ANC leaders accepted that a daunting task lay ahead for the movement to adjust to its new role as the governing party in South Africa.

It is argued that what was less obvious at the transition in 1994, was the likelihood that in the event that the ANC failed to make the transition from liberation movement to political party, particularly in terms of its political culture, the ANC would, within decades, commence its decline, and much like the now obsolete National Party (NP) of apartheid, the ANC would in time experience increasing difficulty to effectively govern and secure electoral support among the population to remain in power. Despite initial pessimism regarding the possible failure of the ANC-led government to implement effective

development and transformation (Baines, 1998: 3–9), the argument is made in this dissertation that the tension which exists between the political culture of the ANC and democratic values of good governance will ultimately lead to the party suffering electoral defeat within the democratic political system of South Africa¹⁴. This chapter will demonstrate how the democratic deficits and contradictions within the political culture of the ANC were, and still remain, unsustainable within a democratic political system, which inevitably would lead to the continued decline of the party in the current regime.

The political culture of the ANC will be examined within the framework presented by Gumede (2017: 3-18), demonstrating that the ANC, much like the liberation movements ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe), Frelimo (Mozambique), APLA (Angola) and SWAPO (Namibia), failed to address the socio-economic challenges faced by the population¹⁵, due to poor governance and undemocratic behaviour while in power.

4.2 Examining the decline of the ANC since 1994

Considering the decline of the ANC since 2016, it is important to explore the conceptualisation of decline in the context of this research. Decline for the purpose of this research refers to decline on three levels, namely electoral support, legitimacy to govern as well as capacity to govern. By examining the policy discussion paper of the ANC published in May 2022, all three these levels of decline can be demonstrated. It is also important to note that, considering the arguments made by Gumede (2017) in relation to the political culture of liberation movements, all three these aspects of decline are directly affected in the case of the ANC, as will be argued below.

According to the party's policy discussion paper, published in May 2022, the president of the party, Cyril Ramaphosa, suggests that the ANC 'has witnessed a decline in support during the 2021 local government elections, which mirrors the declining level of trust and

¹⁴ This argument is made within the context that the South African political system does not regress towards authoritarianism while the ANC is still in power. In the event that the ANC delegitimise the judiciary, media freedom and the election processes, the party may in time resemble the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe.

¹⁵ Refer to *Table 1* for details on the Fragile States Index Report 2021.

credibility in the ANC leadership and cadres to govern' (ANC, 18 May 2022: 3). According to the 2022 ANC discussion paper, the level of poverty in urban townships are of serious concern, a matter which 'underscores the challenges for the ANC to win back the country's metro municipalities' (ANC, 18 May 2022: 8). The document further states that the ANC 'literally has no personnel to produce and publicise party views and opinions, and the party has experienced a reduced capacity to provide context to current developments in various spheres of life' (ANC, 18 May 2022). It is important to examine the possible variables involved for the ANC's lack of personnel and 'reduced capacity' (ANC, 2022). One variable refers to the party's financial challenges since 2012 to retain staff. As early as 2014 political analysts reported that the ANC is facing increasingly dire financial constraints, most visibly manifested in the party failing to pay staff members responsible for the operations of the party (Hunter & Letsoala, 30 October 2014). The ANC General Secretary at the time, Gwede Mantashe argued in 2014 that the financial problems faced by the ANC stems from the party's loss of sixteen seats in the national assembly following the 2014 general elections, and the loss of these seats amounted to a decrease of R20 million in electoral funding at the time (Hunter & Letsoala, 30 October 2014). A lack of financial capacity to retain competent staff by the ANC currently still persist with ANC debts increasing every year (Mahlaka, 15 September 2021).

Secondly, Southall (2015) suggests that the predatory characteristics demonstrated by the ANC government under the presidency of Jacob Zuma is a symptom of the establishment of a 'party state' in which the ANC has since 1994 systematically come to control all organs of state and parastatals (Southall, 2015: 2). Southall (2015) draws a direct correlation between the ANC's financial decline and the increasing strain placed on the state's spending, with ANC members expected to not only donate parts their salaries to the party, but to also source funds for the ANC even through the state if need be. A third possibility for the reduced capacity of the ANC relates to legitimacy. Since the party started to experience visible decreases in votes in 2016, it has become increasingly clear that investing in the ANC, be it financially or political, may not ensure long term returns.

A preliminary examination of the 2022 policy discussion paper of the ANC clearly indicates observations of decline in voter support, legitimacy and capacity to govern since 1999. The results of the general elections since 1999 (*Table 3*) demonstrate a decline in electoral support for the ANC since 2004, the election in which the ANC received its highest electoral support since 1994, at 69.69 percent of the national percentage. It is, however, not only the national percentages that indicate a decline in electoral support for the ANC since 2004, as the provincial results also reflect a similar decline in voter support for the ANC. As was the case in the national results of the 2004 elections, the ANC dominated various provinces including Gauteng (68.74%), Free State (82.05%), North West Province (81.83%) and Eastern Cape (79.31%). The anomalies in the results of Kwa-Zulu Natal, when compared to the other provinces during the measured period, are largely attributed to the influence of Jacob Zuma in that province between 2004 and 2014, during which the ANC increased its provincial support from 47.47 percent in 2004 to 65.31 percent in 2014. During the 2019 general elections, more than a year following the resignation of Zuma, the ANC's electoral support in Kwa-Zulu Natal decreased to 55.47 percent.

Table 3: National Electoral Support for the ANC in General Elections

Election	National Percentage	Variance
1999	66.35%	3.72%
2004	69.69%	3.34%
2009	65.90%	-3.79%
2014	62.15%	-3.75%
2019	57.50%	-4.65%

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

Table 4: Gauteng Provincial Electoral Support for the ANC in General Elections

Election	Gauteng	Gauteng Variance
1999	68,14%	6,14%
2004	68,74%	0,60%
2009	64,76%	-3,98%
2014	54,92%	-9,84%
2019	53,20%	-1,72%

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

The ANC's decline in legitimacy to govern is reflected in the voter turnout during the general as well as local government elections (Tables 5 & 6), as a decline in voter turnout indicates a decline in trust in the ANC by its supporters (Schulz-Herzenberg, December 2020). Examining the voter turnout of both the general as well as local government elections since 2000, the turnout reflects a decline in participation by eligible voters. The national turnout during the general elections decreased from 76.7 percent in 2004 to 66 percent in 2019. Apart from Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal the Eastern Cape, Free State and North West reflected a continuous decline in voter turnout between 2004 and 2019. The increase in turnout during the 2009 general elections nationally, in Gauteng as well as Kwa-Zulu Natal, is attributed to the mobilisation efforts by Jacob Zuma as well as the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) led by Julius Malema during that period. Both these provinces reflected a decline in turnout since 2014.

Table 5: Voter Turnout during General Elections 2004-2019

General Election	National Percentage Turnout of Total Registered Voters	Provincial Turnout Percentage of Total Registered Voters				
		GP	KZN	EC	FS	NW
2004	76,70%	76,40%	73,50%	81,10%	78,90%	77,40%
2009	77,30%	79,00%	79,90%	76,70%	76,90%	72,60%
2014	73,50%	76,50%	76,90%	70,30%	72,50%	68,80%
2019	66,00%	71,80%	67,30%	61,00%	62,80%	59,50%

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

Table 6: Voter Turnout during Local Government Elections 2000-2021


Local Government Election	National Percentage Turnout of Total Registered Voters	Provincial Turnout Percentage of Total Registered Voters				
		GP	KZN	EC	FS	NW
2000	48,07%	43,24%	46,67%	55,99%	49,09%	44,80%
2006	48,40%	42,48%	50,57%	56,06%	47,24%	45,63%
2011	57,64%	55,77%	61,53%	58,16%	55,22%	53,47%
2016	57,94%	57,91%	61,48%	56,43%	56,24%	53,63%
2021	45,86%	43,86%	48,20%	46,55%	45,35%	42,36%

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

Table 7 reflects the decline of councils won by the ANC during local government elections between 2000 and 2021, and the fall from 200 councils won in 2006 to 167 councils won countrywide in 2021 clearly indicates the decline of the ANC's capacity to government, particularly at local government level. The reversal of this capacity is particularly reflected in the councils won by the ANC between 2011 and 2021, moving from 198 councils won to 167 councils won in 2021. Although it is important to note that between 2011 and 2021 various developments may have contributed to the decline in electoral support for the ANC during general as well as local government elections, including the emergence of the EFF and the participation of independent councillors, the voter-turnout in these elections (Tables 5 & 6) however steadily declined since 2011, reflecting diminishing participation by the electorate. The decline in voter support for the ANC since 2011 could


also explain the decline in financial capacity the ANC experienced over the past decade. The argument is made that as the ANC experienced a decline in support, and the loss of positions in councils at local level increased, the financial capacity of the party diminished. It is important to consider the correlation between voter support, the loss of access to influential government positions, and the declining financial capacity of the ANC, which supports the argument that the ANC has become dependent on state and government positions in order to fund the party.

Figure 6: National and Provincial Election Results 2004-2019: ANC



Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

Figure 7: Local Government Elections 2000-2021: ANC Results



Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

Table 7: Total Councils Won by ANC in Local Government Elections 2000-2021

Election	National Percentage of Vote	Number of Councils Won
2000	59,39%	170
2006	64,82%	200
2011	62,93%	198
2016	54,48%	176
2021	46,14%	167

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) (www.elections.org.za)

The argument is made in this dissertation that the decline of the ANC relates directly to the inability or unwillingness of the liberation movement to disengage with those elements of its political behaviour and processes which exist in tension with democratic values. Additionally, this chapter will explore how the elements presented by Gumede (2017) have directly contributed to variables such as poor governance, cadre deployment and factionalism among the members and elite of the ANC, all of which indicate possible continued decline instead of renewal and self-correction by the liberation movement.

Before exploring the political culture of the ANC, it is however important to consider and explore the history of the party. In this regard there are three purposes of exploring the formation and history of the ANC. Firstly, it is important to reiterate that upon coming to power in 1994, the ANC was not a new political movement and, as observed among various other liberation movements in Africa, the ANC underwent important changes and developments during the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid, that would impact its political culture following 1994. Secondly, the ANC was also not the only liberation movement and anti-apartheid organisation active during the decades leading up to the democratisation of South Africa in 1994. The actions by the ANC during the 1980s in particular should be considered as an important aspect of the movement becoming a dominant political party after 1994. Finally, the ANC has since 1994 demonstrated the dualist tendency to revert to reflexes and mechanisms stemming from its liberation movement history, such as centralising decision-making authorities or rejecting dissent within the party when facing criticism from opposition. It remains important to identify and briefly examine some of these historic characteristics still present within the political culture of the ANC.

4.3 Formulating a framework of democratic deficits

Considering the large number of elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017), it is apparent that a more concise approach will be required in order to be effectively applied to the ANC as case study. It is thus deemed important to formulate a condensed frame of reference, utilising the existing elements presented by Gumede (2017). In an effort to formulate a more concise framework with which to examine the political culture of liberation movements, the argument will be posited that the elements presented by Gumede (2017) can be categorised into various sub-groups. It is expected that combining the 20 elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017) will provide an enhanced frame of reference to study the political culture of liberation movements. In formulating a condensed framework, it is also evident that the elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017) should be categorised into two core

stratums, namely inherent- as well as external elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by liberation movements.

4.3.1 Inherent elements of democratic deficit

From the twenty elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017), it was observed that the majority of these elements form part of the inherent political culture of liberation movements. The inherent elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by liberation movements in government, for the purpose of this dissertation, refer to those characteristics which have become internalised within the political culture of the movement, remaining observable following democratisation, liberation or independence. As observed in Chapter two, these inherent elements of democratic deficit emanate from various circumstances, including socio-economic conditions during formation, colonialism, the class-race constituency of the movement, guerrilla tactics adopted against colonial and apartheid governments, global political-economic trends and networks established during time spent in exile by members of the movement.

As indicated previously, the dual political culture demonstrated by liberation movements once in power, may be part of an unwitting reflex integrated in the behavioural fabric of the party or it may be a conscious tactic by liberation movement governments to deflect criticism and remain in power. The argument presented in this dissertation contends that inherent elements of democratic deficit observed within parties such as the ANC, SWAPO and ZANU-PF could be viewed from both perspectives of witting or unwitting political behaviour. It is, however, possible in some circumstances to distinguish between purposeful dualism implemented by liberation movements turned political parties, and instances where integral elements are manifested in the political culture of these parties unwittingly, largely due to longstanding practices and processes.

Considering the dualist characteristics of African liberation movements' political culture, it is therefore argued that the inherent elements of deficit presented by Gumede can be categorised into the following six sub-groups (*Table 8*):

- a) Fusion of state and party (from policy control mechanism to neo-patrimonialism, internal political contestation and factionalism)
- b) Abuse of liberation rhetoric, exploitation of ethnic politics and the ‘cult of violence’ (re-creating the ‘other’ as response to failure and criticism)
- c) The ‘cult of the leader’ and the domination of liberation movements by a small clique, with centralised decision-making authority
- d) Entitlement to rule forever, as the vanguard of liberation on behalf of the people
- e) One-partyism, intolerance of dissent and contempt of opposition and civil society
- f) Moral bankruptcy, ambivalence to democracy, and internalising the undemocratic culture and practices of colonialism and apartheid

Table 8: Condensed Elements of Democratic Deficit

<i>Gumede’s framework</i>	<i>Condensed formulation</i>	<i>External elements</i>	<i>Key attributes¹⁶</i>
One-partyism	One-partyism, intolerance of dissent and contempt of opposition and civil society	The presence of fractured and irrelevant opposition parties in the new political system governed by the liberation movements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adverse posture towards opposition and civil society and their democratic function • Closed debates and discourse • Limited policy adjustment • Limited oversight and accountability
The idea of opposition never properly took root within or outside the liberation movement		The bridling of civil society within the newly established democracy	
Intolerance of dissent			
Discouraging competitive leadership elections			

¹⁶ Key attributes refer to the primary manifestations of the involved condensed element in the table. These attributes will be discussed in Chapter four on democratic consolidation and development in South Africa.

Entitlement to rule forever	Entitlement to rule forever, as the vanguard of liberation, on behalf of the people		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevalence of personal rule among leadership • Promotes strongman politics
Members, supporters and citizens allow leaders to act as vanguard			
Fusion of party and state	Fusion of state and party (from policy control mechanism to neo-patrimonialism to factionalism)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weakened state • Service delivery failures • Promotes corruption and neo-patrimonialism • Promotes factionalism • Prevalence of political violence • Challenges in terms of development and transformation • Hinders good governance • Promotes parallel economies • Promotes nepotism, and cronyism
The abuses of liberation and independence rhetoric	Abuse of liberation rhetoric, exploitation of ethnic politics and the 'cult of violence' (re-creating the 'other' as response to criticism)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotes populism • Adverse to social cohesion • Promotes tribalism • Promotes intolerance and political violence
Playing ethnic politics			
The cult of violence			
The cult of the leader	The 'cult of the leader' and the domination of liberation movements by a small clique, with a centralised decision-making authority		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unilateral policy decision-making • Limited accountability by leaders • Prevalence of personal rule among leadership • Promotes strongman politics
The domination of liberation movements by a small clique			
Centralisation of decision- and policy-making			

Moral bankruptcy of African liberation movements and their leaders	Moral bankruptcy, ambivalence to democracy, secrecy and internalising the undemocratic culture and practices of colonialism and apartheid		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contradicts legitimacy of government and state • Lack of transparency • Repressive behaviour by party-state • Distorts social-compact • Service delivery failures
Ambivalence to democracy			
Internal operations of many African liberation movements are undemocratic			
The culture of secrecy			
Internalising the (political and social) culture of undemocratic colonial governments			

Source: Author's interpretation and summary of the elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017).

4.3.2 External elements of democratic deficit

For clarity it will be argued that apart from the inherent elements of deficit, there exist two external elements (*Table 8*) of democratic deficit, often contributing to the difficulty and challenges experienced by liberation movements to govern within a newly established political system. These external elements, as presented by Gumede, include:

- a) The presence of fractured and irrelevant opposition parties in the new political system governed by the liberation movements
- b) The bridling of civil society within the newly established democracy

It is important to note that the framework below includes the two 'external elements' as identified within the framework presented by Gumede (2017). The elements of 'fractured and irrelevant opposition parties' as well as 'the bridling of civil society' as presented by

Gumede (2017), are deemed to be outside the political culture of liberation movements, and rather relate to the political-economic environment inherited by liberation movements upon coming to power. It is, however, not suggested that these two external elements are not exploited by liberation movements or aggravated within post-liberation societies, particularly to deflect criticism and opposition towards the liberation movement turned political party.

4.4 Elements of democratic deficit observed within the ANC as political party

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there are various commonalities in the political cultures of African liberation movements which explain these movements' difficulty in governing within a democratic political system. Evidence does not suggest that these commonalities are limited to African liberation movements (Dudouet, 2009)¹⁷, however the focus of this dissertation remains on the African variant of these movements. The following section will consider the inherent- and well as two external elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by the ANC, with specific reference to the impact of these elements on the ability of the ANC to govern within a democratic system, since coming to power in 1994.

4.4.1 One-partyism, intolerance of dissent and rejection of opposition and civil society

According to Gumede (2017), African liberation movements are prone to rejecting the democratic principle of tolerating opposition. Mohamed Salih (2018: 26), however, argues that South Africa is an exception in terms of multi-party democracies in Southern Africa, as it consists of a 'vibrant multi-party democracy, and an ANC dominant party state'. The argument by Mohamed Salih (2018) may be accurate in terms of the political system of South Africa, and the freedom awarded to civil society to legally participate in governance

¹⁷ Refer to liberation movements examined by Dudouet (2009) such as the 19th of April Movement/M-19 (Columbia), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri-Lanka) and Free Aceh Movement/GAM (Indonesia) for details of liberation movements outside Africa.

and politics as guided by the constitution, however, this argument does not necessarily imply that the ANC, as the ruling party, accepts the role and function of opposition parties.

Although the South African political system never consisted of a one-party system since 1994, what has been observed within the structuring of the ANC between the 1980s and early 1990s, include efforts to form an alliance between the SACP, labour unions (COSATU) and the ANC. In uniting the SACP and COSATU with the ANC, it could be argued that this effort provided the ANC with a wider mandate in representing the rights of not only Marxist and socialist ideologies, but importantly also, that of the black workers in South Africa. Taking advantage of its hegemonic position within the UDF during the 1980s, the party ensured that it came to represent the masses by the early 1990s. Harvey (2021: 27) suggests that the active role of the ANC in promoting the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) between the 1960s and 1980s created the perception that the ANC would be the best representative of the African masses and working class following 1994. The perception of the ANC representing the workers of South Africa is however emphasised by Harvey (2021) as a misrepresentation. According to Harvey (2021: 146-149; 179-183), the ANC has a long history of being concerned and promoting the interests of a 'black middle class instead of being concerned with the working class'. Harvey (2021: 183) argues that, since its formation, 'all the ANC wanted was what Marxists refer to as a "bourgeois democracy" society, though a non-racial one, which did not confront capitalism at all'.

Harvey's (2021) argument suggests that the ANC, since its formation in 1912, aimed to increase political presence through merging the proponents of Marxism and labour unions with the ANC's initial black middle-class aspirations. Harvey (2021: 188) also suggests that when studying the historic relationship between the ANC, labour unions and SACP (which included other ethnicities), it is 'very evident that the ANC have exploited the simple demographic fact that the African people are the overwhelming majority of the South African population'. Harvey (2021: 188) suggests that 'not only did the ANC wantonly abuse this numerical superiority in a racist chauvinistic sense, but they have exploited it in their own class interests, and not to advance the interests of the black

working class, which has been the main support base of the ANC since the 1940s onwards’.

Harvey (2021: 190), Butler (2007: 37) and Britz (2011: 76) argue that the ANC, although not coming to power in 1994 within a one-party system, has since its formation demonstrated tendencies to promote its hegemonic position within the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid, particularly in its exploitation of its alliance with the SACP and COSATU. The argument is made in this dissertation that since the late 1970s, the ANC actively pursued a position to become the driving force among liberation movements in South Africa, a tendency associated with the party’s promotion of one-partyism and unilateral behaviour emanating from Marxist influences. It is, however, not merely the promotion of one-partyism and its perception of dominance that is observed within the ANC. The party regularly demonstrates the claim of being the only true liberator and mass movement of South Africa. Since 1994, much of this behaviour have started to be directed towards opposition parties in South Africa. During the presidency of Thabo Mbeki this characteristic became clearly evident, with Mbeki even rejecting opposition to the ANC in parliament (Johnson, 2003: 215).

In its policy discussion paper, the ANC (18 May 2022: 18) argues that ‘it is the bitter reality that the party has been kept out of government since 2021 by the phenomena of small opposition parties ganging up to keep the ANC out of power.’ Viewing the function of opposition parties as ‘ganging up’ against the ANC indicates a clear rejection of opposition politics by the party. Multi-party competition and political freedom is deemed to be a primary requisite for democratic consolidation and good governance, however the ANC portrays the role of opposition parties as negative and hostile. This stance by the ANC, twenty-eight years since democratisation, also indicates a clear continuation of the political culture of the ANC to be the hegemonic party within the South African political-economy and the liberation struggle, presently associated to the struggle to implement the NDR by the ANC. As is indicated in later sections of the policy discussion paper of the ANC, the party continues to perceive itself as the only driver of transformation for the majority of South Africans, rendering opposition parties as not only opposing the party,

but opposing the entire framework of the Freedom Charter and NDR. After opposition parties criticised the ANC for defending President Ramaphosa following the Phala Phala¹⁸ theft scandal was revealed in 2022, according to a report in News24 (Gerber, 10 October 2022), the chairperson of the ANC caucus in the national assembly, Seiso Mohai, compiled a letter in which Mohai suggests that opposition parties in parliament acted like Hitler's brown-shirts and the Fascist black-shirts of Mussolini. Mohai also noted that 'the attacks on democracy by some of the South African opposition parties, with the uncritical complicity of the media, have been concentrated on the head of state, President Cyril Ramaphosa' (Gerber, 10 October 2022).

Maintaining the perception that the ANC personifies the liberation cause, the party also proclaims that the 'coalitions formed to keep the ANC out of office, have less in common than a crowd of drunkards in a beer hall, and these opposition coalitions are on a crusade to obliterate the national transformation project of the ANC' (ANC, 18 May 2022: 18). It is noteworthy that the ANC in this regard do not acknowledge the important role of opposition parties as mechanisms of oversight, and the possibility that the fact that opposition parties achieved electoral support to form coalitions stems from various failures of the ANC itself, particularly in local government. According to Schrire (2000), despite the ANC's initial acceptance of the 'rules of the game', the party remains ambivalent about the concept of legitimate opposition. It is also argued by Schrire (2000) that 'while the ANC recognises the philosophical justifications for an opposition, it harbours serious reservations about the nature of opposition in South African politics.' The key variable raised by Schrire (2000) is the notion of legitimate opposition, and it is not difficult to understand why the ANC, as the hegemonic movement in the long liberation struggle against apartheid, view all opposition to the liberation movement as existing in direct opposition to the core values and objectives of the ANC. The ANC, which views itself as the only true representative of the South African majority, cannot logically and simultaneously accept that opposition parties also aim to better the circumstances and living conditions of all South Africans, as this would contradict the purpose of the ANC's

¹⁸ Phala Phala is the name of the private farm of President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Limpopo Province from where Ramaphosa owns a lucrative commercial game farming business.

existence. The argument made in this dissertation posits that the ambivalence towards opposition demonstrated by the ANC relates primarily to self-image of the liberation movement upon democratisation. Prior to democratisation, the ANC enjoyed not only the moral legitimacy to combat apartheid by any means possible, including undemocratic means, but the party could also manoeuvre with significant legal and political opposition during the struggle period. Following the transition in 1994, the ANC now faced various platforms of government in which opposition parties would continuously monitor, report and even sanction legal action against the ANC, if these parties deemed the ANC to be erring in its governance. Additionally, whereas the ANC could rely on the free media to reflect the moral legitimacy of the ANC during the struggle period, the media became increasingly critical of the ruling party's governance as the years passed since 1994. It is also not difficult to realise that this tendency among the free press in South Africa and abroad remains difficult to accept, a matter which also relates to the perception by the ANC that due to its struggle history, the party should remain largely immune to media scrutiny.

It is important to note that although the South African political system does not reflect the external elements presented by Gumede, in which liberation movements often govern, it could be argued that the reaction of the ANC towards opposition and criticism emphasise the observation that the ANC throughout its history as a liberation movement, have not come to accept or adjust to opposition in a democratically mature manner. This argument is supported by Harvey (2021), who argues that one reason why the ANC came to be the primary force within the liberation struggle, instead of the SACP, could be explained by the lack of strong Marxist and Socialist movements in South Africa since the early 20th century.

Apart from disregarding the role of opposition, the ANC also promotes the perception that the liberation movement is the only viable solution to implementing effective socio-economic transformation in South Africa, and the party vilifies any opposing entity, including opposition parties in pursuit of political change, as being set against the poor and transformation cause (ANC, 18 May 2022: 18). In its policy discussion paper of 2022,

the ANC (18 May 2022: 18-19) also continues the rhetoric that the ANC is the only entity that can effectively govern South Africa and implement the policies and strategies of the NDR and Freedom Charter. The unilateral political authority the ANC ascribes to itself in its 2022 policy discussion paper also criticise the emergence of independent candidates since 2021, including those independents who are former ANC members.

The party discussion paper is critical towards ‘independent candidates’ that have made some gains in terms of receiving electoral support in recent elections and by-elections. It could be argued that the Constitutional Court ruling that enabled an increase in electoral participation for independent candidates in South Africa should be viewed as the promotion of democracy, however the ANC remains critical of this development. The political culture of the ANC which posits the party at the centre of governance and transformation have proved to be detrimental to the ability of the party to conduct introspection and corrective measures from the analysis of its failures since 1994. It is argued in this dissertation that the ANC has maintained the political culture of intolerance towards dissent within its ranks, as explained by Gumede (2017), adopted during the struggle period when the party had to operate as a liberation movement and guerrilla force against the apartheid state. It is also argued that in its failure to examine dissent and criticism from opposition, internal debate, the media or civil society, the ANC has increasingly missed the opportunity to utilise diverse internal as well as external discourses within South African society to the party’s advantage.

In demonstration of the ANC’s reaction to criticism, the Minister of Police, Bheki Cele reverted to ejecting the director of civic organisation, Action Society, Ian Cameron from a community meeting on 5 July 2022, after the minister felt insulted by criticism raised by Cameron during a community meeting in Gugulethu in Cape Town. Cameron blamed the minister and the police for not deploying enough resources to ‘fight crime in informal settlements in Cape Town’ (Charles, 6 July 2022). It was reported that the ‘community meeting in Gugulethu descended into a screaming match after Cele told Cameron to “shut up”’ (Charles, 6 July 2022). According to a report by Timeslive, ‘Cele lost his cool during a community meeting in Gugulethu in the Western Cape after Action Society director of

community safety Ian Cameron challenged the minister on the alleged failure of police to combat crime in the area' (Zeeman, 6 July 2022). According to the report, 'Cele spent several minutes defending his struggle credentials, and when Cameron attempted to respond to Cele, the minister told Cameron to shut up, listen or get out' (Zeeman, 6 July 2022). Shortly after this altercation, Cameron was removed from the community hall by police officials. In the video of the incident between Cele and Cameron, Cele claimed that Cameron was disrespectful towards Cele in his tone, and Cele claimed that Cameron spoke to the minister as if the minister is a 'garden boy', which indicate the willingness by Cele to deflect criticism by making racial connotations to such opposition.

The membership of the ANC has, however, not demonstrated a clear rejection of poor governance and intolerance to dissent by the leaders of the party. Harvey (2021: 326 - 327) suggests that the scandal surrounding public funds utilised to make additions and upgrades to the home of former president Zuma at Nkandla 'demanded action of members of the ANC, but predictably there was none'. According to Harvey (2021: 327), when 'critical public issues involve the ANC, the party bosses intervene very quickly to stamp out any dissenting voices in the branches'. This, according to Harvey (2021: 327), is only possible 'because the ANC uses its bureaucracy rather than moral authority to whip disgruntled members into line'. Such political culture has also been demonstrated by the ANC during incidents of 'votes of no confidence' against former president Zuma in parliament, as will be dealt with in a later section.

Gumede (2007a: 13) also suggests that criticism towards the ANC by party members was by 2007 largely muted, with party seniors claiming that internal criticism will provide ammunition to the opposition and detractors of the party. The argument made by Gumede and Harvey (2021) should be viewed as a reflex by the ANC to discourage dissent pre-1994. Considering the liberation movement history of the ANC, it could be argued that in some instances, constructive debate and criticism from within the party and its allies were often also viewed as dissent and rejected as such, political behaviour that would impact on any entity's ability to apply introspection and self-correction from time to time. Matisonn (18 August 2022) notes that the challenges faced by the South African economy in 2022

emanates ‘from the failure of the ANC and its allies to open up debate on how socialist countries were reversing their ideology to work with the private sector, even while calling it socialism, with Chinese characteristics’. Of more importance according to Matisonn (18 August 2022), is the observation that the ‘ANC do not learn from mistakes timeously, and they do not correct errors.’ It is argued in this dissertation that debate and constructive criticism from within the party, could have allowed for more urgent corrections made to policies. The characteristic of the ANC in viewing internal criticism as ‘ill-discipline’ rather than an opportunity to implement introspection has since 1994 increasingly become exploited by party leaders to avoid internal criticism. In eThekweni Metro for example, the ANC leadership in May 2023 considered limiting ANC councillors from speaking to the media and effectively preventing such councillors to portray the ANC-led management of the eThekweni Metro in poor light (Singh, 24 May 2023).

It is important to note that these elements of political culture should not be viewed as separate and independent characteristics. It is argued that these elements of political culture, demonstrated by the ANC, as well as other liberation movement governments such as ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia, are very closely related, with one element often reinforcing another, which could be argued to be a hindrance in correcting such political behaviour. It is therefore logical to accept that by perceiving itself as the primary political authority within South African politics and society, it is understandable that the ANC would attempt to find external causes to its failure, often claiming the right to govern forever.

4.4.2 Entitlement to rule forever, as the vanguard of liberation, on behalf of the people

During February 2022, former president Thabo Mbeki was delegated to the Free State Province, where the former statesman was charged with reinstating coherence and unity among the fractured structures of the ANC in the province. Mbeki publicly stated that South Africa will become ungovernable should the party collapse, arguing that due to the local, provincial and national influence and leadership of the ANC, the economy will collapse (Nkanjeni, 22 February 2022). The statement made by Mbeki (Nkanjeni, 22

February 2022) is not a new claim, as variations of this rhetoric, including that the ANC will rule until the second coming of Jesus (Ngoepe, 5 July 2016), have emerged from the ANC leadership. These types of statements could be viewed as the prevalence of self-proclaimed ownership of the ANC of the liberation of South Africa, and the entitlement to rule forever. De Waal (15 August 2022) notes that the ANC, in its most recent policy discussion document, claims to be the 'sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa'. The claims made by the ANC in its 2022 policy discussion document demonstrates the stance by the party that the interests of the ANC are place above that of the country and its population. The argument is made that this stance by the ANC further contribute to the party's justification of utilising state resources for the benefit of the party and the self-interest of its members and leaders. The notion that the party is the sole representative of the people of South Africa also contributes to justification of the policy of cadre deployment.

During a media briefing in July 2022, the newly elected ANC chair and premier in Gauteng, Panyaza Lesufi, claimed that 'in the absence of the ANC, this country [South Africa] will be doomed and that the country will be difficult to run' (Khoza, 9 July 2022). Lesufi also claimed that 'without getting the ANC right, we will struggle to get SA right. When you divide the ANC, you divide society' (Khoza, 9 July 2022; Nkosi, 9 July 2022). The ANC chair in Gauteng also referred to opposition parties and claimed that 'they may try, they may form new formations, they may merge new formations and they may form coalitions, but the reality is there is only one movement for our people and that movement is the ANC' (Khoza, 9 July 2022; Mahlali, 9 July 2023). It is noteworthy that Lesufi currently chairs the ANC in Gauteng, a province the ANC may lose control of following the 2024 elections due to continued decline in voter support since 2016 (Cilliers, 2022; Naki, 9 April 2023; Hunter, 12 May 2023).

Considering the recent statements by Mbeki as well as other leaders of the ANC, it could be argued that what the ANC leadership are actually referring to is the fact that due to ANC cadre deployment to all sectors of the state, a collapse of the ANC will lead to the collapse of the state, albeit temporarily. This directly relates to the finding by Gumede that

liberation movements are prone to fusing the state with the dominant party established by the former liberation movement once in power. Gumede (1 July 2022) argues that ‘unless stopped now, the ANC deployment policy will be responsible for the total collapse of the state, economy, and social breakdown’.

4.4.3 Fusion of state and party (from policy control mechanism to neo-patrimonialism to factionalism)

The Zondo Commission reports¹⁹ emphasise the severe impact of corruption and neo-patrimonialism on the ANC-dominated state of South Africa. Since the late 1990s, corruption has become endemic to the South African state and public institutions, most of which have become dominated by the ANC through the party’s policy of cadre deployment (Mkhabela, 2022). According to Markakis (2018: 33), ‘seizing political power has been the goal of all liberation movements since the start of African independence, and because the site of political power is the state, liberation movements aim to seize state power, even if the state in question is of colonial origin.’ Although this argument refers to the reason why liberation movements are prone to fuse the state with the movement or party, Gumede (1 July 2022) emphasises that the ‘one main reason for the failure of so many African countries, ruled by liberation movements since independence from colonialism and white-minority governments, has been the policy of cadre deployment, whereby party cadres are appointed to key positions in government, business and civil society’. In the South African context, cadre deployment within state owned enterprises have been particularly devastating to the economy, although, such deployments have not necessarily exceeded the challenges caused by the political appointment of incompetent and unqualified cadres of the ANC, particularly within local government.

¹⁹ Refer to Zondo Commission into Allegations of Corruption and State Capture in South Africa, chaired by Judge President Raymond Zondo between 2018 and 2021. A total of six reports were released by the commission, covering a variety of irregularities within state departments and state owned enterprises during the administration of Jacob Zuma.

There is no evidence disproving the argument that the ANC's cadre deployment policy and practices since 1994 have had devastating impacts on the state institutions and state owned enterprises of South Africa since the late 1990s. It could also be argued that the poor service delivery and the failure of various crucial state agencies and institutions are direct results of the cadre deployment practices of the ANC. Aiming to deploy loyal and aligned cadres of the party to important managerial positions within all state departments in order to promote the policies of the ANC through service delivery, has deteriorated to the practice of nepotism and cronyism, whereby ANC supporters and loyalists are rewarded through receiving high ranking positions in the state. Such practices of the ANC rendered the state as a tokenistic mechanism to maintain patronage networks. This has also had the effect of deploying incompetent and unqualified cadres to critical positions within the state and government, which Tsholo (2021: 27) refers to as 'instigators of government inefficiency'.

Inefficiency within the state and government negatively impacted service delivery in various sectors in South Africa, including health, education, energy, sanitation and water, labour, home affairs, housing and transport. Mlambo *et al.* (2022: 13) point to the negative impact of cadre deployment in relation to the capacity of the state to provide effective service and policy implementation, as 'the ANC's cadre deployment prioritises allegiance above merit and even competence and is thus a significant impediment to the deliverance of effective services.' Utilising the public sector as a means to maintaining patronage provides an additional challenge over the long term, in that such practices often conflate the public sector beyond what could be sustained. According to Sebake and Sebola (2014: 749), despite the possibility that the ANC implemented its cadre deployment policy with good intentions, the question remains whether this practice was 'manipulated as a gate-pass to corrupt employment by the ruling class or by individuals to create patronage and gate-keeping using government employment'. ANC cadre deployment, according to Sebake and Sebola (2014: 749), has led to negative practices in South African public service appointments, including nepotism, favouritism, poor service delivery, and brutal gatekeeping against non-loyalists in the public sector. The argument made by Sebake and Sebola (2014) is supported by Brierley (2020), who suggests that cadre deployment

and appointments made on the basis of patronage, perpetuates a broader clientelistic political economy. Apart from a clientelistic economy, it has become evident that the deployment of loyalists to different factions within the ANC manifested in conflicts which hindered the management of important institutions in South Africa. Since 2016 it has become clear that the heads of institutions such as the Public Protector, have become increasingly embroiled in political interference and internal conflict within the ANC. The appointment of Busisiwe Mkhwebane as the successor to Thuli Madonsela as Public Protector was a controversial matter due to the fact that Mkhwebane was perceived as a loyalist to Jacob Zuma. The appointment of Raymond Zondo as the Chief Justice by President Cyril Ramaphosa was questioned due to the impact of the Zondo Commission of Enquiry on Jacob Zuma, and so too the role and function of executives like Tom Moyane²⁰ at SARS, appointed by Zuma, led to internal disputes which would damage the operations of these institutions.

According to Reddy (2016: 7), the practice of political patronage associated with the ANC's cadre deployment policy, violates the essential principles of good local governance. In this instance there is a contradictory development in terms of the stance of the ANC on cadre deployment. Despite the policy being severely criticised by various institutions and civil society bodies over recent years, including the Zondo Commission (Haffajee, 24 June 2022), the ANC remains silent in terms of ending this practice. The situation surrounding unqualified managers appointed within local government, however, has deteriorated to such an extent that President Ramaphosa recently signed the Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 2022. The act is aimed at barring municipal managers and other senior municipal managers from holding political office (Felix, 18 August 2022). The act was passed by parliament, with an ANC majority, however the party remains unwilling to remove its cadre deployment policy from within its own agenda. Despite the ANC's justification of cadre deployment, the State Capture

²⁰ Tom Moyane was appointed by former president Jacob Zuma as the commissioner of SARS in 2014 and has been implicated in various controversies related to state capture in South Africa. See also Khumalo et al. (29 May 2023).

Commission²¹ however found that this practice is unlawful and unconstitutional (Haffajee, 2022: 296), a matter which the ANC NEC has not adequately address to date.

In the North West Province, the deployment of ANC cadres has led to an internal report presented during the elective conference of provincial leadership during the weekend of 26 to 28 August 2022. In the report, the ANC admits that 13 of the 22 municipalities placed under administration that are governed by the ANC in the province have collapsed by 2022. In 2018 the entire provincial government was placed under administration due to the failure of service delivery (Njilo, 28 August 2022). The ANC report also indicated that challenges at local municipalities in the North West emanates from poor management (Njilo, 28 August 2022). In a study by Chamisa and Shava (2018) it was found that 'cadre deployment exacerbated problems related to corruption, poor procurement systems, wasteful expenditure and the deteriorating state of local government'.

The negative impact of poor governance and mismanagement of state and government institutions has been well recorded in the findings by the Auditor General of South Africa, however the argument is made in this dissertation that apart from exploiting cadre deployment as a means to maintain patronage networks by the ANC, this practice have also allowed the infiltration of state departments and spheres of government by the elements within the private sector aimed at utilising corruption for personal gain. The effect has been that political appointments within the state and government have become contentious, not only between the ANC and opposition parties, but among ANC members themselves. The ANC has also reported that in the North West province, criminal syndicates have compromised ANC leaders at local government level, and the awarding of tenders and contracts in the province have become strained by the involvement of criminal syndicates in such processes (Njilo, 28 August 2022). According to the internal report presented during the North West conference of the ANC, there are at least two organised crime syndicates, referred to as amaRussia and Tshabarefete, operating in the Bojanala and Dr Kaunda regions in the North West Province, and in attempts to influence the awarding of tenders in these regions ANC members, councillors and ANC caucus

²¹ Refer to State Capture Commission Report: Part VI, Volume 2: 67 on the findings of Judge Zondo.

meetings are intimidated and disrupted when they do not adhere to the instructions of the abovementioned syndicates (Njilo, 28 August 2022). The ANC's Provincial List Committee (PLC) mandated to investigate and rectify the manipulation of candidate lists of the ANC prior to the 2021 elections have found that 155 [out of 879²²] North West candidates of the ANC have been appointed irregularly due to candidate list manipulation by the party in 2021 (Makhafola, 15 March 2022). An important aspect regarding cadre deployment includes the argument that this practice is often initially implemented by liberation movement governments as a means to ensure that the 'liberation and transformation agenda represented by the movement, is replicated in all spheres of society and the state and thereby service delivery should be enhanced'. The argument supported in this dissertation implies that the initial intention of such practices is not necessarily relevant, as the effects thereof have already been proven to be detrimental to good governance and service delivery. Secondly, it has also been demonstrated that cadre deployment, as a manifestation of state-party fusion by liberation movements, is related to the perception among these movements that control of the state will translate into total liberation from colonialism or apartheid regimes. Considering arguments made in terms of the ANC striving to consolidate its hegemonic position within South African politics (Cooper, 2015; Harvey, 2021), it could however be argued that cadre deployment rather forms part of the historic clientelistic characteristic inherent to liberation movements, rather than a strategy to cement the transformation agenda within the state in order to serve the population. The argument that cadre deployment enhances transformation in developing states is not supported by evidence.

Apart from good governance and the impact on democratic consolidation, cadre deployment by the party also has a severe impact on society and the political system as a whole, particularly in terms of factionalism as a result of competition for state resources by ANC members. The argument made by Beresford (2015) is supported in this dissertation, arguing that political gatekeeping associated with cadre deployment and neo-patrimonialism within the ANC leads to the behaviour of both 'spoils consumption' as well as 'crony capitalism'. Beresford (2015) describes 'spoils consumption' as the use of

²² Updated data published by IEC in October 2021, (www.elections.org.za)

control over public resources for private ends, and ‘crony capitalism’ as the exploitation of connections to public authority to facilitate private capital accumulation.

The behaviour described by Beresford (2015) is not difficult to observe within the ANC, as well as the cadres deployed by the ANC. The findings of the Zondo Commission²³ provide a detailed account of how cadre deployment by the ANC contributed to the institutionalisation of both ‘spoils consumption’ as well as ‘crony capitalism’, albeit on a national and provincial level. In demonstration of this fierce factionalism, on 22 October 2022, former president Zuma held a media briefing and claimed that President Ramaphosa is a criminal and has committed treason (Gerber, 23 October 2022). Criticism towards President Ramaphosa appeared so unusual that the ANC leadership in Kwa-Zulu Natal, which is pro-Zuma, released a statement in which former leaders of the party, including Zuma, were called to order and requested to implement restraint when raising grievances outside ANC internal procedures.

Political violence as a result of cadre deployment by the ANC, which dominates access to state and regional finances, is not well documented in terms of accurate data sets (Kim, 2021: 10; Bruce, 2013: 13). The observation in relation to further required research surrounding the circumstances around political assassinations and murder in South Africa, it is argued that an important variable to be considered includes the occurrence of political assassinations in relation to important political events in South Africa. According to Kim (2021: 14) the rate of political murders in South Africa indicated an increase in both 2016 as well as 2019, both years in which elections were held in South Africa. It is of concern however that Kim (2021:14) also argues that only 60-70 percent of political assassinations are detected and recorded in South Africa. Bruce (2013: 13) relates political killings in South Africa directly to internal political rivalry, particularly since the late 1990s and 2000s. According to Matamba (2023: 14) politically motivated assassinations in South Africa have risen significantly since 2020, in which 24 assassinations were recorded, with 30 cases in 2021 and 40 in 2022. Matamba (2023: 20) makes the observation that since 2016, political assassinations have increased on a national level,

²³ Refer to State Capture Commission Report: Part VI, Volume 2: 67 on the findings of Judge Zondo.

and is not only limited to Kwa-Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga. The argument made in this dissertation is that the impact of cadre deployment within regional and local government also create significant challenges in terms of corruption, service delivery and violent political contestation, which were not necessarily emphasised by the Zondo Commission reports.

Chipkin (2016: 226) suggests that the weak state of public institutions to deliver services to communities have to a large extent also deteriorated the cohesion among different communities, with various sections of society opting to privatise their service delivery and local governance through the creation of home owners' associations, private estate body corporates and cooperatives aimed at providing efficient services. These privatised communities, however, mostly exclude other communities on the basis of race and financial status.

4.4.4 Abuse of liberation rhetoric, exploitation of ethnic politics and the 'cult of violence' (re-creating the 'other' as response to criticism and deflecting failure)

The history of the ANC, as a liberation movement, have remained an important narrative for the party since 1994, with the party often referring to its central role in liberating South Africa from Apartheid.²⁴ It is however worth noting that since 1994, the ANC has consistently adapted its rhetoric regarding 'liberation'. The emergence of advocates of 'radical economic transformation' (RET) within the ANC itself, indicates the manoeuvring of political leaders within the ANC to not only project the ANC as the only driver of transformation, but a specific faction is promoted as the 'torch bearers' of the Freedom Charter, NDR and radical transformation. The ANC, specifically the RET faction of the party, are often observed appealing to the workers and poor, the majority of whom are African, to support the ANC in its quest to achieve radical economic transformation.

There exists much criticism of the liberation rhetoric utilised by the ANC since 1994 (Harvey, 2021: 190; Pillay, 2021: 56), suggesting that from studying the history and

²⁴ Refer to Mathekg, 2021; Harvey, 2021; Southall, March 2014.

policies of the ANC since its formation, the party 'was never at any point in time a revolutionary mass movement, leading the struggle for the fundamental transformation of the South Africa society' (Harvey, 2021: 190). Harvey (2021: 192-193) also considers the claims of the ANC to represent Africans and the black workers in South Africa as a 'myth' which was exacerbated after 1994 by the dominance of the ANC and through the establishment of a 'small black bourgeoisie and black middle class, at the expense of the black working class'. In terms of controlling the narrative various arguments can be made, including that the ANC's hegemonic position within South African politics enables the party to dominate the 'liberation struggle rhetoric'. The SACP and COSATU, as members of the tripartite alliance, are not observed to be dominating the liberation struggle rhetoric, thus providing the ANC with ample space to manoeuvre in this terrain.

As demonstrated in previous sections, a prominent argument made by the ANC in its 2022 policy discussion paper relates to the perception that the ANC is the only political entity in South Africa that can bring about effective transformation. This rhetoric is commonly utilised by ANC leadership, on a national as well as regional level, however the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), as a breakaway party from the ANC, has provided the ANC with strong competition within the terrain of 'transformation', particularly among the youth and student organisations. The ANC however still dominate the 'liberation struggle' rhetoric, with current leaders still in a position to rely on struggle credentials in appealing to the masses. It has been observed however that when under pressure, the ANC have relied on liberation struggle rhetoric in order to create a clear divide between the 'enemy' and the liberation movement. The utilisation of concepts such as 'White Monopoly Capital' as the cause which has prevented development and socio-economic transformation in South Africa since 1994, provides a clear indication of the ANC's reliance on liberation struggle rhetoric in order to divert attention from its own failings in providing services and transformation. This observation is in line with the findings of Melber (2002) and Gumede (2017) who argue that liberation movements often deflect criticism by exploiting their struggle credentials, ethnic mobilisation and tribalism.

The recent policy discussion paper released by the ANC, however, clearly documents the party's reliance on ethnic politics to deflect failures. In its policy discussion paper of May 2022, the ANC reiterates that:

'In 2020, 7.8 percent of the South African population, (which happens to be white) constituted 64.7 percent of top management positions and 52.5 percent of senior management posts (Department of Labour – Commission for Employment Equity Annual Report, 2021). In quarter 3 of 2021, according to Stats SA, unemployment among Africans was at 38.6 percent compared to 9.2 percent among whites' (ANC, 18 May 2022: 10).

Considering the employment statistics utilised by the ANC in 2022, it is important to consider that the argument made by the ANC is contradictory, as the party has been in charge of labour policy since the 1990s, and has been unsuccessful to transform these demographics by 2022, with the unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2023 estimated at 32.9 percent (StatsSA, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 1: 2023). In 1994 the unemployment rate was 20 percent (BusinessTech, 12 November 2019). The ANC also fails to indicate that as a legacy of apartheid, Africans have been marginalised and disadvantaged in terms of quality education and opportunities towards tertiary training, however since 1994 the ruling ANC has neglected to effectively improve the basic educational system of previously disadvantaged communities. Reflecting the challenges in the basic education system, between 2002 and 2021 the rate of student participation (higher education) for individuals aged 18 to 29 in South Africa increased from 4.3 percent (2002) to 6.5 percent (2021) (StatisticsSA, General Household Survey, 2021: 19). The rate in participation in higher education between black Africans and white individuals aged 18 to 29 indicates continued inequality, with 29.6 percent of white individuals participating in higher education in 2021, and 5.3 percent of black Africans enrolled at an institution of higher education in 2021, increasing from 2.9 percent (2002) for black African individuals, and increasing from 15.5 percent (2002) among white individuals (StatisticsSA, General Household Survey, 2021: 19). The argument is made that although the statistics indicate continued inequality in terms of managerial positions within the economy, there are

numerous variables which have contributed to this statistic, including poor governance by the ANC cadres deployed to government departments, failed policies and corruption.

The history of the ANC and its association with Communism and Marxism also provides the party with alternative forms of rhetoric to deflect failures. Apart from utilising ethnicity to explain the slow progress in terms of transformation since 1994, the ANC also refers to so-called ‘lumpen elements’ among the black middle and upper classes. The ANC policy discussion paper heavily relies on Marxist rhetoric in explaining the lack of service delivery and transformation among the black working class in South Africa. The discussion paper released by the ANC makes the following argument:

‘Monopoly capital and various elements of the erstwhile colonial bourgeoisie often act in a manner that undermines or slows down the process of transformation. Further, among these and the rest of the white middle strata, there are lumpen elements of various types some of whom have found common cause with their peers among the emergent black middle and upper strata’ (ANC, 18 May 2022: 13).

In this instance again, the ANC’s dualist characteristic is clearly observed in the manner in which corruption and a lack of transformation is explained as a neo-colonial phenomenon. While the private sector in South Africa is often involved in corruption and maladministration associated with the state, the ANC has since 1998 intensively implemented its policy of cadre deployment, which placed ANC loyalists and party leaders at the helm of the state and most government departments. The argument made by the party thus implies that those cadres deployed by the ANC willingly form part of the neo-colonial system. The ANC in this regard also portray a party of two economic ideologies, on the one hand utilising Marxist rhetoric to explain failures, while at the same time being the partly responsible for the liberal economic policies implemented since 1994. In arguing the progress made by the ANC led government since 1994 surrounding gender equality, the policy discussion paper makes the following statement:

‘At the public service level, women have significantly grown in numbers as both judges and magistrates in the judiciary and in 2019, there were 38.5% women judges on the bench, starting from just one women judge (white) in 1994’ (ANC, 18 May 2022: 104).

It is noteworthy that the ANC policy discussion paper makes the racial distinction when referring to appointed female judges in the judiciary in 1994. The discussion document also proceeds to explain various threats posed by the ‘white community’ as was observed during the 2021 unrest:

‘Precautionary measures are necessary to limit the security risk posed by certain elements within the white community who had started to form security militias in response to the unrest’ (ANC, 18 May 2022: 118).

The generalisation made by the ANC discussion paper with regard to ‘white communities forming militias’ to defend themselves against social instability supports the argument that ethnicity is one of the central themes of the 2022 discussion paper of the ANC. What the ANC is failing to admit in its argument is that the cause of the July 2021 unrest and looting was as a direct result of ANC factionalism (Africa et al., 2021). Additionally, the ANC has been leading the security and policing sector since the 1990s, and due to the failure in service delivery by the security cluster of the state, private and community-based initiatives have become the norm. Community Policing Forums (CPF’s) are organised and mandated by the South African Police Service Act (68 of 1995), and forms the primary mechanism to coordinate crime prevention between the state and civilian communities in South Africa. The establishment and functioning of CPF’s are promoted by the ANC-led government, however failures by the SAPS to effectively prevent crime within South African communities, has motivated civilians and the private security industry to implement steps to safeguard their communities against crime. The argument made in this dissertation does not suggest that racism is not present within private and community safety initiatives, however, these organisations are the product of poor governance and

failure by the ANC led government²⁵, a matter which the ANC does not address in the discussion paper. It is important to consider that the ANC has deployed cadres to various national and provincial departments within the security cluster, however ANC representation in the community safety initiatives at grass roots levels are not effective. The community safety initiatives by previously white communities are often perceived as racist by the ANC, despite the 2022/2023 fourth quarter crime statistics indicating a 3.4 percent increase in crime when compared to the 2021/2022 fourth quarter (Kahla, 30 May 2023). During the fourth quarter of 2022/2023 murder and assault increased by 3.4 percent, attempted murder increased by 8.4 percent while assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm increased by 0.7 percent compared to the same period in 2022 (Kahla, 30 May 2023). There exist within the rhetoric of the ANC contradictory notions of racism within community based security initiatives. The formation and functioning of CPF's for instance are mandated in legislation and all communities are entitled to establish and participate in CPF's in their communities. The ANC however make generalised racial references to the demographics of certain CPF's in different communities, ignoring the fact that the ANC was and remains an important contributor to the very same law that allows for the establishment of CPF's.

Race and ethnicity remain prominent within ANC rhetoric across various sectors. In 2017 former president Zuma addressed parliament in response to debates on the State of the Nation Address, during which 'Zuma spoke candidly about the history of colonialism in South Africa, where white people from European nations, such as the Netherlands, settled on South African land. Zuma also stated that the dispossession of land from black South Africans continued with apartheid and, at present, white South Africans continue to own large parcels of land' (Pather, 16 February 2017). Despite the arguments made by the ANC government surrounding land reform, in April 2022 following severe floods in Kwa-Zulu Natal province, 448 shack-dwellers lost their lives, and 40 000 informal settlement residents were displaced due to the disastrous flooding (Reliefweb, 2022). In Amaoti, a township north of Durban, residents faced severe risks even before the floods

²⁵ This argument is supported by the crime statistics for 2022/2023 4th Quarter published in May 2023, as well as the statistics for 2023/2024 1st Quarter published in 18 August 2023.

struck the province. According to one report the residents of Amaoti ‘balanced precariously on the embankment of a collapsed road, trying to fetch clean drinking water from a broken pipe underneath’ (Aljazeera, 14 April 2022). Following the floods in Kwa-Zulu Natal, the head of the Abahlali Mjondolo housing activism organisation in Durban, Sbu Zikode, commented that the ‘problem of landlessness goes back to the apartheid era that prevented black South Africans from owning land, but nearly three decades since the apartheid system was abolished, land distribution and economic inequality remain unresolved’ (EWN, 23 April 2022).

It is however not the first time that Sbu Zikode or the Abahlali organisation raised concerns about the lack of housing in Durban and eThekweni municipality. Greg Ardé describes how activists associated with the Abahlali group, calling for greater distribution of land and housing to the poor, are referred to as being ‘agitators with sinister agendas’ by the ANC councillors in eThekweni, and between 2013 and 2019 sixteen members of the Abahlali activist group have been murdered in political assassinations (Ardé, 2020: 192).

As stated earlier in this dissertation, the impact and legacy of colonialism and apartheid remains a significant variable in terms of transformation and the reduction of inequality in South Africa, however, in 2023 the ANC has been in power for 29 years, and these socio-economic challenges remained severe²⁶. When pressure started to build in 2017 surrounding the lack of land reform in South Africa, it became evident that former president Zuma and the RET faction gravitated towards ethnic politics in their rhetoric, explaining the failure of land reforms due to ‘whites owning large parcels of land’ (Pather, 16 February 2017). This argument made by Zuma as well as other ANC leaders, is viewed as superficial, and a deflection of the failure of the ANC led government to implement an effective land reform strategy since coming to power. It is also noteworthy that the land reform debate in South Africa has primarily revolved around commercial agricultural land, and not necessarily urban land ownership, spatial transformation and housing. The argument is made in this dissertation that the land reform debate has become politicised, primarily due to the ethnic variable utilised by the ANC in explaining the lack of progress

²⁶ Refer to global stability ranking of South Africa, *Table 1*.

in terms of land reform. According to Kirsten and Sihlobo (2022), the already difficult debate about land reform in South Africa contains various misperceptions about the statistics on land and the commercial agriculture sector in South Africa. The debate surrounding expropriation of land and the monopoly of white farmers, ignore variables such as the fact that black farmers have since 1994 privately (without any state assistance) purchased 7.2 million hectares of agricultural land (Kirsten et al., 2022). Political rhetoric surrounding land reform also do not account for the hindrances to the process caused by an ineffective public service (responsible for implementing land reform), corruption and patronage (Kirsten et al., 2022). According to Kirsten et al. (2022) it is disingenuous to of politicians and commentators claiming that only 8 percent of farmland has been redistributed to black owners, not to take into account the progress made since 1994 in terms of land reform and redistribution. Despite the continuous reference to slow progress by the ANC, official data indicate that since 1994 roughly 24 percent of farmland in South African has been redistributed to black owners, 20 percent of which was transferred from white farmers to black farmers (Kirsten et al., 2022)²⁷.

Resembling the militant rhetoric used by the SWAPO leaders in Namibia following severe losses in the 2019 polls, the policy discussion paper of the ANC also makes the following statement in terms of resolving the limited socio-economic transformation in South African society:

'The ANC as an agent for change demands that war be declared against lumpens. The party must weed out lumpen elements within its structures for its own survival. The ANC can no longer function without a strong, highly political and disciplined security structure to support its leadership organs' (ANC, 18 May 2022: 14).

Reference to a so-called 'political security structure within the ANC' should be viewed as highly uncommon behaviour from a political party within a democracy. Suggesting that the ANC establish or re-establish an internal security structure relates to para-military

²⁷ Kirsten & Sihlobo (2022) utilised official sources and datasets in order to determine the realistic redistribution of land in South Africa since 1994.

activity, which could very likely be directed towards civilians and opposition to the ANC. In this regard the establishment of the Crime Prevention Wardens (CPW) programme by Gauteng premier Panyaza Lesufi in February 2023 raises various concerns. It was reported that the CPW programme was established unlawfully, as the Gauteng Department of Community Safety did not consult with the Minister of Police nor did the department obtain the required authorisation from the Minister of Justice prior to establishing the programme in Gauteng (Heywood and Pongweni, 29 August 2023). Heywood and Pongweni (29 August 2023) raised various questions with regards to the nature of the programme, particularly surrounding the possibility whether the CPW programme could be abused by Lesufi and other ANC leaders in Gauteng for personal gains.

One of the risks of exploiting ethnic-ideological politics and liberation struggle rhetoric is that such behaviour by political leaders may lead to increased social instability and even violence, especially when minorities or foreign nationals are blamed for failures in governance. It is widely accepted that community frustration due to the lack of service delivery often lead to violent protests in South Africa, however there is evidence that the use of violence has often been an inherent part of the ANC's political culture, often utilised to achieve certain political and personal agendas. Apart from documented political killings, which are attributed to political contestation among ANC councillors and elites, especially in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Eastern Cape, members of the ANC utilise violence and the threat of violence as a means of averting attention, often directed at the critiques of the movement or certain leaders thereof. In November 2022, the legal representatives of journalist Karyn Maughan sent a letter of cease and desist to ANC member Carl Niehaus, (Patrick, 5 November 2022). In a public Twitter statement Niehaus stated that 'we must keep kicking this dog harder so that her owner who pays her comes out' (Patrick, 5 November 2022). Niehaus' comments relate to the media coverage of the criminal case against Jacob Zuma by Maughan, a matter which led to Zuma laying civil charges against Maughan for allegedly revealing his private medical information to the public. According to Maughan's lawyers, Niehaus' comments are 'especially egregious, considering the alarming levels of gender-based violence and femicide in South Africa, not to mention the

global escalation in killings of female journalists’ (Patrick, 5 November 2022). In July 2023 Zuma failed in his appeal against the Pietermaritzburg High Court preventing him from continuing with the private prosecution of not only Maughan, but also the lead prosecutor in the arms-deal case, Billy Downer. In this regard violence, as a political mechanism in resolving factional disputes within the ANC, is of significant concern. A recent report by Chipkin *et al.* (2022) suggests that political contestation among the ANC elites has increasingly spilled over to violent protests and civil unrest in South Africa. According to Chipkin *et al.* (2022), ‘patronage and repression are the most likely reasons why protests stabilised and declined between 2013 and 2017’ (Chipkin *et al.*, 2022: 2), during the height of Jacob Zuma’s presidency. The argument is made that ‘keeping the ANC together has come at the expense of the constitutional framework, the economy and the capability of the state’ (Chipkin *et al.*, 2022: 2). By considering a wide range of databases, indexes and methodological approaches, the study by Chipkin *et al.* (2022: 11) argues that there is limited correlation between the incidence rate of protests and service delivery and governance ratings, suggesting that ‘the character of protests has either changed over time, or more likely, that numerous research interpretations have underestimated the (party-) political character of protests.’

Chipkin *et al.* (2022: 12) also found that due to the dominance of the ANC since 1994, the party faced limited threats from outside the party and thus internal contestation, often resulting in violence, posed a more significant risk. This suggests that political protests are expressions of intra-ANC contestation between competing elites. Referring to the use of violent protest as a means of inter-party contestation, it is argued that the ANC itself has become central to violent protests and instability (Von Holdt, 2011; Africa *et al.*, 2022). The argument made should be viewed from the perspective of the external element of ‘weak opposition’ within the South African political system. The environment in which the ANC took power in 1994, largely contributed to the prevalence of internal contestation within the ANC itself.

Chipkin *et al.* (2022: 12) also devised a methodology in which the correlation between violent protests and ANC events and periods of contestation were compared. The

methodology utilised by the study included the perception levels of service delivery as well as national events such as elections. The study by Chipkin *et al.* found that incidents of violent protest increased and ‘spiked when contestation in the ANC was especially intense and or had come to a head’. The latter study (Chipkin *et al.*, 2022: 12) confirmed this pattern in various provinces and considered a wide variety of ANC events, or events involving the leadership of the ANC, including Jacob Zuma, cabinet reshuffles and even the firing of then finance minister, Pravin Gordhan. (Chipkin *et al.* 2022: 18) and Rademeyer (2023: 13) argue that patronage during the Zuma administration played an important role in keeping local elites in the ANC in line, however ‘the increase in violent protests since 2018 suggest that Ramaphosa simply does not have the same authority in the ANC as did Zuma, nor is Ramaphosa willing to use violence and patronage to the same extent as his predecessor’. An important point emphasised by the research of Chipkin *et al.* relates to the underlying presence of violence, as a political mechanism of inter-party contestation, within the ANC prior to and post-1994. As argued by Chipkin *et al.* (2022), although the ANC was able to manage internal contestation through internal processes, these measures have become unsustainable over the past decade, leading to an increase in political contestation manifesting as violent protests and social instability.

The findings by Chipkin *et al.* (2022) were emphasised in the report of the Expert Panel into the July 2021 Civil Unrest (Africa, Sokupa & Gumbi, 29 November 2021), which suggested that ANC factionalism and internal conflict is posing a serious risk to stability and democracy in South Africa. Cilliers (October 2016) argued that factionalism within the ANC is likely to lead to violence in future, as political contestation within the party increases. From assessing the prevalence of violent service delivery protests and the organisers of these incidents, it becomes clear that the liberation struggle tactic of making government ungovernable remains an important element within the strategies of many ANC leaders, particularly on local government and branch level. Violence implemented by ANC members and leaders are more often than not physical and, as was the case during the history of the ANC, when the liberation movement tortured and murdered party members suspected of being infiltrators and collaborators of the apartheid government, the party continues to direct violence towards its own members. One such incident

involved the murder of ANC MK member, Muziwakhe Ngwenya (also known as Thami Zulu), in 1989. After being appointed as the MK commander in Kwa-Zulu Natal in 1983, it was known that Jacob Zuma opposed the appointment of Zulu, because he was from Soweto (Du Preez, 2013: 67). After MK operations from Swaziland were ambushed by the apartheid security forces, the leaders of the ANC security apparatus, Jacob Zuma and Joe Nhlanhla, ordered Zulu to report to Lusaka where he was detained for questioning (Du Preez, 2013: 68). According to Du Preez (2013: 67), Zulu was successful in phoning his father while in detention, during which Zulu informed his father that he is being tortured and that he feared for his life (2013: 68). Zulu pleaded for his father to contact Chris Hani and Joe Modise to intervene on his behalf, however when Zulu was released by the ANC in Lusaka by November 1989, he was in such poor condition that he died five days after his release (2013: 68). One of Zulu's associates in MK was also detained and beaten to death by the ANC's Department of Security and Intelligence (NAT) members in Lusaka (Du Preez, 2013: 68).

Regardless of the prevalence of violent protests in South Africa, whether part of ANC internal contestation or as a result of bona fide service delivery grievances and poor governance, one of the most damaging manifestations of violence still present within the South African political landscape is the incidents of political assassinations as recorded by Greg Ardé (2020), who have found that the political violence of IFP and ANC contention have made way for political violence and assassination directly associated with contestation within the ANC itself, particularly in Kwa-Zulu Natal.

There is an additional factor in terms of the role of violence utilised as political mechanism by the ANC. The emergence of Julius Malema as the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was promoted by the former president of the ANC Jacob Zuma, in efforts to mobilise support during the period leading up to the 2007 Polokwane conference of the ANC. Malema, then the leader of the ANCYL, was allowed to lead a radical campaign in supporting Zuma as the next president of the ANC. As the leader of the ANCYL, Malema coined the phrase, 'we will kill for Zuma', without the ANC taking any precautionary measures in terms of the public incitement of violence by its youth league leader. It is

argued that the radical campaigns led by Malema as the ANCYL leader, in support of Zuma's presidency, marked the emergence of ethnic populism becoming increasingly evident in the rhetoric of the ANC. Harvey (2021: 301) relates this phenomenon in the ANC and even EFF to the presence of chauvinist African nationalism within these parties, which is suggested to be utilised as mechanisms to promote personal material interests of the leaders of the ANC and EFF.

After a break in the relationship between Zuma and Malema in 2011, Malema was expelled from the liberation movement, and founded the EFF. Upon establishing the EFF, Malema was very successful in transporting the 'cult of violence' from the ANC Youth League to the EFF. This would suggest that the cult of violence inherent to the ANC, has the capacity to be replicated to splinter movements, organisations and even new political parties emanating from the ANC. Additional research will be required in order to explore this hypothesis, particularly among Southern African liberation movements.

The utilisation of violence among ANC members and leaders is not limited to physical acts of violence in order to achieve personal political objectives. Jacob Zuma in 2022 did not hesitate to warn the judiciary, through his legal representation, that not allowing for a postponement of his criminal case in the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court in Pietermaritzburg could very well lead to a repeat of the large-scale violence and looting observed in July 2021 (Maughan, 1 June 2022). In this context it becomes clear that the manifestation of violence is not always required by the ANC or its leaders to implement its authority, as the mere threat of violence also serves as an effective mechanism. It however remains part of the repertoire of the ANC, especially when criticised or under legal-political threat.

4.4.5 The 'cult of the leader' and the domination of liberation movements by a small clique, with a centralised decision-making authority

It could be argued that the role played by charismatic leaders within the ANC formed an important part of the movement's success during the struggle period. The role of leaders such as Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela were also crucial during the early 1990s and

transition period in 1994. The role and impact of a strong leader during periods of armed conflict and struggle is important, and the ANC is most definitely not the only liberation movement that demonstrated the sanctity of the leader, even following liberation. This tendency was observed in Zimbabwe as well as Namibia following independence and there is a case to be made that the ANC demonstrated this tendency pre-1994, however the negative effects of this tendency within the ANC were displayed during the administrations of Thabo Mbeki and, to a large extent, Jacob Zuma.

According to Cooper (2015: 161), prior to the 2007 Polokwane elective conference, the ANC spent decades in cultivating ‘the myth of infallible leadership in which loyalty to the movement, its cause and its principal spokespeople tended to become conflated’. Cooper (2015: 161) also argues that following the death of chief Albert Luthuli in 1967, ‘his position as party leader was assumed by the exiled deputy president of the movement, Oliver Tambo, who served 24 years in office without submitting to election other than his unopposed appointment by a small band of elite members’.

Considering the efforts by former president Mbeki to centralise decision-making to the executive and national platforms of the ANC indicated a continued practice of unwavering loyalty towards the leader of the party. The 2007 Polokwane conference however demonstrated a shift within the ANC, albeit temporarily, when Mbeki was defeated by Zuma. Following the recalling of Mbeki from office and the inauguration of Zuma as president of the country, Zuma swiftly implemented measures to remove opponents and possible contenders for the leadership of the party (Cooper, 2015: 162). This dissertation argues that between 2009 and 2012 Zuma effectively neutralised the primary opponents to the leadership of the party, including ANCYL leader Julius Malema, creating the platform from which Zuma could build on establishing a loyal patronage network throughout all provinces and levels of the party. It should be noted that although Zuma exploited the political culture of unwavering support to the party leader, the ANC’s inability to timeously correct this deficit has greatly contributed to the decline of the party and the various challenges faced by the majority of South Africans.

In the ANC, the protection and shielding of the leader from public criticism and accountability are perceived as strict codes of conduct and discipline among party members. Since coming to office as the President of South Africa in 2009, Jacob Zuma faced six votes of no confidence, four of which were voted on in parliament, one was withdrawn and one was amended (Wilkinson, 2017). The four motions voted on in parliament were all defeated by the ANC caucus, including a secret ballot in August 2017, which provided ANC members of parliament with an opportunity to avoid disciplinary repercussions in voting with the opposition. Despite mounting allegations of corruption and state capture, including the findings of the public protector report against Zuma, the majority of ANC MP's chose not to deviate from party protocols, and voted against the motions of no confidence against Jacob Zuma. The inherent political culture of revering the party leader allowed Zuma to remain in office for an extended period of time, even allowing Zuma to provide access to state resources to the Gupta family. Zuma also utilised the protection from party members to strategize with regard to having a favourable successor elected at the end of his term.

In terms of leadership, Gumede (2017: 5) argues that liberation movement leaders are also often reluctant to 'step down from political office'. This became evident when, following the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of the ANC in December 2017, it required some negotiating among the members of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) to convince Zuma to resign as President of the Republic of South Africa in 2018, allowing Cyril Ramaphosa to take office at the Union Buildings. The matter of ANC leaders refusing to relinquish public office, or senior positions within the party, even after being criminally charged in court for serious crimes remains prevalent. Various leaders of the RET have relied on the 'cult of the leader' feature within the ANC to remain in position, as has been the case with suspended ANC secretary general Ace Magashule and Zandile Gumede. An important observation by Gumede (2017: 5) in relation to liberation movements is the feature whereby its leaders become irreproachable, despite glaring flaws, corruption and even unconstitutional behaviour. The so-called 'hands-off' campaigns which emerged at the court-cases of senior ANC leaders, also resemble an

unwavering support and promotion of leaders despite the often public discrepancies in their behaviour.

While appearing in court in June 2021, former eThekweni mayor Zandile Gumede was supported by a group of two hundred and fifty individuals who gathered outside Durban High Court. Gumede received this support despite facing 2 786 counts of fraud, racketeering and corruption amounting to R320 million, along with her twenty co-accused (Maharaj, 14 June 2021). Supporters outside court stated that they would continue to support Zandile Gumede, despite the charges against her, as they believe that Gumede will be the future regional ANC chairperson of the eThekweni region (Maharaj, 14 June 2021). Gumede's supporters' prediction in 2021 was justified when Zandile Gumede was indeed elected as the chairperson of the eThekweni region in April 2022 (Papayya, 10 April 2022).

The ANC NEC, despite swiftly acting to rectify the 2017 'step-aside' resolution of the party, which stipulates that no official could be nominated and elected to a position in the party in the event that that individual is facing a serious criminal charge, is not adamant to distance themselves from these accused leaders and former leaders. The ANC is also not willing to disassociate or discipline those members of the party publicly supporting criminally charged leaders. It is argued that the party is often unable to publicly discourage support for charged leaders, as this would expose the ANC to the risk of that particular leader convincing mobilised voters to consider an alternative to the ANC during the next elections. The mobilisation of votes by leaders or aspiring leaders within the party have become an important mechanism of 'strongman' politics within the ANC, and it is often observed within the regional and provincial hierarchies of the party.

Related to the 'strongman' politics demonstrated by ANC leaders, is the political culture of centralised decision-making processes. This behaviour emanates from the party's liberation movement history, and according to Dudouet (April 2009: 26), the ANC leadership often made unilateral decisions during the struggle, without internal or external consultations, in an effort to seize opportunities that arose during the late 1980s and early

1990s in order to promote peace negotiations with the National Party (NP). Such a unilateral decision was taken by Nelson Mandela, when he wrote a letter from prison to PW Botha in which Mandela outlined the principle of majority rule in South Africa, while also considering the fears of the white minority (Dudouet, April 2009: 26). According to Dudouet, this unilateral decision by Nelson Mandela was an important pre-emptive step which led to the central role played by the ANC during the peace negotiations to follow (Dudouet, April 2009: 26). Mandela did however indicate afterwards that ‘sometimes leaders have to act now, explain later’ (Dudouet, April 2009: 26). Following democratisation in 1994, the ANC maintained this practice of centralised decision-making, often vested within a small elite of leaders within the party. This practice would have significant implications for the ability of the party to hold their leaders to account.

Harvey (2021: 326) argues that the ‘most senior officials in the ANC control the party’ and the role of branches are often limited to acting as ‘rubber-stamps’ for the decisions taken by the ANC NEC and top six of the party. Harvey (2021: 327) also suggests that ‘executive decisions without prior agreement at policy conferences have determined the crisis in every area of public and social policy since 1994’. The domination of liberation movements by the elite beyond democratisation is an element emphasised by Harvey, who suggests that the ANC was founded by an elite class of educated black Africans in 1912, dominating the leadership of the ANC throughout its history, despite claims by the ANC that the movement is non-racial and represents the black working class in South Africa (Harvey, 2021). Harvey (2021) views these claims by the ANC since its formation as a ‘myth’ and argues that the dominant black middle-class in the ANC have exploited the narrative of Marxist and socialist ideology in order to gain the support of black workers and unions in South Africa, as this support would ensure that the ANC attain the majority of support as a political movement during the struggle, and also during elections following liberation. The centralised decision-making practices of the ANC are viewed as a remnant of the party’s adherence to Stalinist and communist styles of governance during the liberation struggle.

4.4.6 Moral bankruptcy, ambivalence to democracy, secrecy and internalising the undemocratic culture and practices of colonialism and apartheid

Since opposition parties started to erode the legitimacy of Jacob Zuma in 2015 and 2016 (Van Wyk, 30 August 2022), the moral authority of the ANC as a party increasingly came into question. The results of the 2016 local government elections indicate a sharp decline in the voters' confidence in the ANC and the legitimacy of the party and its leaders to govern. It could be argued that the fact that the ANC remained adamant to protect Zuma while allegations of corruption was mounting against the former president, severely damaged the moral authority of the party, as was reflected in the 2016 election results. Political morality, after all, is directly related to the perception of legitimacy.

The ANC and its elite are often implicated in behaviour that raise questions in terms of moral decisions and democratic behaviour, as is the case among other African liberation movements. It is, for instance, difficult to ignore the fact that many African leaders have opted to utilise education and medical services abroad rather than the state facilities which their population is expected to utilise. The former Deputy President of the ANC and South Africa, David Mabuza, often travelled to Russia in order to receive medical care (Mokone, 3 September 2021; Merten, 9 December 2021), and so too did former Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, travel to South East Asian facilities in order to receive medical care (Thornycroft, 16 January 2011).

Following the devastating floods in Kwa-Zulu Natal in 2022 the premier of the province, Sihle Zikalala, received serious criticism when a state operated water tanker was directed to his private residence, while many residents were suffering from water shortages due to the flooding and destruction of infrastructure (Erasmus, 21 April 2022). Moral bankruptcy is an element which could be demonstrated clearly within the ANC's elite, as was extensively detailed in the six reports released by the Zondo Commission. During the height of the Covid-19 lockdown, ANC cabinet minister, Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams published a photograph of the minister having a meal with colleague, and in the process circumventing lockdown regulations applicable to all South Africans. The fact that

Ndabeni-Abrahams transgressed the regulations is not as indicative of moral bankruptcy as the minister's insistence to publish photographs thereof on social media. This behaviour by a member of the national executive of South Africa indicates a lack of moral awareness by such ANC leaders, as the consequences for her behaviour was not considered by the minister prior to the action. This was also demonstrated by Minister of Social Development, Lindiwe Zulu in 2020, when Zulu (deputy Minister of Social Development at that time) published photos of herself on social media in a shopping mall during lockdown in South Africa, an incident which led to Zulu having to issue a public apology (Department of Social Development, 21 March 2020). In August 2023, Minister Zulu was accused of nepotism in attempting to appoint Linton Mchunu as director general in the department, which led to the labour union Nehawu²⁸ writing a letter to President Ramaphosa calling for Zulu's immediate dismissal over the incident (Maluleke, 13 August 2023).

Serious questions have been raised by the allegations made against President Ramaphosa himself regarding an alleged theft that occurred at his private property in 2020. The theft is reported to have included a large sum of US Dollars, with opposition parties suspecting that the matter was covered up due to the possibility that the President was transgressing various financial laws while being in possession of the foreign currency. The President has remained silent on the matter to a large extent, indicating that the law must take its course before he is willing to make an announcement on the matter. It is important to consider the ANC's defense of Ramaphosa following the release of a report by an independent Section 89²⁹ panel of legal experts, in which it was found that President Ramaphosa has committed at least four serious violations as the executive (Ngcobo, et al., 30 November 2022: 79-82). The report was rejected by the ANC majority during a vote in the national assembly in 2022 to implement the recommendations of the Section 89 panel.

²⁸ National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union.

²⁹ Section 89 of the South African Constitution makes provision for the appointment of an independent panel appointed by the National Assembly to make findings relating to the conduct and accountability of the executive.

The Zondo Commission reports also implicate various individuals within the ANC elite in criminal activity including Jacob Zuma, Duduzane Zuma, Arthur Fraser, Gwede Mantashe, Ace Magashule (former member³⁰), Brian Molefe, Matshela Koko, Dudu Myeni, Vincent Smith, Mosebenzi Zwane, Nomvula Mokonyane, David Mahlobo, Thabang Makwetla, Zizi Kodwa, Cedrick Frolick, Winnie Ngwenya, and Malusi Gigaba (Davis, 3 March 2022). The final report released by the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into State Capture emphasised that the ‘cadre deployment’ policy of the ANC was unconstitutional and illegal, and according to the chairperson of the Commission, Judge Raymond Zondo, there is also ‘no reason for the ANC deployment committee to exist’ (Haffajee, 24 June 2022). It was further revealed that until the commission hearings started in 2018, ‘the ANC deployment committee had operated in secret, and it didn’t even keep minutes until recently’ (Haffajee, 24 June 2022). In relation to the element of secrecy, the ANC shares the same background as many other liberation movements in Africa, in that secrecy during years of active conflict was not an option for these movements, often functioning under difficult and covert circumstances in exile. For the ANC, secrecy was a forced necessity in order to continue the struggle against apartheid. Secrecy within the ANC is however an element that became increasingly incompatible within the democratic system post-1994.

During the period leading up to the imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma in July 2021, for defying an order by the Constitutional Court to testify at the Zondo Commission, the Minister of Police Bheki Cele visited the residence of Zuma in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Cele, a public representative, did not divulge the purpose of his meeting with Zuma, nor did Cele divulge the capacity in which the minister visited Zuma. Taking into account the significant damage and violence, including the death of more than 300 people, following the incarceration of Zuma due to civil unrest in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng in July 2021, it should be considered whether the details of the meeting between the ANC deployed Minister of Police and the former president were in the interest of the public. Details emanating from the meeting between the abovementioned ANC leaders, even if Cele conducted the meeting in his role as a member of the ANC NEC and ANC led cabinet,

³⁰ Ace Magashule was suspended from the ANC in 2023 and formed the political party ACT.

any forewarning of the ensuing violence to follow provided to the public could most likely have reduced the damage to the economy and personal circumstances of those affected.

The element of secrecy is well recorded in the history of the ANC, and according to Good (2003: 15-16) during the 1980s the 'UDF experienced latent opposition from the ANC, as the ideas and practice of openness and accountability were unattractive to the great leaders in jail and exile'. It remains evident, evaluating the elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by the ANC that these behaviour traits largely emanate from the party's liberation movement history. In terms of competitive leadership elections, the party conducted its first leadership elections since 1958 in 2007. The factional divides caused by this event would set the stage for coming internal strife within the party.

According to Cooper (2015: 163-164), the procedure in electing the top six leadership of the ANC is, in theory systematic, transparent and democratic in nature, however in practice, the ANC's presidential succession procedures have 'never quite functioned in a democratic manner'. Cooper (2015: 164) also suggests that it is understandable that ANC leadership avoided competitive leadership elections during the struggle period in order to avoid factionalism and divisions within the liberation movement, and thus Oliver Tambo was elected unopposed as the leader of the ANC between 1967 and 1991. Following the passing of Tambo, Nelson Mandela was appointed leader unopposed, succeeded unopposed by Thabo Mbeki in 1999. The process through which the ANC parted from the long-held practice of electing its leaders during the Polokwane conference in 2007, revealed that the party had not fully adjusted to the principles of democratic processes since 1994.

Cooper emphasises that the competitive leadership election of 2007, during which Mbeki was defeated by Jacob Zuma, should have indicated a shift towards increased democratic internal procedures for the ANC, however it became clear that attempts to establish a more democratic and competitive election process of ANC leaders, led to the increased influence by 'party oligarchs and entrepreneurs to influence the outcome through vote-buying within provincial and branch structures' (Cooper, 2015: 164). By 2007, the ANC

had not considered and mitigated the impact of vote-buying among its leadership and external parties, which would compromise the internal processes of the party to elect its leaders in a democratic and transparent manner. It could be argued that although the ANC party envisioned improved democratic processes in electing the leadership of the party, according to nominations and preferences of grassroots members at branches, this attempt was hampered by the long history of the ANC in electing its leaders unopposed as well as the presence of corruption and patronage within and around the party, which in 2007 had already merged with various state institutions providing leaders access to significant state resources and financial and personal benefits.

Between 2009 and 2012 the internal processes in nominating and electing the ANC leadership also demonstrated significant deficits, with various provincial conferences questioned by ANC members in litigation processes, emphasising allegations of fraud and list manipulation in the Free State, Western Cape, Limpopo and North West provinces (Cooper, 2015: 166). Lodge (2014) argues that corruption, neo-patrimonialism and cronyism should be viewed as the main contributors for the deterioration of the internal leadership election processes of the ANC party. According to Lodge, the neo-patrimonial practices observed in the ANC since 1994 were established and developed during the formative years of the movement in the early twentieth century, particularly surrounding the patronage opportunities provided to traditional leaders and community leaders by colonial and apartheid administrations (Lodge, 2014: 7).

The irregularities observed within the internal processes of the ANC over the past two decades, according to Lodge (2014: 7), relate to the fierce competition for influential positions within the party on all levels, and such observed behaviour is merely 'a reflex developed during the ANC's cooperation with apartheid institutions that became hubs for clientelistic undertakings, including apartheid era community boards in black townships'. It should be considered that the internal processes of the ANC were influenced by Soviet Union communism, which shaped the ambivalence towards democracy within the party elite.

Lodge (2014: 9-10) further argues that since the 1950s, following increased militancy within the ANC and banning of the movement, the activities and networks of the liberation movement increasingly came into contact with criminal networks in order to continue the liberation struggle against the apartheid state. It is thus suggested that the flawed internal election processes of the ANC observed twenty-nine years since democratisation, are driven by increased competition for access to state resources to maintain patronage networks, which include criminal syndicates. The origins of neo-patrimonialism and corruption within the ANC forms part of remnants of the movement's formation and history, which was aggravated by the merger of the ANC with criminal syndicates escalating in the 1980s as a means to wage a liberation struggle. Party leaders exposed to such criminal enterprises have however remained in the organisation following 1994, when the ANC was required to transition from a liberation movement to a formal political party.

Cooper (2015: 170) argues that the ANC's elective conference and the challenges and allegations surrounding the internal processes indicate that the party's internal democracy has deteriorated, largely due to the centralisation of authority within the party and neo-patrimonial factionalism. However, this dissertation suggests that the ANC, as a liberation movement, did not internalise democratic processes during the struggle, and thus Gumede's argument surrounding the 'ambivalence to democracy' demonstrated by liberation movements should be perceived as the main contributor to the present-day behaviour of the ANC in terms of electing its leadership.

Since 2007 the process within the ANC has not improved and in 2022, during the regional and provincial elective conferences of the ANC, various disputes were raised by aggrieved members. Such disputes often led to ongoing litigation by affected members, as was observed in North West. The controversy surrounding the nomination and election of regional and provincial leaders facing criminal charges was also prevalent during the 2022 elective conferences of the ANC, strengthening the argument that the political culture of the party, in electing leaders, has not adjusted to democratic processes and principles of transparency since 1994.

In relation to moral bankruptcy, the ANC and its leaders have demonstrated ambiguous behaviour. Various examples can be emphasised in which leaders of the party acted in stark contrast to the moral values and ethical expectations proclaimed by the party. During the national lockdown implemented by the South African government to prevent the rapid spread of the Covid-19 virus in 2020, the ANC deployee and minister of Communications, Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams, was photographed while having lunch at the home of former deputy minister of Higher Education, Mduduzi Manana (Tandwa, 22 April 2020). As senior leaders in the ANC, both Ndabeni-Abrahams as well as Manana were expected to adhere to the regulations set for all other members of the South African citizenry during lockdown in 2020. Ndabeni-Abrahams was suspended for two months by President Cyril Ramaphosa and the minister pleaded guilty and received a fine for transgressing the Covid-19 regulations in South Africa.

During the Covid-19 lockdown period, the ANC also displayed various additional characteristics which demonstrated a lack of moral behaviour by its leaders. Such incidents included the minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, allowing a delegation of the ANC to travel to Zimbabwe with a South African Air Force jet while South African borders were closed to the public during Covid-19 lockdown (De Villiers, 27 January 2021). A funeral hosted by the ANC for Andrew Mlangeni in 2020 allowed more than fifty (the maximum number of funeral goers during lockdown in South Africa) attendees, while the former Premier of Mpumalanga, Refilwe Mtsweni-Tsipane, also contravened the lockdown regulations during a funeral in 2020 by not wearing a face mask in public as required (De Villiers, 27 January 2021). Apart from contravening Covid-19 regulations in public, ANC deployees have also in the past demonstrated disregard for accountability. Former Minister of Tourism, Lindiwe Sisulu, has been recorded in refusing to attend parliamentary oversight committee meetings, despite being summoned on numerous occasions (Mahlati, 16 November 2022). During the first week of August 2023, ANC deployee and National Minister of Transport, Sindisiwe Chikunga, displayed her disregard for the damage and loss of life during a large scale violent taxi strike in Cape Town, arguing that the City of Cape Town is unlawfully impounding taxis for traffic law violations. The City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Government however argued

that the legislation utilised to impound taxis and enforce traffic laws in the city of Cape Town are derived from the National Land Transport Act, of which Minister Chikunga is the custodian (Nombembe & Swartz, 8 August 2023). Minister Chikunga disregarded the legal aspects in her defence of the taxi industry in Cape Town, blaming the DA-led city of Cape Town for the strike which led to violence and loss of life. This behaviour by the Minister of Transport should be viewed from the perspective of the 2024 General Elections, and it is argued that ANC cadres are prone to reject moral arguments in an effort to convince their constituents to continue to vote for the ANC, despite party leaders continuously legitimising entrenched elite privileges enjoyed by the party elite. The South African population are often confronted with privileges awarded to the ANC elite, including funding for private education, private health care, personal protection services by the state and lavish travel expenditure covered by the state.

4.5 Conclusion

Examining the ANC within the framework of Gumede (2017) indicates that the party's political culture is largely a remnant of its history as a liberation movement, particularly since undergoing ideological shifts in the 1950s. Secondly, the manner in which the ANC's political culture manifested since 1994, with the party often reverting back to 'liberation struggle period' tactics, led to the failure of the ANC to adjust to democratic governance. This failure by the ANC have not only contributed to its decline in terms of electoral support, legitimacy and capacity, but it also contributed to a variety of the current political-economic challenges faced in South Africa, due to poor governance.

In terms of opposition parties forming coalitions to challenge the hegemony of the ANC, it is important to observe two developments in terms of the changing political environment in South Africa. An agreement between the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) in the Kwa-Zulu Natal Province to remove the ANC from power following the 2024 elections (Singh, 1 November 2022), point to the possibility that the ANC may have its support in Kwa-Zulu Natal reduced to levels prior to 2004. An additional reality for the ANC exists in the possibility that the party may also be removed from power

in the Gauteng province in 2024 by opposition coalitions. Booyesen (29 October 2022) argues, however, that the instability demonstrated by coalition governments in Gauteng and Eastern Cape metros in 2022 indicates a difficult transition from one-party dominance to unstable multi-party coalition politics following 2024. According to Booyesen (29 October 2022), there are various drivers which hinder the transition to effective multi-party governance in South Africa, including the disproportionate power wielded by micro-parties as king-makers in various councils across South Africa, patronage and the ANC clinging to power through its dominance of the state. It is the argument of this author that the Multiparty Charter for South Africa³¹ formally established at its inaugural convention between 16 and 17 August 2023 (Macupe, 17 August 2023; Shilowa, 18 August 2023), may change the political environment in which the ANC functions over the coming twenty-four months. The Multiparty Charter for South Africa, if successful in removing the ANC from power on provincial level in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng in 2024, will establish a new era within the political system of South Africa since 1994 and would offer a vast terrain of future research in relation to liberation movement governments and coalition politics in Africa.

Apart from the developments among opposition party coalitions in South Africa, it is the finding of the author that, despite various efforts by reformists in the ANC to self-correct and renew the party following the Zuma era, the political culture developed as a liberation movement, is not likely to be altered over the medium-term, particularly when considering the deeply entrenched practices of neo-patrimonialism, corruption, cronyism and party-state fusion throughout all levels of the party. Reverting to former regeneration strategies which served the party during the struggle period and early 1990s is not likely to succeed in restoring the legitimacy of the party to govern, especially during a period of intense socio-economic volatility and pressure on a global level following the Covid-19 pandemic, aggravated by the Russian-Ukraine conflict. Additionally, the fusion of the party and the state, which increased during the Mbeki administration and intensified during the Zuma

³¹ Formerly known as the 'Moonshot Pact' coalition of opposition parties aiming to unseat the ANC during the elections of 2024. The Multiparty Charter for South Africa comprises of the IFP, DA, UIM, ActionSA, FF-Plus, Isanco and the Spectrum National Party.

administration, have left the majority of state institutions severely inefficient, or entangled in fierce ANC factional battles. The strain on service delivery by the deterioration of the state, local government and parastatals is also likely to lead to further decline of the ANC electoral support, which would imply that following the general elections of 2024, the ANC may experience a decreased capacity to govern and implement policies aimed at realising transformation and development. An important disadvantage to the political culture of the ANC relates to the party's claim to be the only movement or party that can govern, which rejects any inclusive efforts to resolve many of the socio-economic challenges in South Africa. Best practices and alternatives suggested by opposition parties and civil society are rejected by default. The party's continued rejection of opposition, dissent and criticism, choosing party loyalty above good governance and ethical behaviour, have severely damaged the legitimacy of the party to govern. It is also argued that the prevalence of the liberation movement political culture within the ANC has prevented the party from evolving in step with domestic, regional, and global trends. New discourses are viewed as dissent and criticism, while ANC members increasingly revert to former strategies and tactics in order to secure and maintain posts and positions within government, the state and parastatals. Since Jacob Zuma came to office, the use of state and parastatal positions became increasingly prevalent as means of patronage, at the cost of a capable state, service delivery, development and transformation.

Comparing the ANC with Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, it could be argued that the only manner in which the ANC can remain in power beyond 2029, is by reverting to authoritarian tactics, limiting the freedom of expression, press freedom and ability of civil society and opposition parties to perform an oversight role of the activities of government and the state. It is within the reality of total collapse and loss of power that the ANC's decline poses a significant risk to the democratic consolidation in South Africa. Chipkin (2016: 222) raised various concerns with regard to the decline of the ANC, in noting the argument by Calland (2015), which suggests that 'there are prospects of bloody years ahead as the ANC may forsake constitutional democracy in favour of authoritarian populism'. Chipkin, however, also notes that 'dominant parties, including the ANC, are able to adapt to defeat, and that South Africa's fall from democracy was not inevitable' (Chipkin, 2016: 222). It is

important to consider how the elements of democratic deficit demonstrated in the political culture of the ANC would impact on the party's acceptance of defeat in future. Elements such as entitlement to rule forever may become contested once the ANC is truly expected to serve as the opposition, rather than the governing party. The ability of the ANC to create effective and workable coalitions would also be impacted, as the ANC would view itself as the primary political force, with its coalition partners as mere spectators and votes in legislative platforms.

Harvey (2021: 306) suggests that the ANC had ample opportunity, even within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism, to improve the lives of the black majority and workers in South Africa since 1994, however the ANC have failed to deliver transformation to the majority of black South Africans due to corruption. Harvey (2021) also argues that the fact that the ANC leadership have indulged in the trappings of material wealth of the former apartheid government officials, points to the suggestion that the ANC middle-class and upper-classes aim to promote their own capitalist interests rather than serving the working classes and poor of South Africa. This dissertation proposes that corruption is merely a symptom and manifestation of the party's inability to disengage from its historical political culture since 1994. This inability has placed the governance by the ANC in stark contrast with developmental orientation, transformation and principles of democratic consolidation.

Apart from the tension existing between the political culture of the ANC and democratic consolidation, the argument is made that the decline of the party will also impact the democratic consolidation process. The political culture of the ANC is the result of decades of operating as a liberation movement, explaining many of the democratic contradictions displayed by the party since 1994. It is important to note that since its formation, the ANC adjusted its internal processes and political behaviour according to the environment in which it functioned. As stated previously, it would be erroneous to expect the party to disengage from those tactics and mechanisms which proved successful during the struggle period. One observation in this dissertation is the likelihood that ANC members and leaders that have not participated in the liberation struggle, are likely to continue the

liberation movement political behaviour in future, which will prevent the ANC to reform effectively in order to gain renewed legitimacy to govern within a democratic political system.

Considering also the arguments by Leftwich (2000) and Good (2004) in terms of the role of good governance in development and democratic consolidation, it is important to note that the ANC enjoyed significant authority and hegemony to continue in its past behaviour of centralisation, cadre deployment, cult of the leader and rejection of dissent since coming to power in 1994. The conclusion is made that stakeholders to the democracy of South Africa must take note of the political culture of the ANC, as well as the manner in which the party's behaviour exists in contrast with those variables that promote democratic consolidation. It is not suggested that the ANC would necessarily lose control over the National Assembly following the 2024 elections, however, there is evidence indicating that the party will steadily decline in legitimacy and capacity to govern effectively, which in turn will accelerate the party's decline in electoral support. The author argues that the reaction by civil society, opposition parties, institutions of democracy, the judiciary and legislature will likely determine the fate of South African democracy in the near future, as these democratic institutions deal with the impact of the decline of the ANC.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and findings of the dissertation

5.1 Introduction

Chapter five provides the key findings of this dissertation, in respect to the research questions set out in Chapter one. This chapter will also provide a brief examination of the current position of the ANC, with an important general elections process due in 2024.

The following research questions were explored in Chapter one:

- 1) *Is there evidence to suggest that the framework of democratic deficit of Gumede can be applied to the case of the ANC, as a liberation movement government?*
- 2) *Secondly, considering the framework of Gumede, is there a clear correlation between the current decline of the ANC and the party's liberation movement political culture?*
- 3) *Additionally, establishing that the political culture of the ANC is a contributing factor to the decline of the party and various challenges surrounding development and governance, what are the key elements involved in the party's decline?*

5.2 The ANC is on a declining trajectory

The declining trajectory of the ANC is largely attributed to the party's inability to deliver on the expectations of its supporters since 1994, however as argued in previous chapters, the decline of the party should be examined from three perspectives namely, electoral decline, decline in legitimacy and decline in capacity. The finding made in this dissertation suggests that there is a causal relationship between the political culture of the ANC and the three areas of decline experienced by the party. Identifying the causal relationship between political culture and decline of a liberation movement government, offers an

explanation for the argument made by Mathekga (2021) that liberation movements experience a decline in voter support³² after approximately three decades in power.

The question raised by this observation relates to the factors contributing to the timeframe within which liberation movements commence their decline. The finding made in this dissertation point to the failure of liberation movement governments to implement effective governance which would promote democratic consolidation or at least effective socio-economic development over time is roughly three to four decades. The arguments made by Leftwich (2000) and Good (2004) becomes increasingly relevant in this finding, as poor performance in terms of development, economic growth, transformation and reversing inequality in third wave democracies over time would come to reflect the capacity and legitimacy of the liberation movement government, which in turn leads to a decline in electoral support. It is also argued that, as the state increasingly reflect the behaviour and structure of the liberation movement, the association made by society of failures by the state, government and democratic institutions with the failure of the liberation movement, increases simultaneously.

The ANC's centralisation of decision-making and the failure to hold its leaders to account have led to widespread corruption and factionalism within the party, which have aggravated the negative impact if the ANC's policy of establishing a party-state on the South African economy, electricity crisis and development. As observed in the Phala Phala case against Ramaphosa, the ANC has continuously opted to defend their leaders, in particular the president. The stance taken by some ANC leaders including Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Lindiwe Sisulu and Tony Yengeni, that Ramaphosa should resign due to the Phala Phala investigation, does not necessarily reflect a moral stance but a factional battle during the build-up to the ANC National Conference in December 2022. Opposition to Ramaphosa from within the ANC should be viewed as contestation for position by certain members of the party elite, which they are unable to secure under the presidency of Ramaphosa.

³² Refer to *Figure 1 – 5* which indicates a decline in voter support for Southern African liberation movements.

5.3 The applicability of the framework presented by Gumede

One of the key findings of this dissertation is that the framework of elements of democratic deficit presented by Gumede (2017) is in fact applicable to not only the ANC, but also to the liberation movements in South Africa's neighbouring states, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe), SWAPO (Namibia), Frelimo (Mozambique) and APLA (Angola) in Southern Africa³³. The finding made in this dissertation presents the argument that in order to assess and examine the maturity of democracy, development and transformation in those states governed by liberation movement governments, the framework presented by Gumede emphasizes important variables in relation to the impact of the political culture of these governments on elements of good governance, democracy and development. The framework presented by Gumede (2017) is thus valuable, particularly as a means to expand on current and future research. The similarities identified among liberation movement governments in Southern Africa, it would be of value to consider the following focus areas for future research:

- The strategies of reform available to liberation movement governments to reverse decline in support, capacity and legitimacy within a democratic system.
- The elements of democratic deficit in political culture that would influence the acceptance of transfer of power or power sharing by liberation movement governments. In this regard it would be important to conduct future research in relation to elements of 'cult of violence, state-party fusion, rejection of dissent and opposition and exploitation of liberation struggle rhetoric'. The period leading up to the 2024 elections in South Africa provides ample opportunities for research in relation to the reaction by the ANC to opposition coalitions, power sharing and even the possibility of transition of power. It would be of value to explore the possibility of the ANC adapting to a changing political environment, in which coalition politics becomes increasingly relevant.

³³ See also findings of Britz (2011) on political culture of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe in Chapter one of this dissertation.

- An important focus area to explore in future relates to the tactics by the ANC in relation to disrupt local and provincial coalition governments following the 2024 elections. This focus should consider the role of Cosatu in mobilising workers against local and provincial governments, particularly those where a coalition government is in power.
- An aspect which received limited attention in past research, including the framework presented by Gumede (2017), relates to the imitation of the political culture of liberation movements by movements and organisations formed during the period after democratisation. The political culture, including the political behaviour, of the EFF, which splintered from the ANC in 2013 would provide a vast terrain for research. There are important variables to explore in terms of the political culture and behaviour of the EFF compared to that of the ANC, examining whether the EFF merely adopted certain selective elements of democratic deficit demonstrated by the ANC since 2013 or whether the EFF pursues realistic socio-economic issues among voters.

5.4 Understanding the contradictions in the political behaviour and policy decisions of the ANC

There are no extraordinary measures to justify the ANC's poor governance since 1994 and political culture remains central to the failure of the ANC government. This argument suggests that self-correction within the liberation movement party, expected to govern in a democratic political system, remains highly unlikely over the coming decade. The argument is made that the political culture of the ANC is not conducive to democracy, as implementing the core values required for effective democracy would imply that the liberation movement disengages from the very same behavioural patterns which have ensured that the party came to power and remain in power since 1994.

Some reforms recently observed, particularly within important state institutions and SOE's such as the judiciary, SARS, Eskom and the NPA, are creating increased factionalism

within the ANC elite, with a clear divide between those inside the continued patronage network, and those outside of it³⁴. The argument made in this dissertation suggests that the cleavages caused by the 2017 and 2022 ANC National Conferences at Nasrec will most likely be widened as reformists within the party attempt to restructure before the 2024 general elections. Decades of cadre deployment, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism however have created the reality that those who are currently likely to lose political and government positions due to the voter support decline of the ANC (provincially and nationally), also have much to lose in terms of access to state resources and influence. It is therefore identified that increased efforts to improve accountability of implicated elites within the ANC will further contribute to factionalism within the party.

5.5 The decline of the ANC and the impact on democratic consolidation and development

There is very little doubt that the decline of the ANC as ruling party would impact the consolidation of the democratic order and development in South Africa, however considering the continued decline in electoral support for the ANC since 2014, the possibility of a transition of power is becoming increasingly evident. In the event that the 2024 general elections resemble the results and turnout of the 2021 local government elections, it is expected that the ANC would be forced to govern in coalition in the Gauteng Province following the elections in 2024. The ANC has since 2022 already engaged with various political parties within local government and metropolitan councils in an effort to establish coalitions on provincial government level by 2024. The manoeuvres of the ANC in Gauteng in the metros of Tshwane, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni in the province demonstrate active efforts by the ANC to accommodate smaller parties through offering important positions to minority parties such as Al-Jama-ah and COPE in order to remove the DA-led coalitions. However despite the instability and challenges observed in large metro coalitions since 2016³⁵, the establishment of the Multiparty Charter for South

³⁴ Refer to Gerber (22 October 2022) in Chapter four of this dissertation.

³⁵ Refer to Booysen (29 October 2022).

Africa³⁶ in August 2023 may prevent the ANC from establishing effective coalitions to contest the national and provincial elections in 2024, should the ANC fall short of a majority (nationally or in provincial legislatures). In the event that the ANC loses its outright majority in Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal or even nationally in 2024, the acceptance of this defeat by the ANC and the party's willingness to act as opposition will be crucial for democratic consolidation. There is limited evidence that the ANC would disengage from liberation movement political culture in supporting coalition government politics, as the party continues to perceive itself as the only representative of the people of South Africa. The two parties outrightly excluded from the Multiparty Charter coalition in August 2023 include the ANC and the EFF, and the behaviour of these parties in the period leading up and following the 2024 elections, in accepting possible defeat (in the case of the ANC) will impact significantly on the survival of South African democracy.

5.6 Key elements of democratic deficit within the political culture of the ANC and the possibility of democratic consolidation in South Africa

The ANC has demonstrated a variety of elements within its political culture since 1994, which can be attributed to the party's formation and history as a liberation movement. The long history of the party has however created certain elements of political culture which would remain deeply entrenched in the behaviour of the ANC, its leaders and members since the 1920s. Despite the change in ideology, tactics and strategy between 1945 and the 1980s, the ANC has remained, predominantly a political movement established by traditional leaders and conservative elites among the black population in South Africa.

The ANC's determination since 1994 to take control of all organs of state through its cadre deployment policy³⁷, often justified by Marxist and Stalinist ideologues within the party, should not be viewed as a strategy to expand the developmental and transformation agenda of the ANC and its tripartite alliance partners, but rather the concealed ambitions

³⁶ Refer to Chapter four in this dissertation.

³⁷ Formally adopted by the ANC at the Mafikeng National Conference in 1997.

by the political elite to gain absolute control over the resources which would ensure continued patronage and clientelism to a small clique within the party.

In assessing the decline of the ANC, and the variables which have contributed to poor governance demonstrated by the party since 1994, it is important to consider that neo-patrimonialism in particular remains an important element of the political culture of the ANC since its formation in 1912. The funding model of the party for instance has proved to be susceptible to transparency and public oversight, as is currently observed due to the Political Party Funding Act (6 of 2018), which has forced political parties to publicly declare large financial donations and funding. Although the Political Party Funding Act primarily impacts on the inflow of finances to the largest parties in South Africa, an important avenue of funding has been narrowed for the ANC, which since the late 1990s has increasingly relied on state resources channelled back to the party through cadres deployed to the state and SOE's.

Additionally, elements such as 'the cult of violence' (Gumede, 2017) which is still observed as part of the political culture of the ANC is directly related to the practices of neo-patrimonialism by the ANC and its elites on all levels. It remains evident that the alarming occurrence of political assassinations in South Africa is largely caused by internal competition within the ANC, on local government level in particular. Despite the argument in terms of the continued decline of the ANC over the coming decade, and the impact thereof on democratic consolidation in South Africa, it is important to consider that in the event that variables such as future coalition governments do not contribute to consolidation, the following reforms will be required for the ANC to contribute to democratic consolidation as the ruling party:

- Ending the policy of cadre deployment and disengaging from the aim to fuse the ANC with the state. The ANC will have to accept and increase the role by opposition parties in governance of the public sector.

- Disengage in the practice of associating political and struggle rhetoric with economic and development policy.
- Consider strengthening the Party Funding Act to focus on lifestyle audits and vetting of government and public officials.
- Consider through legislation, to limit the correlation between political violence and assassinations and the awarding of tenders, contracts and state funding. In this sense the influence and role of councillors within local government will have to be reviewed, and interventions such as training should be considered.

Despite the strategies of reform suggested, the argument made in this dissertation suggests that the ANC will not be able to effectively self-correct, without creating further factionalism and political contestation among its own leaders. Further decline of the ANC in voter support and capacity to govern is expected to increase following the 2024, especially in the event that the ANC loses its outright majority in the Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal legislatures. Although the ANC may still maintain an outright majority in the National Assembly following the 2024 elections, variables such as coalition agreements and power sharing by opposition parties at provincial and local government levels may direct the political environment of South Africa away from the one-party dominance of the past decades since 1994, indicating a transition of power in 2029.

5.7 Recommendations for further studies

The political culture of the ANC, as the dominant party in South Africa since 1994, provides a wide variety of possibilities for valuable future studies that would contribute to the different fields within political sciences. The outcome and dynamics surrounding the 2024 National and Provincial elections will most likely provide a new era in South African politics and the process of democratic consolidation over the medium-term. Observations in relations to the response by the ANC and political elites within the party to losing power in provinces such as Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal following the 2024 elections will

provide further insight with regards to the theoretical frameworks of Gumede (2017) and others in relation to the impact of political cultures of liberation movement governments on democratic consolidation in Africa.

In terms of policy and governance, various aspects of the South African democracy will be of relevance for future studies. Aspects such as the Party Funding Act, Land Expropriation without Compensation, the National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill and the Electoral Act will become increasingly important as the ANC experience a decline in support, legitimacy and capacity.

The political cultural of the ANC is also demonstrating increased elements of populism, particularly as the 2024 elections nears, and various research opportunities would be presented by the political direction of the ANC over the short- to medium term.

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