Causes for violent Buddhist encounters in communities

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Summary

This study is about violent Buddhist encounters in communities. The purpose of this study is to identify causes of Buddhist violence in different communities mainly focussing on Myanmar and Sri Lanka communities. This study compares causes of violence in these communities to find the common cause of Buddhist violence. Buddhism as a religion is not violent due to its teachings of Ahimsa. Thus, this paper follows the life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of the religion, particularly his teaching about violence, what do schools of Buddhism which developed after his death teach about violence and how do they justify the use of it. All the three major schools of Buddhism forbid violence; however, they have exceptions for the use of it. Therefore, these exceptions contributed to the involvement of Buddhists in violence.

The methods used to answer questions in this paper are qualitative and interpretative approach. The main cause of Buddhist violence highlighted in this paper is ethnicity for Buddhism, and politics for the minority. Buddhist in this regard were protecting the unity of their religion and the minority were fighting for their human rights. All these incidents of violence demonstrates that Buddhists like any other religions are capable of violence despite their reputation of peace.

Key words

1. Buddhism
2. Violence
3. Causes
4. Myanmar
5. Sri Lanka
6. Communities
7. Religion
8. Siddhartha Gautama
9. Ethnicity
10. Politics

Contents

Chapter 1

1. Introduction to violence and Buddhism

Most religious adherents around the world believe that their traditions place a higher priority on actions that uphold high moral standards, such as love and forgiveness over everything. Most of these religions believe in working towards peace; however, history demonstrates that no matter how much noble religions may aspire for high moral values, they are still capable of hateful behaviour such as violence.

Among all religions recorded in world literature such as articles, books, and newspapers, Buddhism seems to be portrayed as the most peaceful religion, yet Buddhists have been involved in violence throughout history. This irony between what Buddhism teaches, which is peace and harmony, and some practices which reflect violent tendencies from Buddhist adherents, have intrigued the researcher to delve into this irony.

Although Buddhists have in recent years been involved in violence, it is notable that there is a persistence in Buddhism being a peaceful religion. This may be because Buddhists believe in Ahimsa, the principle of nonviolence, and other notions such as *pratityasamutpada*, translated commonly as arising from a preceding course. Thus, such a statement could be said to be deriving from a preceding course, then all things are consistently linked with the implications that suffering or pain imposed on others should be avoided. The reason behind this belief is that pain imposed on others is viewed as inflicted upon one-self. Therefore, harming others is strictly forbidden in Buddhism.

Even though Buddhists believe in Ahimsa, their history demonstrates that they are capable of violence. However, their reasons or justification for violence are most interesting, particularly looking at how their ethics forbids harm towards all living things. Thus, this paper seeks to examine Gautama's teachings on non-violence and the reasons for the involvement of Buddhist followers in violence.

Buddhism was founded by Siddhartha Gautama. He was a spiritually attained practitioner, whose purpose was to liberate and teach the correct path, which is freedom from fear, delusion, and hate. Helping people to live in kindness and loving, equanimity and harmony was his goal. Gautama taught nonviolence through his

teachings of the Dhamma. The Dhamma can be regarded as a set of tools which are used to assess one's behaviour, feelings, and responsibilities to be nonviolence aligned. In Gautama's teachings of the Dharma wisdom, compassion, kindness, generosity, and patience are the most important qualities.

Following the passing of Gautama, Buddhism began to split into various schools and sects. Each Buddhist sect evolved with its unique spiritual philosophy and traits. All Buddhist sects, however, adhere to or follow the Four Noble Truths in various ways. As an illustration, at first, there was consensus on what Gautama had taught, but with time differences emerged regarding what constitutes Gautama's genuine teachings. These disputes had an impact on the formation of Buddhist schools. Thus, Buddhism was divided into different schools, however, among these schools, there are three major schools: the Vajrayana school of Buddhism which is also known as Tibetan Buddhism, then the Mahayana school, and the Theravada school of Buddhism.

Theravada school of Buddhism is prepotent in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, and Laos. It is the largest Buddhist sect along with Mahayana which is prepotent in Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, and in Tibet. The roots of these two sects are in the primary teachings of the historical Gautama. Both focus on the search for liberation through a process called *samsara*, which is a process of birth, death, and rebirth. Tibetan Buddhism is dominant in Tibet, Mongolia, and the Himalayan religion. The basic Tibetan teachings revolve around a combination of Mahayana Buddhism and Tantric beliefs, which is a Buddhist tradition associated with Tantra[1].

The path of enlightenment is what all schools of Buddhism seek to provide for their followers. During a period of disagreements on what makes up the true teachings of Gautama, conflicts occurred. Thus, this paper seeks to examine what all three major Buddhist schools teach about violence and how to justify its use of it. In addition, the paper will unfold some of the antagonistic relationships and incidents that took place during this period and the reasons for violence in different communities of Buddhism.

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[1] Buddhist magical or mystical text, dating from the 7th century or earlier. These texts often prescribe transgressive acts.

Buddhists base their lives on [Five Moral Precepts](#) which emphasise (1) non-killing of all living things, (2) not taking what is not given to you, (3) prohibition of the usage of drugs, (4) prohibition of sexual misconduct and (5) prohibition of lying. Gautama also taught the [Eightfold Path](#) which elucidates more on how suffering can be ceased. The suffering Gautama refers to is taught or described in the Four Noble Truths. Suffering in Buddhism is regarded as a primary cause of the human problem, thus if suffering can be ceased most human problems would be solved. The Eightfold Path in this regard is guidance to wisdom.

To stop harm and suffering caused by conflicts within and amongst people, Gautama also taught the [Six Principles of Cordiality](#) to instil respect and love. These principles aim to develop the inner state of mind for the regulation of external behaviour. [Dependent origin](#) is another component on which a Buddhist worldview is based. Buddhists use this principle to analyse the causes of war in some cases. Thus, the paper in this regard seeks to discuss how principles such as these explain the causes of violence in Buddhist communities.

1.1. Background on Buddhism and violence

Even though Buddhists are recognised to be peaceful, it should be taken into consideration that they are humans, and like any other human being they also inherently possess violent traits. According to Bueno (2010, p1) in most animal species including humans, aggressiveness is a prominent behavioural trait, however, some may be more prone to aggressiveness or may manifest dissimilar approaches to violent behaviour. Therefore, aggressive behaviour in humans is normal however it does not make it a good behavioural trait.

Within the Buddhist religion, some have committed suicide, those who have murdered and those who are not vegetarians as they should be, especially when their religion stresses the avoidance of any form of harm including the killing and eating of animals. Thus, it is not surprising that Buddhist monks and followers have been involved in various conflicts and have in some instances, instigated violence.

The Meiktila massacre is one of the incidents where Buddhists instigated the violence. According to a news report by Szep (2013, p1), armed Buddhist monks and Meiktila mobs harassed the streets of Myanmar, and three days after the incident,

remains were discovered dumped by a municipal truck near a crematorium on the outskirts of Meiktila. In this tragedy, which involved many Muslims, people were slain, homes were set on fire, and businesses were destroyed.

Another instance of Buddhist monks using violence is the situation in Myanmar Burma. In this instance, the minority of Muslims were persecuted by extremist monks. According to Coclanis (2013, p26) in some way, Ashin Wirathu, an ultra-nationalist monk, inspired this persecution in his lecture before the violent incident. In this case, Wirathu delivered an anti-Muslim sermon and advised Muslim businesses to be boycotted in response to the assaults which occurred in the communities of the Rohingya and its environs.

Additionally, a BBC news report by Strathern (2013, p1) states that Ashin Wirathu was part of a movement called the 969[2]. He started to incite hatred toward Muslims and called for a general Buddhist boycott of Muslim businesses. Following this, a mob violence uprising against Muslims occurred in central Burma. And this led to the dearth of at least 40 people.

And in recent years Buddhist monks unfortunately have participated and supported the war in other countries, particularly in predominant Buddhist wars against religious minority groups. The war in Sri Lanka serves as an illustration of this. According to Orjuela (2020, p33), a group called the B.B.S[3] was formed by radical Buddhist monks and started violence against Muslim immigrants and ordinary Buddhists who were speaking about violence and the Hindu Tamils of northern Sri Lanka.

The origin of the civil war in Sri Lanka may be rooted in the policies which constrained the economic and social rights of the minority groups. The government during the cause of this war lacked a systematic response to protect minorities. Orjuela (2008, p10) states that in Sri Lanka, the political and economic powerlessness of the Muslim minority was disregarded. Due to their unprotected position between armed Tamil groups and the main political parties, the Muslim population, which makes up one-third of the population, has suffered more throughout this war. Additionally, the government in this case did not prioritise the

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[2] The 969 Organisation is a Buddhist nationalist movement that opposes the spread of Islam in mostly Buddhist Myanmar.

[3] Buddhist power force called Bodu Bala Sena.

welfare of the minorities sufficiently. Which became one of the reasons for the escalation of the conflict.

In these instances, it is notable that the minorities were fighting for their political and civil rights, however, it is still unclear why Buddhist adherents were fighting.

To find a common cause of Buddhist violence, the dissertation seeks to investigate the reasons for violence in the above-mentioned instances of Buddhist violence. This will be done by (1) offering a broad review of violent incidents in these countries or communities, (2) identifying causes of violence, and (3) providing a comparative analysis of the causes of violence in each community to find a common cause or explanation for the violence in Buddhist communities.

Chapter 2
2. Method considerations in identifying reasons for violence
2.1. Research problem

The "Four Noble Truths" are regarded as the centre of Gautama's teachings, and he used a medical model to explain them. According to Kruger (2007, p7), Buddha diagnosed a human condition, which is that humans are never satisfied. The existence of humans will permanently be in a non-satisfactory state, that is Dukkha. Gautama regards birth, growth, and death as suffering. Apart from diseases, and psychological and physical illness, the human condition is beset constitutionally by all forms of Dukkha, sadness, sorrow, and despair.

Lack of satisfaction in humans is caused by cravings to satiate sensory desire. Kruger (2007, p. 7) further stated that eight requirements must be met to follow a therapy that claims to be able to cure insatiable appetites and other suffering. This includes having the appropriate perspective on things and making moral commitments, such as refraining from desire, aggression, and cruelty which serve as significant elements of this dissertation. Additionally, it entails speaking and acting morally, such as refraining from killing, thus another theme of this study, as well as avoiding sexual immorality and stealing.

From this therapy, one may say that non-harm and the development of kindness have always been the centre of Buddhist teachings. The research problem, in this regard, revolves around the contradictory instances of violence where Buddhists were involved, whereas their teachings forbid violence. This raised questions such as how a peaceful religion ended up being involved in violence, and how do they justify its use of it. How did they end up doing the opposite of what their religion teaches or says about how they should act or commit?

The purpose of the study in this regard is to (1) explain the concept of violence in religious studies, (2) to research the life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama who is known as the Buddha, (3) to elucidate different types of Buddhist sects and conflict which developed during the process of their establishment and (4) to investigate the cause of the conflict within the Buddhists communities.

Violence can occur due to a variety of causes, and in the instance of Buddhists, due to their belief in Ahimsa, one may speculate that they may have used force to protect themselves. Thanissaro (2020, p. 31) claims that Buddhists have six defences for engaging in violence namely skill in means, illusory death, religious nationalism, relativistic justification, depraved era, and non-dogma justification. A clever excuse mentions using force to defend oneself, which is a skill in means. Furthermore, skill in means justification in the Theravada school involves fighting back in the face of provoked aggression. In the Mahayana, school violence is justified when defending Buddhist territory, property, and teachings.

In light of this, the issue that emerges is what might have happened in the situations where Buddhists initiated violence. According to the six justifications given by Thanissaro (2020), Buddhists, where they had initiated violence, and in most cases, their reasoning revolves around relativistic justification, which means taking a life of one to save a million.

Buddhist monks consider their faith to be a part of who they are. Those identified in this dissertation considered non-Buddhists as dangers to the power and unity of their country, mostly when linked to violence against other religions, such as the Burmese and Sri Lankan civil wars. Therefore, their response, in this case, was violence.

The Buddhist religion is based on the teaching of Ahimsa. The study did, however, draw attention to a few violent incidents involving Buddhists to show that neither a religious movement nor an individual can be faultless. In this sense, the dissertation aims to disseminate information based on an objective and critical study indicating that Buddhists have, at various times throughout their history and doctrine, encouraged violent behaviour, just like any other religious group. Even though they have a reputation for being gentle, they do have violent tendencies. As a result, they have a history of conflictual interactions and events, both within and outside their religion.

2.2. Preliminary literature review

Buddhism and violence have been the subject of much investigation, with a particular emphasis on the Sri Lankan Buddhist civil war and its political and economic repercussions. In this incident people lost their lives, their homes were burned down,

and their way of life was destroyed. Consideration in this regard should also be given to providing information on what sparked the dispute and how Buddhists ought to have behaved following their religious beliefs to have prevented bloodshed.

Although this war was politically motivated Orjuela (2008:7) asserts that the Sri Lanka civil conflict was primarily motivated by religion. However, the political roots of this war might be linked to the implementation of policies that restricted the economic and social rights of the minority.

The Muslim minority's economic and political helplessness was disregarded. Due to their unprotected position between armed Tamil factions and the main political parties, the Muslim population, which makes up one-third of the country, suffered more during the civil war. Because of this, the authorities in this area did not prioritise the wellbeing of the minority enough, which made the war last longer. Military expenditures and the cost of repairing or replacing items damaged during the conflict had a detrimental effect on the economy.

The Sri Lankan civil war is one of several wars that have been linked to religion. However, the root causes of these wars have not been adequately addressed. There have to be more comprehensive theories in the area of international relations that seek to explain the causes of religious conflicts for this phenomenon to be better understood. Thus, the study tries to close this gap by offering potential explanations for religious conflicts, especially in Buddhist communities.

In trying to explain the causes of these wars this section will be divided into two parts. Therefore, the first part gives a review of the body of knowledge about wars and conflicts driven by religion. Second, it presents some of the explanations that have been proposed as to why there is religious violence.

2.2.1. Existing literature on religion as a cause of violence

Academia has produced a good body of literature on religion and violence which stretches across numerous fields of study and themes. In this section, the existing literature on this topic is divided into two along with types of wars associated with religious works. These religious works are the ones identifying the correlation of religion to secular wars.

To defend the use of aggression and conduct in conflict, emphasis has been placed more on religious ethics. The "just war doctrine" of the Christian was first articulated in the fourth century CE by Augustine of Hippo and then formalised by St. Bernard and other academics. In addition, some publications examine religious obligations in Buddhism and other religions like Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism to justify the use of force.

The significance of these works is to understand the character which religion plays in codifying the use of violence in religion. However, two important questions are not answered by these works. First, they do not explain under which conditions Buddhist followers become involved in violence and war. Second, they do not elucidate the difference between peace and war in major religions.

2.2.2. Causes of religious conflict

Existing literature has made connections between religion, nationalism, and ethnicity as causes of conflict. The work on the *New Cold War*: *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (1992) by Mark Juergensmeyer is one of the examples of such work along with *Balkan Babble: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia* (1992) by Petra Ramet. Juergensmeyers work is a consideration of the rise of nationalism in religion after the colonial era whereas Ramet's work describes the duties of religion in differentiating ethnicity and politics.

The usefulness of this literature is to discuss wars and conflicts which are religiously motivated. The first argument is that they demonstrate the significance of religion in the development of a collective identity. They are crucial for a hypothesis on the role that religions play in ethnicity and nationalist wars. Second, these works explain that religion isn't the sole factor driving these conflicts; in fact, it is one of the few factors that encourage violence in these situations. In this way, religion may contribute to violence, but if it were to be eradicated, battles would still break out, but differently.

In such wars, goals usually include the creation of a state or control over the existing one. According to Rowley (2014, p361) the most common reasons for violence in religion are power, politics, economy, the types of God people accept and doctrines. Media and speech are other factors which contributed to violence. According to Wardani (2018, p2) speech can be regarded as an expression of thoughts or

communication. An example of how media and speech can contribute to violence may be traced to Ashin Wirathu's speech which expressed hatred toward Muslims and provoked violence between Buddhists and Muslims.

2.2.3. Theories on religion and violence

In trying to explain the causes of religious wars there are few theories by scholars. According to Girard (1977, p 319) sacrifice is the dominant element of religion to human violence. According to him, human aggression is vented through sacrifice. Thus, it offers humans an opportunity to express their violent desires. However, this theory has two problems in explaining religious violence. First, it is not in every religion where sacrifice is a central element, for example, Buddhist principles do not include sacrifice.

Therefore, this theory does not include Buddhism. This theory also elucidates sub conscious human desire and outcomes produced by its thoughts but does not include religious elites and their conscious decision-making to engage in war. This theory also has similarities with the mimetic theory.

In response to this theory, Juergensmeyer (1992, p109) argues that establishing ultimate order is the primary purpose of religion. This process according to him includes overcoming death which is the ultimate disorder. In addition, he regards any religion that has a sacrifice in its scripture to be battling with conquering disorders such as death. Additionally, Juergensmeyer argues that when there are disasters and threats such as lawlessness, corruption, and occupation and where there is a conflation in earthly violence, it means there is a heavenly war between good and evil occurring.

The usefulness of Juergensmeyer's theory is that it speaks about the key element of religion which is the fight for good over evil. Being saved to salvation is what most if not all religions are concerned with.

Thus, this theory stresses how important salvation is in the struggle against earthly threats such as violence and wars. The relevancy of this theory is that it identifies disasters and threats brought by earthly conditions in the fight for salvation. It also provides an elucidation for why religious groups may be violent or engage in religious wars.

Fundamentalism is another theory which may be regarded as a cause of religious violence. According to Gregg (2003, p 57), fundamentalism started as a mental habit in religious communities. It may be regarded as a belief in one's specific religion that their religion does not have faults and therefore should be forced on others. Fundamentalism may also be regarded as a response to threats.

The three theories namely Girard's sub conscious human desire, ultimate order by Juergensmeyer, and religious fundamentalism try to identify earthly disasters such as wars and violence. However, Juergensmeyers's theory is more relevant to the foundation of this dissertation because it focuses on reasons for religious groups to engage in violence. And it mentions sacrificial rites as battling to conquer disorders such as death, which is a rite that does not exist in Buddhism. As a result, it influences the dissertation to do thorough research on the causes of wars Buddhists were involved in and how they ought to have acted to prevent violence especially considering their ethics surrounding violence.

In light of this assertion, the Sanga[4] traces how Gautama behaved in the face of violence, which is an example of how Buddhist adherents should have behaved in certain violent situations.

In India, there are few antagonistic relationships which were recorded from the Buddhist sangha. According to Matsunami (1979, p330), these incidents are found in the Mahavagga section of the Pali language Vinaya texts. It highlights that one of the Kosambi monks (bhikkhu), dishonoured the rules of discipline with his actions which caused the group to be divided into two opposing groups. The two groups lived together but were unable to cooperate. Gautama tried to oppose their antagonism, but he was unsuccessful. The conflict ended when laymen stopped giving the sangha alms. Monks started to see their errors and made peace among themselves in the presence of Gautama.

Even though there was such a hostile relationship, it did not indicate a significant split or change in the Buddhist Sangha's guiding principles or doctrines. The Devadatta[5] figure did, however, play a role in the Buddhist Sangha's division.

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[4] A community of Buddhists. [5]
An evil figure in Buddhism.

Devadatta and Gautama himself were at odds in this situation. Devadatta allegedly began the assaults on Gautama to take his leadership over the sangha, according to Matsunami (1979, p331). He made an assassination attempt but failed. He then decided to kill him directly but was unsuccessful. Then, knowing that Gautama would oppose, he went to him and offered a series of regulations that he wanted the monks to be required to follow. There was a schism as a result.

Gautama disagreed with those regulations because they were the root of the dispute between him and Devadatta. In response to Gautama's disapproval, Devadatta was able to acquire adherents by disparaging him. Some of the monks were able to follow him, but Gautama was able to pull them back after some time.

There are numerous ways to characterise Devadatta's personality. He is sometimes referred to be Gautama's cousin and other times as Ananda's brother, who was a devoted student of Gautama. For example, Penner (2009, p85) suggests that Devadatta was a possible bother to Ananda, whereas Sarao (2017, p4) suggests that he was a jealous cousin who wanted to take over the Sangha from Gautama. According to the authors, Devadatta was related to Gautama in some way, thus it is safe to assume that he was a close friend or family member of Gautama.

Rather than being a reference to a specific person, the name Devadatta is a representation of all that is at odds with the peace that exists within the Sangha. Another characteristic that different authors have expressed differently is Devadatta's death. Matsunami (1979, p338) argued that Devadatta died of his poison which he stuck in his nail trying to poison Gautama, his nail broke, and he poisoned himself and died in agony. Whereas Horner (1996, p55) argued that Devadatta wanted to see Gautama for the last time when he realised that he was about to die and on his way to Gautama's place the earth opened and swallowed him while he was taking a water break. However, Matsunami's description of Devadatta's death is more realistic than Horner's, therefore one can agree with the fact that Devadatta's death was of his poison trying to kill Gautama.

What might be the root reasons for violence in this situation? One could argue that the root of this dispute was power and resentment. Power, for instance, turned into a scarce good. Devadatta thought that he ought to lead the Sangha rather than

Gautama. And the argument started because Gautama responded to Devadatta in a manner in which he felt unworthy. Consequently, the two started a rivalry.

The distinction of this narrative between Gautama and Devadatta is how Gautama handled schisms compared to how the conflict was handled by some of the Buddhist followers and monks in the instances of violence this research has highlighted.

Gautama in this regard did not resort to any psychological or physical violence when he was attacked, instead, he opted for a friendly dialogue with the rivals. This addresses an answer to some of the secondary questions of the thesis, such as how Buddhists were supposed to have acted in alignment with the principles of their religion towards conflict.

2.3. Research question

The research issue centres on the violent encounters and adversarial relationships that Buddhists experienced, even though their teachings forbid all forms of violence. The following questions will be asked to investigate the hypothesis that Buddhists have traits of violent behaviour. Therefore, the main research question is what are the causes that prompted Buddhist violent behaviour?

The secondary questions that attempt to find answers to the main question of this dissertation are as follows:

(1) Is there a relationship between religion and violence?

(2) What are the salient features in Buddhism that addresses violence?

(3) Does ethnicity and nationalism contribute to a violent response from Buddhists?

2.4. Hypothesis

- In literature review (articles, books, newspapers etc.), it appeared that Buddhism has shown traits of violent behaviour. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to investigate this hypothesis to find causes for such behaviour.
- Religion and ethnicity are the causes of Buddhist violence.

2.5. Research design and methodology

For these questions to be answered, the researcher will adopt a qualitative and interpretative approach. According to (Stausberg & Engler 2011, p5) the expression

of the qualitative approach is through words, and it is used to understand experiences and concepts. The interpretative approach on the other hand aims to stipulate methods to understand different religious traditions, beliefs and views as to what religions are. The reason behind this approach is because of how complex this subject matter is. This approach is built on reviewing existing literature critically, and may also include literature from different academic fields, however not limited to history, sociology, and politics.

The study will primarily focus on library materials such as books, journal articles and electronic databases, newspaper articles. This will include a combination of Buddhist literature and secondary sources. The reason behind the usage of these sources is to ensure that the research meets the required standards of a master's dissertation. The analysis of this information will be through a theological, political, and social approach. This means that this approach will examine factors which provoked or contributed to the Buddhist violence theologically, politically, and socially.

In analysing all these sources, the researcher has planned a methodology which aspires to elucidate the different approaches which have been used in the study of religious violence, and this instance, mainly Buddhist violence. The necessity of this methodology is to ensure the research reaches its objectives.

Practically, the research will first give a broad view of the life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama. Second, it will look at different sects/communities in Buddhism, how they developed and the conflict which resulted during their development. While third, it will explain the concept of violence in different sects of Buddhism. In addition, the focus in this regard will be the causes of violence in these Buddhist communities.

2.6. Unit analysis

According to (Strasberg & Engler 2011, p74) unit of analysis has to do with conceptualisation. It identifies individuals or groups on whether they are religious or not. It provides a way on how important properties must be viewed in research. It also examines the personal practice and believes. The research in this regard examines whether Buddhists are prone to violence yes or no and if yes what are the causes of their involvement in violence.

Buddhists are well known to be non-violent, however, have proved in history that they are capable of it based on the violence instance they were involved in. thus it may be concluded that they are prone to violence. Defending their identity from non-Buddhists is one of the reasons for their involvement in violence, however, there are many more reasons.

Looking at Gautama's reaction towards Devadatta after Devadatta initiated attacks on him and how Buddhist monks in recent years reacted towards violence, it proves that Buddhists, as a group, when pushed to a certain corner, may become violent.

Because Gautama, on the other hand, had already reached dharma. it is justified for him to have reacted peacefully toward Devadatta's threats. The same cannot be said about Buddhist monks, who were in a different state of mind, and reacted differently to threats against their peace and identity from the religious minority of the nonBuddhists.

Media in recent years played a huge role in influencing religion and how people behave. An example is the anti-Muslim preaching by Ashin Wirathu which resulted in violence.

2.7. Limitations

- The limitation of this paper includes first the fact that this research is conducted during a time wherein the whole world is facing a deadly disease such as Covid 19 and the country is going through lockdown levels to save lives. This means that most working environments are closed unless regarded as essential such as shops because they sell basic needs like food. The library in this regard is not open full time depending on the level of lockdown, which makes it difficult to be accessible and continue good research.
- Lack of access to the library makes the research to be reliant on electronic databases.
- Funds are needed to buy some of the books and electronic sources as my bursary does not fund me for books
- There is less recent literature on the topic which forces one to include literature which is more than five to ten years old.

- The sample size includes the population size of Buddhist followers and violent instances committed by some does not define all Buddhists however they are being represented, and therefore they will be regarded as people who are capable of violence irrespective of their teachings of non-violence.

2.8. Chapter layout

Chapter 1: Introductory chapter.

Chapter 2: Methodology.

Chapter 3: Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha) – his life and teachings.

Chapter 4: The relationship between religion and violence

Chapter 5: Teachings and justifications for violence in different sects in Buddhism.

Chapter 6: Reasons for Buddhist Violence in Myanmar communities

Chapter 7: Reasons for Violence in Sri Lanka communities

Chapter 8: Concluding chapter

Chapter 3
3. Life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha)
3.1. Introduction

Gautama as a teacher taught many things, however, most of his teachings were based on the dharma, thus teachings focus on whether Buddhist followers' actions or behaviour is nonviolence aligned. The chapter in this regard seeks to address the life and teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, a few experiences which influenced his worldview and what motivated him to take the path of being a teacher. In addition, this chapter will elucidate a few principles and doctrines Gautama used to explain the causes of violence and how to overcome what he determined to be the source of violence.

3.1.1. Terminology of his name

Gautama is referred to as the Buddha by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. An enlightened person is referred to as a "Buddha." Thus, Buddhism may be viewed as a religion of enlightenment.

Even though the name Buddha was used to refer to the one who established Buddhism as a religion, it was initially a word commonly used by the Jainas[5]. According to Groner (1990, p20) teachers in Jainism were regarded as buddhas. In Buddhist texts, the term Jina is found mostly in Mahayana tradition. "Arahant" is another word used by Buddhists and Jainas. In Jainism, this term was most important due to followers of the religion being known as arhata. In Buddhism, it was used for those who had reached enlightenment. However, these terms are not the only two shared by the two religions.

3.1.2. Gautama's Birth

The founder of Buddhism is known by a variety of titles; however, in this dissertation, he is referred to as Siddhartha Gautama. Groner (1990, p21) refers to him as Sakyamuni, meaning the advisor of the Sakya people, however, acknowledges that the Gautama clan is where Gautama was born, and this is where the name Siddhartha

Gautama originated. He used the name Sakyamuni before living his religious life. The Sakyas stayed on the border of Nepal and India. They were a small tribe of the

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[5] Jaina may be regarded as a person who is an adherent of Jainism.

Ksatriya family which primarily engaged in farming rice. The description "Sakyamuni" meaning the advisor of the Sakyas signifies the historical Buddha in a larger social group than the Gautama clan. In addition, the historical Buddha has always been titled Sakyamuni.

The fact that Gautama was nurtured in a royal household, where he was shielded from the world's ills and afflictions, did not deter him from emigrating to seek enlightenment.

According to Gregg (2003, p91) Suddhodana Gautama's father was one of the Sakyas leaders. However, his mother Maya passed on seven days after she gave birth to Gautama causing her younger sister Mahaprajapati Gautami to raise the future Gautama. But before Maya dies her pregnancy was miraculous, according to Gadjin & Blum (1987, p8) Maya dreamed of a white elephant entering her womb from heaven and through that dream she was pregnant. Although this kind of pregnancy in the contemporary world is unusual, scholars such as Gutschow (2016, p4) agree that

Maya conceived after the dream of an elephant. Therefore, it may be concluded that Maya's pregnancy was indeed in miraculous manner.

Gautama's birth was in Lumbini in a grove during Maya's journey to Devadaha her native village. King Asoka later in 1 or 2 centuries was on a journey of sites connected to the life of Gautama, he went to Lumbini and had a pillar and a memorial moment *stupa* there. Then Hsiian-tsang the Chinese pilgrim visited the site eight centuries later.

In 1896 the pillar was discovered and the writing on it decoded classifying Gautama's place of birth in the modern village of Rummindei. When Gautam was born, a fortune teller from the Himalayas named Asita came to the village and gave predictions that the child would either be a king if he stays at home or a Buddha if he leaves home (see Gadjin & Blum 1987, p9).

3.1.3. Gautama's birth date

The birthdate of Gautama is another issue that could be debated. A few theories have been suggested regarding this matter. Because Gautama is reported to have passed away at the age of 80. The majority of ideas work backwards from his death

date to discover his birthdate. According to calculations from Geiger (1912, p xxiv), Gautama's death occurred in 483 B.C.E thus alluding to his date of birth to be in 563 B.C.E. With the same method in trying to find Gautam's date of birth Jacobi (1930, p 327) states that Gautama's death was in 484 B.C.E. alluding his date of birth to be in 564 which is a year different from Jacobi's calculation. Which also made Kanakura Ensho reach the same date with his calculations (cf Groner 1990, p22).

These calculations are based on the history records of Sri Lanka. Even though there is an inconsistence in specifying the exact death date of Gautama to calculate his birth date, these calculations demonstrate that most scholars agree with the range from
480 B.C.E to 485 B.C.E as Gautama's death date. In addition, Groner (1990, p22) states that the history records of Sri Lanka list kings who ruled after Gautama's dearth till the accession of Asoka.

However, the above-mentioned calculations ware criticised by Hakuju who based his argument on Buddhism of the northern tradition. Hakuju (1965, p80) in this regard states that the range between Gautama's death and the accession of Asoka to the throne is 116 years. Thus, Gautama's dates were 466-387 B.C.E. Hakuju noticed that the Sri Lanka history records affirm that 218 years passed between Gautama's death and Asoka's reign. And the fact that during that period only five kings had ruled, makes it a bit impossible for only five kings to have ruled in 218 years meaning there were supposed to be more kings to rule in those years. Thus, based on this tradition Gautama's death date was rejected.

For Hakuju to arrive at 387 B.C.E as his revised date for Gautama's death, he took 271 B.C.E as Asoka's accession date to the throne and counted 116 years backwards due to the evidence from the northern tradition.

Hajime Hakushi accepts Hakuju's calculations, however, his studied date for the accession of Asoka to the throne is 268 B.C.E, which argues Gautama's dearth date to be in 383 B.C.E (cf Hakushi (1973, p180).

There is a difference of about one century between views upheld by Hakuju and views from most scholars including the ones mentioned above. It is challenging to settle on a compelling hypothesis that adequately explains the differences between

the two points of view. However, the Sri Lankan historical records initially appear to be the better source due to the comprehensive list of kings and the length of time that each monarch governed. The fact that the Hakuju merely mention that more than 100 years transpired between the dates of Gautama's death and Asoka's ascension to the throne without providing a list of rulers and the duration of their reigns makes it appear weaker.

According to the Sri Lankan history records, the division of Buddhism into many schools occurred during the period of Asoka. There is less evidence which highlights that it was during this period that these schools developed, however, Asoka's edicts are among the few (cf Senaveratne et al. 1914, p114). These edicts demonstrate that there were conflicts in many areas of the Buddhist order. The occurrence of these differences would have probably been after the second Buddhist council where there were debates over the 10 monastic discipline points[6].

If by the time of Asoka, the disintegration of Buddhism into different sects had not progressed extremely far, then 463-383 B.C.E, being the dates suggested by Hakushi for Gautama, would be accepted, because it is well aligned with the Buddhist history and the growth of the order. However, in this history the acceptance of Hakushi's dates should not be understood as a rejection of the Sri Lanka history records as a source, but as a difficulty which should be studied further.

3.1.4. Gautama's life

According to Groner (1990, p24) Gautama, as a child, lived a luxurious life. However, he still had problems concerning the meaning of life which made him leave his family to be an itinerant mendicant. Gautama was a thoughtful person; he was touched by the fact that birds eat worms. Thus, according to him, it is wrong how living things harm each other. He realised that people become old even though they may not wish to, and they also get sick or die even though they fear sickness or death.

After encountering a suffering old man who was about to die and another person who had already passed away, Gautama decided to leave his family and set forth in search of a solution to human suffering. Additionally, Gautama's main motivation for

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[6] These are Buddhist ways of life

looking for a way to relieve human suffering was his fear of ageing, sickness, and death. Gautama claims that misery and agony are a grave threat to human existence. As a result, he set out to find means of putting a stop to human suffering, and through that process he experienced enlightenment.

According to Prebish (1993, p3), Gautama studied as a Hindu ascetic for several years, thus he was able to learn the path to enlightenment. However, Gautama rejected the main Hindu philosophical aspects and challenged the priesthood authority. In this sense, Gautama disagreed with the sacrificial cult's use of the Vedic texts as a basis for justification of violence towards living things. In other words, Gautama did not agree with sacrifice as a justification to harm animals. Therefore, it may be argued that it was this kind of wisdom that freed Gautama from his cravings and temptations, allowing him to find redemption from samsara[7]. Thus, through this process, Gautama began a career in teaching. In the beginning, Gautama started by attracting a group of five followers who together started the first Buddhist order or the sangha.

The first sermon Gautama delivered was at a town called Sarnath at a deer park. It is during this period that he outlined or preached the four noble truths which are regarded as teachings about the causes of pain and suffering. These teachings also explain how suffering may be ended by following the eightfold paths.

3.1.5. The first sermon

Gautama spent seven days under a bodhi tree after attaining enlightenment, during which time he was in a highly concentrated state that required extended meditation. According to Tanabe (2005, p363) after Gautama's meditation, he meditated on another tree. During this incident, two merchants approached him and gave him pastries. Those merchants, Trapusa and Bhallika, later became the first lay Buddhists. For five weeks, Gautama remained under this tree. He was unsure at this time if he ought to teach about enlightenment because the dharma teachings were profound and complex. Thus, fear of other people not understanding the dharma teachings was the root of this. These uncertainties resulted from his struggle to remain inspired to thrive after attaining enlightenment. Gautama saw that the only

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[7] To be born again as the Buddha or the one who is awakened. [9]
A mythical God of creation.

way to overcome this was to stop being so focused on himself and his enlightenment. As a result, he decided to preach and help others find salvation.

Gautama in this regard was inspired by the god Brahmii, [9]who requested that he preach, so he accepted and did so to clear up his uncertainties.

Snellgrove (1973, p400) argues that Gautama's hesitation to teach may have been due to his temptations of reaching a complete level of nirvirta[10] once he became enlightened, thus, by avoiding teaching, he was avoiding the complications that would come with it. After Gautama decided to teach, he had to decide on his first audience which he thought will quickly understand his teachings. Thus, he decided to teach the monks who assisted him during the period of his austerities. During his first sermon, alluded to earlier, Gautama advised them to follow the middle way and the four Noble Truths. And through this process he was able to produce enlightened monks, who became his disciples, thus developing the Buddhist order.

3.1.6. The teachings of the Dharma

The Dharma was an important part of the religion that Gautama could acknowledge or take into consideration in his enlightenment. The Four Noble Truths were mentioned in Gautama's first sermon, which led to five monks realising the Dharma. According to Ohnuma (1998, p324), the word Dharma means to keep or hold, and it derives from the root "dhr" meaning of "that which may not change". The dharma is practised according to the norms and ideas which upheld the moral and social order.

Even in the early days of India, despite truth and good deeds, the word Dharma was used to refer to the obligations and traditions that people were expected to follow. In Buddhism, this term has a variety of connotations. Brockington (2004, p656) for example associated the dharma with the sense of truth. This term is also broadened by Buddhists, and before Gautama's time it was referred to as "the good and the truth". However, evils and violations, which are regarded as *klefa* were also classified as part of the dharmas. Thus, the explanation of this term was broadened and developed as an element of existence.

Because the word dharma is used with different meanings this study capitalises the word when it refers to "truths" which are fixed, and uncapitalised when it refers to elements of existence that change.

Buddhaghosa (1999, p99) states that the word Dharma contains four meanings, thus, teaching, thing, characteristics, and scripture. (1) The term Sanga, Buddha, and Dharma in the context of 3 Jewels mean teaching. In these teachings, the term refers

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to the truth. in addition, Dharma when used in the context of scripture it refers to the ninefold which classifies teaching.

The 3 Jewels in Buddhism, also referred to as the 3 refuges or the triple Gem are defined as supports wherein a follower of Buddhism takes refuge in a form of recitation or prayer before they could start their day. Teaching the 3 Jewels is all-important for spiritual growth. Similarly, to the 3 Jewels, the ninefold are the initial teachings which classify the dharma, with each having its power or ability that the other does not have, however when combined they all help with self-liberation

(2) In the sense of cause, dharma happens when it is used for good or evil. These dharmas create the effect, for instance, dharmas which possess good creates good. Therefore, when dharma refers to something which is not good or evil, it may not be used in a sense of cause because these events cannot cause or influence good or evil.

(3) Characteristics as a meaning of the dharma may be traced from the list of the 18 characteristics which only Gautama had, these are 18 Arhats that deal with spiritual enlightenment. (4) Then last as thing the use of the dharma is unique in Buddhism. This includes the dharmas which were recognised by Gautama in his enlightenment. Gautama during his enlightenment understood nirviirza, [8] in a manner in which it truly exists.

The Dharma is understood by the practitioner when they determine the environment in which the phenomena persist. For instance, the self might be considered a transitory phenomenon like many others. However, according to Groner (1990, p 47) when a practitioner discovers the self's true nature, it indicates that they have comprehended the self, which is composed of dharmas. In this context, the word

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[8] May be regarded as real existence and truth.

"dharma" is used in a sentence that outlines how the term functions under *pratityasamuptpada* laws, or laws of dependent origin. This is why early Buddhists did not regard people or things as embodying the dharma. But the dharmas as *skandhas* [9] are considered to be following the law. However, the *skandhas* of mental phenomena and *rupa*, or form, may be further divided and assigned to further dharmas. *Skandhas* in Buddhism may be regarded or associated with five clinging-aggregates.

According to Brockington (2004, p660), the *rupa* may be regarded as a body and material object. The body in this regard refers to the five senses of the body namely the body, ears, eyes, nose, and tongue. The body also serves as a foundation for tangible feelings. Therefore, it becomes the base for other sense organs. Since the mental and physiological features of the body are elucidated from these organs, they are then seen as dharmas. What is also divided into five categories is the material of the external world into objects of sense perception, thus, tangible objects, taste, smell, sounds and forms. The usage of forms, thus *rupa* in this list is to describe things which have colour, form, and visual objects. Within these objects, there is a further division into groups of colours wherein the existence of each element is in a form of dharma.

Furthermore, according to Brockington, basic units are further examined with both physical things and sense perceptions such as taste, smell, and sound. In this context, a group of physical items is made up of the four fundamental elements of the earth: fire, wind, and water. Dharma is categorised under the mental formation category of the mind, where it is arranged according to the five aggregates. This category includes dharmas like mindfulness, focus, and intelligence.

Due to their capacity for effect, attitudes that can affect the mind are included in this category. Examples include perseverance and belief. Then, transgressions like wrongdoings, impure thoughts, pride, lust, and doubt are regarded as dharma. Even though it is a distinct form of power, anything that has control over the mind, such as ignorance and thirst, is viewed as dharma since it also possesses power (cf Groner

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[9] Five aggregates of which one may compose, namely Consciousness, form, perception, sensation, mental formation.

1990, p 47). In addition, dharmas in some of Agama's later texts were categorised under *dhiittu*[10], *liyatana*[14], and *skandha*.

The dharmas in early Buddhism were explained in different ways and the number of dharmas is flexible. Thus, this word is not limited to only the foundational element of existence. However, the dharma theories are ways in which early Buddhism elucidated the existence of humanity and its behaviour.

3.2. The teachings of the four noble truths and the five precepts.

The doctrine of the four noble truths, which form the basis of all Buddhist schools, was the first thing Buddha taught. According to Pereira & Tiso (1988, p 172) this doctrine is regarded as the truth about the root of suffering and how suffering may be defeated. The 1st noble truth is called *dukkha-ariya sacca*, which speaks about suffering, and elucidates how life is full of troubles and sufferings. However, the first noble truth does not aim to disclose a hopeless view of life, but it provides a lesson that is midway between pessimistic and optimistic. Given that the existence of humanity is filled with suffering, understanding the state and nature of suffering becomes important. In other words, it is important to identify the cause of unsatisfactory and worrying features of reality which motivates people to question and try to find the cause of suffering.

How is this to be comprehended? No matter how one chooses to conduct their lives, pain will always exist, according to the Buddha. Therefore, it's crucial to realise that everything is transitory. Peace comes from recognising the fact that everything in life is impermanent.

The second truth is called *dukkha-samudaya-ariyasacca*, it speaks about the reasons for suffering. According to Rubin (2003, p35), the causes of suffering are motivated by cravings which may be regarded as a mental state that makes the mind narrow its focus to a specific view or object. In addition, the fundamental reason for suffering is ignorance. This may be understood as a lack of the right knowledge and selfawareness of reality. Characteristics of ignorance in this regard may include seeing things or situations to be permanent and neglecting ideas which suggest that things will change.

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[10] Eighteen elements in accordance with the dharma. [14]
The twelve bases categorised with the dharma.

Buddha suggests that all problems humans have in the world are because of selfish thirst. This may include arguments in families, conflicts between countries and personal desires. Cravings and wanting to satisfy personal desires are the main reason for suffering.

Because cravings and hunger for transient things are the foundation of suffering, Buddha proposed a solution. Eliminating the sources of misery is the subject of the third truth in this regard. According to Burton (2004, p22), This can be accomplished by reaching a freed level of enlightenment, which will eliminate all delusion. The mind is both the source of misery and its remedy. Therefore, the choice between impurity and purity is personal. In other words, whether a person wants to or not, the duty of maintaining purity rests with their attitude.

The fourth truth acts as a map to a liberated state. According to Rubin (2003, p. 41), Gautama established the eightfold paths as a means of overcoming suffering. This includes seeing right, thinking right, speaking right, behaving right, living right, exerting the right effort, having the right mindset, and concentrating right. According to Gautama, when the eightfold routes are followed correctly, they offer tranquillity and an end to suffering.

There are two ways to comprehend the eightfold path's practice: first, as a progressive progression of stages that the practitioner or follower must go through. And second, they require simultaneous development and parallel practice of all eight things. The promotion of wisdom, moral behaviour, and the appropriate concentration, which together make up the crucial Buddhist discipline, are the goals of the eightfold path.

Furthermore, according to Der-lan Yeh (2006, p. 100), Gautama also outlined five moral precepts. The purpose of these precepts is to regulate the moral conduct of his followers. This includes (1) do not take a life, (2) do not take what is not given, (3) refraining from sensual misconduct, (4) do not speak wrongly, and (5) refraining from toxic substances.

Respecting the principles would include refraining from using violence both on oneself and other people. Avoiding acting inappropriately toward others is one way to achieve this. Scholars such as Kraft (1995, p. 159) and many others recommend the

five precepts as being extremely beneficial for bringing about world peace in the majority of Buddhist teachings for peace. In addition, Galtung (1993, p. 117) also supports the idea that abstaining from violence, as advised by the precepts, makes a significant contribution to Buddhist peacemaking. The precepts would also have a wider application to the social framework where justice is carried out if they were understood in their entirety. For instance, the second principle, which forbids taking from others what is not given, inherently forbids structural violence.

As a result, violence that was ingrained in an institution, such as economic exploitation, could be considered to have oppressed individuals indirectly. Therefore, if individuals had to acquire knowledge about this massive theft of an unusual kind, this knowledge would have allowed them to organise and correct the corrupt condition.

As long as Buddhists observe the second precept in the struggle for enlightenment, spiritual quest and secular economic development may be adjoined through the performance of the eightfold path. Schumacher (1975, p. 4) contends that a person's occupation becomes more than just a job because it contributes to their development towards enlightenment. As a result, the goal of employment can be viewed as having at least three different purposes: to help oneself grow, to use one's skills to help others and to overcome an egotistical perspective, thus resulting in the production of products and services required for existence. The only activity that is consistent with the commandments in this regard is living a moral life; this excludes engaging in butchery, slavery, prostitution, the manufacture and sale of weapons, the use of intoxicants, and economic theft or dishonesty.

Buddhists are taught and reminded repeatedly to abstain from killing, which is viewed as conquering suffering both individually and collectively. War and violence cause misery for everyone, which increases suffering. Hatred exists wherever there is a rivalry. In most conflicts, the loser never feels satisfied. Thus, Gautama guided overcoming hatred in this aspect. According to Segura (2014, p107), It is possible to combat hatred with love rather than with more hate. In other words, when hatred is shown, love must come as a natural reaction to dispel it. In Buddhism, killing someone would be considered a violation of the rules that must be followed to become enlightened. Therefore, it is never acceptable to kill a living thing. The idea

of primarily injuring others through violence contradicts the primary objective of reducing suffering if a Buddhist path involves doing both. Even when there is a justification for violence, this still holds. Buddhism's philosophical principles are incompatible with violence and conflict.

3.3. Six principles of cordiality

Since Gautama did not encourage his followers to live in solitary all that much, the majority of the nuns[11] led communal lives. According to Der-lan Yeh (2006, p.102) when there are no chances to practice the 4 mental liberations of loving and kindness, which include serenity, sympathy, and sympathetic joy in any group, with Gautama's group included, exists the chances of conflicts and disputes. To avoid harm and suffering caused by conflicts within people, Gautama taught the six principles of cordiality to bring respect and love. These principles target the development of the inner state of mind for the regulation of external behaviour.

This includes (1) the acts of the body, (2) verbal acts, (3) mental behaviour demonstrating loving- kindness to other members of the group, (4) sharing with other material gains, (5) committing to the same rules, and 6 seeing the same and working towards the destruction of suffering.

The first three elements of cordiality centre on how individuals use their behaviour to affect the other members of their group. This indicates that, for people to inspire others, they must conduct themselves positively. Sharing material gains is one of the four principles that enforce equality in the community, ensuring that everyone benefits equally and preventing conflicts. The fifth one focuses more on the legal system or regulations and how to ensure that they are adhered to properly. The last one addresses the idea that everyone has beliefs that are consistent with disbelieving suffering.

Even if everyone in the Sangha shared this opinion, there was still room for disagreements; for instance, chapter one of this dissertation emphasised arguments between Gautama and Devadatta and how Gautama lived up to his beliefs. When there was controversy within the Sangha, a small group discussion was held to promote harmony and the expression of diversity or differences. Thus, it was through

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[11] A Nun is a feminine form of a monk.

these meetings that members would correct each other and come up with the same point of view that will lead to the destruction of suffering. According to Der-lan Yeh (2006, p102), Gautama valued these meetings wherein his disciples meet to find common ground. Gautama in this regard used seven criteria to assess the social strength of every monotheistic order, and in that ranking, first was regular meetings and assemblies. The second criterion emphasised harmony among members during their meetings. The meeting procedures of these assemblies were recorded in the Vinaya to ensure harmony and fairness.

3.4. The practice of the group as nonviolence intervention

The Buddhist ideal of non-violence still holds in collective situations. Gautama, according to Chappell (2003, p. 63), imparted a parable about a king of longevity to instruct his disciples on how to respond in the face of hostile invaders or violent conflict. In the story, another monarch attacked the king's land. The king abandoned the armoury defence to safeguard the lives of his subjects. Before the king passed away, he told his son not to exact revenge on him and his wife. When the son later had the chance, he chose not to not exact revenge on the enemy because of his father's advice and wishes. When the son revealed to the enemy king the rationale behind his decision to not kill him, the enemy king started to feel bad and gave back the land he had invaded.

The lesson of this narrative is straightforward: according to Gautama, the best and most moral approach to dealing with brutality and violence is to stop the cycle of violence and show forgiveness to those who have wronged.

Additionally, Taisho (2003, p. 126) claims that an excellent example to highlight nonviolence is Gautama's action when his homeland was invaded. In one case, the Gautama, whose own land of the Sakyans had been invaded, travelled to the border to convince the two kingdoms to renounce hostilities. However, he only succeeded in convincing them once, and he failed to do it a second time. In this case, the enemy monarch sent his army to attack, and they killed the majority of the Sakyans because they refrained from fighting back following the precepts of non-violence. This narrative does not end badly in the eyes of Buddhists followers because of the principle of dependent origin (*pratityasamutpada*)[12]. Despite recent instances when

[12] translated commonly as arising from a preceding course.

they have advocated violence, episodes such as this one helped Buddhism maintain its reputation as a peaceful faith.

Chappell (2003, p 103) argues that non-violence in this instance did not end human suffering instead Buddhism suffered the criticism of being submissive in the name of non-violence. Therefore, looking at this situation it may be stated that people believe in this instance become directory as to whether not fighting back and being killed in the name of non-violence is a good thing or a bad thing. And does it save humans from suffering? Perhaps from a Buddhist perspective, it does.

From a non-Buddhist perspective, it does not save humans from suffering. This may be because many people will suffer severe injuries or pass away. Buddhism views violence as suffering, but it also permits its adherents to be victims of violence when confronted with it rather than protecting themselves to prevent harm or miseries that will result from violence if they do not protect themselves. As a result, Buddhism is contradictory when it comes to this issue, thus it is reasonable to assert that sometimes it is worse to not take precautions.

However, the fact that China communicated with a team from the exiled Tibetan government in Dharamsala for the first time in ten years in September 2002 gives the concept of non-violence a positive spin. In this situation, the Dalai Lama fought hard to keep China at peace. The dedication to nonviolence demonstrated great esteem and sympathy for the Tibetan people throughout the world. To bring about the happiness of the people and less suffering for them, particularly the people of Tibet, the Dalai Lama reached a peaceful agreement with the Chinese rather than expressing his rage or seeking retribution.

His perspectives and comprehension of the issue allowed him to empathise with individuals who had been harmed and come up with a constructive strategy to respond to the injustices and damages done to the Tibetan people. According to Herskovits (2002, p5) to make Tibet a place of ahimsa, the Dalai Lama negotiated middle ground for Tibet, resulting in a self-governing government that would be chosen democratically. According to ahimsa principles, Tibet's goal would be to create a region without any weaponry production. Rather it would be a location with strong protection against the exploitation of natural resources, plants, and animals.

The Dalai Lama's accomplishments and ways of life set a wonderful example for world politics. They also showed how the Buddhist tenet of nonviolence may be applied in the modern world, which differs from the one in which Buddhism originally developed. In the modern world, it is possible to assert that, widely adopted, Buddhist methods of peacemaking may have a greater beneficial impact than a negative one in the fight against human suffering.

3.5. The principle of dependent origin and its application

According to Analayo (2020, p1), dependent origin may be regarded as the centre of the Buddhist doctrine. In this respect, the Buddha made use of the idea of dependent origin to clarify a link between worldly sorrows and the things that individuals encounter in their daily lives. This principle explains the causes of suffering and how it ends as a result of natural independence, which is death. According to this *paticcasamuppada* principle, ignorance clouds people's feelings and thoughts, leading to a false sense of self that is thought of as "me" or "I."

Buddha attempted to explain the natural processes in these teachings to emphasise the causes and make corrections. The occurrence of *paticcasamuppada* occurs as a result of numerous states of ignorance and different types of attachments.

Murray (2012, p. 32) lists twelve connections to the dependent origin principle that explain the causes of human suffering. Ignorance of the truth is the first of the twelve sins. One could argue that ignorance grows through time, and if one is unaware of this development, it can cause worry and constant fear. Murray claims that ignorance can lead to a psychotic condition where a person is unable to distinguish between basic good and wrong. Therefore, even though their justifications for violence are false, most violent individuals frequently think that they are right.

Karma, the second connection to the dependent origin, demands ignorance. According to karma, human personality, beliefs, and behaviours are primarily driven by wrath, envy, and greed. Human speech, actions, and ideas are all part of the construction of karma. Speech thought, and behaviour in humans are influenced or caused by karma. However, depending on the activities, karma can be either positive or terrible. Karma is the driving force behind human behaviour, and it also influences

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how individuals react to and interpret external events. Karma is therefore crucial to the *paticcasamuppada* idea on both a social and personal level.

Third connecting the dependent origin theory is consciousness. Human consciousness, in Analayo's (2020, p. 5), opinion is predisposed to a fundamental mental state in which people tend to see only what they want to see. As a result of, an abundance of stimuli in the world, attention concentrates the mind on a specific item by filtering out unwanted inputs. Additionally, there are equivalent factors that are cognitively active and present multiple stimuli at once; the mind in this regard is not able to process them all at once. In such a case, only a single data point from a single sense may be processed at once.

Explained differently, this means that, for instance, when talking on the phone while operating a motor vehicle, the phone's and the outside environment's stimuli are processed in the order. It follows that the experience of both working together is an illusion. And this is what people are capable of doing with their bodies and minds. However, everything is coordinated and happening one at a time.

The fourth connection to this idea, according to Murray (2012, p. 33), concerns forms that establish a person, that is, the physical being composed of actual feelings, thus, fundamental awareness, perception and ideas, mental labelling, sight, taste, hearing, smell, act, sensation, and sentiments.

In addition, the fifth connection is made possible by the human senses. People can label or identify an object by tasting, smelling, hearing, seeing, or feeling it. When one's senses come into touch, the sixth link is formed, and as a result, the discernment process gathers and classifies unprocessed input. Here, object qualities are matched in opposition to the mental templates. The seventh link results from the awareness and integration of the senses with the perception of one's mental impression at this point. As a result, the volitional impulse increases, concentration, and focus are guided, and the meaning and value of the item being observed are affected.

According to Geshe (2006, p. 26), the identification of an object might cause sentiments of aversion or desire. These sentiments eventually develop into a distaste or a liking for that specific object, at which point these feelings of repulsion or want

are sparked. From a weak attraction to a stronger one, repulsion or desire varies in intensity for that object. In other words, emotions determine the worth of every object. These emotions could be viewed as attachments, which leads to the ninth link.

Feelings are created by a person's neutral state, personality, mental disposition, and training, according to the claims of Wallin (2007, p. 31). The instinctive inclination that a person may have toward whatever object they come into contact with is considered to be their nutria state. Therefore, a propensity to move away from or toward the thing. The mental attitude of people also has an impact on their mood, and this attitude may be affected by mental impairments like intoxication.

The influences of one's culture and life experiences have a significant impact on one's preferences, personality, and behaviour. Most often, people act on impulse rather than based on reality, which can be seen as having an uninformed and confused consciousness. This occurs if the idea of impermanence is not properly understood. It takes a shift from ignorance to enlightenment to comprehend the idea of impermanence; otherwise, suffering will continue. When a newborn is dependent on their mother during the early stages of development, the attachment process begins, which is when a baby first expresses their likes and dislikes for various things. As time goes on, these feelings become stronger, and attachments result, making it impossible to get rid of them.

The ineffectiveness of the cognitive process in how people see their sense of being and individual characteristics, such as craving, aggression, hatred, lust, and wrath, greatly affects how people view themselves (cf Metzner 1997, p157). There are sensual attachments, which occur when people wish to possess objects that fascinate them. Attachments vary depending on their forms. This can include things such as tastes, forms, colours, and sounds as well as imaginary or real objects of desire as well as mental representations of the past, present, and future. These attachments may cause sentiments of hatred, envy, pride, and fury, as well as occasionally lead to suicidal thoughts and violent behaviour.

Everything a person does stems from a sensual attachment, which has the potential to make individuals look for pleasure and drive them to hustle for money in various

ways to find it. Due to a need to feel good, it makes it easy for a person to be a slave to wealth, position, power, and everything else that comes with it, even when doing so sometimes it compels one to act improperly. Thus, this is the root of arrogance and misguided attachments. In this context, sensuality may be viewed as the primary type of attachment.

What people hold dear to their hearts may also be considered an attachment. Zimberoff & Hartman (2002, p. 10) state that the majority of faiths teach about going to heaven, which makes individuals aspire to go to heaven, and that desire for heaven has origins in sensuality. When other people's views and opinions are expressed in someone's head and they remain there, it forms an attachment. Many of these opinions are wrapped up by people's perceptions, which are founded on what they believe in, as well as by customs, professions, rituals, and traditions. Long-standing customs, beliefs, and habits make change difficult in this situation. The attachment to thoughts and viewpoints stems from initial ignorance. The majority of the time, when individuals notice something wrong, they refuse to admit it, which frequently results in animosity, rage, and violence.

The incorrect sense of self that was described at the outset of this discussion may also count as an attachment. Although it is difficult to identify, the notion and belief of oneself may be seen as a widespread sort of attachment that results from a similar attachment to opinion. According to Freud (1926, p15), The primitive urge to assemble and hunt, defend oneself, and reproduce is what gives rise to the paradigm of "me and mine." People usually fear the concept of death because of the desire to see their eternal existence. Due to this type of attachment, one loses all faith in impermanence and start to believe in solidity and permanence. Fear of loss begins to develop as well with the desire to defend space and time as something which must be held on to. That is when a sense of loss comes in. When a person suffers from a loss it may lead to anxiety and depression which causes the search for pleasure to avoid pain.

Aside from that, another effect of mine and me is the growth of aversion. When a person's self is threatened by something, aversion typically enters the picture to sustain the performance of self-notion. Freud claimed that the range of aversion might be anything from mild avoidance to extreme rage, annoyance, or discontent.

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The root of all symptoms in the unconscious stage, when the mind exaggerates the negative aspects of oneself, is ignorance of oneself in this regard.

Cravings represent the ninth connection to the dependent origin theory. The strongest attachment is craving, according to Geshe (2006, p. 54). People who are not pleased with their current circumstances and who seek pleasure at any cost, even if it means harming others, are more likely to experience cravings. A person who craves is motivated to limit their enjoyment.

From this, a dislike for other things grows. When want becomes stronger, it eventually turns into clinging. Models, habits, self-belief, and procedures may all fall under this category. In light of these criteria, a person's perception of themselves and life circumstances are reviewed and evaluated. Grief would result if the ability to enjoy life were to be taken away. This is thought to be selfish behaviour that could bring negative karma.

An individual who clings to something is compelled to live within a set of conditions where their goals, recurring patterns of behaviour, and personal characteristics consume an effect on their physical and mental health. Depending on one's state of being, this affects the situations in which they might be influenced by their beliefs and behaviours. In light of their objectives, worldviews, morals, and prior experiences, their emotions and thinking processes are consequently in harmony.

In this view, karma is formed by an individual's deeds, which may have an effect on their character or have long-term ramifications. Most people perceive this as a condition of life. A person is said to be in this kind of state when they view things to be permanent and they frequently have the self-sense which is in line with a certain component of their lives, such as their sentiments of failure or successfulness (cf Buddhaghosa 1991, p. 80). At this moment, arrogance enters the scene, giving the I in this scenario a stronger sense of superiority and authority.

The ninth link, however, is where things become interesting. According to Mitchell (1993, p299), if a person's existence is founded on desiring through their hubris, their life is expected to undergo the samsara, or reincarnation, process. The revelation of one's dilution, however, might occasionally cause one to think of oneself and rebirth.

It is common for people to experience times in life where they doubt their value, who they are, and what they have accomplished.

This turns into the cause of the emptiness that some individuals experience in their life. Changes in relationships and the onset of self-employment, which will have an impact on the future route with a sense of spiritual guidance, are what follow during this period of inquiry. A person striving to alter their life may have crises that result in various obstacles that may require novel solutions.

However, if there is no change, a person might be destined to follow the same existence, which leads to the eleventh link and ultimately follows the same existence. According to Collin (1990, p102), the term "birth" in this context refers not to a natural birth but rather the birth of the movement. Death, the final link in the chain of twelve, acts as a reminder that everything is ephemeral or fleeting and that everyone must acknowledge their dependent origin. There are declines in life in this sense.

Suffering, misery, despair, and sadness result from the certainty of decline, ongoing nervousness, and exertion made to defend oneself from the immovability of morality. The ego will eventually give up its position, which could lead to neurotic behaviour and thinking as well as a fear of scarcity. A person may have disappointments as a result of not succeeding. Those who experience success could be reliant on external things like achievement, celebrity, accolades, or acknowledgement. The illusion of self is what brings sadness into people's lives.

The delusion of thinking that people have souls is also incorrect, according to Collin (1990, p. 103) who also claims that seeing people as objects and thinking of them as such is improper. Collin asserts that *paticca-samuppanna*, the natural law, which is the only soul, and hence the dharma, arise as a result of one another. Buddhism rejects the idea that a person can be viewed as an object because it holds that a soul cannot exist in a vacuum.

In the Buddhist practice, *paticcasamuppada* is focused on the development and wisdom which helps in terms of controlling emotions that emerge when environmental stimulation is encountered by the senses. When ignorance obscures the mind and results in persistent beliefs and attitudes, suffering results. Only when the senses are controlled by wisdom and mindfulness will suffering end. Buddhism's

main goals include liberating people from false beliefs and putting an end to suffering. Drawing on this passage, one may claim that practising the path is all about being present in the moment and letting go of the past, present, and future to experience freedom from suffering.

3.6. Gautama's death

During this time the teachings of Gautama were still spreading through central India. According to (Senaveratne et al. 1914, p114) Buddhism was competing with religions such as the Ajivikas and the Jainas. After Gautama's death both the Asoka and his grandson went to the hills of Barabar to contribute caves to the Ajivikas demonstrating to them that the Ajivikas were still important in central India.

In the final years of Gautama's life, there was a rift in the Buddhist order that Devadatta planned to start (link with the literature review). But this was not the reason for Gautama's scarcity. When Gautama departed Vaisiili during a wet season, he become unwell and said he would pass away in three months. However, later stories indicate that before Gautama could foresee his death, the God of death Mara arrived and counselled him to commit himself. Despite being unwell, Gautama continued to journey and passed away in Kusinagara.

3.7. Conclusion

The teachings and life of Gautama show what a wonderful and moral person he was, especially when you consider what drove him to set out in quest of a solution to the problem of human suffering or pain, mostly his fear of ageing, illness, and death which he diagnosed based on seeing how it affect others. Gautama's life changed into becoming a teacher after he had attained enlightenment. As a result, Gautama preached nonviolence through the Dharma, which includes (1) the four noble truths, which he utilised to identify the origins and causes of human suffering as well as how suffering can be put to an end. (2) the five rules that he utilised to regulate the moral conduct of his disciples. (3) The six rules of courteous behaviour that promote respect and affection. And (4) the dependent emerging principle, which clarified the causes of suffering and how it is resolved by natural independence, which is scarcity. In addition, Buddha taught how to respond to acts of violence or hatred with compassion, showing love and understanding for those who transgress.

Chapter 4
4. The relationship between religion and violence
4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the life and teachings of Siddhartha. In that discourse, crucial aspects of his teachings were addressed and some of these teachings, in as much as it relates to the eradication of greed, the idea of violence or the anti-violence narrative is inherently alluded to. It is from some of these teachings that the idea of non-violence reverberates. In chapter 5 the different branches of Buddhism are addressed and the teachings and justification of violence in these traditions are discussed. In the present chapter, the researcher introduces the relationship between religion and violence as a prelude to the chapters that follow.

It is vital to consider the relationship between violence and religion while discussing the two occurrences, but in light of this dissertation, it is also crucial to take into account the relationship between violence and Buddhism as a religion. Due to the fact that sacrifice as a ritual is violent and, in most religions, it is permitted and recognised as a good thing, one may argue that sacrifice is a primary cause of violence in religion. This is because sacrifice on its own is violent, however, it is one violent act most religions support or permit. Thus, this chapter focuses on whether there is a connection between Buddhism (religion) and violence given that this religious practice is not a part of this religion.

4.2. What is religious violence?

Religious violence is defined as violence inspired by or tied to religion. In this aspect, religious writings, ideas, or tenets may act as a spur to violence. This entails violence directed at people, teams, or institutions that follow various religions.

Avalos (2016, p. 167) claims that a shortage of resources is the root of violence. This indicates that if people become aware of a lack of what they need but is not readily available, it results in conflict during the acquisition of it. Therefore, when violence is

attributed to religion, it is most often because a particular resource was in short supply.

Although it has sometimes been a source of violence, religion has played an important role in societies by providing a source of social identity. Religious organisations occasionally clash with one another or with other organisations of similar faith. Burma's anti-Muslim movement serves as a prime example of violence committed against other religious communities, with Buddhists against Muslims.

The irony is that religion has helped resolve issues of both violence and peace. Religious leaders have played an important role in setting social, political, and moral agendas, according to the claims by Coogan (2003, p. 13). In South Africa, representatives from several denominations and faiths banded together to call for a peaceful end to the fight against apartheid. This unified Christian voice against apartheid had a significant impact and developed into a powerful voice for a peaceful transition that helped pave the way for a democratic South Africa.

Another instance of how religion helped bring peace during a conflict is the Mozambique civil war. According to a news report by David Smoke, the Saint Egidio community [13]which helped in ending the 1992 Mozambique civil war is one of the recent successful cases which was influenced by religion in peace making (see Smoke, 2006, p.1). Therefore, one might assert that the consequences of violence are less severe where religion has intervened as opposed to where it did not because religion has contributed more to peace than violence.

4.3. Repercussions of religious violence

Dearth and injuries are the most serious effects of violence. People lose their lives and sustain severe injuries during combat. It is also anticipated that significant structures including churches and workplaces may be damaged when there are wars. According to a Prime Asia news story by Parera (2017, p. 1), some Buddhist adherents burned a Kithu sevana praying centre, which was a Christian place of worship, during the Sri Lankan civil war. Failure to acknowledge that some Buddhist families had converted to Christianity was what motivated this attack.

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[13] A spiritual community Saint Egidio in 1992 contributed to ending the civil war in Mozambique. They supported the diplomatic and political struggle in bringing peace.

When important buildings are destroyed, economic activities become disrupted harming productivity. Thus, investors begin to be averse, and then the development of the country and the growth of the economy become affected. Job creation decreases which leads to poverty. From this direction, the conflict diverges into a political conflict because more resources become scarce causing people to strike or start a civil war targeting the government.

4.4. The relationship between religion and violence

Is there truly a connection between violence and religion? When attempting to answer this topic, religion is frequently seen as the primary driver of violent behaviour. First, this occurs when monotheistic religions are portrayed as inherently illiberal. In addition to making religion the only path to peace, which correlates with violence, it also makes it vulnerable to religious violence.

Although many academics argue that religion as a whole is not violent, specific religious rituals, including sacrificial rites, may give rise to the argument that religion is violent in some way. The term "sacrifice" comes from the Latin "*sacrificium*, which refers to offering a living thing to a deity (cf Carrasco 2013, p.210). During a sacrificial ritual, violence is committed towards the sacrifice because there is a life that is being taken by force.

It is disappointing that people do not react to animal sacrifice in the same way that they do to human sacrifice. Consideration from Akedah is a prime illustration of this. Girard (1977, p. 2) claims that Abraham was told to offer up his son Isaac as a sacrifice. Isaac queries his father about the location of the sacrifice as they make their way to the mountain, thus where the sacrificial incident was going to take place. His father replied that God would make the offering. Abraham is aware right now that his child is the offering, but he does not want to admit that he is carrying out such an unethical command.

Abraham's response after God offered the ram, just before he was going to kill Isaac, is the crucial point in this incident. According to Genesis 22.14, Abraham prayed, "Jehovah Jireh, on the mountain of the Lord it shall be provided." Immediately after receiving a command from an angel of God to leave his child behind and, showing him the sacrifice, which was the ram, he let go of his son and took the ram.

Abraham's comment may have been motivated by relief that he was no longer offering up his son for sacrifice, but it was also likely motivated by satisfaction that God had provided as he had hoped. This demonstrates that, despite his decision to sacrifice his son, Abraham was still touched by the sacrificial process. However, after receiving the ram, his reactions changed which proves that he was no longer feeling the same pain he was when sacrificing the ram as he was when sacrificing his son, thus, he is now sacrificing an animal instead of the son he was feeling much better.

The primary driving force behind violence in situations such as this is religion. In this sense, violence resulted from a religious rite. What connection can there be between this incident and peace or violence in general? When a sacrifice is made, it is typically done as part of a cleaning ritual, a communication with a deity, or a life sacrifice when one person is sacrificed to save many. All of these justifications for sacrifice aim to advance peace, but because they take the form of sacrificial rites, they also contribute to violence, violence toward that which is being sacrificed. Religion and violence are thus related, but their coincidence is unintentional like it may be with any other reason for violence, despite the necessity of their relationship.

4.5. Violence and mimesis

To offer an alternative perspective on the connection between religion and violence, Rene Gerald created the mimetic theory. By using imitation, this hypothesis, according to Girard (2010, p. 35), explains the characteristics of violence in human society. Mimetic is a Greek word that means imitation. When discussing human imitation, one may assert that it serves as the foundation for invention, which frequently escalates.

Girard argues that this theory employs a fundamental explanation of violence. It explains how humans have the limitless ability to copy with traits that make them unique and enable them to learn information quickly. This includes what one desires, which could cause conflict if people compete for it because it is a limited resource (see Girard 2010, p35).

Common wants or wanting what others want are frequent traits among people. There is nothing wrong with people wanting the same things, but when there aren't enough

of those things to go around, conflict may arise. Limitations on desired products cause competition, which then evolves into rivalry.

When one party has a resource and the other has not, the one with the resource will attempt to take it from the one without it, and the one with the resource will attempt to defend it. In this way, both begin to act antagonistically against one another. In light of this, Wandinger (2013, p. 129) asserts that the mimetic theory's relevance to the connection between violence and religion becomes clearer when it is applied to the origin of humans. Institutional frameworks did not exist at the beginning of humanity. Due to boundless mimesis, human desire has been freed from the constraints of instinct. Therefore, a simple dispute over wanted products may quickly turn into rivalry.

Girard (2010, p. 38) addressed this topic when he said that lethal confrontations, which start as minor disputes over scant resources in a primitive society, are fed by the contagion of antagonistic mimesis. People who live in such a society start to imitate their opponents more and fight amongst themselves in ways that even outdo them. Before it could reach its apex, cultural growth in this aspect is interrupted.

One may say that Girard's method of thinking is evolutionary after looking into this notion. According to him, the release of mimesis is what distinguishes humans from other animals. Other creatures' behaviour is mostly governed by instinct. Humans, on the other hand, have a far smaller proportion of instinct and a more expansive usage of mimesis. In other words, the freedom of mimesis, which has a positive effect on growth and the need for more, is strongly related to the evolutionary development of human characteristics.

By itself, mimesis offers an escape route. In an attempt to explain how this might occur, Wandinger (2013, p. 129) claims that in circumstances where a group member has the power to persuade other group members to turn against an opponent who is less talented or underrated due to his or her battle prowess, succeeds in obtaining desired goods. The anger he or she has against the person who is perceived as weird only serves to exacerbate this. Additionally, the non-respected underdog could be destroyed by the other group members who may follow the respected by doing the same.

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When considering how this could appear to someone who is actively engaged, it is important to remember that their mimetic character of behaviour is obscured from their consciousness. They believe their actions are appropriate at that precise moment. Some of the explanations include the notion that they fight because their rival crosses the line by pursuing unwarranted gains and desiring things that are not theirs. Because the perpetrator refuses to acknowledge their limitations and instead chooses violence, the issue has escalated. The group as a whole experiences a sharp rise in violence.

Who should be held responsible in such a circumstance? Given that the antagonistic bad guy is to blame for everything, it follows that he or she is guilty. However, how would he or she get the authority to hold people accountable for their share of the sin? When violence reaches its peak, this question is resolved. When the bizarre, pointless person they were all fighting passes away, according to Wandinger (2013, p. 130), all hostilities end, and peace is restored. The group suddenly feels at ease until they remember that they killed an unusual criminal. This was a strong individual whose absence brought their civilisation from peril to peace. On the other hand, the criminal must have had the power to create mayhem. In this case, the bad guy was a goddess with the power to either save or kill. He or she began an experience that supports the existence of this deity.

What is visible here is a primitive culture that is a mimetic process that has driven to the edge of self-harm to escape fate. Consequently, targeting one victim who has been chosen at random with enraged aggression. The charges made against this person gave each person a justification for killing, which further reinforced the mimetic of each. As a result, the murder in this case, would seem justified as a matter of justice. The built-up hostility is exposed and eliminated, bringing about peace.

This explains that chaos or supernatural power does not bring peace, but rather it is the fading away of aggression in people that happens after a community has killed their target that leads to peace. Girard (1978, p32) states that a mimetic mechanism leads to violent behaviour involuntarily or without one being aware of it. Thus, the behaviour of this community was clouded by this mechanism. According to the crowd, this will be attributed to the supernatural, the strange member's power whom

they killed. For the group, this would be their best religious explanation. Even though violence ended, and peace was restored, what started the outbreak of violence has not been destroyed which is the mimetic mechanism. Thus, it can provoke violence again.

4.6. Buddhism and Vedic religion as a sign of rejecting sacrificial rite

Scholars such as Oldenberg (1971, p 172), Thomas (1971, p 11) and others widely believe that Buddhism, as well as Jainism, was an unorthodox movement that questioned Brahmanical religious rites, particularly the practice of sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas. According to Krishan (1993, p 237) the practice of sacrifices, *yajna*, is thought to have been denounced by Buddhism as worthless, if not harmful, for gaining material wealth and spiritual rewards; the practice of animal sacrifices was highly opposed. For these reasons, Buddhism as well as Jainism, are seen as opposition and movements which reforms when it comes to the sacrificial rite.

A detailed review of both canonical and non-canonical religious writings reveals unequivocal indication of Gautama Buddha that he supported laypeople to practice their traditional customs and ceremonies (cf Krishan 1993, p 238) particularly *yajnas Pali yannas*, however in those animal sacrifices in Vedic literature were banned. Additionally, particularly those who entered the order, or became *bhiksus*[14], were obligated to abstain from *yajnas* that include animal sacrifice. In the Kutadanta Sutta of the Dighanikaya V 21, Gautama responds to a query by declaring that practising *yanna*, or sacrifices of ghee, butter, oil, honey, sugar, and curd, results in the performer's rebirth in heaven: Gautama in this regard reiterates in the *Payasi sutta* of the Dighanikaya D.ii, 354 that sacrifice brings good fruit, good gain, good glory, and has a spreading influence if animals are not slaughtered. In this case, Gautama emphasises that sacrifices in which no animals are murdered are more auspicious because no pain is committed.

4.7. Conclusion

This makes it abundantly clear that, despite their often-accidental link, religion and violence have a relationship. But because violence brings pain and Buddhism forbids

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[14] Buddhist monk or mendicant.

violence, Buddhism as a religion does not have a causal relationship with violence, mostly looking at the fact that they do not have a sacrificial rite which is the main root of religious violence. However, according to Girard (1978, p. 34), religion causes violence for society to heal. Violence in general is non-selective, and harmful to society, whereas violence motivated by religion is deliberate, targeted, and harmful to a particular group of people in society to heal or fix the society. Thus, it may be said that religion can be both peaceful and violent. According to the mimetic theory, violence is directed at victims to prevent it from spreading across society.

Chapter 5
5. Teachings and reasons for violence in the three major Buddhist sects
5.1. Introduction

Although there are other sects and schools of Buddhism, the three most prevalent now are Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. The lessons taught in these schools are more likely to be similar, yet they do differ in a variety of ways. Thus, this chapter seeks to investigate and explain the similarities and differences between their separate teachings in light of this, particularly regarding the concept of violence. However, this chapter starts by giving a general overview of the schism that had an impact on the development of the Buddhist schools after Gautama's passing.

5.2. Development of Buddhism in different schools

After Gautama's death, there were small groups of mendicants in the Buddhist order. It was through Gautama's disciples that Buddhism spread from India to other parts of the world. According to Groner (1990, p2) following King Asoka's conversion, Buddhism expanded across all of India during the third century B.C.E. Arguments about the interpretation of the doctrine and adherence to monastic discipline emerged while the Buddhist order grew, and the number of monks increased.

This influenced the early order to be divided into two schools namely the conservative Sthavirada which is the sect of the elders, also known as Theravada, and the progressive Mahasanghika which is a Mahayana sect of Buddhism. In addition, there was more schism which led to the development of other Buddhist schools. The most important among those schools were the Theravada, Mahayana, Sautrantika, Sarvastivada, and Sammatlya. Buddhism in this instance was entering a

sectarian period. The word Sectarian in this regard is used to describe the eighteen or twenty schools of Buddhism which developed during this period.

When the common era began, the development of Mahayana Buddhism had already started. Michael (2018, p49) states that followers of Nikaya Buddhism were criticised by Mahayana Buddhists. Nikaya Buddhists in this regard ware called "Hinayana" Buddhists meaning an inferior Buddhist vehicle. This was a disapproving word which was applied mostly to Sarvastivadins. Even though criticism within the Buddhist order is the main reason for the development of these schools, they were all recognised as Buddhist. The reason why these schools would recognise each other as Buddhists despite arguments is that their teaching was not founded on blind faith.

There were debates within Buddhism as a result of the fact that each of Gautama's twenty students offered a unique interpretation of his teachings. The twenty followers each claimed to have received and conveyed the genuine teachings of Gautama Buddha. However, a Chinese monk named I-Ching travelled through India and Southeast Asia with a travel journal that describes how the Buddha's teachings are compared to an 18-part golden cane (cf Groner 1990, p2). The essence of the Buddha's teachings persisted despite the early order's division into eighteen schools, just as every component of the original cane stayed unchanged.

Following Gautama's dearth, the first council was held at Rajagriha. This council according to Damodar (2007, p30) was led by a monk named Mahakasyapa. The reason for this meeting was to agree and recite the actual teachings of Buddha. This was followed by the second council meeting which was held at Vaisali. The reason for this one was to focus on 10 questionable monastic practices, irregularities such as the drinking of palm wine, and the usage of money. These practices were declared unlawful by the council. The 3rd council meeting was called by king Asoka which was held at Pataliputra. The reason for this one was the purification of the Sangha which contained a large number of false monks.

In addition, during this period the compilation of the Tripitaka which is the Buddhist scripture was completed. The scripture in this regard had an addition of a body which had a subtitle philosophy to the monastic discipline and the dharma doctrine that was listed in the first council. This council also resulted in a dispatch of missionaries to

different countries. The 4th council meeting was held under the support of king Kanishka at Jalandhar; however, its authenticity was not recognised by Theravada Buddhism. It was these Buddhist conferences and councils which contributed a huge role in the dispersion of Buddhism globally.

Theravada, Mahayana, and Tibetan Buddhism are the three primary branches of Buddhism, as noted in the first chapter. Each of these three sects has a unique approach to teaching about violence and the role that Buddhism plays in it. Thus, this chapter's following section will focus on that.

5.3. Teachings and justifications for violence in Theravada Buddhism

The teachings of Theravada, according to Michael (2018, p44), are connected with those of the elders. These are practices from Gautama's time, which were passed down by senior monks. These teachings advocate for behaviour such as meditation and living in the forests. In this sect, the major objective is to become an Arhat (a state of perfection), who is thought to be free from pain. Buddha encountered unfavourable elements like societal injustice, sacrifice, and degrading customs when travelling through India in search of enlightenment. Buddhism thus emerged as a force against such detrimental elements. In this sense, Buddhism liberated women and gave them entire spiritual freedom while also promoting equality for all men.

Theravada doctrine views violence as an unpleasant deed, although to a certain extent, it only condemns violence against the state. Damodar (2007, p. 31) claims that this theory regarding violence derives from the Pali Canon and its commentators. One of the pillars of ethics is the Vinaya, a passage from the Pali canon that is recognised as part of the monastic precepts. Strangely, murder comes in third place out of four defeats [15]in the monastic tradition while it results in permanent exclusion in the Sangha. Sex, theft, murder as the third loss, and false promises of enlightenment as the fourth are included in the list. Even though it comes in third, murder is still viewed as the greatest sin a person can commit.

Although there are violent examples in the Vinaya Pitaka[19], the main considerations in determining how to punish monks were their intentions and whether the act was

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[15] These are 4 *parajikas*, defeats, or rules of Sangha entailing exclusion [19]
A Buddhist scripture

malicious or not. The results of a person's acts of violence, whether they are successful or unsuccessful, are what define the nature of their Kamma. As a result of their intent determine whether they are penalised or not. However, a person who fails wouldn't receive the entire punishment or the same as a person who succeeded. Other sanctions such as those for accidents that existed, were less severe. According to this theory, carelessness is to be blamed for, hence people who engage in it should face consequences.

5.3.1. Intentions behind the act of violence

The Suttavibhanga, often known as the study of rules, is one of the earliest volumes of the Vinaya. According to Horner (1938, p139), this book characterises acts of violence mainly manslaughter and murder. For example, a death which is accidentally caused by pushing a person is not an offence, however attempting to kill that person by pushing them and failing to do so results in a grave offence.

In addition, there was an expulsion for a death in which intentions were purposefully for killing. This rationale also applies to issues such as abortion, for example, if a monk advices a way to abort a pregnancy and it happens that it led to the death of the mother in the process, that monk in the sangha will be expelled. Another factor which plays a huge role in assessing murder is insanity. Gautama before he attained enlightenment, killed creatures; however, this was before he attained a good state of mind. Therefore, it is sometimes understood to sin when not in a good state of mind.

5.3.2. The weight of a victim's life

Michael (2018, p45) argues that the weight of a nonhuman life does not weigh the same as human life, therefore, if a monk murders a nonhuman they do not get expelled regardless of the intensions. However, this action needs a confession. In addition, Gethin (2004, p171) states that in the case of nonhumans such as animals, the smaller their body the lesser the act of killing becomes blameworthy and the bigger their body the bigger the blameworthy for killing.

Because the law of non-injury applies to all living beings, it could be argued that this legislation is unfair and has double standards because all living things should have the same value in their lives. Does this suggest a cow is more significant than a rat since various people may like different animals?

This law states that it is. The unjust part is that some people place a higher value on rats than cows, which begs the question of why someone who kills a rat is considered less guilty than someone who kills a cow. The owners of both animals suffer the same consequences if their animals are killed, but the owner of the larger animal is more likely to see justice than the one of a smaller animal. Whereas, following the law of non-injury, it is not intended to be that way due to all life weighing the same.

In addition, according to Michael (2018, p. 46), the norms of Vinaya specify that lay Buddhists following the Theravada tradition are permitted to consume pork and chicken, but not beef due to a cow being a bigger animal. There is also some uncertainty presented in terms of humanity and virtue. The difference between nonhuman and human murder may be traced from the history of the Mahavamsa[16]. This incident highlights a conflict between a Buddhist king Dutthagamani and the invaders of Damil who were under the command of king Elara. Dutthagamani in this regard felt remorseful and cried after he defeated Elara and his army. The reason he cried was that he felt responsible for the killing of many people. An enlightened monk, however, consoled him with an exposition that incorporated fundamental Buddhist teachings. As a result, he explained to him that according to the five precepts, it is forbidden to take what has not been given to you; therefore, those murders were justified because the perpetrators wanted to take what was not rightfully theirs, and as for the king, he was acting to uphold Buddhist doctrine. Therefor due to the fact his reasons for violence were good, he cannot be punished.

This role may also be traced to Kittiwuttho, a famous Buddhist monk of the 1970s. According to Keyes (1978, p153), this occurred during a period of the Thai campaign against communism. In the eyes of Kittiwuttho communists were a cruel type of human being. However, what is important in this regard was the fact that his or her dearth was to support the doctrine of Buddhism. Kittiwuttho went to give reasons for killing the communists and he was told by a horse trainer that it is justifiable if he did it in support of Buddhism.

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[16] Meaning great chronicle, it is a historical poem in Pali language about the king of Sri Lanka.

5.3.3. Structure of a killer

Depending on a person's role, ethics can vary. The morals of a soldier or a butcher are not the same as those of a monk. Butchers in Theravada, according to Damodar (2007, p. 31), are known to experience greater suffering in their daily lives as a result of trying to atone for their bad karma. On the other hand, the scripture when it comes to solders, it is unclear in certain places about the consequences of their job. Because soldiers may engage in violence or even murder as part of their job description, thus, they cannot be ordained while they are still employed by the state. However, this must not prevent individuals from carrying out their duties; rather, the issues with ethics are more about the state of their psyche. The related discourse is captured by Bhikkhu (2000, p. 1334) of an interaction between a headman and Gautama which serves as an illustration of this.

According to Bhikkhu (2000, p. 1334), Yodhajiva was a headman who sought advice from Gautama because he believed that soldiers who put up effort and devoted themselves in battle, will be reborn in heaven. Gautama however, explained that when soldiers die with impure thoughts, such as murdering people, they end themselves in the animal kingdom or hell. Yodhajiva was indirectly instructed to keep away from evil ideas, but not to keep away from performing his duties as a solder. This advice is relevant because it urges people to purge their brains of impure ideas like murder whenever they defend themselves or behave aggressively.

5.3.4. The approach to just rule

There's an exclusive set of moral structures for kings and the just rule principle, wherein in the modern setting it applies to the nation-states. According to Jenkins (2010, p63) Ashoka, the Mauryan emperor was the earliest model of a just ruler in Theravada tradition. He converted to the doctrines of Buddhism after a successful gory fight against the Kalinga. In this fight, more than 150,000 people got imprisoned and more than 100,000 died. Ashoka resigned, and was praised after he turned to the doctrine of Buddhism. However, Ashoka after his Buddhist epiphany did not separate from his army. He upheld the policy of the state which involved capital punishment. Thus, even after he turned to a righteous kingship of Buddhism, he still committed cruelties such as killing more than 18,000 Jains.

Early Buddhist teachings indirectly provide support for states. This might be so because the early years saw the support for Gautama's principles by the kingdoms of Kosala and Magadha. Collins (1998, p420) states that Gautama had relationships with the kingdoms of Magadha and Kosala. The inter conflict at times would highlight the relationship of Gautama with the two kingdoms. Gautama in this regard reacted on these occasions by condoning defensive wars over aggressive wars as a moral link for both kingdoms. Therefore, this authorisation about wars of defence uses one of two modes on the morals of state war. Theravada scriptures outline instances in which violence may be avoided, and they teach lessons on just war through commerce.

The questions of king MIlinda [17] can be used to trace the ethics of governmental aggression. According to Davids (1984, p. 7), in this passage, King Melinda asks the Buddhist monk, Nagasena, about the teachings of Gautama. According to the king, there are eight classes of men who kill, namely (1) kings in a form of punishing, (2) cruel men, (3) foolish men, (4) lusting men, (5) proud men, (6) needy men, (7) dull men, and (8) greedy men. Unlike the other men, the nature of the king in earlier years was to punish and kill people. This emphasises the norm in the exchange between the king and Nagasena that, in general, people anticipate that the king will punish them if they commit a crime. Prison, torture, or famine are all possible forms of punishment in this case. Therefore, it is logical that the king would have this opinion on murder.

5.4. Teachings and justifications for violence in Mahayana Buddhism

Mahayana Buddhism increased in numbers around 500 years after the dearth of Gautama. According to Groner (1990, p2), there are many included teachings in Mahayana which were not found in early Buddhism. However even though these changes were made, the original teachings of Gautama were not lost. Rather Mahayanists, at that time, received the teachings and spirit of Gautama by acclimatising it to a new age. These teachings, however, came with disadvantages because as time went on many Buddhists began to neglect Gautama's original message turning to the new addition.

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[17] A Buddhist text which records a Greek king Manader and a Buddhist sage Nagasena.

The Mahayana school of thought has connections to the Bodhisattva path. A Bodhisattva may be viewed as someone who enlightens both themselves and others, according to Damodar (2007, p. 31). There are numerous Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the Mahayana tradition. The Mahayana sect places a higher value on rituals than

Theravada. Therefore, Chinese Buddhist groups in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore believe in ceremonies for the welfare of their ancestors.

However, the theological positions of Mahayana and Theravada are very similar when it comes to violence. Theravada and Mahayana both consider violence to be an undesirable deed. Some Mahayana traditions hold that followers must adhere to a rigorous vegan diet to avoid hatred or violence. This means that practitioners must maintain the discipline to refrain from undesirable actions like violence. In this context, food is used as a metaphor to explain that, if a person may be disciplined for behaviours that can be hidden, they will also be disciplined for behaviours that cannot be hidden.

Although in this sect, violence is regarded as an unpleasant act, there are moral exceptions to it. Exceptions in Mahayana include the principle of skill in means and the idea of emptiness. These morals on violence in Mahayana are found within the commentaries and the Tripitaka, thus the second of the three baskets.

5.4.1 Intentions behind the act of violence

Even though violence is justified by the notions of emptiness and skill in means found in Mahayana Buddhism, actors [18]are not supposed to have bad intentions or ill thoughts when they are involved in violence. Demi é Ville (2010, p56) states that the intensions of the actor when involved in violence, should be sympathetic and be filled with skilful means. The actor in this regard is expected to be a *bodhisattva*, thus an enlightened person.

However, in some circumstances to pardon an act of violence, a lack of intent is needed. In Mahayana, intent is one of the most important components when referring to the ethics of violence. However, it is not only about whether the act was deliberate or accidental, but it is also about the exceptions which accept intentional

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[18] An actor or actors refers to a person or people who commit violence in this instance

violence. In other words, the act may be intentional however it is accepted if there is a good reason behind it.

Suicide in the traditions of China is an example of violence which is allowed at times for lay practitioners. The practices of self-immolation within the Chinese traditions are provided in a literary blueprint by the *Lotus Sutra*, which is regarded as one of the essential scriptures of the Japanese and Chinese Tendai and schools of Nichiren. Benn (2007, p61) in the chapter "The Original Acts of the Medicine King" of the Lotus Sutra narrates about a *bodhisattva* who burns himself. The Gautama in this narrative commented on this incident stating that anyone is capable of acting such as this *bodhisattva*, which is self-immolating when pushed to a certain corner. The Buddha in this regard justifies self-immolation under conditions that a person is *boddhisatva* or buddha, meaning they are enlightened; therefore, it is believed that such acts from those who are enlightened are informed by good reasons. Thus, the conscious sacrifice of a person's body becomes an exception to the intent of such violence.

According to Nichiren (2009, p1001), skill in means may be regarded as an approach used by awakened people to assist others to awaken. An example of this may be taken from "the burning house" which is the third chapter of the *Lotus Sutra*. Gautama in this instance relates a story to Sariputa who was his disciple. This story is about a man who tries to rescue his children from a house which was on fire, however, the kids were too engrossed in their games to hear his warnings. Therefore, to get the kids to exit the building, the man promises them gifts. In the story, Sariputra says that even if the man doesn't do what he promised the kids, he shouldn't be held accountable for lying because he was attempting to save the kids. This proves that there are times when doing something wrong is acceptable if there is a strong reason for it. In this regard, the Lotus Sutra not only offers an approach of expertise in means but also obscure excerpts on violence.

The most dangerous measure which justifies violence of skilful means is narrated by Tatz (1994, p74) in the story of Sutra's sympathetic boat captain. This story claims that a thief was on the ship with 500 passengers, including the captain, and he had plans to kill them all. The water ditties instructed the captain in his dream to employ cunning ways to prevent this from occurring so that the murderer wouldn't go to hell and the future *bodhisattvas* wouldn't perish. Upon awakening, the captain gave it

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some thought and concluded that killing the man was best for everyone since he was going to kill people and go to hell.

The captain believed that if he had to tell the merchants this information, they would burn in hell for murdering the man in a fit of wrath. And if he does it, he will spend 100,000 years in hell as well. He still decided to carry it out, though, because if the thief had to kill 500 passengers, his karma would be worse. And for this reason, the captain decided to carry out the plan.

The captain killed the man, and he would go to hell for 100 000 years due to his compassion for killing the man saving him from bad karma and saving the lives of the *bodhisattvas*. The fact that the captain knew what was coming to him (going to hell for 100 000), but still chose to do it qualifies as self-immolation. However, because this was done for a good cause there is an exception for this kind of violence, thus skill in means.

5.4.2. The nature of the victim

The *shunyavada* which is the school of emptiness roots its teachings in the two truths models which are the ultimate and conventional truths. It also bases its teachings on the positions of no self from the pan Buddhist. According to Gautama's establishments, there is no soul or eternal self, and everything comprises of conventional truth, thus perceiving worldly things as impermanent. The most respected and prominent advocate of this principle is Nagarjuna the philosopher, who widens the no self-idea to the entirety of its reality with the claims that most phenomena are empty of essence (see Michael 2018, p50). However, the purpose of emptiness in this regard is to elucidate reality epistemologically and ontologically. In addition, emptiness serves as a lens provider for appreciating a person's life.

However, some humans in Mahayana are labelled as *icchantikas*, meaning those who are excluded from enlightenment. These are the most corrupt and unpleasant beings, they have either rejected the basic teachings of the doctrine or committed evil deeds: thus, they will be considered at a lower level than animals. According to Mahaparinirvana which is the Chinese version of Mahayana, killing an ant is more harmful than killing an *icchantika*. The Buddha elucidates within these texts that there is no bad karma which comes from killing *icchantika's* (cf Ming-Wood 1984,

p68). However, this doctrine advocates evangelical works, thus people undertaking vows from *bodhisattvas* to work in liberating others.

Perhaps the Mahayana ideology is where the majority of religious dehumanisation rhetoric occurs. If a human is devoid of all material, what is being murdered? An answer to this can be found in the Chinese text Susthitamati-Paripriccha. According to Chang (1983, p65), Manjushri, who was enlightened, elucidates to Gautama that if one had to think of emotions as nothing more than thoughts, then one would be able to murder those thoughts. To kill one's ideas and those of a sentient creature is to kill a sentient being if one can free their mind of the act of killing. This implies that if an actor's mind is vacant at the time of action, they should be blameless.

Later on in this text, Manjushri makes an effort to allay the guilt of the *bodhisattva* for trying to slay the Buddha. However. the Buddha in this regard clarified that since there is no killer and no killing, there are no adverse effects such as those Manjushri had to endure for attempting to kill the Buddha because there is no retribution, no karma, and no sword. Who will then experience karma's retribution and who will cause it?

Violence in this context has no actual consequences because the deeds are devoid of any genuine existence.

5.4.3. The prestige of a killer

In certain books, waging war or killing is justified in the name of religion. According to Schmithausen (1999, p. 57), the monarchs in Mahaparinirvana, the Tibetan interpretation of Mahayana, are required to uphold their religions at all costs. This covers warfare and the use of weapons. Similar to Theravada, the Mahayana ideology holds that the ethics of rulers and lay practitioners differ. According to a Mongolian book, kings are commanded to kill and punish harshly anybody who opposes Buddhist doctrines. Wallace (2010, p. 93) adds that the noble teachings in the Bodhisattva's sphere of activity give rulers violent instructions on the issue of skill in means. These guidelines cover how to deal with Buddhists' use of the death penalty and permitted torture.

Within regard to the exceptions for violence, the Mahayana doctrine structure is similar to the Theravada's. But a classifiable collection of ethical ideas in Mahayana

is developed to the concepts of skill in means and emptiness. As a result, Vajrayana, which is acknowledged to have developed from Mahayana philosophy, is based on these communal ideas in Tibetan teaching.

5.5. Teachings and justifications for violence in Vajrayana scriptures

Mahayana philosophy is present in the Vajrayana school of Buddhism. According to Damodar (2007, p. 31), Vajrayana Buddhism adheres to Theravadin monastic discipline, Yogacara and Madhyamika philosophy, as well as tantric rituals and elements of indigenous religions' shamanism. There are four schools within this sect: the Gelugpa, Nyingmapa, Sakyapa, and Kagyupa. Nyingmapa is the oldest of these four schools. It grounds its beliefs on ati-yoga, making it an amazing yoga.

Sakyapa, a tantric figure, is the youngest. Hath Yoga is practiced by the Kagyupa school, however, the teachings that instructors pass on to their students are what is valued more in this school. The Gelugpa School, sometimes referred to as the Yellow Hats, is the youngest of these institutions. But is the biggest and most important school in the world. The techniques of this school are based on meditation and concentration to gain *bodhisattva* training.

The Dalai Lama is the leader of Vajrayana Buddhism's main school. He served as Tibet's political and spiritual authority. He resided in the Norbulingka during summer and in Lhasa during winter. In 1989 he received the Noble prize. Vajrayana Buddhism has been acknowledged around the world thanks to his office thus (Damodar 2007, p. 32).

A Chinese takeover occurred in 1959 while he was exiled. In this way, Buddhism had to deal with issues in China. Such as the cultural revolution in 1960 which was followed by the dissolution of Buddhist monasteries in Han China. In this instance particularly the well-trained teachers, nuns, and monks were imprisoned or put to death. Due to these occurrences, Han China experienced a teacher shortage, which prompted the government to build Buddhist colleges. These colleges were made to teach students about Buddhism, but politics also played a significant role in the curriculum. This marked the start of Buddhism's reconstruction. As a result, statues and temples that were damaged were rebuilt. The Chinese government aided with the reconstruction, although local governments provided the majority of the funding.

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There are numerous commentaries and writings in the Vajrayana system that forbids the usage of violence. The teachings of Hindus and their attitudes on animal sacrifice are criticised by the majority of the Tantric literature. However, some Vajrayana scriptures have similar cases to those they criticise. For example, Jacob Dalton a Tibetologist translated the Kalika Purana including commands for offering human sacrifices to Kali (see Dalton 2011, p90). The success of a kingdom is revealed by the location in which the chopped head rests.

This inconsistency in the Vajrayana literature shows that texts are created in various historical eras by various human beings, and as a result, they represent various schools of thought. Different justifications for justified violence are presented in the literature. The most significant of these writings deal with intentionality, including liberation killing and defensive violence. Additionally, the *bodhisattva* has the reputation of a murderer.

5.5.1. Intention of the killer

Most ethical foundations of Vajrayana doctrine with regard to justifying violence are coextensive with the ones in Mahayana. Vajrayana scripture justifies violence for defensive purposes. However, one may ask what is the purpose of aggression which requires defense. What is the defence's additional component? Davidson (2005, p. 35) claims that cosmic conflicts and sacrifice rites are a part of Vajrayana's defence. When it comes to this issue, tantric ritual goals become the most pertinent. These objectives include the pacification of ailments, adversaries, and emotions, which results in disputes based on merit, power, and wealth. The suppression of emotions, rivals, and gods, as well as the execution of one's sense of self, rivals, and gods are examples of persuasive arguments. One of the protective rituals is the fire sacrifice; in the Mahavairochana-abhisambodhi in India, this ritual defeats despised enemies.

The character of the violence in some fire sacrifice commentary is emphasised. In this respect, Gray (2007, p252) notes that it is believed that sacrificing meat results in the eradication of all problems. Therefore, if one performs the eating-fire-sacrifice rituals without a second thought and offers sacrifices of animals like dogs, pigs, and chickens, especially those with copper-coloured chests, then without fail all kingdoms will be subdued and all will be accomplished.

When it comes to the killing of animals, Vajrayana doctrine is not the same as Theravada particularly when it comes to dietary. Followers of Tibetan and Mongolian traditions are encouraged to avoid smaller animals and eat the larger ones. This is because a larger animal such as a cow is more satisfying than a smaller animal. Therefore, the death of a cow feeds many people with one life, whereas a smaller animal such as a chicken needs more than one life to feed many people, thus killing many chickens.

Defence includes preemptive attacks due to the impending cosmic war, but it goes beyond just addressing state-level threats. This might be significant in the Kalachakra Tantra of Tibet and India, which is based on the wheel of time Tantra. Schmithausen (1999, p. 58) describes an apocalyptic battle wherein the military of a bodhisattva ruler of Shambhala overpowers and vanquishes the troops of Muslims to eradicate their religious tradition and restore Buddhism. It's important to keep in mind the historical context of this work. According to researchers like Michael (2018, p. 55), it was likely written in the 11th century during the northern Indian Muslim conquests.

In some writings, the Mahayana technique is used to show how violence can be used as a liberative action, which is sometimes regarded as liberation killing. Mayer (1996, p. 108) uses the Vajrapani event as an illustration of this; in it, a Hindu god Mahesvara was killed by a *bodhisattva* and then resurrects as a devotee of Buddhism who has attained enlightenment. Buddhists who practice the Nyingma school practice ritualised slaughter to free their foes. The Sarvadurgatiparishodhana Tantra supports killing people who disagree with the Buddha's teachings since it is dedicated to the Purification of All Misfortunes.

This may be justified by the idea of compassion, where an evil person would be killed to prevent them from attracting additional bad karma. Given that it contains information on the Buddhist assassination, the Tibetan *Chos byung me tog snying po* [19]is a suitable illustration of this. Which is the incident of the Lang Darma, a Tibetan emperor who was killed in 841. According to Meinert (2006, p. 100), Lang Darma, the Tibetan ruler, was regarded as anti-Buddhist because he oversaw regulations that reduced the control and influence of monasteries. Due to these

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[19] The history of Buddhism and how it developed in Tibet in the royal dynastic time.

occurrences, a guardian Buddhist deity instructed a Buddhist monk to assassinate the monarch through visions. In this way, the king was freed by his assassination, and the nation was freed from a monarch who was anti-Buddhist. The Tibetan people have a collective memory of this killing committed for liberty.

Even after the ninth century, there was still violence committed in the name of liberation, and it was not just the domain of despicable tyrants. According to Dalton (2011, p. 106), during the period from 942 to 1024 BCE, the ritual of blood sacrifice and killings in the Tibetan Buddhist Tantra was prevalent and pervasive adequately for King Yeshe to oppose it publicly and hermeneutically claim a difference between it and the tantric tradition of liberation ritual.

5.5.2. The killer's stature

Foundational Vajrayana principles consist of Mahayana ideas of *bodhisattva,* thus a person on their path towards enlightenment or who obtained it already. Compassionate and wise individuals such as these in some texts benefit from an ethical double standard. Maher (2010, p85) suggests that provisional ethics limit ordinary people, whereas *bodhisattvas* may do anything even killing a person. This is justified by a belief that those who are fully enlightened never get delayed by attachments of ill thoughts. Thus, they protect the religion and liberate people though skill in means. Tibetan lamas within the Mergen Gegen tradition identified Khan Ghengis the Mongolian emperor as an incarnation of Vajrapani *bodhisattva*. The purpose of Vajrapani in this regard is to obliterate heretics and protect Buddhism.

The 5th Dalai Lama in the Tibetan song of queen spring elucidates that the commands of advanced Buddhist yogis over mental state and emotions allow them to commit violence. The 5th Dalai Lama in this regard justifies the violence committed by Gushri Khan by also stressing that Khan was a *bodhisattva*, and he was defending the dharma.

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter attempted to provide some background information regarding the development of Buddhist sects or schools, including the schisms and conflicts that occurred following Gautama's death. Additionally, it provided comparisons and

contrasts between the three seats on violence and justifications for its use of it. For instance, while violence is prohibited in all three sects, it is tolerated in the Mahayana when executed for a just cause. As a result, *boddhisattvas* and kings were granted permission to employ violence since it was believed that, if they did so, their usage would be justified.

This is essentially the same in Theravada Buddhism, where even though violence is prohibited, it is encouraged by the state to use it and especially when defending Buddhist principles. Violence is likewise prohibited in the Vajrayana tradition; however, it is acceptable when used in self-defence. In addition, this sect does not eat or kill animals, unlike Theravada. Theravada followers are recommended to eat smaller animals, whilst Vajrayana and Mongolian traditions instruct followers to stay away from smaller animals and consume the larger ones. This illustrates that while having certain differences, all three sects have the same beliefs regarding the majority of rites, however, they have ways in which they differ.

Chapter 6

6. Reasons for Buddhist Violence in the community of Myanmar

6.1. Introduction

At this point of the dissertation, it is evident that Buddhism as a religion is not violent due to its ethics of nonviolence, however, Buddhist adherents are capable of violence due to the instances of violence in which they were involved. The chapter in this regard seeks to emphasise specific instances of violence in which Buddhists adherents participated, mainly in the community of Myanmar, as well as their reasons or causes of violence in this community.

6.2. Violence in the community of Myanmar
6.2.1. Background on the conflict

Even though the conflict in Burma was political, it could be argued that it was more ethnic and religious than other factors. Kramer (2015, p 355) argues that conflict in Myanmar may be traced back to 1948 when Burma gained independence from Britain. Myanmar consisted of different religions, with the Rohingya ethnic community being Muslim, which originated from the Rakhine State in the north of Myanmar or Arakan which is in the west of Myanmar. The history of Islam in this region began in the early seventh century when Arab Muslim traders settled in the region.

Since 1968, under the rule of the military junta, the Rohingyas faced human rights violations in Myanmar. According to Rahm (2016, p 4) in 1978, over two thousand Rohingyas migrated to Bangladesh, followed by approximately two hundred and fifty in 1991. The military regime in Myanmar dates back to the 1960s, when the Rohingyas were persecuted, had no legal status, and were forced to migrate to Thailand, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan. However, even in these countries, their suffering did not end due to poverty. Ne Win [20] implemented several reforms, including banning any political opposition, shifting the government to a socialist philosophy, expanding the role of the military in economic and daily life, isolating the nation from outside commerce, and using military force to quell dissent.

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[20] A Politician and a commander of military who was a prime minister and became a president of Burma at some point

Thus, it may be argued that Myanmar's conflict stems from the past. The British Empire in this regard expanded from India eastward throughout the 9th century. Others followed including Hindus and Muslims migrating to cities and towns throughout Myanmar.

Following the Junta's coup in 1962, Rahm (2016, p 4) states that over three hundred thousand Indians fled the country, and in 1982, the rule restricting citizenship to individuals who resided in Myanmar before 1823 was enacted, thus marginalising the remaining Indians. Furthermore, due to national and local travel prohibitions, movements for Muslims in Rakhine State were restricted from their hometown.

Ethnic identity became essential to subnational policy. For more than 70 years, there was armed ethnic opposition to the government, thus, the ethnicities were represented by organisations as political parties. These systems contributed more to the roots of the conflict as time went on, and ethnic groupings categorised the populace. Political tensions rose as democracy contests were held.

In addition, hardliners and the general public, Buddhist monks, legislators, and social activists in Myanmar saw South Asians and Muslims of all backgrounds as a danger to the countries and Buddhist unity. Violence against Muslims appears to have been encouraged by government leaders for numerous decades. Furthermore, many in Myanmar believed that all Muslims had many children, and that poverty was a threat to the majority of Buddhists, whereas Myanmar is primarily Buddhist, with Muslims constituting only a small percentage of the population. The violence against Muslims in Rakhine is influenced by national tensions. Muslims were assaulted in Rakhine State towns such as Sittwe and Maungdaw in 2001 (cf Burke 2016, p 258).

In Myanmar, there is a Buddhist extreme movement called 969. Ashin Wirathu was its commander, and he once referred to himself as the "Burmese bin Laden." He was formerly imprisoned by the old military junta regarding an anti-Muslim fight, and he advocated boycotting Muslim hopes and avoiding mixed marriages. He often refers to mosques as enemy bases. The senior administration backed the 969 movements and recruited monks and followers of the DNL to support it (cf Rahm 2016, p 6).

Communal violence spread in Myanmar throughout the junta's half-century rule, however, the biggest war happened in March 2011 after the takeover of the

quasicitizen government. According to Rahm (2016, p 7), Reuters discovered that the assaults on Muslims in October 2012 were promoted by monks and local security officers.

Additionally, the extremes of Theravada Buddhist leader, Ashin Wirathu of Myanmar, formalised relations with Gnanasara of Sri Lanka. In September 2014, they concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in Colombo to collaborate on three broad problems area: (1) making connections to increase a cohesive "voice against all aspects of religious and political motions which endanger the principles of Buddhism" and also the legacy and ancient monuments globally; (2) cultivating ways to grow to work and functional connections as well as sharing of experiences; and (3) cultivating ways to grow operating and functional connections.

6.2.2. Legacy of Colonialism to the violence.

During the British invasions of Burma in 1852 and 1886, Buddhist monks battled the British. Monarch of Burmese and his administrators tried to prevent conversion to Christianity because it was not only viewed as a transformation of the ruler's people to another tradition and rites but as a conversion to be Kala[21] which is foreign and therefore undermines devotion to the king. Religion and political devotion were inextricably linked. The British takeover was viewed as a danger to Buddhism by Burmese monks. These monks organised multiple revolts in contradiction to the British in 1986 (cf Gravers 2015, p 6).

After the ultimate defeat, Britain did not select a leader of the Sangha (monastic order) because they did not wish to accomplish the royal function as guardian of Buddhism. The monastic order had to be dependent, and monks in Burma established the first nationalist groups as rioting battling colonialism and its disregard for the ideals of Buddhism. The officials and officers of Britain visited Buddhist temples wearing their boots and shoes, violating the hallowed sanctuaries of Buddhism. In response to British contempt for Buddhism, Burmese monks created the YMBA[22] in 1906, following in the footsteps of the Sri Lankan anti-colonial monks in Ceylon.

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[21] Sanskrit word for (1) black or darks, (2) time or destiny, death of fate.
[22] Young Men's Buddhist Association

According to Gravers (2015, p 7), local nationalist groups such as Wunthanu Athins were founded and led by the General Council during the 1920s. Thus, monks infiltrated the secular sphere and dhamma discussions on the Buddhist religion and politics were held. Lectures of dhamma, commonly referred to as the Dhammakathika travelled around Burma preaching the dhamma and engaging in political action.

This however was an anti-colonial campaign. Prominent monks including Ottama journeyed around Asia, learning from such campaigns and Gandhi himself. He was imprisoned by Britain multiple times before his death in 1939. Additionally, Wisara was another well-known monk, he died in prison while there was a hunger strike (cf Smith 1965, 109). The colonial authority recruited thousands of immigrants from British India, who immediately dominated as a force of labour in the south of Burma.

The British used a labour ethnic division for control. For them to plan the cultural diversity of plural society, colonial officials performed an anthropological register of religion and ethnicity. In the hills, the ethnic minority were administered by a frontier zone administrator and was isolated in Ministerial Burma from the Burmans. Christianity rapidly began to rule the Kachin, Chin, and the people of Karen, as well as their ethnic groups. Ethnic and religious classifications evolved as an essential instrument for the government (cf Gravers 2015, p 8). Colonial governance allowed cultural and religious societies to follow their customs provided, they serviced the empire without revolt. As a result, this regime did not see Buddhism as a part of the political structure of Burmese. It may be argued that it is such incidences which influenced Buddhist to want political control for the unity of their religion.

The British in this regard had overlooked the religious aspect of Burman ethnic identity and its future possibilities for conflict. Derogatory allusions to Buddhism ignited the xenophobic fire. Following this, the Sun [23]released an unpleasant letter by a Buddhist monk about the miseries of women who are married to Muslims, particularly the Burmese women (cf Smith 1965, 110). In that document, Muslims should eliminate Buddhists and their language. Then protests against Muslims were organised by monks and rioting ensued. Monks stated that adherents of Buddhism mainly women who married Muslim men were suffering and their children if they

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[23] Owned by a U, Saw a right-wing politician

don't convert, they would lose their legal standings. It was simple to organise laypeople against the

'foreigners. And as a result, most people believe that converts lost their ethnic identity.

The iconic Shwe Dagon pagodas and Sule [24]of Buddhism were threatened with destruction in 1938. Then one thousand five hundred monks from all the BCYM[25] retaliated by assaulting Muslims and plundering and torching their bazaar stores.

According to Cady (1958, 395), the police intervened, 192 individuals of Indian descent were murdered and 878 were injured. Contrary to sangha regulations, monasteries became an armed sanctuary and plunder safes. Over four thousand people were detained, the inclusion of monks who were suspects of assault and killing. The monks' goal, however, was to defend Buddhism, ethnicity, and language. During the protest of 1938, students, and young monks of the Dobama (We Burmans) campaign started and led this anti-colonial aggression having slogans "Myanmar for Burmans" and "Master Race We Are, We Burmans".

On the other hand, the monks declared Muslims their number one enemy since they believed Muslims were exploiting their economy and stealing their women because they believed they were on the verge of racial extinction. Riots erupted across the country, and while the majority of victims were Muslims, 6 monks were slain in this incident. The colonial administration responded by enacting the Buddhist Women's Special Marriage and Succession law to prohibit mixed marriages.

During colonial control, Buddhism in Burma developed into a centre of ethnic nationalism. Monks saw the colonial order as immoral chaos and hence saw it as permissible to meddle in secular affairs. The origins of the current battle for Buddhism, the Burmese culture, language, race, and what was perceived as the outside incursion of secular religious and ideals, can be found here. This trend went on following the independence when Nu[26] designated Buddhism to be the national religion with the intensions to destroy the legacy of the colonial orders. Young monks, on the other hand, were enraged because of the equality Nu granted to other religions.

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[24] A Buddhist Stupa in Myanmar
[25] Burma Council of Young Monks
[26] the Prime minister

Teenage monks demonstrated against the building of mosques in 1961, destroying two in Rangoon, Okkalapa. Monks also objected to marriages involving Buddhist women and Muslim men. An anti-communist campaign was initiated at the time by the military. In 1948, the Burmese Communist Party launched a radical war. The military circulated a leaflet called Dhammantaraya[27]. The campaign condemned Marxism as a foreign influence and made it simple for Buddhism to be promoted as the national religion, even though organisations of Christianity and Islam considered this undemocratic.

The sangha eventually came under increasingly severe governmental supervision following General Ne Win's gain of control in the 1962 coup. Ne Win avoided the possibility of monasteries being the hotspot of political conflict, a resistance site to his hybrid form of military control and a socialist system of one-party Burmese (cf Gravers 2015, p 8). Ne Win established rules for monastic instruction and prohibited the use of Buddha's photographs and pagodas on commercial items such as books, calendars, and cassettes. He forbade monks from engaging in political activity and expelled women and anyone who were not permitted to dwell in monasteries. Monasteries were evicted of so-called "bogus monks," and around three hundred monks were disrobed.

The Sangha's council of thirty-three older monks was elected to administrate three hundred thousand monks under the jurisdiction of the Religious Affairs Department. Ne Win also promoted Buddhism in Burma and other hill peoples, especially Christians. This was performed in a traditional royal manner of the king as a cleanser of Buddhism, as well as nationalism in Burma and a notion of a united state. However, first and foremost it was intended to acquire control of political monks. Following independence, several political and ethnic insurgencies evolved, and an unsuccessful democracy. Thus, Buddhism was seen as endangered and under threat from outside influences.

Even though ' religious misuse for political reasons' was prohibited, young monks continued the practice of participation in secular politics. In 1988 this tendency persisted, when monks took part in protests against Ne and his bankrupt dictatorship (cf Burma 2004, p 13). They momentarily took over control of Mandalay during the

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[27] Buddhist religion being in threat

revolt when authorities ceased to operate. During the insurrection, an estimated six hundred monks were slain. In 1990, seven thousand monks demonstrated in Mandalay, and two were slain.

Using past techniques, the young monks organised clandestine and unlawful organisations and referred to the anti-colonial hero U Ottama's exploits. However, additional rallies and rioting against Muslims in Mandalay persisted in 1993 and 1997. Then in 2003 Military at Kyaukse killed 3 monks, dozens were injured, and 5 monks were twenty-five years imprisoned. Thus, the xenophobic rhetoric from the colonial past has returned (cf Burma 2004, 20). The army claimed the NLD of orchestrating the disturbances, but there were also rumours of military-placed and controlled fake monks. Many people suspected that the military was the initiator.

6.2.3. Attacks in Meiktila on Muslim community

Meiktila is a significant town for business in central Myanmar, placed tactically at the crossroads of the east-west and main north-south routes. It consists of a sizable population of Muslims, which comprises affluent traders and other businesspeople. While residents from both communities stated that they had not noticed any notable rise in tensions before the violence outbreak. Violence in this regard occurred amid a very visible spike in anti-Muslim attitude and discourse in Myanmar, with the birth of the "969" organisation (cf Crisis Group 2013, p12).

There are similarities between recent and old attacks in Myanmar. In March 2013 Clashes erupted after an altercation between a Buddhist adherent and a worker of Muslim-operated gold business. According to the International Crisis Group (2013, p12), this altercation rapidly increased into assaults against Muslim people of the town by the crowd of Buddhist adherents led by monks. The death of a Buddhist monk who appeared to be unengaged in the event by several Muslims triggered a dramatically increasing scope of the violence.

This resulted in a massive disruption of the Muslim towns and neighbourhoods, as well as the killing of at least 20 pupils and many educators at an Islamic school. The death count was forty-four, however, there is evidence that it could have been greater. Andrew (2013, P2) concurs that forty-four people were killed in this incident,

thirteen thousand of which were Muslims, and were displaced as a result of protests in Meiktila in March 2013.

it may be argued that Meiktila had the potential to become a hotspot of violence due to its large and prominent Muslim community. The disagreement at the gold shop was catalysed in this case. This disagreement between female staff and a female customers escalated into a physical altercation, with the other allegedly receiving a severe beating.

The cops allegedly did not interfere due to the staff paying a bribe. This resulted in an angry throng gathering, with local officials arriving and arresting the business employees. According to an individual who witnessed the events an angry mob began to gather, and local officials arrived and detained the shop employees (cf Crisis Group interviews, 2013, p12). After this incident the situation appeared to be over, however, there were false rumours which spread that the buyer had died as a result of their injuries. As a result, a large throng gathered, including several monks, and began vandalising the shop. And because they were outnumbered, the police were unable to maintain or control the situation, thus they made a statement to the crowd that they could demolish the shop, but they had to leave first. Before doing so, they looted and damaged many adjacent Muslim stores. A minute later, probably in retribution, a gang of Muslims in another section of town assaulted a monk riding a motorcycle, who later in the hospital died of his wounds.

When the word got out, the situation quickly exploded from a seemingly minor event to a lethal massacre by a crowd of at least one thousand people over the next two days. Rahma (2016, p5) states that the security forces' response was blatantly inadequate. Additionally, there are claims by witnesses that the police officers were standing by while individuals were slain next to them, and police camera evidence shows this. Police only got involved when thrown by rocks wherein one officer got struck. The mob surrounded a large number of Muslims seeking sanctuary in a complex, the police escorted some of them to safety, unfortunately, they were unable to prevent some of them from being slain by the mob while under escort.

As a result, President Thein Sein proclaimed a state of emergency on the 22nd of March in Meiktila and adjoining areas, which was maintained until July 20. Over a

thousand individuals, mostly Muslims, were staying in overcrowded places such as shelters, sanctuaries, and camps near and outside of town. Many had lost their homes and valuables, as well as their means of subsistence. There was still a large number of armed officers in town, however, Muslims who had remained at home were afraid. Many Muslim businesses were closed, and inter-communal relations were harshly and limited.

Conflict in this issue began to increase in schools, with children in mixed schools experiencing internal difficulties as a result of some parents informing their children, to not have friends from the other group.

6.3. Violence in other parts of Myanmar

In other regions of Myanmar, there were several additional outbreaks of anti-Muslim violence occurred, however, Meiktila outside of Rakhine State continued to be the most dangerous. And after this incident, there were more similar. According to Burke (2016, p 260), an unrelated encounter involving a Muslim and a Buddhist follower ignited assaults by a Buddhist crowd against Muslims, their stores, and religious sites, with security authorities frequently caught off guard and emerging on the scene to intervene late.

This incident was followed by an eruption of an anti-Muslim fight in Okkan in April 2013. An individual was killed, and many others were badly wounded within hours of rioting which could be rooted from a Muslim woman colliding with a young monk in a busy market. Several Muslim stores and residences were robbed and damaged, and a mosque was set on fire. In a few hours, officers and military workers came in numbers, and the restoration of security was done swiftly.

Despite the security personnel's efforts in some instances to stop conflicts, these incidents still took place. According to a Crisis Group interview (2013, p15), AntiMuslim violence broke out again on May 28 in the northeastern town of Lashio. During a night of violence by a crowd of two hundred to three hundred individuals, wherein one individual got slain, and a few Muslim houses and businesses were looted, destroyed, or demolished.

Fire damaged parts of the town's largest mosque, and a big building adjacent which housed an orphanage, and an Islamic school was destroyed. Violence in this regard

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was prompted by an event in which a Muslim guy set a Buddhist woman on fire using petrol and left her with severe burns. Many hundreds of Muslims sought sanctuary at the town's Shan Buddhist monastery, where most remained for a few days.

Lashio is an unanticipated location for anti-Muslim clashes because its focus has been on its function as a vital trading hub. Lashio consists of a substantial population of Chinese that is notably engaged in the business and trade sectors, a community of Muslims which is not very large compared to Meiktila, and a relatively small number of Buddhist Burmans. In town most Buddhists were Shan, and it seemed that there was not any considerable anti-Muslim feeling among them; if they had any hatred, it was directed towards the town's rising Chinese immigrant community (cf Crisis Group interviews 2013, p15).

In terms of ethnicity, Lashio has a mixed Muslim population. A few are of an Indian tradition, and similar to Meiktila, while some are Chinese Muslims classified as Panthay,[28] whose ethnicity is Chinese. However, the majority of Shan Muslims are of Indian heritage and yet they are ethnically Shan and understand Shan.

Muslim members whose homes were damaged described mobs seeking specific properties owned by certain identifiable persons; others claimed that among the crowd some would identify whose properties and stores were Muslim-owned. Fire in these instances was not used much, possibly since it is impossible to burn down exclusively Muslim homes in mixed-race neighbourhoods without the fire spreading.

These incidents resulted in a mob creating an environment of criminality and impunity, which was exploited by looters who had no anti-Muslim purpose. Anti-Muslim violence broke out on August 24 in the community of Kanbalu, in the region of Sagaing. The catalyst was yet another sexual attack by a Muslim male on a Burman woman. Police forces summoned from the neighbouring were able to contain the problem and keep it under control, however, this was only after a crowd of a few hundred individuals set fire to some Muslim homes and businesses (cf Crisis Group interviews, Muslim residents, Lashio 2013, 16). The crowd also blocked firemen from putting out the fires and injured a few who tried to intervene with the violence such as the regional security, a few villagers, and a monk.

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[28] Muslim people of Turkic and Chinese origin inhabiting Burma.

6.4. Causes of violence in Myanmar

Myanmar is home to the great bulk of Theravada Buddhists. About ninety per cent of the population is Buddhist, with the bulk belonging to the Burman ethnic group. First, religious minorities, including the Kachin, Rohingya, Chin, and Karin have sizable Muslim and Christian populations. Policies of the British colony placed these communities against one another regularly during the twentieth century, leaving a legacy of violence which continued for years.

Violence in Myanmar was prompted by a variety of factors, the most important of which were religious or ethical considerations, followed by political considerations. According to Rahma (2016, p 6), South Asians and Muslims of various backgrounds were viewed as a threat to Myanmar's unity by the general public, Buddhist monks, politicians, and social activists. As a result, to safeguard the unity of Myanmar, they resorted to violence. Furthermore, most Myanmar residents felt that most Muslims had a large number of children, and that poverty was a threat to the majority of Buddhists, even though Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist, with Muslims forming a minor fraction of the population.

Additionally, Islamophobic themes, such as false stories of Muslim aggressions against Buddhists or conspiracy theories of Muslims wanting to destroy Buddhism and take over the country, are frequently included in Buddhist lectures (cf Morrison 2020, p138). Hundreds of monks had actively participated in anti-Muslim protests, escalating interreligious conflicts in the area. These Buddhists have used Buddhist doctrine to justify their conduct, arguing that violence is legitimate if committed to defending their religion.

They follow the Theravadin teachings of Buddhism which maintain that only one's purpose influences one's karma. this means that they felt that they had done wrong only if the outcome of their conduct is exactly what they planned. Thus, they argue that in these wars they did not plan any violence. Although Islamophobic monk speeches had escalated violence, monks maintained that karmic consciousness is clear as long as violence is committed while defending the unity of their religion, even though aggression was their objective.

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Another aspect that led to the fight lasting so long was the failure of local security officers to do enough to stop the violence. Even though they were outnumbered by the mob in certain incidents, they did not do enough to request support from other officers to have enough numbers to stop the conflicts. Furthermore, whenever there was an instance of violence in Myanmar, even if it was not religiously motivated since it featured a Buddhist and a Muslim in that particular fight, it escalated to violence, which culminated in riots, which turned into religious violence.

Another cause of this violence was government leaders. Leaders such as Wrath exploited their authority to fuel part of the bloodshed. Wrath called for shunning Muslim hopes and avoidance of mixed religious marriages, which exacerbated racism. He also called for a boycott of Muslim businesses (Coclanis 2013, p26). Buddhist monks and supporters had banded together to fight for legal and economic persecution of Muslims. The 969 movements, the Buddhist nationalist party, have pushed a "Buy Buddhist" programme that encourages citizens to purchase exclusively Buddhistmade items which were only sold by other Buddhists, to focus on the wellbeing of the economy. And used the 969 sign to identify Buddhist-owned businesses.

Monks have also rallied in favour of anti-Muslim legislation in the country's legislature. For example, a 2013 regulation pushed by monks did not allow Buddhist women to marry a person from another religion who has not received formal approval from regional authorities (cf Crouch 2015, p2). However, Rahma (2016, 6) argues that Myanmar military administration maintained that the Rohingya people were not indigenous, but rather immigrants from Bangladesh. Although the Rohingya possessed identity documents and British-issued ration cards, which proved that they were Myanmar residents. Unfortunately, these cards were stolen to disprove their legal identification.

According to Yousuf (2018, p 3), the Junta began a major programme called Operation Dragon King in 1978, which resulted in the indigenous Rohingyas being killed and more than two hundred thousand Muslims being pushed to Bangladesh since they were regarded as not being indigenous. However, this was not true because Rohingyas had been there for hundreds of years, and the bones of their great grandparents are buried there. The Rohingya in this regard were not

acknowledged as Myanmar residents, thus considered unlawful immigrants of Bengali.

After independence, there were a couple of Muslim parliamentarians, which served as cabinet ministers until the 1962 takeover of the military. The lack of Muslim Parliamentarians thereafter contributed to the conflict. The government of the Junta governed from 1962 to 1995, and during this period no Muslim was chosen as a deputy minister, which demonstrates prejudice against Muslims. Muslims in this regard were intimidated by the military and in court, there were no Muslims appointed as a judge (cf Rahma 2016, p 14). Furthermore, there were no Muslim schools, and in other schools' Muslim educators were substituted by Buddhist educators. Muslims lost their human and political rights, and the possibility to serve in government. For those Muslims who concentrated on commerce and cottage industry, the military continued to attempt to drive them out of Arakan.

According to Human Rights Watch, what happened in Rakhine, a region which has at least 3,2 million Muslims, is regarded as "ethnic cleansing" (cf Burke 2016, p 258). The major perpetrators of the war appear to be Rakhine Buddhists. In 2012 what occurred was a calamity for Muslims, and there were many fatalities, the statistics of which are questionable, and most Muslims were sent to isolated camps. According to Mikael (2015, p 11), a crowd of young Buddhist males equipped with clubs and sticks attacked a minority of Muslims in Rakhine State over a rape case of a Buddhist girl in 2012. After several years of hostility, more than one hundred and forty Muslims migrated to camps from their houses in 2015.

Myanmar's government has been blamed for employing "scorched earth" techniques on people, most particularly in Kayin State. According to Rahma (2016, 6), the claims included the wholesale destruction of villages, the placement of landmines, the use of people as slave labour, the use of people as minesweepers, as well as the rape and death of Karen women. These measures used by the Karen have been labelled as ethnic cleansing.

The position of Muslims in Myanmar deteriorated with time, and the government continued to target them. Furthermore, the political network plays a crucial part in

ethnic conflict, since the government withdraws Muslims citizenship status, leaving around seven hundred thousand individuals without nationality.

The government forbade Muslims from running in elections. According to Myo & Group (2020, p 14), the government's actions aid the ANP's progress. Restricting Muslims from voting began shortly after the election began in 2015, at the very same time as they supported the purported law of safeguarding race and religion. The world community did not intervene appropriately, and the atrocities against these Muslims continued.

As it seems in the Middle East, the international community solely acts in their best interests. The answer to this dispute is to talk with both sides, the government, and the Muslim minority, and rewrite a new institution with equal authority for the minority to ensure that they defend themselves. Following that, they established immigration guidelines to foster trust among the country's citizens.

Furthermore, given the brutality that Muslims have faced, independence is not a terrible notion. The violence will not stop unless the international community acts and puts pressure on Myanmar's government, which is to blame.

The religious and ethnic conflict in Myanmar is extremely complicated; wounds of colonialism, hunger, the shift from a military regime to a free democratic country, and the international conflict on terror each contribute significantly to creating the war. Nevertheless, Buddhism's position in this dispute is no less nuanced. While most monks in Myanmar appear to tolerate and even promote violence towards their different religious neighbours, others were continuously fighting to put an end to the bloodshed. Both think that their behaviours are strongly motivated by Buddhism and utilise theology to back up their statements.

6.5. Conclusion

Although violence in this community was prompted by various reasons, this chapter has identified the legacy of colonialism as a main source of violence. It is during this period wherein a testimony to the unity of Buddhism was identified, which led to a religious war and ultimately to a political conflict. Some political leaders in this regard used their status or positions to prompt ethnic violence. And because security offers

did not do enough to stop violence in some instances, it made this conflict last longer.

Chapter 7

7.   Violence in the community of Sri Lanka

7.1.   Introduction

Similar to the violence in Myanmar, the Sri Lanka violence may also be rooted in ethnicity. However, British imperialism on the island left a legacy of war which impacted contemporary wars. At some point in their history on the island Buddhists had NPO political authority; this was perceived as a threat to the unity of their religion. and influenced their aim for a Buddhist-dominated Sri Lanka in aspects such as politics and ethnicity. To identify the main cause of violence in Sri Lanka, this chapter will provide a thorough exegesis of how politics and the legacy of British imperialism prompted religion or ethnicity as a source of violence. It will start by highlighting how both Tamils and Sinhalese came to the island in order to comprehend how the territorial aspect of the conflict contributed to the violence.

7.1.1. Overview of the violence

Both Tamil and Sinhala Sri Lankans have stories regarding when and how the island[29] became inhabited, based partially on historical truth and partly on tradition. These narratives are crucial to each ethnic group's contemporary territorial affirmations on the island. According to Kemper (1991, p 108), the people of Sinhala maintain that their forefathers arrived on the island during the 5th century BCE. According to these beliefs, the island was unoccupied before the arrival of Vijaya, the first Sinhala along with his offspring, who continued to colonise the island. In addition to the offspring's story, a widespread Sinhalese tradition holds that Gautama personally went to the island three times and chose Sri Lanka, the monarch of Sinhala, and their people as particular custodians of the religion.

These occurrences were eventually recorded in manuscripts such as the *Mahavamsa* and the *Dipavamsa*. It is also widely assumed that Tamils from South India arrived on the island about the third century BCE in association with the development of trade routes. Two Tamils captured the kingdom of the Sinhalese in 237 BCE and governed for a recorded 22 years.

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[29] Sri Lanka, originally Ceylon, is an Indian Ocean Island republic which is split from peninsular India.

According to De Silva (1986, p 11) Elara, the Tamil King, gained power 10 years later and reigned for 44 years. Elara's reign ended after a 15-year fight with the Sinhala warrior King Duttagamani, who finally killed Elara and reclaimed the kingdom. There is considerable disagreement on the genuine nature of this historical period. Sinhalese stories about Elara frequently portray him as an illegitimate king and a danger to Sinhala civilisation, whilst Tamils characterise his governance as fair and just, including Duttagamani as an ethnic purifier.

This conflict comprises the majority of the Mahavamsa for the Sinhalese, and Duttagamani is presented as a courageous man, a guardian of the faith, and an ideal Buddhist commander. The Sinhalese monarchy existed on the island from the 2nd to the 7th century CE. The rulers created large Buddhist structures as well as a complex irrigation system that permitted agriculture in the dry zone of the islands.

According to De Silva (1986, p 9), the *Mahavamsa* was compiled during this period, recounting the Sinhala rulers and their numerous accomplishments. Even though the Mahavamsa portrays this period as one of national unity, the monarchy of Sinhala on the Island was not the only state authority. There are 3 kingdoms of Tamil which also developed in the south of the islands, however, in *Mahavamsa* they were not listed. In addition, troops from the Indian kingdom in the south of Cola attacked the island and seized Anuradhpura, the capital of the Sinhalese, in the 10th century CE. Despite recapturing the crown in the twelfth century, the Colas were able to reclaim most of the kingdoms including the city. The Sinhalese in this regard were forced to go south and both Sinhala and Tamils in the 13th century remained different kingdoms on the island till the 16th century when colonial forces entered.

Obeyesekere (1995, p 14) states that when the Portuguese in 1505 and Dutch in 1568 came to the Island, imperial control was generally limited to the island's coastal districts, preserving the Sinhalese Kandy Kingdom and the Tamil Kingdom Jaffna was left substantially untouched. Although the presence of colonialists on the island was limited, the Dutch and Portuguese brought missionaries to the populace. It was through these missionaries that Christianity was introduced. During this period Christians accounted for around eight per cent of the population on the island, with ninety per cent being Catholic.

Unlike its predecessor, British control brought about significant transformations on the island. Britain and Nyakkar, the last king of Sinhala reached an agreement in 1815, to bring the entire island under the rule of Britain. According to this agreement, Buddhism was to be respected, and the Sangha would be allowed to operate unfettered. However, in the early 1800s, Anglican missionaries were introduced, and the Sangha was provided with fewer resources, which made monks rebel against Britain (cf Gregg 2003, p 99).

These upheavals were not successful in altering the status quo[30]. In the 1800s, the increasing presence of Christian missionaries on the island, particularly through missionary-run institutions, sparked Sinhala, and Tamil resentment.

During the 2nd part of the 9th century, both Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus organised groups to challenge Christian influences. This includes the establishment of the Young Lanka League and the 1891 Maha Bodhi association. Both of these groups were formed by Dharmapala, a Buddhist monk, who was widely considered the founder of Sinhala nationalism (cf De Silva 1986, p 9).

Additionally, it contained a series of disputes involving Buddhist monks and Christian missionaries about the legitimacy of their respective beliefs. The Tamils sought to offset the impact of Christian missionaries on the island by consolidating Saiva Hinduism and establishing their schools. Muslims sprung from Arab and Malay ancestors on the island and created schools to resist the cultural and theological challenges presented by the Buddhists missionaries.

Tensions between Sinhala and Muslims over conflicting economic interests led to rioting in 1915, following allegations of a Muslim raid on a Buddhist temple. British soldiers put an end to the disturbances by declaring martial law and detaining a few leaders of Sinhala, including Buddhist monks (Tambia 1992, p 7). Dharmapala, who was implicated in the rioting, was forced into hiding. In 1916, despite the growing colonial dominance, movements such as the cyclone revolutionary league were created by Muslim elites, Sinhalese, and Tamil. Later, this movement was called the Ceylon National Congress which aimed to fight for improvements within the British system. The National Congress swiftly disbanded, and Tamils formed their own association.

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[30] Existing political issues.

In the 1920s the British administration enforced quotas in elections and government positions to try and alleviate conflict on the island, particularly relating to Tamil concerns. This policy caused disagreement among the Sinhala elite, prompting the development of Sinhala groups targeted at resolving the issue. Buddhist monks became involved in a variety of groups, involving unions and political organisations. These monks in the elections of 1947 created an umbrella group called the Ceylon Union of Bhikkus which aimed to influence government policies. They were represented in all main political parties.

The elections were won by the UNP[31], and Don Stephen Senanayake was announced as the first prime minister for independent Ceylon (Little 1994, p 63). He promoted a secular nationalist philosophy in an attempted to unite Ceylon as a nation, a goal never achieved. Instead, the community of Sinhala and Tamil remained divided, founding their separate organisations and political parties. The elections of 1956 were a turning point for the relations between Sinhala-Tamil. The SLFP[32] and Bandaranaike who was referred to as S.W.R.D.[33] won the elections with the help of a large number of Buddhist monks. Bandaranaike introduced the "Sinhala Only" Act shortly after taking office, making Sinhalese the country's official language. The incident sparked Sinhala-Tamil rioting across the country.

In an attempt to ease tensions, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam who was a Tamil political leader and Bandaranaike who was a prime Minister agreed pledging greater integration of Tamil rights and pushing for more freedom for Tamil districts through the creation of organisational councils. However, the agreement was broken under significant pressure from Buddhist monks, resulting in more protests in 1958.

A Buddhist monk killed Bandaranaike in 1959, claiming his conciliatory tone toward Tamils as the reason for the crime. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the wife of Bandaranaike became a Prime Minister in 1960, announcing a different chapter of Buddhists and Sinhala-preferred laws. Her rule endured a Christian-led attempted coup in 1962, which resulted in the expulsion of Christians from the military and the government (cf Tambiah 1992, p 40). The SLPF and Bandaranaike won further elections in 1970.

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[31] United National Party
[32] Sri Lankan Freedom Party
[33] Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, who was the 4th Ceylon Denomination Prime minister.

While slowing the development of the economy and increasing unemployment, the Sinhala youth staged a challenge through the JVP[34]. The government responded by making concessions to the nationalists of Sinhala and the country was renamed Sri Lanka (after the old name of Sinhala the island). The constitution was also amended to emphasise the language of Sinhala and Buddhism.

Little (1994, p74) states that the constitutional revisions of 1972 prompted new strategies in Tamil politics. Chelvanayakam [35]resigned from the national cabinet and launched a Tamil separatist movement. In 1972, he created the TUF[36], afterwards known as TULF[37], and formed an association of "indigenous" Tamil and "estate" Tamils.

Furthermore, militant Tamil organisations such as the LTTE [38]arose during this period, eventually becoming the major militant organisation during the 1980s. The establishment of these groups cleared the ground for the island's civil war and armed Tamil resistance. In 1976 the Vaddukodia resolution exhorted Tamils to struggle for their homeland's liberation and delivered the first formal proclamation of an impartial Tamil state.

The UNP was re-elected to power in 1977, led by J.R. Jayewardene (Krishan 1993, p77). He promised an era of economic development and a place which tolerates different ethnic groups. Despite these intentions, Jayewardene persisted in enacting laws which benefited the Sinhalese Buddhist community. These laws included the refurbishment of Buddhist landmarks and the revitalisation of efforts for the Dry Zone to be populated by Sinhalese.

In 1977, these elections provoked another wave of protests. In reaction to growing incidents of violence and terror targeting government installations in the North, Jayewardene enacted the Terrorism Prevention Law in 1979, granting the state broad detention powers. Tamil-Sinhala riots erupted in 1981 due to the government's refusal to execute changes that would empower district councils to oversee local matters (Little 1994, p78).

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[34] Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
[35] Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam was a Malaysian-born Ceylonese Tamil lawyer, politician, and Member of Parliament.
[36] Tamil United Front
[37] The Tamil United Liberation Front.
[38] Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The country's worst riots occurred in 1983 when assaults against Tamils developed during a Sinhalese funeral in Colombo. The riots killed between two to three thousand individuals, and nearly seventy to a hundred thousand Tamils were homeless (Tambiah 1992, p 71). This forced the government of India to become involved, resulting in the placement of the IPKF[39] and the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement. Tamil and Sinhala terrorists condemned the treaties and the deployment of the IPKF, by launching violent operations to remove the military of India.

JVP-initiated violence claimed the lives of 40,000 to 60,000 individuals. The 1988 elections saw the emergence of a new ruler, Premadasa who was Jayewardene's former prime minister, pledged to dissolve the JVP and eliminate the IPKF's, which he achieved both by 1990.

The LTTE attacked Muslims in the Eastern Provinces in the 1990s, in Kalmunai and Polonnaruwa. In addition, the LTTE killed numerous political leaders such as Rajiv Gandhi who in 1991 was the Indian Prime Minister while in 1993 Premadasa was the President of Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2002, p 134) resulting in numerous Tamil organisations collaborating with the government of Sri Lanka. In 1994, Sinhalas and Tamils created People's Alliance government, led by President Kumaratunga. This alliance negotiated a cease-fire in 1995 and a round of peace negotiations took place.

Talks between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka swiftly collapsed, and a new chapter of the civil conflict started in Trincomalee Harbor with a suicide attack on a navy vessel. The LTTE then attacked the Colombo Central Bank, killing almost two hundred people.   The government launched a public relations effort in the north with the Tamil populace in 1998 and the LTTE was driven into the Vanni Jungles. Violence persisted until February 2002, leading to an imposition of a Norwegian-brokered cease-fire, which resulted in peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government (cf Samaranayake 2002, p 137).

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[39] Indian Peace Keeping Forces

7.1.2. Investigating the waves of violence and peace.

The history of the island records eight major violence incidents: thus, the fight between Elara and Duttagamani in the 2nd century BCE; starting in the 10th century CE with the Cola defeat of the Sinhalese kingdom; during the 1820s there were aggressive revolts against the Sangha against Britain; in 1956 riots from Muslims in Sinhala; in 1958 there were protests again; the insurrection led by JVP against the government in 1971; riots from Tamils in 1977; and the Sinhalese and riots in 1981 and 1983, which resulted in a massive civil war.

The focus here will be the causes of violence through civil conflict in 1956, 1958,1977, 1981 and 1982. These incidents predominanty incorporate all major violence eruptions between Sinhalese and Tamils and they happened under the influence of an emerging independent state Thus, they present an understanding of the opportunities and challenges of developing governments in a country with different religions and ethnicity. Then, during the 20th century, the civil war was one of the longest wars, it was a battle of regional concern because it included neighbouring Indians.

7.3. Protests of 1956 and 1958

The mid-1800s mark the beginnings of Tamil and Sinhalese nationalism as a response to the island's British rule. Tambiah (cf. De Silva 1986, p 36) states that "Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and revivalism, has its beginnings in the early twentieth and late nineteenth centuries" The rise of Tamil nationalism coincides with this period. Britain established laws that significantly transformed the Island's political and social fabric, resulting in different forms of identity.

The establishment of mass education through missionary schools of Christianity was perhaps the most significant shift in Sri Lanka. Before the invention of mass education, those who were educated were mostly restricted to the religious elite. Mass education provided literacy and new skills to those outside of the clergy (Gombrich & Obeyesekere (1988, 207). These new talents formed a social class that consisted neither of clerisy nor peasants, altering pre-colonial civilisation's old divisions. The growth of a literate middle class became essential to the rise of

Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism. Religious converts were also created by Christian-run schools in both

Tamil and Sinhala populations. Such converts introduced different belief systems within local populations, becoming a sub-group in both the Sinhalese and Tamil cultures.

In this, the themes of history, ethnicity, and language as sources of identity were most important. Both British and native experts began to investigate the historical foundations of the various communities on the island. The Sinhalese are considered to be of higher Aryan blood and the origin of their language is Indo-European. In contrast, Tamils were related to Dravidians from southern India (Little 1994, p 15). Although there are no racial distinctions between Sinhalese and Tamils, these categories have persisted.

These categories provided a new approach to organising society and thinking. Mass education influenced the publication and consumption of newspapers, journals, and other kinds of media. These, in turn, connected individuals through information in novel ways that were only conceivable because of literacy. Both Tamils and Sinhalese had publications by the end of the 1800s, including the writings of Arumuga Navalar from Tamil and the Sinhalese Bauddhaya (cf Gregg 2003, p 109). Another significant shift was the adoption of English as an important requirement for government jobs.

Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988, p 208) state that after the British establishment of English as the government's language, rivalry began amongst groups to learn English and obtain these desired positions. Christian missionary schools were the finest places to learn English. As a result, those who refused to attend these institutions struggled to compete. In the 1920s, a major source of contention became the relative number of organisations receiving government positions.

The British conducted surveys and compiled demographics on the people of the islands, which altered how different groups perceived each other. People were classified according to religion rather than caste, geography or class. As a result, religion became the most visible division between communities. Furthermore, the survey provided information on the general number of groupings. Whilst Tamils

considered themselves to be one of two masses, data from the census accorded them minority status.

British officers and historians created stories about the demographic history of the islands, with the borders from previous kingdoms included (Tambiah 1992, p 12). They drafted papers which would subsequently be used by ethnic organisations aiming to establish historical claims of the territory. For instance, the "Cleghorn Minute," was a record issued by the first commander of Britain to rule the island in 1799, which defined the bounds of the Tamil Jaffna kingdom. Modern Tamils have utilised this text to establish the territorial parameters of a distinct Tamil state.

These profound changes in society prompted protests from the religious authorities of the Tamil, Sinhala, and Muslim. The establishment of Christian-run schools, mostly, sparked a religious reaction (cf. Gregg 2003, p 109). Sinhalese Buddhist monks were the educated group, as well as those responsible for upholding and presenting the teachings of Gautama. Monks also preserved the chronicles, particularly through the *Mahavamsa*, which documented the island's political and religious events and developments.

The establishment of Christian-run schools for mass education posed a threat to the framework of society, (1) they provided the public with a different authoritative educator, who contended with the monk as a source of knowledge. (2) The rise of British authority and Christian schools altered the ancient connection between the king, Sangha. and laity (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988, p 208). The king was concerned with the Sangha's function and numerous responsibilities. However, in 1815 since the Sangha was separated from the monarch, the monastic order did not have to respond to the king's modifying powers. The Sangha suddenly faced increasing criticism from a growing educated lay middle-class society. Monks in particular were chastised for being less involved in politics and society. Monks started to take on new positions in society, including ministers in prisons, the military, and hospitals started to broadcast messages on television and radio. For monks, these undertakings subsequently included membership in political organisations and trade unions. (3) Educated laity became the new historians; literate people began debating, researching, documenting, and comprehending history beyond the Sangha's context. This resulted not just in lay people presenting different historical

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interpretations to people, but also in lay people explaining Buddhist beliefs to the masses, which was unprecedented. Dharmapala, trained in Christian schools was the paradigm of the "new historian."

He identified himself as a new authority figure in Sinhalese Buddhist culture. He was, a figure outside the Sangha but adhered to many of its norms, such as a vow to celibacy and service to society.

Dharmapala was a key figure in "Protestant Buddhism," or the shift of Buddhist power and the understanding of Buddhist texts in response to British rule and the challenge from Christianity. Dharmapala aimed his Buddhist understanding at the educated middle class which was rapidly developing through the usage of the Sangha's code of conduct maintained in the Tipitaka's Vinaya writings where there were 200 regulations ranging from cleanliness, funerals to civil behaviour, and travel (cf Gombrich and Obeyesekere1988, p 212). These standards included not just ancient Buddhist rituals, but also parts of western, Christian religiosity, notably concerned with women's behaviour, and so combined the new with the old to create etiquette characterised as "pure and perfect Buddhist ideals".

For Buddhist practice and beliefs, Dharmapala advocated for a stronger dependence on the Pali canon, enabling the literate to read. He emphasised the significance of people being accountable for their redemption and the survival of their faith. He also chastised the Sangha for being less involved in worldly matters. He formed the Maha Bodhi Organisation to revitalise Buddhism In 1891. In 1912, he embarked on a tour of the island to spread his understanding of Buddhism and to revive the identity of Sinhalese Buddhists (cf Gregg 2003, p 112). This restored Buddhism's significance in Sinhalese culture and served to identify and distinguish Sinhalese Buddhists from colonial powers and their neighbours. Under Arumuga Navalar's [40]guidance, the Tamils established their schools to mitigate the impacts of Christian missionaries. Additionally, Navalar oversaw the rebuilding of Hindu temples and revived the study of Hindu classics.

Muslims on the island banded together to combat the theological and cultural challenges brought by existing missionaries of Christianity (De Silva 1986, p 9). Muslim leaders such as M.C. Siddi Lebbe and Orabi Pasha emphasised the

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[40] He strove to maintain and promote Saiva Siddhanta on the island.

importance of education in the community of Muslims and founded Muslim schools. After the religious renaissance, the literate elite began to build political and social organisations. This included the formation of the 1916 Ceylon Reform League, which later in 1919 was named the Ceylon National Congress. This Congress was made up of an intellectual elite who sought to influence political transformation through civil society. It campaigned for a wider vote and equal participation in the government of Brittan, which was given in Donoughmore's constitution soon before the elections in 1931.

However, to secure more protection for Tamils inside the political and administrative system, the Tamils quit the Congress and founded the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress in the early 1920s. This schism, along with the elections in 1931 and the boycott of the Donoughmore Constitution, signified the start of Sinhala majoritarian politics on the Island (Tambiah 1992, p 9). Buddhist religious leaders were more politically involved in the 1930s, founding groups and sponsoring political parties. Initially, they were involved in budding Marxist organisations and trade unions, promoting the Marxist goal of assisting the downtrodden working class. Simultaneously, other monks stated planning for Sinhala-specific goals and Buddhists. Monks in this regard established the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 1935 to coordinate efforts and safeguard Sinhala Buddhist interests. Within that year, the Maha Sabha of Sinhala was established by the politician S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, which aimed to promote the interests of Sinhala Buddhists.

The emergence of the Sinhala Maha Sabha was in a form of the Sangha's primary political voice, subsequently prevailing over the Marxist-oriented monks. Following World War two, the British administration started laying the groundwork for the independence of Ceylon (Little 1994, p63). The *Vidyalanakara Declaration* was published in 1946 by Buddhist monks and advocated that monks engage in politics and social activism. In response Walpola Rahula a Buddhist monk released a publication called *The Heritage of the Bhikku*, suggesting that monks always had a significant role in politics.

However, Rahula's publication triggered a disagreement over the responsibility of monks in politics in the Sangha and the greater Sinhalese population. The All-Ceylon Buddhist council, the Maha Bodhi Society, and other high-ranking monks all spoke

out against Rahula's claims, stating that monks should neither vote nor occupy government (cf Tambiah 1992, p 19). Despite this, in 1946 Rahula founded the (LEBM), the Ceylon Union of Buddhists to defend the Sangha's political and financial privileges using the elections. Most major parties consisted of Buddhist monks which were promoting their campaigns in the 1947 elections. The UNP[41], founded by the Ceylon National Council, prevailed in the election, and Senayanake was appointed as a prime minister, subsequently becoming the first prime minister in 1948 for independent Ceylon.

Despite his secular beliefs, Senayanake adopted measures that benefitted the Sinhalese (Krishna 1999. p60). He approved laws in 1949 which deprived over nine hundred thousand people of citizenship, and "estate" Tamils under the rule of Britain were brought into labour on tea and coffee platforms. He drew parallels with ancient Sinhala rulers and launched an irrigation programme for the island's Dry Zone, by referring to projects built during the Sinhala kingdom's golden period.

Furthermore, he paid formal trips to Buddhist monuments and temples, underlining his Sinhala Buddhist identity. In 1949 these acts caused Tamil disengagement from the UNP and the founding of the TFP[42]. The Federal Party's desired full regional independence and a government of a federation-style in 1950 (cf Little 1994, p 56). The creator of the Maha Sabha, Bandaranaike split from the UNP to join the SLFP[43] in 1951. Bandaranaike, converted to Buddhism in 1930 and petitioned the Mahavamsa to declare that the history of the island and destiny was distinctively Sinhalese and Buddhist and that it was the government's responsibility to safeguard and secure this destiny.

This viewpoint received significant attention, providing Bandaranaike's political party with a foundation which would help him win the upcoming elections. Disagreement over a connection between the government and the Sangha proceeded during the 1950s, along with the emergence of the SLFP and Bandaranaike. A Buddhist committee of inquiry was established by the All-Ceylon Buddhist Council in 1954,

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[41] United National Party
[42] Tamil Federal Party led by Chelvanayakam.
[43] Sri Lankan Freedom Party

which consisted of a group of seven laities and seven Buddhist monks tasked with assessing the Buddhist health on the island.

The study, titled *The Betrayal of Buddhism*, was published in 1956, the same time as Gautama's 2500th enlightenment anniversary as well as the national elections of Sri Lanka.

The study contended that the Sinhalese and Buddhist had been in danger from Tamil invaders and colonial forces for over 400 years. However, military occupation was not the only challenge to Buddhism; the danger was also perceived to come from religious or cultural aspects: namely, the danger presented by missionaries of Christianity and their institutions.

The government has failed to defend Buddhism, leaving it vulnerable to these many dangers (Tambiah 1992, p 30). The committee advocated first enacting the Buddha Sansana law, wherein it aimed to form a government council to defend the interests of Buddhists. Second, it advocated for the cessation of government funding for Christian schools. Third, it requested that the government demonstrate a preference for Buddhist schools. This study and its suggestions served as the cornerstone for Bandaranaike's election campaign in 1956.

In that year, D.C. Wijayawardena authored *Revolt in the Sanctuary* "to honour 2500 years of Buddhism, the Sri Lanka civilians, and the nation of Sinhala which came into life with Gautama's blessing." He asserted in it that "Ceylon" was predestined as a country that combined Buddhism with the Sinhalese population." (Little 1994, p64) Furthermore, Buddhism was regarded as the state's official religion. The monarch from the beginning was Buddhist, and the Sangha had historically played a role in politics through their king's council. The book included a set of requests on the state for the restoration of Buddhism as the island's official religion and to encourage and preserve the faith.

The elections in 1956 proved to be a turning point in the islands' modern history. Monks and a slew of Buddhist groups and Sinhala teamed together to dismantle the UNP and replace it with the SLFP and Bandaranaike. The Buddhist monk and lay organisation Eksath Bhikku Peramuna was formed particularly to oppose the UNP.

Monks went on hunger strike in front of Parliament, referring to the government as the devil or mara.

Tambiah claims that "it is no exaggeration to suggest that the 1956 elections...were the climactic and distinctive moment in twentieth-century political life when a large number of monks prepared to win an election." Bandaranaike's movement relied on the concerns and requests expressed in writings such as The Treachery of Revolt and Buddhism in the kirk to request a state dedicated to defending the interests of Sinhala Buddhists (cf Tambiah 1992, p 45).

According to Deshapriya (2002, p 148), The new administration committed to rebuilding Buddhism to its pre-colonial prominence, reinstating Sinhala as the country's dominant language, and promoting Sinhala identity and culture. To that end, new laws were passed, the most contentious of which was the Sinhala Only Law, which called for Sinhala to be declared the official language of Ceylon. The Act originally intended for Sinhala to be the main language in universities and the government, putting non-Sinhala residents at a disadvantage in terms of occupational opportunities and education. Furthermore, the law alienated the island's minorities not just because of its discriminatory consequences, but also because of its explicitly Buddhist prejudices.

The minority communities immediately protested following the Sinhala Only Act, calling for its repeal. Tamils held sit-ins across the capital, prompting Buddhist monks to organise counter demonstrations (Tambiah 1992, p 46). These protests developed into rioting, resulting in the looting of approximately 43 stores, the majority of which were Tamil, and 113 arrests. Bands of Sinhalese adolescents assaulted the Tamil minority in the Gal Oya valley, killing an estimated 100 people. The deployment of troops in volatile regions put a stop to the riots, lootings, and killings.

The government sought to defuse concerns about the Sinhala Only Law by easing its requirements. Talks between the Tamil Federalist Party and the government resulted in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957, which considered the utilisation of Tamil and Sinhala as dominant languages, particularly in a Tamil-centered place in the north, as well as the establishment of local authorities to give Tamils increased autonomy and power over their social and political destiny.

If this accord had been properly handled and implemented, ethnic disputes on the island would never have escalated into a civil conflict. The deal, however, was met with significant hostility by Sinhalese nationalists and monks, who staged sit-ins and hunger protests near Bandaranaike's homes (cf Little 1994, p67). One of the monks spoke in front of more than 5,000 people claiming that the deal would "give rise to the ultimate destruction of the Sinhalese race." Furthermore, the UNP, which at that time was led by President Jayawardene and the future Prime Minister, rejected the treaty, and pushed for its disapproval; the UNP also planned a parade to the Temple of Buddhism. Bandaranaike eventually caved to the demonstrators' requests and cancelled the arrangement.

In May 1958, following the frustrations and disappointment caused by the failure of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, a fresh and deadlier wave of rioting erupted. The riots started in the East and northern Provinces following a group of Sinhalese arrived at a train station and assaulted a Tamil traveller on the train (Tambiah 1992, p 48). Following this event, a train hauling Sinhalese passenger in a Tamil region was involved in an accident. Within the same region, a former Sinhalese mayor was slain when driving his vehicle. This incident was widely publicised and blamed on Tamils, prompting groups of Sinhalese to go to the streets in various towns across the country.

Riots erupted; the worst was in Padaviya and Polonnaruwa, which is where the government had just moved Sinhalese workers to engage in a development project. These riots featured looting and damage of property, the large bulk of which belonged to Tamils, as well as violence against Tamils, which resulted in several deaths. The violence escalated in Colombo when Sinhalese groups assaulted Tamil communities and merchants' shops (cf Manor 1989, p 290). A few days after the riots, Bandaranaike gave a radio speech to the country, attributing the origins of the conflict to the murder of a Sinhalese police officer by Tamils, thus fueling violence led by Sinhalese. Four days after the incident, authorities declared a state of emergency, sent troops, and imposed a late-night curfew.

However, before the rioting could be halted, the eastern and north Tamils regions began a counterattack on Sinhalese. Before the unrest could be quelled, Tamil bandits burnt down homes, assaulted Sinhalese fishermen, and looted Buddhist

monasteries. In trying to placate the Tamils and stop the present tensions, Bandaranaike changed the Sinhala-only law.

The Sinhala and Tamil riots of 1956 and 1958 have aspects that support the hypothesis stated in this research. Religion had a significant part in the shifting tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils. Buddhist monks, in particular, were more engaged in the scenes of politics as Ceylon approached independence; their objectives, in turn, posed a danger and estrangement to the island's non-Buddhists. Buddhist monks not only supported politicians and parties but also worked to mould their platforms and programmes.

Representatives of the Sangha pressurised the government to safeguard and promote Buddhism by forming reports, committees, and organisations. These attempts were effective in bringing Bandaranaike and the SLFP to positions of leadership, both were supportive of the religious concerns of the Sangha. Additionally, the pact of the monks and their groups was effective in pressuring Bandaranaike to reject the amendments to the 1957 Pact, escalating tensions that produced the 1958 riots.

Moreover, religion had a prominent role in the riots of 1956 and 1958, with politicians, monks, and laymen using Buddhist texts, notably the *Mahavamsa,* to define and explain state acts and policies. The *Mahavamsa* served as a model for the leadership of Bandaranaike and the ultimate vision of the island. Although Senayake professed to have a democratic vision of a multi-ethnic government, he also utilised the *Mahavamsa* in his attempts to rebuild irrigation systems in the country's Dry Zones.

As a result, *Mahavamsa* was a potent weapon for not only mobilising but also shaping and justifying governmental policies. Although the ascendancy of Buddhism in the politics of Sinhala by the 1940s and 1950s, it was not supported by the Tamils. Hinduism had a major role in mobilising Tamils against the British Christian influence in the mid-1800s, particularly in attempts to rebuild Hindu temples and promote Saiva Siddhanta (Gregg 2003, p 120). However, following Navalar's influence, the emphasis on maintaining Hinduism waned.

Tamilian leaders in the twentieth century, mainly Chelvanayakam, were unable to appeal to Hinduism to organise Sinhalese Buddhist national danger against Tamils, and neither did Hindu leadership on the island arise and build political deployment groups. This is odd, considering that "estate" and indigenous Tamils were split by location, beliefs, and history, yet shared Hinduism. In the end, unfairness against the language of Tamil proved to be the most prominent focus of mobilisation for the Tamils.

These episodes show that both parties mobilised in reaction to a potential or real danger. The threat posed by British and colonialism in general, and missionaries of Christianity in particular, spurred Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims to band together in the nineteenth century to combat this threat.

These organisations banded together to provide their respective facilities, most notably their educational institutions, and to foster a sense of identity distinct from their colonial powers. Religion was important in each of these efforts. Tamil, Sinhala, and Muslim groups established new schools that not only taught modern-day skills but also provided information about their religions. Religion had a role in the formation of modern nationalist identities.

Dharmapala contributed to the formation of the identity of the Sinhalese determined by the practices of Buddhism based on the code of ethics of the Sangha. Similarly, Muslim and Tamil leaders emphasised their religious identities, with Tamils embracing Saiva Siddhanta and Muslims defending Islamic ideals. Sinhalese rulers talked of a two-pronged danger throughout the twentieth century, notably in the 1940s. They began by naming external opponents of Buddhism. This encompassed colonial control of 400 years, as well as the imagined long-term danger presented on the island by Tamils and their south Indian ethnic cousins. The second danger was the state, which used its power to safeguard the unity of Buddhism against these dangers becoming a danger to the faith itself. Their solution, as outlined in *Buddhism Wronged*, was for the government to reclaim its duty as Dharma guardian and to implement measures which might restore the faith to its pre-colonial glory.

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists' aggressive actions posed a direct danger to nonBuddhist and Tamil communities. The Sinhala Only rule directly compromised

Tamil possibilities for government posts and university enrolment on the island. The idea of restarting irrigation projects and transferring Sinhalese to the country's Dry Zones put land claimed by Tamils at risk.

The Sinhalese principal actors of the 1956 and 1958 violence possessed means which provided them with an advanyage over the Tamils. The Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists' most valuable asset was a government which was attentive to their requests and empathetic to their activities. Before 1956, both Tamils and Sinhalese used citizens to express their concerns and guarantee their rights. Both factions founded organisations, initially as the Ceylon National Congress and then as independent groupings, to seek alternative political voices under British rule. Postindependence, both factions utilised civil disobedience to express their dissatisfaction with government policy.

Nevertheless, with the ascendancy of Sinhala nationalists to power in Sri Lanka, these peaceful tactics of defending rights started to deteriorate. Bandaranaike's leadership provided Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists with a new opportunity to further their ethnic and religious goals. This was not an option for the Tamils or other communities. The riots in 1956 were the consequence of out-of-control mass rallies; yet they demonstrated that the state was hesitant to react against racial conflict; it was forgiving against Sinhalese.

During the 1958 rioting, this became obvious when Tamils were falsely blamed as the culprits and Sinhalese were free to engage in acts of violence against Tamils across the country. Although Chelvanayakam and the Tamil Federal Party pledged to use nonviolent methods in the aftermath of the 1956 riots, this pledge did not deter atrocities led by the Sinhalese in 1958, nor did it prevent the Tamils from retaliating violently.

7.4.   Protests in 1977

The riots in 1977 were sparked by the outcomes of the elections, indicating that Tamils could organise and attack the state, anticipating the civil conflict that would follow. To comprehend them, it is critical to detail the government's actions in this period, as well as the responses of the Tamils. After the deadly 1958 rioting and the government's sympathy efforts toward the Tamil minority, A Buddhist monk

assassinated Bandaranaike in 1959. His wife Sirimavo took up his post and was appointed as a member of the SLFP in 1960. Mrs Bandaranaike's administration was marked by the adoption of a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist agenda that hurt both the island's Christians and Tamils. With the Sinhala Only Law, her government removed any uncertainties and proclaimed Sinhala the sole language of state bureaucracy across the island in 1961.

She lobbied for legislation to put all schools under state control, including Christianoperated institutions still run by preachers from the West; the Catholic schools were particularly targeted (Little 1994, p 72). Christian schools were obliged to promote
Buddhism as part of this law of 1967. These measures sparked a coup led by Christians in 1962.

Bandaranaike then decided to exclude Christians from the military and the government
Mrs Bandaranaike was defeated in the 1965 elections by Dudley Senanyake and the United National Party. The Senayake-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965 was an attempt by the new administration under Senanyake to alleviate Tamil complaints. Similar to the predecessor of the pact, the 1957 Bandarainake-Chelvanayakam Pact, attempted to provide Tamils with more local autonomy. The deal, however, was rejected in the national assembly by an SLFP-UNP coalition.

Mrs Bandaranaike and the SLFP were re-elected in 1970 after creating a "United Front" coalition with many other parties, including the Sri Lanka Communist Party. In 1971, a Sinhalese rebellion led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) compelled the government to investigate concerns within its racial community (cf Manor 1989, p 593). Rohana Wijeweera founded the JVP in the late 1960s as a movement devoted to bringing about radical reform in Sri Lanka, either via government or by a mass uprising. The organisation was mostly composed of Sinhalese Buddhist adolescents, although it also included monks.

The JVP was able to seize numerous rural areas, which it controlled for several days before the government violently crushed the revolt. During the rebellion, an estimated two thousand to three thousand people were slain, and the majority of them were members of the JVP. The JVP was innovative in that it combined

aspirations of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist with force in a manner which appealed to the Sinhalese youth. This second characteristic, in particular, rendered them a potential threat to the government's stability in the 1980s, as will be described in the next section.

After the 1971 insurgency, the government implemented dramatic measures aimed at pleasing unhappy Sinhalese. The governance of Mrs Bandaranaike's first christened the nation Sri Lanka, after the Sinhalese monarchy. This was followed by significant changes to the 1946 Soulbury Legislation, along with declaring Sinhalese as the only language of Sri Lanka, repealing the rights of the minority's protection, providing Buddhism "the greatest place in the Republic of Sri Lanka" and creating it "the responsibility of the government to foster and protect Buddhism" (cf Krishna 1999. p 75). Furthermore, the state tightened university admissions rules and enforced racial quotas. Both of these measures benefited Sinhalese over Tamils. Northern Tamil admissions to scientific programmes fell from 27.5% to 7% between 1969 and 1974.

As a result, higher education was required for government positions, thus limiting Tamils' opportunities in this field.

Revisions to the 1972 constitution ushered in a new age of Tamil political strategy (Little 1994, p 74). Two days later Chelvanayakam and the Federal Party announced a six-point campaign strategy. Tamils advocated for Sinhala-Tamil linguistic equality, complete nationality for all Tamils, the construction of a democratic state and administration, a constitutional amendment amending equality, decentralised governance, and the removal of untouchability. The govrnment rejcted the plan. Chelvanayakam resigned from the federal cabinet that same year and advocated that Tamils seek independence from Sri Lanka. In 1972 he created the TUF[44], later renamed the TULF[45], to build a partnership between "estate" Tamils and Tamils in the north.

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[44] Tamil United Front
[45] Tamil United Liberation Front

Along with the TULF's attempt to reform the political structure, the TNT[46], TELO[47], PLOTE[48], EPRLF[49], EROS[50], and the LTTE erupted (cf Little 1994, p 77). However, the rise of the LTTE will be addressed in the section that follows.

For the TULF and growing Tamil armed organisations, two decades of talks with the Sinhala-dominated government for more autonomy has achieved few practical gains. The Tamils further claimed that they were losing support amid escalating Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist measures and a growing number of Sinhalese being transported to the Dry Zone[51]. This lack of progress in the political aspect of things was accompanied by mounting financial difficulties throughout the island, concerns felt by both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, which aided in preparing the stage for a power transfer in the 1977 elections.

The TULF issued a Vaddukoddia Resolution in 1976, which publicly pushed for the formation of an independent Tamil government on the island (Krishna 1999. p 77). The drafters picked the term Eelam to allude to what the TULF saw as a traditional Tamil homeland that existed before colonisation. The Vaddukoddia declaration further exhorted every Tamil, "estate" and indigenous alike, to defend the homeland militarily and "push themselves completely into the holy battle for liberation and not shrink until the goal of an independent socialist republic of Tamil Eelam is accomplished." The Resolution was backed by the main Tamil parties and organisations, both "estate" and indigenous, marking a first for the Tamil cause. However, the deaths of the 3 main leaders of the Tamil independence campaign in 1977: Chelvanayagam, Ponnambalam, and Murugeysen Tiruchelvam, dealt a blow to the Tamils. Their deaths left a void in Tamil leadership, paving the path for the formation of militant organisations comprised of young leaders and dissatisfied youngsters.

Under the leadership of Junius Richard Jayewardene, the UNP also regained control of the government in 1977. Both Tamil and Sinhalese parties have utilised ethnicity to mobilse votes, which heightened differences between the two communities.

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[46] Tamil New Tigers
[47] Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
[48] People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
[49] Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
[50] Eelam People's Revolutionary Organisation of Students
[51] Dry zone is the Island's northern part and most of the east and southeast.

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Furthermore, the campaign had resulted in the TULF, led by Armirthalingam, securing the 2nd most parliamentary seats (cf Senaratne 1997, p62). There were promises from the new administration which included economic transformation and a period of social leniency, which Jayewardene referred to as dharmistha, in honour of Asoka, the Indian Buddhist King who brought security and harmony to the Region. Under his new tolerance rule, Jayewardene vowed to change the establishment clause text, grant the Tamil language greater prominence, and allow district councils more autonomy. Furthermore, the administration vowed to address complaints about university admissions practices. These commitments were carried out in 1978.

Despite the new government's diplomatic gestures, some in the community of Tamil contended that it was too late. Military organisations, who gained traction at the beginning of the 1970s, were dissatisfied with the TULF's failure to influence transformation in the state politically. Riots between Tamils and Sinhalese erupted in August 1977, a few weeks after the elections, following a minor altercation between policemen and a band of Tamil youngsters in Jaffna (cf Little 1994, p 86). Fighting began from Jaffna to Colombo, Kandy, and eventually to other regions across the country. The confrontations killed approximately 100 Tamils and displaced approximately 25,000 people. To contain the rioting, the government proclaimed a state of emergency.

The period of peace started from 1959 to 1977 and following this period rioting break out between Sinhalese and Tamil 1977. This rioting contained factors which supported the explanatory theory advanced in this dissertation. Thus, first, religion remained an important factor in the shifting tensions between Sinhalese and the Tamils. Particularly, as an important element of the Sinhalese nationalist agenda, the promotion and protection of Buddhism as a prominent objective of monks and politicians throughout this period.

The evidence of this is traced in the policies of Mrs Bandaranaike, particularly revisions to the laws which granted Buddhism a privileged role in the culture and politics of Sri Lanka. Mrs Bandaranaike's attempted to develop water facilities on the island's dry place and fill it with the traditional heartland of the monarchy in Sinhala, to demonstrate the importance of Buddhism. These cultural, religious, and historical difficulties, combined with discriminatory university entrance changes and the

inability to execute plans establishing regional councils, intensified the Tamil community's perception of danger to the federal government dominated by the Sinhalese.

Frustrations with Sinhala-centric laws pushed Tamil attitudes and initiatives in new directions. In reaction to the constitutional revisions of 1972, Tamils created associations. The TULF pulled together indigenous and "estate" Tamils, as well as youth organisations which bypassed political efforts in favour of violent conflict. For Tamils, religion was not the biggest influence in their mobilisation or rationale for a robust reaction to the danger perceived by the Sinhalese, as it had in the 1956 and 1958 riots. The TULF was founded on the shared linguistic and ethnic history of "estate" and indigenous Tamils, not so much on Hinduism. Similarly, the new military groups focused on leftist Marxist ideology rather than Hindu ideals.

Growth in the nationalism of the Sinhalese Buddhists posed a direct danger to the island's Tamil minority. Factors such as support for the Sinhala language and Buddhism from the government posed a great cultural danger. Nevertheless, increased limitations on Tamil university admissions which created impediments to government occupations as well as the Sinhalese transplantation into Muslim and Tamil districts in dry places presented financial and territorial challenges to the Tamils. Lack of discussion provoked a bolder reaction from the Tamils, along with a call for an autonomous nation and the use of violence to attain that aim.

The activities of the Sinhalese-dominated state during this period might have been motivated by one of two factors. (1) The pro-Sinhalese Buddhist laws brought by Mrs Bandaranaike seemed to have been driven more by the potential to enact the objective of the Sinhalese nationalist than by concerns over the eradication of Buddhism. There were no fresh dangers offered by foreign entities or local minorities in the early 1970s, during a period of constitutional revision. Mrs Bandaranaike's laws, on the other hand, might have been the consequence of challenges presented by divisions in the Buddhist community of Sinhala.

The JVP insurgency of 1971 was targeted, however not by Tamils, but by the government of Sri Lanka, because they viewed it as excessively conservative on the concerns of the Sinhalese nationalist. Pro-Sinhala laws were probably undertaken to

accommodate this rightwing danger; nevertheless, most of the laws, along with the promotion of Sinhala as the official language, predated the 1971 insurgency. As a result, it seems that the government of the SLFP, commanded by Mrs Bandaranaike, promoted Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism because they saw an opportunity rather than danger. Thus, the Sinhalese, such as in past uprisings, had the government's resources at their disposal.

Parallel to the rioting in 1956 and 1958, the Tamils suffered more deaths and losses in their property, implying that the state did not protect them from the rioters of Sinhala. The main difference between the riots of 1956 and 1958 and those of 1977 is the availability of resources to the Tamils. The increasing degree of organisation with the community of Tamil, especially politically with the TULF and on the field with militant Tamil organisations, enabled the Tamils to launch an attack with more intensity. By the time of the riots in 1977, Tamils, especially dissatisfied youth, had become more organised. Despite internal disputes and the loss of major leaders in 1977, the Tamil community was more well-equipped to fight back than in riots before this one.

7.5. Protests in 1981 and 1983, and the acceleration of the Civil conflict

Protests of 1981 and 1983 were the country's worst, following this was the commencement of the civil war. This section will focus on the formation of Tamil militant organisations, their connections, and their wealth to the politicians of Tamil. Also, it discusses the rise of the Sinhalese ultra-nationalist of Buddhist groups, such as the MVP and the JVP, and their use of violence to achieve ostensibly Buddhist aims. And finally, this part examines the ongoing peace effort. The unification of Tamil militant factions into the LTTE, as well as the funding they obtained from numerous outside outlets, best, explains Sri Lanka's descent into civil war. Similarly, the existence of Sinhalese nationalists of Buddhist militant organisations intensified the war by undermining the power of the state and complicating peace efforts.

Between the riots of 1977, 1981 and 1983, the island remained politically volatile. Jayewardene allegedly freed JVP militants jailed as a consequence of the 1971 insurgency from prison in 1977 as a confidence-building gesture within the Sinhalese

society. Instead of assuaging Sinhala Buddhist fears, this measure cleared the stage for a new surge of militancy.

After the deaths of 14 Sri Lankan law enforcement officers in LTTE attacks in 1979, and the bomb attacks on an Air Ceylon airliner, the state made a law of Terrorism prevention, which provided the military and police officers broad authorities to conduct operations against suspected terrorists, most whom were Tamils (cf Moore 1993, p 608). As a conciliation step to the minority of Tamils, the government issued legislation in 1981 authorising the establishment of District Development Councils (DDC) across the island. Other militant organisations and the LTTE rejected the idea, claiming that full independence was the only option for Tamils' future in the county.

Tamil separatists killed a Tamil UNP politician and three law enforcement workers, to undermine the 1981 elections (Senaratne 1997, p 64), This provoked protests in the town, which destroyed the Jaffna City Library, which held about 90,000 Tamil volumes. The government did not investigate the reasons for the incident or seek to prosecute those guilty for the demolition of the library, fomenting more anger in the Tamil community. Sinhalese gangsters plundered, robbed, and torched Tamil stores and residences in Ratnapura and Colombo, resulting in at least seven people dying and the damage of over 200 structures. Jaywardene summoned the military troops to put an end to the violence.

Despite his unpopular ideas and acts, Jayewardene was re-elected to a second term in 1982. Irregular acts of violence occurred during the entire year, including an LTTE assault at a railway near Jaffna, along with several assaults on Tamil shopkeepers led by Sinhala militant organisations. Nevertheless, in July 1983 Sri Lanka in Jaffna experienced the most serious riots, following the death of thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers by the LTTE forces in a raid. As a result, riots broke out the following day in Colombo after the funeral of the soldiers. The cemetery area is where the rioting began and spread quickly to the neighbourhoods of Tamil. Tamil shops were looted and burned by fuming Sinhalese mourners. According to Senaratne (1997, p 68), two to three thousand people were killed in this event and eventually forced from seventy to a hundred thousand people into refugee camps.

The response from the government was slow to deal with the unrest. Jayewardene, in this instance, did not speak to the public till five days following the beginning of the riots to an extent that he blamed the Tamils for provoking the riots with their terrorist activities (cf Little 1994, p 89). Accusations about the government providing furious Sinhalese organisations lists of Tamil-owned companies, and that armed forces and police had engaged in the riots, reduced the Tamil trust in the government. After the protests, the state outlawed the JVPs, since it was blamed for much of the killing.

However, this did not comfort the Tamil people. This was the country's watershed moment for Tamil and Sinhalese relations. The quest for an independent Tamil nation adopted an extra-militant turn, leading to a full-fledged civil war. The conflict may be divided into three periods, which briefly will be discussed: from the 1970s to 1990s, and from 1990 to 1995; as well as from 1995 to 2002.

The 1st stage of Sri Lanka's civil conflict lasted from 1970 to 1990 and was marked by three events. First, it was the development of Tamil militant organisations during the 1970s and assaults largely on the islands law enforcers, soldiers, and governments targeted attacks, including the 1972 killing of Jaffna's mayor (cf Samaranayake 2002, p128). These trends accelerated following the riots of 1983, wherein in the north militant Tamil organisations assaulted Sinhalese residents. Then the Sri Lankan government propelled soldiers to the place in trying to crush militant Tamil groups.

The power consolidation of the LTTE's Machiavellian approach and its development as a major militant group in Tamil Eelam was the second breakthrough in this stage. Starting in 1986, the LTTE committed fractious assassinations, assassinating the commanders of three competing militant groups: the EPRLF, the PLOTE, and the TELO.   The LTTE was the sole significant armed group striving for the independence of Tamil in 1987.

Militants linked with other organisations which were imprisoned, exiled, or withdrew to the Island's sections not held by the LTTE (De Silva 1986, p 98). The LTTE's objective, such as those of its competitor militant groups, was the establishment of an autonomous nation, which it has maintained throughout the 20-year civil conflict. The LTTE, such as its militant opponents, originated as a Marxist-Leninist

organisation in the 1970s, as many other armed groups across the world did. However, the organisations swiftly shifted to a right view centred on the ethnicity of Tamil and nationalism, winning members, and some public support.

The LTTE in this had regard great success obtaining funds and military equipment from overseas sources. The LTTE, has galvanised the Tamil diaspora in support of an Eelam autonomous nation. During the 1970s, Sri Lankan Tamils established organisations aiming to educate people about the Tamil Tamil predicament as well as organise diaspora to give funds to its course (Gunaratna 2000, p119). This comprises groups of the EROS[52], the TLO[53], and several humanitarian organisations.

In 1995, outside contributors were expected to provide for 40% of the LTTE's war budget, rising to 60% by 1996. To fundraise, the LTTE according to Gunaratna (1997, p 110) has also participated in financial fraud, gold laundering, drug distribution, weaponry shipments, and real estate transactions. The LTTE established an information news office in London in 1984 and began publishing many journals, including, Viduthalai Pligai, and Kalathi. and Tamil Homeland. Furthermore, the LTTE has collaborated with other forces of liberation, particularly Palestinians, however, with organisations from " Iraq, Morocco, Iran, Algeria, Syria, Libya, Turkey, Yemen, and Lebanon" as well as with the ETA in Spain. As a result, the LTTE evolved into a resourceful, strong group and a deadly antagonist during the 1980s, in Sri Lanka's civil conflict.

India's entry into the fight was the 3rd occurrence in the 1st stage of the war. After the
1983 riots, the government of India, led by Indira Gandhi, officially intervened in the Sri Lankan war. Before this, it is thought that Indira's administration, through the secret service of the Indian RAW[54], started teaching Tamil militants as early as 1982, 1st by permitting teaching camps to be created in Tamil Nadu, then by providing funding and guns.

Indira proposed services to India as a peacemaker between the government of Sri Lankan and Tamil during the riots of 1983. This proposal is said to have been made for a variety of reasons. Due to the ethnic ties between Sri Lankan Tamils and those

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[52] Eelam Revolutionary Association of Students
[53] Tamil Liberation Organization
[54] Research and Evaluation Wing

in Tamil Nadu, the government of India declared a particular relationship to the war. This bond was cemented by the opinion of Tamil Nadu's public, which was shocked by the rioting and pressed the government of India for action.

India desired to operate as a defensive shield for smaller South Asian nations and to continue seeking regional peace; and engaging in the conflict of Sri Lanka was a key step toward accomplishing this aim (De Silva 1986, p 200) states that. it is alleged that the Indiria-led state engaged in the dispute to carry favour with Tamil Nadu voters ahead of the elections of 1984. As a result, India's engagement in the conflict in Sri Lanka resulted from a combination of local and foreign strategic considerations.

India first advocated peace in Sri Lanka, deploying a negotiator to meet with the two groups. The conference of all parties followed in 1984, which tried to reach an agreement on the establishment of local authorities on the island's eastern and northern provinces, as well as persuading the government of Sri Lanka to award nationality to "estate" Tamils.

In 1984 after Indira's death, Rajiv her son attempted to negotiate an end to the increasing civil conflict mostly a peaceful one. In 1985, he met with President Jayewardene and promised to assist organise additional discussions between the government of Sri Lankan and Tamils, 1st in Thimpu, Bhutan, then in New Delhi, which culminated in the Delhi 1985 Accords (cf De Silva 1986, p 203). The Delhi Pacts subsequently created the foundation for the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Treaty, which was signed in 1987. The pacts called for the establishment of nine provincial assemblies all over the island, using votes in the eastern province to decide whether the residents agree on both north and east to be merged, the reinstatement of Tamil immigrants, the sacking of Tamil activists from India, and the response of seven thousand troops of India to establish the IPKF[55].

Immediately following their deployment, the LTTE categorically rejected the deal and started attacking the IPKF. This compelled the government of India to raise the number of military forces in the area, ultimately hitting about seventy-five thousand to

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[55] Indian Peace Keeping Force

one hundred thousand troops at its peak and killing over one thousand two hundred and fifty soldiers until their departure in 1990.

It is significant to remember how antagonistic the Sinhalese militants were to the IndoSri Lankan Pact of 1987 just as the Tamils were. After 1985 Samaranayake (2002, p 132) argues that LTTE assaults in Anuradhapura on Buddhist pilgrims, wherein 150 people were murdered, Buddhist Sinhalese nationalists formed groups aiming to safeguard Buddhism and protect the motherland from the menace of Tamil. Activist monks established the MSV[56] in 1986 which served as a protection group, coordinating the operations of various Sinhala nationalist organisations, while collaborating with parties such as the SLFP, to protect the Sri Lankan territorial unity of Buddhists on the island and their supremacy.

To support this purpose, it mainly relied on Mahavamsa, arguing that the Sinhalese monarchs of the ancient took the responsibility of preserving and uniting the Sangha on the island. in return, this maintained the teachings of Gautama (cf Tambiah 1992, p 80). Additionally, the group contended that for the Tamil danger to be rejected and to protect the state of Buddhism force was required. For that purpose, the MSV considered monks to be "foot soldiers" in "the revolutionary war." The group attempted to rouse the Sinhalese people by producing literature, lectures, rallies, and union negotiations.

During this time, the JVP, the exact radical movement which tried to topple the government in 1971 remobilised for aggressive action to "protect the homeland." The JVP, and the MSV, took weapons to oppose the acceptance of the 1987 Pact of the Indo-Sri Lanka, which was considered to possibly jeopardize Sri Lanka's territory and sovereignty (cf Tambiah 1992, p 89). Starting in 1987, the JVP initiated an insurgency aiming at toppling the government and preventing the agreements from being implemented. The group had essentially little external assistance for its activities, instead relying on Rohana Wijeweera's attractive and inventive leadership, public support, and the Sangha structure to organise and brutally fight the government.

They assassinated UNP lawmakers, raided military sites, bombed buildings of the government, such as the parliament, and conducted brutal attacks on infrastructure

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[56] Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya

components including the state-run media and power plants (Moore (1993, p612). They also coordinated extensive riots, boycotts of Indian-made goods, and large-scale protests.

The JVP insurgency murdered approximately 40,000 to 60,000 individuals between 1987 and 1989 (Samaranayake 2002. P132). Ranasinghe Premadasa, the new UNP president elected in 1988, in his campaign he expressed two aims: a stop to terror created by the JVP and the total pullout of the IPKF. Ironically, the government's pledge to dismember the JVP was supported by the JVP's promise to kill family members of Sinhalese troops in the army of Sri Lanka, which offended their popular base. The government kidnapped and assassinated Wiljeweera in 1989, and by 1990, they had killed off major members of the organisation, thus defeating the organisation. Similarly, Premadasa secured the IPKF's removal from the island in 1990, thereby ending stage one of the civil conflict.

The second stage of the civil conflict continued from the IPKF's departure in 1990 to the failure of significant talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in 1995. While negotiating with the government of India to remove the IPKF, the new government of Sri Lanka met simultaneously with the LTTE. Premadasa summoned the All-Party Conference (APC) in 1989 to achieve an agreement between the government and LTTE on the formation of local authorities (Samaranayake 2002. p132).   Talks began following the SLFP departed from the discussions and the LTTE opposed the plan of the district council, claiming that it jeopardised the aim of building an autonomous Tamil state.

Failure to reach an agreement led to further warfare, this time it was between the forces of government in the north and Eastern Provinces and the LTTE. The LTTE undertook multiple operations against the Sri Lankan police and military, including the kidnapping and execution of six hundred police officers and raids on army barracks at Mankulam, Elephant Pass, and Poonarin Between 1990 and 1993. In 1993, the LTTE killed several officials, such as the Deputy Minister of Defence, Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, the previous Deputy Minister Of defence, and President Premadasa (Samaranayake 2002. P133).

Additionally, the LTTE carried out acts of aggression against people in the north and

Eastern Provinces, with the ethnic cleansing and confiscation of Muslims from the North in 1990. The retaliation of the government was with military force, especially following the killing of Premadasa, who was succeeded by D.B. Wijerunga. During the second stage, remnants of competing Tamil terrorist organisations teamed up with the military of Sri Lanka to confront the LTTE.

The government of the people's alliance, led by Chadrika Kumaratunga, was elected in 1994. This newly elected government reopened talks with the LTTE. The TTEL and the government agreed to a cease-fire and numerous rounds of negotiations in January 1995. The LTTE created four requests during deliberations: the lifting of the embargo on the North; the closure of Sri Lankan fishing operations off the northern coast; the relocation of a key military camp in the North; and the legal permission for LTTE members to carry arms in the North. Except for the relocation of the military barracks in the north, the administration agreed to all conditions.

In retaliation, Gregg (2003, p 142) states that the LTTE dropped out of the talks and started combat in 1995. And over eleven thousand civilians and military were killed in stage two of the civil conflict, as were approximately twelve thousand LTTE soldiers. The third stage of the civil war in Sri Lanka started with an LTTE suicide strike on a navy vessel in Trincomalee Harbor and continued till the February 2002 truce and reopening of talks. This stage of the conflict was distinguished by a combination of military confrontation and talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.

Additionally, Greg (2003, p 143) states that the state reclaimed the city of Kilinochchi and Jaffna, thus two LTTE strongholds, in 1995.   The LTTE attacked the central bank of Colombo, murdering over two hundred people, and then targeted the country's oil refining installations.   Throughout the turmoil, the state utilised military and diplomatic tactics to bring the war to a conclusion. This included attempts to reconstruct Jaffna's civil society following the city's takeover in 1995, as well as staging elections in wherein the LTTE faced defeat and was forced to retire into the forests. The Norwegian government began working on a resolution to the war with representatives of the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka in 2000.

This ended in a cease-fire in 2002 February. Then discussions in Thailand followed later in the same year. The negotiators failed to reach an understanding, however,

and have taken steps on measures of confidence-building such as the repatriation of displaced individuals and the formation of a subcommittee to deal with this problem.

The 1981 and 1983 uprisings, which were preceded by the commencement of civil conflict, include aspects which support the causal explanation suggested in this dissertation. Religion remained a major source of contention between Sinhalese and the Tamils. The establishment of Buddhist Sinhalese militant groups, particularly the MSV and the revival of the JVP during the 1980s, posed a significant threat to peace. These two violent parties arose in response to the threats of federal devolution to Tamils in the East and North.

Both factions declared it a purpose to "defend the homeland," meaning to retain the territory of the island and the unity of sovereignty under the control of the Sinhalese Buddhists. This objective was defined by both factions in their reading of the *Mahavamsa* and the notion that the people of Sinhala were selected as a particular race to guard and promote the Gautama's teachings. Additionally, both parties included Buddhist monks and conducted violent activities out of several monasteries and temples. Throughout the 1980s, both organisations were famous. The violent efforts of these organisations against the Government of Sri Lanka and the IPKF were costly and brutal.

Despite the Sinhalese being mobilised by religious rationale, the Tamils carried on conducting their violent opposition through non-religious means. Following the 1983 rioting, the Tamils gained co-ethnic backing from India, although religion seemed to have less impact on the Tamil-Indian partnership. The objective of establishing an autonomous state and defending the "homeland" of the Tamil, which was identified by history rather than religion was the rallying cry for people to organise and take up weapons. Thus, religion did not motivate Tamil bloodshed.

In reaction to the threats, both Sinhalese and Tamil terrorists picked up guns during this period. Ironically, both factions reacted to the identical concerns presented by the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987. District councils were rejected by both the JVP and the LTTE. The LTTE claimed an autonomous state, whereas the JVP sought the whole island and Sinhalese Buddhist control over the area. The agreements' desire

for provincial independence jeopardised the interests of both of these factions. Additionally, both the LTTE and the JVP objected to Indian soldiers being deployed.

The LTTE considered the IPKF a danger to its local stronghold and a possible obstacle to their efforts against the government of Sri Lanka, in addition to the existence of the Sri Lankan forces. The JVP condemned the IPKF for what it saw as an Indian trying to take sections of Sri Lanka and jeopardise the integrity of the country's territory. As a result of the 1987 agreements and the establishment of the IPKF, both factions faced a shared threat.

The LTTE's capability to unite Tamil support and collect major money for its campaigns against the IPKF, the government and the military of Sri Lanka was perhaps the most significant development in the dynamics of Sinhalese and Tamil. The LTTE was able to establish itself as the major Tamil group by the mid-1980s by eliminating competing militant organisations. This enabled assets, recruits, material, media, and savings to be focused on this single force, enabling their group genuinely powerful. The JVP too was capable of carrying out a series of devastating strikes.

Without the global organisations to refill their finances, however, the state was able to dismantle the campaign in less than 2 years.

The adjustments that happened between Sinhalese religious extremists and the government of Sri Lanka are another significant development in the Sri Lankan war. With the escalation of brutal conflict between the government, revolutionaries of Buddhism, and Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism organisations ceased to be useful to political groups and authority politics.

In 1988 Premadasa came into power on the promise of putting a stop to JVP attacks on people and property of the government, which he accomplished by 1989, but with much bloodshed. The strength of militant monks appeared to have peaked at this point, and while monks remain to take an active part in political change, their influence is less powerful than it was at some point. Eventually, with the assistance of Norway an unbiased 3rd group, the civil conflict had come to a standstill. These talks were beginning to show indications of progress, with Tamil leadership and the Government of Sri Lanka meeting face to face and discussing solutions to violence.

7.6. Causes of the Sri Lanka civil war

This section suggested that the causes and reasons for violence in Sri Lanka were primarily religious, with British imperialism as a starting point of the conflict. Based on the analyses, this war was primarily ethnic. The principal aim of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and their parties was to establish a state ruled by Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka, eliminating other ethnic communities and religious organisations.

Dharmapala, a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist of the 19th century stated this purpose, asking all Sinhalese as *de facto* [57]Buddhists to unite, accept their beliefs, and preserve Sri Lanka's precious territory against "foreign" forces such as Muslims, Christians, and
Tamils. This call was supported by political and religious authorities, notably Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his spouse, as well as the MSV and JVP members. As a result, radical Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists wanted to eliminate not only ethnic outside components but also religious ones; therefore, Sri Lanka, in their eyes, must be totally Buddhist and completely Sinhalese.

Second, religious scripture analyses have had a major influence on the Sri Lankan conflict. Dharmapala's plea for the rights of Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka was centred on his understanding of the Mahavamsa, a religious document which chronicles the interaction between the ruler, the Sangha, and Gautama's Dharma on the island. According to the Mahavamsa, Sinhalese and Sri Lanka are selected countries by which the teachings of Gautama would "rise in splendour." political and religious authorities have also understood the Mahavamsa to emphasise what they see as a massive threat to the "Buddhist Island" thus, a foreign, and external attack, occupation by Tamils, conquerors, and the necessity to fight to safeguard Gautama's Dharma.

Third, religious clergy have contributed to inciting and carrying out violence against the Island's non-Buddhists. This is especially noticeable from 1950. Monks founded groups such as the JVP, the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, the MSV, and the LEBM to safeguard Buddhism from the threats of the non- Buddhists as well as the government of Sri Lanka. The state's efforts to grant Tamils local authority in 1956,

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[57] Actual Buddhist.

1976, and 1986 all failed due to tremendous opposition from monks staging hunger strikes, sit-ins, and inciting riots.

The MSV and JVP notably, encouraged monks to use aggression to "protect the country" against Tamils' territorial claims, leading forty to sixty thousand murders before the government successfully destroyed the JVP in 1989. As a result, extreme Buddhist monks on the Island have caused significant violence.

Fourth, because Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists were profiting from their connection with the government; they used their connection as the most valuable resource in achieving their objectives. In 1956 when the SLFP and Bandaranaike came into power, they implemented regulations that were discriminatory against non-Sinhalaspeaking residents. Mrs Bandaranaike altered the constitution of the country to grant Sinhala and Buddhism a particular role in the country and titled the island to honour the Sinhalese past.

Additionally, the government did not adequately prevent violence against Tamils in the protests before the civil conflict; proof of this is shown in the police and the military forces which were involved in the 1983 protests. As a result, Sinhalese nationalists profited from their connection to the state. This connection shifted after the government forcibly suppressed the threats of the JVP's Sinhalese militaries.

 Tamil activism and aims, on the other side, were not religiously motivated. Early Tamil resistance to the colony of Britain did incorporate religion, notably the attempts of Navalar Hindu activists to rejuvenate Saiva Siddhanta amongst Tamils in the north of
Sri Lanka by emphasising Hindu literature, reconstructing temples, and establishing Hindu schools. Nevertheless, Tamils have not been motivated or expressed their religious ideals since that period.

The primary activists of the Tamil independence struggle were all religious. This is especially true of Chelvanayagam, whose ideology of politics was socialist and secular. Additionally, almost nothing was published on Sri Lanka Hindu leaders and their reactions to the conflict, implying that they are passive participants in the fight. Similarly, Hindu texts have not emerged as a mobilising tool or excuse for "defending the nation." Instead, the call to arms and protection of most Tamil areas is based on

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historical precedence, notably the presence of the kingdom of Jaffna before colonial rule. As a result, the Tamil area is founded on history rather than religious precedence.

Similarly, the unity of Tamil on the island was not religiously based. The "indigenous" northern Tamils and the "estate" eastern Tamils did not stand united against the government of Sri Lanka. When the government withdrew citizenship from "estate" Tamils in 1948, "indigenous" Tamils in this regard did not organise to oppose the policy. Nevertheless, following a series of harmful legislation encompassing the prestige of language for Tamils and limiting regulations for university admissions in 1970, Tamils banded together to battle these inequalities. Language and access to education, rather than religion, drove Tamil unity on the island.

Furthermore, materialistic motivation for the military action of the Tamils military against the government of Sri Lanka did not come from religious resources or networks. Thus, Tamil militants had a pleasant partnership in the 1980s, which included approval to create training camps in Tamil Nadu as well as financing and materiel. This was supplemented by attempts of India to broker a peace accord between Tamils and the government of Sri Lanka, granting the East and Northern provinces local power. Prime motivating support of India for the movement of Tamil stemmed from ethnocultural connections between Sri Lankan Tamils and their "kin" in Tamil Nadu. thus, this bond was not formed through religion.

Tamils were quite effective in getting political and financial assistance from Tamils living abroad. This comprises mainly many London-based groups and their connections with other movements of liberation from across the world. It also covers Tamil organisations in nations like Canada and the United States, as well as their lobbying activities in favour of the Tamil struggle. Tamils were engaged with different news outlets and civil rights NGOs, distributing information about the government of Sri Lanka's persecution of Tamils.

These networks and groups do not seem to be driven by religion, but rather by ethnic links to Tamils. The religious reasons and aspirations of the Sinhalese, when juxtaposed with the ethnic reasons of the Tamils, show some intriguing dynamics involving religious warfare. First, this instance indicates that religious aggression may

occur in response to non-religious threats. Therefore, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism arose in response to a colony of the British, a combination of religious dangers (particularly the invention of the Christian religion through schools of missionaries) and non-religiously driven dangers such as social reform brought about by an educated middle-class, changes in the economy of the island, and greater competition for governmental occupations. However, the contemporary Tamil danger was religious, unlike the Buddhist.

Tamils were not aiming to convert the island from Buddhist to Hindu. Rather, Tamils desire regional power based on ethnic, historical, and linguistic grounds. These are non-religious objectives. Nevertheless, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have responded religiously. On the other hand, religiously driven violence and aims might elicit a non-religious response.

Sinhalese Buddhists vowed to use force to safeguard their faith and establish a pure Buddhist state inclusive of "foreign" religious and ethnic groupings. In reaction, the Tamils have rallied to preserve the land they think is historically theirs; however, they did not respond to this religiously driven danger with their religious justifications. This shows that the preservation of territory is a critical matter for both parties. However, the causes underpinning Tamil and Sinhala territorial ambitions are very distinct. The Sinhalese are motivated by religious considerations, whilst the Tamils are driven by ethnicity.

7.5.1. The violent conception of cosmology and its historical roots

Since the colonial period, monks have been interested in politics. The BBS which stands for the Buddhist revival of 1900, was directed by Anagarika Dharmapala, a prominent restorationist and lay monastic, in a battle against colonial control, education, and missionaries of Christianity. Dharmapala, with motivation from Henry Olcott, the originator of Theosophy, who travelled across the area, with Burma included. He attended a Christian school and developed a contemporary Buddhist activity. He founded the Association of Young Men's Buddhists and produced a lay set of morals. Dharmapala in this regard was not only involved in the repair of old temples but was also driven by a passionate desire for the history of Sinhala (cf Gravers 2015, p17).

Ethnic and religious violence against the Sri Lanka Muslims was motivated by "passions to create a powerful Sinhala-Buddhist country" against the allegedly predatory Muslim minority. Radical Buddhist monks and groups including the BBS, RB[58], and Sihala Ravaya had fostered such strong anti-Muslim bigotry. The most powerful of these was the BBS, which was managed by Gnanasara Thero (cf Kumar 2021, p 2). Furthermore, Gnanasara Thero served a particularly prominent role; from 2013 to 2014 he is named in the reports of the UN Human Rights Committee detailing attacks on Muslims in Sri Lanka. In 2014 his remark in the city of Aluthgama was reported to have led to anti-Muslim violence wherein 4 individuals were killed, and more than a hundred Muslim-owned shops were damaged.

The History books of Buddhism, especially the Mahavamsa, which was translated into English, were an essential source for combining the cosmological Buddhist fantasy with the burgeoning nationalism. This history relates to the narrative of the Buddhist monarch Duhagmin, who banished the Tamils in the 2nd century after a prolonged fight against the wicked Tamil monarch Elara. Duhagmin's narrative is used as if it was true. It portrays Duhagminas a dhamma ja, a Buddhist noble monarch who battles demons and preserves Buddhism from a war.

The narrative is a metaphor for Mara's call for Gautama's death before his enlightenment. When the Earth Goddess pulled her damp hair, the subsequent flood pushed aside the Mara and the wicked army, thus, the eventual defence of Gautama and the doctrine of dhamma (cf Deegalle (2003, p 126). A Sinhala monk, Duhagmin exhibited guilt after murdering his opponent and offered Elara's final honour. Duhagmin was consoled by monks who argued that killing an evil unbeliever was not worse than killing an animal. As a result, the Mahavasa might be viewed as a declaration of the non-violence precept, which maintains that murdering all innocent creatures causes karma and opposes loving kindness, thus *metta*.

For traditions and teachings of Theravada Buddhism, this reductionist approach is troublesome. Justifying the murder of Tamils in the conflict as not evil or sin is a major error, even if it is employed as a way to a goal in the Mahavasa.

A 2000-year-old story, unfortunately, has been reflected in contemporary racial politics. Even though they were no distinct limits between Sinhalese Buddhists and

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[58] Ravana Balaya

Hindu Tamils back then, the mythology is used to construct a racial division between the darker Dravidian of Tamil and the Ariyan ('good') Sinhalese, which is then transferred onto colonial Ceylon. Tamils, Muslims, and Christians were categorised as foreigners, mainly those transported from India and put on the tea plantations of Britain.

According to Tambiah (1996, 70), Dharmapala stated that the collapse of Sinhalese society may be attributed to both spiritual and economic factors and that Muslims, who were competent businessmen, were outperforming local enterprises. In a language reminiscent of Burma, nationalists of Sinhala blaming Muslims for seducing "their women". Spencer (1990, 286) claims both radical monks and the Dharmapala were motivated by Victorian anthropology of ethnicities: The Sinhalese ethnologically are a different race in a manner that they may feel good about having no slavery blood within them because they were not colonised by the Tamils or European troublemakers who destroyed the land for 3 centuries, demolishing ancient temples, burning important libraries, and well almost annihilating the historical race.

The assertions made above are quite identical to those made in modern Sri Lanka and Burma. According to Buddhist monks and the Dharmapala, Buddhist culture was in peril. the violence which broke out in the 1880s and again in 1915. Most people were slain, and stores were ransacked by mobs wielding clubs. Tambiah (1996, 62) observed that everything appeared to be in order. After 1948, the history of colonialisation created the cornerstone of Buddhist nationalism, used by globally known monk WalpolaRahula. He suggested monks be permitted to engage in politics since natural culture, nationality, and Buddhism are all intertwined in patriotism.

Also, he mentioned the chronicles of Mahavamsa. The confluence of the righteous leader, the dhammara ja, Buddhism, the language Sinhala, as well as the Aryan ethnicity as contrasted to the Tamils, was identical to the Sri Lankan nation of Sinhala in his mind. Extreme Buddhist organisations, who are believed to have been misled by Buddhism, have preserved the pattern of language, country, nation, and religious beliefs (cf Tambiah (1996, 62).

After hardline monks proposed the Sinhala-only Law during the 1950s, which favoured the language of Sinhala in public schools and government, this nationalist

agenda was quickly accepted by political groups. Nonetheless, PM Bandaranaike was slain by a Buddhist monk in 1959. Three thousand individuals were murdered in anti-Tamil protests in 1983. The customary trend of planned and armed masses of extreme Marxist Nuns, pupils, and criminals was in place. During the period, the Tamils were the extreme monks' principal adversaries. Monks founded the political organisation Jathika Hela Urumaya ('Our Legacy') and the organisation of Sinhala Urumaya in 2004.

In the elections, the legacy movement nominated two hundred monks and gained nine votes. JHU introduced an anti-conversion measure to combat 'unfair conversion thus, the conversion of Christian Evangelicals. The proposed measure sparked international Christian outrage. JHU monks stormed a peace march with the Tigers of Tamil in 2006. (LTTE). The culture group sees foreign faiths and economic factors as threats to the Sinhalese. They were anti-secular and antigovernment, and untrustworthy politicians' ability to safeguard independence, democracy, language, the economy, Buddhism, and justice. They say that Buddhism ought to be the official Sri Lanka religion and that the nation should be governed according to the ten principles of dhammara ja, which they equate to the ideals of a contemporary equitable state.

One of the senior monks Gangodavila Soma and a pupil of Rahula, died mysteriously, gaining heroic status, and being likened to Dharmapala. Even though BBS was a minority, and their use of force appears to instil terror, their views have earned some popular favour. Moderate voices are met with hatred, and their leaders have even sparked a battle in parliament. They redirected their hate against Muslims and Christians when the civil war ended in 2009. Most extreme monks left JHU in 2013 to create the Buda Bela Sena.

According to Juergensmeyer (2008,126), the acts of the monks constitute a battle against the secular government's moral decay to establish a Buddhist Government rooted in the spirituality of politics and a claim to reflect the desire of the public as well as the heritage of the nation. The extreme campaign's global viewpoint had a strong historical relation to imperialism, as expressed by a monk of Sri Lankan, "who thought that freedom from the West had yet to be gained on the ideological and cultural basis".

Therefore, it is a wide political fight manifested as a celestial battle, rather than a religious or ecumenical conflict. Extreme Nuns may be described as Buddhist fundamentalists who were anti-modern. Such titles hinder comprehension of the organisation. It is not anti-modern; however, it is anti-secular, and while its participants are ardent Buddhist defenders, they do not belong to a particular fundamentalist type of Buddhism. It is not a new style of Buddhism to justify murder by using histories or Jataka tales. Nevertheless, as shown in Burma and Sri Lanka, the active involvement of monks in politics, protests, and the political conflict intensified during colonial times and highlights a modern tendency in conjunction with nationalism. As an aspect of a reformer, Buddhism became involved in nationalism and racial politics. The involvement of Monks in politics was contested in both nations, and most of them including lay people believe it violates monastic precepts.

7.6. Conclusion

The first part of this chapter shows how monks rebelled against British control since the Sangha was provided fewer resources, and there was an increase in Christian missionaries which also influenced the resentment of the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Buddhists and Tamil Hindus organised groups to oppose the influence of Christianity. This was followed by tensions which made the British government enforce elections in trying to ease the tensions. However, a turning point in this was when the SLFP won the elections under the control of Bandaranaike. This was a period wherein most laws enforced during this period favoured Buddhists, including laws such as the Sinhala only Act which suggested Sinhala as the official language of the country. Laws such as these influenced a lot of rioting in Sri Lanka. This resulted in a decrease in the country's economy adding more to the conflict. All these factors combined prompted a civil war in the country, which was political, economic, and ethically influenced. The chapter in this regard highlighted how wars kept on reoccurring after the first rebellion against British control, rooting the primary cause of violence in British imperialism, which prompted political, economic, and ethical war in the country.

Chapter 8

8.1. Introduction

Chapters 6 and 7 of this study outlined instances of violence in which Buddhists were involved and their reasons or causes of violence. Therefore, this chapter seeks to provide a reflective and comparative study to identify the common reason or cause of Buddhist violence.

8.2. Reflections and comparison of the violence instances in Buddhist communities

Although there are cultural and historical distinctions, there are commonalities between the 2 nations wherein Buddhism is a prominent political instrument. Activist monks in both nations have a nationalist view of the Buddhist worldview that portray Buddhism threatened. This view is used to promote individual liberties in the ethics of Buddhism, as well as collectivist and racist nationalist objectives. First is democratic, but the second opposes other religions and fosters political conflict which includes ethnic violence. To fully comprehend why religion is employed to advocate war or as a cause of violence, the dissertation examined three characteristics of politicised religion, which includes first, the historic aspect, a societal legacy of colonisation or earlier battles second, theories of a specific religion being in danger from other

religious groups and third A worldwide idea of cosmological conflict. Additionally, in the regional political situation, thus, theology is a tool for nationalist politics.

In the preceding instances, all of these aspects mix and interact. The employment of cosmic conceptions conjures up images of a moral order which must be protected or restored. This imagination, with its myths, stories, and ideals, may direct and justify collective acts, as well as incite violent disturbances. Nevertheless, the religious ideal is not inherently violent. But when the ideal is linked to a nationalist agenda of cultural or ethnic identification and a type of political group is developed, violence emerges. Furthermore, violence in these instances produces a self-fulfilling cycle, thus, acts of violence create more violence.

As the instances demonstrate, violent deeds and violent language from history are frequently repeated. When identity, faith, and culture are perceived to be in threat, mistrust, hatred, and fear arise, fueling anger and reinforcing organised violence. Crowds or riots using violence in the name of religion are seen in the two nations of Sri Lanka and Burma. These provide religious justification for their actions and revolve around:

Buddhists who have either lost their ethical sense or individuality. While it legitimises the levelling of the opponent and their identification, violence opposes the aims and objectives of the monks, which is to maintain inflexible ethical objectivity to fight off threats to religion. Violence also undermines Buddhism's goal of alleviating suffering, avoiding animosity, and sharing the knowledge of dhamma.

Internationally, due to politics growing more religious, the ethical question is perceived through a prism of politicised religion. Since this dynamic might spread and interpret comparable types of conceptions, it is not certain that it may be described as a worldwide cosmic conflict or global revolt, as implied. This means the cosmological ideals' reasoning, of religion in threat and global battle to save identity and religion, would be utilised to conceptually elucidate the occurrence. Religious revolutionary groups frequently characterise their efforts as global, even though they operate in regionally or local defined contexts.

As a result, while emphasising the importance of global problems, this could obscure awareness of how global issues are localised and transformed into a particular

political context. Although monks in both nations share and communicate an ideology, the instances from Sri Lanka and Burma show that inner socio-cultural intricacies, ethnic disparities, and conjunctures of politics are essential for comprehending the link between violence and religion.

Furthermore, by generalising religious violence, threads of aggression are seen at the heart of this issue of religious ideology. Nationalism and xenophobia have separated monks in both nations. Most monks may be opposed to active action but keep mute out of fear of causing discord within the sangha. Whenever Buddhism is regarded as facing a threat, it is not that simple to disagree.

It is worth noting that Buddhism and religious divisions have always involved elements of racial or ethnic politics in Sri Lanka and Burma. Religion In Burma has been implicated in a protracted civil conflict among those who seek a united nation-state and those who seek an ethnic federal union, and religion in Sri Lanka has been implicated in a long-running conflict between Tamil and Sinhalese nationalism insurrection. As a result, civil war and bloodshed have harmed interfaith connections.

Additionally, an essential component of the complication is the activity of political monks, who had personal agendas of gathering huge lay support and legitimising their acts with moral arguments.

The most crucial factor is the relationship between high public leaders, political parties and activist monks. Some of the riots were almost certainly co-organised or provoked by political figures. The violence reached the crowd. Ultimately, religions may contain allusions to violence, but it is their political coordinated activities that make religious groups violent. As a result, religion is utilised to justify a certain political objective. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the significance of global relationships.

In this framework, how may international relations be viewed? one may argue that there is a worldwide concentration on ethical issues and racial politics by ideals of cosmology which are conveyed worldwide but installed in most diverse agendas of politics. These objectives are primarily anti-western and anti-secular, which is, they are opposed to the hedonism of the west, a culture that frequently involves human rights and political-economic dominance. Nevertheless, this does not mean that

these organisations are completely anti-modern, instead, they are modern selectively. They heavily rely on current social media to disseminate their message and rumours, as well as to mobilise and recruit adherents.

Effectively they are adapting classic religious fantasies to a contemporary setting. Global notions, such as religious and ethnic identity protection, are nationalised, translated, and translocated through modern media. To uncover global views, we must first investigate regional procedures and their international relationships, as well as how comparable issues are conveyed and reinterpreted regionally. Cosmological ideologies appeal to morals and spirituality, to cosmic ideals as genuine problems and the source of contemporary identity.

Cosmological ideologies seek political spirituality through the moral leadership of powerful leaders such as the Dalai Lama. At the same time, such fantasies serve as the fulcrum of religion in peril, substantiating measures of defence like murder, destruction, and the levelling of other religions. As a result, the holy or supra-mundane realm must intervene in secular society and organise a moral subject force. Furthermore, religious nationalism rallies on the defence of culture, and ethnicity while viewing religion as the foundation of such modern identities. Whenever religion is challenged, revolutionary groups find it simpler to organise depending on a mix of emotions, fear, rumours, and provocative situations.

Cosmological theories direct processes and enable lay people as well as mobs. These organisations, however, are probable towards becoming unintended political components of political groups. Having said that, most religious acts practised by Buddhist monks and lay people are still generally peaceful and include humanitarian service. Reports which include terms like violence and terror in association with religion must be utilised with precaution, as one must not assume that there is a natural affinity here nor that all followers adhere to extremism and violence.

Radical sangha adherents in these countries defend aggression via self-preservation beliefs, scriptural exclusions to violence in Theravada Buddhism, and dehumanising Muslim communities. However, because the conflict was fueled by non-religious motives such as politics, colonialism, and the exploitation of authentic Buddhism, it must not be described purely as Buddhist violence.

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In the instances shown by this study, Sinhala-Buddhist radicalism evolved in the framework of Muslim anticipated challenges to Sinhala-Buddhist political power. What appears to have fueled the rise of extreme religious movements, including the BBS in Sri Lanka, was the concept that Theravada Buddhism on its own was seen to be in danger from the seemingly voracious forces of the global minority, and that if the early intervention was not made, Sri Lanka would follow in the footsteps of the previously Buddhist Asian countries which had already become Muslim. In this respect, Buddhist radicalism is not a unique phenomenon.

Buddhist radicalism, as a sort of religious radicalism, is a fundamentalist religious faith which validates that group violence has similarities with other religious radicalisms motivated by in-group fears of destruction by other strong and aggressive groups.

The core characteristics of Buddhist radicalisms discovered in this study are heavily reliant on maintaining authenticity dominance; in-group favouritism; out-group hatred; focusing on retaining in-group purification such as through the avoidance of combining with the other religious groups; thus, limited integrative difficulty conveyed in binary thinking; which includes violent speech in every mode; and ultimately, the search for political authority, by force if necessary.

Radical monks targeting Muslims in Myanmar communities frequently explain violence as self-defence. Because Buddhist monks think that Buddhism needs a solid link with the state to spread, radicals defend acts of violence against densely populated Muslim populations by stating that they are defending this link with the state. Monks contend that "violent measures performed against non-Buddhist societies, which appear to contradict Buddhist principles of kindness and serenity, are justifiable in defence of their teachings and doctrines. Thus, according to them with Muslim influences in Myanmar, Buddhism will lack the strong tie it needs to the state, and that aggression to re-establish this link is thus justifiable.

Furthermore, aggressive monks in Sri Lanka communities frequently believed that one cannot pursue enlightenment while a gun is pointing at them, and then utilise this philosophy to promote the notion that an armed monk would be preferable to no monk at all, this is the same as killing an animal being more punishable than killing

an evil non-Buddhist. Thus, radical monks thought that because they viewed Buddhism as being under attack in a failing society, they fought to protect Buddhism, which justified the acts of violence against Buddhist adversaries. However, only nirvana gives a definitive remedy to suffering in real Buddhism.

Radical monks follow a distorted interpretation of Buddhism since their ultimate purpose has changed away from nirvana. As a result, the violence is sustained not by genuine Buddhist philosophy, but rather by non-religious anxiety about losing control.

While ancient Buddhist philosophy does not encourage violence, Theravada, Mahavamsa and Vajrayana texts allow monks to rationalise religious violence. Most of these explanations are drawn from interpretations demonstrated in this dissertation, which provides exceptions to nonviolence depending on the assailant's purpose and the victim's character. Since karma is dependent on the purpose.

Additionally, purpose, violence in Buddhism is justified based on the victim's character. Following an examination of Theravada texts, it may be concluded that "in the case of entities that contain ethical qualities, such as human beings, the action of murdering becomes less worthy of criticism when the person has no purity and more blamed when the person is of good virtue.

In Myanmar, politically engaged monks have utilised this stated exemption to aggression or violence to further deflect accountability for oppressing Muslims by arguing that they possess "less virtue." Nevertheless, since the politically engaged monks had only used Theravada Buddhism to justify their brutality, the holiness of pure Buddhism stays unchanged and distinct from the bloodshed in Myanmar or Sri Lanka.

Additional to religious grounds, Myanmar's racist norms of culture fueled the monks' brutality. Even though Buddhism is fundamentally a peaceful faith that emphasises love, racism nevertheless affects the Sangha society. Institutional racism conditioning is demonstrated in violence and prejudice toward Rohingya and Myanmar Muslims; various communities in Myanmar frequently referred to Rohingya Muslims through the usage of insulting names, intended at their ethnicity.

Wirathu also operated in Myanmar to indoctrinate the general public against Muslims in the area of Rakhine. He dehumanised Muslims in his speeches and looked down on them as if they are animals. In old Buddhist theology, the animal world is less valuable than the human world, and this difference permits laymen and monks to rationalise their brutality while still believing they are authentic adherents of Buddhism.

The authentic Buddhist teaching of nonviolence, on the other hand, instils a love for all living beings and does not choose whether it is human life or an animal, and considers the purposeful loss of life as a severe evil. Therefore, irrespective of dehumanisation explanations, violent Buddhist monks practised and propagated a kind of Buddhism which does not adhere to the original philosophy. Furthermore, the radical monks are not just practising a distorted kind of Buddhism, rather their conflict against Muslims is encouraged more by ethnic exertion than by a conflict of religious values.

While hardline monks were driven by a distorted view of Buddhism, the bloodshed in Myanmar may not only be attributed to a religious conflict. Other conditions such as economic disparity, injustices, and anger towards political leaders are necessary even if a religious basis for conflict was provided.

The British colonialism of Myanmar drove the Sangha to dread the loss of control again, which encouraged Buddhist xenophobia and nationalism indoctrination among the monastic communities. Monk Dharmapala expressed the twin features of a colonial creation, the reasoned puritanism of the missions understood in Buddhist terms, that he united with a strong loathing of the European master's culture and religion.

Monks such as Dharmapala blended ideals of rational puritanism and a strong loathing of other organisations into the Sangha to counteract the impacts of colonialism and the re-establishment of the Sangha's dominance. These basic ideas evolved into forms of Buddhist xenophobia and nationalism, which continue to fuel later bloodshed. Furthermore, colonialism generated "chaotic upheavals to the conventional political and social balance, which drove Buddhist monks to renounce their faith or religion.

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The concessions made with colonial empires explain Buddhists' frequent cooperation with imperial conflict, social inequality, and militarisation. After colonisation, Buddhist monks moved away from the initial teaching of Buddhism and toward a controlled mind which enabled Western ideas such as xenophobia, nationalism, and militarism training; this shift in thinking is what sustained violence against Muslims today.

In Myanmar, radical Buddhist monks tried to excuse their violence against Muslims by claiming self-preservation, textual exclusions in Theravada, and the racial othering of Muslims in the state of Rakhine. However, as a result of the monks' misuse of traditional Buddhist teaching and postcolonial repercussions, the Myanmar violence was mislabeled as Buddhist violence. Western press misrepresented the war in Myanmar by repeatedly using the term "Buddhist violence," while ignoring monks who do not adhere to extreme ideas or Buddhist doctrine.

Sadly, the European world's fascination with violence perpetrated by followers of a nonviolent faith will only grow and generate greater media attention to the appealing idea of 'Buddhist violence.' Irrespective of how the West portrays the violence in Burma, it is important to keep in mind that the actual purity of the Buddhist faith continues in these nations and that a lot of monks and laymen are still committed to the ancient Buddha's purpose.

8.3. Concluding remarks

The dissertation has sketched out the fundamental aspects of Buddhist radicalism in different communities. It has demonstrated that, despite the ethics of Buddhism and the general image of non-violence, when one examines the traditions of Buddhism and its experiences in the real world, it is evident that, like other religious communities Buddhists are and have both vindicated and participated in the violence. The dissertation has shown that specific Buddhist texts and traditions forbid violence, however, since there are exceptions for violence mentioned in some texts, Buddhist extremism comes from the interaction of specific texts, history, traditions, ethnicity, politics, and social psychology.

Violence is prohibited in all three sects or schools of Buddhism, however, the dissertation highlighted that there are exceptions for violence in all three schools. In Mahayana exceptions for violence includes engaging for a just cause. This is similar

to Theravada Buddhism, however, their exceptions for violence are dependent on defending the principles of Buddhism. Then in Vajrayana tradition, it is acceptable to use violence when defending oneself. Thus, it is highlighted in this study that both Sri Lanka and Myanmar communities have used the Theravada justification of violence in defending the unity of their religion.

These wars were more ethical than they were political for Buddhists. Therefore, ethnicity for Buddhists was the main cause of violence and for non-Buddhist, it was more of fighting for their civil and political rights, therefore for the minority, the main cause of violence may be traced to politics. This answers the hypothesis of this research that ethnicity was the main cause or source of Buddhist violence which automatically makes Buddhist prone to violence due to the instances of violence they were involved in.

Gautama used different principles to explain the causes of suffering, however, he used the principle of dependent origin to explain the causes of violence. According to this principle ignorance clouds people's feelings and thoughts, leading to a false sense of self that is thought of as "me" or "I.". ignorance grows through time, and if one is unaware of its development, it can cause worry and constant fear. Buddhists in this regard allowed their ignorance to develop into a fear of losing their identity and tried, by all means, to protect it by excluding the minority from the political side of things and the trauma from colonialism also had its impact. Therefore, all these aspects sparked the war which turned into an ethnic war.

According to the principle of dependent origin when enlightened it is easy to overcome bad and negative thoughts, thus it may be argued that most of the Buddhist adherents involved in these violent incidents, had not reached the level of enlightenment. In the teaching of Gautama compassion is the only way to respond to hate, however in these instances Buddhist followers did not respond according to their teaching.

Gautama as a person and a teacher lived by high moral values and he tried to act and teach right. He encountered threatening moments and acted with compassion and that is how Buddhist adherents ought to have acted when faced with a threat to

avoid conflict and violence. This is the most salient feature of Buddhist violence, how they respond when their unity is threatened which is the usage of violence.

According to this study religion and violence have a relationship because normal fights turn into religious fights. However, since violence brings pain and Buddhism forbids violence, Buddhism as a religion does not have a causal relationship with violence, mostly looking at the fact that they do not have a sacrificial rite which is the main root of religious violence highlighted in this study. But violence and Buddhism are not coincidental due to violence exceptions made by the three schools. Additionally, religion causes violence for society to heal. Violence in, general, is harmful to society, whereas violence motivated by religion is deliberate, targeted, and harmful to a particular group of people in society to heal or fix society. Thus, it may be said that religion can be both peaceful and violent similarly Buddhism may be peaceful and violent as a religion.

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