

about 300,000 rixdollars or 60,000*l*. Suppose then the contingencies and extraordinaries of the army to be 30,000*l*. the whole sum required would be 90,000*l*. or 450,000 rixdollars, the exact amount of the colonial revenue at the close of the year 1801.

The point of view, in which the importance of the Cape next presents itself to our consideration, is its local position, as being favourable for distributing troops to any part of the globe, and especially to our settlements in the east, with facility and dispatch ; which is not by any means the least among those advantages it possesses as a military station. Important as the considerations are of healthiness of climate and cheapness of subsistence where a depôt of troops is intended to be formed, its value in these respects would very materially be diminished by great distance from, or difficulty of conveyance to, those places where their services are most likely to be required.

The longer the voyage the less effective will the troops be on their arrival ; and delay is dangerous, even to a proverb. Perhaps it is not saying too much, that we are indebted in a very high degree to the Cape for the conquest of Mysore and the overthrow of Tippoo ; not merely from the reinforcements that were sent from thence to join the Indian army, though they eminently contributed to the conquest of Seringapatam, but from the speedy intelligence obtained of the transactions carrying on at the Isle of France in consequence of the arrival of the Sultraun's agents, of which they were entirely ignorant in India, but which, by the vigilance and precaution of Lord

Macartney, were detected and communicated to the Governor-general of Bengal. "I received," the Marquis of Wellesley observes in his dispatch to the Court of Directors, "on the 18th of June 1798, a regular authentication of the proclamation (of the Governor of the Isle of France) in a letter from his Excellency the Earl of Macartney, dated the 28th of March." And he acted, on this intelligence, with that prudence, promptitude, and spirit, for which the character of the noble Marquis is so eminently distinguished. The object of Tippoo was to gain time in order that he might strengthen his position and augment his forces. But the rapid movement of our troops towards his capital, as soon as his hostile views were confirmed, frustrated his plans, and effected the total subversion of his country. Both the moment of attack and the reinforcement from the Cape were acknowledged to be important; in either of which a failure might have proved fatal to the campaign, and would, at all events, have postponed the day of victory.

The almost incredible celerity, with which twelve hundred effective men joined the Egyptian army in high health and spirits from the Cape of Good Hope, is another instance that must force conviction of its vast importance as a military station. The advantages indeed that are afforded by its geographical position of acquiring and conveying intelligence with respect to the affairs of neighbouring nations, or of transporting troops, are by no means precarious or depending on chance; there being scarcely a week in the year in which English whalers or merchantmen, or ships of neutral powers, do not touch at the Cape, especially on their outward bound

voyage. And few of these are unwilling to engage as transports.

It appears from the books of the Custom-house, and the returns of the Captain of the port, that there sailed from the Cape

In 1799	-	103 ships
1800	-	109 ditto
1801	-	130 ditto
1802	-	131 ditto

being, in four years, 473 ships, besides the men of war and coasting vessels. Of these 82 were Americans, 66 Danes, 24 Portugueze, 15 from Hamburgh, and 6 Swedes, 4 from Prussia and Bremen, and the rest English.

The Americans, for some years past, have been establishing a very considerable carrying trade from the eastward on the ruins of the Dutch commerce, and have acquired no small portion of the India and China commerce. The ships of this nation have always found it convenient to touch at the Cape, partly for the sake of refreshing their crews, but with a view, at the same time, of disposing of the whole or any part of their cargo to advantage. This cargo is generally lumber, or it is composed of what they quaintly term *notions*, from the great variety and assortment of goods which they take a fancy, or *notion*, may succeed. In payment of such a cargo they are glad to get bills on India for hard money, which they carry to China to purchase teas, nankcens, and porcelain. From

the Cape to India they are always glad of the opportunity of being employed as transports.

The situation is pretty much the same with regard to the Danes. But the assistance of neither the one nor the other could possibly be wanted, provided the numerous fleets of our East India Company were permitted to touch at the Cape. Without the least inconvenience to their commercial concerns, these ships might transport from England to the Cape a constant succession of raw recruits to be formed there into complete soldiers, from whence they might take on board as many of the latter as should be wanted to reinforce their armies serving in India.

The possession of the Cape is also important in another point of view. Foreign nations trading to India may be said to be at the mercy of the power which holds this grand outwork.

To England, however, its real value consists more in the effectual security it is capable of affording to her trade and settlements in India, than to any advantage that might be taken of annoying or interrupting the commercial concerns of other nations. The unbounded credit of the East India Company, the immensity of its capital employed, the superior quality of British manufactures, and the low rate at which they can be afforded in foreign markets, will always ensure to them the best part of the trade to India and China, and give to England a preference before the other maritime powers of Europe, or that of America. No naval power, therefore,

except France, could feel any jealousy, nor entertain reasonable grounds of objection against the Cape becoming a settlement of the British Empire. They were all allowed to trade and to refresh on the same terms as British subjects, with this single exception, that an additional duty of 5 per cent. was payable on all goods brought into the Colony in foreign bottoms.

The possession of this settlement, at an early period of the war, so completely excluded every hostile power from the Indian seas, threw so great an increase of commerce into our hands by that exclusion, left us in such quiet and undisturbed dominion in the eastern world, and gave us so many solid advantages unexampled in any former war, that one would suppose it a moral impossibility for the East India Company to be unmindful of the source from whence they sprung. But things that are apparently of little value in themselves, are sometimes magnified by intense observation, swell into importance by discussion, and become indispensable by contention; whilst objects of real moment lose their magnitude when slightly viewed, or seen only at a distance, grow little by neglect, and useless without a quarrel. This observation may probably be applied to Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. Respecting the importance of the latter, the French seem to have avoided any discussion in the late negotiation for peace. Their views were, no doubt, well known to our Government, and might have induced it, in the very first sketch of the conditions of peace, to propose that the Cape of Good Hope should be restored to the Dutch, or be declared a free port. The latter, however, happening to be just

what France could have wished, was, on further consideration, restored in full sovereignty to its ancient possessors. France, finding that her purpose would be completely answered when once it was rescued out of the hands of the English, made no objection to this arrangement. Ceylon she considered as a less important sacrifice, although she knew it to be a much greater to Holland than that of the Cape. The latter has always been an expensive settlement to the Dutch, whilst from the former they derived a considerable revenue. Had the Cape been demanded on the part of England, there can be little doubt the French would have been equally eager in contesting the point in regard to this settlement as to Malta, knowing their vast importance to us as points of security.

I have no intention to discuss the comparative value of these two stations to England, considering them both to be essentially necessary to her independence as well as to the protection of her commerce and settlements, so long as the restless and aggrandizing spirit of the French Government shall continue to disturb the peace of Europe. It may not, however, be improper to endeavour to point out, and to compare some of the inconveniencies that would necessarily have resulted to our trade and settlements in the East Indies during the late war, from either one or the other of these places being in the hands of an ambitious enemy.

In the first place, it may be considered as a general principle that has long been rooted in the French Government, and from which it is likely never to depart, to aim at the overthrow

of our power in India, and to endeavour to erect upon its ruins an empire of their own. To accomplish this point, and in consequence thereof, in the language of the present Corsican ruler, "To strike a blow at England which will be followed up with its complete destruction," they know there are but two roads to take: the one by getting possession of Egypt and Syria, where they might collect and season their troops for the grand expedition, either by sea or land; the other by occupying the Cape of Good Hope. Knowing the latter to be a desperate attempt, they were induced to make an experiment on the former. Had they, or their forced ally, the Dutch, kept possession of the Cape, there is no reason for supposing that the same fleet which sailed for Egypt, might not have sailed from some other port, to this station; or that they could not have slipped out from time to time almost any number of troops they might have thought proper to send. These troops, when seasoned and prepared at the Cape, for a warmer climate, could easily have been transported to the Isles of France and Bourbon, where the French would not only continue to draw supplies from the former, and to victual and provision their ships of war and transports from thence, as in the American war, but where they could not fail to have received a material reinforcement to their shipping from the Dutch; for it may be recollected, that the fleet under the command of Admiral Lucas reached Saldanha Bay, in spite of the obstacles which the Southern Atlantic presented, by the Cape being then in our hands. This fleet combined with that of the French would have required a naval force, on our part, in the Indian seas that might not have been quite convenient for us to spare. It is possible, also, they might have

eluded the vigilance of our force, as their object would not have been so much to fight us, as to have put in execution a plan that many are inclined to suppose floated in the mind of Buonaparte when he took the road of Egypt, though he was soon convinced of the futility of it by that route, without at least double the number of troops; his whole army being barely sufficient to keep the conquered country in subjection.

Among many reasons, which led to this conjecture, was the work of *Mr. Anquetil Duperron* on India, which, after being withheld from publication for fifteen years on account of the information it contained, and of which it was supposed the English might avail themselves, was hastily issued from the press on the sailing of this memorable expedition; being intended, most probably, as a guide for the officers on their arrival in India. This intelligent writer, who, to a mind capable of observation and deep reflection, adds the great advantage of local knowledge, fixes on the coast of Malabar as the foundation and corner-stone of their long projected empire in India. The considerations which induce him to give this coast the preference are, among others, the facility of possessing the passes of the neighbouring mountains, and of thus securing the internal commerce of Hindostan—the opportunity it would afford of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas, whom he considers as a warlike and faithful people—the easy intercourse that might be maintained from this coast with the Persian gulph, the Red Sea, the Isles of France and Bourbon, Madagascar, and the Cape of Good Hope.

These are certainly important considerations, and demanded all the vigilance and attention of our Government in India. Even a small force of French troops, had they been thrown upon the coast of Malabar, at the very moment when our forces were drawn off into the Mysore, against the Sultaun's army, might have proved fatal to our possessions on this coast. The usurper would, no doubt, have obtained his reinforcement from the Isle of France, and probably without our knowledge, rendering, by their means, the conquest of Seringapatam doubtful. If, in such a state of things, the French forces could have gained a footing at Bombay, Goa, or Guzzarat, and intrigued themselves into an alliance with the Mahratta powers, though it might not have realized their project of an Indian empire, it would, at least, have been destructive of our possessions in the west of the peninsula, the holding of which, indeed, Mr. Anquetil considers as fatal to our power in India.

On this subject his opinion is not singular; before the overthrow of the Mysore kingdom, there were many of our own countrymen, whose sentiments in this respect accorded with his; and who, like himself, have not only a profound knowledge of Indian politics, but are well acquainted with the physical and moral character of the natives, their several connections and relations; and who, at the same time, possess the advantage that local information so eminently affords. The reduction of the Sultaun, it is true, has contributed in no small degree to our security on the Malabar coast; has consolidated our power in Southern India, and rendered the junction of foreign forces with the Mahratta chiefs more dif-

ficult, if not altogether impracticable. On the northern parts of this coast only are we vulnerable in India by sea.

Supposing, however, the views of the enemy, on the Malabar coast, to have failed, they would, at least, have been enabled, with the assistance of the Dutch, to annoy and cut up our Indian and China trade by the multitude of cruising vessels sent out from their islands of France and Bourbon, and from the Cape of Good Hope. Even under every disadvantage, the French frigates and the nest of privateers on the Mauritius station did much mischief at the commencement of the late war, and although they had few reinforcements from France, it required five years, with a very active and powerful squadron from the Cape and from India, before they were all taken and destroyed. What then must have been the case, if, instead of the English possessing this important station, it had been an enemy's port for assembling, refitting, and refreshing the combined fleets of the French and Dutch? It is unnecessary to observe, that neither of these powers would have found much difficulty in reaching the Cape with single ships, when we have an instance of a whole fleet of Dutch ships arriving there notwithstanding they were fifteen weeks on their passage. This single fleet, acting from the Cape, might have been productive of much inconvenience, expence, and injury to England, and especially to the trade of the East India Company. Were, indeed, the French and Dutch to keep up a proper naval force at this place, it is extremely doubtful if any of the homeward-bound fleets of the East India Company would ever reach England, or if they did, it would be under an expence of

convoy so enormous, that the profits on the cargoes would be inadequate to meet it; but of this we shall have occasion to speak more particularly in the next chapter. Such are the dangers to be apprehended in consequence of the Cape being held by an enemy.

The principal disadvantages that would result to England by leaving Malta in the possession of France appear to be, in the first place, the power it would give them of excluding our ships from that port, the best, undoubtedly, in the Mediterranean, and of increasing their force there to the complete annihilation of our Mediterranean trade; and secondly, the means it would afford of facilitating their views upon Egypt, by enabling them to throw into that country a force sufficient to conquer it, and probably to renew their project upon India.

With regard to the extent and importance of the Mediterranean trade I speak with diffidence, but I am not apprehensive of hazarding much by saying that it admits not of a comparison with that of India and China, though, perhaps, too valuable to be altogether relinquished. In this respect then the value of Malta is certainly less important than that of the Cape of Good Hope. But the second point is of a more serious nature. Some, however, are of opinion, that although the subjugation of Egypt may at any time be accomplished by the French, through Malta, yet, in such an event, we have every reason to expect that the vigilance and activity of a British fleet, and the valor of British soldiers, might always enable us to dispute with them the passage of

Syria. But that, admitting even they should succeed in collecting at Suez an army equal to their wishes, the difficulties of transporting this army to India would be almost insurmountable. If it be meant by those who support this opinion that the attempt is to be made by sea, whilst the Cape remained in our possession, I have little hesitation in agreeing with them that it must certainly fail. During the last war, when their troops had marched to Suez, they had not a single ship in the Red Sea that dared to carry the French flag, nor, with the Cape and Ceylon in our hands, could they at any future period have a fleet of any description without our permission.

But we will even allow them to have assembled at Suez a fleet of their own ships, or of the country coasters, sufficient to take on board their armament destined for the Malabar coast. The next question is, where, or in what manner, are they to victual and to provision such a fleet for a month or five weeks passage, and especially in the supply of the indispensable article of water? The fountains of Moses, it is true, furnish a supply of water at all seasons of the year, but they are situated at twelve miles distance from Suez. Water may be, likewise, and is, collected in tanks or reservoirs near the town, but it soon grows fetid. The difficulty, however, of victualling and watering such a fleet, though great, is not insurmountable, and therefore may be allowed to be got over.

The dangerous navigation of the Red Sea, in which it appears not fewer than fifteen armed ships were lost between

the time of the French entering Egypt, and the signing of the definitive treaty of peace, is the next obstacle that presents itself, and which may also be surmounted. But as the navigation down this sea can only be performed six months in the year, on account of the periodical winds which there prevail, we can always know, within six months, when such a fleet would attempt to pass the narrow strait of Babelmandel, and be prepared accordingly. This strait is completely commanded by the island of Perim, against which there is no other objection but the want of water. If, however, we have allowed the French to surmount so many difficulties before they can arrive at the straits of Babelmandel, we may surely give ourselves the credit of being able to overcome this single objection against the island of Perim. A reservoir to collect and preserve rain water might be constructed; or, by digging below the level of the sea, fresh water would, in all probability, be obtained; or, at any rate, water might be transported thither from the continent, sufficient for the supply of the small garrison that would be necessary to protect the strait. The possession of this island, with a few frigates, is said to be competent to the destruction of all the craft that could possibly be collected and sent down from Suez and all the other ports of the Red Sea. Little, therefore, is to be apprehended from the designs of the French on India by the way of the Red Sea, so long as we can command the strait and victual the force necessary to be stationed there; advantages which the possession of the Cape and of Ceylon would always enable us to make use of.

But if through the Cape the French can contrive to assemble and victual a large armament in the Indian Seas, we must have an immense force to prevent such an armament from co-operating with a body of troops that may previously have been thrown into Egypt and Syria, a plan which they probably intended to have carried into effect, had not the ambitious views of Buonaparte put us on our guard, and rendered the present war both just and necessary. Such a plan, by means of such a peace as the last, might easily be realized long before any intelligence of it could reach India, or any force be sent out from England to counteract it, were Malta and the Cape of Good Hope accessible to the French; but with the latter in our possession the attempt would be madness.

What the consequence might be of an attempt entirely by land, from Greece or Syria to India, is not quite so certain. If the emperor Paul had lived to carry into execution his wild but dangerous scheme, of assembling a large body of troops on the eastern borders of the Caspian Sea, to act in concert with the French, it is difficult to say where the mischief of their quixotism might have ended. The minds of men, intoxicated with power and maddened by ambition, are not to be measured by the same motives which commonly guide the actions of mankind. It is certain that neither Paul nor Buonaparte regarded the great waste of men that such a project would have occasioned. They must have known that by no precaution nor exertion could they have made sure of a constant supply of provisions for so vast a

combined army ; but such knowledge would not have prevented them from making the experiment, the lives of their people being objects of little consideration with them. If, like the host of Xerxes, they should be compelled to feed on grass and the shrubs of the thicket, or, like the army of Cambyses, in its march against the Ethiopians, be reduced to the still more dreadful necessity of killing every tenth man to feed the rest, what remorse would such calamities occasion in the breast of that man, who could deliberately put to death by poison the companions of his victories, for no other fault than the misfortune of being disabled by sickness ?

Yet, although vast numbers would necessarily perish in such an enterprize, the result might, nevertheless, be the means of shaking our security in India ; and this would be considered as a most ample compensation for any loss the enemy might sustain in the expedition. The obstacles that have been urged against it were, perhaps, equally great and numerous when the Macedonian hero undertook to march his army across the same countries ; yet he overcame them all. And if Alexander could succeed in penetrating into India, why not Buonaparte, since military skill and tactics are now so much superior among Europeans to what they were in his day, whilst they have remained nearly stationary in the nations of the East ? No sufficient reason can, perhaps, be assigned why the one, with the same or with increased means, and with talents, perhaps, not less suited to apply these means to the best advantage, should not be able to proceed to the same length that the other did.

That no part of his army would ever return is extremely probable. When a considerable proportion had perished by fatigue, by sickness, and by famine, the rest, in all human probability, by change of climate, manner of living, and by intermarrying with a new people, would produce a new race, and that race would cease to be Frenchmen, just as the successors of Alexander ceased to be Greeks. An army for such an expedition must, in the outset, be immense, to afford a sufficient number of men to maintain the conquered countries through which they must pass. The farther they proceeded the more numerous would be the enemies left in their rear; and on their approach to India, there is no reason for supposing that the native powers would welcome their arrival, jealous, as they now must be, of admitting new European visitors, after the dearly bought experience they have already had of their old friends from the same quarter. These, however, are contingencies that amount to no security of a failure in the main object of the expedition, namely, the destruction of our empire in the east. We shall, perhaps, come nearest the mark by considering the most serious, and probably the only, obstacle that would impede their progress in the countries that lie between Syria and India, to be occasioned by the great difficulty of procuring provisions and transporting the baggage and ammunition that would be required for so large an army. But even these are difficulties which, by an enterprising and determined mind, would be surmounted.

Whether the French really intended to march an army by land, in the event of their having reduced Acre and got pos-

session of Syria, seems to be doubtful; but it is pretty evident they entertained hopes, at one time, of being able to co-operate with the Sultaun of Mysore by the Red Sea, though it does not appear that any previous plan had been concerted for transporting their troops from Egypt to India. The whole expedition, indeed, should seem to have been, in the first instance, a momentary thought, without any further plan or design than that of diverting the original intention of an armament, which was vauntingly called the Army of England. The fact seems to be, that the power and the influence of Buonaparte, who had the command of this army, had rendered him the object of jealousy and hatred to the Directory, who were equally glad with himself to have an excuse for changing the current of these vast preparations from a hazardous, almost hopeless, enterprize, whose failure would have ended in equal disgrace both to the Directory and their general, into a romantic expedition that had the sanction of the old government for the attempt, and, at all events, was more promising of success than the pretended invasion of the British islands. The fame of Buonaparte required, in fact, to be supported, at that time, by some new and signal adventure which might be the means of rescuing him from the secondary part the Directory had reserved for him, by the command of a pretended expedition against their only remaining enemy. In this situation some of his friends, it is supposed, suggested to him the conquest of Egypt, which had long been an object of the French Government under the monarchy. The brilliancy of such a conquest was well suited to the enterprising spirit and ambitious views of the Corsican. It is supposed, also, that the memoir which

the philosopher Leibnitz presented to Louis XIVth was put into his hands, and that the grand objects held out therein took strong possession of his mind. "*The sovereignty of the seas—the Eastern Empire—the overthrow of the Porte—and universal arbitration,*" were all to be accomplished by the conquest of Egypt, a conquest that was reserved for his mighty arm. "Soldiers," says he, on the departure of the expedition, "you are about to undertake a conquest, the effects of which, upon commerce and civilization, will be incalculable; and the blow it will give to England will be followed up with its destruction."

But vain are often the hopes of man! The brilliancy of such a conquest, however alluring at a distance, seems to have faded on the approach. Whether his unsuccessful attempt against Acre had damped his ardour, and thrown an insurmountable barrier to any views he might have entertained against India, or whether he meant to be satisfied with annexing Egypt to the colonies of France, is still matter of conjecture; but it would seem from one of his letters, published in the intercepted correspondence, written at a time when he had not the least idea of being baffled in his schemes, and his army finally driven out by the English, that the acquisition of Egypt was the end of his design, and that his intention was to return to Paris as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made for its future government. His object, no doubt, as appears from his letters to the King of England and the Emperor of Germany, was to obtain a general peace, and by certain sacrifices on the part of France or its allies, to retain possession of this new colony, from whence, at some distant period,

when he had assembled a sufficient force, and prepared the necessary quantity of shipping in the Red Sea, he might have availed himself of a favourable opportunity of making a descent on the Malabar coast. In such an event he was well aware that England, at that time, would never have relinquished the Cape of Good Hope, which he might therefore have proposed as an equivalent for Egypt. The importance which the French have attached to this half-way station between Europe and India, appears from the conferences which took place between Lord Malmesbury and Monsieur *De la Croix*, wherein the latter persisted that the Cape of Good Hope was of infinitely greater importance to England than the Netherlands were to France, and that if our demands for keeping it were acquiesced in, it should be considered as a full and ample compensation for them. "If," says he, "you are masters of the Cape and Trincomalée, we shall hold all our settlements in India, and the Isles of France and Bourbon entirely at the tenure of your will and pleasure; they will be ours only as long as you choose we should retain them; you will be sole masters in India, and we shall be entirely dependent on you." On one occasion, he vehemently exclaimed, "Your Indian empire alone has enabled you to subsidize all the powers of Europe against us, and your monopoly of the Indian trade has put you in possession of a fund of inexhaustible wealth!"

As the French, in all human probability, will very soon be deprived of all their colonies in the west, they will be the more anxious to increase their establishments in the east; and however limited might have been the extent of their

views on the memorable expedition to Egypt, there cannot now be a difference of opinion on the subject. India is, undoubtedly their object, and to gain that object they will leave no measures untried, nor regard the sacrifice of thousands. They have now, indeed, stronger motives than ever for attempting the destruction of our power in the east. Driven from the most valuable of their West India settlements, by a conduct of which the consequences might easily have been foreseen, and in a fair way of losing the rest, they will seek for reparation in Egypt and in India, and I am persuaded that nothing, but our regaining possession of the Cape, will prevent them from making the attempt. That we should, at this moment, possess every strong point which may tend to check the career of an overwhelming and insatiable ambition, ought to be the wish of every nation of Europe. In vain would any of the inferior powers hope to meet a better fate under France if triumphant than Holland, Hanover, or Switzerland have experienced, where, before the palsying arm of Gallic tyranny had destroyed their health and vigour, the people were prosperous, happy, and free. Can Denmark or Sweden, Prussia or the principalities of Germany expect to be treated with more consideration than the Italian provinces have been? Will Spain and Portugal increase their influence, wealth, and commerce, by being degraded into tributary provinces of France, and do they promise themselves a better security of their colonies by the humiliating alliance? Nothing, surely, but the most morbid apathy, will prevent these, and others, to join the great powers of Europe now in arms, and endeavour to wipe off the disgrace that has already fallen on many, and which momentarily threatens them all. How is it possible

that those powers, who have yet the means of rescuing Europe from universal misery, can remain inactive, and insensible of their own impending danger, when it is visible to all the world that the system rooted in the mind of the usurper is nothing short of universal and arbitrary dominion? an ambitious desire of reducing all Europe into Gallic provinces, as Asia fell under the yoke of Rome.

Nor would the dreadful effects of French aggrandizement be confined to Europe, were they not completely checked by the maritime power of Great Britain. Asia, Africa, and South America would soon be overrun with Frenchmen. No one can doubt, for a moment, what the fate of Egypt would be if England should relinquish the possession of Malta. The First Consul, indeed, in an unguarded moment of frenzy, has most unequivocally avowed it. The destruction of the Ottoman Government is another object of French ambition. One of the most intelligent of the French officers, in his correspondence with the Executive Directory, observes, “The Ottoman Empire is generally regarded as an old edifice, tottering to its fall. The European powers have long been preparing to divide its scattered fragments, and many politicians conceive that the catastrophe is close at hand. In this supposition, they think it but right that France should have her share of the spoils; *and the part allotted to her is Egypt.*”

But let those professed Cosmopolites, who, from principles of pretended humanity, declare themselves friends to the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, reflect seriously on the


consequences that would inevitably ensue were France concerned in the dissolution and partition of this government. However desirable it may seem to free the Greeks from the miserable yoke under which they long have groaned, yet a sudden transition from slavery to freedom would scarcely be borne with more moderation by the Greeks, than by the French at home or the negroes in the West India islands. Nor would the horrors of a revolution be confined to the Turkish provinces. The licentious army who might effect it, trained and accustomed to rapine and plunder, led on by needy or ambitious officers, who, on their part, are spurred by the aggrandizing views of their government, would not be content to sit down with Egypt as their share of the plunder. As Malta was the step that led them to Egypt, so would Egypt be to Syria, and Syria to the possession of India; to the plunder of that wealth which, in their opinion, is the great support of Britain. Thus would the scourge of their inordinate ambition be felt from the Nile to the Ganges, and from thence, in all probability, to the Yellow Sea. And by adverting to the geographical position of the southern extremity of Africa, in relation to other countries, and to the advantages it commands as a military station, we shall perceive with what ease might all the ports of South America be made subservient to their ambitious views, and how speedily that great continent from the isthmus of Darien to Terra del Fuego would fall into their insatiable grasp. The accomplishment of these objects, chimerical as they may appear, are prevented only by the transcendent and invincible strength of the British navy.

As it must therefore obviously be the interest of the whole world that the restless and aggrandizing spirit of France should as effectually as possible be counteracted; and as both the Cape of Good Hope and Malta, if left in her possession, would forward her views at universal dominion, there seem to be no reasonable objections on the part of the other powers of Europe against these two grand points of security being left, at a general peace, in the hands of England, or, at all events being protected by English garrisons, as some guarantee against the designs of the general enemy of the human race.

As the importance of every military station must depend, in a considerable degree, on the sufficiency of the works that either are already constructed for its defence against internal or external attack, or on the local advantages it possesses of being rendered defensible, it may be expected I should here say something on this subject. Being no professional man, I am aware, in doing this, of the risk I run of laying myself open to the censure of some who are so, particularly as I have heard so many and such contrary opinions advanced as to the best means of attacking and of defending the Cape of Good Hope. The little I have to offer on the subject will be chiefly descriptive; and as to the defence of the place, my ideas will be grounded on the opinion of those whose skill in their professions, and whose sound judgment in the ordinary affairs of life, joined to their local knowledge, entitle such opinion to some degree of consideration. It may be observed, however, that there are not, perhaps, two officers who perfectly agree on this subject.

MILITARY PLAN OF THE CAPE PENINSULA

drawn by order of the Dutch Government
and revised and corrected by
Lieut. Col. Bridges Roy, Engineer.



- References
- A The Citadel
 - B Cape Town
 - C Table Mountain 3584 FT High
 - D Devil's Hill 2855
 - E Lion's Head 4160
 - F Lion's Ramp 4145
 - G Orange River & Harbour
 - H Fort de Kock
 - I The landing place & Wharf
 - K Roggebaai Battery
 - L Amsterdam Battery
 - M Chapman's Battery
 - N Battery de Meulle
 - O Little Battery
 - P Society House
 - Q Camps Bay
 - R The Grange
 - S Eikensberg
 - T Bontebok
 - V Estate called Brunsberg
 - W D'..... of Joubert
 - X D'..... of Joubert
 - Y La rue de Mer
 - Z Hook's Blom
 - 1 The old Gin Mill
 - 2 The Salt River
 - 3 Farm called Zonneboom
 - 4 Farm or Horse Island
 - 5 Salt River
 - 6 Looche's River
 - 7 The Old Mouth
 - 8 Great Road to Eider Bay
 - 9 Gardens Battery
 - 10 Schoorwa Battery

- References
- 11 The Sea Line
 - 12 Munnich's Line
 - 13 Jagers Estate
 - 14 Kemper's d'
 - 15 D'..... d'
 - 16 D'..... d'
 - 17 D'..... d'
 - 18 D'..... d'
 - 19 D'..... d'
 - 20 D'..... d'
 - 21 Estate called Sollysbay
 - 22 D'..... d'
 - 23 D'..... d'
 - 24 D'..... d'
 - 25 D'..... d'
 - 26 Estate of De Wael
 - 27 Klanshoek
 - 28 Good school
 - 29 Witteboom on the Silver Tree
 - 30 Fransens Estate
 - 31 Great Constantia Estate
 - 32 Little Constantia d'
 - 33 Brink's Farm
 - 34 Estate of called Berg vliet
 - 35 The English Camp
 - 36 The Deep River
 - 37 Van Etrens Estate
 - 38 Lockhouse d'
 - 39 Bonaire d'
 - 40 Lake nearly dry in Summer
 - 41 Nucleus
 - 42 Brucke
 - 43 Erasmus's d'
 - 44 Van Renssela Estate

In speaking of the defence of the Cape of Good Hope, I mean to confine the observations I have to make to the peninsular promontory, including the two bays, which are the usual resort of shipping. And for the better illustration of what follows, I have added a military map of the said peninsula, the outline of which was taken, I believe, some years ago by a French engineer, was afterwards filled up by different officers in the Dutch service, and was examined, corrected, and verified with great care and accuracy, by Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Bridges of the British engineers, under whose directions several new and important works were constructed by order of Sir James Craig. For the sake of conveniency, I found it necessary to reduce the scale to half the size of the original drawing, and have added to the Dutch scale of roeds one of English yards, the former being to the latter as $4 \frac{119}{1000}$ to 1.

This military plan, together with the charts of the bays, I have thought it expedient to publish, as multiplied copies of them are in the possession not only of the government and officers at the Cape, but also of French officers in Europe; and it is presumed they may be of use hereafter, especially to those who may be sent on an expedition against this important settlement, and who may not have had the opportunity of collecting a competent share of local information; which, however, is extremely desirable, where operations are to be carried on against an extensive and dangerous coast. For such a purpose, those only ought to be selected who are well acquainted, not only with the fortified peninsula, but also with the different bays and passes of the country, the manners of

the colonists and their resources, and, above all, with the habits of the native Hottentots.

Cape Town, which may be called the capital of the colony, is situated on the south-east angle of Table Bay. It usually happens that the advantages of the bay, in forming a new settlement, determine the choice of the site for the town; but, in this instance, the convenience of a plentiful stream of pure limpid water, rushing out of the Table Mountain, was the primary object to which the bay was subservient. Had this not been the case, the first settlers would unquestionably have given the preference to Saldanha Bay, whose only defect is the want of fresh water in the vicinity; whereas Table Bay is faulty in every point that constitutes a proper place for the resort of shipping; and so boisterous, for four months in the year, as totally to exclude all ships from entering it.

As this point of the peninsula became, however, the seat of the petty concerns in which the Dutch East India Company allowed its servants to traffic, and, under certain restrictions, the other settlers to carry on with foreign ships, a commerce that was chiefly confined to the supply of provisions and refreshments in exchange for Indian and European articles, they found it necessary to build a fort for the protection of their property and of the Company's warehouses against the attempts of the natives.

As the trade to India increased, and the Cape, in consequence, became more frequented, it was deemed expedient to extend the works, and to erect a citadel that should serve

as a defence against any attack either by land or by sea. This citadel is the present castle, a regular pentagon fort, with two ravelins and some other trifling outworks, and surrounded by a wet ditch; but so injudiciously placed, in the very lowest part, or sink, of the valley that, although it commands the town and part of the anchorage, it is itself commanded by the ground rising from it in a gradual slope to the Devil's Hill, which renders it on this side not defensible. This slope is now occupied as high as the commencement of the perpendicular rocky side of the Devil's Hill, by various redoubts, batteries, and block-houses commanding each other and the advance ground to the castle, all of which were added by Sir James Craig.

During the American war, when the French were at the Cape, they threw up lines with two redoubts to protect the approach to the castle on the land side, the expence of which they defrayed in paper money. These lines, however, extending no farther up the tongue of land that projects from the Devil's Hill, than the point, No. 12, in the map, were liable to be turned between that point and the craggy summit D; a manœuvre, I believe, which General Craig intended to put in practice, provided the Dutch, after being driven out of Wynberg, were disposed to make a stand at the French lines. He therefore, very properly, ordered a battery and block-house to be constructed immediately under D, and a second a little lower down the hill, which, with the two redoubts in the lines, and Fort de Knokke at their extremity on the shore of Table Bay, being all within the compass of 3000 yards, would enable the garrison to keep up such a cross

and concentrated fire, as to prevent any moderate number of troops from attempting to force the lines in their approach to the town from Simon's Bay, without a very considerable loss of men. And, in order to strengthen the northern extremity of the lines, and, at the same time, to cover the landing place at the mouth of, and passage across, the Salt River, he added a bomb-proof tower and battery at G, both of which bear his name. Notwithstanding, however, the strength of these lines, the officers of the Dutch garrison, now at the Cape, were of opinion that the most eligible mode of attacking the town would be to force the lines, though at the expence of a few men, after which the castle must immediately fall; and many English officers are of the same opinion.

Fort Knokke is connected with the citadel by a rampart drawn along the shore, called the Sea lines, defended by several batteries, mounted with heavy guns, and furnished with ovens for heating shot. Within these lines is a powder magazine, and a long range of low buildings, that were converted, under the English government, into a general hospital, with lodgings for the inspector, storekeeper, and apothecary to the forces.

On the west of the bay are three strong batteries at the points K, L, M, the Rogge-bay battery, the Amsterdam battery, and the Chavonne battery, the guns of which all bear directly upon the anchorage. At N is also a small battery, called the Mouillé, commanding the entrance of the bay; for all ships, when coming in, keep the point of the Mouillé close on board, and go out of the bay between Roben Island

and the continent. A little farther, at the point O, where there is a small sandy cove, a work was thrown up with a few light guns and a furnace for heating shot, to prevent a landing at this place, which they have further endeavoured to impede by fixing three anchors across the inlet. A very few shot from one of our frigates soon, however, dislodged the enemy from this work.

At Camp's Bay, on the western coast of the peninsula, there are also a few small batteries, and a military post on the height above it, directly between the Table Mountain and the Lion's Head. An almost perpetual surf rolls upon the sandy beach of Camp's Bay, otherwise, this might be considered as a very vulnerable point. An army landing here, and at Three Anchor Bay, might take the town and all the batteries in their rear, or, which would still be more important, might get possession of the Lion's Rump at F, from whence, with a few howitzers, the town and citadel, and the strong batteries on the west side of Table Bay, would be completely commanded. And this hill has the very great advantage of not being commanded by any other point.

So fully convinced was Sir James Craig of the vast importance of this situation, that he proposed to Government, in the event of the Cape remaining in our possession, to erect a citadel upon it, with buildings for every military purpose, such as barracks for the garrison, houses for an hospital, buildings for the ordnance department, for military stores, and for at least twelve months' provisions. Such a fortification, when properly completed, would, in the opinion of Sir

James, be ably defended, in time of war, by 1200 men; and would render the town, the batteries, and the castle untenable by an enemy, all of which might be totally destroyed from this height in four-and-twenty hours. The most intelligent of the officers of the Dutch garrison, now at the Cape, were precisely of the same opinion, and immediately pointed out the situation as the most eligible for erecting a citadel. The Dutch Government, however, are not in circumstances at present to undertake a work of such magnitude and expence, not being able to raise funds adequate to meet the subsistence of the troops, and the contingent and extraordinary expences of the garrison, though it consists of less than two thousand men.

The greatest difficulty, in occupying this situation for such a purpose, would be the want of water; but it is by no means an insurmountable difficulty. Twelve hundred men, at a daily allowance of a quart to each man, would consume, in twelve months, 109,500 gallons, and a cistern, capable of containing this quantity, would not be required to exceed a square of twelve yards, provided the depth be about four yards and a half. And two cisterns of these dimensions would be fully adequate for every purpose that the garrison would require.

Another objection, however, was started, grounded on the opinion of some of the artillery officers in the service of the East India Company, who conceived the Lion's Hill to be within point blank shot of the Devil's Hill, the slope of which, even below the rocky summit, is at least twice the

height of the former, and consequently commands it. These gentlemen, who are supposed to be among the best informed of the Company's officers, may be very good artillery officers, but they are certainly bad judges of distance in a mountainous country; for, as Sir James Craig has observed, the nearest point of the Devil's Hill is at the distance of 3700 yards; but that, in order to get any thing like a level with the part of the Lion's Rump, on which the most considerable part of the works would be placed, it would be necessary to go farther back on the slope of the Devil's Hill, at least five hundred yards, and even then the elevation on the latter would not be equal to that point on which the said works were intended to be situated; so that the point blank range of the Company's artillery officers is, at least, 4200 yards. Sir James observes, that a residence of fourteen months at the Cape, since he gave his opinion on this subject, and a continued and unremitting study to render the place as defensible as possible, had only served to confirm him in it; an opinion, indeed, which perfectly coincided with that of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, as well as with that of every intelligent officer who has been on duty at the Cape, not only among the English, but also among the French, Dutch, and German officers now serving there.

Near the narrowest part of the peninsula, on the western shore, are two contiguous bays called Hout or Wood Bay, and Chapman's Bay; the latter communicating, by a defile of the mountains about 5400 yards in length, with Vis or Fish Bay close to Simon's Bay; and the former, by another defile, with the great road leading from Cape Town to Si-

mon's Bay. There appears to be no instance on record of any ship going into Chapman's Bay, it being completely exposed to all the prevailing winds that blow at the Cape, and, in consequence, seldom free from a heavy swell of the sea. Were it, indeed, ever so secure and convenient for landing troops, all the advantages it holds out would be obtained by a landing at Simon's Bay. This is not the case, were an enemy to effect a landing at Hout Bay to the northward of it; as, from this place, they would be enabled to make their approach to the lines, after passing a defile of the mountains which is totally unoccupied.

Hout Bay affords safe and convenient anchorage for eight or ten ships; and has a rivulet of fresh water falling into it from the back part of Table Mountain; but the getting out of the bay is supposed to be very difficult and precarious, on account of the eddy winds from the surrounding mountains when they are moderate in the Offing, or from the southeasterly winds setting into the entrance; as well as from the constant westerly swell and wind prevailing from that quarter in the winter season. Captain Blanket, however, in the year 1784, when he commanded the *Nymph* sloop of war, ran, out of curiosity, into Hout Bay, at which the Dutch were exceedingly jealous and angry, none of them having ever seen a ship there before. It is now defended with a battery and a block-house, situated on an eminence which is too high to be successfully attacked by ships of war.

As to Simon's Bay, which lies on the eastern side of the peninsula, in the great bay of False, and is the usual resort

of shipping for five months in the year, it should seem the Dutch had no idea of their colony being attacked from that quarter, as there are only two small batteries mounting four or five guns each, to which ships of the line may approach within 500 yards; and the strong ground at Muisenberg was entirely unoccupied before the British expedition appeared in the bay; the few works and batteries, with which they attempted to defend this ground, were constructed between the time of its arrival in the bay and the day the troops marched for the Cape. But though the Dutch at that time suffered themselves to be easily driven out of this pass, they are now too well acquainted with its strength and importance to abandon it so speedily, should an enemy again attempt a landing in Simon's Bay. In fact there is no other road to Cape Town but at the foot of this mountain washed by the waves of False Bay. It is the 'Thermopylæ of the Cape; and so strong a position that, with the assistance of the several breast-works constructed while in our possession, a *chosen band* of 300 riflemen might stop the progress of an army.

For the complete defence of the various works upon the Cape peninsula, which I have just enumerated, a garrison of five thousand men has been considered, by all who are acquainted with the place, as the very least force that would be required; and, consequently, no part of it could, with propriety, be detached into the interior, without exposing the garrison to danger. The colony, indeed, is so extensive, having an unprotected coast of 580 miles from Cape Point to the Kaffer country on the east, and of 315 miles from Cape

Point to the River Koussie on the north, that an army of ten thousand men would scarcely be sufficient to keep out an enemy, if he were determined to effect a landing. A large force, however, landed at any great distance from the Cape, could not possibly be subsisted. At Mossel Bay it might, perhaps, receive a small supply of corn, but no cattle; at Plettenberg's Bay, neither the one nor the other. At Algoa Bay an enemy might, at all times, create a great deal of mischief, by putting arms into the hands of the Kaffers and Hottentots, who might very easily be encouraged to drive the whole colony within the limits of the Cape peninsula; a measure, by which the garrison and the settlers would be reduced to the danger of starving for want of provisions. It is obvious that such a step would be attended with the ruin of the settlement, and would not, on that account, be resorted to but by a desperate or a Machiavelian enemy. The Dutch, I understand, have stationed at this bay near three hundred troops, to keep the peace between the boors, the Kaffers, and the Hottentots, but the greater part would, undoubtedly, be withdrawn on receiving intelligence of the present war; the weakness of the garrison not admitting of so large a detachment being sent off the peninsula.

One effectual way of distressing the garrison would be to land detachments at various points not very distant from the Cape Peninsula; as, for instance, at Saldanha Bay, from whence, by getting possession of Roode Sand Kloof, all supplies of cattle would be cut off from the interior—at Gordon's Bay, in the north-east corner of False Bay, whose proximity to Hottentot Holland's Kloof would afford an easy

possession of that important pass which, being defensible by a very few men, would completely cut off all communication with the district of Zwellendam and the eastern parts of the colony—and, if the attempt was made in the month of December, a detachment landed near Blauwberg opposite to Robben Island would intercept the annual supply of corn, which, in the beginning of the year, is always transported to the Cape. The garrison would then be obliged to abandon their forts to dispute those posts or starve within their lines, as they never have a stock of provisions in store, and are particularly reduced at this season of the year.

Some, however, are of opinion that the place would best be taken by a *Coup de Main*, by dashing at once into Table Bay in a south-east wind, and cutting out all the ships that may happen to be at anchor. In doing this, they would have to sustain the fire of Craig's tower and battery, Fort de Knokke, the sea lines and the castle, beside the three heavy batteries on the west coast of the bay. There are few places, perhaps, where so great a fire can be concentrated, as may be brought to bear on the anchoring ground of Table Bay. The batteries are mounted with a considerable number of heavy guns; but, it is true, they are very old; a great part of them honeycombed, and the carriages of many completely demolished. The Amsterdam battery has also many defects, and, in the opinion of some naval officers, would soon be silenced by a single ship of the line, brought to lie close alongside of it. It must be recollected, however, that in this situation she would be flanked by the Chavonne battery, and have to sustain the fire of that of Rogge Bay

Others are of opinion, that a moderate force of infantry and artillery, landed at Three Anchor Bay, might easily succeed in getting possession of Amsterdam battery in the rear, as well as the Chavonne and Rogge Bay batteries, after which the castle would no longer be tenable, and the town would be at the mercy of the attacking party. This is very true, if the landing could be reduced to a certainty; but this bay is a mere narrow creek, choaked with anchors, and nine days out of ten subject to a heavy rolling swell that makes it dangerous for a boat to attempt a landing. Perhaps the strongest impression might be made by combining the operations agreeably to the two opinions; though a large force might probably prefer landing on the eastern beach of Table Bay, where there is nothing to interrupt them, cross the Salt River, and carry the lines by a *Coup de Main*, after which, as I have before observed, the castle must immediately fall, and the garrison surrender at discretion.

The Dutch garrison, at the evacuation of the colony by the English, in March 1803, were certainly not capable of opposing any extraordinary resistance, or to defend the place against a spirited attack, conducted by an officer of skill and local experience; and their numbers since that time have considerably been reduced. Three or four ships of the line, with four thousand men, would be fully sufficient to carry their point; provided the Dutch should receive no reinforcements from the French, which, hitherto, there are no grounds for supposing to be the case. The whole garrison, when complete, was intended to consist of three thousand men; of these were already arrived, at that time, barely two thousand,

consisting in a regiment of the Prince of Waldeck, about six hundred strong; three hundred cavalry; three hundred artillery; two or three companies of grenadiers, and the rest *jagers* or a light rifle corps, totally undisciplined, and composed of almost every nation on the face of the earth, being, for the most part, deserters from German regiments. And, with regard to the artillery, they were so miserably defective that, out of the whole corps, they could not select a sufficient number of trained men to fire the salutes intended to be made on hoisting the Dutch flag on the first of January; but made application to the commanding officer of the British artillery, for a party to assist them: yet, when the orders for the surrender of the colony were countermanded, and it became a probable event that hostilities would ensue, it was industriously circulated by the Dutch officers, or rather by the French officers nominally in the Dutch service, that their corps of artillery was in the highest state of discipline and order, the greater part of the men having distinguished themselves at the battle of Marengo! They were commanded, however, as well as the cavalry, by active and intelligent officers.

The services of the *Burgher Cavalry* are not likely ever to be again demanded. Were they, indeed, ever so well disposed to fight, the number that it would be found practicable to raise is far from being great. Those who dwell in the interior parts of the settlement would find it extremely inconvenient to quit their homes, on account of their slaves and Hottentots, who might be induced to take advantage of their absence; and the Cape district, containing only about

six thousand souls, could not be supposed to furnish more than a thousand men fit to bear arms, and, probably, not one hundred that would dare to use them.

The Hottentot corps, consisting of about five hundred men, so far from feeling any disposition to enter into the service of the Dutch, actually declined it, and expressed the strongest wishes to return to their connections in the distant parts of the colony. What may be the fate of these poor creatures, under their old masters, is difficult to conjecture. Convinced, as the Dutch Government would speedily be, that they would never be prevailed on to draw a trigger against the English, it will become a very serious difficulty in what manner to dispose of them. If they should desert in a body, which was generally thought would be the event, they would drive in the whole country. But if, before this happens, the humane colonists should succeed in obtaining the prayer of two petitions presented by them, the government will be relieved from any apprehensions with regard to the Hottentot corps : one of which was to surround and massacre the whole corps ; the other, to put a chain to the leg of every man, and distribute them among the farmers as slaves for life.

The only chance they have of escaping rests upon the good intentions of the Governor and Commander in Chief towards them, from whose humane disposition, and honorable character, they will receive every protection and support, as far, at least, as depends upon him ; but, in a revolutionary government, the best disposed must, in some degree, swim with the torrent of popular opinion.

One single ship of war, the Bato of 68 guns, remained in Table Bay, preparing to follow two others of the same class, the Pluto and the Kortenaar, to Batavia. She has since been condemned as totally unfit for service. None of these three ships had any of their lower-deck guns on board, and were only half manned; being intended, though under the command of an Admiral, to take on board, and carry to Europe, cargoes of coffee. Three frigates had sailed a few months before for the same purpose, under the command of Commodore Melisse, and two others formed part of Rear-Admiral Dekker's squadron; so that the Dutch had, at that time, in the Eastern Seas, three ships of the line and five fine frigates, which, however, were in no condition to add much lustre to the Batavian flag.

The ammunition and stores that were found at the capture, together with those that were given over by the British Government, at the surrender, to the amount of about twenty thousand pounds value, will serve for many years, not only as a supply of the garrison, but also of the Isles of France and Bourbon. The great barrack, situated between the town and the castle, was put into thorough repair, and fitted up with bedding and other necessaries for the reception of two thousand men; and the citadel, capable of containing one thousand men, with lodgings for the officers, was intended to be put into the same condition.

Recent accounts mention the deplorable state of the colony under its new government. The revenues are so reduced as to be totally inadequate to meet the expences of the garrison,

and they have no hope of any supply from Holland. New taxes were imposed on the inhabitants, which they refused to pay. The people detested the government, and the government was afraid of the troops. The garrison was in a complete state of insubordination; several were under trial for mutiny, and numbers were daily deserting with their arms. Universal discontent and general distress prevailed. All credit was at an end, money had totally disappeared, the little commerce they had was destroyed, bankruptcies were without number, and a war was only wanting to complete their misery. Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Cape will fall an easy conquest to a British force.

CHAP. III.

Importance of the Cape of Good Hope, considered as a Naval Station.

WHEN one reflects, for a moment, on the diminutive space that the British islands occupy on the surface of the globe, in comparison with the large portions which some nations enjoy, and considers their detached and remote situation by which their inhabitants were, in the opinion of the ancients,

“ *Toto ab orbe divisos,*”

“ Cut off from the rest of mankind :”

when, at the same time, one bears in mind the vast weight and preponderance these little islands have long maintained in the history and transactions of almost all the governments and nations which constitute this world of human beings, it is impossible to withhold our wonder and admiration at a phenomenon which, at first sight, wears the appearance of being so much out of the ordinary course of things. In vain should we search for a parallel in the history of the world, because the history of the world affords no example of a country where property has so much weight, where it affords so much enjoyment, and where it is so well secured by just and equal laws, as in Great Britain.

Exertions to amass wealth will, generally, be proportional to the stability that is given to property. Hence, the enterprising spirit of Britons has collected the riches of the world within their fortunate islands. Hence, the great and stupendous works of convenience, utility, and magnificence, that embrace the shores of the Thames, the Mersey, the Severn, and most of the navigable rivers of the empire which, whilst they facilitate the purposes of commerce, add splendor and ornament to the country, and serve as notable monuments of a powerful and opulent nation. But, although the seat of empire, the central point of power and wealth, is fixed in the British islands, yet, if we cast our eyes on the map of the world, and skim along the western shores of the Atlantic, thence descend to the Southern Pacific, and return easterly to the Indian Seas, we shall there find that the possessions of Britain comprise "a vast empire on which the sun never sets, and whose bounds nature has not yet ascertained."

Whatever philosophers may advance on the subject of the wealth of nations depending on the encouragement given to agriculture, it cannot be denied that the wealth and the influence of the British empire derive their source and their main-spring from commerce. It is to commerce we owe our colonies, and to our colonies the perfection of navigation. For, after all the objections that have been urged against the colonizing system, it is pretty evident that, without foreign possessions, we should have few seamen. The mere carrying-trade is so precarious, and so liable to be affected by every

little incident that may involve the nation carrying it on, in its relations with contending powers, that no degree of stability can be assigned to it. As long as the Portuguese maintained their territories and their dominion in the East, the Portuguese navigators were the first among Europeans in reputation; but no sooner had the Dutch deprived them of the best part of their possessions, than the whole of the carrying-trade fell into the hands of the Dutch; and the Dutch flag maintained the superiority in the East, and was respectable in the West.

As the Dutch began to lose their colonies, the Americans snatched the remains of their carrying-trade, which, while they preserve a state of neutrality, they will not only maintain but improve to a very great extent; but, having no foreign possessions, the instant they go to war with a nation that has, their carrying-trade will in all probability fall to the ground. Such will be the case also with the Danes and the Swedes; and such has France found, by experience, to be her fate from the moment she lost her best colonies.

The number of hands that are required to work the ships employed in transporting to England the produce of our colonies furnish for the navy, in time of war, an immediate supply of skilful and able-bodied seamen: giving it, at once, a decided superiority over that of all other nations. The French, the Dutch, and the Spaniards can construct their ships fully as well as, and some of them, perhaps, better than, the English; but none of them can make such good seamen. The rough and resolute character that is necessary to form

good sailors, would appear to be incompatible with the frivolous and flexible tempers of Frenchmen. Their natural versatility disqualifies them for situations that require steady perseverance; and the trifling gaiety of their disposition is ill suited to the order and discipline that are indispensable on board of a ship. In a gale of wind, it is said to be a matter of the greatest difficulty to prevail on a sufficient number of Frenchmen, in a whole ship's company, to go aloft for the purpose of taking in the sails; and if the gale comes on suddenly, the odds are great that the masts are carried away, or the sails blown from the yards.

Both men and officers are averse to long voyages, and are seldom inclined to pass a friendly port. To possess the advantage of having such ports, in different parts of the world, is of the first importance to their navigation and commerce. They pay little attention to cleanliness, either in their persons or ships, and they are generally very much crowded; hence, a long voyage, without refreshments, is seldom unattended with disease and mortality.

The Dutch seamen are steady, persevering, and intrepid; and, of all nations, have maintained the hardest struggles with the English; but they are habitually slow and inactive. That they are not physically so, the crew of the *Rattlesnake* sloop, a great part of which were Dutchmen, afforded a sufficient proof, when they engaged, in the most gallant and active manner, the *La Preneuse* frigate, which they drove out of Algoa Bay. By example and a little practice, they overcome the dull and sluggish motion to which they have

been accustomed, and soon become capable of prompt and vigorous action.

The Dutch sailors, it seems, are always glad of an opportunity to serve in English ships, where they have the reputation of being a quiet, orderly, and obedient people. The manner in which they are fed, in their own ships, is little calculated to give them encouragement. The captains of the men of war are, at the same time, the pursers; and they feed their men by contract, which, stipulating for quantity only, leaves the quality to the discretion and the conscience of the captain. The Dutch ships of war that were sent out, with the governor and troops on board, to take possession of the Cape, had a remarkably long passage, which occasioned the Dutch sailors on board our ships to observe, that the captain's musty peas, rancid pork, and black bread were not consumed, before which it would not be his interest to come into port where better articles were to be had. The same sailors got hold of some of their bread, which they carried through the streets of Cape Town, tied to the end of a stick, by way of a joke, it being so very black as to have more the appearance of animal excrement, baked in the sun, than of bread.

On the present plan of navigating their ships, the Dutch would find it impracticable to proceed from Europe to India without breaking the voyage. The unfavorable form of their vessels for moving quickly through the water, the little sail they carry, especially by night, the economical plan in which they are fitted out, forbidding the use of copper sheathing,

and the bad provisions laid in for the people, are all against a long continued voyage. The mortality that sometimes prevails on board their Indiamen, even on short passages, is almost incredible. Mr. Thunberg informs us, and his veracity may be depended on, that the mortality on board the ship which carried him to the Cape, after a voyage of three months and a half from the Texel, amounted to one hundred and fifteen; that three other ships in the same fleet suffered still more in proportion to their crews, the *Hoenkoop* having buried one hundred and fifty-eight; the *William Vth* two hundred and thirty; and the *Jonge Samuel* of *Zeeland* one hundred and three men!

It may be considered, indeed, as next to a physical impossibility for a Dutch ship to run from the Texel to Batavia without stopping. The possession we held of their old half-way house, the Cape, was so severe a blow to their navigation in the Eastern Seas, that, after the capture of Lucas's fleet in Saldanha Bay, there was not, in the course of five years, a single Dutch ship of any description that ventured to the southward of the line. The convenience of refreshing at the Cape is absolutely necessary to, and inseparably connected with, the Dutch trade to India. The Spaniards and Portuguese are equally averse to long passages, without refreshing, as the French and Dutch. The Danes, the Swedes, and Americans less so, because their provisions, in general, are more wholesome, and their ships more cleanly: yet, to all these, an intermediate port is always considered as an object worthy of attention.

To the English the intervention of a port, in the longest voyages, is the least important; and many commanders, of late years, have been so little solicitous on this point, as to prefer making the run at once, rather than suffer the delay and impediment occasioned by calling for refreshments on the passage. The commanders, indeed, of the British ships, in general, are so well acquainted with the nature of the fixed and periodical winds (the Trades and Monsoons), and with making the most of those that are variable, that distant voyages are now reduced almost to a certain duration. The old system, still, perhaps, too rigidly adhered to in the navy, of endeavouring to place the ship's head in the direction of her intended port, is entirely exploded by the commanders of ships in the employ of the East India Company. It may answer the purpose in the British Channel, and near land, but is ill suited for a long voyage, through climates where the wind undergoes but little change. The squadron of men of war, which brought away the garrison, on the evacuation of the Cape, were twelve weeks on their passage, whilst the *Sir Edward Hughes* Indiaman, which left the Cape a week later, was three weeks in England sooner, than the said squadron. A passage from China, which formerly was reckoned from ten to twelve months, is now reduced to four months, and has been made in a hundred days.

This rapidity in skimming over the ocean, reduced, as nearly as the nature of such a loco-motion will allow, to a certainty, added to the superior quality, as well as abundance, of provisions that are laid in for the voyage, has rendered it a matter of perfect indifference to English seamen, in point of

health, whether the run be made at once, or the voyage be broken for the sake of obtaining refreshments at some intermediate port. This being the case, the former method is usually preferred, and much delay, as well as expence, is thereby avoided.

Since, however, all maritime expeditions and transactions are, in a very peculiar degree, liable to accident and misfortune, it must always be considered as a desirable object to have some neighbouring port to resort to in case of urgent necessity. In the short voyage to the ports of the Levant and others in the Mediterranean, Malta, and a number of other islands, present themselves as places of refuge for ships in distress. The bay of Madeira lies open to the outward bound ships in the West India trade, and the Western Islands, if necessary, may be approached on the return-voyage. And, although the Portugueze settlement of Rio de Janeiro in South America is not greatly out of the way of ships, in their outward-bound passage to the East Indies and China, nor the island of Saint Helena on their return, yet it cannot be denied that the Cape of Good Hope is infinitely preferable to both of these places, since it not only divides the passage more equally, but supplies, in general, better refreshments, and in greater plenty, and is alike convenient for shipping to touch at, whether in their outward or homeward-bound voyage.

In the early periods of foreign navigation, the ships of every nation, trading to the East Indies, found it convenient to call at the Cape for water and fresh provisions, long before

it was taken possession of, in form, by any European power. The native Hottentots, at that time, were numerous on the Cape peninsula, and rich in cattle, which they supplied to passing ships on easy terms.

In the reign of John II of Portugal, Bartholomew Diaz made the first successful attempt to reach the southern promontory of Africa, which he effected in the year 1487; but whether he quarrelled with the natives, and was driven away by them, as some historians have pretended, seems to be doubtful. Vasco-de-Gama, ten years afterwards, touched at the Cape, but made no attempt to form a settlement there. Next to Vasco-de-Gama, was the Portuguese Admiral Rio d'Infanté, who strongly recommended to his Government the establishment of a colony on the southern coast of Africa; and fixed upon the mouth of a river for that purpose, to which was given his own name, and which is now called the Great Fish River. Some other attempts, by different Portuguese navigators, were made to colonize the Cape, but they all failed.

After this the English and the Dutch were frequent visitors to the bays of the Cape.

The English, in their outward-bound voyage, had a custom of burying their dispatches for the directors, and to point out where they were to be found by cutting a sentence, to that effect, on some large blue stone laid on a particular spot. The intelligence, engraven on the stone, was usually limited to the name of the ship and captain, the date of her arrival

and departure, and it ended with "Look for letters (in such " or such direction) from this stone." Two or three stones of this kind are built into the castle wall, and are still legible. The Dutch used to bury, on a certain spot on Robben Island, a register of the state of their vessels and cargoes, outward bound, which the next ship, in coming home, took up and carried to Holland for the information of the Directors.

In this manner the English, the Dutch, and the Portuguese continued, for more than a century, to refresh at the Cape, without any design, on the part of the two former, of appropriating the soil; until the year 1620, when Andrew Shillinge and Humphrey Fitzherbert, two commanders of two fleets of English ships bound for Surat and Bantam, took a formal possession of the soil for, and in the name of, King James of Great Britain, because they discovered that the Dutch intended to establish a colony there the following year; and "because they thought it better that the Dutch, or any other " nation whatsoever, should be his Majesty's subjects in this " place, than that his subjects should be subject to them " or any other." It was not, however, until a period of more than thirty years had expired after this event, that the representations of Van Riebek, stating the richness of the soil, the mildness of the climate, the advantage it would give to the Dutch, as a colony, over other nations, whose ships would all be obliged to touch there, and, above all, the barrier it would afford to their Indian dominions, prevailed on the Directors of the Dutch East India Company to form a regular establishment at the Cape.

Their original intention was to limit their possessions to the Cape peninsula, and the two bays that are separated by the isthmus ; considering it only, as it had hitherto been, as a place for refreshing and refitting their ships. But the number of settlers that crept in, from time to time, made it necessary to cross the isthmus, and, by presents and promises, to obtain from the natives the cession of a tract of land to which they gave the name of Hottentot's Holland. Having discovered that the predominant passion of this feeble people was the love of spirituous liquors and tobacco, and that pieces of iron and glass beads were considered among the first necessities, they negotiated for whole tracts of land with these pernicious drugs and paltry baubles. A cask of brandy was the price of a whole district, and nine inches in length of an iron hoop the purchase of a fat ox. The natives, however, it would seem, had no idea of resigning, for ever, to a foreign nation, the ground that was necessary for feeding their own cattle ; but conceived it could only be intended for temporary use, and that, in time, their visitors would depart from the country as other Europeans had hitherto done for the last century and an half ; but, when they observed them building houses and fortifications, sowing and planting the ground, and rearing their own cattle, they began to be jealous of the encroachments of their new neighbours, and commenced hostilities with a view to expel them. These hostilities terminated, as is usual in such cases, in the further extension of the Dutch settlement, and in an increase of troops and colonists from Europe.

Still, however, the Dutch East India Company endeavoured to limit the Cape to the original design of a port for refreshing