A 30-YEAR REVIEW OF SADC'S DEVELOPMENT INTO A SECURITY COMMUNITY: WHERE IS SADC FALLING SHORT?

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ABSTRACT

2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and this occasion provides a good opportunity for conducting a review that focuses on how far the SADC region has come in its quest to develop into a security community. SADC, over the last 30 years, has emerged into and continues to develop into a regional security community that aims to have the capacity to successfully address regional security threats. Since its inception, although SADC has made some modest strides that have signalled and strengthened its development into a security community, its overall successes in this regard have been limited. The limited success that SADC has demonstrated has resulted from the shortfalls exhibited by the SADC Organ and regional agreements and policies. The challenges faced by SADC in developing into a regional security community have hindered the ability of the region to respond to security threats as can be seen in the case of Mozambique and Eswatini. Theoretical frameworks on security communities are applied in this study as a lens through which SADC, its successes, and the challenges it faces, are studied.

KEYWORDS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CHRPA	Commission on Human Rights and Public Administration
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FLS	Frontline States
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
ISDSC	Inter-state Defence and Security Committee
MDP	Mutual Defence Pact
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	The Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SSF	SADC Standby Force
UN	United Nations
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front

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INTRODUCTION

1.1. Identification of Research Theme

The concept of "security community" was first coined by Deutsch (1957). Security communities can be defined as a group of people who have become integrated within a region that holds a sense of unity and solidarity strong enough to ensure long-term dependable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch 1957: 5). Security communities can be understood as political communities which have reached a degree of integration that allows for rules of enforcement, habits of compliance and a sense of community present in all institutions and practices (Ditrych 2014: 351). The framework on security communities was developed by Deutsch (1957) to understand the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which had begun exhibiting new forms of institutions and institutionalisation in its practices. Key characteristics of NATO which reflected its development into a security community, included shared and mutual values, mutual responsiveness that fostered a sense of trust and sympathy, the rise of a core state within the community, a wide range of mutual transactions and superior mutual economic growth (Deutsch 1957: 133-144). The characteristics of NATO underpinned the security community framework laid out by Deutsch (1957).

SADC is ideally placed to be understood and analysed by the security community framework as the region has, over the last 30 years, exhibited aims, objectives and traits that characterise a security community. The Treaty of SADC clearly reflects this as it outlines that the region aims to "work out and adopt a framework of cooperation that provides for deeper economic integration, common economic, political and social values and strengthened regional solidarity" (SADC 1993: 4-5). This indicates that SADC can be understood as more than just a political community as it has deepened the extent to which integrated practices and institutions have been developed. SADC is also ideally placed to be understood by this framework as it has demonstrated mutual responsiveness towards regional security. Although SADC has exhibited some level of integration, the degree to which this has been successful in achieving security community status still leaves much to be desired in terms of analysis and understanding.

1.2. Literature Review

A very brief overview of the most important and comprehensive work related to SADC from the perspective of security community theory is presented in this section. The literature review is discussed in chronological order and tracks the earliest literature put forth in 1997 until the most recent literature in 2013. No relevant literature and research has been published since 2013 on the development of SADC into a security community. The theoretical frameworks on security community theory are not considered in this overview as they will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this dissertation. A discussion of existing theoretical frameworks on security communities will allow for an analytical framework for analysing SADC to be constructed that will aid in identifying the challenges and weaknesses facing the region in attaining security community status. In this regard, the study will depend heavily on the pathbreaking work of Deutsch (1957) and later refinement of and contributions to security community-building by scholars such as Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2001), Bellamy (2004) and Nathan (2006a).

There are several bodies of literature which have laid the foundation for this study. The first work done on SADC's emergence as a security community was offered by Van Aardt in 1997. This literature emphasised that SADC has started to prioritise regional cooperation as a means through which national and regional security could be addressed and thus has begun emerging as a regional security community (Van Aardt 1997: 2). The launch of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) by SADC at the Gaborone conference in 1996 is identified as the first signal of SADC's evolution towards a security community in this study. This is because the development of the Organ reflected a new structuring of SADC's security arrangement which exhibited the institutionalisation of security (Van Aardt 1997: 15). The work published by Van Aardt (1997) served as the basis upon which further studies on SADC's development into a security community would be founded. Van Aardt's (1997) publication was supported by the literature presented by Zacarias (1998) which reaffirmed that SADC had started to demonstrate an evolution into a security community. This study supported the notion that the development of the Organ served as clear evidence that SADC was starting to emerge as a security community as it reflected a coherent framework for security (Zacarias 1998: 47). Zacarias (1998) built on the work introduced by Van Aardt (1997) in that he stated that SADC still had key variables to take into consideration in its

development into a security community. These variables included power as a means through which social cohesion is acquired, the fear of dominance by stronger states and the reluctance to relinquish sovereignty and interdependence between SADC members (Zacarias 1998: 49-52). Zacarias (1998) highlighted key areas that constituted potential threats that could weaken SADC's development into a security community.

Neethling (2003) added to this in that he also identified the structural weaknesses within the institutions of SADC, particularly in the Organ, as a potential threat to the development of SADC into a security community. This study identified that failures related to the functioning of the Organ were limiting SADC's successful evolution into a security community as it was negatively impacting the development of common values and interests. An example of this failure identified by this research was the fact that SADC members were unwilling to criticise the Zimbabwean government for their violation of human rights and their defying of the rule of law (Neethling 2003: 9). The potential problems identified by Zacarias (1998) and Neethling (2003) were agreed upon by Nathan (2004a; 2004b) whose work examined the key challenges hindering SADC's development into a security community. In 2004 (and later in 2006), Nathan produced two related articles that highlighted that the theoretical work done on security communities had neglected to acknowledge the impact of internal instability on security communities and this was one of the key factors hindering the progress of SADC (Nathan 2004a: 3). In these studies, Nathan (2004a; 2006a) reiterated that the prevalence of internal instability and conflict within the SADC region was continuing to undermine SADC's development into a security community. This is because internal instability and conflict contributed to restricting the aggregation of mutual trust and a common identity which served as one of the main requirements for a security community (Nathan 2004a: 14). Nathan followed with two further studies, also in 2004 and 2006, which built upon his first set of publications in that it identified the absence of common values, the hesitance to surrender sovereignty and weak states as further challenges which were limiting SADC's development into a security community (Nathan 2004b: 1). These works stressed that common values between members was a crucial aspect of security communities and the division between authoritarian and democratic regimes that were present in Southern Africa was preventing them from being attained (Nathan 2004b: 3). Furthermore, Nathan (2006b) also identified that most Southern African states

were reluctant to give up their sovereignty to a regional body as they had only recently overcome and defeated oppressive regimes and colonial powers (Nathan 2006b: 618).

Ngoma (2005) concurs with the challenges facing SADC as presented by Nathan (2004 and 2006) but also acknowledged that SADC had made significant strides in its shift towards developing into a security community. This research suggested that SADC had surpassed the first tier of security community development as theorised by Adler and Barnett (1998). This tier identified a wide range of push and pull factors that encourage and lead states into forming an alliance. This was demonstrated by SADC in that push and pull factors present in the region included developments in technology as well as the development of mutual external threats (Ngoma 2005: 53). This publication pointed out that SADC was still grappling with meeting the criteria of the second tier of security community development as the region was struggling to centre the security community around a core power and to develop legitimate shared institutions (Ngoma 2005: 55). Franke (2008) echoed the work of Ngoma in that this work maintained that SADC had reflected increasing regional cooperation in pursuit of development into a functioning security community.

The contribution of Franke (2008) added to previous literature as this research pointed out that the increase in military cooperation addressing regional security threats served as further evidence that SADC was continuing to emerge as a security community. As highlighted by the literature discussed above, numerous scholars had identified that regional integration was becoming increasingly prominent in the SADC region. The work developed by Chingono and Nakana (2009) resonated with this sentiment but proposed that there were significant internal challenges within the SADC region continuing to impede SADC's development into a security community. This study identified these challenges as a lack of infrastructure amongst SADC members, debt and dependency on the West, the presence of poor economic and political governance throughout Africa, institutional incapacity as well as slow economic growth (Chingono & Nakana 2009: 402).

The work published by previous scholars was further supported by Nathan in 2012. Nathan (2012) confirmed that the internal challenges which were present in the SADC region were reflected by the ongoing conflict and civil wars which have persisted in the region since its inception (Nathan 2012: 133). This research further reaffirmed that domestic instability was limiting SADC's

evolution into a security community as it was preventing cooperative relations needed for a functioning security community. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, an expert on SADC, agreed with the work of his peers in 2012 in which he put forth a study that highlighted that the development of SIPO reflected a shift towards a security community by SADC (Van Nieuwkerk 2012: 10). His work identified that SIPO was successful in that it allowed for the building of trust and confidence which characterised security communies however also faced significant shortcomings in its implementation (Van Nieuwkerk 2012: 12).

The 2013 article by Africa and Molomo serves as the most recent work on SADC's emergence into a security community and built upon the body of literature that preceded it. This study made clear that the consistent increase in regional cooperation and the regionalisation of security can be explained by Southern Africa's development into a cohesive regional security community. Africa and Molomo (2013) explained that the SADC region has demonstrated peaceful relations, a shared desire to address regional security threats and to some extent mutually shared values. However, this research stressed that key challenges preventing SADC from developing into a functional security community included a lack of political will, intra-state instability, state disintegration and insufficient capacity (Africa and Molomo 2013: 21). The contribution of Africa and Molomo illustrates a need for a more recent and updated study on SADC's evolution into a security community to be conducted as it was published close to a decade ago.

1.3. Formulation and Demarcation of Research Problem

SADC is approaching the 30-year mark of its existence which calls for a review of the region's progress to be explored. The region has exhibited a shift towards development into a security community aimed at using regional integration to combat the challenges facing Southern Africa. However, since its inception, SADC has demonstrated shortcomings in its response to regional security challenges which is owed to the fact that various challenges continue to hinder and limit the strengthening of SADC as a security community.

This study hypothesises that for SADC to respond to regional security threats successfully and effectively it would need to overcome the obstacles impeding its development into a security

community. Therefore, for SADC to be successful in addressing regional security threats, it would need to make significant strides in intensifying its development into a regional security community. This research aims to provide an analysis of SADC's development and evolution into a security community over the last 30 years to identify where SADC is facing challenges in its development into a functional security community. This study will analyse the extent to which SADC has developed into a security community by looking at the successes achieved by the region along with the obstacles faced by SADC in its pursuit of regional integration.

1.4. Research Questions

The main research question that this study will seek to answer is as follows: How has SADC's development over the last 30 years reflected a shift towards SADC developing into a security community and what obstacles are hindering its progress in pursuit of regional integration?

Stemming from and building upon the main research question of this mini-dissertation, this paper aims to address the following sub-questions:

- How have security communities been defined and what are the notable characteristics and traits that underpin them?
- What key developments have been demonstrated by SADC that signal a shift towards a security community?
- Why has SADC experienced limited success in its development into a security community?
- How can SADC address the challenges limiting its evolution into a security community and in turn its response to regional security threats?

1.5. Research Methodology

This study is qualitative in nature and makes use of a descriptive-analytic research design that employs a deductive approach. The use of this research design will aid in identifying key characteristics and trends that relate to SADC's development into a security community as well as

will help to trace its background and evolution. Furthermore, this research design will be useful in identifying what previous research has suggested regarding SADC's progress in developing into a security community and how SADC has reflected successes and failures in this regard.

The use of both primary and secondary sources will be present in this study. The primary sources used in this study include official SADC policy documents and treaties in which SADC has been involved and/or has ratified. All primary sources have been obtained from the official SADC website, official government websites and other electronic media. Furthermore, all primary sources are available in the public domain. The secondary sources which have been utilised in this study include journal articles, statistical data and books related to SADC as a security community as well as regional security threats. This data has been acquired through libraries and accredited online repositories. Both the primary and secondary sources have been selected based on their falling in the date range from 1992-2021. Content analysis will be employed to analyse all data used in this study which will allow for patterns and trends to be identified that signal SADC's shift towards security community status. This form of analysis allows for the description of ideas related to SADC as a security community to be unpacked and understood. The analysis of all data used in this study will maintain the consistent acknowledgement of sources to adhere to basic research ethics and uphold the integrity of all authors cited in this study.

The value of making use of qualitative research in this study is that it allows for a meaningful insight into SADC as a security community to be understood and developed. Furthermore, the research methodology employed in this study also allows for the generation of innovative ideas related to SADC as a security community and leaves a gap in which further research on the topic can be done. Limitations of the research methodology used in this study include the fact that although primary sources are used, in the form of policy documents, no first-person accounts of the development of SADC into a security community are utilised. Furthermore, although the study does make use of both primary and secondary sources, most of the sources used are secondary sources. In addition, the central theoretical frameworks upon which this study is based are Western in nature and this can create difficulties in its application to SADC.

1.6. Rationale of the Research

The first rationale for this study is centred around the fact that 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of SADC and therefore offers an opportunity to review how far SADC has come regarding developing into a security community. As pointed out in the Literature Review (1.2), no attention has been paid to SADC as a security community since 2013. Most analyses appearing after 2013 focus on specific aspects of regionalisation in functional terms, especially related to industrialisation and trade relations. This study, therefore, has the potential to contribute to the literature on SADC's quest for building a security community. Secondly, this study is based upon the fact that in the last several years no detailed study on SADC as a security community has been done and therefore an updated study of SADC and its current development into a security community would constitute a contribution to the scholarship on the topic of regional integration in Southern Africa. This is reflected in the fact that the last significant work on SADC as a security community was conducted in 2013 by Africa and Molomo. The third key motivation behind this study is that there is ongoing and persisting instability within SADC states which has created security threats for the region. This includes present-day conflict in Mozambique and Eswatini. The need for SADC to evolve into a stronger and more effectively functioning security community to be better equipped to deal with these regional security threats is reflected in the persistence of the ongoing conflict in the region.

1.7. Structure of the Research

The first chapter of this mini-dissertation has outlined the aims and objectives of my study, as well as the limitations. This chapter has also provided a literature review of what other key scholars have said about SADC's development into a security community. The second chapter of this study focuses on providing an in-depth review of the theoretical scholarship of regional security communities to develop an analytical framework through which SADC will be analysed and understood in later chapters. This chapter will make use of the theoretical work on security communities submitted by Deutsch (1957), Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2001), Bellamy

(2004) and Nathan (2006a). The third chapter of this study will trace SADC's evolution over the last 30 years and review the key developments in SADC's history and important policies and protocols produced by SADC which have signalled the shift towards a security community. This chapter provides a brief contextualisation of the instability and conflict in Mozambique and Eswatini as the main case studies of this research. The fourth chapter of this mini-dissertation will serve as the analysis section of the study. This chapter will address the central regional security threats that SADC has faced over the last 30 years which has impacted security community development. This chapter will focus on assessing the successes and failures exhibited by the SADC Organ, policies and protocols and SADC threat response in Mozambique and Eswatini to determine the key obstacles hindering the development of the region into a security community. The concluding chapter of this study will identify the key reasons behind SADC falling short in security community development and will propose areas in which SADC can address these challenges. This chapter will also suggest areas for future research on SADC as a security community.

CHAPTER 2:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

2.1. Introduction

The notion of security communities was first conceptualised in 1957 by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues who made use of the idea and definition proposed by Van Wagenen in 1952 (Franke 2008: 314). This study served as the seminal work upon which security communities would be theorised and analysed as well as laid the foundation for the further framing and refinement of security communities. Although the work of Deutsch reflected ground-breaking research, the understanding and study of the concept halted for several years as the study was conducted during the Cold War (Tusicisny 2007: 426). As such, in the Post-Cold War era, there was a renewed interest and need for research related to security communities to be conducted which accounted for new developments in Europe and the international political arena. As such, a large body of work on security communities was produced in subsequent years.

The chapter will present the theoretical frameworks, upon which this study is based, to create an analytical framework to analyse SADC in this study. The first section unpacks how security communities are defined, as well as how this concept differs from that of collective security and security complexes. This chapter will then put forward an in-depth literature review on the theoretical frameworks of security communities developed by Deutsch (1957), Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2001), Bellamy (2004) and Nathan (2006a). The closing section summarises the merits of each of these frameworks and how they will be adapted as an analytical framework to be used in this study. Finally, the chapter concludes with an explanation of how this research fits in with the theoretical work which has been done on security communities.

2.2. Forms of Regional Security Cooperation

Although the focus of this study is on the concept of security communities, various scholars have offered contrasting models of regional security integration. Security communities are often confused and conflated with security complexes and collective security. As such, it is imperative to unpack each of these concepts and their distinguishable characteristics. Through a discussion of

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collective security and security complexes, a comprehensive definition of security communities, which this study will make use of, can be established.

The concept of security complexes was put forth by Buzan in 1983 and emerged from a Neo-Realist perspective through the development of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Security complexes can be defined as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be understood apart from one another" (Buzan and Waever 2003: 44). This definition reflects a state-centric approach in which the security of the state is the main priority. A distinguishing feature of security complexes is that the cooperation of members is framed by the mutual fear of violence in political relations (Walsh 2020: 304). This mutual fear sparks expectations of and preparations for war.

Security complexes are underpinned by three key variables. The first key characteristic relates to the boundary that outlines the community (Buzan and Waever 2003: 45). Geographical proximity stimulates interaction between neighbouring states, which leads to similarities in security concerns. For security complexes, adjacency between member states is key because threats are more likely to travel over short distances. Therefore, commonality in security interests is more likely to exist (Buzan and Waever 2003: 46). The second variable is the anarchic structure and the distribution of power through which security complexes arise. Due to the unequal distribution of power of states within a geographic region, violence and conflict is often created (Buzan and Waever 2003: 46). This is because the unequal distribution of power can result in the domination of weaker states by "superpower states" which leads to unhappiness, dissatisfaction and inevitably stimulates the outbreak of conflict. As such, security complexes exist to prevent insecurity threats created by unequal power relations and the absence of a supreme authority by establishing security interdependence and aggregating the security interests of member states (Buzan and Waever 2003: 47).

The last key aspect of a security complex is the patterns of amity and enmity that exist among the units of the regional grouping. A significant consequence of the unequal balance of power that exists within a security complex is that interactions which take place can be premised on friendship or fear (Bailes and Courtney 2006: 199). Interactions based on friendship (amity) or developed out

of fear (enmity) allow for the emergence of common security interests, security interdependence within the complex, and cooperation between strong and weak states within a geographic region (Buzan and Waever 2003: 49).

Collective security can be defined as a formal commitment of states to a joint system of security that reflects aggregated security interests over a prolonged period (Aleksovski et al 2014: 274). One of the key traits of collective security systems is that they involve a legally binding agreement that is governed by a legitimate international organisation such as the United Nations (UN) (Jordaan 2017: 163). This model of regional security cooperation, therefore, requires all states involved to give up a portion of their sovereignty to the governing body to allow for the enforcement of norms and rules within the system. Another distinguishing characteristic is that collective security arrangements implement a rule-based system that restricts the use of military action by one member on another, unless in the event of self-defence (Jordaan 2017: 164). This rule-based system also enforces collective action when any threat is posed to any fellow member state by a non-member of the alliance. The rules and principles upon which collective security is based are enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which outlines the norms that a collective security arrangement follows to mitigate and prevent war and the outbreak of violence (Aleksovski et al 2014: 276). Collective security differs from a security complex in that it is not based on and determined by unequal and competing power relations. Security complexes anticipate the domination of one member by another whereas collective security limits the abuse of unequal power relations to create security interdependence.

Deutsch defined security communities as " a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time" (Deutsch et al 1957: 33). This definition highlights that a sense of community is needed to constitute the formation of a security community that is founded upon shared values and identities (Koschut 2014: 2). A distinguishable characteristic of security communities, which is not evident in collective security and security complexes, is the fact that security communities move away from a state and military-centric focus. This is because security communities are formed through increased social

interactions and shared knowledge which fosters the mutual trust needed to create integration (Ngoma 2003: 19). Another key aspect of this form of regional security cooperation is the fact that security communities exist on the premise that members of the grouping do not have any expectations of violence in any of their interactions and relations (Walsh 2020: 304). Therefore, security communities are based on the notion that all conflict be resolved through non-violent means and relations maintain expectations of peaceful change (Adler 1998: 167). Security communities differ from security complexes in that it involves a much deeper level of integration needed to develop collective identities to eliminate the prospect of war, unlike security complexes that expect and plan for the rise of violent conflict. Collective security systems also differ from security communities in that cooperation is based on prescribed rules and norms. In a security community cooperation is dependent on a shared identity, trust, and sympathy that members have for one another. This definition of security communities serves as the foundation upon which all frameworks, which will be discussed in the next section, have stemmed from.

2.3. Theoretical Frameworks on Security Communities

2.3.1. Karl Deutsch: Setting the General Conditions for Security Communities

Karl Deutsch pioneered and developed the first theoretical framework through which security communities could be understood and analysed. The historical context in which his work on regional integration was conducted is important: it followed the devastation of the Second World War and a search for lasting peace in Europe. As discussed above, Deutsch's framework for security communities was dependent on the absence of the expectation of war and violence within a political community, which is needed to foster a culture of mutual trust and sympathy (Ditrych 2014: 351). The definition of security communities put forward by Deutsch (1957) focused on long-term expectations of peaceful change within a community and the notion that disputes will be resolved through non-violent means (Deutsch et al 1957: 117). Long-term expectations of peaceful change are created through complex and ongoing interactions and communication among a political community in the pursuit of resolving common social problems (Ngoma 2005: 43). A security community according to Deutsch, therefore, reflects a closeness at the structural and personal level which aims to achieve peaceful co-existence within a regional grouping.

In his work, Deutsch observed two types of security communities. The first type is an amalgamated security community which refers to the formal unification of independent states into a larger grouping that is governed by some form of government (Deutsch et al 1957: 6). The United States constitutes an example of this type of security community. Pluralistic security communities, on the other hand, were the second type and refer to groupings in which states become integrated but still maintain separate and sovereign governments (Tusicisny 2007: 426). Such communities constitute a form of deep regional integration. An example of this type of security community is the European Union (EU). This research will focus on the development of SADC as a pluralistic security community rather than an amalgamated form of integration.

Deutsch's work aimed to identify the general conditions essential to the development of a pluralistic community and why the meeting of these conditions was important. Deutsch identified two essential conditions needed in the development of a security community as well as twelve conditions that were not critical but proved helpful. It is important to note that the meeting of the essential conditions for a security community can be done in any order but at some point, both need to be realised for a security community to be successful (Deutsch et al 1957: 121). Furthermore, the attainment of one condition does not necessarily lead to another condition being met. As such, the acquirement of one condition may demonstrate progress but may not result in ultimate success.

The two conditions essential to the development of a security community, identified by Deutsch, are the compatibility of major values, as well as mutual responsiveness. To allow for integration to take place there needs to be compatibility of major values that are held by all units of the security community. This means that all values which are considered important to the units involved in a security community need to be considered and held in high regard in all relations between the states (Deutsch et al 1957: 123). These main values are firstly, but not limited to, basic political ideology. For states to become integrated into a security community there needs to be a consensus regarding the accepted political ideology of the grouping (Deutsch et al 1957: 124). Oftentimes the mutually accepted political ideology is democracy and constitutionalism. Deutsch implies here that states with diverging political ideologies and beliefs cannot be properly integrated as it could create conflict and the potential for violence to break out. The second main value is

economic in nature and refers to the compatibility of the economic systems of each state. Two conflicting systems of economic beliefs and organisation cannot be integrated as they have contradicting economic and financial priorities for the different states involved in the pursuit of building a security community (Deutsch et al 1957: 124). For example, a state that prioritises a free economy cannot be integrated with a state that enforces a nationalised economy, as these differences will not foster the sense of community needed to develop and maintain a security community. At a practical level, it would impede economic cooperation. Thirdly, religion can also serve as one of the main values that need to be integrated within a security community. However, this value is not held at the same level of importance as political and economic ideology, as oftentimes people and states with different dominant religions can peacefully co-exist and develop a collective identity.

The second essential condition is mutual responsiveness, which can be defined as reciprocated communication, perception of needs, and action toward the needs of the member states of a security community (Deutsch et al 1957: 129). Mutual responsiveness is dependent on the attainment of a mutual "we-feeling," i.e., a sense of identity, among a community that fosters trust and sympathy between the members (Deutsch et al 1957: 131). This sense of identity in terms of belonging to a community is crucial to ensure that all members of a security community can predict each other's behaviour, which can ensure dependable expectations of peaceful change. Mutual responsiveness is dependent on social learning and thus constant communication and interaction within a security community are essential. An ongoing learning process is needed to ensure peaceful change and create a culture of "keeping in touch" that prevents unlearning (Deutsch et al 1957: 130).

Along with the essential conditions for a pluralistic security community, Deutsch also identified twelve other non-essential but helpful conditions. The first of these conditions is a distinctive way of life. Security communities need to develop a set of established institutions, values, and norms to create mutual habits that are adopted by all members of the community. Secondly, integration can be promoted and strengthened by the development of a strong nucleus or centre within a security community that holds strong capabilities and capacities integral to maintaining peaceful change and security. The third condition refers to steady economic growth. This is because

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stagnant and declining economic growth has proven to be a trigger for disintegration. Fourth, the strengthening of a security community can be fostered by the belief in joint economic reward as it will make members more active and willing to participate in the community. A fifth condition that stimulates the development of a security community is a wide range of transactions including face-to-face interactions, written messages as well as the collaboration of governmental and non-governmental organisations. The next non-essential condition is the broadening of elites, which refers to the expansion of elites at the political, social, and economic levels. This expansion refers to the broadening of interactions between elites with members of other social strata as well as the cultivation and maintenance of these connections. Seventh, the links of social communication aid in the development of a security community as they provide effective channels of communication and involve both individual people as well as organisations within the security community. The eighth non-essential condition is greater mobility of people, which allows for the spread of social knowledge and facilitates more personal contact and communication. The last four non-essential conditions do prove to be helpful in the development of a security community, though of less importance than the previous eight conditions that have been mentioned. These four conditions are a reluctance to wage war, the absence of an outside military threat, strong economic ties among the units of the security community, and lastly a common language and ethnicity (Deutsch et al 1957: 133-158).

Although the framework produced by Deutsch reflected ground-breaking findings on security communities, his work has faced several critiques which created the platform for further work and research to be done in this field. The framework on security communities created by Deutsch was developed as a response to the formation of NATO and as such his framework was criticised for being too Western-centric (Ngoma 2005: 45). As a result of the Western-centric nature of Deutsch's model, the adaptability of his security community framework to developing countries has proven to be difficult. Thus, there was room for further research to be conducted that focused on how this framework could be adapted to developing countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The second critique Deutsch's framework faced was centred around the context in which it was developed. Deutsch's research was formulated and produced during the Cold War and as such its relevance in the post-Cold War era was questioned (Vesa 1999: 3). This criticism was further compounded by the fact that research on security communities remained dormant for

several decades after Deutsch's work was produced which created the gap in which the framework by Adler and Barnett (1998) was developed.

2.3.2. Adler and Barnett's Framework for the Study of Security Communities

The framework put forward by Adler and Barnett (1998) demonstrated a revival of the research produced by Deutsch. Adler and Barnett (1998) aimed to address the shortcomings and critiques of Deutsch's work which became known as well as to provide further evidence on and strengthen the findings of Deutsch (Ditrych 2014: 353). Although Adler and Barnett aimed to further the research of Deutsch, they also aimed to propose some modifications and additions to Deutsch's framework which would counteract some of the difficulties Deutsch's work presented. These modifications and additions include the differentiation between tightly and loosely coupled security communities, the construction of a three-tier framework that outlines the evolution of a security community as well as three phases that track and measure the development of a security community (Franke 2008: 315).

Adler and Barnett built on Deutsch's categorisation of security communities in that they identified two ideal types of pluralistic security communities. The first type is loosely coupled security communities which only meet the minimal defining properties and do not go any further (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). These security communities demonstrate shared meanings and collective identities but only in the interest of maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change and to prevent any acts of aggression within the community (Ngoma 2005: 50). Tightly coupled security communities constitute the second type and are more demanding in what they require from members of the community. These communities reflect a "mutual aid" society in which all members construct a collective system (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Furthermore, this type of security community also enforces a system of rule that takes the form of a centralised collective security system that has common institutions. Although loosely and tightly coupled security communities differ in the demands each has on its member states, both types are dependent on social transactions that produce dependable expectations of peaceful change. The emphasis on lasting peace, as originally conceived by Deutsch, therefore, remains at the core of Adler and Barnett's work.

The three-tier framework for the study of security communities, produced by Adler and Barnett (1998), focuses on factors that contribute to peaceful change being attained. The first tier of this framework is concerned with the precipitating conditions that cause states to start engaging with one another and to organise their relations (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38). The conditions which spark engagement between states include developments in technology, economics, and the environment, new interpretations, and understandings of social reality, as well as the rise of an external threat (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38). These conditions prompt states to relook at their policies, which would evoke a change in their policies to work with states that share mutual interests. The presence of these precipitating conditions encourages and fosters ongoing interaction between states that create the foundation upon which mutual trust and sympathy can be created. Furthermore, these conditions create an incentive for states to have increased interactions and start to formulate new social connections (Adler and Barnett 1998: 39).

The second tier is defined by the fact that states have now become accustomed to ongoing social interactions aimed at changing the environment in which they are rooted (Adler and Barnett 1998: 39). This tier is further characterised by the relationship between structure and process. Structure refers to power and knowledge that structurally guide the development of security communities in that it fosters collective identity and mutual trust (Adler and Barnett 1998: 41). The process aspect of this tier focuses on transactions, social learning, and international organisations. These processes contribute to the development of mutual trust as international organisations encourage interactions and establish norms that strengthen and promote social learning which is crucial to the development of a security community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 42). At this level, the focus is on strengthening the interactions created in the first tier by prioritising the factors conducive to these interactions that aid in the development of mutual trust and collective identity.

The final tier of this framework focuses on strengthening the mutual trust and collective identity produced in tier two, which serve as the necessary conditions needed for dependable expectations of peaceful change to be achieved (Adler and Barnett 1998: 46). This trust and collective identity allow for mutual identification which drives security community development. Trust and collective identity need to be continuously strengthened and maintained to not allow the security

community to disintegrate. This tier reflects an ongoing process reliant on interactions that strengthen trust and identity.

Along with the three-tier framework used to understand security communities, Adler, and Barnett (1998) also developed and outlined three phases of development that align with each of the tiers in the framework. The nascent phase constitutes the start of security community development and is linked to the first tier of the framework. In this phase, there is no explicit desire to create a security community but an exploration of how to coordinate relations in the pursuit of mutual security and to promote further engagement and interaction is present (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). The second phase is the ascendant phase, which reflects a rise and development in the security community. This phase relates to the second tier of the framework in that it demonstrates the emergence of patterns of interactions and institutions that promote these interactions (Ngoma 2005: 49). At this level, mutual trust and collective identities begin to form and the priority is to strengthen them. The final phase is the mature phase, which relates to the third tier of Adler and Barnett's framework. In this phase, all actors within the security community share an identity and peaceful change comes into existence as well as the security community itself (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). Furthermore, at this level, members of the security community find it difficult to make use of violence or war against other members of the community.

Much like Deutsch, the framework and findings produced by Adler and Barnett (1998) also faced significant criticism. The first critique of their framework is that although it placed focus on the conditions and factors needed to prompt and maintain a security community, no attention was afforded to the factors that could potentially threaten and disintegrate the security community (Tusicisny 2007: 429). This is because Adler and Barnett's framework takes for granted that all interactions reflect a positive dynamic and does not consider the possibility that interactions can be negative in nature and thus have a disintegrative effect on a security community. Secondly, Wiberg (2000) noted that Adler and Barnett's framework did not pay attention to key aspects of identity, namely language and religion, and the impact they can have on security communities (Wiberg 2000: 296). This study identified this critique by applying Adler and Barnett's framework to the security community development of the Nordic region. In the case of the Nordic states, the existence of a common language and religion allowed for easier meaningful interaction to take

place that played a key role in security community development. This demonstrates that interaction is not the only way to develop a shared identity and that alternative routes to a collective identity have been neglected by this framework. Thirdly, Adler and Barnett's framework also focused on a state-centric model of security, which implies that conflict is limited to inter-state conflict. Wiberg (2000) highlighted that the first tier of Adler and Barnett's framework only made specific mention of external threats as a stimulus for engagement and interaction (Wiberg 2000: 293). As such, this serves as a further critique of their framework as it does not account for the fact conflict is often intra-state in nature which also creates limitations for the adaptability of this framework to developing countries. The work of Adler and Barnett (1998) reflected a significant development in the literature on security communities but still left room for further research as there were still key areas that had not been addressed.

2.3.3. Acharya: Constructing Security Communities

Amitav Acharya (2001) produced the first significant work that attempted to apply the frameworks of Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) to security communities in developing countries, namely to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). His study was developed in response to the critique that Deutsch's work was Western-centric and aimed to fill that gap with his research on security communities (Franke 2008: 316). Acharya's work served as the foundation upon which the development of security communities in Africa could be understood in later research. Much like Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya also put forward a definition of security communities and identified the key elements needed for the formation and development of a security community. However, Acharya built upon the work of his predecessors in that his framework focused on the decline of security communities and what factors could have a disintegrative effect on security communities, an aspect discussed below.

Acharya's framework adapted the definition of security communities put forward by Deutsch in that he agreed that security communities reflect a group that has become integrated and has developed dependable expectations of peaceful change (Acharya 2001: 16). He identified two primary features of a pluralistic security community. The first feature is the absence of war, and this refers to the absence of any form of military or organised violence within the territory of the

community (Acharya 2001: 16). However, this absence of war does not imply that there are no differences, disagreements, or conflicts present among the members of the community. What is crucial is that any conflicts or disagreements that arise are managed in such a manner that prevents violence in the most peaceful way possible. The second feature key to security communities, identified by this framework, is the absence of notably organised preparations for war or violence by any member of the security community (Acharya 2001: 17). This means that because the phenomenon of war and violence is deemed to be illegitimate, any form of competitive military development and the build-up of arms involving members of the security community should cease to exist. As such, the attainment of any security community can be evaluated against the existence or lack thereof of any formal preparations for war and the acquiring of weapons (Acharya 2001: 17).

The Deutschian framework on security communities placed heavy emphasis on the role that transactions play in the construction of security communities. Although the literature presented by Acharya agreed with this, it highlighted that the role other elements of society play in the formulation of a security community should also be prioritised. The elements focused upon in this study were institutions, norms, and identity. The development of a security community may also bring about the formation of multilateral institutions that serve to reinforce the links and connections present within the security community. Multilateral institutions, although not a prerequisite, provide a framework that is conducive to the strengthening and development of security communities (Acharya 2001: 22). This is because multilateral institutions can significantly contribute to the mitigation of conflict, the stimulation of cooperation as well as ensures the loyalty and compliance of all states in the community. Furthermore, institutions outline and set the norms for the regional culture and conduct of a security community and promote social learning which contributes to the strengthening of mutual trust and values (Acharya 2001: 23). Norms are relied upon by all forms of communities as they prescribe and regulate the behaviour of states which need to be followed. This is important to the development of a security community as it contributes to the identity of the community and provides a framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Acharya 2001: 24). The third key element identified by Acharya (2001) is the notion of identity. Security communities demonstrate an exercise in identity building as members exhibit common values and attributes that allow for mutual responsiveness (Acharya

2001: 27). The establishment of a collective identity is central to the 'we-feeling' needed for the attainment of a security community. Collective identities are promoted through social interactions and socialisation as it allows for common interests to be realised, which leads to integration.

The framework on security communities put forward by Acharya differed from that of earlier scholars as it drew attention to the decline of security communities. This aspect of Acharya's work stemmed from the three phases of development put forward by Adler and Barnett (1998). Each phase of Adler and Barnett's framework exhibited several 'trigger mechanisms' which could stimulate the development of a security community but could also bring about its decline. These "trigger mechanisms" include the perception of threats, expected trade benefits, shared identities, and the emulation of other multilateral organisations in the nascent phase; lessened fears by one and not all members, stronger military coordination, and the transition towards a collective identity in the ascendant phase; a high degree of trust, low probability of military action and greater institutionalised in the mature phase (Acharya 2001: 34-35). To get a security community off the ground, the above "trigger mechanisms" need to be used as ideational triggers. However, these mechanisms can also bring about cataclysmic events that threaten the success of a security community and as such, it is important to manipulate these triggers in a manner that avoids negative effects on the security community emerging (Acharya 2001: 35). Acharya emphasised that a security community can start to disintegrate and unravel due to internal circumstances that stem from within the security community as well as external circumstances that arise from the relations that member states have with non-members of the community. Thus, both the positive and negative impacts of these circumstances need to be understood in the study of security communities (Acharya 2001: 36).

The framework put forward by Acharya (2001) highlights the importance of understanding potential threats and their impacts in the study of security communities. However, although Acharya's framework addressed a gap that existed in the literature of Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998), it continued to leave growth for further research as there was still a need to further understand external threats and how they can be triggered by the neighbours of security communities.

2.3.4. Bellamy: The Relationship between Security Communities and their Neighbours

Alex Bellamy (2004) furthered the research done by the scholars before him in that he put forth a framework that addressed an aspect of security communities that had not been mentioned before. His framework assumed that the socialisation of members of a security community transforms their interactions that extend beyond their fellow community members (Koschut 2014: 5). This is because if a security community practices peaceful conduct between members, they are more likely to employ the same conduct and mindset in transactions with non-members. Bellamy's findings are particularly important as security communities do not exist in isolation and as such, it is important to understand the relationship they have with their neighbours as it reflects the reality in which they exist. The framework produced by Bellamy's research consists of four key areas. The first two areas focus on the ideational aspects of a security community and explore the processes in which the community is constructed (Bellamy 2004: 62). The second two areas probe the physical manifestations of the community as well as the extent to which there is a connection between outsiders and insiders (Bellamy 2004: 62).

The first area of this framework investigates the evolving nature of the "community" aspect of a security community. Security communities are constructed through three sets of social practices; frames that distinguish the community from others, a social abstraction that legitimises the community, and the embedding of the points of reference used in social abstraction into the identity of the community (Bellamy 2004: 54). The justifications and interpretations offered by political entrepreneurs during social abstraction are an ongoing process that is dependent upon the physical actions of states within a security community. As such, a security community's understanding, and conception of itself are constantly changing as the actions of its members are constantly changing (Bellamy 2004: 54). However, although the "community" aspect of a security community is constantly changing, purposive norms and rules are established to help construct a community. These norms and rules ensure that security communities are characterised by identification, moral unity, involvement, and wholeness (Bellamy 2004: 55). This area of the framework, therefore, requires a study of existing discourses on the construction and constitution of communities as well as on the rules and norms adopted.

To place a security community within a broader regional and global context, the second area of this framework focuses on the extent of shared normative content (Bellamy 2004: 56). This aspect of the framework aims to measure how closely the identities, interests, and norms of a security community resonate with regional and global interests. Shared normative content is identified through the discussion of points of similarity and differences that security has with its broader environment (Bellamy 2004: 57). This aspect of the framework also identifies shared normative content through an evaluation of how the security community pursues its goals and how it securitises issues (Bellamy 2004: 57). By placing a security community within a broader regional and global context, the extent to which its interests, identities, values, and norms overlap with its neighbours can be measured.

The third area of Bellamy's framework focuses on investigating the material quality of a security community. Investigating the material quality of a security community refers to assessing the standard and strength of the material aspects of the community, which are made of the economic, social, and institutional ties between member states (Bellamy 2004: 58). This was conducted in a four-part analysis. The first is done through an exploration of how the security community is manifested at the institutional level (Bellamy 2004: 58). The line of inquiry allows for the institutional reach of a security community to be measured. The epistemic community serves as the grounds for the second part of the analysis and is concerned with recognising the depth of epistemic communities that exist within a security community (Bellamy 2004: 58). Thirdly, transversal communities within the security community are assessed to measure the extent to which civil society blurs the boundaries between insiders and outsiders (Bellamy 2004: 59). The final area of analysis explores how institutions, as well as the epistemic and transversal communities of a security community, shape the interests, identities, and actions of all state members.

By building upon this framework's three previously discussed elements, the final area investigates the scope and standard of all relations between insiders of the security community and outsiders (Bellamy 2004: 60). The process of socialisation that developed identities and norms within a security community guides the relations that members have with outsiders, as oftentimes sources of overlap exist. These relations are advanced by bilateral and multilateral relationships that

members of a security community have with non-members. The last element of this framework aims to demonstrate how the links identified in the first three elements shape and guide the behaviour of states within a security community as well as outside its borders.

2.3.5. Nathan: Domestic Instability and Security Communities

This final theoretical framework that this study will make use of was put forward by Laurie Nathan who focused on understanding security communities in Africa. Nathan's study served as a refinement of the framework put forward by Acharya (2001) and was solely interested in addressing the impact of domestic instability on security community development. He argues that for any grouping to achieve security community status, it must be free of any form of domestic instabilities within the territories of its members (Nathan 2006a: 277). This is because domestic instability leaves states and their people vulnerable, it heightens the risk for destabilisation across borders and leads to tension, uncertainty, and feelings of mistrust among members of a security community (Nathan 2006a: 277). Nathan (2006a) went further and argued that the absence of domestic instability should be a necessary condition of any security community because of the extent to which it impacts success in the development of a security community.

His research identified three key reasons for this claim. The first reason relates to the security of the people, viz. human security. Domestic instability threatens the security of the people within a state and as such threatens the survival of the state (Nathan 2006a: 278). It would therefore not be credible to consider any state part of a security community if its citizens are not secure because of domestic instability. Secondly, domestic instability has a destructive impact on interstate relations. The presence of internal violence inevitable creates the risk for conflict and instability to spill over into neighbouring countries which overall threatens interstate relations (Nathan 2006a: 280). As a result, compromised interstate relations can foster hostilities between states which can prompt rebel attacks and military action by governments. As a result, any form of dependable expectations of peaceful change cannot be attained. Furthermore, domestic instability can impact interstate relations as oftentimes countries are unwilling to address human rights violations taking place in neighbouring countries which further creates feelings of hostilities (Nathan 2006a: 282). Instability at the domestic level often needs collective action to address the conflict which also strains

interstate relations as other countries in the region carry out military action that can have other negative political consequences. The final reason is concerned with the uncertainty and volatility produced by domestic instability. This is because mutual trust and a sense of community require predictability and consistency which cannot be achieved with the presence and persistence of large-scale internal violence (Nathan 2006a: 286). The development of a region into a functional security community is dependent on states being able to predict the behaviour of neighbouring countries which cannot be accomplished if there is ongoing instability at the state level.

2.4. Conclusion

Each of the frameworks discussed above has exhibited key findings which will serve to guide this research. Deutsch's framework developed and outlined the general conditions needed for the attainment of a security community, namely mutual responsiveness, and compatibility of values. Furthermore, Deutsch (1957) also put forward a variety of non-essential conditions that have proven helpful in analysing the development of a security community. Adler and Barnett (1998) furthered the research of Deutsch in that it organised the conditions set by Deutsch into a framework that allows for the development of a security community to be measured according to three tiers and phases of development. Acharya (2001) filled a significant gap in the literature on security communities in that his research prioritised the impacts that internal and external circumstances may have on security communities and how they can lead to the decline of a security community. The framework put forward by Bellamy (2004), was concerned with understanding the relationship that security communities have with their neighbours, what frames their relations, and how this can impact the attainment of a security community. The final framework discussed in this chapter, proposed by Nathan (2006a) focused on unpacking the impact that ongoing violence and instability at the domestic level on security community development, particularly in Africa. The merits of each of these frameworks provide the basis upon which an analytical framework can be formed to be used in this study.

The theoretical frameworks summarised above can be used to develop an analytical framework that serves as the tool to analyse SADC in the succeeding chapters of this research. Although each of these frameworks has exhibited some shortfalls individually, when used together they can

provide a comprehensive lens through which SADC as a security community can be reviewed. The Deutschian framework will be used to trace the conditions critical to a security community that SADC has met over the last 30 years. Deutsch's framework will be used to, not only identify which conditions have been met but also to explore how SADC has met the conditions identified. This will be done through a review of key policy documents and developments in regional security cooperation that have taken place in SADC since its inception. Following the identification of the conditions which SADC has met, the analytical framework employed will make use of Adler and Barnett's three-tier approach to assess the progress SADC has made in pursuit of security community status. To assess SADC's progress and situate the region in Adler and Barnett's three-tier model, this aspect of the analytical framework will unpack the key successes exhibited by SADC as well as how they have contributed to the development of a security community. Furthermore, the successes achieved by SADC will also be used to identify which phase of development SADC can be placed in according to the phases of development put forward by Adler and Barnett. This will be done through an explanation of how SADC has met the conditions with each phase exhibited by its successes. The last aspect of the analytical framework will make use of the work put forward by Acharya (2001) and Nathan (2006a) to analyse the failures that have taken place within SADC. This will be done to understand the impact these failures have had on the development of SADC into a security community as well as how they have had a disintegrative effect. Furthermore, this aspect of the framework will be used to assess how SADC failures have led to domestic instability that has negatively impacted security community development. The framework put forward by Bellamy (2004), although valuable to the body of literature on security communities, will not be used as part of the analytical framework utilised in this study. This is because this study is concerned with the internal circumstances that exist within SADC that have contributed to both their successes and failures. Furthermore, the emphasis of this study is on the internal challenges hindering SADC's realisation of security community status.

The third chapter of this study will make use of the analytical framework discussed above to present an assessment of the key developments that have occurred in SADC that demonstrate the establishment of the region into a security community. This discussion will provide the grounds upon which the key failures and successes exhibited by SADC can be analysed in chapter 4 of this

study that allows the reasons why SADC is falling short in its attainment of security community status to be determined in chapter 5 of this study.

CHAPTER 3:

HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND ON THE EVOLUTION OF SADC

3.1. Introduction

The establishment of The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 marked the first major shift toward a regional security grouping in Southern Africa since the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) in 1975. SADCC laid the grounds upon which regional integration could occur as it represented a joint commitment to political liberation and addressing the most pressing security threats affecting the region. The transformation of SADCC to SADC, in 1992, symbolised a turning point in regional security integration and security community development in Southern Africa. This is because with it came a newfound commitment to improve the quality of life in Southern Africa through the deepening of regional cooperation which would eventually lead to the establishment of a security community. SADC aimed to pursue its development into a security community through the introduction of a wide range of new policies and security mechanisms. The most notable security architecture developed by SADC was the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996. The OPDS, alongside other new policies implemented by SADC, allowed for greater response to regional security threats and subsequently created the potential for improved regional security cooperation and integration. Although the transformation of SADC brought the promise of improved regional stability, economic growth, and quality of life in Southern Africa, there has been limited success in achieving these goals.

Considering the above-mentioned, this chapter aims to provide a historical context and background on the evolution of SADC through a description and assessment of the key developments which have taken place since its inception. The historical context put forward in this chapter will allow for the key characteristics of a security community, that SADC has exhibited, to be assessed as per the analytical framework developed in chapter 2 of this study. This will serve as the basis upon which an analysis of SADC can be carried out in the succeeding chapter of this study which will be used to evaluate why SADC has fallen short in its development into a security community.

The chapter will firstly discuss the transformation of SADC from SADCC and the development of the OPDS. Secondly, this chapter will explore key policy developments which have been

introduced since 1992 namely the SADC Declaration and Treaty (1992), The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (2001), The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) (2003), The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (2004) and The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ I and II (SIPO) (2004 & 2010). Although SADC has carried out a wide range of regional security threat responses since its founding in 1992, the last section of this chapter will focus specifically on unpacking SADC's involvement in resolving the instability taking place in Mozambique and Eswatini.

3.2. Evolution of SADC

This section evaluates the transformation of SADCC to SADC through a discussion of the initial development of SADCC and the causes of the transition. Secondly, this section will unpack the establishment of the SADC Organ.

3.2.1. From SADCC to SADC

The FLS was formed in 1975 as a political response to the persistence of the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the presence of colonial rule in Southern Africa (Hwang 2007: 57). The members of the FLS were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism were the founding values of the FLS with decolonisation being at the centre of its priorities. Destabilising the Apartheid regime and supporting the battle for independence by its member states were the core objectives of the FLS and as such once there was increased political liberation in the region the FLS began its transformation into SADCC. The FLS played a key role in setting the stage for regional cooperation to develop and progress in Southern Africa. Hwang (2007) reiterated that the reason for this was that the FLS outlined the guiding frameworks upon which all future security mechanisms could be developed. The establishment of SADCC reflected the first attempt by the region to address the economic and developmental woes affecting Southern African states to reduce dependence on Apartheid South Africa (Cleary 1999: 2). The SADCC members comprised Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Malebang (2012) states that the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, titled "Southern Africa: First Steps Toward Economic Liberation", officially instituted SADCC and it outlined how the grouping would go about achieving regional liberation. This document placed specific emphasis on cooperation between all states in the pursuit of acquiring resources and in carrying out national and regional projects. Although the Lusaka Declaration formally inaugurated SADCC, it was not legally binding. To encourage unity and cohesion, a commitment by member states toward the peace and security of the region would have to be voluntary and as such this document was not a contractual agreement. One of the main goals of SADCC laid out in the Lusaka Declaration was the "reduction of external dependence and in particular on the Republic of South Africa" (SADCC 1980: 1). Through the boycotting of the Apartheid regime, the region separated itself from South Africa which marked the start of a regional building project. Other objectives of SADCC were concerned with reviving and restoring the transport and telecommunication networks of the region as these sectors played the biggest role in achieving economic liberation (Hwang 2007: 61).

SADCC experienced some success in that they made concerted efforts towards the mobilisation of resources in the interest of security and in securing international investment. By the end of the 1980s, SADCC had managed to obtain $2675 million in investments from the United States and had developed 571 projects (Poku 2014: 103). However, their main object of reducing economic dependence proved to be difficult for SADCC to realise. Cleary (1999) suggests that because most economies in the region were dependent on trade ties with South Africa, economic independence could not be realised without them. Thus, towards the end of 1990, it seemed the unravelling of SADCC would culminate in its dissolution due to its inability to make any significant strides in achieving the core objective of the grouping. However, with the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, there seemed to be a glimmer of hope for SADCC which led to the eventual transformation of the grouping into SADC in 1992.

Unlike SADCC, SADC was officially instituted by a legally binding treaty which was ratified by all its members, and this reflected the first formal security framework in the region. Apart from the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa, the transformation of SADCC into SADC was also ushered in by other factors such as the ending of the Cold War in 1989 and the outbreak of violent

tensions in The Great Lakes region in the 1990s which would inevitably impact peace and stability in Southern African (Van Nieuwkerk 2012: 9).

The main objectives of SADC shifted away from economic dependence and focused on addressing the socio-economic and security issues threatening its member states. According to the SADC Treaty (1993), the focus for the region would broadly be "deeper economic integration, common economic, political, social values and strengthened regional solidarity" (SADC 1993: 4-5). The driving force behind SADC would be the attainment of a "shared future within a regional community (SADC 1993: 5). Integral to this change from SADCC to SADC was the inclusion of the word "community" in the title of the new organisation, indicating the resolve of member states, at least at the time, to build and promote a deeply integrated region. To achieve these objectives, SADC implemented a wide range of new mechanisms and policies to account for its newly expanded agenda which will be discussed in greater detail in the preceding sections of this chapter.

The establishment of SADCC, and later its transformation into SADC, reflected a shift towards security community development in two key ways. Firstly, the name change demonstrated a commitment to regional integration in that the grouping no longer identified itself as a coordination conference but as a security community. The use of the name "community" served as a precipitating condition for the development of a security community, according to the framework developed by Adler and Barnett (1998), as it prompted new policies to be developed that prioritised regional integration. Secondly, the formation of SADCC exhibited an aggregation of common values in that its membership was based on the anti-Apartheid sentiments held by all members. Deutsch (1957) emphasised that a common belief in a "basic political ideology" was essential to security community development. The rejection of Apartheid by the region reflected that democracy was accepted as the common political ideology of SADC. This compatibility of values allows for one of the key conditions for a security community to be met and constitutes the second way in which a shift was reflected.

3.2.2. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (hereafter referred to as the Organ) served as the most notable mechanism implemented by SADC to address regional security issues in the region. It was established on the 28th of June 1996 in Gaborone and was influenced by a new understanding of security in a collective way rather than in a military way (Breytenbach 2000: 87). The Organ conceptualised security through a human-focused lens that prioritised safeguarding the citizens of the region as opposed to military efforts and actions aimed at protecting the state. Structurally, the Organ was implemented to operate independently of all other SADC structures. This was done to ensure that response to regional security issues would be as flexible, timely and effective as possible. Furthermore, the OPDS was made up of two main components; the directorate and the troika both of which report to the SADC summit (SADC 2001: 5). The Organ is led by a chairperson elected on a rotational basis that is tasked with the responsibility of acquiring human and financial resources needed to carry out all tasks. Overall, the general objective laid out for the Organ is "to promote peace and security in the region" (SADC 2001: 3). According to Bekoe (2002), in its establishment, the Organ aimed to fulfil three central purposes: to further regional political cooperation and democracy, to peacefully respond to all regional conflicts and instabilities and to focus on addressing human security needs that arise during the conflict. The functioning of the Organ is guided by the principles outlined in the SADC treaty as it focuses on the peaceful settlement of disputes, the maintenance of the rule of law as well as the prioritisation of human rights, non-interference, and the protection of the sovereignty of member states (SADC 2001: 1).

At the core of the Organ's objectives is collaboration in the realm of defence and security. A report published by the International Crisis Group (2012) identified five categories in which this collaboration could take place: the prevention of crime, intelligence, military cooperation, the development of foreign policy and the preservation and protection of human rights (International Crisis Group 2012: 3). The Organ and its objectives recognised and emphasised the nexus that existed between development and security.

The SADC Organ aimed to carry out its purpose by tackling a wide range of security and defence issues including the peaceful mediation of disputes, protecting the region from internal and

external instabilities, developing a collaborative foreign policy, establishing collaborative security and defence mechanisms, the realisation of long-term sustainable peace and security and the effective coordination in peacekeeping operations (Cilliers 1996: 3).

The establishment of the OPDS constituted a crucial step in the development of SADC into a security community. According to Adler and Barnett (1998), the development of mutual interests would serve as one of the precipitating conditions for interactions to take place that would allow for a region to be placed at the first tier of security community development. The Organ aggregated and outlined the security interests held by the region that served as an incentive for interactions between states to take place. Furthermore, the Organ promoted the notion of collective security that strengthened the creation of a sense of "we-feeling" and togetherness needed for the development of a security community. Both Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasised the importance of mutual trust and sympathy in security community development which the Organ served to achieve through mutual security interests and action. Although the development of the Organ aided in improving SADC's response to regional security issues, it has also experienced significant failures which have negatively impacted security community development.

3.3. Key Policy Documents of SADC

The wide range of policies introduced and implemented by SADC since its inception plays a crucial role in understanding the evolution of SADC. A discussion of key policy developments is needed to conduct an analysis of SADC and its progress in developing into a security community. This section focuses on unpacking five notable policies that have been implemented by SADC that guide all responses to regional security issues.

3.3.1. SADC Declaration and Treaty

The SADC Declaration and Treaty were built upon the Lusaka Declaration of 1980 which governed SADCC and was adapted to accommodate the transition to SADC and account for its new agenda. The SADC Treaty was formally implemented in 1992. When SADCC transitioned

into SADC, the Treaty served as the legally binding document that committed all member states to the regional grouping and the maintenance of peace and security in the region. As such, the Treaty constitutes the most important policy governing SADC as it outlines the principles all member states must abide by and the objectives they are committed to realising. Furthermore, the Treaty provided the basis for the development of all other SADC policies. The signing of the Treaty institutionalised the region which established norms for the functioning of all SADC states. Acharya (2001) noted in his framework the importance of institutions and norms in security community development as it allows for predicted behaviour and in turn, mutual trust can be created. As such, the signing of the Treaty strengthened the SADC's development into a security community as it laid the foundation for norms and behaviours to be implemented that would allow for common values and mutual trust to be established.

The objectives, as outlined in the Treaty, which SADC is committed to achieving include aggregating all policies of member states, the development of human resources, the creation of mechanisms that will allow for the implementation of SADC operations, improving economic performance for the region as a whole and overall harmonisation in all relations between member states (SADC 1993: 6). Other than outlining the rules for conduct for all SADC member states, the treaty also plays a significant role in ratifying how SADC and its institutions are structured and the power afforded to all SADC officials. The rules for conduct constitute the norms that guide how SADC states should interact with one another and as such aid in the development of mutual trust and cooperation. Norms play a crucial role in the development of a security community as they "help to coordinate values among states" (Acharya 2001:24). Therefore, the objectives and principles ratified by the SADC Treaty further the region's pursuit of security community status by enforcing behaviours and values that enable meaningful interactions to take place and a sense of belonging and integration to be created.

Another important aspect of the Treaty is that it regulates the conditions under which sanctions against any member state of SADC can be enforced (SADC 1993: 21). This is an important aspect of the Treaty as it prevents any member state from violating the principles governing SADC such as carrying out violence against one another or infringing on the sovereignty of any member state. According to Deutsch's framework discussed in chapter 2, mutual responsiveness is dependent on

all members of a security community being able to predict each other's behaviour (Deutsch 1957: 129). The fact that the Treaty prohibits SADC states from violating the principles governing the region, there is an expectation held by all members that these pillars will be abided by to avoid facing sanctions. This allows predicted behaviours to be developed as states assume their fellow members will act per the principles outlined in the Treaty which strengthens the development of the "we-feeling" essential to a security community.

The last notable aspect of the Treaty is that it commits the member states to cooperate in a wide range of industries including trade, agriculture, peace and security, infrastructure, natural resources science and technology, information, and culture (SADC 1993: 16). The various industries identified as areas for cooperation in the Treaty are reflective of the needs and changes taking place in SADC member states and constitute the initial conditions, as per Adler and Barnett's framework (2001), needed for engagement to coordination to begin. Therefore, the commitment to cooperation laid out in the Treaty enabled SADC to be placed at the first tier of security community development as it served as a stimulus through which engagement and policy coordination could take place.

3.3.2. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security

The Organ constitutes the mechanism that SADC would use to address all security and defence issues. However, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (hereafter referred to as the Protocol) served as the institutional framework that operationalised the actions and decision-making of the Organ and was established in 2001. The Protocol provided a clear regional cooperation agenda which legitimised the Organ's main objective as the overall promotion of peace and security in Southern Africa.

The objectives of the Organ that were outlined in the Protocol (SADC 2001) were as follows:
- Enhance the regional capacity for disaster management;
- Promote regional collaboration and integration in the realm of security and defence;
- Reinforce treaties on the control of arms and peaceful relations established by international organisations;

- Strengthen the peacekeeping forces of all member states, to co-ordinate relations between the police of all member states to address the issue of border control and to foster a community approach to domestic security;
- Protect and safeguard all members bound by the SADC territory from instability;
- To foster the evolution of common political values, to diffuse and resolve all intra and inter-state conflict;
- Assist and support the establishment of foreign policy approaches to shared issues;
- To ensure that all action follows international law;
- Aid in the development of democratic institutions and practices in all SADC states;
- Aid in the development of a combined security and defence capacity

The strategic objectives laid out in this document highlighted the key areas of focus for the Organ and outlined how the effectiveness and success of the mechanism would be measured. Hammerstad (2003) emphasised that the adoption of the Protocol allowed for the foundation of security integration in SADC to be made official and thus continued to echo the region's commitment to achieving and maintaining peace and security. The prioritisation of peace and security by the Organ reflected a desire by the entire region to enhance collaboration in the pursuit of mutual security interests. The nascent phase of security community development put forward by Adler and Barnett (2001) is characterised by states exploring potential ways to coordinate their interactions to achieve mutual security (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). As such, the strategic objectives laid out in the Protocol stipulate how SADC states can cooperate in the realm of security and allow for the region to exhibit some of the characteristics of the first phase of security community development. This is because solidarity and cooperation in the interest of regional security served as the driving principles underpinning the Protocol.

A key aspect of the Protocol that stood out was the fact that it placed significant focus on prioritising a human security agenda. This mirrors the principles enshrined in the SADC Treaty. This was embedded in the fact that the strategic objectives of the Organ were centred around the use of political, rather than military, solutions in the resolution of instabilities and threats that ensue in the region (Van Schalkwyk 2005: 35). A shift in the focus of security in Southern Africa from the state to the people reinforced that SADC was dedicated to improving the way of life for all

citizens in the region and to deepening regional cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the emphasis on a human security agenda in the Protocol highlighted that human and traditional security work hand in hand and as such addressing one would have a domino effect on the other. Although the Protocol realised a wide range of achievements, it also exhibited some detrimental failures both of which have contributed positively and negatively to the development of SADC as a security community.

3.3.3. Mutual Defence Pact

The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) was established in 2003 and reflected the objectives of the Organ being put into action. It set up a collective security arrangement in the form of a pact that allowed for "mutual cooperation in defence and security matters" (SADC 2003: 2). Most importantly, Article 6 of the MDP outlined the conditions under which a collective response could take place and what constituted a military attack on the region. Ngoma (2004) pointed out that the MDP was motivated by two driving factors. Firstly, the ongoing instability in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) created serious security risks for its neighbouring countries. Angola had just put an end to a 27-year-long civil war, which had severely impacted the country and its citizens, which created a large gap for conflict to endure. Similarly, the DRC was also facing ongoing security challenges created by the presence of armed groups that formed because of the Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994. The situation in both Angola and the DRC threatened the peace and security of the region as it was inevitable that the conflict would spill over into neighbouring countries and that the effects of the instability would be felt by all member states. As such, there was a demand for a collective security arrangement focused on addressing these tensions. The second factor that prompted the need for the MDP was the fact that strain on the sovereignty of some member states of SADC was inevitable as the region consists of diverse power dynamics and military capabilities. An MDP would play a crucial role in preventing SADC states from infringing on and threatening the sovereignty of their fellow members in the pursuit of selfish interests.

The MDP defined an "armed attack" as the use of military force carried out against a state intending to "destabilise" the people, assets, or territory of a particular SADC state (SADC 2003:

2). As such, a multilateral security arrangement was needed to not only allow for a collective response to resolve these instabilities but also to successfully secure all neighbouring states threatened by the conflict. The development of the MDP established an official regional security institution that strengthened the development of SADC into a security community. The importance of institutions in security community development was emphasised by Acharya (2001) as it facilitates increased trust, social learning, and common values. Furthermore, the implementation of the MDP would aid in diffusing internal instabilities and violence at the state level. According to Nathan (2006a), the prevention of domestic instability is essential to the development of a region into a security community. The MDP would aid in addressing local conflicts that threaten the security of the region as a whole and as such play a key role in security community development.

The biggest role that the MDP intended to play was to legitimise that an attack on one member would be deemed an attack on the region as a whole and would immediately be met with joint action (International Crisis Group 2012: 5). The SADC MDP committed all SADC members to two key things; to participate in collective action to combat a threat against one or more member states and to not carry out armed and military attacks against any state in the SADC territory (2003: 3). The pact symbolises a treaty founded on non-aggression, unless in the event of self-defence, which was crucial to the attainment of security integration in SADC. This is because it discouraged any hostile activities in SADC territories and favoured a sense of community existing within the region. The MDP formalised non-aggression as a norm for the region, unless in self-defence, and as such contributed to mutual responsiveness being achieved. This is because all SADC states could predict that they would all act in a way that encompassed the principle of non-aggression needed for mutual responsiveness to take place. Both Deutsch (1957) and Acharya (2001) noted the importance of norms in security community development and the MDP reinforced the guidelines for military action and the principle of non-aggression. Much like the key SADC policies discussed above, The Mutual Defence Pact also faced struggles that had negative consequences on its implementation and the realisation of its objectives.

3.3.4. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was agreed upon in 2001 and approved in 2003 but was only launched in 2004 in Tanzania. It served as an in-depth framework for the development and implementation of regional integration in Southern Africa (SADC 2021a: 12). The initial RISDP was a 15-year plan that would take place from 2005-to 2015 but was revised twice to cover 2015-2020 and thereafter 2020-2030. The establishment of this document and its subsequent revisions aimed at guiding the region towards achieving the SADC Vision 2050. Each revision of this document adjusted the initial framework set out for regional integration to adopt and incorporate the lessons learnt from previous versions.

The RISDP is based upon four founding pillars (SADC 2021a: 13):
- The Foundation: Peace, Security and Governance;
- Industrial development and market integration;
- Infrastructure development in support of regional integration;
- Social and human capital development

The pillar this paper is mostly concerned with is The Foundation: Peace, Security and Governance. The Foundation comprises strategic objectives that are dedicated to achieving the SADC Vision 2050. These objectives are broadly made up of enhanced conflict management and prevention aimed at monitoring and tracking political, socio-economic and security threats, strengthened political cooperation, democracy, and human security, and intensified collective security and defence systems capable of protecting the region from internal and external (SADC 2021a: 47-48).

The RISDP reinforced the principles laid out in Article 4 of the SADC Treaty as well as the objectives and goals of the Organ. Additionally, Chapter 3 of the SADC RISDP (2021a) reiterated that the focus of this policy also included regional development, addressing the socio-economic challenges facing SADC states and ensuring better use of the region's natural resources. A vital role that the RISDP played was establishing a long-term goal for all member states of SADC to work towards and providing guidelines as to how this vision could be realised. The establishment

of the RISDP constituted a development in SADC's security community journey as it outlined clear goals that would aid in the protection of mutual security interests held by the region. This policy would enhance interactions and engagement between SADC states in pursuit of achieving the SADC Vision 2050 which is needed to place the region at the first tier of Adler and Barnett's security community development framework. Furthermore, the long-term nature of the objectives laid out in the RISDP created the belief of joint economic reward as all states were working towards common goals that could improve the financial conditions of all states. Although it is not essential to a security community, Deutsch identified the belief of joint economic reward as one of the non-essential but helpful conditions that aid in the development of a security community (Deutsch 1957: 141). It served as a motivating factor for regional security integration to be deepened within SADC as it committed all member states to long-term mutual interests and activities. Much like the other policy documents discussed above, the RISDP promoted collective security and cooperation that serves to strengthen security community development as it strengthens mutual trust as well as fosters ongoing interactions.

3.3.5. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

The SIPO I was officially instituted in 2004 but was in the works since 2002. It constitutes a five-year strategic plan of action for the implementation of the Protocol broadly focused on security cooperation, state and human security and governance (International Crisis Group 2012: 3). To keep the SIPO relevant and up to date with present-day issues, the ministerial committee of SADC agreed that a review of the SIPO would need to take place every five years. However, evaluation reviews of SIPO I were carried out in 2007, 2009 and 2010 which eventually led to the development of SIPO II (SADC 2010: 20). These evaluations built on the failures that SIPO I exhibited since its inauguration to make it more effective in achieving its goals.

Van Nieuwkerk (2006) highlighted the three main objectives put forward in the SIPO document; to structure the day-to-day functioning of the Organ, Protocol and MDP, to provide a framework for strategies and action to take place and to align SADC's peace and security agenda with that of the AU. The objectives aimed at addressing a wide range of issues that span the political sector, the defence sector, the state security sector, the law enforcement and public security sector and the

police sector. Some of these issues include peacekeeping training, disaster and conflict management, the mitigation of political instability, regional cooperation and the promotion of democracy and human rights just to name a few (Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk 2004: 8-9). The exhaustive list of issues included in the scope of SIPO constitutes the main regional security threats facing Southern Africa and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4 of this study.

The transformation of SIPO I into SIPO II was driven by a wide range of factors that were determined through the evaluation reviews conducted between 2007 and 2010. According to the report developed by the International Crisis Group in 2012, the biggest motivating factors behind the development of SIPO II include firstly that SIPO I included too many broad priority areas which lacked details on how to achieve them. This was reflected in the fact that the document lacked milestones for monitoring and evaluation specific to each priority area. The second driving force was growing political and donor pressure being put on SADC to improve the SIPO and make it more effective in action so that clear results could be seen (Van Nieuwkerk 2020: 149). This is because little progress was made in executing the action plan that would ensure better implementation of the Protocol. SIPO II was officially launched in 2012 and it emphasised that for its implementation to be successful and worthwhile a vast range of stakeholders would need to collaborate and engage.

Both the SIPO I and II reflected strides being made by SADC in security community development as it prioritised cooperation in the realm of security. The frameworks put forward by Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasised that for security community development to progress there needs to be ongoing interaction that eventually leads to mutual trust and sympathy. The action plan outlined in the SIPO placed focus on security cooperation and therefore served as a further stimulus through which meaningful interaction could take place. SIPO I and II targeted issues in a wide range of sectors that impact the region as a whole and individual SADC states. Nathan (2006a) specified domestic instability as a factor that hinders security community development. The issues covered by the SIPO constitute the main driving forces behind domestic instability and as such by prioritising these threats this policy enhanced SADC's ability to progress as a security community.

3.4. SADC Response to Regional Security Threats

Since its founding, SADC has intervened or been involved in a wide range of interventions in states where instability and conflict arose that had begun to threaten the overall security of the region. For the purpose of this study, the regional security threats created by conflict and instability in Mozambique and Eswatini will be focused on to put forth an assessment of SADC's progress in developing into a security community. At the start of this research, these conflicts constituted the most recent examples of instability in the SADC region and thus were the main case studies focused on. This section will briefly discuss what took place in each of these conflicts, the response and involvement of SADC and lastly the status of the conflict today.

3.4.1. Mozambique

The Northernmost region of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, became a source of conflict and instability in October 2017 when a group of armed militants known as al-Shabab initiated an attack on police stations and governments in the town of Mocimboa da Praia which lasted two days (Matsinhe and Valoi 2019: 3). Authorities in Cabo Delgado claimed that it was an isolated incident even though local people warned them otherwise. The report carried out by the International Crisis Group (2021) noted that there were three key driving forces behind the rise of extremism in Cabo Delgado. Firstly, the province has been identified as a region that is ripe for conflict. During Mozambique's war for liberation, Cabo Delgado served as the hub for illicit activity and the illegal trade of precious stones, ivory, narcotics, and timber that took place at remote coastlines which were ignored by the government of Mozambique. However, since the end of the war, there has been an increase in different forms of monopoly and elites dominating the Mozambican economy which have started to seep into Cabo Delgado (International Crisis Group 2021: 3). The increased involvement of government in Cabo Delgado did not contribute to improving the lives of the citizens in Northern Mozambique who continued to suffer. As such, the socio-economic conditions in the region worsened along with poverty levels and public resentment toward the government. The second driver behind increasing extremism in Cabo Delgado was political dissatisfaction. Historically, the people, particularly the youth, of Cabo Delgado faced social and economic exclusion and as such struggled to connect and identify with government leaders. This led to

ongoing political dissatisfaction and feelings of anger amongst the youth of Cabo Delgado which created a gap through which Islamic insurgents could set foot. Post-liberation Cabo Delgado saw an influx of extremist Islamic doctrines and practices which appealed to the youth over their government and as a result became a breeding ground for insurgents (International Crisis Group 2021: 6). The extremist views perpetuated by al-Shabab seemed increasingly appealing to the people of Cabo Delgado who felt that they could do more for them than their government. Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) suggest that the youth viewed government officials and leaders as the "rotten political elite" who are to blame for the elevated levels of unemployment they face which also acted as the stimuli for violent extremism.

The final driving factor behind the conflict was centred around the fact that Cabo Delgado experienced a resource boom in 2009. The main source of revenue in Cabo Delgado was the mining of hydrocarbon and ruby sources. Furthermore, the region of Palma had experienced developments in the gas industry that attracted the attention of multinational companies (International Crisis Group 2021: 6). This led to heightened political involvement in Cabo Delgado that came at the expense of the livelihoods of local people. The expansion of gas operations in Cabo Delgado did not prioritise creating job opportunities for local people as foreign companies contracted their employees. The explosion of the resource industries in Cabo Delgado should have signalled a new dawn for local people that brought better socio-economic circumstances, prosperity, and increased job prospects. However, this was not the case and thus ideal conditions for conflict to brew were created.

The Mozambican government initially dismissed claims of terrorism and initiated counterattacks and strategies, which included mass arrests and violence, against the militants which caused widespread death and injury and deepened the local dissatisfaction with government and law enforcement (International Crisis Group 2021: 10). From October 2017 till late 2018, al-Shabab continued their campaign of violence that involved the burning of homes, the displacement of civilians, beheadings, and raids of security posts to claim control of the region. By the end of 2018, the insurgents had control over all four areas dominating the coastline of Cabo Delgado and had begun moving towards the inland districts (International Crisis Group 2021: 11). As al-Shabab grew stronger in their organisation, arms, and skills they started engaging security forces more

intensifying the spread and severity of the violence. Gerber (2022) found that by 2019, the militant group had been deemed terrorists that were carrying out a jihadist agenda. Since the start of the extremist movement, it has been estimated that there have been over 3,000 deaths as well and close to a million people have been displaced and the situation only proved to get worse. On the 24th of March 2021, al-Shabab carried out a strategic attack on the town of Palma that was coined the Battle of Palma (Africa News 2021). Al-Shabab rebels carried out coordinated attacks that targeted police stations and banks to take control of the town. The attack on Palma resulted in numerous casualties and allowed the rebels to acquire financial and military resources. In the present day, the violence in Mozambique continues to persist with interventions struggling to find a long-term solution.

Initially, SADC was seen to be taking a very passive approach to the conflict and instability in Mozambique. However, for SADC to intervene the government of Mozambique would first need to request their help which was only done two and a half years after the extremism began (Chikohomero 2020). This prevented the region from getting ahead and being proactive in addressing the situation in Mozambique. SADC's first effort in intervening in the conflict in Mozambique took place in 2020 when a meeting of the Organ Troika concluded by saying that they were committed to ending the terrorism in Mozambique. Following this meeting, numerous follow-up sessions were scheduled but did not take place due to COVID-19 restrictions. The next major effort taken by SADC took place on the 15th of July 2021 when the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed (SADC 2021b). The mission deployed troops from a wide range of SADC states including Angola, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Soldiers were mandated to displace terrorists, reclaim villages, seize weapons, and overall create a secure environment for humanitarian assistance (SADC 2021b). SAMIM was scheduled to end in January 2022; however, the mission continues to be extended with stability still not being restored in Mozambique. According to a press release submitted by Relief Web (2022), the most recent effort taken by SADC in Mozambique is the implementation of peacebuilding support initiatives in the province of Cabo Delgado. These initiatives aim to provide humanitarian assistance and enhance mechanisms for social protection and the involvement of civil society in peacekeeping. Furthermore, this programme has allowed for the involvement of community leaders in the protection of human rights and law and order.

3.4.2. Eswatini

The Kingdom of eSwatini constitutes the last functioning absolute monarchy in Africa and is governed by King Mswati III who came to power in 1986 (Brooke-Holland and Loft 2021: 1). The monarchy holds ultimate power in the state and over the three branches of government but have implemented some constitutional provisions. The parliament of eSwatini is composed of a 65 non-partisan member House of Assembly of which 10 members are appointed by the King and the rest through tribal communities (Vandome et al 2013: 25). Parliamentary elections are held every five years however the most notable characteristic of elections is eSwatini is that political parties are banned from participating. There has been widespread calls for constitutional reforms to take place as the monarchy and the king are protected against all judicial, legislative and executive powers. A such, the control and power held by the monarchy has created the backdrop for gross human rights violations to take place in eSwatini as well as created the platform for ongoing conflict to erupt as demonstrated in the uprisings and instability that took place in 2021.

The eSwatini instability reflects one of the most recent conflicts in Southern Africa which began in May 2021. It was triggered by national calls for a reform of the political system which came after there was a suspected killing of political activist and law student Thabani Nkomonye (Maphalala 2021: 11). Nationwide protests produced petitions that advocated for the election of a prime minister which was delivered to MPs by 93% of constituencies. The petitions focused not only on political reforms but also pushed support for constitutional reforms. The Commission on Human Rights and Public Administration (2021) tracked that over the course of May and June, protests began to get increasingly violent with reports of burning tyres, vandalism, the burning of buildings and the looting of shops surfacing. This resulted in the prime minister issuing a ban on the delivery of petitions. The following day there was an attempt to deliver a petition in Mbabane which was halted by armed forces and led to the eruption of violence. Tensions were fuelled even further four days after the ban was initiated as the government imposed a curfew and a national internet shutdown. The causes of the conflict can be split into two lines of thinking: political factors and socio-economic factors (Maphalala 2021: 3). The protests that took place in eSwatini exhibited a deviation from the usual pattern of protests. This is because earlier protests were normally led by trade unions but in this instance, protests were being led by young activists that had become

fed up with the restrictive political system that was compromising the effectiveness of the government and intensifying the socio-economic issues of the country (Maphalala 2021: 3).

Throughout the civil unrest that took place in eSwatini, there were numerous reports of gross human rights violations being committed by state security forces as well the royal family. These human rights violations included unlawful killings by the government, unlawful punishment by the government, violence against journalists, restrictions on internet access as well as restrictions on the movement of people (United States Department of State 2021: 2). The Commission on Human Rights and Public Administration (CHRPA) released an assessment that stated that there had been an estimated 46 deaths and 245 gunshot injuries during the unrest (United States Department of State 2021: 3). The human rights violations fuelled dissatisfaction with the government and the monarchy that had initially sparked the unrest and protest. **Figure 1** below shows that in 2016 only 35% of the eSwatini population held satisfaction with the government which continued to drop at a rapid rate to 16% in 2021. Dissatisfaction with the government has been motivated by the socio-economic issues plaguing citizens which includes a deteriorating economy, censoring of the media the gross, high levels of poverty and unemployment and the inequality that exists between the royal family and the ordinary civilians.


Figure 1: Satisfaction with Democracy, eSwatini, 2013-2021

Source: Dlamini 2021: 7

SADC's involvement in resolving the instability in eSwatini remains to be limited in that the only real involvement was a one-day consultation and engagement of the Organ Troika that took place (Chabalala 2021). SADC seems to have taken a very laid-back approach to act in eSwatini and has even been criticised as being "lazy." Following the meeting of the Organ Troika, SADC carried out a fact-finding mission in July 2021 (Maphalala 2021: 12). The results and findings of this mission were not made public and as such had minimal impact on the situation in eSwatini. Bebington (2022) pointed out that the most recent action taken by SADC in response to insecurity in eSwatini took place in November 2021. The current chair of the Organ's troika, President Cyril Ramaphosa, made a breakthrough in getting King Mswati to agree to a national dialogue. However, this victory was short-lived in that the dialogue has still not taken place. Whether there will be further and more improved efforts by SADC in resolving the conflict in eSwatini is still yet to be determined.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on providing historical context and background on SADC upon which the analysis of this study will be based. The first section of this chapter began by tracing the evolution of SADC starting with its transformation from SADCC and thereafter the development of the Organ. The shift from SADCC to SADC marked an important milestone in the region's journey towards security community status. This is because the inclusion of "community" in the name reflected a commitment towards regional integration and laid the grounds for SADC to develop into a security community. Similarly, the establishment of the Organ also constituted a step towards regional integration as it prioritised collaboration in the realm of security and defence which fostered the development of mutual interests and a sense of community.

Following this, this chapter unpacked the key policy developments that have been established and implemented since 1992 that have played a significant role in the operation of SADC. The policies focused on were the SADC Treaty (1992), The Protocol (2001), The Mutual Defence Pact (2003), The RISDP (2004) and SIPO I and II (2010). The introduction of these policies has allowed for the establishment of norms, mutual responsiveness, mutual trust, and sympathy as well as a

collective security agenda and arrangement. All the above are crucial elements needed for the development of a security community. This section demonstrates that SADC has put a lot in place that points to security community building and opening the way for the region to move through the phases and tiers outlined by Adler and Barnett (1998).

The last section of this chapter focused on discussing the instability and conflict that has taken place in Mozambique and Eswatini and the role that SADC has played in each of these situations. Although in theory, SADC has taken steps towards security community development, in practice this is not necessarily the case. These case studies demonstrate that theory and practice do not always coincide and that SADC is still facing significant challenges in security community development and consequently in being able to respond to regional security threats. The historical review of SADC that this chapter has provided will serve as the basis upon which an analysis of SADC's progress in developing into a security community can be conducted in the chapter to come. The following chapter will analyse the successes and failures exhibited by each of the key policies, the Organ and the SADC interventions discussed above to put forth an assessment of how far SADC has come in its development into a security community.

CHAPTER 4:

ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE ORGAN, SADC POLICIES AND SADC THREAT RESPONSE

4.1. Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, SADC has made some strides in its pursuit of security community status through the formation of collective security frameworks and mechanisms that have allowed for a regional response to security threats. The evolution of SADC discussed in chapter 3 of this study lays the grounds upon which an analysis of the region's development into a security community can be put forward. To determine the extent to which SADC has made progress in its development into a security community, the achievements and flaws experienced by the region need to be explored. By examining the successes exhibited by the Organ, SADC policies and regional threat response discussed in the preceding chapter, the key characteristics of a security community that have been attained by SADC can be identified. These successes will allow for SADC's progress in security community development to be measured according to the three-tier framework and phases of development put forward by Adler and Barnett (1998) as discussed in chapter 2.

Contrastingly, an analysis of how the Organ, SADC policies and response to regional threats in Mozambique and Eswatini have experienced failures play a crucial role in understanding SADC's development into a security community. These failures provide insights into the "trigger mechanisms" having a disintegrative effect on the region and how they are hindering security community development. As pointed out by Acharya (2001) and Nathan (2006a) in the analytical framework put forth in chapter 2, the security threats and issues present within a region are also critical to the understanding and study of a security community. This chapter will also explore the major regional security threats facing SADC member states and the impact these issues have on security community development.

In consideration of the above, this chapter presents an analysis of the successes and failures that SADC has exhibited in terms of the Organ, SADC policy documents and regional security threat

response taking place in Mozambique and Eswatini. This analysis will allow for the central reasons behind why SADC is falling short in security community development and areas of concern to be identified. By recognising the factors hindering SADC's development into a security community, the concluding chapter of this study can highlight significant areas through which SADC can address these challenges.

The following section discusses the dominant regional security threats facing SADC, at this point in time (2022), as this is key to understanding why SADC is experiencing such a wide range of challenges in its development into a security community. The second, third and fourth sections will delve into the successes and failures exhibited by the Organ, SADC policies and SADC threat response in Mozambique and Eswatini respectively and the impact it has on the development of the region into a security community.

4.2. Regional Security Threats Facing SADC

Whilst SADC faces a diverse range of security threats, for the purpose of this research, this section will focus on governance issues, poverty and inequality and domestic instability. Acharya (2001) and Nathan (2006a) emphasized that what happens domestically plays a significant role in security community development. Thus, it is important to contextualise the central threats facing the region at the domestic level to understand both the successes and failures experienced by SADC. The persistence of these issues across the region has negatively impacted the progress made by SADC in attaining security community status.

4.2.1. Governance Issues

Governance refers to the systems, institutions, leaders, and political processes responsible for the management, organisation and operation of the state and its affairs. A state relies on good governance to ensure that citizens are safe and secure, have access to basic service delivery and can actively participate in political processes. As such, a breakdown in the state and its institutions can have detrimental effects on the security of a state, its people, and the region as it means the government can no longer provide for and protect its citizens. Lisakafu (2017) states that

governance-related issues stand at the forefront of the regional security threats through which instability in SADC emerges. This claim is supported by Zondi (2009) as he notes that deficient governance inevitably leads to the deterioration of state institutions as well trust that citizens have in their government which is needed to prevent domestic instability. In the analytical framework developed in chapter 2, Nathan (2006a) reiterates that domestic stability is a "necessary condition of a security community" (Nathan 2006a: 278). As such, the persistence of poor governance within SADC states makes it impossible for the region to develop into a security community. The absence of good governance renders citizens and the state itself insecure and this can lead to domestic instability due to the state's inability to provide for its citizens and maintain order. Nathan (2006a) identified structural instability as one of the factors that heighten the risk of domestic instability. This is because vulnerable states face challenges in preventing domestic instability from transcending national borders and thus poses a threat to the entire region. As such poor governance has a domino effect of results that starts with citizen dissatisfaction that sparks domestic instability which can lead to regional instability.

The struggle for liberation experienced by most African states has led to electoral dominance which constitutes the biggest cause behind governance issues in SADC (Cawthra 2008: 2). In Africa, liberation struggles, and the gaining of independence were followed by the establishment of emerging democracies or hybrid regimes (DFID 2015: 21). These newly formed political systems have failed to develop into fully consolidated and operational governments able to meet the needs of the state. Both emerging democracies and other regimes faced flaws in their electoral systems that led to electoral dominance held by different political actors in each SADC State. The preservation of electoral dominance has resulted in nepotism, corruption, the diverting of state funds and the misuse of state institutions has led to the systematic deterioration of African governments that sparks widespread dissatisfaction among citizens, violence, and instability at the national and regional level (Aeby 2018: 4). Electoral dominance leads to poor governance as it leads to a breakdown in state institutions and the activities that come as a result have detrimental effects on the security of citizens.

The Kingdom of Eswatini gained independence in 1968 and has since implemented a constitutional monarchy as the leading political system (Simelane 2017: 2). This system undermined the

implementation of a democratic electoral process and was tailored to afford the monarchy and the king's electoral dominance and control. Although Eswatini does undergo regular elections, the monarchy is granted specific provisions that allow for the king to hold electoral dominance. Firstly, the prime minister that leads the country is appointed by the King and thus the real power is held by the monarchy (GlobalEDGE 2022). An election is held to decide on the cabinet members and citizens only have a say in this regard. Secondly, the king selects ten of the cabinet members appointed to the house of assembly as well as judges appointed to the judiciary (CLGF 2019: 233). Lastly, it is evident that the king holds electoral dominance as he holds the power to dismiss and replace the prime minister, and members of the cabinet as well as has control of all branches of government. In Eswatini the fact that the monarchy has absolute power constitutes the biggest reason for poor governance. According to the transformation index put forward by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022), the electoral system is severely undermined by the veto power held by the king which has resulted in poor governance, weak state institutions and the weak implementation of laws by the prime minister and the cabinet. As such regular citizens are not provided adequate access to basic service delivery, are subjected to harassment by the government and are not involved in political decisions. The repressive and restrictive political system practised in Eswatini has not been able to address the socio-economic issues facing citizens and thus the political situation and poor governance have become a driving source of instability.

Following Mozambique's independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the country was plagued with a civil war between the ruling party FRELIMO and its opposition RENAMO (Mukwakwa 2020: 18). This war ensued for almost 20 years with Mozambique only achieving democratic liberation in 1994 signalled by the first multi-party elections that were won by FRELIMO that held power since. The electoral dominance held by FRELIMO led to ongoing political struggle and conflict with the opposition party that has led to a breakdown in governance structures. According to the report produced by Mukwakwa (2020), the conflict between the two political parties re-emerged in 2013 which was a result of poor governance by the FRELIMO government. This poor government was evident in the lack of inclusion of certain regions of Mozambique, poor service delivery, high unemployment rates, poor resource distribution as well as limited economic growth (Mukwakwa 2020: 4). As a result of the FRELIMO-led government, the Northern region of Mozambique was excluded and not represented in the political sphere. As

such, the government failed to provide citizens in the North with basic amenities, and employment opportunities and has failed to stimulate economic growth. This is the basis upon which violent extremism in Cabo Delgado emerged. The ruling party in Mozambique also struggled with establishing strong governance because the FRELIMO party was led by liberation leaders. According to Cawthra (2008), most liberation leaders do not have the expertise, experience and skills needed to ensure good governance and the effective practice of political processes. As such, SADC member states struggle to provide for their citizens leading to poor service delivery and face challenges in ensuring that credible elections take place. The misguided actions and decisions made by liberation leaders further exacerbated the deterioration of government structures and institutions. Poor governance fuelled dissatisfaction and unhappiness amongst citizens as they continue to face circumstances of poverty, inequality and inflation because of electoral dominance which created the ideal conditions for conflict and instability to break out.

Apart from Mozambique and Eswatini, there is evidence of poor governance in other SADC states that has also led to domestic instability that has compromised the development of the region into a security community. Since claiming independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, Zimbabwe has faced poor governance due to the presence of electoral dominance under the rule of Robert Mugabe and the dominating party ZANU-PF. Poor governance manifested in the form of property rights violations, corruption, poor economic growth, human rights violations, and high inflation rates with the government failing to develop strong policies and government structures (Cain 2015: 1). The poor governance faced by Zimbabwe has led to ongoing domestic instability that has compromised the development of the region into a security community. Similarly, South Africa has also exhibited electoral dominance since the end of the Apartheid regime with the ruling ANC having been in power since the first election in 1994 which has led to ongoing governance-related challenges. Thus, poor governance threatens the economic and political stability of individual states and creates vulnerabilities for the entire SADC region. The absence of good governance within SADC states has served to hinder the regional development into a security community as it leads to challenges of poverty, inequality and domestic instability which will be discussed below.

4.2.2. Poverty and Inequality

The second major challenge threatening the security of the SADC region is the high rates of poverty and inequality that exists throughout SADC states that continue to exponentially increase. Poverty and inequality issues at the domestic level pose significant challenges to SADC's development into a security community. In the analytical framework put forward in chapter 2, Acharya (2001) stated that one of the "trigger mechanisms" needed for a region to enter the nascent phase of security community development outlined by Adler and Barnett (1998) is the establishment of a shared identity through which mutual trust can be developed. This echoed the sentiments of Deutsch (1957) who identified mutual responsiveness as one of the essential conditions for the development of a security community that was only possible if a region exhibited a sense of community, trust, and some sort of collective identification (Deutsch 1957: 129). The prevalence of poverty and inequality makes the development of a collective identity and mutual trust difficult as the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen which makes limits the possibility that people in different social classes will integrate and identify themselves with one another. Furthermore, increasing poverty and inequality fuels tensions between citizens and the state as people grow increasingly unhappy and dissatisfied with the government which they feel is not helping address the socio-economic challenges impacting their lives. This inevitably can lead to the outbreak of domestic instability as it leads to a breakdown in state institutions and structural weaknesses which Nathan (2006a) identified as one of the driving risk factors behind insecurity at the state level. The impact that poverty and inequality have on the establishment of a collective identity and mutual trust as well as in triggering domestic instability hinders the progress that can be made in the development of SADC into a security community.

Persisting issues of poverty and inequality can be attributed to the presence of poor governance in SADC states which has led to the region containing some of the poorest countries in the world (Lisakafu 2017: 172). This is because poor government actions and choices have led to the vast majority of people facing extreme difficulties in having access to basic needs like sanitation and healthcare as well as employment opportunities. As such, the region is plagued with people living on the bare minimum which is further exacerbated by high unemployment rates. Furthermore, the growing poverty rates in SADC countries are worsened by the fact that governments are indebted

and dependent on foreign aid and investment to stimulate the economy which the poor rarely benefit from (Cawthra 2008: 2).

Figure 2 below illustrates that in 2022 45% of the population in Southern Africa is living in extreme poverty which equates to one hundred million people. As much as the elevated levels of poverty in the region present significant challenges for peace and stability presently, there are further concerns that this number is projected to keep increasing until 2040. There is a clear correlation between poverty and conflict as countries that face persisting instability are normally also the poorest in the world and on the continent (Mueller and Techasunthornwat 2020: 2). Increased poverty levels act as a stimulus for conflict and instability as economic growth is severely stunted by increased poverty levels. This is because people living in conditions of extreme financial hardship cannot productively contribute to the workforce and as such cannot contribute to the economy (Mueller and Techasunthornwat 2020: 3). Furthermore, people living in poverty often only have access to low-level jobs that prevents them from transcending the financial obstacles they face. The effects of poor economic growth reflect a vicious cycle as they mostly impact people facing poverty which strengthens dissatisfaction with the government and resorts to violence to voice their issues which can lead to instability. This has been evident in both Mozambique and Eswatini.


Figure 2: Extreme Poverty Forecast for Southern Africa, 2015-2040

Source: Porter 2017

Figure 3 indicates that most of the population in Mozambique is caught in the struggles of poverty with an estimated 60% of citizens living in extremely poor conditions. A large contributing factor to this is the fact that the youth continue to face elevated levels of unemployment. Furthermore, in Mozambique the citizens caught in this "poverty trap" feel excluded from the economy and political processes as they are too poor to actively participate (Cunguara and Hanlon 2010: 12). This means that most people cannot improve their economic situations as they do not have access to the market or job opportunities and are not involved in advising decisions made by the government to improve their lives. Extreme poverty levels have heightened the extent to which Mozambican people are unhappy and angry with the government as they feel nothing is being done for them as shown in Cabo Delgado (Sithole 2021: 6). As a result, the lack of action taken to reduce poverty in Mozambique created the space in which violent extremism could emerge and grow as citizens seek an alternative to the government to improve their financial circumstances.


Figure 3: Share of the Population in Extreme Poverty in Mozambique from 2016 to 2022

Source: Kamer 2022

In the country brief on Eswatini put forward by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2022, it was measured that at least 69% of the population survives below the poverty line and of this 25% are facing conditions of extreme poverty. Land dispossession, the dominance of the royal Swazi family and poor governance are considered the driving factors behind increased poverty in Eswatini (Eswatini Country Team 2020: 10). Because most citizens lost their land and their primary source of income, many were forced to work as cheap labourers to survive. Much like Mozambique, this had led to limited economic growth that continues to impact low-income households who struggle to break poverty cycles, acquire basic needs and services, and find better job opportunities. Increased poverty levels in Eswatini are also a result of an abuse of power by the monarchy who live in absolute wealth at the expense of their people. According to Nindi and Odhiambo (2015), more than 50% of the country's wealth is owned by the richest 20%. The actions of the monarchy coupled with the extreme poverty experienced by the citizens of Eswatini have led to widespread unhappiness and resentment towards the government and the royal family have sparked protests and violence that have led to domestic instability.

Elevated poverty rates existing in SADC member states, as shown in the case of Mozambique and Eswatini discussed above, show that most of the wealth in the region is enjoyed by a small percentage of the population that constitutes the elite. This has resulted in extreme measures of inequality and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Increased disparities in inequality in any Southern African State can threaten the security of the region as citizens grow unhappier when their grievances continue to be ignored whilst simultaneously the rich get richer (Lisakafu 2017: 172). The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (2020) suggests that there are two key reasons why increased levels of inequality can compromise the peace and security of SADC states and consequently the entire region. Firstly, increased inequality results in the limited upward mobility of people from lower income to higher income levels (DESA 2020: 46). This is because people at the more favourable end of the spectrum have access to better job opportunities, policymaking opportunities, higher quality education and better access to public services which means they can create the best environment for generational wealth to be created that ensures constant upward social mobility. Contrastingly, people in poverty experience limited opportunities to improve their conditions as the public services and job prospects they have access to are inferior to that of higher classes. As a result, people in the low-income category face continued poverty

through generations and the barriers blocking their social mobility undermined their aspirations and fostered resentment towards the government that can lead to unrest.

Secondly, growing inequality affords the wealthy elite the power to manipulate political processes and abuse state institutions (DESA 2020: 48). As such, higher classes become increasingly involved in political systems that benefit them at the expense of people on the lower spectrum of the inequality scale. This can lead to increased public outcry and unrest as the capturing of state resources by the elite undermines democratic institutions and creates a lack of trust in the government and their capabilities. It can therefore be said that increased inequality creates a breeding ground for conflict (Kishi 2015). The abuse of state institutions and political dysfunction results in poor service delivery that is mostly felt by the lower class which leads to people in poverty resorting to violence to have their grievances addressed. The lack of trust and contempt towards the government because of high equality can therefore also result in conflict and instability within the SADC region.

Figure 4 below shows that, according to the Gini coefficient, three of the most unequal countries in the world are SADC member states namely South Africa, Namibia, and Zambia, followed by Eswatini and Mozambique. Furthermore, apart from Tanzania and Mauritius, all SADC member states are in the Top 50 most unequal countries in the world. The alarming levels of inequality and division between the rich and the poor leave SADC states highly vulnerable to conflict that endangers the peace and security of the region due to the reasons discussed above.

Figure 4: SADC Income Gini Coefficients

Source: Oxfam International 2022: 4

The issue of growing poverty and inequality, discussed in this section, poses significant challenges to SADC's development into a security community. It compromises the establishment of a collective identity, mutual trust and a sense of community that is needed for mutual responsiveness and meaningful interaction and cooperation to take place. Furthermore, the poverty and inequality experienced by most citizens in SADC states create ripe conditions for domestic instability to break out as it heightens feelings of anger, resentment, dissatisfaction, and contempt for governments that can eventually lead to the breakout of conflict and domestic instability.

4.2.3. Domestic Instability

The lack of good governance reflected by corruption, inept leadership, and poor service delivery as well as the elevated levels of poverty and inequality present in SADC, as discussed above, create ripe conditions for violence and unrest to erupt at the national level. This is because citizens experience frustration, resentment, and anger towards the government because of the tough socio-economic and living conditions they face that are difficult to overcome. This is further compounded by the wealth and luxury enjoyed by the elite and the government themselves at the expense of people living in poverty (Aremu 2010: 553). As a result, citizens are more than likely

to resort to violence to protest the actions of the state as well as their failures and to ensure that their injustices are heard and afforded attention. The persistence of violence, protest and unrest creates the space for intra-state conflict to develop which destabilises individual nations at the domestic level and threatens the peace and security of the entire region. The analytical framework developed in chapter 2 emphasized the findings of Nathan (2006a) who stated that a region cannot constitute a security community if there is domestic instability present (Nathan 2006a: 278). This is because conflict and violence at the domestic level compromise the survival of the state and make it vulnerable to external threats. Furthermore, states experiencing large-scale violence cannot develop dependable expectations of peaceful change with their neighbours. The presence of domestic instability hinders the possibility of a region developing into a security community as violence and conflict at the state level often evolve into cross-border tensions (Nathan 2006a: 280). As such, an intra-state conflict that destabilises the state negatively impacts security community development as it has repercussions on the region as it requires action and resources from neighbouring states, the violence can transcend borders and it can undermine regional cohesion and integration.

According to the EISA report put forward by Gluhbegovic (2016), due to the above factors, intra-state conflict can manifest in four key ways: political conflict, violent extremism, rebel movements and military and state interventions. Political conflict is characterised by ongoing tension between opposing political parties who cannot cooperate which leads to weak governance, poor service delivery and a lack of effective political participation by civil society. This type of intrastate conflict leads to domestic instability as tensions between political parties and leaders seep into civil society which results in the outbreak of widespread violence. Furthermore, when ruling parties are more focused on tension with their opposition, little attention is afforded to the socio-economic issues affecting people at the grassroots level and ongoing dissatisfaction and mistrust of the government is created (Gilpin 2016: 27).

The ongoing violence perpetuated by political tensions serves to worsen the socio-economic conditions experienced by citizens and which feeds into the second type of intrastate conflict of violent extremism as political conflict pushes people away from government structures and towards other forms of leadership and ideologies that seem more appealing. Violent extremist

movements can only thrive if they are supported by members of civil society. The failure of government and political leaders to provide basic services mobilises support towards extremist movements as people feel that their methods and beliefs will be the only way to voice and address their grievances as well as better their socio-economic and financial circumstances (Chevrier 2017: 8). The domestic instability that has been present in Cabo Delgado is a result of both political conflict and violent extremism. The political tensions that have ensued between political parties RENAMO and FRELIMO since the 1970s in Mozambique have fostered ongoing violence and political and economic exclusion of people in the Cabo Delgado province. According to Human Rights Watch (2022b), the historical political conflict that severely impacted Northern Mozambique laid the ground for al-Shabab insurgents to claim a foothold that has resulted in domestic instability since 2017 that still ensues today. The fact that the insurgents were able to recruit such widespread support, particularly from the youth, is because their offer is seen as an alternative form of job creation which contrasts the failure of the government to address high unemployment rates (Louw-Vaudran 2022b). The extensive backing al-Shabab received from the youth and citizens in Cabo Delgado has strengthened the impact of the movement's actions that have caused domestic instability. As a result of the historical political conflict as well as the emergence of violent extremists, Mozambique faces ongoing domestic instability that threatens the peace and security of the entire SADC region. The resilience of the al-Shabab insurgents in Cabo Delgado has created the risk of violent extremism spilling over into other SADC countries. According to the International Crisis Group (2022), Tanzania is of major concern in this regard as there have already been attacks and raids by insurgents in the Mtwara region and a handful of other villages in Tanzania. The domestic instability in Mozambique also constitutes a regional security threat as it results in the displacement of thousands of people in the form of refugees and undocumented immigrants into neighbouring countries. An influx of people into other SADC countries can create tensions as it leads to weak border control, the creation of xenophobic tensions and can worsen unemployment.

The third type of intra-state conflict that enhances domestic instability is military and state interventions. Intra-state conflict of this nature is characterised by violent action carried out by local military troops and security forces against the citizens of a state (Gluhbegovic 2016: 14). Armed action by security personnel and military forces is normally triggered by the outbreak of

protests, riots, demonstrations, and uprisings against grievances experienced by civilians of a state. Interventions carried out by the state and the military directed at local people lead to domestic instability as it intensifies conflict and creates anger and distrust of the governance and the breakdown of democratic institutions. This, in turn, limits the ability of the government to practice good governance and address the major challenges facing its citizens which only serve to worsen poverty and unemployment (Cilliers and Schuunemann 2013: 5). The present-day instability in Eswatini is clear evidence of this. When violent protests broke out in Eswatini against the decree of the king banning petitions, security forces deployed to diffuse the situation shot at protestors with live ammunition which led to the death of a law student (Human Rights Watch 2022a). The actions of the police escalated the level of violence associated with the protests as civilians felt that the government and the monarchy were not concerned with their interests and safety and called for overarching democratic reform. The mistrust and discontentment felt by the citizens of Eswatini have caused democratic instability to persist with violent attacks against state institutions and forces still taking place today (Chikohomero 2022). The domestic instability present in Eswatini poses a security threat for the entire SADC region as inevitably the conflict will spill over into neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the government of Eswatini has expressed that they will move forward with national elections in 2023 and the continuing conflict and political crisis will serve as a stimulus for election-associated violence to break out that creates security risks for Southern Africa as a whole.

The last type of intra-state conflict manifests in the form of rebel movements that also foster domestic instability. This type of intra-state conflict is not focused on in this paper as it has not taken place in Mozambique or Eswatini. Armed rebels are non-state actors that carry out violent military acts against the government and state institutions of a particular country motivated by a wide range of factors such as ethnic divisions, economic interests, and the possession of territory (Gouby 2012). The presence of rebel groups creates domestic instability as it results in citizens being exposed to human rights violations, poverty, and sexual violence. Much like violent extremism, rebel movements also lead to the displacement of many citizens as refugees and undocumented immigrants into neighbouring countries. Although not focused on in this paper, the domestic instability currently ensuing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a clear indication of how national conflicts can undermine the security of the SADC region. The DRC is

facing 122 rebel groups operating including the M23 rebel movement whose actions have resulted in the death of soldiers and citizens and have led to ongoing violence in the DRC and neighbouring states (Tsongo 2022). The domestic instability created because of armed rebels in the DRC has created security challenges for the region as neighbouring countries face the risk of rebels creating bases in remote villages which can lead to an increase in weapons trade and spillover of the violence across their borders.

4.3. The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

The development of the OPDS indicated a shift toward a new security regime in Southern Africa and as such reaffirmed the principles held by the region in the SADC Treaty. As such, the effectiveness of the Organ in terms of functioning and implementation directly impacts the development of SADC into a security community as it aids in the development of common values and regional cooperation. This section puts forward an analysis of the successes and failures exhibited by the Organ to evaluate SADC's security community development.

4.3.1. Successes

The nascent phase of security community development outlined by Adler and Barnett, discussed in chapter 2, constitutes the first stage of security community development. The key characteristic of this phase is that although states in a regional collective do not explicitly set out to evolve into a security community, there is a newfound interest in mutual security and action (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). This phase represents the first tier of security community development, as per Adler and Barnett's three-tier framework, which is brought about by conditions that stimulate engagement and interaction between states in a regional grouping. For SADC, the introduction of the Organ in 1996 served as the first step towards the development of the region into a security community. This is evident in the two main successes that the Organ has achieved since its inception.

Firstly, the formulation of the Organ represented a commitment by all SADC member states to the notion of collective security for the region. The precipitating condition that led to the development

of the Organ was a violent coup in Lesotho that prompted the region to realise that a mechanism for collective security was needed to mitigate and address regional security threats (Muntschick 2018: 202). By consensus, the SADC states agreed on the principles that would guide the Organ as well as what the key objectives of the Organ would be. Since all SADC member states agreed to the principles and objectives of the Organ, the first interest in regional security cooperation was introduced and the first step toward a security community was taken. This commitment by all member states would serve as the foundation upon which engagement and interaction throughout the region take place as this was needed for the successful implementation and coordination of the Organ and its objectives. Furthermore, the objectives and principles agreed upon by SADC member states demonstrated mutual security interests being developed in that all states realised the need for collective action to successfully address threats facing the region. The establishment of mutual security interests and the belief in collective action would allow for mutual trust and sympathy to be developed between SADC member states. The first tier of Adler and Barnett's framework identified that states needed an incentive to coordinate policies and increase interactions (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38). The objectives of the Organ constituted this incentive and promoted engagement and interaction between SADC states. As such, the Organ played a significant role in the development of SADC into a security community as it allowed for the starting conditions of the first tier of security community development to be met.

According to Van Schalkwyk (2005), the objectives laid out for the Organ placed significant focus on the protection of the people from instability threatening peace and security and on addressing human security needs. This is evident in the fact the first specific objective of the Organ laid out in the Protocol is to "protect the people" (SADC 2001: 3). As such, little emphasis was afforded to the military dimensions of the state. This shift from state-centric security to people-centric security constituted a new era of security for SADC. The mutual agreement of a human-security agenda for the Organ further demonstrated an aggregation of the interests of all SADC member states which constitutes the second success. The shared dedication to a human security agenda by the region was crucial for the establishment of a sense of shared identity and "we-feeling" to begin. Acharya (2001) noted the importance of norms, as discussed in chapter 2, in security community development as it allows for the development of prescribed behaviours that are expected in the region (Acharya 2001: 24). The Organ established a human-security agenda as the norm for the

region and a people-centric focus was expected in all interactions and activities. This norm also contributed to the development of a shared identity as all SADC members could predict and trust that all states would adhere to a human security agenda. Reciprocated security interests and concerns allow member states to associate and group themselves together which plays a key role in the development of trust and sympathy. This common sense of identity is needed for mutual responsiveness to take place, which is an essential condition, according to Deutsch as laid out in chapter 2, for the formulation of a security community. Furthermore, mutual interests allow for an environment that is conducive to regional cooperation and integration (Van Schalkwyk 2005: 34). Consensus and agreement in any context reduce the chances of conflict and violence breaking out. As such, common interests in the realm of security ensure that member states have a joint understanding of what their security priorities are as well as their responsibilities in preserving peace and stability. This allows all states to work toward a common security goal which limits the potential for violence and conflict to break out.

Thus, the Organ has had a positive impact on SADC's development in that it has as allowed for critical factors, namely a sense of identity and mutual security interests, underpinning the essential conditions for a security community to be realised.

4.3.2. Failures

Although the Organ, as explored above, has had some positive effects on SADC's development into a security community, it has also exhibited some major failures that have hindered the strengthening of collective security in the region. According to the framework developed by Acharya (2001) discussed in chapter 2 of this study, the flaws and shortcomings experienced by the Organ serve as 'trigger mechanisms' that could bring about the decline of SADC as a security community. The two central failures experienced by the Organ, which will be discussed below, are the political tensions that surrounded its formation as well as a lack of effective implementation.

Even though the Organ was developed in 1996, it was only finalised in 2001 due to the political tensions and competing visions that characterised its formulation. The negotiations and discussions

that took place regarding the design of the Organ were centred around two key topics; whether a centralised or de-centralised body should be created and if the institution should operate independently or be integrated into the architecture of SADC as an organisation (Muntschick 2018: 203). Tension and division were present regarding the latter of the two topics. Desmidt (2017) highlights that there were two competing camps for the Organ, one that embodied a pacifist vision and the other a militarist. The pacifist camp, comprising South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius, and Tanzania, believed that the Organ should pursue conflict management and security cooperation through political rather than military means (Muntschick 2018: 207). Furthermore, this camp advocated for the institution to be integrated into SADC and be a centralised body. Contrastingly, the opposing camp, composed of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and the DRC, promoted the vision that the Organ should be an independent body that prioritised the military dimension of security cooperation and the use of military action against threats (Desmidt 2017: 8).

The ongoing tension and rivalry that plagued the development of the Organ had significant consequences on its effectiveness and consequently on security community development. The initial lack of consensus on the direction and agenda for the Organ meant that even though all member states eventually agreed on the guiding principles and objectives, there remained an underlying absence of common values on how these goals would be executed (Nathan 2004b: 17). On paper, the Organ reflects a commitment to mutual security interests and priorities. However, this is undermined by the fact that fundamentally there is a difference in the beliefs, in terms of how to deal with regional security threats, held by the member states of SADC. The historical division that exists within SADC makes collective action against regional security threats difficult in that the chance of consensus regarding the nature of regional security response will be unlikely. Division regarding how to deal with the DRC rebelling is evidence of this as the pacifist camp wanted to implement a diplomatic solution whilst the militarist camp wanted to make use of military tools (Nathan 2004b: 17).

The absence of common values that undermine the effectiveness of the Organ was further reflected in the fact that not all SADC member states are governed by democratic systems (Gumede 2014: 163). Eswatini constitutes one of the states that do to follow a democratic system and employ a constitutional monarchy. The differing political systems present in the SADC region create

significant challenges for security community development. Deutsch (1957) identified basic political ideology as one of the major values in which compatibility is needed for the formation of a security community. As such, the presence and power of the monarchy in Eswatini have made it difficult to aggregate the values of all SADC members which impacts the ability of the Organ to carry out its objectives and in turn undermines regional cooperation.

The political tensions present during the formation of the Organ resulted in the presence of weak institutions. Political and diplomatic mechanisms were prioritised in the pursuit of the protection of peace and security and conflict management by the Organ (Van Aardt 1996: 151). For these mechanisms to be successful and effective, proper institutions and structures are needed. According to the analytical framework developed in chapter 2, Acharya (2001) highlighted that institutions play a key role in the development of a security community as it aids in the establishment of norms and common values. The fact that the formulation of the Organ was marked with disagreement and tension resulted in more focus being placed on determining direction and agenda at the expense of properly establishing institutions and processes. An example of this is the double troika system employed by the Organ. The double troika system can be seen as more inclusive as it contains rotating seats, however, this has impacted the Organ's effectiveness in dealing with crises as the seats are often held by leaders of smaller states that hold little influence and this institution is often misunderstood by the public (PSC Report 2020). As a result of the Organ containing underdeveloped institutions, it has consequently faced shortcomings in effectively preventing and resolving domestic instabilities throughout the region which hinders SADC's progress in developing into a fully operational security community.

On paper, all member states agreed and committed to the practice and upholding of the human-centric security agenda stipulated by the Organ. However, this has not been true in practice. This is evident in the fact that there have been various actions taken by the governments of member states that jeopardise the peace and security of its citizens rather than protect them (Bekoe 2002: 7). This is evident in the violence and instability present in Eswatini. As discussed in chapter 3, protests in Eswatini were met with military action that endangered the lives of citizens. How the government of Eswatini attempted to diffuse the conflict and violence deviated from the principles of the Organ as military action was used and a human-security agenda was not prioritised. This

action heightened domestic instability rather than resolving it. Furthermore, there have been instances of interventions taking place under the guise of SADC that only involved a select few member states. An example of this controversial military action was the intervention carried out by South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe during the conflict in Lesotho in 1998 known as Operation Boleas. These interventions contradicted the objectives of the Organ as they did not involve full political cooperation, nor did they constitute collective action as they were actioned before being sanctioned by SADC (Bekoe 2002: 7). The main objectives of the intervention in Lesotho were to secure the dam, rid the royal palace of protestors and to restore order (Likoti 2007: 253). However, the fact that South Africa declined to get involved in the conflict in the DRC a few months prior the motives behind the intervention in Lesotho were signalled to be about securing water resources.

The lack of implementation of the principles and objectives of the Organ in both situations discussed above has negatively affected the development of SADC as a security community. When military action that goes against the objectives of the Organ is taken at the national level the credibility of that state is brought into question and trust between member states start to deteriorate as it demonstrates that there are no longer mutual interests held by the entire region. A lack of adherence to the principles guiding the Organ compromises the "we-feeling" held by SADC states that is needed for mutual responsiveness and meaningful interactions to take place. As such, this undermines the essential conditions of a security community outlined by Deutsch (1957) as well as Adler and Barnett (1998). The decline of trust between member states hinders the effectiveness of the Organ as member states will not have the political will to be a part of collective security action and thus limited response to regional security threats can happen.

Interventions carried out by a select few SADC states undermine their commitment to the regional grouping. Deutsch (1957) highlighted that for mutual responsiveness to be developed, a sense of identity is needed that is founded on states being able to predict each other's behaviour. Therefore, when states undermine their commitment to the regional grouping, it creates uncertainty and behaviours cannot be predicted which negatively impacts security community development. Political cooperation and collective action are at the core of the Organ and as such a violation of this nature signals a disregard for the collective that inevitably can create conflict. This is because

their motives for action are questioned as not all member states are included in the approval and deployment of the intervention. This signals a breakdown in mutual trust and integration of the region. In most cases where interventions were carried out by SADC members outside of the organisations' institutional framework, it involved the more dominant states of the region. As a result, less dominant member states will be hesitant to give up their sovereignty in carrying out the objectives of the Organ in fear that their interests will be ignored and disregarded by dominant members that act in their own interests. The seminal work produced by Nathan (2004b) emphasises that the hold on sovereignty by SADC states is due to the absence of common values and mutual trust. This makes the pursuit of security cooperation difficult if some members have doubts about working with others. The "trigger mechanism" having a disintegrative effect on the region is therefore a breakdown in mutual trust and identity that comes because of the Organ being poorly implemented.

4.4. SADC Policies

Chapter 3 of this study provided a discussion of five key policies and protocols introduced and implemented by SADC since its inception. This discussion elaborated on what led to the development of these documents as well as what each policy entails in terms of objectives, aims and guidelines for the overall conduct of all SADC member states. Much like the Organ, each of these documents has contributed, both negatively and positively, to the development of SADC into a security community. This section will build on the discussion presented in chapter 3 by examining the successes and failures of SADC policy documents and protocols and how it has impacted security community development.

4.4.1. Successes

The most notable success achieved by the SADC policies and protocols discussed in this paper is that each has contributed to and allowed for, in one way or another, a slow-building sense of community needed for regional integration. This has been done in several ways by each policy. An assessment of these successes will allow for SADC's progress in security community

development to be measured as it informs what essential conditions have been met according to Deutsch (1957) and where SADC fits in Adler and Barnett's (1998) three-tier framework.

Firstly, the MDP represents a security mechanism focused on long-term stability as it prevents conflict between SADC countries (Maeresera and Uzodike 2010: 97). The prohibition of hostile activities by SADC members against one another and in their territories limits the possibility of unequal power dynamics being abused and manipulated. Furthermore, if aggression is taken by one state against another the threatened state can lean on the rest of the region for support and help. As such, a sense of community is developed as member states can rely on one another to fight threats emanating from inside and outside the region. This promotion of states working together against a common enemy reinforces feelings of community between SADC countries. The mutual understanding and condemnation of aggression by one SADC country on another reduces the chances of conflict and creates conditions conducive for cooperation and positive engagement to take place as all states, regardless of influence, are placed on the same page. Cooperation on security and defence issues allows for coordinated planning to take place which contributes to the development of mutual responsiveness between SADC member states needed for the development of a security community as per the framework put forward by Deutsch (1957) in chapter 2 of this study.

Secondly, SADC policies and protocols have allowed for the building of confidence and trust that underpins a sense of community. The signing of the Protocol represented a regional commitment to the Organ, and its objectives, as well as to the preservation of the peace and security of the entire region. The ratification of the Organ by the Protocol allowed for the security interests of all SADC member states to be aggregated which in turn provoked feelings of community amongst member states. The SIPO aided in the strengthening of trust and confidence between SADC countries in that it allowed for the exchange of information, sharing of training institutions and joint exercises (Van Nieuwkerk 2012: 10). This sort of cooperation contributes to the slow building sense of community as it shows that member states are willing to ensure that the region as a whole benefit from information and training that will contribute to the overarching needs and interests of the community. This trust and confidence allow for increased positive and functional engagement to

take place which is a key characteristic of the nascent phase of security community development, as per Adler and Barnett's framework.

Lastly, the introduction and implementation of SADC policies and protocols have allowed for the development of mechanisms that promote and reflect a commitment to collective security. Van Nieuwkerk (2020) notes that the SIPO successfully established and launched the SADC Standby Force (SSF), the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Each of these mechanisms seeks to advance the notion of collective defence and security within SADC and as such reinforces the regional commitment of member states. This commitment aids in the building of a sense of community as it links the security interests of member states through multiple different mechanisms that strengthen the sense of identity and "we-feeling" present in the region. Intertwined security interests and mechanisms allow for the essential characteristics, as per Deutsch's work, to be strengthened, and as such lays the foundation for SADC to be placed at the first tier of Adler and Barrett's framework.

4.4.2. Failures

The slow building sense of community, belonging and common identity brought on by the SADC policies and protocols, discussed above, have played a salient role in advancing the development of SADC into a regional security community. This has allowed for some of the essential conditions of security development to be met and has enhanced regional integration. However, the SADC policies and protocols discussed in this study have experienced some major shortcomings that have proven detrimental to the development of the region into a security community. The main failures to be discussed below is the gap that exists between policy documents on paper and actual implementation as well as the undermining of policies and protocols by member states and leaders. These failures demonstrate potential "trigger mechanisms" that could lead to the decline of a security community and spark domestic instability. Acharya (2001) and Nathan (2006a) noted the importance of understanding these aspects of security community development as it can reveal why limited progress is being made.

According to Malebang (2012), SADC member states have demonstrated a poor track record in implementing and upholding the regional policies and protocols they have agreed upon and endorsed. As such, SADC countries have committed themselves to enforcing the objectives and aims laid out in regional documents, but this is not evident in their actions. The main reason for this is the fact that the signing of SADC policies and protocols are not binding and therefore success in implementation is dependent on voluntary action carried out by member states (Lotshwao and Maltose 2010: 47). Therefore, even though member states have theoretically committed to the enforcement of regional policies and protocols, they are not legally bound to do so which poses significant challenges for implementation.

The weak enforcement of regional agreements by member states undermines the extent to which SADC is effective in the prevention of and response to regional security threats. Inadequate implementation of the policies and protocols guiding collective action in the region indicates a level of political unwillingness held by member states that makes security cooperation difficult. Because the principles and objectives of SADC policies are not integrated into the fundamental institutions and functioning of member states, there is little political will and commitment shown towards the region as a collective. A lack of political will hinders SADC's development into a security community as member states carry out limited action against "hard issues" that inevitably prevent the resolution of domestic instabilities (Fisher and Ngoma 2005: 6). The lack of action taken by SADC is evident in the fact that little has been done to hold the government and monarchy of Eswatini accountable for the human rights violations committed against citizens during the protests that took place in 2021 and for general constitutional violations. A further example of this is the unwillingness and hesitance by SADC member states to act against President Robert Mugabe for his involvement in the election violence that took place in Zimbabwe in 2008.

Implementation challenges have also been experienced by the RISDP and the SIPO I. The RISDP identified poverty and social inequality as central driving forces behind security challenges facing the region (Lisakafu 2017: 171). As such, this policy set out to provide long-term goals for SADC countries that would aid in the alleviation of poverty and inequality. However, the increasing rates of poverty and inequality present throughout the region indicate that there have been significant shortcomings in the enforcement of the framework outlined in the RISDP. Van Nieuwkerk (2020)

suggests that the SIPO, as well as the mechanisms it established, suffered from poor implementation in numerous ways. This was shown in the fact that most of the objectives outlined in SIPO I never materialised which affected the functioning of SADC. Furthermore, there is no clear agenda for the use of the security mechanisms developed by the SIPO that will enable SADC to respond to security threats more effectively. The failure of SADC member states to effectively translate SADC policies and protocols into action that benefits the region hinders the development of mutual trust and sympathy. This is because all countries act in their own interests first and do not prioritise realising the objectives of the collective and this limits the possibility for security cooperation to take place. The breakdown of mutual trust and sympathy can lead to a deterioration in the sense of community held by member states and in turn, limits the amount of meaningful interactions that can take place. Both Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasised that mutual trust and a sense of identity are needed for the development of a security community and thus constitute a trigger that could lead to a decline in regional integration. As such, the lack of political will dedicated to the region over the state results in collective action against regional security threats facing shortfalls and the persistence of domestic instability.

The second failure experienced by SADC policies and protocols that have negatively affected the development of the region into a security community is the fact that there is ongoing disregard and undermining of regional agreements by member states (African Business 2013). All SADC policies and protocols are centred around the protection of citizens in the region from threats that emanate from inside and outside the region's borders. However, numerous actions taken by leaders of SADC member states have served to compromise the peace and security of the region by making decisions that provoke and induce domestic instability. In Mozambique, there have been numerous reports of the Mozambican government mandating local police forces to detain journalists covering the conflict in Cabo Delgado to prevent details and images of the situation in Northern Mozambique from spreading to the rest of the world (Civicus 2021). In 2021, there were thirty-three violations against journalists reported which constituted the highest number of cases in five years. The action taken by the Mozambique government fuelled instability as it was a violation of the freedom of expression and undermined democratic processes that further intensified dissatisfaction with the government and increased the allure and support of the extremist movement. Similarly, the monarchy of Eswatini also took action that fuelled instability as it was a

blast violation of the right to a free press and the media. Following the outbreak of protests in 2021, the government instituted an internet shutdown that restricted access to social media and all online platforms (Karombo 2021). This intensified the violence during the protests as people felt that their call for democracy was being silenced and that the government was trying to hide the violent methods used by security forces attempts to disperse demonstrations that included the use of teargas, bullets, batons, and overall violence. The voluntary nature of SADC documents creates the space for violations to take place. SADC leaders have undermined the principles, objectives and aims of regional agreements in two key ways.

Firstly, the prevalence of corruption in the SADC region is a major driving factor behind domestic instability. There is a culture of nepotism, diversion of funds and abuse of power that plagues the SADC region and is the leading cause of political and economic crises (Lisakafu 2017: 171). The bulk of the consequences is felt at the grassroots level with civil society facing poor service delivery, unemployment and poverty that comes because of corruption taking place. The ongoing unhappiness and dissatisfaction of civil society with their governments make the state ripe for instability as citizens are more likely to protest and take violent action against the acts of the government (Bonga 2021: 9). Furthermore, a disconnect between civil society and the state increases the appeal of alternative forms of government that allow for the actors behind intra-state conflict to thrive.

Corruption is a blatant example of SADC leaders violating and undermining the policies and protocols governing the region which threatens security community development. This is because corrupt acts go against the principles outlined in the SADC Treaty that prioritises equity, mutual benefit, solidarity, and human rights (SADC 1993: 4). All regional policies and protocols are founded upon the principles defined in the SADC Treaty. Thus, by violating these principles, there is an overarching undermining of all SADC policies and protocols. The presence of corruption poses challenges to the aggregation of values and interests of member states which are needed for collective security action and cooperation to take place. Furthermore, corruption widens the inequality gap and heightens feelings of unhappiness and resentment towards the government. In both Mozambique and Eswatini, corruption continues to run rampant. According to the report produced by Bak (2020), Mozambique is ranked 146 out of 180 countries on the Corruptions

Perceptions Index (CPI) which indicates that the country is facing extreme challenges of systemic corruption. The biggest way in which corruption has manifested is that elites have been afforded the opportunities to control and capture the economy to maximise their benefit. Local elites have been strongly linked to the privatisation process and the ruling government has ensured they are granted economic opportunities at the expense of the lower classes. The dominance of the elite in the economy has allowed for the capture of natural resources, which has aided in the strength of violent extremists in Cabo Delgado (Bak 2020: 8). Eswatini is also poorly placed on the CPI ranking 122 out of 180 countries (Khumalo 2022). The control of the government by the monarchy is the most significant way in which corruption has been present in Eswatini as it has resulted in the diversion of public funds, the nepotistic appointment of civil service, lack of action taken against reports of corruption by citizens and abuse of state funds for personal use by the royal family, the prime minister, and the cabinet.

Secondly, the trend of constitutional amendments taking place throughout the region contradicts the principles and objectives laid out in the SADC protocols and policies and thus constitutes a trigger for domestic instability. Across Africa, there has been an increase in efforts being taken to implement constitutional amendments to extend presidential tenures beyond what is permitted (Lisakafu 2017: 175). In 2015, various strategies and actions were employed to extend presidential tenures in Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and the Republic of Congo (Dawson and Young 2021: 276). Specific to the SADC region, constitutional amendments were implemented to extend presidential tenures and prevent punishment for human rights violations in Zimbabwe (Matanda 2022).

Constitutional amendments reflect a breakdown in democratic institutions and principles which limits the prospects of common values being developed within the SADC region (Mbaku 2020). The attempt to abolish presidential term limits fuels domestic instability as it oftentimes is done for selfish reasons for the benefit of leaders, and this can spark protests and unrest by citizens. This is because the constitutional rights of citizens are being further violated by leaders with whom they are already unhappy and thus extending their presidential tenure intensifies resentment towards the government. The abolishment of presidential term limits hinders the development of common values as it goes against democratic principles and reflects authoritarian practices that indicate the

state is not concerned with the interests, values and principles guiding and benefitting the region (Matanda 2022). Undermining SADC policies and protocols in the form of constitutional amendments threatens peace and security as they can serve as a stimulus for domestic instability. The framework put forward by Nathan (2006a), identifies structural weaknesses as one of the risk factors behind domestic instability. Constitutional amendments stimulate feelings of mistrust and doubt held by citizens and thus weaken state institutions and structures as it no longer has the support of civil society which can lead to unrest.

The undermining of SADC policies and protocols has had a disintegrative effect on the security community development of the region largely because it serves as a trigger for domestic instability to break out. Security cooperation is dependent on mutual trust, sympathy, and a sense of community. However, the disregard for the principles and objectives of SADC policies and protocols displayed by SADC leaders and states has compromised the "we-feeling" present in the region. This is because it reflects the self-interested nature of states which creates feelings of mistrust between the state and civil society and between SADC member states which can lead to domestic instability. As such, regional integration has faced challenges as the lack of implementation and undermining of policies and protocols has limited the extent to which SADC can meet the essential conditions outlined by Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) for security community development.

4.5. SADC Threat Response

The successes and failures exhibited by the Organ and the protocols and policies guiding SADC have provided some key insights regarding the extent to which the region has made progress in security community development. SADC has made progress in attaining the essential conditions outlined by Deutsch (1957) needed for security community development due to these successes that can place the region in the first tier and nascent phase of Adler and Barnett's framework (1998). Contrastingly, the failures of the Organ and SADC policies and protocols have revealed the factors hindering the progress of the grouping in evolving into a security community. The effectiveness of the collective response to threats by the region is dependent on the progress made by SADC in developing into a security community. As such, an analysis of the successes and

failures exhibited during regional security threat response constitutes a good mechanism through which security community development can be measured. This section will assess the regional security threat responses carried out by SADC in Mozambique and Eswatini and what it shows about the development of the region into a security community.

4.5.1. Successes

The persistence of the instability in Mozambique that began in 2017, driven by insurgency and violent extremism, continues to pose a significant threat to the peace and security of the SADC region. As such, intervention by SADC was justified at various levels. Firstly, SADC member states must act against security threats facing any territory in the region as per the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. Secondly, the government of Mozambique officially requested assistance in combating the insurgency from SADC and therefore action had to be taken. Lastly, the instability in Mozambique threatens the overall peace of security of the region and intervention is therefore justified according to the Protocol (Gounden 2021).

The deployment of SAMIM by SADC constitutes the most significant action taken by the region to combat the insurgency. According to Cheatham et al (2022), it is because of this mission that Cabo Delgado is more secure, and this is owed to the fact that SAMIM activity has resulted in major losses for the insurgent movement. The soldiers deployed as part of SAMIM have managed to reclaim villages, neutralise terrorists and displace and upset the home base of insurgents allowing for the confiscation of weapons and military equipment. This has forced members of the insurgent movement to have to rethink their strategies to counteract the activities of SAMIM. Furthermore, the implementation of the Peace-Building Support initiatives by SAMIM has allowed for significant humanitarian assistance in Cabo Delgado (Relief Web 2022). This form of support has reinforced the human security agenda laid out in SADC policies through the involvement of civil society and local law enforcement services and leaders.

The fact that SAMIM constitutes a collective mission involving a wide range of SADC member states demonstrates that the region has made some progress in developing into a security community. SADC's deployment of SAMIM reaffirms the commitment of member states to

maintaining the peace and security of the region and to upholding the objectives enshrined in regional agreements. This reflects that SADC member states do have mutual interests in maintaining the peace and security of the region. Furthermore, the security cooperation that characterises this mission is indicative of some level of trust and confidence existing between member states that allows for collective action of this nature. For SAMIM to achieve any sort of success in stabilising Mozambique, there needs to be ongoing engagement and interaction that allows for strong cooperation to take place. SADC intervention in Mozambique shows that collective security action taken for the benefit of the region is possible. The undertaking of peace-building activities within local communities supports the attainment of long-term stability in Mozambique as it aims to address the fundamental issues unsettling the country. This will aid in mitigating long-term domestic instability that threatens the peace and security of the entire region. Therefore, SADC's response to Mozambique shows that SADC has made progress in developing into a security community in that interaction and engagement are taking place, there is a degree of trust and confidence between member states and there is an overall commitment to the region that is needed to develop mutual interests, mutual responsiveness, and common values.

SADC's response to the instability in Eswatini has been limited in that little action and effort have been taken. However, there can be some success observed that demonstrates that SADC has made progress in its development into a security community. In a statement made by the President of the Organ in July 2021, SADC committed to deploying a fact-finding mission to Eswatini and facilitating a national dialogue to address the socioeconomic and political challenges facing the country (SADC 2021c). The goal of the fact-finding mission was to analyse the security situation in Eswatini to determine how to best support the citizens and find a solution to the unrest. Much like Mozambique, the efforts of SADC in Eswatini reflect the commitment of the region to maintaining peace and security and as such are furthering the objectives of the region. This supports the development of SADC into a security community as it shows mutual security interests being held in diffusing the situation in Eswatini which is necessary for trust and confidence to be developed. Most recently, SADC's 42nd summit prioritised achieving long-term stability in Eswatini and convened an Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Organ Troika to find a solution to security challenges (South African Government 2022). This reflects the interest and commitment of the region to achieving long-term peace and security. Furthermore, the initiative taken by SADC

to help facilitate a national dialogue that addresses the fundamental challenges facing Eswatini reflects efforts to prevent further domestic instability that would threaten the peace and security of the region.

4.5.2. Failures

The actions taken by SADC to quell the instability persisting in Mozambique and Eswatini demonstrate that the region has made some progress in developing into a security community. However, the shortcomings faced by each response serve as evidence demonstrating SADC's development into a security community is being hindered by the fact that domestic instability in Mozambique and Eswatini endures.

According to Chikohomero (2020), one of the biggest flaws exhibited by SADC's intervention in Mozambique was the fact that overall SADC did not seem to have a clear plan on how to protect the country's citizens against the insurgents. This is because SADC involvement came only two and a half years after the insurgency started and as such did not have the time frame or the intelligence to properly coordinate an intervention. Even though the mission deployed to Mozambique did, to a certain extent, manage to stabilise certain areas and impede the activities of the insurgents, the instability persists today and as such still poses potential threats to the security of the region. Initially, the SAMIM mission was financed by the countries deploying troops themselves. However, once the extension of the mission was announced questions regarding capacity and funding were raised (Fabricius 2022). SADC lacks significant capacity concerning financial resources and according to Louw-Vaudran (2022a) was not well-versed in dealing with violent experiences. The lack of capacity in expertise and funding forces the region to be dependent on external organisations and donors to carry out and maintain the intervention. The minimal knowledge and experience held by troops in dealing with violent extremism and terrorism mean that the SAMIM mission is not in an ideal position to resolve the instability and Mozambique. Furthermore, the reliance on external donors and funding can result in a delay in the action taken in Mozambique. This lack of capacity has contributed to the fact that the insurgency has not been fully resolved and Mozambique is still plagued with domestic instability. The ongoing instability

creates the risk for tensions and conflict to unfold in the region and as such hinders SADC's development into a security community.

The primary reason that SADC's response to unrest in Eswatini fell short is owed to the fact that there was a glaring lack of action (Bebington 2022). This is evident in the fact that there is no ground-level presence of SADC in Eswatini. Furthermore, SADC has not hinted at any sort of deployment into Eswatini which means that no direct engagement can take place which is needed for the region to influence the instability. Due to the lack of urgency shown by SADC in diffusing the situation in Eswatini, the region has faced criticism of its ability to play a meaningful role in addressing security threats. The seemingly "lazy approach" adopted by SADC is further shown in the fact that the national dialogue proposed in 2021 by SADC has still not taken place as of September 2022. Although King Mswati initially agreed to the dialogue, he pulled out from the meeting set to discuss how it would take place stating that the region should not be involved in the situation in Eswatini (Human Rights Watch 2022a). No further steps have been taken by SADC toward executing the national dialogue. This has undermined the development of SADC into a security community as it reflects hesitance by the region to hold the monarchy accountable for carrying out human rights violations that threaten peace and security. As such, domestic instability continues to persist in Eswatini because SADC has failed to address the core issues that provoke protest and unrest which hinders the development of the region into a security community.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has concentrated on assessing the successes and failures exhibited by the Organ, SADC policies and regional response to security threats in Mozambique and Eswatini to evaluate the region's development into a functional security community. The first section of this chapter focused on discussing the key regional threats facing SADC that serve to compromise the peace and security of Southern Africa. Poor governance, poverty, inequality, and domestic instability constitute the most significant challenges facing SADC countries. An understanding of these issues is needed to assess the development of the region into a security community.

Following this, this chapter unpacked the successes and failures experienced by the SADC organ and the impact this has had on the progress made by the region in developing into a security community. The formulation of the SADC Organ has been successful in that it reflects the first commitment of the region to security community development and that it allowed for a shift towards a human security agenda to be realised. This has aided in advancing the region's pursuit of security community status as it has allowed for mutual security interests shared by member states to form. However, the political tension that characterised the development of the Organ and the lack of implementation of its objectives have undermined the development of common values and political will in the region essential to a security community.

The third section of this chapter highlighted that SADC policies and protocols have allowed for a slow building sense of community, the development of trust and confidence between member states and the establishment of mechanisms that aid in the progression of the region into a security community. Contrastingly, this section has also identified that the weak enforcement and undermining of regional agreements, at the national level, have hindered the development of the region into a security community as it fuels mistrust, domestic instability and weak political will that has a disintegrative effect on the region. Lastly, this chapter has measured the development of the region as a security community against the successes and failures exhibited by SADC's response to security threats in Mozambique and Eswatini.

The analysis put forth in this chapter serves as the basis upon which the reasons for SADC falling short in security community development can be identified in the closing chapter of this study. This chapter made use of the analytical framework developed in chapter 2, through a multidimensional assessment of successes and failures, by identifying the conditions and phases of development of a security community attained by the region as well as the major challenges leading to a decline in regional integration. The following chapter concludes this study and will make use of this analysis to determine the core reasons underpinning the region's shortcomings in security development as well as what needs to be done to address these challenges.

CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

In light of the fact that 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of SADC's formation, this research set out to evaluate the extent to which the region has developed into a security community. The last chapter of this study will summarise the key findings highlighted by this research. Chapter 4 of this study presented an analysis of the successes and failures exhibited by the Organ, SADC policies and protocols as well as in regional response to security threats in Mozambique and Eswatini. Furthermore, this analysis has unpacked the impact that these successes and failures have had on the development of the region into a security community. As a result, the primary challenges hindering the advancement of SADC as a security community can be diagnosed.

The first section of this chapter discusses the relevance of this research and will put forward an outline of the study. Secondly, this chapter identifies the key reasons why SADC is falling short in its development into a security community and will propose ways in which these challenges can be addressed. The chapter concludes the study by suggesting areas for further research.

5.2. Relevance and Overview of the Study

This study aimed to put forward a 30-year review of the extent to which SADC has developed into a security community by assessing both the successes achieved and obstacles faced by the region in pursuit of regional integration. The relevance behind this research is the fact that instability in SADC continues to persist which threatens the security of the region. Thus, there is a need for SADC to evolve into a stronger and more effective security community to be able to better deal with these threats. This study aids in identifying the key challenges hindering the development of the SADC region into a security community. The relevance of this study also stems from the fact that, as pointed out in chapter 1, in the last five years limited research has been done on SADC's development into a security community and therefore there is a need for an updated study.

To do this, this study was structured as follows:

Chapter 1 focused on presenting the basis for this research and how it would be carried out. This chapter outlined the main research theme, aim and purpose of the study, the rationale for the research, the key questions that this study would set out to answer as well as the research methodology that would be used to conduct this study. Lastly, the first chapter of this study puts forward a literature review of the most significant bodies of literature related to SADC and its positioning within security community theory that have laid the foundation for this research.

Chapter 2 explored the different forms of regional security cooperation, namely security complexes, collective security, and security communities. This was done to identify the key characteristics unique to a security community. This chapter focused on examining the theoretical frameworks produced by Deutsch (1957), Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2001), Bellamy (2004) and Nathan (2006a) for the study of security communities. Broadly each of these frameworks focused on the essential conditions, phases of development, the impact of norms and institutions and the importance of domestic stability related to security communities, respectively. This was used to develop an analytical framework that would serve as the tool through which SADC was analysed in succeeding chapters.

Chapter 3 set out to provide historical context and background of the evolution of SADC through a review of the key developments that have taken place since its inception. The first developments focused on the transformation of SADCC to SADC, as well as the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Secondly, this chapter presented a description of five notable policies, formulated, and implemented by SADC, which guide the functioning of the region as well as the collective response to regional security threats. The policies and protocols discussed were the SADC Declaration and Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, the Mutual Defence Pact, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ. Lastly, the chapter briefly contextualised the instability and conflict unfolding in Mozambique and the Kingdom of Eswatini as well as the regional security threat response carried out by SADC. The historical background presented in this chapter served as the basis upon

which an analysis of the progress SADC has made in developing into a security community was executed in the following chapter of this study.

Chapter 4 assessed the developments made by SADC, as discussed in chapter 3, to determine how far the region has come in evolving into a security community as well as the challenges hindering progress being made. The first section of this chapter focused on discussing the primary threats facing and compromising the security of the region. An understanding of the nature and type of challenges undermining peace and security is crucial to evaluating how far SADC has come in security community development. The main regional security threats explored were governance issues, poverty and inequality and the presence of domestic instability. Secondly, this chapter investigated the successes and failures exhibited by the Organ, SADC policies and protocols and regional threat response in Mozambique and Eswatini, as well as its impact on security community development. The successes demonstrated the progress that has been made by SADC in developing into a security community to be weighed and contrastingly the failures revealed the predominant challenges hindering the advancement of regional integration.

5.3. Key Findings and Recommendations

The regional security challenges facing SADC continue to pose a significant threat to the overall peace and security of the region. This is because these challenges create the space for conflict and instability to ensue in SADC countries that can destabilise the region. As such, the development of SADC into a security community is of growing importance to combat the challenges facing Southern Africa. The analysis presented in chapter 4 of this study highlights that three significant challenges are hindering the advancement of SADC into a functional security community.

Firstly, the feeling of mistrust and a weak sense of community that exists throughout the region prevents the development of common values between SADC countries. Deutsch recognised this as one of the conditions essential to a security community and as such its absence is detrimental to regional integration. Furthermore, a lack of mutual values makes the possibility of security community development unlikely as SADC countries will be hesitant to give up their sovereignty in the name and interest of the region as a security community. Secondly, there is limited political

will exhibited by SADC members in prioritising the interests of the region. This impedes the establishment of mutual responsiveness which is pivotal for the development of a security community and for collective action against regional threats to take place. Lastly, the prevalence and persistence of instability at the national level continue to threaten the development of SADC into a regional security community. As discussed in Chapter 2, Nathan (2006a) argued that for security community status to be achieved a region cannot have domestic instability present within its territories. The analysis presented in chapter 4 emphasised that the ongoing instability in Mozambique and Eswatini heightens the risk for destabilisation to spill across borders.

One of the biggest driving factors behind the challenges discussed above is the fact that SADC, as an organisation, has taken limited action in ensuring that the policies and protocols guiding the conduct of the region are implemented at the national level. The institutions of SADC need to take greater steps in enforcing regional agreements within the territories of member states to ensure that the principles and objectives governing the region are upheld. The weak implementation of SADC policies and protocols has contributed to the declining sense of trust, confidence and community needed for regional integration to take place in Southern Africa. Furthermore, SADC as an organisation has not played enough of a role in holding member states accountable for human rights violations and breaches of regional policies and protocols. This has further intensified the presence of mistrust between SADC countries that hinders the development of the region into a security community. As such, SADC institutions need to make considerable improvements in imposing consequences and sanctions against action taken by member states that contradicts the mutually agreed-upon principles governing the region.

An active political will exhibited by all member states towards the mutual interests and challenges affecting the region plays a crucial role in the development of SADC as a security community. The establishment of the Organ as well as the ratification of SADC policies and protocols reflect a measure of commitment by member states toward the preservation of the region's peace and security. However, as time has passed this commitment has grown weaker with less and less action being taken by SADC states in the interest of addressing security issues at the regional level. As such, attempts by the institutions of SADC to strengthen the implementation of regional policies and protocols will also aid in strengthening political will in the regions. More action against

violations of the principles governing the region, such as corruption and human rights violations, will show more credibility and transparency on the part of SADC which will make member states more active in participating in collective security action.

The issue of capacity in terms of expertise, knowledge, skills, and funding has also contributed to the fact that the region has fallen short in addressing regional security threats. Greater efforts need to be taken at the domestic and regional levels of the SADC region to improve these aspects to enhance the effectiveness of the regional response to security threats. SADC needs to prioritise improving the skills development and training given to security forces to make decision-makers and soldiers better equipped to deal with a wide range of regional security threats. Security forces and military troops across the region do not have the skills and expertise related to the wide range of security issues facing the region, such as violent extremism which negatively affects their ability to be influential in situations of conflict and instability. Regarding funding, more pressure needs to be placed on dominant and more influential SADC states to commit resources towards the goal of maintaining peace and security in the region to limit dependence on external bodies.

5.4. Areas for Future Research

This study has provided a comprehensive review and discussion of the development of SADC into a security community that has taken place over the last 30 years. However, there are significant areas of research relating to SADC in the domain of security community theory that play a crucial role in understanding how regional integration can be advanced to better deal with regional security threats that have not been addressed in this study and requires attention.

These areas of research include:
- What factors, external to the region, have both positively and negatively influenced the SADC's pursuit of security community status?
- What is the role of non-state actors such as civil society and non-governmental organisations in security community development and how can their involvement be strengthened?

- This study has focused on discussing the most recent regional security threat responses carried out by SADC. As such, there is a need for an exploration of what earlier responses to instability (Such as in the DRC and Angola) reveal about SADC's development into a security community.

- There is a need for an analytical framework to be developed that measures the development of security communities in Africa that is conducive to understanding and accounting for the historical background and the political, economic, and social conditions of African countries. This can be done through a refinement of the existing theoretical frameworks on security community development.

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