ATTACHMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE ANC'S ATTAINMENT OF HEGEMONY BY 1999

by

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In the spirit of this dissertation, acknowledgement is owed firstly to the time and place in which it has been written. A long time has now passed since the dawn of South African democracy, a period when the author was born. The mood of both the country and the world are much less hopeful than the period covered in this study. The world's existential crisis of climate change is defining of our times and must be understood as the backdrop to any smaller study trying to achieve valuable but limited insight. This dissertation was largely undertaken during the Covid-19 pandemic, unfortunately meaning that this was largely written in isolation from the university, a spiritual space built on collective thought and collaboration. Additionally, the pandemic saw accelerated decay in the country and exacerbated the contradictions of capitalism.

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A final word of appreciation is directed to myself, without whom these words would have gone unwritten.

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The period of 1990 - 1999 saw a major turn in the fortune of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. While the seeds for the ANC's political ascent to the seat of government were sown during the 1980s, it was during the following decade that the party became a hegemonic political actor in South Africa. The ANC's success was in no way guaranteed at the beginning of the decade. In a country where political power was highly contested (often violently) and in a global context of American triumphalism, the party's achievement of hegemony required specific action that mitigated these challenges. One of the means of mitigating resistance from other groups was to cultivate a stake for these groups in the ANC. This dissertation argues that a set of actions which fall under the *de novo* typology of *attachment* were key to the hegemony achieved by the ANC by 1999. Attachment is defined as the nonviolent act of one group aligning its interests with those of another, with either the purpose or effect of gaining power. Four kinds of attachment are conceptualised: consensus, negotiation, cooptation, and coercion. The question pursued in this dissertation is the degree to which ANC hegemony by 1999 was characterised by attachment. The theorisation of the ANC's actions through the lens of attachment identifies a trend, across different spheres in South Africa, which significantly and crucially contributed to ANC hegemony. It is hoped that through this historical analysis, this dissertation can contribute to the understanding of the ANC's longevity and the concurrent contradictions the party endures today.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
DC	Democrazia Cristiana
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KZN	Kwa-Zulu Natal
LRA	Labour Relations Act
MK	uMkhonto we Sizwe
MPNF	Multi-Party Negotiating Forum
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NP	National Party
PAC	Pan African Congress
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
USA	United States of America
WCRP	World Conference on Religion and Peace

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1.   Introduction to Research Theme

What is the task of scholarship when in possession of a curiosity but not the correct words to enquire after this interest? Within contexts of change, it is likely that novel phenomena appear, and, upon emergence, these new events are neither named nor understood. In such cases, it is incumbent upon people to share observations and to give language to previously unobserved phenomena. These observations are of course not separate from the phenomena themselves. Words and concepts shape phenomena by determining how people interact with the phenomena themselves. This dissertation offers a conceptual typology coined *attachment* which is used to study a possible pattern of action employed by the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's ruling party since 1994. This suggested pattern is born of an observation of the successes and failures of the party since it first came into government. On one hand, the party has dominated South Africa's democratic political landscape for the last 28 years. On the other hand, it has also disappointed many who once placed hope in the party to repair the damage done by a racist and exploitative Apartheid state. Why has it assumed such dominance despite underperforming? Within this tension appears a pattern of action (and inaction) on the part of the ANC of establishing and maintaining shared or concordant interests with other political and economic actors or groups. Despite allusion to this phenomenon within the media and academia (Marais 2011: 403; Gumede 2005: 150; Terreblanche 1999), there has not been a substantial conceptualisation of this action and how it links to the party's dominance, nor has there been an inquiry into how prevalent this pattern actually is.

While existing concepts partially capture this apparent political phenomenon of developing concordant interests, use of the existing concepts would both overcode and undercode a study of the ANC. This then justifies the attempt at developing a fresh concept, namely attachment, which is inductively designed to better explain the ANC's

hegemony by 1999. This research has the potential to elucidate an aspect of the functioning of South Africa's political economy in the genesis and early stages of its new democracy, while also opening up room for further research. By tracing key events in the history of the ANC between 1990 and 1999, this dissertation characterises the extent to which a pattern of attachment contributed to ANC hegemony. Having introduced the broad subject matter of this dissertation, this first chapter provides a brief overview of the literature germane to this dissertation. It then defines the research question of this work. Following this, the research design and methodology are introduced to ground the work in established practices of knowledge creation. Finally, the theoretical underpinnings and ethical considerations of this dissertation are considered.

1.2.   **Literature Overview**

First, it is necessary to provide a summary of the main authors, debates and reference points that relate to the research problem introduced. This focuses on three main areas: i) existing accounts and interpretations of the ANC's political ascension during the 1990s; ii) examples of cooperation by the ANC, and iii) conceptual tools for analysing the phenomenon of dominant political parties.

Some scholarship on (and especially from) the decade under study (Friedman & Atkinson 1994; Moss & Obery 1992), consists of descriptive accounts of the political transition and early democracy. These descriptions largely focus on specific issues or sectors of South African society, including South Africa's economy (Hirsch 2005), police (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a) military (Du Toit 2001), legal system (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a) or social fabric (Sitas 2010). While the first four years of the nineties (following Mandela's 1990 release from prison) enabled the conditions for the ANC to govern South Africa, the following five years consisted of a consolidation of the ANC's political influence throughout the aforementioned sectors. The extent of this consolidation was sufficient for the ANC to constitute what is known as a *dominant democratic party* (Lodge 2002: 155-175; Butler 2009: 159-162). Owing to the party's ideological and moral influence in South Africa, the ANC is also considered to be a *hegemonic* party (see Terreblanche 2002: 95-141; Hart 2012: 193).

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There are two main reasons frequently put forward for ANC hegemony by 1999. The first reason, espoused by, amongst others, the ANC itself (ANC 2002), was simply the popular support enjoyed by the party. Not only did this popularity gain the party a majority victory in elections but it also comprised active consent from most South Africans to the party's rule. The second, not incompatible, common explanation for the ANC's ascendancy to hegemony refers to the party's ongoing relations with the capitalist elite. Hall (in Bloomfield 1977: 65) argues that hegemony within a capitalist society should be understood as the shaping of culture and civil society according to the needs of capital. Patrick Bond's *Elite Transition* (2000: 53-85) reads the transition to the ANC-governed new South Africa as being part of a class project to respond to the accumulation crisis of the corporate sector during the 1970s and 1980s. Bond argues that the agreement between white business and the ANC constituted a new regime of dominance of elites in South Africa. In this new regime, the ANC was best suited for the role of governing party because of its ability to ideologically neutralise popular discontent. Gillian Hart (2012: 219-242) identifies this process, characteristic of the ANC, of neutralising popular discontent as what Antonio Gramsci calls *passive revolution*. This term denotes a top-down seizure of power by elites, who, by overthrowing older social forms and enabling some new ones, successfully subdue subaltern forces. Hart argues that a combination of nationalism, populism, and buy-in from capitalist interests which needed to contain a long-term crisis of its own making, all enabled the ANC's hegemony. The second account of ANC hegemony juxtaposes with the ANC's own historical project of liberation, which is consistently touted as conflicting with capitalist requirements (ANC 1997a). Terreblanche's explanation for this is that the ANC was coerced by foreign powers (especially the USA in its moment of post-Cold War triumphalism) into adopting a neoliberal economic model, post-transition (Terreblanche 2002: 106-107).

Bond, Hart and Terreblanche all rightly contextualise the transition as taking place in a specific moment, where a truly global capitalism was emerging for the first time. It appears a fair assumption that no degree of hegemony could be achieved by going against this forceful current of capitalist interests. To frame these accounts in terms of the subject of inquiry in this dissertation, these authors argue that the ANC established relations of shared interests with actors more powerful than itself, to achieve its own hegemony. Both Bond and

Terreblanche provide vital insight into compromises made by the ANC, linking these compromises to the ANC becoming the governing party. However, the explanation of the ANC as an organisation that purely served an elite minority appears insufficient. This is because it fails to account for the continued consent to ANC rule, through 1999 (and after), from large sections of the mostly poor voting population. It is thus in moving away from reading the ANC as merely an elitist organisation that this dissertation departs from the otherwise astute accounts of scholars like Bond or Terreblanche.

The debate over whether the ANC is best understood as an organisation primarily representing elites is one that currently exists within the academy and broader South African society today.[1] An important disagreement relates to the nature of consent to ANC rule and whether this consent has legitimised the party's dominance. This dissertation does not settle this debate, but it contributes to some of its terms. Importantly, the account provided in this dissertation is of the ANC responding not just to one, but rather to many interests. Unlike Bond and Terreblanche, the focus of this dissertation is on how the ANC not only formed hegemony as a result of its compact with elite groups[2], such as white business and global power but through multiple compacts. These compacts, defined more carefully in Chapter 3, include those with traditional leaders and religious organisations (both explored by Leatt (2017)), organised labour (explored by both Reddy (in Butler 2014: 101-120) and Naidoo (in Butler 2014: 121-136)), the military, and the police. These associations, which cut across society along different angles and grains, gesture towards a commonly cited phrase which describes the party as a '*broad church*' (see Marais 2011: 403; Gumede 2005: 150; Terreblanche 1999). The outcome is that the ANC has had to be constantly sensitive to varying and often contradictory interests. The description of the ANC as a broad church leads to another question of public debate relating to the organisational character of the ANC. Wolmarans (2012), in seeking to describe this character of the party, identifies its tendency towards consultation (with *various* groups) as being a key characteristic of the organisation. The ability to contain several, often divergent, interests goes to the heart of this dissertation's interest in ANC hegemony. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (*2001: xviii) Ernesto Laclau

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[1] See for example disagreement between Satgar (2008) and Marais (2011).
[2] This theme is also explored by Seekings and Nattrass (2005).

and Chantal Mouffe argue that hegemony results specifically from political processes which mediate divergent interests. This makes hegemony essentially pluralist and what the theorists deem 'an articulated totality of differences' (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 143).

Numerous instances abound, more examples of which are provided in Chapter 4, where the ANC worked to align with a plurality of groups. Three major examples are provided here. Firstly, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), which painstakingly negotiated the terms of South Africa's transition from Apartheid, was *inter alia* a process of mediating South Africa's divergent interests, which had been the cause of violent conflict during the eighties and nineties. Mamdani lauds Codesa as a positive-sum process of what he calls *political justice* (as opposed to retributive justice) which uniquely enabled meaningful political change in South Africa (Mamdani 2015: 63). Codesa constituted a major example of how the ANC was party to negotiation. This firstly acted in the ANC's favour by generating societal stability, a condition particularly favourable to the ANC in government. Secondly it opened room for the party to rub shoulders with the old corporate elite, who, once enemies, became cooperators.

The nature of this alignment with corporate South Africa, as documented by Bond (2000) as well as Seekings and Nattrass (2005), is of major interest in this dissertation. The claimed cooptation of the ANC by corporate South Africa (see Bond 2000; Terreblanche 2002) is, by the organisational theorist's definition of the term, the *bringing of the interests* of a challenging group *into line* with those of a dominant group (Trumpy 2008: 480-481) (emphasis added). This dissertation, however, challenges the claim that corporate South Africa was indeed dominant over the ANC in ways that have been claimed above. A similar reading of interest-alignment can be applied to the apparent coercion of the ANC by global capital into adopting a neoliberal economic model, as documented by Terreblanche (2002). In this case, Terreblanche claims, the ANC was 'warned in no uncertain terms… of the large outflow of capital, entrepreneurs and professional skills that could be expected – or orchestrated - if their rules of the capitalist game were not accepted (Terreblanche 2002: 107). Put differently, the ANC's capitulation in terms of economic policy, had much to do with its interests having been realigned because of incentives being defined by powerful groups.

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A third example is in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which was one of the major processes undertaken in the history of the new South Africa. While the Commission had varying consequences and interpretations, one that has been argued is that the TRC was a consensus-oriented process which, as per van der Merwe and Sensabaugh (2017: 26), established a common national narrative about the country's past. If one agrees with this premise and agrees that a particular conception of history informs the values and the interests of various groups in society, then it can be concluded that the TRC was, in part, a process of using coercion to align more closely the interests of people within an intensely disparate society by creating relative consensus about the historical accounts of the nation.

This dissertation then consolidates a number of discussions around the ANC and the formation of South Africa's new democracy. It contributes to the discussion on the identity of the ANC or lack thereof. It participates in the debate about the ANC's relationship with capitalism as well as its relationships with other interest groups in South Africa. Finally, it provides a nuanced historical account of what comprised ANC hegemony in 1999.

In what remains of this section, I discuss the theoretical contribution made by this dissertation. Chapter 3 entails a more extensive discussion about the existing concepts that could be used to theorise this hitherto disparate set of actions (namely cooptation, coercion, negotiation, and consensus) which are apparent in the ANC. Two main alternatives are discussed, namely *garantismo* and *pactismo. Garantismo* refers to the strategy of centrist parties in democratic societies recognising, legitimising, and collaborating with more extreme parties on the left or right, as a way of subduing the more threatening elements of those parties (Di Palma 2017: 190). According to Di Palma's theorisation, *garantismo* involves a simultaneous delegitimation of opposition alongside the legitimisation achieved by organising or sustaining a system that accommodates opposition (Di Palma 2017: 191). When applied to the ANC, the concept of *garantismo* is encouraging. For one, the party has avoided recourse to authoritarian measures of violent repression, seen elsewhere in fledgling African democracies (Butler 2009: 163-164). Simultaneously the ANC has been able to side-line the very opposition that it accommodates through its ability to marginalise other parties from national narratives of

liberation which the ANC itself has written (Southall 2013: 40-44). Di Palma's (2017) formation of the concept of *garantismo* is a response to an associated concept known as *pactismo,* defined as the tendency to reach agreements or make pacts to solve political or social issues (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 3). This melds well with Bond's *Elite Transition* (2000) which emphasises the deal struck between the ANC and a business elite.

However, neither concept appears to fully describe the events during the nineties. It is not solely because of *intentional* coordination that the ANC developed aligned interests with other groups within society (as in the example about the consensus around the country's national history developed by the TRC). The party seems to benefit from several groups with whom it shares interests but with whom it has not systematically coordinated (an example being the large portions of the voting population). This is to say that the party does not share interests and derive power simply from deal-brokering or *pactismo.* Similarly, there exists a broader set of shared interests than that which *garantismo* encapsulates. G*arantismo* refers exclusively to the shared stake of opposing parties in a democratic system and the pacifying effects that this often has on more extreme parties (Di Palma 2017: 177-178). There thus exists scope to develop a concept, that this dissertation terms *attachment*, that potentially captures the dynamics that lead to the ANC's hegemony by 1999. Nevertheless, this typology is developed with close reference to the concepts of *garantismo* and *pactismo*.

As far as the categories of cooptation, consensus, negotiation, and coercion are grouped together as subcategories of a single typology, it does not appear that there are any existing academic works that simultaneously discuss all four of these processes. Furthermore, there do not appear to be any terms which denote specifically what is meant by the term attachment. To this degree, this dissertation is unique. However, these concepts are not entirely separate within previous scholarship. There are several studies that consider simultaneously at least two types of attachment and how they relate to power (albeit understood in varying ways). Building on the body of work known as cooptation theory (founded by Philip Selznick in 1947) in a paper titled *Cooptation and Noncooptation: Elite Strategies in Response to Social Protest*, Holdo (2019) discusses the

reasons why elite organisations often opt against the aggressive and expensive strategy of cooptation and instead opt for strategies that *accommodate* the continued existence of opposition groups and as such enhance their own legitimacy. In a paper titled *Coercion, Cooptation, or Cooperation*, de Soysa and Fjelde (2009) explore the capacities of states, particularly in being able to avoid civil war. Their main lens for observing the capacity of a state is by examining its strategies of cooptation, cooperation and coercion and using these actions as indicators of a state's capacity. These discussions on cooptation relative to alternative organisational strategies (Holdo 2019; de Soysa & Fjelde 2009) are utilised for identifying and theorising about the different types of attachment that the ANC has used to its advantage. This enables a comparison with other examples within the general language of attachment.

1.3. <u>Research Question</u>

The research question eventually answered in the findings of this dissertation is, to what extent was the hegemony of the African National Congress, which it had achieved by 1999, a product of attachment? Section 1.2 above highlights two main gaps in existing research. The first relates to understanding of ANC dominance, accumulated during the nineties. The second relates to an underdeveloped conceptual schema for studying this dominance. Thus, this research aims to develop a *de novo* conceptual schema to better clarify the topic of ANC dominance during this period. The conceptual typology[3] developed in this dissertation is coined *attachment*.

1.4. <u>Research Design and Methodology</u>

This is a basic, qualitative research dissertation, aimed at conceptualising, investigating, and ultimately judging the prevalence of attachment in the ANC. As a basic research dissertation, the aim of this project is to advance the overall knowledge and thinking about

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[3] Collier, Laporte and Seawright (2008) highlight the common use of typologies in the political sciences to add content to an *overarching concept,* by designating *types* which fall under the overarching concept, according to a matrix of differentiation, as provided in 3.2.3, commonly along two main vertices (Collier, Laporte & Seawright 2008: 156).

the ANC, as well as introducing a possible theoretical clarification about power and hegemony. The class of qualitative research that this dissertation ascribes to is Grounded Theory.

This dissertation is designed for the application of a Grounded Theory approach, discussed further in 3.2.1., which aims to derive theoretical insight from initial evidence. This theoretical insight is then tested and even improved on. This involves three main steps: firstly, the provision of initial material, secondly a proposed conceptual schema for organising and analysing this material, and finally the testing of the conceptual schema using further evidence to determine its utility and to improve on it. The initial evidence provided in this dissertation consists of a combination of historical occurrences from the period under study *and* analysis of this period. The reason for using existing analyses as initial evidence is to build on already well interpreted features of ANC hegemony. Following this evidence, a theoretical framework is proposed that attempts to pinpoint repeated action by the ANC as it relates to hegemony. This proposed framework is then tested by providing both evidence and counterevidence. The purpose of such an approach in the context of this work is to elucidate the phenomenon of ANC hegemony on the topic's own historical terms, taking into context the unique conditions and actors amongst which it manifested. Further details of the contents of these chapters are provided in the following subsection, where a broad summary of the dissertation is provided.

1.4.1 **Chapter Outline**

Chapter 2 begins by arguing that the ANC was in a precarious position in 1990 but that in 1999 it qualified as a dominant democratic party. The starting point of the period under study is the unbanning of the ANC by the De Klerk-led National Party in February of 1990. The end point is the ANC's victory at its second national election in 1999 in which it won an out-and-out majority – thus qualifying in the technical terms of Ostroverkhov (2017: 148) as a dominant democratic party. An initial characterisation of the changes that took place over this short decade, is accompanied by the argument that the rapidity of power-accumulation by the ANC warrants further investigation.

Both power and hegemony are complex, contested and often poorly understood concepts. Chapter 2 offers a definition of both terms, basing the choice on both the quality of scholarly work, as well as the respective appropriateness of either concept when applied to South Africa and the ANC. The main scholarly reference point for the concept of power is Hannah Arendt, who defines power, in opposition to strength, as the ability to act in concert. Meanwhile, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau provide the main reference point for the definition of hegemony. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (*2001: xviii) Laclau and Mouffe argue that hegemony results from political processes which mediate divergent interests. Hegemony is thus pluralist and 'an articulated totality of differences' (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 143). What is important is that both definitions of power and hegemony emphasise coordination, as it appears that responding to several, often divergent, interests is a practice at the heart of ANC hegemony.

Exactly what this coordination consists of forms the content of the typology of attachment. Chapter 3 builds the typology of attachment in response to a justified imperative for theorising a new concept. This is done using the inductive method of theorisation laid out in the literature of Grounded Theory. Given that this dissertation subscribes to the methodological procedures inherent in Grounded Theory, the creation of the typology of attachment and its subcategories is justified by Grounded Theory's claims that generalisations are performed as a response to initial observations rather than observations being derived from pre-existing generalisations. Out of the various strains of Grounded Theory, Charmaz (2014) provides the most appropriate framework for the purposes of this dissertation, defining Grounded Theory as a method of qualitative research that builds conceptual frameworks or theories through building inductive analysis from data. The data used for this theorisation consists of prior research as well as ANC and government policy documents published during the period under study. In line with pragmatist philosophical thought, the typology of attachment is developed for the purpose of elucidating a type of strategy that appears to be present in ANC history between 1990 and 1999. The validity of the concept should be established based on its ability to highlight a contributing cause to ANC hegemony.

A definition of the different types of attachment and an elaboration on their specific features

is provided, engaging with scholars on each of the individual phenomena of cooptation (Selznick 1949; Holdo 2019; Trumpy 2008; de Soysa & Fjelde 2009), coercion (Arnold 2001), negotiation (Korobkin 2002; Menkel-Meadow 1984; Van Dyke Parunak *et al* 2001) and consensus (Selznick & Broom 1955). While Chapter 3 is the theoretical hull of this dissertation, it frequently refers back to the subject under study. This is an essential part of the method of Grounded Theory.

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to bring the concept of attachment into existence. The nature of concepts and concept-creation is a contested phenomenon in philosophy (Margolis & Laurence 1999). While the definition of attachment is ultimately an analytical one, acknowledgement is given to the valid philosophical position that strict definitions of concepts are synthetic unities (Deleuze & Guattari 2013: 4-6). The acknowledged tendency of concepts to contravene their own borders is used as an opportunity to explore attachment as a word and to connect it with ideas that contextualise attachment in its strict definition as a particular coordinate on a broader map of exploration. This further helps to situate attachment within a history of thought and thus to motivate for its relevance as a concept for political analysis. A further tool used for developing the concept of attachment is that of game theory. Using simple game theory models, this section elucidates some of the potential conditions that enable cooptation and consensus. Both consensus and cooptation are conceived of as forms of cooperation, while negotiation and coercion are understood as processes which enable the two forms of cooperation. Each game involves two players, typically with options either to cooperate or not; and the section on game theory offers an abstract yet clear means to describe how cooperation may come about. Furthermore, game theory helps to provide further granularity to the subtypes of attachment by highlighting the payoffs (costs and benefits) considered by decision makers in interactions between different groups.

Chapter 4 focusses on the actions and decisions of the ANC with the clearly delineated framework of attachment with which to sort between means of power accumulation in the 1990s. This chapter presents extensive evidence of ANC attachment to groups across South African society. The *tertium comparationis* of events to be studied through the lens

of attachment is their having happened between 1990 and 1999 and their qualitative nature of involving significant actors in South African society. Events that relate to five main spheres, namely the economic sphere, the political sphere, the security sphere, the legal sphere, and the sphere of values, ethics and religion is explored. Existing secondary sources as well primary sources, including ANC and government policy documents, are used to research instances of attachment within the given historical period.

Following an account of the party's attachment within these confines, an estimation of its contribution to the party's hegemony will be needed. The task of Chapter 5 is to assess how prevalent attachment was within the ANC between 1990 and 1999, and then to judge the extent to which the party's rapid power accumulation is likely to have contributed to ANC hegemony. No numerical or percentage account can be provided and instead a considered judgement and description is aimed for. An effort is made to avoid any perceived metanarrative about the role of attachment in ANC power accumulation. This is done by positing the opposite of attachment (i.e. *non-attachment*) and discussing some key moments during the decade which i) involved the exercise of strength instead of power; or ii) involved conflict. This section provides the response to this dissertation's research question. Additionally, some additional insights gleaned from this study are provided in Section 5.3.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

The development of the typology of attachment and the use of Grounded Theory which holds that the philosophical work of concept-creation involves first an interaction with the world in which experience is had, data is collected and trends observed (Charmaz 2014: 365), are both rooted in the conception of philosophy being the work of concept creation (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 3). It is in response to initial observations that generalising concepts are developed to highlight commonalities between vastly different events and objects. As opposed to a deductive approach of theorisation, the inductive approach of Grounded Theory, is less concerned with testing the veracity of a pre-existing framework, and instead is concerned with developing a framework that, in being informed by data from the world,

develops a coherent account that is more likely to be useful. Constructivist grounded theory, which holds that data and theory are simultaneously coloured by the perspective of the researcher, accepts that an ultimately true theorisation is impossible (Charmaz 2000: 511). This is to acknowledge that there may be other ways of theorising the hegemony of the ANC. Further, it is to acknowledge that that cooptation, consensus, coercion and negotiation are not *objectively* of the same class but to assert that, given an initial indication of their common features and their apparent prevalence in the actions of the ANC between 1990 and 1999, there is further reason for investigation into how prevalent a pattern of this combined set of actions can be said to have contributed to the ANC's history between 1990 and 1999.

1.6. Research Ethics and Implications

I have read and understood the University of Pretoria's Code of Ethics for Research and believe that this proposed project complies with the policy. As this dissertation does not involve any subjects for testing, human or otherwise, the primary ethical concern revolves around the kind of knowledge that this research may produce and how this knowledge might be used. In accordance with the concern of the Code's demand for social responsibility, there may be a concern about the study's seemingly disinterested inquiry into the ways in which power is exercised and how others may utilise the knowledge generated in this dissertation. However, in as much as this study could potentially be used as an 'instruction manual' for domination, it is equally, if not more, possible that this study could be used to resist or restrain it. Indeed, the focus of this study is designed to unpack and understand some of the methods *already used* by those in power and it is the belief of this researcher that an inquiry that plainly focusses on power and how it is exercised (undistracted by imperatives to incorporate concepts which are commonly associated with social responsibility such as justice or democracy) is best purposed to laying bare the workings of power or domination. As a research project which is concerned with developing new concepts, comprehensive work has been done to identify similar or overlapping concepts so that any claims of originality are justified and valid and all work already done by others is acknowledged.

Chapter 2 expands on the preliminary information provided in this introduction. It first discusses the precarity of the ANC in 1990 and then the hegemony of the party in 1999.

After this it engages in a discussion of the South African state during the nineties and links the fact of the state, as a locus of multiple pressures, with power, defined as coordination, and the articulated totality of differences that comprises hegemony. The chapter concludes with initial indications of the multiplicity of the ANC which, over the course of chapters 3, 4 and 5, will be more sharply defined and linked to the ANC's power and hegemony.

CHAPTER 2

THE ANC: PRECARITY IN 1990, HEGEMONY IN 1999

2.1.   Introduction

As explained in the introduction, over the course of this study, the researcher pursues the question of the prevalence of a particular pattern of action within the ANC. Exactly what to call this action and how to define it to set it apart from other actions are, as yet, open-ended. The main purpose of this chapter is to map out the *initial data* about the ANC, which introduces the imperative for the theorisation of attachment conducted in Chapter 3.

The initial data, which this chapter analyses, relates to the pattern of ways in which the ANC developed shared interests with other groups who had political influence within the period

under study. This chapter articulates the reasons for inquiring into this pattern. The data relates to the period between 1990 and 1999, but, on occasion, the chapter may refer to dates outside this range to assist with a particular line of argument or contextualisation. *Data* is simply understood here as factual information garnered from prior research of other academic scholars as well as first-hand sources such as ANC policy documents. In addition to mapping out the initial data on the ANC, this chapter clarifies the key terms of power and hegemony.

To begin, this chapter contrasts the ANC's respective situations in 1990 and 1999. The discussion highlights the main weaknesses and threats to the party in 1990 and identifies the main events and conditions that led to the ANC achieving political dominance by 1999. While the party's dominance in 1999 technically qualified it as a dominant democratic party, this chapter mainly uses the term hegemony to describe the political dominance of the ANC, because of a) its dependence on holding together many groups and b) its extension into the realm of the ideological. The purpose of this historical narration and qualification of the party's hegemony is to highlight the ANC's unusual rate of political ascendency during this decade, leaving us with the question of how this was achieved. In response to this question, the main hypothesis of this chapter is advanced – that the ANC's projects, both as a political party and as a government geared towards coalition building, nation-building, and creating national unity, were instrumental to the ANC's success.

2.2.   The ANC's Precariousness in 1990

A combination of strengths and weaknesses characterised the ANC and its precarious position in 1990. What this means is that their political fate was in no way clear and that their ascendancy to power was far from guaranteed at the start of the decade. Nevertheless, in several ways, conditions prior to the decade of the 1990s enabled the rapid ascendency of the ANC in South African politics (Mufson in Lodge & Nasson 1991: 16-17). Entering the 1990s, conditions favourable to the ANC included the international sanctions imposed against the morally reprehensible Apartheid system (Terreblanche 2002: 78-79); enormous popular support for the ANC as the main alternative to the governing National Party in South Africa; weak domestic

economic growth and declining real incomes under the government of the National Party (Terreblanche 2002: 82); active and often militant social, labour and church movements (Lodge in Lodge & Nasson 1991: 112); existing (albeit limited) channels of negotiation with other groups including the business sector and the National Party; and the imminent collapse of the Soviet bloc (whose strength had previously constituted a reason for the United States' support for the Apartheid regime) (Habib 2013: 27-28; McKinley 1997: 104).

However, Tom Lodge (Lodge & Nasson 1991: 190-191) notes that:

> *'The ANC, notwithstanding its successes during the 1980s, was not well prepared at the start of the 1990s for the task of transforming itself into an openly functioning and popularly based political party… Although the [ANC's] guerrilla networks were well trained and organized, the ANC's clandestine political structures were poorly developed… In addition to the difficulties arising from the weak internal structures, as the 1990s began, the ANC faced the more profound problem of establishing an identity suited to its new tasks. For thirty years, the ANC had functioned as a revolutionary bureaucracy, its organizational culture and administration moulded by the requirements of fighting a guerrilla war and conducting international diplomacy.'*

Furthermore, while the collapse of the Soviet Union was favourable to the ANC from the point of view that it reduced the antagonism between the ANC and the United States, it was detrimental to the party for two reasons. One reason was that its ideological orientation in economic terms was left vulnerable in the face of the discredited socialist ideology. The second reason was that from as early as 1986, military funding from the Soviet Union dried up, making the possibility of a military takeover unavailable to the ANC (Terreblanche 2002: 103).

Other obstacles that the party had to face included a historically poor relationship with the USA (the world's unipolar hegemon in 1991) that required active efforts to smooth over; a South Africa starkly divided along class, racial, ethnic and party lines, with a threatening civil war (that materialised as such, albeit only in certain areas); enmity with the ruling National Party which had every intent to overcome the ANC's challenge to its own political rule; the hope from the

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party's electorate that the ANC would resolve the triad of unemployment, poverty and inequality that only made the task more demanding (Southall 1994: 629).

Threats to not only the party's own reproducibility but that of South Africa as a state were prevalent, especially before the election in April 1994. Following more than three hundred years of colonial and settler domination, South African society was divided sharply along class and racial lines. A bloody political rivalry between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which was funded by the Apartheid regime (Terreblanche 2002: 406), constituted a semi-civil war between 1992 and 1994. White paramilitary groups found allies in the chiefs within the Bantustans, leading to attempted coups in Ciskei, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana (Gumede 2005: 43). The country's economy had stagnated and high Apartheid era debt added to the list of destabilising factors that the ANC had to face up to (Gumede 2005: 30).

In a National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting in November 1992, the ANC, taking account of the balance of forces at play at that moment, referred to certain disadvantages of the organisation that could hinder its stated goal of achieving 'the transfer of power from the white minority regime to the people as a whole'. These disadvantages included organisational weaknesses and the lack of military and financial resources in the face of vast resources controlled by the white minority regime, and the white minority regime benefitting from support of powerful economic forces and counter-revolutionary instability (ANC NEC 1992).

What eventually transpired, however, was a largely peaceful election in South Africa, which instated the ANC as the governing party within a temporary government of national unity (GNU). But despite the obvious gains from winning the 1994 election, which welcomed the ANC as South Africa's new ruling party, with a near two-thirds majority, the ANC still experienced the threat of relying on the old-guard white contingent within the security forces and entrenched bureaucracies (Southall 1994: 629) as well as the burden of the power-sharing arrangement within the GNU. The following five years, between 1994 and 1999, would complete a decade in which the ANC transformed from a clandestine political organisation to a governing party.

2.3.   **ANC Dominance in 1999**

Looking forward to 1999, the ANC emerged from South Africa's second democratic elections with an increased majority of votes and several national and international successes to show. Through Codesa and the Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF) between 1991 and 1993, the ANC was central to implementing a largely peaceful transition from Apartheid, succeeding in delivering stability where the Apartheid state could not (MacDonald 2006: 71-76). Through the TRC, which began hearings in 1996, it had determined a channel (albeit limited) through which the deep injustices of Apartheid could be addressed. It had shed itself of the GNU in which it had had to cooperate with the National Party and curbed national debt levels that had previously threatened the country's stability. The IFP, which was the primary black opposition to the ANC at the time, had largely been neutralised and the figure of Nelson Mandela and his party was celebrated around the world (Gumede 2005: 53-55). Under these conditions (and others) South Africa entered the new millennium with a new political party firmly in office and significantly more stable than it had been a decade before.

Political office, however, does not necessarily constitute political power, as lamented by ANC figures who, throughout their first term in government, argued that the old centres of white corporate power remained intact (Lodge 2002: 19). While it is true that opposing groups predictably curtailed the ANC-led government in implementing several policies, Lodge (2002: 19-31) argues convincingly that the 1994 election (and more broadly the transition to democracy) represented a significant shift in power relations in the country. For a start, a vastly reformed legal system displaced the necessity of white dominance. Secondly, under both the Apartheid and new democratic dispensations, the South African state had significant economic and military capacity, particularly compared with its continental counterparts. Between 1990 and 2000, South Africa was the continent's highest gross domestic producer and concordantly had the highest reported tax revenues (as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)) on the continent (OECD 2022). These two factors logically infer that the South African government had command over the highest budgets (possibly by quite a long way) on the continent. Furthermore, between 1990 and 1995, South Africa accounted for more than 20% of the entire continent's military spending, year on year (SIPRI 2019: 1-2) and it was only after ANC-deployed minister of defence, Joe Modise, signed off on a 1996 White Paper that military spending began to be reduced. Additionally, South Africa's share of all diplomatic engagements in Africa nearly doubled between 1994 and 1998 (ISS 1998: 16), with the

country increasing its number of foreign embassies from below thirty in 1994 to more than seventy by 1999. All these facts indicate that, as the ruling party of South Africa, the ANC, had control over significant resources, albeit limited by domestic and international pressures.

Indeed, the consecutive landslide election victories in 1994 and 1999 technically qualified the ANC as what is known as a dominant democratic party (Lodge 2002: 155-157). While some scholars, such as Ostroverkhov (2017: 136), emphasise simply the consecutive electoral victories of a party, more sophisticated scholarship on dominant democratic parties emphasises not only a sustained majority at the polls but also dominance in the formation of governments and dominance in determining the public agenda (Giliomee & Simkins 1999: xii). The first two criteria are clearly true for the ANC in South Africa. To start with, the ANC has not received below 57% of the national vote since 1994 and a dip below 60% has only taken place in recent years. To the second criterion, the fact that the ANC has consistently received over 50% of the national vote has meant that they have had the mandate to unilaterally form a government. The third criterion, while less easily proved, has been argued by Butler (2014: 4) and Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 1-45). Additionally, Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 98-102) find that the ANC exhibits other common characteristics of dominant democratic parties including the blurring of lines between party, government and the state as well as harnessing a historic narrative of national liberation.

This is not to say that the ANC had free rein. On the contrary, Lodge (2002: 20) points out that the 1994 election represented the victory of a broader liberatory movement that consisted not only of the ANC but also of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco), the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The post-Apartheid dispensation also involved the coordination of these organisations from within the liberation-movement (minus the UDF) but now with the ANC in government and thus far more central to the functioning of the coalition. Therefore, the party was to a degree restrained by the demands of its liberation partners. But several instances of ANC unilateralism (see Habib 2013: 113-122) during the 1990s suggest that the ANC was anything but beholden to them.

A more serious limitation on the ANC's ability to achieve its aims was surely imposed by South Africa's corporate sector. A relationship between business and government exists in any

capitalist state, albeit of varying power relations, levels of collaboration and harmony. The claim of certain ANC leaders that the ANC was in office but not in power, is not uncommon in South Africa and generally implies that 'real power' is in the hands of economic actors. The ANC's about-turn on certain issues, including that of nationalisation and trade liberalisation constitutes real evidence of the response of the ANC to pressures from South Africa's business sector. Several authors including Bond (2000) and Terreblanche (2002) emphasise the ANC's relations with capital when analysing the party's political dominance. While particular emphasis is justified, some nuance is required to avoid the vulgar supposition that corporate South Africa was the *eminence grise,* controlling the marionette that was the ANC. The evidence against this crude argument is significant. Firstly, the assumption that corporate South Africa is (or was) a coordinated unit, capable of having a single agenda implemented on its behalf has been debunked by the likes of Habib (2013: 23) and Lodge (2002: 29). Both use the example of import tariffs, which are favoured by the manufacturing and industrial sectors but opposed by the financial sectors, as an example of contrary motivations amongst the capitalist class. Secondly, the ANC Government, while implementing several business-friendly policies (including the 1996 Growth, Employment, and Redistribution macro-economic framework), was also responsible for policies and legislation that were unpopular with large sections of South African business, including the Labour Relations Act of 1995. Thirdly, it would be incorrect to understand the ANC's role in resolving the accumulation crisis experienced by South African business during the 1980s (see Terreblanche 2002: 72-73) as being merely that of a junior partner (Habib 2013: 23). Finding local opportunities for new profits to be all but saturated, the corporate sector *needed* the ANC to a) restore South Africa's global image and thus end economic sanctions and b) enable overseas expansion (Terreblanche 2002: 101-102). In other words, South African business relied on the ANC just as much as the opposite was true too, thus imbuing the party with much more leverage of its own than this crude argument suggests. The fourth point is that while ANC relations with business were amicable, the relationship did not constitute the flourishing kind of collaboration seen between the state and capital elsewhere in the world, especially in East Asia (see Freund 2007: 193-195). As evidence of this, levels of investment in fact remained comparatively low and the Mbeki presidency directly ascribed this to a relationship lacking trust between business and the state (The Presidency 2003). A final point to add in the dispelling of the crude myth that capital controlled the South African state in the nineties is

that, on a more general level, several concerns of state actors do not necessarily concern economic elites, including those relating to foreign policy, national security, group identities, law and order, and religion. Instead of being simply beholden to a single-minded capitalist class, each of these areas inevitably contains their own pressures, thresholds, and interest groups. The next section takes a more complex view of the state, in which not just the business class but other political actors influence political choices and events. This perspective then influences this dissertation's definitions for power and hegemony.

2.4 The State as a Locus of Multiple Political Pressures

As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation is interested in the ANC's actions both as a party, *simplicita*, and in government (i.e. actions undertaken by government mandated by the ANC). This scope is to ensure that a fuller picture of the actions and character of the ANC is developed. Noteworthy, however, is that within a dominant party system, the separation between party and government often becomes indistinct. For this reason, it is not always possible or useful to isolate whether an action is the ANC acting in its party capacity or in government. This short section nevertheless looks specifically at the state. In the early 1990s, the ANC sought to gain control of the state (ANC 1997a). The party achieved this by 1994 and became progressively more dominant in its control as the decade went on. Conceptualisation of the state is thus necessary in order to clearly understand the power of the ANC. This conceptualisation is of course nowhere near a comprehensive theory of the state. Instead, the conceptualisation is germane to the theme of this dissertation and continues the discussion from the last section about the multiple interests to which a state must respond.

In answering the question, '*who rules South Africa?*', Lodge (2002: 25) remarks that the question would be better formulated by asking '*who influences the state?*' By asking this question, one gains a perspective on the myriad of actors that influenced South African politics at the time. The ANC, at the centre of SA politics, found itself representing amorphous interests – ranging from organised labour to black entrepreneurs, to a multiracial intelligentsia – with no one group being dominant (Lodge 2002: 31). To Lodge's list of interest groups that the ANC ostensibly represented, several other groups can be added that exerted

real pressure on the ANC at the time. These groups include South African business, traditional leaders, and the international community, at the forefront of which was the USA.

Through this lens, one gets a perspective of South Africa being a deeply pluralist society where group identities cut across society in different ways (across multiple class, religious, racial, and linguistic lines to mention a few) with individuals belonging to multiple and sometimes contrasting groups and with no group holding obvious supremacy. Furthermore, groups were not easily reconcilable or reconstitutable, with structural and ideological forces effectively maintaining group separation. It thus follows that any project towards political dominance required collaboration between multiple groups. Considering these conditions, the next section defines power and hegemony before further extrapolating the ANC's hegemony. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

2.5. **Power, Hegemony and its Application to the ANC**

This section discusses literary evidence of a multiplicity of pressures, meant here as factors compelling actors towards either action or inaction, exerted on the ANC within the period between 1990 and 1999. Understandably, a large part of the literature on such pressures during the lead-up to the elections between 1990 and 1994 and then during the first years of the ANC-led state between 1994 and 1999, has focussed on pressure from the business sector. I discuss some of the main authors who have documented the ANC and its relations with corporate South Africa. I then elaborate on how this emphasis on the ANC's pact-making with South African capitalists forms only *part* of the root of ANC hegemony. But first, two key terms must be defined: *power* and *hegemony*. These two terms prove important when elucidating a) the ANC's rapid accumulation of power between 1990 and 1999, and b) the ANC being a dominant political party by 1999. The way these terms are defined is key to identifying *how* it was that the ANC managed this achievement.

2.5.1. **Defining Power**

While the definition of the term 'power' is multifaceted and the meaning of the term at times elusive when identifying its existence in the real world (see Lukes 2005), it is practical to espouse

a definition that is both situated in prior work and commonly understandable without resolving all the puzzles that make 'power' problematic as a concept. However, the definition used in what follows veers from the most widely used definition of power: the ability of an actor to carry out their own will (Weber 1978: 53). The rejection of this definition, variations of which have also been used by Russell (1992) and Poulantzas (2018), is not on the basis of any inherent contradictions to that particular use. However, the alternative definition, put forward by Arendt, deals more specifically with what Weber, Russell or Poulantzas may consider a subdivision of power. The virtues of Arendt's definition for power are twofold. Firstly, it untangles some of the knots that typically appear when unpacking the concept of power by limiting its definition and allocating separate terms to the other facets that normally comprise the definition of power. Secondly, Arendt defines power in a way that aids the discussion at hand, situating power in the hands of the many acting as one.

Arendt chooses to distinguish between *power*, *strength*, *force*, *authority* and *violence* (each being different means by which people rule over people), which Arendt laments are concepts that prior theorists lumped together undiscerningly within the single concept of power. '*Power*', Arendt writes, '*corresponds to the ability not just to act but to act in concert*' (Arendt 1970: 50). Thus, it belongs to a group and not an individual. For an individual or group to be *in power*, a number of other people or groups would need to be willing to act in their name or at their command. *Strength*, on the other hand, resides in a single entity and relates to the ability of that entity to, on its own, achieve its will, including through the meting out of *violence*. A person in a position of *authority* (i.e. where norms result in an unquestioning reverence to a particular person's position, e.g. a police commissioner) may command a violent act of a *strong* state institution (e.g. the police). But in the case that the many (in this instance the many police officers) no longer respect the authority of the commissioner, the commissioner's power disintegrates owing to his or her inability to instantiate the act of the many. The police may themselves choose divergent paths of action, no longer acting in unison. Thus, power itself disintegrates. Or the officers may choose a new path, in concert, and thus use their power for new purposes, having abandoned the authority of the commissioner. For Arendt, power is in opposition to violence. Violence is used when power recedes and is not needed by those who have absolute power, for they do not encounter opposition. And while the two concepts appear side by side (for example in the running of a state) they nevertheless are distinct.

Power and strength are understood as the two aims of the ANC within this study. This is not to say that the ANC did not have other goals during the decade, but this dissertation is not concerned with discerning a complete or ultimate list of motivations of the party. Instead, an assumption is held that whatever these goals may have been, the ANC would have been better able to achieve these aims whilst in possession of power or strength and thus the ANC was in pursuit of both.

Hannah Arendt's theory of power has been termed (including by herself) a *communicative concept of power* (see also Habermas 1977*)*. While this term may suggest that action in concert is solely because of *active* coordination, in Chapter 3 I elaborate on why it is possible that action in concert, of the kind that Arendt describes, need not require direct communication between different actors. For now, two examples may suffice. One: the simultaneous, identical actions of millions of consumers, worldwide, when either choosing to consume or not, has far less to do with direct communications between the actors than with the *interests* and *incentives* of the consumers. All the same, the consumers acting *en masse* possess the potential to make or break a company if incentives and interests change. Two: workers experiencing mistreatment at a large country-wide company (due to, e.g., low pay, long hours, or no prospects of promotion) are likely to have little incentive to place any special effort into their work. The simultaneous go-slow of thousands of workers is bound to affect company productivity. This in turn may drive a company to change its policy in terms of pay or benefits. Notably, in both these instances, communication within each group (consumers and then workers) will increase the respective group's ability to act in concert. Nevertheless, concordant action, because of shared incentive and not necessarily communication, is compatible with Arendt's definition of power.

Despite the pragmatic philosophical assumptions adopted throughout this dissertation, which place agency with the theorist to define concepts in a way that he or she feels will best resemble how things hang together (see for example Rorty 1982), there is a need to justify the use of particular definitions so as to avoid arbitrary, contrived or irrelevant understandings of concepts that may wash away all previous meaning from words. Arendt argues in favour of the distinctions between power, strength, force, authority, and violence by calling upon examples, particularly of instances where governments commanding vast military capacity, have crumbled in the face of rebellions by people commanding vastly inferior capacity for force. She refers to the 1969 student

uprisings in Paris, which consisted largely of non-violent rebellion, but which led to a deterioration of the entire political system (Arendt 1986: 48).[4] A recent application of Arendt's communicative theory of power has been in relation to the Arab Spring (see LeJeune 2014). Across the Arab world, highly militarised dictatorships suddenly collapsed in 2011 in the face of organisation and largely peaceful dissent (aided by the use of social media and other efficient communication technology).

I do not intend to settle the debate about how power is best defined. This is both because of a concern for the scope of this dissertation and out of a sense that different definitions of power are inevitably used (and useful) within different analyses and discussions. In this dissertation, the subject under examination pertains specifically to the ANC's political success and stability owing to their non-violent acts in concert with other groups. In Arendt's terms this would be to discuss very specifically the ANC's exercise of and participation in power. For others (like Weber or Poulantzas), the discussion may relate *either* to a specific kind of power *or* to a particular means towards achieving power. Which one of these two meanings to adopt is not automatically evident in the orthodox definition of power and this potential ambiguity gestures towards the virtues of Arendt's distinctions and clear definitions of the different means by which people rule over people. Thus, for the rest of this dissertation, the word power, unless otherwise stated, adopts Arendt's meaning of the ability to act in concert.

Furthermore, in using Arendt's definition for power, I believe a clearer discussion can be had about the, at times opaque, concept of hegemony. Power is understood here as one of the means by which people rule over people, and more specifically that which is exercised through the coordination of the many. What this coordination requires is the issuing and following of commands as well as the more subtle processes of coordination through shared incentives, priorities, and moral imperatives. Hegemony is often simply used as an intensive form of power or a synonym for dominance as understood when discussing dominant party systems. On the one hand, I would like to move away from such a general definition and delve into the more specific scholarship on hegemony. On the other hand, while previously advisable to avoid this shorthand definition (when using power as per Weber or Poulantzas), understanding power in Arendt's

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[4] Interestingly, in 2014 and 2015, similar student protests in South Africa did not lead to a collapse in government.

terms is far more tenable. Indeed, there are many overlaps between the following conceptualisation of hegemony and the scholarship on dominant democratic parties.

2.5.2. Defining Hegemony

Antonio Gramsci (1971: 193), a founding theorist for hegemony, states 'the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, firstly as domination and secondly as intellectual and moral leadership.' Hegemony relates primarily the latter. Here there is an apparent parallel distinction between *domination* and *hegemony* in Gramsci as between *force* and *power* in Arendt. For Gramsci, intellectual and moral leadership must involve an ensemble of ideas and values that are shared by a number of sectors to create a collective will (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 67). It is thus to be understood that hegemony, as opposed to domination, does not primarily consist of force. Gramsci (1971: 12) elaborates that social hegemony comprises spontaneous *consent* given by the great masses of the population. This consent is owing to a combination of material conditions and incentives as well as ideological norms (regarding, e.g., morality and aesthetics).

The relation of consent (from 'the great masses of the population') to Arendt's definition of power is: consent is one way that people are put *in power*. It is an act of concert by the many (be it overt or tacit) to recognise the *authority* of a governing individual or group, to follow its laws, and to avoid questioning its actions. The word comes from the Latin prefix *con* (meaning together) and the Latin word *sentire* (to feel). The word thus denotes a meaning of accord or togetherness and is commonly used to signify agreement or concert.

Consent is notably not a simple concept, owing mainly to the possibility for manipulation or coercion when coming to an agreement. The Marxist concept of false consciousness is an example of how doubt can be cast on an apparent act of consent by appealing to untrue psychological representations that result from a person's incentives that prevent them from realising their true interests. It is a subject of debate whether Gramsci's conception of hegemony should be taken to consist strictly of uncoerced forms of consent (Barrett 1991: 233) especially because coercion is commonly conceived as involving violent force. Thus, there may be an eventual limit to the correlation between Gramsci's hegemony and Arendt's definition of power

(which is separate from violence). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to settle the debate over Gramsci's intended meaning in his conception of hegemony. This study examines hegemony in non-violent forms and coercion (as discussed in chapters 3 and 4) in terms of non-violent cultural forms relating to the processes of value-formation.

A few further remarks are necessary to deal with how hegemony is understood in this dissertation. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe (2001: xviii) argue that hegemony results from political processes that mediate divergent interests. Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 65) point out that Gramsci, born in Italy, was likely influenced in his insights by a contradictory society cut through with criss-crossing lines of division related to a range of issues including North-South relations, Catholicism and the presence of the Vatican, a failure of the unification after the *Risorgimento* and insufficient capitalist development. This picture mirrors Lodge's description of a diverse and disparate South Africa, brought forth in Section 2.4. Indeed, some interesting parallels have been drawn between the strategies developed to address multiple contradictions within South African politics under the ANC and those used to address similar societal divisions within Italian politics under the Christian Democrats who came into power a decade or so after Gramsci's death (see Rostron 1999).

Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 47-50) point out that while hegemony is a concept largely associated with Marxist theory, the concept originated to account for real-world processes that exceeded the class-based theoretical assumptions of certain orthodox Marxist theorists. Even Gramsci himself maintained a certain Marxist orthodoxy, which insisted on the essential class nature of society (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 69). Laclau and Mouffe instead argue that classes (or rather groups) are as much defined by the contingent ideological superstructure that imposes indeterminate forms of classification as they are dependent on objective infrastructures associated with, for example, production and space. Laclau and Mouffe thus maintain that hegemony does not necessarily constitute itself on the basis of class in the Marxist sense because class grouping and class interests are contingent on specific conditions being met; and under other conditions, groupings and interests may be constituted or framed otherwise and thus hegemony will be required to agglomerate according to these different conditions. Hegemony is thus by necessity pluralist and what Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 143) call 'an articulated totality of differences.' What this means is that hegemony must be conceived of as a unity, amongst

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different groups, achieved through a means that enables differences to in fact function as an integrating force. While it seems unlikely that political dominance across the ages would necessarily require this kind of strategy, it does indeed seem to be a more than likely condition within complex, modern societies.

It may, however, be acceptably argued that what is described above is not hegemony itself but merely a likely *means* of achieving hegemony (understood as political dominance in the form of moral and intellectual leadership). However, much as an aeroplane could be said to merely be a means to achieving cost-effective overseas travel, it is currently the only means for achieving it and thus it is acceptable to synonymise the two. While it is not within the scope of my argument to advance Laclau and Mouffe's definition the world over, hegemony is, I believe, necessarily an articulated totality of differences in South Africa. While the Apartheid state leveraged domination, the ANC offered moral and intellectual leadership, particularly within its early rule between 1994 and 1999. As argued earlier, with South Africa being deeply pluralist, any kind of hegemony will have to coordinate an array of differences. What is next discussed, then, is some ways in which the ANC fulfilled the role of being an integrating force within South Africa. This involves citing some examples about *what* the party needed to integrate and then later *how* it did so. This chapter does not exhaustively discuss how the ANC managed to be an integrating force. Instead, the issue is revisited in Chapter 4 after a clear theorisation relating to the kind of interaction that is being discussed.

2.5.3. ANC Hegemony in a Pluralist South Africa

The above definition of hegemony, cited by Laclau and Mouffe, comes across as highly useful when applied to a South African context and specifically to the ANC and its political ascendency in the 1990s. Gillian Hart's (2007: 97-98) characterisation of Jacob Zuma, president of the ANC between 2008 and 2017, provides a good example of what might be meant by 'articulated totality of differences':

> *Positioning himself as the key to national liberation is the key to Zuma's capacity… to articulate multiple, often contradictory meanings into a complex unity that appeals*

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powerfully to a 'common sense' across a broad spectrum… The figure of Zuma operates in many ways as a point of condensation for multiple, pre-existing tensions, angers and discontents that until recently were contained within the hegemonic project of the ruling power bloc in the ANC.

By the above description, both the ANC's early stint in government and the prior anti-apartheid struggle was itself hegemonic; or it attempted to be so. In terms of its first term in power, the nationalism of the ANC, which involved phrases such as 'the rainbow nation', cited by Mandela in his inaugural presidential speech, was designed to articulate unity through conflict and difference (see Hart 2013: 168-170). Meanwhile, Desmond Tutu, the chair of the TRC, was the person to coin the term rainbow nation. Processes like the TRC then become visible as nation-building projects, designed to draft common histories and meanings for the country (Sitas 2010: 27). The anti-apartheid struggle was advanced by many groups that were often themselves heterogeneous, including numerous international organisations, Cosatu and the UDF (itself an agglomeration of unions, student groups and church groups). While the ANC was very much part of the anti-Apartheid struggle, there is no evidence to suggest that the party was somehow more active than other organisations such as the UDF, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Cosatu or the SACP. So why was it that the ANC, specifically, ended up in power?

While this question itself may be worthy of an entire dissertation, involving a comparison of the different possible groups that could have attained hegemony in a new South Africa, it is worth briefly mentioning some specific factors that seem to have prevented any of these other parties achieving what the ANC achieved and then two features of the ANC that were not characteristic of any of these organisations. Ideologically the PAC was much more suspicious of collaboration, with internal squabbling dogging the capacity of the organisation. It was itself a breakaway organisation from the ANC, following the ANC's adoption of the Freedom Charter and a more general turn towards inclusion of other races, specifically whites within their organisation. By Arendt's definition, this tendency would exclude the PAC from having any potential for being in power because of their much more limited willingness to act in concert with other groups. Following the unbanning of various political parties (including the ANC and the PAC), the UDF dissolved itself in 1991. The SACP were ideologically and reputationally weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, excluding them from any serious contention for political office. Nevertheless,

both Cosatu and the SACP entered a tripartite alliance with the ANC, with several of their officials receiving cabinet posts. So, it is somewhat inaccurate to say that they were not in power.

Crucially too, none of the aforementioned organisations had any real rapport with corporate South Africa. However, from at least as early as 1985, representatives of Anglo-American held meetings with the ANC. At the time, Anglo American controlled sixteen of the largest fifty companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Pallister, Stewart & Lepper 1987: 37). Furthermore, formal negotiations that determined the political settlement were coupled with informal negotiations with the corporate sector, led again by Anglo American (Terreblanche 2002: 99). To what degree should one understand the transition from Apartheid as a project, concerning primarily elite interests? In the following subsection, I examine this claim.

2.5.4. Two Perspectives on South Africa's Transition

As noted in the introduction, Patrick Bond's (2000: 53-85) *Elite Transition* reads the patterns of the ANC-governed South Africa as being defined by an elite agenda facilitated by the ruling party to respond to the accumulation crisis endured by corporate South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. The idea conveyed by the likes of Bond (2000) and Terreblanche (2002) was that the ANC provided a necessary makeover to South Africa, to renew the consensual participation of the majority of South Africa's population in the South African economy. This reflects Stuart Hall's argument that hegemony within a capitalist society should be understood as the shaping of culture and civil society according to the needs of capital (Hall in Bloomfield 1977: 65). Accordingly, Bond (2000) argues that the compact between the old elite in the form of white business and the new elite in the form of the ANC, constitutes a new form of dominant class rule in South Africa and that the ANC became capital's favoured candidate for the ruling party because of its ability to ideologically neutralise popular discontent such as that of the militant labour movements of the 1980s.

Hart concurs that the ANC's hegemony involves containing rebellion, its hegemony having as much to do with the action it prevents as the action it enables. Hart (2013: 219-242) utilises another Gramscian concept to identify the ANC's success in neutralising popular discontent: *passive revolution*. What is meant by passive revolution is a top-down seizure of the commanding heights by elites, who, through the processes of overthrowing older social forms and enabling some new social forms, manage to subdue subaltern forces (Hart 2013: 9). From at least as early as the 1980s the ANC used popular demonstrations as a means of strengthening their political hand: Tambo's successful 1985 appeal to 'make the townships ungovernable' or the ANC's resort to 'rolling mass action' in 1992 in the context of the Codesa negotiation deadlock. But just as important was their ability to quell the fury of the masses, to call off the mass action once political progress had been made. In a book titled *The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power,* Susan Booysen (2011) dedicates an entire chapter to the topic of cooperation, complicity, and cooptation. In the chapter, she highlights the ANC's encouragement of public participation as a central means of the reproduction of the party's power. While public participation is commonly celebrated as encouraging democracy, Booysen argues that it is a form of cooptation, placing potential adversaries in official positions and thus neutralising opposition.

Hart argues that in addition to the support of local capital which needed to contain long-term crises of its own making (this being a direct application of Marxist, Gramscian analysis), the ANC's maintenance of hegemony has been aided by ideological phenomena such as nationalism and populism, which are specifically shaped by local conditions. Gramsci too was interested in nationalism because in 1920s Italy, fascism adopted a kind of nationalism to articulate a sense of nationhood that unified people across class divides through constructing a national narrative and collective will (Hart 2013: 225). In the South African context, Hart argues that nationhood has been articulated by the ANC as being attached to struggle and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). This struggle to overcome injustices, inequalities, and atrocities of the past in order for South Africans to unite in their diversity has generally been referred to as rainbowism, echoing Desmond Tutu's phrase of a rainbow nation. For Hart, rainbowism and nation-building in South Africa has, however, been fraught with contradiction owing to counter dynamics, which Hart refers to as '*denationalization*'. Placing South Africa's transition into a global perspective, Hart (2013: 201) describes South Africa's passive revolution as being a process enabled (if not led) by 'increasingly financialised forms of neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy'. She cites

Zizek (see Hart 2013: 229) who argues that South Africa forms part of a global trend in which the USA has enacted a form of damage control in response to crises generated by capitalism by channelling popular uprisings into parliamentary-capitalist systems.

Bond, Hart and Terreblanche all provide accounts of how the ANC established relations of shared interests with actors stronger than it, including locally based capitalists and US-based international institutions, to achieve its own hegemony. It can be argued that they represent a particular branch of scholarship on post-Apartheid South Africa that understands ANC influence as being primarily rooted in elite pacts (Habib 2013: 25-27). While there is real value to this perspective and the emphasis it places on the capitalist economy as a driving force within politics, I have argued earlier in this chapter that the ANC's relations with business ought to be understood as a vein of activity (albeit a central one) amongst several. This is to say that Bond and Terreblanche place an overemphasis on ANC relations with capital that fails to appreciate the ambiguities and contradictions that run through South African society.

For a start, the explanation of the ANC as an organisation that purely served an elite minority appears insufficient to explain the increased democratic popularity in 1999 on the part of large sections of the (mostly poor and black) voting population for the ANC to remain in power. This was despite the declining share of workers' wages in South African GDP and the increased levels of unemployment, as pointed out by Terreblanche (2002: 118-120). To both Bond (2004: 5-21) and Terreblanche (2002), the ANC's progressive identity is merely a false front, behind which lurks a party that connives with capital. Hart (2013: 234) however argues, I believe successfully, that political events within South Africa cannot simply be understood as being solely influenced by capital accumulation. Instead, she interprets the ANC's rhetoric of, for example, socialism or the NDR not merely as a false front of ancillary practices but as central to the workings of the party's political success and as a solution to the many dimensions of difference in South African society (Hart 2013: 234). This allows for both the expression and the simultaneous containment of discontent that constitute the ANC's passive revolution (Hart 2013: 193).

Hart employs more nuance than the likes of Bond in accounting for ANC hegemony by understanding ANC progressive discourses as being equally central to the party's identity as its elite practices. At the same time, she explores mainly the articulations (of, e.g., the NDR) that the

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ANC adopted to enable the so-called passive revolution and does not investigate the kinds of *incentives* that enabled the ensuing stability following South Africa's first democratic election. Moreover the concept of passive revolution, taken on the definition above, does not fully do justice to the degree of change that was achieved as a result of the negotiated settlement, democratic elections, and instatement of a new and globally lauded Constitution that happened in South Africa during the 1990s. Notable is that Hart's book, published in 2013, is intended to account more for the second decade of ANC rule rather than the first. In fact, Hart (2013: 197-199) suggests that the Bredell land occupation[5] of 2001 was a turning point in South African politics at which the ANC's passive revolution began to bud. But what earlier patterns or conditions made this possible or convenient as a political strategy? Alternatively, what prior patterns were broken? Another way of looking at it is that part of Hart's focus is on the 'National', the second term within African National Congress and how its reinscriptions and circumventions relate to ANC power, whereas this dissertation focuses on the 'Congress' aspect of the party, the word congress consisting of the Latin *con* (meaning *with* or *together*) and *gradi* (meaning *to walk* or *step*).

The debate over whether the ANC is best understood as an organisation that survives primarily because of it having served elite interests is ongoing within the academy and broader South African society today. Satgar (2008) and Marais (2011) disagree strongly on the point, with Marais rejecting Satgar's framing of the South African transition as being a Gramscian passive revolution. His main disagreement is owing to the fact that the ANC has been able to receive sufficient consent from the South African populace (most of whom are not elites) with the effect of avoiding significant social instability. This argument is characteristic of the second branch of theory, also espoused by Seekings and Nattrass (2005) and Habib (2013). This branch of scholarship emphasises the confluence of structural conditions such as the negotiated transition and the acceleration of globalisation that formed South Africa's early democracy. This branch of scholarship is generally more sympathetic to the ANC and interprets the failures and disappointments of the new South Africa, led by the ANC, as having been somewhat of a genetic

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[5] Bredell, on the East Rand of Johannesburg, was the site of a land occupation in 2001 by about five thousand poor black people, mostly from the neighbouring township of Thembisa. The South African state eventually received a court order to evict the occupiers. Hart views this as a major moral crisis within post-Apartheid South Africa, owing to a constitution that upholds strict property rights and has often acted to preserve the impoverishment of poor, propertyless people, systematically disenfranchised by the Apartheid system.

weakness built into the historical DNA of the country.[6] Trying to implement change, the ANC introduced new institutions (such as the Constitutional Court, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), and the TRC) but also maintained old ones (including the South African Police Service, parliament and the courts), for the purpose of maintaining stability. This view of events reflects a particular school of thought around the subject of corporatism and pact-making. Known as the historical continuity school of thought, it understands the role of pact-making as that of ensuring stability as transition is made from one regime to another. The main scholarship from this school of thought comes from Latin America and understands the changes (and the lack thereof) from the precolonial through to the post-colonial period (see Wiarda 1981). Habib (2013: 124), however, judges that in South Africa the most applicable lens regarding social pacts and corporatism is the crisis response theory advanced by the likes of Stepan (1978). Stepan argues that corporatism and pact-making generally emerge when states face moments of capitalist crisis. At these times of crisis, elites seek to preserve their status but do so by newly incorporating subordinate classes into formal politics (Stepan 1978: 24-25). To do this, there is a need to develop new mechanisms to link the lower classes to the state and institutions are either created or changed to accommodate new groups. Habib (2013: 124) adds that while Stepan particularly formulates the crisis response theory of pact-making in relation to the state, it is equally applicable to other branches of society, such as unions. Thus, a theoretical explanation is provided for not only the formal and informal negotiations but also the creation of the tripartite alliance and even the ANC's absorption of the Coloured Labour Party and the Military Rulers of Venda and the Transkei (Southall 1994: 630-631).

Surely one of the essential characteristics of this moment (where the revolutionary instinct of Vladimir Lenin meets the conservative, preservationist bent of Edmond Burke; or where revolutionaries needed to become bureaucrats; or where Mandela sat at a table with those who jailed him for 26 years) was that of *contradiction.* And, as it appears, enduring contradiction (for the sake of generating a critical mass of support) (see Southall 1994: 631-632) was necessary to

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[6] For example, Habib (2013: 27) describes the nature of South Africa's transition as being 'Janus faced'. This should not simply be understood as two-faced dishonesty. Janus, the Roman god of transitions, looks with one face into the past and with the other looks into the future and there are indeed worse ways to understand the South African transition.

facilitate the transition. Anecdotally, one of the more ironic instances of contradiction within the government of the new South Africa was the cohabitation of the South African cabinet by ex-Transkei homeland leader Stella Sigcau alongside Bantu Holomisa, who orchestrated a coup over Sigcau in 1987.

The general outlook of the second branch of theory (espoused by the likes of Habib and Marais) resonates with this dissertation because it provides a reading of the ANC as responding to not just one but rather many *interests* of society. Moreover, this is viewed not as minor or coincidental but instead as central to ANC power. Interests are here defined as that which is best for an individual or group. A broader discussion on this concept is be espoused in Chapter 3 where interests are viewed to have both objective and subjective dimensions, being rooted both in incentives created by the physical world, by institutions and by laws but also in conditions relating to morals, values, meanings, and identity that are contingent on psychological or subjective interpretation.

The two opposing branches of scholarship on post-Apartheid South Africa have certain commonalities too. They are both commentary and analysis from the academic left with an emphasis on crisis and failure (often understood as unrealised promises from the democratic transition). The emphasis is not unwarranted – owing to the extreme forms of poverty, inequality and unemployment that sustain in the country. The emphasis in *this* dissertation, however, is not on the multiple crises that exist within South Africa but on the general political stability in South Africa *despite,* and even because of, these crises. The claim that the ANC received consent from the vast majority of the South African population seems almost certainly true when discussing the ANC's early years in government. In addition to their landslide electoral victories in 1994 and 1999, the country entered a new period of stability. Political extremism and conflict prior to the 1994 election all but dissipated after the 1994 election (see Klopp & Zuern 2007: 129). And while South Africa remained (and remains) a country impacted by ongoing violence, particularly in terms of increased violent crime (see Schönteich & Louw 1999) the violence was mostly not of a political nature. After 1994, political action, instead, took place largely within the bounds of the new political system, with a high increase in public protest.

2.5.5. **Initial Indications of the Stabilising Multiplicity of the ANC**

The question that this dissertation aims to pursue is the extent to which the hegemony achieved by the ANC resulted from a pattern of action that functioned to align the interests of the ANC with those of other groups. Given the definitions of power and hegemony that have been adopted in this dissertation, this may appear to be true, a priori. But the task here is, in having put forward these definitions, to demonstrate that this is indeed a beneficial way to understand ANC power and hegemony. The aforementioned processes of negotiation constitute significant examples of interest alignment processes, but the scope of this proposed dissertation is broader than simply interest alignment through processes of negotiation. One of the contributions that this theorisation could make would be an elucidation and verification of the extremely common allusion to the ANC being something of a broad church. Indeed, Marais (2011: 403) writes that 'by the late-1980s, [the ANC] had established its status as a government-in-waiting and confirmed its ideological supremacy over the internal opposition. The route towards a 'better life for all' (the party's later election slogan) was seen to pass through the 'broad church' of the ANC, where the specific meanings different constituencies attached to this vision seemed to achieve harmony.'

In practice, the ANC as a broad church may refer to its many internal wings and structures (such as the ANC Women's League, the ANC Youth League, its armed wing, and its NEC) as well as its multiple branches that stretch across the country. It also points to the multiple strains of heritage in terms of culture, political ideology and living conditions of senior people within the organisation (see Schrire 1996: 15). As noted in the introduction, the idea of a broad church or a broad front has repeatedly been used (in academia and in the media) in relation to the ANC. In a 1989 NEC statement, the party itself emphasises the need for a 'broad front' as a means of challenging the Apartheid regime. Terreblanche (1999) refers to the tripartite alliance (consisting of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu) as a 'broad church' of liberation organisations. Gumede (2005: 150) writes 'ideologically, the ANC is a broad church, sheltering under its umbrella myriad political hues: liberals, Christian democrats, communists, socialists, social democrats, African nationalists and Africanists.'

From these sources one gathers the sense that the ANC gains its power from its inclusivity and willingness to enter alliances. This dissertation is, broadly speaking, concerned with the

apparent *orientation* of the ANC towards peaceful processes of cooperation with other groups for the sake of gaining power. Orientation is understood here as per the conceptualisation of Sara Ahmed (2006). Although Ahmed's work on orientation focusses on the idea of sexual orientation, her conceptualisation is abstract enough to apply to many other fields. For Ahmed (2006: 1), an orientation is to face a certain way and 'to be turned to certain objects, those that help us to find our way'. In pursuit of these objects, for example the peak of a mountain range, and in occupying particular spaces (the Drakensberg Mountain range and not the Himalayas) 'the lines that enable us to find our way… make certain things, and not others, available' (Ahmed 2006:16). 'A path is made by the repetition of the event of the ground being trodden… So, we walk on the path as it is before us. But it is only before us as an effect of being walked upon' (Ahmed 2006: 16). Orientation is thus about repetition and direction. The concept could be likened to that of *character* as used by Michael Oakeshott. Particularly germane is Oakeshott's distinction between secular and diurnal activity. For Oakeshott the domain of diurnal activity relates to the repeated, unchanged actions as opposed to secular activity, which pertains to new actions that in some ways do not resemble past actions. For Oakeshott (2004: 255-276), diurnal action relates to what he calls political character. Wolmarans (2012) adopts Oakeshott's concept to point to a gap for the study into the nascent character of South African politics.

As mentioned earlier, one of the apparent repetitions of the ANC during the 1990s was its ongoing accommodation of other groups in their policy and strategy. The term accommodation is used here without a particularised meaning but instead to gesture towards an area that can be more sharply theorised over the course of this dissertation. What it means, for now, is the ANC's symbiosis, correspondence with, collaboration with, as well as tolerance of other groups. The relation that this practice has to power or hegemony is easily visible: it had the potential to secure consent and even support for the ANC's programmes, first as official opposition and then as the governing party of South Africa.

One of the best-documented forms of accommodation on the part of the ANC is its strategy of negotiation in the early 1990s. The post-Apartheid arrangement was largely a result of agreements reached during the Codesa negotiations, a platform that effectively struck a balance between negotiating party interests to make way for the peaceful abolishment of Apartheid.

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Prior to Codesa, realising that their opponents, the National Party, were equipped with superior military and political force, the ANC resolved in its 1992 NEC meeting that a negotiation process, combined with mass action and international pressure would be best suited to shifting the balance of forces in favour of the liberation movement (ANC NEC 1992: 48-52). Formal negotiations that determined the political settlement (first negotiations about negotiations and then Codesa I, II and the MPNF) were coupled with informal negotiations with the corporate sector (Terreblanche 2002: 99). Despite the secret nature of these informal negotiations, Terreblanche (2002: 95) adjudicates that there was nothing obscure about the content of these sessions, arguing that it is fair to assume that key matters on the topic of the economy were being hammered out between business representatives and the governing party-to-be. While Terreblanche (2002: 102) notes that it is unclear what kinds or methods of communication existed between the formal political negotiations and informal economic negotiations, he suggests that the ANC made major policy concessions with regard to the economy to rapidly gain political headway. Economic concessions included abandoning redistributive policy, minimising state economic activity and actively pursuing an export-led approach to growing the economy. Terreblanche (2002: 98) remarks that the agreement between the ANC and big South African business should be viewed as one of the most decisive ideological turning points within the ANC and moreover that the agreement married the party to the intricate network of local capital as well as to highly influential global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Additionally, the ANC's ascertaining of power (i.e. its accommodation of other groups) had much to do with a) the bent of these other groups towards coordination or cooperation and b) the willingness of other groups to coordinate with, specifically, the ANC. While ample attention has been given to the corporate sector, several other actors, most notably the National Party and Cosatu, sought to coordinate with the ANC during this time of crisis. Firstly, as noted by Habib (2013: 115), Cosatu began to practice what is known as *strategic unionism* from the early 1990s. Strategic unionism is understood as a strategy of unions geared towards forming social pacts and influencing policy by participating in policy discussions. As discussed further in Chapter 4, Cosatu entered an electoral pact with the ANC, which saw the ANC adopt the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). Habib argues that in continuing this strategy in the post-Apartheid period, Cosatu was able to effectively increase its role in Nedlac.

Secondly, from at least as early as 1980, there was a strong National Party bent towards a consociational solution to the dangerous divisions created by Apartheid (Frankel 1980: 481-482). Habib (2013: 38-39) notes that the National Party were strongly influenced by Dutch theorist Arend Lijphart in their conception of how a post-Apartheid South African society would look. Lijphart's findings were that within a pluralist society, a consociational system functions best to create stability and uphold democratic principles. The ANC was largely opposed to the consociational model pursued by the National Party and instead advocated for a majoritarian system. While Lijphart himself celebrated the outcome of South Africa's democratic transition arguing that it satisfied several consociational criteria, several individuals convincingly argued that, at least in an institutional sense, South Africa's post-Apartheid political structure was much more closely majoritarian (see Habib 2013: 47-48).

Two important points can be made here. The first, as pointed out by Gumede (2005: 67), is that, politically, the ANC trounced the National Party and the democratic system's majoritarian bent is a remaining legacy of that victory. The second and more important point is that, although it is agreed that formally and institutionally, a majoritarian system won the day, it is not as obvious that South Africa did not end up with an informal consociational system as a result of a) political negotiations and b) a relative balance of strength between different groups including the new black political establishment and the old corporate sphere. Indeed, philosopher Brian Barry (1975: 483-486) notes that 'Consociations may be democratic, but they are also pragmatic and hybrid enough as forms of political organisation to be convoluted to virtually any political purpose'.

A more challenging prospect for garnering consent to South Africa's new system, was the IFP and other organisations associated with the Freedom Alliance such as far right organisations like the militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the far-right Conservative Party who also refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of a democratic society in which all people share equal rights and thus refused to enter into any kind of negotiation or agreement with the ANC. While it cannot be claimed that the AWB or the Conservative Party ever gave its consent to the new democratic dispensation, other sections of South Africa's white right wing (such as General Constand Viljoen's Freedom Front) did. Furthermore, the IFP endorsed the democratic elections just a week before they were due to take place. As noted by Southall

(1994: 632-633), both the IFP and the Freedom Front changed their positions owing to incentives to take part in the new democratic system. The IFP's incentive related to a probable 10% of the electoral vote (coupled with the fear of losing political clout in KZN to the ANC if it did not participate); and the Freedom Front's incentive related to the associated security personnel's desire to be included in the post-Apartheid security forces. Concessions were also instrumental in roping the two parties into the fold. For the IFP, special status was afforded to King Goodwill Zwelithini and a secretive deal afforded the Zulu king ownership of a large part of the former KwaZulu homeland. For the Freedom Front, the ANC's concessions that a constitutional mechanism allowing for the consideration of a *volkstaat* and that a double ballot for national and regional elections be included, were enough to secure their participation in the first democratic elections. All this reflects that, as per Mamdani (2015: 68), much horse trading was needed to achieve the kind of consensus or at least a clear majority to make the democratic transition viable.

In observing the political character of the ANC, Sylvia Neame (2015) dedicates several pages to describing the ANC's frequent pursuit of consensus both within the party and when dealing with other political players, associating the party's congress character with consensus creation. She suggests that the 1950s leadership, including Mandela and Sisulu, developed a political reputation for consensus-creation which served as a prelude to the events in the 1980s and 1990s (Neame 2015: xxvi). She locates, in part, the ANC's adoption of a consensus-based approach in African communal custom (Neame 2015: xxvii) and identifies its purpose as being associated with non-violence and avoiding confrontation (Neame 2015: xxviii). There is good evidence to suggest, then, that this age-old political process was carried across into a modern-day political movement and was influential within the Codesa negotiations themselves.

Meanwhile, Levy *et al* (2021: 11) emphasise the key role played by ideas (as opposed to institutions) in politics. They particularly refer to the subjective preference shown by the ANC towards cooperation and the belief that through it a thriving future was possible. In the following passage, Neame (2015: xxviii) further indicates how consensus was instrumental in the face of the country's national crisis:

The method of using consensus within the ANC was closely connected with its non-class character – as the potential for class conflict in the society at large intensified, it was a method of neutralising this potential.

If the method of consensus was an important one for decision-making within the ANC, it was also central to the conception of how relations between black and white would 'finally' be resolved in the country as a whole.

The next chapter more extensively covers the topic of consensus in terms of its theoretical relationship with consent, hegemony, and interests. Furthermore, the same treatment is issued upon the concept of negotiation. Chapter 3 unpacks two more concepts, both touched on in this chapter, namely cooptation and coercion, in the same way. All four of these concepts are understood as means by which interests are shared between political actors. Lastly, Chapter 3 elaborates on the common features of the four concepts as well as on their interplay.

2.6. <u>**Conclusion**</u>

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth pausing to observe and synthesise what has been determined thus far. In this chapter it has been argued that the ANC rapidly ascended to a position of hegemony from a position of political precarity at the beginning of the 1990s. It has been argued that the combination of forces acting on the ANC came from multiple sources and indeed the party's actions in this period, which at times come across as contradictory, reflect as much. Owing to the evidence of these multiple sources of pressure, any form of stability achieved would come out of at least partially resolving the pressures. This is to say that the ANC's firm position in government by 1999 was not a result of support from one main group (e.g. a capitalist elite) but instead a confluence of groups from whom the ANC needed consent. This consent is understood as central to the ANC's power and hegemony, given the terms by which the two concepts have been defined.

Some indications as to *how* the ANC garnered consent have already been provided and the negotiations for a democratic South Africa constitute the prime example of this. However, it is yet to be clearly discerned if the means by which the ANC developed and maintained broad consent to govern South Africa can be viewed as a pattern of repeated action as opposed to

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a disparate set of individual strategies pragmatically geared towards generating popular support. Chapter 3 is dedicated to developing a typology of action, termed *attachment,* which is offered as a potential pattern of action that could, hypothetically, be proved to constitute part of the character or orientation of the party. After developing the typology, Chapter 4 tests the salience of this kind of action in the period under review. By following this route, it becomes possible to more clearly answer the question pursued in this dissertation about whether a pattern of action, pertaining to the ANC's shared interests with other groups, can be said to have contributed to their rapid ascendency.

CHAPTER 3

THE TYPOLOGY OF ATTACHMENT, ITS SUBCATEGORIES AND ITS RELEVANCE TO HEGEMONY

3.1.   **Introduction**

Chapter 2 laid out a selection of data with the purpose of introducing an imperative for theorisation and classification that could more clearly discern a pattern of action on the part of the ANC. This Chapter forms the theoretical fulcrum of this dissertation, developing a concept called *attachment* that gives clear parameters to the kind of action that is under study in this dissertation. Up until this point, a picture of only partially formed shapes has been painted with regards to the kind of action that this dissertation is investigating as key to ANC power. In this chapter the shapes are given clear lines, that is, the concepts are thoroughly defined and a clarification of how the concepts relate to each other is provided.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. What this chapter first pursues is an explanation and justification of the methodology used in this dissertation. This is be done in three subsections. First, one of the loose ends from Chapter 2, pertaining to the concept of interests, is discussed. Interests, as a problematic concept, serves as a means of introducing

the methodology of Grounded Theory which, I argue, unties at least one of the knots associated with the concept. Following the introduction of Grounded Theory and the explanation of it being inductive rather than deductive, I review the deductive option for theorisation, looking at existing concepts and indicating their shortfalls. This three-part section is then be concluded by arguing in favour of using a grounded theory methodology in this study of ANC action.

The second half of this chapter is dedicated to creating the concept of attachment. Three different modes of discussion are used to give eventual clarity to the concept. Firstly, an analytic approach is used to give definition to both the broad category of attachment and its subcategories. Especially in the discussion on attachment's subcategories, this discussion is also be used to cite the relevant literature which exists in relation to each type of attachment. Following the analytic discussion on attachment as a concept (without yet having discussed its subcategories) a broader discussion of attachment as a rhizomatic concept takes place. While the purpose of the analytic discussion will have been to provide strict limits to attachment, this section discusses the links of attachment with other ideas and practices. This serves the purpose of giving a broader political and economic context in which attachment is thought to operate and to expand upon the spirit which the concept is meant to engender. The third mode of elaborating on the concept of attachment is a game-theory analysis of the subcategories of attachment. This follows the analytic exposition of the subcategories and is helpful in showing some of the prerequisites, especially in terms of incentives, for attachment to take place.

The chapter begins with a discussion justifying the approach of developing the *de novo* typology of attachment. This section comprises the methodological overview of the dissertation and provides an understanding of Grounded Theory, which is the basic approach used to develop this dissertation's knowledge. One of the central tenets of Grounded Theory is the emphasis on the virtues of inductive theory, which is theory created using existing data, rather than data analysed using existing theory. This section motivates for this approach by looking at some existing concepts and explaining where they fall short. This then clears the way for developing the typology of action, termed attachment, which will be offered as a potential pattern of action that could be either proved or disproved as being part of the character or orientation of the ANC. To begin, an overview of the concept of attachment is be

provided. This introduces the opportunity to elucidate the common features of the subtypes of attachment and how it is proposed that attachment is linked to power and hegemony. It is also used as an opportunity to clarify how the subtypes of attachment differ from each other and the conceptual lines along which they are divided. Next, each type of attachment is specifically discussed, namely Consensus, Negotiation, Cooptation and Coercion. Literature on each of these concepts is elaborated on and the relationship between the four concepts as well as their interplay are laid out. The first section commenced by providing a brief synthesis of the current point along this dissertation's trajectory. A similar synopsis was provided when concluding the previous chapter but, in this instance, I would like to use the concept of *interests* as an entry point to this discussion.

3.2. A Discussion on the Appropriate Methodology for this Dissertation

3.2.1 Adopting a Grounded Theory Approach

While it was noted at the end of the previous chapter that in the historical period under study – 1990-1999 - there was a combination of *forces* acting on the ANC, going in multiple and sometimes contradictory *directions*, exactly what these forces and directions were was not spelled out. *Forces* must be understood as groups with common desires or projects and the *directions* must be understood as these desires or projects and how they are purportedly fulfilled. Both of these factors are determined by a combination of objective and subjective conditions - a concoction of ideology, culture and expectations as well as economic, political and technological factors which drive people towards acting in a certain way. It is this complex combination of desire and programme as well as the feasible options for the fulfilment of desire or programme that I refer to as *interests* (see Giddens 1979: 189). Broadly, interests can be defined as the key priorities and needs of a group; but a more extensive use and concurrent elucidation of this term is undertaken in Section 3.4. Consisting of both needs and priorities, interests are necessarily but not exclusively associated with the survival and growth of an organisation but also its flourishing. Flourishing is a factor which is normatively determined, making interests a concept which cannot be understood as purely objective.

Interests, by being distinguished from desire or need, for example, are indeed a worthwhile variable for social analysis[7]. For the purposes of this dissertation, the concept zones in on the specific requirements of a group, considering its objective context as well as its normative telos. However, two common issues that emerge from any interest-based paradigm must also be addressed. The first relates to the potential for groups or actors to be mistaken. For example, it is convincing that the cattle culling associated with the visions had by Nongqause were not in the interests of the Xhosa people amid a war against the British (Peires 1989). Nevertheless, an entire group embarked on a course of concerted action that caused widespread starvation amongst the Xhosa people. Enough other examples exist (see Glaser 2013) such that it is compelling to say that individuals and groups do not always plan, desire, or act in accordance with what is best for them. This dispels the subjectivist notion which conceives of interests as basically being *revealed preferences* (see Dahl 1958: 463-469) but then leads to a second problem of how anyone, including the academic theorist, is to know what the real interests (understood as that which is best for an individual or group) truly are (see Callinicos 1987: 124). If people, intimately acquainted with their own situation, are unable to perceive their own interests, is it possible for the external observer to claim to know better? And even if people are at times correct about their true interests, how is it that the theorist can vet between those who are correct and those who are misled? It is hypothetically possible for a theorist to play this role, but a relatively high threshold of information is needed for a theorist to make a compelling case for understanding the true interests of an individual or group. Not only a full understanding of the material conditions inhabited by a person or group, governing their incentives and realistic possibilities, but also comprehensive insight into their subjective values which shape the telos of their lives, will constitute a sufficient account that can reasonably be seen as knowledge of their interests.

This means a method of first discerning the interests of a group and then comparing it with ensuing action (to determine whether the action is in line with the true interests of a person or group) is severely fraught. As noted already, it is not an adequate alternative to simply suggest that interests become discernible after the fact of action. Some actions reflect impulses and subconscious biases that exceed the scope of an actor's interests or even

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[7] For a discussion on the history and multiple uses of the concept of interests see *Interest* by Richard Swedburg (2005: 1-25).

contradict them (Callinicos 1987: 125). Furthermore, if interests are not easily defined, owing to distorted or incomplete information, group separation (especially those based on a claim of being in possession of common inherent interests) becomes equally difficult.

This serves as an opportunity to introduce a fundamental virtue of Grounded Theory. The work of Grounded Theorists like Kathy Charmaz argues that the philosophical work of concept-creation involves first an interaction with the world in which experience is had, data is collected, and trends observed (Charmaz 2014: 365). Instead of a starting point consisting of pre-existing groups with pre-established interests (the identification of which would prove, at best, controversial), theorists are provided with a set of data including public discourse, policy choices and political decisions which provide the theorist with a historical account of the events which potentially partitions groups and defines their interests. Legal documents and political policy impose direct influence on incentives and realistic options for the fulfilment of the mandates or desires of groups and people respectively. How they define and delineate groups is often mirrored by broader society, which may act within the incentive structures laid out within policy or public discourse. Approaching the delineation of groups from this historical angle sidesteps the problem associated with identifying groups through first identifying their interests. This goes some way towards ameliorating the problems associated with an interest-based paradigm discussed above by defining interests and groups according to identifiable incentives.

There remains, however, the issue of accurately identifying the interests of these groups. Apartheid policy, for example, may well have manipulated the incentives of black people (a group delineated by Apartheid law) but in fact their interests lay entirely outside of this policy. Grounded theory is again able to assist here. It helps us to conceive of the concept of interests being a theoretical tool that can help make sense of the 'raw' information in the world. Interests are as much shaped subjectively by people, as they are shaped by the real-world conditions acting on that individual or group. This subjective shaping may take place at the level of household individuals, wishing to discern their own interests, or the academic theorist who attempts to discern the interests of others. Interests are thus shaped linguistically and must be acknowledged as culturally specific (Stedman Jones 1983: 21). It remains the case that interests are not simply determined at the behest of the theorist and that certain criteria must be met for the theorist to identify interests. In this dissertation, interests are indicated

through the presence of *deliberation* and *repetition* in the action of an actor[8]. While a claim that an individual's isolated action reflects her interests is potentially dubious, the claim becomes more convincing when discussing a repeated set of actions. This becomes more compelling when there is evidence of deliberative and strategic decision making. The decisions and actions that I discuss in Chapter 4 are indeed of this nature: they typically involve deliberative, as opposed to impulsive, decision-making, which manifests as diurnal action.

How exactly one should characterise the ANC's repeated actions *vis a vis* power accumulation is a question answered in this chapter. For Grounded Theory, first the raw material must be handled and observed before it can be separated into different elements. Only after this initial handling and observation is done, can each element (in this instance: groups) have its properties (in this instance: interests) revealed. Chapter 2 brought forward a sample of the crude ore that forms the topic of this dissertation which, upon observation, suggests that there is value in further exploration. This chapter tries to delineate the particular terrain that is being excavated and the particular types of elements that are sought. As established in Chapter 2, these elements contain the common property of concert-creation, thus relating to power instead of strength. In Chapter 4, the political, legal, and economic patterns are highlighted. These resemble the continuous and discernible seams that form part of the terrain being surveyed. These are historical seams that have taken shape in light of real-world events. In Chapter 5, a judgement as to the prevalence of these patterns is offered. But first, it must be clarified why, upon this exploration, it is not adequate to simply go in search of predefined phenomena (for example one that has been conceptualised in other academic studies in pursuit of related questions). Finding that the existing concepts come up short in this study, it is then proposed that it is a unique element, yet to be named, that I must look for.

3.2.2. Existing Conceptual Lenses and their Limitations

What existing concepts could one use to theorise the hitherto disparate set of actions of concert apparent in the ANC between 1990 and 1999? One immediate option is a

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[8] The deliberative connotation to the concept of interests was identified as a vital feature of the concept by the Duke of Rohan in 1638 who identified interests, which are understood calculatedly and methodically, as being a positive variable against the impulsive and destructive passions of kings (Swedberg 2005: 9).

phenomenon known as *pactismo.* This is defined as the tendency to reach agreements or make pacts to solve political or social issues (see Casanovas in Casanovas, Corretger & Salvador 2019: 24). Scholarly work generally refers to its use in both Spain and Latin America - see (Basáñez 2015) and (Villegas 2006). In Spain, the multi-century political conflict over the Catalan region between its local people and the Spanish crown was stabilised by compromises which symbolically and pragmatically established agreements between the Catalans and the Spanish and enabled the building of the modern Spanish state (see Casanovas in Casanovas, Corretger and Salvador 2019: 31-38). Furthermore, *Pactismo* frequently appears in recent history as a means of mediating the interests of new challengers and old elites. The previously mentioned scholar in comparative democracy, Arend Lijphart, makes reference to *pactismo* in several sources (including Lijphart 1990 and Lijphart 2012). *Pactismo* here relates to Latin America's democratic formation in post-colonial contexts which were characterised by established elites with control over resources encountering challengers with popular legitimacy, bearing a resemblance to South Africa's transition. Furthermore, although he does not make explicit reference to the term, Bond (2000) suggests that the ANC's hegemony is rooted in a practice of *pactismo* between the leadership of the ANC and a business elite whose rate of profit greatly slowed towards the end of Apartheid. The deal was effectively that in exchange for capital's assent to the ANC's political power, it would be allowed to maintain control of the commanding heights of the South African economy, all within a new regime of legitimacy and consent. However, as it appears in Chapter 2, it is not because of solely *intentional* coordination or overt consent that the ANC developed the capacity to coordinate society. The ANC seems to benefit from several groups with whom they share interests but with whom they have not systematically coordinated (an example being the substantial portions of the voting population). This is to say that the party does not coordinate and thus garner power simply because of *pactismo.*

A historical case study showing similar traits to the ANC's sustained democratic dominance is that of Italy's *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) which was a dominant centrist force in Italy between 1948 and 1990 and a meeting point of multiple interest groups (Ginsborg 1990: 75-77)). Emerging from Italian fascism after World War Two, Italy voted in the Christian Democrats in 1946, analogous to the ANC replacing the oppressive, racist, and fascist National Party. A year into the DC's rule, the party would oversee the introduction of the Italian Constitution

(Ginsborg 1990: 100-101). This founding role in forming and introducing the new rules of a society is again mirrored by the ANC, which was the majority party during the introduction of the South African Constitution. With Christian and European emphases, the DC was ideologically different from the ANC in significant ways, but the two also share certain formal characteristics in the ways their respective ideologies were articulated. These include populist traditions and a cross-class approach of working with both business and workers which attempted to ameliorate rather than exacerbate the antagonisms between the two groups. Finally in this brief comparison, both parties gradually developed into grand patronage networks. Giuseppe Di Palma (in Pempel 2019), a leading figure in terms of Italy's history of one-party dominance argues that Italy's democratic transition *enabled* one-party dominance by the DC, something which he shows is by no means a natural course following transitions into democracy. Writing in 1987, Di Palma finds, in a comparative study of eight different democracies, that Italy was the *only* country of eight where democratic reconstruction actually assisted in bringing about single-party dominance. Given the list of similarities between Italy and South Africa's democratic development, it is likely that Di Palma would have to update his findings to include South Africa, which has been politically dominated by the ANC for 28 years now. To add to the historical similarities listed above, both countries underwent transitions from extremely violent and repressive regimes. In Italy, the move away from fascism involved agreements with elite groups including a deal that reinstated the Italian monarch and saw the DC retain long lasting ties with the USA (Tarrow in Pempel *et al*., 2017: 316). As mentioned in Chapter 2, assent from the USA also constituted a green light for the ANC to govern South Africa. Further, its deal brokering with local elites such as South African capitalists and traditional leaders including the Zulu monarch were decisive in ushering in a peaceful transition.

Di Palma, in part, ascribes the early dominance of the DC's 42-year political hegemony in Italy to a phenomenon he calls *garantismo. Garantismo* refers to the strategy of centrist parties in democratic societies recognising, legitimising, and collaborating with more extreme parties on the left or right, as a way of subduing the more threatening elements of those parties (Di Palma in Pempel *et al*., 2017) (Di Palma in Castles & Wildenmann 1986). According to Di Palma's theorisation, *garantismo* involves a simultaneous delegitimisation of opposition, simultaneous to the legitimacy of the same opposition afforded by a system that recognises

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opposition as valid political contenders. For Di Palma, *garantismo* typically arises in the context of constitution-making, which involves making the political market as openly contested as possible. This entails a process of legitimisation because it recognises nearly anyone as a valid political contestant. Crucially too, it incentivises participation in the democratic system, including the participation of those on the extreme ends of the political spectrum. The extreme ends may not be unanimous in their support for the new democratic dispensation, but their discord only serves to strengthen the political hand of the centre. This is partly because of the effect of internally weakening the more extreme parties (because ambiguous incentives drive disagreement) but more importantly owing to the peripheral role played by more extreme parties in the context of constitution-making. Di Palma thus argues that it is not in the nature of parties on the far-right or far-left to simultaneously achieve democracy and dominance (Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 64). The simultaneous existence of a democratic constitution which dominates legal, moral, and political discourse alongside the non-democratic connotations of the more extreme parties, provides immediate material for a centrist party to discredit its opposition.

Di Palma suggests that the uncertainty of political outcomes inherent in democracy is key to reproducing political consent. For him, this is a key mechanism that creates stability within democracy. He argues that a set of rules that does not guarantee certain winners and certain losers creates a potentially positive-sum game for all involved over the long run. This is why portions of the extreme left and right gravitate towards participating in the system. At the same time however, *garantismo* also involves a process of delegitimisation (particularly of the extreme left and right) because these parties tend to maintain principles that question democratic institutions. In the case of the ANC, the concept of *garantismo* is indeed promising. For one, the proportional democratic system, agreed upon during political negotiations, has on one hand allowed for participation of smaller parties but also entrenched dominant party democracy by distancing accountability of party members from their actual voting constituencies (Mattes 2002: 24-26). Furthermore, evidence suggests that the democratic system was enabling rather than disabling of ANC power because, particularly in the early years of ANC rule, the party avoided recourse to authoritarian measures of violent repression, seen elsewhere in fledgling African democracies (Butler 2015: 3). Simultaneously the ANC has been able to side-line the very opposition that it accommodates through its

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ability to marginalise other parties from national narratives of liberation which the ANC itself has written (Southall 2013: 40-44).

Di Palma's (1982) formation of the concept of *garantismo* is done by learning lessons from his home country and is a response to the concept of *pactismo*. Rather than focussing on the explicit agreements of political actors, he looks at the institutional incentives that tacitly reproduce consent within democratic systems. However, neither *garantismo* nor *pactismo* appears to fully capture the workings of the ANC under examination in this dissertation. *Pactismo* refers only to overt agreements between elites, while coordination and consent also operates at more discrete or tacit levels. To this effect, *pactismo* ignores the institutional emphasis that *garantismo* provides. But it is similarly clear that there exist a broader set of concerns in this dissertation than that which *garantismo* encapsulates. For a start, g*arantismo* refers exclusively to the shared stake of opposing *political parties* in a democratic system and the pacifying effects that this often has on more extreme parties (Di Palma 1982: 177-178). Even if the concept of *garantismo* is extended and applied to other phenomena outside of merely opposition parties, inherent to the concept itself is an interaction between opponents. However, only a limited number of the examples mentioned in Chapter 2 involve the ANC engaging with opponents *per se.* A concept which captures the democratic dynamic of negotiating the interests of multiple constituencies (most of whom are not direct opposition) is therefore required. Neither is it sufficient to simply create a hybrid concept, combining the concepts of *pactismo* and *garantismo*. While the two concepts together do encapsulate much of what has been touched on, there still are several facets of interest outside the scope of both. Firstly, neither concept substantially addresses the ideological aspect of hegemony (understood as per Gramsci as moral and intellectual leadership). While Di Palma, in formulating *garantismo*, does employ some discussion on ideology (Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 167-172), this is solely concerned with ideological forces that enable a functioning democratic system. Ideologically, the ANC was invested in shaping values around nationhood and race, to name just two, alongside its ideological focus on democratic values. Secondly, neither of the concepts specifically addresses the adopted definition of power (understood as the ability to act in concert). While both *pactismo* and *garantismo* have connotations of this definition with a potential for elaboration, neither concept can accommodate this dissertation's interest in the ability to act in concert without the possibility of direct coordination. While *pactismo*

encapsulates the potential for direct coordination and *garantismo* comprises a type of indirect coordination, the indirect coordination that *garantismo* refers to is largely that of pacification and neutralising, referring mostly to opponents battling it out on the electoral stage. There thus exists scope to develop a concept (what this dissertation terms the typology of *attachment*) that potentially captures the dynamics that lead to the ANC's hegemony by 1999. Nevertheless, it is planned that this typology is developed with close reference to the concepts of *garantismo* and *pactismo*. In what follows, I flesh out the methodology involved with creating a new concept that theorises a de novo typology associated specifically with the ANC.

3.2.3. Grounded Theory as the Methodology for Enquiring into the Power of the ANC

Following the previous section which discussed the shortfalls of using a pre-existing concept for analysis, this section describes and justify the chosen methodology used in the remainder of this dissertation. Firstly, this is a basic, qualitative research dissertation aimed at conceptualising, investigating, and ultimately assessing the prevalence of attachment in the ANC. As a basic research dissertation, the aim of this project is to advance the overall knowledge and thinking about the ANC. The class of qualitative research that this dissertation ascribes to is Grounded Theory. As earlier mentioned, Grounded Theory is an inductive method of theorisation defined by Charmaz (2014) as a method of qualitative research that builds conceptual frameworks or theories through building inductive analysis from data. This method involves a regular 'referring back' between data and theory called *constant comparative analysis*. This technique allows the generality of a fact to be established (Cho & Lee 2014: 4). Furthermore, Grounded Theory involves a process of *theoretical sampling* which involves insight from one set of data provoking the search for further data sets.

While the previous chapter was a collection of an initial dataset, this chapter builds the typology of attachment in response to the imperative for theorisation argued for in Chapter 2. Given that this dissertation subscribes to the methodological procedures inherent in Grounded Theory, the creation of the typology of attachment and its subcategories is justified

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by Grounded Theory's claims that generalisations are performed as a response to initial observations rather than observations being derived from pre-existing generalisations. The initial observation that this question is based on is the appearance of a pattern of action (and inaction) on the part of the ANC of establishing and maintaining shared or concordant interests with other political and economic actors or groups. Despite allusion to this phenomenon within the media and academia (see Marais 2011: 403; Gumede 2005: 150; Terreblanche 1999), there has not been a substantial inquiry into how prevalent this pattern is and how it links to the party's power. Furthermore, while existing concepts partially capture this apparent political phenomenon, use of the existing concepts (such as *garantismo* or *pactismo* – see previous section) would both overcode and undercode a study of the ANC. This then justifies the attempt at developing a fresh concept (in this case a typology) that is inductively designed to analyse the ANC's hegemony which it had secured by 1999. This research has the potential to elucidate an aspect of the functioning of South Africa's political economy in the early stages of its new democracy while also opening up room for further research.

Owing to the methodology of grounded theory, the way that this dissertation approaches its research problem is largely occupied by defining the problem itself. Thus, the approach is not simply that of asking a question that has a pre-established definition and then conducting research to answer it. Instead, when asking the question: '*to what extent was the hegemony of the ANC, which it had acquired by 1999, a product of attachment?*' a key term is first in need of delineation for the question to be truly meaningful. The next section thus introduces the term attachment in the way that it is understood in this dissertation. This is done in three distinct stages. The first is to give an analytical definition of attachment, attempting to exhaustively define the terms within the definition. This attempt to give attachment a strict definition, premised on an Arendtian understanding of power, allows for its conceptual leveraging in Chapter 4 to identify actual instances of attachment. It is, however, with a certain amount of wariness that such a strict definition is assumed. The world of politics and power, society, and economy, of history and people, is not arranged according to such distinct categories. It is with this admission in mind that the researcher undertakes to elicit a discussion that locates the concept of attachment within a reality of other concepts and practices to render the concept as part of, rather than separate from, the real world.

3.3. The Concept of Attachment

3.3.1. An Analytic Definition of Attachment

As stated in Chapter 2, the apparent proclivity of the African National Congress towards peaceful processes of cooperation with other groups for the sake of gaining power is the broad concern of this dissertation. The purpose here is to narrow and specify this concern so as to develop a concept that can identify the causes of ANC hegemony at the end of the decade. As previously discussed, the facet of hegemony that this dissertation investigates is that of *power,* as opposed to strength, where power resides in concert or coordinative ability. Furthermore, the most convincing conceptual locus or meeting point for coordination has been the broad concept of interests, where more aligned interests are understood as leading to better and more extensive coordination and thus greater power. From this, my attachment concept can be advanced using the following definition: *the nonviolent act of one group aligning its interests with those of another group, with either the purpose or effect of gaining power*. Despite two key terms (*power* and *interests*) having already been defined, there remain several terms which need closer attention for this definition to be lucid and justified.

After this clarification, a more exploratory discussion elaborates on the so-called *geist* of this concept. In part, this assists with explaining why the term attachment has been selected to denote this concept. Furthermore, this discussion gestures towards the kind of political and social phenomena that characterises the terrain underfoot. Finally, having had a more fluid discussion, which also serves the purpose of building the concept, a second round of delineation of the concept is had specifically for the benefits of limiting the scope of this dissertation.

Firstly, two key terms must be defined in the basic definition of attachment cited above namely: 1) *groups* and 2) *alignment*. Secondly, it must be explained why it has been posited that attachment should be understood as relating to *either* the *purpose* or the *effect* of an action and not just one of them.

Groups are understood as *collections of people with shared interests*. This is a relatively narrow use of the sociological conception of secondary groups which, as opposed to primary

groups, are impersonal and/or instrumental (see Cooley 1963: 248) and (Lee 1964: 28-34). Owing to the conception of groups constituting themselves on the basis of shared interests, they, too, are then loci of coordination. This coordination can be through communication for realising their interests or indirectly, through simultaneously pursuing their identical aims.

Because groups are, at times, identified in this dissertation prior to identifying their interests, and in fact as a route to homing in on interests, I will focus on preconceived groups designated either through legal policy or self-identification. The reason for choosing these two forms for identifying groups is the clear visibility of both legal policy and self-identification and the compelling case that they are both strong factors which contribute to the formation of interests. A group designated through legal policy during Apartheid, as an example, were coloured people. As a result of Apartheid policy, coloured peoples' experiences and incentives were shaped in unique ways and thus people within the group designated as coloured can be said to share a specific set of interests in relation to their colouredness. This is not to say that all coloured people have the same interests. As mentioned in Chapter 2, groups cut across society in a variety of ways and the interests of a coloured industrial worker may differ from that of a rural coloured preacher[9].

In relation to the second kind of groups, those who are associated via self-identification, what is meant is that groups are constituted by sets of individuals who pronounce themselves to belong to that group. The primary group under study in this dissertation, the ANC, is understood as a group because of self-identification of individuals claiming they are part of the ANC. In turn, the ANC, via the individuals that inhabit the organisation as a group, itself identifies as a collection of people who share a particular mandate and common project.

Alignment of interests is meant to denote a process of increasing complementarity between the interests of two groups. This is to say that for two groups' interests to be said to begin to align, they must conflict with each other less and complement each other more. For two groups' interests to be said to be aligned, their interests are in cooperation (either cooptation or consensus) with one another. While the optimal form of complementarity of interests between two groups could be said to exist when interests are identical, according to the

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[9] For a well-considered discussion on groups, refer to Iris Marion Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference (Young 1990: 46-48).

above definition of groups, complete identity of interests would dissolve any separation between groups. Nevertheless, as discussed in 3.2.3., attachment is conceived of as taking place over particular issues and it may be that with respect to only specific problems or urgencies, two groups (distinguished by their difference on other matters) have identical interests in relation to a particular matter.

Considering the inclusion of either the purpose *or* Effect of Gaining Power in the definition, it may seem contrived or overextended to include two distinctly different identifying characteristics within a definition namely both *purpose* and *effect* as potential marks for attachment. Indeed, the cleavage between purpose and effect has formed the entire crux of disagreement between deontological and consequentialist moral philosophies (McCain 1991: 168-182). Nevertheless, it remains important for the definition of attachment to capture both phenomena. This hinges on the fact that coordination or concert – which is a key component of this dissertation's conception of power – is not solely a product of intended coordination. For instance, in the previous section, it was indicated why *pactismo* was an insufficient concept because it consisted solely of intentional coordination. Why not then employ solely the identifier of *effect* in our definition? This would almost certainly reduce the potency in the insights that this dissertation could produce. To deliver proof that an action truly had the effect of increased concert (and therefore increased power) could potentially exclude several cases where this is likely the case but not beyond doubt. More importantly, what is under examination in this dissertation is a pattern of action within the ANC, successful or not, which I am trying to establish as either prevalent or not in its political character or orientation. To only include visibly successful cases of coordination would be to overlook potentially important cases of attempted coordination which should be seen as no less germane to our understanding of a party's political character.

The somewhat non-unified definition of attachment may betray a trace of some of the philosophical influences which inform the author's personal inclination towards concept-creation and the ways in which this is appropriately done. In the next section, a broad sketch of the concept of attachment are provided. Here the influences of pragmatist and Deleuzean philosophy are used in order to frame attachment through a different yet prominent and compelling philosophical lens, which necessarily complexifies the nature of truth and the role

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of theory and philosophy. Moreover, it is also useful to catch a glimpse of the potentialities of attachment before returning to the more concrete study at hand.

3.3.2. A Rhizomatic Discussion on Attachment

Now that a strict definition for attachment has been provided, there is brief room for a broader discussion about the proposed concept to potentially elucidate the ideas that attachment engenders. While the definition previously provided is analogous to a tree trunk (*i.e.*, a central concept from which subtypes derive), the below discussion is intended to be more *rhizomatic*. This borrows[10] from Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about the nature of concepts (Deleuze & Guattari 2013: 3-4) which, unlike the tree, do not embody a neat identity in relation to where concepts begin and end; in terms of what is conceptually peripheral and what is central; and in terms of how components of a concept are connected and ordered. For Deleuze and Guattari, the work of concept-creation *is* philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 3) and their endorsement of pragmatist philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 88-97) correlates with the theoretical assumptions of this work and the Grounded Theory methodology applied in this study.

For Deleuze and Guattari, in order to truly partake in the real world, concepts must hold within them multiplicity, ambivalence and even contradiction (Deleuze & Guattari 2013: 37). As argued within Chapter 2, both South Africa and the ANC should not be viewed as having strict identities but are instead made up by multiple and often contradictory segments. It may thus be appropriate to consider the multiple potentialities, which transgress unification and identity[11], lying within the concept of attachment which are otherwise negated by the strict definition applied in the remainder of this dissertation.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the development of a concept is analogous to drawing up a map which potentially serves as a tool for navigating the world. The appropriateness of the map

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[10] Owing to their vastly unique and complex system of thought, the author does not intend or attempt to fully apply a Deleuze and Guattarian lens but instead to leverage their concepts that add insight and dexterity to the concept of attachment.

[11] The lack of identity in concepts links with Wittgenstein's insights into concepts and language, in which concepts do not possess strict essences which unite their components but instead consist of components with 'family resemblances' (Wittgenstein 1953: 32) that turn the concern about what *necessarily* falls within and outside of a particular concept into a less discernible and less important matter. What matters more is the history of a concept and the way its components have been grouped under a particular name owing to *previous use*.

can only be established after testing out its coordinates on a journey through the world you have sought to describe (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 12). In what follows, the broad territory of attachment is discussed. The reason for sketching this rough map comes from i) the contrived nature of having a neatly defined concept and ii) a belief that this kind of description might give the reader greater potential to grab hold of the concept that is being created. Eventually a clear conceptual delineation proves indispensable for properly defined research, but for a moment I must look at the expense at which I choose to limit attachment. Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari's thinking is too obscure to sustain for the entirety of a dissertation that does not wholeheartedly take on the thinkers' entire paradigm, so it is just in this section, for the purpose of a brief lateral *line of flight* that I invoke their concept of the rhizome. In what follows, I discuss that which is being chiselled off to give this dissertation clear form, the sections of the terrain of attachment which are *not* otherwise explored. This is not to abandon the definition of attachment in the previous section but to consider what surrounds it.

Possibly the best-known use of the word attachment within academic work is from the field of psychology, denoting (particularly long-term) relationships and bonds between people (Bretherton 1985: 3-6). While the relationships referred to in this dissertation do not preclude the possibility of emotional connection between organisations (and especially their leadership), the idea is primarily concerned with the incentives and *modi operandi* that connect organisations with one another. Other terms such as 'agreement' or 'contract' were also considered for conveying the importance of pact, collaboration, and coordination in relation to power. However, because this research deals with the *links* (of varying power relations) between the interests of two groups and the mutual reliance between actors for the existence and wielding of power, 'attachment' was chosen. The connotation of sustained relations between actors relates better to this study's interest in diurnal activity from repeated cooperation.

Because cooperation breeds power, groups whose interests lie in gaining power become attached to one another. In the instance that groups become *detached*, power dissipates, the possibility of conflict increases, and groups must rely on themselves (*i.e.* strength) for survival. This theme has historic roots in human thought. A significant portion of modern Western philosophy (particularly Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau but dating back to the ancient Greeks (Ritchie 1891: 656-658) is occupied by the nature of a social contract, a hypothetical positive-

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sum arrangement between people who are otherwise likely to do injustice unto one another. The social contract is an understanding of consent to a government which exercises power over people, stripping them of the right to certain actions (especially violence) in return for certain goods such as personal security (Blackburn 2016: 447-448). The influential idea of the social contract forms part of a trend within western political philosophy from the last five hundred years that has consistently returned to themes of unison and collaboration. This may be partly tautological as political philosophy is, by common definition, occupied with the problems associated with people living within communities and societies, depending on each other, organising, fighting, and cooperating (see Blackburn 2016: 367-368). Nevertheless, Thomas Paine was emphatic: humans must cooperate or else humans, as individuals, perish (2004: 5-6). Hobbes (2018: 1) believed that the level of concord within society was synonymous with the overall wellbeing of society. Marx not only believed that capitalism is reliant on cooperation between masses of people (1990: 439-454) but that the only way for workers to rid themselves of the oppressive yoke of the system exploiting their labour was to unite and overthrow it. A further contribution of Marx was to point out that this coordination takes place not always via direct coordination but instead through implicit and shared interests of people (Marx & Engels 1997: 75-76). An acknowledgement of indirect coordination owing to shared interests appears too within contract theory and the like (including Adam Smith (1976: 456) but Marx emphasises the reality of opposing interests creating inevitable contradiction (while contract theorists emphasise the opposite: inevitable equilibria generated by common interests).

Echoes from across centuries and even millennia of political thinkers sound out in the more contemporary political philosophy of Arendt whose underappreciated conception of power, discussed extensively in Chapter 2, constitutes a conceptual fulcrum of this dissertation. Furthermore, Foucault introduced the concept of an apparatus (or *dispositif*), central to his thinking on the subject of power. This is best understood as a *coordination* (or network) of people, discourses, institutions, laws etc. (Agamben 2009: 1-25), the coordination of which has a strategic function and is always concurrently present with power (Agamben 2009: 3). A reading into this lineage of ideas comes across as a Wittgensteinian family with regularly appearing themes of unity, coordination, cooperation, amongst others. As it appears, these themes were evident in the early years of ANC rule with the Government of National Unity,

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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the party's nation-building project during this period. Alongside unity and cooperation, another pronounced historic theme within ANC discourse and history is *leadership*[12] *(*Lodge 1983: 105-106). The origins of the party exist as a collection of professionals, chiefs and religious leaders and a strict respect of hierarchy has been sustained within the organisation. Their endorsement of authority shows a historical emphasis on the kind of coordination under study in this dissertation, namely that which is associated with the exercise of power.

In the political sphere, attachment also shares a resemblance with political pragmatism - more so than it does with the more rigid *politics of principle.* While a politics of principle is guided by certain moral aims, and power constitutes but the means to achieve those aims, what is meant by political pragmatism is the pursuit of power as the main aim of politics. Here alliances are formed *in spite of* differing ideologies, generating contradiction within a particular apparatus of power. Conversely, a politics of principle is more naturally divisive because, by definition, principles are inflexible to convenience and compromise. Albert Camus' persona of the rebel (1971) or the historical figure of Lenin are examples of people embodying politics of principle. The political success of Lenin attests to the potential of a principled form of politics to generate both power and strength. The point being highlighted here, however, is that while alliances may be formed on a basis of pre-existing shared principles or ideology, within pragmatic politics, principles and ideology are typically formed as a result of existing alliances (see Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 92-117).[13]

Because power is conceived of as existing solely within forms of human coordination, attachment, in the forms that it is next discussed, only constitutes some of the means for creating power. But there is a multiplicity of ways in which concert and thus power is created. Greater coordination may take place through flattery or persuasion, the latter of which may

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[12] Interestingly, the words social, associate and society are all derived from the Indo-European root '*sekw-*', meaning to follow (Online Etymology Dictionary). This etymological tracing poses a potential challenge to the common social contract theories which conceive of initially free individuals uniting in voluntary and equal association as being at the origin of society. This is particularly pronounced in Paine who begins Common Sense with the thought experiment of castaways on an island, first able to self-suffice and only gradually entering free accord as mature adults.

[13] A good example of an apparent about-turn in policy, as alliances began to shift, was the ANC's position on redistribution. This alludes to another relevant reference to Italian politics relating to the term *trasformismo* which refers to the tendency of politicians or political parties (typically those within the centre) changing political ideologies for the sake of power.

relate more closely to a politics of principle. Coordination may correlate with the ability, proclivity, or willingness of political actors to compromise. Notably these factors cannot be determined simply to be outcomes of interests. The use of interests in the concept of attachment is a voluntary limitation on the concept for the practical purpose of wielding it; but the subject of coordination extends further than the topic of interests.

While attachment has been classed as a kind of *action* it may just as well be classed as a phenomenon without any agential actor[14]. It may also be understood as a *result* of an action rather than an action *per se*. However, in the study at hand I look specifically at the character of an organisation, the clues to which are betrayed by actions, as per the discussion on Michael Oakeshott's conception of character in Chapter 2. Therefore, and this is the reason for most of the features determined when designing the concept, it is pragmatic to view attachment as a kind of action. Similarly, while the study at hand only observes attachment as an action that takes place between separate groups, it may take place *within* a group. Single groups are themselves assemblages of smaller entities (factions, individuals etc.) and the strength or weakness of a group will derive from the ability of its constituents to act in concert and harmony. It is a significant limitation on the scope of this dissertation and the ambit of the concept of attachment that it looks only at relations between organisations and not within organisations. This is said when observing the immediately visible kinds of interest-sharing at play in early ANC government and parliament appointees which ostensibly sought an elaborate balance between racial representation, provincial representation, a balance between previously exiled and local ANC forces, and sufficient representation from its women's and youth leagues (Lodge 2002: 23; Schrire 1996: 15).

There are several parts of the terrain that have not been mapped and which this dissertation does not have the space to chart. However, the above discussion is likely to have provided the reader with a broader picture of the region of life that is under study, as well as the philosophical approach used in this dissertation. The purpose of this subsection is also to expound a particular feature of politics which relates to a particular set of actions apparent in the ANC. While in what follows, four kinds of attachment are discussed, the claim is not that cooptation, consensus, coercion, and negotiation are *objectively* of the same class. Instead,

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[14] For example, Axelrod (1984: 88 - 105) has a fascinating discussion on the evolution of cooperation in biological systems.

this work is contriving to group them together as a class and to research their relevance in relation to power and the history of the ANC. The study of these forms of action owes more to their apparent relevance to the ANC than to their inherent importance to the concept of attachment. An entirely different means of classifying attachment may therefore validly be undertaken. Nevertheless, this grouping is not arbitrary either. These actions have the common feature that they are all actions that take place between people. The etymology of coopt, coerce and consensus all include the same Latin prefix *co-,* etymologically meaning *'together' or 'with.'* This is to say that attachment is a kind of social action – an action by people, in relation to other people. While in what follows politics and economics are the focus, attachment may well be social, sexual, psychological, or biological. However, the way power is conceptualised in this dissertation is specifically in relation to Arendt's communicative conception. A conception of attachment cannot exist outside of the realm of people.

If this dissertation were to open itself to the rhizomatic version of the concept of attachment, there would be many entry points and purposes which might be adopted. Deleuze and Guattari compare the rhizomatic concept to a burrow, a place without a single centre or doorway, which over time will change location, change inhabitants, and even alter its purpose. This is central to the two philosophers' project of rejecting the philosophical category of identity. It might even strike some as a pathway to madness and the two eccentric philosophers may even accept this claim. It is at this point that it is appropriate, then, to conclude this dissertation's Deleuzean moment because of a sense that overextending a concept in such fanciful directions is like overstretching a spring. Although it may incur costs, it is worth guarding concepts from overburden to maintain their potential. In the next section I thus resume the analytic trajectory which was initiated in the previous section and discuss the four types of attachment.

### 3.3.3. Four Types of Attachment

The four types of attachment posited below are also everyday words. However, the way in which they are understood in this dissertation does not necessarily correspond in totality to their everyday definitions. All four terms must first and foremost be understood as kinds of attachment. This is to say they are nonviolent kinds of action involving one group aligning its

interests with those of another with either the purpose or effect of gaining power. This is to exclude, for example, violent forms of coercion or forms of negotiation which do not relate to power.

The distinctions between these types of attachment are based on two criteria, both referring to the relations between the actors with aligned interests. We thus ask two questions to form these distinctions. Firstly, are interests between actors aligned because of one group dominating another, or is their attachment characterised by relative equality? Dominance comes as a result of the inordinacy of either strength or power (or both) as defined by Arendt and discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, in aligning their interests, do both parties' interests *remain* distinct from one another such that the parties are as yet unable to coordinate or do the party's interests converge sufficiently for coordination? It is in response to these two questions that the four subcategories of attachment – consensus, negotiation, cooptation, and coercion – are proposed, as per Table 1.

Figure 1: Four Kinds of Attachment

↑ Coercion leading to cooptation   Negotiation leading to consensus ↑

As visible in the table, negotiation and coercion are seen as means towards arriving at consensus and cooptation respectively. Typically then, consensus and cooptation are seen as

results of gaining power and negotiation and coercion are seen as taking place with the purpose of gaining power. One may therefore attempt to argue that the first two are results of attachment and the second two are means of attachment. However, the suggestions that consensus and cooptation are in fact attachment *per se,* and that negotiation or coercion are merely means towards attachment, are rejected here. This is because the study underway is into the pattern of action ascribable to the ANC which explains its increased power (*i.e.* its increased ability to act in concert). The hypothesis is that negotiation and coercion are already forms of concerted action, even though both endure greater divergence in interests between actors. Additionally, as is discussed further on, negotiation and coercion do not necessarily lead to consensus and cooptation respectively.

Before proceeding, it is worth returning to the concept of interests, and specifically to its relationship with the concept of incentive. On this, four points are made to begin conceiving of how interests manifest in the real world occupied by the ANC. Incentives and interests are closely related but synonymous. While interests are defined, for the purposes of this dissertation, as the priorities and needs of a group, incentives are understood as the conditions which privilege particular means for the fulfilment of interests. They do this firstly by mediating between conflicting interests within a particular actor[15]. If, for example, it can be said to be in the interest of people to pursue prosperity, it may ultimately be against their interests to steal. While stealing is one way of pursuing prosperity, with the presence of an effective legal system that successfully prosecutes thievery, people are typically disincentivised from stealing because, through stealing, another interest, i.e. that which is invested in freedom, is likely to be sacrificed. However, incentives do not only act by pitting interests against one another, but they also exist as synergistic relationships between interests. It being in one's interest to pursue prosperity, coupled with one's interest to live a happy life, both may act as incentive to develop professional expertise in a field where one has passion and enjoyment. As an example more germane to this study, the complementarity of the ANC's interests in majority rule and maintaining peace with the globally hegemonic USA, the party had clear incentive to call for democracy. Thirdly, interests are not protected

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[15] David Hume's conception of justice functions according to the principle of overcoming destructive interests by pitting them in opposition to interests for self-preservation. He states: 'There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction' (Hume 1978: 492)

or achieved through an infinite number of strategies. Amongst other things, institutions, conventions, and technologies present *viable options* for recognising one's interests. One viable option for achieving a prosperous life is to attend university. In a different era, there may be radically different means of pursuing prosperity. Negotiation became a viable option for ANC power only when the National Party showed itself as willing to negotiate. Prior to the 1980s, it would not have made sense to speak about the ANC's interest in negotiating, without the attendant incentive derived from external conditions. Further and finally, because actors are taken to be constituted by multiple interests at any one time and because many of these interests may not interfere with one another, may lie dormant or their pursuit disincentivised, the potential for attachment between different actors takes place over particular *issues.* What this word denotes is instances where attempts to realise the particular interests of different actors meet to either complement or conflict with each other. An example of this is the momentary alliance, in opposition to the political negotiations, between traditional leaders and the Afrikaner far-right called the Concerned South Africans Group (see Booysen 2011: 16). On many other matters, these two groups would have directly conflicted (including the fact that the latter believed in white supremacy and the former consisted entirely of black leaders). However, in a context of political strides being made towards a peaceful and democratic settlement, which would circumvent the interests of these two groups, there existed an issue, an urgency for action, where their interests were complementary. Conflict and complementarity are considered the only two possible scenarios that arise when interests meet, and attachment relates to the latter. Put differently, interests can only be said to meet if i) they clash with one another and create conflict or ii) they complement one another and create concert. There is certainly more potential for conceptual refinement in terms of the broad definition of attachment and how it manifests in the world. This is done further in later sections and chapters. To recap on this discussion: incentives form a crucial component of the interests of an actor, simultaneously giving interests the *form* of being pursuable in the world and restricting how they can be pursued. There is, nevertheless, a notable dialectical relation between interests and incentives, because just as incentives determine what interests are ultimately pursued (and how so, too), they nevertheless rely on interests (*i.e.* a goal or pursuit) to exist at all. Attachment between two groups exists as a function of these pursuits being active issues which indeed involve both actors.

In what follows, more specific definitions for each type of attachment are provided. As an application of Grounded Theory, the best definition of each term is determined by its symmetry with actions and utterances of the ANC during the period under study. In addition, the theoretical and empirical literature which is germane to the way in which these terms are defined is discussed.

3.3.3.1. *Coercion*

It may be recalled from Chapter 2, that the ability to command is a feature of power. What was not elaborated was that which imbues one with this capacity. Also noted in Chapter 2, the ability of the ANC to open and close the faucet of people's protest (i.e. to command the tide of public discontent) was a key feature in its bargaining position. Its moral reputation, sprawling national network, its broad (even international) recognition and its gradually-developed position of financial strength (see Booysen 2011: 12-13) all gave it potential to command. One question that can only be properly answered in Chapter 4 is, what this ability to command consisted of? To what extent, for example, did it comprise an ability of the ANC to control rewards and punishments distributed to different groups in return for their cooperation or lack thereof? It is in response to this second question that the first subcategory of attachment is termed coercion.

In general, coercion is understood as the act of persuasion through threat of force. Because attachment is seen as a strictly non-violent phenomenon, the use of force, or what Arnold (2001) refers to as physical compulsion, is immediately eliminated from the attachment subcategory of coercion. Physical compulsion is the manipulation of someone's actions through direct force (Arnold 2001: 55). Arresting a person and putting them in a prison from which they cannot escape is an example of physical compulsion. The exercise of this kind of violent compulsion is in opposition to the adopted definition of power and would fall under Arendt's understanding of strength instead.

A more complicated discussion arises, however, when discussing the *threat* of violence, rather than violence itself. Should one consider laws, which have behind them the threat of imprisonment if they are broken, to be violent or nonviolent forms of coercion? While most people within a society where laws are obeyed do not experience the physical force that

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accompanies effective laws, they do obey these laws to avoid said force. This question will be partly answered by clarifying what exactly violence is considered to be. While physical compulsion should fall under the concept of violence, whether the threat of violence is enough to be considered violence itself, is more debatable. Within some circles, any kind of coercion whatsoever may be referred to as violence because of its harmful effects such as infringing upon peoples' freedom. Hateful speech such as racist slurs are regularly referred to as violent. Meanwhile others disagree with this usage, arguing that confusing the meaning of violence, dangerously equates physical force (which has the potential to kill, physically damage or maim) with something fundamentally different - the speech act. The debate centres around a disagreement in terms of the appropriate narrowness or broadness of the definition of violence. This debate, again, I believe cannot be settled by either appealing to an essence of violence or an official definition from a dictionary or some other authority. Violence can and does mean different things in different contexts and its meaning, like the semantics of any other word, is prone to change.

In this dissertation a narrow definition of violence is adopted, referring to violence as acts of direct force which damage, kill, or physically harm someone or something. This narrow definition is important here because of the central distinction between power and strength that is used throughout this paper. Strength resides in the ability of an actor to realise its will through direct implementation by that actor. Power resides in the ability of an actor to realise its will through communication, be it the threat, command, or persuasion of others. Violence is an act of direct implementation. Thus, speech acts, insofar as they are communicative, cannot be violent. While speech may speak *of* violence, may lead to violence, and may even have similar effects to violence, they yet cannot equate with violence. This is not to make a judgement on the level of harm which can be caused by a speech act nor an attempt to minimise the potential inherent in words. Instead, it is to classify what appear to be two different things: direct implementation on the one hand and coordination on the other. Instead, threats are seen as communicative means of generating conformity to one's will. They thus serve the purpose of developing concert, without violence actually taking place.

The above conceptualisation matches with Arnold's separation of physical compulsion from rational and psychological compulsion. Next, Arnold cites Aristotle's discussion on coercion in

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the Nicomachean Ethics, implicit in which is another distinction between rational and psychological compulsion. The differentiating factor between the two is the presence of deliberation in arriving at the former. According to Arnold (2001: 56) 'rational compulsion takes place when an agent is forced to choose between two options, one of which is plainly superior'. As will be seen in the next section, which models the four subcategories of attachment using game theory, what is being discussed is the reshaping of the incentives and thus the interests of a subordinate party by a dominant party. Thus, coercion is understood in this dissertation as rational compulsion, as defined above[16]. This is an appropriate definition because the subject matter of this dissertation deals with interests of political and economic actors. These actors are not considered hyper-rational, unbiased, or infallible but are considered to be deliberate and deliberative. Thus, actions followed by these actors are unlikely to be driven by impulses (and if they are, they may be against actors' interests), the likes of which are active in instances of psychological compulsion. It follows that any definition of coercion for the purposes of this dissertation must be considered to be of the rational kind.

A common blueprint for coercion, including for the way it is understood here, is to accompany the threat of violence with the promise of reward, given in return for the cooperation of the coerced party. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an example of a national process which used coercion as a key instrument to persuade people to testify to the politically motivated transgressions that took place in South Africa between 1960 and 1994. Here the promise of amnesty was paired with the threat of punishment to generate desired outcomes of bearing witness to and recording human rights violations. Positive reward as much as negative punishment is thus considered to be coercion. Coercion is thus defined as: *the altering of incentives of a subordinate party, whose initial incentive is for conflict with a dominant party, such that its interests further align with the interests of the dominant party.* So that coercion can be a subcategory of attachment, it is necessary that the manipulation of a subordinate party's interests takes place to a minimum degree such that a subordinate party's interests are no longer opposed to those of the dominant party. The subordinate party remains formally independent but would stray from the course of action determined by the dominant party at great cost. A final difficulty remains, relating to the topic of *intention*.

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[16] This would depart from Arnold's understanding of coercion. Because Arnold conceives of coercion as involving no autonomous action, any form of deliberation automatically precludes coercion (Arnold 2001: 58).

Arnold argues that there is no coercion without a coercive will. This is not the case in the definition of attachment. Rewards and punishments can equally be systemic and indirect as they may be borne of intention. While a legal system may be an intentional set of coercive incentives, political, moral, and economic systems involve many indirect forms of coercion which encourage particular lines of action without any ultimate designer of those incentives. From the definition of coercion that has been provided, the origin of the coercion must remain the superior strength or power of the dominant group. However, it need not necessarily be the fact that the dominant group is in fact the coercer, and neither is it necessary that there be any intentional coercer *per se*.

3.3.3.2. *Cooptation*

Cooptation is by far the newest term out of the four used as subcategories of attachment. Advantageously to this study, it is a term that is far more closely defined by rigorous scholarship than by common use. However, there is a certain disparity within the academic literature on cooptation about how exactly cooptation should be understood. The differences relate firstly to the degree of benefits and the independence that the group in opposition to the elite (or dominant) group actually receive in the process of cooptation. The second dissimilarity amongst accounts of cooptation comes from the kinds of actions that are theorised as being cooptive. This had led to different, yet intersecting, definitions touching on similar themes of absorption and neutralisation of opposition by elites.

In the more traditional theory on cooptation, the term is defined by Selznick (1949: 34) Gamson (1975: 29) as well as Piven and Cloward (1977: 30) as the act of an elite group which uses ostensibly cooperative practices to absorb opposition, making the subordinate party work with elites without giving them any new advantages. This definition is rooted in the founding theory on cooptation developed by organisational theorist Philip Selznick in his study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a US-state owned corporation set-up in 1933 to respond to ills of the Great Depression by providing several large-scale services (such as flood control, fertiliser manufacturing and economic development). Selznick uses this study to illuminate what he considers to be a key option for social control within democratic societies i.e. cooptation. Selznick finds that alongside the stated economic mandate of the TVA, it also performed a political function of absorbing regional discontent by providing key

opposition personnel, including union leaders from within the region, with senior positions at the SOE.

More recent theory on cooptation has focussed on other means that elite groups have employed to quell opposition by ostensible cooperation. These theorists have at times resorted to slightly different definitions of cooptation to account for these discrepancies in method. Trumpy (2008: 481) defines cooptation as being the bringing of the interests of a challenging group into alignment with the goals of an elite group. Trumpy focuses on corporate strategies of cooptation, particularly those associated with replicating the discourse of environmental activists while continuing their environmentally harmful business practices (2008: 488). In the instance of an opposition group ceasing their activism, as a response to a mere change in discourse by the corporation (without an attendant alteration of business practices), Trumpy identifies the occurrence of cooptation. Although not saying so explicitly, Trumpy seems to think that this typically takes place because of a naivety on the part of the opposition group who prematurely celebrate, despite not having achieved any real gains. This is not to say that Trumpy's definition of cooptation is implausible; and neither is it unconnected with the object of study in this dissertation. Indeed, Terreblanche's account of who benefited from South Africa's transition, suggests that the poorest 50% (Terreblanche 2002: 98) in South Africa gained nothing material from South Africa's negotiated settlement. Bond, meanwhile, argues that even fewer South Africans benefited (Bond 2000: 19) Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, South Africa entered a new period of stability after the 1994 elections. This poses the question as to whether the poorest segment of South Africans was coopted into consenting to a continuation of the same basic economic system that was not in their interests. This arguably happened via the progressive discourse of the ANC (like that appearing in the Freedom Charter and RDP) and the discourse of new legislation and rights (many of which are still yet to be recognised). Does this suggest, despite Trumpy's initial definition, that cooptation does not involve an actual altering of the interests of a group, but instead involves a group acting *against* its own interests (often by ceasing action). If this were the case, it would mean abandoning all instances that conform to Trumpy's definition of cooptation because they do not adhere to the broad definition of attachment, central to which is the concept of interests. The alternative is that the interests of a group reside, in part, in discourse, alongside material and economic gain. This is a more promising line of

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thought, firstly because it provides an explanation conforming to Occam's razor. It is far less complicated to account for cooptation taking place if a change in discourse is marginally beneficial to a group. Secondly and more importantly, it seems true that, however marginal the benefit, there is potential gain from a change in the discourse of a dominant group. The change, for example, of the discourse of South Africa's national government from one propagating racist ideology, to one of non-racialism, seems to obviously be of some benefit to those on the receiving end of the racist dogma. The only reasonable argument against this is that this change in discourse enabled the containment of resistance forces and subaltern classes, preventing them from attaining far greater material advances. Aside from the assumption that South Africa's resistance forces would inevitably have achieved material gains, this argument misses the point of the discussion at hand. I am not suggesting here that a mere change in discourse is somehow optimal. What is at stake here is instead the question of whether a change in discourse can, in some way, be framed as being in the interest of a certain group. If not, then this definition of cooptation must be side-lined from a definition of attachment. If so, given how it seems to relate to the ANC, this form of cooptation should be accommodated in our eventual definition.

For both Selznick and Trumpy, cooptation is a bad thing, allowing elites to repress, exploit, control and sidestep challengers. For de Soysa and Fjelde (2009: 9-10), however, cooptation need not be sinister. In fact, they view economic goods, like provision of infrastructure, to be cooptive strategies employed by governments and political parties in return for votes and evasion of civil strife. Therefore, for them, a government's budget correlates directly with its cooptive capacity. However, they see cooptation and coercion as distinct mechanisms of government, the latter correlating with a capacity for violence and the former relating to economic capacity to generate voluntary consent (de Soysa & Fjelde 2009: 9). As per the previous section on coercion, this is of course a different conceptualisation to the one used in this dissertation. For the purposes of this dissertation, coercion and cooptation are not separate in this way. Instead, cooptation is a potential outcome of coercion. Another difference in the definition of cooptation used here is that both cooptation and coercion may involve positive and negative incentives, as opposed to de Soysa and Fjelde's equation of coercion with negative incentive and cooptation with positive incentive. The difference between the two, in this dissertation, is not between the valency of incentives, but instead in

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the resultant equilibrium or remaining disequilibrium between two groups and the similarity in their respective interests.

To return to our quest to develop a definition of cooptation compatible with attachment, it is important to acknowledge the potential of economic benefits (as per de Soysa and Fjelde), discursive benefits (as per Trumpy) and political benefits (as per Selznick) as key positive incentives that enable cooptation. Furthermore, it is necessary to explicitly incorporate the concept of interests in the definition of cooptation as a subcategory of attachment. Importantly, it cannot be argued that cooptation takes place with no benefit whatsoever to the subordinate group. However, in the instance of cooptation, the elite group achieves an optimal outcome for itself and coerces the subordinate group to participate in this outcome by altering the incentives of the subordinate group. Thus, the following definition is used for cooptation: *the alignment of the interests of a subordinate group with those of a dominant group, where the dominance of the group creates incentive for alignment, and the oppositional potential of the subordinate party is effectively neutralised*.

An objection to the above definition of cooptation cites its relatively low prevalence in the real world. Holdo (2019: 453) suggests that cooptation is a less frequent elite strategy than might be expected. In line with several other authors such as Bozzini & Fella (2008) and Davidson (2018), dominant actors often tend to opt for arrangements of *conflictual cooperation* or what Holdo calls *mutually assured autonomy.* The meanings of these terms are akin to that of *garantismo* in that they entail the development of cooperative relationships between competitors without their competition actually ceasing. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate, using a direct example from South African politics, why *garantismo* should be considered a form of cooptation. What *garantismo* does not encapsulate, though, is the feature of knowledge-sharing and direct negotiation that characterises mutually assured autonomy. Holdo gives two accounts of why elites do not successfully coopt opposition more often. On one hand, cooptation may be resisted by the subordinate party, either because it can resist or is unwilling to comply. In both instances, interests of a subordinate party are not suitable for cooptaton. Therefore, cooptation happens (or does not happen) depending on the resources available to the subordinate party or its prevailing ideology. In the event of failed cooptation, conflict occurs with the subordinate party, which resists the dominant

party's coercive attempts. On the other hand, as noted by Holdo, even when feasible, cooptation appears as a less attractive option when compared to mutually assured autonomy which confers the benefit of legitimacy to either party. Holdo notes the example of the strategic relationship developed between Martin Luther King Jr. and President Lyndon Johnson. Here, affording the black protest movement of the 1960s independence and legitimacy, Johnson stood to gain electorally. Meanwhile, through mainstream acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the movement (by senior Statesmen and an official political party) the movement was able and succeeded in gaining mass appeal. What this is meant to show is that it is neither necessary nor even probable that from a dominant-subordinate relation, a coercive-cooptive pattern of attachment will appear. Instead, a relationship of negotiation and consensus is likely to appear. The next two subsections discuss and define this. However, there are three assumptions at play in Holdo's account (or when superimposing Holdo's account onto this dissertation's definition of cooptation). One is that indeed Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights movement were weak enough to be considered a subordinate party in relation to the US government, where cooptation (instead of negotiation between equals) could have been a viable strategy. If one grants this assumption, there is a second assumption that there was in fact no coercion that rewarded the peaceful and reformist strategy of the civil rights movement and dissuaded it from more extreme action. Finally, even if this second assumption is conceded, there is a third assumption which is that mutually assured cooperation should not be conceived of as a kind of cooptive relationship (especially in the terms this dissertation uses) when it exists between a dominant and a subordinate party. Without being able to fully determine the validity of this example, mentioning this gauntlet of assumptions serves the purpose of indicating that cooptation should not be considered as rare. Indeed, in Chapter 4, it is argued that *garantismo (*or mutually assured cooperation) can indeed be a form of cooptation. With that I conclude this subsection and move on to the following subcategory of attachment.

3.3.3.3. *Negotiation*

Of the four subtypes of attachment, negotiation is the most obviously apparent in ANC action between 1990 and 1999. The ANC's ascension into government would arguably not have happened if not for the negotiatory strategy it adopted. It is via this observation, that through

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negotiation South Africa achieved a newfound stability, that this dissertation first came to life. This led to the question of: in what other ways does the ANC find itself linked (or attached) with groups in other ways? Hence the other subcategories of attachment. Below a definition of negotiation is provided, looking at its different common conceptions to establish the appropriate one for attachment.

For the purposes of this dissertation, one can do worse than citing Korobkin's definition of negotiation as 'an interactive communication process by which two or more parties who lack identical interests attempt to find a way to coordinate their behaviour or allocate scarce resources in a way that will make them better off than they could be if they were to act alone' (Korobkin 2002: 1). For a large part, this definition serves the purposes of this dissertation well. Firstly, it articulates the purpose of coordination that is inherent in negotiation. This so-called coordination is what is more specifically termed consensus within the next section. The second strength in Korobkin's conception of negotiation is his definition in terms of interests and his insight which rightly identifies the interests of negotiating parties to be dissimilar. It is this difference in interests that instigates negotiation in tandem with the less preferable potential inherent in either party acting alone.

Importantly, however, Korobkin's definition does not refer exclusively to a positive-sum game, whereas the definition of negotiation as a subcategory of attachment does. The reason that it must be positive-sum negotiation is because attachment must entail either the purpose or effect of power accumulation, where power is understood as the ability to coordinate. As seen below, zero-sum negotiation does not involve any remaining coordination or inherent power cultivation. For these purposes, Menkel-Meadow (1984) distinguishes between adversarial and problem-solving negotiation, the former relating to zero-sum games and the latter relating to positive sum games. Within adversarial negotiation, negotiating parties compete over a fixed number of benefits and whatever is received by one is not received by the other. Here they opt for negotiation because conflict may shrink the size of the overall pie, nevertheless they negotiate within a zero-sum set-up. If this had been done in South Africa, the country would have been divided into smaller independent states for each interest group. On the other hand, problem-solving negotiation subordinates available negotiational strategies and promotes the creation of new potential outcomes from the negotiation

(Menkel-Meadow 1984: 780). Through looking at the respective interests of either party, an attempt is made to avail alternative strategies (to that of the zero-sum trade off) to each party that will increase the payoffs for all. The problem-solving lens of negotiation correlates to Stepan's crisis-response theory of social pact making mentioned in Chapter 2 where new mechanisms (here seen as strategies) are created to address crises (read here as zero or negative-sum games with a tendency towards conflict). One of the prerequisites for this kind of negotiation, however, is that which Susan Strange (1994) calls *structural power* (with power not understood in Arendt's terms here) which allows actors to change the rules that other actors must follow[17]. However, structural power or the ability to change the rules of a particular scenario exists at many levels. It can be convincingly argued that at a global level neither the ANC nor the Apartheid Government were in possession of the ability to change the fundamentals of global politics or economics. However, at a national level they had significant power in these terms, with both able to bring into existence realistic political options within the country. As is elaborated on in Section 3.3., both coercion and negotiation are means of changing the terms on which a game is played and having structural power (i.e. the ability to influence the payoffs of a game) is a prerequisite for these processes.

There is a second way that Korobkin's definition falls outside of attachment. That is, by defining negotiation mainly with a legal orientation, exclusively referring to negotiation which entails direct coordination. However, Van Dyke Parunak *et al.* (2001), for example, show that negotiation can take place through a shared environment without agents being in direct communication. This so-called environment can take the form of a shared market or a public sphere in which initially competing or conflicting parties come to cooperate through the incentives and information shared within that environment. The shared environment that the ANC inhabits and in which it potentially negotiates indirectly with other groups can be conceived of in manifold ways including within the South African legal and state channels, through media, through the sentiment of the voting public and even within an international context.

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[17] Structural power is opposed to relational power. Relational power denotes the possession of a certain amount of valuable resources whilst existing within the strictures of fixed, existing rules.

As far as the history of the ANC goes, the CODESA negotiations should be paradigmatic[18] in informing this dissertation's conception of negotiation. What is also visible is that the Codesa negotiations are described aptly using pre-existing theory on negotiation. Prior to the CODESA negotiations, talks about talks were concluded with the signing of the Groote Schuur minute in May of 1990. Kruger (1998: 62-66) suggests that these talks reached as far back as 1985. This evidence is compelling owing to the talks between then Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee and Nelson Mandela, discussed by Mandela himself (Mandela 2009: 522-531). Furthermore, Tikhomirov (1992: 5-6) cites the Afrikaner Broederbond's 1986 document titled *Basic Political Conditions for the Continuing Survival of the Afrikaner* in which the elite secret society argued in favour of including black people in state structures and legalising all political groupings. Put into language of negotiation theory, the signing of the minute and the extended prior talks, comprised the establishment of a *bargaining zone*. A bargaining zone is a range within which cooperation is more beneficial to both parties than the alternatives of conflict or going at it alone. This *creation* rather than mere identification of a bargaining zone is equivalent to the problem-solving style of negotiation defined by Menkel-Meadow (1984).

Once it was clear that a bargaining zone existed, the Codesa negotiations were announced, the purpose of which was to establish a democratic society in South Africa. Codesa included several other political groups and parties, transforming the pattern of negotiation from bilateral to multilateral negotiation. Despite this, a type of coalition was formed between the NP and the ANC - one which sought sufficient consensus between these two main parties prior to tabling them at the multi-party negotiations (Friedman 1993: 25)[19]. During these negotiations, the bargaining zone was further expanded in order to increase the potential gain for those party to the negotiation. One of the main ways that this was done was by agreeing on a five-year government of National Unity. This effectively enlarged the 'shadow

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[18] The Codesa negotiations and the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum which followed it, were amongst the founding events of the new South Africa, viewed by Friedman (1993) and Spitz (2000: 27) as 'seeds of compromise' which allowed a country home to by plurality, contradiction, and inequality to exist peacefully and democratically.

[19] An interesting insight into this cooperation between old foes was that it was catalysed by defecting parties from both the far left and the far right. It is likely that this made the cooperation within the centre of South Africa's negotiations more possible. This is arguable because the ANC and NP could effectively cooperate whilst making further necessary concessions owing to ongoing pressure from the margins. An example of this was the National Party giving up its demand for minority vetoes within the Constitution in return for the PAC's concession to end its armed struggle (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 95).

of the future' (see Axelrod 1984: 126-132), which augmented the incentives of actors to cooperate. It was this process of facilitating cooperation (not solely relating to the Government of National Unity) which led Mamdani (2015: 77) to laud the Codesa negotiations as a ground-breaking form of justice which he terms *survivors' justice*. Survivors' justice, which developed positive-sum solutions (Mamdani 2015: 80) for those remaining in South Africa (both perpetrators, victims, and others too) to live together, is posited in opposition to *victims' justice*, the template for which was the Nuremberg trials, which sought to achieve restitution for victims and against perpetrators. Part of the project of Codesa was to facilitate the continued coexistence of perpetrators and victims within a shared society, which differed significantly from the approach adopted after Nazi atrocities of creating an exclusive Jewish homeland. The way this was done was to morally focus not on perpetrators but instead to focus on the 'contentious issues' (read here as conflicting interests) 'that drove cycles of violence' (Mamdani 2015: 79).

Simultaneously, however, both parties pursued extra-negotiational tactics, which were often violent (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994c: 182-201). These violent protests and crackdowns caused the collapse of the first round of negotiations. This indicates that the early nineties were characterised just as much by the opposite of attachment. But in some instances, negotiations were in fact accelerated by violence.[20] Codesa and the MPNF were both forms of direct negotiation amongst elites to establish the rules that would govern the transition from Apartheid to democracy. These processes eventually triumphed over the concurrent violence of the period. The possibility that these negotiations and their ensuing cooperation and consensus laid the ground for further forms of negotiation (both direct and indirect) is explored in Chapter 4. The hypothesis advanced in this dissertation is that the ANC engaged in a pattern of action (including pact-making, negotiation, and cooptation) that extended past the well-known political negotiations of the early 90s. Thus, while the definition of negotiation is informed by Codesa and the MNPF, it is not bound to the forms of negotiation found in these particular events. Using the above discussion and reference to the

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[20] This was particularly marked with the killing of Chris Hani. While intuition may have it that the killing of the ANC's equivalent of an army general would spark violence, it in fact appeared to do the opposite. On the side of the ANC, the killing of Hani bolstered the liberation movement's legitimacy, a key factor in its negotiation. On the side of the National Party government, the event threatened the positive sum game that was being pursued by provoking violence and potential civil war.

Codesa negotiations, negotiation is a form of attachment characterised by cooperating parties that, despite differing interests and even differing plans of action, are mediated in their decision-making by concessions from either side to steer towards actions that are more concordant. Using the above discussion, I thus define negotiation as *a positive-sum process by which two or more parties with at least partly conflicting interests attempt to find or succeed in finding ways of coordinating their behaviour, through adjustments in their respective programmes and goals to increasingly align their interest*s.

3.3.3.4.   *Consensus*

There are four main reasons that the term consensus was chosen instead of cooperation. The first has to do with the clear conceptual relation between consent and consensus. Put simply, if consensus is loosely defined as the general agreement on a particular issue, then the consent from numerous actors in favour of a certain path of action pertaining to an issue, can be said to constitute consensus. The second reason relates to the purpose of negotiation being driven more specifically at consensus and consent than merely cooperation. To quote Walter Sisulu's explanation of the purpose of political negotiations: 'We *all* have to *agree* on where we are going… because the aim of negotiations is not about whether to rid our country of Apartheid or not. It is the question about how and what comes in its place' (Mayibuye 1991: 16) The third reason has to do with the prevalence of this word within ANC discourse and practice as per the citation of Sylvia Neame in Chapter 2. Finally, the fourth and final reason has to do with the fact that cooperation in its common meaning overlaps too much with both negotiation and cooptation. So, a more prompt and intuitive separation from both negotiation and cooptation is achieved by using the term consensus instead.

As noted in the previous paragraph, the common definition of consensus is: widely shared agreement on particular issues. This agreement typically relates to opinion and interpretation about certain phenomena (like a consensus within the scientific community about black holes). However, this kind of consensus is not the kind that is understood as a type of attachment. While subjectivity and interpretation *do* feature in this dissertation's understanding of interests, they do not do so independently of needs or incentives and instead form part of them. Thus, the meaning of consensus is different from that of scientific

consensus, where disinterested observers agree on what is true. Instead, the kind of consensus I am referring to is focussed on a commonality of interests[21].

Consensus is typically used as a concept of analysis where there has been previous disagreement. As put by Selznick and Broom (1955: 276): 'as consensus develops, the subject is removed from political competition.' The way that one may understand political competition here is in terms of *issues* on which actors' interests clash. Thus, the process of generating consensus is that of aligning the interests of actors on particular issues. This definition is obviously not enough. Cooptation as a form of attachment could be discussed in the same broad terms as these. What distinguishes cooptation from consensus is the feature that both parties have conceded a similar degree of benefit in order to reach an equilibrium of cooperation. Cooptation on the other hand involves the dominant group conceding little and the subordinate group being coerced to concede significantly in terms of their interests. Furthermore, the process of developing consensus is not typically unilateral. From a prior state of conflict, it is firstly unlikely that an equal actor will concede their own interests, without any reciprocal concessions from its opposing party. Secondly, the attempt at unilaterally reshaping the incentives of the opposite party is coercion which would likely lead to cooptation or conflict.

Typical of consensus is attachment reached by a procedure of systematic negotiation where different actors realise their converging interests or adopt a collective, agreed-upon strategy that balances parties' interests. However, it is important to understand that how it is meant here is not exclusively in these terms. As mentioned over the course of this chapter, negotiation can take place through means where actors do not overtly communicate and agree on adjustments that lead to greater cooperation. Consensus refers to an equilibrium point within a cooperative dynamic where negotiation is no longer required to avert conflict.

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[21] Referring to the example of scientific consensus - of course, if one were to say that scientific findings are driven primarily by needs, culture and incentives which strongly influence interpretative schema, then perhaps scientific consensus is indeed an outcome of interests. However, one hopes, the main offering of science is not a reflection of peoples' interests (which it may inevitably be to a limited degree) but instead a best possible reflection of the nature of the world.

It is in these terms that one might argue that what is here termed consensus might be more readily understood as cooperation. However, this is only a certain *kind* of cooperation. Negotiating parties can be said to be engaging in a particular *form* of cooperation too, characterised by the problem of the cooperating parties having a certain degree of divergent interests. Similarly, cooptation can be said to comprise a perverse form of cooperation in which a weaker party comes to serve the interests of a dominant party.

In the instance of consensus, a process of interest-coordination by cooperating, usually equal parties who adopt consensual strategies compatible with one another, is being discussed. The different actors' interests may remain distinct but within consensus, interests of attached parties are aligned to the degree that no further negotiation is required to avoid conflict on a particular issue. Furthermore, consensus is distinct from cooptation because it is born of a process of negotiation where both parties elect to cede certain interests to relatively equal degrees in order to reach this point of harmony. Thus, at the risk of repetition, consensus is defined as a form of attachment in which two or more parties' interests are consensually aligned to the degree that, *ceteris paribus,* no further mediation of interests is required for ongoing cooperation. Having now defined the four subtypes of attachment, I apply them, for now in abstract game-theory scenarios. This serves to further clarify the sub-concepts under the umbrella of attachment. Moreover, it amplifies the scope for applying the concepts during the course of Chapter 4.

3.3.4.   Attachment through the Lens of Game Theory

Two game theory scenarios are looked at in this section where, through illustrating the respective power situations under consideration in this paper, a conceptualisation of the incentives (and thus payoffs) which are generally present within these power situations takes place. This helps to add granularity to the subtypes of attachment by discussing factors which enable attachment. Additionally, a discussion is had on how alterations in these payoffs change the equilibrium outcome of the game. The first model takes place between unequal actors (one dominant and the other subordinate). After setting up an initial game and considering different possible equilibrium outcomes, it is considered how a situation of cooptation might arise. By increasing the costs incurred by the subordinate player when adopting a subversive strategy, the dominant player might compel the subordinate actor

towards complying with the dominant group. The second scenario takes place between two relatively equal actors. Again, the scenario illustrates different potential equilibria, and it is considered how a player, desiring cooperation, might increase the costs to the other player who chooses to defect (decreasing the potential gains from conflict), thereby approaching a state of consensus. Since the decisions that this section aims to illustrate usually take place between parties in an ongoing relationship, I am ultimately interested in how iterated games (considering repeated interactions) might play out in these situations. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, I illustrate the types of attachment using simple one-shot games.

3.3.4.1. Coercion for Cooptation: Attachment Between Unequal Actors

Figure 2: Unequal Game

We begin with a simple sequential game that displays the relative costs incurred by each player according to each strategy profile. Being in a dominant position, Player A, the dominant party, is assumed to have first mover advantage. Additionally, it may be assumed that because player A is dominant that D > S where D=Dominant player starting payoff and S= Subordinate player starting payoff, prior to considering the impact of the interaction. Both of these

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assumptions are for the purpose of a more true-to-life model but do not affect the outcomes of the game itself.

The symbols in the above diagram represent the different costs as follows α: cost of accommodation; γ: cost of compliance; δ: cost of being subverted; φ: cost of subversion; χ: cost of repression and β: cost of being repressed. Each cost is assumed to be positive, unless otherwise stated. In a real-world scenario, one can imagine that a strategy of Accommodation would be to avoid intervening in the actions of a subordinate group, for example allowing a protest to take place. The cost of this kind of action (α) exists as a function of the damage done by allowing the day-to-day actions of the subordinate party to run their course. These costs could exist in the form of the existential challenge posed by the operation of the subordinate group or in a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of constituencies who view the accommodation of a challenging group to be intolerable.

Similarly, Compliance would be, in a particular moment, avoiding direct confrontation with the dominant party, for example by ensuring that the protest remains within the bounds of the law. Nevertheless, this kind of compliance could still be at significant cost. While in many situations, γ, the cost of Compliance, is far smaller than the cost of being repressed (for example) there are some scenarios in which the cost of Compliance is regarded as insurmountably high. A situation of slavery might be seen as one such example where the cost of pain or even death is seen as preferable to the indignity of servitude. It is precisely this consideration which led Emiliano Zapata to say: 'it is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees' (Marshall 1992: 513). This kind of payoff choice was likely one that existed for many black people during Apartheid. In this scenario, compliance with the regime's brutally racist laws may have appeared too great an indignity for individuals to endure. At an organisational level, no organisation claiming to be acting in the interests of black people could have achieved legitimacy whilst cooperating under the terms set out by P.W. Botha, for example. Thus, even when considering the potential costs that come with subversion, such as risk of prison and death, the perceived cost of compliance can be greater than that of subversion i.e., γ>φ.

The other costs in these scenarios have more to do with damage endured from opposition or from resources spent. Both δ and β (respectively the cost of being subverted and the cost of being repressed) are costs imposed by opposition within a dominant-subordinate

relationship. A dominant party may repress by imprisoning opposition or instating repressive laws. A subordinate party may subvert by attacking strategic infrastructure (as was the case with MK during the sixties), engage in terrorism or guerrilla warfare. While each of these involves imposing costs on opposition, they also entail their own costs i.e. φ: the cost of subversion and χ: the cost of repression. These are intended to symbolise the resources (financial, time, risk) necessary to engage in conflict.

Having defined the different costs, I now look at potential outcomes depending on the relative magnitudes of the costs, beginning with the outcome of mutual conflict. If γ (cost of compliance) > φ (cost of subversion), then the subordinate party has a best response to Subvert. By backward induction, Player 1 knows that it has only two potential payoffs to choose between: either {D - α - δ} (the payoff to Accommodating, given Player 2's strategy of Subvert) or {D - δ - χ} (the payoff to Repressing, given Player 2's strategy of Subvert). Therefore, in choosing a best response, Player 1 must determine whether the cost of accommodation (α) or repression (χ) is higher. We first consider the situation where α is higher. If one again looks at the scenario of 1960s South Africa - whether it be owing to a racist white constituent of voters, internal ideology of the National Party, a demand from certain industrial sectors, a fear of communism, or the real and/or perceived threat of black resistance (or of course a combination of all these factors plus others) - it was clear that the Apartheid government opted for a strategy of Repression, deciding that given the Subversion of the ANC (here γ > φ: the ANC's best response was to subvert the regime), the cost of Accommodation was higher than that of Repression. That is, the NP chose a strategy of Repression, leading to the subgame perfect equilibrium of {Repress; Subvert}, i.e., mutual conflict.

This is of course only one possibility. It may in fact be the case that α < χ (i.e. the cost of repression is in fact higher than the cost of accommodation). If, *ceteris paribus*, this is the case, a new equilibrium will be found at {Accommodate; Subvert}. This is likely to be the case in instances of extreme imbalance in power or strength where the accommodating of an opponent is of little consequence to a group or organisation, even when that opponent simultaneously subverts them. Here efforts to successfully Repress a very small organisation may well require disproportionate resources.

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If, however, ɸ > γ (the cost of subversion is greater than cost of compliance), for example in the instance of punitive laws being increased, a {Repress; Comply} equilibrium comes about, provided that α > χ (i.e. the cost of accommodation is higher than the cost of repression). This dissertation is, however, primarily interested in the conditions under which the equilibrium would reach the potentially more optimal point of {Accommodate; Comply}, where both ɸ > γ and χ > α.

We start again with the situation where γ > ɸ (player S's dominant strategy is to Subvert), and where χ < α (D finds Repressing less costly than Accommodating). Player D will therefore Repress Player S. We now assume that, for example, owing to retaliatory crackdowns, arrests etc., ɸ (the cost of subversion) increases to become greater than γ. This would change the best response of Player S to Comply. Player D's response again depends on the relationship between χ and α. If Repressing remains less costly than Accommodating, a Repression-Compliance dynamic will appear. In an ongoing interaction, however, this might not sustain. This might shift in two ways: Player S might find that the cost of (continued) Compliance (γ) with a repressive regime would become greater than ɸ (the cost of subversion). This would happen, for example, if the dominant party is an aggressor[22]. Alternatively, the cost of accommodation (α) to the dominant party might be perceived as less than the cost of repression (χ). In the former instance a return to mutual conflict would take place. In the latter instance where χ > α, the dominant party would pursue a strategy of Accommodation. Despite player D's incentive to Accommodate, player S might still have incentive to Subvert if γ > ɸ. If one assumes that player D has structural power that enables them to manipulate the incentives of the game (especially the costs of compliance and subversion for player S), D might act either to reduce γ (the cost of compliance) or to increase ɸ (the cost of subversion) using rewards or threats so that γ < ɸ. We therefore see how changing the payoffs for different strategy profiles can alter the outcome of the game.

As discussed earlier in the Chapter, Holdo argues that cooptation is an infrequent strategy used by elites in response to social movements. He claims that this is because a strategy of mutual autonomy has the potential synergies of increasing payoffs for both groups. However,

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[22] Some game theorists such as Scholz and Wang (2009) and Axelrod (1984) conceptualise different kinds of players. Within iterated games, *tit-or-tat* players are initially cooperative but will retaliate if taken advantage of by an *exploiter*. Meanwhile, Nowak et al. (2004) argue that tit-for-tat strategy requires the lowest threshold for invading (or spreading) within a full population of players.

cooptation is defined more broadly here than in Holdo. While Holdo defines cooptation as compliance owing to repression from a dominant party (which has been established as an unlikely outcome to sustain in an iterated game), it is defined more broadly in this dissertation as compliance owing to coercion, through both positive and negative incentives determined by a dominant party. This is seen as a form of mutual cooperation, albeit one that benefits the dominant party much more. Thus, within this dissertation's definition of cooptation, what Holdo calls mutual autonomy is included, provided that both parties reach equilibrium at a cooperative point and the dominant-subordinate relationship remains intact.

In Chapter 4, interactions involving the ANC, where one party is dominant and another subordinate, are discussed. The costs conceptualised in the above modelling are considered and mentioned where necessary. This helps to clearly determine the kind of attachment at play between different groups. In the next subsection, a game between two equal actors is discussed, framing a situation of negotiation and consensus.

3.3.4.2. <u>**Negotiation for the Sake of Consensus – Attachment Between Equal Actors**</u>

For this game between equal actors, the payoffs and costs are symbolised as follows: P is player's base payoff in the absence of interaction with the other player. We then include α: cost of cooperating; β: the cost of defecting; δ: cost of being defected on; χ: legitimacy cost. Unless otherwise stated, these costs are conceived of as being positive. Like the dominant-subordinate game, the cost of cooperation may involve a loss of legitimacy from voting constituencies, or loss of other allies etc. The legitimacy cost is understood specifically as the cost incurred (particularly reputational) when defecting against a cooperating party. The cost of defecting, β, is intended to capture the more general costs that defecting entails. Finally, the cost of being defected on is incurred when an opponent defects and is assumed to be stable, regardless of whether the player itself also defects. The following table indicates the strategies with each incurred cost.

Table 1: Costs in Each Scenario

Strategy	Potential Cost	Symbolising
Cooperate	A	Cost of cooperation (if the other player also cooperates)
	δ + α	Cost of being defected on + Cost of Cooperation (if other player defects)
Defect	χ + β	Legitimacy cost + Cost of defection (if the other player cooperates)
	δ + β	Cost of being defected on + Cost of defection (if other player also defects)

The scenario between two equal actors is simpler than that of a dominant-subordinate interaction because both actors are taken to have identical costs and payoffs, thus having identical overall incentives. Being equal actors, neither player is modelled as having a first mover advantage. These considerations give birth to the following table:

Table 2: Equal Game

	P2- Cooperate	P2 – Defect
P1 – Cooperate	P - α; P − α	P − (δ + α); P − (χ + β)
P1 – Defect	P − (χ + β); P − (δ + α)	P − (δ + β); P − (δ + β)

Again, four outcomes are possible. But owing to the fact that δ (the cost of being defected on) cannot necessarily be avoided (it may be unavoidably incurred if the opposing player has enough incentive to defect), it need not factor into either player's decision making. This is to say that no matter the value of δ, the outcome of the game, determined by the relations between other costs, will not be affected. Thus, the cost of being defected on (δ) does not form part of any of the equilibrium calculations but does serve to define the socially optimal point.

Removing δ from the above equations, leaves a relation between three costs: α (the cost of cooperation; χ (legitimacy cost) + β (the cost of defection); β (the cost of defection). Each utility-maximising player will determine their strategies by ranking the potential costs for both

them and the opposing player and deriving a best response from this calculation. However, in the more likely scenarios where mutual defection entails a lower overall gain than mutual cooperation, a number of outcomes are possible. Three possibilities are explored below, with a prisoner's dilemma discussed in game 1.

3.3.4.2.1.   Game 1

The first game is a classic prisoner's dilemma scenario, in which both parties defect, despite the nonoptimal social outcome. If $\alpha > \beta$ and $\alpha > (\chi + \beta)$, then the equilibrium would be at {Defect; Defect}. The problem encountered in the prisoner's dilemma is the tendency towards mutual defection even though this may not be socially optimal. This is defined by the following relation between costs: $\delta > \alpha > \chi + \beta$. While the equilibrium outcome does not depend on the magnitude of δ (the cost of being defected on), in a non-finite[23], iterated game, however, where $\delta > (\alpha - \beta)$ utility-maximising players are likely to seek or arrive at alternatives that would steer the game away from mutual defection (Axelrod 1984: 11). This is because the interests of the players under these payoff conditions are not in conflict (since the socially optimal point is mutual Cooperation) but instead their incentives currently direct them to mutual defection. Both players' realisation of the suboptimal incentive towards mutually assured defection within the structure of the current game may lead to an attempt at manipulating the incentives in favour of cooperation (which is the socially optimal strategy).

The means of manipulating incentives in favour of Cooperation between mutual actors is negotiation, where both sides give up particular strategic positions (e.g. releasing political prisoners, signing ceasefire agreements) which lower the benefits or increase the costs of defecting, thus increasing β or χ. As discussed earlier in the chapter, this process of negotiation leads to consensus (a new shared equilibrium of mutual Cooperation) and also a consensus on the means for achieving those goals which is enough to secure the relationship of cooperation without necessarily adding to the essential gains to be reaped from a mutually cooperative outcome. Before looking at an example of a game whose incentives promote

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[23] Only in a non-finite prisoner's dilemma game, in which actors will interact an indefinite number of times, is cooperation likely to emerge. Luce and Raiffa (1989: 94 - 102) point out that within an iterated but finite game an actor is likely to defect in the final round, owing to their being no possibility of influencing the future moves of their counterpart. Given the fact that both actors are guaranteed to defect in the final round, so to do they defect in the penultimate interaction and the one before that. This logic then extends to the very first interaction, leading to a finite game of defection.

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mutual Cooperation, below is an example of a scenario in which some negotiation has taken place. Here incentives have been sufficiently changed to avoid mutually assured defection whilst not yet achieving a cooperative equilibrium.

3.3.4.2.2.   <u>Game 2</u>

Game 2 involves negotiation taking place to position mutual Cooperation, as not only the socially optimal strategy, but also the most favourable for each player. This is achieved by manipulating the incentives away from Defection, by decreasing α (the cost of cooperation) and increasing χ (the legitimacy cost). Negotiation itself is likely to achieve this because through negotiating – cooperating outside the game – cooperating within the game is likely to be less abhorrent to constituents. Furthermore, through negotiation, χ is raised because negotiation itself endorses cooperation and legitimises the interests of the opposition. Therefore, defecting undercuts one's own previous claims. An example of the simultaneous decreasing of α and increasing of χ is between the National Party and the ANC where, owing to negotiations and ensuing mutual concessions, cooperation was viewed as increasingly legitimate in the eyes of the different organisations' constituencies. Simultaneously, defection against a cooperating party was increasingly costly, as in the case of Chris Hani's assassination, where the ANC's bargaining position strengthened relative to the NP, despite the fact that one of the ANC's top leaders had been killed. In comparison with the previous example, the below equation reflects either the reduction of α and/or the increasing of χ, leading to the following cost relation: $\chi + \beta > \alpha > \beta$.

Even though mutual Cooperation is not only socially optimal but also individually optimal, there is no dominant strategy because neither strategy of Cooperating nor Defecting guarantees an outcome that is better than the other. Neither does the game provide certainty in terms of the action of the opposing player. In this instance there will be two possible pure strategy equilibria: either both players will Defect, or both will Cooperate. With two pure strategies, a mixed strategy equilibrium would also exist where players would play Defect and Cooperate with positive probabilities.

Regular Defection may serve to undercut negotiation, which, as discussed, is itself a form of cooperation (outside the structures of this game). It is notably not sufficient that the costs of

defecting are simply lower than the cost of cooperation. The conditions to promote mutual Cooperation as the equilibrium outcome in the above game are presented in Game 3.

3.3.4.2.3.   Game 3

Within the previous games, β, the cost of defecting, is the lowest cost. Within this third scenario, negotiation would specifically have to target the cost of defecting and ensure that this variable increases to disincentive defection. This is particularly possible within iterated games where β can be conceived of as containing a future cost where gains made via negotiation are lost in retaliation to the defection. In the below game, negotiation continues, maintaining the disincentives for defection achieved in Game 2 but this time also raising the cost of defection. Payoffs are thus identical to the previous game, with the exception of β which has been raised. This means that $\chi + \beta > \beta > \alpha$.

In the instance of successful negotiation, where payoffs are sufficiently altered, as per the above table, a new equilibrium, in which both sides choose strategies of cooperation, is achieved. Thus, the new equilibrium is at {Cooperate; Cooperate}. An important understanding of cooperation in the real world is advanced here, where it is assumed that within iterated games, goodwill alone will not promote repeated cooperation. What is also achieved in this section is conceptualising some of the factors which comprise the subcategories of attachment. These potential costs are referred to during Chapter 4 in which the ANC's attachment to other organisations is explored.

3.5.   **Conclusion**

This dissertation is now at its midpoint. As such it is now possible to meaningfully ask the question: to what extent was the ANC's hegemony in 1999 characterised by attachment. While Chapter 2 introduced an account of power and hegemony and then mapped out the initial data that introduced sufficient traces to suggest a relationship between ANC's political ascendency and its concert with other groups, this chapter has attempted to define and classify the kinds of concert which appear to have made this possible. This has been done both by referring to the abstract rationale that exists for cooperation and concerted action and the concrete history within the ANC. To account for this potential relation, I have developed the category of attachment which is understood as concerted action between two

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groups done with either the purpose or the effect of gaining power. Under the category of attachment, two main types of cooperation have been theorised: consensus and cooptation. These are seen as possible equilibrium outcomes where without a change in incentives, future actions will follow the course of previous ones. Furthermore, two means of establishing cooperative interaction have been identified: negotiation and coercion. These are actions which are designed to alter incentives owing typically to the fact that socially optimal outcomes are born of cooperation, but current incentives might cause parties to defect. At the same time both negotiation and coercion are themselves viewed as concerted action and are thus understood as kinds of attachment. It is easy to understand why with a certain set of fixed incentives, an actor may regularly engage in cooperative behaviour. All the same, incentives are a key factor in shaping the diurnal activity of an actor which, as discussed in Chapter 2, lie at the core of what can be understood as the character of an organisation. Whether an actor pursues negotiation or cooptation, in pursuit of sustained cooperation, and whether they succeed in changing incentives is also to be understood as being rooted in the character of an actor. The primary cause of this does not however lie in the immediate incentives available but within the knowledge, existing processes of decision making, ideology and general constitution of an actor (Mnookin 1993: 235-245).

Both negotiation and coercion are means of creating consent and both cooptation and consensus are actions resulting from consent. The kind of consent generated typically hinges on the power relations between the two actors. While this consent may be begrudging, it is nevertheless usefully understood as wholly distinct from force. In the next chapter, an attempt is made to gather a bulk of major actions on the part of the ANC which conform with this chapter's theorisation of attachment. In Chapter 5, these actions are placed alongside actions which do not conform to the categories of attachment. By juxtaposing actions which do and do not appear as attachment, a conclusion is assembled, relating to the prevalence of this kind of action within the governing party.

CHAPTER 4

EXAMPLES OF ATTACHMENT DURING 1990 - 1999, WITHIN FIVE SEPARATE SPHERES

4.1.   **Introduction**

Chapter 2 was an introduction to the broad reasons for this study which justify the conceptualisation of attachment which took place in Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, the concepts of power and hegemony were introduced, and it was argued that the ANC became a hegemonic political force in South Africa by 1999. Chapter 3 involved the concept of attachment and the elucidation of its pertinence to both power and hegemony. Because power is the ability to act in concert and attachment is the creation of concert, attachment is directly linked to power - as a method of activating it. Four means through which concert exists were then conceptualised, giving attachment a set of subcategories: coercion, cooptation, negotiation, and consensus. Now, with the concept of attachment and its subcategories in mind, this dissertation turns back to focus again on ANC action between 1990 and 1999 and examine several instances of ANC action that can be said to comprise attachment.

The negotiations for a democratic South Africa involved an extraordinary moment in South Africa's history and the ANC was at the centre of this moment. The early nineties in South Africa, during which negotiations took place, were a crisis context, prone to wholesale change and attendant disorder. The imperative to manage this change incentivised bargaining and pact-making (Habib 2013: 37-38). The peace settlement (albeit unfinished) in South Africa was astoundingly successful in comparison to other attempts to broker peace around the world (see Mamdani 2020). Owing to the success of negotiations, it is a reasonable hypothesis that actions which bore fruit during the negotiations were repeated even after a new South Africa was well established. On the other hand, further into the decade, as the ANC became more politically dominant, the imperative for collaboration with others may have become weaker. To what degree did attachment remain as part of the ANC's political character? The answer evinced in this chapter and spelled out in Chapter 5 is that even after the immediate crisis posed by Apartheid had passed, the ANC continued to pursue attachment. This was continuously informed by a context in which the ANC drew its main staying power from its popularity and its strategic alliances. This is to suggest that by the end of the decade, the ANC was extremely powerful but still not particularly strong and thus relied on attachment to a meaningful degree throughout.

At least in principle, the negotiations for a democratic South Africa constituted a profound transformation from a society based on racial oppression and violence to one that was non-racial and peaceful. Negotiation towards consensus within Codesa and the MPNF touched on matters reaching across society including: the economy, police and the army, justice, law, traditional leadership, and religion. This chapter thus divides a study of the ANC's attachment between 1990 and 1999 along these lines. However, these matters, which are divided for mainly practical purposes, bleed into one another in a way that does not lend to a possibility of stark and orderly division and topics may be touched on in more than one subsection. Additionally, over the course of this section, the concept of attachment is applied to each instance and further be developed by incorporating the information at hand.

The end of the 1990s (as well as the early 2000s) represents a high watermark of ANC hegemony during which its nation building project, its claim to be the rightful custodians of the South African state and its strategic set of alliances were at their most coherent and widely accepted. Largely owing to its own strategic choices to pursue negotiation, the ANC

managed to shift the balance of forces (which at the beginning of the decade were ambiguous) to being squarely in its favour. Over the course of this chapter, it is shown how the ANC had to adapt its strategies to accommodate the needs of other groups. In doing this, it reduced resistance, developed synergies with other groups and uncovered new strategic possibilities which it may not have entertained were it not for its attachment with those groups. Additionally, in doing this, the ANC shifted its own interests. Starting the beginning of the decade as a banned political movement, the party ended the decade as the hegemonic governing party, owing much to their successful negotiations early in the decade. As a very broad indication of the changing of the ANC's interests, the decade started with an interest in changing the status quo and it finished with an interest in maintaining it. This preliminarily indicates a movement away from conflict with others towards attachment (which is conceived as being conceptually at odds with conflict). What this meant more specifically is that its initial incentive, to act as a destabilising force against the state, transformed into one of playing a stabilising role across institutions including *inter alia* state bureaucracy, parliament, the military, and the police force. The ANC's interests therefore became intimately linked with those of the South African state. Where the Apartheid regime had failed to create security (oft considered to be the *raison d'être* of a modern state) the ANC offered a solution of peace which was key to the continued existence of the South African state (see Du Toit 2001: 16-18).

But the ANC could not achieve this stabilisation in a vacuum and the consent of many actors (i.e. those comprising the plurality of South Africa) needed to be secured. What remained throughout the decade and what appears often tantamount for the party, was the ANC's interest in surviving, reproducing itself and maintaining increased influence. For as long as this was achieved, the interests of many groups in South Africa remained invested in the ANC's survival. This chapter tries to note the most important examples in which the interests of the ANC intersected with other groups that had influence on the outcomes within the country. These interests are both material and normative and the achievement of the ANC was not only to deliver what others valued but also to shape these values.

In this chapter, five spheres are explored. The first three spheres (the economic, political and security spheres) contain assumed fixed end-goals which motivate actors: In the economic sphere, the accumulation of money or wealth; in the political sphere the attainment of

political office and power and in the security sphere the attainment of office within the army or the police and the accumulation of strength. The final two spheres are ones in which the end goals of actors are viewed as changing according to *laws* and *norms* respectively. A note must be made here that a relatively broad definition for ANC action is employed where the ANC as an organisation, the state governed by the ANC and the key leadership within the ANC are all considered as mediums through which other groups became attached to the ANC. This is justifiable because of the way in which the ANC dominated the South African state during the first five years of South African democracy (blurring the lines between party and state) and the hierarchical leadership structure of the ANC which saw pivotal decisions in ANC history at times taken by individuals in the organisation.

4.2.   **Attachment in the Economic Sphere**

The economic sphere is understood here as being associated with either the gain or maintenance of wealth, where wealth is understood as money or assets. The matter of the relationship between the ANC and elite economic actors received a fair amount of preliminary attention in Chapter 2. While several authors consider the economic settlement of 1994 to have been the *sine qua non* of the South African transition (see (Bond 2000) and (Terreblanche 2002), this chapter bolsters two claims made in Chapter 2 that the economic side of the settlement of 1994 was but a component of the transition (albeit a major one) and that the ANC had to respond to several, and not just one, economic interest groups.

What can be understood as the economic settlement was itself multifaceted and had to cater to numerous interests, including corporate South Africa, an international community dominated by the USA, local unions, and the ANC's electoral constituency, which was made up largely by unemployed and impoverished black South Africans. What emerges is that the ANC had a cooptive role in its relation to economic groups such as the unemployed and impoverished, who appear throughout this section as the out-and-out losers from South Africa's transition (see Terreblanche 2002: 132-138). On the other hand, a coopted relation of the ANC by international powers and organisations appears, revealed mainly by policy

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choices in the economic sphere. Slightly more complex is the party's relation to corporate South Africa and South Africa's trade unions. By and large, both of these relations emerge as being negotiatory and at times having reached a state of consensus. The main form of ANC policy that is referred to here is the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and later the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy and the main dynamics at play in their drafting and then implementation.

4.2.1. The Cooptation of the ANC into an International Economic Order

To begin with the ANC's relations with international groups such as international financial institutions (especially the IMF and World Bank) and the USA, there is ample evidence to suggest that the ANC progressively acquiesced to Washington Consensus[24] style policy. This was partly achieved through the ideological conversion of certain key ANC role players as well as through coercive means. As covered in Chapter 2, Terreblanche provides an account that informal economic negotiations took place during which coercive communication was delivered to the ANC by the World Bank, IMF, as well as British and American ambassadorial staff, dissuading the ANC from its plans of nationalisation and redistribution (Terreblanche 2002: 85-103). It has been suggested by Terreblanche (2002: 85-98) that this pressure explains the party's about-turn on its basic economic approach[25] from growth through redistribution to redistribution through growth. This stood as one of the clearest pre-1994 indicators that the ANC was beginning to conform to international norms on economic policy.

Instead of a response to direct coercive pressure, Padayachee and Van Niekerk instead emphasise the importance of ideas, stating that key ANC figures (including Trevor Manuel, Thabo Mbeki, and Tito Mboweni) were imbibed into an acceptance of neoliberal economic policy by attending workshops organised by the World Bank and JP Morgan (Padayachee &

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[24] The Washington Consensus is a collection of widely criticised economic policy prescriptions which are promoted for struggling developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and United States Department of the Treasury (Terreblanche 2002: 487). Some of these principles include fiscal discipline, tax reform, trade liberalisation, privatisation of state enterprises, market deregulation and strong property rights.

[25] The reasons for this policy shift are contested. Padayachee and Van Niekerk (2019: 171 - 172), cite the lack of evidence provided by Terreblanche for any clandestine talks having happened. Chris Landsberg, on the other hand, concurs with Terreblanche, stating that Mandela's changing position on fiscal responsibility was not a response to the local business community but was instead directly related to foreign investors and governments putting pressure on the ANC to adopt more 'prudent' economic policy (Landsberg in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 291).

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Van Niekerk 2019: 229). This ideological commitment both informed (and constrained) the economic scenario planning that would eventually inform policy decisions in post-Apartheid South African government (see Bond 2000: 53-85). Added to this were other factors including the pressure from domestic capital and advice of Eastern (and not Western) governments such as Vietnam and China to steer clear of nationalisation policy (Gumede 2005: 70).

While the importance of prevailing economic ideas of the time is indeed an important factor with which to give nuance to one's account of the ANC's major shifts in economic policy positions, it seems naive to accept that it is simply that - a change in the mind of certain key personnel. If it is interests that motivate actors, one must consider the full composition of interests, including material incentives. Even though Terreblanche (2002) does not provide evidence for the secret meetings between the ANC and powerful global actors, it is almost beyond doubt that the ANC was materially and intentionally coerced. This coercion, the definition for which was established in the previous chapter, at least took place indirectly through signals from previous global events led by the USA, in which developing countries were punished or rewarded, especially in East Asia and Latin America (Chomsky 2003: 148 – 156; Perkins 2005). Considering the unequal game theory scenario from Chapter 3, the ANC would have been aware of the cost of defecting (experienced by South Africa during the 1980s as it increasingly became a pariah state), inherent in which were major financial outflows and restriction of its export markets.

Coercion to acquiesce[26] to neoliberal economics was acting on South Africa, as it was around the world, in the 1990s (Gill in Stubbs & Underhill 2000: 48-59). To this effect, an agreement on trade liberalisation was signed in 1995 with the World Trade Organisation and exchange rate controls were phased out during the first years of democracy (Terreblanche 2002: 144). Alongside this policy of liberalisation came large-scale capital flight and the transfer of the headquarters of some of South Africa's largest corporations to the London Stock Exchange

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[26] One early yet revealing moment came early in the decade with the last-minute alteration of Mandela's speech to be delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1991. The initial draft, which had an overriding socialist tone was altered frantically and extensively by Tito Mboweni and, as Alan Hirsch notes, "the version of Mandela's speech actually delivered could best be described as carefully written, harmless and mildly reassuring for the collected band of plutocrats and international financial bureaucrats" (Hirsch 2005: 30). In 1992 at the ANC's Ready to Govern policy conference, Mandela relayed the message he received at Davos regarding private property and nationalisation - that international opposition (particularly from the West) would be shown if such policies were pursued. In what ensued, future ANC policy would comply with this international pressure (Turok 2014: 26).

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(Bond 2000: 26-27). Moreover, unlike a developing economy's calculation during the decades of the Cold War, the real or perceived[27] costs of subverting powerful companies and norms espoused by the USA were no longer able to be mitigated by the counter-hegemon of the USSR. The change of incentives for a subordinate player like the ANC in the global context could be mapped out as follows: the ANC's cost of subversion was increased and the cost of compliance decreased, leading to a dominant strategy game, in favour of cooptation.

In terms of actual policy implemented by the ANC, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), (to be discussed further later in this section) was not necessarily a document which simply followed international norms of the time, promoting several redistributive measures to address the dire state of most South African people. However, it is widely argued especially by Bond (2000: 113-118) and Terreblanche (2002: 108-116) that the ANC had little plan or space to actually implement the economic visions of the RDP in any meaningful way. This was seemingly confirmed when the plan was all but abandoned just two years after adoption in 1996, and GEAR was implemented in an uncharacteristically unilateral fashion[28]. Compared with the RDP, GEAR was far more aligned with Washington Consensus economics, emphasising privatisation, reduction of government expenditure and a need for real wages to be moderated in order to create employment within the private sector (Terreblanche 2002: 144). This acquiescence to a neoliberal order, despite the glaring inequality, poverty, and unemployment, can be seen as one of the first instances of real belligerence, and thus non-attachment (see 5.2), on the part of the ANC. It flew in the face of both ANC voters and alliance partners[29] (see Bond 2000: 83-84). At the same time, it can convincingly be seen as cooptation by dominant foreign actors, particularly those in the USA. This compliance was an obedience to existing international norms which involved no change of course on the part of global institutions.

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[27] Terreblanche (2002: 106 -107) judges that the ANC shifted too far to the right in terms of the economics it adopted. Instead of adopting a neoliberal framework for economic policy, a more social-democratic one, like those adopted across Europe could have been opted for. Hirsch (2005: 68 - 69) suggests that this overcorrection was a response to international scepticism and suspicion about the ANC and its ability to govern.

[28] Created without consultation with the ANC's alliance partners, GEAR was stated by Mandela as being non-negotiable. Proponents of GEAR tried to claim that the policy was merely a fleshing out of the means by which the RDP goals were to be recognised but it directly contradicted the RDP in several key respects (see Terreblanche 2002: 114 - 123).

[29] This is stated with the caveat that Cosatu's Industrial Strategy Project, by being export-focussed and endorsing trade liberalisation, was itself a neoliberalised document (Bond 2000: 65 - 70).

Gumede convincingly shows that key advocates of GEAR knew quite well about the failings of the very free-market principles that GEAR nevertheless pursued (see Gumede 2005: 91-94). This is not to claim an irrationality inherent in pursuing futile economic principles but rather additional evidence that a much greater real or perceived cost existed in *not* pursuing these policies (Turok 2014: 34). The ANC's behaviour in generating economic policy comes across as it, and in the process the South African state, having clearly been coopted into a global economic order, dominated by the USA, multinational firms and global finance institutions (from which South Africa was partially excluded under Apartheid). With a small number of key personalities within the organisation having been converted into agreeing with these economic principles (Marais 2011: 106), there was most importantly a great potential cost of national economic stability[30] if the ANC government did not follow the advice of the global community (see Habib 2013: 85 - 86). As is consistent with the concept of cooptation (as used in this dissertation), there was also reward for adherence to Washington Consensus norms. Analysing South Africa's adoption of GEAR, William Gumede (2005: 91) quotes Brazilian economist Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira who states the following regarding the pressure put on weaker, developing countries by the USA and its allies to adopt particular economic policies: 'The recipe is simple. If a country completes its fiscal adjustment, if it carries out other neoliberal reforms and if it opens up the financial sector to the world market, then it will be rewarded by an influx of foreign capital.'

4.2.2. The Various Economic Links of the ANC

The above account of the ANC and the new South Africa being coopted into a global economic order is not a complete picture. The truth is that the ANC, through both policy and personnel, was attached to multiple economic groupings. Having discussed the attachment of the ANC and the South African state to international institutions, this section looks at the ANC's relations to three additional economic groupings in the order of the poor and unemployed within South Africa; the local bourgeoisie; and the black middle and upper classes. Labour unions, especially Cosatu, are another economic grouping mentioned in this section which, however, receives more attention in 4.3.

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[30] In 2001, GEAR was deemed, by its main adherents, a stabilising rather than a growth strategy (Terreblanche 2002: 120).

Especially prior to getting into government, the ANC was neither able to state nor display an unequivocal affiliation to any particular interest group, instead advocating for a mixed economy in which both government and the private sector played key roles[31] (Hirsch 2005: 31). As discussed in Chapter 2, despite cooptation into a global economic order, the ANC remained responsive (albeit in constrained ways) to multiple economic issues and interests, and more broadly multiple spheres of interests. The economic issues and interests are explored in the rest of this section, while the multiple spheres of interests are covered in the rest of this chapter.

Within the global context of neoliberalism entering its second decade and the collapse of socialism, local economic issues included inequality, poverty, low growth, and unemployment, all of which comprised realities that laid the ground for the transition from Apartheid. An extensive dynamic of push and pull between the economic left and right (see Habib 2013: 76-79) over the above issues was visible in the drafting and implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Plan. The RDP was a site where multiple interests clearly converged and provides a lens into the contradictory constituencies with which the ANC chose to simultaneously cooperate[32]. As Terreblanche notes, the document originally emanated from Cosatu yet was at the same time the ANC alliance's manifesto for its 1994 election campaign (Terreblanche 2002: 108). The RDP was a document on which there was effective consensus within the Government of National Unity (GNU) and thus was a policy document that enabled political cooperation amongst previous enemies and consensus amongst broader society (Terreblanche 2002: 109).

Patrick Bond's assessment of the actual implementation of the RDP suggests that a long list of progressive or popular items from within the RDP were simply not implemented. For this reason, Bond suggests that the RDP was intended as a nation-building signifier rather than a detailed policy guidebook (Bond 2000: 112-118). Terreblanche (2002: 109) spells out a similar assessment, stating that the publishing of the RDP white paper, which

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[31] The concept of a mixed economy reflected a new policy position developed by ANC economists, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hirsch 2005: 32).
[32] The RDP's preface states this explicitly: "The RDP is the result of many months of consultation within the ANC, its Alliance partners and other mass organisations in the wider civil society... It is a product of consultation, debate, and reflection on what we need and what is possible" (Reconstruction and Development Plan 1994).

departed significantly from its draft document, was the death blow to the potential of the original document.

> *'It introduced fiscal prudence not as a means of attaining RDP objectives but as an added goal. The notion of redistribution was dropped, as the government's major role in the economy was reduced to the task of managing the transformation… Given the ANC's commitment to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance, no 'fiscal space' was available for properly implementing the RDP… It therefore seems that the ANC accepted the RDP on a rhetorical level only and used it mainly for electioneering purposes.'* (Terreblanche 2002: 109 -110)

Despite these valid criticisms, the dynamics evident in the creation and implementation of the RDP clearly indicate a party beholden to *multiple* and *contradictory* economic interests. This is to say that even if the RDP was solely a means of communicating, then policy was responsive not only to the dominant sphere of global capital, but also to the dominated groups of the poor or the well-organised, relatively equal unions and local businesses.

The RDP started as a document drafted by trade union leadership, with a focus on uplifting the poor and unemployed. However, its language and meaning increasingly conformed to orthodox economics of the time, especially in the stage of being drafted as government policy, before being side-lined in favour of the GEAR policy. In terms of implementation, the RDP's pro-poor vision was only partially enacted (see Bond 2000: 113-115) and changes to the document were generally made in a direction favourable to elite economic actors. GEAR was far more rigorously implemented than the RDP, with a number of its targets achieved (excluding the all-important ones of growth and employment) (see Hirsch 2005: 235-236). All this evidence indicates a balance of forces that clearly favoured elites at the time and thus an imperative for greater responsiveness to elite groups. The following passage from Lodge (2002: 21-22) indicates the multiple forces, as well as the balance of forces, which acted on the RDP over time:

> *'The genesis of the [RDP] stemmed from the tacit bargain between the ANC's leadership and Cosatu. The RDP's first four drafts were chiefly the product of policy*

expertise associated with the trade union movement. Three further drafts were debated at meetings which built up a wider range of consensus between the ANC, the trade unions, the SACP, MDM affiliates and a range of sectoral non-governmental organizations... As the RDP evolved, its contents drew upon an increasingly broad diversity of tributaries... In 1990 the ANC-Cosatu workshop in Harare had embraced a set of proposals that would have included an extension of public ownership, state regulation of credit, a prescribed high-wage economy, and a central role for organized labour in policy formulation. Redistribution would serve as the principal agency of economic growth.

Through 1991, though, ANC economists began to shift ground. The 1992 Draft Policy Guidelines included the suggestion that the public sector might need to be reduced; they noted the necessity for legal protection of property rights; and they reflected an increased sensitivity to the requirements of international competition for South African manufacturing.'

The topic of the RDP is a segue into the ANC's links with multiple groups. Each group and their attachment to the ANC is further discussed below. In terms of the ANC's relation to the poor and unemployed groups in South Africa, the suggestion that the RDP was mainly used as an election manifesto to garner their consent is one that proposes that the RDP was an instrument for cooptation. Here, the ANC received (or attempted to receive) cooperation from the poor majority in the form of a vote, without seriously altering any course of action of its own in favour of the constituency it targeted. This is not to ignore the fact that major gains, especially in political rights and freedoms, were made in favour of the poor black majority. It is, however, to point out the relatively cooperative stance taken by this broad swathe of South African society during the ANC's first term (Marais 2011: 447), despite evidence that their interests were not being served. Through the lens of attachment, the promise of positive economic reward for the poor led people to vote for the party, only to have these promises mostly reneged. In traditional democratic theory, this should have meant that the ANC was punished at the polls in the following election. Nevertheless in 1999, the ANC received an even greater share of the national vote. While to some this may indicate increased consent owing to increased consensus amongst the poor

and unemployed, the evidence suggests that the increase in consent was mostly as a result of increased dominance and dependence. This was likely the result of a cooptive strategy adopted by synonymising the ANC with political freedom whilst employing pro-poor discourse and providing selective yet minimal services to vulnerable groups to maintain their loyalty.

Next, the ANC's attachment with corporate South Africa appears to be one of constant negotiation without a state of consensus being reached. After Apartheid, the political and economic spheres in South Africa became largely distinct. The former was occupied by a new black elite, associated with the ANC and the latter was occupied by a white elite which established itself in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors earlier in the century. Nevertheless, a co-dependency (described in Chapter 2) sustained throughout the nineties where neither group could do without the other. The ANC benefited from the fact that capitalist accumulation in South Africa became dependent on the legitimacy of the ANC government (Terreblanche 2002: 79-84).

While the structure of South Africa's political landscape came to be completely dominated by the ANC, the commanding heights of South Africa's economy (which is itself connected to the global economy[33]) was (and still is) highly concentrated amongst a white elite, often with monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies in many sectors (Hirsch 2005: 103). The property clause (Section 25) in the Bill of Rights made it impossible for political actors to legally dispossess and thus weaken those who were already economically well-endowed. The ability of strong market-players to affect employment, the stock market and the purchasing power of the South African Rand (Terreblanche 2002: 96-112), meant that the ANC was limited in the choices it could make in relation to economic policy, lest it and its citizens pay an inordinate price. Nevertheless, some policies implemented by the ANC government such as the Labour Relations Act (LRA) were unpopular with the local bourgeoisie. Additionally, trade liberalisation and lowering of tariffs and subsidies (in accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), whilst being favourable to global capitalist forces, was detrimental to many local manufacturers who had to deal with cheaper products from abroad (Hirsch 2005:

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[33] Although some may argue that domestic capital cannot be separated from the global capitalist order into which the ANC was coopted, it is worth pointing out that companies with large stakes and assets in South Africa were dependent on the ANC to manifest law and order in the country, to protect the domestic currency, to avoid nationalisation and to guard against revolution.

135). Furthermore, local companies, especially the larger conglomerates, defected on the tacit accord between business and government, with high capital flight taking place during the nineties (Marais 2011: 114). What existed for the remainder of the decade after the transition was a cold but civil relationship between private and public power. Both groups vied in favour of their own interests whilst being unable to ignore those of their counterparts. During this period both the ANC and corporate South Africa grew enormously in their respective spheres and remained influential upon one another. There appears to have been no equilibrium reached between the two, but instead an ongoing form of negotiation where both direct and indirect signals were exchanged, communicating terms for cooperation, coupled with periodic defections by both groups.

Next, the ANC had a special kind of role in attaching to the black middle and upper classes, much of which did not exist in the early 90s. Using various mechanisms of the state, the ANC facilitated the expansion of a black middle class, which by 2002 consisted of about 6 million people (Terreblanche 2002: 132). This was done in part through South Africa's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Southall (2016: 79) explains that the ANC viewed the approximately three hundred South African SOEs, which employed more than 300-thousand people and comprised more than 15% of South Africa's economy, to be instrumental transformative mechanisms within the economy. One direct means of attaching the interests of the black elite, within and represented by the ANC, to the white corporate class was through BEE. While this legislated and negotiated process (van Holdt 2019: 7) did not fundamentally disrupt economic patterns, it did achieve an enrichment for a class of black South Africans contributing to a growth of the black middle and upper classes (Terreblanche, 2002: 132-138). These two interlinked classes (consisting of civil servants, political leaders, rural elites, urban professionals, and a handful of businesspeople) had their interests further enmeshed with the ANC during the nineties. The growth of the black middle class was already underway during the eighties, and active negotiation began prior to formal legislation, starting in 1993 when Sanlam sold a subsidiary to New Africa Investment Ltd. (Marais 2011: 140)[34]. The dependence that the black elites and middle classes had during the decade on continued ANC hegemony appears as cooptation, where the

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[34] Marais suggests that gestures of this kind indicate corporate SA holding up its end of a tacit political bargain during South Africa's transition (Marais 2011: 140).

interests of a fledgling and precarious class were largely indistinct from the governing political party that was not only home to many of the people within that class but was also key to the class's prospective growth.

On an even broader societal level, policies (such as BEE) related to economic enrichment of small and primarily symbolic sectors of the black public, appear too as cooptation of black South Africa into a system that by and large remained to their detriment. Bond (2000: 40) argues that BEE was a means of generating consent to a system of racial exploitation without actually conceding any meaningful ground to the majority of black people. Through BEE, only a cluster of black people were enriched, but the policy played a legitimising role for a system that continues to foster the greatest inequality in the world. It is important, however, not to understate the material impact of BEE policy. Despite its underwhelming impact, it is nevertheless meaningful that, by 2000, 47% of all new promotional opportunities were awarded to black managers (Hirsch 2005: 230). Additionally South Africa's public sector consisted of more than 70% Africans by 2003 (Hirsch 2005: 229).

BEE, alongside the LRA, was an arm of policy to secure the loyalty of the black middle and upper classes. Additionally, these policies both operated in relation to, but not simply subordinate to, corporate South Africa, and were also instrumental to ANC funding (Marais 2011: 142). In 2011, one third of the ANC's NEC served as directors of BEE companies (Marais 2011: 140). Additionally, corruption[35] came to be associated with some Black Economic Empowerment deals[36]. Informal political-commercial networks developed, with BEE shareholders being used by the private sector as avenues for government access (Bond 2000: 39).

A flagship incident of post-1994 corruption was the Arms Deal - a multi-billion-dollar defence procurement by government, implicating numerous ANC heavyweights including chief whip Tony Yengeni, Deputy President Jacob Zuma, Zuma's advisor Schabir Shaik, and former

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[35] Terreblanche (2002: 136) laments that the structural corruption that developed during the late Apartheid period appears to have transferred into the new South Africa, surmising that the *pactismo* of the transition may well have facilitated this continuation.

[36] Van Holdt (2019: 3) argues that corruption should be seen primarily as a function and mechanism of class formation rather than a criminal or moral issue. Seen as a mechanism for class formation it comes as no offence or surprise then when it is associated with Black Economic Empowerment which too is a mechanism for class formation.

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minister of Defence and former MK head Joe Modise (Feinstein 2007: 154-206). The deals took place mainly with foreign arms companies who relied on senior ANC figures to access government contracts (Marais 2011: 360-363). Despite exhibiting features of attachment, specifically negotiation, (especially between the ANC and multinational arms companies), the arms deal is further discussed in Chapter 5 as an event that comprises in various ways, features of non-attachment.

These practices gesture towards further linkages of give-and-take-based negotiation, without equilibrium between the private sector and the ANC-led state. Here, an informal practice of deal-brokering existed to lubricate between the, at times, opposing interests of the corporate sector and the ANC. A possible reason for there never having been an equilibrium between private capital and the governing ANC is the opposing incentives for greater private access on the part of the ANC and the incentive to minimise ANC access on the part of capital. While South Africa's most valuable economic assets were indeed under the command of the white elite, the state being under the command of the black elite was no less meaningful. Both the ANC's political dominance and the business elite's economic dominance were relatively unchallenged by the end of the decade, with the ability to spend hefty funds going in both directions.

Four main economic groups have been discussed in this section: global capitalist powers and international finance institutions; South Africa's local business elite; South Africa's black middle and upper classes and the unemployed and impoverished poor. Presumably, owing to the ANC's subordinate relations with international institutions, the ANC, and the country it governed are best understood as having been coopted in a relationship that sustained throughout the decade. South Africa's local business elite was more reliant on the ANC in a relationship that involved ongoing negotiation, without ever reaching an equilibrium that resembled consensus. This is likely to do with the largely separate groups that constituted the South African economic and political elites and the inherently different set of incentives that each group had. Owing to the dependence of the black middle and upper classes on the ANC for the continued existence of these economic classes, the relation between the two is interpreted to be one where the ANC was dominant and thus cooptive of the black middle and upper classes. This is to some extent limited by the more equal dynamics between the ANC and both rural elites and workers unions, both of which I discuss in other sections of this

chapter. Finally, the poorest (and mostly black) fifty percent of the country are also understood to have been coopted by the ANC where, as an economic class, their interests were being tacitly but systematically neglected, particularly after their political rights were secured. This cooptive relationship was largely sustained through symbolic means, discussed further in 4.6.

4.3. **Attachment in the Political Sphere**

While the ANC had limited advantage in the economic sphere, being unable to gain any upper hand over corporate South Africa and being clearly beholden to global economic forces, it was far more dominant in the political sphere, especially by the end of the decade. In Chapter 2, it was noted that this study conceives of the ANC's main aim as being that of strength or power. Authority is the ability to command and thus to coordinate and the state of being *in power*. The political sphere is defined here as the sphere in which the end goal of actors is authority (be it formal or informal). In a representative democracy, authority and power converge to a significant degree, where the collective (who in Arendtian terms are the powerful) determine who is to be in authority (Arendt 1963: 165-166). It was in the political sphere, consisting both of formal politics (i.e. institutional, electoral politics) and informal politics (permitted by freedom of association, based in unlegislated relations and behaviours) (see Misztal 2000: 8), that the ANC became hegemonic. Through first participating in the consensus-making of talks about talks (Maharaj & Jordan 2021) the ANC was able to manoeuvre the space for more substantial negotiation to take place. Next, through the Codesa negotiations, the ANC was party to the development of a political arrangement that can be framed as having best served its own interests, while simultaneously minimising other parties' losses, thus reducing resistance to the ANC's political ascension. Talks about talks and then the Codesa negotiations entailed a process of consensus-making that signalled a change in the existing game in South Africa, with its process almost unparalleled around the world.[37] As Mamdani (2015: 67-68) states: '[by] decriminalising and legitimising opponents, CODESA turned enemies into political adversaries. In the process, CODESA also moved the goalpost:

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[37] Mamdani (2015) discusses Codesa as a positive-sum process of what he calls Political Justice. Contrasting this with the idea of Criminal Justice (a process followed by the TRC and the Nuremberg trials), Mamdani (2015: 77) reads Codesa as having achieved justice for survivors rather than justice strictly for victims. Through providing a platform for negotiation, survivors, being both victims and perpetrators, took part in a positive sum game so as to be able to live together in the future.

the goal was no longer the internment and punishment of individuals charged with so many crimes, but a change of rules that would bring them and their constituencies into a reformed political community.'

After South Africa's first democratic elections, the ANC was part of a major coalition in the Government of National Unity but also other coalitions at local levels. An overall picture of the political sphere shows that, despite ANC dominance, continuous and painstaking coordination was necessary to maintain this dominance. Much of this was owed to the formal system of politics that was established after 1994. But as will be shown, the system sustained because of the buy-in of various political interests, not just the ANC's. Alongside the existing formal structures, throughout the decade the ANC needed to accommodate these interests to sustain its own hegemony.

4.3.1. Negotiation and Consensus on and within Formal Political Structures

This subsection turns around two main claims. The first relates to the seminal negotiations for political transition and their outcomes which manifested as a new societal consensus. The second claim relates to the content of this consensus and how it benefited the ANC, including through further attachment.

Firstly, in relation to the formal structures that would house politics in the country, South Africa's Constitution and many of the structures set up that would define government were subject to negotiation and consensus amongst political actors (especially the ANC and the NP) during the political negotiations for a democratic South Africa (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 92-103). Unlike other constitutions (like the American or the French) which were drawn up by the winners of conflicts, South Africa's Constitution was created amongst adversaries in the context of avoiding violent conflict. Overall, the practice of negotiation for the sake of consensus-creation (see Mamdani 2015: 68-74) would generate broad consent (and thus stability) to the system that the ANC came to govern. If one applies a game theory lens, it is clear that stakeholders in South African society saw the suboptimal outcome from ongoing mutual defection. What ensued was a process of reducing the costs of cooperation, via legitimising the transition (see 4.6.), increasing the cost of non-cooperation and decreasing the cost of being defected on. What this made way for, gradually and with episodes of

defection and non-cooperation, was a new equilibrium of consent between political opponents to the same political system, inherent in which interests began to align.

While government is, by nature, a locus of coordination, South Africa in the 1990s had this function of government amplified on several fronts owing to the imperative to maintain stability. The content of South Africa's new-found consensus was visible on a formal political level in four main ways. Firstly, the unique moment of fundamentally altering the rules of the society (i.e. drawing up the Constitution) required agreement from as many sections of society as possible. Secondly, the GNU was a mode of cooperation, forming a set of shared incentives between extreme adversaries who otherwise may have very likely entered into violent conflict. Thirdly, the ANC was inexperienced in government which made it beneficial from the point of view of both government know-how and external confidence in government for the ANC to cooperate with the previous governing party. Fourth and finally, the new South African government overhauled the country's diplomatic approach[38], characterised by transitioning from secretiveness to openness, bilateralism to multilateralism and from isolation to broad representation[39] (Muller 1998).

One thing that South Africa's new-found reliance on cooperation resulted in was political power being decentralised and diluted to restrain any particular group from accessing inordinate advantage. This was visible, for example, in the strong resistance to (and eventual scrapping of) the National Party's proposal for a white veto in the Constitution (Du Toit 2001: 63). At the same time, despite its anti-majoritarian premises, the power-sharing agreement penned into the Constitution required that for the first five years of democracy a GNU ought to be formed amongst all parties achieving more than 10%[40] at the national polls. This was a make-or-break point in South Africa's negotiated consensus. Moreover, as opposed to South

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[38] This paper does not go into any further depth on diplomatic relations in the new South Africa, but its reformed approach was further characterised by a stronger regional focus which was not primarily militaristic. One infamous instance of this quiet diplomacy was the highly accommodative approach of quiet diplomacy (see Adelmann 2004: 251-259) adopted in response to the escalating crisis in Zimbabwe under Zanu PF, an old ally of the ANC (see Marais 2013: 366).

[39] Within the informal sphere, the ANC's formal diplomatic ties were bolstered by unofficial but historical ties to countries and organisations across the world from its period in exile.

[40] It has been suggested that the 10% awarded to the IFP which gave it a place in the GNU, the 20% awarded to the NP which made it eligible for a deputy president position, the awarding of KZN to the IFP and the aversion of a two-thirds majority to the ANC were all measures that did not so much reflect the voter's count but instead were means of avoiding civil war. This led Steven Friedman, the head of analysis for the IEC during 1994, to deem the election "a technical disaster but a political triumph". (Friedman 2014).

Africa's previous political makeup, a more delicate balance of powers was established between the judiciary, the executive and parliament (Schrire 1996: 17). At the same time, establishment of regional governments and the creation of effective new institutions such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac)[41] and the Human Rights Commission devolved governmental functions away from the centre (Schrire 1996: 16-17). A further example of the spreading of political power (rather than a concentration of it) can be seen in the proportional[42] electoral system agreed upon.

The point that must be emphasised here is that, while at face value these factors curtailed the ANC, particularly in terms of its ability to implement its programme directly, it drew great benefit from a system for which there was relative societal consensus. On one hand, a proportional system meant that the ANC had its potential political *strength* reduced in comparison to a majority system in which the ANC would certainly have controlled an even greater share of government. This was because the majority system typically rewards frontrunners to a greater degree than their actual percentage of votes that they receive. On the other hand, while a proportional system or a GNU were almost certainly a curtailment on ANC strength, the system benefitted the ANC for three main reasons. One was that within the proportional system, smaller parties would have less claim to a lack of representation, making ANC dominance more difficult to legitimately challenge. This is particularly true because the threshold for parliamentary representation of 0.25% was the lowest threshold in the world (Robertson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 56). The second reason, which relates to the first, is that the proportional system, the GNU and the wide distribution of institutions, in more evenly distributing responsibility, made government's failures less easily attributable to the ANC. These first two reasons resemble the effects of *garantismo*, discussed in Chapter 3, which is the simultaneous practice of empowerment and disempowerment of smaller opponents.[43] *Garantismo* constitutes a coopted equilibrium into a shared political system

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[41] The Nedlac Act (35) of 1994 explicitly states the function of the Council being "to seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining to social and economic policy" (National Economic Development and Labour Council Act 1994).

[42] The proportional electoral system is typically the most favourable amongst common democratic systems to smaller parties (Robertson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 56).

[43] Further evidence of *garantismo* exists in the following statement from an ANC strategy document in 1997: "It is always tempting for revolutionary organisations in political office to characterise all opposition to their programmes as acts of counter-revolution. In general terms, an opposition that pays allegiance to the Constitution and the country's laws and seeks to modify the programmes of transformation or even to express

which defines interests and incentives and preserves the dominance of a particular group. The effect of *garantismo* and the set of incentives that accompany it drew subordinate groups into cooperation with dominant groups, as further discussed in 4.5. The third way that South Africa's formal structures acted to benefit the ANC was that the party list form of proportional representation gave the ANC greater control over its own members. Through the proportional system, the party voted into power deploys individual members rather than direct voting for representatives (Marais 2011: 407). An example of this augmentation to ANC power is the treatment of ANC parliamentarians who were investigating the arms deal. Through the obligations of parliamentarians to the party and the ability of the party to either appoint or remove parliament appointees, as opposed to direct appointment of voters, the ANC was able to cover up its first major corruption scandal while in government.

Next, the issue of regional government during Codesa also deserves attention. During negotiations, the ANC and the National Party had opposing views about regional governance. The NP saw it as in its best interests to fight for regional government in order to maintain a power base in the Western Cape (Humphries, Rapoo & Friedman in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 149). Meanwhile the ANC, opposed to the NP's separatist bent, pushed for a unitary state in which it would inevitably receive a flat-out majority of the vote. The differences did not exist only between the NP and the ANC: a strong push for regionalisation also came from the likes of the IFP and the far right of Afrikaner conservatism (Humphries, Rapoo & Friedman in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 158-166). Disagreement on the issue of regionalisation contributed to the collapse of Codesa 1 (Humphries, Rapoo & Friedman in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 150). So, to repair the chasm between negotiators, over the course of the following years attempts were made to conceptualise a model that would combine regional and central government. Some of this work was done by Joe Slovo and Albie Sachs who came to realise that a stonewalling of federalist-type proposals was not necessarily in ANC interests (Humphries, Rapoo & Friedman in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 152). In fact, agreeing to a model of government where regions had a role, would match the regional structure of the ANC, and would suit its unparalleled network of branches. Moreover, it was believed that

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a retrogressive school of thought shared by a given constituency, is a legitimate actor in the contradictory process of change." (ANC 1997a: 1)

regionalisation would encourage democratic participation (Humphries, Rapoo and Friedman in Friedman & Atkinson 1994: 152).

One way that this process of the ANC altering its course can be framed, is that the ANC came to realise its *true* interests: that its interests were not purely in central government as was first thought. However, what was primary was the very need for the ANC to negotiate. Without negotiations, it would continue to lose from an outcome of mutual defection. And given the breakdown in negotiation, the need to alter certain interests was required. Given the idea that interests are *framed* (see Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986: 464) and not *a priori* defined prior to this framing, the imperative to negotiate meant that interests (and attendant strategies) needed to be reframed. A reframing of interests was an alteration of the perceived pay-outs that could be achieved, allowing for the creation of a bargaining zone in which opposing parties could cooperate and arrive at an equilibrium of cooperative consensus with the NP and IFP on this issue. What this reframing then amounted to was an altering of interests instead of merely a recognition of them.

The consent of the ANC to the idea of regional government also gave birth to a number of coalitions (particularly with the IFP in KZN) that the ANC would not have otherwise entered. The ANC's coalition with the IFP was used as an opportunity to cooperate even outside of the GNU and the KZN coalition (Mnguni in Booysen 2021: 422-427). Booysen argues that coalitions were strategically entered into by the ANC as a means of either gaining or consolidating power. She states 'In the early days of South Africa's democracy, coalitions helped the ANC build reconciliation and bring former political foes into the co-governance fold… Coalitions also gave the ANC footholds in provincial governments where it had not won outright at some stage of the election game… [This] helped the ANC consolidate power over political opponents.' (Booysen in Booysen 2021: 26). In the next subsection, the content of what filled these formally agreed-upon structures is further discussed.

4.3.2. Attachment within Informal Politics

As mentioned in the introduction of this section, informal politics refers to political actions taking place not according to institutional rules and regulations. Instead, informal politics take place *within* formally set up institutions but following unlegislated patterns of behaviour. Attachment in this form is born of political innovation and character and not political

structures of the state. Within formal politics, attachment was primarily defined during the period of negotiation 1992 - 1994, setting up channels of communication and cooperation that often sustained for the remainder of the decade. Concurrently, the ANC and its different wings actively maintained various political alliances. Examples include the potent tripartite alliance and the ANC Youth League's connections with multiple youth alliances (see ANC Youth League 1998). These alliances stand as examples of attachment through informal politics, examples of which are further analysed below. Butler (2012: 71) highlights their importance, stating: 'the ANC engaged in relationships of some depth and endurance of Africanist and black consciousness competitors… it… adopted similar tactics in civil society, building relationships with traditional leaders, churches, and NGOs. In such circumstances leaders expect reciprocity of a special kind… partners can make representations to the ANC but at the same time they are expected to refrain from open denigration of the movement.'

From a strategic perspective, the ANC viewed its control of the state as a factor in its favour within an incomplete liberation context.[44] The state was thus viewed not as an end in itself but a means to an end of implementing a particular set of projects (be it a liberatory vision by some and self-enrichment for others). Preceding the state, so that it was viewed as *part* of a political environment, rather than the political environment in its entirety, was only possible given how dominant the ANC was (see Southall 2005: 64-66). More importantly within this discussion, is that this position foregrounds the impact of what is deemed here as informal politics, where formal state structures were viewed as a component of the broader political economy in which the ANC acted.[45]

Outside of formal political structures, the ANC encountered battles on numerous fronts, which are covered in the other subsections within Section 4.2 of this dissertation. Despite the restrictions on ANC potential, the party, owing to its parliamentary majority, was able to occupy, coordinate and manipulate formal political structures in ways that meant that the post-Apartheid state came to be progressively controlled by the ANC (Southall 2016: 70). One

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[44] This is evinced by the following quote: "By assuming the leading position in government, the democratic movement took formal control of the state machinery, with the possibility of starting, in earnest, to transform it to serve the new order." (ANC 1997a).

[45] In 1990, Mandela told the Washington Post that the ANC had never been a political party but instead was a coalition. Butler (2012: 77) uses this to present the idea of the ANC being an organisation of multiplicity rather than identity but it can also be understood as ascribing a broader purpose to the ANC that circumscribes simple party politics within formal state structures.

such practical means of achieving this was through the cadre deployment by the ANC (also discussed in 4.5.4.) across state institutions (Southall 2016: 71). The effect of this was that government institutions would increasingly conform to party mandate[46] (Booysen 2011: 373 -378). What might appear to be the case is that the ANC coopted the state, occupying its institutions and deploying them for ANC purposes. However, a far more equal dynamic was at play between the ANC and the South African state, insofar as the two could be separated. Here, ANC policy was either in *negotiation with* but not totally subsumed by the law of the state; or ANC leaders inevitably undertook to implement *concurrent* ANC and state directives, typically with a dynamic of being directed by the ANC and restricted by the state, within the executive. Nevertheless, the ANC's first five years in power went by without much friction between the ANC and the state. With senior ANC leaders within parliament or the executive as the main medium of attachment between party and state, the relationship between the state and the ANC was largely one of consensus, with moments of negotiation between areas of the state, including the civil service and the ANC.

Another facet of the ANC's political attachment is captured by describing the leadership style of Nelson Mandela, which, while in the presidency between 1994 and 1999, has been frequently cited as being characterised by consensus-based leadership (Maylam 2011: 274) (Schrire 1996: 16). In the terms set out by this dissertation, this is to suggest that Mandela was orientated towards aligning his and ANC interests with those of others, through processes of negotiation. One of the practical implications of this, according to Seekings and Nattrass (2015: 188), was a decentralised and uncoordinated form of governance where different departments exercised relative autonomy as a means of reconciling diverse interests and maintaining a broad political coalition. Robert Schrire argues that this approach owed as much to the political necessities of the times as to the personal style of South Africa's first democratic president. The political necessities included the precarious period of political transition from white domination, the multiple alliances of the ANC and the internal machinations of the ANC which restricted executive power (Schrire 1996: 16). At the same time, this negotiation often took place at the level of the symbolic[47] (further discussed in 4.6.).

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[46] This is a concrete example of how the division between party and state becomes blurred within a dominant party system.
[47] Leatt (2017: 140) remarks: "much of the creation of a moral community between rulers and ruled was achieved by Mandela through his statesmanship during the transition and in the ways in which he sought to

An additional set of factors encouraging consensus-based leadership existed in maintaining the GNU, which was important for sustaining the loyalty of the still largely white civil service as well as the potentially destabilising forces associated with the IFP and the old guard within the South African Defence Force. Schrire states:

> *'While few would dispute that the ANC dominates the executive, it does not enjoy a blank cheque. The ultimate power of the two minority coalition partners, the NP, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, is to withdraw from the Government.*
>
> *This would not affect the ability of the ANC, with its overwhelming parliamentary majority, to govern. But it would shatter both domestic and foreign confidence and would dramatically heighten political tensions. Although the 'sunset clauses' which made a coalition government necessary were adopted by the ANC as a tactical necessity, they are generally recognised today as an important if temporary confidence-building mechanism'* (Schrire 1996: 16).

Mandela used the GNU for particularly broad political inclusion, inviting representatives of smaller parties to take part in it.[48] Initially it was agreed and constitutionally mandated that a GNU would sustain for the first five years of South Africa's new democracy. However, in 1996, just two years in, the opposition NP exited the fold owing to declining support (Booysen 2011: 226). What this seems to indicate is the burgeoning ANC influence during this period, partly owing to its society-wide coordination, allowing it to outflank rivals. Over the course of the first term of the ANC in power, opposition parties (especially the NP) were side-lined and delegitimised (see 4.5.2) with the ANC's power snowballing between 1994 and 1999 (Booysen 2011: 295). The termination of the GNU was decisive and indicative of the growing political hegemony of the ANC and the attendant lack of political alternatives in South Africa at the time. The National Party's decline in support whilst in the GNU and further decline after

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include as wide a range of political actors as possible… Mandela engaged in a wide range of languages and cultural tropes, from participating in ANC rallies that were recognisably Zulu to taking tea with Betsy Verwoerd, the aged widow of the architect of Apartheid."

[48] Additionally, historian Paul Maylam remarks that while the first government to be placed under ANC rule was of varying quality, its diversity (in terms of race, religion, background, and ideology) of its members was remarkable (Maylam 2011: 274).

exiting it (see Booysen 2011: 296-297) suggests a sliding into an eventual relationship of cooptation in which its payoffs from cooperation were low but its payoffs from non-cooperation were even lower.

Aside from the GNU, an area of concession by the ANC to the white power bloc related to local and provincial government, as discussed in 4.3.1. While the ANC was initially opposed to consociational and federalist proposals such as those advocating for provincial governments and the Local Government Transition Act which entrenched consociational government at a local level (Mamdani 2015: 70), the party came to utilise these structures to its benefit. Since its instatement, local government has regularly been seen as a site for the enrichment of already established ANC petty elites and the simultaneous containment of public discontent (Marais 2011: 354). Booysen notes that local and provincial government, as sites of public participation[49], have been affected as tools for cooptation[50] of communities (Booysen 2011: 174-200). While public participation and local government have been positioned as a means of giving power to the people, they have just as much been used as means of containing rampant public protests, diffusing responsibility, and neutralising political opponents (Booysen 2011: 182-194). In its 1995 local government election manifesto, the ANC states the following:

> *'Through democratic local councils, communities can make their areas better places to live in. Through them we will decide on delivery of water to our houses; where new electricity supplies and sanitation will be put in; where streets will be laid; where schools, clinics and houses will be built; and how rubbish will be removed from streets and public areas. They will make sure that there is a system of fair rents and services for everyone. Together we can break down the barriers that have kept us apart for so long and build truly South African communities in the cities, towns, and villages.'* (ANC 1995).

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[49] Booysen (2011: 176) notes that public participation does not simply constitute informal politics contingent on the organisational character of the ANC but is also legislated via Section 59 of the Constitution for the purpose of governance being based on consent.
[50] Not all public participation was cooptive in nature and some public participation, particularly with the business sector, was more directly negotiatory and consensus based (Booysen 2011: 192-193).

The language used here, alongside espousing democratic values and people's power[51] contains two hints of cooptation. Firstly, in the presence of unequal power relations, the provision of goods and services is understood in this dissertation as cooptive, garnering consent of actors in exchange for certain material provisions. Secondly, local government councils were prone to patronage politics (van Holdt 2019: 8), benefitting a small group of local elites, very often with no meaningful value being delivered to citizens (Reddy 2016: 5). This is not to presuppose anything about the sincerity or lack thereof regarding the above quote (or regarding other similar rhetorical outputs of the ANC) but instead to judge the effective *result* of this kind of discourse when it goes unfulfilled. Doing this, casts a light on the respective incentives and payoffs that are put both to those in powerful positions and to those in positions of being subordinate where the mutual incentive to cooperate benefits the dominant party much more than it does the subordinate party.

The final facet of informal political attachment that is discussed is that of the Tripartite Alliance, which was formed in 1990 between the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP. The ANC's alliance with Cosatu was one with strategic benefit in the economic sphere and thus was mentioned briefly in Section 4.2. The following statement from the ANC in 1994 details some dynamics present within the Tripartite Alliance:

> *'The Alliance, which is putting up one election list in the name of the African National Congress, consists formally of the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party. In late 1993 the South African National Civic Organisation was also co-opted onto the team.*
>
> *Although its historical and ideological roots go back to the 1950s, with the Congress Alliance that brought together the ANC and its coloured, Indian and white counterparts, the Alliance continues because of a happy coincidence of present political interests. The ANC needs the organisational skills, material support and membership of the country's largest trade union federation. Many of its best strategists and election prospects belong*

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[51] In a separate 1995 statement in its local election manifesto, under the heading *Real People's Power, the ANC states the following:* "By voting in the November elections, every local community will get an additional voice in government. Each community will have the power to work with the ANC-led national government to make the RDP work for them." (ANC 1995)

to the SACP and the party's reputation for militancy has given it a powerful
base in the ANC's constituency.

Cosatu needs a political organisation which can win the election for the
constituent assembly and represent its interests in government.

The SACP does not have enough popular support to be a powerful political
force on its own, so it must remain in an alliance with its more powerful
partners and try to get them to incorporate its political and social objectives
in their agendas.' (ANC 1994).

The statement reads in many ways as if it is using the direct language of attachment developed in this dissertation. Besides mentioning cooptation as a neutral as opposed to a bad form of alliance creation, it notes that the Tripartite Alliance functions because of aligned political interests. The statement speaks as if there is an equal interchange, i.e. a consensus, between the ANC and its alliance partners. This certainly appears to be true of Cosatu earlier in the decade, with Marais (2011: 435) arguing that Cosatu specifically avoided cooptation, releasing hundreds of its top members to represent the ANC in parliament and within provincial structures. Workers and organised labour were instrumental to the anti-Apartheid struggle (Maharaj & Jordan 2021: 41-44) over the nearly three decades when the ANC had been banned from the country and as such were in a relatively strong position in the early nineties. As mentioned in Section 4.2. and as is discussed in 4.5., Cosatu and its members saw and achieved several material gains as a result of their alliance with the ANC, suggesting a fairly equal relationship between the alliance partners.

With regards to the SACP, Lodge (2021: 456) notes that in 1991, nineteen SACP members were on the ANC's National Executive Committee and nearly half of the 26-person National Working Committee were communists. Through these channels and others, the ANC relied significantly on its attachment to the SACP for intellectual and strategic input even late into the decade (Lodge 2021: 456). However, the relationship with the SACP appears primarily as cooptation. There was a measurable power discrepancy between the ANC and the SACP - the SACP's membership in 1991 was 25-thousand compared with the ANC's 750-thousand (Lodge 2021: 455). Furthermore, following the global collapse of communism, the SACP was left internally fractious, greatly weakened in terms of party funding and highly dependent on its

senior alliance partner to maintain its proximity to resources (Lodge 2021: 455-457). Senior party members were regularly given key cabinet positions and positions on the ANC's NEC, but many directly contradicted their communist affiliations through the policies they adopted in ministerial positions (Lodge 2021: 472-473).

By 1999, a picture of the ANC being in a far more dominant position within the alliance took shape. GEAR, which directly contradicted the interests and positions of both alliance partners was only met with muffled discontent and where dissent surfaced, the ANC was regularly in a position of disciplining members within the alliance (Marais 2011: 436-438). Marais remarks on the dependence of the two other alliance partners on the ANC when he says that a break from the ANC would likely cause a split within the organisations themselves, thus further weakening them (Marais 2011: 438). The move rightwards[52] by the ANC towards economic conservatism during its first term in government, which came much from its new bonds with local and international business, was a cause of strain between the ANC and its alliance partners. Nonetheless, it was one which the alliance partners seemed to acquiesce to for fear of exiting the alliance and losing their proximity to the state.

The dynamics between the ANC and its alliance partners allows for space for further theorisation in terms of attachment. What clearly starts off as a relatively equal co-dependency, seems to gradually become a cooptive relationship. The betrayals of the ANC against Cosatu's and the SACP's programmes indicate that a gradual imbalance developed between the two parties even while a dependence remained. Marais (2011: 437) argues that the ANC's alliance partners served two main purposes: one being therapeutic and the other one being disciplinary, providing a space where disagreements and dissent could be simultaneously voiced and contained. What this suggests is that an equilibrium of cooperation remained, but as the imbalance in respective power and strength grew, the cooperative equilibrium moved from one of consensus to one of cooptation. The shift from consensus to cooptation can be understood as a weakening of the payoffs received by organised labour. In 1994, being relatively equal, both groups received equal payoffs from cooperation. As the decade wore on, however, the cost of cooperation became increasingly high for Cosatu, which

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[52] A countermovement leftwards took place with the election of Jacob Zuma as ANC president at Polokwane in 2007, the landslide victory was achieved by Zuma gaining popular support notably from the ANC alliance partners (Marais 2011: 439). These events saw Mbeki promptly removed as state president.

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nevertheless continued to cooperate because the cost of defection had also increased, owing to greater ANC dominance.

This subsection has detailed numerous links of attachment of the ANC within the political sphere. While these attachments existed much as a function of the democratic architecture, designed by the ANC and its fellow negotiators, it also existed apart from (and after) the establishment of the rules for a new society. Leatt (2017: 139) states 'it is not only the text that authorised the new dispensation and the political transition. The process of negotiations and the miracle of the political transition were themselves secular authorisations for the new dispensations.' This gestures towards the simultaneous use of formal and informal politics to provide legitimacy to the transition. Even past the transition, however, this dynamic sustained throughout the decade, as the ANC attempted to coordinate (with) the multiple stakeholders across South Africa's political spectrum. In doing so, it was continuously able to tilt the balance of forces in its favour in relation to allies and opponents alike, at times making the distinction between the two unclear. The political sphere may be understood as the sphere where power (as opposed to strength) is primary, where coordination is definitive of the sphere itself. In the next section, I look at the sphere where it is the opposite, where the defining characteristic of the sphere is strength and violence, but nevertheless whose coordination is required in the interest of hegemony.

4.4. **Attachment with Military, Police and the World of Crime**

As noted in the introduction, the 1990s was a period when the ANC progressively had its interests intimately entangled with the South African state. It began the decade negotiating with those governing the state, during the middle of the decade it entered into a GNU with the previously dominant National Party and in the final stage the ANC alone constituted a government with a near two thirds majority of seats in parliament. This progressive enmeshing of the ANC with the South African state meant that the party increasingly had its own interests invested in common state concerns. One *de facto* state concern is security from physical attack or invasion, requiring capacity for force. There was always going to be a deep and tragic sense of irony in this change, as it was precisely the South African security forces which victimised and murdered many people within the ANC. However, after the negotiated settlement, the new South Africa could not do away with the 'bad' and simply instate a

reformed and benevolent police force and military capable of maintaining national security. Instead, a patchy, incomplete, and not entirely transformed police and military was created. In addition, as is demonstrated during this section, the ANC and some of its key personnel saw their interests absorbing and aligning with State Security groups and even associated groups, including criminal networks and Bantustan security. This continued the legacy of Apartheid in the new South Africa, governed by the ANC. As undesirable as this appears, it nevertheless comes across as a necessary component for any short-term hegemonic project in South Africa during the 1990s.

Despite the fact that bodies such as the military or the police are instruments of violence and thus pertain more directly to strength rather than power in Hannah Arendt's terms, they themselves are social groupings whose coordination and consent was vital to the success of the transition. The police or military force of a state is a key example of where power and strength go hand-in-hand, owing much to the need for specific offices of authority to retain legitimacy in order to coordinate and deliver both the threat of and actual force. The sound legitimacy and sufficient reach of these bodies are frequently cited as correlating with social regulation and societal stability (see (Tyler 2004) and (Vollaard & Hamed 2012)). Moreover, command over these organs of the typical modern state, gives one access to coercive capacities which enable the *creation* of consent through coercion. In South Africa, these bodies historically lacked legitimacy, particularly where they were used for repressive rather than protective purposes - against non-white groupings during Apartheid. Particularly in urban townships, this left space for the development of gangs which filled the gap left by an illegitimate state. Gangs performed the role of social regulation and security provision (Kynoch 2005: 2-3) by exercising violence but with the cost of making crime endemic within these communities. This is to suggest that criminal organisations, through their relatively high potential for violence and coercion, came to play a part in regulating South African society and they thus form a part of this dissertation's subsection on the organisations for violence in South Africa. The dynamics of a legacy of state violence and active gangs were factors that the ANC had to navigate during the nineties and ones that it was not simply able to negate or control. For two main reasons, the police, the military and criminal networks are of key interest to this study in their interactions with the ANC. Firstly, each group bears immediate relevance to conceptual aspects of attachment, particularly to coercion. Secondly, an

important role was played by these organisations (state and criminal) in the stabilisation of the modern state.

In the early nineties, the military and the police force, which remained under the control of the National Party, were crucial to the bargaining position of the ruling minority. They gave the Apartheid rulers the ability to negotiate the terms of a new South Africa as opposed to simply succumbing to an agenda for majority rule (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 228). But what is evident when studying the arms of state violence through the lens of attachment is the dynamic character of attachment which not only reflects the static balance of forces at a given moment but witnesses their change over time too. Whilst, early in the decade, the NP had a bargaining position augmented by its control of the military and police, later on, through the processes of negotiation and transfer of national government that they were party to, the organisation became almost obsolete within a few years. One reason for this was that, as far as the interests of the police force and the military are concerned, the transition itself represented an automatic shift in the interests of these institutions. This was made evident with the police force when it asserted that its mandate was purely beholden to whichever political grouping was in power (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 205). Both groups were, under Apartheid, mandated to provide security to whites only (see Du Toit 2001: 35-38). The transition to democracy would resemble a shift in this mandate towards including all the South African population, as enshrined in the Constitution. In contradiction to the reformed formal mandates, however, there remained many personnel from the old regime. Furthermore, many senior and vocal proponents of the previous regime kept their jobs both in the military and the police force (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 229).

The variance in behaviour of the police and the military on the other, suggests a differing relation to the transition between the two bodies. While the military existed as an independent bargaining power, with incentive to enter negotiation as a separate bargaining group (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 231), the police force made it well known that it was subordinate to political negotiations (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 205). Nevertheless, both saw it as necessary to assert their independence from the National Party, even prior to elections (Seegers 1996: 285). Below is a description of the initially negotiatory interaction between the military and the ANC which was successful enough to comprise a

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consensus. Furthermore, the subordinate and thus cooptive relationship of the ANC, once in government, over the police force is discussed.

Despite the low-level civil war in South Africa between 1990 and 1994, the transition of the military during formal negotiations was fairly clean, albeit intricate. Two internal factors which eased the transition of the military were the failed coup of Bophuthatswana by the Afrikaans far-right (representing the collapse of potentially threatening forces within the SADF) and the assent of various homelands to negotiations and cooperation with the ANC (Du Toit 2001: 65). A third factor relates to the fact that South Africa was under no external threat during the period under study. Commenting on the military in 1993, Mark Shaw states: 'The future of the military lies at the heart of South Africa's transition. When the society was at war with itself, it was the various military forces that had done the fighting: compromise between them was arguably more important, but potentially more difficult than between politicians…' (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 228). Owing to the division of the country into various racial groups and Bantustans, South Africa was home to no fewer than 6 different armies, not mentioning other paramilitary groups. Nevertheless, with relative success these different armies, including the ANC's armed wing, were successfully integrated into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 229-234) owing to intricate and sustained negotiations.

Part of the justification by the military for being an independent bargaining power was that it claimed to be apolitical (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 252). This assertion stood as an attempt to situate greater influence for the military by providing this key arm of the state with independence from political changes and actors within the ANC or the National Party. The military was only partially able to win on this front with an agreement set in the Constitution that the president appoints the chief of the SANDF, rendering the military legally subordinate to the government. This interaction indicates a negotiated consensus between the ANC and the military, which eliminated any serious threat of a military coup. Within this (negotiated) consensus, the TRC was very lenient on potential perpetrators of Apartheid's political violence from within the military (Stott 2002: 14-15), and even at the end of the decade the newly

named South African National Defence force was relatively untransformed at the top[53] (Stott 2002: 7, 58-59). The risk of either party defecting from this consensus would appear to be high, incentivising careful cooperation, which did not after all have particularly high costs for either party.

The same ease cannot be said to have been achieved within the creation of the new South African Police Services (SAPS) (Laufer in Steinberg 2001: 16). It has been suggested that this is because, unlike within the military, there were no equivalent policing bodies within the ANC or any of the other liberation movements, making the task of transforming the police much more difficult (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 205). Additionally, domestic conflicts (as opposed to foreign threats) were multiple and fierce (Institute of Security Studies 1998). As a result, police numbers during the nineties were far from adequate for fulfilling their mandate (Marais 2011: 230). This partly explains the more subordinate bargaining position of the police force, in comparison with the military. As with the military, the police were a subject of extended formal negotiations, albeit never themselves a negotiating party. The negotiations about the police related much to the matter of regional or national control of police structures[54] (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 216-222). Eventually, the police forces from ten Bantustans were incorporated into the new SAPS.

One of the difficulties was the ambiguous role that the police played in the lead up to negotiations. As already discussed, the police stated their independence from the NP and their subordinacy to elections. Additionally, Shaw details how, prior to formal negotiations concerning police reform, which would eventually lead to the name change from South African Police (SAP) to South African Police Service (SAPS), changes within the SAP were already underway in response to the political changes afoot in the country at large (Shaw 2002: 25-28). While this may come across as a form of negotiation without direct communication, according to Shaw these early changes in the SAP turned out to be

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[53] Despite the inordinate representation of whites in the SANDF as a whole, but particularly at the top of the SANDF, it had been significantly transformed in terms of overall personnel by 2001 to having more than 60% black staff. Such a transformation would have somewhat neutralised the threat of military rebellion.
[54] One of the things at stake was the appointment of provincial police commissioners, with the ANC predictably advocating for national appointment of these offices while the NP advocated for their appointment to be solely at the behest of regional government. What was eventually determined, as per 218(b) of the Constitution was that provincial commissioners were to be appointed by the national police commissioner but that provincial governments were to have a veto in the matter (Shaw in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 217).

unsubstantial and the SAP continued to crush those in opposition to the government (Shaw 2002: 26). Nevertheless, after the 1994 elections, the police force by and large did not act as a wayward force against the new government and thus were successfully coopted into the new system.

Even after the 1994 elections, a deep public mistrust of the police still existed, and the ANC believed that the legitimacy of the police (i.e. the power of the police rather than its strength) was a priority within the transition (Shaw 2002: 28-29). A key reconceptualisation, captured by the change from SAP to SAPS, was for South Africa's police to move from a force to a service (Marks 2000: 157). This symbolised a broader effort towards turning the police away from an orientation of violence, focusing on bolstering the *power* of the police, rather than the strength of the organisation [55] (see Shaw 2002: 28-34). One of the ways of reforming the police was by including communities within policing structures. As discussed in Section 4.3., there is a potentially cooptive effect of public participatory programmes. The outcome of public participation within the SAPS seems to have been similar (see Shaw 2002: 34-36), with Community Policing Fora largely playing a subordinate and assisting role under the SAPS (Shaw 2002: 122). More evidence of the attempt from within the police, under the new guidance of the ANC, to generate concert between the police and other groups comes from the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1995. This was underpinned by two claims. The first was that the problem of crime would not be solved by government alone and thus partnerships with non-governmental actors would be required to prevent crime. The second was that the resources required for crime prevention exceeded the resources within the existing criminal justice system (Simpson and Rauch in Maharaj 1999: 298). By 1999, the NCPS had been implemented only partially and had achieved only partial success (van der Spuy in Maharaj 1999: 234). Simpson and Rauch comment that this policy was drafted using the ANC's powerful intellectual resources for creative and innovative policy making. However, both the extensiveness of coordination itself, as well as the very reliance on coordination,[56] rather than internal capacity, were both weaknesses of the strategy (Simpson & Rauch in Maharaj 1999: 298).

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[55] While this may have been compatible with ANC ideology, it was not necessarily an appropriate way of addressing a virulent crime wave in the nineties (see Steinberg 2008: 97)
[56] Shaw (2002: 35) even argues that efforts of coordination with multiple community, business, and even overseas groups, consumed police resources that could otherwise have been used to combat crime.

The above provides substance to the assertion that the police were subordinate and thus pliable to the government of the day. In comparison with the military, the police had a higher number of amnesty applications at the TRC (Stott 2002: 15), suggesting a greater adherence to ANC-led processes. As such, the police force came to have a coopted relationship to the ANC, as the ruling party. On top of this, the ANC seems to have implemented policies within the police force specifically related to generating popular consent and even cooptation. On one hand, it would appear crucial that the police force be entirely beholden to a political and legal system of government, rather than behaving independently from it. On the other hand, is the concern that political actors came to have undue influence on the police, blurring the lines between law and lawlessness.

With the advent of democracy, crime rates soared, and the newly appointed government plainly failed[57] to maintain the security of its citizens (Mothibi, Roelofse & Maluleke 2015: 649-650). This is not uncharacteristic of transitional societies which struggle with state capacity (see Shubane in Steinberg 2001: 186-187). Several hypotheses[58] have been advanced for why South Africa experienced such an enormous crime wave post democracy, and it was no doubt a confluence of sociological, political and ideological factors. Khehla Shubane argues that the ANC government relied on an excessive level of persuasion (as opposed to violent coercion) in its approach to fighting crime. Criminal gangs were negotiated with, and government corruption was tolerated (Shubane in Steinberg 2001: 195). Lodge (2002: 133) comments that in 1998 a total of ten thousand policemen out of 140 000 were under investigation. Meanwhile, senior police appointees were frequently subpar, owing to the complex set of political concerns (particularly from a racial perspective) needing to be addressed and negotiated when making these appointments (Laufer in Steinberg 2001: 17-21).

A concurrent dynamic to the (often failed) attempts at repurposing South Africa's police for dealing with the institutional disruptions of the transition, was the ongoing links between

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[57] The inability of South Africa to secure its borders was a key failure in the security of post-Democratic South Africa, providing meaningful ease for conducting of organised crime (Shaw 2002: 66 - 67).
[58] These suggestions included a lack of zeal from South Africa's largely white police force; a hesitance of a newly democratic regime to adopt authoritarian tactics; a spilling over of already existing crime from South Africa's townships; a proliferation of human rights without attendant emphasis on responsibilities and discipline.

South Africa's police and the criminal underworld. This involved a legacy from Apartheid which had seen a high level of symbiosis between South Africa's state security and organised crime circles (Shaw 2017: 199). At the same time, ethically oriented (but criminalised) political movements, such as the ANC, were pushed towards working with established violent criminal networks during the decades preceding the nineties to provide resources to its liberation struggles (Lodge 2014: 9). These links to the criminal class sustained after the democratic election and figures within the ANC benefitted from links with drug traffickers and notoriously violent taxi associations (Shaw 2017: 69). Vigilante groups, which often had their own criminal elements, formed in response to rising crime in South Africa and were frequently coopted into the police force (Shaw 2002: 34-35). Moreover, informants to police and other state intelligence officials were themselves often born of the criminal underworld (Shaw 2017: 194-195). A key example of the continued link between South Africa's post-democracy security cluster and the criminal class of South Africa was the Minister of Defence, appointed by Nelson Mandela in 1994, Joe Modise. Modise was a former gangster who had throughout his time in exile drawn on links to criminal networks and even in the post democratic era played a major role in facilitating the arms deal (Lodge 2014: 10).

How can one surmise the benefits to the ANC of drawing on links between the police and criminal networks, even after having gained the reins of government? As evidenced in the previous paragraph, an inextricable network of crime and crime fighting, government and corruption[59] was inherited from the Apartheid state. Here any engagement with one involved engagement with the other.[60] In the context of the 1994 election, drawing on any network, including the criminal underworld, was expedient for the ANC to cast the widest possible net for garnering support and loyalty across South Africa (Lodge 2014: 17). Secondly, within a

[59] Minnaar (1999) points to several potential symbiotic features to the relationship between government corruption and organised crime in South Africa, specifically crime related to the illicit flows of people and goods. Minnaar does point out, however, that by his time of writing (in 1999) government corruption mostly manifested at lower levels of government and not primarily the upper echelons of the state which were more likely to have housed key ANC personnel.
[60] Graeme Simpson argues that the TRC (discussed more extensively in 4.6.1.) was a process designed to deal with the dramatic dilemma that was presented by the fact that there was not a clear dividing line between politics and crime under Apartheid. To do this, the TRC dealt exclusively with politically motivated violence, developing what Simpson deems a sanitised narrative of previous violence and a chronological fissure between the old and the new South Africa (Simpson in Dixon & van der Spuy 2004: 11). More broadly, the need to facilitate the political transition (discussed in 4.3.) priority of transitional justice rather than criminal justice imbued a contradictory mandate within South Africa's justice system, which more than usual accommodated criminality and violence.

context of limited resources and a focus on the political transition, organised crime went relatively unchecked for the first years of South Africa's democracy (Mothibi, Roelofse & Maluleke 2015: 650). Thirdly, the scale of involvement in crime by state officials appeared to grow rapidly in the early days of the new democracy (Du Toit 2001: 50). Lastly, as it was under Apartheid, links between State security and criminal networks, alongside providing personal benefit to senior members on either side of the criminal-policing divide, could have provided a negotiated equilibrium where the respective interests of the two groups are better served than if there were no interchange whatsoever. This generates not only personal stability but political stasis more generally. This, while not ideal, attaches the interests of criminal groups and crime fighting groups to a new regime, at once entrenching and regulating crime. As Mark Shaw writes:

> *'In South Africa, an entrenched system of patronage and influence has distorted the policing of organised crime. It is less about the payment of protection fees than it is about providing political support up through the system... State officials become corrupted, then, not only for the money that they earn but also because corruption, when linked to political interests, brings bureaucratic power. In the symbiotic relationship that develops, that power is deployed to protect political interests who return the favour.'* (Shaw 2017: 193).

This is not to say that the ANC did not have an agenda of actually fighting crime. It is also not to make the mistake of equating the high level of ANC links with criminal networks in more recent years with the more moderate level of the nineties. It is however to say that, owing to concurrent and contradictory interests within the ANC (which existed back then), any crime-fighting programme espoused by the ANC was made ambivalent by the fact that certain internal interests opposed this. Admittedly, when looking at actual policies, the ANC showed concern with managing criminality within society and even within the ANC. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the ANC made material efforts to reform South Africa's police force in ways that made it more compatible with a democratic society. Nevertheless, a combination of more pressing priorities, criminal elements internal to the ANC and negotiation and cooperation with previous non-democratic forces from the previous Apartheid and homeland regimes, meant that at the source, the new South Africa accommodated criminal elements.

On the whole, the ANC-led government seemed unable to curb the seriously high crime levels experienced in South Africa during the nineties.[61] The ostensible embeddedness of corruption, criminality and gangsterism, some of which the ANC itself benefitted from, suggests an attachment through negotiation where an acceptance of the strength of an opponent means that one must give up certain strategic interests in order to sustain others. As it appears, with limited resources and even interests *within* criminal networks, the ANC was party to a tacit and constant give and take between organised criminal networks, politicians, and police to avoid an all-out war on crime. Importantly, all three groups - the military, the police, and the criminal sector - all had capabilities for violence that the ANC itself had no ability to challenge. However, none of these organisations had the moral credibility of the ANC, giving each group superior payoffs from cooperation compared with defection when interacting with the party. A relative (and formal) consensus was achieved between the ANC and the military, and ongoing negotiation (both direct and indirect) took place with criminal groups. The police on the other hand subordinated themselves to political authority and thus were coopted under the ANC once it was in government. Having discussed the ANC's link to custodians of the law and those who systematically breach it, the next section discusses ANC attachment in the legal sphere that was partly inherited from the Apartheid era but also in-part newly designed during negotiations.

4.5. **Attachment within the Legal Sphere**

This section deals with aspects of the post-Apartheid legal system that were either designed as a result of negotiation or designed for or with the effect of attaching the governing ANC to other groups. The primary zone related to the former item relates to the creation of South Africa's Constitution and surrounding institutions, which ushered the country away from Apartheid minority rule from a parliamentary system to a constitutional democracy. In addition to the Constitution being born of negotiation, I also apply the concept of *garantismo* to analyse the effect that the ANC's central role in constitution-making had on opposition parties. After this focus on the Constitution, I look at other legislative acts of parliament under ANC majority rule and the groups and interests that these acts served. These instances of

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[61] Shaw (2002: 26) cites former Minister of Justice Penuel Maduna as having said "we are constrained about the need to transform existing forces and instruments of the law… and infuse them with the new, humane, and democratic values and personnel… The alternative of us throwing them out lock, stock and barrel is just not feasible."

negotiation, consensus, coercion, and cooptation are peepholes into various and crosscutting interests at play in South African society and how the ANC attached itself to the interests of multiple groups through its role in developing legislation.

4.5.1. Negotiation and Consensus in Creating the Constitution

The comparison made in Section 4.3., of societies where there were out-and-out winners of conflicts (such as France and the USA) with South Africa's own context of stalemate for drafting its Constitution, is one which highlights the centrality of interests when it comes to the creation of any legal system. Remarking on the process of drafting South Africa's Bill of Rights, which was to become Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, Professor Doreen Atkinson states, 'some disputes which ostensibly concerned matters of principle were really tussles over the values and interests of the various parties' (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 121). Expanding on what these interests may have been, in a separate article, Atkinson highlights a central dynamic at play in the drafting of any constitution:

> *'Two seemingly contradictory tasks face framers of a democratic order - to ensure that majority rules and that minorities are included in the game. In most democracies, this twin task is achieved by a constitution which spells out the rules of political fairplay. Supporters of constitutionalism argue that some issues should not depend on the outcome of elections: while the majority must govern, it must do so within rules which prevent it from restricting the rights of the opposition… For South Africa's negotiators, these rules were particularly important: decades of Apartheid had ensured that the majority's desire to rule - and the minority's concern for protection - was unusually strong'* (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 92).

What Atkinson gestures towards is the generation of consensus and consent in relation to the supreme legal document of the land. Commenting on exactly this imperative, Cyril Ramaphosa, a key ANC negotiator and then the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly stated:

> *'It is… important that as we put our vision to the country, we should do so directly, knowing that people out there want to be part of the process and will be responding, because in the end the drafting of the constitution must not be the preserve of the 490*

members of this Assembly. It must be a constitution which they feel they own, a constitution that they know and feel belongs to them.' (South African History Online)

The entirety of South Africa's Constitution was subject to extended negotiation at both Codesa and the MPNF; and after many compromises, the Constitution came to be a document on which there was eventually broad consensus (see Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 92-117). The creation of South Africa's new Constitution is one of the most explicit examples of negotiation towards consensus to fall under the scope of this study.[62] Even the political and legal processes which restricted and ushered in the new Constitution were subject to negotiation (see Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994b: 98). After elections, a Constitutional Committee was formed by South Africa's new Constitutional Assembly as the main locus of further constitutional negotiations (De Klerk in Barnes 2002: 32). In addition, the Constitution was opened up to the public for comment, with more than 1.7-million submissions (De Klerk in Barnes 2002: 32), further expanding its scope for consensus making.

4.5.2. The Constitutional System as a Means for Political Cooptation

South Africa has a globally celebrated liberal and secular constitution, which enshrines democratic rights, upholds principles of justice and fairness and outlaws discrimination (Marais 2011: 75). This kind of constitution is, in many respects, the best for widespread consent and consensus, particularly within a pluralistic society[63]. As mentioned in previous chapters, Di Palma argues, a party at the helm of liberation in a society has a 'first-movers advantage' in a democracy, potentially awarding it a position as a dominant democratic party. However, as more political actors enter the fray and as the political crisis disappears, dominance tends to become more difficult to maintain. For Di Palma, a deterioration in first-mover's dominance is particularly prevalent when a party leans towards political poles on either the left or the right. Centrist parties on the other hand have a much greater opportunity to establish party hegemony. Di Palma argues that this is the case because centrist parties are, by definition, likely to create a game with no fixed winners or losers (Di Palma in Pempel

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[62] Gifford (1989: 181 - 183) refers to the single negotiating text as a problem-solving negotiating procedure in multiple party negotiations in which an initial text is drafted and subsequently altered by the various negotiating parties until all parties are satisfied.
[63] Leatt (2017: 139) points out that the negotiations (and various smaller landmarks associated with them) were themselves authorisations for a new government. This is to point out that the negotiations should not be viewed solely as deal-brokering *pactismo*, but also as symbolic exercises in political public relations.

2019: 172). Through doing this, centrist parties are less vulnerable to challenge from the left and right and 'in so doing [the centrist party] can dispel public concern with democracy's erraticism and vulnerability as well as build its indispensable role as guarantor of an orderly and stable transition' (Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 173).

The legitimacy gained from creating and keeping to rules that do not explicitly favour any actor contribute to *garantismo*. As mentioned in Chapter 3, *garantismo* involves the simultaneous process of a centrist party recognising and side-lining opposition, through guaranteeing to opposition groups a level playing field whose rules they can either challenge or follow, with both options being detrimental to the opposition (Di Palma in Castles & Wildenmann 1986). This concept appears valuable when applied to the ANC's instrumental role in the creation of a constitutional and democratic South Africa, whose rules were not rigged in favour of any particular group. Nevertheless, through this very action, the ANC neutralised and delegitimised resistance from parties like the IFP or the NP, both of whom had more extreme and antidemocratic tendencies.

How exactly does one make sense of the phenomenon of garantismo when applying the concept of attachment? In Di Palma's terms, *garantismo* must be understood as a form of cooperation, which functions alongside *pactismo* (Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 178). However, while *pactismo* takes place between relatively equal actors (Di in Palma in Pempel 2019: 177), it is clear that a power imbalance exists between cooperating parties in the instance of *garantismo*. An indirect *coercive* relation exists between the centrist party (which has created the constitutional order) and the challenging party, who is clearly incentivised to follow the rules of that order, albeit to its detriment. *Garantismo* refers to an equilibrium state in which a dominant party can reproduce its dominance owing to cooperation from opposition parties. While Di Palma sets up *garantismo* in opposition to cooptation (see Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 178), this is applying a narrower definition of cooptation to the one used in this dissertation. Using the broader understanding of cooptation, provided in Chapter 3, where cooptation is defined as the alignment of the interests of a subordinate group with those of a dominant group, often through coercive means, to effectively neutralise the oppositional actions of the subordinate party, *garantismo* can be understood as a clear form of cooptation. This cooptation takes place indirectly, where there is incentive of opposition parties to adhere to the constitutional order, but mainly to the benefit of the dominant party. When faced with

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the choice of endorsing or undermining the democratic system and its processes (which a dominant party has incentive to uphold), the cost of subverting to a weaker democratic opponent would be higher than the cost of cooperating (or endorsing the system). An attempt to subvert the system would potentially benefit the dominant party, who would receive a greater payoff when the subordinate party subverts than when it complies. The ANC's invitation of smaller parties' participation in the constitutional process was a means of securing consent to the constitutional order that the ANC came to benefit from most.

4.5.3.   The Impact of the White Right and Black Traditionalists on the Constitution

I would now like to remark on two areas of the Constitution which were born of negotiation and consensus but, eventually, had the effect of *garantismo* on the two main opposition parties to the ANC, namely the National Party and the IFP. Through key concessions from the ANC, which secured the consent of these two groups to the new democratic dispensation, South Africa's constitutional order was all but safe. The National Party (and other more extreme white interest groups) can be understood as the representatives of the historically privileged, white, often property-owning class (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 137). The status of private property was a key issue in South Africa's Constitution. Much like the issue of majority rule being non-negotiable for the ANC, the issue of private property had a similar status for the governing National Party (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 136). As already noted in Section 4.2., the matter of property related to the ANC's suggestions of wealth-redistribution and nationalisation and eventually underwent an about turn in ANC directive, with much of this change owing itself to international pressure. Pressure from the other end of the political spectrum (comprising the PAC, traditional leaders, and the Azanian People's Organisation) advocated for much more rapid and extensive redistribution to Africans (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 137 - 140). Disagreement on this issue threatened to boil over into violent conflict, and agreement on this issue was only reached in the last hours of negotiation (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 135) Both the interim

and the final Constitutions set out fairly strict property rights which limited potential programmes for expropriation. Some may argue that strict property rights are born of astute moral principle, but a historical account suggests that they are instead the outcome of powerful interest groups such as local property owners and international actors[64].

In relation to traditional leaders, most significantly the Zulu royalty, which was represented on the political stage by the IFP, a number of concessions were made to draw the IFP into the elections[65], to appease powerful traditional leaders and to secure the participation of South Africa's rural population at large. Chapter 12 of the final Constitution recognises the status and role of traditional leadership and customary law. While customary law was initially included as a clause in the bill of rights it was eventually struck from the bill, after it was presented with opposition from women's groups, including the ANC Women's League (Atkinson in Friedman & Atkinson 1994a: 131-132). Nevertheless, the final Constitution does include recognition of customary law, customary courts, and traditional leaders, provided that they do not clash with any actual content of the Bill of Rights.

The context in which this process took place is important for understanding the different interests at stake in the drafting of this section of the Constitution. The importance of traditional leaders within the transition came from the fact that, in 1990, 17-million people, comprising 44% of the population, lived in South Africa's Bantustans (Kessel & Oomen 1997: 561). The Bantustans were developed by the Apartheid State to house and control the black population who were not industrial workers. Within these areas, traditional leaders were bankrolled by the Apartheid state with the general purpose of garnering or enforcing compliance from the populations within these areas. In the late eighties and the early nineties these regions became increasingly unstable. White paramilitary groups found allies in the chiefs within the Bantustans, with attempted coups in Ciskei, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana transpiring (Gumede 2005: 43). The inclusion of traditional leaders in the MPNF was initially extended as an olive branch to the IFP which had previously refused to partake in negotiations

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[64] Nevertheless (as per Section 25, of Chapter 2 in the Final Constitution) certain clauses for expropriation and redistribution (see Terreblanche 2002: 45-46) exhibit the impact of other constituencies at the negotiating table which also needed to be accommodated.

[65] The Ingonyama Trust Act of 1994, signed just days before the elections, infamously placed more than 29% of the land in KwaZulu Natal province under the authority of the Zulu monarch. This land consisted of the land previously falling under the jurisdiction of the Bantustan of KwaZulu. The extent to which the ANC had knowledge of the Act is contested.

(Leatt 2017: 105). However, the effect of this was to include an entire cohort of South African society (i.e. traditional leaders who had previously been excluded from the negotiations)[66].

A consistent position held by the ANC with regards to the Bantustans, was that they needed to be eradicated and South Africa be established as a single, unified state. To a large degree however, the same problem that the Apartheid government encountered when creating the Bantustans, would remain for the ANC government-to-be. These problems included the fact that large swathes of the population were surplus to the needs of the capitalist economy. These people were largely poor, low-skilled, and unemployed and a potential risk to the stability of the country. Given their sheer numbers, the consent of the people within the former Bantustans would be crucial for any form of new South Africa. Even with the imminent eradication of the homeland system, traditional leadership was one of the most convenient routes to securing this compliance[67] (Marais 2011: 426). Moreover, securing the affiliation of traditional leadership would be crucial in achieving the much-sought goal of national unity, and to avoid a conservative oppositional alliance to the ANC (Kessel & Oomen 1997: 571). The ANC had not always taken this position in relation to traditional leaders. Dhammamegha Leatt argues that a distinct change of discourse in relation to traditional leadership took place in 1988 (Leatt 2017: 97). While the ANC was historically opposed to traditional leaders, its position began to change, framing traditional leaders as victims (rather than agents) of Apartheid. The year before, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) had been formed and in 1988, a Contralesa delegation visited the ANC in Lusaka. The ANC's alliance with Contralesa gave it a foothold in the rural areas and was a challenge to IFP power which had historically been the black party affiliated with traditional leadership (Leatt 2017: 96). Future ANC and national president Jacob Zuma was one of the main exponents of the view advocating for the continued role of traditional leadership in South Africa, with the caveat that traditional leadership should now be under ANC control (Leatt 2017: 97). Zuma's

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[66] This is an example of a potential snowball effect of Attachment - as one group is sought out for negotiation (or another class of attachment), another may be drawn in too.

[67] In the new dispensation, municipalities under publicly elected representatives were appointed to take over roles previously performed by traditional leaders (Leatt 2017: 168). However, weak local governments meant that the state could not fully assert its authority over traditional leaders who then, *de facto,* resumed on certain responsibilities unfulfilled by local government (Leatt 2017: 169). What this suggests is that, despite legislation, the balance of power and strength was such that traditional leaders in South Africa both practically and normatively retained (and even increased) their influence, benefitting from the reworked image of traditional leadership.

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power base grew during the 1990s in KwaZulu Natal, the province of greatest electoral contestation amongst black voters, with a large portion of the province voting for the IFP in 1994. By 1999 the gap between the IFP and the ANC had closed from 18% to just 2% and by 2004 the ANC won the province for the first time and has not lost since. One of the ways in which this was done was by contesting with the IFP for the allegiance of the Zulu King Zwelithini (see Mandela 1994: 566) and other leaders who typically opposed the creation of democratic institutions (Daniel, Southall & Lutchman 2005: 68).[68] Furthermore, state financing of traditional leaders increased significantly following the transition under ANC leadership (Leatt 2017: 167). Finally, a clear dynamic of negotiation appeared between the ANC and traditional authorities after 1994. Several attempts were made by the government to both limit and more clearly define the role of traditional authorities and their relation to government (Leatt 2017: 167-168). The push-pull dynamic is most evident in the events leading to the scrapping of the Land Rights Bill, first proposed in 1995, which inter alia sought to remove chief's authority for land allocation and tenure. After opposition from Contralesa, the bill was eventually withdrawn. Derek Hanekom, the minister who proposed the Bill, was replaced by the more traditional Thoko Didiza, who shelved the Bill entirely (Leatt 2017: 168).

In summary, traditional leaders' influence and authority was gradually buttressed over the course of the decade, first securing a place at the negotiating table, then securing a parallel rule of law for themselves, then avoiding the threatening Land Rights Bill and paving the way for several favourable pieces of legislation in the 2000s (Marais 2017: 425-426). The issues of both interests and groups were key points of contention during the drafting of the Constitution, which had to deal with claims to rights and recognition of different ethnic groups (Klug 1995: 422). A vivid instance of compromise lies in the fact that South Africa's overridingly liberal constitution (generally associated with the primacy of individual rights) was forced by the interests within society to acknowledge Apartheid-legacy ethnic classifications and leaders appointed during this era. A similar and possibly more fundamental contradiction exists in the Constitution's simultaneous recognition of democratically elected representatives and hereditary traditional leaders as legal authorities (Daniel, Southall & Lutchman 2005: 65). The process of negotiation with traditional leaders, particularly during

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[68] Following the Shobashobane Massacre in KZN on Christmas Day of 1995, Nelson Mandela met with King Zwelithini in early 1996 to organise an *imbizo* to stop the bloodshed in the province.

the drafting of the Constitution, did however have a longer-term effect of allowing the ANC to gain a hold of government and to come to dominate the political landscape. On this basis, the IFP could be said to have been coopted into a democratic game that they, in theory, could win but in reality would not. This is most clearly indicated through the evidence relating to the erosion of IFP power in their ethnic stomping ground of KwaZulu Natal. At the end of the decade the IFP could no longer employ the negotiatory tactic of brinkmanship that they had used during the early nineties and had no real room to manoeuvre outside the limits of a constitutional system. Moreover, the subsuming of traditional leadership and customary law under the Bill of Rights can be said to have had the effect of coopting previously semi-independent traditional leaders into the single constitutional system, governed by the ANC, achieving Jacob Zuma's aforementioned vision of sustaining a role for traditional leadership but this time under ANC control.

4.5.4. Attachment through Parliamentary Acts

Two significant and interlinked groups are highlighted by acts passed by Parliament, bearing relevance for analysis within this section. The first group consists of workers in South Africa; the second is the black middle class. The main worker-related policy to come out of the period under study is the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995, with the important additions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Skills Development Act passed in 1998. The LRA, which gave effect to Section 27 of the Constitution, was undoubtedly a gain for organised labour in South Africa (Habib 2013: 118), increasing the bargaining power of organised labour and recognising the right for collective bargaining in South Africa (not previously recognised under Apartheid). The policies which specifically benefited organised labour reflected, on one hand, the partial willingness of government to act contrary to business interests. On the other hand, it showed the lack of priority given to addressing South Africa's chronic unemployment problem, where policy and resources were instead directed towards a relatively well-off and increasingly skilled group of those already employed (see Seekings & Nattrass 2015: 222-230). The LRA stands as a major example of the representation of organised labour within parliament (mentioned in Section 4.3.)

through the ANC. Marais (2001: 240) points out that many of the movement's historic demands were recognised in legislation through these acts, with Lodge pointing out the serious resistance from the corporate sector to these acts (Lodge 2002: 27). The LRA was criticised on some fronts by unions, especially for its cooptive workplace forums (Bond 2000: 220). But taken on the whole, the introduction of various acts which were clearly in the interests of employed workers, indicates an initial state of negotiation between the ANC and Cosatu. A regular give and take was present from either side, where both furthered their own interests by recognising each other's interests. In other moments, however, disparate interests resulted in friction between the two organisations, and as mentioned in 4.3, ANC dominance gradually led to the cooptation of organised labour.

Alongside the number of acts introduced throughout the first five years of ANC rule that improved the conditions of organised workers, was the Employment Equity Act of 1998. This sought to boost the economic opportunities of previously disadvantaged people, specifically along racial lines.[69] This policy benefited many individuals within the trade union movement itself (Terreblanche 2002: 137). Nevertheless, the Act most directly served a different cross section of South African society, namely the black middle and upper classes, which were still in formation during the nineties. This instance of attachment contributes an interesting insight into the fact that attachment of interests need not require attachment to pre-existing groups and can even constitute the *formation* of groups themselves to garner consent from a swathe of the population. This proposition is supported by Southall who in *The New Black Middle Class* in South Africa states that 'as the product of the ANC, the black middle class is also its proponent' (see Southall 2016: 200-208). This is based on the claim that the growth of South Africa's black middle class was directly engineered by the ANC, partly through the Employment Equity Act of 1998, which came from a longstanding commitment to affirmative action by the ANC (see Southall 2016: 73). This legislation was central to vast changes in the racial demographics of

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[69] An additional point about these acts mentioned is that both employment equity act and LRA can be read as ways of ameliorating class conflict (see Bond 2000: 84).

the public sector and a slower, but still meaningful, transformation of the corporate sector.

This section has looked at both the legal system and certain laws themselves and delved into their implications for attachment. It is perhaps most telling that South Africa's Constitution itself was borne of negotiation. The way that the ANC benefited from this most, however, was through the effect of *garantismo* which put political competitors in an effective straight jacket. Competitors were incentivised to play by the democratic rules but, all the while, reinforced ANC legitimacy. This broad participation in the democratic order was obtained by specific concessions, including demands for strict property rights and pressure from traditional leaders for special recognition. Even as the decade went on, the ANC used its numbers in parliament to progress the interests of two key constituencies, namely organised workers and the black middle class. In the next section, I discuss the often unwritten but equally important 'laws' of values, norms and ideology which helped to weave ANC hegemony.

4.6.   **Attachment through Values, Norms and Ideology**

As discussed in Chapter 3, interests are understood in this dissertation as comprising not just incentive towards material gain but instead a hybrid of material incentives, normative values, and ideological framings. The project to dismantle Apartheid had much to do with reshaping the values of a population which had been indoctrinated and divided by the racist ideas of Apartheid and the imperialist system that precluded it (Marais 2011: 322-323). Of particular relevance here is the ANC's nation-building project, which needed to consider the deep-set and pluralistic beliefs, traditions and values of the people that comprised the nation in South Africa. This was crucial to creating long-term stability in South Africa. This section covers some of the prominent appearances of attachment as far as ethical norms, values and ideology is concerned. This is done by specifically discussing three main means of attachment, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the largest formal value-shaping process of the nineties outside of the legal sphere); the concept of the National Democratic Revolution; and the symbolism surrounding Nelson Mandela. These means of attachment managed to reach

many groups along previously discussed racial lines but also touching on religious and cultural fronts too.

4.6.1. **Reading the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Through the concept of Attachment**

Possibly the most significant process for redress post-Apartheid was the TRC, established following the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. The Commission provided conditional amnesty (and not blanket amnesty) to perpetrators who committed any act, omission or offence associated with a political objective between 1 March 1960 and 6 December 1993. Only those who made full confessions to the commission were granted amnesty from prosecution for their human rights violations. The scope, content[70], and effect of the Commission were contentious and had varying interpretations (see Mamdani 2015: 63 - 68; Posel & Simpson 2002; Asmal & Roberts, 1997).

The meaning of the TRC would be greatly undercoded by reading it through a lens of attachment alone. Nevertheless, its limited success, its ideological purpose, and its methods for achieving this purpose do indeed appear as three distinct types of attachment, namely negotiation, consensus and coercion respectively. Firstly, the limited effectiveness of the TRC had much to do with powerful and strong groups in South Africa with interests directly contrary to any process of retribution (Lenta 2000: 52). This meant that the terms of justice in post-Apartheid South Africa had to be negotiated, as the momentum of progressive and retributive pressures were countered by the inertia of people, groups, and institutions (including the judiciary) that previously took part in Apartheid (Lenta 2000: 61-62).

Secondly, as per Lalu and Harris (1996), the TRC has been analysed as a consensus-oriented process, which at least attempted to establish a common national narrative about previous injustices, forgiveness, and unification (see Sitas 2010) for the sake of reconciliation and nation-building. As Lalu and Harris put it: 'History, it seems, is being made, written, spoken and used to build a new nation. In the perception of the TRC, history lies waiting to be uncovered — the facts are self-explanatory, and when compiled will provide a common past for all South Africans' (Lalu & Harris 1996: 24). This perspective is germane to this dissertation

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[70] One peculiarity of the TRC was its overtly theological content (Leatt 2017: 1) which ran contrary to the secular values entrenched in the Constitution.

insofar as interests can be understood as including peoples' worldviews and the historical narratives that define their lives. The relative consensus achieved through the TRC (about the facts and the meaning of Apartheid and the justification about transitioning away from it) is viewed as attachment between various actors via the shaping of their respective values through a common perception of truth.[71] Moreover, within this common narrative of the new South Africa, the ANC positioned itself as the rightful founders of a new society.[72]

A third way in which the TRC can be read through the lens of attachment is as a process of using coercion through the threat of prosecution and the incentive of amnesty. This dissertation has theorised that coercion itself is a *form of* coordination as opposed to being merely an instrument for it. Through manipulation of the incentives of perpetrators, the ANC-led state brought perpetuators of Apartheid violence into the orbit of the new South Africa, making their interests more aligned, if not completely complementary with one another.

Furthermore, coercive measures were taken to more closely align the interests of people within South Africa's intensely disparate society. Interests were harmonised by creating relative consensus about the historical accounts of the nation. Here interests are understood as being invested in historical narratives. As far as this dissertation's theorisation is concerned, however, a discrepancy appears where the apparent end of coercion is consensus instead of cooptation. Coercion towards consensus runs contrary to the account of attachment in Chapter 3, where, depending on the power relations between actors, either negotiation results in consensus or coercion results in cooptation. In reading the TRC through the lens of attachment, some fleshing out is needed to clarify the different dynamics of attachment at play. Importantly, those who were coerced are largely distinct from those amongst whom consensus was developed. It is compelling that there was a clear imbalance in power and strength between former perpetrators of the violence during Apartheid and the South African state. The former consisted of a set of individuals, stripped of formal office; and the latter,

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[71] Consensus may seem to be used here in the more common definition of the word meaning 'general agreement on the facts of a particular matter'. In this definition of consensus, the interests of different parties may not be seen as relevant to peoples' beliefs about facts. It is however possible that peoples' beliefs about facts impact upon their interests through influencing both ethics and meaning in people's lives.

[72] This was not without contradiction as figures from the ANC, Winnie Madikizela Mandela were also defendants at the TRC. When the TRC report was released in 1998, it contained findings about torture and execution of dissidents in MK military camps which Mbeki dismissed as misguided and untrue (Gumede 2005: 65).

although possessing limited resources (see ANC 1996), still occupied formal state positions and wielded institutional power. The State had far superior capacity for coordination and violence to the collection of ex-policemen and guerrilla fighters that appeared before the commission, and there is little room to suggest a negotiational or consensus-based relation between the two groups. A relation of coercion, for now with only the *threat* of violence, existed then between the ANC-led state and the ex-Apartheid perpetrators from within the National Party, the IFP and even the ANC itself. The creation of consensus, on the other hand, existed at a societal level, at which people from a plurality of backgrounds were drawn into a common foundation narrative for the new South Africa, in part by challenging falsity within sections of the public realm (see Terreblanche 2002: 126).

What appears as an overall picture is that the TRC involved several dimensions of coordination, which in different ways attached the ANC to other groups within South Africa. Through the TRC, the ANC was not only able to influence the foundation narrative of the new South Africa but to exercise coercive state power against opponents in the pursuit of justice, legitimacy, and political dominance. The achievements of the TRC were eventually significantly limited, largely because of the resistance to the commission from those with an interest in evading retribution (Alexander 2002: 128). This resistance represented a broader political reality and balance of power, included in which was the participation of the ANC in a GNU alongside two of the primary perpetrators of Apartheid violence - the NP and IFP (who exited the GNU six months into the TRC being underway). The TRC was a terrain on which values of South African society were contested and redefined, through official state process and within the broad national and even international community. For the ANC, the TRC was an interaction that exposed the ANC mostly to external groups. In the next subsection, I look at the concept of the National Democratic Revolution, which helps illuminate the normative contestation and attachment internal to the ANC and its alliances.

4.6.2. The National Democratic Revolution and the Pursuit of Unity

The above subsection argues that the TRC was instrumental in the ANC's multi-pronged nation-building project. The TRC was a procedural prong, which was useful for the furtherance of consensus and national unity. Another prong directed towards this end, which could be said to be theoretical in nature, is the ANC's adoption of the theory on National Democratic

Revolution (NDR). There are two main characteristics of the NDR that I focus on in relation to attachment, one relating to the form of the NDR and the other relating to its content. First a brief summary of the NDR and its origins are provided in order to make any assertions about its form and content possible.

The formulation of the NDR originates with Lenin and was transmitted to the ANC via its link with the SACP (Filatova 2012: 508) (Butler 2005: 725) and is an example of the SACP's intellectual impact on the ANC. The conception of the NDR was adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and was a means of adjusting socialist theory to account for the events of national liberation in India and Africa which did not follow the orthodox Marxist prediction that a socialist revolution would be implemented by the industrial proletariat (Filatova 2012: 515-517). A key feature of the NDR, including in the ANC's conception, is a two-stage revolution in which first democracy is achieved and more specifically the political freedoms of native people is attained (Filatova 2012: 512). The second stage of the national democratic revolution ushers in full-blown socialism. In this formulation, the transition of 1994 was the first stage of a two-stage revolution. Nevertheless, the conception of the NDR, itself, was subject to internal ANC politics, particularly after 1994 (Butler 2005: 726). For example, immersed in the ANC's adoption of the NDR is an explicitly socialist challenge to the narrow structures of property ownership. This idea, which would inform ANC policy in the early nineties, largely via the Freedom Charter, was the prevailing ideology that was directly challenged by the emergence of orthodox economics in the party.

Amidst contestation over the definition of the NDR, there was, however, no real contestation about whether the NDR was in fact desirable. To this effect, a vital insight for understanding the NDR as an ideology is to grasp its fluidity and ambiguity in how it contains several vague signifiers related to 'the people', to unity, to 'transfer of power', to revolution and to democracy (Filatova 2013: 518-521; Butler 2005: 725-726). Slavoj Zizek (1997: 87) cites Laclau and Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (discussed in Chapter 2) in identifying the key ingredient to ideology being a multitude of 'floating signifiers of proto ideological elements' which are 'structured into a unified field through the intervention of a certain nodal point'. The NDR was the multifaceted nodal point of these floating signifiers which were open

enough[73] to discursively satisfy multiple interest groups with varying conceptions of the good (Butler 2005: 726). It is argued that the NDR, as used in post-Apartheid South Africa, has simply been an instrument of deception or cooptation where a mere display of leftist discourse by ANC elites is enough to quell the dissatisfaction of popular and working-class forces and enable accumulation by aspiring cadres (Pillay 2011: 31-32). This appears as cooptation, aided by coercive language associated with the NDR, labelling those disagreeing with ANC official policy as counter-revolutionary (Marais 2011: 369). However, as Gillian Hart points out, accounting for the NDR simply as a top-down means of cooptation, fails to account for the full function of the NDR in reproducing ANC hegemony (Hart 2013: 180-183). Instead, taking the discourse of the NDR as more than merely superficial, helps with 'grasping the interconnections of populist politics from above and popular understandings arising from the social and material conditions of everyday life… [pointing] towards a more fully Gramscian analysis of hegemony… in which issues of language are crucial.' (Hart 2013: 197).

As mentioned, the NDR was a site of discursive struggle throughout the nineties. Hart even suggests that subsequent policy (such as GEAR) is, in part, a result of redefining the concept of the NDR and thus rearticulating the values of nationalism, development and liberation to make them complimentary with capitalism[74] (Hart 2013: 184). This gestures towards the ideological function of the NDR in managing the contradictory constituencies accommodated by the ANC. What this also suggests is that, while the NDR did eventually become a discourse serving elite interests, this was not initially the case in any certain terms. In fact, a reframing of the NDR was needed to challenge the socialist ideas within the NDR's conception that would directly clash with the capitalist economic model within post-Apartheid South Africa. Read in terms of attachment, the NDR was a site of negotiation. Through the NDR, the ANC attempted to influence and harmonise constituencies and allies and, at the same time, was able to accommodate them through the use of revolutionary language.

Here it is opportune to look at one of the central signifiers used within the language of the NDR, i.e. *unity*. While the NDR has played the important function of maintaining internal unity

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[73] A poignant example of the vagueness of the NDR is the undefined time that the second stage of the revolution may arrive, allowing the doctrine of the NDR to avoid falsification and for the nouveau riche of the ANC to indefinitely legitimise a prolonged period of self-enrichment (Butler 2012: 75).
[74] Quote from Mbeki's I am an African: "I am Nongqause. I am he who made it possible to trade in the world markets in diamonds, in gold, in the same food for which our stomachs yearn" (Mbeki in Maharaj 1999: 13).

within the ANC by prolonging the teleology of struggle (Butler 2005: 726), it has also been used as a means of justifying compromises between the multiple ANC constituencies discussed throughout this chapter (Butler 2012: 75-76). The way that unity has been maintained by the ANC has often been coercive, sanctioning tight discipline and rewarding loyalty (Marais 2011: 369-370). Unity, as an imaginary goal and a moral principle, is broadly instrumental to a nation building project (owing much to the increased stability it brings) and is conducive to hegemony for as long as the leaders of national liberation can define the terms along which unification is devised. This is because the ability to determine the condensation points for unification enables leaders to create an ideology that is at once stable and suitable to their own survival and enrichment. The TRC and the NDR are two means adopted by the ANC for defining these terms of unification, with differing forms of attachment being adopted for this ideological work to be done. In the next section, I discuss further examples of attachment on the terrain of values, norms, and ideology.

4.6.3. Additional Instances of Attachment in terms of Values, Norms and Ideology

Along with the formal TRC proceedings and the overt leveraging of the concept of the NDR, a number of linked examples appear where the ANC appears to provide the moral and intellectual leadership (to put it in Gramsci's terms) which aided the ANC's attempt at a hegemonic project. How exactly this leadership was deployed or to what degree it could be called leadership rather than partnership (where perhaps leadership corresponds with cooptation and partnership with consensus) depends on the power relations between the respective actors and their alignment of interests. Below I discuss some additional instances where attachment is apparent in the field of values, norms, and ideology.

4.6.3.1. Nelson Mandela and Other Popular ANC Symbols

Despite its obvious significance it would be remiss not to discuss the symbolism surrounding Nelson Mandela. It appears that there is possibly no component of the ANC which held a greater and more complete form of hegemony than the symbolic sway of South Africa's first democratically elected president. Even today, as ANC power and moral authority wanes, the symbolic staying power of Mandela, the avowed father of the new South Africa, remains almost entirely intact (Nasson 2016: 219-220). Any understanding of the ANC's hegemony must take into account the ethical clout and global adoration possessed by Mandela and, by

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extension, the ANC in 1994 (Hart 2001: 32-33). Within this discussion it is necessary to understand Mandela, the symbol, as relatively distinct from Mandela the person. Mandela, the person, regularly tried to counter the notion that he was a saint and even by his own autobiographical account, he has been shown to be standardly imperfect (see Mandela 1994: 6, 617). Nevertheless, a counter push, including by the ANC[75], towards sustaining the mythical narrative around Mandela has perpetuated Mandela as a demigod whose ubiquitous legitimacy is rivalled only by a handful of human beings in history. In 4.3.2., the leadership style and decisions of Mandela - the person - were discussed. This had implications, particularly regarding the points of direct contact between the ANC and other groups. The symbolic dynamics, on the other hand, which attached him and the ANC to millions of people its leaders never met or systematically negotiated with, was of equal import to its coordinative ability.

The symbolic content of Mandela is at once both defined and undefined. While Mandela stood for several specific and unchallengeable values such as freedom, equality, humility, forgiveness, bravery, perseverance. However, these signifiers (much like the NDR) are themselves vague and free-floating enough to be associated with the good and appeal to desire across a plurality of people. Somehow, Mandela's journey of struggle, imprisonment and eventual triumph achieved sufficient abstraction to associate him with universal values, which allowed him to attain an unrivalled popularity both globally and locally. The rare and *odysseyic* nature of Mandela's true yet simplified narrative, which places him as the hero overcoming enormous odds, formed the basis for a mythmaking that could inscribe a meaning of sufficient intensity and glory to the new South Africa, where a story of redemption was greatly needed.

The symbol of Mandela was associated with virtue, simplification, abstraction, and intensity. These were all leveraged and branded to great effect by the ANC, who had Mandela as a

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[75] As an example, the opening lines of the ANC's 2013 statement on the passing of Nelson Mandela: "In the life of every nation, there arise men who leave an indelible and eternal stamp on the history of their peoples; men who are both products and makers of history. And when they pass, they leave a vision of a new and better life and the tools with which to win and build it…Our nation has lost a colossus, an epitome of humility, equality, justice, peace, and the hope of millions; here and abroad." (ANC 2013)

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central symbolic cog to its ideological constellation. With characteristic eloquence, Hein Marais writes the following:

> '*The ANC has become adept at a key aspect of any hegemonic project: it developed and deployed an array of ideological precepts and symbols and asserted their pertinence to the lived realities of millions of South Africans… the liberation struggle [is] personified in the form of Nelson Mandela; the colours, flags, songs and slogans of the ANC became ubiquitous features of resistance activities*' (Marais 2011: 434).

While Mandela was a central node in a complex symbolic nexus associated with legitimising ANC rule, this symbolism extended beyond Mandela to include an extensive history, inclusive of millions of South Africans. What this exercise entailed was a framing of the new South Africa as being in the interests of all, which was a claim made possible by the fact that the new society was a product of negotiation between all of the country's constituencies. In its draft[76] 1997 strategic document, the ANC maps out the following account of its own moral leadership:

> '*The primary mission of the ANC was, and remains, to mobilise all the classes and strata that objectively stand to gain from the success of the cause of social change. Indeed, the fact that a particular group, class or stratum stands to benefit from such transformation does not necessarily mean that it will automatically be aware of it. Thus, the task of education, organisation and mobilisation is critical… Given the common interests that various classes and strata have in the success of the NDR, it is the task of the ANC to channel the energies of these forces towards that goal. It should be able to identify those common interests and unite the motive forces and others in joint action.* (ANC 1997b: 2).

What this discussion elicits is the ongoing drive through numerous symbolic and discursive means towards genuine national consensus that the new South Africa was indeed desirable for everyone compared with the old. As discussed in 4.5., South

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[76] This particular passage is edited out of the final Strategy and Tactics document of 1997.

Africa's Constitution, which neither gave privilege nor disadvantage to white South Africans, was a document that was difficult to legitimately challenge despite the fact that white South Africans had enjoyed exactly this privilege for many decades prior to 1994. One of the strategic challenges for the ANC in the sphere of the ideological was in the generating of consent from previous proponents of the Apartheid regime,[77] which comprised a large section of the existing civil service, an overwhelming majority of business owners (including farmers providing food security), a large section of South Africa's middle class and its landowners[78]. Earlier discussions have been had (mainly in 4.2.) about the ANC's negotiatory relation with the white South African business elite and (in 4.3.) about the negotiatory relation with the white South African political elite. In these spheres, economic and political actors found that their respective interests in wealth or power were attached with the ANC. Nevertheless, the majority of white South Africans were not elites *per se*. In 1997, 1.6-million of the 1.9-million working age white South Africans were employed in professional, technical and managerial jobs (Statistics South Africa 1997: 62) that arguably positioned them within the middle class of South Africa. Whites, however, were by far the wealthiest racial cohort in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 1997: 60-62), making their consent in the new South Africa a valuable prize for the reformist ANC (Mandela 1994: 559).

Despite initial concerns about white paramilitary groups (Grobbelaar in Moss & Obery 1992: 102-108), the far right in South Africa was emphatically neutralised over the course of the transition[79] and white South Africans' consent to the democratic dispensation was gradually secured. Was this consent best described as negotiated or coerced? Insofar as people are convinced by a reframing of societal values in a way that accommodates their own interests, this pertains to the creation of consensus.

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[77] One specific way the Afrikaner right was brought into the election was for the interim Constitution to recognise the rights of groups to seek territorial self-determination (Carrim in Maharaj 1996: 257). This provision fell away in the drafting of the final Constitution, perhaps indicating a decline in the political clout of the Afrikaans right.

[78] As early as 1987, the ANC were advised that reintroduction of the Springboks into international rugby would be instrumental to winning over white South Africans (Maharaj & Jordan 2021: 142). A famous and symbolic moment came at the Rugby World Cup final when Nelson Mandela handed the trophy to Francois Pienaar in front of a majority white Ellis Park, waving new South African flags, accompanied by South African Rugby Union President and former Apartheid-era business magnate Louis Luyt (Maylam 2011: 277).

[79] The 1992 whites-only referendum which received over 68% of white support for negotiated reform and a thwarted attack on Bophuthatswana led by Constandt Viljoen, botched by AWB militias (Du Preez 2013: 32), were two key defeats of the far-right white wing in South Africa.

However, if incentives and values are mostly adjusted by a more powerful group, this exhibits cooptation. While it has been suggested in 4.2. and 4.3. that the ANC interacted on a level footing of either negotiation or consensus with the white business and political elite, a less negotiatory dynamic appears with the white South African population at large. The discursive and symbolic[80] applications of rainbowism (see Hart 2013: 167-170), the changing of the rules of the game, primarily by elites (see 4.5.), the eventual success achieved by the ANC in seizing control of the coercive instruments of the state and the attempted influence (including through the TRC) on white interests to convert the white South African population to the new South Africa, suggest a cooptive relation between the ANC and the broad white South African population. Here whites, as a group, had certain Apartheid privileges removed but nevertheless acquiesced to the new dispensation.

This is not to cast a normative judgement on the relation of cooptation here. It was entirely necessary that Apartheid-defined white privileges were constitutionally scrapped and further concessions to the Apartheid-defined white population were not made. Neither is this to say that whites did not in any way benefit from the transition. In fact, whites economically gained significantly from the transition and a fairly compelling argument can be made that their security was guaranteed by the transition away from Apartheid. Furthermore, the threat of expropriation of white wealth and property did not materialise.

The following 1997 statement by the ANC in its draft[81] *Strategy and Tactics* Document indicates the ANC's approach to white South Africa:

> *'The ANC is also called upon to win over to its side those who previously benefited from the system of apartheid: to persuade them to appreciate that their long-term security and comfort are closely tied up with the security and comfort of society as a whole.'* (ANC 1997b: 2)

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[80] In one fascinating incident, the ANC's Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale visited the Voortrekker monument, an infamous symbol of Afrikaner nationalism. Sexwale published a double-page spread in the Sunday Times subverting a number of the symbolic associations of the monument (Coombes 2003: 34-38).
[81] This particular passage is edited out of the final Strategy and Tactics document of 1997.

It seems, based on the prior discussion, that this so-called persuasion was more akin to coercion, where reward and threat coaxed whites into participating in the new dispensation. Nevertheless, this framing of common interests comes across as distinctly different in approach to many revolutionary movements, often with a stronger Marxist bent, which emphasise immutable contradictions within society which eventually result in revolution. The ANC's more reformist approach, however, reflected most saliently in its articulation of the NDR (see Hart 2013: 177), was that of framing interests as *shared.* Alongside framing interests as shared, thus altering perception of payoffs, the ANC also partook in the *creation* of shared interests - the altering of payoffs themselves. This was done, for example, by creating institutions such as the Constitution which protects and grants certain goods to all people. The option of whether to embrace or subvert the values of the new South Africa would have been presented, knowing that the ANC had chosen a cooperative strategy. The rapid change of the terrain of values of the new South Africa successfully stigmatised racism (Hart 2001: 32) (publicly at least) which was often the basis for white rejection of the new society. And even if this were not the true attitude, it was fairly easy to portray it as such. Thus, by and large, there was a coercive moral incentive to embrace the new South Africa. In this situation, it seems worthwhile to conceptualise the payoffs as clearly incentivising cooperation with democratic rules and majority rule.

Alongside the engagement with white South Africa and its attempts to ameliorate racial and class divisions (see Butler 2012: 63-70), this same strategy is apparent in interaction between the ANC and other sectors, including on religious and traditional fronts. The final two subsections below are dedicated to these two groups which typically comprise more conservative forces within society which the largely progressive ANC of the day chose to work with.

4.6.3.2.   ANC Relations to the Values of Tradition and Authority

From its creation in 1912, the ANC was marked for its principle of non-tribalism, drawing its power from its ability to resist the divide and conquer colonial principle and to create a unified front across African ethnicities (Butler 2012: 59-62). Its victory in 1994 was born very much of the same achievement, and the relative unity of black

South Africa was a key feature of the political landscape and a weapon of the ANC's that the Apartheid government seemingly underestimated when entering into political negotiations. However, securing the transition meant enduring certain contradictions within the ideological positions of the party. As discussed in 4.5.3., the constitutional negotiations secured a future for traditional leadership in South Africa and did so partly through a negotiated form of attachment between the ANC and traditional leaders (including chiefs, kings, headmen and former Bantustan leaders). Here traditional leadership had enough bargaining power to avoid being subsumed into South Africa's revamped liberal democracy led by the dominant ANC.

A reframing of traditional leaders' historic role (from perpetrators to victims) was necessary to legitimise the renewed authority of traditional leaders. At the same time the ANC increasingly found itself on a path of simultaneously supporting divergent principles (Kessel & Oomen 1997: 570). The axis of divergence centred on the fact that principles of democracy and economic development were at odds with traditional leadership based on hereditary authority (Kessel & Oomen 1997: 572). Despite the contradiction, this forked approach nevertheless proceeded.

At base, the recognition in law of traditional leaders was itself a normative statement about traditions in South Africa and those who legitimately define them. It gave precedence to tribalism and tribal authority (which was often authoritarian and often patriarchal) and was an active decision to reinscribe the prominence of a particular interest group as custodians of South Africa's morality. The legal recognition of traditional leadership, albeit ambiguous, cemented a future for traditional leadership in South Africa which was not solely dependent on the ANC.

### 4.6.3.3.	The ANC's Relations to Religious Groups

It was mainly rhetorically that traditional leadership encountered opposition from the ANC. Meanwhile, the opposite can be said in relation to religion: that, rhetorically, religious groups and ideas were afforded relevance but were institutionally side-lined in South Africa's new democracy (Leatt 2017: 159). Leatt adjudges that this amounted to cooptation of religion, where the TRC and visible government offices awarded to religious struggle figures were symbolic gestures made for popular support (Leatt

2017: 187). Given the near omnipresence of religion within South Africa (see Butler 2017: 39-42), it seems unlikely that religion was (in the terms of this dissertation) coopted by the ANC who was particularly reliant on broad popularity for its own success. Instead, within what follows, I establish that a relative consensus was achieved between the ANC and religious bodies both in the institutional framework of the new South Africa and with regards to the values replicated during the 1990s.

Like its connection with traditional leadership and other aspects of civil society, the ANC coordinated with a variety of religious bodies in South Africa both before, during and after the transition. Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Christians all played unique and complex roles during the Apartheid period and each one was uniquely examined and represented at the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997). Christianity, South Africa's most prevalent religion, played (like all religions) an ambiguous role in South African history (see Walshe 1995: 107-110), assisting with colonisation (through missionaries) and ideologically justifying Apartheid (particularly via the Dutch Reformed Church). On the other hand, many early ANC leaders were from the clergy, and many church bodies, including the South African Council of Churches (SACC), played an increasingly active role in the struggle against Apartheid (Maharaj & Jordan 2021: 40 - 41; 149 - 150). In the progressive SACC and gradually in other charismatic and Pentecostal denominations, the ANC found allies who played roles in facilitating the transition and as mediators[82], providing a common ground for understanding between Afrikaner conservatives and black activists (Leatt 2017: 124).

The negotiations themselves were influenced by religious groupings, particularly the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), consisting of groups from all major world religions, whose South African chapter was headed by Desmond Tutu (Leatt 2017: 69). Moreover, the WCRP had close and active ties with the ANC throughout the eighties and nineties. The WCRP's activities in South Africa were themselves an exercise of negotiation and consensus amongst different religions (Leatt 2017: 69-71), enabling the various religious bodies within it to unitedly influence the transition; and not only in relation to religious rights. In return for

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[82] Religious mediators were not unique to South Africa. The Mozambican war between Frelimo and Renamo was mediated by Sant Egidio in Rome and a peace agreement signed in 1992 (Sant Egidio, 2019). In South Africa, the evangelical Kenyan Washington Okumu played a vital (almost miraculous) role of mediation between the ANC, the IFP and the National Party (Leatt 2017: 124).

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recognising its demands, the WCRP promised to support the transition. This comprised, for the ANC, an attachment of consensus to both local and international religious groups who not only constituted social and economic communities but also moral ones. What this suggests, in terms of hegemony, is that the ANC likely benefited from creating alliances with moral authorities, where moral legitimacy was gained through cooperating with authorities rather than through acquiescing to certain moral principles. In turn, religions and religious leaders had their own authority, norms and ideologies reinforced and replicated in government processes and public discourses.

The WCRP did not however represent all religious bodies within South Africa and a large portion of the more conservative, Christian leaning was in fact opposed to interfaith cooperation, with some advocating for Christianity to be the state religion (Leatt 2017: 127-128). Interestingly, however, most religious representatives advocated for a secular state (Leatt 2017: 72-73). The ANC took the position, arguing that creating a secular constitution was not anti-religious, but the best way to generate support for all religions (Sachs 1990: 45). What was opted for in South Africa was a model of a wholly secular State that nevertheless interacted directly with religious bodies. It would seem the ANC gained in two apparent ways from the relative consensus that no favour should be extended to any particular religion. One existed in the form of legitimacy: where rules are made which are impartial to any particular group, there is less room to challenge them. Secondly, by divorcing the state from religion, the authority that the ANC in government would have to answer to was minimised (i.e. they did not have to answer to either God or the church). Nevertheless, while religion was institutionally side-lined, it was rhetorically and performatively included into the state (Leatt 2017: 167), via the TRC and with mention of God in the preamble of the Constitution and in the first line of the national anthem.

4.7.   **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have tried to assemble and organise evidence of ANC attachment during the nineties. Through separating the discussion into five different sections, it has been shown how the ANC's attachment cut across society, touching on multiple groups, many in more than one way. This also helps to indicate the extent of ANC hegemony and the all-encompassing nature of any hegemonic project. This hegemonic project was, however,

limited by numerous factors. One of these factors was that the ANC was by no means at the top of the global pecking order in an era of US triumphalism and rapid globalisation. A second reason was the plurality of groups in South Africa, many of whom were not easy to bring under ANC control. The next chapter both reflects on the extensive evidence of attachment presented in this chapter and provides counter evidence of what is coined non-attachment. Non-attachment is used to develop a more accurate answer to the question about the extent of ANC hegemony and that which characterises it. Chapter 5 thus provides this dissertation's findings and conclusions.

CHAPTER 5

ASSESSING ATTACHMENT IN RELATION TO ANC HEGEMONY AND CONCLUSION

5.1. **Introduction**

This Chapter aims to finally assess the extent to which the ANC's hegemony by 1999 was established via attachment. Following the last chapter, which identifies instances of attachment during the decade, this one opens by summarising, using a table, the different instances of attachment identified in Chapter 4. Following this summary, some salient instances of ANC action taking place during the period 1990 to 1999, which do not fall within the category of attachment, are discussed. This exercise helps with providing a clearer answer to the inquiry into the *extent* to which the ANC's political ascendancy was characterised by attachment. It also helps avoid any suggestions of a meta-narrative which seems to claim that attachment explains all or even most of the ANC's political ascendancy. Instead, it hopefully contributes to a sober and mature understanding of how the ANC became so dominant. To this end, a section dedicated to giving this dissertation's best answer to the aforementioned question will be delivered, before concluding. What is established in the findings section (5.4) is that attachment between the ANC and other groups contributed significantly and crucially to ANC power and thus hegemony. Within the conclusion, a summary of the dissertation takes place, as well as remarks that touch on possible implications of this dissertation's findings, which however fall outside the scope of this dissertation.

5.2. **Summarising and Analysing the Findings of Chapter 4**

Below, in table form, is a recapitulation of the numerous relations of attachment to other groups of the ANC, as assessed in Chapter 4. Following the below table, which is also provided simply to sum up the overwhelming evidence of attachment during the decade, a section covering non-attachment, for which the definition is specified in the section, is delivered before summing up the findings of this dissertation and concluding.

Table 3: Summary of Findings in Chapter 4

Group	Kind of Attachment to ANC	Details
Global Economic Actors - USA, World Bank, IMF	Actors coopted ANC	The dominance over the ANC was exemplified by gradual but major change in ANC economic policy. Facilitated by coercive measures of international institutions.
Local South African Business	Negotiation	It was an antagonistic relationship with simultaneous co-dependency. Some unpopular policies amongst business were implemented by government. Defections by local business through capital flight, offshoring etc. took place. Government corruption furthered corporate interests and vice versa.
South African Poor Majority	Coopted by ANC	Progressive discourse of RDP, NDR was not matched by actions. Public participation was used to contain discontent The elitism of ANC leaders and actual economic policy neglected the needs of the poor.
Black Middle Class	Coopted by ANC	The black middle class was a group largely created by the ANC through Black Economic Empowerment,

		Deployment Policy, and use of South African SOEs. The reliance of the black middle class on the ANC for its continued existence suggests a cooptive dependence.
Inkatha Freedom Party	Negotiation to Consensus to Coopted by ANC	Buthelezi's brinkmanship and proximity to Zulu monarchy gave bargaining power to the IFP in the early nineties. Concessions around regional government and federalism gave constitutional recognition to Zulu monarch and, resultantly, the IFP took part in election. However, by 1999, IFP support had waned in KZN, and previous strategies of violence were no longer possible.
National Party	Negotiation to Consensus to Coopted by ANC	Initial negotiation resulted in a practice of *pactismo*, and the creation of sunset clauses and a GNU. However, over the course of the decade, the ANC became inordinately dominant in SA politics and initial consensus became better understood as cooptation.
Democratic Opponents	Coopted by ANC	Through *garantismo*, opposing political parties (including the NP and IFP) were incentivised to partake in a democratic political game which favoured the ANC as originators of democracy.

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| South African State | Negotiatory | Blurred lines came to exist between the state and the ANC.

The ANC was powerful enough not to be totally subsumed by the state but also not able to be entirely independent of it.

The ANC's view of the state was as a tool within a broader liberation context. |
|---|---|---|
| South African Communist Party | Coercive to Coopted by ANC | ANC policy and action was progressively against the SACP's stance with little consequence.

The SACP was significantly smaller and weaker than the ANC.

High profile job posts were given to SACP leaders. |
| Cosatu and South African Workers | Consensus to coopted by ANC | A consultative and reciprocal relationship, consisting of knowledge exchange, votes, legislative support initially existed between Cosatu and the ANC. But policies in the decade reduced payoffs for Cosatu greatly, while Cosatu nevertheless remained in alliance with ANC. |
| South African Military | Negotiation to consensus to Coopted by ANC | Initially starting as an independent bargaining power, the SA military fully consented to the new dispensation, after negotiation.

Gradually ANC political hegemony meant that the |

		military came securely under its control.
South African Police	Coopted by ANC	Police asserted their subordinacy to political leaders.

Efforts at restoring police legitimacy involved practices based on bolstering the power rather than the strength of the police. |
| Organised Crime | Negotiated | It was not a high priority to tackle crime in the context of the transition,

There were some fledgling criminal elements internal to ANC.

Police and criminals not distinct in South Africa. |
| Apartheid Transgressors | Coerced by ANC | The TRC incentivised testimony by perpetrators through threat of punishment and promise of amnesty. |
| Traditional Leadership | Negotiation to consensus to coopted by ANC | Traditional leaders were key allies for the ANC in rural areas during the nineties

Major concessions were made to traditional leaders during negotiation, including the recognition of the Zulu king in the constitution.

Parallel legal structures were set up for customary law.

Eventually a relationship of dependence came about, particularly owing to the |

		decline of other parties
White South Africa	Coercive to coopted by ANC	The end of Apartheid signalled a restraining of white privilege in South Africa. White resistance to new South Africa was stigmatised. Symbolic gestures by ANC over rugby, voortrekker monument were made to garner white sympathy.
Religious bodies	Consensus	Consensus was generated with regards to a secular state. A consultative relationship existed between the ANC and Religious bodies.

Three insights can be gleaned from the above table. One is the frequency of cooptation, particularly materialising at the end of the decade as ANC dominance reached its zenith. The second interesting point is how, contrary to ANC discourse, those that were regularly cited as ANC allies (the SACP, Cosatu, the poor, black middle class) were regularly those over whom the ANC was dominant, while those deemed enemies (global capital, local capital, organised crime) were more frequently those with whom the ANC was either in negotiation or to whom the ANC was subordinate. The third insight concerns the nature of ANC hegemony by 1999, where it seems that the ANC had come to dominate broad swathes of South African society but were not able to dominate the economic sphere. A question which follows from this insight is whether the ANC's dominance of key economic allies - including organised labour, the black middle class, and the poor majority - meant that the interests of these groups were not allowed to flourish enough to bring balance to the economic sphere. This would suggest that the ANC as a mediator aided the process of capitalist interests to dominate. There is not room to provide a conclusive answer to this question, but it stands as an example of one of the possible doors that could be unlocked along this corridor of analysis. Additionally, while

ANC dominance was at times enabled by (and manifested as) attachment, it also, at times, meant that the ANC was less dependent on these relations of attachment. This is made visible in the next section which covers instances of non-attachment in the period under study.

5.3.   <u>**Instances of Non-Attachment between 1990 and 1999**</u>

A short section is needed to remark on some (and certainly not all) examples of *non-attachment* in the period under study. This is with the purpose of avoiding any perceived metanarrative about the ANC and also contributes to solidifying the conclusions that are advanced in the final section of this chapter. Many miscellaneous actions may be considered instances of non-attachment. But of particular interest in this section are actions or readings of actions which pertain to the ANC's hegemony yet did not involve the coordination of its own interests with those of others. What this involves is instances when the ANC exercised or bolstered its strength as opposed to its power; or when it engaged in conflict, i.e. where the ANC did not seek to ameliorate a disparity of interests and instead chose to defect against other actors. Non-attachment thus refers to actions which conform to one of these two definitions.

Admittedly, other kinds of action which are not examples of either attachment or non-attachment feature within the ANC's history over the period under study and these too could be understood as pertaining to the character of the ANC. There is not the scope here to define other typologies of actions but, broadly speaking, it seems fair to assume that not all actions of a political party are driven by the pursuit of power or strength (which is the assumed but limited understanding of the ANC's motivation in this dissertation). Thus, other kinds of actions may well have defined ANC character over the decade. Furthermore, in certain cases the ANC failed to coordinate its own interests with those of others. In some instances, this resulted in conflict but in other instances it simply meant a lack of coordination and a lack of power. Both of these instances suggest limits to ANC hegemony. But because this dissertation attempts to assess what the ANC's hegemony was composed of, only non-attachment is discussed.

This section identifies three ways in which the ANC exercised or accumulated strength as opposed to power; and three ways in which the ANC engaged in conflict as opposed to cooperation. One instance, namely the Arms Deal is analysed as exhibiting both these

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characteristics. The other two examples of the ANC exercising strength include firstly its all-important electoral victory and secondly its own vast network in South Africa. In addition to the arms deal, the ANC engaged in apparent conflict and thus non-attachment through the GEAR policy and through its discourse employed in the NDR. Interestingly, both of these were analysed in Chapter 4 as being tools of attachment, however perhaps unsurprisingly attachment to one group might involve conflict with another.

The most obvious and important augmentation to ANC strength came with its electoral victory in 1994. Recalling Arendt, strength consists of the inherent ability of a person or group, as opposed to its potential for acting in concert. The electoral victory imbued in the ANC a crucial legal ability and mandate to implement its policies through parliament and the executive. In sections 4.2. – 4.6., a number of instances of coercion and cooptation were identified, which although being instances of attachment, required a preceding degree of power or strength to enable them. Being in government was an example of how it attained coercive strength - with ability to legislate, command an army and command the police. Furthermore, it gave the party access to resources to deploy in the interests of its constituents. The mere event of the ANC being voted in as the governing party, as crucial as it was, was not sufficient for the kind of political dominance that the ANC experienced in the years to come (Di Palma in Pempel 2019: 163). However, the sheer numbers with which it won gave it near to a parliamentary majority. Even so, as discussed in Chapter 2, it still operated within a precarious political context, particularly owing to the state's lack of legitimacy and limited capacities, curtailed by the GNU and reliant on the consent of a diverse array of local actors and the approval of global powers too.

The next feature of ANC strength which bolstered its ability for garnering consent was its embeddedness in South African society on the back of eighty years of existence and struggle. From the beginning of the decade, the ANC leveraged a vast branch structure and membership base (according to Darracq (2008: 593), there were 936 branches and 289-thousand members in 1991). This feature of the ANC, which improved in both scale and efficiency throughout the decade, allowed it to have a political presence across the country, to contest elections within all provinces, wards, and municipalities and to win in the majority of them. While this aspect of the ANC may well be seen as a feature that enables coordination (and thus power), it is nevertheless an inherent feature of the organisation as opposed to a

link with those outside the organisation. Thus, the ANC's branch structure and mass of members should be viewed as exhibiting the *strength* of the organisation. In this example there is an instance where power and strength go hand in hand. The strength of the ANC (its vast network of branches) gave the party an ability to coordinate, particularly with black South Africans, at a scale unequalled by any other organisation in South Africa. What this ultimately fed into was a massive voting constituency, which translated the combined institutional democratic design of the post-Apartheid state and the ANC's enormous popularity and coordination into ANC strength, once it had a parliamentary majority and it governed seven of the nine provinces.

Next, one of the most emphatic sagas in the decade exhibiting various kinds of non-attachment is what came to be known as the arms deal. This refers to a strategic arms procurement package worth R43.8-billion which became subject to enormous corruption, parliamentary investigation, and the imprisonment of certain protagonists within the deal (see Gumede 2005: 301-302). The first reason that this should be viewed as a moment of non-attachment is because the procurement of weapons is a bolstering of state *strength*. More importantly, reliable claims have been made that the arms deal was used to directly improve the bank balance of the ANC in preparation for the 1999 election (Feinstein 2007: 177). Perhaps realising that the party could not survive on power alone (through its links and alliances), it needed to bolster its own inherent capabilities including its spending power.

The arms deal had ramifications for the ANC deep into the following decade, as, gradually, information about major corruption emerged. However, as documented by Feinstein, the ANC for several years was able to maintain a high level of internal coherence that enabled them to use their dominance to cover up details about the arms deal. By punishing and excluding those who broke ranks, the ANC piloted investigations into the arms deal. This internal coherence may well be seen as coercive or may be viewed as a kind of consensus (both of which are types of attachment). However, in the terms of this dissertation, this should be viewed as strength where internal coherence is an inherent quality of the organisation, even though within the organisation there is a kind of coordination that has the appearance of attachment. Additionally, the arms deal can equally be viewed as an instance of ANC conflict. In what clearly emerged as a contravention of the legal system, which one could argue was an instance of conflict, the ANC was placed in an automatic position of

antagonism[83] with the legal system. A number of senior ANC representatives, including its president, Thabo Mbeki, vice president, Jacob Zuma, and Defence Minister, Joe Modise, were all involved or had knowledge of the deal (Feinstein 2007: 208-222).

As discussed in Section 4.2., the arms deal exhibited features of attachment. In the same section, economic policy, including GEAR, was discussed, especially in relation to how GEAR favoured multinational companies, responding to pressure from international finance institutions. However, at a national level, GEAR benefitted only a minority, creating little employment, and doing nothing to successfully reverse the country's inequality (Terreblanche 2002: 117). GEAR was drafted without consultation[84] with the party's main alliance partners (Terreblanche 2002: 144). What GEAR represents more broadly is what Sampie Terreblanche argued was the neglect of the poorest 50% of South Africa who had not benefited from South Africa's democratic transition (Terreblanche 2001: 132-138). The ANC found other ways of coordinating with the poorest 50%, mainly through cooptation and coercion. Nonetheless, GEAR, as well as the overall track record[85] of the ANC during the second half of the 90s, appears to be in direct conflict with the needs of a large number of South Africans, whose interests more likely lay in progressive economic policies that redistributed the unequal wealth generated during Apartheid.

Furthermore, throughout the decade the ANC continued to employ a language of resistance and struggle, including in articulations of the NDR (Hart 2013: 166-167). A language of resistance and struggle[86] speaks to a facet of the ANC character, which is not altogether that of attachment. The simultaneously employed language of the NDR and policy of GEAR, side by side indicate a contradiction, of conflict and compromise. While it pursued relatively conservative economic policies to assuage global and local capital, the ANC's continued

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[83] The irony is that even as the ANC came to be effective custodians of the law, they increasingly became breakers of the law, punishing whistle-blowers rather than transgressors and uniting in doing so. Another such instance was the ousting of Bantu Holomisa from the ANC for having, without consultation, exposed Stella Sigcau for having received funds from business magnate Sol Kerzner.

[84] In fact, with the exception of the Labour Relations Act, all legislation and policy bypassed consultative structures (Habib 2013: 20).

[85] Similar in effect, if not in intention, was the ANC's Outcomes Based Education programme which became the main education policy in South Africa which categorically failed to uplift the poorer in society (Marais 2011: 329 - 330). Additionally, widespread implementation of OBE was basically unprecedented and was an example of the ANC-led government straying from the global pack of recognised best-practices.

[86] The ANC's forthright submission to the TRC about the role of business in supporting Apartheid is an example of this rhetoric of resistance coming to bear on formal processes of the transition and is proof of a willingness to directly contradict business (ANC 1997c).

reference to socialism (often through the Freedom Charter) and its links to the SACP went against the zeitgeist of American capitalist triumphalism in the nineties. To this same effect, during the nineties, Mandela welcomed Fidel Castro on two occasions to South Africa, as well as welcoming contentious US religious leader Louis Farrakhan[87] (Maylam 2011: 270-280). Part of this was to remain true to the kernel of resistance crucial to the ANC's history and identity (Butler 2012: 16-57), which potentially finds itself at odds with the practice of attachment. Two sides of a coin appear here[88], involving the ANC mediating the interests of groups which are diametrically opposed. In allying with one group, i.e. global and local elites using the GEAR policy, it defected against the local poor and unemployed who were not favoured by free market policies. A counterweight was provided discursively, employing radical language of resistance associated with the NDR, which is a form of defection against elites and cooperation with the poor of the country, but with a decisively lower cost of defection than if the ANC were to side with the poor at a policy level.

What is made clear in this section is that the ANC cannot by any means be judged to have only followed a path of attachment and cooperation with other groups. Attachment alone would be an impractical strategy in any project pursuing hegemony for three main reasons. The first reason is the importance of strength alongside power. The second reason is the relatively high likelihood that some groups will fundamentally challenge one's own interests, in which case no bargaining zone exists for attachment. Thirdly, to serve the interests of one group is often against the interests of another. This is to say that despite the ANC's nation building narrative (that a new South Africa was in the interests of all), there was plainly and unsurprisingly some whose interests were better served than others. Its dominance (whether achieved through attachment or not) was one that ultimately side-lined the interests of other groups and privileged its own. The instances of non-attachment mentioned in this section cannot be labelled as insignificant features of ANC hegemony. The ANC's institutional power in fact

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[87] Other examples of non-attachment include the removal of the death penalty, and the permission of both abortion and of gay rights, both of which were against most South Africans' preferences (Leatt 2017: 166).
[88] In its 1997 Report on the Tripartite Alliance Summit, the ANC acknowledges this contradiction in its own action: "*The national and global terrain on which we are struggling to implement an NDR is dominated by capitalism. This is a reality which cannot just be wished away. Capitalist corporations own and control enormous resources which we require. On the other hand, the capitalist accumulation process, left to itself, everywhere promotes inequality and underdevelopment. We have to engage capitalism, and we have to struggle with and against it. The one-sided emphasis on one or another of these challenges (the "with" and the "against") often results in dispute and confusion within the alliance. Both the "with" and the "against" are crucial.*" (ANC 1997d)

appears as an equally vital condition as any level of attachment for the level of dominance it achieved. Having established this, the next section expands this discussion and spells out the findings of this dissertation, providing an answer to the main question pursued in this work, namely: to what extent did attachment characterise the ANC's political ascendancy? In addition to this, three ancillary findings that can be gleaned from this dissertation are also provided.

5.4.   <u>The Extent to which the ANC's Political Ascendancy was Characterised by Attachment</u>

This section comprises the findings of this dissertation, taking into account the theorisation of attachment that was undertaken in Chapter 3 and the extended evidence provided in Chapter 4 that attachment between the ANC and other groups in South Africa was present in multiple ways throughout the decade. Finally, the counterevidence provided in 5.2, shows that attachment was not the sole dynamic that contributed to ANC hegemony. This section then tries to i) judge the degree to which ANC political dominance can be attributed to attachment; ii) consolidate the conceptual vocabulary of this dissertation which, aside from the factual claims, is the knowledge contribution of this project; and iii) provide a summary of three ancillary findings that this dissertation contributes, alongside the answer to its primary question.

A recap of the argument put forward over the course of Chapters 2 and 3 is useful for beginning this discussion. Premise one of this dissertation's main argument is that the ANC had a rapid political ascendancy during the 1990s. Premise two is that this ascendancy can be characterised in Hannah Arendt's terms as comprising a degree of power and a degree of strength, where power exists in coordination with others and strength exists as an ability in oneself to manipulate the external world. Premise three states that the ANC was not a particularly strong organisation, with weak military capacity and organisational deficiencies, which curtailed its own abilities to govern. The hypothesis generated from this argument is thus that the ANC's political ascendancy was born, to a significant degree, of power and not strength.

What happens, broadly speaking, in this chapter is a testing of the hypothesis that the ANC's political ascendancy was an outcome of power instead of strength. Put more specifically in the language of this dissertation, this present Chapter 5 tries to give an answer to the question of the degree to which the ANC's political hegemony can be attributed to attachment. Because this research is based on qualitative and descriptive data, it is not possible to describe this magnitude in terms of a numerical percentage. Instead, a considered judgement and descriptive account must be provided by the author, given the evidence that has been collected.

The first question that must be posed is whether the ample evidence of attachment can be said to have brought about the ANC's political ascent. After all, the frequency of attachment may simply coincide with the party's positive political fortunes without any relation of significance between the two. If this were the case, Arendt's understanding of power would be totally undercut, as there would be little reason to adopt a definition for power when it says nothing about the change in the political fortunes of the organisation under study. There is good reason, however, to believe that Arendt's definition of power is a useful tool in this study. It would be a fairly major and sustained serendipity that such a high degree of coordination simply coincided with such a rapid change in political fortunes. An application of Occam's razor would accept a connection between the two. Additionally, Arendt's idea of power is based on historical evidence of governmental collapse in the absence of consent from a populace. The Apartheid state encountered exactly this issue, where South Africa's oppressed populations did not view the NP as legitimate authority and were often no longer willing to comply with the laws of the state. Moreover, the Apartheid state's ability to collaborate with those abroad was imperilled by its global isolation. As acknowledged in multiple sources (including Du Toit 2001), the Apartheid state thus encountered a crisis of legitimacy which it compensated for with increased violence and securitisation. The vacuum that the ANC was called on to fill was thus one where power and legitimacy (and not strength) were missing, both locally and globally.

An alternative and more plausible counter argument is that the ANC's political rise may have been the source of its increased attachment, rather than the inverse. This claim is almost certainly to some degree true. It seems almost self-evident that as an organisation grows, others will seek a proximity to it for their own benefit. However, this can be theoretically

accommodated by positing a dialectical relationship between general political clout and the degree of coordination achieved by an organisation, where an increase in A results in an increase in B which in turn brings about an increase in A, and so forth. At this point, it is expedient to repeat some facts noted within this dissertation. One is that the ANC's bent towards coordination came *prior* to a meaningful movement of the party into the centre of South African politics. Secondly, the ANC overtly espoused a strategy of negotiation in order to tilt the balances of forces in its favour. Third, it was *through* years of formal negotiation that the ANC arrived at the most meaningful moment in its political fortunes (i.e. becoming the ruling party in the country) and not the opposite way around. Lastly, if one were to ascribe the ANC's hegemony to its strength, it would be contrary to almost every scholar that has studied South Africa's early democracy. It would be dubious to remove focus from the ANC's popularity and legitimacy and to explain its hegemony on the basis of its inherent capacities, despite, *inter alia*, its inexperience in government at the time, its mild success in transforming the South African economy, and its failures including in healthcare and education.

What this discussion warrants is a fairly safe assumption that, to at least a small degree, the ANC's hegemony by 1999 was characterised by attachment. This is almost tautological because attachment is a concept that is developed from directly studying the ANC's actions over the course of the decade. Nevertheless, the sheer bulk of instances of attachment that are provided in Chapter 4, which is not exhaustive of all ANC action, suggests a clear pattern of action that should be seen as exhibiting a salient feature of the ANC's political character during this period. This is evidenced by the ANC's overt focus on persuasion, reconciliation, consensus, and unity during this period. Just how salient attachment actually was, within the framework laid out in this dissertation, then relates to what the composite of strength versus power that made up the ANC's dominance.

It has been indicated in many sections of this dissertation that the ANC was not an organisation of particular strength. In addition, as noted in 5.2, even where strength was evident, the ANC's strength was far from sufficient for hegemony. Furthermore, where the ANC did exhibit strength as opposed to power, for instance as a party with a mandate to govern or its vast national network, these factors are linked to their ability to coordinate, especially within a pluralist society such as South Africa. The plausible connection between power and coordination, the sheer frequency of attachment throughout the decade, the

conditions of South African society and the limited strength of the party thus all suggest a crucial role played by attachment in contributing to ANC hegemony.

Whilst many organisations were agents of attachment during the 1990s, none were quite so central and multi-linked as the ANC. The ANC was thus an organisation whose power snowballed during the decade, owing to their unique position as a broad-based, popular black, reformist resistance movement. Alongside the context it was in, the ANC clearly chose a strategy of broad cooperation. What this dissertation is able to show is that this cooperation was both contradictory and did not preclude a potential for dominance and domination. Having spelled out the answer to the main question pursued in this dissertation, three additional ancillary findings are provided below.

The first ancillary finding from this dissertation regards the nature of hegemony, particularly in relation to the ANC. An articulated totality of difference, Laclau and Mouffe's phrase referenced in Chapter 2, is clear to see in Sections 4.2. – 4.6., consisting of a society-wide set of groups with whom the ANC was attached - through pact-making, shared incentives, discourse, and institutions. While Sections 4.2. – 4.6. separated instances of attachment into five different fields, which helps to create different seams of discussion, the separation should not be viewed as indicative of strict real-world divides. For example, the discussion in Section 4.4. on the links between the ANC, policing and crime has relevance to each of the other subsections in Chapter 4 (4.2. - 4.6.). The lines between crime and policing blurred for political and economic reasons, where both law and societal values were factors which enabled or impeded the proper functioning of police and a legal system. What is being driven at here is identifying the totality that the ANC was aiming for. Each instance of attachment mentioned in Chapter 4 should not be viewed myopically as only a piecemeal measure for remedying a single issue. Each should also be viewed as part of a trend, made clear by the fact that each measure of attachment itself had potentially broader implications across societal spheres and in fact through the whole of South African society.

The ANC's hegemony was, however, compromised by the necessary relations of negotiation with the local private sector and a subservience to the global capitalist order. This comprises the second ancillary insight. It is, however, not to claim that the ANC had a quasi-hegemony but rather that it involved a dependence that constrained the hegemonic party's agency.

Today, significant attention is paid in public debate to the role of capital in South Africa. What is sometimes conveyed is an antagonism between the ANC and business. This dissertation suggests that such attention is valid, especially given the fact that local and global capital were two groups over which the party seemed unable to assert dominance. However, the framing, including by the ANC, of the ANC's relationship with global and local capital as conflictual is misguided. In the formative years of its reign, the ANC did almost nothing to challenge the norms of global capitalism. Local business and agents of global capitalism played a necessary but not a sufficient role in allowing ANC society-wide coordination and hegemony. The fact that it was drawn into a coopted relationship with global capitalism does not mean that there is any less of a cooperative relationship, but simply one of domination. This is also not to say that there was somehow no contestation at play. Despite its broad cooptation into the global capitalist system, the ANC still had to appease other local forces, some of which perceive the current economic system to be against their interests.

A third insight involves a fairly broad assertion about the theme of liberalism[89] during the nineties in South Africa. As an ideology which was globally dominant in this period, as an underpinning principle of the Constitution, and as a policy pursued in the economic sphere, liberalism appears most appropriate a name for the ANC's ostensible character. Compared with any other single label such as nationalist, developmental, Marxist, neoliberal or Africanist, liberalism - distinguished also by cooperation, tolerance and accommodation with many groups – seems to have taken precedence in this period. The ANC did not ignore South Africa's pluralism but instead tried to appease its myriad of interests so that consent to the new dispensation was received as broadly and sustainably as possible. At the same time, the newly liberated South African society was carefully moulded, so that consent, i.e. the choices made by South Africans, was compatible with the formal deals struck during Codesa and the informal deals alongside it. This gestures towards a general tension that liberalism endures, not just in South Africa, where, for a liberal system to sustain, free choice is typically piloted (see Selznick 1949: 1). Nevertheless, there appears to be a specifically contradictory character of liberalism in South Africa, which required the active support for (and from) a number of highly non-liberal groups (e.g. the National Party, traditional leaders, Apartheid police). The

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[89] Liberalism is understood here as a governing system which emphasises freedom for all people and where political authority and law must be justified (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy).

theme and the failures of liberalism in relation to the ANC appears to be an underappreciated facet of the party within existing scholarship.

5.5.   **Conclusion**

This dissertation started with a set of indications, apparent in previous scholarship and public knowledge, that the ANC's dominance was to some extent caused by its nature of being a broad-church party. What can be concluded is that this is true. More specifically (and meaningfully), its rapid rise to being a hegemonic party between 1990 and 1999, was facilitated substantially and crucially by a pattern of action which linked its own interests with those of other groups. Early in the decade it suggested using negotiation to tilt the balance of forces in its favour and by the end of the decade, the ANC itself acknowledged that it had successfully done so (ANC 2002). It was, however, not only through negotiation with which it linked its own interests with those of other groups. Consensus, for example, was another extolled goal within ANC circles during the nineties. Both negotiation and consensus are words which imply a level terrain of consultation and coordination. However, there were also processes, namely coercion and cooptation, of coordinating interests which were not between equal actors. The coordination between the ANC and another group, characterised by a disparity in power and/or strength in favour of one group, impacted upon the dynamics that took shape in the new South Africa and whose interests were more favoured. Furthermore, a number of instances saw initial relationships of negotiation or consensus slide into a state of cooptation as the ANC gained in dominance. Because attachment implies coordination (both direct and indirect) and because coordination comprises power, as argued in Chapter 2, the fact that this study of the ANC exhibits attachment with multiple groups across South African society means that the ANC derived significant and broad-reaching power from attachment. While its hegemony consisted of organisational strengths, not least its branch structure and its mandate from the South African populace to occupy the seat of government after 1994, even these interrelated strengths were derived from a coordinative ability that has remained unmatched by any other political organisation in South Africa.

As well as being a study in politics, this dissertation strongly considers the importance of economic actors and finds the relation between the ANC and capital (both local and global)

to be the one least in its favour. The economic sphere is also where the greatest contradiction was endured by the ANC which was in alliance with organised labour, had electoral promises to the poor and unemployed of the country, and had a close historical association with Marxism and socialism. An analytical tool from the field of economics, namely game theory, is used to understand and break down the different incentives presented to the ANC and their counterparts. One of its main strengths is its applicability across spheres of politics, economics, law and even ethics, owing to the presence of cost and reward in all of these fields. Furthermore, game theory helps to give a further conceptual granularity to attachment by determining its prerequisite costs and conditions.

This gestures to a priority present throughout this dissertation, related to the practice of concept-creation. The pragmatic philosophical assumptions of this dissertation provide the grounding for the entire study undertaken, where concepts are understood as tools to be consciously designed and employed for the sake of assembling knowledge. Attachment is designed with this freedom in mind, however constrained by a constant backward referral to actual historical events, as is methodologically required by Grounded Theory. Like game theory, the abstract concept of attachment provides a tool for comparison across societal spheres. This is important for any study on power or hegemony, which do not spring from institutional or economic sources alone.

It is with some optimism towards numerous possibilities for further studies that this dissertation concludes. Future studies following this dissertation could inquire into the processes of ANC attachment prior to the nineties which enabled the events discussed in this dissertation. Similarly, a study could be conducted into the degree to which the following two decades of democracy compared with the first five years, using the lens of attachment. A different line of study may wish to analyse other groups in other countries through the lens of attachment or may wish to contest or add to the conceptual dimensions of attachment.

Further questions relating to the ANC are also left unanswered by this study including: does the ANC have strength that can actually be delinked from its political power? Are its wealth and capabilities for governance sufficient for it to reproduce itself, more on the basis of strength, in the political marketplace once its populist sheen of liberation movement is dulled? Answers to these questions cannot be offered in this study. Lastly, a vital conceptual

tool that seems heretofore underutilised is Arendt's understanding of power. While it is impossible to state that her conception of power is ultimately the correct one, it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction for Arendt to have made efforts to clarify and organise the different components of what people commonly mean when they use the blanket and nebulous concept of power.

A parting word about the identity of the ANC and how this study contributes to an understanding of it is necessary. Throughout this dissertation an implicit question has been present - what is the ANC? The answer that can be offered is that the ANC is not just one thing. Others too have offered this answer but the way this dissertation has arrived at this conclusion is unique. In Africa's oldest liberation movement, one discerns many ideological currents and numerous sub-organisations. Its alliance partners have often been a second home to ANC heavy weights, making the distinction between the ANC and the SACP or Cosatu highly blurred. The same blurred lines exist when attempting to distinguish between the ANC and the State. This distinction has become even more obscure now, given the length of time that the ANC has commanded the state as the ruling party. Even the private sector has not gone untouched by the ANC and the revolving door between South African business and high-level government offices did not stop turning at the end of Apartheid. Factions within the ANC itself, which have come to exist particularly since the turn of the millennium, mean that even the party's members would disagree on the true identity of the party. In action its members are just as divergent. Although its authoritarian structure may increase the possibility for the organisation to portray a united front, its 108-person NEC is a patchwork of business interests, political factions, struggle names, state bureaucrats, traditionalists, and union representatives.

While many claim that the identity of the ANC is placed on the elite side of the class divide, the ANC must endure the contradiction that the source of its legitimacy to govern lies with more than 50% of the South African electorate, most of whom are not elites. While there is some truth to the idea that the ANC typically eases this contradiction by disenfranchising the poor and appeasing the rich, one cannot ignore the extent to which the ANC identifies as a pro-poor grassroots organisation. And even if this claim is in every sense false (this dissertation suggests that it is not wholly false), constant self-identification of official party channels as pro-poor and the number of people convinced that the ANC indeed harnesses

this orientation cannot be ignored. This suggests instead that this current of pro-poor principles is another salient stream running through the ANC, intersecting with its current of virile elitism. Both of these currents have unique sources, reaching a long way back into ANC history, each performing unique functions in the party, and neither is likely to disappear any time soon.

The above contradiction is one of many. The ANC's patriarchy juxtaposes with an active and historical women's league, endemic corruption currently runs alongside an anti-corruption impetus, non-racialism is mixed with ethnic chauvinism and its legacy of Pan-Africanism kisses unhappily with a current flirtation with xenophobia. All this, the divergent currents and taught contradictions, the many layers and spheres that converge and contest within the ANC, the stake that so many others place in the ANC, lead to the conclusion that the party cannot be thought of as having a single identity. Any attempt to define the party as having one root identifier will at some point face the problem that there seems to be an equally significant set of roots elsewhere. And while this dissertation's concept of attachment attempts to capture many of these roots, there nevertheless remain others. In this sense the ANC is rhizomatic. Its longevity is supported by multiple sources.

So, what does this mean for someone hoping to get to the bottom of things? Is the ANC an unwieldy web that people should give up on trying to describe? The stakes seem too high to accept this kind of ignorance. However, the problem should be approached with an appreciation of the complexity of political dominance and how this manifests in the ANC. This dissertation offers some insight into the constitution of ANC power which has leant to their political dominance over nearly three decades. What is also evident then is that the ANC, for better or for worse, has seeped like moisture into every corner of South African society, be it at macro levels of state and business or at micro levels of values, ethics, and smaller institutions. Its sudden disappearance would thus leave a society-wide vacuum that would destabilise South African society. However, its current ubiquity makes it highly unlikely that the party will disappear any time soon.

Ceteris paribus, any hegemonic project (if hegemony and power are understood in the terms of this dissertation) in South Africa will have to comprise an effort at melding the nation's pluralism, politically, ideologically, and economically in a way that the ANC tried, succeeded,

and then failed to do. Moreover, what this dissertation suggests is that this will only be possible when an organisation has sufficient negotiatory leverage and/or coercive capacity such that it can fix its own interests to as many of South Africa's plurality of groups as possible. Without this, no societal consensus (where interests align) can possibly exist, and neither will any group sufficiently subsume many others into their orbit of command. While the 46-year period of Apartheid was an exercise of strengthening a particular group and its coercive capacities to enormous success, it eventually failed because its system was based on principles that could not be consented to by a majority. Today, a 28-year-old system, worthy of consent, is feebly implemented. Education, economy, employment are all variables which tell a woeful story about the ability of the ANC to exercise strength as opposed to power. An attempt at improvement, therefore, is likely to derive from a project that addresses these variables without compromising the democratic system. The two main opposition parties seem inadequate for these purposes. The Democratic Alliance are a majority white party, representing relatively limited interests and will not have the coordinative ability that is derived from the consent of the majority of South Africans. The Economic Freedom Fighters challenge the legitimacy of a constitutional system, the removal of which would be a step backward in the gains achieved in South Africa. What is more likely then, is a non-hegemonic South Africa, consisting of emphasised pluralism, regionalism, and sectarianism. As a small country in a globalised world this will not bode well economically. Neither will it permit the bold changes needed to address structural characteristics of South Africa's economy which perpetuate unemployment, inequality, and poverty. Adequately responding to a global climate crisis will also be made all the more difficult by the kind of gridlock and conflict that is associated with diffuse power.

The political state of South Africa today should not come as a surprise. The corruption and inertia of today is only a shade different from the deal-brokering and stabilisation of the 1990s. No one should be confounded by the persistence of unemployment and inequality given the fact that no serious measures were taken to restructure the South African economy during the nineties. Any future with the ANC is likely to involve a familiar stasis. Moreover, the ANC's claim to be self-correcting should be viewed as an additional feature of the rhizome and not an essential change.

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