MSocSci Research Mini-Dissertation: Department of Sociology

Mapping precarity and social movements in contemporary South Africa

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Acknowledgments

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ANC - African National Congress

BEE - Black Economic Empowerment

BBEEE – Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment

BRICS - Brazil Russia India China South Africa

COSATU - Congress of South Africa Trade Unions

GDP - Gross Domestic Profit

GEAR – Growth Employment and Redistribution

GNP - Gross National Product

LPM – Landless Peoples Movement

MEC – Mining Energy Crisi

1. Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation focuses on the continual development of precarity in South Africa since the transition to democracy, from a broader political, social, and economic perspective as well as a labour perspective, with some brief historical contexts. This is then contextualized to illustrate the material and existential impact on individuals and groups who live in precarity. Furthermore, the dissertation then focuses on the development of social movements in contemporary South Africa, whilst focusing on drawing possible links to precarity. This connection helped to demonstrate how existing research illustrates ways in which we can understand the relationship between precarity and protest in South Africa's political economy.

The first part of this chapter briefly covers contextual factors of precarity and social movements and introduces the reader to the overall aim of the dissertation. The second part of this chapter illustrates how precarity and social movements have been theorised from the Global North and South, which is the starting point for the development of an analysis of the relationship between precarity and social movements in South Africa.

Precarity in South Africa

When looking at precarity, Scully's (2016) work presents the argument that there are two divergent schools of thought, the Eurocentric Global North/Northern perspective and the Global South/Southern perspective. The Eurocentric view mainly attributed to Guy Standing, argues that "globalization ... has generated a [new] class structure, superimposed on earlier structures", where the precariat emerged as a new class (Scully, 2016: 162). The North viewed that from the early 19th century up until the 1970s, in the golden age of capitalism where work was significantly more secure, and the working class was defined under "proletarianization". Proletarianization signified a reliance on mass labour, wage income, an absence of the control of ownership of the means of production, and habituation of stable labour, "a bygone golden age of secure work" (Scully, 2016: 162). Scully (2016) goes on to further say that this clear Northern perspective, views precarious work as a product of the globalization era that began with the collapse of the golden age of capitalism in the 1970s.

In contrast, the Southern perspective does not genealogically follow Standing's analysis, as few regions have experienced a golden age of secure work. Due to colonialism, work under capitalism in the global South always bore the hallmarks of precarity, and this has not changed significantly after the end of colonial rule. Southern economies have remained in a subordinate position in the world economic system, with working classes being subject to "permanent primitive accumulation" in the form of accumulation by dispossession and super-exploitation (Munck, 2013: 752). Munck's (2013) analysis adds to this further by stating that precarity from contemporary and Eurocentric debates was foreshadowed by debates in the South. The genealogy of precarity goes back further, where similar working conditions were seen in the theories of 'Marginality' and 'Informality' which emerged in Latin America in the 1960s and Africa in the 1970s respectively (Munck, 2013: 748-749). When looking at precarity in the Global South, South Africa potentially acts as an interesting case study of this phenomenon.

Precarity in South Africa is deeply embedded in entrenched structural inequalities and poverty. These include amongst others a carryover of racialized spatial inequalities from a colonial and Apartheid past, which have resulted in decreasing rural employment and access to work as well as increased forms of proximal capital inequality. Proximal capital inequality is the lack of access to concentrated affluence, and availability of social connections, where information and access in broadening one's social network, aiding in the access of working opportunities (L'Heureux and McCoy, 2014). This has shifted more individuals to migrate towards the city where enduring inequalities in skills acquisition and education persist with the shift to free-market trade, which resulted in extended periods of jobless growth (Dawson and Fouksman, 2020). In addition, these structural inequalities are present in the pursuit of profit, which often breeds institutional domination and the suppression of worker rights, creating facets of potential precarity (Bolt and Rajak, 2016). These negative factors impacting the labour market create a greater potential for precarious work as well as the disenfranchisement and repression of workers, through shifts in employment regimes and vulnerability due to unemployment.

Precarious work is closely related to the various states of poverty, such as working poverty, also known as working poor or the marginal working class, in which working individuals remain below the poverty line. This comes as a result of low-wage formal unskilled/informal labour and insufficient household income as a result of a portion of primary breadwinners being unemployed or a total lack of sufficient income (Nattrass and Seekings, 2015). Resulting from unemployment and working poverty the marginal poor and working-class are comprised of the

lower cluster of classes, people working in highly casualized marginal sectors or informal sectors of the economy (Nattrass and Seekings, 2015). In South Africa three poverty lines express the amount that many individuals are living off, these include:

- The food-poverty line (average of R585 per person per month) is the absolute minimum an individual needs to survive.
- The lower-bound (average of R840 per person per month), refers to the food poverty line plus the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose total expenditure is equal to that of the food poverty line.
- The upper-bound poverty line (average of R1284 per person per month), is the food poverty line plus the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose food expenditure is equal to that of the food poverty line (Statistics South Africa, 2020).

In 2015, 55.5% of the population were living in one of the three categories, and this only continued to worsen post 2015 according to Statistics South Africa (2021). What makes this even more striking is the inequality surrounding wealth in South Africa. Where the household per capita income Gini-coefficient currently stands at 0.63 as of 2021. In addition, the richest 10% of the population hold 71% of the wealth, while the poorest 60% of the population hold only 4% (Statistics South Africa, 2019). Moreover, high levels of poverty, the significant gap in wealth, unemployment, and precarity have the potential to manifest in the questioning identity, worth, and security, as many individuals attach their self-identity to work or to their financial circumstances (Kenny, 2004). This work identity was exploited in the Global South for decades, whereby work was your identity under colonial rule (Scully, 2016; Munck, 2013).

The South African labour market has been and continues to be shaped by a colonial rule along racial and nationality lines. Particularly for black Africans and the black working class often results in a continual reproduction of social vulnerability. With existing forms of precarity and the casualization of employment, vulnerability and insecurity of the black African working class are embedded on two levels. On an objective level, precarity sows disruption and destabilization in the workplace, it disrupts and imbalances workers' financials and creates an overall unhealthy environment both in and outside the workplace for all employees (Masquelier, 2018). On a subjective level, precarity and insecurity often directly result in

subjective precarity and insecurity through perceiving the potential or experiencing the actuality of falling into poverty, which is already a prevalent concern among black Africans. Havoc is wrought on an individual's psychological and psycho-social wellbeing, given that individuals strive for an occupational identity (Munck, 2013). This form of subjective insecurity comes from the social construction on behalf of both material forces such as labour markets and symbolic constraints that embody internalised common beliefs or popular opinions (Masquelier, 2018).

Social movements in South Africa

When looking at social movements regarding precarity and the erosion of civil rights and workplace protections, Burawoy's (2017) argument presents that the Global North seems to be following the path of the Global South. Burawoy (2017) suggests that the Global North is now experiencing broad erosion of human rights, whereas the Global South has experienced this phenomenon for an extended period. What Burawoy (2017) is suggesting is a link between social movements and capitalism driving marketization across the globe. With the development of capitalism different regions, countries and citizens had varying levels of access to the global market depending on their political, economic, and social structures. The vast majority of the South was dispossessed through capital accumulation in the development of the global market, the silent encroachment of the South, who were then excluded from the global market. The Global North is experiencing a reduction in workplace protections and secure work, which is something that has not existed in the Global South, given the exclusionary politics and accumulation by dispossession of the South by the North.

The South has always been much more susceptible/vulnerable to the influences of capitalism and forceful introduction to neoliberalism, given how the South was continually excluded and exploited under colonial rule, such as through resource and land dispossession and offering little to no compensation for those the land was taken from (Scully, 2016). This vulnerability resulted in the structural adjustments of macroeconomic policy, which drove neoliberalism to a mainstream developmental practice in the expectation of sustainable economic growth. In addition, this approach would silence domestic industrial workers and unions who would oppose many political elites. Poorer countries were expected to lessen market regulations, strengthen the rule of law and essentially "trade their way out of poverty" (Harris and Scully, 2015: 423). In contrast to the Global South, the Global North's post-war era of secure work

began to transform in the early 1970s to 1980s as a result of increased reliance on market-based income for social reproduction. This brought deregulation and the removal of social protections and was exacerbated by neoliberalism (Harris and Scully, 2015). Altmann et al. (2017) continue with this analysis by showing how Southern resistance is historically related to powerful economic forces and oppressive political institutions of the North that would engage in unequal/exclusionary politics to dispossess the South. South Africa acts as an interesting example of this phenomenon given the colonial and Apartheid influence on social movement.

When looking at the genealogy of South African protest, Burawoy (2017) illustrates the above phenomena by showing that contemporary South African protest is at a crossroads. Moving from an era of oppression and exclusion that shaped South African resistance, many expected the post-Apartheid period to be the turning point, where inclusion was expected. However, historical structures of exclusion and inequality have become so embedded in South African institutions and are difficult to reform. This has led the majority of social movements in the contemporary era to continue to fight for inclusion in political, economic, and social spaces. Burawoy (2017: 21) goes on to further suggest that movements in contemporary South Africa are based on two key factors "movements based on unequal inclusion in major institutions of society and movements based on forcible exclusion from those institutions". These forms of exclusion were based on three main reasons.

According to Ballard et al. (2016), South African social movements during the initial stages of the transition to democracy were related to three specific issues. First, the union and civic struggles against the neoliberal policy GEAR (Growth Employment and Redistribution). Second, struggles against service delivery failures, notable protests such as the Landless People's Movement (LPM), which addressed land redistribution, whilst resisting market policies. Third, sporadic and organised struggles against governmental repression activities, such as the Soweto electricity crisis committee, the concerned citizen's forum, and the anti-eviction campaign. This was an attempt to organise poor and marginalised communities to resist local, provincial, and national governmental attempts to repress class outcasts, by removing basic needs and evicting citizens.

Botes (2018) shows an additional six possibilities as to why social movements and resistance continue to remain consistently elevated in contemporary South Africa.

- Protest as a manifestation of a lack of political trust. Social stress and instability often result from the non-responsive and self-interest culture of the political elite and cause feelings of non-recognition and discontent, a common precursor of community protests.

- Protest as a means to solicit political accountability. The growing governmental unresponsiveness, corruption and general lack of accountability and display of responsibility have accounted for approximately 17% of the grievances expressed by protestors (Botes, 2018: 245). This often lead to grassroots mobilisations in South Africa between 2004 and 2017 that sought to enhance the accountability of political elites to the country's citizens.

- Protests to restore human dignity, to illustrate and express people's experiences and grievances with regards to inequality and relative deprivation. Resistance arises when individuals draw comparisons with their own lives with those who are better-off, economically and socially.

- Protests as a result of poor service delivery, where communities are resisting and mobilising against the government's inability to provide basic needs and quality services such as housing (accounted for 21% of grievances), clean water, and electricity (each accounted for 11% of grievances) and sanitation (accounted for 9% of grievances) from 2004-2017 (Botes, 2018: 248).

- Protests as a result of economic hardships, where the agenda is determined by the labour market, the economy, and the experiences of citizens within the economy at different levels. During high protest years of 2009-2017, economic issues account for nearly 85% of the underlying fuelling factors. Where community protests are local level articulations challenging multiple deprivations to bridge the interests of distinct and alienated constituencies as well as build a more responsive government and civil servants (Botes, 2018: 249).

- Protest due to the lack of consultation and participation. In South Africa, the main concern is the provision of service delivery from a top-down approach and many citizens find this to be unacceptable and instead seek 'public service', where there is meaningful incorporation of citizens' choice and autonomy as well as aspirations for bottom-up developmental processes facilitated through grassroots-movements.

This relationship between precarity and social movements seems to be both direct and indirect in nature and the intersection between the two warrants further discussion. Existing theories have analysed precarity and protest as a whole and how it relates to an understanding of inequality at a broader level. This dissertation used specific research related to precarity, inequality and macro-level inequalities as well as social movement research in the form of qualitative accounts and various forms of quantitative data to provide context on the effects of these broader level inequalities on contemporary South Africa. Furthermore, there is an exploration of how power relations between institutions and agents are influencing precarious situations within and outside the workplace and what exactly the response has been to circumvent the consequences of precarity.

1.1. Problem statement

This mini-dissertation is based on secondary research focused on the relationship between precarity and social movements in contemporary South Africa. Qualitative data and methodology will be the main focus, while quantitative data will help in providing context. To do this the dissertation concentrates on the two-fold paradox that surrounds the transition from Apartheid to democracy in South Africa. First, this transition coexists with the reproduction and deepening of racialized structures of poverty and inequality. Second, this transition also coexists with the persistence of collective action and protest from below. The dissertation is to develop a critical synthesis of existing research on the dynamics and dimensions of precarity and protest in South Africa to reflect on the turbulent nature of the country's political economy in the twenty-first century.

1.2. Research questions

1.1.1. What are the main forms and manifestations of precarity in contemporary South African society?

1.1.2. How is precarity in South Africa linked to and shaped by past and present economic and social policy regimes?

1.1.3. To what extent and in what ways have groups and communities living in/with precarity engaged in collective action to change their circumstances?

1.1.4. What have been the political and economic outcomes of collective action by groups and communities living in/with precarity

1.3. Objectives and aim of the research

The overarching objective of this mini-dissertation is to analyse pre-existing research surrounding precarity and contestation through social movements within South Africa. The *specific* objectives are as follows:

1. To explore the main forms and manifestations of precarity in contemporary South Africa.
2. To determine if and how precarity is linked to past and present social and economic policy regimes.
3. To explore the impact of economic and social policy on individuals and communities in precarious situations.
4. To scope and evaluate various social movements across South Africa in the post-Apartheid period.
5. To determine to what extent these social movements have helped individuals in precarious situations.

1.4. The rationale of the study

The intent behind this research is to look more closely into the paradox that surrounds the transition to democracy and the two decades of post-Apartheid. This paradox has seen deepening forms of inequality and precarity as well as a persistence of collective action and protest from below. In this research, I am seeking to understand the relationship between precarity and collective action. The first part of this relationship to be explored consists of precarity as a material and existential condition and how it impacts the livelihoods and lifeworlds of the citizens in contemporary South Africa, especially black working-class communities. Then, I explore and discuss social movements and various forms of resistance in contemporary South Africa, to determine how precarity and collective action are linked. This link will be unpacked in relation to how many South Africans feel as though they are left without a voice by the elite in the call for social, political, and economic change through asserting their autonomy and resistance. The ambition is that a critical synthesis of existing research on these topics contributes to further discussions and debates about the nature and dynamics of the political economy of contemporary South Africa, and what the likely future trajectories of this political economy might be.

1.5. Chapter Division

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Methodology and Ethics

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2. Chapter 2: Methodology and Ethics

2.1. Research design

This dissertation follows an overarching qualitative methodology approach research design. According to Christensen et al. (2015), qualitative research involves nonnumerical data to answer a research question. Even though in this dissertation the dominant approach was qualitative there are some brief amounts of published statistical data to provide context. Furthermore, this dissertation utilises a secondary analysis approach. According to Heaton (2004, 2011), secondary analysis is a methodology that makes use of pre-existing data, both quantitative and qualitative. Furthermore, Johnston (2014) states that secondary analysis is any further analysis of an existing dataset that already presents interpretations, conclusions, or knowledge additional to, or different from, those presented in the original report and its main results.

The dissertation uses published findings in books, governmental databases, statistical data, journal articles, and other related sources as a point of analysis. Addington-Hall et al. (2013) iterate that secondary analysis aims to find answers to research questions that differ from the questions asked in the original research, where one seeks to generate and synthesise meanings from multiple studies. Moreover, this dissertation utilises a critical interpretative synthesis to evaluate the data to be used in the secondary analysis and examine their context, analytical techniques, and methods applied to promote the rigor and ethical conduct of the research.

2.2. Sampling

Since secondary analysis makes no use of primary sampling techniques the sampling methods used in the original data neeeds to be evaluated. Thorne (2013) states that when one conducts a secondary analysis study, it is important to have a critical account of the inherent nature of the samples involved in creating the original databases. This has been done to avoid representational issues that can be exaggerated or even distorted in secondary analysis research. In addition, evaluating the sampling helped to determine if there were any forms of bias within the study. For example, if primary databases systematically privilege distinct perspectives, the analysis of the research must take note of the implications of the representational problems.

2.3. Data Collection

This secondary analysis research made use of official archived and published research data, that had been collected by other institutions or researchers for other purposes in order to generate new understandings and further analyses for this research (Christensen et al., 2015). The data obtained was comprised of already collected primary data via formal (public or institutionally archived primary datasets) and or informal data sharing sources (pooled datasets separately collected by two or more researchers or other independent researchers in carrying out secondary analysis) (Wickham, 2019). In this dissertation, official data was obtained from various sources, including public published research, and publicly available qualitative and quantitative data accessed through archives, journals, and governmental surveys.

This dissertation made use of a reflective approach to check for appropriateness, congruency, and quality of the collected data before it has been included in this research. Before any data was used in this study, the following was evaluated, the original purpose of the study, who was responsible for compiling/ collecting the data, what information was collected, when was the information collected, and how was the information collected as well as the consistency of the information in relation to other sources (Johnston, 2014).

2.4. Data analysis

Data analysis from a secondary perspective can become quite complex. There are epistemological tensions in qualitative research, such as the problem of not being present during data collection, meaning there is a lack of consistency between the 'epistemological' and 'paradigm' positions (Heaton, 2011). This research utilised publicly available published qualitative and quantitative data to summarize and construct new meaning from already existing data surrounding precarity, social movements, and the ideology behind the subaltern in contemporary South Africa. The qualitative data was analysed through retrospective analysis to generate new perspectives or conceptual focuses concerning precarity and social movements within contemporary South Africa. (Brewer and Miller, 2003; Bryman et al., 2011).

2.5. Literature, the advantages, and limitations

When researching precarity and social movements one needs to understand that Global North and Global South theorisations differ in the utilization of the information and the context in which it has been obtained and analysed from. In this research, genealogies of precarity and social movements regarding precarity itself from both the Global North and South are investigated. This is done to determine whether an overarching Global perspective has influenced the genealogies of precarity and social movements in South Africa. From there a more specific contemporary approach is taken within the Southern African context.

This research made use of secondary data and there are a variety of advantages, such as the saving of time and accessibility to a plurality/diversity of data and cost reductions. This research made use of open-access journals and books for qualitative data and some quantitative and governmental and census data sources exclusively for the quantitative data that allow for the collection of secondary data in South Africa (Clow and James, 2014).

There were some limitations in the use of secondary data that were encountered during this research, such as the amount of data that was irrelevant to the research, which required some navigation and carefully crafted phrases. This helped to limit some of the unnecessary information and the ease of finding applicable data (Clow and James, 2014). In addition, another downfall is that one needs to evaluate the accuracy of the literature before making use of it to determine if the information is sound and it if will be of use in one's research. The data source, the purpose of study, sample selection, data collection process, data analysis, and data interpretation all need to be evaluated to determine whether or not the data applies to one's research.

2.6. Advantages and limitations of the methodology

- Qualitative methodology:

First, the advantages of qualitative methods include, the capability of drawing on multiple types of sources which is advantageous for secondary analysis (Christensen et al., 2015). In this study like most qualitative studies, subjectivity is both an advantage and a limitation. The advantage lies within the exploration of a phenomenon from multiple avenues and this allows the research

to evolve, much as it did in this study. The limitation lies in the fact that the data remains open to interpretation, meaning different interpretations can arise when different researchers tackle the data. One other limitation is that the data is particularistic meaning it is difficult to generalise, which is why the research sticks to a Southern African perspective and inserts key statistics to provide context.

- Secondary analysis:

First, the advantages of secondary analysis include the furthering of research around precarity and social movements through re-analysis and re-interpretation of existing data (Johnston, 2014). Second, the limitations of secondary analysis include, that the data originally collected was for another purpose, meaning it was set in a particular space-and-time paradigm, which has been acknowledged in this research.

2.7. Ethical Considerations

According to Addington et al. (2012: 6), "there are ethical considerations when carrying out any research, such as issues of confidentiality, nonmaleficence, and fidelity, which are relevant to secondary analysis". When one conducts secondary analysis, informed consent cannot be presumed. In this research, it was feasible to obtain said consent prospectively (Heaton, 2011). What Heaton (2011) means by this is when conducting secondary analysis, one must only reuse data where consent has been procured from participants for their data to be shared for future analysis or to have the research archived by the primary researchers. This is done to make sure that all considerations for consent are met and adhered to.

With regards to confidentiality and nonmaleficence, this research de-identified data and prevent any linkages if there are any as far as possible. If there was any information that could link back to the participants of the primary research it was either not used or altered in such a way that the data still holds its original meaning but cannot be traced back to any participant. This was done through anonymizing data by deleting any real names, using pseudonyms, or otherwise disguising any identifiers where required (Heaton, 2014). With regards to fidelity and copyright, this secondary analysis research adhered to all intellectual property rights and cite all relevant authors following the copyright Act 98 of 1978 and the University of Pretoria's 'Plagiarism Prevention Policy'.

3. Theoretical Framework

Much focus on the study of precarity has been Eurocentric in nature and inevitably skewed more towards understanding the phenomenon from a Global North perspective, although this has provoked critique from the Global South. The first section of the chapter looks into how precarity is theorised from the Global North and critical theorisations that have arisen in the Global South. The next part of the chapter illustrates how precarity is theorised to extend beyond the workplace and the various forms of resistance aimed at dismantling precarity.

3.1. Precarity in different contexts

Northern theorisations of precarity. The Global North has theorised precarity to be a post-world war II phenomenon, a manifestation of the globalisation era and neo-economics, whereby, market flexibility would increase and result in the creation of *the precariat*, "a *class-in-the-making*" (Standing, 2011: 7). Standing (2011) views the precariat as a proletariat who has lost long-term, stable and fixed-hour jobs. Where there is a precariousness of residency, labour, and work as well as social protection, which he refers to as old entitlements that have been stripped away in the contemporary globalised market. From the early 1970s to the present day, precarity has become a significant concern in the sociology of work. Standing (2011), believed that the central aspect of precarity in the Global North was the neoliberal model, where market competitiveness is maximised to allow the market to permeate all facets of life.

Standing (2011) goes on to further say that globalisation has destroyed the national class. Much attention has been focused on how neoliberal policies have resulted in labour markets plagued by low-paying jobs, insecure employment, long working hours, and little access to social protection. The precariat, according to Standing (2011), is a class with little to no bargaining power in relation to capital, and no form of secure work-based identity, and those who belong to this class thus find it difficult to cement themselves in a workplace. Precarity in the Global North was first seen in the form of irregular work that came with the spreading of informal work in the 1970s as the long-term crisis of Fordism and Keynesianism came to a head.

The rise of a post-industrial economy in the wake of the economic crisis of the era. Characterized by the spread of "flexible labour arrangements" and the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in western labour markets, leading to a new regime of flexible accumulation

(Betti, 2018). Betti (2018) illustrates that these transformations are characterized by an essentially neoliberal approach to labour relations. The flexibilization of work freed the market from state control and allowed capital to mobilise around deregulated employment relations, increasing insecure and low-paying jobs (Harvey, 1990).

Standing (2011) lists the several forms of labour security under industrial citizenship that have been eroded by the neoliberal turn and precarious work:

- Labour market security: adequate income opportunities and at the macro-level involves a governmental commitment to full employment.
- Employment security: protection against unfair workplace practices, such as arbitrary dismissals, hiring and firing policies, and consequences for employers who do not adhere to the policies.
- Job security: opportunities of job retention in niche employment or upward mobility in terms of status and income and barriers for skill dilution.
- Work security: compensation for and protection against accidents and illness at work, such as health and safety regulations
- Skill reproduction security: opportunity of gaining skills through training or apprenticeship and/or making use of competencies
- Income security: assurance of adequate, sustainable, and stable income, protected through systems such as minimum wage, wage indexation, independent trade unions, and progressive taxation to reduce inequality.
- Representation security: possession of a collective voice in the labour market, such as through unions and the right to strike.

As laid out in Betti (2018) other Northern theorists such as Cynthia Cranford, Leah Vosko, and Nancy Zukewich define precarity as a continuum across four categories, the degree of certainty in employment continuity, control over the labour process, and degree of regulatory income and protection. Kalleberg (2009: 2) goes a little further by defining precarious work as "employment that is uncertain, unpredictable and risky from the point of view of the worker", where precarious work is a process, a shift in power between labour and capital, often mediated through the state and policy. This shift in power as Kalleberg and Vallas (2018: 5) suggest is the emergence of a new stage in the political economy, a successor to "organized capitalism",

where precaritization serves as a political function as a result of the uncertainties of neoliberalism. Kalleberg (2009) acknowledges that precarity impacts on a multi-institutional level, by laying out the impacts both within and outside the workplace as well as the fact that it is not a new phenomenon. Where precarity acts as an instrument of governing, a basis of capital accumulation, social control, and regulation, although, the main focus is on precarity as an experience from the Global North perspective, with the application of this paradigm on a global level (Kalleberg and Vallas, 2018). As Mosoetsa (2016) states, many researchers either leave precarity as implicit, formulate a new definition, or an ad hoc operationalization based on available data, which is restrictive. In the 1990s, precarity became a looser term denoting an omnipresent social background of precariousness, a social situation that could potentially lead to poverty, which included although was not limited to the realm of work (Choonara, 2020). Theories of precarity were often formulated from a Northern perspective by scholars such as Standing as it was tied to the globalisation era, in which, a new class structure is generated and superimposed on earlier structures (Scully, 2016). These Northern views of precarity as suggested by Southern theorists like Scully, Munck, and Mosoetsa are short-sighted; in viewing precarity as static and one-dimensional in the workplace, one negates the impacts of precarity beyond the workplace.

Southern theorisations of precarity. We start with Scully (2016), who states that precarity and how individuals experience the effects of precarity is in no way a universal phenomenon. Given the fundamental differences in the history of work, workers in the Global North and the Global South have experienced different forms of proletarianization and dispossession. Looking at the genealogy of precarity, Southern studies in labour sociology have documented working conditions in the South long before there was mention of it from a Northern perspective. According to Munck (2016), some of the first conceptual understandings of Global South precarity can be traced back to having its genealogy tied to the theory of 'marginality' from the 1960s in Latin America. During this time a vast number of internal migrants were under-employed and resided in the urban periphery in informal dwellings and were subsequently marginalised from the capitalist system (Munck, 2013). Although in the 1970s and beyond empirical research showed that there were limitations to the marginality theory, such as there was limited evidence that a labour elite or aristocracy had formed, separated from, or opposed the marginal masses. The marginal poor and working-class were seen as functional to monopoly capitalism and were then integrated into the system, where there was considerable continuity between the patterns of formal and informal work, rather than a rigid divide. They

were seen as marginalized surplus mass, the lumpen-proletariat, a group with little to no class status, lacking a relation to productive activity, as a result of historical and continuous exploitation and marginalization (Han, 2018). However, the marginal poor were not anomic individuals or mere symptoms of social breakdowns, they did not lack awareness of their collective interest as an oppressed class, on the contrary, they developed strong social networks and strategies of considerable dynamism.

The next Southern development in the theorization of precarity took place in the 1970s in the African context and was understood under the term informality. Informality as Munck (2016) states, is used to describe individuals working outside the formal capitalist system, where the means of production are non-capitalist intensive and are owned by those who operate it and the division of labour is rudimentary. Munck (2016) goes further to show the distinction between formal and informal work is that of wage-earning and self-employment. Mosoetsa (2016) enhances the argument of informality by stating that the concept allows a broader view of precarity beyond the scopes of formal/stable employment, given that stable employment is not as common in the Global South in comparison to the Global North. Han (2018) also adds that defining precarity from a Eurocentric point of view, and purely linking it to the facets of Keynesianism, Fordism, capitalism, and intimacy is an effective desire for security itself, which is problematic. In the Global South precarity is theorised differently as the Global South/postcolonial world has never directly experienced neither a Fordist phase of capitalism nor the manifestation of a welfare state, resulting in the casualizing of work, which stands in contrast to neoliberalism.

In the Global South, instead of Fordism or welfare state capitalism, there was what Munck (2016: 752) calls modern forms of "permanent primitive accumulation" in super-exploitation and accumulation by dispossession, that contributed to precarious work. On the one hand, the Polanyian viewpoint focuses on the commodification of labour, land and money, where working-classes are being unmade and precarised in the North and separated from the means of subsistence in the South. On the other hand, the Marxian viewpoint focuses on proletarianization based on the separation of workers from the means of production; moreover, Marx engages with the new working-class of the South. Consequently, this will allow for what Munck (2013) refers to as combining the Polanyian disembedding and dispossession process and Marxian proletarianization viewpoints on labour issues. This allows us to first illustrate that work was 'always-already' precarious in nature and never completely secure, in a system

based on power differentials and promotes structural exclusion, second by combining the Marxian proletarianization and Polanyian dispossession the current dynamics social transformation, which is inevitably to unmake and remake the working class (Munck, 2013). Although this form of thinking as pointed out by Munck (2013) can potentially lead to social disintegration and the rise of authoritarianism. Neither approach on its own will be sufficient, and still does not fully grasp and acknowledge the Southern condition of precarity, although the combination could help in unravelling some of the contemporary processes affecting labour. Moreover, given the lack of acceptance of Global South academic data and research as well as unequal forms of Global South labour relations that were normalised under the colonial project (Munck, 2016). This normalisation of insecure work in the colonial project has now become a defining feature of work in the Global South from its colonial past, through various stages of independence (Scully, 2016). In the contemporary Global South, precarity has been marked by the postcolonial state and later, the developmental state. The changing nature of work from a contemporary standpoint comes as a result of the erosion of the welfare state and can only be seen as one contributing factor of precarity. Other contributing factors such as the fraught relations between workers, the state, and society in the South, which manifested through limited forms of citizenship in the South have existed for far longer (Munck, 2016).

3.2. Precarity beyond work

Choonara (2020) highlights that there are two common divergences of precarious thought. The first includes that in social science literature, the understanding of precarity moved beyond just the workplace, into how such conditions of employment may impact on a social or a political level. The second involved the experiential understanding through radical social movements where the unemployed protested under the banner '*Agir Contre la précarité laboral*' as well as workers and labour unions struggling against labour reforms and precarious contracts (Choonara, 2020: 429). Utilising Southern paradigms of theorizing precarity goes beyond precarity merely being a working experience and helps to illustrate the phenomenon as an ontological condition, which can neither be grounded in simple factual evidence nor can it only be applied to the workplace. Neilson and Rossiter (2008) argue that the ontological condition of precarity cuts across social divisions by illustrating the experiences of the political subject, a general existential state of economic exploitation. In addition, under precarity, there is a commonality of existential insecurity and unstable relations with one's identity. Rather, precarity is felt most in environments where there are already high levels of inequality

vulnerability, marginalization, and poverty. More specifically, precarity is vastly more prevalent in the Global South, where a surplus of labour-power has led to a significant rise in the informal sector (Paret, 2016).

Precarity as a political concept. According to Neilson and Rossiter (2008), precarity is seen as an identity defined by the economic and existential experience of risk and uncertainty, where the political subject is in an existential state of economic exploitation and political subjugation. However, precarity was not seen as an irregular condition, when set against the Fordist/Keynesian norm, and rather in a capitalist system, it is seen as a norm. In these paradigms, the driving force is the economy, the relation between the state and capital, not the citizen/worker. Neilson and Rossiter (2008) go on to suggest that the debate around precarity sought to identify precarious, contingent, and/or flexible workers as new kinds of political subjects, with their own forms of collective action and modes of expression and how they fit into the changing political economy. However, this relation between citizenship and labour is fading and ceasing to produce the status of citizenship, as a result of the fracturing nature of the work environment such as working times and places make political organization difficult, which slowly erodes solidarity amongst workers (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). From this Neilson and Rossiter (2008) show that on the one hand precarity can be seen as a political concept where it can act as a form of social praxis instead of epistemological mapping, upon which we can critically reflect on questions of economic, political and social justice and emancipation. On the other hand, precarity as a political concept goes beyond the economist approaches, where precarity becomes an ontological experience of a transversal manner, rather than something completely empirical. Where precarity is investigated as an experience, used to understand political subjugation and economic exploitation as well as the existential state of the precarious worker. This broadened scope of precarity would aid in illustrating the existential state of individuals in precarity beyond the workplace and allowed for the questioning of justice and emancipation in the form of collective organization. The experiences of precarity occur across competing value regimes, such as the surplus value of precarious labour, scarcity of intellectual property rights, cultural and social value of individuals and group identities, and legal and governmental policies. It would involve questions of housing, debt, welfare provision, and personal relations individuals have with precarity. The translation of precarity across these value regimes is dynamic and registers the movement of relations, which are directly and indirectly influenced by external factors (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Although precarity is not grounded in set experiences it is dynamic and transversal in nature, where a

multitude of experiences, become the schematic of political organisation that cuts across social, geographical, and temporal sites.

The commodification of human beings and the creation of an identity of insecurity. Even though precarity cuts across multiple experiences across diverse value systems, there are common themes that impact on a multi-institutional and multidimensional level, which are insecurity (material and existential) and inequality. Within capitalist societies, there is an immense need for the accumulation, exploitation, and commodification of labour. This is highlighted when Neilson and Rossiter (2008: 57) state that " living labour-power as a whole appears as inescapably subjugated to the unstoppable march of accumulation". This accumulation intensified over time leading to what Neilson and Rossiter (2008: 57) refer to as "the breaking of collective bargaining, and the stratification of the labour force into a restricted upper level of highly skilled workers and a vastly lower level of atomized and flexibilized individuals kept on low wages and in precarious jobs." How this relates to work and precarity is through the wage relation between labour-power, exchange value, and surplus-value. Some of the surplus value goes to running the workplace, investing in machinery and some profit is appropriated by the employer. However, exchange value is determined by a baseline of what is considered necessary to meet the absolute basic needs of the worker itself, meaning the pay the worker receives is not a fair share of the surplus-value produced. This unequal economic relation between surplus share and labour is a pivotal factor in the reproduction of the experience of precarity, especially for wage labourers (Holborow, 2018). Labour expropriation creates an inherent possibility of the existential questioning of work identity, given the connections that individuals develop with their work (Kenny, 2011).

Beyond work identity disruptions, are the psychological hardships and individual identity disruptions that come from being treated as commodities and expendable labour by the owners of the means of production (Kalleberg, 2009). Precarity influences not only the material aspects of our lives, but also sows insecurity, which disrupts our existential moral conduct of life, resorting to such thinking of *how to best live our lives in a bad life* (Butler, 2015). Social categories and conditions are linked to an individual's moral conduct, where existential inequalities become linked to existential insecurities. This relation goes deeper into "how the broader operations of domination and power enter into or disrupt our individual reflections on how best to live" (Butler, 2015: 195). This disruption of an individual's life through power and

domination potentially leads to existential insecurities, or more specifically, "how can one live a good life in a bad life?" (Butler, 2015: 213).

3.3. The history of social movements against precarity

Northern resistance to precarity. Scully (2016: 164) argues that some of the earliest signs in the struggle against precarity were seen when "peasants and early industrial workers" exhibited fierce resistance to dispossession and proletarianization. Although in the 19th century, popular class struggles arose not where proletarianization and de-skilling had advanced the most but rather where they were being resisted. This form of resistance to proletarianization shows what Scully (2016) refers to as a strong rejection of the experiences of wage labour in the Global North. Continuing through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries where resistance against precarity and proletarianization as well as the lobbying for active and fair labour politics remained marginal in the North, but remained central to the labour politics of workers in the South. It was in the 1990s that resistance specifically to precarity and precarious labour became prevalent in the Global North as was seen in France, Italy and Spain through the Euro Mayday radical social and Occupy movements (Han, 2018). During this time in France sections of the unemployed could protest under the banner of "Agri contre la précarité laboral". In Spain, unions had begun rallying against labour reforms that were seen as normalizing precarious work and contracts (Choonara, 2020).

Han (2018) takes this further by showing that these movements sought a rethinking of political forms and actions that arise from institutions or the formal rules of politics. These resistances were coordinated through singularities that negate the masses through unstable, networked, patchwork multiplicities, experimentation with direct democracy, or dispossession as a political response to disenfranchisement. Moreover, this line of thought allowed individuals to question why understanding precarity was important. Not specifically as a medium through which we can objectively look into the increasing unemployment, poverty, or the increasing amounts of precarious work, but rather as a concept of lived insecurity and a fear of instability concerning employment, income, and living standards (Choonara, 2020). Moreover, that precarity was to be seen as a political motif where global movements relate not only to the labour market but also to the interpersonal insecurities and moods that surround current economic events in advanced capitalist climates in a time of interminable global conflict.

Southern resistance to precarity. Resistance to proletarianization and dispossession has been part of a long legacy for the southern worker and a central aspect of the labour politics of workers throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Since precarity is not a new issue in the Global South there have been adoptions of different strategies, such as social movement unionism and grassroots struggles which link workers' demands to broader social and political issues (Scully, 2016). The legacy of resistance in the Global South begins with the rejection of colonial rule, the subjugation to western power in Global South territories, and the rise of capitalism, all of which directly sought the dispossession of subaltern groups through primitive accumulation (Nilsen, 2016).

According to Nilsen (2016: 274) in the early twentieth-century globalisation resulted in the colonial doctrine increasingly coordinating their efforts to "manage rural livelihoods" and "to order, control and compel the progress of their most backward subjects" to push for greater forms of development. Ultimately leading to the underdevelopment of the Global South, from this there was an influx of rural populations to urban centres. These areas made up the majority of the region's working class, and would further entrench anti-colonial nationalism and likewise resistance. Between the first and second world wars in the aftermath of the Russian and Mexican revolutions, peasants and workers collectively mobilized in the struggle for freedom from colonial rule and were linked in with the struggles for social justice, ending poverty, and promoting inclusion into the labour and broader markets. In the wake of decolonisation, newly independent countries experienced the demobilisation of mass movements that carried forth the anti-colonial project, in exchange for political accession. With political ascension came the development project of the mid-twentieth century which enhanced the commodification of economic life and dispossession across the third world. This created an enhanced form of top-down social control as well as the discrediting and vilifying of resistances against capitalism, privatisation, and neoliberal development. In addition, neoliberalism continued to reproduce and entrench mass proletarianization and precaritization, to further capitalistic commodification of labour (Harris and Scully, 2015).

According to Scully (2016), one theory pertains to the labour movement in the Global South being in the midst of a prolonged crisis, as Scully (2016) states that over the past few decades formal wage workers and traditional organised labour is being undermined by capitalistic ideologies and globalization. This inadvertently had significant and far-reaching impacts on the labour movement and unions, given the erosion of shared material interests that defined

traditional labour politics. Another theory that Scully (2016) brings up by Ching Kwan Lee and Yelizavetta Koffman is the reformulation of the politics of labour towards a politics of precarity, where precarious workers are treated as political actors in their own right. This could be considered as a continuation of the theorising of erosion of formal labour movement organisations and precarity as an ontological experience, given that precarious workers will continue to resist, only it may not necessarily be through the same organisational forms as traditional labour.

4. Chapter 4: Contextualizing precarity and protest in contemporary South Africa

This chapter provides a general overview of the existing research to contextualize the contemporary South African environment and collective action. The aim of providing this overview is to show the development and entrenchment of South African precarity as well as the response of those living with the consequences. This overview sets the stage for the evaluation of four key aspects. First, to determine the main manifestations of precarity. Second, to evaluate the extent to which capitalism, neoliberalism, and politics and policy influence the continued creation, maintenance, and reproduction of precarity. Third, to scope and evaluate the landscape of resistance. Last, to determine to what extent these forms of resistance have aided individuals in precarious situations.

4.1. Contemporary South Africa in context

4.1.1. Economic context of contemporary South Africa

The economic climate in South Africa has been claimed to be that of an emerging global power and this was even seen with the introduction of South Africa into the BRICS - the grouping that recognises the world's leading emerging markets. Yet, the country remains a site of extreme inequality. South Africa's economy has gone through some vast changes with the transition to democracy. Although, to empower the black majority of the country entrenched colonial and Apartheid characteristics in public and private sectors need to be resisted and restructured, to circumvent the widening of inequality in the post-Apartheid climate.

South African Settler-colonial and Apartheid economy. Hart and Padayachee (2013) break down the settler-colonial and Apartheid economy development into three chronological stages. The first stage was the mining revolution of the late nineteenth to early 20th century, which took place in the context of financial imperialism. As early as 1889, the Chamber of Mining organized the recruitment of black labourers, who were housed in single-sex households. Compelling the miners to return to rural areas regularly, an oscillating system of migration was created by the state and highly regulated by the Chamber of Mines through the pass-laws. Wilson (2001) corroborates this by illustrating that the system of imperialism and exploitation would serve as a method of regulating the supply of cheap black labour as well as ensuring that white labourers, got and kept the best jobs by defining what jobs blacks could not do with the

colour bar. Furthermore, the imperialistic system created oligopolies and large enterprises that would go further influence governments to secure particular advantages through colonial-type relations. The Boer wars and the British colonists contributed a large portion of their global private and public investments into South African infrastructure to act as a subsidiary of white commercial agriculture and later manufacturing (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). From the late nineteenth to early twentieth-century South Africa fully participated in the globalisation process driven by financial imperialism and *Haute* finance. Mining and racial segregation during this era played a central role in South African capitalism and the embedding of racialised capitalism. Consequently, racialised capitalism resulted in disparities between black wages and mining growth. Wilson (2001) states that black miners had no real wage increase since their employment began in the 1880s up to 1969. In the years of 1911-1971, the gold mining sector increased its production on average by 30%, and the average value per fine ounce increased by 28%, every 10 years (Wilson, 2001). This shows that the gold mining sector was on average generating more income, yet the black wages saw little to no increase, a clear disparity.

The second stage emanated from the 1920s out of import-substitution industrialization, a Latin-American-style importing method with diversification in consumer goods industries for the limited white market. During this period, South Africa wanted to ensure greater forms of self-efficiency. According to Hart and Padayachee (2013), this was first seen in 1919, in the early stages of South African national/state capitalism, companies began securing spaces to create more opportunities for alternative investments within the country. Furthermore, Hart and Padayachee (2013) point to two trends that illustrated this move to national capitalism, namely the formation of the national state-run bank and the Afrikaner mutual financial services group. The national bank assisted in the establishment of the state-owned National Industrial corporation in 1919 to support the growth of local manufacturing and the JP Morgan financial empire. This development helped establish Ernest Oppenheimer's Anglo-America corporation, which subsequently shaped the development of the entire region, other developments included the formation of the Afrikaner mutual financial services group Sanlam. From here, there was an embrace of state capitalism with the introduction of the public electricity utility Eskom and the iron and steel monopoly, Iscor. Feinberg and Horn (2009) emphasize that these companies were white-owned under the colonial and Apartheid law, which paved the way further for the entrenchment of South Africa's racialised capitalism. All these companies followed white supremacist ideology, which was a result of segregation and reserved ownership laws such as the Natives Land Act. This would prevent Africans or any person of colour from buying land

in about 93% of Southern Africa and if there was any potential purchase of land anywhere in South Africa it had to go through the government. Inevitably preventing black business ownership in the majority of Southern Africa during this period and ensured their continued involvement in cheap labour, whilst promoting and reproducing white superiority (Feinberg and Horn, 2009).

The third stage began in 1945, where there a move was made from mining into the steel and chemical sectors in what came to be known as the Mineral-Energy Complex (MEC). 1945 signalled a turning point in forms of capitalism in the leading industrial countries, which included South Africa. This turn was a move away from the unregulated market system, which was driven by unaccountable and volatile financial forces, and marked the start of national capitalism in South Africa, where government policy focused on developing public infrastructure and services. This was a clear move away from western imperialism. However, in South Africa, the anti-colonial revolution differed as privileges were racialised and reserved for the white minority in South Africa (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). This was further cemented by increasing work relations between state corporations under the National Party's control such as Eskom and Iscor and Anglo, meaning that there could be higher forms of governmental control and surveillance within the mining, manufacturing, and energy sectors. Introducing and reproducing racially discriminatory legislation and policy facilitated by the national party would go on to be one of the many stagnations of the African economy, that would further protect white labour and exploit African, coloured, and Indian labour (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010).

Furthermore, as highlighted by Bell and Farrell (1997) the relevant contributions of each sector to the GDP of South Africa between 1956 and 1994, both the MEC and mining in South Africa showed initial signs of growth between 1956 and 1966. Piggy-backing off of the golden age of capitalism and the post-war boom, both sectors after this period began to show increasing forms of decline. The MEC fell by approximately 5% during this period and the mining sector fell by 10%. MEC manufacturing showed minimal growth during this period at roughly 5%. One of the main reasons this came about was the growing shortage of skilled labour caused by racial segregation in the labour market (Hart and Padayachee, 2013). Nattrass and Seekings (2010) point out that this resulted in meagre productivity growths of 0.2% per annum between 1950 and 1973, meaning that South Africa could not compete on a global level. However, this was

only the beginning, by the early 1970s, there were increasing forms of resistance both local and global towards South Africa's form of capital accumulation and Apartheid structure as a whole.

The development of the South African economy in the democratic regime. With the transition to democracy in 1994, it took a while for the economy to reach the same point, early in the transition the economy remained stagnant. Although, this is to be expected, as the restructuring and reformation of the South African economy would not change overnight, given the entrenchment of widespread unemployment, inequality, and a lack of competitive capacity brought on by the Apartheid regime (Bain et al., 2017). Between 1994 and 1998 the economy only grew by approximately 3%, this was before the economy went into a recession in late 1998. Resulting in economic depreciation, where jobs began to be shed in the formal sector at a staggering rate (Bond, 2000). In light of this poor growth, the South African democratic government tried to take preventative measures in 1996 with the incorporation of the Macroeconomic Strategy, GEAR, based on neoliberal market principles, with a strong focus on economic growth. This policy aimed to increase government investment and would eliminate government dissaving, with claims of GDP growth of 6% and the creation of 400, 000 jobs per annum by the year 2000 (Bain et al., 2017). Moreover, there was a return to RDP in the 1999 election to keep the favour of the voters and ensure the ANC could remain in power and maintain control over these state-owned enterprises that could benefit the political elite.

The structuring of the South African economy. There were two major reasons for the introduction of Neoliberalism into the South African economy. The first was on the national level, representing what Bond (2000) refers to as an "elite transition" and to boost the economy in terms of global competitiveness through policies such as GEAR and growing foreign investment. The second was on a global level, as well as external pressures from Global North countries as well as China and Russia for investment. The introduction of neoliberalism in the transition to democracy was to ensure an *elite transition*, where communities and labourers were being ignored, resulting in increased amounts of community and labour struggles. Rather than respond to these sporadic and grassroots movements the democratic government introduced RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme). RDP was uneven and contradictory in practice, resulting in those in charge, being eventually dropped, given that welfarist programs were never in the mandate of the nationalist ideology of the ANC. The party then shifted the RDP fund toward 'corporate welfare' Spatial Developmental initiatives in 1998, where billions of taxpayer subsidies were injected into "capital-intensive, electricity-

hungry mega-projects" (Bond, 2000: 36) This includes amongst others the Mozal aluminium smelter in Maputo, which directly benefitted Apartheid white-owned capitalist companies Anglo-American, Sanlam, and Gencor. However, state-owned companies such as Eskom and the Industrial Development Corporation, which were now under the ANC's power, also benefitted (Bond, 2000).

On the national level, in 1990, just before the transition to democracy, Nelson Mandela and the ANC began talks of modifying the Freedom Charter to nationalize the mines, banks, and monopoly industries. What this turned into would be the scenario that Bond (2000) describes as the forgetting of the former shopfloor or street activists in favour of old-style, capital-intensive public subsidised industrial investments. This would result in a clear transition of power and capital from the Apartheid to the democratic government, where the neoliberal orthodoxy world become a reality in 1996 in the form of GEAR (Bond, 2000). Moreover, this push for neoliberalism came in the form of liberalisation demands from domestic capital and firms that were disinvesting millions of rands, whilst shifting to other African countries and abroad (Marais, 2011). One of the main reasons for this disinvestment was the supposed need for a corporate presence in the countries with which these companies traded. On the Global level, in light of the global recession in 1970, South Africa began looking into neoliberal adjustments to circumvent the consequences of the recession as much as possible. Furthermore, South Africa was looking to become more globally competitive, given that in the 1990s the post-war accumulation strategy broke down and export earnings were largely dependent on mineral commodities. However, the liberalisation of the South African economy led to the consequential penetration of the global recession and exploitative capitalistic investment into the South African economy. On the one hand, this resulted in increased inflation, job losses, and the removal of state subsidies as a consumer good. On the other hand, it allowed black workers to seize new spaces in the restructured labour market and launch a new wave of strikes to further cripple the Apartheid economy and its inherited consequences (Marais, 2011).

4.1.2. Social Context of contemporary South Africa

The social context for the majority of South Africans was and still to a large extent is shrouded in insecurity. Throughout South Africa, insecurity has infiltrated the labour system, especially the wage labour system, where workers are treated as nothing more than expendable commodities. An inherited Apartheid system rife with inequality continues to produce

inequality through diminished intergenerational transfers. Even within the democratic regime there is a diminished ability to produce and reproduce social and economic capital. Deepening inequality within the country and insecurity amongst the South African people.

The social consequences of Apartheid in contemporary South Africa. Apartheid has had long-lasting consequences, and still impacts peoples' lives today. Apartheid was defined by a set of racially discriminatory policies that were implemented by the Nationalist Party between 1948 right up until the early 1990s (Reddy, 2015). These policies were meant to preserve European or white political and economic domination and entrench economic, political, and social insecurity amongst people of colour in the country. Ultimately, this would contribute to the reproduction of a racialised class system within South Africa. These policies were implemented to maintain social control and white hegemony, where people were segregated by race into separate geographic locations or otherwise known as 'racial zone planning' (Christopher, 1997). Consequently, the black majority was exploited for their land and resources, and people of colour were removed from key suburb areas and city centres, as they were reserved for the white population.

Christopher (1997) goes on to further say that this impacted people of colours access to key job areas, meaning they had to either take part in semi-migration from the Bantustans to areas where they were allowed or spend most of their money on transport to their work. In contemporary South Africa, this remains a key problem as many South Africans are still located outside of key areas due to these forms of spatial planning. According to the SERI (2018), the Apartheid state failed to invest in the development of housing or municipalities in Bantustans, townships, and segregated areas; consequently, triggering repercussions of mass housing shortages, overcrowding, and the establishment of informal settlements. Moreover, despite constitutionally mandated land reform measures the post-Apartheid state has not been able to fully address the legacy of Apartheid's spatial planning. This is seen in the minimal increases in government subsidy to provide housing access from 5.6% in 2002 to 13.6% in 2018 and 13.1% of households still residing in informal settlements in 2018 (Statistics South Africa, 2018). This has led black South Africans to be disproportionately confined to the urban peripheries in dense poorly serviced settlements. According to Statistics South Africa (2019), there has been a consequence of disproportional access to vital resources such as water, electricity, and sanitation:

- Access to electricity for households by race in 2002: the highest was 99.2% for white and 97.7% for Indian/Asian, the lowest was 70.6% for black and in 2017 was 98.6% for white, 98.1% for Indian/Asian and 81.5% for black, whilst in 2017 the South African average was approximately 85%.

- Access to water for households by race in 2002, the highest at 99.3% for Indian/Asian and was 98.0% for white, the lowest was 63.7% for black and in 2017 was 97.5% for Indian/Asian, 94.8% for white, 69.1% for black, whilst in 2017 the South African average was 74,2%.

- Access to sanitation for households by race in 2010, the highest was 100.0% for white and 98.5% for Indian/Asian, the lowest was 49.2% for black and in 2017 was 99.4% for white, 98.8% for Indian/Asian, 78.7% for black, whilst in 2017 the South African average was 82.5%.

Even though these gaps are diminishing over time, with higher amounts of governmental intervention, access inequality persists to a large degree. The average access across South Africa is higher than the average access for the black population, which shows a racialised disproportionality between white and black households' access to these basic needs. Apartheid spatial planning system has led to geographical inequality in terms of access, which meant people had to migrate to urban areas to try and bridge the gap.

Mass urban migration in the transition to democracy. With the transition to democracy, there was mass urbanization from rural areas to cities once Apartheid segregation laws were abolished. This led to an influx of people migrating from rural areas or Bantustans to key suburban areas and city centres (Turok, 2012). South Africa's urban population has been rapidly increasing since the early 1990s. Following a report by Turok (2012) in 1990 the urban population accounted for approximately 52% of the population, in 2010 this grew to 62% and has been projected to grow to approximately 76% by 2050; however, the growth rate has been rapidly declining. In 1990 the average growth rate per annum of the urban population was around 42%, in 2010 this rapidly declined to around 21% and it has been projected that by 2050 the average annual growth rate per annum will be less than 10%, a possible indication of excessive permanent urban migration. This mass rural-urban migration comes as a response to the disequilibrium within a country's economic setting of increasing inequalities, economic disparities, poverty, and economic hardships (Mlambo, 2018). More specifically, the reasons

behind rural-urban migration include employment opportunities, educational and health services, and wage differences. Rural areas lack the critical infrastructure needed for rapid development thus limiting opportunities in rural areas. In Gauteng alone, 20 000 people per month temporarily migrate to search for better life opportunities, mainly in the form of employment purposes. However, many of these individuals did not have any form of property rights in the city centres or key suburban areas or claims to the land and they had to either create or dwell in informal settlements, a form of continuity inequality from Apartheid.

4.1.3. The political context of contemporary South Africa

South Africa has remained a site of political turbulence even in the democratic regime. Since the transition to democracy in South Africa, the ANC has held the majority vote and maintained its political hegemony in the battle amongst other parties. In societies like South Africa that are marked by a particular kind of modernity, brought on by settler colonialism, there is a mode of politics that involves a "power struggle over resources, recognition and who has the power to establish the foundations of evaluation" (Reddy, 2015: 4). This has led to a mode of politics that involves power struggles over resources, associated with liberal constitutional democracy and a competitive political realm. However, Booysen (2018) claims this hegemony is slowly diminishing as a result of spiralling inward and outward struggles for the ANC. The spiral came from a variety of reasons such as poor leadership, faltering loyalties as well as other parties in the country sparking the interest of civil society.

Transition to democracy, the shifting of power? Southall (2019) argues that before 1994, South Africa was one of the most polarised nations in the world, where white conquest and colonialism constructed, entrenched white domination, whilst reproducing poverty and powerlessness in the black majority. This was confronted by the counter-movement spearheaded by the ANC. The counter-movement and countless struggles resulted in the beginning of negotiations, leading to the unbanning of South African liberation organisations, the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, and the incorporation of the democratic constitution, although there was an air of uncertainty (Bond, 2000). In 1994 the vast majority of the South African population consented to ANC rule, whereby there was an acceptance of both the legitimacy and democratic order and ANC hegemony by electoral dominant position (Booysen, 2018). By 1996 the ANC government was gearing more toward economic policy to service domestic and economic capital for the emerging black capitalist class, and the hope was that

the benefits, would cascade into the lives of the impoverished majority. This was a monumental shift from organising with the working class and maintaining strong ties to South African trade unions, such as COSATU towards more of an allowance of capitalism to thrive on the same working-class constituency. The focus was on making South Africa more internationally competitive and attracting foreign investment, which would then be funnelled into targeted areas of the economy. This was to be an attempt at growth through redistribution, and the fruits of that growth were to be redistributed to fund basic needs for the working class and poorer majority (Marais, 2011).

From settler-colonial to a democratic regime and the structures at play. South African politics is shrouded in conflict, mainly over the distribution of resources, and the recognition of the rights of historically subjugated groups. This conflict relies on violent and threatening discourse. South African contemporary politics is based on its relation to modernity, that the state and civil society are integral to each other in a liberal society marked by settler colonialism. This approach allows for an understanding of proletarian unease, being manifested in the politics of social mobilisation as an experience of the country's modernity. It allows for a deeper analysis of how expressions its past histories, legacies of violence, and othering of identities. Illustrating a racially constructed economy with influences of racialised capitalism present in the liberal democratic project (Reddy, 2015), where inherited political, social, and economic divides, polarization and inequality persist. Democracy as argued by Southall (2019) brought about national reconciliation but would come to be challenged by ANC dominance. Furthermore, Southall (2019) states that this persistent polarization and widening inequalities are not the faults of democracy as an institution, but the politicization of democratic institutions by the ANC. Although, it must also be noted that the transition to democracy was under great pressure as the country incurred significant costs from Apartheid, including international sanctions, domestic costs from protest action, and insurgent popular revolt (Southall, 2019). This points back to Marais' (2019) argument of the inward and outward struggle of the ANC, showing a multi-institutional and multi-level influence on the paradox surrounding transitional democracy. Examples of polarization can be seen in spatial inequality and unequal access to proximity capital, where 80.5% of blacks, 8.5% of whites, 8.8% of coloureds, and 2.5% of Indians are still living in areas that were racially demarcated to them in Apartheid (Southall, 2019).

The shift of power based on contemporary structures and the democratic regime. Initially, in 1990 the ANC rejected calls from businesses for a low-wage economy in favour of the organising of labour and implementation of policy through redistribution. An approach that would come under heavy fire by economists for its socialist and populist leanings (Marais, 2011). This approach would be difficult to achieve as sovereign states are never autonomous and all modern states exist within a framework of constrained rules and politics in the interstate system. This would go on to being a political platform in which the ANC would cite globalisation as an unsurmountable roadblock in implementing national economic policy, without regarding the influence of the market. While this is true to some extent, it should not be a factor in removing the role of the state from the economy, trade, and industry. Especially, when that same democratic regime government was pushing for redistributive policies such as the affirmative action program BEE (Black Economic Empowerment), and the social security system. However, neoliberal policies were the dominant policy, such as GEAR which would inevitably stagnate state revenues and enhance capitalistic influence, making it more difficult to invest in redistributive and social protection policies (Leubolt, 2014).

4.2. Social movements in contemporary South Africa

In post-Apartheid South Africa, the country has remained a site for political turbulences for collective action from below. There have been four broad trends of resistance have surfaced in South Africa over the past two decades relating to precarity. These forms of collective action include the struggle of the radical ANC, community protests, the remaking of the trade union movement, and student movements (von Holdt and Naidoo, 2018). In addition, South African resistance has seen a massive increase within, the community, the workplace, and mainly individuals and groups who suffer under precarity.

Movements contesting democracy. When the ANC government adopted the macro-level economic policy that would later lead to the abandonment of redistributive and welfarist programs in favour of a more neoliberal approach there was bound to be resistance, as was seen with the 'Congress movement'. According to von Holdt and Naidoo (2018), this first began in 1996 as a challenge to the supposed democratic breakthrough that had not come to fruition. Consequently, this movement sought to question why the ANC was not fulfilling its mandate, and individuals in precarious situations realised the negative impact that neoliberal capitalism would have on their livelihoods (von Holdt and Naidoo, 2018; Nattrass & Seekings, 2015).

The resistance referred to as 'new social movements' follows a Polanyian perspective against economic liberalism, commodification, and privatisation which is generated through the experience of the market (Runciman, 2015). Other movements that contested democracy were seen in the early 2000s and some of the most noticeable included movements such as "the Concerned Citizens Group, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Form, and the Landless People's Movement" (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015: 304). All seem to follow the same golden thread which is standing up against political and economic subjugation of those in precarious situations. Some of the protests adopted class-based political ideologies, meaning they were anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal in nature.

Workplace movements and trade union restructuring. Beginning in 2009 there was a surge in worker resistance 'from below', mostly beyond both the unions and existing institutional frameworks (Paret & Runciman, 2016). Paret & Runciman (2016) make an important note here which is that many of the most marginalized workers such as temporary and casual employees are not part of unions. An example of trade union restructuring came during the Marikana massacre, where independent worker committees bypassed the workplace structures of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) one of COSATU's biggest affiliates. According to von Holdt and Naidoo (2018), violent conflict ensued between the platinum belt workers and NUM, resulting in the collapse of NUM across these platinum mines. The 'unprotected' wildcat strikes came as a result of the disconnection of the Union's stewards and officials and the mine workers, which led to the death of 34 mine workers. When negotiations proposed a greater wealth share with workers, established collective bargaining was being rejected, mass dismissals occurred and the voice of the mineworker was essentially being ignored and forgotten.

Another example of this would be COSATU, which is mostly made up of permanent employees and full-time contracts at around 92% in 2012. This comes as a result of the casualization of the workplace and growing entanglements between workers and unions. With the casualization of the workplace, unions and worksite organisations are hindered as many precarious/atypical workers are either not from a single workplace or any workplace at all. Employers take advantage of this by abusing definitions such as a 'worksite' to prevent the organisation of workers, thereby taking away their collective bargaining power (Naidoo & Veriava, 2005). The entanglements between unions and workers came about with the growing bureaucratization of unions and have been critiqued for losing their legitimacy of worker representation because of

this increase in bureaucratization. This is resulting in higher forms of worker militancy and resistance outside of unions and the Labour relations act.

Community-based collective action. There has been a rise of sporadic grassroots movements in contemporary South Africa, which took the form of community protests seen across the country, and generally take place in poorer sections of townships or informal settlements. These community-based grassroots movements usually centre around political exclusion, service delivery, and the provision of basic needs such as housing, water, and electricity. These community-based protests seem to arise out of frustration due to the situation of those suffering from precarious circumstances and the lack of support given to them by the channels that are meant to support and protect these individuals (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015). Most of these protests surround the personal experiences of precarity and mainly are aimed at local municipalities around housing, water, and other municipal services, although they do have the potential of becoming more widespread (von Holdt & Naidoo, 2018).

Moreover, these protests began with the lower-class, working-class, and eventually, the middle-class. Civil society would then go on to encompass major concerns regarding the ignorance of the ANC, state, and municipal to community needs and the lack of resolution relating to structural and racial inequality. Communities and citizens are expressing their anger and frustration, such as through the feesmustfall movements between 2015-2017, the xenophobic cases of 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2018 and the destruction (mainly through arson) of public buildings, transportation services, and freight-carrying trucks (Booysen, 2018). This ignorance on behalf of the state has led to community protests becoming more sporadic, disorderly, disruptive, and violent in nature as they have shown greater success in increasing governmental response.

Contemporary movements of a newer generation. As von Holdt and Naidoo (2018) state, this is one of the latest forms of contemporary resistance in South Africa. In a new context led by students and new workers, a mobilization of old political repertoires through social media against universities reorganizing around neoliberal lines. Aiming for free education and fair labour practices at higher institutions, was the basis; however, the movement was challenging broader social issues. Fomunyam and Hlatshwayo (2019) illustrate these issues included but were not limited to, the marginalization of black workers, decolonizing the higher education curriculum, poverty of students and families as a result of fee increases, and the engendering

of precarity by commodifying the educational life-line of upward social mobility. In addition to these issues, von Holdt and Naidoo (2018) identified that these students began grappling with the dominance of the Congress movement. Turning more toward Pan-Africanism and black consciousness when identifying problems with the ANC government. Von Holdt and Naidoo (2018) seem to think that these movements could hold the potential for a new kind of politics, where we stand together and overcome factionalism and shape holistic policy that will benefit everyone.

4.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, this contextual chapter has provided a general overview of existing literature around precarity and collective action in contemporary South Africa. This overview sets the stage for the evaluation of key aspects. First, to determine the main manifestations of precarity. Second, was the evaluation of the extent to which capitalism, neoliberalism, and politics and policy influence the continued creation, maintenance, and reproduction of precarity. Third, to scope and evaluate the landscape of resistance. Last, to determine to what extent these forms of resistance have aided individuals in precarious situations. Furthermore, The chapter sets the stage for a detailed analysis of precarity and social movements within contemporary South Africa, by aligning both phenomena in South African economic, social and political contexts. Social movements are becoming even more prevalent in South Africa for the precariat or groups against precarity continue to demand change and either confront, alleviate or avoid possible existential crises by tackling the problem from a collective front.

5. Chapter 5: Contemporary analysis of the South African political economy concerning precarity and social movements

This chapter analyses the contextual components of the contemporary South African economic, political and social environments and whether these realms potentially contribute to precarity on both a material and an existential level. By showing the paradox surrounding the contemporary South African environment a deeper understanding of South African precarity is illustrated as well as how precarity has and continues to be a racialised experience. Then, the South African social movement environment is analysed and contrasted with precarity to determine the relationship that exists between them, and whether or not social movements have brought relative change to the lives of individuals and communities living within precarity.

5.1. Precarity in the political and economic context

In the democratic regime, there has been a consistent push to ensure South Africa is competitive on a global scale to create jobs and grow our economy from the outside within. There have been both domestic influences such as consistent policy shifts such as GEAR in 1996 to establish 'fruitful' neoliberal grounds for capitalistic development and global influence, such as the penetration of the economy by international capitalistic institutions or global economic trends.

Expropriation and neoliberalism. South Africa's history with labour expropriation has resulted in the continual racializing of the labour market. Developed during Apartheid through racialized capitalism and continues to plague the South African society in the democratic regime (Bond, 2000). This is fairly evident in the races' unemployment and job aberration rates. This comes as a result of the entrenchment of colonial and Apartheid economic practices, the freeing up of the market and labour environments in South Africa as well as both ANC South African political factionalism and corruption (Reddy, 2015).

The democratic regime aimed to shift power to the black majority, although this redistribution still proves to be difficult and paradoxical in nature for two main reasons. Whites continue to dominantly own wealth in the private sector, whilst black communities experience unequally high and skewed levels of poverty and unemployment (Southall, 2019). The democratic government's rigid focus on nationalism and neglect of the country's poor are acting as a

stumbling block in achieving the developmental path of redistribution (Hart and Padayachee, 2013).

As was stated in the contextual chapter, the South African economy since the transition to the democratic regime has been more deeply embedded in global economic circuits through opening up trade through neoliberal policies. This resulted in an overall average annual GDP growth rate of 2.4% between the years 1994-2020, which is just under the Global average annual rate of 2.9% (World Bank, 2020). However, even with this average positive annual growth rate in GDP, the gains are not being transferred into the hands of your average South African and more importantly those who need it the most, those on the lower spectrum of the class scale who are either at risk of falling into poverty or are already suffering its grasp. Between 2017 and 2019 the average overall employment was approximately 27.1 million based on the reports received by the labour department, of that amount the private sector made up approximately 72.2% of overall employment. Now, between 2017 to 2019 whites continued to dominate top management positions at an average of 66.6%, while blacks were at 14.9%, Indians at 9.8%, and coloureds at 5.3% (Department of Labour, 2019). This shows that the vast majority of wealth which is owned by the private sector is still in the hands of the white minority; therefore, the entrenchment of a racialized of South African economy has resulted in wealth inequalities, an unequal division of the labour market, and unequal wage earnings.

Wealth inequalities:

- The Gini coefficient, invented by Corrado Gini is a coefficient that ranges from 0 to 1, to display the income inequality of a country (Statistics South Africa, 2019). South Africa's household per capita income Gini-coefficient currently stands at 0.63 as of 2021, the highest in the world in terms of income inequality, and has remained this high since 1993 (World population review, 2022). What drives this high Gini coefficient is the high levels of unemployment and unequal wage distribution within the labour market.
- As previously mentioned in South Africa the richest 10% of the population holds 71% of the wealth, while the poorest 60% of the population holds only 4%. As shown by Statistics South Africa (2019) there is an embedded racial structure to this ratio of wealth, between 2008 and 2017 in the distribution amongst social classes by race. The

South African elite class was white at 65.4%, followed by black at 22.6%, Indian/Asian at 6.5%, and coloured at 5.6%. Even more strikingly, the lower social classes including the vulnerable, transiently poor, and chronically poor were predominately black at 91.1%, 86.4%, and 94.4% respectively, coloureds at 8.7%, 10.8%, and 5.6%, Indian/Asian at 0.2% and 1.2%, and white 0.1% and 1.6% respectively. Both white and Indian/Asian did not feature in the chronically poor category.

This shows that there is a structural inequality component of precarity within South Africa, which was racialized through the Apartheid regime. During the Apartheid regime, there was the destruction of peasant agriculture and the informal economy, creating a system reliant on racialized waged work (Dawson and Fouksman, 2020). This has been carried over into the contemporary environment of South Africa, bringing forth inherited consequences of Apartheid policies that "intentionally created extreme inequality in every dimension of well-being" (Statistics South Africa, 2019: 10). This problem worsens when government serve their factional interests, rather than considering what is best for the economically, politically and/or socially marginalised people of South Africa. Booysen (2018) argues that these factional interests were present within the ANC and affected the state's ability to govern and transform society, creating rifts between government and their constituency and reproducing structural inequalities.

The racialized labour market:

- There have been persistent increases in unemployment and high fluctuations in labour participation and absorption rates. In the first quarters of 2020 and 2021 respectively, the unemployment rate stands at approximately 30.1% and 32.6%, labour force participation stands at 60.3% and 56.4% and the labour absorption rate stood at 42.1% and 38%. (Orkin, 1998).
- In 2004, the demographic composition and economic composition of South Africa were still incredibly unequal where the white minority made up 10.7% of the labour market. Yet they held the majority earning share at 42.9% and the highest wage per capita at R8438. The Indian/Asian population made up 3% of the labour force, held 6% of the wage earnings share, and their wage per capita was R5092. The Coloured population made up 10% of the labour force, held 9.9% of the wage earnings share, and earned

R2702 per capita, respectively; and the Black population made up 73.6% of the labour force, held 41.2% of the wage earnings share and earned R2023 per capita (Burger and Jafta, 2006).

- In 2015, this trend had not changed much with whites still earning the most on average per month at R24 646, Indians at R14 235, Coloureds at R9339, and Blacks at R6899 (Statistics South Africa, 2019).

- According to Statistics South Africa (2021), the unemployment and labour market absorption rates for whites are 10.1% and 63.7%, for Indian/Asians are 18.7% and 52.6%, for coloureds are 31.0% and 47.6% and for blacks/Africans are 44.1% and 39.2% respectively.

- In 2021 unemployment stood at 32.6%, and still, there are vast amounts of gender inequality, the unemployment rate, and absorption rate into the labour market for men are 36.9% and 47.5% respectively, whereas the unemployment rate and absorption rate for women is 43.4% and 36.9% respectively, there is inequality across racial lines in terms of employment (Statistics South Africa, 2021).

What this shows is a gap in wealth, employment, and wage earnings amongst different races, with a large skew favouring the white minority. In addition, it shows poor policy choice as there was a push for economic emancipation; however, there was no emancipation seen amongst the under-, working- and lower-middle-class constituency of the democratic regime. (Statistics South Africa, 2019). The majority of the time only upper-middle or elite classes can take advantage of a free-trade economy, whilst a large portion of South Africans continue to live in chronic poverty, as seen between 2008 and 2017, where on average this class accounted for 49% of South Africans. These inequalities systematically create an under-skilled labour force, as many of the individuals in the current labour environment are not being upskilled or cannot afford to upskill themselves or their families.

The racialisation of capitalism and the labour market and the inherited political, social, and economic structures have led to a racialised experience of precarity, whereby the black majority are being continuously marginalised in terms of employment, wealth distribution, and access to resources. This potentially constrains many South African citizens to partake in precarious labour, not by choice but to make ends meet. Consequently, capitalistic institutions continue to take advantage of these constraints in the pursuit of profit over worker relations expropriation.

This was done to suit only the needs of those who hold the most power in the industry, this being top-tier level management, shareholders, investors, and oligarchs both domestically and abroad who have interests in South Africa. This could lead to further consequences of current and future job seekers not being able to meet the hiring requirements of the labour environment, whose standards are increasing every day as a result of competitive market ideologies and the introduction of the 4th industrial revolution. In addition, through analysing gaps in wealth distribution, unequal labour participation and access to resources, and persistent inherited racialised structure, there seems to be a racialised experience of precarity. Moreover, the black majority is bearing the brunt of inherited consequences and contemporary failings of the political economy, which shows that the transition to democracy has become shrouded in a continual cycle of deepening racialized structures of poverty and inequality.

Capitalistic and neoliberal influences on precarity. South African capitalism historically depended on and benefitted from a racial division of labour for the sole purpose of cheapening African labour. Cheap labour allowed the white capitalist class to generate super-profits and extreme amounts of transferable wealth off exploitative and racist policies, and continuously marginalise black labour (Reddy, 2015). This began the entrenchment of a racialised capitalism in South Africa and these systems carried over into post-Apartheid South Africa (Reddy, 2015). During the transition to democracy, the South African political elite embraced global neoliberalism. When neoliberal policies are incorporated with the historically racialized inequities of Apartheid, it gives rise to a new form of 'market' inequities and increased capitalistic influence/power, instead of deracializing the economy by creating a free market. (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015: 8). With this neoliberal approach, the post-Apartheid government shifted its attention from being pro-poor to pro-business, contributing to the disregarding of shifting power to the black majority. Leading to the persistence of poverty and inequality as more power was given to international and domestic capital rather. In the early 2000s, there was a deepening embrace of neoliberalism, with increased privatization and the marketization of service delivery. Leaving many people without access to jobs and resources leading to worsening economic conditions, increased casualization, declining wages, and increased poverty. Nattrass & Seekings (2015) refer to this as 'predatory liberalism', a neoliberal capitalism driven by a powerful state and the capitalist oligarchy. This 'predatory liberalism' further marginalizes any who opposed the authority of the state and provided more power to Apartheid capitalism. So, instead of improving and embracing institutional, regulative, and macro-economic environments to strengthen government capacity, this predatory liberalism

strengthens key-decision making elites. Inherently, this limits policy and reform contributions and political involvement of oppositional parties, civil society, and citizens as a whole, which is essentially an erosion of democracy and could lead to greater forms of accumulation by dispossession (Andreasson, 2006).

To further improve the economic potential of the democratic regime, South Africa moved to become a greater global competitor, although this would go on to further entrench neoliberal ideology. Through the induction into the major emerging economies BRIC to show that South Africa is a competitive and investable market. The BRICS structure aims to recognize nations that were historically outside the recognised global core, with a high potential for future economic growth based on the size of their economies in comparison to their population size and growth performance of their immediate past (Harrison, 2014). However, the induction of South Africa into the BRIC system was and still is quite controversial, given the population size and annual GDP of South Africa as the smallest in comparison to China at the largest. Even in 2020 these controversies still stand with South Africa's population size and GDP at 59 million and $351 million respectively, in comparison to China the largest of the BRICS cohort with a population size of 1.398 billion and an annual GDP of $14.363 trillion (Rosstat, 2020). Where South Africa's induction into BRIC makes sense is the IMF indicators, which in 2014 showed that South Africa's economy is well diversified and structurally mature in comparison to the other countries (Harrison, 2014). However, this is a one-sided achievement for South Africa that will only benefit the elite and those who have access to the labour and broader markets. There seems to be a greater focus on international competitiveness rather than domestic concerns, resulting in domestic problems being ignored and the consequences only worsening over time.

Global trends are constantly influencing the South African economic, social and political environments, which also contribute to inequality and precarity in South Africa. First, during the Apartheid regime rising global oil prices as a result of steep hikes between 1973 and 1979 placed enormous pressures on local businesses. Given that their production was faltering and they were more reliant on the local market this hit the South African market and the MEC harder than most. Second, there were various economic sanctions placed on South Africa by other countries. For example, in 1986 there was the passing of the United States Anti-Apartheid Act against South Africa acted as additional pressure, this act was set to cut ties with South Africa in terms of Krugerrands, uranium, coal, iron, and agricultural products. Moreover, loans,

nuclear trade, and the export of computers, munitions, oil, and petroleum from the United States were either eliminated or greatly restricted (Redden, 1988). Additionally, in the same year, the European Commission placed limited bans on the imports of iron, steel, and gold from South Africa. This has caused South Africa to suffer financially as a result of trying to circumvent the sanctions through import-substitutions, some estimations say that South Africa lost approximately \$350 million or 0.5% of the GNP annually (Levy, 1999). Both the internal and external pressures placed considerable strain on the South African market which led to its stagnation.

In addition to political factionalism, neoliberalism, nationalism, and the neglect of the local economy, there is the influence of the fourth industrial revolution on the South African labour market. Precarity in South Africa is not only driven by the political, economic, and social landscape, modernity and industrialisation are influencing factors as well. Through automation and Artificial Intelligence, many South Africans are facing additional forces of casualization and unemployment. This has caused wage, informal and short-term labour to become became a central feature in South Africa as the working environment (Rapanyane and Sethole, 2020). Moreover, in the era of democracy, it would seem as though more power is shifting toward the employer, with increased amounts of outsourcing and an expansion of casual employment (Di Paola and Pons-Vignon, 2013). This slowly diminishes the bargaining power of all workers, but especially wage workers who already have minimal power in the workplace, as many of them are working in precarious situations. This could potentially increase South Africa's labour insecurity as well as existential insecurity and has resulted in further propelling South Africans into either precarious work environments and/or unemployment and poverty as well as reliance on an unsustainable social support system from governmental entities for survival.

5.2. Precarity in the social and economic context

To correct for the inherited economic consequences of Apartheid and the contemporary labour and class crises South Africa turned to reformative and redistributive social policies; however, social policy is never static, rather it is quite dynamic. There are external factors in the broader economic and political realms that can influence the introduction, functioning, direction, and efficacy of social policy (Patel et al., 2019). South Africa has a pluralistic social landscape that is focusing on both a transformative and a residual policy framework. On the one hand, transformative frameworks focus on the norms of solidarity and provide services and transfers

based on rights. The state intervenes as a channel for the reversal of structural inequalities and the redistribution of income and opportunities, which considers social and economic policy as complimentary. On the other hand, residual frameworks incorporate minimal forms of social policy and are based on norms of individual responsibility for the care of dependents, education, and the maintenance of health, these frameworks give provisions based on reciprocity. Considering social policy to be subordinate to economic policy, through regarding the market and the family structure as the primary welfare provider, while the state becomes involved as a last resort.

Social policy entrenching and reproducing precarity. First, South African transformative social policy aimed at changing the system and indirectly helping the precariat. Since 1994, there have been policies put in place by the democratic government that are aimed at tackling issues at a structural level, one of the most important would be the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which seeks to create a democratic society (Patel, et al., 2019). More specifically, the constitution provides a rallying point for civil society movements and the judiciary system to keep true to the common vision of human wellbeing. Next, we have the bill of rights, which contains the right to basic needs such as housing, healthcare, water food, shelter, social security, and education. The constitution then requires the state to fulfil the bill of rights within reason of the state's available budget. An example of these transformative policies would be RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme), which "seeks to empower the poor to seize opportunities to develop their full potential and sustain themselves through productive activity" (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015: 5). There are other transformative policies which seek to change the system, curb social and political inequality and aim to empower the majority precariat in South Africa, these include land reform and BEE policies (Ndlovu, 2019). Although as Ndlovu mentions it still has a long way to go as these policies are being overshadowed by a neoliberal discourse that "places economic rationalism at the centre of social transformation". Inherently overshadowing "non-institutional discourses of the marginalised subaltern - the poor and landless black South Africans" (Ndlovu, 2019: 133, 134).

South African residual policy aimed at directly helping the precariat. From the framework of the constitution, the foundation for the creation of certain policies and welfare systems that are aimed at directly helping the precariat were laid out (Patel et al., 2018). The residual framework focuses its attention in two ways, the first is on aiding individuals in lower social classes through direct monetary transfers and the second was to incorporate a neoliberal shift in the

economy so that those businesses can inadvertently assist individuals in precarious situations. The first involves welfare policies in South Africa, one of the main focuses lies in the redistribution of financial resources. This includes investment in public education, primary healthcare, child nutrition, housing, municipal services, welfare services, and social assistance for children, the disabled, and the elderly, which in the 2017/2018 period accounted for 60% of the South African government's expenditure (Patel et al., 2019). This has also been steadily increasing over the years as well, meaning that more funding is being set aside for social assistance. What is concerning though is that there is an increase in child care grants that are being requested, from 12 million in 2015 to a predicted number of 13.1 million between 2020 and 2021 (Department of National Treasury, 2019). This could be a cause for concern as it means there are more children in precarious situations, which has the potential of causing intergenerational transfers of poverty and increased forms of future precarity. The Second focuses on policies such as GEAR, a macroeconomic strategy that embraces neoliberal ideology and the requirements for capitalism to thrive, by emphasizing trade liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, fiscal austerity, and labour-market policy reform.

Social insecurity of South Africans and attempted the security solution. The social security system in South Africa to address widespread poverty has been in contention with neoliberal agendas to control social spending for years (Goldblatt, 2014). The social security system in South Africa contains a small insurance component and a large social assistance program, which is made up of three categories. Social assistance, which includes social grants, the public works program, and other interventions, such as the National School Nutrition Programme. The statutory funds, which includes the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Compensation Fund. The voluntary funds, such as medical schemes and retirement funds (Oosthuizen, 2021). In 2021 accounts for 3.3% of the country's GDP and approximately 15% of total government expenditure, which remains one of the largest across middle-income countries. However, there are relevant shortcomings of this system, such as a lack of support for working-age adults and informal workers, weak integration across governmental agencies and programs, and a limited ability to address household needs comprehensively. Moreover, social transfers are not fully integrated with other support systems to help recipients exit poverty (Oosthuizen, 2021). Although with around 17.8 million South Africans relying on social grants in the 2018/2019 period, and approximately 60% of the entire country benefitting directly or indirectly from such grants, the problem is larger than a social support system.

5.3. Existential inequality as a consequence of precarity

Failings of the contemporary democracy. In a liberalised economy that has become deindustrialised, where formal work decreased, casual and informal work has increased, an adverse effect on the oppressed majority occurs, which has led to increased forms of precarity and poverty (Nattrass & Seekings, 2015), which could result from three main reasons. The first is the entrenchment of colonial practices and capitalist relations within South African institutions, which resulted in a racialised capitalistic economy. The second is the failure of the introduction of neoliberal policies in contemporary South Africa, whose modernity is based on settler colonialism, racialised capitalism, and the incorporation of inadequate social and economic policies that created more precarious work environments and drove individuals into further poverty. The third is South Africa has a history of white supremacy, resulting in the political and economic exclusion of black people and other people of colour (Reddy, 2015). It is for these three reasons that there is a continual reproduction of impoverished households. The majority of black Africans had no access to land, as a direct result of Apartheid, pushing the black majority into rural areas or informal settlements. Working-age adults are unemployed as a result of the racialised economic climate, there is a high possibility they lack the skills to enter a shrinking labour market, and if they managed to find employment, it usually involves precarious conditions. Many black households had no claim on the state, no members were entitled to pensions nor governmental grants during Apartheid, and in the contemporary environment, these grants are either barely assisting or at best mitigating extreme poverty (Nattrass and Seekings, 2015). The contemporary government is failing to follow the schematic of democracy, which begins to undermine the "meaning of wage labour as a vehicle of social advancement for the formerly oppressed majority". Social policy can only go so far in a system that has characteristics of historical inequality, racialised capitalism, and a contemporary regime that focuses more on international markets and economic policy rather than local markets and welfarist policy (Barchiesi, 2008: 119).

Existential insecurity as a continuation of entrenched inequality. Existential inequalities arising from precarity, inequality, and marginality restrict freedom of action for certain categories of people. It is the denial of equal recognition and respect and has for years in South Africa been prevalent in specific categories of lower social classes and especially black communities (Therborn, 2012). Existential inequalities are blatant forms of discrimination, which often result in negative associations with the actuality of redundancy, the foreclosure of

expectations, and the continuity of poverty and suffering under inequality, it is existential insecurity that results from the radical uncertainty about the future (Bolt and Rajak, 2016). To understand these existential insecurities and precarity and vulnerability on a social level one has to go beyond work and look at it as a personal and a collective condition, to look at how precarity is affecting individuals' livelihoods on a micro- and meso-level. Bolt and Rajak (2016) argue that existential insecurities are especially prevalent for the black majority as it comes from the visible gap between reality and expectation on the backdrop of the liberation struggle and the transition to democracy. Where the black majority was promised liberation in all forms but has yet to be completely recognised. An example of existential insecurity comes in the form of racial spatial planning, precarious partial incorporation, and marginalization. This created a system of geographical inequality and marginality during Apartheid. Resulting in contemporary ripples in the form of larger transport costs, long commute times, decreased proximal capital (being located in an area of concentrated affluence, but the ability to actualize this capital is mediated by relationship quality, reach and connections one has), and access to the resources available in urban sectors, thereby increasing precarity within and external to the workplace (L'Heureux and McCoy, 2014). Neilson (2015:1) puts forward that existential precarity can often result from "ontological insecurity", which is the absence of predictability, stability, solidarity, and continuity of life. Ontological insecurity is present within the South African labour market, for two main reasons. First, as previously mentioned was the Apartheid inherited racialized capitalist system that relied on exclusionary and marginalizing polities. Second, is the incorporation of a neoliberalised market that reproduces labour casualization, economic vulnerability, and poverty. Neilson (2015) goes on to mention that this ontological insecurity can lead to existential insecurity/anxiety, which is mental unease induced through self-reflection on the precarious character and is intensified when ontological security becomes compromised by deepening social and material precarity.

The paradox here is that many South Africans are having to try and escape these existential insecurities on their own and fight for economic liberation. An example of this is seen in urban migration, where individuals are searching for better opportunities within the urban landscape, yet have had to reside on the periphery of the urban areas in informal settlements, which make up 1 in 7 South African households (SERI, 2018). However, even these individuals who are striving for better lives are treated as second-rate citizens, a direct contradiction to the aim of South African democracy as laid out by the ANC. Enright and Rossi (2018) argue that with the transition to democracy came the shift from racialised to an economically driven government,

although there is a continuation of racialised logics of marginality. Furthermore, how the contemporary structures of neoliberal precarity should be understood through a lens of anti-black violence, especially towards poor-black communities. Enright and Rossi (2018) further argue that the urban environment continues to be a political site made to be a thing and a process, defined in its own space, where the political, urban, and economic interests intersect. Individuals within this setting become subject to this intersection and are often ignored given the unequal power dynamic present in political and economic relations that pertain to privatization and the bounding of communities. Where certain spaces are privatised and public spaces are designated and normalised as a bounded political community. Resulting in individuals who are in precarious situations being marginalized both within the workplace as previously mentioned, now they are being marginalized outside the workplace as well. This is a clear paradigmatic shift from the democratic government's original stance on realizing economic rights and broad social justice agenda (Enright and Rossi, 2018). This paradox has led to two trends, either the expulsion of individuals from their new metropolitan homes or increased amounts of informalisation in the urban area or the periphery, in many instances these trends would overlap.

First the expulsion trend, many individuals have been dispelled from their new metropolitan homes, as they do not have authentic roots, but are rather living in informal settlements constructed by the people in these areas. This uprooting comes as a result of neoliberalism and is contributing to the continuity of precarity, by removing them from sites where they can make a livelihood either in the formal or informal economies, as a result, these individuals are undervalued by society as they are seen as not being able to contribute (Enright and Rossi, 2018). Second, the trend of increased informalisation, many of these informal settlements do not have any form of municipal provision of basic services, such as the Slovo Park informal settlement in Johannesburg, which is home to 10,000 residents. This informal settlement was established in 1991 and did not have a municipal provision of basic services for more than two decades, it was only in 2016 that with the help of SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa) that this settlement litigated the city and received a judgement that the settlement needed to be upgraded. Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that the city ignored the USIP (Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme) in favour of pursuing a plan of eviction and relocation, which is in breach of section 26 of the South African constitution and the housing act of 1997 (SERI, 2018). The judgement by the Constitutional Court ordered the city to make an application to the provincial government for a grant to upgrade the settlement.

Both the expulsion trend and informalisation are contributing to the existential marginality of people already suffering under precarity. Kenny (2011) argues that there is an emotional connection to an individual's work, in which value, where workers invest their lives into their work. The same can be said for the emotional connection to belonging, identity, citizenship, and value. When individuals are marginalized both within the workplace and outside the workplace, existential marginality develops, where there is a sense of a lack of being excluded from a bounded society, in which they have little/no right of access.

5.4. Resistance in the contemporary context

Social movements in South Africa gained increased momentum in 1999 coinciding with the second democratic election. There has been a steady increase in protests between the years 1997 and 2013, with some obvious fluctuations every year. When analysing protest one can never know the exact number, given that there are many forms of protest that are not recorded, meaning that there one must work with both estimations of reported cases of protest, given the under-recording of incidents of approximately 20%-40% between 1997 and 2013 (Alexander et al., 2016).

According to Alexander et al. (2016) between 1997 and 2013, there have been a total number of 67,750 estimated PRPs (police-reported protests), 56,950 (84%) were categorised as peaceful and 10,800 (16%) were categorised as violent. Between 1997 and 2013 there have been increases in both peaceful and violent protests, in this period peaceful protests have increased by approximately 20%, with the highest levels of peaceful protests in 2006 and violent protests have increased by approximately 129%. In 2012 there was a peak year of protest action for protests of both a peaceful and violent nature. Increasing from the lowest year of protest action which was in 2004 by 104% for peaceful and 325% for violent, this is attributed to voting registration and coming off the prosperous years of the world cup and their aftermath of economic decline. South African GDP growth continued to decline from 3% in 2011 to only 0.3% in 2016, with inflation doubling from 3% in 2011 to 6% in 2016 (Farure, 2017). At the same time, unemployment continued to rise, so it comes as no surprise that protest action continued to increase as general life and standards of living were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Resistance against precarity is seen in the resistance against the very factors that contribute to a precarious environment, in South Africa, this is seen in the political, economic, and social realms.

5.4.1. Resistance against precarity

Precarity itself is difficult to protest against, given that it is a conceptual framework that as mentioned before relates to a multi-level and multi-institutional paradigm of inequality and exploitation. Resistance against precarity is more seen in contributing factors of precarity, such as the bypassing of human rights, unequal working environments, unequal access to resources, and disproportional treatment based on social categories. Resistance toward these contributing factors comes from either a bottom-up perspective in the form of workers and communities or a top-down perspective through organizations like unions and civil society in the labour environments as well as on a community-based level. According to Paret and Runciman (2016) resistance against precarity mainly takes place from two poles. On the one hand, there are movements led by the unemployed, mainly in communities, such as many service delivery protests, where these protests have either been carried out in the workplace or at a grassroots level. On the other hand, there are movements led by workers, occurring both within and outside trade unions (Paret and Runciman, 2016). Although precarity can be rather difficult to resist in the community or the workplace, meaning there needs to be a multi-pronged form of resistance.

Community and grassroots-based resistance. These protests include locally-organised or sporadic movements that place demands on people who hold or benefit from political power. Some strategies include mass meetings, drafting of memorandums, petitions, toy-toying, processions, and election boycotts. Now, these kinds of movements also have the propensity to become either somewhat unorthodox or even violent when the individuals or communities who are raising their concerns feel as though they are being ignored. Some strategies include road blockades, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, driving unpopular individuals out of their areas, clashing with police or other authorities, and the forced resignation of elected officials (Alexander, 2010).

Workplace-based resistance. Hlatshwayo (2018) states the workplace in South Africa acts as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there has been democratisation won allowing trade unions to operate more freely and allowing workers more rights. On the other hand, with neoliberalization and economic liberation, workers are being retrenched, and there is a rise in worker flexibility, precarity in the workplace continues to increase and there is a general pauperization of the worker, in which trade unions could only act as a delaying of the inevitable.

This then acts as a potential catalyst for workplace resistance, whereby resistance from workers and/or trade unions are used to highlight labour disputes by any public or private entity (Lancaster, 2018).

Existential-based resistance. As previously stated many communities, workers and individuals are having to pursue their form of economic liberation, given that the majority of power is still in the hands of the Apartheid elite or has been transferred to the native elite, which provided security for only a select few (Bond, 2000). This resistance was seen outside of the formal organizations, both within the workplace and in communities or through other means, such as exiting the formal work environment. On an existential level, resistance is to secure the emotional attachment and solidarity that individuals develop within their working environments as it becomes a part of a worker's identity (Kenny, 2004). Moreover, it is to protect the ideology of living a 'good life' within a world in which a 'good life' is structurally or systematically foreclosed. A 'good life' can only be achieved when one has stability and security in their livelihoods (Butler, 2015).

5.4.2. Development of precarity resistance in politics and the economy

Contemporary resistance against political structures. The South African democratic regime is based on participatory governance and there has been an implementation of a large number of participatory schemes. On the Municipal level, there have been the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and on a community level, there have been ward committees, both of which have allowed for the state and the people to communicate grievances and issues. However, this participatory governance is built on pre-existing spatial and socio-economic structures, which were and have continued to be entrenched in exclusion and unequal citizenship. Through spatial inequality ignorance (negation of historical spatial planning and differential spatial access) and temporal blindness (historical factors, such as pre-existing civil societies), there has been an institutionalization of two-tier citizenship and an entrenchment of hierarchical privilege (Lemanski, 2017). This has resulted in growing disconnections between the government and the people of South Africa, which initially came from the shift from a people-oriented welfarist policy to a more economic-oriented policy. What came of this was higher recognition of privatisation and liberation of the economy, whilst undermining redistributive and reconstructive policies, which would focus on the developmental needs of the marginalised poor, which has contributed to higher levels of poverty and inequality across all levels

(Khambule, 2021). Prompting a reduction in capital transfers between national and local governments, meaning municipalities are expected to deliver services based only on revenues generated from their tax base and thus has resulted in service delivery insufficiencies and backlogs (Paret and Runciman, 2016). This tremendous failure to address specific demands over the past 28 years, has led to a growing and generalising dissatisfaction, that is ultimately resulting in a disconnection from government and the constituency (De Juan and Wegner, 2019). Consequently, there is anger at the lack of basic service provision, and there is public-related anger, which is transforming into more general grievances regarding governmental accountability and responsiveness. These grievances are from critical citizens and organisations alike, who aspire to democracy as their ideal form of governance, yet remain skeptical of how democracy plays out in their environment (Kowalewski, 2019). This scepticism comes about when the government disconnects from its constituency, especially in an environment, like South Africa, that was built on participatory governance through the liberation struggles which would then transition into a participatory democracy. If we were to couple this disconnection with the current economic and political contexts, a potential catalyst for social unrest and resistance forms in the people of South Africa that want change.

5.4.3. Development of precarity resistance with social policy

Upon reflecting on the literature one needs to see if transformative and residual social policy are indeed leading to a significant impact in alleviating precarity and providing those who are in precarious situations the agency to voice their aggrievances or escape the destabilization that comes with precarity.

Transformative policy frameworks in contemporary South Africa. These policies aim to correct structural inequalities through state intervention, including land reform agendas, as well as labour reform policies such as BEE, BBBEE and, are the main focus of South African transformative policies. The land redistribution began with the introduction of RDP, which has been met with fierce resistance from a grassroots level and civic groups such as the Landless People's Movement, the Concerned Citizens Group, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, and the Anti-privatization Forum (Paret and Runciman, 2016). This resistance resulted from mismanagement and neglect of the RDP program as well as the threat that neoliberal policies bring to the continuation of the program. The main grievances come from a grassroots level, who reject the neoliberal economist approach, and the protests mainly

advocate for equal citizenship and material benefits of full social inclusion, which is not a reality in contemporary South Africa (Alexander, 2010). Some main grievances included the lack of formal housing, the "extremely poor quality" of the housing provided under RDP, or the complete maladministration of the process (Alexander, 2010). Often resulting in individuals not getting homes they were promised or if they did manage to secure a home they potentially were not able to maintain their homes, given the costs of maintenance, many of these individuals could not afford to pay for utilities. Leading the homes to become empty financial assets that would often leave individuals in greater debt than before.

During the Mbeki administration, these grievances, unrest, and protests from the poor then spilled over into xenophobic attacks against migrants from the rest of the African continent, who were scapegoated for the failures of government and trade unions (Sato, 2013). These protests are even being seen in the present Ramaphosa administration, currently, these xenophobic protests are being spearheaded by "Operation Dudula" in Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, and the Western Cape (Ngcuka, 2022). Targeting undocumented foreign nationals, who are being treated as scapegoats for a much larger problem of precarity, poverty, unemployment, and inequality, which as discussed throughout the dissertation are caused by domestic failures and international macro-economic and -political influences. An example of these failures is seen as transformative policies associated with the labour environment such as employment equity, BEE, and BBBEE (Broad Based Black Economic empowerment). In the now 28 years of democracy that South Africa has had, there have been slow and minimal structural changes, especially with regard to wealth and employment. The majority of top management positions are still largely occupied by the white minority at 67.7% in 2017, which decreased to 65.6% in 2019. On the other hand, top management positions from 2017 to 2019 increased for Africans from 14.3% to 15.2%, from 5.1% to 5.6% for coloureds, and from 9.4% to 10.3% for Indians (The Department of Labour, 2020). We still have a long way to go to achieve equality in the workplace.

Residual policy frameworks in contemporary South Africa. From protests against service delivery and the insufficiencies of the cash transfer scheme, there is resistance against the social security system. South Africa acts as a developmental state, through state intervention and aiding the precariat through social security systems, which is an inadequate poverty alleviation strategy (Goldblatt, 2016). This is one of the many reasons unemployment, poverty, and precarious employment continue to increase is because our residual policies are not effective

enough to combat inflation or the rising prices of goods. This sparked resistance against the residual policy in South Africa, which was seen in the July Unrest of 2021. South Africa experienced one of its largest unrests in years from the 8th to the 17th of July 2021 (The Presidency, 2021).

Originally sparked by the arrest of former president Jacob Zuma of the ANC, provided a platform for the precariat to shed light on inequality, poverty, unemployment, and a lack of support from governmental entities. These unrest events took place mainly in Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu-Natal, which lasted over a span of several days of looting and violence. Causing approximately 50 billion Rands worth of damage to the country's logistics, retail, and commercial sectors, and the overall economy. Leading to more than 300 deaths, thousands injured and approximately 2500 arrested (Kalina, 2021). These forms of social unrest can be viewed as an expression of collective dissatisfaction with the current political, economic, and social climates to which they find themselves subject (Lancaster, 2018). The reason various citizens partook in violent protests/unrest comes from feeling abandoned by the state. The presidency (2021) report further explains some contributing factors, such as high levels of unemployment, inherited levels of poverty, inequality on multiple levels, poor urban planning, corruption in the government, and the relative frustrations that came as a result of the covid-19 pandemic and lockdowns. Moreover, the victims of the unrest and violent protests also felt abandoned by the various institutions that are meant to serve and protect. This has resulted in dividing the people in the affected communities, many of whom relayed that they did not know how to continue co-existing in the same environment (The Presidency, 2021).

5.4.4. Development of precarity resistance in the workplace

In South Africa, the settled minority relied on the majority's labour and political exclusion to exercise capital monopoly and entrench the ideology of the modern bureaucratic state. With the introduction of capitalist relations, wage labour, and large-scale proletarianization in a country whose modernity was marked by settler colonialism. Leading to what Reddy (2015) refers to as racialised capitalism, characterised by the majority of the people of colour in South Africa living in squalor, whilst most of those who are in the upper class are white. Reddy (2015) further goes on to state that under the democratic government labour has faced lasting social inequalities and conservative policies of economic liberation. When there is a combination of neoliberal policies and capitalism, Apartheid framed labour and migration regimes, which were

built on the coercion of the black workforce, then this is where a paradox is seen in the continual racial and unequal structuring of the contemporary workplace.

These economic and political inequalities affecting the oppressed majority have become entrenched within broad South African institutions. Consequently, organised resistance to such structures becomes exceedingly difficult, where institutions such as trade unions, are finding it difficult to incorporate precarious workers. For example, the vast majority of trade union memberships like COSATU's contain permanent, full-time contract employees, which negates temporary and informal workers (Paret and Runciman, 2016). Now, according to Hlatshwayo (2018), workers have found a way to circumvent this to a certain degree, and that is through informal worker organisations or worker committees. Originally, these forms of 'insurgent unionism' was seen in the internal bureaucratisation struggles of NUM, but have started to become more mainstream. The reason being is that many workers who are being marginalised by mainstream unions either through membership (such as informal workers) or failing to assist with the worker's labour disputes (such as being unable to assist with contractual obligations), are looking for organisational responses to precariousness. These kinds of worker organisations act as independent committees and can sometimes take a militant stance which can be seen in the Marikana wildcat strikes, work stoppages in car industries, truck driver strikes, and power station strikes by City Power workers in Johannesburg (Paret and Runciman, 2016)

5.4.5. Development of resistance to existential precarity

With a positively growing economy, the introduction of social policies, and social movements advocating for those who live in precarity, why is it that we are not seeing the level of change that we need to see? Why are so many individuals still working and living in precarious situations and how do these individuals cope when in the situation? Precarity is often accompanied by other factors that lead to destabilization, including poverty, unemployment, as well as dangerous and/or unfair working environments. Precarity has consequential effects on the existential identity and security of an individual, which impacts livelihoods, and causes rippling repercussions that spill over into their everyday lives, identity, and interactions with the self.

Neilson (2015) argues that the first step to resisting existential precarity is countering the psychology of disavowal, which is difficult as, under neoliberal and capitalist ideology, self-

sufficiency, and inclusive solidarity are disavowed. Neilson (2015) further states that the central aspect of a counter-movement is a politics of solidaristic resistance, which realises the constructing of the material and social conditions that are conducive to universal ontological security. Although difficult solidaristic resistance can be achieved through a shared vision of a global project of cooperation. Though given the current divides in South Africa as a result of its history and the continual division through the political economy and neoliberal structuring, this will take time to be realised. In addition, any movement against precarity is vilified and the precariat is seen as the vulnerable other which is scapegoated as the cause of insecurity and existential precarity. Through neoliberal ideology precarity has sent us as people into a state of denial, thereby attacking solidarity by creating division (Neilson, 2015).

To overcome existential precarity is to overcome capitalist and neoliberal ideologies that have been entrenched and normalised in our society and to bolster resistance against material and ontological precarity. This is achieved through inclusive solidary, which could potentially impede inequality produced through neoliberal ideologies of individualism and self-sufficiency and disrupt South African and even global capitalist class interests (Neilson, 2015; Kalaitzake and Lynch, 2018). In South Africa, this could prove to be difficult given that the South African political, economic, and social environments have inherited forms of policy driven by exclusion and division, with a democratic political economy that is slow to reform and create enduring liberation (Rapatsa, 2014).

Reflecting on the literature, macro solidarity in the contemporary South African environment becomes difficult for three reasons:
1. Our political realm is built around competitive politics and the sole pursuit of hegemony.
2. Our economic realm is built historically on a racialised division and contemporarily on the neoliberal and capitalist ideology that promotes exclusion, division, and competitive individualism.
3. Our social systems are built on historically exclusive policies that have been carried over into the contemporary environment.

As a result, there is a denial of precarity or ignorance towards those who are suffering in precarity, which is why solidarity is only seen in microcosms rather than on a macro level. These microcosms of solidarity are seen in various social institutions such as social

movements, unions, politics, and the workplace. Although on average there will always be marginalisation of some kind, such as what is seen with unions, political parties, and economic hierarchies. Subsequently, there is a common adherence to three processes that are endemic to neoliberalism, individualization, inegalitarianism, and anti-democratic practices (Kalaitzake and Lynch, 2018). When solidarity is only seen in pockets rather than on a broader scale, inclusive solidarity is all the more difficult to achieve. Consequently, precarity will continue to be reproduced in the workplace and existential realms of society. Neoliberalism and capitalism will continue to reign with little inhibition if we continue to only recognise "self-responsibilized individualism", which through the political, economic, and social realms weakens all forms of solidarity (Kalaitzake and Lynch, 2018: 2). Therefore, if we continue to pursue self-interest, we will continue to ignore precarity and its consequences, we will never achieve broad meaningful resistance, we will never be able to recognise inclusive solidarity nor the needs of the collective and bring an end to the contributing factors of precarity.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has taken the contextual chapter which highlighted the contemporary economic, social and political as well as social movement climates in South Africa, and applied it to precarity and social movements.

It is clear to see that the main manifestations of precarity are occurring on a macro-level, which then trickles down into various micro-levels. However, there also seems to be a mirroring of macro-level structures at the micro-level. Through the internalisation of macro-level structures individuals, households and communities are also acting as reproduction sites of inequality. Through their distribution of power relations, and how some individuals are questioning their identity as a result of precarity, which they have little control over. This could contribute to a paradox of internalising external crises of precarity, and reproducing their own powerlessness and anomie.

Consequently, this is why precarity needs to be resisted in communities, the workplace, and on an existential level. The reason being is so that we can foster inclusive solidarity, whereby we can meet the needs of the majority and focus on domestic concerns, before beginnings to focus on international problems. Once domestic contributors (i.e. – economic policy, social security, wages, employment, and wealth) of precarity are understood and steps are taken to alleviate

them can we then even hope to tackle international contributors to precarity (i.e. – neoliberalism, capitalism, and global patterns of change). Even though local and international contributors overlap, local should take priority.

6. Chapter 6: Conclusion

In conclusion, through the gathered information surrounding the transition to democracy, and following a more Southern understanding of precarity and resistance, there is a pronounced paradox in the carryover of inequality into the contemporary South African environment. Precarity manifests more so as a result of macro-level structures, reproducing a continual cycle of precarity development. Racialised capitalism, inherited Apartheid structures, a state that focuses more on international interests rather than domestic concerns, and ineffective transformative and residual policy, all of which contribute to a racialised experience of precarity, where the brunt is felt by the black majority. The paradox lies in the lack of liberation for the black majority in South Africa, there was a promise of economic, political, and social liberation/emancipation. However, this has not fully been recognised leaving citizens feeling abandoned in the supposed democratic regime. Rather there is the continuity of a racialised capitalism, and a racialised labour market. Many feel as though the broader economy is more valuable than the individual and the worker, contributing to the broadening of existential inequality and insecurity. Where they are often ignored by broader social systems of government and trade unions, so they have to find their own means of liberation.

In the economic and political realms, precarity manifests as a result of inherited structures of Apartheid, and poor contemporary political decisions towards economic policy rather than welfarist policy. Welfarist policy as a bottom-up approach could potentially contribute more to alleviating precarity, instead, we have allowed capitalism to become more pervasive in a country plagued by pervasive and embedded inequality. Through the push for more expansive economic policies such as GEAR, there is an invoking of neoliberal and capitalist ideologies, which creates a further deepening of racialized structures of poverty, precarity, and inequality in South Africa. Exacerbated by global patterns of change and the lack of decisive/poor internal focus on the people of South Africa, precarity and inequality are being reproduced, which only worsen over time. There needs to be stricter management and regulations in both social and economic policies to ensure reformation and transformation are achieved.

There have been continual reductions in collective bargaining, where people are being indirectly forced to work under precarious circumstances to make ends meet, as a result of deepening forms of inequality, negatively impacting the labour environment and widening unemployment and wage/wealth gaps that have existed in South Africa since Apartheid. South

Africans are being left unemployed when companies follow the capitalist ideology of 'higher and fire' in the search of other exploitable commodities, especially in precarious wage, contractual, temporary, or informal labour. This then causes an existential level paradox, with all of the macro causes of precarity and inequality, which they have little to no control over. From here, individuals begin to question their identity, worth, and purpose in their workplace, households, or even for themselves when in precarious situations. Given that emotional value is placed on work, disconnections form in the workplace, in households, and within themselves, as precarity can create a sense of powerlessness and anomie. Further research is needed to grasp the complexities of well-being, identity, and existentialism of individuals living in precarity, possibly from a more primary viewpoint. Through the continual reproduction of precarity in a cycle that seeks to benefit the capitalist class, as well as the political, economic, and social elite, without solidarity. The powerless, such as the black working class will continue to be marginalised and exploited, a continuation of historical Apartheid environment, albeit in a more subtle shift from political suppression to economic and labour suppression. This is why it is imperative that precarity on all levels and in all realms needs to be resisted.

Precarity is a multi-faceted problem that needs a multi-pronged form of resistance to overcome it. In Global South territories like South Africa, precarity is not a new phenomenon, it is linked to common patterns of exploitation, suppression, and accumulation by dispossession. Throughout the dissertation precarity in South Africa has been shown to be pervasive across a variety of institutions across the economic, political and social realms. Creating long-lasting consequences for those who are suffering in precarious situations both within the workplace and within their everyday lives. For such a multi-pervasive structure, there needs to be a multi-pronged form of resistance, although there cannot be simply resistance towards precarity. Resistance to precarity needs to tackle all the factors that contribute to its manifestation and reproduction, across the economic, political, and social realms. From a variety of perspectives, from a bottom-up and top-down perspective, and not just across labour, but with informal worker committees, civil society, and communities.

When it comes to resisting precarity, many feel as though they need to take liberation into their own hands instead of relying on government, which is seen in civil society movements, community struggles, workplace resistance, and sporadic forms of unrest. However, to affect real change, there needs to be greater accountability, communication, solidarity, and transparency between the state, civil society, and the people of South Africa as well as in

political, economic, and social realms. This will allow for greater stability amongst institutions, in the workplace, and in individuals' everyday lives, where they can have safe and open working environments. Consequently, this will allow for holistic negotiations where solutions can be found before workers feel they have no other option but to strike, which puts both businesses and workers at risk of instability and insecurity.

Efficient and effective policies need to be considered when dealing with macroeconomic policies, neoliberalism, domestic and foreign investment, social security, and the labour market. In addition, when considering these policies and weighing up the potential costs and benefits, all parties need to be considered equally and fairly. This will allow for a greater understanding of more efficient ways of addressing unequal power structures that are contributing to precarity in South Africa. This includes but not is limited to the labour market, macroeconomic policies, the political economy, and relations between and amongst government, civil society, and the people of South Africa. Moreover, when one acknowledges and tries to understand the experiences of precarity we can potentially develop more effective and creative ways of meeting the needs of the collective majority of South Africa.

In addition, there needs to be a dismantling of the villainizing of resistance and social movements, especially from a bottom-up perspective that capitalist and neoliberal ideology peddle. More support needs to be given during wage-related negotiations and working environment disputes so that the workers' rights are respected and their concerns are heard. The various resistances that aim to tackle inherited Apartheid structures and oppressive structures of neoliberalism and capitalism, in the realms of the community, workplace, and existential, need to be taken more seriously. Further research into these forms of resistance could help to highlight their specific impact on individuals in precarity, their effectiveness, and the relationship that these forms of resistance have to the three realms contributing to precarity. However, based on the collected information, there is a need for greater amounts of inclusive solidarity between and amongst workers, unions, and businesses; communities, municipalities/community leaders, and civil society as well as broader domestic and foreign governmental entities and the people of South Africa. Especially when it comes to questioning and addressing factors contributing to precarity, marginality, instability, insecurity, and informality across the political, economic and social realms.

7. Chapter 7: Reference List

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8. Chapter 8: Appendix

8.1. Declaration of own work

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This document must be signed and submitted with every
essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation, and/or thesis.

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Full names of student:..………………………………………………………………………………….

15050752

Student number:.……………………………………………………………………………………….

Declaration

1.   I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

2.   I declare that this ….…Mini-Dissertation……………… (e.g., essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation, thesis, etc) is my own original work. Where other people's work has been used (either from a printed source, Internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.

3.   I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in as my own.

4.   I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own work.

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