The 1914 South African Industrial Strike: the First Internal Deployment of the Union Defence Force.

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Abstract

The first internal deployment of the Union Defence Force (UDF) since its inception in 1912 was to suppress a violent labour strike in January 1914. Because the inexperienced UDF was still assimilating various British and Boer military traditions, the Permanent Force was not yet sufficiently organised to quell the strike on its own. Therefore, the commandos of the Citizen Force Reserve were deployed. The traditional commando system of the former Boer republics and the Transvaal Colony was thus briefly revived to subdue the strike, in the unstable and complex South African socio-economic environment of 1914. This operation marked the end of the Boer commando system in its established format. It formed part of a vanishing military culture and was destined to be replaced by the modernising military systems of the early twentieth century. The deployment of burghers during the strike sets the background against which the article investigates both the customary and changing nature of military service for the long-established commandos. This article explores the conditions, abilities, and experiences of the 'burghers' on commando that participated in the crushing of the strike from a social-military history perspective.

Keywords: South Africa; Union Defence Force; commandos; military history; internal deployment; 1914 strike.

Introduction

The year 1914 marks one of the most notable and tumultuous periods in South African history, especially in the early history of the Union Defence Force (UDF). In addition to being deployed by the government to subdue a violent national labour strike in January 1914, the UDF was also required to suppress the Afrikaner Rebellion later that year and to fight on the British side in the First World War.[1] This was a daunting task for a young, polarised, and disorganised defence force.

As a result of government retrenchments on the railways, a general industrial strike broke out in January 1914, leading to uprisings and disturbances in the Union of South Africa's Witwatersrand region. It was in effect an extension of the militant miners' strike of 1913. The strikers wanted to safeguard white workers' interests and uphold the 'colour bar', which prevented black workers from competing for certain jobs designated to white miners.[2] When the violence escalated, martial law was imposed for the first time since the Union of South Africa formed on 31 May 1910. Louis Botha's government was resolute to end the strike at once. As a relatively new force established in 1912[3], the UDF was mobilised for its first internal operational deployment to quell the strike and restore national stability.[4] The operational readiness of the fledgling defence force to control domestic instability and counter foreign threats would be tested during this deployment.

The nascent UDF was assimilating various former colonial and Boer military units and, therefore, the newly constituted Permanent Force (July 1913) was unorganised and not yet capable of quelling the strike by itself.[5] Subsequently, the commandos (also known as 'rifle associations')[6] of the Citizen Force, Class B Reserve were deployed, most originating from rural areas.[7] After the establishment of the Union in 1910, it had proven a mammoth task to reconcile the diverse Boer, British and

colonial military traditions into one modernised defence force, which largely accounted for the challenge of creating a unified ethos.[8] This forced the new government to depend on the Citizen Force, Class B Reserve, consisting of former Boer commando members, who had served during the Anglo-Boer War (ABW) or South African War to quell the strike.[9] As Hancock perceptively observed when the commandos rode into the Witwatersrand: 'The shadow of the burgher lay over Johannesburg'.[10] Therefore, in 1914, the traditional Boer commando system (resurrected as rifle clubs in the Transvaal upon becoming self-governing in 1907)[11] was revived to subdue the strike in an unstable socio-political climate.

The Citizen Force commandos' relatively quick and efficient deployment amid the UDF's troubled transformation to squash the labour unrest should not be underestimated. This success meant that the traditional Boer commando system, the quintessential symbol of Afrikaner nationalism could still be revived at short notice. This military success of the mounted Boer warrior during January 1914 fuelled Afrikaner patriotism in a divided South Africa and helped foster the Afrikaner Rebellion of that year.[12]

Within the above context, this article offers new insights into the burgher commandos' socio-military role during the 1914 strike by drawing on underutilized primary sources from the Department of Defence Archives. Crucially, important social military historiographical aspects of South Africa that have previously been neglected are explored. For instance, the burgher commandos' role in suppressing the 1914 strike during the UDF's first deployment has received little or no previous scholarly attention.[13] Furthermore, this violent event has been incorrectly interpreted by some researchers since the primary sources have not been consulted. Seegers, for instance,

only mentions the 1914 strike briefly and inaccurately asserts that the Citizen Reserve Commandos were not mobilised in January 1914 to subdue the strike.[14]

Additionally, little is written about the burgher commandos' soldierly experiences during the strike and their circumstances during the UDF's first deployment.[15] Historical narratives of the 1914 strike typically focus on its political and economic aspects and on its military development only.[16] Academic literature also focuses almost exclusively on the larger political and historical events of 1914, for instance, the Afrikaner Rebellion[17] and the First World War.[18] More recent works, such as Ian van der Waag's[19] and David Katz's[20] briefly mention that the old commandos were deployed during the strike. A small number of contemporary studies infer that the 1914 strike was the UDF's first deployment.[21]

Sandra Swart's studies present a comprehensive analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of Boer-Afrikaner men on commando. Within the historic framework of the traditional Boer commando system, she examines republicanism, leadership, masculinity, and the social-economic dynamics that influenced the rebellion of 1914.[22] These respected studies address social military topics previously overlooked. However, Swart erroneously asserts that the commando systems and its established Boer leadership networks were 're-activated' in the 1913 strike.[23]

During the 1913 strike, the Botha government depended on the support of the Imperial Forces, the South African Police, special police constables, and the South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR).[24] Therefore, the Citizen Force, Class B Reserve (rifle associations or commandos) was not mobilised to repress the 1913 industrial strike. It was only during the 1914 strike that the commandos of the UDF were deployed[25] giving the 'traditional Boer leadership' the opportunity to galvanize their restricted military and political networks.[26]

In this study, their deployment forms the background to investigate both the customary and evolving nature of military service for the long-established commandos' ordinary 'burghers' as well as the intricacies of deploying an untested military force encumbered by logistical challenges and internal strife. Therefore, this article considers the military conditions, abilities, and experiences of the 'burghers' on commando that participated in the crushing of the 1914 strike from a socio-military history perspective. More specifically, it explores topics such as commissioning the burghers, provisions, transportation and veterinary assistance, soldierly conduct, and discipline.

Commissioning the burghers of old.

As mentioned earlier, the Permanent Force was unable to suppress the unrest in January 1914. It was impossible to assemble a well-trained and properly equipped Permanent Force, as little more than a nucleus staff was responsible for its administration.[27] Initially, on 9 January 1914, it was decided that only units of the Active Citizen Force (ACF) and SAMR (which had a rural policing function in peacetime) of the Permanent Force would be deployed to quell the strike. However, the government realised that most of the ACF units were not ready to be deployed in the field. Therefore, later that day, the defence ministry ordered the commandos (officially Class B Reserves or rifle associations) to mobilise.[28] Eight commandos from the Transvaal (Bethal, Ermelo, Krugersdorp, Middelburg, Standerton, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, and Heidelberg) and two from the Orange Free State (Heilbron and Vredefort) were called up for service. The ACF, Reserve Class B commandos, consisted of white men between the ages of 17 and 45 who were past or present rifle association members. Consequently, the Class B reserves mainly consisted of traditional Boer commandos, who had fought for the old Boer republics and who were members of the later rifle clubs. Increasing industrial

violence forced the government to mobilise the SAMR and ACF support units and an additional 41 ACF Reserve Class B commandos.[29]

Reports by Viscount H.J. Gladstone, the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa, to the British Secretary of State, Harcourt, refer to the deployment of the long-established burgher commandos. On 15 January 1914, Gladstone praised the

> ...mobilisation and arrival of the commandos from the "back veld" in the Witwatersrand as the most picturesque feature and possibly also the decisive factor in the prevention of serious disorder. For all practical purposes, there is little to distinguish them from the Boer Commandos which took the field in the war of 1899-1902.[30]

He clarified that these commandos were technically defined as the Citizen Reserve Force, Class B under the new Defence Act. He further celebrated the arrival of the Boer commandos, saying they had 'unquestionably relieved the mine owners of grave anxiety.' Ironically, many Afrikaner burghers, who suppressed the labour strike aided English capitalists, although they were on opposite sides during the ABW (See Figure 1).[31]

Figure 1. Cartoon by J.R. Millar reprinted in the Independent Labour Party publication *Forward*, 21 February 1914. The foreground shows a Rand mine-owner eagerly grasping an armed Boer commando burgher; the background reveals a shackled white worker.[32]

Walter L. Bagot, of the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency, noted on 19 January 1914 in a letter to Louis Botha that:

> It is a great eye-opener for many of us that the old commando system is still much alive and effective as in the pre-war days and speaking as an Englishman I am delighted that this is so. The Burghers are real stout stuff![33]

Despite his optimism, he warned that the commandos were not a disciplined force and that they had not received sufficient training. He added that they also did not experience real combat during the strike, and it was, therefore, impossible to know how they would behave in an actual battle. Hence, Bagot indicated that it would be unwise to place too

much trust in the UDF's real capability in a war situation.[34]

Some jingoist English-speaking citizens in South Africa reacted strongly to the actions of the Boer administration. For example, in a letter to Gladstone, A. MacDonald lashed out at the Afrikaner government, which, according to him, was now rearming the 'Boers who laid down their arms in 1902, with new rifles'.[35] He expressed his anti-Boer sentiment and disapproval of the use of Boer commandos. Furthermore, he asserted that England had not spent millions of pounds or sacrificed the lives of her lost sons only to aid the Boers in 1914.[36]

This raises the question of why Afrikaans-speaking burghers mobilized to subdue the strike in January 1914. Primarily, the new Defence Act mandated that every citizen – which meant all white men[37] – was required to perform military service under the government's command. Anyone found guilty of deserting was subject to punishment. Many of the Afrikaans-speaking burghers thus obeyed the decree to report for service on account of the legal requirement to render military service. Under the new law, they had no option.[38]

Other factors contributing to the participation of the burgher on commando during the 1914 strike include ideological differences, rising militant nationalism and republican nostalgia, the pursuit of national identity by Afrikaners post-1910, loyalty to the new Boer leadership after the ABW, and white poverty. Moreover, commando service contributed to a restored sense of Afrikaner self-pride and manliness after the loss of 1902 and reinforced traditional societal structures; commandos symbolised national pride and gave expression to Afrikaner identity.[39] Some of the Afrikaners also considered it an opportunity to take revenge on the 'English', mainly because of the bitter memories of the ABW. The ongoing feud between the nationalistic Boer and imperialistic Briton motivated some Afrikaners to deploy for military service during the

strike. This faction of Afrikaners sided with Hertzog's fierce anti-British and anti-capitalist sentiments.[40] Therefore, for some burghers, commando service and the prospect of crushing striking workers made sense; for them, the urban workers epitomised British dominance. However, the majority of the burghers who took part in suppressing the strike were loyal to the ruling party and did not support the republican cause. Burghers on both sides of the political divide, therefore, took part in suppressing the strike, although for different reasons.[41]

Despite the inexperience of the UDF, deploying the burghers was done relatively quickly. This was mainly achieved because the long-established commandos (later rifle clubs) were practically the only military structure of the former colonies that was incorporated intact into the new UDF. This structure represented continuity in function and command for the most part and was a system familiar to the burghers; it represented their way of life.[42]

Even so, the deployment of the burghers took place not without complications and tensions. The 1912 Defence Act imposed modern training methods, uniforms, ranking systems, disciplinary codes, and promotion norms that all threatened the Afrikaner military tradition.[43] Although the commando system retained the traditional ranking and leadership systems of the former Boer commandos, which included commandants, field cornets, assistant field cornets, and burghers,[44] the UDF introduced a new system of military areas to ensure command and control. These areas regulated the deployment of forces and were commanded by district officers. This new command and ranking system of appointed officials was unfamiliar to the commandos, and dissatisfied burghers were suspicious of the new structure and the officers selected by the Botha administration. The controversy of the new UDF policies stoked dissenting views among some burghers.

Therefore, during the strike, the commandos were mobilised and deployed according to certain new military procedures. A number of burghers viewed these as foreign, a threat to Afrikaner identity, and refused to serve.[45] Due to this, some commandos had real difficulties in mustering men and officers for strike duty and the police had to take over their command. For example, the commandant and the officers of the Harrismith Commando failed to report for duty.[46]

By January 1914, however, when the commandos deployed to quell the strike, only a few of these new regimens had been established in the Citizen Force Reserve. Consequently, the burghers reverted to the only military system that they were familiar with – the traditional commando system of the former Boer republics,[47] which had been adapted and incorporated by General Botha into rifle clubs in the Transvaal Colony after the ABW.[48]

Supplying the burghers

As far as the supply of the commandos during the 1914 strike was concerned, shortages, as well as the delay in making equipment available, were a reality. It was one thing for the new Defence Act to state that the commandos must be provided with equipment and facilities when deployed, but quite another for the untried UDF to put it into practice. Preparations for mobilisation were made hastily and, in some cases, unsystematically because there were insufficiently trained administrative officers in the new UDF in January 1914.[49]

One of the supply issues affected the availability of uniforms and basic equipment. Many of the burghers, especially those in the countryside, had not been provided with the necessary uniforms and kit before they mobilised, and, therefore, they had to wear their civilian clothes and use their own gear.[50] This was strictly against the modern uniform regulations as set out in the new Defence Act of 1912. According to

the new instructions burghers were supposed to turn up with the required equipment. However, in many of the military districts, the burghers reported for duty without even the basic supplies; they did not have cutlery, soap, shaving kit, waterproof sheets, blankets, saddles, bridles, knapsacks, etc.[51] This situation was not new to those burghers who had previous experience of military life. They were not outfitted in the past, such as during the ABW.[52]

The delays in the provision of adequate uniforms and equipment to the commandos caused difficulties because many of the burghers deployed with only the clothes on their backs. For instance, the burghers in Boksburg received clothing items and blankets only eight days after deployment.[53] In some cases, the lack of uniforms also contributed to poor sanitation. There was no time to do laundry during deployment and as a result, clothes became grimy and foul-smelling. Clothing items that included overcoats, raincoats, belts, trousers, breeches, and socks were in high demand. These shortages forced the UDF to authorise commanders to purchase sufficient apparel and shoes; an unforeseen expense to the newly formed UDF.[54]

Because of the delays in issuing supplies, many of the burghers had to provide their own personal items like cutlery, shaving kits, and hairbrushes. After demobilisation, several burghers requested compensation, as these items were damaged or lost during deployment. However, private debt for items incurred by individual burghers on commando during the strike, and not considered by the UDF as essential for service during the operation, had to be settled by the respective members. Astonishingly, the UDF harshly applied the new regulations and refused to pay the majority of the claims because the burghers were not supposed to use private items in military camps; this decision ignored the inexperienced and unprepared defence force's obligation to provide equipment and uniforms during mobilisation, as mandated by the

1912 Defence Act. It was a contentious ruling that caused displeasure amongst many burghers.[55]

The controversy about the khaki uniform of the 'British conquerors' that had to be worn by the commandos was not accentuated during the 1914 strike. The new uniform was introduced by the UDF in 1913. Most Afrikaans-speaking burghers had no wish to wear the uniform that was reminiscent of their conquerors, and which they judged as 'too khaki' in appearance.[56] However, the fact that most of the burghers were not issued uniforms during deployment may have contributed to the lack of discontent with this issue. Additionally, there is no evidence that those who received uniforms during the strike were unhappy about it.

The inexperienced UDF being routinely slow in supplying the commandos and the regular occurrences of shortages were not unexpected. For example, shortages of firewood led to incidents where burghers used the fence poles surrounding their camps, to make cooking fires.[57] There was also a shortage of pots, kettles, food, and tents. As the field equipment was stored in five separate military supply depots, the distribution and delivery of supplies took much longer than expected. Additionally, the sudden increase in demand for supplies at the military supply depot overwhelmed depot staff.[58] Most burghers that deployed had already served in the former Boer commandos and were familiar with the arrangement that each member had to be self-sufficient in terms of provisions.[59] However, it is clear that, at the time, the UDF still had many growing pains to overcome and that the supply system was inefficient.

Similarly, the occurrence of commandeering during the 1914 strike was an experience to which most burghers were accustomed.[60] The new Defence Act provided for the commandeering of supplies.[61] According to the martial law proclamation of 14 January 1914, items such as horses, feed, saddles, food, drink, or anything else required

for use by the armed forces could be appropriated during the strike.[62] The commandant or responsible officer, appointed by the former, had to issue and sign proper receipts for all items commandeered.[63]

Another supply issue related to weapons and ammunition. The mobilisation instructions during the 1914 strike stipulated that each member of the Citizen Force Reserve commandos had to bring his rifle, if he owned one, to the muster points. This was also in line with the commando practices of the past.[64] The call-up instructions for the commandos of the Witwatersrand area required that the burghers, if possible, had to contribute one hundred rounds of ammunition. If there were any problems in supplying the ammunition locally, the shortages in quantities had to be reported to the Defence Headquarters by telegram. As soon as the units arrived at the military camps, arrangements would be made to issue them with ammunition.[65]

The UDF and the burghers, however, were severely in short supply of weapons and ammunition at the time of the 1914 strike and the British Imperial Forces in South Africa had to provide additional weapons and ammunition to the Union government.[66] Gladstone, gave the commanding general of the Imperial Forces in South Africa, Lieutenant-General Sir Reginald C. Hart, written permission to loan rifles to the South African government.[67] This critical shortage was a long-term result of the ABW during which the British Forces confiscated most of the Boers' weapons and later destroyed them.[68] Arrangements were made to transport a consignment of weapons and ammunition by ox-wagon from Roberts Heights[69] to the Artillery Barracks of the UDF. About 500 service rifles, borrowed from the Imperial Forces, were thus transported.[70] In total, about 6,600 rifles were obtained from the Imperial Forces in South Africa. A number of rifles were retained by the Imperial Forces as a defensive measure against possible resistance to colonial rule in the British protectorates.[71]

Because of the lack of rifles, some burghers (for instance in the Carolina and Zeerust areas), were reluctant to deploy.[72] Rifles, bandoliers and ammunition were thus sent to various commandos who were in short supply.[73] Furthermore, disarming the Boer during the ABW undermined his male identity as a warrior. However, some hoped to regain their bellicose status – which was grounded in a traditional assertion of power, represented by the Boer and his gun, and fortified by commando service – by serving in the UDF in 1914.[74]

Table 1. The number of burghers from six military districts who failed to comply with the order to mobilise.[75]

Military District	Wilfully refused	Known to have good excuses	Causes unknown	TOTAL
6 - Standerton	-	-	293	293
7 - Potchefstroom	-	-	176	176
8 - Johannesburg	224	110	383	717
9 - Pretoria	15	42	485	542
10 - Kroonstad	1	-	573	573
11 -Bloemfontein	1	2	180	183

These shortages indicate that the UDF of January 1914 was ill-equipped, which resulted in delays and disruptions in the mobilisation process. This raised concerns about its readiness to deploy for internal and external operations.

Transportation and veterinary assistance

A basic logistical function of the young UDF was to transport the burghers that were deployed in January 1914. The UDF acquired horses, mules, donkeys, trains, ox-wagons, and trolleys (a trackless tram), as means of transportation, as was used by the Boer commandos in the past. Due to the innovative technology of the early twentieth

century, the UDF also made use of motor vehicles to improve and accelerate the movement of burghers and supplies, particularly in the more industrialised Johannesburg area. It was impractical to use these in the more inhospitable rural areas. Moreover, motorcycles were used to notify burghers in remote areas of the mobilisation instructions. A shortcoming was that the UDF lacked adequate fuel to operate motor vehicles and motorcycles. As a result, fuel was commandeered. Nevertheless, ox-wagons were the cheapest means of transport in the Union at the time and that is why the military hired more ox-wagons and trolleys from private suppliers to transport supplies and water to the commandos. The downside was that the ox-wagon was slower than motor vehicles and so it took much longer to deliver supplies. Additionally, the oxen had a slow recovery time after traveling long distances and were prone to diseases and injuries.[76]

Of all these forms of transportation, riding horses remained the most dependable and familiar mode of mobilisation for the commandos in January 1914. This reinforced the Boer commando tradition. According to the regulations of the Defence Act of 1912, all members of the ACF who had to perform mounted service had to provide a suitable horse.[77] The burgher had to register a horse that was legally his with the military authorities. A few burghers did not deploy on commando during the strike of 1914 because they did not own horses. The shortcoming was mainly because of the enormous death rate among horses during the ABW as a result of deprivation, combat injuries, and disease – the latter was still widespread in the post-1910 period.[78] For the Afrikaner, this loss was traumatic because the idea of a Boer and his horse on commando embodied not only a unique and independent lifestyle but also his identity as a man and a warrior.[79] Subsequently, the UDF bought, hired, or commandeered riding horses for those burghers who did not own or could not afford their own horses. Following the

strike, the defence force had to pay compensation to those owners whose horses were seized.[80] The military also used rail transport, as defined in the new Defence Act to transport burghers who did not have horses to the assembly points.[81]

During the 1914 strike, horses received better medical care than before. Although the UDF approved the South African Veterinary Service in 1913, they were only able to provide a limited veterinary service to the commandos. Members of the small Veterinary Corps, who formed part of the Permanent Force, were deployed in the Witwatersrand area to aid the mounted burghers. They were supported by the veterinarians of the Agricultural Department.[82] This was one of the few cases where units from the Permanent Force were deployed to support operations.

Where military veterinary services were not readily available, private veterinarians were hired to care for sick and injured animals and to trim hooves and fit horseshoes.[83] The UDF paid for the medical examinations and treatment of ill and injured horses, which were the private property of the burghers on commando.[84] New medical veterinary discoveries at the time made it possible to test for equine diseases and to prevent and treat these. As a result, sick horses were not shot and replaced, as in the past. Hence, these innovations were more cost-effective for the young UDF and provided psychological support to the burghers on commando, who cared for their horses.[85]

Soldierly conduct and discipline

There was a lack of discipline among some commando members during the strike of 1914, as is often the case when ordinary men without formal military training are called on active duty.[86] Incidents of theft, mostly of clothes, were reported by several burghers on commando. Even before martial law was enforced on 14 January 1914, insubordinate burghers confiscated equipment and horses illegally.[87] After

demobilisation, the UDF investigated these incidents and acted against those responsible.[88] Very few cases of drunken and disorderly behaviour were reported. Martial law regulations stipulated that no alcohol could be sold, supplied, or delivered to members of the UDF while in uniform, and beer and spirits were banned in the military camps. It appears that alcohol abuse was not common among the burghers.[89]

In 1914, several burghers disobeyed the mobilisation orders, although most adhered promptly to the call.[90] Following the strike, the district officers of the various military districts had to determine how many burghers had failed to join their commandos and the reasons for this. It was verified that some burghers wilfully refused to serve. For instance, burgher Meyer Scheepers of Brandfort (military district eleven, Bloemfontein) refused to deploy. The reasons for his refusal are unknown, but in May 1914, he was charged with desertion in accordance with the Defence Act's disciplinary code. He received a warning and a five-shilling fine.[91]

The highest percentage of renegades was from the Witwatersrand and Northern Free State areas. Military district eight, an urban region that included Johannesburg, Boksburg, Germiston, and Krugersdorp in the Transvaal, recorded 224 cases of wilful desertion.[92] These deserters appeared to have sympathised with the striking workers or were striking themselves.

There were quite a number of instances, mostly in the Vredefort and Heilbron districts, where burghers of the Orange Free State commandos refused to serve in the Transvaal.[93] A burgher from the Vredefort commando refused to serve because he declared himself a working man who would not shoot at other workers.[94] This suggests that one of the reasons for disregarding commando duty was sympathy for the strikers (primarily foreigners). Post-unification, many poor white Afrikaners seeking new

identities developed solidarity with other white workers in their struggle for better economic conditions.

A melting pot of seditious and despondent men lived in this area. They felt ostracized by the Union on both a political and economic level and yearned for the restoration of the old republic. The new government was viewed with a great deal of mistrust, particularly since it did not appear capable of alleviating the devastating economic conditions aggravated by the post-ABW capitalisation, and commercialisation of agriculture. To cite Grundlingh and Swart, many of the Free State burghers had little regard for Botha, a 'Transvaal leader'; they despised and fiercely contested the 'English' Botha regime and many of them contemplated rebellion.[95] One example is the refusal of three Free State field cornets, G.D. le Roux, D.J. Steenkamp, and A.P. du Plessis, and assistant field cornet P.J. Raath along with 41 of the burghers under the command of commandant Naude, to cross the Vaal River to be deployed in the Boksburg area. They considered the Vaal River to be the borderline between the area they were willing to serve and the Transvaal. Furthermore, the incident illustrates how burghers readily followed the lead of their field cornets. It supports the theory that the field cornet has traditionally been regarded as a community leader, father figure, a man of 'influence'; a leader worthy to be followed rather than an outsider.[96]

Interestingly, the nationalistic Commandant General C.F. Beyers reasoned in a letter to Smuts in June 1914 that it would be unproductive to prosecute these burghers since the officers set a poor example. Beyers stated that he intended to assemble the insubordinate burghers from these areas and to drive home the grave breach of military discipline committed by them.[97] In September 1914 Beyers emerged as one of the prominent rebel leaders with the majority of rebels hailing from the Free State.

Tragically, on 8 December 1914, he drowned in the very Vaal River which was seen as the dividing line between the Afrikaners.[98]

An alternative explanation for the animosity is that many of the burghers in these areas were bitter-enders[99] during the ABW, and blamed the Transvaal for surrendering prematurely.[100] Botha's call to mobilise was met with suspicion by many nationalistic burghers in Heilbron, where there were rumours of mutiny.[101] The incident illustrates the rift within the Afrikaner community between those who championed the republican cause, and the majority who supported the governing party. A few months later, the government would deploy these loyal men against the Afrikaner rebels during the fratricidal Boer Rebellion.[102]

The investigation also revealed several other reasons for the absence of the burghers in the various military districts. Pretoria's district staff officer reported that many defaulting burghers served in former commandos, that is, in commandos in districts other than the ones where they were legally required to serve. It appears that they served with their hometown commandos. Hence, they were reported as absentees. The staff officer claimed that it was challenging to identify the burghers since he had to examine each commando's nominal roll and pay list to determine which members were from Pretoria.[103] This suggests that burghers working in Pretoria, did not regard it as their home, so they returned to serve in their preferred and familiar commando units led by leaders they trusted and were loyal to.[104]

Staff officers reported that a number of burghers from rural areas were unaware of the deployment because of their remote locations. Some burghers had good reasons for not deploying, including being medically unfit. They were required to submit medical certificates as proof to the officers. Additionally, a number of burghers said that family responsibilities prevented them from serving on commando duty.

However, a few of the burghers disregarded the requirement for military service and provided trivial excuses for their absence. For instance, one burgher stated that he was dipping his sheep, and another was restoring his threshing machine. It appears that the district staff officers were unenthusiastic in reporting the number of absentees and pursuing the reasons behind their absence.[105]

Smuts instructed that all cases of absenteeism had to be investigated and every burgher who refused to serve had to be prosecuted. He ordered that the disciplinary code of the Defence Act had to be strictly applied to anyone who disobeyed the mobilisation instructions. Noteworthy is that Major J.J. Collyer,[106] an English-speaking UDF staff officer, urged the commandant general to use caution, and only punish burghers who had already enlisted in the rifle associations (commandos).[107] In the new UDF, the concept of rifle associations as an alternative for traditional commandos was still a sensitive issue and required much encouragement because of the resistance to the weakening of the traditional Boer commando systems. At the time, the strict application of military discipline would have been unpopular. Therefore, it was decided to prosecute only those burghers who refused to serve or did not mobilise within seven days. Due to the ACF officers' lack of experience in managing military councils and disciplinary procedures, these cases had to be handled by civilian magistrates. Depending on the severity of the case, deserters could be punished by fines or imprisonment of up to one month. The majority of the alleged deserters only received a warning because they were unaware of the implications of the new Defence Act, or their duty to serve in the military if required by the government.[108] The reluctance to render compulsory military service placed the UDF in a disadvantageous position; one, which would lead to the recruitment of volunteers during the First World War.[109]

The majority of serving burghers, however, behaved satisfactorily, helping to crush the industrial unrest effectively. This success was due in part to the military experience of the burghers and their familiarity with the long-established commando system. The commandos were deployed primarily to protect mines, railways, and commercial property. Additionally, they arrested a large number of strike leaders for sedition. In response to the Transvaal Federation of Trades calling for a general strike on 14 January 1914, martial law was imposed by the government. On 15 January, burgher commandos were deployed in strategic locations and the Johannesburg Trade Hall was surrounded by the troops and police. A cannon was aimed at the building and the government demanded unconditional surrender from the remaining strike leaders who had barricaded themselves inside. The strikers recognised the superiority of the UDF and capitulated. The remaining leaders were arrested, which prevented large-scale victimisation and calmed the disturbance. Thanks to the swift and effective suppression of the unrest by the UDF, the strike was effectively over on 15 January 1914.[110]

This was a triumph for Smuts because the government was ready to deal with the picketers, unlike during the 1913 strike. The burgher commandos were immediately deployed, martial law was imposed, and the UDF's show of force secured a bloodless victory for the administration. By announcing strict regulations and having enough burghers to enforce them, the government prevented further unrest. By 18 January 1914, the situation had improved to the point where the commandos were demobilised. Some commando units were kept on alert until 19 March 1914 when martial law was lifted.[111]

Smuts caused an international storm when he unilaterally decided to illegally deport nine strike leaders, born abroad, to Britain without a trial. These nine were smuggled onto the steamship *Umgeni* on 27 January 1914, under strict secrecy. Strike action, however, has suffered a major setback.[112]

The burgher commandos' ability to deploy relatively quickly and efficiently and to successfully quell the strike meant that the traditional commando system of the Afrikaner was still an effective military tool. The UDF successfully passed its first test, a rural counterinsurgency operation, and as a result, avoided the intervention of the Imperial Forces and strengthened Botha's government.[113]

Conclusion

The 1912 Defence Act brought about the fundamental reorganisation of South Africa's military system. However, the young UDF was unable to institute most of the planned improvements by January 1914. It was only done gradually. Accordingly, the military experience, capabilities, and conditions of the burghers deployed on commando during the 1914 strike were comparable to those of the former Boer republics. It meant that the burghers were not equipped with the latest combat skills and resources during the 1914 strike. However, a few improvements had been made such as the establishment of contemporary veterinary services and the use of automobiles to speed up the transportation of burghers and supplies. Importantly, with the deployment of the commandos during the 1914 strike, the use of the Boer commando system in its traditional style by the UDF came to an end. The government deployed mainly Afrikaans-speaking ACF Class A members to crush the 1914 Rebellion. The UDF also used commandos during the 1922 strike, but by that point, the modified British influence over the military had grown significantly.[114]

The deployment during the 1914 strike went reasonably smoothly. In general, the burghers seemed to have maintained a good level of discipline and conduct which contributed to the successful crushing of the strike. Although there were some incidents of disagreement, irregularities, and incompetence during the operation, the majority of serving burghers did not perceive these as excessively challenging or disturbing. A

faction, however, viewed the new defence force and its reforming institutions as foreign constructs that threatened the Afrikaner identity and was, thus, reluctant to serve.[115] Some disillusioned burghers felt denied their traditional military customs because of the impact of progressively tailored British influences on the UDF and its Citizen Force Reserve commandos.[116] Despite being deployed briefly by the government during the 1914 strike, the Afrikaners' traditional military-commando system represented a declining military culture that was destined to be replaced by modern twentieth-century warfare systems.

The challenges and conditions during the operation revealed that the UDF was an inexperienced force. Several lessons still had to be learned about discipline, campaign readiness, capability, and performance, which hindered the provision of a well-equipped, dependable, and deployable defence force.[117] Much work remained to transform a customary citizen force into a professional force ready to meet the challenges of industrialised war.

Nonetheless, the quelling of the 1914 industrial strike did provide the fledgling UDF with some operational experience, which enabled them to subdue the Afrikaner rebels and to participate in the First World War later during that historic year.[118] In its first military test, the nascent UDF successfully crushed the industrial uprising by deploying the ACF, Class B Reserve burgher commandos. The UDF appeared to have demonstrated its ability to handle future internal conflicts and insurrections that threatened the stability of the country.

Notes

1. Mouton, "'A Free, United South Africa," 40–41; and R. Geyer, "Die Eerste Operasionele Optrede," 63–65.
2. Visser, "Governments, Parliaments and Parties," 2-4; Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 330; and Hyslop, *The Notorious Syndicalist*, 229–230.
3. The UDF was established on 1 July 1912. See *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act No. 13 of 1912, 624–698.
4. Visser, "Governments, Parliaments and Parties," 2-4; Mandy, *A City Divided*, 39; and Meintjes, *General Louis Botha*, 203.
5. Grimbeek, "Die Totstandkoming van die Unieverdedigingsmag", 150; and Van Der Waag, *A Military History*, 102-119.
6. Although the members of the Rifle Associations were officially called the Citizen Force Reserve, Class B, they were referred to in the general parlance as the "commandos". In this study, they are referred to as commandos and burghers. See *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act No. 13 of 1912, Article 79, 630–632; and Tylden, *The Armed Forces*, 217.
7. National Archives of South Africa (hereafter NARS), Commissioner of South African Police (SAP) 10, 6/183/14/4, Correspondence about extraordinary government gazette proclamations signed by Governor-General Gladstone, 9 January 1914; NARS, Prime Minister (PM), 1/1/332; PM 200/1/1914 vol. 1, W.L. Bagots – General Botha, 19 January 1914; Oberholster, "Die Randse Staking", 37; Meintjes, *General Louis Botha*, 203; Jacobs, "Die Rol van die Unieverdedigingsmag," 6; Ploeger, "Hoofstukke uit die voor", 48, 68; Pietersen, "Stakings aan die Witwatersrand," 91–96; Anon, "Martial Law Declared", 14 January 1914; Anon, "The Crisis: General", 14 January 1914; Geyer, "The Union Defence Force", 136-140.
8. Van der Waag, "The South African Military," 199–201; Ploeger, "Op Brandwag: Drie Eeue," 4; and Tylden, *The Armed Forces*, 216.
9. Van der Waag, "Rural Struggles," 266–270; and Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 330.
10. Hancock, *Smuts, the Sanguine Years*, 368.
11. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 98.
12. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 112-129; and Geyer, "The Union Defence Force," 137.
13. See for example: Swart, "'A Boer and his Gun," 737–751; Swart, "'Men of Influence,' 1–30; Katz, "Pre-war Military Planning," 1-9; and Stapleton, "Union of South Africa," 3-4.
14. Seegers, *The Military in the Making,* 26.

15. See for instance: Swart, “A Boer and his Gun,” 737–751; Swart, “Men of Influence,” 1–30; Seegers, *The Military in the Making,* 26; Nasson, “A Great Divide,” 53; and Walker and Weinbren, *2000 Casualties: A History,*
16. See for instance: Jacobs, “Die rol van die Unieverdedigingsmag”; Hyslop, *The Notorious Syndicalist*; and Krikler, *The Rand revolt.*
17. See for instance: Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie;* Spies, “The Rebellion”; Swart, “The Rebels of 1914”; Fedorowich, “Sleeping with the Lion,” 71-95; and Scholtz, *Die Rebellie*.
18. See for instance: Delport, “Boks and Bullets”; Genis, “Recruitment,”; Garcia and Kleynhans, “Counterinsurgency,” 1-27; Nasson, *Springboks on the Somme*; Samson, “South Africa Mobilises,” 5-21; Strachan, *The First World War*; and Van der Waag, “Battle of Sandfontein,” 141-165.
19. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 116.
20. Katz, *General Jan Smuts*, 48-50.
21. See for instance: Visser, “Governments, Parliaments and Parties,” 4; Garcia and Kleynhans, “Counterinsurgency,” 1-2, 18; and Fokkens, “The role and application,” 19-24.
22. Swart, “The Rebels of 1914”; Swart, “A Boer and his Gun,” 737–751; Swart, “‘You were Men,” 187-199; Swart, “Desperate Men,” 161–175; Swart, “Men of Influence,” 1–30; and Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie*.
23. Swart, “A Boer and his Gun,” 740; Swart, “Men of Influence,” 13; and Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie,* 74.
24. Some publications incorrectly refer to the SAMR (or Zuid-Afrikaanse Bereden Schutters (ZABS)) as part of the Active Citizen Force. For example, in Pietersen, “Stakings aan die Witwatersrand,” 39, 48. See NARS: PM 225, file 148/20/1913, Confidential report from the governor-general, H.J. Gladstone to Colonial Office, London, 30 July 1913. The SAMR was part of the Permanent Force of the UDF and had a police function.
25. South African Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), SA Cit. Force, Box 97, File 7164A, Proclamation No. 10 of 1914, signed by Governor-General Gladstone, 9 January 1914; Proclamation No. 11 of 1914, signed by Governor-General Gladstone, 10 January 1914; and Geyer, “Die Eerste Operasionele Optrede,” 63–65.
26. Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie,* 74–75; and Van der Waag, “Rural Struggles,” 262–265.
27. DOD Archives, Pamphlet collection, Box 99, Pamphlet 6983, H.Camp, Union Defence Force: 1910-1930, 39.
28. *Government Gazette Extraordinary of the Union of South Africa*, no. 449, 9 January 1914; *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, 196, 244-246.

29. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, Article 79, 665; *Government Gazette Extraordinary of the Union of South Africa*, no. 451, 10 January 1914; NARS, SAP 10, File 6/183/14/4, Threatened Strike, 9 January 1914; NARS, Governor-General (GG), 1921, File 62/582, Railway strike 1914, Particulars of Defence Forces called out, 14 January 1914.
30. NARS, GG 1919, 62/510, Reports on progress and development of the Strike, 15 January 1914.
31. Ibid.
32. Kenefick, "Confronting White Labourism," 49.
33. NARS, PM 1/1/332 -PM200/1/1914 vol 1, Letter from W.L. Bagot to General Botha, 19 January 1914.
34. Ibid.
35. NARS, GG 1920, File, 62/563, Railway strike, 1914.
36. Ibid.
37. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, Article 7, 626. Persons of non-European descent were excluded from compulsory military training and combat duty. However, they were allowed to serve voluntarily as non-combatants. According to the spirit of the time, women were totally ignored in the Defence Act.
38. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, Article 79, 624, 626, 662, 664-665, 674-683.
39. See Geyer, "The Union Defence Force," 136-151.
40. Fedorowich, "'Sleeping with the Lion," 71–72.
41. Nasson, "A Great Divide," 49; Krüger, *The Making of a Nation*, 68–70; and Fedorowich, "'Sleeping with the Lion," 71–72.
42. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 87-121.
43. Swart, "A Boer and his Gun," 737.
44. DOD Archives, Secretary of Defence Group 2 (DC2), Box 168, File 2/7164: Pay and allowances of burghers on commando, 1914; NARS, SAP 130, S49: Defence Force Commandos: recognition of services.
45. Van der Waag, *A Military History,* 102-121.
46. NARS, SAP 10, File 6/183/14/7, Threatened strike, January 1914.
47. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/11, Telegram Major C.R. Burgess to all district staff officers, 10 January 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/10, Communication, Major C.R. Burgess – District staff officer Kroonstad, 9 January 1914; and Geyer, "The Union Defence Force," 136-151.
48. Van der Waag, "Rural Struggles," 266–270; and Van der Waag, "Boer Generalship," 29.

49. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File DC765, Strike, Precautionary measures - general correspondence from Defence HQ, January 1914; DOD Archives, Pamphlet collection, Box 99, Pamphlet 6983, H. Camp, Union Defence Force: 1910-1930, 39.
50. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 170, File 7178B: Threatened Indus Crisis, April 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 174, File 7454: Strike Act, No. 8 District Johannesburg, 1914.
51. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, article 43, pp. 642-643; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7178: Industrial crisis, January 1914.
52. Tylden, *The Armed Forces,* 219; and Pretorius, *Kommandolewe,* 82.
53. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 170, file 7178B, Threatened Indus crisis, April 1914.
54. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7178: Industrial crisis, January 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7198: Ordnance supplies, Strike, 6 January 1914.
55. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 142, File 5109: Private debts of members of the Union Forces, 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7178, Industrial crisis, January 1914.
56. Seegers, *The military in the making,* 21; Grimbeek, "Die totstandkoming van," 178-183; Jooste, "Die politiekekoerswending van 1948," 113-128; and Naude, South Africa's Active Citizen Force".
57. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7178, Industrial crisis, January 1914.
58. DOD Archives, SA Cit Force, Box 59, File 765/12, Distribution of equipment, January 1914.
59. G. Tylden, "The development of the commando," 309-310.
60. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe,* 56, 83.
61. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 of 1912, article 86, pp. 668-669.
62. *Government Gazette Extraordinary of the Union of South Africa*, no. 455, 14 January 1914, 251.
63. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/11, IC, January 1914.
64. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/10: IC, January 1914, District No. 12.; Tylden, "The development of the commando," 307.
65. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/11: IC, January 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File DC765: Strike, Precautionary measures – general correspondence from Defence Headquarters, January 1914.
66. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 147, File DC5256: Strike on Rand – Rifles and bayonets on loan from Imperial authorities, 1914; NARS, SAP 9, 6/183/14/3: Threatened strike. Protection of coal mines, Witbank area, 3 January 1914.
67. DOD Archives, SA Cit Force, Box 97, File 7164B: Threatened Indus crisis, 12 January 1914; NARS, GG 1919, 62/502: Railway strike 1914. Letter requesting loan of rifles

which is at the disposal of the High Commissioner, 12 January 1914; NARS, GG 1918, 62/498: Railway strike – outlines policy with regard to use of Imperial troops, 1914.

68. DOD Archives, SA Cit Force, Box 59, File 722: Arms stored at police barracks, Pretoria, Jul 1913.
69. Originally named after "Lord" F.S. Roberts and later renamed Voortrekkerhoogte. It is currently known as Thaba Tshwane. See Visser, "British influence on military," 67.
70. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7178: Threatened Industrial Crisis 1914. Protection and storage of arms and ammunition, 14 January 1914.
71. DOD Archives, SA Cit Force, Box 97, File 7164B: Threatened Indus crisis, 12 January 1914; NARS, GG 1919, 62/502: Railway strike 1914. Letter requesting loan of rifles which is at the disposal of the High Commissioner, 12 January 1914; NARS, GG 1918, 62/498: Railway strike – outlines policy with regard to use of Imperial troops, 1914.
72. NARS, SAP 9, File 6/183/D, Indus disturbances Tvl. Matters affecting Ermelo district, January 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/7, IC, District No. 7, January 1914.
73. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File 7198, Ordnance supplies telegrams, Strike, 6 January 1914.
74. Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie*, 21–32.
75. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force 1914-1918, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with the Proclamation calling out forces, 13 February 1914.
76. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 172, File 7229: Transport – Railway strike, January 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 174, File 7451: Transport accounts Industrial crisis, 1914; DOD Archives, SAMR, Box 982, File 330/4: OC's motor car allowances, 1912-1914.
77. *Government Gazette of the Union of South Africa*, Act no. 13 van 1912, article 65, 658-659; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 1436: Correspondence on the commandos' accounts during the strike, 1914.
78. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 12 February 1914; Swart, *Riding High*, 104, 113, 138-139.
79. Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie,* 49.
80. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 174, File 7451: Transport accounts Industrial crisis, 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 1436: Strike accounts No. 6 District, Standerton, January 1914; DOD Archives: SA Cit Force, Box 88, File 29/227, Commandeering horses during strike, 1914.
81. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File DC765, Strike, Precautionary measures - general correspondence from Defence HQ, January 1914.

82. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 171, File A163/7178: Telegram, Admin officer Johannesburg area to Secretary of Defence, 13 January 1914; DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 47, File 277: Citizen Force, 1914.
83. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 174, File 7454: Strike accounts, No. 9 District Pretoria, 1914; DOD Archives, DC 2, File 174, File 7454: Strike accounts, No. 8 District, Johannesburg, 1914.
84. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 174, File 7451: Transport accounts Industrial crisis, 1914; DOD Archives, DC2, Box 170, File 7178: Threatened Industrial Crisis, January 1914.
85. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 147, File 5270: Gladers, Mallein test for horses, 1914.
86. Tylden, "The development of the commando," 307; Van der Waag, "Boer Generalship," 29–30; and Katz, *General Jan Smuts*, 44.
87. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 170, File 7178: Threatened Indus Crisis, January 1914.
88. DOD Archives, DC2, Box 39, File 765/10/7: IC, District No. 7, 26 February 1914.
89. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 63, File 1382, Prosecution citizens for offences during January strike, January 1914; SA Cit. Force, Box 59, District Camp orders: No. 4 Mil district, 20 January 1914; NARS, SAP 130, File S29A, Martial law: action taken i.c.w. enforcement of, January 1914.
90. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765, Reports from district staff officers on defaulters, 12 February 1914.
91. DOD Archives, SA Cit Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 19 May 1914.
92. Ibid.
93. DOD Archives: SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 12 February 1914.
94. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12. No further information about the incident could not found.
95. Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose rebellie,* 33-35.
96. Van der Waag, "Boer Generalship," 17-30; and Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie*, 67–78.
97. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 24 June 1914.
98. Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie*, 18–21.
99. A faction of the Boer forces during the Anglo-Boer War did not want to negotiate peace but preferred to fight to the bitter end.

100. Seegers, *The Military in the Making*, 9.
101. Meintjes, *General Louis Botha*, 204.
102. Nasson, "A Great Divide," 51; and Grundlingh and Swart, *Radelose Rebellie*, 20–21.
103. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 12 Feb 1914.
104. Van der Waag, "Boer Generalship," 39
105. Ibid.
106. Later major-general in the UDF and military secretary to General Smuts. See Uys, *South African Military*, 48.
107. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Letter Major J.J. Collyer – Commandant General C.F. Beyers, 21 February 1914.
108. DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 59, File 765/12/11, Reports from district staff officers, Prosecution of citizens who failed to comply with proclamation calling out forces, 12 Feb 1914; DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 63, File 1399, Letters Commandant J.M. Els and Commandant D.H. van Coller – Commandant General C.F. Beyers, 30 January 2014; DOD Archives, SA Cit. Force, Box 63, File 1399, Commandeerd [sic] men – application compensation, 30 January 1914.
109. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 145-146.
110. DOD Archive: DC2, Box 171, File A163/7178, Memorandum SA Railways – Dept of Defence, Pretoria, 28 February 1914; NARS: GG 1919, File 62/509, Strike 1914 – Report on causes of, 1914; NARS: GG 1919, File 62/514, Strike 1914 – reports on positions, 15 January 1914; and Hyslop, *The notorious syndicalist*, 232-233.
111. Pietersen, "Stakings aan die Witwatersrand," 95-100.
112. NARS: Secretary of Justice (JUS), 194, File 3/98/14, Deportation of strike leaders, January-March 1914; NARS: SAP 10, File 6/191/14, Re deportation of civilian persons ex SS Umgeni, 27 January 1914; and NARS: PM 1/1/332, File PM 200/1/1914, vol. 2, January 1914.
113. Van der Waag, *A Military History*, 116; and Kleynhans and Garcia, "The Union Defence Force", 3.
114. See, for instance, Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 382.
115. Swart, "A Boer and his Gun," 737; and Van der Waag, "Boer Generalship," 37–38.
116. Van der Waag, "Smuts's Generals," 60–61; Stapleton, "Union of South Africa," 2; and Grimbeek, "Die Totstandkoming van die Unieverdedigingsmag," 330.
117. Van der Waag, *A Military history*, 102-121.

118. Visser, "Governments, parliaments and parties," 4; 20 000 Afrikaans speaking and 10 000 English speaking ACF commandos were deployed during the Rebellion. See Grundlingh and Swart, Radelose Rebellie, 19-20.

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