

**POPULISM IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN THE 1960s AND 1990s:
A HISTORICAL REVIEW**

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Submitted as requirement for the degree MScSci

in History

in the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

at the

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

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2021

“Political populism always poses a great danger because it disorients people, creates excessive expectations or, on the contrary, prioritises objects that are clearly not priorities or are simply impossible to achieve.”

- Vladimir Putin

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ABSTRACT

By the 1970s, when the internal mainstream anti-apartheid movement had been disrupted and was beginning to re-group elsewhere, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) emerged to occupy the vacuum left by mainstream formations. The BCM used a 'populist' Black identity ideology to put pressure on the National Party government to dismantle the oppressive and segregationist regime. At the same time, there emerged ultra-right-wing groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and Volksfront that were pushing for the maintenance of the white status quo and called for an intensification of the apartheid laws in the face of the increasing resistance. Mobilising on different sides of the aisle, these organisations claimed that they were the representatives of the 'people' against the 'established elite'. Even though they operated from different ends of the ideological spectrum, they both shared "an enemy" in the form of the National Party, which they had labelled as the corrupt elite. This thesis explores this curious case of contemporaneous but different practices of populism, with the view to seeing how populism can be differently understood as an eclectic historical phenomenon with both progressive and conservative/reactionary elements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the writing of this dissertation, I have received a great deal of support and assistance from many different people in many different spheres of my life.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Glen Ncube, whose expertise was invaluable in formulating the research questions and methodology and guided me on my research journey. Your insightful feedback pushed me to sharpen my thinking and brought my work to a higher level.

I would like to acknowledge the Andrew Mellon Fund for funding my research at the University of Pretoria. I would particularly like to single out the Head of the University of Pretoria's Department of Historical and Heritage Studies, Professor Karen Harris and thank her for her continued support on this challenging journey.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Joey, and Lester van Rooyen, for their wise counsel and sympathetic ear. You are always there for me. Initially when I set out on this journey my father was still with me but now, he is watching from heaven, and I would like to dedicate this to research to him. And mostly I would like to thank my mom for her support and continuous love through all the tears and anger and joys while writing this research. And thank you to Dylan Yorke and Ulrich Van Rooyen for standing by me and all the coffee. Also, thank you to all my friends, family, and mentors from all the different aspects of my life for supporting me on this journey, your help is very much appreciated. Also, a very special thank you to my Oupa Dick and Ouma Millie who are watching me from heaven. I know you are always with me, and I know you would have been extremely proud of me.

Above all else, I would like to thank my father God for this opportunity he has afforded me to complete this journey. His continued blessings in my life has driven me to develop myself as a child of God who honours Him in all I do.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC -	African National Congress
APLA-	Azanian People Liberation Army
AWB -	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AZAPO -	Azanian People's Organisation
BAWU -	Black Allied Workers Union
BC -	Black Consciousness
BCM -	Black Consciousness Movement
BCP -	Black Communities Programmes
BKA -	Boere Krisis Aksie
BPC -	Black People's Convention
BWP -	Black Workers Project
CRM -	Civil Rights Movement
DA -	Democratic Alliance
EFF -	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU -	European Unions
FFPlus -	Freedom Front Plus
GDP -	Gross Domestic Products
HNP -	Herstigte National Party
IFP -	Inkatha Freedom Party
MK -	uMkhonto we Sizwe
NP -	National Party
NUSAS -	National Union of South African Students
NYO -	National Youth Organisation
PAC -	Pan Africanist Congress
POQO	PAC Military Wing
SA	South Africa
SABTU -	South African Black Theatre Union
SACP -	South African Communist Party
SASM -	South African Student Movement
SASO -	South African Students' Organisation
TRC -	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCM -	University Christian Movements
UK -	United Kingdom
UKIP -	UK Independent Party
USA/ US -	United States of America
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Refiguring populism in South Africa

This thesis aims to give a historical review of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the Afrikaner Weerstandbewiging (AWB) between the 1960s and 1990s through the relatively new lens of populism, by re-examining the rich history of identity and popular politics in South Africa's past. By the 1970s, when the internal mainstream anti-apartheid movement had been disrupted and was beginning to re-group outside the borders of South Africa, the BCM emerged – mainly driven by Black student activism – to occupy the vacuum left by mainstream formations. Arguably, the BCM used a progressive 'populist' Black identity ideology to put pressure on the National Party government to dismantle the oppressive and segregationist apartheid regime. The BCM also appealed to Black people to radically transform their thinking.

At the same time, ultra-right-wing groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and Volksfront emerged pushing for the maintenance of the white status quo and calling for an intensification of the apartheid laws in the face of the increasing resistance. Mobilising on different sides of the ideological and identity divide, these movements claimed that they were the representatives of the 'people', against the 'established elite'. Even though they operated from different ends of the ideological spectrum, they both shared 'an enemy' in the form of the National Party, which they had labelled as the corrupt 'elite'. This thesis explores this curious case of contemporaneous but different mobilisations of populism, with the view to seeing how populism can be differently understood as an eclectic historical phenomenon with both progressive and conservative elements.

Populism is historically rooted in anti-establishment sentiment, and populist characters often seek to endear themselves with publics. This is what we often see and hear from politicians who portray themselves as 'outsiders' to the system and as the voice of the people. Some examples that immediately come to mind are people such as former American president, Donald Trump, the British Brexiteer politician, Nigel Farage, and South African opposition party leader/politician/maverick, Julius Malema, among others. Populism can be found on either the left or the right wing of the political spectrum. Even the former leader of the British Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, and US senator and former presidential candidate, Bernie

Sanders, have dabbled in populism, vowing to tackle corruption and big business interests in politics or to introduce what they call “democratic socialism”.¹

Although it is a trend which is on the rise globally, it is not a new phenomenon. Populism works on the basis of the ‘*Vox Populis*’ or the voice of the people, when in actual fact democracy should have been the voice of the people and rule in favour of the people.² Populism aims to maintain the power and interest of the people through reform rather than through revolution. There is a commonly accepted idea that a populist leader is a charismatic leader who claims to embody the will of the people to consolidate his own power. It is also important to understand that populism can link to extreme forms of Nationalism such as African Nationalism which fuelled the Black Consciousness Movement or even racism such as the preservation of white Afrikaners by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, as an attempt to conceal the failures of the leader or to distract the general public from the real causes of social and economic problems.³

Given its rising prominence in contemporary politics globally, populism presents itself as a topic fertile for academic exploration, especially in young democracies such as South Africa, which recently emerged from a deeply racialised political dispensation, with legacies that are still visible. In South Africa, there has been a sudden surge in populist anti-corruption (and of late anti-foreign) movements, forming political and electioneering platforms across opposition parties, who often can be found to be corrupt themselves. This has become a fashionable political trend because of its popular appeal to a weary citizenry. According to Tom Head ‘around 39% of South Africans are deemed to have populist views, which is the second-highest number of the “big 19” countries surveyed. Brazil – which recently elected the far-right and widely controversial Jair Bolsonaro on an anti-corruption platform – comes out on top, whereas Thailand completes the top-three.’⁴

In South Africa, many of these anti-corruption opposition crusaders have thrived on the fact that there has been a fair number of events linked to corruption such as the recent Gupta

¹Haltiwanger, J., *Business insider: Here’s the difference between a ‘socialist’ and a ‘democratic socialist.’* [Online] Available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/difference-between-socialist-and-democratic-socialist-2018-6?IR=T> [Accessed 29 May 2020].

²Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

³ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

⁴Head, T., *The South African*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-is-populism-south-africa-populists/> [Accessed 3 May 2020]

family's influence on the state, or the many charges of corruption faced by former President Jacob Zuma in relation to the Arms Deal scandal or the excessive spending on his homestead in Nkandla. Currently, there is controversy around "Covidgate" in the wake of the looting of funds set aside for the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.⁵ It is fair to say that the people of South Africa have been exposed to an onslaught of corruption in the past, however, in the last few years, public scrutiny and media reportage have concentrated on exposing the cases of corruption. According to some assessments 'more people in this country now base their political choices on those with anti-government, anti-corruption policies.'⁶

With the recent surge in populism, South Africa saw the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – headed by Julius Malema – make significant gains during the 2019 elections when compared to the 2014 elections, with a large amount of support coming from the younger voters who connect to the idea of free education and the resistance to 'white monopoly capital'.⁷ However, populism is not exclusive to Malema and his apparent leftist organisation, the EFF. The former leader of the Democratic Alliance's (DA), Mmusi Maimane, never passed an opportunity to criticise the ruling African National Congress (ANC) for their history of corruption.⁸ It is very clear that opposition parties are trying to present themselves as being 'for the people and their needs' and against the 'established elite who are corrupt'. The inroads that Herman Mashaba's new Action SA party made in the November 2021 municipal elections, arguably owe to this political strain among South African publics.

However, elements within the ruling party have also dabbled in populist politicking. For example, there are cases where current President Cyril Ramaphosa has called out the corrupt elements within his party and distanced himself from any of the supposedly corrupt actions. His administration has also sought to benefit from popular sentiment by pouncing on the notion of radical land reform and expropriation without compensation.⁹ When his power was

⁵ Matlala, G., *Covidgate: Are we at the climax of the race to the bottom?* [Online] Available at: <https://sundayworld.co.za/opinion/covidgate-are-we-at-the-climax-of-the-race-to-the-bottom/> [Accessed 18 August 2020].

⁶Head, T., *The South African*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-is-populism-south-africa-populists/> [Accessed 3 May 2020].

⁷Matlala, G., *Covidgate: Are we at the climax of the race to the bottom?* [Online] Available at: <https://sundayworld.co.za/opinion/covidgate-are-we-at-the-climax-of-the-race-to-the-bottom/> [Accessed 18 August 2020].

⁸Maqhina, M., *Don't fall for ANC, EFF lies, says Mmusi Maimane* [Online] Available at: <https://www.iol.co.za/news/dont-fall-for-anc-eff-lies-says-mmusi-maimane-22638926> [Accessed 18 August 2020]

⁹Head, T., *The South African*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-is-populism-south-africa-populists/>[Accessed 3 May 2020].

challenged, former president Zuma and his administration came up with a populist notion of Radical Economic Empowerment.¹⁰ Therefore, corruption, land expropriation without compensation, radical economic empowerment, and the call for free education have essentially taken up a large space in South Africa's political landscape and this ultimately influences the populist sentiment, meaning that it has a strong impact on the populist thinking in the country.

This thesis traces the historical evolution of populism in South African politics from the 1960s to the 1990s, looking specifically at the populist nature of the Black Consciousness Movement and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and how these two organisations could possibly be labelled as populist movements, with starkly contrasting features and motivations. The main aim is to develop an understanding of how different organised groups/formations and social actors (political and grassroots), have mobilised populism within the South African public sphere in the recent past. The thesis examines populism with reference to nationalism and explores how they have nourished each other within the South African polity. In other words, the aim is to develop an understanding of the evolution of populist phenomena by comparing how African nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism have both been inflected populist phenomena as they evolved during the apartheid era.

Both populism and nationalism have been at the centre stage of political debates since the 1800s by various nation states.¹¹ However, in this thesis, the time frame under review is the period from the 1960s, when Black South Africans moved into an assertive and more militant form of resistance towards apartheid, to the 1990s when South Africa became a democratic country. This period was fertile for competing versions of nationalist and identity populisms. However, in order to gain insight and perspective, forays have been made into the period before the 1960s and after the 1990s, and comparative examples have been cited.

So far, there is limited comparative research on the kaleidoscopic historical evolution of the blend of populism in the South African context. This research therefore seeks to address this gap, by examining the differential influence of populism on South African public politics in the competing domains of African nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism since the 1960s.

¹⁰Ngcobo, Z., *Zuma: Black unity only way to achieve radical economic transformation*. [Online] Available at: <https://ewn.co.za/2018/03/09/zuma-Black-unity-only-way-to-achieve-radical-economic-transformation>. [Accessed 18 August 2020]

¹¹Head, T., *The South African*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/what-is-populism-south-africa-populists/> [Accessed 3 May 2020]

Some of the methods used by these political formations have been discussed at length in order to understand their genesis, lives, and afterlives.

Populism: A conceptual overview

There is still a lot of scholarly literature that sets the conceptual parameters of populism; however, this thesis has leaned towards the definition used by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. Mudde and Kaltwasser define ‘populism’ as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, namely “the pure people” versus the “established elite”; and posits that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.¹² Populism therefore has two opposites: elitism and pluralism.¹³ Quite often therefore, populism is used as a tactic to dismiss those whose politics we do not agree with.

Mudde and Kaltwasser place emphasis on applying populism to political groups and leaders who appeal to the ‘will of the people’ and contrast this with the ‘established elite.’¹⁴ Mudde and Kaltwasser have used populism as a way to explain how people make sense of the political world, stating that the world is divided into ‘friends and foes’, in which the foes are the elite who possess very different priorities, values and beliefs from the people in the community.¹⁵

Other scholars such as Albertazzi and McDonnell have adopted the definition of the Mudde and Kaltwasser to further explain populism in terms of it being a small group of united people who are ‘pure’ and are at loggerheads with the unfair ‘elite’, who are ultimately trying to deprive the people of their rights, values, beliefs and voice.¹⁶ Manuel Anselmi describes the phenomenon as characteristic of a ‘homogenous group of people who perceive themselves as the true holders of popular sovereignty’ in a country and they commonly agree on and express an anti-establishment sentiment.¹⁷

Populism is based on the idea that the ‘will of the people’ should prevail over the established ‘elite’, and therefore has its roots grounded in the anti-elitist sentiment which is able to harness

¹²Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017).

¹³Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 15.

¹⁴Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 15.

¹⁵Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 15.

¹⁶Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D., *Twenty-First Century Populism*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 33.

¹⁷Anselmi, M., ‘Populism: An Introduction.’ *Sociological Theory*, 22, 1, (2018), p. 102.

the resentment of the marginalised people.¹⁸ Populist parties can be classified as either left or right-wing because it is not based on one ideological spectrum, but is fluid and is used to describe the way politicians manipulate the beliefs of the people in order to gain support for their cause.¹⁹ Any politician not in the ruling party is able to criticize and/or promise as much as he/she wants as she/he does not have to deliver at that point in time.

Cass Mudde describes populism as the defiance to the established order, which means that the people feel that the government does not rule for the people but conspires against them. Mudde goes on to label the people as the true soul of the nation and therefore they should hold the power. Populism tends to be nativist and suspicious of foreigners, sceptical of the information provided by the press and follows closely what is said by those that are believed have the best interests of the people at heart.²⁰

In terms of classifying whether a person is considered to be part of the ‘people’ or not all depends on how the populist leader perceives the people, based on ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’ terms.²¹ Leaders who distinguish the people in terms of inclusionary terms are generally concerned with the idea that these ‘people’ are part of a more broadly accepted majority which have been marginalised in the past.²² Leaders who are more ‘exclusionary’ define the ‘people’ as a focused sociocultural group and they tend to be harsher against minority groups.²³ At the same time, ‘inclusionary’ populist leaders often are very selective in who to include and who they do not include. It is worth noting that populism as a whole is very selective, and it affects the way in which populism is defined. If one were to look at populism as whole, the whole concept of who is part of the people and who is considered as ‘other’, or ‘elite’ needs to be clearly defined.

There are certain patterns and conditions that scholars have identified as leading to the rise and resurgence of populism during modern times. Firstly, Moises Naim, editor of *Foreign Policy*, states that it is a rhetorical tactic that has been used throughout history to gain power and hold

¹⁸ Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 2.

¹⁹ Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 2.

²⁰ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

²¹ Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 2.

²² Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 2 – 3.

²³ Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 2 – 3.

on to it.²⁴ He argues that it is not an ideology but rather a way to maintain power, and that today it is pushed forward by the digital revolution, poor economies, and insecurity, basically meaning that populism thrives and grows on conspiracy, criminalises all opposition and plays on external threats to gain support.²⁵

Anthony Giddens is another scholar who has attempted to explain the resurgence of populism. Giddens states that the current world is following the path of globalisation meaning that the whole globe is interconnected and there is a constant flow of goods, services and knowledge globally.²⁶ Giddens goes on to explain that the world and current politics is following the anarchic and haphazard fashion of the old world which is covered in anxieties that leaves the general people with no control.²⁷ This means that people are losing their sense of identity and belonging, due to the fast changing nature of the world and people crave to return to a more traditional time where they felt safe in their own countries. Ultimately, what Giddens is stating is that populism is based more on identity politics, rather than human economics per se.

Another scholar who has attempted to explain the resurgence of populism is Arvind Subramanian. Subramanian argues that populism is not so much linked to identity but rather is linked to hyper-globalization.²⁸ Contemporary globalization has been on the rise since the 1970s and growing constantly to include the financial crisis of 2008 and continues today. Many advocates of globalization argue that it has helped to increase wealth, drove up the world's GDP, encouraged development in poor countries and relieved poverty in many countries such as India, China and Africa.²⁹ However, Subramanian argues that globalisation has caused wealth to fall into the hands of a wealthy few, resulted in many workers having lost their jobs because the demand shifted elsewhere and resulted in the increase of access to cheap imports and cheaper labour from immigrants into those countries.³⁰

Together this literature shows that populist phenomena are linked to the class identity of people as well as economic circumstances in a country. People fear the unknown and they are

²⁴ Naim, M, 'How to be a populist', The Atlantic. (2017).

²⁵ Naim, M, 'How to be a populist', The Atlantic. (2017).

²⁶ Giddens, A., *Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives*. (London: Routledge, 2002).

²⁷ Giddens, A., *Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives*. (London: Routledge, 2002).

²⁸ Subramanian, A & Kessler, M., 'The Hyperglobalization of Trade and its Future', Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series. (2013).

²⁹ Subramanian, A & Kessler, M., 'The Hyperglobalization of Trade and its Future', Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series. (2013).

³⁰ Subramanian, A & Kessler, M., 'The Hyperglobalization of Trade and its Future', Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series. (2013).

uncomfortable with the threat to the status quo, thus when a leader or populist party comes onto the scene, speaking out against the corrupt elite and acting as if they are the true voice of the people, they have gained the support of the marginalised masses.

Some scholars have argued that there are certain occurrences linked to populism that are needed in order to identify whether populism truly exists in an area, namely that it must look after the people, oppose the elite and advocate for the general will of the people. The people are considered to make up the national community or the general population. It is a certain group of people that sway the political system or circumstances, and leaders claim that these people make up the whole population of a country. An example could be taken from Brexit, when UKIP leader Nigel Farage claimed that it had been a success for the people of the UK to leave the EU even though 49% had voted to remain part of the EU.³¹ The ‘elite’ are seen as corrupt and actively working against the general will of the ‘people’, basically meaning that those in power favour ‘others’ over the general population of their country.³² The general will of the ‘people’ links to theories developed by Jean Jacques Rousseau where he criticises a representative democracy but favours some aspects of direct democracy such as referendums. For populism, this means that ‘people’ must be united as a single group and that anyone not seen as being part of that group is treated as unequal, thus meaning that it can be used to attack anyone not seen as part of the ‘people’ because they are a threat to democracy.³³

According to existing literature, there have been recurring models associated with popular politics and populism in contemporary South Africa throughout the apartheid period. There are three main models identified by Sithembile Mbete in her article “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s turn towards Populism”; and these include the “political style”, “crisis, breakdown and threat” and finally the model of “bad manners”.³⁴ The models discussed by Mbete are based on the models of Moffitt and Tormey whose work explores the rise of populism in Europe.³⁵

³¹Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

³²Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p.17.

³³Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

³⁴Mbete, S., ‘The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?’, *Journal of African Elections*, 14, 1, (2015), pp. 36 – 37.

³⁵Moffitt, B & S Tormey., ‘Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style’. *Political Studies*, 62, 2, (2014), p. 386.

Firstly, there is an appeal to the ‘people’; this means that populists play on the idea of the people as being the true holders of power instead of the corrupt ‘elite’.³⁶ This is reinforced by the idea that the political ‘elite’ have let the ‘people’ down and exploited them. This is achieved by the politicians distancing themselves from the established elite by adopting popular language, gestures, and fashions to be more relatable to the general population and by claiming that they are the true voice of the ‘people’.³⁷

In South Africa specifically, an example is that of the Economic Freedom Fighters, who state that they represent the poor and marginalized masses who continue to be exploited by white monopoly capital and the corrupt elite within the state. This can be seen in the fact that they wear workers’ overalls as their uniform in parliament and the females wear the head cloth usually worn by domestic workers or they wear a hard hat of the type used by construction and mine workers.³⁸ Examples from the past that can be classified as populist are the Black Consciousness Movement under Steve Biko, the Pan-Africanist Congress in terms of Black liberation movements, and another example, could be the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging on the right wing of the spectrum. This was the Afrikaners’ “resistance movement” during apartheid which aimed to protect the rights of white Afrikaner people when democracy was looming on the doorstep of South Africa.

The second model is that of ‘crisis, breakdown and threat.’³⁹ This model examines the idea that populism arises from the perceived crisis, breakdown, and threat to the people in a country and is linked closely to the breakdown of relations between the people and their representatives, as well as to economic hardships or a lack of social development. An example here is that of the BCM during the 1960s in South Africa. The BCM started in a political vacuum after the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were banned and many leaders were jailed following the Sharpeville Massacre.⁴⁰ The BCM attempted to be a grass-roots anti-apartheid movement which represented a movement towards political consciousness for Black people. The BCM openly rejected what they saw as liberal white values.⁴¹ They

³⁶ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

³⁷ Moffitt, B & S Tormey., ‘Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style’. *Political Studies*, 62, 2, (2014), p. 386.

³⁸ Mbete, S., ‘The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?’, *Journal of African Elections*, 14, 1, (2015), p. 38.

³⁹ Mbete, S., ‘The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?’, *Journal of African Elections*, 14, 1, (2015), p. 38.

⁴⁰ Davenport, T., *South African: a modern history*. (Bergville: Southern Book Publishers, 1977).

⁴¹ Davenport, T., *South African: a modern history*. (Bergville: Southern Book Publishers, 1977).

refused to engage with the white liberal opinion on the pros and cons of Black Consciousness and emphasised the rejection of white monopoly as the centre of their movement. There emerged a greater cohesiveness and solidarity amongst Black groups in general, which in turn brought Black consciousness to the forefront of the anti-Apartheid struggle within South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴²

The last model is ‘bad manners’.⁴³ Once again referring to the work of Moffitt and Tormey, many populist groups’ appeal, comes from the fact that they do not act in ‘appropriate’ ways that are generally accepted in the political sphere.⁴⁴ This links to the idea that the mannerisms of populists appeal to the general peoples’ understanding of politics and links them to the people, instead of to the complex politics of the elite.⁴⁵ An example here is the EFF’s adoption of a language style similar to that used during the liberation struggle against apartheid, regardless of the fact that it is out of place in democratic politics. Moreover, their act of challenging parliamentary gatherings and disregarding the rules of parliament, speaks to the popular belief of the youth having a kind of moral authority to challenge those in power. In the past, the BCM was considered as a radical Black movement that aimed for the liberty of African people from the chains of oppression, which appealed to the young Black South Africans, focusing specifically on one group of people.⁴⁶ The exact opposite is also true of the AWB which appealed to the needs of Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans who were afraid of the end of the apartheid regime because they were afraid of the consequences in a country with no strict racial regulations in place.

It can be argued that the conditions of violence and the emergence of populism in South Africa are due to the socio-economic history of colonialism, violence, dispossession, exploitation, and impoverishment. The legacy of colonialism has continued and accelerated with the continuation of the poor socio-economic conditions as well as the high levels of unemployment, lack of service delivery and corruption in politics and government. The change in political power in 1994 did not ensure a decrease in violence because there was no

⁴² Ellis, T., ‘The genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle in South Africa 1948 – 1961’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37, 4, (2011), p. 668.

⁴³ Mbete, S., ‘The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?’, *Journal of African Elections*, 14, 1, (2015), pp. 38-39.

⁴⁴ Mbete, S., ‘The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?’, *Journal of African Elections*, 14, 1, (2015), p. 39.

⁴⁵ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

⁴⁶ Ellis, T., ‘The genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle in South Africa 1948 – 1961’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37, 4, (2011), p. 668.

fundamental change in the living conditions of the vast majority of the population. This ultimately meant that the stage was set for the continuation of old populist formations or the emergence of new populist formations in South Africa.

Studies on popular politics and populism globally

Popular politics and populism have played a role in the history of many countries across the world. If one had to look at the global context of populism by using the politics of the United States of America, there are two main political spheres (Republicans versus the Democrats). The current politics in America is an interesting example of eclectic populism manifesting itself on both the left- and right-wing spectrums. With the surprise election of President Donald Trump, a non-mainstream Republican candidate in 2016, it is fairly obvious how he used populist tactics to gain support; his campaign platforms included the deportation of immigrants to secure jobs for the average America and to build a wall between America and Mexico, so as to prevent people from crossing into America illegally.⁴⁷ Among the Democrats, Bernie Sanders also used populist methods in his bid to capture nomination by criticising the income inequality in the country as well and the disdain for the ‘billionaire class’.⁴⁸

The phenomenon of populism in America is not a new occurrence. Left-wing populism was started in the late 1880s by farmers who were suffering from the drought on the Great Plains and the decrease in cotton prices, which compounded their financial insecurity.⁴⁹ This ultimately meant that there was increased resentment towards the elite which led the joining of forces by farmers, labour unions and other sympathizers to create the People’s Party, which was commonly called the Populist Party.⁵⁰ The aim of the party was to normalise prices, to break up big trusts and to get rid of the Gold Standard.⁵¹ However, in the 1892 election the Populist Party president, James B. Weaver, only gained 8.5% of the vote, and the party eventually failed after that. On the other hand, right-wing populism seems to have emerged in the late 1840s with the creation of the xenophobic movement who called themselves the “Know-nothing Movement.”⁵² The protestants viewed the immigration of German and Irish Catholics as a threat to American culture and religion. Only in 1855 did they come out as the

⁴⁷ Anselmi, M., ‘Populism: An Introduction.’ *Sociological Theory*, 22, 1, (2018), p. 5.

⁴⁸ The Week staff, *A Brief History of Populism*, Washington: The Week. (2016).

⁴⁹ Mény, Y. and Surel, Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 5.

⁵⁰ Mény, Y. and Surel, Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 10.

⁵¹ The Week staff, *A Brief History of Populism*, Washington: The Week. (2016).

⁵² The Week staff, *A Brief History of Populism*, Washington: The Week. (2016).

American Party, demanding immigration restrictions and a 21-year residency requirement in order to gain citizenship. In 1856, Millard Fillmore won 21.6% of the votes but the party came to a definitive end with a divide between people who were pro-slavery and those that were anti-slavery but had a lasting effect in that it caused an increase in nativism.⁵³ Therefore, it can be deduced that populism America laid the foundation for the Democrats to develop their ideology, which can be seen in the New Deal resolutions created by F.D. Roosevelt. By the time the Cold War started in America, the liberals had been in power for a while and had become the exact people they had spoken out against, and populist methods had taken a back seat.⁵⁴ However, in 2008 the Financial Crisis, as well as globalisation, continued migration and intercultural mixing sparked great anger from the people against the government which led to the resurgence of populism, taking it full circle to Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.⁵⁵ The idea that is prominent here is that the populist phenomenon has influenced mainstream politics throughout history.

Another example that can be examined with regards to the populist insurrection is the French Revolution that took place in Europe during the 18th century. The French Revolution occurred in 1789, although the exact month in which it began is debated on. Some believe that the Revolution began when the Tennis Court Oath was signed, while others believe it began when the peasants took matters into their own hands and stormed the Bastille.⁵⁶ The reason behind the French Revolution however is very simply, the people were unhappy and angry with the continuous corruption of the monarchy and unfair rule of King Louis XVI. The French society had been divided into three distinct groups, with the Clergy and Nobles at the top and the peasants at the bottom. France as a nation at the time was in deep debt due to the extravagant lifestyles of the first and second estates, as well as the lifestyle of the king and his infamous wife, Marie Antoinette. There was also the ever-growing debt of war that continued to hamper the economic development of France.⁵⁷ The King and nobles were aware of the danger that the country would face if the debt was not settled and thus called for a meeting of the Estates general where it was decided that taxes would be increased. However, this was the spark that was needed to unleash the fury of the general people in France because they would be the ones

⁵³ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 83.

⁵⁴ Gagnon, J., Beausoleil, E., et al., 'What is populism? Who is the populist?', *Democratic Theory*, 5, (2018), p. vi.

⁵⁵ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

⁵⁶ McPhee, P., *The French Revolution 1789 – 1799*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1.

⁵⁷ McPhee, P., *The French Revolution 1789 – 1799*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

who would be forced to pay the taxes.⁵⁸ Thus, the people unanimously decided that it was time to take control of their nation, hence the historically famous rebellion.

It is a classic example of the people converging together and resisting the established and corrupt elite. Eventually, after the rebellion had started, the king was removed from his seat of power and France became a republic. The French revolution operated under the slogan of 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité' which translates to 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.'⁵⁹ This slogan is key to linking the French Revolution to populist tactics because it speaks to the idea that the people who were in France at the time wanted the country to be a fair and just country, where the people have a voice and are treated equally before the law. This was in contrast to the rights that they had been denied with the class system that was in place. From that time onwards, the government was elected by the people and would represent the true nation of France as a true democracy. The new legislation and acts that were put in place with the new government favoured men and favoured equality for the working class.⁶⁰ This new development in the French history was short lived however, because by the end of the 1790s, Napoleon Bonaparte took control of France and populist reign was abruptly ended.

Therefore, it can be deduced that populism strategies and tactics have been existing and evolving throughout history long before the concept was given a name, as evinced by popular uprisings in America and France during their revolutions. It can also be seen in the Haitian Revolution which took place shortly after the French Revolution, as well as in African history with the Algerian Revolution that started in 1954 and ended in 1961, the Rwanda Revolution in the late 1950s and even as recently as the Libyan Revolution, in 2011. All these revolutions rallied around the same idea, which was that the government was elite and detached from the masses and that the revolutionary movement would restore power to the people and make them the true masters of their destinies. Populist uprisings have changed the course of history many times over but with regards to South Africa, it presented itself in particular forms of racial politics during the 1960s.

⁵⁸ History.com Editors, *The French Revolution*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/france/french-revolution> [Accessed 24 November 2021].

⁵⁹ McPhee, P., *The French Revolution 1789 – 1799*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 52.

⁶⁰ McPhee, P., *The French Revolution 1789 – 1799*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 158.

Studies on popular politics and populism in South Africa

Any new work on the history of populism in South Africa will benefit from several works that have explored this impulse and its related ideological and political expressions. Paul S. Landau's *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400 – 1948*, is a very useful resource that explores the emergence and development of public politics in the South African public affairs arena.⁶¹ The book serves as very useful background reading on the making of the political spectrum in South African history. Although quite short, the article by Leslie Dikeni offers very useful conceptual insights about populism and nationalism and their “implications for South Africa”.⁶² Dikeni's article also classifies and links certain contrasting conceptual strains of populism with different social actors in contemporary South Africa. Dikeni's main argument in his article is that both populism and nationalism have shaped and changed society in South Africa. It is key to evaluating the impact that these phenomena have had on the move towards populist strategies by using the nationalist ideologies.

Another relevant piece of work is an article by C. R. D. Halisi, which attempts to link populism and the question of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa.⁶³ In the article, Halisi speaks about “rival populisms”,⁶⁴ a framing which is useful in the juxtaposition of the contrasting examples that will be explored in this study. W. R. Terblanche's thesis on populism and human rights in South Africa has a section on the history of populism in South Africa, with useful pointers on aspects of this very broad and complex historical phenomenon.⁶⁵ Terblanche argues in his thesis that populism poses a threat to basic human rights because it treats all people as equal in all aspects of society, but the danger lays in the point that the ‘pure people’ are a select group who have been identified as the marginalised and oppressed members of society, thus making the concept of equality in a populist system null and void. However, not all populisms in history can be said to be a danger to human rights.

The Institute of Security Studies' Jakkie Cilliers has also written on populism, with specific focus on the rise of populist elements within the ruling African National Congress and the rise

⁶¹Landau, P., *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948*. (United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁶²Dikeni, L., ‘Populism and Nationalism: Implications for South Africa’, *The Journal of The Helen Suzman Foundation.*, 80, 1, (2017).

⁶³Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998).

⁶⁴Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 428.

⁶⁵Terblanche, R., ‘An analysis of populism and human rights in South Africa.’ (University of the Free State, 2018).

of the EFF. Cilliers conceives of these recent developments as a sort of risk to be dealt with.⁶⁶ This probes this perspective by checking the historical risk-factor of populism, with keen eyes on who defined it as such and why. From an economic policy studies point of view, Phillip Mohr's 1994 article explores the scenario of macroeconomic populism in the newly democratising South Africa, with indications that the imperative of transformation created conditions for such populism to take root.⁶⁷ This subject is picked up by Louise Vincent whose 2011 article looks precisely at the ANC's shift towards populism and their reductionist view of democracy as "majoritarianism" or the clichéd "will of the people" mantra, was challenging "the founding precepts of constitutional democracy".⁶⁸

Besides these works, the other relevant literature that deserves to be highlighted includes works that look at the formation of these political movements and how they link to popular or resistance politics. Some key examples include the work written by BCM leader, Steve Biko – *I write what I Like*, published in 1978. This book deals specifically articulates Steve Biko's ideas about the apartheid regime and the idea that Black people would only truly be free once they had thrown off the mental chains of oppression.⁶⁹ In Biko's book, there is a range of various speeches and writings that he published during his time as leader of the South African Students Organisation. After reading and analysing these speeches and writings one can truly come to terms with Biko's intriguing articulation of ordinary Black South African's suffering under the apartheid regime and what they needed to do in order to unite and claim back their human dignity.⁷⁰

Another notable author is Ian Macqueen who argues that Black Consciousness was not an elitist or separatist group but rather an organisation that was aimed at developing Black Consciousness openly through the improvement of self-awareness.⁷¹ He argues that Black Consciousness wanted to achieve psychological liberation for Black South Africans through Community Programmes and Christian ideals without an armed underground struggle.⁷²

⁶⁶Cilliers, J., *The future of South Africa - dealing with risks of populism*. [Online] Available at: https://www.hss.de/download/publications/AMEZ_22_Populismus_03.pdf [Accessed 25 August 2020].

⁶⁷Mohr, P., 'Can South Africa avoid macroeconomic populism?', *Development Southern Africa*, 1, 1, (2008).

⁶⁸Vincent, L., 'Seducing the people: Populism and the challenge to democracy in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29, 1, (2011), p. 2.

⁶⁹Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

⁷⁰Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

⁷¹Macqueen, I., *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*. (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2018), p. 58.

⁷²Macqueen, I., *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*. (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2018), p. 63.

Macqueen also deals at length with the growth of Black Consciousness ideals and the implementation of these ideals through student and Christian organisations. Due to its anchorage in student politics, other works that were found to offer valuable comparative insights and context included the works of such scholars like Anne Heffernan whose work examines the history and trends of student politics in South Africa's northern campuses during the 1960s, with a particular focus on how student movements influenced broader politics and change. A chapter in her book, *Limpopo's Legacy*, tackles the issue of populism and youth.⁷³ This new work offers useful insights for refiguring the BCM within its wider context.

A key source that examines the AWB is a book written by Arthur Kemp, entitled *Victory or Violence: The Story of the AWB in South Africa*. This book deals with the formation of the AWB and the beliefs and tactics it employed in its quest to preserve of white Afrikaner power and its grip on the levers of state power.⁷⁴ It looks at the AWB's campaign of violent resistance against impending ANC rule and the response that the then government was forced to impose, such as the imposition of a state of emergency in the many parts of the country. Kemp's book is a major text on with the history of one of South Africa's most hard-line white resistance movements against the end of white rule.⁷⁵

Another important book that gives details on the motives and life of the AWB is a book written by Amos van der Merwe, entitled *Eugene Terre'Blanche – My Side of the Story*. This is a very important source of information as it provides details about the ideas held by Terre'Blanche and the AWB as they sought the preservation or independence of the Afrikaner nation. It details his early life and years of service in the military, followed by his move towards right-wing politics and the quest for the preservation of Afrikaner domination.⁷⁶ Saul Dubow's book *Apartheid 1948–1994* also discusses the rise and fall of white supremacy and places apartheid within the global context, which provides a perfect basis from which to study the implications that white supremacy had in South Africa.⁷⁷ Herman Gilliomee has published a large number of articles which discuss the impact that Afrikaner nationalism had on the AWB. Gilliomee argues that Afrikaner nationalism significantly influenced the rise of the AWB, and it aided the

⁷³ Heffernan, A., 'Black Consciousness's Lost Leader: Abraham Tiro, the University of the North, and the Seeds of South Africa's Student Movement in the 1970s', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 41, 1, (2015).

⁷⁴ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

⁷⁵ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

⁷⁶ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

⁷⁷ Dubow, S., *Scientific racism in Modern South Africa*. (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1995), p. 10.

movement in garnering support from white Afrikaners by linking themselves closely to the Afrikaner heritage.⁷⁸

Methodology

Data for this research was gathered from different relevant data sources, including primary and secondary sources, documentary, and audio-visual sources. Primary sources such as the results from voting, written sources of established nationalist party leaders and recordings of speeches or presentations by populist movements which fall under oral histories were consulted for important insights about this phenomenon. Secondary sources were also be used extensively in building the background of this research. Secondary sources included scholarly articles, books, seminars, and presentations on populism both globally and specifically in South Africa. The research used the framework of qualitative historical research to provide deeper insights on this phenomenon by triangulating different primary and secondary sources and subjecting them to thorough historical analysis. The qualitative approach allowed for the exegesis of textual materials such as articles, books, and internet sources so as to compare the changes in support for supposed populist or nationalist political parties from the past to the present.

Some of the key sources used include books such as *I write what I like* by Steve Biko, *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa* by Arthur Kemp, *Popular Politics* by Paul Landau and *A concise History of South Africa* by Robert Ross. Audio-visual sources used in this research included discussions by Cass Mudde on the rise of populism and recordings of AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche. Sources such as newspaper reports from the time period are also analysed so that the extent of the influence could be discussed, such as how the people reacted to these political actors and movements.

This study did not involve the carrying out of interviews but rather focused on data collected from sources that are mostly in the public domain or those that can be accessed without involving human subjects as direct sources of information. This condition was mostly imposed by the COVID situation which coincided with the start of this study. Proper archival research in the National Archives in Pretoria was also impractical. Consequently, this research relied heavily on a closer reading of written and other non-interview sources to draw out insights about populism.

⁷⁸ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992).

One of the main challenges faced when conducting this research is that there was very limited research on the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging in terms of published works, hence this led to much difficulty in gauging the true nature of the AWB and its dynamics as a right-wing populist movement. As such, many of the resources used to write about the AWB were online sources such as documentaries and video clips of the AWB and its leader Eugene Terre'Blanche. The research relied mainly on interpretation of speeches made by Terre'Blanche, which benefited the work in the sense that one could examine first-hand how the AWB manipulated the emotions and minds of the Afrikaner people and persuaded them to believe that they were the true people who needed to be protected from the corrupt National Party government, which at the time was moving towards ending segregation in South Africa.

Chapter outline

This study is organised into five chapters which specifically deal with the idea of populism, the Black Consciousness Movement, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, and a comparison between the two movements and their dabbling in populist politics.

Chapter One is the introduction, which introduces the topic, and outlines both the conceptual parameters and historical examples of populist events. This chapter also presents the literature review. The main literature covered in this chapter focuses on the conceptual basics of populism and what scholars believe is essential for a populist movement to occur. The chapter also briefly discusses the methods and sources used in the study.

Chapter Two deals with the evolution of the African populist phenomenon as exemplified by the BCM. It examines some of the main political formations, both past and present, which have links to the progressive populist strategy as espoused by the Black Consciousness Movement. The chapter examines some of the main methods used by this progressive movement in order to gain support and gauges their evolution over time. The chapter sets the stage for comparative examination later on.

Chapter Three starts by outlining the history of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa and to the ways in which it fostered the rise of Afrikaner populism. After broader contextualisation, the chapter then zooms in and examines the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a political movement whose raison d'être was the preservation of white Afrikaner rule. The chapter traces the origins and evolution of the movement and makes the case for its classification as a right-wing populist movement which outlived apartheid.

Chapter Four comprises mainly of a comparative analysis of the AWB and the BCM through the lens of populism and how each movement had unique thoughts and beliefs that drove their agendas. In essence, the chapter explores both the similarities and differences between these two movements with a keen eye on their rhetoric and their mobilisation methods. The major intention of the chapter is the demonstration of the eclectic nature of populism in apartheid South Africa.

The final chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the extent to which the populist sentiment in South Africa has changed from the 1960s and 1990s. It reiterates a particular historical moment in South Africa that saw the rise of populist politics on two opposing ends of the ideological spectrum and argues for a wider understanding of populism by paying attention to both its progressive and conservative elements.

Chapter 2: The Black Consciousness Movement: A Progressive Populist Movement?

Due to its position within South African anti-apartheid and liberation history, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) has been the subject of many worthy historical works. Most scholars and academics have dealt with the Black Consciousness Movement and Steve Biko in broad terms by identifying the movements as a liberation movement with Steve Biko as a martyr for the struggle against apartheid. A few examples include that of David Hirschmann who wrote an article in 1990 that deals with the history of the movement. He discusses to a great extent the establishment and progression of the movement specifically as an anti-apartheid movement.⁷⁹ Alongside this is the work of Gail Gerhardt who dealt with the rise of Black Power in South Africa under apartheid and how the Black Consciousness Movement was key in developing Black identity in South Africa.⁸⁰ Donald Woods is another author who specifically dealt with the history of Steve Biko in a book named *Biko*, published in 1978. Woods examines the life of Biko from a young age, and follows him to university, concluding with a discussion of the circumstances surrounding his death in 1977.⁸¹ A recent treatise on Biko's BCM and allied movements is Ian Macqueen's book, *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*, which argues that Black Consciousness Movement was not an elitist or separatist group but rather a formation that was aimed at developing Black Consciousness openly through the improvement of self-awareness.⁸² He argues that Black Consciousness wanted to achieve psychological liberation for Black South Africans through Community Programmes and Christian ideals without an armed underground struggle.⁸³

However, this thesis reworks the ideas of Black Consciousness, the Black Consciousness Movement and Steve Biko through the lens of populism. The aim is not to firmly place the BCM in the solid category of populism but rather to explore the possibility that it might be framed as a populist movement of its time. The history of the BCM and of Steve Biko are

⁷⁹ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 5.

⁸⁰ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 92.

⁸¹ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 92.

⁸² Macqueen, I., *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*. (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2018), p. 58.

⁸³ Macqueen, I., *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*. (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2018), p. 63.

discussed at great length in this chapter in order to refigure it through a populist framework later on in the thesis.

From the start of apartheid in South Africa in the late 1940s, the major political groups that had resisted the apartheid state had been the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and, later, the Pan-Africanist Congress, among others. However, the state had implemented extremely repressive laws such as the Suppression of Communism Act (1950, renamed Internal Security Act, 1976) or the General Law Amendment Act (1963), in order to silence these resistance movements. As a result of these laws, many of the leaders of the Black liberation movement and other white radicals were sent into exile or incarcerated for long spells in apartheid jails. Therefore, by the late 1960s to the early 1970s, a political vacuum had been created with regards to the resistance movements against the apartheid regime. Against this backdrop, there emerged the Black Consciousness Movement under the guidance of the charismatic and indefatigable African activist, Stephen Bantu Biko (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Steve Biko, the charismatic leader of the BCM




Figure 2: The formation of SASO



Durban University of technology, *Celebrating the life of Steve Biko and confronting challenges to nation building*. [Online] Available at: https://www.dut.ac.za/Celebrating_the_Life_of_Steve_Biko_and_Confronting_Challenges_to_Nation_Building/

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

South African History Online, *South African Student Organisation*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-student-organisation-saso>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

The BCM was formed when its founding leadership broke away from the multiracial, but white-dominated, National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to form the South African Students Organization (SASO) in 1969 (see Figure 2 above).⁸⁴ The main aim of the BCM was to redefine and reshape the ideas that Black people had of themselves within the hierarchy of races. Instead of Black being seen as negative, the BC ideology aimed to define the Black population as inclusive and created a positive image of Black identity. Biko believed that Black South Africans could make a meaningful change in society if they become completely aware of their self-worth and the need to discard the chains of oppression that were driving society.⁸⁵ The BCM was highly influential amongst the Black youth of South Africa in the sense that it influenced the development of the mindset of African independence, and led to the creation of new political movements such as the Black People's Convention and Black Community Programs, which were all grassroots developmental initiatives.⁸⁶

When the BCM began to operate in the late 1960s, most of the African continent was beginning to gain independence from colonial rule. However, the apartheid state was intensifying its oppressive rule over the Black African population in South Africa. This led to an increase in a number of political organizations operating underground or in exile in their attempt to get rid of the apartheid system. The apartheid state continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s to use violent and aggressive methods to prevent any resistance from the African population.⁸⁷ The increased violence and restrictive measures that were put in place had a very negative impact on the anti-apartheid movements because it instilled fear in the African people, some of whom were becoming less willing to risk their lives to fight for liberation.⁸⁸ The apartheid state increasingly began to control every aspect of the lives of Black people such as where the people worked, where they lived, whom they had contact with and even who they were allowed to

⁸⁴ South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 21 February 2021]

⁸⁵ South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 21 February 2021]

⁸⁶ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 8.

⁸⁷ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 8.

⁸⁸ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 9.

marry or have sexual relations with.⁸⁹ This was apartheid's so-called "Golden Age" – its strength was assured, while Black resistance was on unsure ground.

The state had greater control over the economy, society, and education. Moreover, Bantu Education, that had been designed to enable firm control over the African, had gradually taken hold, before its foundations could be shaken by the Soweto Uprisings.⁹⁰ However, one of its unintended consequences was that it had allowed many African children to receive an education as well as allowing them to come together in large numbers, where they could share ideas and experiences apartheid. In essence, it created relatively safe spaces where they could plan to deal with the frustrations they experienced in their daily lives.⁹¹ This is how the BCM originated. The youth were able to band together without the hindrance of the fears that older generations harbored and were able to look for alternative methods to fundamentally change the society in which they found themselves.⁹² The idea that these young activists had was aimed firstly at changing the mindset of the Black people of South Africa, after which they could focus on changing the governance of the society itself.

As already been noted earlier, the BCM had its roots in the South African Students' Organization (SASO) which was created in 1969. It was started by university students who broke away from NUSAS, a predominantly white led group that was sympathetic to the injustices faced by Black students.⁹³ Black students felt that the leaders of NUSAS did not fully understand the cause they were fighting for and that they were therefore unable to achieve any real change when it came to fighting for the relaxation or removing of racial policies of the universities⁹⁴

Another very influential group that must be considered when dealing with the origins of the BCM is the University Christian Movement (UCM) which was started in 1967.⁹⁵ The UCM

⁸⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, *Encyclopedia Britannica*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Black-Nationalism> [Accessed 30 June 2021]

⁹⁰ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 10.

⁹¹ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 5.

⁹² Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 5.

⁹³ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 3.

⁹⁴ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), pp. 3 – 4.

⁹⁵ South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 21 February 2021]

was a religious association that was influenced by Black Theology or Liberation Theology which aimed at teaching religion from the perspective of an oppressed person.⁹⁶ It based its teaching off the idea that Black people were equal to white people and promoted the idea of a just and equal society. The UCM wanted to make the religious teachings relevant to Black South Africans because they believed it would aid the liberation process.⁹⁷ However, Steve Biko and his fellow students that formed SASO were critical of the racial structure of the UCM because it was felt that since the majority of the leadership were white, they could not fully come to terms with the Black South Africans' fight for liberation.⁹⁸ After a meeting held by the UCM in 1968, Black students felt a need to form a Black organization and this ultimately gave rise to SASO.⁹⁹ This early rejection of the established racial status quo, and the articulation of issues along colour lines, betrays a populist strategy because in essence both were "progressive movements", if one can borrow from Macqueen's articulation,¹⁰⁰ but the other group felt that liberalism was not enough.

In 1969, SASO which had been planned in Natal the previous year, officially began at the University of the North where its inaugural conference was held, with Steve Biko being elected as its first president.¹⁰¹ Biko, along with other students from the University of Natal were the pioneers of the many structures and programs such as community development programs that dealt with health care and education which were implemented by SASO.¹⁰² Members of SASO believed that Black South Africans had to learn to speak for themselves and be able to determine their own needs. However, there was some resistance to the creation of SASO. Some members of NUSAS believed that by creating a new group that was completely separate, it would alienate people from other races who were sympathetic to the cause. NUSAS members

⁹⁶South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 21 February 2021]

⁹⁷ Hopkins, D., 'Steve Biko, Black Consciousness and Black Theology,' in B. Pityana, M. Ramphela, M. Mpumlwana, & L. Wilson, eds, *Bounds of possibility: The legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness*. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991), p. 10.

⁹⁸ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 13.

⁹⁹ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 13.

¹⁰⁰ Macqueen, I., *Black Consciousness and Progressive Movements under Apartheid*. (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, 2018), p. 7.

¹⁰¹ For new research on the central role played by northern campuses in Black student politics during the apartheid era, see Anne K. Heffernan, *Limpopo's Legacy*.

¹⁰² Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 8.

believed it would weaken the forces of the anti-apartheid movements.¹⁰³ Some students who were part of SASO were completely against the idea of including any one that was not Black African, for example Coloured or Indian, because they were not truly Black in their view.¹⁰⁴ This made it important for the leadership of SASO to be careful with its management so that there was no conflict internally in the organization.¹⁰⁵ In the early 1970s, SASO became more assertive in its operations, with the ideas of Black Consciousness fueling this assertiveness. In 1972, in order to increase their range of power and influence, SASO leaders established the populist Black People's Convention (BPC), which was aimed at being the umbrella body promoting adult participation in their political movement.¹⁰⁶ Winnie Kgwane, who was actively involved in supporting students in their fight against the government restrictions on campuses, was elected as the first President of the BPC.¹⁰⁷

The way the BCM detached itself from white-led liberal politics and charted a new path, gives us sufficient ground for arguing that progressive populism was one of the birthmarks of the Black Consciousness Movement. The students at various universities had become frustrated with the multi-racial organizations that claimed to represent the oppressed people but never took any decisive or precise action to challenge the enforced racial segregation, with the segregated accommodation debacle at the Rhodes University student conferences being the decisive blow that broke the camel's back.¹⁰⁸ Black students of SASO and BC took action to reject the established status quo, and pushed the boundaries of student politics beyond the boundaries that white liberal organizations were hesitant to cross. Biko, along with Barney Pityana and many Black students went on to create an exclusively Black organization which would more effectively advance the psychosocial emancipation of the oppressed South Africans.¹⁰⁹

With the start of SASO, the pioneers of the BCM used it as a forum to articulate the main tenets of the Black Consciousness philosophy and Black Theology, and as a springboard to actively

¹⁰³ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 92.

¹⁰⁴ SASO, *South African Students' Organisation policy manifesto*. (1971).

¹⁰⁵ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 187.

¹⁰⁶ Desai, A., 'Indian South Africans and the Black Consciousness Movement under apartheid', *Dispora Studies*, 8, 1, (2015), p. 39.

¹⁰⁷ Desai, A., 'Indian South Africans and the Black Consciousness Movement under apartheid', *Dispora Studies*, 8, 1, (2015), p. 39.

¹⁰⁸ Desai, A., 'Indian South Africans and the Black Consciousness Movement under apartheid', *Dispora Studies*, 8, 1, (2015), p. 44.

¹⁰⁹ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 273.

engage with their broader community through development programs such as the Black Community Programs (BCP) that were designed to improve education in communities, and eventually use that as a solid base in their fight against the apartheid government.¹¹⁰ Because SASO members had access to information and a broader student constituency, they were able to engage actively with each other. There were many ideas that students took from broader African literature that underpinned their ideas of Black Consciousness, including from Julius Nyerere's philosophy of African Socialism, Kaunda's African Humanism and, to a certain extent, the ideas of Black Theology.¹¹¹ The Black Power Movement in America and the ideas of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X also had a part to play in the development of Black Consciousness.¹¹²

Another movement that influenced the BC ideology was the literary movement known as Negritude.¹¹³ It was created in the 1930s and 1940s by Black writers in France who were united through the French Language. Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor were two of the most influential writers at this time who had aimed to unite ordinary Black French people together through literature and poetry.¹¹⁴ Negritude was a response to the constant oppression faced by African people and proclaimed that Black identity should not be determined by European people, but rather Black identity should be claimed as their own.¹¹⁵ This inspired the ideology of BC who wanted Black South Africans to claim their identity as their own, as the true people of South Africa who were oppressed by the established and corrupt 'elite' apartheid government.

'Black man, you are on your own!'

From the outset, Black Consciousness was aimed at creating a conviction in the minds of Black South Africans that they had potential and value as people. This was then linked to the fact that there was need for Black co-operation in order to achieve liberation. SASO argued that South African Black people faced two major problems, firstly, the ever-present threat of white racism

¹¹⁰ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 84.

¹¹¹ Fredrickson, G., *White Supremacy: a comparative study of America and South African History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹¹² Fredrickson, G., *White Supremacy: a comparative study of America and South African History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹¹³ Micklin, A., *Negritude Movement*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.Blackpast.org/global-african-history/negritude-movement/> [Accessed 5 May 2021]

¹¹⁴ Micklin, A., *Negritude Movement*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.Blackpast.org/global-african-history/negritude-movement/> [Accessed 5 May 2021]

¹¹⁵ Micklin, A., *Negritude Movement*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.Blackpast.org/global-african-history/negritude-movement/> [Accessed 5 May 2021]

and superiority complex and, secondly, the fact that Black people were forced to accept this racism.¹¹⁶ The leaders of the movement believed that there would never be any real change unless Black South Africans were taught about self-awareness and self-determination. The leaders of the BCM had hoped that this would allow ordinary Black people to believe that they did have the ability to challenge those in power.¹¹⁷

By targeting the fundamental mindset that the majority of Black South Africans had with regards racial inferiority, the BCM was aiming to galvanize a sense of self-reliance and independence from white rule. An argument can be made that this was the BCM representing the true 'people' of South Africa against the established white 'elite' by building up the Black communities through self-reliance.¹¹⁸ Steve Biko stated in his iconic 1978 book, *I Write What I Like*, that:

This is the first truth, bitter as it may seem, that we have to acknowledge before we can start on any programme designed to change the status quo.... The first step therefore is to make the Black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth.¹¹⁹

This clearly indicates the very vital strategy of BC ideology of changing the mindsets of Black South Africans in order to bring about broader social and political change. While the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were in exile, organizing the liberation movement underground, the BCM and its leaders were determined to reach the masses within South Africa and liberate them through ideation.¹²⁰ Biko harnessed his populist charisma and appealed directly to the people and sought to work with the people at grassroots level, which is important when dealing with how a populist leader garners support.

¹¹⁶ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 54.

¹¹⁷ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 86.

¹¹⁸ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978), p. 29.

¹¹⁹ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

¹²⁰ Halisi, C. R. D., *Black political thought in the making of South African Democracy*. (United States: Indiana University Press, 1999).

The Black Consciousness activists defined the term “Black” not as a physical feature but rather a category to describe anyone who was discriminated against by the apartheid regime.¹²¹ This approach was not based on the categories that had been used by the apartheid government but was rather based on the shared experiences of the oppressed.¹²² The whole concept of Black Consciousness was to create a positive Black identity which would ultimately whip up and mobilize Black South Africans against apartheid injustices. The BCM wanted unity amongst Black South Africans as this would provide a stronger front of resistance against apartheid. There was a call to all Black South Africans not to cooperate with any institution that emphasized racial segregation, including the homelands system or the passbook system.¹²³ There was also a commonly accepted stance of rejecting white liberals or any white person who rejected apartheid.¹²⁴ This was due to the fact the Black Consciousness activists believed that white leadership or white sympathy suppressed Black liberation because they thought that it would ultimately lead to Black people relying on white sympathizers to help fight against the apartheid regime.¹²⁵ Biko clearly displayed this in his work published in *I write what I like*:

Briefly defined therefore, Black Consciousness is in essence the realisation by the Black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their operation--the Blackness of their skin---and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the lie that Black is an aberration from the "normal" which is white. It is a manifestation of a new realisation that by seeking to run away from themselves and to emulate the white man, Blacks are insulting the intelligence of whoever created them Black. Black Consciousness, therefore, takes cognizance of the deliberateness of God's plan in creating Black people Black. It seeks to infuse the Black community with a new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion, and their outlook to life.¹²⁶

The foregoing exudes eloquent, populist reframing of the meaning of Blackness. In stark contrast to this attitude of the BCM, the ANC had sought to accommodate white members as

¹²¹ Halisi, C. R. D., *Black political thought in the making of South African Democracy*. (United States: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 123.

¹²² Halisi, C. R. D., *Black political thought in the making of South African Democracy*. (United States: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 123.

¹²³ Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 8.

¹²⁴ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

¹²⁵ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

¹²⁶ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978), p. 49.

part of its resistance movement due to the Freedom Charter, which spoke of a multi-racial democracy in South Africa.¹²⁷ Biko and the BCM highlighted this difference when speaking to the ‘people’, stating that the white people were the established ‘elite’ who had oppressed African people and therefore had no right to be involved in the anti-apartheid struggle.¹²⁸

When looking closely at the sentiment held by the BCM of self-determination, it is obvious that at its very core the BCM could be labeled a progressive populist formation. It held the belief that Black South Africans had experienced the oppression and marginalization from the minority which was white people in power and therefore they had the knowledge and insight of what needed to be addressed in the country and how it should be changed.¹²⁹ The slogan ‘Black man, you are on your own!’ was adopted by activists and it brought about a renewed belief in Black self-reliance.¹³⁰ As Daniel Magaziner has noted, the pioneers of BC had “looked critically at themselves and at their community and argued that if some sort of change was going to come, it needed to begin at the level of the individual, on the fraught terrain of consciousness”.¹³¹

BCM activists and leaders also aimed to promote Black Consciousness through asserting the concept of freedom of speech and in doing so they emphasized the idea of freedom from oppression. There were various means of communicating with members of the organization such as the *SASO Newsletter* at first and later using the Black Press Commission to publish newsletters that reached a large number of people across the country.¹³² These newsletters often included information on the philosophy of the organization which argued for psychological liberation as a precondition for broader political liberation. The newsletters also reported on various meetings, which helped to spread the ideas and resolutions of the meetings. The BCM made a strong point of training a number of separate groups of people that could take over leadership should the apartheid government react and increase its repression.¹³³

¹²⁷ Magaziner, D. R., *The law and the prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968– 1977*. (United States: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 143.

¹²⁸ Magaziner, D. R., *The law and the prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968– 1977*. (United States: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 143.

¹²⁹ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979).

¹³⁰ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978), p. 91.

¹³¹ Magaziner, D., “‘Black Man You are on Your Own’: Making Race Consciousness in South African Thought, 1968-1972”, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 42, 2, (2009), p. 205.

¹³² Desai, A., ‘Indian South Africans and the Black Consciousness Movement under apartheid’, *Dispora Studies*, 8, 1, (2015), p. 42.

¹³³ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

Over the course of the 1970s, the ideas and beliefs of the BCM spread throughout South Africa, much further than the borders of university campuses, before the apartheid government took any action to suppress the movement. The ideas of the Black Consciousness Movement began to link a multitude of political organizations which included a broad spectrum of people who all believed in the ideas of psychological liberation in order to overcome the continued oppression in South Africa.¹³⁴ Liberation psychology developed elsewhere in the world at the same time as the BCM such as Latin America and across African countries that were becoming independent in the 1960s. In Latin America, a ‘psychology of the people’ was specifically developed by the Spanish-born social psychologist, philosopher, and Jesuit clergyman, Ignacio Martín-Baró, in the early 1960s. He defined it as the process of when people become conscious of themselves and their circumstances which had been affected negatively by oppression and unequal treatment.¹³⁵ With regards to the BCM’s liberation psychology, it was often argued, that “the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”¹³⁶ an effective, and arguably populist statement.

There were various other aspects that were combined within the movement, and each contributed differently to the successful expansion of Black Consciousness. The first aspect that played a significant role was the Cultural Movement in South Africa. Music, art, and theater were important channels used as weapons and antidotes by those who were opposed by apartheid.¹³⁷ The beliefs of the BCM specifically influenced poets, musicians, writers, and theater actors in the 1970s, many of whom were members of SASO during their years as students at universities. Specific groups such as the South African Black Theatre Union (SABTU) produced theater productions such as *Black on White*, and *Resurrection*, which dealt with what it meant to be a Black South African in an oppressive country.¹³⁸ BCM-influenced/sympathetic poets included the likes of Mongane Wally Serote, Mafika Gwala and Oswald Mtshali. These poets used their writing as a way of dealing with racism and oppression, and framed their work in ways that served to inspire Black liberation and self-determination

¹³⁴ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹³⁵ Martín-Baró, I., *Writings for a liberation psychology*. (United States: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 2-3.

¹³⁶ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978), p. 68.

¹³⁷ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 197.

¹³⁸ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 197.

through portraying positive Black self-identity and the heavy use of liberation and resistance.¹³⁹ A few good examples of such liberation poems are found in the book *Yakhal'inkomo* published by Mongane Wally Serote in 1972.¹⁴⁰ These poems inspired the youth activists and imbued them with a renewed sense of hope in their struggle for liberation. The use of popular culture was an effective way of spreading the ideas of the BCM in the sense that it reached a broader spectrum of Black South Africans who, if they united, could successfully overthrow the oppressive apartheid regime.

Another aspect that particularly nourished the BCM was the development and expansion of Black Theology in South Africa. The University Christian Movement (UCM) linked closely with the BCM only after they had moved away from the university campuses.¹⁴¹ A project that was led by Sabelo Stanley Ntwasa taught that Christ came to liberate the poor and oppressed Black populations in South Africa. This project was used by the UCM and BCM to influence a change in leadership in the churches.¹⁴² The idea behind the change in leadership was that the older pastors preached what the BCM believed to be 'white Christianity' or the religion of the oppressor. If the leadership of the church was changed to those who were sympathetic to Black Theology and Black Consciousness, then the movement would have greater influence on the people.¹⁴³ Black Theology aimed to make Christianity more relevant to the African community and the cultural beliefs that they held. The close contact and interaction between student activists and sympathetic priests allowed for the Christian ideals to be used as justification for the movement.¹⁴⁴

In 1971, the South African Council of Churches had appointed Bennie Khoapa as the leader of the Special Project on Christian Action in Society.¹⁴⁵ Khoapa was a part of the leadership of the Black Community Programs and therefore combined the philosophy of Black

¹³⁹Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹⁴⁰ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 13.

¹⁴¹ Hirschmann, A., *Getting ahead collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America*. (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984).

¹⁴² Hirschmann, A., *Getting ahead collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America*. (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984).

¹⁴³ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 5.

¹⁴⁴ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 6.

¹⁴⁵ Wiredu, K., Irele, A. & Menkiti, I., *Companion to African Philosophy*. (United States: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).

Consciousness with Christian action to promote a positive self-image for African people.¹⁴⁶ The Black Community Programs, along with the Special Project on Christian Action in Society established a large project aimed at publishing relevant news to Black communities.¹⁴⁷ It was a positive source of information which would help to educate people and inspire them to become more self-aware of their worth and to reclaim their identity as African people.

There were, however, some Africans who felt the small community-based projects were not achieving the main goals of the BCM. This led to the formation of the Black People's Convention (BPC).¹⁴⁸ The BPC was launched in 1972 and held its first official meeting in December 1972 with Winifred Kgwere elected as its first president.¹⁴⁹ The aim of the BPC was to create a united political front for the BCM so that psychological liberation could be achieved on a larger scale. It is interesting to note that the BPC was the first political organization to form since the Suppression of Communism Act was enacted in 1950.¹⁵⁰

The increasingly popular ideals and ideology of the BCM activists also influenced students in high schools across South Africa. This led to the development of resistance consciousness among the youth across the country. SASO and the BPC held conferences and conventions about leadership for young African students.¹⁵¹ These conferences taught the youth about leadership and how to engage with fellow students with regards to teaching them about critical analysis and organizational skills. This ultimately led to the formation of the National Youth Organization (NYO) in 1973.¹⁵²

A special case that can be examined here is the youth movements in Soweto which had been operating since the inception of Black Consciousness. This was due to the fact that many of the SASO leaders who were expelled from universities had ended up teaching in high schools

¹⁴⁶ Wiredu, K., Irele, A. & Menkiti, I., *Companion to African Philosophy*. (United States: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).

¹⁴⁷ Makino, K., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 20 June 2021]

¹⁴⁹ South African History Online, *Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1970s-Black-consciousness-movement-south-africa> [Accessed 20 June 2021]

¹⁵⁰ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 71.

¹⁵¹ Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 11.

¹⁵² Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 12.

in places like Soweto where they continued to spread the ideas of Black Consciousness.¹⁵³ This led to the creation of the South African Student Movement (SASM) which was responsible for organizing the Soweto Student Uprising on 16 June 1976. The Soweto Student Uprising was an organized march by the students against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. This specific march led to widespread Student Uprisings and marches against the government across South Africa.¹⁵⁴ It is true that the BCM could not claim credit for organizing the 1976 Uprising; however, it was the BCM's ideas of Black self-consciousness that had influenced the high school students.¹⁵⁵ It is evident that the Black Consciousness Movement influenced the way the African people thought about themselves and others across South Africa just by looking at the Soweto uprising itself and how other BC leaders involved in community programs in Soweto helped develop and evolve the ideals of Black Consciousness. This owed to its populist appeal.

The State, the Black Consciousness Movement, and its organizations

Despite the relentless suppression of Black organized groups by the apartheid state, the BCM continued to grow and develop. This was a result of the BCM's populist grassroots mobilization strategy, as well as the fact that at its apex was a very charismatic leader who branded himself as voice of the oppressed Black people. The ANC and PAC both espoused and advocated for modernist versions of multi-racial democracy. Although the BCM and Steve Biko positioned themselves as the voice of the people from the outset, initially they did not mobilize the masses against the state.¹⁵⁶ Instead, the BCM was initially focused on psychological liberation, which would in turn help communities develop and become independent. Once the people were able to completely identify with the ideas of BC, they would then be able to rally *en masse* and achieve political liberation.¹⁵⁷

While the ANC and PAC were in exile working under ground to organize the anti-apartheid movement, the BCM was working openly within South Africa's borders and advocating for the psychological liberation of the Black African people. This was the biggest difference

¹⁵³ Biko, N., *Biko: A Symbol beyond his lifetime*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.sbf.org.za/home/biko-a-symbol-beyond-his-lifetime/> [Accessed 26 June 2021]

¹⁵⁴ *From Protest to Challenge: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*. 1997. [Film] Directed by T. Karis, G. Gerhart.

¹⁵⁵ *From Protest to Challenge: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*. 1997. [Film] Directed by T. Karis, G. Gerhart.

¹⁵⁶ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 6.

¹⁵⁷ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 6.

between the ANC and BCM since the ANC approached its own struggle from a multi-racial standpoint, having in their ranks some white people, who were supposedly part of the 'oppressive elite.'

The apartheid state had an enormous influence on the shaping of the BCM and the direction that the movement took. The BCM leaders were very aware and careful of the state that had increased its suppression of resistance from the 1960s and many of the SASO leaders avoided direct confrontation with the police and the state in an attempt to avoid being caught and prosecuted.¹⁵⁸ The leaders of the BCM took precautionary measures with regards to leadership. There were a lot of leadership programs developed where people were continuously trained to assume leadership roles in the event that the leading activists were arrested or killed. In this way, the movement would be able to avoid a vacuum being created in the leadership, which had been the case with the ANC and PAC when they were banned and forced into exile.¹⁵⁹

Initially, the apartheid state was not very concerned with the development of Black Consciousness because it fit perfectly into the regime's scheme of separate and independent development of African people.¹⁶⁰ However, in the late 1960s, the state started to realize the strength that the BCM had because it united people around the common goal of overthrowing the apartheid regime.¹⁶¹ It became clear as the ideas of Black Consciousness spread across the country that the very basis of the movement undermined the philosophy of apartheid and consequently the state began to crack down on the movement and its leaders. Efforts by the state to suppress the BCM included banning individuals, arrests (including house arrests) and imprisonment without trial. There was also constant police surveillance and intimidation.¹⁶² However, leaders of the movement were not deterred because they honestly believed that the sacrifices that they were making would advance Black South Africans closer to the goal of racial equality in the country.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ji-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

¹⁵⁹ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ji-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

¹⁶⁰ Fredrickson, G., *White Supremacy: a comparative study of America and South African History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹⁶¹ Fredrickson, G., *White Supremacy: a comparative study of America and South African History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹⁶² Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 11.

¹⁶³ Gerhart, G., *Black Power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology*. (California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 11.

The first big confrontation between the BCM and the state was in 1972 when Onkgopotse Tiro, the Student Representative Council president at the University of the North, gave a vigorous speech that criticised the white leadership of the University as well as the unfair treatment with regards to education which was based on racial divisions as seen in the extract below from his graduation speech in 1972:

The magic story of human achievement gives irrefutable proof that as soon as nationalism is awakened among the intelligentsia, it becomes the vanguard in the struggle against alien rule. Of what use will be your education if not linked with the entire continent of Africa? Remember that Mrs. Suzman said, 'There is one thing which the minister cannot do: He cannot ban ideas from men's minds.'¹⁶⁴

The university expelled Tiro, a move that was followed by Student Uprisings at universities across the country, resulting in many of these students also being expelled.¹⁶⁵ Eventually, the state placed a number of bans on individuals such as Biko, Barney Pityana and Bokwe Mafuna. These bans at first did hinder the movement because it created disunity amongst the student activists in the country. However, this did not last long as students began to devise more creative and secretive ways of continuing their work of opposing the state.¹⁶⁶ Once these student activists had been banned from the university, they moved out into the broader communities and continued the work of the BCM beyond the limitations of the University setting. They started to implement projects such as the Black Communities Programme, the Black Peoples' Convention, and the Black Press Commission, which aimed at bringing to tangible effect the ideals of BC.¹⁶⁷ This shifted the BC ideology away from the educated middle-class students who had fought for equal rights at university, to a mass movement that involved the majority of Black people in South Africa.

During the 1970s, the state repression of the BCM intensified, which heightened tensions between the two entities. A particularly interesting case example of the BCM's move towards more overt action against the state were the pro-FRELIMO rallies that were planned to be held at the University of the North where they would celebrate the liberation of the neighbouring

¹⁶⁴ Tiro, O., *Graduation speech by Onkgopotse Tiro in 1972*. [Online] Available at: http://ulspace.ul.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10386/1798/tiro_graduationspeech_1972.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 8 December 2021]

¹⁶⁵ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹⁶⁶ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹⁶⁷ Gwala, M., 'Black Community Programmes', *Black Review*, 2, (1973), p. 168.

countries from European colonialism.¹⁶⁸ However, the Minister of Justice at the time, Jimmy Kruger, declared these rallies illegal and threatened the students with detention. However, the students decided to ignore the orders of the minister and continued with the rallies even if it meant clashing with the police, which ended up being the case, as police heavy-handedly broke up the rallies and arrested many of the SASO leaders. The end result of the arrests was that many of the leaders were put on trial and convicted of encouraging racial hostility. The court case was made public and brought a lot of attention to the BCM, which ultimately established them as enemies of white people and the state and as heroes who were engaged in a struggle to liberate Black South Africans.¹⁶⁹ Steve Biko also became a very important character during these trials as he was a defence witness for SASO. He harnessed the public court case to further spread the ideology of BC to the people.¹⁷⁰ A hallmark of populism was Biko's strategic use of media coverage and attention to further galvanize Black South Africans to fight for liberation despite the violence and repression of the state.

The clashes which followed between Black people, who were influenced by the BCM, and the police, escalated further with the 1976 Student Uprisings and continued deep into 1977. Many of the leaders of the BCM were becoming demotivated and drained by the continued suppression from the state, while many had suffered injuries. Some activists had even lost their lives fighting for the struggle of Black Liberation. The most notable leaders who had died during the 1970s included Abram Ramothibi Onkgopotse Tiro who died after opening a letter bomb in 1974, Mapetla Mohapi who was a SASO organiser who was killed in police custody in 1976 and most notably, Steve Biko who died in police custody in 1977 following severe beatings and denial of urgent medical care.¹⁷¹

Can Biko be termed a populist leader?

As discussed in Chapter One, there are some main characteristics that determine a person's classification as a populist leader. The main characteristic for populist leaders are that they are very charismatic and charming people, who by nature are natural public speakers and can easily captivate the minds of people and manipulate them or sway those people in a certain

¹⁶⁸ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 16.

¹⁶⁹ Hirschmann, D., 'The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, (1990), p. 5.

¹⁷⁰ Morgan, M., 'Performance and power in social movements: Biko's role as a witness in the SASO/BPC trial', *Cultural Sociology*, 12, 4, (2018), p. 460.

¹⁷¹ Morgan, M., 'Performance and power in social movements: Biko's role as a witness in the SASO/BPC trial', *Cultural Sociology*, 12, 4, (2018), p. 470.

direction.¹⁷² Scholars such as Mudde and Kaltwasser state that the populist leaders are essential to the mobilization of the populist movement.¹⁷³ It is quite often the case that populist leaders attract support based on their own personal appeal and thus they are able to claim that they have a direct and personal relationship with the ‘pure people’ or they can even go as far as saying that they are ‘the people’ and therefore they fully understand the circumstances that people are facing because they are facing exactly the same issues.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, in a sense populist leaders are seen as the saviours of the ‘people’ because as they are making personal sacrifices for the greater good of the citizens. Thus, it means that if you are loyal to the populist leader, you are automatically loyal to the people who are opposed to the ‘corrupt elite’.¹⁷⁵ If you are not loyal to the populist leader or ‘the people’, then you are seen as an outcast who supports the established and corrupt system that is continuously keeping the ‘pure people’ out of their rightful place in society and you are seen as being against the will to fight and implement the general will of ‘the people’.

Steve Biko conducted himself in the above manner and was arguably a populist leader who played a significant role in making the BCM a popular movement by planting a seed as small as a grain of wheat. Biko was a very prominent and vital figure in the formation of the BCM. Biko was one of four children, who was raised by his mother after losing his father at a young age.¹⁷⁶ As a young child, Biko was not involved in politics but in 1963, when his brother was expelled from high school for being involved in the Pan Africanist Congress activities, Biko became very aware of the segregationist political situation in South Africa after this.¹⁷⁷ His move towards politics and attempts to find liberation for African people went on an upward curve from 1964 as he became more interested in finding solutions to police brutality and the state’s oppression of the African people.¹⁷⁸

The main turning point for Biko in his political career was when he attended the University of Natal from 1966 to 1972. Here he was able to interact with students from different

¹⁷² Tormey, S., ‘Populism: Democracy's Pharmakon?’, *Policy Studies*, 39, 3, (2018).

¹⁷³ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

¹⁷⁴ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

¹⁷⁵ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017).

¹⁷⁶ Biko, N. *Biko: A Symbol beyond his lifetime*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.sbf.org.za/home/biko-a-symbol-beyond-his-lifetime/> [Accessed 26 June 2021]

¹⁷⁷ Biko, N. *Biko: A Symbol beyond his lifetime*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.sbf.org.za/home/biko-a-symbol-beyond-his-lifetime/> [Accessed 26 June 2021]

¹⁷⁸ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

backgrounds, which opened his eyes to the unequal treatment faced by non-white South Africans. Biko became actively involved in student politics at the university where he joined NUSAS and worked alongside the UCM.¹⁷⁹ Biko was introduced to people such as Barney Pityana and other Black students, who together formed SASO in 1968.¹⁸⁰ Biko strongly began to believe in the idea of Black liberation from white supremacy and travelled around South Africa to spread the word of SASO and to educate people about the philosophy of Black Consciousness.¹⁸¹ At first he was put in charge of the publications sent out by SASO and he had a newsletter called “*I write what I like*” in which he tackled and dealt with a lot of issues experienced by African students. These issues included the crippling racist segregationist laws that gave Black students an inferior education as compared to white students at universities and the fact that the state continuously enforced racial discrimination in all areas of people’s lives in the broader South Africa.¹⁸² Biko spoke to the idea that Black people needed to be mentally independent from white people because African people needed to claim their identity and be proud of being Black, which is depicted in his words below:

The call for Black Consciousness is the most positive call to come from any group in the Black world for a long time. It is more than just a reactionary rejection of whites by Blacks. The quintessence of it is the realisation by the Blacks that, in order to feature well in this game of power politics, they have to use the concept of group power and to build a strong foundation for this. Being an historically, politically, socially, and economically disinherited and dispossessed group, they have the strongest foundation from which to operate. The philosophy of Black Consciousness, therefore, expresses group pride and the determination by the Blacks to rise and attain the envisaged self.¹⁸³

Steve Biko was expelled from medical school in 1972 because of his continued political activism and had to find employment in order to support his family. This is where he became heavily involved in the BCP under Khoapa.¹⁸⁴ Here Biko worked on co-ordinating the various Black organisations such as health care programmes and education programmes that formed

¹⁷⁹ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

¹⁸⁰ Hopkins, D., ‘Steve Biko, Black Consciousness and Black Theology,’ in B. Pityana, M. Ramphela, M. Mpumlwana, & L. Wilson, eds, *Bounds of possibility: The legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness*. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991), p. 198.

¹⁸¹ Makino, K., ‘The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997), p. 7.

¹⁸² Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

¹⁸³ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978), p. 68.

¹⁸⁴ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

part of the BCP and as well as helping to produce the information sent out in the “Black Review” which led to the revival of Black culture, politics and literary activity through the Black Press Commission.¹⁸⁵ The Black Press Commission played a vital role in spreading the ideals of BC because they went out as reporters to gather information from the communities to publish; at the same time they were able to showcase themselves as truly caring about the needs of the people by being in direct contact with them and actually listening to the people. Members of the Commission would go into communities and speak to people about the issues and circumstances that they were facing, then the information would be reworked and reworded before it was published in order to display the need for self-reliance and self-awareness for Black people.¹⁸⁶

In 1973, having realized the threat the Biko and the BCM posed to the apartheid regime, the state put a banning order on Steve Biko, using the Suppression of Communism Act.¹⁸⁷ Due to this ban, Biko was forced to return to Ginsberg, his hometown. This enabled him to be actively involved in promoting the activities of the BCP through the setting up of a branch of the BCP in King Williams Town. This branch spearheaded general community development through the setting up of clinics, and the running of bursary and grocery schemes as well as free health care and day care clinics in Ginsberg.¹⁸⁸

Biko continued his political activity regardless of the continuous police surveillance and repeated attempts to arrest and detain him. Biko even went a step further to develop himself by studying a degree in law through correspondence with UNISA.¹⁸⁹ The state was beginning to implement harsher and more restrictive measures on Biko by forcing him to not be involved in the BCP, yet he continued to secretly advise others in the BCP on the projects and political matters.¹⁹⁰ The BCP did not accept the restrictions the state had placed on Biko and made him the honorary president of the BCP, so that he could have some authority in order to cultivate unity among the different Black political groups in South Africa.¹⁹¹ Although the on-going

¹⁸⁵ Makino, K., ‘The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997).

¹⁸⁶ Legassick, M., ‘South Africa in crisis: What route to democracy?’, *African Affairs*, 84, 337, (1985), p. 591.

¹⁸⁷ Makino, K., ‘The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997).

¹⁸⁸ Makino, K., ‘The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1, (1997).

¹⁸⁹ *From Protest to Challenge: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*. 1997. [Film] Directed by T. Karis, G. Gerhart.

¹⁹⁰ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹⁹¹ *From Protest to Challenge: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*. 1997. [Film] Directed by T. Karis, G. Gerhart.

restrictive efforts by the government made Biko feel isolated because he could not be directly involved in the struggle for Black self-actualisation in a segregated dispensation, he did find various ways to avoid the police and to challenge their authority. He was arrested and detained multiple times but never convicted.¹⁹²

In 1976, Biko was called to testify in a trial involving SASO-BPC activists, which was known as the SASO Nine Trial.¹⁹³ Thirteen SASO leaders and other BC leaders were tried for treason and nine were found guilty. The nine people tried and found guilty of treason were Mosioua Lekota, Aubrey Mokoape, Zithulele Cindi, Saths Cooper, Strini Moodley, Muntu Myeza, Gilbert Sedibe, Nkwenke Nkomo and Pandelani Nefolovhodwe.¹⁹⁴ As a witness for the SASO members, he was able to address the court and media which was a much-needed opportunity for him to publicly discuss the true meaning of Black Consciousness and allowed him to reach a broader audience, without censorship or state intervention.

On that occasion he also met Donald Woods, the editor of the *Daily Dispatch* in East London.¹⁹⁵ With the friendship between Biko and Woods, Biko was about to now move into the broader network of the media and reach a larger audience with his message. The fact that Biko became more involved in the media links back to Chapter One and how a populist leader uses the media to convey their message directly to the people. Biko used the media during the SASO Nine Trials to spread the message of BC and truly explain to the people how the BCM aimed to achieve psychological liberation and develop communities.¹⁹⁶ Biko was able to connect the BCM to the grassroots level by actually going in and asking the people what their concerns and challenges were through the Black Press Commission.¹⁹⁷ In addition to newspapers, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, were used to spread the BC gospel and reach wider audiences.

¹⁹² Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

¹⁹³ Morgan, M., 'Performance and power in social movements: Biko's role as a witness in the SASO/BPC trial', *Cultural Sociology*, 12, 4, (2018), p. 457.

¹⁹⁴ Morgan, M., 'Performance and power in social movements: Biko's role as a witness in the SASO/BPC trial', *Cultural Sociology*, 12, 4, (2018), p. 457.

¹⁹⁵ Woods, D., *Biko*. (New York and London: Paddington Press, 1978).

¹⁹⁶ Morgan, M., 'Performance and power in social movements: Biko's role as a witness in the SASO/BPC trial', *Cultural Sociology*, 12, 4, (2018), p. 458.

¹⁹⁷ Hadfield, L. A., *Liberation and development: Black Consciousness Community Programs in South Africa*. (United States: Michigan State University Press, 2016).

Biko's death and the decline of Black Consciousness

As was a norm at the time, Biko met the same fate as many other resistance leaders and activists at the hands of the cruel apartheid police. In August 1977, Biko travelled to Cape Town with fellow activist, Peter Jones. In Cape Town, they planned to meet with various people involved in the BCM, for example Neville Alexander, who was the leader of the Unity Movement.¹⁹⁸ However, these meetings never took place as Biko, and Jones became concerned that staying too long in Cape Town would bring negative repercussions. They therefore tried to return home without delay.¹⁹⁹ Murphy's Law states that 'anything that can go wrong, will go wrong' is very appropriate here. On the way home, the two were stopped at a roadblock just outside of Grahamstown. The police then learnt that the two men in their custody were leaders of the BCM, which led to the arrest and detention of both men in the police headquarters in Port Elizabeth.²⁰⁰ This was ultimately the downfall of Steve Biko. At the hands of the police, Jones and Biko suffered from unspeakable acts of torture and beatings.

In custody, Biko was beaten to the point of unconsciousness and then chained to the bars of his cell.²⁰¹ The police statements claim that Biko had refused to submit to the police and that is why they used brute force on him. There was no medical attention provided despite the clear evidence of brain damage, and so Biko was left in his cell until his condition worsened.²⁰² On 12 September 1977, Steve Biko succumbed to injuries and was proclaimed dead.²⁰³ Official police documents stated that Biko died from a hunger strike, but post-mortem results indicated that he had died from the injuries to his head.²⁰⁴

The fact that Steve Biko refused to be a whistle blower and did not confess to anything, showed clearly that he was a true leader of 'the people'. He refused to let anyone else take the blame for his actions. To the point of death, Biko was able to link the BC ideology and BCM to 'the

¹⁹⁸ Biko, N. *Biko: A Symbol beyond his lifetime*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.sbf.org.za/home/biko-a-symbol-beyond-his-lifetime/> [Accessed 26 June 2021].

¹⁹⁹ Hirschmann, A., *Getting ahead collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America*. (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984).

²⁰⁰ Hirschmann, A., *Getting ahead collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America*. (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984).

²⁰¹ Woods, D., *Biko*. (New York and London: Paddington Press, 1978).

²⁰² Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

²⁰³ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

²⁰⁴ Bernstein, H., *South African History Online*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/ii-life-steve-biko> [Accessed 26 February 2021]

people', because regardless of what happened to the leaders, the movement would continue to blossom in the minds and hearts of the people.

The death of Steve Biko was a major turning point for the resistance movement in South Africa. It sparked a rapid increase in the ideals of African nationalism and increased support for the BCM in the Black communities in South Africa. Thousands of people attended his funeral, which infused African people with a renewed energy and galvanized their action against apartheid because they felt the need to avenge his death due to a sense of loyalty to him and the ideas he had stood for.²⁰⁵

The state did not take lightly to this and banned all BCM related organisations such as SASO, the BCP and the BPC. The state also banned any newspapers, organisations and individuals they saw as sympathetic or as being in line with the ideas of the Black Consciousness Movement.²⁰⁶ The death of Steve Biko solidified him as the martyr who had died for his belief in the freedom of the Black people as depicted in Figure 3 and 4 below.²⁰⁷ Biko has been seen by many as someone who sacrificed himself for the greater good of the majority of people in South Africa which sets him apart from current leaders who are often charged with corruption and self-serving politics. Biko's progressive populism cemented his place in liberation history and Black psychology.

²⁰⁵ Brewer, J.D., *After Soweto: An unfinished journey*. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1986).

²⁰⁶ Brewer, J.D., *After Soweto: An unfinished journey*. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1986).

²⁰⁷ Brewer, J.D., *After Soweto: An unfinished journey*. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Figure 3: A crowd mourning the death of Steve Biko




Times Live, *Steve Biko: Gone but not forgotten*.

[Online] Available at:

<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-09-12-steve-biko-gone-but-not-forgotten/>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

Figure 4: A poster displayed by the mourners of Steve Biko



Timetoast.com, *Apartheid*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/apartheid-jena-young-and-bryana-baer>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

After the death of Steve Biko, the BCM took a different direction in terms of BC. New leaders stepped forward to take the positions left vacant after Biko and regrouped in many different ways to continue their activism, with many working underground so as not to be discovered.²⁰⁸ Many Black people continued with the community development programmes to further the ideals of Black self-improvement. Key examples include Malusi Mpumlwana who created the Zingisa Education Fund to replace the Ginsberg Education Fund. Later, Mpumlwana established the Trust for Christian Outreach and Education, which helped to develop communities around South Africa.²⁰⁹

After the death of Biko, debates began to emerge among those involved in the BCM about how to move forward with the struggle against the oppressive apartheid system. There was a strong call for more direct confrontation with the state and in the light of this, many organizations had started to join together and began to arm themselves for a more violent resistance movement.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Kenworthy, P., *Kenworthy News Media*. [Online]

Available at: <https://stiffkitten.wordpress.com/2010/04/17/the-relevance-of-Black-consciousness-today/> [Accessed 29 March 2021]

²⁰⁹ Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 16.

²¹⁰ Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), pp. 18 - 19.

These organisations included the armed wings of both the ANC which was uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the PACs armed wing Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), as well as another organisation known as the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO).²¹¹ It must also be noted that even though there was a call for a more direct approach, some of the conservative members of the BCM believed that the above-ground organizations were still the most reliable way to display the ideals of Black Consciousness and to bring about effective change.²¹²

The BC ideology did not end after the death of Steve Biko, in fact another organization took up where the BCM left off and totally changed the course of BC in South Africa in the 1980s. In 1978, a group of activists met in Roodepoort to form the AZAPO with the main aim of openly defying state repression and continuing with the work of the BPC.²¹³ AZAPO initially dealt with the aspects and experiences of the ordinary Black South African. At the same time, communism was one of the dominating world ideologies and AZAPO soon began to follow the ideas of socialism therefore they began to stand more for the concerns of the workers.²¹⁴ This disunity among the groups that were for and against Black Consciousness led people to join other existing resistance groups such as the ANC and PAC with the idea that the ideals of Black Consciousness should be seen as a way of life rather than a political group, ultimately meaning that African people in South Africa should be self-reliant and self-aware regardless of the political formation they belonged to.²¹⁵

Although the Black Consciousness formations gradually died down, the idea and its popular appeal continued to resonate. Many activists during apartheid looked at the ideals of Black Consciousness as a means to uproot the lingering consequences of colonialism and the segregation that was present. Until today, many young Black South Africans still look back to Black Consciousness as a means to an end, such as the Student Uprisings of 2015/2016 commonly known as *Fees Must Fall* or the 2020 *Black Lives Matter* campaign. The youth of

²¹¹ Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 19.

²¹² Gibson, N., 'Black Consciousness 1977 - 1987: The Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa.', *Africa Today*, 35, 1, (1988), p. 19.

²¹³ South African History Online, *Black Wednesday, the Banning of 19 BCM organisations*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/Black-wednesday-banning-19-Black-consciousness-movement-organisations> [Accessed 27 April 2021]

²¹⁴ South African History Online, *Black Wednesday, the Banning of 19 BCM organisations*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/Black-wednesday-banning-19-Black-consciousness-movement-organisations> [Accessed 27 April 2021]

²¹⁵ Kenworthy, P., *Kenworthy News Media*. [Online] Available at: <https://stiffkitten.wordpress.com/2010/04/17/the-relevance-of-Black-consciousness-today/> [Accessed 3 March 2021]

South Africa today draw on the ideas of Black Consciousness to instil a new sense of Black pride and self-reliance, which means that the whole concept of Black Consciousness still remains a very valid and influential ideology and continues to produce new leaders who stand as the voice of the 'oppressed people'. Besides student formations, small political movements such as the one led by Andile Mngxitama have attempted to resurrect Biko's style and ideology and use them as political platforms in debates about land and post-apartheid transformation.

Chapter 3: The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging

The AWB and Afrikaner Nationalism in South Africa

Due to the very controversial and racist nature of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), it is a topic that is sensitive to deal with in the noticeably young democracy of South Africa, given the very harsh reality that many Black South Africans faced during apartheid. However, this thesis aims to review the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging through the lens of populism rather than rehash the past. Many scholars tend to stay away from dealing with the movement and its actions. But some have ventured deeper into the creation and evolution of the organisation for example Arthur Kemp who wrote *Victory or Violence: The Story of the AWB in South Africa*. This is an especially important source that has been investigated thoroughly in order to construct the history of the AWB. Kemp discusses quite extensively the motives and violent actions taken by the AWB who felt that the Afrikaner people were at risk of losing their position of power in society and how the AWB promised to protect the Afrikaner nation. Another notable author who had written a number of articles on the AWB and Afrikaner people is Herman Gilliomee. His works have played a key role in developing an understanding of the link between the rise of the AWB and their meticulous use of Afrikaner nationalism as a basis for their movement. The AWB was by no means a peaceful organisation that wanted a better future for South Africa. The AWB and its leader Eugene Terre'Blanche were determined in all their actions to preserve the Afrikaner nation through any means necessary.

The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was formed in 1973 as an Afrikaner bulwark against anti-apartheid movements and sentiments within South Africa. It was formed due to perceptions of increasing threats to white supremacy in the country.²¹⁶ The AWB's deeper roots can be traced back to the rise and growth of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, which started in the 19th century with the Groot Trek that witnessed the massive migration of the Dutch Boers from British-controlled Cape Colony. The main aim of this chapter is to examine the AWB's emergence as a vocal Afrikaner organisation that stood in stark contrast to the BCM in the arena of South Africa's complicated racial politics. The objective is to link the AWB and its key leader, Eugene Terblanche, to late-twentieth century right-wing populism that was itching for deeper entrenchment of Afrikaner rule and culture.

The AWB attempted to disrupt the 1994 election with the vain hope of preserving the "Afrikaner nation" which was seen as being under mortal siege by Terre'Blanche and his AWB

²¹⁶ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

followers. The AWB carried out acts of sabotage and acts of violence throughout the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt to achieve its main goal. It led up to the point where a bomb was detonated at a Johannesburg airport, resulting in the death of twenty people in order to sabotage the elections in 1994.²¹⁷ The AWB's ultimate goal was to establish an autonomous Boer State that was independent from greater South Africa. The AWB did not want to be under the rule of non-whites. The idea was to establish the Boer State in the former Boer Republics, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. The AWB would often display the old Boer Republic's flags, alongside their flag to identify as true Afrikaners. (Figure 5, 6 and 7).²¹⁸ The main hopes and dreams of the AWB as a far-right neo-Nazi organisation was to use right-wing populist tactics to galvanise the support of the majority of the Afrikaner population in order to turn them away from the ostensibly liberal National Party government. The AWB claimed that the NP government was failing dismally to preserve a historically pure and powerful Afrikanerdom and was, in the 1980s, apparently beginning to warm up to the idea of possible racial equality in in South Africa – or even a transfer of power. Terre'Blanche and the AWB used what can possibly be labelled as populist tactics to further the aims of the movement, with the main tactic being that the AWB represented the 'pure people' (which was the white Afrikaners), against the 'established elite', represented by the NP government.

²¹⁷ Gilliomee, H., *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people*. (United States: University of Virginia Press, 2010).

²¹⁸ Historical Flags of the World, *Flags of the Boer Republics*. [Online]
Available at: https://tmg110.tripod.com/boer_nf.htm [Accessed 28 June 2021].

Figure 5: The flag of the former Boer State – Orange Free state



Historical Flags of the World, 2021. *Flags of the Boer Republics*. [Online]
Available at:
https://tmg110.tripod.com/boer_nf.htm
[Accessed 28 June 2021].

Figure 6: The flag of the former Boer State – Transvaal



Historical Flags of the World, 2021. *Flags of the Boer Republics*. [Online]
Available at:
https://tmg110.tripod.com/boer_nf.htm
[Accessed 28 June 2021].

Figure 7: The flag of the AWB flown alongside the old South African Flag



Council on Foreign Relations, *Transnational White Supremacist Militancy Thriving in South Africa*. [Online]
Available at:
<https://www.cfr.org/blog/transnational-white-supremacist-militancy-thriving-south-africa>
[Accessed 9 December 2021].

The AWB held the belief that their rights were rooted deeply in South Africa’s colonial past. Terre’Blanche claimed that the true history of the Afrikaners was not understood. As he stated:

They think we stole the land from the Blacks. Well, that's not true. What happened is, the white people moved from the south to the north. The Transvaal was vast and open and lonely, with more or less no Blacks. We built the cities; we worked and developed the mines. The Blacks were here for centuries. They walked on diamonds and didn't even pick them up, because they didn't realize the value of what they had. Now they want our mines. Well, we want our land back. It's as simple as that.²¹⁹

²¹⁹ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]
Available at:
<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>
[Accessed 20 June 2021].

To further entice Afrikaans people to follow the AWB ideology, Terre'Blanche and his acolytes claimed that allowing racial equality would ultimately lead to the introduction of African communism and the end of providential Afrikanerdom.²²⁰

Terre'Blanche continuously promoted the idea that the Afrikaner nation needed to be protected and in order for their heritage and culture to be preserved, they needed to have their own land where they would rule themselves away from the English-speaking white liberals and the African population.²²¹ Terre'Blanche and the AWB used the idea that they were part of the 'pure (Afrikaner) people' who were pitted against the corruption elements with the National Party state that was showing signs of leaning towards some form of equality in South Africa. The AWB criticised the NP state of trying to destroy the heritage, traditions, and beliefs of the Afrikaner nation under pressure from African and other progressive political formations. This appeal to racial sentiment is typical of populist leaders, who sometimes use a siege mentality to make their case. (Donald Trump used it recently when he sought the American presidency). Terre'Blanche and the AWB actually made the astonishing claim that the NP government did not care about the fate of the Afrikaner people. However, to fully understand the AWB, it is necessary to first outline the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa and examine how the AWB used this historical phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism as the basis for the movement's ideology.

Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the emergence of the AWB

A brief history of the rise and establishment of Afrikaner nationalism is important in order to show what fuelled the aims and goals of the AWB. This is because the AWB relied heavily on the Afrikaner people's past so as to build the foundation of the movement. One of the most profound developments which irrevocably altered the history of twentieth century South Africa was the emergence and development of a diaspora Dutch-Boer strain of culturally inflected political sentiment and platform that came to be known as Afrikaner nationalism. According to Hermann Gilliomee, Afrikaner nationalism refers to the ideology that developed amongst Afrikaner people from the late 19th century to the early twentieth-century based on an anti-British sentiment.²²² It was developed and based on the idea that Afrikaners were the true

²²⁰ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>

[Accessed 20 June 2021].

²²¹ Dubow, S., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race', *The Journal of African History*, 33, 2, (1992), p. 215.

²²² Gilliomee, H., *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people*. (United States: University of Virginia Press, 2010).

pioneers of South Africa, and that the British were oppressing their God-given right by taking the land and its resources during the Minerals Revolution and the South African Wars.²²³

Nationalism, the notion that one's culture or race is unique or even superior to other cultures or races, has been developing in various forms since the emergence of the Westphalian state entity.²²⁴ Nationalism can be used to explain the European imperial tradition or in this case, it can be used to explain the idea of protecting the interests of Afrikaner people in South Africa. Nationalism stresses the idea of creating a common unity of citizenship, which allows for cohesion in the face of fragmentation and disintegration of a nation due to rapid industrialisation and urbanization, for example. It also appeals to the beliefs and values of the people of a nation so as to gain mass support through creating a common cultural identity for differing groups within a society.²²⁵ Nevertheless, Afrikaner nationalism developed as a political and socio-economic response to the perceived uneven development of the South African economy during the era of contestations between British imperial and Afrikaner power.²²⁶ Certain groups of people, especially white English-speaking men held the monopoly capital in the country which linked back to the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa. This was a source of concern for the Afrikaner people who did not have any wealth or power in South Africa, a country they claimed to be theirs since they had settled and developed on South African soil long before the arrival of the British.²²⁷ Afrikaner nationalism gained ground within a context of increasing urbanisation and secondary industrialisation during the period between the two world wars, as well as the continuing British imperial influence in South Africa.²²⁸ Important ideological building blocks in this process included the promotion of a common language, with emphasis was on what was perceived to be a common past and the unity of a common sense of religion.²²⁹

p. 660.

²²³ Gilliomee, H., *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people*. (United States: University of Virginia Press, 2010), p. 661.

²²⁴ Bracher, K., *The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Consequences of National Socialism*. (United States: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

²²⁵ Orwell, G., *Notes of Nationalism*. (United Kingdom: Penguin UK, 2018).

²²⁶ Dubow, S., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race', *The Journal of African History*, 33, 2, (1992), p. 221.

²²⁷ Cameron, T., *An illustrated History of South Africa*. (Johannesburg: Routledge, 1986).

²²⁸ Gilliomee, H., *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people*. (United States: University of Virginia Press, 2010), p. 22.

²²⁹ South African History online, *Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-4-industrialisation-rural-change-and-Nationalism-chapter-3-afrikaner-Nationalism-1930s> [Accessed 15 June 2021].

Certain aspects of society helped to aim and direct the course of Afrikaner nationalism and it came mainly from the middle-class Afrikaans people, which included pastors, teachers, academics, and civil servants.²³⁰ It was no secret that many Afrikaners belonged to an organization known as the Afrikaner Broerderbond. The Broerderbond worked behind the scenes to promote the ideals of a true and pure Afrikaner *volk* or the people.²³¹ It called for the unity of all Afrikaners regardless of class, status, wealth, political belief or gender, which in the end the Broerderbond hoped would increase Afrikaner nationalism and preserve their culture in South Africa in the 1930s and 1940s.²³² This later helped form the basis for Eugene Terre'Blanche and the AWB who based their movement on the works of the Broerderbond from the 1970s to 1990s.

The Great Depression that started in 1929 in America after the crash of the stock market on Wall Street led the whole world's economy into a downward spiral. In South Africa, many white Afrikaners had suffered greatly in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Many people who had been working in the agricultural and farming sector were forced to move to cities in search of jobs so as to support their families.²³³ They were forced to work in factories and in the mines in order to make a living. However, many of them neither had the education nor the skills to successfully compete in the modern urban environment, thus they could only be employed in low level jobs that paid very low wages. Some examples of the jobs that white Afrikaans speaking males were qualified for included positions such as manual labourers, mine workers and railway workers. There was even an enquiry into the levels of poverty of white people in South Africa in 1932, it was known as the Carnegie Commission of Enquiry into white poverty.²³⁴ The results of this enquiry found that there were almost 300 000 white people who were classified as poor in South Africa.²³⁵

Thus, many Afrikaner organisations were established during the 1930s, whose major aim was uplifting the Volk. There were groups such as Sanlam (an insurance firm) and the Volkskas

²³⁰ Gilliomee, H., *The Afrikaners: Biography of a people*. (United States: University of Virginia Press, 2010), p. 372.

²³¹ South African History online, *Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-4-industrialisation-rural-change-and-Nationalism-chapter-3-afrikaner-Nationalism-1930s> [Accessed 15 June 2021].

²³² Gilliomee, H. & Mbenga, B., *New History of South Africa*. (Cape Town: NB Publishers, 2010), p. 372.

²³³ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

²³⁴ Carnegie Corporation Oral History Project, *Carnegie in South Africa: First inquiry into poverty*. [Online] Available at: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/oral_hist/carnegie/special-features/ [Accessed 5 June 2021].

²³⁵ Carnegie Corporation Oral History Project, *Carnegie in South Africa: First inquiry into poverty*. [Online] Available at: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/oral_hist/carnegie/special-features/ [Accessed 5 June 2021].

Bank, which were established to help the poor Afrikaners financially.²³⁶ The ideas of Afrikaner nationalism and pride were strengthened through different movements as well, such as the youth group known as the Voortrekkers, which is similar to the Hitler Youth group in Nazi Germany or even the Broederbond.²³⁷ These groups aimed to promote pride and education amongst the Afrikaner people for their culture, which in essence they believed would lead to an increase of support and willingness to protect their culture.²³⁸

Afrikaner nationalism is closely linked to the history of the nation as a whole. There was an ever-growing importance placed on the history of Afrikaans-speaking people and their history of overcoming the rule of the British in the Cape of Good Hope during the Great Trek.²³⁹ It is essential to link the rise of the AWB and the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in the late 1970s and 1980s to the growth of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s because many of the far-right political organisations and movements had as their ideological base the early organisations such as the Broederbond. Late twentieth-century Afrikaner nationalist movements drew their legitimacy from the early movements.

A key moment for the development of Afrikaner nationalism took place in 1938 when Afrikaners were united even closer together with the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek. The event aimed to celebrate the move of the Afrikaners away from the British-controlled Cape about 100 years prior.²⁴⁰ It was celebrated by having ox-wagon drawn carts making the same journey from the Cape up to the Transvaal and ended at the newly constructed Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria.²⁴¹ The people took to the event with great enthusiasm.

The second Great Trek was very symbolic for many Afrikaners because it brought back to life the ideas of Afrikanerdom that had been lost in the years between the 1830s and the 1930s. For many, the original Great Trek represented the freedom from the British imperial rule, which linked closely to the centenary celebrations which gave rise to a renewed desire for a better and more prosperous future.²⁴² The celebration showed quite clearly that the Afrikaners felt like

²³⁶ Webb, V. & Kriel, M., 'Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism', *International journal of Sociology of language*, 2000, 144, (2000), p. 27.

²³⁷ Webb, V. & Kriel, M., 'Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism', *International journal of Sociology of language*, 2000, 144, (2000), p. 34.

²³⁸ Bunting, B., *The Rise of the South African Reich*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969).

²³⁹ Webb, V. & Kriel, M., 'Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism', *International journal of Sociology of language*, 2000, 144, (2000), p. 21.

²⁴⁰ Cameron, T., *An illustrated History of South Africa*. (Johannesburg: Routledge, 1986).

²⁴¹ Dubow, S., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race', *The Journal of African History*, 33, 2, (1992), p. 212.

²⁴² Dubow, S., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race', *The Journal of African History*, 33, 2, (1992), p. 219.

outsiders in their own land and that the only way forward was to have a united and organised political, cultural and economic front that could stand firmly against English monopoly in South Africa.²⁴³ The centenary trek was a turning point for Afrikaners in the late 1930s as it ripped away the class system and brought the people together regardless of their status, with a binding sense of true ethnic mobilisation.²⁴⁴ This celebration inspired the Afrikaans-speaking people in the sense that if their forefathers had overcome so many obstacles in the past, there was nothing stopping them from making the Afrikaner nation survive and prosper in the future.

The foregoing overview is important for this research because it is the first point in Afrikaner history that can be linked to popular mobilisation along purely racial lines. It spoke to the idea of the 'pure people', in this case the Afrikaans-speaking people, who had been oppressed by the 'elite' monopoly, the British. The people who still had such a history of struggle within living memory would surely be amenable to the message of organisations such as the Broederbond who promoted themselves as the voice of 'the people' of Afrikaner stock.

The Path of Afrikanerdom after the 1940s

However, the enthusiasm and unity of the centenary celebrations soon wore off, and after the celebrations, Afrikanerdom started to divide along different paths, with multiple organisations being established, each having its own goals and agendas.

A group that was particularly prominent after the centenary was the Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel).²⁴⁵ The main aim of this group was to keep the unity of the Afrikaner nation that had been achieved during the centenary celebrations. The Ossewabrandwag claimed that their organisation was separate from the politics of the time because political differences would create divisions among the Afrikaans-speaking people; as an organization, the group felt that it was imperative to keep the Afrikaner people united.²⁴⁶ The AWB and Terre'Blanche resuscitated this idea of Afrikaner unity during the 1980s with the establishment of paramilitary groups based on the ideals of unity pioneered by Ossewabrandwag.

However, the 1940s was apparently not an ideal time for the unification of the Afrikanerdom because of the various political differences. Some political groups favoured the old Boer Republics ideals, others wanted a complete change in the system of governance to a more

²⁴³ Bunting, B., *The Rise of the South African Reich*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969).

²⁴⁴ Fűredi, F., *The silent war: Imperialism and the Changing preception of race*. (New Jersey: Rutger University Press, 1998).

²⁴⁵ Dubow, S., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of Race', *The Journal of African History*, 33, 2, (1992), p. 229.

²⁴⁶ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013).

national-socialist system which entailed the dissolution of the parliamentary system.²⁴⁷ Some people however continued to support the Smuts government which worked closely with the British. Many traditional Afrikaners believed that Jan Smuts had betrayed the Afrikaans people by working with the English-speaking people because of a very difficult past between the Afrikaner and the British nations.²⁴⁸ Another factor that played an important role here was the fact that South Africa, under the Smuts government, had sent a lot of young men to Europe to fight in World War 2 on the side of the Allied Powers. Many of the supporters of D.F. Malan, an emerging Afrikaner leader, were against fighting in the war and tried to persuade the people that Smuts was sending healthy Afrikaner men to their death for the benefit of the British.²⁴⁹

While this was taking place, the Herstigte Nasionale Party which was a far right-wing party, under Malan, was still trying to promote itself as the true party for the Afrikaans-speaking people.²⁵⁰ Although Malan had slowly begun to gain support for his party by claiming that he was the true leader for the Afrikaner nation, that support had not translated into victory during the 1943 general election.²⁵¹ The United Party emerged from the election with almost two thirds of the seats and the National Party only managed to gain a little more than a quarter of the seats. However, they had managed to gain a total of 6 more seats in the House of Assembly as compared to the 1938 election, which consolidated Malan's positions as the true representative of the Afrikaner people.²⁵² Much of the NP's effort between 1943 and 1948 was focused at reorganising the Party with the aim of gaining support from the Afrikaans people by using the idea that the United Party did not care about the Afrikaner Nation

In 1948, when the next general elections took place, the NP swept into victory with a very narrow majority of 70 seats as compared to the United Party's 65 seats.²⁵³ In order to gain majority in the Parliament, the NP went into a collation with the Afrikaner Party, bringing the total number of seats in Parliament up to 79.²⁵⁴ This marked the beginning of the apartheid era in South Africa because shortly after the NP came into power, many laws and acts were passed that began to suppress and oppress non-whites.

²⁴⁷ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

²⁴⁸ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

²⁴⁹ Lentz, H., *Heads of States and Governments since 1945*. (London: Routledge Books, 1996).

²⁵⁰ Lentz, H., *Heads of States and Governments since 1945*. (London: Routledge Books, 1996).

²⁵¹ Meredith, M., *In the name of apartheid: South Africa in the postwar period*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).

²⁵² Meredith, M., *In the name of apartheid: South Africa in the postwar period*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).

²⁵³ Gilliomee, H. & Mbenga, B., *New History of South Africa*. (Cape Town: NB Publishers, 2010).

²⁵⁴ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

The NP won the election for multiple reasons, but the biggest one that garnered support for them was the fact that they used propaganda and populist tactics to manipulate the people into voting for them.²⁵⁵ One of the biggest tactics used by the NP was the idea of the *Swart gevaar* (black peril) and *Swaart oorstroming* (black swamping) in the urban areas.²⁵⁶ There had been an influx of African people into urban areas during WW2 as they were looking for better employment opportunities. The National Party capitalised on this by arguing that the jobs and security of Afrikaans people were at risk and that the United Party was doing nothing to preserve or protect the Afrikaner rights, traditions, and history.²⁵⁷ This was a strategic move as many Afrikaans-speaking people were still trying to recover financially after the Great Depression.

Together, the above-mentioned factors all gave rise to Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa and led to the start of apartheid in 1948. It gave Afrikaans-speaking people a renewed sense of belonging and purpose and brought about an increased belief that they should fight for their people and culture to remain intact in the face of the increasing dangers of African people swamping and taking over white South Africa. It is important to take note of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and its establishment since the AWB and Eugene Terre'Blanche used this to defend their actions in the 1970s.

The rise of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and violent actions

During the 1970s and 1980s, the NP government started introducing some new reforms that put fear into the minds of Afrikaans people for they felt that their interests were now being pushed aside in favour of the African people.²⁵⁸ Under then President P.W. Botha, the government had started to introduce some concessions in the vain hope of placating the Black African masses and avoiding the complete failure of the apartheid system.

Some of the concessions that Botha began to make in the 1980s included the introduction of the Tri-Cameral Parliament. The Tri-Cameral Parliament gave limited power to Indian and Coloured people in parliament. The whites-only House of Assembly however maintained majority control, while Black South Africans were excluded all together.²⁵⁹ The reason for excluding African people was that, according to the state, they had rights in the Bantustans and

²⁵⁵ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

²⁵⁶ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

²⁵⁷ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

²⁵⁸ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 108.

²⁵⁹ Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001), p. 108.

therefore did not need to have any say in the running of greater South Africa. Botha also went on to change some of the petty apartheid laws and allowed inter-racial marriages. He also lifted the ban on multi-racial parties and relaxed some of the rules of the Groups Areas Act.²⁶⁰ Eugene Terre'Blanche used these concessions to his advantage for it had created fear in the minds of the Afrikaner people who were beginning to believe that they would no longer have control. Terre'Blanche was quick to pounce on this fear and swing it in his favour of the AWB.

Terre'Blanche used his very forceful personality and skilful oratory to convince the people that he was going to protect their interests against the weak apartheid government. The true reasons for the state's lifting of the petty apartheid laws were disregarded and opposed by the AWB in their quest for the preservation of Afrikaner racial dominance and power. The AWB actually opposed the limited power given to non-whites in the Tri-Cameral parliament.²⁶¹ The AWB was not afraid to use violence to instil fear in those opposed to their ideals. This became very clear when the AWB went on violent and murderous sprees against non-white South Africans and openly spoke out against the ANC and its members.²⁶²

The AWB was started on 7 July 1973, at a meeting held in Heidelberg, in the former Transvaal. Terre'Blanche was concerned about the changes he saw taking place in former colonies across the African continent that had gained their independence in the 1960s and feared that those ideas would make their way into South Africa which ultimately would have meant the fall of white rule in South Africa.²⁶³ He and six other men decided to create the AWB with the intention of maintaining white Afrikaner dominance and to protect white interests in South Africa.

The ultimate aim of the AWB was to establish an independent Boerstaat (Boer State) for white, Afrikaans-speaking people only.²⁶⁴ This state would be independent from South Africa, which harked back to the independent Boer republics of the past, that were independent from British imperial influence and separate from African people. The two independent Boer states, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, were seen as the core of Afrikanerdom and an inspiration

²⁶⁰ Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001), p. 108.

²⁶¹ Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001), p. 108.

²⁶² Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001).

²⁶³ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 183.

²⁶⁴ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 183.

to the AWB. However, there would be strict rules in place in order to enter the independent Boer state as a citizen. The biggest restriction was that one had to be white and Afrikaans-speaking.²⁶⁵ Other white people could possibly gain citizenship but only if they identified with the beliefs of the AWB and were ready to be initiated into the Afrikaner Boerevolk.²⁶⁶ This clear belief in the superiority of the Afrikaner people can be seen in the following extract from a speech made by Terre'Blanche:

Nothing can stop a nation when they are fighting for their survival, when they were tricked out of their own country. I think they will be more explosive; I think there will be more actions if the government continues to ignore the call for international laws for the just claim of my people to demand some land.²⁶⁷

Terre'Blanche and the AWB were able to attract thousands of people to their cause because they played their cards well by using fearmongering to gain support. The AWB was the only organisation that dealt specifically with Afrikaner nationalism and did not allow any non-white Afrikaans speaking people to join their movement.²⁶⁸ However, they were fishing from the same pond as the National Party because they claimed to be the voice of the “chosen” Afrikaans-speaking people who needed to be kept racially pure and in power.²⁶⁹

Although established in the 1970s, the AWB only gained support and motion during the 1980s. In terms of style and strategy, the AWB drew very heavily on the ideology and style of Nazi Germany.²⁷⁰ Like the Nazis, the AWB yearned for the independence of their respective nations away from the influences of other major powers. They also yearned for the preservation of their culture, tradition, and histories on strict racial terms. Moreover, the AWB adopted a khaki uniform to show unity of the members (See Figure 8 below) and they adapted a swastika-like emblem to create the symbol of the AWB known as the *three-sevens* and an eagle, which is depicted in Figure 9 below. Ostensibly, the AWB used the emblem to show their Christianity and supposedly to attract God's protection. The colours even had certain meanings such as the red which represented the blood of Christ to wash away the sins, white for the purity of the

²⁶⁵ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992), p. 141.

²⁶⁶ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992), p. 141.

²⁶⁷ AP Archive, *South Africa - Terre'Blanche on Right Wing Attacks*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78jCahnu6BI> [Accessed 20 October 2021].

²⁶⁸ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 183.

²⁶⁹ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

²⁷⁰ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

ideals, and black for bravery of the Afrikanerdom.²⁷¹ All these factors combined showed a strong unitedness amongst the AWB with the support of God for their ideals.

Figure 9: AWB flag and emblem of three 'Sevens' and the Nazi Flag and emblem, the Swastika.



CrowdhNews, *God, Volk, Vaderland: What ever Happened to the AWB?*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.crowdh.com/god-volk-vaderland-awb/>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

Figure 8: Photograph depicting the Khaki uniform of AWB members at a rally in Ventersdrop



akg images, *AWB – Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, march in Welkom..* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.akg-images.co.uk/archive/-2UMDHU1R0BA9.html>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

The Volkstaat Party was launched by the AWB to carry out the ideals of the independent Volk State and to allow the AWBs' ideas to enter into the political spheres of South Africa. The Volkstaat Party was entrusted with creating and setting into motion an independent Afrikaner State. One key feature of this independent state was that it would be a one-party state.²⁷² It would have been organised along the same lines as any normal political party, which included grassroots level citizen councils, regional councils, and a national council which seemed to legitimise the strategies of seeking independence.²⁷³

²⁷¹ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>

[Accessed 20 June 2021].

²⁷² Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 243.

²⁷³ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 186.

The AWB took matters a step further by introducing paramilitary groups known as *Brandwagte* which they sent into towns across the country. These groups carried out acts of violence and instilled fear in non-white South Africans. The troops were trained in a military style fashion and their organisation and tactics were based off of the Ossewabrandwag that had been established during WW2 to maintain the flow of Afrikaner nationalism.²⁷⁴ The AWB went on to set up and establish a special task force known as Aquilla that would protect Terre'Blanche and to ensure his safety as the true leader of the Afrikaner Nation.

The AWB started their campaign to gain attention with small acts of sabotage in the late 1970s. This started when the AWB accepted responsibility for throwing tar and feathers at Floors van Jaarsveld who was an academic.²⁷⁵ Van Jaarsveld had questioned the significance of the celebration of 16 December which was celebrated as the Day of the Covenant. For the AWB, questioning such a significant Afrikaner holiday was an insult and hence they harassed Van Jaarsveld.²⁷⁶ During the 1980s, the AWB disrupted multiple NP meetings and held a great many rallies themselves that were quite disruptive.²⁷⁷ The party set up its headquarters in Ventersdorp and continued to use different means such as literature which included poems and books, glossy pamphlets and radio broadcast to spread its message for the protection and independence of the Afrikaner nation, much of which has been written or spoken by Terre'Blanche himself. The AWB also gained a much-needed boost in support when they developed a programme that would distribute food packages to the needy poor white people.²⁷⁸ Together, these factors aided Terre'Blanche and the AWB to link themselves to the idea of being part of 'the people' who were against the 'elite' and established NP government. Terre'Blanche and the AWB relied on possible populist tactics by creating the idea that the government did not care about the Afrikanerdom because of the concessions that Botha had allowed in the 1980s which brought South Africa closer to racial equality on one hand, but on the other, it brought the Afrikaner nation closer to its demise. In a speech made by Terre'Blanche in the late 1980s, it is clear that he places the Afrikaner people above all others in South Africa and that the AWB was willing to help protect the status quo:

²⁷⁴ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 186.

²⁷⁵ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 117.

²⁷⁶ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 118.

²⁷⁷ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

²⁷⁸ Gilliomée, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992), p. 121.

The country where the North wind carries away dry thorn bushes, where the North wind blows knots of wool against barbed wire, where rivers and rocks reverberate with the cry of the crow and wild dog. This is a heartsore land with a heartsore history.

But you are the owners. You are the boss of your house, your farm, and huge areas of South Africa. And it is your absolute unalienable property. This is the property of a group of whites, the Boers. Joined together in a land with its own title. You are the owners of this land. You own it.²⁷⁹

The person that played a pivotal role in the creation and growth of the AWB was Eugene Terre'Blanche. Terre'Blanche was extremely fixated on maintaining the Afrikanerdom even if it was at the expense of other races. Terre'Blanche was born in 1944 in Ventersdorp. There was a strong sense of Afrikaner nationalism on the rise in South Africa in 1944, and this set the stage for Terre'Blanche later in his life and career. His family were heavily involved in maintaining the culture of Afrikaners and this influenced how Terre'Blanche was raised.²⁸⁰ After high school, Terre'Blanche served in the Police force as part of the Special Guard Unit, that was responsible for protecting important government members.²⁸¹ This allowed Terre'Blanche to receive much needed training and intelligence on government workings and organisations, which he would use later when he helped to establish the AWB.

²⁷⁹ DocsOnline, *My beloved country*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5KVE7IN9E0> [Accessed 20 October 2021].

²⁸⁰ *The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver's Wife*. 1991. [Film] Directed by Nick Broomfield. United Kingdom: Lafayette Films.

²⁸¹ *The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver's Wife*. 1991. [Film] Directed by Nick Broomfield. United Kingdom: Lafayette Films.

Terre 'Blanche built up a very strong persona during his younger years as an amateur play writer and he used his skills in theatrics to mesmerise and manipulate his supporters.²⁸² He would often arrive at AWB meetings on horseback (see Figure 10 and 11 below), which would then effectively link him in the minds of the Afrikaans people to the idea of preserving the rich Afrikaner history and making him part of the true Afrikaners. He would also be dressed fully in either khaki or black uniform, decorated with all kinds of badges and insignias representative of Afrikanerdom. This created a very powerful image of him being the true hero of the Afrikaans people and a point of unity for them, as shown in Figure 12 below. The AWB and Terre'Blanche were convinced that then President P.W. Botha was taking white South Africa down a very dangerous road with all the concessions that were being given to non-whites and therefore, believed that it was the responsibility of the AWB to protect the survival of white people, more specifically Afrikaans people and to protect their culture and heritage.²⁸³

Figure 10: Terre 'Blanche holding the AWB independent Boer Staat Flag



Figure 11: Terre 'Blanche on horseback to show close link to the Voortrekkers



Figure 12: Terre 'Blanche dressed in Khaki as part of the AWB uniform which indicates unity



akg images, AWB – Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, march in Welkom.. [Online] Available at: <https://www.akg-images.co.uk/archive/-2UMDHU1R0BA9.html> [Accessed 9 December 2021 2021].

Lee, D., *Eugene Terre'Blanche, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) leader*, [Online] Available at: <https://aodl.org/oralnarratives/militaryyops/object/167-606-11/b/> [Accessed 9 December 2021].

Raath, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche*. [Online] Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugene_Terre'Blanche#/media/File:Eugene_Terreblanche_\(386542672\).jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugene_Terre'Blanche#/media/File:Eugene_Terreblanche_(386542672).jpg) [Accessed 9 December 2021].

²⁸² *The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver's Wife*. 1991. [Film] Directed by Nick Broomfield. United Kingdom: Lafayette Films.

²⁸³ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

Even though the AWB was relatively underground in the early 1970s, they became publicly active in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially after the incident with Floors van Jaarsveld in 1979. It was in 1979 that the AWB held their first public meeting in which they declared their opposition to reforms undertaken by the government.²⁸⁴ Terre'Blanche was of the belief that the end of apartheid would lead South Africa on to the path of communism and threatened F.W. De Klerk in 1989 with a full-on war if power was given to the ANC and Nelson Mandela.²⁸⁵

The small acts of terrorism committed by the AWB continued throughout the 1980s, but it did come at a price. In 1983, Terre'Blanche and three other members of the AWB were charged under the Terrorism Act after weapons were found hidden on a farm owned by the AWB.²⁸⁶ The men were all sentenced to two years imprisonment for the illegal possession of fire arms, which was suspended for 5 years.²⁸⁷ In the same year, two more AWB members were sentenced to 15 years in prison for conspiring to overthrow the government.²⁸⁸ These events did put a halt to the movement's planned resistance, however, it did not stop them from pushing forward. Three years later, in 1986, Terre'Blanche announced the formation of a group known as the AWB Brandwag, based on the Ossewabrandwag of the 1940s.²⁸⁹ This group was created with the aim of protecting white interests and white lives if there were not enough police available at the time of rallies or meetings as claimed by the AWB.²⁹⁰ In essence, however, the AWB Brandwag was a militant group of young white, Afrikaans-speaking men who went out and terrorised African people and anti-apartheid sympathizers.²⁹¹ This was designed to display the continued efforts of the AWB to protect the marginalized Afrikaans-speaking people.

In 1988, Terre'Blanche and the AWB handed over a petition to President P.W. Botha which demanded that the former Boer Republics be restored, namely the Transvaal and Orange Free State.²⁹² In the petition, it stated that the land would be for the Volkstaat and that African people

²⁸⁴ South African History Online, *Eugene Ney Terre'Blanche*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/eugene-ney-terreblanche> [Accessed 25 June 2021].

²⁸⁵ South African History Online, *Eugene Ney Terre'Blanche*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/eugene-ney-terreblanche> [Accessed 25 June 2021].

²⁸⁶ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

²⁸⁷ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

²⁸⁸ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 117.

²⁸⁹ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), pp. 117 – 118.

²⁹⁰ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 181.

²⁹¹ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 181.

²⁹² Battersby, J., *Rightists Rally in Pretoria*, New York: The New York Times. (1988).

were only allowed in these areas as labourers.²⁹³ He also stated that all white people would be welcomed in these areas as long as they showed true acceptance of Afrikaner nationalism and upheld the Christian ideals.²⁹⁴ The AWB threatened the NP government, stating that they would forcefully take over South Africa in order to prevent the rise to power of the ANC; thereafter, they would implement their goal of having independent Afrikaner states. This prompted the government to prohibit members of the AWB from carrying any firearms so as to prevent violence.²⁹⁵ Terre'Blanche responded by stating that any white man in South Africa without a gun is surely a dead man.²⁹⁶ Here again, the link to the populist strategies is seen as Terre'Blanche is showing the willingness of the AWB to protect the true and 'pure' Afrikaans people against the loss of white power and domination.

All seemed to be advancing well for the movement in the early 1980s, however, as time went on, the AWB began to attract a lot of negative media attention. In 1988, Terre'Blanche was accused of breaking down the doors to the monument in the Paardekraal incident. A year later in 1989, Terre'Blanche was accused of having an affair with a journalist from the *Sunday Times*.²⁹⁷ This came as a shock to many Afrikaners because they believed he was a God-fearing man but now he was being accused of having an affair, a grossly sinful act. These events created a lot of tension between the leaders of the AWB and caused a split in the leadership. The developments also led to the suspension of three of the key leaders of the movement because they called for the resignation of Terre'Blanche.²⁹⁸ This turn of events was almost crippling for the AWB and they had to fight for the survival of the organisation. The only reason that the organisation survived in the end was because of the charismatic and manipulative nature of Terre'Blanche, who was able to persuade his followers not to believe the lies being broadcast by the media.

²⁹³ Battersby, J., *Rightists Rally in Pretoria*, New York: The New York Times. (1998).

²⁹⁴ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 183.

²⁹⁵ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm> [Accessed 20 June 2021].

²⁹⁶ South African History Online, *Eugene Ney Terre'Blanche*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/eugene-ney-terreblanche> [Accessed 25 June 2021].

²⁹⁷ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992).

²⁹⁸ *The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver's Wife*. 1991. [Film] Directed by Nick Broomfield.

In the 1990s, the AWB became more militant and aggressive because they were acutely aware of the rapid changes that were taking place in South Africa. The militant groups that formed part of the AWB were given new lease of life when the AWB offered them more incentives such as higher wages and better living conditions, in order to continue the fight. This mobilisation of white Afrikaans-speaking people allowed Terre'Blanche to threaten the government with a war if the African National Congress came into power, or if their demands for an independent state were not met.²⁹⁹ This is displayed in a speech made by Terre'Blanche at a rally for the AWB supporters:

No one who lived here and was white had an easy time in this country. At Bloukrans and Moordspruit, women and children were stabbed. Two white people were skewered on one spear as if on a safety pin. I am not popular with white liberals, but the fact of the matter is that 27 000 gravestones point to Heaven and speak to God and our people. Here are the dead victims of the British concentration camps. This is the country the AWB claims, this is the land we are willing to die for. They won't get our land. With gun in hand, we'll crush the ANC. Make a stand. Make a stand with prayer. Make a stand with work and organisation. Make a stand with your vote, with bullets and with guns. Make a stand in God's name. You have no right to hand this land to the ANC communists. This is God's land. This is the promised land. They say the AWB speaks a threatening language. Yes. I threaten in the clearest language – Hands off Boer land!³⁰⁰

The AWB openly displayed their militant tendency through the use of groups such as the Wenkommando and the Ystergarde. These groups were established to train young white Afrikaner men in paramilitary tactics that were necessary to keep the Afrikaners in power through any means necessary. The AWB also went as far as creating grassroots vigilante groups such as neighbourhood watches known as the Brandwagte. These groups aimed at gaining the trust and support of Afrikaners at community level, based on the idea that the AWB truly cared about the Afrikaner nation and wanted to protect them against the threat of Black people in urban areas. This was done under the pretence of lowering crime in urban areas; however, the

²⁹⁹ *The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver's Wife*. 1991. [Film] Directed by Nick Broomfield.

³⁰⁰ DocsOnline, *Eugene Terre'Blanche's Afrikaner Resistance Movement - Rally*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbvzZTB9O0k> [Accessed 20 October 2021]

real reason was to enforce a curfew to keep African people out of white areas.³⁰¹ There was a continuous determination from the AWB to display their goal of protecting the interests of white Afrikaners.

The 1990s in South Africa was a very delicate time as negotiations were taking place between the National Party government, resistance leaders and resistance movements such as the African National Congress to move towards the first democratic elections in South Africa.³⁰² The AWB were not happy with these developments that would bring about racial equality. In order to show their displeasure with the government's action, in 1991 the AWB disrupted a rally being addressed by the then President, F.W. de Klerk. AWB members and the police clashed in what became known as the Battle of Ventersdorp.³⁰³ The news of the potential release of ANC member Nelson Mandela had become public knowledge the year prior and the AWB were not pleased with the decision, which was what fuelled the Battle of Ventersdorp. The AWB gathered at the rally with about 2000 members, who were all heavily armed and prepared to face the South African Police force by wearing masks and body armour to avoid injury from police weapons. Terre'Blanche ordered his men to attack, and the police retaliated with force. In the end, there were three AWB members killed as well as one civilian. In terms of injuries, in total, 13 AWB members, 29 civilians and six policemen were injured.³⁰⁴ The reforms and potential changes that the NP government was planning acted as a catalyst for the AWB to increase their terrorising tactics in South Africa, under the guise of maintaining Afrikaner power.

Another event that further entrenched the claws of the AWB in the flesh of maintaining white Afrikaner control took place in 1993. While peace negotiations were taking place at the Kempton Park World Trade Centre, a peaceful protest was organised by far-right wing Afrikaner groups which included the Afrikaner Volksfront and some members of the AWB and its paramilitary group, the Ystergarde.³⁰⁵ The protest was peaceful enough at first as many AWB supports had brought along their families and peacefully sat outside the building. But

³⁰¹ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992).

³⁰² Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 119.

³⁰³ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 119.

³⁰⁴ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992).

³⁰⁵ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

soon, the protest took a turn for the worst when Terre'Blanche's personal bodyguard began damaging cars and causing trouble outside the building.³⁰⁶ Many of the people present at the protest had been trained as paramilitary soldiers, therefore, many were carrying firearms and other weapons on their person.³⁰⁷ As things escalated quickly, an armoured vehicle was used to crash through the glass windows of the building, as depicted in Figure 13 below. This turned the protest violent because members of the AWB invaded the premises while chanting "AWB"; the police present in the building tried to stop the invasion, but they were unsuccessful.³⁰⁸ Police officers were beaten and shot at, effectively putting the AWB in control of the building for a moment. The members of the multi-party negotiations ran for safety and hid away in offices to avoid being attacked.³⁰⁹ The AWB members continued to destroy the building by breaking doors, windows, and anything they could find. Along with this they painted the AWB logo and racial slogans all over the interior of the building.³¹⁰ They moved into the main negotiation chamber where they continued to hold a prayer meeting, as seen in Figure 14.³¹¹ This links closely to the fact that it was God's will for the AWB to maintain white control in South Africa, especially for the Afrikaner people. Before leaving the building, a discussion was held between the protestors and the police. It was agreed that in order for the protestors to leave peacefully, no one who had been involved in the invasion would be arrested.³¹² This was agreed to and the AWB withdrew quite calmly from the building as compared to their entry.

³⁰⁶ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

³⁰⁷ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

³⁰⁸ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 87.

³⁰⁹ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 87.

³¹⁰ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 200.

³¹¹ Youtube.com, *Storming of Kempton Park World Trade Centre (June 25, 1993)*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnOmaJYiDh0> [Accessed 9 December 2021].

³¹² Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

Figure 14: *The invasion of the Kempton Park World Trade Centre during the peace negotiations taking place in in 1993*



Youtube.com, 2011. *Storming of Kempton Park World Trade Centre (June 25, 1993)*. [Online]
Available at:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnOmaJYiDh0>
[Accessed 9 December 2021].

Figure 13: *AWB members praying in the main negotiation chamber at the Kempton Park World Trade Centre during the invasion in 1993*



Youtube.com, 2011. *Storming of Kempton Park World Trade Centre (June 25, 1993)*. [Online]
Available at:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnOmaJYiDh0>
[Accessed 9 December 2021].

This act of invading the Kempton Park Trade Centre was a direct illustration of the rejection of the negotiations which hoped to move South Africa forward as a more inclusive and democratic country. The far-right Afrikaners were afraid of the new dawn of racial inclusivity, and they were demanding an independent Afrikaner homeland, in which they would be self-sufficient and have their own government. It was completely the opposite of what the National Party government was attempting to do, which was to move South Africans towards racial co-existence.

The year 1993 saw a lot of violence and clashes between multiple different groups who all wanted their own agendas to be implemented. This included the clashes between the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which were ostensibly fanned by the NP as a divide and rule tactic; it also included the machinations of the AWB who were resisting all efforts to move towards a racially inclusive country; and finally, the assassination of popular SACP leader, Chris Hanu, which almost derailed the peace negotiations that were taking place.³¹³ It became more important than ever that the negotiations should continue as fast as possible to avoid a full-blown civil war in South Africa. Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk worked tirelessly to

³¹³ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 117.

contain the violence and condemning it as sabotage.³¹⁴ The attempt by the AWB to derail negotiations only discredited the party even more because they were seen as working against the greater good for South Africa.

The Crisis of Bophuthatswana and the AWB – a direct clash of races

In 1994, the AWB gained international notoriety. This was due to their attempt to aid the rule of Lucas Mangope in Bophuthatswana, an African homeland. In 1994, Bophuthatswana was experiencing a lot of internal resistance due to the fact that the President Mangope attempted to disperse and crush labour unrest and demonstrations calling for the reintegration of the homeland into greater South Africa.³¹⁵ These calls had come about due to the fact that South Africa was moving towards a multi-racial country and wanted the homeland to be part of the new South Africa. President Mangope had announced in early March 1994 that Bophuthatswana would boycott the elections planned for April 1994.³¹⁶ This sparked mass uprisings and protests by the local armed forces and strikes by the civil service workers. It was complicated even further when right-wing Afrikaners arrived in the homeland with the idea of preserving the Mangope government rule.³¹⁷ Afrikaners supported the idea that African people should develop independently from white people and believed that if they supported Mangope and helped him win independence for Bophuthatswana, then their call for an independent Afrikaner State would have to be recognised by the government. However, after facing a lot of internal resistance, Mangope agreed to allow participation in the election, but this did not last long as he again withdrew his support. This time however, the South African Defence Force became involved by deposing him and restoring order to the area by 12 March 1994.³¹⁸ These developments became known as the Bophuthatswana Crisis and were an illustration of the damage that had been caused by the fragmentation of South Africa into homelands.

It is important to note why the far-right wing Afrikaners became involved in Bophuthatswana. President Mangope had realised that he could not maintain his power after his announcement of the boycott of the elections, therefore, he approached the Volksfront president Constand

³¹⁴ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), pp. 117- 118.

³¹⁵ Cawthra, G., *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1997).

³¹⁶ Cawthra, G., *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1997).

³¹⁷ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p. 81.

³¹⁸ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p. 172.

Viljoen.³¹⁹ The Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) was an umbrella organisation for far right-wing Afrikaner parties in South Africa. The AVF was established in 1993 by General Constant Viljoen, General Tienie Groenwald, General Cobus Visser and General Koos Bischoof. The AVF was not a political party itself but consisted of a coalition among different Afrikaner parties such as the Boerestaat Party, the Herstigte Nasionale Party and Oranhowekers.³²⁰ The main aim of this organisation was to disrupt the 1994 democratic elections. An interesting similarity arises here in that the AVF wanted to establish an independent state for Afrikaans-speaking people and to put self-determination into practice, which was very similar to the idea that the AWB had of establishing an independent Boer State. The AVF wanted the Afrikaner nation to have their independent state in the Pretoria area, which fell in the formerly independent Transvaal Boer State. This resonated with the leadership of Bophuthatswana, hence it made sense for President Mangope to ask for the assistance of the AVF in maintaining the independence of Bophuthatswana in 1994. Mangope and Viljoen went into discussions along with the Bophuthatswana Defence Force and national police to use the Volksfront military force to protect key locations in Bophuthatswana if necessary.³²¹ It was made clear by Mangope during these discussions that the AWB would not be welcome in the homeland as they were seen as an extremely racist organisation and their acts of violence would not be tolerated in his territory.³²²

By 10 March, the protests and strikes in Bophuthatswana had become much worse and President Mangope fled to Mopswedi in the North West Province of South Africa.³²³ By the afternoon, the people of Bophuthatswana had presented a petition to the South African ambassador, Tjaart van der Walt which stated that the homeland should be reintegrated into the broader South African nation.³²⁴ The resistance was fuelled by the fact that the ANC was in full support of making the homeland part of South Africa again. Mangope, who was no longer in the homeland, proceeded to ask Viljoen and the Volksfront to assist in keeping order and peace.³²⁵ Immediately, the Afrikaners were mobilised and moved to meet at the Mmabatho

³¹⁹Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p. 172.

³²⁰Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p. 172.

³²¹Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001).

³²²Roberts, M., *South Africa 1948-2000: The rise and fall of apartheid*. (London: Longman Press, 2001).

³²³Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p. 173.

³²⁴Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 124.

³²⁵Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 124.

Air Force Base by 11 March 1994.³²⁶ At the same time, the South African Defence Force was busy organizing itself to intervene in the very volatile situation, with the aim of protecting the lives of the innocent people in Bophuthatswana.³²⁷

Coinciding with the mobilisation of the Volksfront, Terre'Blanche and the AWB also rallied troops together from areas such as Ventersdorp and the Western Transvaal area. The AWB paramilitary troops entered into Bophuthatswana and met with the Volksfront at the Air Force Base.³²⁸ However, some of the leading members of the Volksfront were unhappy with Terre'Blanche and AWB members being present and demanded that they leave because of their reputation of being extremely violent.³²⁹ Terre'Blanche finally agreed to leave and his men were ordered to remove any insignia that represented the AWB.³³⁰ This created a lot of tension amongst the men of the AWB and the Volksfront.

During the course of the evening of 11 March, many AWB members caused havoc in the streets of Bophuthatswana, specifically in Mafikeng and Mmabatho, as they shot and injured protestors and civilians while leaving the homeland.³³¹ This led to the Bophuthatswana Defence Force threatening to attack the Afrikaner militants because the leaders could not control the gunmen.³³² The AWB members continued to create more tension when they left the Air Force Base and drove around Mafikeng and Mmabatho where they shot at Black citizens.³³³ This

³²⁶ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 124.

³²⁷ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>

[Accessed 20 June 2021].

³²⁸ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>

[Accessed 20 June 2021].

³²⁹ O'Malley, *The Heart of Hope: Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03191.htm>

[Accessed 20 June 2021].

³³⁰ South African History Online, *Three AWB members shot and killed during the invasion of Bophuthatswana*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/three-awb-members-shot-and-killed-during-invasion-bophuthatswana> [Accessed 21 June 2021].

³³¹ South African History Online, *Three AWB members shot and killed during the invasion of Bophuthatswana*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/three-awb-members-shot-and-killed-during-invasion-bophuthatswana> [Accessed 21 June 2021].

³³² Watson, W., *Brick by Brick: an Informal guide to the history of South Africa*. (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2007).

³³³ Watson, W., *Brick by Brick: an Informal guide to the history of South Africa*. (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2007).

infuriated the Bophuthatswana residents and a crowd gathered to stop the convoy. The crowd was only dispersed when shots were fired into the air by members of the AWB.³³⁴

However, one of the single most significant events that is remembered from the conflict in Bophuthatswana was the killing of 3 AWB members at point blank range by a Black officer, Ontlametse Menyatsoe.³³⁵ The three AWB men were Alwyn Wolfaardt, Nicolaas Fourie and Jacobus Uys.³³⁶ They had been driving at the end of the convoy. The convoy of AWB members had been firing randomly into the houses as they drove by, and this led to members of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force to retaliate by shooting at the convoy.³³⁷ The three AWB members were shot at in their car and were injured. Fourie, who was the driver of the car was hit in the neck, Wolfaardt was hit in the arm and Uys was shot in the leg.³³⁸ They were forced to stop the car and climb out. Wolfaardt raised his arms in the air as a sign of surrender and begged that they cease fire. A police officer approached Woolfaardt and took his firearm. Officer Menyatsoe spoke directly to Woolfaardt and asked if he was a member of the AWB, which Woolfaardt confirmed but in the same breath he pleaded for his life and the life of his friends. However, Menyatsoe disregarded the plea and shot all three men dead at point blank range.³³⁹ This incident was captured by journalists and broadcast across the world.

Later, during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings, Menyatsoe applied for amnesty for the shooting of these men. It was opposed by the families of Uys, Fourie and Woolfaardt.³⁴⁰ During the hearing, Terre'Blanche cross examined Menyatsoe and he defended his actions by stating that he acted out of emotion due to seeing his mother injured from the shots that had been fired by the AWB and he stated that he took the responsibility to kill the men because there was no commanding officer present and he believed the men were a threat.³⁴¹ The TRC gave him amnesty.

³³⁴ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 157.

³³⁵ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019), p. 157.

³³⁶ Watson, W., *Brick by Brick: an Informal guide to the history of South Africa*. (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2007).

³³⁷ Watson, W., *Brick by Brick: an Informal guide to the history of South Africa*. (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2007).

³³⁸ Gilliomee, H. & Mbenga, B., *New History of South Africa*. (Cape Town: NB Publishers, 2010).

³³⁹ Louw, P., *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid*. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

³⁴⁰ SABC, *Truth Commission Special Report*. [Online] Available at: <https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/documents.htm> [Accessed 18 June 2021].

³⁴¹ SABC, *Truth Commission Special Report*. [Online] Available at: <https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/documents.htm> [Accessed 18 June 2021].

Discussion: The AWB and right-wing populism

The AWB, as stated previously, was a white supremacist group that wanted to preserve the traditions and beliefs of the Afrikaans-speaking people in South Africa in the light of the changing nature of South African politics in the 1990s. The AWB held strongly on to the idea that the Afrikaner people deserved their own space in South Africa because of the colonial past and the oppression they had suffered under the British.³⁴² Terre'Blanche claimed that Afrikaans people had never stolen the land from African people because when the Voortrekkers moved from the Cape up to the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the areas had not been occupied.³⁴³ He went further to explain that the Afrikaner forefathers had built cities, roads, mines and industries and this meant that they had capitalised on the generous natural wealth that the land had to offer.³⁴⁴ He also stated that the African people had never realised the true value of the land and therefore, they have no claim to the wealth that the Afrikaners had created. For these reasons, the AWB advocated for an independent Afrikaner state, where they would be separate from African people and able to maintain the wealth that their forefathers had created when moving into the interior in the late 1830s. Therefore, the group fits quite neatly into the category of right-wing populism. This is because Eugene Terre'Blanche and the AWB claimed that they were the true voice of the Afrikaner people who had to be excused from a racially mixed South Africa that was fast approaching in the horizon.

The AWB openly showed their resistance to the National Party by manipulating the Afrikaans-speaking people into believing that they had the Afrikanerdom's best interests at heart. To protect these beliefs and to show people that they were fighting for Afrikanerdom, they committed violent acts such as the shootings and the killing of African people, the invasion of the Kempton Park Trade Centre, getting involved in Bophuthatswana and continuing with their campaigns of intimidation and random assaults. In 1994, the group went to a new extreme when the first democratic election was taking place by detonating bombs in urban areas with the hope of disrupting the multiracial elections. By taking aim at the NP for supposedly poisoning the ideals of a true Afrikaner Nation, the AWB fashioned itself as the saviour of the Afrikaner people from the onslaught of inter-racialism.

It is worth noting that much of the AWB's image was linked closely to the leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche, a charismatic man who was able to unite Afrikaners together for the common

³⁴² Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

³⁴³ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giffel Media, 2010).

³⁴⁴ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

goal of preserving Afrikaner identity. Terre'Blanche had a very intriguing and imposing character, which are some of the very key features needed for populist leaders. Terre'Blanche portrayed himself as the saviour of the persecuted and oppressed Afrikaans-speaking people. The people often referred to him as '*Die Grootleier*' (the Grand Leader) and they were so devoted to him that many cried at the mention of his name.³⁴⁵ He had created such a 'god-like' image of himself in the eyes of the Afrikaner people that it was difficult for them to separate the image of him from the real person that he was. He meticulously upheld the idea of the creation of a Volkstaat during the early 1990s and used the media to do so, reaching Afrikaans people all over the country to galvanize their support and continued to portray the image of being the voice of 'the people'.

However, regardless of these efforts by the AWB and Terre'Blanche, they were never able to gain the right amount of support needed to truly derail the National Party or the transition to a multi-racial South Africa. The AWB was for all intents and purposes a nationalist and possibly populist movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but their movement's attraction was short lived. Ironically, Terre'Blanche actually played a huge role in the failure of the AWB. He was seen by some as joke because of some of his scandalous actions such as his affair with an English-speaking journalist or his failed coup in Bophuthatswana. These incidents eroded the respect he initially had.

The failure of the AWB

The decline of the AWB had started to show in the 1990s. In February 1992, Former President F.W. De Klerk declared that there would be a referendum held in the country to decide the fate of South Africa.³⁴⁶ Initially, Terre'Blanche stated that the referendum was a betrayal to Afrikanerdom, but quickly changed his tune when the Conservative Party declared they would take part in the referendum.³⁴⁷ The AWB claimed that they would work strongly towards a 'no' vote so as to keep apartheid in place. However, as the year wore on, many of the leading members began to leave the movement because they felt that Terre'Blanche was no longer focused on the main goal of preserving the Afrikaner nation but rather was focused more on his own personal gain.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

³⁴⁶ Van Der Merwe, A., *Eugene Terre'Blanche: My Storie*. (Cape Town: Giiffel Media, 2010).

³⁴⁷ Cawthra, G., *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1997).

³⁴⁸ Cawthra, G., *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defence, Development and Security in Transition*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1997).

Terre'Blanche and the AWB never carried out the threats of war in South Africa. This can be seen as the end of the reign of terrorism carried out by the AWB because in April 1994, the first democratic elections were held in South Africa and the ANC rose to power. Following on the end of apartheid, Terre'Blanche and his supporters sought amnesty from the TRC for all the violent acts committed during apartheid such as the World Trade Centre Storming and the others acts of terrorism committed.³⁴⁹ The TRC did grant amnesty for these acts. However, in 2001, Terre'Blanche was put on trial for assault and attempted murder where he was sentenced to six years in prison. He was released after 3 years in 2004. Upon his release, he claimed to have found God and that he had become a changed man.³⁵⁰

However, in 2008 the AWB was re-activated. The reasons for its revival were stated as being the fact that South Africa was facing an electricity crisis, increased corruption in the government, and the ever-increasing crime.³⁵¹ Terre'Blanche spoke at many rallies in which he sang the same old tune of a free Afrikaner republic. However, these actions ultimately led to his demise in 2010 when he was murdered on his farm just outside of Ventersdrop.³⁵²

Today, there are still remnants of white supremacy and neo-Nazi elements present in the country. It has been documented across the world, where white extremists are continuing to take up the cause of preserving the white minority. Many white supremacists refer to the ideas of the AWB to support their actions.³⁵³

In South Africa, there are still sporadic incidents that show the lingering ideals of white supremacy such as a case in 2002 when a group known as the Warriors of the Boer Nation claimed responsibility for several blasts in the township of Soweto, in Johannesburg, which led to the death of one woman.³⁵⁴ In 2019 members of the Crusaders, a white supremacist group, were arrested for planning to attack Black political leaders. Moreover, the AWB is still active

³⁴⁹ SABC, 2021. *Truth Commission Special Report*. [Online] Available at: <https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/documents.htm> [Accessed 18 June 2021].

³⁵⁰ Bevan, S., *AWB leader Terre'Blanche rallies Boers again*, United Kingdom: The Telegraph. (2008).

³⁵¹ Bevan, S., *AWB leader Terre'Blanche rallies Boers again*, United Kingdom: The Telegraph. (2008).

³⁵² Smith, D., *White Supremacist Eugene Terre'Blanche is hacked to death after row with farmworkers*, Johannesburg: The Observer. (2010).

³⁵³ Campbell, J., *Council on Foreign relations*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/transnational-White-supremacist-militancy-thriving-south-africa> [Accessed 28 June 2021].

³⁵⁴ Campbell, J., *Council on Foreign relations*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/transnational-White-supremacist-militancy-thriving-south-africa> [Accessed 28 June 2021].

and boasts close to 6000 active members.³⁵⁵ There is a case where members of the AWB were arrested in 2010 for plotting to attack Black townships as revenge for the murder of Terre'Blanche. These AWB members were also found guilty of intimidation in 2010, when they threatened foreigners who came to South Africa for the World Cup.³⁵⁶

It is evident that these AWB members still want to uphold the ideas of Afrikanerdom. However, in the modern world, there is a very strong move towards equality and freedom without fear of discrimination based on race, gender, religion, age, or sexuality. white nationalism and more specifically Afrikaner nationalism is no more than an absurd idea to many people today. It is easy to dismiss the ideas of Afrikaner nationalism because of a lack of support and lack of numbers to enforce their ideals. Far-right movements are very fragmented in South Africa which means that there is no unity therefore, no joint movement can be created. It is a frightening idea to imagine that should these groups unite and combine their skills, strategies, and military training, what would the outcome be in South Africa. A factor that must be considered is that with the continued upset with the corrupt government that many see as the 'elite' who are out to oppress the people, specifically the white minority, could be a common uniting factor that could start a revolutionary fight based on the populist ideas.

³⁵⁵ Campbell, J., *Council on Foreign relations*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/transnational-White-supremacist-militancy-thriving-south-africa>
[Accessed 28 June 2021].

³⁵⁶ Campbell, J., *Council on Foreign relations*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/transnational-White-supremacist-militancy-thriving-south-africa>
[Accessed 28 June 2021].

Chapter 4: The BCM, AWB and Populism: Content, Context and Comparative insights

This chapter closely examines the Black Consciousness Movement and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging as contemporaneous but different populist expressions. It will examine some of the key factors that are included in the conceptual idea of populism which will then be followed with a link to the historiography of the BCM and AWB so as to investigate the link they possibly have to populism. Obviously, juxtaposing the BCM against the AWB is like comparing apples and oranges. However, there are common threads of populism and comparative insights of interest. By examining the BCM and AWB together in comparative perspective, the aim of this chapter is to gain full insights on the features of, and factors driving populist sentiment in mid-twentieth century South Africa. The ultimate goal is to see how the South African experience – driven as it was by race and identity politics, and the politics of separate development and decolonisation – compares with other experiences globally, as illustrated in the extant historical literature.

On populism and popular politics

As noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the term populism is used to refer to a wide range of political beliefs and expressions that emphasise the idea of ‘the people’ and is often embraced in contrast to ‘the elite’. Populism has been defined mainly as a strategy which is used by established ideologies such as democracy, liberalism and communism, to name a few, to spread their beliefs and values in societies and has been known to separate a society into two distinct groups, namely ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite.’³⁵⁷ However, when looking at who constitutes the ‘people’, it is clear that they are grouped, either according to class, gender, ethnicity or nationality which can mean that those who form part of the ‘people’ can be changed at any time to suit the needs of leader or movement. In the same boat is the fact that the ‘elite’ are also divided into groups along the lines of political beliefs, economic systems, and values. However, the main factor that is continuous amongst the ‘elite’ is that they are a homogenous group that places their own interests and needs above those of the general population according to a populist leader or organisation.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁷ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 24.

³⁵⁸ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 6.

The idea behind populist parties is that they supposedly speak for the common good of the people and therefore they fully understand what the people need. Populism is often combined with other ideologies so that there is a solid foundation on which to base the system, and these can include but are not limited to nationalism, patriotism or even liberalism.³⁵⁹ This means that populism can be either on the left-wing or right-wing of the political sphere. In terms of this research, the left-wing group that used African nationalism alongside populism was the Black Consciousness Movement, which advocated for mental freedom, liberation, and racial reform. On the right-wing side of the political spectrum was the Afrikaner Weerstandbewiging, a movement that drew its legitimacy from earlier forms of Afrikaner nationalism and glorious historical pasts and traditions.

The strategies and tactics used by leaders and organisations that can be termed populist can be traced back to the 18th century when popular revolutions occurred around the world. In the 19th century democratic traditions evolved and spread into the twentieth century, even as late imperialism engulfed Africa. However, as time progressed the idea of democracy has been contorted and lost in some circumstances, allowing undemocratic populism to fill the void. If one were to look at the People's Party in the United States of America or the Agrarian Socialist Narodnik Movement from Russia, the link is all too clear. Between the 1920s and 1940s, there also emerged strident strains of nationalism when Nazim and Fascism were on the rise, using populist tactics to garner support for their movements. For example, Hitler spearheaded the notion of Aryan identity to preserve the German Nation that entailed flushing out undesirable elements such as Jews and wadding off foreign influences and meddling with the terms created by the Treaty of Versailles.

Because the term populism refers to protean phenomena, many so-called populist leaders have been given the label by people who observe certain traits associated with the commonly accepted ideas about populism. Those leaders who have been labelled as populist then often take the label and run with it, making it their own and using it to their advantage in order to gain support and sympathy from followers.³⁶⁰ The fact that populist leaders and groups use the general term of 'the people' creates a certain sense of cohesion and a shared identity between different groups in society and mobilises them towards a common goal or cause.³⁶¹ This tactic

³⁵⁹ Moffitt, B & S Tormey., 'Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style'. *Political Studies*, 62, 2, (2014), p. 381.

³⁶⁰ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 11.

³⁶¹ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 11.

is employed by populist leaders against the established ‘elites’ by forcing them to let decisions lie with ‘the people’ as they are seen as the sovereign holders of power in society; thus, if the elites ignore the people, they will mobilise and strike back against those in power.³⁶² An example is that this was the hope of the AWB and its leadership.

Populist leaders often classify ‘the people’ by using their socioeconomic statuses or classes and combine them with a specific cultural tradition or a popular belief in the said society. This can then be taken a step further through the argument that the ‘elite’ do not see the beliefs and values of the ‘people’ as having any meaning or value for society, thus making the people’s ideas and voice null and void. Some populist leaders use the idea that the ‘people’ are the same as using the term the ‘nation’ and this means that all people are considered to be indigenous to that particular country.³⁶³ In order to form part of the ‘people’ there is certain criteria that needs to be fulfilled such as the need to be related to the country either through birth, ethnicity, similar beliefs and values, a common history, or shared experiences. An example is in the case of Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement, where people who were oppressed by the racist apartheid policies were considered as ‘Black’ and therefore, they made up what the BCM saw as the ‘true people’.³⁶⁴ It is interesting to note that there is a common trend amongst populist leaders to represent the ‘people’ as oppressed, and thus, as leaders they seek not to change the people but rather, they aim to preserve their way of life, which includes protecting the history and tradition of the people.³⁶⁵ This can be seen when Terre’Blanche and the AWB sought to preserve the Afrikaners and their culture towards the end of apartheid.

Determining whether a person may be considered to be part of the ‘people’ or not, depends on how the populist leader perceives ‘the people’. This can be based on ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’ terms.³⁶⁶ Leaders that distinguish the people in terms of inclusionary populism are generally concerned with the idea that these ‘people’ form part of the majority group who have been marginalised in the past, such as with the ANC.³⁶⁷ Leaders who are more ‘exclusionary’ define the ‘people’ as a very focused sociocultural group and they tend to be

³⁶² Stanley, B., ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13,1, (2008), p. 102.

³⁶³ Charney, C., ‘Civil society vs. the state: Identity, institutions, and the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa’ (PhD thesis, Yale University, 2000).

³⁶⁴ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

³⁶⁵ Stanley, B., ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13,1, (2008), p. 104.

³⁶⁶ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 26.

³⁶⁷ Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019).

harsher towards majority groups which was the case of the AWB and the Afrikaner Nation or even the BCM and the oppressed African Nation.³⁶⁸ The commonality between the two though is that the both claim to be the voice of the ‘people’ against the establish system. It is worth noting that populism as a whole is very selective, and it affects the way in which populism is defined. If one were to look at populism as whole, the whole concept of who is part of the people and who is considered as ‘other’, or ‘elite’ needs to be clearly defined.³⁶⁹

There are certain factors which have led to the rise of populism in modern society and can be applied to historical movements when looking at the roots of populism. In the case of this thesis, these factors have been used to determine whether the Black Consciousness Movement and Afrikaners Weerstandsbeweging were populist movements in the context of South African history. These factors include phenomena such as modernisation, economic decline, or turmoil, racial or religious segregation and the threat of change in the political system of governance in a country, such as for example moving from an autocratic to a democratic form of government.

Modernisation has increased the gap between the government and the people, which creates a perfect base for populist leaders or movements to fill the vacuum. There is a belief that countries that have industrialised have experienced the separation of people in society and this means that the traditions and cultures of ‘the people’ were destroyed and lost. This is where populist leaders come into play because they promise to be the voice of ‘the people’ and recreate the sovereignty that was in place prior to modernisation for the marginalised and ‘oppressed’ people.³⁷⁰

Economic decline or turmoil also plays a big role in the move of the people towards the populist ideology and movements in their country. Global economic recessions have formed a large part of modern history, and this has led to a steep increase in unemployment and poverty levels in many countries. There is also inequality in terms of wealth and access to jobs.³⁷¹ Therefore, populist movements and leaders have taken the opportunity with both hands and made promises to ‘the people’ that they will provide jobs, housing and eliminate poverty, unlike the ruling government. Many people have taken strongly to the promises made by populist leaders

³⁶⁸Hawkins, K. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2019).

³⁶⁹ Gagnon, J., Beausoleil, E., et al., ‘What is populism? Who is the populist?’, *Democratic Theory*, 5, (2018), p. vi.

³⁷⁰ Mudde, C., *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 302.

³⁷¹ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 234.

because it offers the people a hope and a sense of security in terms of financial status.³⁷² People often follow populist leaders for reasons such as economic turmoil or even due to continued corruption in a country. A good example of economic decline that led to the rise of populism in recent history is the Great Recession of 2007-2009, this decline of the global economy led to the rise of the populist movements in southern Europe, such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain.³⁷³

Racial or religious segregation has defined the history of many parts of the world, specifically in Africa, South America, and in the case of this thesis, South Africa. Since the time of exploration, Europeans have seen African people as being inferior both because of their race and because of their difference in beliefs. The Europeans had made it their main goal to colonize other territories all under the belief that it was a God given right to spread the word of Christianity to the rest of the world.³⁷⁴ This has influenced the divide between the different races from the 1600s until modern times in South Africa. It has laid the grounds for the populist leaders to take advantage of the situation and call for the unity of races against the elite. For example, in South Africa, since the 1600s when the Dutch settled in the Cape of Good Hope, they had treated the Khoi and San people as inferior, and this continued when the British arrived which led to segregation, and this eventually culminated in the introduction of apartheid in 1948. During apartheid, there were racial divisions between the white people who could be classified as superior and the non-European people who were regarded as being inferior, but in the eyes of resistance movements, they became the 'pure people'.³⁷⁵

Along-side these factors that led to the rise of populism, is the belief held by many voters that the political system is uncaring and unresponsive to the needs or demands of 'the people'. This is often the case when governments introduce new policies that are unpopular amongst 'the people' but yet the state imposes the policy because they claim that is for the best for the people.³⁷⁶ Populist movements often take these opportunities to unite and mobilise the people

³⁷²Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 234.

³⁷³ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 455.

³⁷⁴ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³⁷⁵ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³⁷⁶ Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and Krastev, I., *Nationalism after communism: lessons learned*. (Hungary: Central European University Press, 2004), p. 270.

against the state by promising that they are for ‘the people’, and should they gain power, the voice of the people shall be heard and implemented.³⁷⁷

The BCM, the AWB and their populist strategies

The engagement between movements, their leaders and the people assist in providing an understanding as to how movements such as the BCM and AWB gained the support and trust of the ‘pure’ people that they claimed to be fighting for. These movements needed to focus on creating meaningful, value-driven, and collective identities as the foundation for ‘the people’ to connect with each other and with the movement in general. This collective identity is key to the goal for a united front against the so called ‘elite.’³⁷⁸

This can in essence possibly link both the BCM and the AWB to populism because both movements relied heavily on some key populist tactics, more specifically the idea of the ‘pure people’ being oppressed by the ‘elite.’ In the case of the BCM, the ‘people’ were considered to be any non-European who had been oppressed and who had suffered under the cruel and racist laws of the ‘elite’ which was the apartheid state. In terms of the AWB, the ‘pure people’ were the Afrikaners, who felt threatened by the fact that a multi-racial government would mean an end to Afrikanerdom.³⁷⁹ The strategies used by these movements targeted collective identity and a carefully articulated victim discourse that was meant to appeal to and unite “the people.”

The influence of the movements cannot just be based on the successful or failed outcomes but rather needs a new perspective to be used which looks at the intentions the movements or leaders had when they set out on their endeavours to be the voice of ‘the people’ and to protect the interests of those they claimed to be part of or representing. The strategies, whether populist or not, that were used by movements such as the BCM and AWB varied vastly from the start of the movements until their demise later on. However, one common thread that can be found is that there were remarkably similar methods used to garner support and sympathy for their movements, and these methods revolved around the creation of common identities amongst the people.

The leaders of both the BCM and AWB can generally be classified as educated and working middle class. The supporters of both these movements tended to be those who were part of the

³⁷⁷ Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and Krastev, I., *Nationalism after communism: lessons learned*. (Hungary: Central European University Press, 2004), p. 270.

³⁷⁸ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 561.

³⁷⁹ Clark, N. & William, W., *South Africa: the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. (London: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 118.

lower class or those living in poverty. Turmoil and spectres of racial siege acted as catalysts that drove people towards populist leaders who promised them a better future as compared to what the current state was not providing.³⁸⁰ The educated 'elite' status held by leaders of the BCM and AWB meant that the leaders were often seen as being distant from the people and their needs, which meant that these leaders needed to close the gap by temporarily side-lining their educated elite status and trying to present themselves as part of the 'people.' In the case of the BCM, the organisation and its leaders needed to implement community development programmes which would allow them to directly be involved with the people and to cement the idea that the leaders had the interests of the people at heart as illustrated by their being actively involved in the communities.³⁸¹

With specific reference to the BCM, many of the leaders were educated at tertiary institutions and this ordinarily created a distinct divide between them and the people. For all intents and purposes, the initial struggles that the student movements fought for at university level were initially focused on their specific needs of racial equality at universities and not as focused on the needs of the masses. On campuses where African students attended classes, the system of segregation was already in place, with white students receiving better education and better opportunities for growth as compared to African students.³⁸² This ultimately fuelled the African students desire for equality in terms of access to quality education at university level, but it was almost impossible to achieve due to the strong hold of apartheid on South Africa's education system and society at large.³⁸³ Only later, when many of these student leaders had been removed from universities, did they really start moving towards finding equality at local community levels with initiatives that promoted self-determination and self-awareness amongst the African communities.

This inequality in terms of access to equal education and equality at universities was the perfect breeding ground for the Black Consciousness Movement to begin because African students had to some extent the freedom to express their opinions on campuses where they clearly saw difference in treatment between white and Black students.³⁸⁴ African students who were part

³⁸⁰ Hopkins, D., 'Steve Biko, Black Consciousness and Black Theology,' in B. Pityana, M. Ramphela, M. Mpumlwana, & L. Wilson, eds, *Bounds of possibility: The legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness*. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991), p. 198.

³⁸¹ Müller, J. W., *What is Populism?* (New York: Penguin Books, 2017).

³⁸² Mangcu, X., *Biko: A life*. (United Kingdom: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

³⁸³ Marx, A. W., *Lessons of struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960–1990*. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1992).

³⁸⁴ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 86.

of the student politics on university campuses called for a strong and clear focus on a way to address the class identity amongst African students in South Africa.³⁸⁵ The call to focus on changing class identity was faulty because it was aimed more at the issues faced by the middle class educated Africans, instead of looking at the needs of most African people. This highlighted the difference between the needs of the minority educated African leaders and the real life needs of the majority of African people. The majority of African people wanted to have their everyday issues addressed and corrected.³⁸⁶

Baruch Hirson argues that the BCM leaders sought self-awareness and a common identity based on liberation from psychological oppression rather than addressing the actual conditions experienced by many African people who were part of the working class with limited access to education.³⁸⁷ This made the whole BC movement almost irrelevant at grassroots level initially because the BC leaders were focused on redressing the inequality they faced at universities. These leaders were only able to reach a much wider audience when they moved beyond the borders of university campuses

With reference to the AWB, its intention was to promote and uphold the interests of white Afrikaans speakers in South Africa. The ultimate aim of the AWB, as indicated in the previous chapter, was to establish an independent Boer State for white Afrikaans speaking people, which would allow for the preservation of the Afrikaner traditions and culture.³⁸⁸ Terre'Blanche and the AWB advocated that in the Boer State, Afrikaners would be protected from the liberal ideology of English-speaking, white people, and they would be able to remain culturally pure.³⁸⁹ With the imagined community that would be established as part of the Boer State, there was a set of strict regulations in place that would determine citizenship. The main criteria that needed to be met was that a person need to be white and Afrikaans speaking, this would automatically give people citizenship in the independent state.³⁹⁰ However, there were some exceptions to this in that other white people could also apply for citizenship if they were willing

³⁸⁵ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 86.

³⁸⁶ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 86.

³⁸⁷ Hadfield, L. A., *Liberation and development: Black Consciousness Community Programs in South Africa*. (United States: Michigan State University Press, 2016).

³⁸⁸ Ramutsindela, M., 'Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a Volkstaat', *Politics*, 18, 3, (1998), p. 183.

³⁸⁹ Osaghae, E., 'What democratisation does to minorities displaced from power: The Case of White Afrikaners in South Africa', *Forum for Development Studies*, 29, 2, (2002).

³⁹⁰ Gilliom, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992), p. 347.

to fully convert to become part of the Afrikaner nation, thus meaning they would have to speak fluent Afrikaans, convert to the follow the Dutch Reformed Church and be willing to fight for the preservation of the Afrikaner traditions and culture.³⁹¹ This could possibly be linked to a form of exclusionary populism where people who shared a common race, language and culture would make up the true nation of people in South Africa. In essence, while the BCM was fighting for psychological awakening and decolonisation, the AWB was fighting for cultural preservation and decanting from the broader polity.

While the BCM drew their legitimacy from discourses anchored in the people's psychology, the AWB sought to anchor its legitimacy on older organisations such as the Ossewabrandwag, which was established in the 1930s to maintain promote Afrikaner ethnic interests. By extension, this very strategic move by the AWB forged the link of the Afrikaner nation in the late twentieth century to that of the Voortrekkers and early Boer republics that collapsed at the turn of the century after the Anglo-Boer War and the formation of a Union. The AWB mobilised the shared history, culture, and traditions of the Afrikaner nation from the past as a means to an end.

The techniques and tactics used by the AWB such as adopting a uniform based on the old Boer clothing to display a united front for the Afrikaner nation or adopting the *three-sevens* with specific colours with specific meanings, were clear populist manoeuvres designed to create a common identity around which people could rally. This was because the AWB was able to convince a large number of Afrikaners that their history, culture, traditions, and beliefs would be nourished and protected by the movement. They attempted to convince the Afrikaans-speaking people that the concessions and lightening of apartheid laws that were being introduced by the NP government were against the interests of the Afrikanerdom and that if African majority rule was in place in the country, Afrikaners would no longer have any power or place in the country.

Although the AWB itself was not a political party, this did not stop them from becoming involved in the politics of the country. The AWB went as far as creating a political party known as the Volkstaat Party whose aim was to implement plans for an independent Volkstaat in South Africa.³⁹² They were given the task of convincing the Afrikaner-dominated state that an

³⁹¹ Gilliomee, H., 'Broederwis: Intra- Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', *African Studies*, 91, 364, (1992), p. 132.

³⁹² Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

independent Boer State was essential for the preservation of the Afrikanerdom.³⁹³ This political party would also be the ruling party in the Volkstaat, and they would be responsible for maintaining the racial ‘purity’ as well as the cultural identity. Again, it links to the populist idea of a ‘pure people’ standing united against the established ‘elite’ in order to sustain its traditions and beliefs.

Movements such as the BCM and AWB and the tactics they used play on the very thin line of defining them as populist movements versus popular politics. It could be argued that these movements were just dabbling in the populist strategy as a means to an end in which they ultimately wanted to establish a solid ideology such as an Afrikanerdom for the AWB or a decolonial Black society, for the BCM.

Populist strategies: connecting the BCM and AWB to their people

Connecting with the people in South Africa proved to be difficult for both the AWB and the BCM. When the BCM started, its leadership was seen as aloof and distant from ordinary Africans. This was a result of their initial locus of enunciation – the university arena – which was detached from the majority.³⁹⁴ It was only when the BCM leadership had started the community development programmes that the gap between themselves and the masses was minimised. The community development programmes had successfully made the organisation a grassroots level movement. With regards to the AWB, it had taken almost eight years for the group to gain real momentum. The lack of media coverage and the initially secretive manner in which the AWB operated had led to extraordinarily little support for the movement. Perhaps these years were crucial for setting the foundation, however the AWB only truly gained the much needed support in the 1980s when fear was struck into the hearts and minds of Afrikaners that they would lose their power and status in society due to the ascendancy of Black resistance movements and the increasing number of concessions made by the NP government.³⁹⁵ This was the turning point for the AWB support base because the AWB was able to now capitalize on this fear and spread their message that they would fight to preserve the Afrikaner nation in the face of a flailing NP government.

Marx describes the BCM as an ideational movement which was detached from many of the real problems faced by many Black South Africans in the 1960s and 1970s.³⁹⁶ He goes on to

³⁹³Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).

³⁹⁴ Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 430.

³⁹⁵ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³⁹⁶ Marx, A. W., *Lessons of struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960–1990*. (Unites Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1922).

argue that the initial BCM was more focused on changing the ideas about themselves and the lives they lived which would in the future lead to a change in the conditions in which people lived and worked under the apartheid system because they would be more self-aware and more determined to change their conditions.³⁹⁷ He states that most of the SASO members were from middle-class families, with their parents working and earning wages and that these students were granted some advantage above other African people because they had access to tertiary education, which improved their opportunities for employment.³⁹⁸ However, Jasper notes that regardless of the fact that the students were able to access better education and had more opportunities, they still suffered under the same laws that other African people in South Africa faced and their degrees were also considered to be inferior.³⁹⁹ Steve Biko stated in that the BC activists were aware of the fact that as intellectual leaders of the movement, they could become distant from the grassroots levels but he argued that that did not completely separate them from the masses and that if they were to be separated from the majority of the population of African people, it would be a disadvantage to Blacks as a whole.⁴⁰⁰ Brewer takes this a step further by examining the fact that the BCM included not only African people in their movement but also included other groups that had been oppressed by the apartheid regime, which he suggests as showing the tolerance that the BCM had because of their privileged status in terms of education which made them aware of the intense injustices that were taking place in South Africa from the 1950s.⁴⁰¹

Scholars such as Benford and Snow refer to a concept known as *frame bridging* when dealing with the BCM leaders and the masses. Frame bridging can be defined as linking ideologically congruent but structurally different frames of thought together based on a particular issue.⁴⁰² Basically, this means that a link was created between the Black Consciousness Movement's ideology and the masses of African people with the common goal of achieving freedom from the oppressive apartheid state. The BCM used strategies that were aimed at mobilising the masses by linking themselves directly to the community and stating that they were the voice of the 'pure people' against the racist apartheid state. The fact that the BCM was able to link

³⁹⁷ Marx, A. W., *Lessons of struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960–1990*. (Unites Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1922).

³⁹⁸ Marx, A. W., *Lessons of struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960–1990*. (Unites Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1922).

³⁹⁹ Jasper, J., *The art of moral protest*. (United States: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁴⁰⁰ Biko, S., *I write what I like*. (London: Bowerdean Press, 1978).

⁴⁰¹ Brewer, J. D., 'Black protest in South Africa's crisis: A comment on Legassick', *African Affairs*, 85, 339, (1986), p. 295.

⁴⁰² Benford, R., & Snow, D., 'Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment' *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 1, (2000), p. 616.

themselves to the communities because they claimed that they were part of ‘the people’ portrays the populist strategic sentiment. Brewer posits that because the BCM linked themselves to the communities, their ‘elite’ status became irrelevant, and they were seen as servants of ‘the people.’⁴⁰³

Another key area that the BCM used to their advantage was religion and something that is known as Black Theology. It can be specifically linked to Barney Pityana, a BC leader and theology student. Pityana quite often claimed that Black Theology was the study of Black Consciousness through the reinterpretation of the Bible.⁴⁰⁴ The BCM recruited a large number of supporters from established communities such as churches. This was key to the movement of the BCM from an elite group to a community-based group. It can be seen as the main entry point for the BC ideology into the community, according to Mangcu.⁴⁰⁵ The ideas of self-determination and liberation which the BC expressed were quickly spread through communities by pastors who believed in Black Theology. Many African people believed in the ideas of BC because they had faith in their pastors, however, there was also a large majority who questioned the new Black Theology.⁴⁰⁶ The main reason for this was that Christianity had been established in South Africa for many years through mission schools and it had always advocated for the separateness of races, with Europeans being seen as superior.⁴⁰⁷ European Christianity and European values had been ingrained in the minds of thousands of African people, so when Black Theology started to challenge the established system, many were not in favour of the new theology.⁴⁰⁸ The end result of this was that Black Theology failed to bring about any real change in terms of fighting against the apartheid state but it did bridge the gap between the BC leaders and the general community.

This can be compared to a similar case in the United States of America where religion was used as a way to mobilise the masses during the Civil Rights Movement. During the Civil Rights Movement, many activist leaders such as Martin Luther King Junior used religion to galvanise their movement. King was a well-known pastor and activist who fought against the

⁴⁰³ Brewer, J. D., ‘Black protest in South Africa’s crisis: A comment on Legassick’, *African Affairs*, 85, 339, (1986), p. 292.

⁴⁰⁴ Pityana, B., ‘What is Black Consciousness?’, in B. Moore, ed., *Black Theology: The South African voice*. (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1973).

⁴⁰⁵ Mangcu, X., *Biko: A life*. (United Kingdom: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

⁴⁰⁶ Magaziner, D. R., *The law and the prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968– 1977*. (United States: Ohio University Press, 2010).

⁴⁰⁷ Cone, J. H., *Black theology and Black power*. (South Africa: Heinemann Publishers, 1969).

⁴⁰⁸ Cone, J. H., *Black theology and Black power*. (South Africa: Heinemann Publishers, 1969).

segregationist policies in America.⁴⁰⁹ King was able to use religion as a binding factor for the downtrodden people who were oppressed by the racist and oppressive American system. He was able to unite people across America on the basis of religion, regardless of their race, gender, or status, so that they could form a united resistance movement to challenge the repressive laws.⁴¹⁰ It is interesting to note that Martin Luther King Junior and the Civil Rights Movement were inclusive in terms of who could form part of the resistance movement, meaning people of all races could join the resistance. The movement did dabble in some populist strategies of creating an image of the ‘pure people’ standing up against the established elite.⁴¹¹ However, the difference between the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Consciousness Movement is noticeably clear. Although both the CRM and BCM were involved in the fight for Black people’s emancipation from similar racial discrimination, the BCM was not successful in using religion to mobilise the masses because they were too focused on changing the beliefs that people had established long ago and excluding those that the BCM saw as liabilities to the true ideals of the movement, such as white people.⁴¹² On its part, the CRM worked with the beliefs that people already had and used those beliefs to the advantage of the movement, calling for a united resistance movement whose common goal was the equality for all in America, regardless of their difference in race, status, gender or religion.

The apartheid state was not oblivious to the influence that Black Theology could have and so they quickly reacted with very repressive measures. The apartheid state quickly started to target the University Christian Movement in an attempt to stop the spread of their Black Theology gospel.⁴¹³ In 1973, the Vorster government set up a parliamentary commission known as the Schibusch Commission to investigate the objectives and aims of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the University Christian Movement (UCM), the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, and the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). The Commission found NUSAS and the UCM to be illegal organisations that were planning to overthrow the government by using African people as the main leaders.⁴¹⁴ Following the commission’s findings, the Christian Institute was banned, NUSAS was decapitated, the

⁴⁰⁹ History.com Editors, 2021. *Martin Luther King Jr.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/Black-history/martin-luther-king-jr> [Accessed 28 October 2021].

⁴¹⁰History.com Editors, 2021. *Martin Luther King Jr.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/Black-history/martin-luther-king-jr> [Accessed 28 October 2021].

⁴¹¹ History.com Editors, 2021. *Martin Luther King Jr.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/Black-history/martin-luther-king-jr> [Accessed 28 October 2021].

⁴¹²Moore, B., *Black Theology: The South African voice.* (New York: Hurst & Co., 1973).

⁴¹³ Moore, B., *Black Theology: The South African voice.* (New York: Hurst & Co., 1973).

⁴¹⁴ Morgan, M., & Baert, P., ‘Acting out ideas: Performative citizenship in the Black Consciousness Movement’, *American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, 6, 3, (2017), pp. 481 - 482.

UCM was shut down and Black Theology was hindered. Challenges that the AWB faced early on included the fact that they lacked momentum and support. While they started with small acts of sabotage in the late 1970s, their taring of Van Jaarsveld was an important steppingstone as it showed some weary Afrikaner people that the AWB would do anything in its power to uphold the Afrikaner traditions and cultural heritage.⁴¹⁵ The AWB's formation of a paramilitary group, the Ystergarde, was further evidence of their resolve to act as a kind of bulwark against interracial onslaught.

By the 1990s, the AWB had resorted to tactics that were violent and ruthless, demonstrating that they were intent on preserving the status quo by any means necessary. The way that the AWB rallied people together around the ideas of a common heritage and history helped mobilise Afrikaners into acting, leading to some well-publicised incidents such as the Battle of Ventersdrop and the Kempton Park World Trade Centre debacle, discussed earlier in the thesis. On their part, the BCM did not have the luxury to use such tactics as they risked being mercilessly crushed by the state; indeed, Biko's non-violent means led to his death in 1977.

The influences of the BCM and AWB on the changing apartheid system

Following apartheid's so-called "Golden Age", from the 1970s to the 1980s, the entire apartheid system was under severe strain from internal resistance from both Black and white people as well as increasing international pressure to reform. Although not entirely quiet, the 1960s was a relatively slow period for the resistance movements in South Africa. During the 1960s, being an African person in South Africa, was like being an outsider in your own land. Following the Rivonia Trials and the banning of mainstream liberation movements, the state resorted to reacting to any attempts made by African people to resist the system with very violent and repressive measures. Civil society was so completely divided and disempowered that it proved difficult for any resistance organisation to form a united front.⁴¹⁶ However, this did not stop people from attempting to change the circumstances in which they found themselves, especially Black people in the Bantustans. There were also multiple strikes that had taken place from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, such as the strikes in Durban and on the mines in the Witwatersrand.⁴¹⁷ These strikes had been violently crushed by the apartheid police and this put an increasingly large amount of pressure on the anti-apartheid movement. People

⁴¹⁵ Kemp, A., *Victory or Violence: The story of the AWB in South Africa*. (London: Ostara Publications, 2019).


⁴¹⁶ Gilliomee, H. & Mbenga, B., *New History of South Africa*. (Cape Town: NB Publishers, 2010).

⁴¹⁷ Gilliomee, H. & Mbenga, B., *New History of South Africa*. (Cape Town: NB Publishers, 2010).

had very little motivation to continue to struggle, as they had no hope appearing in the horizon in South Africa. However, it was here that the BCM found its breeding ground and it managed to galvanize a critical mass through a unique ideational struggle before they were crushed by the apartheid state machinery.

Indeed, the BCM filled a huge void left by the banning and exile of conventional movements. The ideas from other liberation movements on the African continent and even the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power Movement in the United States were used by the BCM as a basis to create a sense of connectedness to the people.⁴¹⁸ Biko and his BCM colleagues reframed and articulated these ideas in ways that echoed across the length and breadth of the oppressed. In particular his charge about the mind of the oppressed being the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor, proved to be a powerful and timeless formulation in the domain of liberation psychology (See figure 15 below).

Figure 15: A mimetic framing of Biko's speech



Rise Up for Students, *You cant fix what isn't broken*. [Online]

Available at: <http://www.riseupforstudents.org/blog//you-cant-fix-what-isnt-broken>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

By the 1970s, when the anti-apartheid struggle was regaining its full strength to reach its peak in the 1980s, the BCM and other anti-apartheid movements were working tirelessly to dismantle the apartheid system. However, the apartheid state had remained intransigent,

⁴¹⁸ Fatton, R., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The dialectics of ideological resistance to White supremacy*. (United States: State University of New York Press, 1986).

perhaps partly owing to pressure from right-wing populist groups such as the AWB and Volksfront that had a real chance of capturing the confidence of weary whites. For that time, the apartheid state found itself sandwiched in-between two competing brands of populist political formations that posed a real threat to the stability of the system. The impact of these two forces on the apartheid state is notoriously difficult to determine; however, the heavy-handed response to the BCM shows that the apartheid state either paranoid or was fully aware of the impact the BCM could have on South African society. Crushing it was therefore the solution. On the other hand, the AWB actually partly represented what the apartheid system entailed, but the difference was methodology. However, race also certainly played a role in determining the softer treatment of the AWB.

A key aspect that differentiated the BCM and the AWB and their impacts on the apartheid system was that the former advocated for the creation of self-directed community development projects, while the latter went for the jugular and petitioned for a completely new state for an ethnic group. The community programme strategy of the BCM was obviously a correct reading of the situation and an appropriate assessment of what was possible under the circumstances. This could impact the apartheid state indirectly.

Besides community programme, the BCM also tried to organise Black workers – and initiative which the BCM hoped would bring a sense of Black empowerment in the arena of industrial relations. The Black Workers Project (BWP) was meant to be a flagship workers’ formation responsible for creating a sense of Black worker consciousness by empowering communities to develop through improved working conditions.⁴¹⁹ The BWP was aimed at organising Black workers into unions. The BWP eventually led to the establishment of the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) in 1972.⁴²⁰ BAWU was a remarkably diverse union in the sense that they represented workers across all sectors of employment. One significant event that accelerated the organisation of Black workers was the 1972 Dock Workers Strike. The ideas helped spur workers to organise themselves around the idea of recognition for Black trade unions.⁴²¹ The formation of the BAWU had wider implications in South Africa because it created a platform where Black workers could meet and discuss their experiences and plan a way forward in terms of obtaining better working conditions and wages.⁴²² Even though African unions were not

⁴¹⁹Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 434.

⁴²⁰ Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 434.

⁴²¹Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 434.

⁴²²Halisi, C., ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’, *Africa Today*, 45, 1, (1998), p. 434.

recognised by the apartheid government and had no rights or ability to strike, the unions were still allowed to operate. This is where the BCM took advantage and were successful to a certain extent in terms of disseminating the ideas of Black Consciousness among Black African workers.⁴²³ The BCM promised workers better opportunities and skills development because it was important for the development of self-determination for African people. Consequently, more African people were supportive of the BC ideology and Steve Biko as they felt that the BCM understood the challenges that the workers faced.⁴²⁴ It was only much later in 1979 that the government started to make concessions by allowing workers councils and eventually recognising trade union rights during the Weihan Commission.⁴²⁵ This was due to the continued pressure placed on them and a recognition that a regulated workforce was required. This eventually success allowed trade unions to gain strength and for them to become one of the leading agents in the political struggle for liberation in the 1980s. Obviously the internal forces were aided by external forces, which are outside the scope of this thesis.

However, it was not only the African community and external forces that were causing problems for the National Party. There was internal fragmentation within the party itself that began the process of undermining the system from within. There was an increasing split within the party over the topic of giving out more concessions to African people.⁴²⁶ This caused a group to splinter away from the National Party in 1969 to form the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) (Reconstituted National Party), a group that was fully against any concessions being made to accommodate the demands of the Blacks. Later in 1979, there was a scandal that surfaced about corruption within the National Party under John Vorster (Prime Minister 1966-1978; President 1978-1979), and he was forced to resign.⁴²⁷ He was then replaced by P.W. Botha who began to implement some reforms which were aimed at lessening the resistance in the country from the African community. This began with the removal of some 'petty' apartheid laws such as the Separate Amenities Acts, the relaxation of the Group Areas Act, and the Passbook system.⁴²⁸ Botha however was working with a plan; he was hoping to create a

⁴²³ Legassick, M., 'South Africa in crisis: What route to democracy?', *African Affairs*, 84, 337, (1985), p. 594.

⁴²⁴ Mbembé, A., 'Biko's testament of Hope,' In C. Van Wyk (Ed.), *We write what we like: Celebrating Steve Biko* (South Africa: Wits University Press, 2007), p. 141.

⁴²⁵ South African History Online, *Black Wednesday, the Banning of 19 BCM organizations*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/Black-wednesday-banning-19-Black-consciousness-movement-organisations> [Accessed 15 September 2021]

⁴²⁶ Ross, R., *Cambridge History of South Africa*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

⁴²⁷ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁴²⁸ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Black middle class that would support the NP government because they needed the NP government to maintain their newly acquired positions in society.⁴²⁹

This move by Botha and the NP government was met with much resistance from Afrikaners in the country who felt as if they were being betrayed by the government in favour of Africa people. This is where the AWB stepped in strongly and started spreading the message of preserving the Afrikaner nation from demise at the hands of the 'liberal' and corrupt National Party.⁴³⁰ The final straw for the increasingly weary Afrikaner nation was the introduction of the Tri-Cameral Parliament which gave limited power to Coloured and Indian people. The AWB and Terre'Blanche were outraged at this idea because they believed that the government was changing the status of Afrikaans white people to be equals with non-whites and they claimed that this was going against the true ideals of the Afrikanerdom that had been given the right by God to control the land of South Africa.⁴³¹ Many Afrikaners at the time found some comfort in the continuous call by the AWB for an independent Boer State because to them it meant a meaningful escape from the now compromised South Africa.

At the same time, African people were angered by the new constitution because even though it introduced limited reforms in terms of power given to Coloured and Indian people, Black Africans were again left without any power or say in the running of South Africa.⁴³² African people considered it to be an insult to them because it only enhanced the idea that they were not citizens of the country, and they never would be recognised as such if the apartheid government remained in power. This ultimately led to increased conflict in townships where the African people started to attack and destroy government building or anything that was linked to the apartheid system.⁴³³ The state responded with more repression.

Steve Biko and Eugene Terre'Blanche: Populist leaders?

Movements and organisations, whether nationalist, liberal, communist, authoritarian, or even populist, all depend on the leaders. They determine whether a movement or organisation will

⁴²⁹ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁴³⁰ Webb, V. & Kriel, M., 'Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism', *International journal of Sociology of language*, 2000, 144, (2000), p. 31.

⁴³¹ Sparks, A., *Tomorrow is Another Country: The inside story of South Africa's road to change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

⁴³² Nengwekhulu, H., 'The meaning of Black Consciousness in the struggle for liberation in South Africa', *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents*, 16, 76, (1976), p. 4.

⁴³³ Nengwekhulu, H., 'The meaning of Black Consciousness in the struggle for liberation in South Africa', *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents*, 16, 76, (1976), p. 4.

be successful or not. In terms of populism, the leaders of the movements are vital to winning support for the movement. Leaders of populist groups are the key actors that present the idea to the people that their movement stand for the ‘oppressed and pure people’ who need to be united and independent from the corrupt and established ‘elite’ systems.

To classify whether a leader or a movement is populist or not, one must be able to find key characteristics that stand out amongst those that are established populist leaders. It is interesting to note that most of the established populist leaders are very charismatic and charming people, who by nature are natural public speakers and can easily captivate the minds of people and manipulate or sway them in a certain direction.⁴³⁴ Scholars such as Mudde and Kaltwasser state that the populist leaders are essential to the mobilization of the populist movement.⁴³⁵ It is quite often the case that populist leaders attract support based on their own personal appeal and are able to claim that they have a direct and personal relationship with the ‘pure people’ or even go as far as saying that they are ‘the people’ and therefore fully understand the circumstances that ‘the people’ are facing because they are facing exactly the same issues.⁴³⁶ In a sense, populist leaders are seen as the saviour of ‘the people’ because they are making personal sacrifices for the greater good of the citizens, which means that if you are loyal to the populist leader, you are automatically loyal to ‘the people’ who are opposed to the corrupt ‘elite’.⁴³⁷

Canovan noted that many populist leaders shy away from using political jargon and rather create a rapport with the people by using tactics such as speaking in the indigenous language of ‘the people’ rather than in English or the languages of the ‘elite’.⁴³⁸ Most of the populist leaders will often present themselves as taking a more active role when dealing with issues faced by the people rather than just using words. These leaders create the image in people’s minds that they will take solid and swift action which appeals to the common-sense knowledge of the people. Quite often populist leaders portray themselves as being separate from the ‘elite’ by taking up similar roles to that of the common people.⁴³⁹ For example, in South Africa, Julius Malema and the EFF are seen in parliament wearing their red overalls and workers outfits

⁴³⁴Tormey, S., ‘Populism: Democracy’s Pharmakon?’, *Policy Studies*, 39, 3, (2018).

⁴³⁵ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 4.

⁴³⁶ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017), p. 4.

⁴³⁷ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 204.

⁴³⁸ Canovan, M., *Populism*. (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1981).

⁴³⁹ Resnick, D., ‘Populism in Africa’, in Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 597.

which makes them stand out as outsiders to the general members of parliament.⁴⁴⁰ This appeals to the young Black South Africans because they can see themselves as being represented by the EEF, who are part of ‘the people’ and not the corrupt ‘elite’. However, Mudde and Kaltwasser have noted that regardless of the efforts made by populist leaders to separate themselves from the ‘elite’, they are in actual fact part of the ‘elite’ because they are often highly educated, upper class, wealthy members of society, which in essence goes against the very definition of a populist leader.⁴⁴¹

In order for a populist movement or leader to gain support, their message needs to reach the masses. This is where the media becomes involved, it is a direct means of communicating with the masses of ‘the people’, whether it be radio, television, newspapers or in today’s world, social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram. This type of contact between the populist leader and ‘the people’ creates a sense of connectedness which is welcomed with open arms as they feel as if they have been ignored before by the governing powers.⁴⁴² It can be argued that the media has helped, if not consciously, populist leaders gain exposure and coverage by reporting the actions and doings of the populists to ‘the people’. However, with the increase in globalisation and the development of better technology, many populist leaders today completely move away from mainstream media and use social platforms to connect more directly to ‘the people’.⁴⁴³ This means that populists have a direct form of communication with a wider and younger audience, and it is not necessary for them to edit the message they send out. A good example to use here as reference is in the case of former US president Donald Trump, who had constantly used Twitter as a way to reach his base. He used the platform to send out messages that spread hate, rumours, xenophobia and many more ideas which many of the people in America would follow because they believed Trump was doing it in their best interest.⁴⁴⁴

In the case of this research, it was in the 1970s, after the death of Steve Biko, that the people raised him up to the status of a martyr for the resistance movement during the period in which

⁴⁴⁰ Resnick, D., ‘Populism in Africa’, in Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 597.

⁴⁴¹ Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser C. R., *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. (New York. Oxford University, 2017).

⁴⁴² Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 497.

⁴⁴³ Kaltwasser, C.; Taggart, P., et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017), p. 497.

⁴⁴⁴ Stewart, E., *Donald Trump Rode \$5 Billion in Free Media to the White House* [Online] Available at: <https://www.thestreet.com/politics/donald-trump-rode-5-billion-in-free-media-to-the-white-house-13896916> [Accessed 20 June 2021]

the ANC and PAC were in exile. It can be said that Steve Biko personified the concept of a populist leader because he was considered as part of the 'people' with his continued commitment to the people and their needs and his continued belief in the self-reliance of African people. Biko was the physical embodiment of the BC philosophy with his ever-growing pride of being African.⁴⁴⁵ The idea of being Black was redefined as Steve Biko and other leaders of the BCM movement tried to change the negative connotation that being Black had been associated with and tried to change it into a positive and constructive force of pride.⁴⁴⁶ The BCM gave birth to the idea that by being Black, African people could then take on the identity of strength, beauty and defiance, because the BCM portrayed these features when working with the people. It can be said that being Black was a unifying feature used by the BCM to unite the 'pure people' who had been oppressed by the 'established elite' through harsh repressive laws and through instilling an inferiority complex among Africans.

A very crucial factor that had set the BCM apart from any other resistance movement at the time was their categorisation of people in terms of their Black skin colour. The BCM defined people as being 'Black' according to two categories. Firstly, for a person to be categorised as 'Black' they needed to have been discriminated against either through laws implemented by the state or through political exclusion or by having been treated differently either socially or economically. Secondly, a person needed to identify as part of the united resistance front which acted as a unit in the struggle towards the realization of Black people's aspirations of self-identity and self-determination.⁴⁴⁷

While the BCM sought to connect through ideas and projects, in the case of the Afrikaner nation, the AWB gained much of its support because of the movement's leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche and his appeal to racial pedigree. By the 1980s to the 1990s, the AWB had modelled itself as the true voice of the Afrikaans-speaking people. However, since 1994, they had started to rapidly lose support and membership. However, as the post-apartheid state started to drop some crucial balls, the AWB re-merged and targeted the ANC government.

⁴⁴⁵ Nengwekhulu, H., 'The meaning of Black Consciousness in the struggle for liberation in South Africa', *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents*, 16, 76, (1976), p. 5.

⁴⁴⁶ Ramphela, M., 'Empowerment and symbols of hope: Black Consciousness and community development,' in B. Pityana, M. Ramphela, M. Mpumlwana, & L. Wilson, eds., *Bounds of possibility: The legacy of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness*. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991), p. 218.

⁴⁴⁷ Pityana, B., 'What is Black Consciousness?', in B. Moore, ed., *Black Theology: The South African voice*. (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1973).

The decline of the BCM and AWB as populist movements

Populist movements are quite often able to build exceptionally large support bases and can move people into action. However, as time goes on and changes occur within a movement or organisation, such as a change in leadership or a distinct set of beliefs being introduced, the momentum of these organisations will decrease and eventually collapse.

However, as argued by Albert Hirschmann, even though a movement declines and ceases to exist, the ideas and histories of such movements tend to survive and get used for fuel by movements.⁴⁴⁸ In this case, it is possible to talk about the afterlives of such movements; in other words, they become the ancestors of newer formations. Both the AWB and the BCM have had active afterlives. The ultimate dream of the AWB has been partly realised through the existence of Orania, an Afrikaner town in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa (See figure 16 and 17 below). Indeed, Afrikaner nationalism and African interest groups exist in South Africa and share some of ideals espoused by the AWB.

Figure 16: Traditional Boer republic Flags during a celebration in Orania



The South African, *Lesufi's nightmare: Population of Orania RISES by 16.5%*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/offbeat/breaking-how-many-people-live-in-orania-population-latest-news-lesufi/>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

Figure 17: Welcome board into the Orania republic:



BBC News, *Inside South Africa's whites-only town of Orania*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29475977>

[Accessed 9 December 2021].

⁴⁴⁸ Hirschmann, A., *Getting ahead collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America*. (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984).

Moreover, as noted earlier, the AWB itself does exist in a much different format. As for the BCM, Biko's ideology and inspiration are written everywhere in the DNA of contemporary student organisations and some start-up political parties such as Mngxitama's Black First Land First party, founded in 2015. Biko is also an iconic figure in postcolonial liberation memory and decolonial scholarship.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The main aim of this research was to look at the possibility of casting the AWB and BCM through a populist lens by scrutinising contemporaneous but starkly different historical formations through the conceptual prism of populism. The tactics and strategies used by both organisations link closely to the definition that Mudde uses for populism, especially in regard to the personification of populism and its public profile. In the case of the BCM, the pioneers produced a unique way of articulating the struggles and aspirations of the Black people through a discourse anchored in people's liberation psychology. In the case of the AWB, the pioneers used ethnic pedigree, traditions, beliefs, and symbolism to articulate their concerns with multiracialism.

The Black Consciousness Movement and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging were very unconventional and non-traditional movements from their conception until their demise. The BCM's aim of decolonising the mind was a unique strategy that set it apart from conventional politics of liberation. Biko and the BCM's work can be equated to the work of Fanon or Martin-Baró. The BCM did not follow the traditional resistance tactics that were used by other anti-apartheid movements such as the ANC or PAC. Their turn towards the promotion of self-help projects was an astonishing mesh of modernisation and Black liberation psychology. The BCM wanted African people to take responsibility for their own development which would help them in the long term. The BCM was not enthusiastic with the multi-racial methods that other resistance movements used because Biko believed that allowing white people into the BCM movement would make African people reliant on white people. Instead, Biko and his fellow BCM leaders were determined to set up a form of self-reliance amongst African people so that they could be completely independent. Notions of self-reliance were of course percolating through the decolonising African world: Julius Nyerere tried it with his Ujamaa policy in Tanzania in the late 1960s; the newly formed Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also made self-reliance one of the pillars of the Lagos Plan of Action, the organisation's first continental developmental blueprint.

In essence, Biko populism was not empty rhetoric; they were attempts to put into action the ideas articulated at theoretical levels. This is proven by the fact that the BCM and its leaders made the movement a grassroots level movement and specifically focused on the 'pure people' who had been oppressed and marginalised by the apartheid government. The historical experience of oppression was the main marker of Black citizenship. The BCM shunned

multiracialism and opted instead to focus on creating a consciousness of those who had been oppressed without the inclusion of white people in the movement. The 'pure people' to the BCM were the marginalised masses of South Africa who needed to be united against the established 'elite,' which was the apartheid government. Biko and the BCM's questioning of multiracialism coincided with the questioning of liberal scholarship/historiography by the radical Marxist tradition.

The populist tactics that the BCM employed by speaking directly to the community and speaking as the voice of the oppressed pure people endeared the movement to the masses. Its momentum was broken by the apartheid state when it became clear that the BCM was effectively filling the gap left by the banning of mainstream organisations, and that it could actually shake the foundations of the apartheid system.

With a vastly different goal to that of the BCM, the AWB wanted to preserve the white Afrikanerdom in South Africa using spectacle to attract attention, and ultimately through the invention of tradition: the creation of a new Boer Republic/state. Spectacle was created through regalia, emblems, acts of sabotage, and Terre'Blanche's equestrian grand entries. The AWB deployed an exclusionary brand of populism, which aimed at preserving white privilege. An astonishing fact is that this was a privileged group, which felt under siege, and used that to carve out some more privileges.

Looked at in another way, the AWB represented an evolved version of Afrikaner nationalism. In the late twentieth century, Afrikaner nationalism was put on the defensive, a far-cry from its early twentieth century incarnation when Afrikaners largely acted as victims of British imperial aggression. The AWB therefore represented a remnant of that 'victim' cohort that saw itself as now being under siege. Otherwise, the larger Afrikanerdom was in power and a prime target of resistance politics domestically and internationally. Perhaps this was the basis of the AWB's dystopian fears – that indeed there was going to be reverse suffering given many people's disgusts with the apartheid system and its treatment of Black people who were sure to dominate the political space in the event of any democratisation of politics. The apartheid state's differential response to the two populist formations, was telling: it suggests some inner sympathies with the AWB, with some obvious tactical discomfort.

As this research has also shown, Steve Biko and Eugene Terre'Blanche and their movements were chalk and cheese. So why compare the two? If not for a renewed understanding of populism as an eclectic phenomenon, then merely for understanding how two

contemporaneous organisations that organised along racial lines spectacularly articulated their different cases directed to the same enemy, so to speak. In fact, an interesting point of connection found by this research is that the BCM was leaning more towards an exclusionary form of populism on the progressive, left-wing political spectrum. On the other side, the AWB strain was decidedly exclusionary as the movement promoted old, right-wing racial politics, defined by the core imperative to protect, and preserve the Afrikaner nation. Another interesting finding is that both the AWB and BCM wanted their target groups to develop separately and independent from each other. The irony is that the BCM was fighting against the separation of races that had been implemented by the apartheid regime, but they were in essence also striving for the separate development of the Black African race. It is impossible to imagine what would have happened had these two organisations' ideas and manifesto's come to fruition. South Africa might have been completely different today, still highly segregated, with Black and white people separated into various parts of the country, developing, and growing independently from each other.

While this is counterfactual reasoning, what is factual is that populist ideologies of both formations have had some afterlives. Appeals for mental decolonisation abound. There also many newer political formations that have emerged recently, borrowing heavily from Biko and the student movements of yesteryear. The progressive student movements of the 1970s-1980s have certainly had a lasting impact on South African public politics, arguably because of the populist resonance of their brand of politics. Obviously, new populist formulations have emerged, including the EFF's big splash about "white monopoly capital" and their mantra about "economic freedom in our lifetime." They promise people employment, health care and the rights that have been elusive under the ANC government. The EFF is the third largest political party in South Africa today, following the Democratic Alliance and the African National Congress (Figure 16 and 17) which are second and first respectively.⁴⁴⁹ The EFF has built its vanguard among youths, especially those in universities – the initial constituency of the BCM. Sociologically, youths are quite amenable to populist politics.

⁴⁴⁹ ENCA, *Elections 2019: Meet SAs top five party leaders*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.enca.com/news/election-2019-meet-sas-top-five-party-leaders> [Accessed 28 September 2021].

Figure 18: The DA, ANC, and EFF. The three largest political parties in South Africa



Figure 19: Electioneering posters during the 2019 elections



Daily Worthing, *Contesting Political Parties To Sign The IEC Code Of Conduct*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.dailyworthing.com/index.php/2019/03/20/contesting-political-parties-to-sign-the-iec-code-of-conduct/> [Accessed 9 December 2021].

Polity.org, *Election 2021: 49.3% of voters expected to vote for ANC but DA, EFF to get double-digit figures – poll*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.polity.org.za/article/election-2021-493-of-voters-expected-to-vote-for-anc-but-da-eff-to-get-double-digit-figures-poll-2021-09-06> [Accessed 9 December 2021].

The afterlife of the AWB movement can be found in the town of Orania. This is not to suggest that there are direct links; more research is required on this town. This tiny town is tolerated as an aberration. The inhabitants of the town still follow the old ways of Apartheid, with 94% of the population being made up of white people and only allowing African people into the town to work.⁴⁵⁰

Other organisations have also started to develop based on the idea of the preservation of the Afrikaner Nation, similar to the AWB in the 1970s – 1990s. One such group is the Bittereinders Youth Movement, which aims to restore the lost unity and identity of Afrikaners through involving the youth of South Africa to unite against the social, racial, and economic discrimination they believe Afrikaans white people face today.⁴⁵¹ This movement has based its beliefs and actions on similar tactics to that of the AWB. It is safe to say that although populism does gain support for organisations or movements and leaders very quickly, these movements tend to be very radical and unconventional and eventually, through internal and external factors

⁴⁵⁰ Orania Beweging, *Orania Beweging*. [Online] Available at: <https://orania.co.za/> [Accessed 28 September 2021].

⁴⁵¹ Bittereinders Jeugbeweging, *Bittereinders Jeugbeweging*. [Online] Available at: <http://bittereinders.co.za/> [Accessed 28 September 2021].

these movements fail or decline, but their main ideas persist. As seen above, new organisations and movements move into the political vacuum left after the demise of the original organisations.

Although both the BCM and AWB could in essence be labelled as populist movements according to the definition used for this research, a lot more research needs to be done on each movement individually as possible populist movements to properly define whether they could be nationalist populist movements or not. Only then can a true comparison be made between the two movements as populist movements. This is an incredibly open field that can be researched and examined, not only for the BCM and AWB but for other political organisations and movements in South Africa in the past and present. The biggest challenge though is the ever-changing nature of who is populist and how groups can be labelled as populist. There needs to be a definite concept of what populism is in order to properly label groups as populist or not. Once there is proper clarification in this field, further work can be done on political parties, organisations and movements in South Africa and determine their link to the concept of populism.

There also needs to be a clear indication made between popular politics and populism because the two can often be confused. For example, the ANC has focused more on mass mobilisation rather than operating on the basis of a narrow theory, which puts the ANC more in the fold of popular politics than populist political mobilisation such as the BCM. The ANC defines itself as “a broad church,” which is the vanguard of a national democratic revolution. However, there have been paroxysms of populist ideas and policy platforms within the ANC, such as the recent Radical Economic Transformation.

To sum up, in the words of Jan-Werner Müller “Many populist victors continue to behave like victims; majorities act like mistreated minorities.”⁴⁵² On account of this, populism is a notoriously vexatious historical phenomenon with an eclectic profile as this thesis has tried to demonstrate.

⁴⁵² Müller, J. W., *What is Populism?* (New York: Penguin Books, 2017).

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