Supplementary material for the article "Citizens' preferences for taxation of internationally mobile corporations: Evidence from Tanzania"

Appendix A. Definitions and descriptive statistics

Table A 1. *Summary statistics for respondent characteristics.*

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Male	803	0.498	0.500	0	1
Head	803	0.432	0.496	0	1
Age	803	35.222	12.492	18	86
Primary education	803	0.460	0.499	0	1
Secondary education	803	0.351	0.478	0	1
Tertiary education	803	0.154	0.362	0	1
Asset: Own radio	803	0.893	0.309	0	1
Asset: Own tv	803	0.854	0.353	0	1
Asset: Motor vehicle	803	0.350	0.477	0	1
No of rooms in dwelling	802	4.045	3.356	1	53
Self-employed	802	0.439	0.497	0	1
Public sector employees	802	0.034	0.180	0	1
Agriculture sector	554	0.042	0.200	0	1
Mining sector	554	0.014	0.119	0	1
Manufacturing sector	554	0.078	0.268	0	1
Service sector	554	0.570	0.495	0	1

Table A 2*. Attributes, levels and variable names of discrete choice experiment.*

Attribute	**Explanation**	**Levels**	**Variable name**	**Variable type**
Profits	How much money the company makes after costs	10 billion TSh 11 billion TSh 12 billion TSh 13 billion TSh	Profits	Continuous
Mobility	How easily the company could move all operations out of Tanzania	Easily With difficulty	Mobile (omitted category)	Dummy
Sector	Type of business activity that the company is conducting	Manufacturing Mining, oil, gas Services Agriculture	Manufacturing (sector) Mining, oil gas (sectorl Services (sector) (omitted category)	Dummy Dummy Dummy
Local employees	Part of workforce that are Tanzanians	None Half All	Local employees (share)	Continuous
Country of origin	The country the company is from	China Great Britain India Tanzania	China (country of origin) Great Britain (country of origin) India (country of origin) (omitted category)	Dummy Dummy Dummy
Exports	Part of sales outside Tanzania	None A quarter of sales	Exports (share of sales)	Continuous

Appendix B. Additional results

Table B 1. *Fixed effects estimation using amount allocated in taxes to companies as dependent variable.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*Company tax allocation*	*Company tax allocation*	*Company tax allocation*
Profits	2.453***	2.463***	2.445***
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Mobile	2.906***	2.633	-0.434
	(0.48)	(1.61)	(1.85)
Manufacturing	4.220***	4.124***	4.220***
	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)
Mining	7.991***	7.839***	8.001***
	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.90)
Services	0.987	0.981	1.016
	(0.82)	(0.82)	(0.82)
Local employees	-15.569***	-15.517***	-15.534***
	(0.94)	(0.94)	(0.94)
China	10.423***	10.393***	10.386***
	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.93)
Great Britain	10.926***	10.933***	10.917***
	(0.91)	(0.91)	(0.91)
India	10.114***	10.134***	10.121***
	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.85)
Export share	12.556***	12.557***	12.495***
	(1.87)	(1.87)	(1.87)
Mobile*Inequality aversion		0.032	
		(0.22)	
Mobile*Risk aversion			0.932*
			(0.49)
Constant	15.862***	15.813***	15.957***
	(3.33)	(3.33)	(3.33)
R2	0.067	0.066	0.067
N	12846	12798	12846

*Note: Results from linear regression with fixed effects at the choice set level, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.*

Table B 2. *Results from mixed logit estimation of first DCE.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*Company choice*	*Company choice*	*Company choice*
Profits	1.428***	1.432***	1.440***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mobile	1.476***	1.555**	0.905
	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.16)
Manufacturing	1.541***	1.538***	1.546***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Mining	2.628***	2.607***	2.779***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.32)
Services	0.999	0.987	1.005
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Local employees	0.112***	0.109***	0.100***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
China	3.183***	3.167***	3.329***
	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Great Britain	3.749***	3.883***	3.936***
	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.43)
India	3.337***	3.389***	3.478***
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Export share	5.874***	5.794***	5.647***
	(1.36)	(1.34)	(1.31)
Mobile*Inequality aversion		0.990	
		(0.03)	
Mobile*Risk aversion			1.151***
			(0.06)
SD			
Profits	1.687***	1.653***	1.710***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Mobile	1.788***	0.569***	0.533***
	(0.29)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Manufacturing	1.604***	0.818	1.005
	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Mining	2.428***	2.352***	2.791***
	(0.61)	(0.41)	(0.48)
Services	0.732	1.558***	0.783
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Local employees	9.294***	0.104***	10.151***
	(1.20)	(0.02)	(1.39)
China	0.716	1.049	0.810
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.39)
Great Britain	0.903	1.178	0.951
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.31)
India	0.949	0.796	1.023
	(0.41)	(0.12)	(0.34)
Export share	21.347***	21.799***	21.051***
	(9.74)	(9.13)	(8.28)
Mobile*Inequality aversion		1.027	
		(0.03)	
Mobile*Risk aversion			1.118**
			(0.06)
Log Likelihood	-3406.165	-3385.875	-3380.031
N	12848	12800	12848

*Note: Odds ratios from mixed logit estimation in upper panel, and their standard deviations in the lower panel. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.*

Appendix C. Details of additional variables

Box C 1. *Details of inequality aversion index*

General structure of questions used to construct inequality aversion index:

"Imagine two people that you don't know who work equally hard at the same job. One person receives 20.000 TSh for the job, the other person gets nothing.
You can take some money from the first person and give to the second. But taking from one and giving to the other is costly, due to administration costs.
So the two people get less money in total the more equally you divide the money. If you were to choose among these two options, which one would you choose?

A. Let the first person keep 20.000 TSh and give the second person nothing. In total they get 20.000 TSh.
B. Let the first person keep [X] TSh and give the second person [X] TSh. In total they get [2X] TSh."

Each respondent faced three successive questions like this, with the value of X (and hence the efficiency loss 20.000-2X) varied across the sequence of questions as follows:



Box C 2. *Details of risk aversion index.*

General structure of questions used to construct risk aversion index:

"Please imagine the following situation. You can choose between a sure payment of [X]TSh or a gamble, where you would have an equal chance of getting amount 40000 TSh or getting nothing. What would you prefer?

A. 50% chance getting nothing and 50% chance of getting 40 000 Tsh.
B. Get [X] TSh for sure."

Each respondent faced two successive questions like this, with the value of the safe option X varied across the sequence of questions as follows: