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**Armed groups and disarmament challenges in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo's Kivu region, 2013-2018.**

By

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation which I hereby submit for the degree Master of Arts in Political Science at the University of Pretoria, is my own original work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ibrahim Ekyamba Steven'.

.....
Ibrahim Ekyamba Steven

19198915

December 2020



Acknowledgement

*“Now unto Him that is able to do exceedingly abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to his power that works in us; to Him be all the glory in the Church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, World without end, Amen, **Ephesians 3:20-21**.* I thank God who is the source of my inspiration for everything I do in life including my academic journey; without Him, this Research project could not be done. I also give a special thanks to my wife Gracia K. Mwamini and our beautiful daughters, my parents and siblings who devoted their lives praying for me day and night; may the Lord richly bless and protect them.

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Abstract

Whilst the role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs was to neutralize armed groups and restore sustainable stability in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the proliferation of armed groups witnessed between 2013 and 2018 in the Kivu region interrogate the efficacy of implemented DDR programs. The DRC faces serious setbacks in terms of socio-economic and political development due to the presence of many armed groups oscillating in the eastern parts of the country, particularly the Kivu region. This situation poses peace and security problems not for the DRC alone but for the Great Lakes region. To stabilize this region, the DRC government and its International partners employed DDR programs as mechanisms to neutralize armed groups and reinstate sustainable peace and security. However, despite these efforts, there has been a rapid increase of non-state armed groups between 2013 and 2018 and an increase in violence against civilians leading to the displacement of millions of people. This study investigates the dynamics of various factors behind the creation of armed groups, their proliferation and resistance to DDR programs. The study reveals that there have been long grievances and unresolved crises behind armed groups' resistance in the Kivu region including ethnic antagonism and resentment between autochthonous citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers; and the socio-economic deprivation, hardship of life and feeling of marginalization by the central government. This dissertation delineates better approaches to address the problem of armed groups and succeed in future DDR programs such as the establishment of a long-term reconciliation mechanism to address ethnic resentment created by war within communities in the Kivu region; and a national development plan guaranteeing socio-economic opportunities (income generating activities) to citizens in the Kivu region. This study uses a qualitative research approach to investigate the dynamics of non-state armed groups and disarmament challenges in the DRC.

Keywords: Armed groups, Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration.



List of Acronyms

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
ALiR	Rwanda Liberation Army
ANC	Congolese National Army
AU	African Union
APR	Rwandese Patriotic Army
CAR	Central African Republic
CENI	Independent National Electoral Commission
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
CNRD	National Council for Resistance and Democracy
CNPSC	National Coalition of people for the sovereignty of Congo
CONADER	National Commission for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ex-FAR	Former Armed Forces of Rwanda
FAC	Congolese Armed Forces
FAPC	Armed Forces of the Congolese People
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FAZ	Armed Forces of Zaire
FDD	Forces for Defense of Democracy
FDLR	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
FNL	National Liberation Front
FOREB	Republican Forces of Burundi



GLR	Great Lakes Region
HRC	Human Rights Commission
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IMF	International Monetary Found
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NDC-R	Nduma defense of Congo Renove
NGO's	Non-governmental Organizations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PARECO	Congolese Patriotic Resistance
PNDRR	National Program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
RCD-G	Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma
RCD - N	Congolese Rally for Democracy - National
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy – Movement for Liberation
RDF	Rwandan Defense Force
RED	Resistance for the rule of law
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UE-PNDDR	Unité d'Execution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation, et Réintégration
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



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Chapter One: Introduction

1. Identification of the research theme

This study investigates the dynamics of armed groups and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly the Kivu region. The armed group and DDR are key concepts frequently discussed throughout this study and are broadly defined in chapter two. But for the purposes of this chapter and study background, non-state armed groups and DDR are briefly defined in this section. According to Geneva Call, non-state armed groups can be defined as “any organized group with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives. These groups may include ‘rebel groups’ and governments of entities which are not widely recognized as states” (DCAF and Geneva Call, 2015:7). Similarly, the International Council on Human Rights Policy defines non-state armed groups as groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control (Hofmann, 2006).

In his discourse on DDR, Banholzer (2014:9) defines DDR as a transitory component that lubricates the conversion from conflict to stability by helping combatants to leave military structures and readjust to civilian life. This author adds that DDR enables the achievement of a sustainable peace and security process, in which parties involved directly in the conflicts, can delink from their past experiences. Tunda (2017) maintains similar view as of Banholzer when he attests that the role of DDR is to restore peace and security in a conflict or post-conflict zone through the elimination of weapons from combatants, helping them delink from armed groups’ structures and integrate them back into society or State apparatus.

Analysing the above definitions of both concepts (non-state armed group and DDR), and comparing this analysis with the rapid increase of armed groups witnessed in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018 despite the implementation of DDR programs; one will agree with the researcher that, there was a need to understand factors triggering the creation of armed groups and their proliferation posing challenges to DDR programs in the eastern DRC. In their observation on the proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region, Stearns and Vogel



(2015) argue that there were no more than 20-armed groups in the Kivu region in January 2008. Similar observations were also noted between 2009 and 2013; armed groups started proliferating gradually, especially when prominent armed groups such as Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), National Congress for the Defence of People (CNDP), the movement of March 23 (M23) and Mai Mai groups started splitting to the extent that in the mid-2013, there was a mapping of approximately 35-40 main armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region (Stearns et. al, 2013:4).

In their discourse on the proliferation of armed groups, Verweijen and Wakenge (2015:1) posit that despite the defeat of M23 rebels in November 2013, the mobilization and fragmentation of armed groups continued at a frightening pace that in 2014 most existing armed groups split and new ones emerged totalling to more than 70-armed groups by early 2015. This proliferation continued throughout 2015 and 2018, as attested by the Human Right Watch (2018) that in the mid-2017, there was the presence of more than 100 armed groups active in the Kivu region committing atrocities on civilians, which led the displacement of approximately 1.4 million people as a result of intensified fighting. Stearns and Vogel (2017:1) support the view of Human Rights Watch by confirming that by December 2017 there were more than 120 armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region alone.

The Geneva Academy in its 2018 war report on DRC, supports Stearns and Vogel's observation by affirming that about 120-armed groups were active in the Kivu region late 2017 (Geneva academy, 2019). Similarly, the *Kivu Security Tracker (2017)*, a tracker by Congo Research Group, which records and documents violent incidents by armed groups and members of the Congolese security forces, both in armed conflict and political violence, mapped 132-armed groups active in the Kivu region by December 2017. Furthermore, in its 2018 report on events in the DRC, the Human Rights Watch attests that there were approximately 140-armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region alone. This report adds that throughout 2018 violence increased leading to the internal displacement of about 4.5 million people while 130,000 fled to neighbouring countries as refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2019).



From the above discussion, it is evident to support the premise that the Kivu region has experienced the highest number of armed groups compared to previous years despite the fact that DDR programs have been implemented at least three times, DDR phase one and two, and the ongoing phase three. It is based on this reality that this study sought to understand the dynamics propelling armed groups to take up arms and resist DDR programs. It should be noted that the role of DDR programs, as stated by the World Bank (2009) is to neutralize armed groups and eliminate weapons through the collection, registration and destruction of those weapons; to help ex-combatants delink or leave military structures through the demobilization process, and to integrate ex-combatants both economically and socially back into society through the reintegration process.

Tunda maintains a similar view as of the World Bank when he argues that the implementation of DDR programs was extolled as key mechanisms that would end the problem of armed groups and insecurity in the eastern DRC to restore sustainable stability. Tunda further attests that despite these efforts, the region has remained entangled in an endemic disastrous armed conflict that has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and increased the number of displaced people (refugees) as the proliferation of armed groups continued unabated (Tunda, 2017). Deetlefs (2017:26) is of the opinion that the presence of many armed groups with various motives and objectives in the eastern DRC, pose difficulties to post-conflict reconstruction programs such as DDR to achieve their objectives. This instability caused by hundreds of armed groups and the limited success of DRR programs in the DRC raised questions that instigated the researcher to conduct this study aimed at investigating the dynamics of armed groups posing DDR challenges in the Kivu region. This also sets out the significance of this study as it contributes towards an understanding of underlying factors propelling the creation of armed groups and their resistance, challenges facing DDR programs from planning to implementation, as well as proposing adequate mechanisms to address this problem.

1. 1. Overview of the trend and Demographics of armed groups.

As argued above, this study focuses on the dynamics of armed groups and disarmament challenges in the Kivu region. As such, there is a need to understand what Kivu region entails; how did the current armed groups emerge and how much they resemble the DRC



society at large; what is their demographic nature and what contributes to their resistance. Thus, this section provides answers to these questions through an overview of the trend and demographics of armed groups and sets the stages for the analysis of their root causes. It highlights the key features and historical context of the trend of current armed groups and their links to previous ones. The term “trend of armed groups” is used to refer to the manner in which armed groups have developed, whilst “demographics of armed groups” refer to the characteristics and nature of armed groups.

The Kivu region is the name of large region surrounding Lake Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), comprising of mainly two provinces, South Kivu, and North Kivu; located on the eastern fringes of the DRC, close to the border with Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda (Murphy and Li Zhenfang, 2019:78). Deployed around the Kivu region, armed groups are the stronghold of peace and security in the eastern DRC, especially in the Kivu region (Stearns and Vogel, 2017:1). The region is currently littered by the presence of more than 130-non-state armed groups (Human Rights Watch, 2018 and 2019). As such, many are unfamiliar with their historical composition and background. Given this, this section begins by providing an overview of historical analysis on past legacies (colonial and Mobutu regime legacies), which established ethnic cleavages that have had an impact on the trend and demographics of today’s armed groups in the Kivu region (Muraya and Ahere, 2014:15).

On the past legacies in the DRC, Muraya and Ahere (2014:15) posit that the colonial administration in the DRC created an ethnic and civic legal divided system to rule the region, which resulted in local authorities manipulating the law by denying Kinyarwanda speakers (also known as Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda) certain rights, while most rights were being explicitly tied to membership of particular indigenous (autochthons) ethnic groups. These authors add that this situation sourced and incited ethnic cleavages within communities in eastern DRC. Similarly, Vlassenroot (2013:9) affirm that the process used by colonial masters (Belgians) in integrating customary chiefs into their administration put ethnicity at the centre of politics, which created a territorialisation of identity. This sharpened division within communities as identity became a driving force to the social, political, and administrative organization, which left migrant communities with limited access to customary powers, particularly the Kinyarwanda speakers. As such, these discriminatory policies were



evident and continued in the post-colonial regimes fuelling the increase of ethnic tensions between Native citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers. This resulted in autochthonous citizens to start considering Kinyarwanda speakers as foreigners and invaders. The Mobutu's regime also promoted the discriminatory patterns in 1989 by launching a campaign of identifying foreigners in the Kivu region, called Mission of identification (Alusala, 2015:106). This author adds that this campaign was marred by high tensions between autochthonous ethnic groups and Kinyarwanda speakers in 1990-1991, as most Tutsis were excluded from Citizenship and were denied opportunities accrue to citizenship.

Furthermore, Alusala argues that it was this past ethnic antagonism that ignited the eruption of the First and Second Congo wars in 1996-1997 and 1998-2004 (Alusala, 2015:107). Muraya and Ahere (2014:8) share similar view as of Alusala when they affirm that whilst ethnic tensions (discriminatory rhetoric) were still high and the growth of a separate ethnic consciousness spread in the Kivu region, a civil war in Rwanda and Burundi broke-out between 1992-1994, leading to the influx of more than a million refugees in the Kivu region. These refugees (Hutu and Tutsi) increased ethnic strife with local communities between 1994 and 1995 and established anti-Tutsi sentiments into indigenous Congolese communities leading to inter-ethnic fighting, especially between native locals and those perceived as foreigners (Murphy and Li Zhenfang, 2019:78). In a discussion on ethnic tensions, Vlassenroot (2002) maintains a similar view as of the above authors when he asserts that the tensions between ethnic groups led the Congolese Hutus to unite with indigenous communities as Bantu people to fight against Nilotic or Tutsi people. This in return, caused the Zairian government to re-adopt a restrictive citizenship law that denied the Kinyarwanda speakers citizenship and all political rights in 1995.

This law ignited the anger of Kinyarwanda speakers, as it marked an official withdrawal and denial of their citizenship, which was once conferred upon them in the nationality law of 1981 increasing a rising sense of ethnic hatred (Alusala, 2015: 109). In a discussion on sources of Congo wars, Stearns et. al. (2013:20) reflect similar views as of Alusala, Muraya, and Ahere by asserting that the rising sense of ethnic hatred ignited the First Congo (1996) war, which Kinyarwanda speakers were in frontlines, backed by Rwanda to oust Mobutu's regime as he promoted policies that marginalised the Kinyarwanda speakers. Regarding the second



Congo war (1998-2003), Stearns et. al. argue that it was characterized by the fragmentation of anti-Laurent Kabila armed groups; Kinyarwanda speakers felt marginalized again and deprived, led the most prominent armed group, Congolese rally for democracy (RCD Goma), who sought to regain citizenship and political rights (Stearns et. al, 2013:21). The local communities formed Mai Mai groups to resist armed groups and movement of the Kinyarwanda speakers whilst others aimed at protecting their families against rival groups (Stearns et. al, 2013:20).

From the above discussion, it is clear to note that the trend of armed groups in the Kivu region has been characterized by a heavy demographic pressure between local communities (indigenous) and Kinyarwanda speakers (Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups), who arrived as immigrants in the DRC. This has resulted in the formulation of armed groups and their proliferation along ethnic cleavages, with antagonistic rhetoric against each other. The implication of this has been hatred and antagonistic rhetoric between autochthonous citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers on one hand, and between Hutus and Tutsi on the other hand. In his analysis on the historical background and dynamics of conflicts in the Kivu region, Vlassenroot (2013:9), argues that there has been a climate of ethnic rivalry and communal tension around identity, territory, and power in the Kivu region, which explain some of today's dominant local cleavages and grievances.

Vlassenroot further attests that one of the key dynamics behind ethnic cleavages, impacting today's ethnic division and creation of armed groups along ethnic lines is "the direct connection between identity and territory, and between ethnic citizenship and political representation" (Vlassenroot, 2013:19,32). Given this, there has been a growing resentment around the citizenship of Kinyarwanda speakers, which has not been addressed adequately. This has resulted in most armed groups capitalizing largely on the unresolved issues of ethnic hatred and antagonism, citizenship, land disputes, and identity. This section provided a brief overview of the historical background of past legacies and the trend of current armed groups in the Kivu region. The dynamics of armed groups are discussed and elaborated broadly in Chapter three.

1. 2. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem



Research problem is a specific issue or gap in the body of knowledge that is not fully comprehended and need further research. In the case of this study, the research problem emanates from the fact that the role of DDR programs was to neutralize armed groups and restore sustainable peace and security, but the presence of more than 120-armed groups witnessed active in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018 interrogates (questions) the role of implemented DDR programs. As argued in the above sections, the Kivu region has experienced the highest number of armed groups between 2013 and 2018 compared to previous years despite the implementation of DDR programs. In 2017 and 2018 approximately 140-armed groups were witnessed active in the Kivu region alone (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This is more evident that the implemented DRR programs have provided limited success, which raises questions whether the ongoing DDR phase three will yield much-expected result. The startling increase of armed groups and the limited success of DRR programs created the need to understand the dynamics behind the creation of armed groups posing DDR challenges in the Kivu region. It is within this context that the broad question this study sought to answer is why the proliferation of armed groups remained high between 2013 and 2018, despite the implementation of DDR programs. The research will answer the following specific questions:

- (i) What factors explain the resistance of armed groups and the limited success of DDR programs in the Kivu region?
- (ii) What are the relevant approaches and viable tools to end the problem of armed groups and disarmament challenges in the Kivu region?

1.3. Research objectives

The research objective describes and summarises what a research intends to achieve through a project and provides directions to the study. The broad objective of this research is to examine why the proliferation of armed groups remained high between 2013 and 2018 despite the implementation of armed groups. The research focuses specifically on the following objectives in exploring the dynamics of armed groups and DRR programs:

- (i) To discuss the factors behind the resistance of armed groups and explain why DDR programs provided limited success in the Kivu region.



- (ii) To propose and recommend mechanisms that may lead to the neutralization of armed groups and successes in future DDR programs in the Kivu region.

The scope of this study was demarcated in such a way that, at a conceptual level, the key variables were armed groups, DDR processes, and the role of the DRC government and its international partners. As far as the time frame is concerned, this study was limited to exploring various factors that influenced the proliferation of armed groups and DDR challenges between 2013 and 2018 in the Kivu region. As the background, the study also considered various factors that explain the dynamics of armed groups in the Kivu region and the role played by some internal and external actors in peace and security problem of the Kivu region, such as the exploitation of natural resource linked to superpower rivalry and control over mining areas and trading activities.

1.4. Research Methodology

The research methodology is the specific procedures or techniques used to identify, select, process, and analyse data about a research topic. There are various methodologies in collecting data of a research topic, but this study employed a qualitative research method to answer the central questions of this research. The research adopted a descriptive case study approach to investigate the impact and the proliferation of armed groups, and the role of DDR programs in addressing this crisis. The emergence of a large number of armed groups in a short span in the Kivu region fostered the use of this approach as it provided a detailed description and analysis of underlying factors that triggered the creation of armed groups and their resistance.

In addition to the outlined framework above, this study was research-based study. It used available primary and secondary sources to analyse the dynamic of armed groups and DDR challenges in the Kivu region. This required a comprehensive literature study of the historical, geographical, and political environment of Eastern DRC, which served as tools to understanding the features and characteristics of armed groups and allowed for a nuanced understanding of how the implemented DDR programs failed to attain its objectives.



Thus, to achieve the outlined objectives, this research relied on the use of a single analytical case study, as explained by Scott and Garrison (1995: 235). This has a two-fold function of providing a thick description, as well as a comprehensive analysis (Scott and Garrison 1995: 235). This research also made use of political analysis (Scott and Garrison 1995: 188). This required conducting a comparative analysis of the history of armed groups in the eastern DRC over time and tracing their root causes.

Due to the instability, unpredictability, and uncertainty of the situation in the Kivu region, the researcher was not able to conduct field research. Therefore, this research relied on books, journal articles, newspaper articles, internet articles, policies, statements, communiqués on conceptual and theoretical facets related to armed groups, and disarmament challenges in eastern DRC. These sources provided background information and analytical evaluations of armed groups and disarmament challenges, as well as necessary recommendations to resolve the problem of armed groups in the eastern DRC.

1.5. Structure of the research (research outline)

This research comprises five (5) chapters that focus on exploring the dynamics of armed groups and DDR processes. The presence of many armed groups is considered as key factors in the rise and emergence of recent violence and instability in the Kivu region. As such, this study investigated the dynamics of armed groups and DDR programs from planning to implementation.

Chapter one introduces this study. It presents a general overview of the study by providing the background and context of the research problem. It provides research objectives, as well as a research methodology for this study. This chapter also provided clarity on the demarcation, scope, and focus for this research.

Chapter two provides the Literature review, theoretical, and conceptual framework of this research. This forms the basis of the discourse explored in this research. This chapter focuses on theories and major concepts that form part of this study. It presents theories that illustrate the underlying factors of armed groups as well as definitions of concepts used in the study. It analyses the concept of armed group and DDR by providing their historical



background in understanding the insecurity and violence in the Kivu region. This chapter also provided a review of the literature used in this study.

Chapter three comprises of a descriptive analysis of the dynamics and background of armed groups and their recent trend in the Kivu region. In providing this analysis, this chapter presents an overview of factors that have fuelled the proliferation of recent armed groups. As these are the drivers that provided the conceptual and contextual identification of the violence and instability the region is facing.

Chapter four provides a comprehensive analysis of the DDR program, its origins, objectives, actions, and strategies. This assists in providing a detailed account of how DDR was planned and implemented and why it failed to achieve its objectives in the Kivu region. This allowed for a more understanding of the efficacy of the DDR program as well as how it dealt with armed groups issues in the Kivu region.

Finally, **chapter five** serves as a summary and analysis of the key findings of the previous chapters. It provides also general conclusion and recommendations of relevant approaches to neutralize armed groups and to end circles of armed conflict and violence that have littered the Kivu region for decades. This chapter explains how these armed groups have become existential threats to the credibility, integrity, and legitimacy of the DRC government.



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Chapter Two: Literature review

2. Introduction

Chapter one provided the contextual overview and background of this research; this second chapter comprises the literature review, theoretical and conceptual framework as a further step from the contextual overview covered in chapter one. In analyzing the factors behind the creation of armed groups posing DDR challenges, this chapter uses the theoretical and conceptual framework that contextualize various aspects propelling groups to take up arms and resist disarmament. Given this, the conceptual framework provides descriptive details of key concepts used in this study while the theoretical framework analyzes and provide a clear understanding of occurrences that underpins the creation of armed groups posing DDR challenges. The literature review propounds analysis of the available literature on this topic.

2. 1. Conceptual framework.

Conceptual framework, according to Adom et.al. (2018) can be defined as the structure of key concepts, set by the researcher to discuss the state of a phenomenon to be studied. In the context of these authors, the conceptual framework is the explanation of the researcher on how the study problem would be explored. Similarly, Jabareen (2009:51) asserts that a conceptual framework evinces the relationship between concepts and their impact on the phenomenon being studied. In addition to this, Luse et.al. (2012) posits that conceptual frameworks assist the researcher to construct and identify worldviews on the phenomenon under investigation and make it easier for the researcher to easily specify and define the concepts within the problem of the study. Thus, the concepts discussed in this section provide the lens for the investigation of this research; and gives a thorough description of key concepts to be used throughout this study. To explore this research, the key concepts for this study include armed groups, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as well as additional concepts such as repatriation, resettlement, armed conflict, and ethnic conflict.

2. 1. 1. Defining the armed group.



The Armed group is one of the key concepts that is frequently discussed throughout this study. Many authors and scholars have employed various terms in defining “armed actors” but this study will use the term armed groups and non-state armed groups interchangeably. Ali (2017:14) posits that defining armed groups is difficult owing to their varieties and features. Similarly, Muller et. al (2017:6) affirms that there is no agreement of a single or general definition of non-state armed group at the academic level. Mamiya (2018:3) supports the views of Ali and Muller et. al by arguing that there is no consensus and unanimous or dominant definition of what armed group means in the literature. With this absence of a universally accepted definition of an armed group, this study probes several existing definitions; thereafter employ a definition pertaining or contextualizing the diversities of non-state armed groups in the Kivu region.

To start by Muller et. al (2017:6-7) who define non-state armed groups as groups with a basic structure, involved in armed conflict and operates outside State control, and are motivated by political goals. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) defines non-state armed groups as groups that are capable of employing “arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; and are not within the formal military structure of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organizations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate” (DCAF and Geneva call, 2015).

According to the International Council on Human Rights Policy (2000:5), non-state armed groups are “groups that are armed and use force” to accomplish their target goals and operate outside state control. The International Humanitarian Law considers a non-state armed group as “groups that parties to the conflict” (ICRC, 2008). For Actors (2013) non-state armed group is any armed organization that threatens the monopoly of State legitimacy, which may include various actors such as opposition and insurgent movements, pro-government militias, and community-based vigilante groups. Furthermore, in their discourse on non-state armed groups, Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener define non-state armed groups as:

“Distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies,



presidential guards, police, or Special Forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy regarding politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure. They may, however, be supported or influenced by state actors either secretly or openly.... Moreover, there may also be state officials or state agencies directly or indirectly involved in the activities of non-state armed actors sometimes for ideological reasons (e.g., secret support for rebels), sometimes because of personal interests (such as political career, corruption, family, or clan ties, clientelism, and profit” (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011:604).

From the above definitions, it is clear to note similar components (concepts) describing the main characteristics of non-state armed groups, such as organized groups; use of force and arms to achieve a certain goal; operating outside State control and having a political agenda. However, the most appropriate definition that caters to the prerequisites of this study is that of Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener. Their definition constitutes an array of features that armed groups in the Kivu region depict. The choice of this definition is because armed groups in the eastern DRC have diverse characters either in terms of their organizational capacity, or territorial control and objectives. This makes non-state armed groups to be labelled in different ways. For instance, in the Kivu region, some groups are prompted by deep-seated ethnic cleavages; economic and political grievances; insecurity in their villages; and others were reacting against the central government’s repression due to 2016 general election delays. It is within this context that this study considers this definition the most appropriate as far as armed groups active in the Kivu region are concerned.

Furthermore, this study used the term “proliferation of armed group” frequently and it does not have a clear or unanimous definition in the literature, but in the context of this study, the term “proliferation of armed groups” refers to the rapid increase, growth, and spread of many armed groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force. The term is not used to describe the number of combatants of each armed group; rather it is used to describe the increase of the number of armed groups, such as the split of rebel groups into many factions in the Kivu region.

2. 1. 2. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs



DDR is another concept that appears and is frequently discussed throughout this study. Given this, there is a need to understand what DDR entails in this research. The term “DDR” has drawn the attention of many authors and scholars, although it is essentially contested in the literature, there is also much of consensus in the definitions of various authors and scholars. For instance, the United Nations in its 2010 report on DDR posit that of previous authors by arguing that DDR programs are the first attempts taken to facilitate the transition period from conflict to peace reconstruction. Its objective is to contribute to the security and stability in a post-conflict environment so that recovery and development can begin (UN-DDR, 2010). Similarly, the African Development Bank Group (2011) posits that DDR programs are the preliminary attempts in establishing recovery services to placate post-conflict societies so that development can start. In this context, DDR programs are the first procedures that help ex-combatants to gain a foothold in the community to prevent them from remobilizing and returning to armed conflict in the future. According to Banholzer (2014:9), DDR enables the achievement of a sustainable peace and security process, in which parties involved directly in the conflicts, can delink from their past experiences.

In their discourse on DDR, Deetlefs (2017:3) and Braberg (2016:1) share a similar view when they affirm that the aim of DDR is to eliminate weapons from ex-combatants through the collection, registration, and destruction of those weapons. These authors add that DDR helps ex-combatants to leave military structures through the demobilization process and to integrate ex-combatants both economically and socially back into society through the reintegration process. The United Nations’ definition correlates with that of above authors by attesting that “DDR is the process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society” (United Nations DDR, 2018). Braberg (2016:1) further posits that the process of DDR seeks to support ex-combatants and former participants of conflicts “during the transition period from instability to peace development by helping them integrate socially and economically into society; and by laying the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals reintegrate; whilst building the national capacity for long term peace, security, and development”.



The consensus factor among all the above definitions is the recognition that the role of DDR is to restore peace and security in Post-conflict societies, sustain peace and security, as well as helping individuals involved in conflicts integrate into civilian life. However, most definitions excluded two components that formed part of DDR implemented in the DRC including repatriation and resettlement programs. These two components are implemented in cases where foreign armed groups are part of the armed conflict, which is the case of armed conflict in the Kivu region. This made this study defines DDR within the context in which it was implemented in the DRC. Therefore, this study defines DDR as a set of platforms, which serve as tools to reinstate peace and security in a conflict or post-conflict zone, to neutralize armed actors through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of local armed groups and the resettlement and repatriation (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. The following section focuses on the stages (phases) of DDR/RR programs, namely: disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement.

2. 1. 2. (i) Disarmament

Disarmament is considered as the first stage (phase) of DDR programs, which focuses on collecting, removing, eliminating, and managing small arms, ammunition, light, and heavy weapons carried by both combatants and civilians within a conflict or post-conflict zone (Idris 2016:3; United Nations, 2010). This includes their safe storage and the final disposition, which may entail their destruction (the African Development Bank Group, 2011:2). According to Allen (2011:11-12), disarmament is a process characterized by the physical elimination of weapons or removal of means, which ex-combatants may use to instigate violent conflict. He adds that the essence of disarmament is the eradication of weapons, to create a stable environment wherein combatants will be confident in the peace process and build a common sense of security.

Banholzer's arguments correlate with those of Idris and Allen when she argues that disarmament is normally the inceptive pace of DRR programs; it encompasses the assembly of combatants, the collection and documentation of weapons, and the "verification and certification" of disarmed combatants for eligible assessment to receive assistance and benefits. This author further adds that "whilst the short-term objective of disarmament is to improve the quality of security by reducing the number of weapons owned by individuals



and to restore trust among warring parties; its long-term process is to prevent the circulation of small arms in particular and their proliferation to other countries through the black market” (Banholzer, 2014:10). This implies that the success of the disarmament process instils trust in the entire peace process, which creates confidence to combatants and pave ways to the next stages; while its mismanagement and failure can have devastating consequences, as armed groups may lose confidence and commitment in the peace process.

2. 1. 2. (ii) Demobilization

According to Idris, demobilization is the second stage (phase) of DDR programs, which facilitate disarmed combatants or ex-combatants to disband from any form of armed groups’ structures, through a controlled, screened, registered, and encampment of these combatants in an organized center for various training (Idris, 2016:3). This may include support packages (also known as reinsertion kits) and information dissemination such as psycho-social and HIV/AIDS counselling (Abatneh, 2006:24). Similarly, Hakim (2016:6-7) asserts that during Demobilization ex-combatants are facilitated to transform from militant to non-militant status. This process usually includes giving them some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs.

The United Nations (2010) defines demobilization as a formalized and controlled disband of active combatants from non-state armed groups. This process usually begins by opening recruitment centres to encamp disarmed combatants, as to prepare them for civilian life and eventually transport them back to their hometowns or new living quarters; and for those exempted, they receive training to integrate into the national army forces in order to sustain a functioning military status (Hakimu, 2016:6-7). The aim of the demobilization process is to assist ex-combatants breakaway from the organizational structure of armed groups, dissolve armed units, and eradicate the trail of command including their ranking and status as well as removing any form of military symbols from returning combatants (Allen, 2011:12).

2. 1. 2. (iii) Reintegration

Reintegration is third phase of DDR programs and the most important because it determines whether the ex-combatants and/or returning community members will cope in the community or will relapse and return to armed life. According to the United Nations



reintegration can be defined as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Braberg, 2016:9). Similarly, Abatneh (2006:24) defines reintegration as a process of re-uniting ex-combatants into civilian life. It involves re-connecting those who were separated from their communities due to conflicts and dislocation. Abatneh adds that reintegration is always regarded as the most complicated and challenging phase of DDR programs because it involves re-uniting belligerents with their communities and readjust to civilian life.

In her view on the reintegration of combatants, Banholzer (2014:13) argues that in some communities returning combatants are welcomed back respectfully as heroes; whilst those who belonged to violent and most abusive armed units face rejection and hostile reactions from their host communities. Furthermore, the United Nations posits that reintegration is fundamentally a social and economic process that guarantees settlement of ex-combatants into civilian life and pave the way to sustainable peace and security in the societies they integrate (United Nations, 2002). Thus, the economic development in communities at the local level creates mutual certitude between ex-fighters and the societies to which they return.

Munive and Stepputat (2015) affirm that the main aim of the reintegration process is uniting ex-combatants with communities by providing them and the communities they return to, a sense of physical and economic security to ensure they do not relapse back into a devastating conflict. Thus, the sustainability of the reintegration process requires social and economic support to ex-combatants to adapt productive civilian life such as lucrative packages, jobs, and income-generating activities. This view correlates with that of Allen (2011:14) who posits that the main objective of the reintegration process is “the absorption of former fighters by the labour market so that they gain access to income-generating activities and join their communities’ social networks”. This is to ensure the development of ex-combatants and build a sense of belonging and well-being in their new civilian life. The



United Nations also supports this view when defining Reintegration as the process that gives ex-combatants a civilian stature and “gains sustainable employment and income”.

2. 1. 3. Additional concepts

This study also employs the use of several other concepts that describe the characteristics of armed groups and DDR activities in the Kivu region. These include repatriation, resettlement, armed conflict, and ethnic conflict. These concepts also contribute to the overall understanding of the dynamics of armed groups and DDR programs in the eastern DRC.

2. 1. 3. (i) Repatriation and Resettlement

Repatriation and resettlement form part of the conceptual frameworks of this study. The two concepts are employed throughout this study because the UNSC resolutions 2098 and 2147 supported two types of DDR components in the DRC: namely, DDR programs for the local armed groups and DDR/RR) programs for foreign armed groups operating on the Congolese soil (Tunda 2017). Thus, DDR for foreign armed groups included the components of repatriation and resettlement. And it is within this context that those two terms are used in this study. Therefore, this study defines repatriation as the process of returning foreign ex-combatant to their countries; and resettlement is defined as the process of moving ex-combatant where they are not wanted to their designated settlement places. For foreign combatants, this involves a resettlement scheme that facilitates sustainable settlement in their respective countries or the third country of their choice (Alusala, 2007:42).

2. 1. 3. (ii) Armed conflict and ethnic conflict

These two terms will also appear frequently throughout this study as one cannot talk of DRC conflicts without mentioning armed conflict and ethnic conflict, especially in the case of eastern DRC. The two terms are defined in the context in which they are used in this study. Thus, this study defines ethnic conflict as the social, economic, and political conflict between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda speakers over identity, citizenship, and land. It is in this context that the concept of ethnic conflict is used in this study.



As of armed conflict, this study employs the definition of International Humanitarian Law, which distinguishes two types of armed conflicts: namely, international armed conflicts, which involve more than one state forces fighting against each other; and non-international armed conflict involving government forces fighting against non-governmental armed groups or between such groups only. The wars and armed conflicts in the DRC have had both International and non-international armed conflict features. However, in this study, it is used to refer to armed conflicts that involve the State's forces against non-state armed groups and conflict between those groups (International Humanitarian Law, 2012).

2. 2. Theoretical Framework.

The objective of this section is to discuss theoretical frameworks for the appraisal of armed groups and DDR challenges in the Kivu region. Thus, before delving into this section, a basic understanding of the theoretical framework is important. According to Grant and Osanloo (2014), a theoretical framework is a “blueprint” that guides the investigation of research. It provides the structures that contextualize the objectives of the study. These authors add that theoretical frameworks reveal the clear structure and vision of the study, much like a house that cannot be constructed without a “blueprint” or a plan. Similarly, Adom et. al. (2018) posit that theoretical framework is the foundation upon which the study is constructed; and comprises of selected theory (theories) that undergird the relevance of the study and explain the research problem. Given these definitions, this study uses theoretical frameworks that analyse and provide a clear understanding of occurrences that underpin armed groups and DDR challenges in the DRC, including Human needs theory of conflict and Economic theory of conflict.

The choice of these two theories emanates from the fact that the population in the Kivu region has different perspectives and expectations of life, which denotes how they respond to its challenges. Thus, these differences have been leading to instability; in which armed conflicts have been occurring in a climate of more parties (individuals or groups) having or think have incompatible objectives. As argued by Azam and Rehman (2018) that the emergence of conflict in most cases evolves around competing interests of States and social groups. Azam and Rehman's views reflect the context in which armed conflicts has been escalating in the eastern DRC. Given this, the theories guiding this study have



comprehensive assumptions that help understand and illustrate various aspects that propel groups to take up arms and resist DDR programs in the Kivu region.

2. 2. 1. Human needs theory

The basic understanding of Human Needs Theory in conflict according to Burton (1990) is a state of felt deprivation, which must be satisfied. It is something needed by a human being (non-negotiable) to lead a healthy and secure life. This implies that the fundamental roots of conflicts are the result of unmet basic human needs; and that the resolution to such conflicts lies in the satisfaction of the basic needs of all parties involved (Yamanaka, 2019). The analysis of human needs theory and the contributions of theorists in this school of thought, explain the problem of armed groups and DDR challenges in the Kivu region. As argued in section 3.4 of this study (Chapter 3) that although the underlying causes of armed groups and their resistance are multifaceted, they are largely embedded in the question of long grievances around unmet basic needs within communities in the Kivu region.

Christie (1997) posits that unmet human basic needs always lead to conflict evolution. This is the case in the Kivu region, where unmet human basic needs have led to the limited success (failure) of various peace agreements and the implementation of DDR programs to end violence, conflict, and neutralization of non-state armed groups. There are ample shreds of evidence to show that armed groups are capitalizing on unresolved grievances around lack of livelihood (Nantulya, 2017). For decades now, hundreds of both local and foreign armed groups have been oscillating in this region despite various peace agreements and DRR programs. Similarly, Yamanaka (2019) posits that human behaviour can be motivated by a set of basic needs. In addition to human basic needs, Azam and Rahman (2018) add that it is inevitable for a revolt to occur when a social group is obstructed, denied, and deprived access to human basic needs. These authors conclude by asserting that deprivation is the most direct cause of emerging conflicts.

Endorsing the above definitions, the instability in the eastern DRC, is mainly linked to lack of basic needs within communities including security, identity, livelihood, and self-determination. In a discourse on lack of security, Verweijen & Wakenge (2015:3) posit that most community based armed groups resist DDR programs claiming that the government



has failed to reinstate security in their villages. Thus, to voice against unaddressed grievances of insecurity, communities support armed groups that defend their communities against rival groups. Similarly, Hakim (2016:56) argues that the government's failure to address security problems in the villages as to secure a safe environment for affected populations led communities to rely on local militia groups including "ethnic, religious and community-based Mai Mai groups". In the case of identity, Muraya and Ahere (2014:15) attest that the instability in the Kivu region is embedded in the question of ethnic identity, especially the nationality status of Kinyarwanda speakers who remain opposed and regarded as foreigners by most native citizens. This situation has created ethnic tensions and resentment between these groups; as such, armed conflict and violence have been the way both groups depict grievances against each other.

For instance, the Banyamulenge in the South Kivu and Banyarwanda in the North Kivu (all Rwanda descent), have launched several insurgencies claiming that their security and identity are being threatened by natives and their local authorities. This view reflects Alusala's discourse on causes of conflict in the DRC when he contends that "...ethnic discrimination resulting in a denial of political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other resource allocation... are causative factors to the conflict" (Alusala, 2015:52). This is more evident to support the premise that the protracted presence of armed groups and their resistance in the eastern DRC is embedded in the questions of unmet basic human needs such as security, Identity, and livelihood. As such, the interpretation and perspectives of human needs theory matches and explains why there is a protracted presence of non-state armed groups resisting the DDR program in the eastern DRC.

2. 2. 2. The economic theory of conflict

The concept of conflict theory is very broad and there are various conflict theories. But for the purposes of this study, the focus is on the economic theory of conflict, which explains the nature of conflicts that occur and increase because stakeholders (actors) are gaining and making profits out of the conflicts (Charles and Osah, 2018). Charles and Osah add that conflicts in which actors are making economic profits (interests) appear to be lasting longer. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2000), civil war increases when combatants have an opportunity to make a financial gain or have an opportunity to generate profits through the



extraction of natural resources such as Diamonds, gold, and timber. This is clear that the interpretation and perspectives of theorists in the economic theory of conflict better inform the analysis of why peace and security efforts have failed in the DRC. This is because actors in the war (armed conflicts) in the eastern DRC have an economic gain (interests) in the ongoing conflicts. In a discussion on sources of wars, Alusala (2015:55) posits that “many wars in Africa are linked to the exploitation of natural resources”.

Thus, analyzing the resistance of armed groups in the Kivu region from Collier and Hoeffler’s contributions, and comparing this analysis to various peace efforts by the DRC government and its international partners, a basic understanding is that armed groups are not willing to disarm because they are making gain and profits out of armed conflict and in holding arms. The perspectives of the economic theory of conflict explain the protracted presence of armed groups in the Kivu region, where both local and foreign armed groups have control over mining areas making illicit profits (Stearns et. al, 2013:8). As a result, they resist any form of DDR programs fearing to lose economic interests gained out of holding arms (conflicts).

In a general overview on conflict theory, Chappelow (2019) posits that a basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within society will use force to maximize their benefits. He further adds that Conflict theory focuses on the competition between groups within society over limited resources. This explains the ongoing ethnic tensions fostering armed conflict within local Mai Mai groups, and between foreign armed group over control of mining areas (Burnley, 2011). Bushoff (2010) asserts that joining or membership in an armed group has become a business opportunity in the Kivu region. This is more evidence that the resistance of armed groups is capitalizing on the economic gain, in which combatants make profits out of the armed conflict in their areas of influence in the Kivu region.

At the same time, there is also evidences that DRC neighbours are directly supporting rebel groups to gain from illicit smuggling of DRC natural resources, which cause protracted violence and the presence of rebel groups in the Kivu region (Muraya and Ahere, 2014:22). From the above discussion, a basic understanding is that competition between armed groups over control of mining areas, as well as infighting within community-based militia



groups over limited resources, explain the problem of protracted conflict and the presence of armed groups in the Kivu region. The study concludes by attesting that the pursuit of economic gain and illicit interests out of conflicts has been one of the factors underlying the protracted violence and resistance of armed groups in the Kivu region.

2. 3. Literature Review

The literature review deals with the consultation of existing scholarly knowledge presented by other scholars and writers on a topic to be researched. This section examines the literature on armed groups and DDR programs in the eastern DRC. The escalation of armed groups and the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC have increased substantial literature and the need for more research reflecting the length, complexity, and immensity of instability in this region. The most recent scholarly works on the instability in the eastern DRC is twofold: Firstly, on armed groups and their proliferation; and secondly, on the implementation of DDR programs. Given this, the aim of this section is to explore and provide an analytical overview of existing studies accounting for the divergences of armed groups and DRR programs. To complement this analysis there are series of scholarly works and reports on this topic including works of Jason Stearns, Koen Vlassenroot, Severine Autesserre, Judith Verweijen, United Nations Group of Experts reports, Kivu security tracker reports, Human Rights Watch reports, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and many more as referenced throughout this study. Therefore, the section begins by discussing the most important issues stemming from this later body of literature. This includes studies on the trend of current armed groups, their proliferation, and DDR programs.

2. 3. 1. The trend of current armed groups

Scholars, who have written on the trend of current non-state armed groups in the eastern DRC, have argued that the most fascinating part of armed groups in the Kivu region has been their proliferation and subsequent fragmentation (Stearns and Vogel, 2015:7). Others have argued on the increase of violence and cycles of armed conflict attributed to the presence of these armed groups currently active in the Kivu region (Human Rights Watch, 2018). For instance, Stearns and Vogel focus on the trend of armed groups and the aftermath of the M23 rebel group (Stearns and Vogel, 2015:5). In this paper Stearns and



Vogel argue that despite the defeat of M23 in November 2013, which was celebrated as a historical victory that would end violence and the presence of armed groups in the Kivu region; this resulted into a disappointment as armed groups proliferated at a startling pace, reaching approximately 70- armed groups towards the end of 2014 and early 2015. This proliferation triggered fresh cycles of armed conflicts and violence leading to an estimate of 1.6 million people internally displaced in the Kivu region alone. Stearns and Vogel (2015:7) further add that the trend of current armed groups has been characterized by their fragmentation; where most prominent armed groups splintered into disparate factions, scattered across considerable areas of Walikale, Lubero, Rutshuru, Masisi (North Kivu), Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi (South Kivu) territories. Similarly, Verweijen and Wakenge's arguments correlate with that of Stearns & Vogel when they posit that the mobilization of armed groups continued at a frightening pace despite the demise of M23. They assert that in 2014 "the landscape of armed groups went through further fragmentation, as existing armed groups split and new ones emerged", totalling to more than 70-armed groups active in the Kivu region alone by early 2015 (Verweijen and Wakenge, 2015:1).

In a report on the current armed conflict and violence in the Kivu region, the United Nations Refugee Agency affirms that as the number of armed groups grew in the eastern DRC, attacks also increased against security forces, FARDC and MONUSCO personnel, and civilians (UNHCR, 2014). This report adds that armed groups took advantage of the lack of state authority and instability to perpetrate mass atrocities in the eastern DRC. This is despite military offensives conducted by the government's armed forces (FARDC) with the assistance of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) through its Force Intervention Brigade. The Human Rights Watch (2018) contends that throughout 2017 armed groups continued violence, which led to the displacement of 4.5 million populations internally and approximately 630,000 fled to neighboring countries as refugees. This report attests that in mid-2017, there was the presence of more than 100 armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region and intensified armed conflict and violence to civilians.

On the landscape of armed groups in the eastern Congo, Stearns, and Vogel (2017:1) attest that there was the presence of more than 120 armed groups that remained active in December 2017, including the Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda



(FDLR) and allied Congolese Nyatura groups, the Ugandan-led Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové (NDC-R), the Mazembe, Yakutumba Mai Mai groups, and several Burundian armed groups, just to mention a few (the list of current armed groups is in section 3.4 of this study, Chapter three). These authors add that many commanders of these armed groups have been implicated in war crimes, including ethnic massacres, rape, forced recruitment of children, and pillage. These atrocities by armed groups and government forces are reported by the Kivu Security Tracker in its 2018 and 2019 reports on events in the Kivu region, which estimated that armed actors killed more than 883 civilians and kidnapped approximately 1400 for ransom in the Kivu region in 2018; although this study found that several reports and figures on atrocities committed in the eastern DRC have always been underestimated as low as compared to the actual ground substantiality.

Furthermore, in its report on events in the DRC, the Human Rights Watch (2019) maintains similar views as of the above authors by asserting that there were more than 140 armed groups active in the Kivu region and carried attacks on civilians. This report asserts that between December 2017 and March 2018, violence remained intense as armed groups continued launching deadly attacks on villages, killing scores of civilians, raping or mutilating many others, torching hundreds of homes, and displacing many from their homes (Human Right Watch, 2019). Similarly, the United Nations Refugee Agency posits that since the establishment of the Kivu Security Tracker, approximately 1,897 conflict-related civilian deaths have been recorded between June 2017 and June 2019 (UNHCR, 2019). Adding that during 2018, there were between 120 and 140 armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region, many of which had committed numerous human rights abuses and posed a serious threat to civilians. The list of these armed groups is in appendix one of this study.

On the basis of current armed groups' challenges, the United Nations Group of Experts' report also noted that the presence of armed groups posed threats to peace and security processes in the eastern DRC including attacks on peacekeepers and government forces across the country (UN Group of Experts' report S/2018/531). This view reflects in its report of 2017, in which the group provided a critical assessment during the course of 2017 as armed groups continued committing atrocities at a startling pace, where two of its experts



were assassinated in March 2017, Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan in Kasai; as well as the deadliest attack against peacekeepers in December 2017, which claimed the lives of 15 peacekeepers and wounded 43 as one went missing (UN Group of Experts' report S/2017/672/Rev.1). The United Nations Group of Experts investigated this attack and found that the orchestrators were a coalition of currently formed armed networks including the ADF and Mai Mai factions (UN Group of Experts' report S/2018/531).

Talking of the traits of current armed groups, the United Nations Group of Experts affirm that, there is a shift in the mobilization structure of armed groups that the current armed groups operate in more centralized networks and there is an interconnectedness between local and foreign armed groups, which has also influenced patterns of violence. The Group added that foreign armed groups have begun wearing masks of Congolese nationals in their various ranking and operations including collaboration with National army (FARDC) officers on several occasions. Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz's views correlate with that of the United Nations Group of Experts when they talk of the traits of armed groups in the Kivu region. They argue that the complexity of armed groups and violence in the Kivu region is characterized by the diversities of local and foreign armed groups of various shapes and sizes. These authors add that these groups vary in structure, some are politically structured with large-scale military movements and others are small-scale rebel groups, local defense groups, and village militias groups without political wings, but with significant military capabilities and political influence that threaten the national government. There are also factions that amount to as little as bandit groups in the rural areas and are troubling civilians than the central government in Kinshasa (Stearns et. al, 2013:13).

2. 3. 2. DDR programs and the proliferation of armed groups

This section analyses the literature that focuses on the implementation of DDR programs and the proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region. Thus, this section analyses the literature that provides nuanced knowledge on the overall DDR/RR programs in the eastern DRC. Many authors and scholars who have written on the DDR/RR programs in the DRC have focused mainly on its origin (background) and the implemented DDR phase one, two, and the ongoing phase three. For instance, the World Bank (2009:1) provides a historical context of the DDR/RR programs in the DRC by stating that the peace process that brought



the establishment of DDR/RR programs emanated from the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The directives of this Accord focused on the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups involved in the second Congo war and the disarmament of Rwandan rebel groups with rear bases in the DRC such as ex-FAR, Interahamwe and FDLR combatants (World Bank, 2009:1). This disarmament process was undertaken by the United Nations Organization Mission (MONUC, today's MONUSCO) in the DRC. The World Bank further posits that despite these peace frameworks and the presence of UN peacekeeping troops, armed conflict continued unabated until the Global and Inclusive Agreement was signed by all parties to the conflict in 2003. It was through this Global and Inclusive Agreement that the initial framework for DDR programs emerged in the DRC. In her discourse on DDR/RR programs in the DRC, Renske Van Veen maintains a similar view as of the World Bank when she talks about the background and objectives of DDR/RR programs in the DRC. In her view, the main aims of the Pretoria Accord and all-comprehensive Peace Agreements were to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate many combatants into civil life as well as incorporate others into the national army (Veen, 2009:45).

Veen adds that the experience of previous unsuccessful DDR programs in Great Lakes region (specifically in Angola and Rwanda), and the spread of weapons in the hands of armed actors, as well as the continued cycles of armed conflicts that engulfed the entire region between 2001 and 2002, propelled the United Nations to establish and launch a regional DDR program that would stabilize the Great Lake region as a whole (Veen, 2009:46). Given this, DDR program was enacted in 2002 with twofold: firstly, was the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (MDRP) aimed at demobilizing and reintegrating all ex-combatants in Great Lakes region including Burundi, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Angola, Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. And secondly was to support national or individual governments in the Great Lakes region to establish their national DDR programs. Veen concludes by affirming that it was within this context that MDRP had to support DRC's National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs, PN-DDR (Veen, 2009:46-47; Actors, 2013).

According to Boshoff (2010), the PN-DDR had three main objectives such as the reduction of spread illegal weapons country-wide; the reintegration of ex-combatants and their



dependents into the community; and the re-creation of a united national army comprising of former Congolese army and ex-combatants through a professionalized and modernized framework. The Mission of United Nations in Congo (MONUC) supported both the MDRP and PN-DDR programs; and it was in conjunction with this that the United Nations thought of incorporated two more elements on DDR, the repatriation and resettlement of foreign armed groups to make it DDR/RR. Furthermore, although the resolution 1341 of the United Nations Security Council on 22 February 2001 had alluded about DDR programs for the DRC, it was only in 2004 that the United Nations Security Council under the resolution 1565 strengthened the implementation of DDR/RR programs under the supervision of MONUC (Veen, 2009: 46-47).

Braberg (2016:22-25) gives an account of various phases of DDR programs implemented in the DRC. She indicates that the First phase of DDR started in 2004 to 2006 and the Second phase of DDR started from 2008 to 2011. She adds that DDR phase one and two had various objectives including the DDR of local combatants, the withdrawal of foreign combatants from the DRC, and to address the issues of child soldiers and their DDR. This author concludes by arguing that DDR phase one and two failed due to continued instability in the country, lack of political will and military presence, enmity among ethnic groups, embezzlement of DDR funds, and lack of credible coordination. This failure is proved by the fact that none of the set goals was attained at the end of these programs. Given this, there was an initiation of the third phase of the DDR program, which was supposed to be implemented in 2013 but due to some constraints had to be concluded in 2014 and was officially launched in 2015 with almost same objectives as previous programs (DDR phase one and two). This included DDR of local combatants and DDRRR for foreign combatants, hoping this could consolidate peace and security through neutralization of armed groups in the Kivu region (Braberg, 2016:25).

Tunda's arguments correlate with those of Braberg, when he argues that DDR programs were established to consolidate peace and security by neutralizing armed groups active in the eastern DRC through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of local armed groups and the repatriation and resettlement of foreign armed groups. He also affirms that lack of political will, poor management, misappropriation of DDR funds, miss-presentation



of DDR policies, and the integration of belligerents into the Congolese national army (FARDC), led the failure of DDR programs (Tunda, 2017). Similarly, Allen (2011:47-50) affirms that although major armed groups agreed to disarm during DDR I and DDR II, other groups resisted claiming that there was no security in their villages, especially rebel groups of the Kinyarwanda speakers, fearing that the manner in which DDR was planned and implemented failed to provide or guarantee security to disarmed combatants. Thus, many remained reluctant to DDR processes, as DDR I and DDR II lacked viable tools to keep ex-combatants from remobilizing or re-joining armed groups.

Hakimu (2016:46) stresses that the protracted presence of non-state armed groups and the perpetuated violence in the eastern DRC is an indication of how DDR/RR programs have failed to achieve its objectives and show the weakness of the DRC government in assuring the security of its citizens. This author adds that the presence of the large number of armed groups in the eastern DRC has exacerbated instability, which confuses both civilians and ex-combatants thereby forcing many young people to join armed groups and ex-combatants to remobilize and return into their former activities. This situation poses more difficulties for DDR programs to achieve set goals in the Kivu region. Tunda (2017) maintains similar views as of Hakimu, when he talks about the various efforts employed by the DRC government and its international partners in attempting to neutralize armed groups, particularly through DDR/RR programs. He affirms that despite the implemented phases of the DDR program, the proliferation of armed groups continued and ignited more instability and violence leading to new fragmentation of armed groups. This author further adds that the resolution 2098 and 2147 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) supported the development of a comprehensive DDR/RR, which failed to meet the much-awaited expectation as ex-combatants in cantonment centers deserted to form and join new-armed groups.

The United Nations Group of Experts' report (S/2017/672/Rev.1) also indicates how DDRRR programs have provided limited success in the eastern DRC. The report demonstrates that the reintegration of ex-combatants has remained the most difficult part of the DDRRR program in the DRC. In their survey, the group confirmed that both ex-combatants in the National army and those in cantonment centers deserted; some formed new armed groups, and others joined existing armed groups. The interview conducted by the United Nations



Group of Experts to ex-leaders of rebel groups confirmed this desertion, in which these ex-rebel leaders highlighted reasons behind this desertion including the fear of perpetuated insecurity, lack of livelihood, and low salaries for those in the National army. After this interview with Mateke W. Mayele and Diego Maradona (Leaders of rebel groups) who both confirmed that their former ex-combatants re-joined other armed groups after returning from DDR programs, the UN group of experts suggested that there was a need to reform DDR/RR policies, as failure to do so could culminate in the mobilization of ex-combatants (UN Groups of Experts S/2017/672).

According to Verweijen & Wakenge (2015:1-2), there are various factors to the failure of DDRRR programs including the adoption of lousy policies. In their opinion, several approaches by the DRC government and its international partners to address the problem of armed groups provided limited success and became the source of more proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region. This included the conducted military operations, which emerged as the main strategy of armed group stabilization. Furthermore, their analysis attests that there are many factors attached to the problem of armed groups and the failure of DDR programs in the Kivu region such as the growing involvement of lower-level political actors in armed mobilization, the continued volatility of local conflict dynamics, and inefficacious military policies. These authors conclude by affirming that the linkages between inter-elite competition on the one hand, and conflicts between and within communities, on the other hand, stimulate the mobilization of armed groups within communities and along ethnic lines.

Nantulya (2017) focuses on the factors behind the recent proliferation of armed groups by affirming that the government's repression to citizens and the population's frustration with delays of 2016 general election are among factors that triggered new waves of armed groups' proliferation and resistance in the Kivu region between 2016 and 2018. The implication of Joseph Kabila's refusal to step down at the end of his final term in December 2016 fueled a disastrous political crisis that ignited more mobilization of armed groups, which revived even dormant militia groups. This led to further protests across many cities, especially in the Kivu region where people harbored long-running grievances against the central government. Some militia groups in this region conducted several insurgencies to



worsen their grievances, calling upon President Kabila to step down. Furthermore, this author concludes by adding that the central government's endemic corruption, weak and non-existent State institutions created a lack of trust between citizens and the government in the Kivu region creating a security vacuum that armed groups capitalized on as they escalated throughout the region in 2017.

Stearns and Vogel (2017:1) share similar arguments as those of Nantulya when they argue that the political instability posed by the uncertainty around President Kabila's succession ignited conflict dynamics, influencing the "rhetoric of some groups and quickening coalition formation among others" such as in Fizi and Beni territories. They further add that the expansion of armed groups has been heightening by a weak national army, in which the DRC government failed to provide reasonable and regular wages to its army thereby causing government armed forces to involve into criminal activities and hold ties with non-state armed groups. In a discussion on the factors triggering the proliferation of armed groups in the eastern DRC, Stearns et. al (2013:25) posit that power-sharing and representation in central government before and after election results are among factors igniting the proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups in the Kivu region. In their analysis, the processes of general elections have been the root cause of several fragmentations. For instance, the 2006 general election ended the transitional government but did not stop the violence as politicians who failed election and could not get the position they hoped for, supported non-state armed actors, which resulted in the formation of new armed groups.

The same situation intensified in the 2011 general election, as politicians kept ties with non-state armed actors to get electoral support and when they lose the election, to retain power. These authors indicated other factors behind the fragmentation of armed groups including grievances of local conflicts over local authorities and land ownership; as well as the problem of integrating belligerents with ranks into the National army. This fueled more mobilization of non-state armed groups within communities (Stearns et. al, 2013:30). Tunda's arguments correlate with those of Stearns et.al when he attests that "political insecurity, land disputes and ethnic conflicts" are among factors posing peace and security problems in the eastern DRC (Tunda, 2017). He adds that it is difficult for non-state armed groups to comply with



DDRRR programs as there is no security in their villages. Factors that triggered the proliferation of armed groups is discussed in chapter three of this study.

From the literature consulted, it is evident that there is a rich scholarly work on the armed groups and DDR/RR programs in the eastern DRC. The outcomes of the above-consulted literature indicate that there are consensus, similarities, and differences at some points in the arguments and views of authors and scholars depending on what the author or researcher sets out to achieve. Regarding the literature on armed groups, this study found out that a lot of studies focused on their trend and characteristics, and the atrocities they perpetrated but little attention was paid on the underlying factors of armed groups and their resistance. Thus, the existing debates provided a limited discussion on the factors triggering the creation of armed groups, their proliferation, and DDR challenges in the DRC, especially in the Kivu region. Many authors and scholars did not provide an in-depth discussion on the unresolved crises that ignited the creation of current armed groups posing DDR/RR challenges in the DRC, especially between 2013 and 2018. This study covers this gap by providing a comprehensive discussion on the dynamics of armed groups and the factors that have triggered their proliferation posing DDR/RR challenges in the Kivu region. The dynamics of armed groups and DDR/RR challenges are discussed in chapters three and four of this study.

2. 4. Conclusion

This chapter comprised of the Literature review, theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The conceptual framework discussed in this chapter provided conceptual clarity on key concepts that are used in the remaining chapters. It has provided clear definitional guidelines for the use of the concepts of non-state armed groups, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, resettlement, armed conflict, and ethnic conflict. The analyses of these conceptual frameworks allowed a nuanced understanding of the current situation in the eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivu region. This chapter also discussed theoretical frameworks that contextualized various aspects propelling armed groups and their resistance in the Kivu region including Human needs theory and Economic theory of conflict.



The insights in this chapter also provided a contextual background on the trend and characteristics of armed groups and DDR programs in the Kivu region. Therefore, the concepts defined in this chapter provided the operational guidelines to understanding the dynamics of non-state armed groups, threats, and insecurities thereof, as well as the processes of DDRRR programs from planning to implementation in the Kivu region. Whilst this chapter (two) focused on Literature review, theoretical, and conceptual frameworks, chapter three (3) focuses on the background and dynamics of armed groups in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018.



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Chapter Three.

Background and dynamics of armed groups in the Kivu region.

3. Introduction.

Chapters One and Two provided the rationale, methodology, Literature review, theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study, which catered the context and parameters guiding the remainder of this study. As such, this chapter provides an analysis of the background, trend, and dynamics of armed groups; and it explores the historical underpinnings that have underscored current armed groups in the Kivu region. It is through this historical background that one will have a thorough understanding of the dynamics of armed groups, and the underlying factors that have triggered their creation and proliferation posing DDR/RR challenges in the Kivu region. This Chapter provides, therefore, a comprehensive and descriptive assessment of armed groups in the Kivu region.

3. 1. Background of current armed groups in the Kivu Region.

For more than two decades, the Kivu region has been described as “the epicentre of non-state armed groups and protracted violence” by many authors and scholars due to many armed groups oscillating over large territories (Mangwanda, 2017:1; Allen, 2011:33). As stated in chapter two that the region is currently littered by the presence of more than 120 armed groups of various shapes and sizes (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). The United Nations Refugee Agency’s report also confirms that in 2018, there were between 120 and 140 armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region committing serious atrocities (UNHCR, 2019). Similarly, the United Nations report S/2019/783 affirms that the security situation in the eastern DRC remained fragile due to many armed groups that continue committing atrocities against civilians and government forces. These cyclic armed conflicts and the increase of local and foreign armed groups in the Kivu region fostered the need to understand their origin as discussed below.

In a discussion on the background of current armed groups in the eastern DRC, Prince (2013:11) posits that most armed groups that were formed during the first and second Congo wars did not disarm; many found sponsors and continued expanding their influence in the

eastern DRC. This is evident that the current armed groups in the Kivu region have underlying historical factors that can be traced back during previous war outbreaks. Thus, this study paints a historical trend of occurrences that fostered the continuity of armed groups and the creation of new ones posing DDRRR challenges. To understand this historical background, the following section examines the impact of the First and Second Congo wars (1996-1998), the Directives of Transitional Government (2003-2006), and elections proceedings and its outcomes, especially the first two elections (2006 and 2011).

3. 1. 1. First and Second Congo Wars.

The eruption of the first Congo war in 1996 through AFDL rebellion and of the second Congo war through RCD-Goma in 1998, sparked violence that triggered the creation of localized-defense armed groups that explain the resistance of today's armed groups and cycles of armed conflicts in the Kivu region (Garrett, 2014:30). The outbreak of these wars fueled new waves of armed groups in the Kivu region. For instance, the emergence of the AFDL (also known as AFDL invasion) in 1996 propelled community leaders to assist in the creation of several communal self-defense Mai Mai groups to oppose the presence of Rwandan forces on the Congolese soil. Thus, at the local level, the mobilization of armed groups and their fragmentation increased within communities to resist what was considered as a foreign invasion (Vlassenroot, 2013:39).

The coalition of the AFDL considered as the orchestrators of the first Congo war in October 1996 following years of intense ethnic strife in the Kivu region comprised mainly Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian armed forces as well as a slight number of local militia groups who opposed Mobutu's regime (The United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010:70). The Local militia groups that became part of the AFDL included the People's Revolution (PRP) led by Laurent Kabila, who was AFDL's spoke person; the National Council of Resistance for Democracy (CNRD) led by Andre Kisase Ngandu; the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MRLZ) led by Anselme Masasu Nindaga and the Democratic Alliance of people (ADP) led by Deogratias Bugera with the support of mainly Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundi governments (Kapinga, 2015:92; Geneva Academy, 2018).



In his view on the first Congo war and AFDL invasion, Alusala (2015:112-113) argues that Rwanda and Uganda used Kabila as a proxy to lead the group as to label the invasion as a Congolese rebellion, but the “first Congo war was a direct invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and its allies Uganda and Burundi”. This, according to Stearns et. al (2013:20-21) ignited two types of armed groups’ mobilization among ethnic groups in the Kivu region. Some groups mobilized to support the AFDL rebellion with hidden agendas and other groups mobilized against the rebellion. For instance, most Kinyarwanda speakers backed the AFDL because they saw it as their “survival and political emancipation”; whilst most indigenous militia groups remained skeptical to join AFDL owing to the presence of Rwandan armed forces. Thus, although Laurent Kabila tried to persuade the local people and painted the AFDL as a Congolese movement, the communities in Uvira and Fizi did not trust the AFDL movement because of foreign backers, especially the Rwandan armed forces.

The local communities in Uvira and Fizi, where the AFDL rebellion started perceived the presence of Rwandan forces in AFDL as Rwanda government backing Banyamulenge (whom they considered as foreigners) to expand their local influence in the DRC. This increased ethnic hatred and tensions between autochthonous communities and Banyamulenge resulting in the creation of community-defense armed groups against the AFDL in 1996. Since then, elements of communal self-defense groups continued within communities in Uvira and Fizi, which explain the on-going armed conflict in the Haut Plateau of Uvira, Fizi, and Mwenga territories/South Kivu between autochthonous armed groups (a coalition of Babembe, Bafuliiru, Banyindu, and Barega) and Banyamulenge factions (Ngumino and Twiganeho armed groups). Native armed groups capitalize on the rhetoric that the Banyamulenge are foreigners and invaders who are forcing to have a territory in the DRC.

The coalitions of AFDL crushed a year later after Laurent Kabila took power and asked his backers (Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops) to leave DRC (Oppong and Woodruff, 2007:67-68). This process ignited the eruption of the second Congo war in 1998 with new waves of anti-Kabila armed groups’ mobilization across the Kivu region (Reuters, 2008). Verweijen (2015:76) asserts that the outbreak of the Second Congo war in 1998, revived dozens of armed groups including the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and numbers



of Mai Mai groups. She adds that the RCD remained the largest and robust rival group against Laurent Kabila's government, a coalition predominated by the Congolese Tutsis backed by Rwanda and Uganda governments, whose aim was to topple Laurent Kabila's regime. On the other hand, Laurent Kabila allied with and supported some autochthonous militia groups and Hutu groups from Rwanda and Burundi such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), formally known as Rwandan army Forces (FAR), Interahamwe, and the National Council/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD).

Oppong and Woodruff (2007:68) maintain similar arguments as those of Verweijen, when they contend that the eruption of the Second Congo war in 1998 and the presence of Rwandan forces in the RCD coalition rekindled local resistance that caused mobilization and fragmentation of local Militia groups that were later used by Laurent Kabila's government as proxies against the RCD. A year after its operation, the RCD movement splintered into disparate groups including RCD-National, RCD-Kisangani Movement of liberation (RCD-K-ML), and RCD-Goma. This was due to increased ethnic antagonism between combatants in the coalition (Vlassenroot 2008:5). The split of RCD gave rise to fragmentation of armed groups along ethnic lines and increased inter-ethnic conflicts, in which autochthonous armed groups remained radical against Tutsis' invasion.

From the above discussion, it is clear to note that the outbreak of Congo wars gave rise to ethnic consciousness and discrimination within communities, which triggered the continuity of localized self-defense armed groups along ethnic lines. This explains the problem of today's armed groups in the Kivu region. In 2002, a series of peace agreements between the DRC government and main rebel groups were signed including the withdrawal of Rwanda and Ugandan troops under the auspices of international partners such as South Africa, the United Nations, and the African Union (Geneva Academy, 2018). The outcomes of these agreements marked the official end of the Second Congo War and set a platform for the transitional government as discussed below.

3. 1. 2. The transition and the beginning of democratic elections (2003, 2006-2011)

The transitional period, which started in 2003 and the directives of launching a democratic election also played a crucial role in the trend of current armed groups (Congressional



Research Service, 2019:4). According to Baaz and Stern (2019:26) the adoption of the Peace Accord that resulted in a transitional government between Joseph Kabila and warlords in 2003 did not yield anticipated peace as violence continued in the Kivu region. The structure of the transition government brought together parties to the conflict to sign a “Global and All-Inclusive Agreement”, which marked the formal end of the Congo wars. This also marked the beginning of a treaty that would allow the sharing of power both politically and militarily in the DRC (Veiweijen, 2015:77). The signatories in this agreement encompassed the main warring factions such as the DRC government, MLC, RCD-Goma, RCD-N, RCD/K-ML, diverse Mai Mai groups, and a range of dim category of civil-society and non-armed opposition (COI Report service, UK Border Control Agency, 2012:24-25; Reuters, 2008). Stearns et. al (2013:22-25) posit that the transitional government yielded a set of positive outcomes such as the draft of a new constitution that merged the “rights of citizens like never before”, the arrangement of first free and fair democratic elections in 2006 since independence; as well as the establishment of government institutions such as a National army, parliament, and all spheres of governing institutions, in which power was divided among various signatories.

However, although the transitional government and 2006 elections raised hope and was lauded as the peace cornerstones in the eastern DRC, the outcome of elections became the triggering factors that fostered the proliferation of armed groups; instead of consolidating peace, it set a new motion of the mobilization of armed groups and violence (Vlassenroot, 2013:40). The approaches employed in structuring the transitional government paved the ground that fostered fresh mobilization and fragmentation of non-state armed groups. This included the integration of former belligerents in various spheres of governmental apparatus; the insertion of untrained rebel combatants with ranks in the National army; as well as the competition among elites aimed at gaining political positions (Baaz and Stern, 2019:26).

Similarly, a paper by the International Alert (2012:26-27) contends that the transitional government and various Peace Accords left a lot of unresolved issues. Adding that the logic of sharing political power with former warlords and their insertion in the National army triggered the proliferation and fragmentation of non-state armed groups, as they started launching new insurgencies to draw government attention to bargain and use of violence to



access political power. Many anticipated that the first democratic elections in 2006 could establish permanent peace and security in the DRC, but its outcomes ignited armed conflict and the proliferation of armed groups. Those who lost at the polls and failed to get positions they hoped for, especially belligerents who formed the transitional government fell on armed groups to maintain influence. The aftermath of the 2006 general elections was marred by new insurgencies owing to ethnic antagonism and disparities among political actors and armed groups, which increased ethnic tensions. Some groups felt marginalized by the allocation of positions such as Kinyarwanda speakers, many of their candidates lost at polls and were not part of the newly formed government (International alert report, 2012:27).

Stearns (2012:36) contends that after the outcome of 2006 elections members of prominent armed groups such as RCD remained divided among themselves as they lost at the polls most expected seats. This resentment of losing seats at polls and the fear of being marginalized led leaders of many armed groups to wage armed insurgencies against the Kinshasa government. This included the RCD factions (which evolved into CNDP and later M23), FDLR, and Mai Mai groups. At the same time, many groups splintered, and others joined the new government in Kinshasa while holding ties with rebel groups. The groups that remained skeptical of the Kinshasa government refused to integrate; they allied with FARDC defectors to form or join armed groups, which intensified violence and armed conflict. Most armed groups that emerged after the 2006 general elections were supported by elites who lost at polls and used new insurgencies and violence to retrieve influence and political power (Stearns, 2012:38).

The aftermath of transitional government and elections demonstrated that, armed insurgencies became the fashion of reclaiming political power and a way of depicting political grievances in the Congolese politics, in which the desperation of political power and a feeling sense of marginalization by the central government propel interest groups to maintain ties with armed groups and sometimes support the creation of new ones along ethnic lines to maintain political influence (Congressional Research Service, 2019:6). For instance, Laurent Kunda defected from FARDC to form the CNDP in 2006 with the support of Tutsi officials in Goma and Kigali government, asserting to recoup the interests of the Tutsi



communities, who were marginalized and attacked by FDLR and local Mai Mai groups (Pankakoski, 2018:16).

Throughout 2006 and 2007, armed conflict between the CNDP and FDLR as well as against local Mai Mai groups intensified and increased violence across the Kivu region. This revived further mobilization of community defense groups seeking the protection of their communities against rival groups including Mai Mai Yakutumba in the South Kivu; and the Coalition des Patriotes Resistants Congolais (PARECO) in the North Kivu. As a result, the post-electoral government (in 2006) was characterized by the multitude of revolt from various armed groups, and non-armed interest groups that felt marginalized by the Kinshasa government after they were not given positions in the post-electoral government. This led leaders of rebel groups to return in the bushes between 2007 and 2009, which increased violence at a startling pace in the Kivu region (Barrera, 2015)

In 2008, the DRC government and various armed groups, especially the CNDP sat for a peace and ceasefire agreement (Goma Peace Accord), which failed and resulted in further proliferation of armed groups (Boshoff, 2008). Towards the end of 2008, the DRC government and Rwandan government agreed on neutralizing the CNDP and deploy its combatant for a joint operation against the FDLR and dozens of Mai Mai groups that deteriorated peace and security efforts in the Kivu region (COI report service, UK Border Agency, 2012:26). Thus, on 23 March 2009, the DRC government signed an agreement, in which the CNDP was transformed into a political party and its combatants were integrated into FARDC. This agreement was enacted on the preferences of CNDP's terms and conditions because many of its officials and combatants (mostly Kinyarwanda speakers) refused to be deployed in other parts of the Country except in the Kivu region with ranks. Most of these officers were positioned in strategic mineral sites, they continued holding ties with their former armed groups and became extremely calamitous to civilians. This situation angered autochthonous armed groups and fueled further mobilization, which increased cycles of armed conflicts and violence between 2009 and 2011 (Prince, 2013:24).

In 2011 towards elections, the DRC government attempted to restructure the army by deconstructing the impact of CNDPs within the FARDC, but this process yielded meagre



result as it rekindled another mobilization. Many of CNDP's officials and combatants within the FARDC remained discontent about the dispensation of ranks in the new structure, which led many to defect from FARDC to launch new armed groups. The mobilization intensified even further after the 2011 general election result as leaders of armed groups and politicians who lost at polls fell on armed groups for political influence. Thus, violence and cycles of armed conflict increased as the numbers of non-state armed groups multiplied between 2011 and 2013 (Oxfam, 2012:9).

The CNDP as a party failed to obtain expected seats after the 2011 general elections, which led to its splinting; some of its officials and combatants, who felt marginalized, deserted from government apparatus to form a new armed group called "M23 movement", claiming that the DRC government failed to respect the "23 March 2009 Peace deal". In April 2012, under the leadership of Bosco Ntanganda and the support of the Rwandan government, the M23 rebels started launching disastrous insurgencies against FARDC and rival Mai Mai groups. The M23 movement like CNDP was also predominated by Tutsi military officers and combatants whose key motives were the solidarity of the Tutsi ethnic group as well as ethnic interests and extortion (Deetlefs, 2017:45; Obala, 2015:5).

The insurgency of M23 alarmed local communities and triggered further mobilization as it revived even dormant community-based militia groups seeking communal defense. This is because local communities in the Kivu region perceived the M23 rebellion as the incarnation of ethnic Tutsi led conflict, whom they accused since the first Congo war of wanting to expand their influence and dominance over autochthonous citizens (Aljazeera news, 2013). The M23 rebellion lasted for approximately two years between 2012 and 2013, after its defeat by a joint operation of FARDC and the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in November 2013 (BBC News, 2013). The above Sections provided a basic understanding of the historical background and the trend of armed groups from the First and Second Congo wars 1996-2003; and from the transitional government to hosting of First and Second democratic elections (2003, 2006, and 2011). The following section focuses on the proliferation of armed groups between 2013 to 2018.

3. 2. The Proliferation of armed groups, 2013 to 2018.



In November 2013, the government forces and the United Nations peacekeepers celebrated a victory over the M23 rebellion, but this victory did not end the mobilization and proliferation of armed groups (Katombe, 2013). The defeat of M23 was extolled by the DRC government as the beginning of a lasting peace and security in the eastern DRC; in which the former government spokesperson Lambert Mende was quoted saying “it is the end of the non-state armed groups, there is no place for irregular groups anymore in the DRC (Wallis and Manson, 2013). Despite Mende’s declaration, there were still dozens of armed groups that remained active in the eastern DRC including the FDLR, ADF and Mai Mai groups (France24 news, 2013).

In its briefing paper, Oxfam (2014:5-6) states that the demise of the M23 movement did not solve the problems of armed groups, as the proliferation of armed groups continued and triggered more mobilization of new armed groups. The report adds that in 2013 the DRC government and its international partners paid much attention to the M23 rebellion and their area of influence such as Goma and Rutshuru in North Kivu, whilst this was just one of the numerous armed groups scattered across the Kivu region. Thus, as a lot of efforts and focus were pressed on M23 and their area of influence, other armed groups fragmented and took control over areas under security vacuum when FARDC left and turned their focus on the M23 rebellion. Stearns et. al (2013:30) maintain similar views as of Oxfam when they affirm that, despite the celebrated victory over the M23 rebellion, there were more groups that would continue to fuel violence if factors behind the mobilization were not addressed.

As of early 2014, there was the resurgence of many armed groups that expanded the number of their fighters including the recruitment of children totaling to approximately 54 - armed groups (UNHCR, 2014). These armed groups were the reincarnation of previous ones with almost the same features, similarities, and objectives reached approximately 70-armed groups in the mid-2014 (Verweijen and Wakenge, 2015:1). In the mid-2015, a political crisis broke out in Burundi as President Peter Nkurunziza refused to step down, causing an influx of hundred thousand of Burundians refugees in the Ruzizi plain, South Kivu, which rekindled the mobilization of new armed groups including the Resistance pour un Etat de Droit (RED) and Forces Populaire du Burundi, formally known as Forces Republicaines du Burundi, FOREBU (Stearns and Vogel, 2017:1). At the same time, the perpetuated rumors



that President Joseph Kabila proposed to amend the constitution to extend his term in power galvanized local resistance as protests escalated across the country igniting further mobilization of Mai Mai groups (Congressional Research Service, 2019:5).

In 2016, protests against Joseph Kabila's bid for a third term continued and revived further mobilization of armed groups in the Kivu region including the emergence of the Coalition Nationale du Peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC), led by former FARDC commander William Amuri Yakutumba in South Kivu (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531). Following the violence and intensified armed conflict between CNPSC and government forces, further mobilization emerged in the South Kivu, especially across Ruzizi plain, moyens, and Haut Plateau of Uvira. In North Kivu, the antagonism between Hutu armed groups (Kinyarwanda speakers) and autochthonous armed groups such as Nande, Nyanga, and Kobo militia groups (community-based armed groups) triggered further mobilization including the emergence of a new group the Conseil National pour le Renouveau de la Démocratie (CNRD), which splintered from the FDLR, led by Wilson Irategeka (Stearns & Vogel, 2017:2).

In 2017, violence exacerbated following Joseph Kabila's refusal to step down at the end of his last term in December 2016, which led more fragmentation of armed groups into various factions including FDLR factions, ADF factions, Nyatura, and Rai Mutomboki factions who recruited along ethnic lines in the Kivu region (Congressional Research Service, 2019:6; Nantulya, 2017). As of December 2017, and early 2018 numbers of armed groups reached more than 120 committing atrocities against civilians, which led to the internal displacement of approximately 3.8 to 4.5 million people (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018). From the above discourse, it is clear to note that there has been a startling proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018 despite the implementation of DDR/RR programs. As such, there is a need to understand their causative factors. These factors are discussed in the following sections.

3. 3. Underlying Causes of Armed groups and their proliferation, 2013-2018

It is important to note that the causes of armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region are complex and multi-dimensional because current armed groups capitalize on the



previous unresolved grievances that have exacerbated in communities. This study has noted that since the end of the first and Second Congo wars (1996-2003), creation of armed groups and violence have emerged as the most prevailing form of depicting political and socio-economic grievances against the central government in the DRC. Verweijen (2013:44) maintains similar views when she contends that armed groups have become a fundamental trait of resolving political disputes in the eastern DRC. This evidences that there are underlying crises causing the creation of armed groups and their resistance. The following sections discuss these causes including the protracted insecurity and ethnic antagonism, the socio-economic deprivation and grievances against Joseph Kabila's regime, the election proceedings, and delays of the 2016 general elections, the failure of Security Sector Reform and FARDC operations as well as the neighboring countries and mineral resources.

3. 3. 1. Protracted insecurity and ethnic antagonism

Barrera (2012) contends that it is difficult to imagine a stabilization mechanism for the DRC because of protracted inter-communal antagonism that has existed since colonial times, which continue increasing ethnic tensions within the communities leading to the creation of community defense based-armed groups. There is also lack of social cohesion and trust within communities which leads to social discrimination conflicts in the Kivu region (Ireng, 2017:16). This has triggered the continuity of armed conflicts and the creation of armed groups along ethnic lines, which exacerbate the insecurity in the villages in the Kivu region. Thus, ethnic antagonism and grievances against the on-going insecurity are the core factors causing the resistance of localized self-defense armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region.

Hakimu (2016:56) argues that the government's failure to address security problems in the villages as to secure a safe environment for affected populations led communities to rely on local militia groups including "ethnic, religious and community-based Mai Mai groups". For instance, the emergence of General Laurent Kunda's CNDP between 2004 and 2006 later M23; Mai Mai Yakutumba in 2007 and many small local militia groups, was a result of violence perpetrated by rival groups in their communities. The ongoing local conflict dynamics causing volatility in the villages have not been defused, thus increasing antagonism among rival ethnic groups that perpetrate insecurity to worsen their grievances.



Many armed groups claim to protect and represent their communities to voice against unaddressed grievances of ongoing insecurity. Thus, armed groups have capitalized on this situation in mobilizing communities where they originate, to support them as to respond to the growing militarization of other communities (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2010:25). This is the character of community based-armed groups and their conflicts in the Kivu region, where hostilities are perpetrated by groups claiming to represent Kinyarwanda speakers against those representing the autochthonous populations. The native Mai Mai groups have continuously objected to the presence of those perceived as foreigners (Kinyarwanda speakers) in the Kivu region, which in return antagonize the mobilization of Tutsi led armed groups and the resistance of community based-armed groups in the Kivu region (De Heredia, 2017:130).

For instance, the de facto leader of CNPSC (a.k.a Mai Mai Yakutumba), William Amuri Yakutumba, and his group attempted to disarm but owing to numbers of Kinyarwanda speakers' armed groups that resisted disarmament and remained violent in the Fizi territory/South Kivu made Yakutumba and his combatants withdrew from the DDR process fearing despotism from rival armed groups (De Heredia, 2017:131). Yakutumba claimed that his groups may not disarm if Ngumino and Twiganeho's combatants (the Banyamulenge armed groups in Fizi territory) defied DDR programs. This was the case with other nativist Mai Mai groups in the Ruzizi plain, local armed groups escaped disarmament claiming that Burundian armed groups such FNL-Nzabampema and FOREBU combatants refused to disarm and continued committing violence against civilians in the Haut Plateau of Uvira territory and Ruzizi plain.

In his discourse on causes of internal conflict in the DRC, Alusala (2015:52) contends that "...ethnic discrimination resulting in a denial of political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other resource allocation... are causative factors to the conflict". This has been the case of armed conflict, especially in the North Kivu, where the insecurity is perpetrated mostly by the history of ethnic discrimination and antagonism between communities, especially autochthonous citizens versus all Kinyarwanda speakers; and Hutus versus Tutsis (Amnesty International, 2005:17). The tensions of ethnic division and



discrimination within communities in the Kivu region explain the persistence of inter-communal violence and community based-armed groups, such as the ethnic division between the Hutus and the Tutsis who have been fighting against each other for decades on the Congolese soil (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2010:13). Most of these fighting armed groups are supported by disparate armed groups.

Prince (2013:22) points out that the “presence of nativist Mai Mai groups, Hutu and Tutsi armed groups” antagonizing against each other makes the Kivu region politically and ethnically unstable region. The emergence and the proliferation of various Raia Mutomboki factions capitalized on the same rhetoric of protecting their communities against the perpetrated insecurity by rival groups within their settlements. In the territories of Beni, Masisi, Lubero, and Rutshuru in the North Kivu, armed conflict is characterized by clashes between Hutu backed-armed groups (Nyantura factions) against Tutsi backed-armed groups (Raia Mutomboki factions). In most cases Tutsi factions have been backed by Rwanda government whilst Hutu factions have been backed by FDLR and local Mai Mai groups (De Heredia, 2017:134).

A basic understanding from the above discussion is that the growing antagonistic behavior between ethnic backed-armed groups explains the insecurity they perpetrate against each other in the villages. This protracted insecurity within communities have left many young people with no option than to join or form armed groups in an effort to protect their communities against perpetrators of insecurity. This is because a community must militarize to respond to the threat posed by other militarized communities in the Kivu region. At the same time most affected communities in the Kivu region support armed groups that promote ethnic and community interests.

3. 3. 2. Socio-economic deprivation and grievances against J. Kabila’s regime.

Kapinga (2015:96) argues that causes of armed conflict in the eastern DRC can be explained by the underlying grievances such as deprivation of human needs, which bolster sources of social conflict. The government’s failure to resolve grievances of deprivation such as human needs leads to outbreaks of inter-communal violence. Kapinga adds that protracted social conflict is inevitable to governments that are characterized by “multi-



communal compositions, incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. Alusala’s view correlates with that of Kapinga when He affirms that grievance “as a result of (mal) distribution of natural resources” can fuel conflicts (Alusala, 2015:58-59). In a discussion on causes of wars or conflict in Africa Alusala further argues that the breakout of armed conflict can be explained by the unequal distribution of natural resources and a feeling sense of marginalization of the population “closest to mineral deposits”, which always result in disastrous clashes between these population and government forces (Alusala, 2015:58-59).

Socio-economic deprivation is one of the underlying factors that contribute to the resistance of armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region. The concept of socio-economic deprivation used here, refer to the hardship of life (poverty level) of the populations in the Kivu region due to the government’s failure to distribute equally the Country’s enormous natural resources, as to provide basic human needs to many of its citizens. Prince (2013:24) affirms that the population in the Kivu region suffers various socio-economic deprivation for decades, however, the most prevailing one that exacerbated recent violence and the emergence of many armed groups is the hardship of life and lack of income-generating activities (employment), in which a larger number of both educated and uneducated youth lack means of survival leading many to form and join armed groups in an effort to make living incomes.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in its book entitled “Conflict in the DRC: Causes, impact, and implication for the Great Lakes region” indicates that the dynamics of armed conflicts in the eastern DRC are embedded in the question of protracted socio-economic deprivation, which promoted socio-economic inequality as many citizens struggled to sustain a decent living whilst politicians and allies amassed enormous wealth and continued enjoying life at the expense of suffering citizens. In return, “the increasing socio-economic alienation of the population, especially the unemployed youth, including those who were educated” had no option than to join and form rebellious groups against the central government to voice their grievances, which led disastrous armed conflicts and the proliferation of armed groups at a startling pace in the Kivu region (The United Nations Economic Commission of Africa, 2015:19). To secure means of survival, most young people



find joining armed groups as a salient way to generate incomes. The lack of economic opportunities made many families in the Kivu region rely on those who join armed groups for basic needs supply such as food. As a result, joining armed groups has become a profitable option, which ignited the mobilization and the resistance of armed groups against disarmament processes in the Kivu region (Boshoff, 2010).

The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672 indicates that Mai Mai groups that have access to valuable resources and generate daily income on illegal taxation in areas under their control remained threats to peace and security efforts. For instance, Rebel groups' leaders voiced out that the DRC government failed to implement a disarmament program that guaranteed permanent sources of income to disarmed combatants and restoration of sustainable security in the villages. This is more evident that armed groups have been resistant to disarmament programs fearing the loss of incomes. In most cases, armed groups in the Kivu region claimed that they cannot easily give-in weapons that they use to generate enormous income and leave their area of control for a mere national integration advanced by a government they do not trust and consider illegal (talking of extended Joseph Kabila's third term, 2017-2018).

Another factor that fueled the mobilization of armed groups was grievances against Joseph Kabila's regime, especially between 2016 and 2018, which they accused of being autocratic, full of nepotism, and authoritarian failing to establish democratic and effective governance across the country (Cimetta et.al, 2018). Similarly, Kapinga (2015:97) contents that throughout Joseph Kabila's regime, a number of Mai Mai groups revolted and remained vigorous against his regime considering it as failed governance and administration, which had no aim in promoting the people's interests besides monopolizing power to benefit his immense business interests with political and business elites around him. A report by Global Conflict Tracker (2019) supports Kapinga's view by affirming that the widespread violence against civilians in the eastern DRC can be explained by the weak governance that struggled to address the threats posed by the prevalence of many armed groups.

Chick (2018) argues that under Joseph Kabila's rule Congolese citizens remained the poorest in the World while "politicians and the elites profited from the country's mineral



wealth” exasperating the population as the armed conflict intensified over deficient resources, which revived further mobilization of Mai Mai groups. The communities in the eastern DRC have always attributed the protracted violence and economic crisis to Joseph Kabila’s lack of political will, corruption, and negligence (Cimetta et.al, 2018). Some armed groups accused his government of being behind various massacres against civilians in the Kivu region, particularly in the Beni territory, North Kivu, and in Kasai between 2017 and 2018. The exacerbation of violence ignited further mobilization of armed groups against his government, attacking government forces and properties across the region (Vava Tampa, 2017).

Also, the population blamed Joseph Kabila’s government of not having presence or control over rural territories that armed groups took advantage of and perpetrated atrocities against civilians (McGragor, 2018). Thus, armed groups enjoyed autonomic power in the absence of government authority over large parts of the Kivu region. This has made the region a rear base for local and foreign armed groups capitalizing on the absence of state authority in the villages. Alusala (2015:63) argues that “the poorly governed region of eastern DRC attracted a plethora of armed groups from neighboring countries orchestrating insurgent activities against their countries of origin”. For instance, foreign armed groups that have enjoyed the absence of government forces in the Kivu region include FDLR, FNL-Nzabampema, FOREBU, CNRD, and RED-Tabara among others. This proved Joseph Kabila’s government failure to uphold its responsibility to protect civilians; a situation in which government forces were complicit in the perpetration of mass atrocities. This in return fueled further mobilization of community-based defense groups against government forces.

3. 3. 3. Elections proceedings and Delays of 2016 general elections

The transition government (2003-2005) brought a new constitution that allowed and introduced multi-party and democratic elections in the DRC for the first time since its independence in 1960 (Amnesty International, 2005:7). The introduction of these elections was lauded as the catalyst for sustainable peace and security in the eastern DRC. The first multi-party and democratic elections were held in 2006 and 2011, which Joseph Kabila was allegedly announced as the winner of both elections despite allegations of frauds (Salihu, 2019). The third multi-party elections were held in December 2018, which Felix Tshisekedi



was allegedly announced as the winner. The processes and outcomes of these elections have been marred by disastrous violence, which always ignited the mobilization of armed groups and their fragmentation.

The struggle for power-sharing and representation in central government after elections outcomes have always paved ways for the mobilization of Mai Mai groups as politicians who lost at polls and interest groups disappointed by the outcomes support community-based militia groups to maintain influence (Mikhael and Norman, 2019). For instance, the 2006 general election ended the transitional government but failed to end violence in the Kivu region as dozens of new armed groups were formed, backed by officers and politicians who failed to get positions they hoped for. The same situation intensified in the 2011 general election, as politicians fell back on armed groups to obtain electoral support and when they fail at the polls, to maintain influence. For instance, in FIZI the parliamentary candidates like James Mulengwa supported Mai Mai Yakutumba, while the Mwami (customary chief) of the Fuliro in Uvira who also ran for parliament mobilized his self-defence militia (Stearns et. al. (2013:26-27).

Regarding the 2016 general elections, their delay, and postponement presented one of the core causes of the proliferation of armed groups between 2016 and 2018. Many armed groups emerged capitalizing on the political crisis caused by Joseph Kabila's refusal to step down at the end of his final term in December 2016. This crisis intensified throughout 2017 and 2018 leading to the proceeding of 2018 general elections which Mwakideu (2018) argues that had various issues of contention that fueled violence by armed groups such as the introduction of voting machines, which the opposition parties allegedly objected claiming that could be manipulated by CENI in favor of Joseph Kabila's preferred choice Emmanuel Shandary. This in return ignited further violence as the mobilization of militia groups continued across the Kivu region with the support of civilians. This author adds that the uncertainty about whether elections will be free and fair, as well as the impediment of some opposition leaders' candidacy, remained looming issues that perpetuated attacks by armed groups against CENI facilities across the Country.



In the North Kivu the cancelation of the presidential election in Beni and Butembo territories, owing to the Ebola outbreak raised tensions that fueled disastrous protests in which government forces killed a number of protesters leading to fresh mobilization of militia groups, which exacerbated violence and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people (Reuters, 2018). From the above discourse, this study notes that the processes and outcomes of elections as well as the postponement of the 2016 general elections played a crucial role in the prevalence of armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018.

3. 3. 4. Neighboring countries and Natural resources.

It is argued in previous sections that the outbreak of recent Congo wars, especially the Second Congo War (also known as Africa first world war) involved many African countries including Angola, Chad, DRC, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe allying on the one side; and on the other side were Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Eritrea (Kapinga, 2015:100). Some of these countries are DRC's neighbors capitalizing on the availability of Mineral resources to support proxy armed groups to maintain illegal smuggling of mineral resources. The availability of abundant natural resources in the Kivu region contributes to the protracted presence of many armed groups and the involvement of neighboring countries in the Kivu region, in particular Rwanda and Uganda (International Alert, 2010:9). This view is maintained by Burnley (2011) who contends that current armed conflicts in the eastern DRC are embedded in the availability of natural resources that armed groups and neighboring countries capitalize on to fund their activities. There have been shifts and clashes over control of mining areas between various interest groups including armed groups and National army forces (Garret, 2014:212).

Muraya and Ahere (2014:22) share similar views as those of Burnley when they argue that the availability of enormous natural resources shifted the motives of neighboring countries' involvement in the DRC's conflicts. They add that during the first and second Congo wars, the initial objectives of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi backing the rebellion along Laurent Kabila among others were to topple the Mobutu regime, protect their borders owing to security threats posed by rival rebel groups with rear bases in the eastern DRC such as FDLR and LiRA from Rwanda, ADF, and LRA from Uganda and FNL-FDD from Burundi.



But Rwanda as the main external actor in the DRC's armed conflict capitalizes on more objectives including the pursuit of perpetrators of Rwanda genocide (Génocidaire) and reinsertion and solidarity of Tutsi dominance in the DRC. They conclude that these motives shifted gradually as the conflict "ushered in a new wave of illegal exploitation of natural resources", in which Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi armies were literally involved in large-scale looting of various forms of natural resources transporting some back to their countries and others directly to international markets.

Kapinga (2015:106-107) posits that Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi got involved in the DRC conflict with distinctive objectives and these reasons were proved by the resistance and unwillingness of these countries in withdrawing their troops from the DRC. The three countries supported rebel movement in both wars although Burundi and Uganda distanced themselves from the allegation, while Rwanda took the lead and has been widely criticized in supporting rebel groups even after the end of wars including CNDP and later M23 between 2009 and 2013 (Hakimu, 2016:60). Kapinga adds that the involvement of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in the DRC conflicts and their support to rebel movement have been motivated by self-economic interests, in which these countries have benefited a lot from the natural resources of the DRC.

To endorse the views of the above authors, a basic understanding is that the enormous mineral endowment in the DRC has been the source of prolonged armed conflict and served as incentives to both local and foreign armed groups to resist disarmament and to refrain from leaving the DRC even after peaceful agreements. For instance, knowing that Rwanda and Uganda's main aim was to gain access to natural resources they lacked, their troops established bases in mineral-rich areas closest to mining sites across the Kivu region (International Alert, 2010:7). Even during the integration processes of armed groups into the national army (FARDC), groups that were backed by Rwanda (mostly Tutsi's belligerents from CNDP and later M23) refused to be deployed in other parts of the country and remained in mineral-rich areas they had control and influence holding close ties with Tutsi rebel groups, Rwanda, and Uganda governments. Although several reports indicate that Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their troops from DRC at the end of wars in 2003, this study found that Rwanda and Uganda remain DRC's neighboring countries that have a direct



involvement in the support of rebel groups to maintain economic interests through the extraction of natural resources. Rwanda and Uganda have taken advantage of the DRC's weak state to support proxy armed groups and pushed for their infiltration into the national army (FARDC) during peace negotiations in an effort to advance and protect the economic interests of the two countries from the DRC.

It is therefore important to note that the resistance and increase of both local and foreign armed groups in the Kivu region is also embedded in the availability of enormous natural resources. Thus, armed groups resist DDRRR programs because they are “unable to let go of milking cow” or mining areas under their control fearing to lose income-generating activities. The predatory character of armed groups in the Kivu region is because combatants have an opportunity to make enormous financial gain and profits through the extraction of mineral resources in areas under their control. For instance, the United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531 finds out that Mai Mai Yakutumba and allies in the Fizi territory/South Kivu had control over large mining areas in Fizi territory including the Misisi mining site, one of the largest mining areas in the South Kivu region.

3. 3. 5. Failure of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and FARDC operations

The transitional government under the terms of various peace agreements unleashed the consensus of forming a unitary national army, which would involve the integration of rebel groups and ex-belligerents with a scheme of Security Sector Reform, SSR (Verweijen, 2015:77). The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) was formed in 2003, and the main parties in the unification of the new army included the government forces (FAC), RCD functions, MLC, and Mai Mai groups (Ebenga and N'landu, 2005:76). The main objective of forming FARDC with the integration of armed groups was to strengthen the country's security as well as the neutralization of perpetrators of insecurity in the Country.

Along this process of forming FARDC was the establishment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) aimed at strengthening security institutions including the Police, Military, and Justice systems (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012:143). The main role of Security Sector Reform was to assist (educate) personnel in these security institutions on how to respect and foster democratic standards, human rights, the rule of law, and the principles of good governance,



which in return would harmonize the relationship between security services and civil society and end the antagonistic tensions that existed between them (EUSEC RD. CONGO, 2015).

However, the ongoing insecurity perpetrated by security personnel and the way the justice system operates in the Kivu region favoring the elites and subverting human rights and rule of law questions the efficacy of SSR and the role of FARDC's operations in the DRC (Hendrickson and Kasongo, 2010). According to Wallis and Manson (2013) despite the efforts of international partners in rehabilitating the FARDC, the insecurity in the eastern DRC proves the inability of the national army that is not capable of restoring state authority in areas under armed groups control. The FARDC has suffered several defeats in the hands of non-state armed groups on the nation's many battlefields.

The population in the conflict zones in the Kivu region has never witnessed any victory by FARDC against armed groups except auto-victory proclamation. The inability of the FARDC is also proved by the fact that after the so-called defeat of M23 in November 2013, the FARDC promised to turn its attention to neutralize the FDLR, ADF-NALU and all non-state armed groups that destabilized peace in the eastern DRC. In support of this, the former government spokesperson Lambert Mende announced that the government would assist the FARDC to deal with the remaining armed groups as there was no more place for irregular groups (France24 news, 2013). This promise has not materialized as the study found that between 2013 and 2018 there were a startling increase of armed groups totalling to more than 120-armed groups.

Mangwanda (2017:19) argues that the FARDC instead of protecting civilians in the promotion of security, they have been among the actors harming civilians at a startling pace in the Kivu region including gang rapes, abductions, and illegal taxation. This author concludes that FARDC has contributed to the rising sense of insecurity and prevalence of community-based defense groups, who refuse to disarm until there are permanent peace and security in their villages. Similarly, the United Nations Group of Experts report S/2018/531 contends that the FARDC has been accused of contributing to current violence and exacerbation of insecurity, which triggered the mobilization of community defense groups in several villages. This report further asserts that among other reasons why many



young people joined armed groups in the villages was the insecurity perpetrated by FARDC personnel.

In her discourse on FARDC, Verweijen (2015:78) argues that the formation of FARDC did not solve peace and security problem as expected, particularly in the eastern parts of DRC, where the distribution of ranks raised tensions that incentivized the mobilization of Mai Mai groups. She adds that the character of ethnic antagonism that existed between Mai Mai groups' commanders and RCD officers continued even after the integration into FARDC, which led many to maintain ties with rebel groups and desert from FARDC to form or join armed groups (Verweijen, 2015:80). The army that was supposed to combat perpetrators of insecurity became the source of the insecurity in the Kivu region, which left communities with no option than to support the creation of communal-defense armed groups.

This also proved the failure of SSR, which was supposed to provide thorough training to the DRC's security forces to serve the interests of the country by fostering the rule of law and providing security to the citizens. This study concludes that the FARDC as a national army has been a disappointment to the population in the Kivu region not only by failing to protect civilians against armed groups but by being complicit in committing atrocities against civilians. This sections above provided a thorough analysis of the dynamics of armed groups, their background, and causative factors in the Kivu region. Given this, there is a need to know some of these groups as discussed below.

3. 4. List of some armed groups active in the Kivu region, 2013-2018.

This section provides historical background and the structure of some eminent armed groups while the full list of more than 120-armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018 is found in Appendix section (page,107). As stated in the previous sections that the Kivu region has hosted more than 120-armed groups between 2013 and 2018 divided in two categories, namely foreign armed groups, and local armed groups. Also, because there is not enough literature with the list of all armed groups currently active in the Kivu region, this listing relied mainly on the following sources: recent reports by Congo Research Groups through its *Kivu Security Tracker* of 2017 and 2018, Human Rights



Watch reports of 2018 and 2019 as well as various United Nations Group of Experts' reports on the trend of armed groups in the eastern DRC.

3. 4. 1. Foreign armed groups

(i). Forces Democratic de la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)

The FDLR is a foreign armed group operating on the DRC soil for more than a decade now since 2000, and was previously led by Ignace Murwanashyaka, Callixte Mbarushimana, and Sylvestre Mudacumura (BBC News, 2014; Aljazeera News, 2019). Owing to fragmentation and hierarchical structure, the FDLR has other renowned leaders in different zones of operations such as Gaston Iyamuremye, Colonel Gustave Kubwayo, and Pacifique Ntawunguka; and the group is predominantly by the Banyarwanda Hutus opposed to Banyarwanda Tutsis. The FDLR emerged from the former Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR)/ Interahamwe and Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) despite the fact that most of its combatants came from these platforms (FAR, Interahamwe and ALiR) seeking to distance itself from the label genocidaires, which ex-FAR/Interahamwe and ALiR combatants were labelled (Allen, 2011:42; United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19).

The FDLR is the political wing of the organization while its formal armed wing is called the "Forces combattantes Abacunguzi, FOCA". The groups started with more than ten thousand combatants in 2000 but owing to various attacks and operations led by DRC government forces, infighting, and breakaway factions, as well as the desertion of many combatants, the group have been weakened in size although it remains one of the most devastating armed groups. The group continue committing all kind of violence against civilians, causing protracted cycles of armed conflicts, which poses strenuous to peace and security efforts in the Kivu region (The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531).

Stearns et. al (2013:21) argue that FDLR played a crucial role in the second Congo war as it received extensive backing and cooperation from Laurent Kabila's government, who used the group as a proxy force against the foreign Rwandan armies operating in the country, in particular the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPF) and Rwanda-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Even after the official end of the Second Congo War in 2002, FDLR



combatants continued to attack Tutsi forces both in the Kivus and across the borders into Rwanda increasing tensions in the region, which led the DRC and Rwandan governments set joint operations aimed at disbanding the FDLR in December 2008, which was enacted on January 20, 2009 (Jones, 2014).

The FDLR like other armed groups in the eastern DRC underwent various fragmentation, which weakened its influence and loss of many strategic areas of control. The group that was estimated to have about 6500 combatants in 2008 is believed to have approximately 600 and 1000 combatants between 2013 and 2018 scattered in diverse zones of operations including western parts of Rutshuru territory inside the Virunga Park and several subsectors in the territory of the North Kivu, which serve as their headquarter and operational zone of dominance. Some other groups of FDLR operate in the Mwenga, Shabunda, Fizi, and Uvira territories of South Kivu. Although weakened in size, the FDLR continued recruiting between 2016 and 2018, after the recent breakaway of the Conseil National pour le Renouveau de la Democratie (CNRD)-Ubwiyunge, led by Wilson Irategeka in May 2016 and Rassemblement pour l'Unite et la Democratie (FDLR-RUD-Urunana) led by Jean Demascene Ndibabaje. The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672 states that throughout 2016 and 2017 the FDLR enjoyed alliances with others armed groups including Nyatura combatants, local Mai Mai groups, RUD-Urunana, as well as collaboration with some local authorities and FARDC officers, who severally used FDLR as a proxy in the past conflicts against the M23 rebellion. The FDLR remains one of the most calamitous armed groups in the eastern DRC to date that various efforts if not all have failed to neutralize the FDLR from the Congolese soil.

(ii). Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

The ADF is a Ugandan rebel group operating on the Congolese soil for almost two decades since the 1990s, with approximately 400-500 estimated combatants scattered in the north and south-east parts of North Kivu, particularly in Beni territory (Titeca and Vlassenroot, 2012:159). The ADF was formed as an amalgamation of several armed groups in Uganda including the Allied Democratic Movement (ADM), the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the Uganda Muslim Liberation Army, and the Tablighi Jamaat movement, led by Jamil Mukulu and currently by Sheikh Musa Bakulu since May 2015 owing to Jamil

Mukulu's arrest in April 2015. The ADF rebel group originally emerged in opposition to the Ugandan government before converting into an Islamist, Congo-based movement (Marcucci, 2019).

The ADF's zones of operations and military camps have been in the Mountains of Rwenzori and the Semuliki Valley in Beni territory, North Kivu. Between 2013 and 2018, the group is reported to have committed the deadliest attacks on both civilians and peacekeepers personnel in Beni territory than any armed group active in the area, which contributed to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. The ADF is also believed to have strong ties with some local armed groups including the combatants of Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie Kisangani/Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-K/ML) and indigenous customary chiefs of some communities (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19).

Owing to its organizational structure that promotes stringent internal discipline code, the ADF, has not experienced fundamental splits such as many armed groups have done. The group has remained intact, despite losing many of its combatants in wars and through arrest by the Congolese National Army (Titeca and Fahey, 2016). The FARDC and Forces Intervention Brigade launched several operations between 2013 and 2015 including Sokola I in January 2014, which succeeded in destabilizing the ADF's bases and pushed the group out of its initial camps and weakened its influence. However, the groups still exist and continued with their usual recruitment from Uganda and DRC. The ADF has a mixture of combatants from various countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia although the predominant remains the Ugandans and Congolese (The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19).

The ADF's insurgencies increased at a startling pace between 2016 and 2018, committing several massacres of civilians and attacks on peacekeepers bases. This situation led government troops and FIB to intensify their operations against rebel groups including the launching of the Usalama 2 operation aimed at neutralizing armed groups in the North Kivu. The FARDC suffered loss through this operation as it was estimated that between the first of January 2018 to 8th of March 2018, at least 81 of FARDC combatants were killed and 72



were injured (The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531). These operations succeeded in weakening the ADF movement and pushing them away from normal settlements, but the group continues to pose a problem to peace and security, and it remains the most vicious armed group in the Kivu region.

(iii). Forces Republicaines du Burundi (FOREBU)

FOREBU is a newly formed Burundian armed group operating on the DRC's soil since December 2015, following civil unrest that emerged in Burundi as former President Nguruziza announced his bid for a third term despite the two-term limit set out by the 2000 Arusha accord (Anderson, 2017). The group operates in the Moyens Plateaux of Uvira and Fizi territories, South Kivu, and operates clandestinely inside Burundi. The founders of FOREBU are mostly former senior members of the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) ruling party in Burundi, opposition members, and dissidents from the security forces including, Colonel Eduoard Nshimirimana, General Geremie Ntiranyibagira, Hussein Radjabu, Abdu Rugwe and Godfroid Niyombare who is considered as the main orchestrator of failed coup d'état 2015 (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672).

In 2016 and 2017, FOREBU emerged as one of the most rival rebel groups against the third term government of President Nguruziza with its operational base in the hills of Lusenda village in Fizi territory, South Kivu. The group has recruited mainly Burundian combatants and a few Congolese. Some recruits were from the Burundian refugees in the Lusenda Camp as its headquarters was situated above the Camp. The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672 states that there have been instances where FOREBU combatants held food tokens, giving them access to receiving food from the Lusenda Camp. In August 2017, owing to internal fighting and leadership struggle, the group changed its name to "Forces Populaire du Burundi", FPB (Popular forces of Burundi) as General Geremie Ntiranyibagira and Colonel Edouard Nshimirimana became de facto leaders of the new platform shifting power away from alleged "absentees" such as Goffroid Niyombare and Hussein Radjabu. FOREBU added on the number of Burundian's armed groups currently active in the Kivu region including the Forces National de Liberation (FNL)-Nzabampema, the Resistance pour un Etat de Droit (RED)-FRONABU-Tabara, and elements of ex-CNDD-



FDD militia groups scattered in Ruzizi plain, moyens plateau of Uvira and Haut plateau in Fizi/Mwenga territories (Anderson, 2017).

In mid-2017, the group was estimated to have between 300 and 500 combatants, who maintained strong ties with Burundian refugees in the Lusenda camp and local Mai Mai groups. The group also collaborated with other Burundian armed factions, such as the Resistance for the rule of law (RED-Tabara) and FNL-Nzabampema, whose combatants subsequently defected to Forebu. It was also alleged that Forebu received support from the Congolese government of Joseph Kabila and the Kigali government. Although FOREBU's main aim was to combat against President Ngurunziza's government in Burundi, the combatants of Burundians' armed groups have been accused of assaulting civilians in areas under their control such as in the Ruzizi plain, the road connecting Uvira to Kamanyola border, travelers have been robbed frequently, as well as civilians living in the Ruzizi plain experienced several attacks by FOREBU combatants (*Kivu Security Tracker, 2017*).

(iv). Forces Nationales de Liberation, FNL-Nzabampema,

FNL-Nzabampema is also a Burundian armed group, led by General Aloys Nzabampema with its base in the Ruzizi plain since 2008. This group is a splinter of the Front national de libération (FNL), which also splintered from former Burundian Parti pour la libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU). FNL-Nzabampema had close ties with Agathon Rwasa's FNL party in Burundi and both groups remained the main armed opposition against Pierre Ngurunziza's government. In 2009, Agathon Rwasa's FNL party reformed its structure, which allowed the party to participate in the 2010 general election; this reformation affected the relationship with FNL-Nzabampema, who constantly opposed Ngurunziza's regime (Allen, 2011:44; United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19).

Although the main aim of FNL-Nzabampema was insurgencies against the CNDD-FDD government in Burundi, the group has been involved in the various armed confrontation with local armed groups that increased violence and insecurity in the Ruzizi plain and moyens plateau of Uvira in South Kivu. The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19 indicates that FNL-Nzabampema was once allies of FDLR and committed several joint atrocities including, massacre, rape, and theft of castles. However, towards the end of 2013,



the relationship between FNL-Nzabampema and FDLR was strained due to infighting and ideological divergences. The group remains active in the South Kivu region, committing violence both in the region and Burundi. The group was reportedly having launched several insurgencies in Burundi throughout 2014 with its base in the Ruzizi plain in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(v).The resistance pour un état de Droit, RED-Tabara

Also known as FRONABU-Tabara, is considered as the first Burundian armed group to install a “rear base” in the Kivu region owing to a third term election of President Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015 (Anderson, 2017). The group emanated from an opposition political party of the militant wing Alexis Sinduhije’s Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie (MSD). It is alleged that before setting-up a rear base in the Ruzizi plain, the combatants of RED-Tabara, underwent military training in Rwanda following close ties that the group’s leaders had with the Kigali government, a process that drew regional and international attention. The presence of RED-Tabara in the Ruzizi plain, increased violence and insecurity that local armed groups allied with Burundian’s National army to fight against the group. The RED-Tabara was thus weakened in the Ruzizi plain, many of its combatants defected to FPB/FOREBU despite the strained relationship of the two groups (United Nations Group of Experts’ report S/2017/672/Rev.1; *Kivu Security Tracker, 2017*).

(vi). Conseil Nationale pour le Renouveau et Democracie, CNRD

The CNRD is also a Rwandan armed group, which splintered from FDLR, owing to prevailed internal dissent over various matters including the providence of Banyarwanda refugees in camps in the Kivu region. The CNRD was formed in May 2016, led by Colonel Wilson Irategeka who felt discontent by the principle of the biometric census of Rwandan refugees underpinned by FDLR’s president Victor Byarungiro. The CNRD took most of its combatants from FDLR’s units in the South Kivu, while in the North Kivu many combatants remained attached to FDLR Foca despites the various clashes between the two groups since the creation of CNRD (Marcucci, 2019).

The CNRD is based in South Kivu, between the Mitumba Mountains and Hewabora near Kilembwe village in western Fizi territory, and in North Kivu to the north of Mweso village.



The group reinstated more fundamental approaches reinforcing conciliation with the Kigali government aiming at the repatriation of Rwandan refugees from the DRC. This approach was conceived as more moderate than various approaches used by the FDLR Foca, which led many armed groups ally with the CNRD including various Nyantura factions. The group has enjoyed collaboration and support of local armed groups and FARDC against FDLR Foca (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672/Rev.1). This report further states that there were instances the FARDC launched several joint operations aimed at capturing senior leaders of FDLR late 2016 and early 2017 with the help of CNRD. However, in mid-2017 the CNRD's relationship with FARDC as well as with groups that once supported them deteriorated and many of its senior leaders were arrested by government authorities. This weakened the groups' influence and loss of operational territories leading to defection of its combatants to other groups that by late 2017, the group was estimated to have about 400-500 combatants compared to more than 1000 combatants when it started in 2016.

3. 4. 2. Local Armed groups

(i). CNPSC (a.k.a Mai-Mai Yakutumba).

The Coalition nationale de peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC) also known as Mai Mai Yakutumba is a local armed group (indigenous armed group) based in the Fizi territory, South Kivu. This group is led by a former FARDC officer William Amuri Yakutumba, who created the group in 2007 under the official name "Parti d'action pour la reconstruction du Congo Forces armées alleluia, PARC-FAAL" (Marcucci, 2019). Capitalizing on perennial local grievances, particularly within the Babembe community, Yakutumba succeeded in mobilizing a number of smaller Mai Mai groups and lured the youth in Fizi to join the group, which is predominately by the Babembe ethnic group who harbour long grievances against the Kinshasa government. Mia Mai Yakutumba has enjoyed local and international support owing to its antagonistic rhetoric against Kinyarwanda speakers, perceived by many indigenous people as invaders and foreigners (Congo Research Group, 2017:4). Thus, all along with local chiefs and political elites in South Kivu, especially in the Fizi territory support and hold close ties with Mai Mai Yakutumba for various motives.

Various factors can be attributed to the creation of Mai Mai Yakutumba in 2007 and its existence until late 2016 before the emergence of the current coalition and its development



into one of the most daunting and vicious local armed groups in the South Kivu towards the end of 2016. Factors such as political discontentment vis à vis the allocation of political posts and ranks in the government and national security forces after the 2006 general election propelled Yakutumba to create his armed groups. Firstly was the issue of key posts in the army, police, and National intelligence agency (ANR), which were held mostly by Banyarwanda; Secondly, a large number of Banyamulenge combatants refused to disarm and continued committing violence in Fizi territory, where memories of atrocities caused by Rwandan-backed rebellions in Fizi between 1996 and 2003 were still looming; and Thirdly, was political elites who fell on armed groups after losing at polls to retain political influence triggered Yakutumba to defect FARDC and form a rebellious group (Stearns et. al, 2013:49).

In 2016, following the postponement of general elections, Mai Mai Yakutumba mobilized dozens of militia groups again and recruited new combatants to form “the coalition de peuple pour la Souveraineté du Congo, CNPSC”. The launching of this coalition was once conceived and attempted in 2013 with its de facto leader William Amuri Yakutumba, but could not materialize owing to undisclosed factors. The rise of CNPSC started in December 2016 and grew gradually that between September 2017 and January 2018, the CNPSC emerged as one of the most frightening local armed group, controlling significant areas of Fizi territory, north Tanganyika and south Maniema (Congo Research Group, 2017:3-4).

In the first half of 2017, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and its allies successfully launched a series of attacks against the FARDC including the Uvira attack in September 2017 aimed at extending its influence to Uvira territory, which MONUSCO intervened and blocked the group’s entry into Uvira at the Kalundu port (Munyakazi, 2018). The United Nations Groups of Experts’ report S/2018/531 posit that the CNPSC committed “100 attacks against FARDC positions from January 2017 to January 2018, as well as the killing of an estimated 80 FARDC soldiers”. The CNPSC’s rhetoric against the third term of President Joseph Kabila lured massive support from civilians in its zones of control triggering many youths in Fizi territory to join the group including the mobilization of several smaller armed groups to join the coalition early 2017. The CNPSC has collaborated with other armed groups including FDLR, Nyantura factions, and Forebu in fighting against Tutsi predominantly armed groups in the Haut Plateau of Uvira and Fizi territories such as Ngomino and Rai Mutomboki factions.



Given the increase of violence by the CNPSC combatants, the FARDC intensified its operations on various CNPSC settlements, which has destabilized and weakened the group's influence and loss of zones of operation to FARDC.

The CNPCS were estimated to have 1000 to 1500 combatants in 2017, but mid-2018 the coalition disseminated and scattered in various territories of the Kivu region divided into small groups not more than 200 combatants. However, several operations by FARDC against Mai Mai Yakutumba did not terminate its activities. In December 2018 there was intense armed conflicts that continued between Mai Mai Yakutumba and allies against the Ngomino armed group in the Haut Plateau of Fizi, Uvira, and high land of Itombwe territories in the South Kivu region. Mai mai Yakutumba remains one of the largest and formidable local armed groups in the Kivu region, operating a parallel administration in its zones of control, especially in the Ubwari peninsular, Ngandja forest, and mountains surrounding the Mining hub of Misisi (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531).

(ii). Nduma Defense du Congo Renové, NDC-R

The NDC-R is a local armed group in the North Kivu, created by Guidon Shimiray Mwissa in 2015 (Marcucci, 2019). The NDC-R was considered as one of the largest local armed group in the North Kivu between 2016 and 2018, and its leader remained popular and enjoyed community support owing to the group's ability to provide security and defend community's interests against rival armed groups in Walikale territory (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531). The NDC-R with its headquarters in Irameso Walikale territory managed to consolidate its power and expanded its area of influence through attacking and destabilizing the influence of the FDLR and dozens of other groups perceived as of foreign origin, which continued committing violence against civilians in Walikale and neighboring territories (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

The NDC-R coalition with Kobo and Nande Mai Mai groups managed to gain control over numerous mining sites, which was under FDLR control and extended its zone of control including some parts of Lubero, Rutshuru, and Masisi territories in North Kivu. Despite the NDC-R's success over FDLR and militia groups that increased violence, the group was also accused of becoming a liability to civilians owing to its extortive taxation practices, in which



every adult in their zones of control had to pay a fixed amount including farmers and miners who were forced to sell their gold on a fixed low price to the group. The NDC-R issued tokens as proofs of payment, and those who did not comply with terms and conditions faced serious charges and some were incarcerated. The group was also accused of extensive recruitment of children as combatants that the NDC-R leaders ordered forceful recruitment of children (United Nations Groups of Experts' report S/2018/531).

The main target of the NDC-R was to fight against the FDLR, however, there have been instances that the NDC-R clashed with other armed groups in their zones of influences including the Alliances des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), Mai Mai Mazembe and many militia factions (Marcucci, 2019). The group also had collaborated with FARDC on several occasions in 2017 discussing strategic approaches to attack other armed groups. Despite controlling a large territory than any armed group in the North Kivu, the NDC-R did not experience attacks from FARDC until mid-2018 when the group attacked the FARDC position in a mining site that generated its income. The FARDC operations and its split into two groups weakened its influence; one group (NDC-R) remained under Guidon and the other group broke away with Bwira in July 2020 who later surrendered to the government forces in August 2020 (Munyagala, 2020). Thus, NDC-R has remained active to date under Guidon, holding sway over large areas in Walikale territory in North Kivu (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

(iii). Mai Mai Nyantura and Raia Mutomboki

The growing insecurity perpetrated by FDLR in Shabunda and the antagonistic rhetoric between Banyarwanda Hutu and Banyarwanda Tutsi ignited the creation of Nyantura and Raia Mutomboki factions. The Nyantura is a local armed group predominately by Banyarwanda Hutu created around 2011 claiming to protect the Congolese Hutu from other Mai Mai groups. Since its creation, the Nyantura is accused of coalescing with FDLR and local Mai Mai groups against the Banyarwanda Tutsis. On the other hand, the Raia Mutomboki faction emerged as a mix of communal self-defense group in Shabunda following atrocities committed by FDLR and its allies against civilians (Schlindwein, 2012). Made up of many loosely affiliated units, the Raia Mutomboki started in 2005 and 2006 under Jean Musumbu, a local leader from southern Shabunda territory who mobilized



against the FDLR, the group remained dormant until its second wave of reemergence in 2011 which continued and fragmented into many factions to date. The term Raia Mutomboki means “outraged citizens” and Nyantura means “hit them hard”. The two groups have fragmented into dozens of factions (United Nations Group of Experts’ report S/2015/19).

In 2015 and 2016, owing to political instability that galvanized the DRC, the Nyantura groups continued proliferating and operated in a chain of networks across the Kivu region including the renowned Nyantura Kasongo in western parts of North Kivu in Rutshuru territory with a network of other Nyantura factions under his influence and Nyantura Domi and John Love, who also cooperated through the umbrella of Nyantura with a chain of networked factions under their influence (United Nations Group of Experts’ report S/2015/19). The Nyantura factions were estimated to be approximately 12 factions spread across the Kivu region operating mostly in networked style. The presence of Nyantura factions increased fear and insecurity in communities, especially in the Tutsi communities as the main aim of Nyantura factions has always been protecting the Hutus against Tutsi tyrannizes.

This triggered the mobilization and fragmentation of the Raia Mutomboki faction between 2016 and 2017 resulting into dozens of factions scattered across the Kivu region including the Rai Mutomboki Donat/Ndandu led by FARDC defectors Major Donat Kengwa Omari and Major Ngandu Lundimu of Rega community-based in northern Shabuda; Raia Mutomboki Blaise based in Kabare territory in South Kivu; Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo in Kalehe Territory in South Kivu; Raia Mutomboki Butachibera in Bunyakili nearby the border of North and South Kivu and Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto in Walungu province. Some of these groups operate in a networked model that one commander control two to three factions under his influence.

The FARDC and FIB’s joint operations aimed at neutralizing armed group networks and eradicating violence in the North Kivu did not achieve its objectives, as of 2018 the Nyantura and Raia Mutomboki factions continued cycles of armed conflict and committed all kind of violence including abducting, rape, forceful recruitment, killing and extortive taxation in various zones under their influence. The Nyantura and Raia Mutomboki factions have remained a threat to peace and security in the Kivu region as many of their combatants



refuse to demobilize and continue to split into various small groups scattered across the Kivu region. The Nyantura factions occupy large parts of Southeast of North Kivu in Rutshuru, Lubero, and Beni territories with few elements in South Kivu, whilst the Raia Mutomboki tenanted in the western north of South Kivu, in Shabunda, Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe territories (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2015/19).

(iv). Union des Patriotes pour la Libération du Congo, UPLC (a.k.a Mai Mai Kilalo)

The UPLC is a local armed group in the North Kivu, created in 2016 led by a traditional healer Katembo Kilalo and his fellow rebel veteran Mambari Bini Pélé (alias Saperita). Kilalo served as a combatant and healer in Lafontaine and Paul Sandala's armed groups, while Mambari was a former FARDC officer and a member of local Mai Mai groups (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672). The group emerged in response to intensified attacks against the Nande community by ADF rebels in Lubero territory. In the beginning, this group allied with Mazembe factions to fight against the ADF, though this coalition was short-lived. In December 2016, the group attacked MONUSCO camp in Butembo and killed almost 4 people including a South African peacekeeper, a Congolese army officer, a police officer, and a civilian. In 2017, the group increased attacks against rival groups and government forces to worsen their grievances against the prolonged term of President Joseph Kabila including several attacks in Lubero town between August 2017 and January 2018 (The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531).

In 2018, the UPLC leader Kilalo continued mobilizing other Mai Mai groups to join him to fight against the Kinshasa government, which he accused of deliberate unconstitutional delays of the 2016 general elections. In March 2018, the group was estimated to have approximately 500 to 600 combatants divided into sub-sections across Lubero, Beni, and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu. The group appears to operate in a chain of networks and emerged as one of the vicious armed groups in the North Kivu committing violence against civilians and forceful recruitment of children as combatants (The United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2018/531). The FARDC's operations throughout 2018 weakened the group's influence over certain areas of control but failed to neutralize the group that continued posing threats to peace and security in the North Kivu region to date.



(v). Mai Mai Corps du Christ

The Mai Mai Corps du Christ is also a local armed group created in 2016, led by David Maranatha a former member of a long-standing Christian sect, based in Mount Carmel near Butembo where the group originated and drew its name. The group emerged following a ripple of new mobilization of armed groups across Butembo, Beni, and Rutshuru towns in response to continued atrocities in Beni territory. The group drew the attention of and lured other militia groups to join the group owing to its rhetoric campaign against massacres that galvanized Beni territory, which led the group to a peaceful stride in Butembo town demanding conveyance to Beni to fight against perpetrators of massacres (United Nations Group of Experts' report S/2017/672).

The Mai Mai Corps du Christ, like other armed groups, had a chain of Mai Mai groups under its influence including Mai Mai Lolwako Pokopoko and Mai Mai groups of former RCD-K/LM commander Kakolele Bwambale who claimed to be the leader of the group in January 2017. The group launched several attacks in Butembo against government forces in December 2016 leading the FARDC to intensify its operations against the group. These operations weakened the group's influence, and it was dislodged away from its initial settlement in mid-2017. There was an instance that the group collaborated with other armed groups such as Mai Mai Kilalo and Mai Mai Nzurunga but this was a short-lived coalition (Kivu Security Tracker, 2018).

3. 5. Conclusion

This chapter provided the background and dynamics of various factors that triggered the recent proliferation and resistance of armed groups in the Kivu region. The central argument maintained in this chapter is that armed groups currently active in the Kivu region are the reincarnation of the previous ones capitalizing on unresolved past crises. The study noted that the coalition of AFDL served as the orchestrators of the first Congo war and the source of current armed groups. The study found out that it was through the splinting of AFDL due to Laurent Kabila's antagonistic rhetoric against Congolese Tutsis, who toiled along with him to topple Mobutu's regime that the wide range of armed conflicts and the fragmentation armed groups exacerbated in the Kivu region.



The demise of AFDL, and the emergence of various anti-Laurent Kabila groups such as RCD (a coalition preponderated by Congolese Tutsis) backed by Rwanda and Uganda, revived two types of conflict patterns that featured throughout the increase of current armed groups. Firstly, it rekindled ethnic hatred and tensions of a separate ethnic consciousness in various communities, which created waves of fragmentation of armed groups along ethnic lines and increased inter-ethnic conflicts, especially between native Congolese and Banyarwanda Congolese. Secondly, it exacerbated the insecurity in the villages causing the mobilization of localized self-defense Mai Mai groups with antagonistic rhetoric against other ethnic groups perceived as rivals.

These patterns are the core causes of protracted prevalence of armed groups in the Kivu region; whilst socio-economic deprivation, grievances against Joseph Kabila's regime, delays of 2016 general elections, neighboring and natural resources as well as the failure of Security Sector Reform and FARDC operations are proximate causes that triggered the creation of current armed groups and their resistance in the Kivu region. It is within these parameters that armed groups continue oscillating in the Kivu region repudiating various forms of DDR/RR programs as examined in Chapter Four.



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Chapter Four.

The DDR/RR programs in the Kivu region.

4. Introduction

In chapter three (3) the study focused on various dynamics of non-state armed groups and provided a comprehensive analysis of their trend in the Kivu region. It is argued in the preceding chapters that DDR/RR programs were established to neutralize the armed groups and end violence in the DRC, especially the eastern parts of the country. This chapter, therefore, assesses the overall establishment and implementation of DDR/RR programs in the DRC and it looks more specifically at its successes and failures vis-à-vis the current increase of armed groups witnessed in the Kivu region.

4. 1. Background of DDR/RR in the DRC.

The idea of DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo emerged from the Lusaka ceasefire agreement in July 1999, owing to exacerbated armed conflict and the multitudes of local and foreign armed groups that were involved in the second Congo war in 1998 (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012:144; the United Nations, 1999). As argued in chapter three that the second Congo war (1998-2003) involved many African countries in the conflict including Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, CAR, and Republic of Congo Brazzaville. This conflict increased the presence and the number of foreign and local armed combatants in the DRC, particularly in the Kivu region (United Nations, 2002). Thus, the key component of various Peace Accords was to initiate DDR/RR frameworks within the context of ending the armed conflicts, the neutralization of armed groups and the eradication of weapons spread in the DRC (Amnesty International, 2007).

The first attempt of the DDR/RR program included in the Lusaka accord as argued by Alusala (2007:37) was the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission (MONUC) in the DRC under the resolution 1279 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in November 1999 with a mandate to oversight the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and run voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation, and repatriation (DDR/RR) of foreign armed combatants. The UNSC Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001



impulse warring parties to collaborate with MONUC to implement plans for immediate Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and Resettlement of all armed combatants.

Towards the end of 2001, these earlier attempts and MONUC's mandate did not yield much-expected results, which led to the negotiations and signing of the Pretoria Peace Accord in July 2002 between the DRC and Rwanda government (McGreal, 2002; Alusala, 2015:230). In this Accord, Rwanda agreed to withdraw its soldiers from the DRC within 90-days and the DRC government had to disarm and repatriate the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FDLR combatants within the same timeframe to Rwanda (Malan & Boshoff, 2002). This was to ensure that there was no interruption or interference of foreign forces in the scheduled government of national unity (transitional government) and proposed election processes; thus, the timeframe for the removal of all ex-FAR, Interahamwe and Rwandan troops was between 30 July 2002 and 30 October 2002.

At the same time, under the Pretoria Peace Agreement, MONUC was obliged to liaise with the DRC government through a joint military commission initiated by the Lusaka Accord to attain two principal objectives: the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed combatants to their countries (the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and the FDLR) as well as the integration of local warring factions into government forces or civilian life (United Nations, 2002). In an effort to propel this agreement Alusala (2007:37) adds that MONUC was also mandated to set up immediate processes to disarm all ex-FAR and Interahamwe combatants and facilitate their repatriation to Rwanda in collaboration with the DRC and Rwanda governments. Talking of the success and failure of the timeframe of this 90-days DDR/RR operations, Hakim (2016:37) argues that only about 23,400 out of estimated 56,000-60,000 Rwandan Patriotic combatants withdrew within the 90-days timeframe, claiming that the DRC government had demanded about 20,000 Rwandan combatants to remain under the umbrella of community demobilization and reinsertion in the Kivu region.

Similarly, a report by the United Nations maintains that in February 2003 the FDLR combatants did not disarm or demobilize despite the fact that they were the main target of this 90-days DDR/RR programs. This report further adds that only about 402 Rwandan

Hutus underwent disarmament whilst thousands remained armed (United Nations report, 2003). In the first quarter of 2003, the DRC government and MONUC did not attain the objectives of the agreements between DRC and Rwanda governments on the issue of capturing, dismantling, and repatriating ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FDLR to Rwanda within the specified timeframe. Later, the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, FDLR, and the remnant of RPA combatants refused to comply with DDR/RR processes, which prompted the DRC government to use force to disarm and repatriate them, but without success (United Nations, 2003). This marked the failure of the first attempted DDR/RR program under the umbrella of the MONUC in Congo.

The failure of the first attempted DDR/RR program exacerbated violence and cycles of armed conflict as the Rwandan government returned thousands of its soldiers in the eastern DRC claiming to protect its borders; a situation that increased new waves of armed conflict and violence in the Kivu region. Towards the end of 2003, it was evident that various signed Peace Agreements did not achieve the much-expected result. At the same time, the negotiations of launching a formalized DDR/RR program under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) impeded; as a result, violence exacerbated owing to the multiplication of foreign and local armed groups, which increased the instability not only for the DRC but for the Great Lakes Region as a whole (Allen, 2011:46-50).

Given the crisis in the Great Lakes region, the World Bank in partnership with various donor countries including the United Nations and its partners had to propel the launching of a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) aimed at ending cycles of armed conflict, neutralizing the presence of non-state armed groups and enhancing the prospects of restoring stability in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) through demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants of countries involved in the conflict (Kolln, 2011:4-5). The MDRP's main aim was to partner and assist individual countries within the Great Lakes Region including the DRC, Central African Republic, Angola, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda to set up and implement national DDR/RR programs for ex-combatants (Lamb et. al, 2012:5; Deetlefs, 2017:51).



Although the MDRP was launched in 2002, it did not fund DDR/RR operations in the DRC; only after all parties to the conflict agreed to sign “the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement” in December 2002 in South Africa leading to the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government in June 2003, which marked the end of the Congo wars (Amnesty International, 2007). After the signing of this agreement and the flow of initial funding that began in 2004, the MDRP started implementing its operations to national governments in the Great Lakes Region, in which the DRC was a beneficiary. And it was within this parameter that the MDRP and the World Bank began funding the implementation of DDR/RR programs in the DRC under the supervision of MONUC, UNDP, NGOs, and UNICEF as the DRC government had not established a national body that could monitor the implementation of MDRP’s DDRRR funded programs (Braberg, 2016:22).

Also, when the MDRP funding was ready for DDR programs to individual countries in the Great Lakes region, the DRC government had already created its own National Program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (PNDDR) in an effort to establish national peace in 2004. To run this PNDDR, the DRC government established three (3) governing bodies: firstly, was an inter-ministerial committee in charge of conceptualization and orientation of DDR programs in December 2003. Secondly, was the National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (CONADER) in May 2004, to monitor and elaborate a master plan of the overall implementation of the National DDR programs including the execution and coordination of the entire National DDR programs. And thirdly, was a financial committee for the management of National DDR funds (Lamb et. al, 2012:5; Alusala, 2007:43-44).

Along these three (3) bodies was also the Structure for Military Integration (SMI), which together served as National bodies to run the overall monitoring of PNDDR implementation; and it was through these bodies that the MDRP funded DDR programs in the DRC. The Structure for Military Integration (SMI) was established on 24 January 2004, as “a dual-track process” through which all combatants intending to enter PNDDR had to pass-through before being demobilized and integrated into the national army or civilian life (Allen, 2011:48).



The main role of the PNDDR was firstly, to restore peace and security in the country, to monitor and initiate security sector reform and create a united Congolese national army through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants of various groups that signed the “Global and Inclusive Peace Agreement” (World Bank, 2009:1-3). And secondly, the MDRP requested individual governments in the Great Lakes region to have their own National DDR program as a prerequisite to access the MDRP funding for national DDR programs (Amnesty International, 2007). To support the PNDDR, the United Nations Security Council resolution 1493 (2003) mandated MONUC to assist the DRC government in the overall running of DDR/RR programs within the MDRP’s framework. This was despite the fact that MONUC in partnership with various NGOs had run independently various segments of DDR/RR programs since MDRP’s inception in 2002, which did not yield much-expected results in the DRC (UNSC, 2003).

Veen (2009:48-49) argues that although MONUC was mandated to assist the DRC government regarding the processes of implementing MDRP’s program, its tasks were limited because much of DRC’s PNDDR activities were monitored by DRC government’s bodies. Thus, whilst CONADER was tasked with the overall organization of the processes of demobilization and reintegration, MONUC’s role was limited to disarmament level as this was not part of the MDRP program (Lamb et. al, 2012:6). Similarly, Deetlefs (2017:52) attests that the main role of MONUC in the implementation of PNDDR was to assist CONADER in the disarmament of foreign armed combatants and the protection of disarmed combatants who wanted to go through DDR; as well as providing logistical support, facilitating, and harmonizing peaceful dialogues between warring actors involved in the DDR/RR programs. The following sections provide the overall implementation of DDR/RR programs and its subsequent phases in the DRC.

4. 2. DDR/RR and its Phases in the DRC.

Under the umbrella and support of the MDRP, the DRC’s National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (PNDDR) has been implemented at least two times (DDR phase One and two) while the government is rolling a third parallel DDR program since 2015. The First Phase of the DDR/RR program started in October 2004 to December 2006; Second Phase began in July 2007 to December 2011; and the ongoing



third Phase begun in August 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Among other objectives, DDR/RR programs were established to achieve the following general objectives in the DRC: Firstly, the program targeted the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of all local armed combatants; Secondly, the program had to facilitate and guarantee a total withdrawal of all foreign armed combatants (in particular, ex-FAR, Interahamwe, FDLR and RPA) from DRC as per Lusaka Accord (Hakimu, 2016:36; World Bank, 2009:2-3). This included the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reinsertion (resettlement), and reintegration (DDR/RR) of foreign armed groups (Alusala, 2007:42); Thirdly, the program had to address the issues of using children as soldiers and their disarmament and reintegration; and Lastly, the program had to address the continued hostilities in the eastern parts of the country.

4. 2. 1. DDR Phase One (2004-2006)

Launched in October 2004, DDR/RR Phase One began featuring when the MDRP and the DRC government established the Joint Coordinated Operation Centre (CCOC) in February and March 2005 as a mechanism of coordination to amalgamate efforts of various DDR actors in the country in order to optimize the overall implementation of the National DDR program (Allen, 2011:47). At this time MDRP, MONUC, and PNDDR were the main institutions that superintended the DDR activities in the DRC; and it was through these institutions that other bodies were established and given various tasks to oversight the full delivery of the first phase of National DDR programs including CONADER, which was tasked with the overall coordination and implementation of the civil demobilization and reintegration part of the program; SMI was tasked with the initial screening of ex-combatants before being integrated into the national army; Inter-ministerial Committee was tasked with the conceptualization, orientation and taking care of the entire DDR/RR plan; and the financial committee was tasked with the monitoring and analyzing of the funds needed to execute the National DDR plan and to mobilize these funds from donor organizations (Deetlefs, 2017:53).

Through these bodies, all the necessary logistics to optimize the implementation of the First Phase of the DDR program was set, such as the establishment of Orientation Centers (OC) and Centre de Brassage in different locations in the Kivu region including Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungu, and Goma, where ex-combatants would be camped when undergoing through



demobilization and reintegration processes (Lamb et. al, 2012:6). According to the second draft of the National DDR program, an estimate of about 330,000 combatants were to go through PNDDR, in which about 150,000 combatants were to be integrated into the National army (FARDC) and the rest had to be disarmed and reintegrated into society (Amnesty International, 2007). The World Bank (2009:2) posits that although the launching of DDR targeted all armed combatants in the DRC, the main beneficiaries remained combatants of armed groups that signed the Global and All-Inclusive Accord; who were estimated to be about 250,000 combatants, of which former Congolese armed forces (FAC) registered about 100,000 combatants; MLC registered about 50,000 combatants; RCD-National registered about 10,000 combatants; RCD-Goma registered about 45,000 combatants; and RCD-K/ML registered about 30,000 combatants.

CONADER as the main body and coordinator of the overall implementation of the national DDR program formulated an operational structure that specified demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration eligibility criteria for ex-combatants as part of the selection process. These eligibility criteria targeted the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants whose armed groups signed the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement including the FAC, MLC, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N, and Mai Mai groups that fulfilled the eligibility criteria. These criteria included: (a) Having a Congolese nationality, (b) Possessing a weapon or a certificate of disarmament issued by competent authorities (even those issued during voluntary disarmament by MONUC), (c) having proof of membership in a recognized non-state armed group, (d) Proving that you have taken part in armed conflict in the DRC between October 1996 and May 2003 (The World Bank, 2004).

In a discussion on the operational structure of the DDR phase one, Veen (2009:49) argues that it was sketched to usher cooperation between military and non-military organizations through the support of CONADER and MONUC. For instance, the National DDR program was devised “within a common strategy for both army integration and DDR”, considering the tasks that were already done by the structure for Military Integration (SMI) in the creation of a unified national army through the army integration process. This implied that the implementation of PNDDR had to consider the role played by previous institutions in demobilizing and integrating combatants, especially factions that were already integrated



into FARDC through the SMI processes and were waiting to go through the *tronc commun* process to determine whether they wanted to demobilize or integrate. By the time phase one of DDR/RR had to be implemented, the SMI had already reinserted about 60,000 combatants while various child protection agencies had reintegrated about 30,000 child combatants. As such, the implementation of PNDDR had no option than to consider the role played by various institutions including the SMI in managing the processes of integrating armed combatants into the National army (Veen, 2009:48; World Bank, 2009:3). However, these processes were criticized that many combatants were reintegrated and reinserted without proper screening.

The last stage of DDR/RR phase one provided two options to all targeted combatants: either to integrate into DRC National army (FARDC) or to mobilize and re-integrate into civilian life (Deetlefs, 2017:53). In this process, the role of MONUC remained to oversight the disarmament process of armed combatants on a voluntary pace and registering weapons at various disarmament points, afterward ex-combatants received receipts of capitulated weapons, which allowed their access to Orientation Centers (Lamb et.al, 2012:6). Before entering the orientation centers, combatants had to relinquish their military status; afterward, they were given information about the overall status of ex-combatants and then choose either to demobilize or return to civilian life (Actors, 2013:2-4).

Under the SMI, combatants who chose to integrate into the national army were transferred to training centers (*camps de brassage*) to pass an aptitude test and to go-through military training (Alusala, 2007:45). Actors (2013:6) argues that ex-combatants who failed this aptitude test were returned to Orientation Centers to continue with the DDR program, which would lead to their integration into community; and those who passed the test were retrained and given posts into newly formed brigade *brassees* of the DRC united national army, FARDC. In addition, Actors (2013) assert that ex-combatants who chose to reintegrate remained in the orientation centers for medical screening, basic vocational training and afterward received exit kits such as basic household items and a sum of 60\$ as the transport to their communities of origin (Veen, 2009:50). Regarding to choose between reintegration into the national army and civilian life, Alusala further states that many ex-combatants opted for demobilization and reintegration into the national army for various motives including



“financial compensation” accrued to demobilization and reintegration and the fear that if peace efforts failed, they would fall victims against rival groups (Alusala, 2007:45-46). The DDR/RR phase one was set to achieve its objectives before the general elections that were scheduled for 30 July 2006, but it was only by December 2006 that phase one came to an end with almost 18 orientation centers closing owing to various challenges (Actors, 2013:5-6).

Braberg (2016:23-24) posits that DDR phase one came to an end and the budget was almost depleted while the project’s original objectives were not achieved. For instance, out of 132,000 demobilized ex-combatants, only about 54,000 received reintegration packages; and out of 30,000 demobilized ex-children combatants, only about 16,000 received integration support. Some orientation centers were closed having large numbers of demobilized combatants without reintegration support, especially female and children ex-combatants, which prompted many to re-recruitment and vulnerability to be used by emerging non-state armed groups. Similarly, Conoir (2012:11) argues that the most frightening part of DDR/RR phase One was the delays of reintegration supports and activities to mobilized ex-combatants that could ignite unrest amongst them. The protracted delays between demobilization and reintegration packages were becoming unbearable to mobilized ex-combatants and was looming a conflict breakout.

The uncompleted DDR phase one left approximately 40,000 ex-combatants yearning for demobilization and reintegration support, and the cost involved to address this amounted to an additional of approximately US\$ 75 million (Deetlefs, 2017:54). At the same time the end of phase one coalesced with the new government that came to power in 2007, which embossed series of convoluted issues beyond the control of CONADER and contrived the fulfillment of the original objectives of PNDDR. This resulted in insufficient funds to accomplish the demobilization and reintegration of disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants who were scattered in various parts of the eastern DRC including an estimate of about 70,000 FARDC combatants and who waiting for another scheme of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes. Bushoff (2010:5) maintain similar views as of above authors when he posits that although DDR phases One succeed in disarming and demobilizing approximately 115,000 adult combatants and 54,000 children, only about



45,000 adult combatants were reinserted into the national army whilst 70,000 ex-combatants had to wait for new or re-establishment of reintegration program. Boshoff adds that the time CONADER closed its operations, the UNICEF continued with the DDR of children associated with armed groups; and those mobilized were integrated back to their communities; and for adult combatants, there was still an estimate of approximately 80,000 combatants that were targeted for DDR program.

4. 2. 2. DDR Phase Two (2007-2011).

As the objectives of achieving stability through DDR phase one failed and the budget was depleted, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and the World Bank agreed to aid the establishment of the Second Phase of the DDR program with a budget of USD 75 million; in which the World bank ordered the DRC government to reform CONADER as far as its funds were to be released for the Second Phase of DDR/RR programs (Breyden and Scherrer, 2012:147; World Bank, 2009:4). On 14 July 2007, CONADER was dissolved and replaced by a new body, Unite d'Execution du Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reintegration (UE-PNDDR) to manage the Second Phase of the National DDR program (MDNDAC, 2014:5). Although this administrative change was a positive step, the ongoing armed conflict in the eastern parts of the country delayed the starting of the Second Phase of the DDR program for almost a year.

The Second Phase was scheduled between July 2008 and December 2009, but due to series of peace negotiations that continued, including the Goma Peace Accord in early 2008, Umoja Wetu (our unity, between DRC and Rwanda government), and the Peace Accord of 23 March 2009, between DRC government and various armed groups (in particular the CNDP rebels), the processes of DDR/RR phase two were entirely delayed and could only start in June 2009 (Stearns, 2012:40; Actors, 2013:6). The new UE-PNDDR, which replace CONADER was tasked to achieve the original objectives of the PNDDR program by stabilizing the security situation in the eastern DRC (OIOS, 2018:1). Between July 2008 and February 2009, the EU-PNDDR launched special "evaluation schemes" aimed at assessing the successes and shortfalls of DDR phase One as well as general analysis on all subsequent caseloads of processed ex-combatants to enable the operational recovery that would foster the beginning of PNDDR phase Two with improved structure.



In March and April 2009, the processes of launching DDR phase Two were accompanied by other programs, which derailed its progress including the re-organization of the national army (army reform process) as part of peace negotiations, which resulted in the DRC government agreeing to reintegrate CNDP and Mai Mai combatants into the national army without passing through the agreed pattern of PNDDR/SMI process and brassage (Bryden and Scherrer, 2012:145). Baltus (2015:84) argues that the integration of CNDP combatants into the national army was a big mistake as it triggered the defection of discontent combatants from FARDC and the creation of new armed groups, which led to new waves of armed conflicts.

Approximately 20,000 CNDP and Mai Mai ex-combatants were reintegrated; some with ranks into FARDC without passing-through the brassage process (Sengenya, 2015). This process was highly criticized as it allowed perpetrators of human rights into FARDC with ranks increasing their authority and power to continue committing atrocities against civilians in their area of influence. Boshoff (2010:3-4) asserts that ex-combatants who reintegrated into FARDC without going through PNDDR/SMI and brassage processes were not detached from the chain of command that existed between warring groups. Boshoff adds that it was vital for all ex-combatants to go-through initiated PNDDR/SMI and brassage as it involved a 45 days military training that all mobilized ex-combatants choosing to reintegrate into the national army had to go through; and it was through this process that ex-combatants were detached from the various chain of command.

Brusset et. al (2011:97) argue that by the time phase Two was to be launched, many combatants were already mixed into FARDC without vetting, which reduced the previously anticipated caseload of approximately 70-80,000 combatants that the government had planned to process in Second Phase, despite the fact that the exact number of combatants remained confusing due to armed groups' leaders who always presented long and false lists of combatants in an effort to seek financial gain. This prompted the UE-PNDDR to conduct a thorough verification of combatants' eligibility for phase Two, due to past experiences in DDR phase One, in which leaders of various rebel groups presented lists of many combatants who did not exist. Brusset. et. al conclude by stating that it was evident that



numbers of armed combatants presented on the lists did not correspond to those who physically appeared to disarmament, demobilization, and orientation centers. The DDR phase One experienced various cases of this nature in almost every armed group whose leaders sought money gain in the processes of DDR.

Actors (2013:7) states that even the introduction of “one weapon, one combatant approach, emerged as concerns against the signatories of Goma Peace Accord and their vast inflated number of combatants under their command”, which could not correspond to the actual number of combatants presented to orientation centers. This led the UE-PNDDR to revise down the anticipated number of ex-combatants for DDR phase Two, in which the demobilization of the anticipated 70,000 combatants was reduced to 10,000 combatants of which only 5000 would be demobilized and the rest would be reintegrated into the army. The reintegration of 40,000 mobilized ex-combatants of DDR phase One remained and were to receive reintegration packages under DDR Phase Two whilst the estimated 19,000 ex-combatants that would join the reintegration process had not existed and could not be part of DDR Phase Two.

Analyzing the shortfalls of DDR/RR phase one, the directives of UE-PNDDR regarding phase two focused mainly on the combatants recognized associated with illegal political militarization, who were ready to go-through formal and legal process of renouncing their military status for mobilization and reintegration into civilian life or national army, which was the initial objectives and target of DDR programs (World Bank, 2009:4-6). This included the dismantling of all armed groups associated with the armed conflict in the eastern DRC and a thorough vetting of processed ex-combatants who met strict criteria set out by PNDDR during phase One. This was because the launching of phase Two did not have structures that would cater for rebel groups (groupes d’auto-defense) that were not entitled to formal demobilization support despite the security threat they posed and serious violence committed against civilians. The estimated number of these combatants was approximately 60,000 towards the end of 2008; and the UNDP and MONUC had to continue with their DDR program after the Goma Peace Accord, which incorporated many into PNDDR programs.



The UE-PNDDR and key agencies that assisted the implementation of phase One including FAO, ADEKOR, CARITAS CONGO, ILO, and INPP launched Phased Two, focusing mainly on the reintegration stage of the DDR program, with a specific number of targeted combatants. The program started by giving reintegration support to about 23,780 combatants out of awaiting 40,000 demobilized ex-combatants (old caseload of phase one); and out of 70-80,000 previously anticipated combatants for Demobilization and Reintegration, only about 10,000 combatants were demobilized, of which only 5000 were reintegrated into the national army (Brusset et. al, 2011:96-98). This is more evident that phase Two paid much attention to old caseload including signatories of various peace accords. According to Conoir (2012:12-13), Phase Two succeeded in treating the demobilization of mostly FARDC combatants compared to phase One that focused on rebel groups and failed to accomplish its objectives. He adds that the nature of demobilization in phase Two differed with that of phase one, especially with the number of ex-combatants who were fully demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life and the national army. For Conoir, phase Two improved demobilization and reintegration structure, which led many ex-combatants to opt for demobilization than reintegration.

However, Vogel and Musamba differ from Conoir when they talk about the success of Phase Two. They argue that phase Two did not achieve much of the expected result because it treated cases that were almost done in phase One. They further contend that about 65% of phase Two budget remained and as a result, severe corruption emerged in PNDDR and its management. Coordinators started using PNDDR as an avenue to enrich themselves, using reintegration packages meant for ex-fighters for personal interests. For these authors, Phase Two closed its activities whilst thousands of ex-combatants were unattended and failed to mobilize commanders of armed groups who remained threats to peace and security, which increased violence and numbers of non-state armed groups in the Kivu region (Vogel & Musamba, 2016:3). The statistic shows that both Phase One and Two did not achieve the original objectives of DDR programs. By the end of Phase Two in December 2009, many armed combatants were not neutralized, and the consolidation of peace and security remained difficult owing to continued armed conflicts and violence in the Kivu region. As such, the original target of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating an estimate of about



320-350,000 armed combatants in the eastern DRC was not achieved by both DDR phase One and Two.

Deetlefs (2017:56) argues that out of 350,000 estimated armed combatants only about 208,438 combatants were processed during phase One and Two between 2004 and 2009; of which only about 110,921 were mobilized, and about 89,946 were reintegrated into the national army including 4524 female ex-combatants as stated in a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service in 2018 (OIOS, 2018:1). Actors (2013:6) posit that between 2004 and 2009 approximately 118,548 weapons were recovered, although Akimu (2016:42) criticizes this view by claiming that the number of combatants demobilized, and weapons collected was not exactly documented.

The limited success of Phase One and Two left many armed combatants scattered across the Kivu region in need of disarmament and mobilization. This led the United Nations Security Council under the resolution 1925 to extend MONUC operations in the DRC and changed its name to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO (Braberg, 2016:25). Under this resolution, MONUSCO was charged with the responsibility to assist the DRC government to restructure another segment of the DDR program. The process of DDR Phase III delayed but between December 2009 and September 2011 combatants who were to be mobilized were processed under the “UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy and the Congolese Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflicts Armes, STAREC”. Under these platforms, a limited demobilization and reintegration program continued and by 2011 this scheme had managed to mobilize an additional of about 2000 ex-combatants (Actors, 2013:7; Conoir, 2012:12)

4. 2. 3. DDR Phase Three (2015-Present)

Following the failure of PNDDR phase One and Two, and the increase of armed groups that exacerbated violence in the Kivu region between 2012 and 2013, the DRC government established the third phase of the DRR/RR program, which was supported by the United Nations Security Council under its resolution 2198 and 2147 (UNSC S/Res/2277/2016). On 24 February 2013, the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Accord was signed in



Addis Ababa to consolidate peace and security and reliance amongst neighbors in the Great Lakes region. In this Accord the DRC government was mandated to establish the third phase of the DDR/RR program to strengthen regional security efforts (Baltus, 2015:85).

To endorse this Accord, on 28 May 2013, the United Nations deployed the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) with a mandate within MONUSCO to cooperate and assist the DRC national army to neutralize and disarm armed groups threatening peace and security efforts in the eastern DRC (Obala, 2015:6-7). In November 2013, the FARDC and FIB conducted a joint operation against the M23 movement, in which M23 rebels were defeated. This defeat propelled many rebel combatants to surrender to disarmament centers, which fostered the urgent need for DDR phase Three (World Bank, 2015:2). DDR Phase Three was established in 2013 and was supposed to start that same year but owing to various issues including thorough analysis and review on previously failed DDR programs, the implementation delayed and the conclusion concerning its overall processes was only reached on 17 June 2014; and the implementation was then scheduled to start on 15 August 2015 while the proposed closing date was supposed to be on 31 December 2019 (Vogel and Musamba, 2016:2-4)).

The UE-PNDDR remained the government body to monitor the overall processes of phase Three with the support of various organizations including the World Bank, European Union, the Swedish government, UNICEF, Caritas Congo, FAO, Institut National de Preparation Professionnel (INPP), and MONUSCO. By the time the preparation of launching phase three was going on between June 2015 and February 2016, there was an estimate of about 12,205 ex-combatants that DDR phase III targeted excluding the 4700 ex-combatants that remained in the recruitment centers, which the UNICEF, Caritas Congo, UNDP, FAO, and MONUSCO continued assisting under the implementation of STAREC program involving the disarmament, demobilization, and reunification of children associated with armed groups; these processes continued as pre-phase or emergency phase of DDR phase three (World Bank, 2015:27). The experience of previous DDR programs, which always left disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants without reintegration, led the EU-PNDDR to establish stern directives for DDR phase three to avoid pitfalls of previous programs. These measures included firstly the development of an extensive reintegration program that would



pay more attention to skills enhancement training for all processed ex-combatants of previous DDR programs; which would enable their socio-economic reintegration into communities of their choice to start a civilian life with established livelihoods; children and female ex-combatants were also included (World Bank, 2015:27).

Secondly, avoiding the reintegration of ex-combatants into the national army, in which only a limited number of ex-combatants would be allowed to reintegrate into the national army. This led the DRC government spurn the proposition of integrating ex-combatants into the national army. For instance, in February 2014, the former government spokesperson Lambert Mende Omalanga was quoted saying that “DDR 1 and 2 failed because we accepted to integrate the bad elements into our army; in phase III, we shall never, never again accept these criminals in our army; We understand the need for reconciliation, but we can't reintegrate elements who mutinied twice; We shall get a few people with a good record to integrate into our army and the rest will be reinserted into the community” (IRIN news, 2014).

Thirdly, UE-PNDDR had to apply stringent and appropriate approaches to disarm and demobilize new combatants who wished to join phase three; then regroup and reintegrate ex-combatants into camps and communities far from their community of origin in an effort to disband them from the chain of command and re-recruitment to former armed groups (Vogel & Musamba, 2016:4). Thus, before launching phase three, the EU-PNDDR established structures to create awareness campaigns informing armed groups the benefits accrued to DDR programs including skills training that would assist ex-combatants to become productive when they are integrated into the communities (Sengenya, 2015). The main focus of phase three was therefore directed to reintegration stage and much efforts had to be placed on assisting ex-combatants with life skills training for integration into the communities (IRIN news, 2014).

Phase Three was launched officially on 15 August 2015 with series of various skills training to 4700 estimated demobilized ex-combatants in Reintegration Preparation Centers including Kitona, Bas-Congo, which had about 1647 demobilized ex-combatants; Kamina North Katanga, with more than 1700 demobilized ex-combatants; and Kotakoli Equateur,



which had close to 900 mobilized ex-combatants. These three camps remained the main Reintegration Preparation Centers (RPC) for DDR phase Three and hosted many demobilized ex-combatants of previous programs (old caseload), who were the immediate beneficiaries of phase three program, whilst the rest and newly disarmed and demobilized combatants were grouped in other recruitment centers such as Mubambiro/Goma, which had 300 ex-combatants; Nyamunyi/Bukavu with 87 ex-combatants; Walikale/Goma had 37 ex-combatants; and Rwampara/Bunia with 75 ex-combatants (World Bank, 2015:4-6).

Training activities launched to ex-combatants in phase three included entrepreneurship, auto-mechanic, masonry, hairdressing, carpentry, baking, numeracy, and conflict resolution. The World Bank (2016:7) indicates that by June 2016 approximately 4800 demobilized ex-combatants in RPCs completed their training and were ready to go back to their communities to begin their reintegration processes. However, towards the end of June few days after the DRC government has started the processes of conveying ex-combatants back to their communities in South and North Kivu, lack of enough funds from partners and emerging insecurity due to President Kabila's bid for a third term, led the suspension of these processes, which ignited violence in the RPCs and many ex-combatants deserted these centers to re-join armed groups.

In July 2016, the DRC government attempted to resume the process of transferring ex-combatants who had fully completed the reinsertion processes to communities of their choice, but this process also failed due to transport mis-budgeting vis-à-vis the large number of ex-combatants in RPCs waiting for reintegration into communities. As a result there was a protracted waiting time of ex-combatants in the RPCs due to government's delays in processing their return to communities of their choice leading to resentment and escalation of violence that ex-combatants protested against poor living conditions in the RPCs and the fact of remaining in the camps even after completing all their training programs (World Bank, 2016:6-8).

In 2017, despite the escalation of violence and increase of armed groups due to the postponement of the 2016 general elections, the focus of DDR phase three remained on the reintegration process of 4700 demobilized ex-combatants in the RPCs fearing their re-



recruitments and less efforts were placed on the disarmament and demobilization of new combatants. As a result, the Internal Oversight Services report (OIOS) affirms that in some cases armed combatants surrendered and disarmed themselves and handed over their weapons and ammunition to DDR field personnel due to lack of disarmament programs (OIOS, 2018:7). In this report, MONUSCO is criticized for not fulfilling its responsibility under UNSC resolution 2348/2017 and 2409/2018, which mandated MONUSCO to help the DRC government in the processes of DDR phase Three.

The report further states that MONUC was mandated with a specific aim and budget to conduct disarmament phase of new combatants (which was not funded by the World Bank) and demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of foreign combatants in their countries of origin or receptive third countries. This report concludes by asserting that, in many cases, MONUSCO personnel on field circumvented disarmament activities on one hand and on the other hand it was conducted at a very low scale in the view that their main aim was not to disarm surrendered combatants rather provide security to DDR camps and disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants (OIOS, 2018:7).

In December 2017, DDR phase three had not disarmed new combatants, neither did the program pay any attention to disarming new combatants, despite the startling increase of armed groups in the Kivu region as indicated in Chapter three of this study. The World Bank (2017:8) posits that towards the end of 2017, only about 3780 combatants out of 4700 demobilized ex-combatants in RPCs were involved in reintegration activities, of which 3355 ex-combatants received their reintegration incentives and kits while the rest remained in the camps to complete their training session before reintegration activities. In its 2018 implementation status and results report on DDR phase three in the DRC, the World Bank attests that by June 2018, the program managed to demobilize between 4700 and 4800 ex-combatants, in which only about 3786 ex-combatants were successfully reintegrated back into their communities of choice and about 649 remained in the RPCs to complete their training cycles to be reintegrated into communities (World Bank, 2018:1). Analyzing these two reports of the World Bank 2017 and 2018, it is clear to note that DDR phase three did not focus or put any effort into disarming new armed combatants except the reintegration progress of demobilized 4700 combatants who were in the Reintegration Preparation



Centers since its official launch in August 2015. This clearly demonstrate that between 2015 and 2018, DDR phase three did not pay any attention to disarm new combatants; it has only succeeded in processing the caseloads of DDR phase Two (4700-4800, ex-combatants).

From the above discussion, a basic understanding is that although DDR phase three was established to achieve the original objectives of previous programs (DDR phase one and two) including restoring stability and neutralization of armed groups, the increase of armed groups and violence in the Kivu region demonstrate that DDR phase three has so far provided limited success and has also failed to achieve these objectives. As stated in chapter three of this study that between 2013 and 2018 the Kivu region has recorded the highest number of armed groups, violence, and displacement compared to previous years. In December 2018, the Kivu Security Tracker mapped approximately 144 armed groups active in the North and South Kivu alone (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Christensen and Laitin (2019:341) posit that most current armed combatants in these new armed groups have been in DDR/RR programs. A situation that raises questions such as why the DDR/RR program is failing to achieve its objectives in the DRC? This question is answered in the following section.

4. 3. Challenges of DDR operations in the DRC.

As stated in previous sections that from the beginning, the establishment of DDR/RR programs were extolled as the catalyst that would establish and consolidate sustainable stability in the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole. Thus, the DRC government and its international partners employed and relied on DDR/RR as the fundamental approaches to end violence and neutralize armed groups in the Kivu region. Since its inception in 2004, it is reported that DDR/RR phase one and two successfully managed to process approximately 208,438 ex-combatants, of which 110,921 ex-combatants went through demobilization and reintegration process whilst the ongoing phase three has so far processed about 4800 ex-combatants and integrated 3786 ex-combatants (World Bank, 2018; Deetlefs, 2017:56). Analyzing these efforts and successes vis-à-vis the current violence and the increase of armed groups between 2013 and 2018, this study endorses the premise that implemented DDR/RR programs have provided limited success and have failed to achieve the original objectives of stabilizing the eastern DRC and



neutralizing armed groups in the DRC. This raises the need to understand why DDR/RR program is failing to achieve its objectives in the DRC.

4. 3. 1. Direct causes of limited success of DDR/RR in the DRC.

It is stated in previous sections that the implemented DDR/RR programs focused mainly on ending violence and neutralizing armed groups. However, these processes did not address the crises that have been triggering the creation of armed groups posing DDR/RR challenges as discussed in Chapter three of this study. In his view on DDR/RR in the DRC, Alusala (2007:40) contends that DDR programs should not only pay much attention to ending violence, “but should encompass wider consideration aimed at addressing the crises underlying such violence including ethnic factor in the region”. From Alusala’s point of view, it is more evident to note that the implemented DDR/RR programs are not addressing the underlying crises triggering groups to take up arms in the eastern DRC. Tunda (2017) maintains similar views as of Alusala when he posits that the protracted conflict in the DRC is thoroughly embedded in and influenced by exogenous factors that DDR/RR alone cannot resolve. From these authors, it is clear to note that there have been crises underlying violence, and the creation of armed groups that DDR/RR alone is failing to address.

Many reasons have been advanced for the failure of DDR/RR programs in the DRC, but this study asserts that the direct causes are proximate causes that triggered the creation of armed groups and their proliferation between 2013 and 2018 including protracted insecurity in the villages and ethnic antagonism; socio-economic deprivation and grievances against Joseph Kabila’s regime; elections proceedings and delays of 2016 general elections; neighboring countries and natural resources; and the failure of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and FARDC operations. These causes are broadly discussed in section 3.4 of this study. The basic understanding is therefore that one of the most prevailing core factors posing the failure of DDR/RR programs in the DRC is the lack of a mechanism within the DDR/RR processes to address the crises underlying the taking of arms and the resistance of armed groups.

4. 4. Conclusion



This Chapter has provided the background and challenges of DDR/RR programs in the DRC. Using the analysis derived from Chapter three, it is clear to underline that restoring stability in the DRC, especially in the Kivu region is strenuous despite DDR/RR efforts. The central argument of this chapter is that the limited success of DDR/RR in the DRC is the failure to address crises causing the taking of arms and the resistance of armed groups. This includes the ongoing insecurity imputed by (caused by) unresolved ethnic resentment and ethnic antagonism, especially between autochthonous communities and those perceived as foreigners (Congolese of Rwanda origin, Banyamulenge, and Banyarwanda). This chapter concludes by affirming that it is difficult to stabilize the Kivu region through DDR/RR of combatants alone. There is a need to employ mechanisms that will address crises causing the creation of armed groups. Thus, relying on DDR/RR of combatants alone will pose permanent failure of peace and security efforts, which will lead to protracted instability in the Kivu region. There are possible approaches that may address the underlying crises, as discussed in Chapter Five of this study.



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Chapter Five.

Conclusion and Recommendations

5. Introduction

This chapter provides concluding arguments and recommendations from the findings of this research. Starting from the premise that the Kivu region has recently hosted more than 120-armed groups and that DDR programs were established to neutralize armed groups; the main research question was why the proliferation of armed groups remained high despite the implementation of DDR programs. To answer this question and achieve objectives of this research, the study analysed underlying factors of armed groups posing DDR challenges in the DRC, in particular the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018. Therefore, to summarise the study, this chapter begins by reviewing the main arguments presented in each chapter; and presents a summary of the findings on armed groups and DDR programs in the DRC, which are central contributions this study brings to the body of knowledge; and it offers some recommendations to the DRC government and its international partners which is useful for further research building on this study's findings.

5. 1. Overview of preceding chapters

This dissertation was organized into Five (5) chapters. The introductory **Chapter One** outlined the general research overview, the relevance of the study, and the rationale for choosing the Kivu region as a case study. It provided the contextual guidelines for the study, mapped out various areas of interest of this study, as well as the methodological parameters that were used within this research. The chapter concluded by laying a basic understanding and highlights of the historical background of armed groups from colonial times and how this has impacted the emergence of current armed groups in the Kivu region.

Chapter Two provided the Literature review, theoretical, and conceptual framework, which delineate the basic understanding of the fundamentals of armed groups in the Kivu region. Central arguments in this chapter were expanded on the understanding of theoretical frameworks that contextualise the emergence of armed groups and their resistance in the Kivu region including human need theory and economic theory of conflict. The chapter



argued that one of the primary causes of intractable conflicts is people's unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs including identity, shelter, and livelihood. The frustration around unmet needs and a feeling sense of economic deprivation leads to conflicts according to the human needs theorists; and that the conflicts in which combatants make financial gain increase and last for a long time according to the theorists of economic theory of conflict. The chapter also provided conceptual frameworks, which delineate the clarification and shed light on the principal underpinning of armed groups and DDR challenges in the Kivu region. Furthermore, this chapter examined the literature of other scholars that informed this study, paying special attention to the value of conceptual meaning, to establish a common understanding of this study.

In Chapter Three, the research explored the dynamics of armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region. It provided an analysis of historical background, drivers and occurrences that have had an impact on the continuity and the creation of new armed groups and their proliferation including the escalation of the First and Second Congo wars (1996-1998); the directives of the transitional Government (2003-2006); and election proceedings and its outcomes (2006 and 2011 elections). The aftermath of these occurrences provided and cultivated a fertile ground which allowed the rise, resistance, and proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region until today. One of the basic arguments brought to the fore in this chapter is that between 2013 and 2018, the Kivu region experienced the highest increase of armed groups compared to previous years reaching more than 120-armed groups. The chapter also provided a thorough analysis of the underlying factors behind these armed groups in the Kivu region.

Chapter Four focused on the role of the DDR program in the DRC, the Kivu region. The chapter paid more attention to its origin, design, and how the overall programs were implemented from phase one, two and the ongoing phase three. Central arguments in this chapter were extended on the factors behind the limited success of DDR program such as lack of mechanisms addressing the underlying crises causing the creation and resistance of armed groups. **Chapter five** summarised the research and emphasized on the key findings and main arguments on armed groups and DDR programs in the Kivu region. This chapter concludes by proposing recommendations and possible areas for further research.



5. 2. Findings of the study

While the national security is the main objective of the State, the presence of many armed groups witnessed in the Kivu region threatens the territorial integrity and sabotage the legitimacy of the DRC State. The armed groups in this region have not only created a protracted national instability but have also costed countless civilians lives; derailed the social, economic, and political development of the DRC. Based on this crisis, the study paid much attention and extended its focus on exploring the factors behind the armed groups posing DDR challenges in the Kivu region. It is by discussing these factors that this study has come out with the following conclusions on the armed groups and DDR programs in the Kivu region.

5. 2. 1. Armed groups

To conclude this research and to answer the question of why the proliferation of armed groups remained high despite the DDR programs, the research reveals that there have been long grievances and unresolved crises that armed groups capitalize on which DDR programs could not address. These crises are the fundamental factors behind the continuity, resistance, and proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region since the escalation of Congo wars in 1996. The first crisis is the ongoing ethnic antagonism and resentment between autochthonous citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers on the issues of their citizenship and political rights. Various peace accords and DDR programs ignored this reality while it is the central crisis behind many armed conflicts and armed groups in the Kivu region. How does this crisis contribute to the proliferation of current armed groups?

This study revealed in chapters one and three that it all started when Mobutu regime recalled the citizenship of the Kinyarwanda speakers and banned them from all political rights in 1995; one of the crises that triggered the emergence of the AFDL rebellion, and the outbreak of 1996 war was the growing ethnic tensions around the nationality (citizenship) of the Kinyarwanda speakers opposed by many autochthonous citizens in the Kivu region. Thus, the presence of the Kinyarwanda speakers in the AFDL rebellion backed by Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan troops was perceived by indigenous citizens as a foreign invasion



and Rwanda invading the DRC (Chapter one). This conflict rekindled ethnic hatred, antagonism, and tensions of a separate ethnic consciousness, which led to countless massacres between indigenous citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers (Chapter three). It was this ethnic resentment among other factors that caused the split of the AFDL and RCD-Goma into many factions, which this study considers as the root of today's many armed groups in the Kivu region.

At the same time, the memories of inter-ethnic massacres of the first and second Congo wars left and created a severe ethnic resentment between native citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers, who continue perceiving each other as rivals. This led to the continuation of localized self-defence groups within communities; and most Mai Mai groups that were formed during these wars did not disarm capitalizing on the armament of other ethnic groups. This was confirmed by how armed groups continued growing in the pattern of ethnic lines; and how most ethnic groups held ties with local defence armed groups. Also, there have been countless armed conflicts between indigenous armed groups against Kinyarwanda speakers' armed groups capitalizing on the unreconciled resentment and hatred; a situation that has generated a protracted insecurity in the villages that many Mai Mai groups refuse to disarm capitalizing on this insecurity.

For instance, one of the armed conflicts triggered by ethnic resentment is the ongoing armed conflict in the haut plateau of Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories/South Kivu, between a coalition of autochthonous armed groups against a network of the Kinyarwanda speakers' armed groups. This conflict is a recapitulation of previous conflicts triggered by unreconciled resentment and ethnic tensions. Most autochthonous citizens in the South Kivu have categorically rejected the citizenship of Kinyarwanda speakers, and have been resisting any policy attempt by the government giving them political rights and ownership over land. This has led to both parties to continue holding onto arms, supporting community-based armed groups, and using armed conflicts and violence to demonstrate their grievances against each other. Thus, the unreconciled ethnic resentment between indigenous citizens and the Kinyarwanda speakers and the uncertainty around their (Rwanda descent) citizenship are the major crises behind the continuation of armed groups and their resistance since the eruption of the Congo wars. In most cases, the armed groups that have been capitalizing



on ethnic antagonism boycotted various peace agreements and DDR programs; and in some instances, they subscribed to peace efforts while holding ties with their former armed groups as discussed in Chapter three.

The second crisis is the socio-economic deprivation, hardship of life and a feeling sense of marginalization by central government. This is also one of the longest grievances that have not been addressed and was one of the reasons why local communities joined and supported the AFDL rebellion and armed groups that continued after its demise. Since then, the armed groups that capitalized on socio-economic deprivation and hardship of life never disarmed and fragmented into many factions that grew gradually until today. The government's failure to distribute equally the country's enormous resources; and the failure to create income generating activities to its citizens have left many people with no option than to join armed groups, especially the youths find joining armed groups very lucrative as holding arms has become the only means of survival.

This is a crisis that has been ignored and the DRC government and its international partners have not resolved it until today. As a result, many families feed and rely on the support of their relatives associated with armed groups in the Kivu region; and armed groups capitalizing on this crisis resist disarmament claiming that they do not trust the government and its promises. This study corroborates that one of the major underlying crises is the socio-economic deprivation and hardship of life within communities, which has existed for decades and the DRC government is not showing any plan to address this crisis (Chapter three). This is also to confirm that armed groups capitalizing on the hardship of life and use arms to generate incomes (which is the case of many current armed groups) will continue resisting disarmament unless there is a clear government action plan to resolve the crisis.

The third crisis is the anger of violence perpetrated by armed forces of the national security (FARDC and Police personnel) and the presence of belligerents (former warlords) with ranks in the army and police. As discussed in chapter three, in various peace agreements the DRC government integrated heads of armed groups with ranks into the national army and Police without passing through formal screening and military protocols. And surprisingly, these integrated former warlords refused to be deployed in other parts of the country except in the



Kivu region, which was their area of control as rebels. This significantly meant that most FARDC and Police commanders sent in the Kivu region were former heads of armed groups that committed massive atrocities against communities during the First and Second Congo Wars. As a result, they continued violence targeting former rival ethnic groups using government resources, which triggered the resistance of local armed groups. This also raised memories of massacres committed by these bodies and triggered the continuation of localized self-defence armed groups supported by various communities that did not trust the national army and Police personnel. The proof that the composition of national security forces was a problem, most heads of current armed groups are former FARDC and Police personnel; and in some instances, current FARDC and Police commanders who integrated in the army and police as former warlords continue holding ties and are associated in one way or the other with armed groups; a situation that makes it difficult to neutralize armed groups because government forces that were supposed to facilitate the peace process are part of the problem.

The fourth crisis is the presence of foreign armed groups with rear bases in the Kivu region including the Democratic Forces of Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Burundian armed groups in Ruzizi plain. This has contributed to the resistance of local armed groups (section 3.4 of this study). Most local armed groups resist disarmament fearing the presence of these foreign groups in their communities. For instance, local communities in Beni territory/North Kivu have witnessed the deadliest massacres committed by the ADF rebels. A situation that has left communities with no option than to join and support community defence armed groups to fight against the ADF. This is the same situation in the plain of Ruzizi in Uvira territory and the Haut Plateau of South Kivu, where foreign armed groups continue committing massive atrocities against civilians. The presence of foreign armed groups with rear bases in the Kivu region has ignited local resistance that many Mai Mai groups reject disarmament fearing that their communities will suffer attacks of rival foreign armed groups.

The fifth crisis is the availability of mineral resources which has caused the resistance of both local and foreign armed groups active in the Kivu region. As argued in chapter two that armed conflict always increase when combatants have an opportunity to make a financial



gain or have an opportunity to generate profits through the extraction of natural resources such as Diamonds, gold, and timber. This is the context of armed groups in the Kivu region, both local and foreign armed groups have control over mining sites, making illegal smuggling of natural resources. In some instances, there have been infighting between armed groups over ownership and control of mining sites. Some armed combatants have been quoted saying that there is no gain in disarmament or joining national forces compared to holding arms and control over mining sites; and others were quoted saying “Disarmament is like letting a milk cow go”. This implies that most armed groups, especially those controlling mining sites and making illicit interests out of natural resources are not ready for and will never subscribe to DRR programs.

Furthermore, Rwandan and Ugandan are DRC’s neighbours directly involved in the illicit smuggling of its natural resources through proxy armed groups active in the Kivu region. Although Rwanda and Uganda have denied these allegations, there are ample evidence and the basic truth about this is that, when the alliance of Rwanda and Uganda with Laurent Kabila broke out, most anti-Kabila groups were made up of Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces with the aim of toppling L. Kabila’s regime and tracking-down of rival rebel groups with rear bases in the DRC. However, these motives changed and shifted when these groups discovered mining sites with enormous reserves of natural resources in the Kivu region. Rwanda and Uganda shifted their motives and started supporting rebel groups in an effort to keep the flow of illicit smuggling of DRC natural resources. Till today Rwanda and Uganda support armed groups as proxies controlling mining sites to keep the flow of illegal interests from the DRC’s natural resources. This reality is very known within local communities in the Kivu region and many local Mai Mai groups resist disarmament capitalizing on this reality (Chapter three).

The sixth and final crisis for this study is the tensions around election processes, outcomes, and power-sharing after elections, which have always revived the emergence of Mai Mai groups because the politicians who fail at polls fall on armed groups to maintain political influence. This was evidenced during the past three elections in 2006, 2011 and 2018 that politicians fell on armed groups to maintain political influence. At the same time, Joseph Kabila’s regime always negotiated power-sharing with belligerents as approaches to peace



agreements; thus, most politicians and interest groups always supported violence and held ties with armed groups as means to bargain posts with the government. This demonstrates how politicians and interest groups support the existence of armed groups to maintain political influence. In addition to this, the delays and postponement of the 2016 general elections contributed largely to the proliferation of armed groups between 2016 and 2018. The lesson drawn from the armed groups in the Kivu region is that the inter-linkages of the above crises is a phenomenon that is ignored and various peace efforts including DDR programs did not seek to address them while they are the core factors to the continuation, resistance, and proliferation of armed groups in the Kivu region until today.

5. 2. 2. DDR/RR Programs

Established as an integral part to stabilize eastern DRC and neutralize armed groups, DDR/RR programs have faced many challenges in the DRC; and deriving from the above findings on armed groups, there is no doubt to endorse the premise that DDR/RR programs have provided limited success in the DRC despite the lauded successes by the DRC government and its international partners. To conclude this research and in answering the question of why the DDR programs have not achieved their objectives of stabilizing and neutralizing armed groups in the eastern DRC, this study corroborate that the underlying crises that caused the emergency of the AFDL rebellion and the continuation of armed groups and their proliferation until today are still the same core crises posing the limited success of the DDR programs in the DRC; because these crises have not been addressed and current armed groups are capitalizing on them in resisting disarmament (see chapter three and four).

Thus, the lesson drawn from DDR programs in the Kivu region is that, although there has been issues of mismanagement of the PNDDR and its resources contributing to its limited success, the main challenges have been the unresolved underlying crises causing the creation of armed groups and their resistance discussed in the above section (under findings on armed group). From the above findings on armed groups, it is clear to note that the DDR programs were established amid multifaceted crises that the set objectives of DDR could not address. The context in which DDR programs were implemented in the DRC focussed mainly on ceasing fire, neutralizing armed groups, and collecting weapons but nothing was



done to resolve crises that triggered their creation and existence. Issues such as ethnic antagonism and resentment generated by the Congo wars between autochthonous citizens and Kinyarwanda speakers; as well as the socio-economic deprivation and hardship of life are the core crises propelling the armed groups to resist DDR/RR programs; and there has not been any plan by the DRC government and its international partners to address these crises.

Many local armed groups are capitalizing on ethnic resentment and repudiate DDR programs fearing to fall victims of rival groups; and those capitalizing on the hardship of life resist DDR programs fearing to lose income generating activities as many in this category have taken advantage of the availability of natural resources including many foreign armed groups and those used as proxies by neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Uganda). Thus, although there are other crises, the longest grievances and most prevailing crises are ethnic tensions, resentment, and hardship of life (caused by socio-economic deprivation by central government); and until they are addressed properly, DDR programs will continue facing similar challenges in the future in the Kivu region. Furthermore, the complex nature of armed groups and violence in the Kivu region generated the armament of civilians within communities which require a variety of robust and holistic DDR approaches that not only focus on armed combatants but on a broader scale involving armed civilians. As illustrated in chapter four, the implemented programs focused mainly on a limited number of armed combatants of particular armed groups and less attention was given to mobilize armed civilians within communities in the Kivu region.

5. 3. General Conclusion

The protracted presence of armed groups and their proliferation in the Kivu region is the product of various underlying crises due to decades of poor governance in the DRC. This created a fertile ground for ethnic tensions that resulted in armed conflict and the emergence of many armed groups. This also opened rooms for interference by neighbouring countries, who capitalized on the security vacuum in the Kivu region; and took advantage of this and started supporting rebel activities to gain and maintain their state's interests through the Congolese natural resources. Also, lack of sufficient and professional security forces

fostered decades of insecurity that have produced numbers of both local and foreign armed groups with various motives and objectives on the Congolese soil.

Today the DRC has become a hub for rebel groups, hosting hundreds of foreign rebel combatants of about five different countries including Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Given this current complicated crisis of armed groups, restoring sustainable peace and security in the Kivu region requires more holistic approaches that not only focuses on the DDR of armed combatants but also society, the economy, and the government.

5. 4. Recommendations

To conclude this study, and based on the key findings above, brief recommendations are made to the DRC government and its international partners regarding how to neutralize armed groups and succeed in the future DDR programs in the Kivu region as follow: **(i) Regarding armed groups**, the DRC government and its international partners should firstly establish and implement a long-term reconciliation mechanism aimed at addressing ethnic resentment created by wars within communities in the Kivu region. This process should be accompanied by a transitional justice mechanism to combat impunity by promoting peace, justice, truth, reparation, reconciliation, and compensation of victims of armed conflicts marked by large-scale human rights abuses and guarantee a non-recurrence of conflicts. These processes should start at the local level including village chiefs, traditional leaders, civil society, religious leaders, university student associations and engage constant broader political dialogues with all stakeholders (actors). In addition to this, the DRC government should address adequately the issues around the nationality (citizenship) of Kinyarwanda speakers and their political rights vis-à-vis land ownership disputes, because a successful implementation of these mechanisms leading to ethnic reconciliation and reparation will foster the disarmament not only of armed combatants but also of armed civilians within communities in the Kivu region.

Secondly, the DRC government and its international partners should reform the national security institutions such as FARDC, National Police, and ANR as well as strengthening



Security Sector Reform (SSR) in an effort to provide better training and professionalize the security personnel to respect and foster democratic standards, human rights, the rule of law and the principles of good governance. As argued in chapter three that the creation of FARDC was problematic because most warlords (belligerents) were incorporated into the army with ranks without passing-through military protocols and screening. Thus, reforming security institutions with strict formalized military training and ranking system will professionalize security personnel, who in return will serve the interest of the state in restoring security and assist in eradicating non-state armed combatants through DDR programs.

Thirdly, the DRC government should establish and implement a clear national development plan focusing on and guaranteeing socio-economic opportunities to its citizens, especially the youths at local, provincial, and national levels. As indicated above, lack of income-generating activities has been approved as one of the underlying factors behind the resistance of armed group in the Kivu region. The unemployment rate in the Kivu region is mostly amongst the youths, age between 20 and 45 years. Since the eruption of wars, most unemployed youths have found joining and forming armed groups as a business opportunity and an easy way to make quick money. As a result, the Kivu region hosts numbers of militia groups (also known as bandit groups) fighting only for livelihood. Most of these groups have not been targeted in any DRR/RR phases. It is argued in chapter Four that, one of the causes that led the re-recruitment of ex-combatants was lack of economic opportunities (income-generating activities). This is more evident that groups surviving on the holding of arms will not subscribe to any form of DRR if there is no clarity and hope of economic opportunities in their localities.

(ii). Regarding DDR/RR operations, the DRC government should re-structure and implement DDR program as a broader long-term project with a clear vision and objectives focusing strictly on all its stages (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration) that include community to enable the disarmament of armed civilians. In the previous programs, some stages were poorly managed and implemented, in particular the disarmament stage which at some points remained voluntary under the auspice of MONUC/MONISCO with meagre result. While efforts on all the stages are very important,



special efforts should be directed mainly on the reintegration phase, in which much attention should be placed on training ex-combatants on various professional skills and job creation to guarantee ex-combatants' productivity when they reintegrate into society.

This implies that there should be a guarantee of income generating activities to ex-combatants to avoid their re-recruitment due to hardship of life. Finally, the government should always reform CONADER and establish an independent (robust) assessment team in charge of auditing and evaluating the progress made by CONADER personnel to eradicate corruption and fraudulent reports about the successes of implemented DDR programs; so that the success of DDR programs should not be measured by numbers of ex-combatants processed, rather based on numbers successfully integrated and become productive members of society integrated into.

(iii). For further research

As evidenced throughout this study, the crisis of armed groups in the eastern DRC and the limited success of DDR programs raise more questions that need further research. There is a need to know the modalities of peace and security efforts that will set the DRC in a better direction and build a sustainable peace and security.



Appendix

List of more than 120-armed groups that remained active in the Kivu region between 2013 and 2018.

Sources: - Kivu Security Tracker at: <https://kivusecurity.org/map>

-Armed groups biographies at: suluhu.org/congo/biographies

- 1- Allied Democratic Forces, ADF
- 2- Alliance de Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain, APCLS
- 3- Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souveraineté du Congo, CNPSC (Mai Mai Yakutumba)
- 4- Conseil Nationale pour le Renouveau et Democratie, CNRD
- 5- Ex-M23 Busumba group
- 6- Forces Democretiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)-Foca
- 7- Front Nationale de Liberation (FNL)-Nzabampema
- 8- Front Nationale de Libération (FNL)-Nibizi
- 9- Front de Resistance Patriotique de l'Ituri, FRPI
- 10- Force Republicaines du Burundi, FOREBU/FPB
- 11- Forces de Defense du Congo-Guides and Mac
- 12- Former March 23 movement (ex-M23)
- 13- Mai Mai Aigle
- 14- Mai Mai Aoci
- 15- Mai Mai Baleke/Kashilogozi
- 16- Mai Mai Bigaya
- 17- Mai Mai Biloze Bishambuke
- 18- Mai Mai Charles
- 19- Mai Mai Chochi/Yenga
- 20- Mai Mai Corps du Christ
- 21- Mai Mai Dario Syaghuswa
- 22- Mai Mai Delegates (Mabisho, Musema, Masabo and Mafikiri)
- 23- Mai Mai Echilo
- 24- Mai Ebuela
- 25- Mai Mai Endaniluhi
- 26- Mai Mai Forces Divines Simba
- 27- Mai Mai Fujo
- 28- Mai Mai Hilaire
- 29- Mai Mai Gere-Kilolo
- 30- Mai Mai Jackson
- 31- Mai Mai Karakara
- 32- Mai Mai Kashumba
- 33- Mai Mai Kifuafua Baeni Limenzi
- 34- Mai Mai Kifuafua Mbaenda Delphin
- 35- Mai Mai Kifuafua Maachano
- 36- Mai Mai Kifuafua Shalio
- 37- Mai Mai Kithikyolo
- 38- Mai Mai Kiwis Kalume
- 39- Mai Mai Kirikicho



- 40- Mai Mai Kombi
- 41- Mai Mai Kyangenga
- 42- Mai Mai Leopards-Muthundo
- 43- Mai Mai Lwanga
- 44- Mai Mai Malaika -She Assani
- 45- Mai Mai Mahinduzi
- 46- Mai Mai Mahima
- 47- Mai Mai Makanaki
- 48- Mai Mai Mahoro
- 49- Mai Mai Mazimano
- 50- Mai Mai Mbulu
- 51- Mai Mai Moliere
- 52- Mai Mai Mulumba
- 53- Ma Mai Mupekenya
- 54- Mai Mai Mushombe
- 55- Mai Mai Muhima
- 56- Mai Mai Mwenyemali
- 57- Mai Mai Nzirunga
- 58- Mai Mai Nguru
- 59- Mai Mai Ngengwe
- 60- Mai Mai Nyakiliba
- 61- Mai Mai Nyerere
- 62- Mai Mai Nzirunga
- 63- Mai Mai Patriotes résistants Mai Mai (PRM/PAREM)
- 64- Mai Mai Rene
- 65- Mai Mai Reunion
- 66- Mai Mai Santos
- 67- Mai Mai Sibenda
- 68- Mai Mai Simba-Luc
- 69- Mai Mai Simusizi
- 70- Mai Mai Simba-Manu
- 71- Mai Mai Tawimbi
- 72- Mai Mai Toto
- 73- Mai Mai Vivuya
- 74- Mai Mai Vutura/FODP
- 75- Mai Mai Zone
- 76- Milice Pakombe
- 77- Milice M'vuba
- 78- Nduma Defence de Congo-Renove (NDC-R)
- 79- NDR-Sheka
- 80- Nyantura Bavakure/Jed
- 81- Nyantura Benjamin
- 82- Nyantura Bizagwira
- 83- Nyantura Delta
- 84- Nyantura Domi
- 85- Nyantura Gatuza
- 86- Nyantura Jean-Marie
- 87- Nyantura Kalume
- 88- Nyantura Kasongo
- 89- Nyantura Kavumbi
- 90- Nyatura Kigingi
- 91- Nyantura John Love
- 92- Nyantura Mahanga
- 93- Nyantura Niyonzimana
- 94- Nyantura Nzayi
- 95- Ngumino
- 96- Raia Mutomboki Aliko
- 97- Raia Mutomboki Blaise
- 98- Raia Mutomboki Bipompa
- 99- Raia Mutomboki Butachibera
- 100- Raia Mutomboki Donat/Ngandu
- 101- Raia Mutomboki Elenge



- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 102- Raia Mutomboki Hamakombo | 120- Raia Mutomboki Mwekee |
| 103- Raia Mutomboki Imani Bitaa | 121- Raia Mutomboki Ndarumanga |
| 104- Raia Mutomboki Kabanzi | 122- Raia Mutomboki Safari |
| 105- Raia Mutomboki Kabazimia | 123- Raia Mutomboki Shabani |
| 106- Raia Mutomboki Kashungushungu | 124- Raia Mutomboki Shebitembe |
| 107- Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto | 125- Raia Mutomboki Shemakingi |
| 108- Raia Mutomboki Kikwama | 126- Raia Mutomboki Shukuru |
| 109- Raia Mutomboki Kimba | 127- Raia Mutomboki Takulengwe |
| 110- Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa | 128- Raia Mutomboki Wemba |
| 111- Raia Mutomboki Lukoba | 129- Rassemblement pour l'Unite et la
Démocratie (RUD) |
| 112- Raia Mutomboki Mabala | 130- Resistance pour un Etat de Droit
(RED)-Tabara |
| 113- Raia Mutomboki Maheshe | 131- Twiganeho |
| 114- Raia Mutomboki Mamba | 132- Union des patriotes pour la Libération
du Congo, UPLC (Mai Mai Kilalo) |
| 115- Raia Mutomboki Manyiisa | 133- Union des Patriotes Congolais pour
la Paix, UPCP-Lanfontain |
| 116- Raia Mutomboki Machite | |
| 117- Raia Mutomboki Mirage | |
| 118- Raia Mutomboki Mungoro | |
| 119- Raia Mutomboki Musole | |



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