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A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 'LAND LANGUAGE' ARTICULATED BY THE POLITICAL ELITES CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND QUESTION AFTER 2013

An ideational exploration of an imagined pluralistic security community

by

Robin Michael Blake

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ABSTRACT

South Africa's unresolved land question has material and ideational dimensions. While undeniably crucial to resolving the land question, the material dimension has created tension and conflict. Therefore, this thesis considers the necessary but insufficient material approach to South Africa's land question after 2013 and, as a supplementary response, introduces social constructionism and the inherent ideational context as an extension to the material. Social constructionism emphasises the social origins of knowledge and the articulation of language for the construction of multiple realities by actors with different identities who use structures and agency to construct distinctive social communities and networks.

Drawing on primary data sources such as the Hansard, television interviews, speeches and personally authored documents explicitly involving party leaders Julius Sello Malema (EFF) and Petrus Johannes Groenewald (FF+) as political elites, the methodology entails a qualitative content analysis of their 'land language' from 2013 to 2019. In this regard, Malema and Groenewald have articulated conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' to construct social networks and communities that emerge from their differing realities leading to hostility, fear and confrontation. It shows that despite the hostility, fear and confrontation over the land question there is also, to a degree, 'land language' contributing to an imagined pluralistic security community with dependable expectations of peaceful change. As an ideational response, a security community integrates social communities and networks to engender an over-arching sense of we-ness. We-ness is achievable by advancing societal interest, promoting human dignity and inculcating compassion as a virtue to introduce dependable expectations of peaceful change when considering South Africa's post-2013 land question.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
CST	Colonialism of a Special Type
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPC	Extended Public Committee
EWC	Expropriation without compensation
FF	Freedom Front
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
JS	Joint Sittings
NA	National Assembly
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NP	National Party
NPA	National People's Assembly (Economic Freedom Fighters)
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SONA	State of the Nation Address
SOPA	Socialist Party of Azania
UN	United Nations
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization

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USA	United States of America
VOC	*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Dutch East India Company)

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Beds Are Burning

Out where the river broke
The bloodwood and the desert oak
Holden wrecks and boiling diesels
Steam in forty five degrees

The time has come
To say fair's fair
To pay the rent
To pay our share

The time has come
A fact's a fact
It belongs to them
Let's give it back

How can we dance
When our earth is turning
How do we sleep
While our beds are burning

How can we dance
When our earth is turning
How do we sleep
While our beds are burning

The time has come
To say fair's fair
To pay the rent
Now to pay our share

Four wheels scare the cockatoos
From Kintore East to Yuendemu
The western desert lives and breathes
In forty five degrees

The time has come
To say fair's fair
To pay the rent
To pay our share

The time has come
A fact's a fact
It belongs to them
Let's give it back

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How can we dance
When our earth is turning
How do we sleep
While our beds are burning

How can we dance
When our earth is turning
How do we sleep
While our beds are burning

The time has come
To say fair's fair
To pay the rent now
To pay our share

The time has come
A fact's a fact
It belongs to them
We're gonna give it back

How can we dance
When our earth is turning
How do we sleep
While our beds are burning

(Moginie *et al*. 1987)

Released in 1988 in advance of the 200th anniversary of the arrival of European settlers in Australia, "Beds are Burning" is a protest song by the now defunct rock group "Midnight Oil."

The song was composed to remind Australians that their country was founded on a history of land dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples. Incidentally, the song reached top positions in the 1980s music charts of Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, three countries that have a history of land dispossession.

The ideational lyrics include symbolic language that accentuates injustices associated with the historical and immoral confiscation of ancestral land from indigenous inhabitants and consequently require an obligation for redress. The words hint that values such as conscience and fairness are also appropriate when making amends. Above all, the song calls for an end to denialism by admitting to past wrongs visited upon the Aboriginal peoples. With its ticking clock at the conclusion, the song is an apt reminder of the sense of urgency associated with the resolution of South Africa's land question.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Cry the beloved country, these things are not yet at an end.
The sun pours down on the earth, on the lovely land that man cannot enjoy.
He knows only the fear of his heart.
(Paton 1948: 74)

1.1. Identification of the research theme

South Africa's post-2013 land question is undeniably political and this thesis is therefore located within the Political Science discipline. The definition by Lasswell (1936) that politics is "who gets what, when, how" confirms that land ownership in South Africa involves acquiring land, retaining it and securing it. When applying Lasswell's parsimonious definition to the land question, it highlights the issue of how and when land, as a scarce resource, was acquired and by whom. History shows that the politics behind the land question in South Africa concerns exercising power (Goodin 2011: 5) to dispossess or repossess land that is also in and of itself political in a post-2013 context.

Land dispossession permeates South Africa's history over centuries. Beginning in the colonial era, when dispossession occurred through occupation or conquest, it culminated during the apartheid era, when it was deliberate and systematic. In its wake, land dispossession created materially and ideationally scarred and divided social communities. The dehumanising and infantilising historical legacy associated with land dispossession generated a clamouring demand for redressing the land question[1] fairly, justly and equitably in the post-1994 democratic dispensation.

Redressing land dispossession in the post-1994 democratic dispensation was inevitable. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which took place in the early 1990s to negotiate a just dispensation for a post-apartheid South Africa, was accompanied by

[1] Literatures concerning land interchangeably refer to the national issue, land issue, land problem, land debate, agrarian question or land question. This thesis adopts the term 'land question' exclusively as it is supported by a substantial body of data sources.

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high expectations that the land question would finally be resolved. It did not happen. Successive government administrations endeavoured to attend to the land question but failed to lay the matter to rest. As a consequence, the solutions that were implemented have tended to fuel discontent and to increase frustration and anger, entrenching division and conflict among the political elites and the social communities involved.

The land question was elevated to a national discourse by the political elite[2] during the 2018 State of the Nation Address (SONA) parliamentary debate when Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Commander-in-Chief Julius Malema insisted, "[t]his cannot be an issue to bluff about, this cannot be an issue to pass any time with. It's an emotive issue and you only mention it if you mean it" (Eyewitness News 2018). Clearly the land question remains a site of ongoing contestation that manifests as a consequence of past and present injustices leading to frustration and anger, which culminate in confrontation. Malema is therefore correct in his frustration concerning the sensitivity of the land question and his pointed contention that the time for pretending that a solution is imminent has passed. That the matter must be settled urgently is no longer open to conjecture as the potential for open confrontation is increasing.

The research theme concentrates on South Africa's contested land question. In the light of the absence of an all-encompassing and satisfactory answer, it remains an enduring national disappointment. As a consequence of this apparently intractable dilemma, the response to the land question has degenerated to a zero-sum solution emphasising expropriation without compensation (EWC). Added to this are the intersecting – and often conflicting – roles of the political elites, which have entrenched and hardened attitudes among their respective social communities.

Irrespective of the multitude of actors occupied with the land question, it is undeniable that it has remained unresolved since the advent of the democratic dispensation in 1994. Few would argue that South Africa's answer to the land question, the land reform programme, is a resounding success. In this respect, Du Preez (in Koopman 2014: 1) highlights the deep-rooted sentiments that the land question evokes by noting that

[2] The political elite exercise agency disproportionate to their representation and are able to influence political decision-making (Zuckerman 1977; Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987). Political elites exemplify the saying that size matters not and they therefore 'punch above their weight.'

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> [n]o national issue elicits as much anger, fear and fiery confrontation as the ownership of land. At the same time, few, if any, other national issues are as misunderstood, misrepresented and mismanaged as the land question.

Du Preez's contention that the land question is misunderstood, misrepresented and mismanaged warrants further investigation, especially concerning the political elites and the language[3] they articulate, together with the emotions and responses that it induces. Current solutions such as EWC together with the underlying misunderstandings and misrepresentations, are significant, as the land question continues to fester as unfinished business.

South Africa's land question is mostly researched within two paradigms: firstly, positivist and secondly, interpretivist. On the one hand, positivism with its focus on problem-solving holds benefit for quantifying the size and shape of the land question, but has not contributed to identifying the underlying motives behind the misunderstandings and the misrepresentations, thereby inhibiting the study of an overall sense of a security community[4]. On the other hand, interpretivism allows for wider and deeper fields of enquiry that permit the exploration of an imagined "pluralist security community with dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler & Barnett 1998: 6-7) (hereinafter a security community), a useful concept imported from international relations. It must, however, be stressed that the concept is not in and of itself a comprehensive solution, as the land question is complex and interconnected. Both paradigms are explained in the following paragraphs.

A large body of research concerning South Africa's land question is located in positivism. Positivism views social phenomena, such as the land question, as an object of research implying it is unnecessary to examine the underlying motives for individual – by implication social – behaviour (Neuman 1997: 64). Accordingly, the positivist paradigm is solidly focused on the material dimensions[5] of the land question. It suggests a solution within

---

[3] Language, as a form of communication, is explained in Chapter 2.

[4] The concept was pioneered in 1957 by Karl Deutch who defined a "security community" as a community that has "dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler & Barnett 1998: 34). See Chapter 2 for details.

[5] The material dimensions are tangible and cover, amongst others, agricultural productivity, food security, return on investment and viability. For instance, Cousins and Scoones (2010), in their insightful article, *Contested Paradigms of 'Viability' in Redistributive Land Reform: Perspectives from Southern Africa*, analyse what viability means (in a material sense) when evaluating the outcomes using neo-classical economics, new institutional economics, livelihoods, welfarism radical political economy and Marxism. Another perspective regarding the material is provided by Fraser (2008: 316-318) in his article, *Geography and Land Reform*. He argues that the

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measurable bounds that include, among others, constitutional and legal rights and a land reform programme consisting of three components: land redistribution, land restitution and land tenure reform. This research has a strong quantitative focus, which is in itself problematic, as there are misunderstandings and contestations concerning, for example, how much land was dispossessed, who owns what land, how much land must be returned and to whom. Moreover, when quantitative data is made available, questions are raised concerning the reliability of the statistics. By way of example, in the 2018 government land audit leading academics questioned the accuracy of data concerning white land ownership in the report (Van Rensburg 2018). In addition to the data accuracy problem, Hall (2011: 28) expresses concern over the limitations of a quantitative approach, specifically the measurement of restitution. Although undeniably germane to the land question, positivism with its quantitative focus has inadvertently entrenched misunderstanding and misrepresentation between the political elites, thereby promoting conflict[6]. Conflict was, for example, clearly evident in the language during the countrywide hearings held by the Joint Constitutional Review Committee from 26 June to 4 August 2018 to consider amending Section 25 of the Constitution to make provision for land EWC.

Given the wide-ranging literature and research concerning the material component of the land question, it is noted that the ideational context has not received the same degree of attention. In this respect and related to the land question, a pertinent gap exists. This thesis therefore steps back from the current stasis and, without negating the positivist paradigm, seeks to extend it into an ideational paradigm. Accordingly, the ensuing response utilises interpretivism to advance a supplementary – yet modest – answer to the literature and research that addresses the ideational dimension of the land question. This key argument that is central to the answer is an imagined community involving the political elites to advance and advocate the idea of a security community. In this way a necessary but insufficient contribution will be made to the land question.

---

geography of land reform connects people and places in social relationships that are material. Fraser (2007b), in another article, *White Farmer's Dealings with Land Reform in South Africa: Evidence from Northern Limpopo Province*, substantiates the failure of the South Africa government's material approach to land acquisition. The material dimension is therefore exceedingly complex and complicated by the use of different theories and paradigms, often leading to diverging conclusions and outcomes.

[6] Conflict is defined as, "[a]ny situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties' (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals." (Mitchell 1989: 17).

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1.2. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem, research question and sub-question

1.2.1. Research problem

The research problem is vested in the insufficient, yet relevant, material answer to the land question since 1994, which has triggered fear, discontent, frustration and conflict, especially after 2013. Rooted in positivism, the material dimension of the land question is undeniably crucial to this question, but it is a partial solution. This is clearly evident in, for example, the notion of EWC – potentially a zero-sum solution – which is a source of division and confrontation involving the political elites and their social communities.

Less attention has been paid to an ideational alternative that examines the historical origins of land dispossession, the essence of the land question, the idea of land and how the political elites have engaged with the land question after 2013. A promising alternative to the positivist paradigm is interpretivism. Interpretivism views social phenomena, such as the land question, as the subject – not the object – thereby enabling an examination of the 'land language' articulated by political elites.

Research using interpretivism to understand and explain South Africa's land question is limited. Hall (2011: 28), for example, laments the absence of a qualitative approach for understanding the outcomes of land reform. Supporting Hall is the research undertaken by Beyers (2013), Hall (2010), Hall (2018), James (2007), Gibson (2009), Koopman (2014) and Walker *et al*. (2011). In all of the works attention is paid to the ideational context of the land question, particularly the injustices, the frustrations, the associated anger and conflict. However, while these works are crucial, they remain in the background as the material continues to overwhelm the debate.

In this respect, interpretivism provides a gateway to explore the land question further by coming to grips with the political elites and their emotions expressed in conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' (hereinafter 'land language'), as well as conditions for imagination to contribute a supplementary solution that makes provision for a security community so as to "to think together, to see together, and to act together" (Adler & Barnett 2000a: 7).

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1.2.2. **Research question and sub-question**

Based on the aforesaid problem, the research question is: Given the limitations of the material approach when analysing South Africa's land question, how can the ideational context inherent in social constructionism[7] better deepen understanding of the post-2013 'land language'[8] articulated by political elites? As a consequence of the fear, hostility and confrontation emanating from the 'land language' articulated by the political elites, the research question leads to a related sub-question: How does 'land language' articulated by political elites contribute to an imagined pluralistic security community characterised by dependable expectations of peaceful change?

The aim of this thesis is two-fold. First, it applies social constructionism for deepening understanding of the post-2013 conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' articulated by the political elites to construct social communities. Second, it explores the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change as a response to the post-2013 land question.

In response to the research question and sub-question the thesis has the following objectives:

To identify an appropriate epistemological and conceptual framework on which to base the thesis.

To trace the historical context of South Africa's land question, prior to 1994, to understand the background to the research question.

To qualitatively analyse the content of 'land language' after 2013 to identify the social construction, identity, agency, structure, networks and configurations in response to the research question.

---

[7] Although social constructionism and social constructivism are often used interchangeably, they are not the same. For the purpose of this thesis the singular focus is on social constructionism which is explained in Chapter 2.
[8] 'Land language' is explained in Chapter 5.

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To apply qualitative content analysis to explore an imagined pluralistic security community as a response to the research sub-question.

The current and future relevance of the thesis is to explore the potential emergence of a security community as a modest contribution to an all-encompassing answer to the land question. The research is demarcated in epistemological-conceptual, historical-contextual and current dimensions. At a theoretical level, the emphasis is on interpretivism as the paradigm, with social constructionism as the epistemology. Conceptually the focus is on ideational thought; community, imagined communities, security communities; the manifestation of the other, othering and otherness as conflictual, unifying or diversifying; and the emergence of a security community. The historical context is from 1913 to 2013 and the current context is the post-2013 period.

The positionality of the researcher in relation to the research question, sub-question, aim and objectives, as well as the current and future relevance of the thesis, is reflexive. As "an integral aspect of qualitative research", reflexivity appreciates researcher positionality in relation to the processes and ways in which research is conducted to reach conclusions. Reflexivity, Corlett and Mavin (2018: 377) declare, is conducted in order to self-monitor and self-respond to "thoughts, feelings and actions" while paying continuous attention to the relevance of the assumptions, the potential prejudices and the language used in the thesis. Moreover, reflexivity reminds the researcher that there are three sensitive aspects of research practice: firstly, questioning the understanding of reality, the nature of knowledge and how alternative perspectives open new and alternative avenues of thinking; secondly, questioning the researcher's relationship with the thesis context and data; and, finally, questioning what constitutes 'valid' research (Day 2012; Corlett & Mavin 2018: 378). The positionality of the researcher takes into account the fact that he has not been physically and ideationally exposed to land dispossession, relocation or deprivation of dignity and is therefore solely reliant on data sources to understand the associated trauma that accompanied the loss of land and the frustrations emanating from the unresolved land question. The positionality of the researcher is encapsulated as follows:

> There is no single discernible reality or truth regarding the land question. Therefore, the 'land language' articulated by the actors – in the case of this thesis, the political elites – is contingent upon particular perceptions of history and current reality.

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Knowledge concerning the land question is contested by the political elites. In this thesis the accuracy and the veracity of their claims is not critiqued, as the focus is to describe and understand the historical origins of the land question and the accordant 'land language' that is articulated.

The ideational dimension of the land question evokes, among others, emotions and feelings that are challenging to code and interpret qualitatively. Therefore, the finer nuances associated with the experiences of the other, their utterances and body language, can only be partially accounted for and understood.

The importance and relevance of the material dimension of the land question is not negated. However, by attending to the ideational dimension, this thesis will merely offer a modest and insufficient contribution to a resolution of the land question, since the idea of a security community is explorative.

Based on the aforesaid, the assumptions on which this thesis are based are as follows:

The material dimension of the land question has provided a necessary but insufficient answer to the land question.

The ideational dimension is an extension of the material dimension of the land question.

The 'land language' articulated by political elites constructs multiple realities, social communities and concomitant networks within and between the political elites.

The ideational extension permits an exploration of a security community that accommodates change under peaceful conditions as opposed to violence.

1.3. **Research methodology**

This section is a synopsis of the research paradigm, the research design, the research method, the data analysis and the approach to the findings, interpretation and discussion that will be adopted in this thesis.

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1.3.1. **Research paradigm**

Embracing an interpretivist paradigm, this is a descriptive-explorative qualitative study to analyse the ideational context as an extension of the material dimension regarding South Africa's land question and is articulated in 'land language.' The thesis is descriptive in the sense that it examines how the land question emerged and developed into its current form, together with the political elites that are involved, and explorative in the sense that it investigates the emergence of a security community. The descriptive-explorative approach is epistemologically situated within social constructionism that is conceptually expanded to include community, imagined communities and a security community.

1.3.2. **Research design**

The research design is the plan that will be followed to ensure that sufficient evidence is gathered to answer the research question credibly, as identified in the previous section. The research design is descriptive-exploratory and unfolds in two parts. The first part of the research design is a literature review, the purpose of which is twofold: firstly, to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework and secondly, to provide a description of the historical and contextual framework of South Africa's land question from 1913 to 2013 in an ideational context. The second part of the research design explores the emergence of a security community and involves the political elites, their social communities and their networks.

1.3.3. **Research method**

A research method identifies the data sources that will be used to execute the research design. Qualitative between-method research is employed in this thesis, with data from primary and secondary sources. Primary data sources include the Hansard[9], videos (speeches, debates, interviews and presentations) and policy documents for first-hand accounts related to the land question, ideational dispossession and the 'land language' articulated by political elites. Secondary data sources supplement primary data sources and include authoritative works such as academic journals and research articles, media articles, opinion pieces and political cartoons.

[9] The Hansard is a verbatim report – omitting repetitions and redundancies – of parliamentary proceedings.

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1.3.4. **Data analysis**

Data analysis stipulates how data sources, as identified in the research method, are analysed and integrated to provide credible evidence to answer the research question. Qualitative content analysis is used to analyse the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' articulated by the political elites for constructing social communities. The results of the analysis culminate three possible conclusions, namely convergences, inconsistencies or contradictions (Hastings 2010: 1538) regarding a pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. Hastings (2010: 1538) additionally points out that, from a constructionist perspective, triangulation is more concerned with identifying inconsistencies and contradictions – as opposed to convergences – in order to identify multiple perspectives and realities concerning the post-2013 land question, all of which are key to the thesis findings.

1.4. <u>**Research structure**</u>

The next section delineates the research structure for each chapter of the thesis. There are five chapters: Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2: Epistemological and contextual framework; Chapter 3: Research methodology; Chapter 4: Historical and contextual framework; Chapter 5: A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by the political elites from 2013 to 2019; and Chapter 6: Conclusion.

1.4.1. **Chapter 1: Introduction**

This chapter, based on the research proposal, identifies the research theme, demarcates the research problem, stipulates the research question and sub-question, explains the research methodology and delineates the research parameters.

1.4.2. **Chapter 2: Epistemological and conceptual framework**

This chapter is a systematic literature review, firstly to substantiate social constructionism as the epistemological framework; secondly, to expand the epistemological framework by adding identity, agency and structure; thirdly, to substantiate the other, othering and otherness as

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conflictual, unifying or diversifying; and finally, to examine the underpinnings of a security community.

1.4.3. **Chapter 3: Research methodology**

This chapter explains the research methodology in terms of the research paradigm, research design, the research method and the data analysis with a specific focus on qualitative content analysis.

1.4.4. **Chapter 4: Historical and contextual framework**

This chapter is a systematic literature review structured in three sections. The first section addresses the historical framework which is explained in terms of four inter-linked ideational drivers regarding land which are: autochthony; land tenure; land ownership and dispossession; and land dignity. This is followed by a summary of land and its history concerning the European colonisers to understand their mindset as a prelude to the arrival of the Dutch colonisers at the Cape and their encounters with the indigenous population. Thereupon a historical review, which examines five key moments that track the evolution of the land question over a timeframe from 1913 to 2013, is undertaken. The second section entails the contextual framework of land and deals with the national question and then the land question from 1994 to 2013, as well as the post-2013 land question. The final section identifies three organisational categories of actors that have emerged, together with their involvement in the post-2013 land question.

1.4.5. **Chapter 5: A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by the political elites from 2013 to 2019**

The chapter begins with the provision of a broad South African political context together with selected events concerning the land question from 2013 to 2019. Thereafter, a societal context of present-day 'land language' is offered in the form of political cartoons. Following this, two leaders of political parties on opposing sides of the political spectrum, Julius Sello Malema from the EFF and Petrus Johannes Groenewald from the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), are identified. Subsequently, a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by each leader is undertaken in respect of two themes, namely the construction of social

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communities concerning land, and the networks constructed within and between the social communities.

1.4.6. **Chapter 6: Conclusion**

This chapter serves a three-fold purpose. Firstly, it provides observations concerning the research methodology, secondly it thematically summarises the qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by the political elites to assess the extent to which the research question was answered. Finally, it presents findings regarding the emergence of a security community as a response to the research sub-question as well as recommendations for future research

1.5. **Limitations and delimitations**

The research limitations concern understanding and interpreting 'land language' content; in this respect four limitations are identified for this thesis:

> The first limitation concerns the political elites which are restricted to Malema of the EFF and Groenewald of the FF+, as they are on opposing sides of the political spectrum in South Africa, have different realities and identities and have constructed dissimilar social communities and networks regarding the land question.
>
> The second limitation is the use of language by the political elites. This means that, in some cases, the true essence and underlying meanings may not be entirely captured or understood. In order to overcome this, attention will be paid to accurate translation and coding definitions, with particular emphasis on the significance of the symbols, icons and indices.
>
> The third limitation is that most of the content is in the English language which is not the mother tongue of most South Africans. This means that specific contexts and connotations sometimes have a uniquely South African background and meaning which may not be apparent to an external observer.

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The final limitation highlights potential researcher bias (Smit 2002: 67) regarding qualitative content analysis, particularly the coding categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories, terms and definitions, all of which affect the reliability and validity of the findings.

The research has the following temporal and spatial delimitations:

It is temporally delimited from 1913 to 2013 to follow the evolution of land dispossession and the emergent land question historically and contextually.

It is temporally delimited for the qualitative content analysis to the period from 2013 (when the EFF entered the South African political landscape) until 2019.

It is spatially delimited to South Africa with no distinction between the urban, rural and gendered dimensions of the land question.

1.6. Conclusion

Based on the aforesaid identification of the research theme, the formulation and demarcation of the research problem, research question and sub-question, the research structure as well as the limitations and delimitations, attention will be paid in the following chapter to the epistemological and conceptual framework.

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CHAPTER 2

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Constructionism is not subjectivism. It is curiosity, not conceit.
(Crotty 2006: 52)

2.1. Introduction

The complexity, intractability and divisions underpinning the land question have material and ideational components. As explained in Chapter 1, the material dimension of the land question is not rejected; this thesis rather seeks to extend the land question into the ideational dimension, which is less researched. Understanding the land question and the related 'land language' from this perspective demands an epistemological and conceptual framework on which to base the thesis.

The research question highlights the relevance of social constructionism and the inherent ideational context as the epistemological and conceptual framework. The aim of the chapter is to conduct a systematic literature review: firstly, to substantiate social constructionism as the epistemological framework; secondly, to expand the epistemological framework by adding identity, agency and structure; thirdly to substantiate the other, othering and otherness in a conflictual, unifying or diversifying context; and finally, to examine the underpinnings of a security community.

To achieve the aim, the chapter is structured as follows: it begins with the ideational context as a backdrop to the epistemological component consisting of social constructionism as the overarching construct, paying specific attention to language, identity, agency and structure. This is followed by the conceptual component which expands the epistemological framework by adding three concepts: community, imagined communities and security communities. It thereupon continues into the relational dimension that revolves around the other, othering and otherness manifesting as conflict, unity or diversity, to understand the emergence of a security community. The conclusion highlights salient observations concerning the epistemological and conceptual framework.

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2.2. **The ideational context**

As reflected in the research question, the ideational context is the primary focus and it is therefore introduced at the beginning of the chapter as a backdrop to the epistemological and conceptual framework. The ideational context consists of ideas, ideational thinking, ideational thought and imagination.

Unmistakeably described as "the 'switchmen' on history's tracks" by Max Weber, the relevance of ideas rose to prominence in the 1960s because of the inability of the rational and quantitative – or positivistic – approach to predict and explain the deep and profound societal upheavals that emerged across the United States of America (USA) and in Europe (Jacobsen 1995: 283-284). It thereafter fell out of favour before becoming *en vogue* in the aftermath of the Cold War. Scholars interested in the ideational context do not necessarily reject the material but take issue with the materialist viewpoint that the ideational is secondary to the material and that it, as such, does not warrant systematic or theoretical enquiry (Berman 2001: 233). Moreover, Berman (2001: 234) identifies the perpetuation of an inherent status quo regarding the relevancy of ideas in that they are taken as a given. She warns that this approach must be rejected, since it is important to take account of how ideas, as well as norms and culture, are created and applied by political actors (Berman 2001: 234). Ideas have utility across disciplines. Jacobsen (1995: 287), for example, examined interest and economic ideas, which he described as "… 'shared beliefs' so as to exclude idiosyncratic beliefs or leader-specific beliefs as explanations." However, he offers a subtle yet important warning that unless there is commonality of beliefs, ideas could be held hostage by leaders for selfish and narrow purposes (Jacobsen 1995: 288).

Ideas are particularly relevant in the Political Science discipline as they guide behaviour during times of "uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action" (Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 16). Ideas are parsimoniously defined by Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3) as "beliefs held by individuals"; they identify world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs as three belief categories (Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 7-10). They argue that ideas as world views have the greatest impact on action vested in identity which induces deep emotions and loyalties for the construction of the future (Goldstein & Keohane1993: 8). As principled beliefs ideas are normative, they mediate world views and include criteria for differentiating, for example, "right from wrong and just from

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unjust" (Goldstein & Keohane1993: 9). Also, ideas as causal beliefs identify cause-and-effect relationships vested in agency derived from shared consensus, for example between political elites, and guide individuals towards the achievement of objectives (Goldstein & Keohane1993: 10). In summary, ideas as world views and principled beliefs structure individual perspectives concerning universal fundamentals together with preferences leading to praxis. Causal beliefs direct praxis by initiating action to achieve desired goals or outcomes that reflect world views and principled beliefs. However, ideas are in and of themselves meaningless unless expressed as interests (Goldstein & Keohane1993: 3) and are also accompanied by action (Barker 2000: 227). Therefore, ideas are not simply restricted to the mind of an individual as they have context, meaning and implications for conflict or conciliation, which are motivated by the material and ideational.

Both the material and ideational remain relevant to an individual's receptiveness to ideas (Fukuyama 2018: 28). Although the material importance of land is not rejected, the primary focus of this thesis is on the ideational, as an extension to the material dimension, since it is under-researched. As Hurd (2010: 301) pointedly notes, "material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life." Therefore, while the material dimension is necessary, it remains an insufficient condition for the fulfilment of human development and an extension into the non-material dimension is vital for understanding conflict (Burton 1990: 60). Moreover, Hay (2011: 474) adds, "the complex interaction of material and ideational factors" must be taken into account since material reality is given meaning by the ideational context in which it is perceived and interpreted. In this respect Emile Durkheim argues

> human societies are held together by the 'social facts' of culture, not just objectively rational responses to 'natural' or material facts,' and … particular societies creatively invent different socially constructed identities and beliefs (Parsons 2010: 81).

Non-material thought, as an extension of material thought, is linked to the ideational context. As previously stated, this research does not negate the relevance of the material which, Burton (1990: 60) notes, is the foundation, or "*satisfier*", for non-material human needs. Stated in another way, discontent with the material dimension triggers ideas of unfulfilled expectations,

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entropy[10] and conflict (Burton 1990: 60). Therefore, non-material resources, Burton (1990: 61) argues, lie at the apex of human wants and desires and include, for example "role recognition and conflict-free valued relationships." Moreover, when conflict is present, the non-material dimension is particularly important as it is related to the identities of the parties involved (Burton 1990: 61). In this respect Burton (1990: 61) points out that while there is a material dimension to security and conflict, "the pursuit of non-material human needs is the ultimate human goal, the denial of which is the source of deep-rooted conflict."

Ideational thought further extends ideational thinking and is "founded on subjective assumptions, ideas, views, and evaluations of a thinking subject", leading to conclusions that have a particular context (Ule 2015: 491). This type of thought is useful for dealing with everyday life, although it assumes that "people around us think, feel, and evaluate the world and life situations in fairly similar and uniform ways" (Ule 2015: 491). This assumption leads to a pitfall in that ideational thought can become misguided, especially when confronting people who are "different" and this dictates that their views must also be acknowledged and accommodated (Ule 2015: 491). Another pitfall is that ideational thought is often uncritically generalised across individual and social community contexts, implying that ideational thought translates into group thinking where it is assumed that there is general consensus or a sense of we-ness. Despite its pitfalls the utility of ideational thought has enjoyed a resurgence and is once again prominent in academic research.

Berman (2001: 231) points out that the post-Cold War era brought with it renewed interest in the role of ideational thought in the Political Science discipline that was precipitated *inter alia* by dissatisfaction with the "inability of nonideational (*sic*) theories to account satisfactorily for a wide range of political phenomena." Barker (2000: 223), another leading proponent of the ideational context, who pays specific attention to the role of history, argues for an integration of ideas with outputs to permit "flexible, illuminating, and historically and empirically sensitive accounts." The role and influence of ideas are therefore a justifiable area of enquiry for this thesis, together with the associated 'political terms and concepts, to convince

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[10] The Entropy Law is the second law of thermodynamics which states that matter and energy transforms in one direction, "from useable to unusable, or from available to unavailable" (Rifkin & Howard 1986: 6). In their work, *Entropy: A New World* View, Rifkin and Howard (1986) argue that humans use resources – in this case material resources – wastefully. This entropic practice will ultimately lead to the destruction of society.

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the themselves and others of the utility, truth or virtue of their perspective" (Finlayson 2004: 530).

Ideational thought has, nonetheless, not received adequate scholarly attention from political scientists as politics is often narrowly understood as an output or an action (Barker 2000; Finlayson 2004). According to Barker (2000: 223) the prevailing notion that ideas and outputs are distinctly separate areas in politics and therefore mutually exclusive, requires revision. In many instances the importance and relevance of ideas are downplayed by academics as merely "background assumptions, or noisy rhetorical interference that can and must be bracketed off" (Finlayson 2004: 530). Despite these misgivings, Finlayson (2004: 530) insists that, although ideas are initially declarations, they are part of the "wider processes of deliberation, argumentation and persuasion" concerning culture, habit and tradition. However, ideational thought was backgrounded by political scientists to avoid scholarly engagement with ideas that were consequently relegated to the backwater of academic enquiry. Finlayson (2004: 531) concludes that ideas are, indeed, an area of academic enquiry for overcoming two shortcomings. The first shortcoming is a tendency to view politics as a passive outcome of social phenomena as opposed to a dynamic force that includes the use of ideas to transform organisations and relations (Finlayson 2004: 531). This tendency, Finlayson (2004: 531) notes, is informed by the mistaken notion that individual ideas and beliefs have no bearing on the action taken or the outcomes envisaged. The second shortcoming is the abstraction problem that political scientists encounter when working with ideas (Finlayson 2004: 531). He mentions that abstract models in the Political Science discipline often employ homogeneous areas and objects of enquiry, including ideas, but he is adamant that ideas cannot be viewed in this way (Finlayson 2004: 531). In this respect social constructionism, with its focus on ideas and the ideational, is not limited to only the beliefs of individuals. It highlights that the ideational involves the sharing of ideas among people using intersubjective interaction, leading to institutionalisation reflected in identity and practice (Hurd 2010: 301).

Therefore, as a vehicle for change, imagination – a form of ideational thought – is introduced to explore whether the political elites and their social communities involved in the land question imagine a security community. By straddling the divide between internal perception and "external material reality", imagination mediates the "positivist world and the human mind" (Yusoff & Gabrys 2011: 516). The mediation space provided by imagination allows centripetal and centrifugal forces to interact, concepts to cohere, objects to be framed

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and contested, and ideas to come to the fore (Yusoff & Gabrys 2011: 517). Yusoff and Gabrys (2011: 529) pointedly state that imagination is a cornerstone of human existence, as it is a "counterweight to the actuality of the world [by allowing us] to imagine how we might be otherwise." The use of imagination is therefore emancipatory, since it allows individuals and the political elites to free themselves from "those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Booth 1991: 319). Here it is important to note the observation regarding imagination by the 17th century English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1651: 14), that

> [i]f this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it prognosis from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty and ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.

Hobbes' crucial observation that the imagination of individuals and communities can be held hostage, subverted or suppressed by elites or other actors emphasises the potential for civil disobedience and conflict. Consequently, the positive use of imagination for the constitution of ideas is to be nurtured and encouraged as an emancipatory activity for "when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever" (Hobbes 1651: 10). Therefore, Hobbes provides the primary motivation for the culmination of this thesis, that of the potential for an imagined pluralistic security concerning the post-2013 land question.

The land question spawns an almost endless range of political, social, cultural, ethical moral and emotional responses, making it virtually impossible to envisage future possibilities and outcomes. Ideational thought and imagination can lead to ideas for breaking this logjam. Ideas, a crucial element of social constructionism, are given meaning when they are shared and expressed in an identity, the practices associated with that identity as well as the agency and structures that are employed to act out that identity.

For the purpose of this thesis the ideational context of the land question and the concomitant 'land language' focus on the inter-subjective sharing of ideas from knowledge pertaining to multiple historical realities by political elites who have identity, agency and structure. Political elites articulate 'land language' to construct divergent social communities and networks, which converge in a security community. In the following section social

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constructionism, as an epistemology, is described to highlight specific aspects on which to base this thesis.

2.3. Epistemological framework

The epistemological framework selected for this thesis is social constructionism because it shows how the origins of knowledge fashion the nature of perceived reality which, in turn, shapes human behaviour that is exercised in identity, agency and structure. A fundamental proposition of social constructivism highlighted by Alexander Wendt (in Hurd 2010: 300) is that the meaning of objects (in this case land) dictates the manner in which communities act in relation to those objects and to other actors, leading to the practices that follow. In this respect it is emphasised that while meanings and practices may appear stable, they are in reality temporary and change over space and time (Hurd 2010: 300).

2.3.1. Social constructionism

Although used interchangeably in literature, social constructionism differs from social constructivism. Social constructionism, which is elaborated upon in the following paragraphs, is succinctly defined as

> the view that *all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context* (Crotty 1998: 42).

Here it is important to pause to consider what is meant by the word ‘social’ in social constructionism. Crotty (1998: 55) is adamant that ‘social’ has to do with the construction of meaning and understanding of objects. He adds that, in social constructionism, understanding need not necessarily involve other humans as the object could be an inanimate, for example in the case of this thesis, the land together with culture that enables meaning-making (Crotty 1998: 55). Social constructivism emphasises meaning-making (or construction) by way of an individual’s enculturation and this has found traction in a number of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines, such as international relations, education and psychology (Crotty 1998: 42-65, 92). In this respect social constructionism and the creation of meaning are particularly useful for this thesis since these, for example, accommodate the significance of history, the role of

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actors such as political elites and the 'land language' they articulate to construct social communities and networks.

Crotty's definition highlights the role and importance of knowledge for the construction of reality. Both knowledge and reality are contingent upon interaction and communication in a social context that recognises the importance of culture. The following sections review the historical origins of social constructionism, explore the debates advanced by leading academics, highlight how social constructionism and politics are related, emphasise the role of language and ideational thought, investigate identity and its implications and conclude with an assessment of the relational nature of agency and structure.

2.3.1.1. ***Historical origins***

Social constructionism is rooted in philosophy and social theory. Its philosophical origins are traceable to the 18th century *constructivist* (own italics) Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico (1668-1774). His work, *Scienza Nuova*, published in 1725, dealt with human nature, social and historical change as well as the relevance of knowledge and methodology. Among the many ideas he advanced was the identification of two worlds: a natural world created by God and a historical world created by humankind (Lock & Strong 2011: 12-16). In particular, he postulated that the historical world is constructed through human ideas and actions that have an impact on the natural world and, in this way, advanced what could be termed a constructionist approach based on *verum ipsum factum,* "the true is the made" (Costello 2014). As Lock and Strong (2011: 15) accordingly suggest, history is constructed and therefore understood, by allowing humans to use imagination and rationality to comprehend the "creations, institutions and knowledges that have been constructed by humans over time." However, Vico (in Lock & Strong 2011: 15) suggests that humans are rational thinkers but that it is this rationality that prevents them from stepping aside from their own views in order to imagine – not understand – the constructionist perspectives of others. Warrick (n.d.) provides an additional angle by highlighting the relationship between truth, knowledge, language and knowledge creation and asserts that "[t]he human mind can only know what the human mind has made." As a consequence, a "system of interconnected abstractions or ideas that condenses and organises knowledge about the social world" is created and finds expression in social theory (Neuman 1997: 37). Accordingly, constructionism explains how ideas drawn from history and social theory translate into a social world that humans relate to for the configuration

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of reality. Reality was a fascination for another philosopher, Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), who explored how reality is constituted and concluded that the human mind acts a filter to shape perceptions of reality and that knowledge is therefore subjective (Butler-Bowdon 2017: 158; Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 211). Kant accordingly shows that the human mind is integral to shaping reality but this reality is linked to the subjective application of knowledge and is therefore a consequence of an individual's perception of the composition of the world. In this way Kant shows that individuals are capable of constructing their own reality based on their knowledge and this implies that an objective singular perspective cannot exist.

Social constructionism draws on a rich tradition, which questions how different worlds are constructed by humans that are reified in reality. Importantly, the original seminal thinkers highlight that human beings construct reality based on, among others, history and imagination, both of which are subjective. This means that multiple interpretations of reality emerge, increasing the potential for disagreement and conflict. While the historical origins of social constructionism provide some insight, its essence requires elaboration and clarification, particularly regarding the current generation of commentators who have come to the fore since the 1960s when social constructionism rose to prominence.

2.3.1.2. ***Contemporary social constructionism***

Although social constructionism does not have a central unifying idea, most academics and commentators agree that the seminal work published in 1966 by Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, provides a solid departure. In their work the authors contend that knowledge associated with the study of social problems involves understanding the processes that lead to the construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann 1991: 13). Reality, they suggest, cannot be wished away and it is the deeper sociological and philosophical underpinnings that are crucial for understanding how knowledge is socialised (Berger & Luckmann 1991: 13-14). Knowledge is socialised in different ways and include, for example, historical perspectives on particular events, but Berger and Luckmann also emphasise that Scheler (in Berger & Luckmann 1991: 20) holds the view that knowledge is socialised through a "socio-historical selection of ideational contents." In this way, Berger and Luckmann confirm the role of history in the construction of reality, emphasising that the ideational context (discussed at the beginning of the chapter) also plays a role. These processes include historical and cultural processes that manifest as events and in this respect the ideational leaves an

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indelible imprint on the human mind. This leads to the construction of reality, such as the land question, that selects and accentuates, for example, injustices and violence that were visited upon individuals and communities which are thereupon socialised, also in an ideational context. Berger and Luckmann's research is broadened and deepened by other scholars to extend its application. Their contributions are examined in the following paragraphs.

Gergen and Gergen (2012: 818) point out that Berger and Luckmann's work is surpassed by three separate scholarly movements, which converged to shape contemporary social constructionism. The first is the critical movement, which is an "ideological critique" of so-called authoritative world accounts, for example empiricism (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 818). The second is the "literary-rhetorical" movement, which shows that "scientific theories, explanations and descriptions of the world are not so much dependent on the world itself as on discursive conventions" and instead rely on the use of language to construct the world (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 818). The third movement is the "social", where the focus is on the social processes that culminate in types of knowledge (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 818-819). These developments, although diverse, embody three foundational propositions for contemporary social constructionism. They are firstly, the "social origins of knowledge" where knowledge is founded on relationships that lead to a shared consensus (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 819); secondly, the "centrality of language", which is linked to the social origins of knowledge, where meaning is derived from language (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 821); and thirdly, the "politics of knowledge" where assumed 'value neutral realities', as a source of discontent and frustration, are brought into question (Gergen & Gergen 2012: 822). Gergen and Gergen's account adds to Berger and Luckmann's work by showing that the processes for knowledge generation to construct and socialise reality are dynamic and a site of enduring enquiry, debate and contestation. This means that there cannot be a single authoritative account of knowledge and reality. Moreover, the significance of language in socialisation and the construction of knowledge must be taken into consideration. There are two reasons for this: firstly, to understand the events and processes that brought the knowledge into existence and secondly, to uncover the motives for the construction of language and the knowledge that is socialised. Finally, the afore-mentioned commentators concur that there is no reality that can be considered value-neutral or objective, as each account has a unique context and construct. The contemporary approach to social constructionism is summarised by Gergen (2001a: 25) who highlights the salient points thus:

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> Dialogues on social construction now span the range of inquiry in the sciences, humanities and professional schools. Constructionist scholarship has been devoted to understanding the generation, transformation and suppression of what we take to be objective knowledge; exploring the literary and rhetorical devices by which meaning is achieved and rendered compelling; illuminating the ideological and valuational (*sic*) freighting of the unremarkable or taken for granted; documenting the implications of world construction for the distribution of power; gaining an appreciation of the processes of relationship from which the real and the good are achieved; comprehending the historical roots and vicissitudes of various forms of understanding; exploring the range and variability in human intelligibility across cultures; and more.

The contemporary approach to social constructionism, therefore, aims to uncover and critique the assumptions on which knowledge is based. This is thereupon extrapolated to explain how knowledge is given meaning through language using terms that manifest in relationships that justify how history informs comprehension and to understand how meanings change over time.

Various commentators have added to the social constructionism debate. In particular, the perspectives of Burr (2003), Lock and Strong (2011) and again Gergen (2014) are examined in the following paragraphs. Burr (2003) in her work, *Social Constructionism*, argues that social constructionism is a multi-disciplinary theoretical orientation that extends, *inter alia*, into the humanities – thus including the Political Science discipline – and is based on four assumptions: firstly, “a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge”; secondly, “historical and cultural specificity”; thirdly, “knowledge is sustained by social processes”; and finally, “knowledge and social action go together” (Burr 2003: 2-5).

A critical stance implies that knowledge, together with the assumptions underlying that knowledge, cannot be accepted at face value. In particular, the categories and divisions that this knowledge produces, for example race and class, must be questioned to uncover alternative perspectives (Burr 2003: 3). Historical and cultural specificity means that understanding a particular condition is contingent upon the cultural, social and economic circumstances for a particular timeframe, implying that knowledge is a historical and cultural artefact (Burr 2003: 4). Social constructionism also argues that knowledge imposition by one culture on another has imperialist undertones, since it perpetuates colonisation and marginalises indigenous knowledge (Burr 2003: 4). Sustaining knowledge through social processes takes place through

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human interaction and social constructionists are especially interested in the use of language to construct shared (or differing) knowledge versions. People, both past and present, are responsible for conceptualising and categorising a reality that is constructed through language, which is a form of social action (Burr 2003: 11). Language is therefore "… 'performative'…" in that it consists of statements, responses and consequences together with a search for the truth (Burr 2003: 8).

The search for the truth, particularly in a historical and cross-cultural context, cannot be established by objective observation, as the truth is constructed through social processes and interaction (Burr 2003: 4-5). Social interaction results in differing interpretations of knowledge, which in turn leads to actions affecting power relations, permissibility and legitimacy concerning those actions by humans and how they treat others (Burr 2003: 5). By emphasising that existing knowledge cannot be accepted without interrogation, Burr provides deeper insight into the role of knowledge in social constructionism – it has a historical and cultural context, it is socially sustained and it is linked to social action. Social action relies on language that gives meaning to knowledge.

In their work, *Social Constructionism: Sources and Stirrings in Theory and Practice,* Lock and Strong (2011) extend the debate by identifying five tenets of social constructionism. Firstly, it is concerned with human activities, their meaning, associated with language symbols, and the different understandings attached to human activity (Lock & Strong 2011: 6). Secondly, meaning and understanding are co-constituted through interaction to create shared symbols; thirdly, meaning is temporally and spatially located; fourthly, essentialism is rejected as there are no pre-defined or objective methods for establishing how humans construct shared lives and experience; and finally, a critical approach is adopted that is concerned not only with political critique in search of emancipation and social justice, but also with "inquiring into, and understanding, human 'nature' …" (Lock & Strong 2011: 7-9). The five tenets culminate in generalised truth claims which Gergen (in Lock & Strong 2011: 9) accordingly questions by asking: how do truth claims function; in which conventions are they indispensable; what activities are promoted and impeded; and who is harmed and protected?

Gergen (2014) accordingly identified three propositions regarding social constructionist theory that expanded on his earlier work, particularly the role of language. Firstly, the language used to characterise, depict and discuss an object is not contingent on the

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object itself; secondly, the way in which an object is characterised depends on the community, relationships and paradigms with which the person depicting the object is associated; and finally, irrespective of the depiction accorded to the object, it will be assigned a tangible or intangible value. He goes on to highlight that the three propositions concerning language do not mean that 'anything goes' but rather manifest in a Wittgensteinian term, "language games", which is an articulation according to agreed rules and conventions. These rules and conventions are not restrictive; they open alternative avenues for argument when examining particular phenomena within multiple realities (Gergen 2014). The approach advocated by Gergen concerning the role of language, together with games of language, opens options for examining a particular phenomenon by questioning how and why it came about, how and why it is articulated in language, and how and why it is socialised in communities.

While social constructionism appears nebulous and difficult to pin down, the common thread provided by the commentators in the afore-mentioned paragraphs show that material and ideational objects are given meaning by interaction expressed through language based on imagination and ideas. Different meanings given to material and ideational objects lead to multiple realities based on divergent interpretations. The emerging multiple realities are rooted in different interpretations of history, diverse cultures and contexts, various types of social interaction and different forms of language. As a consequence, there cannot be one reality founded on a singular and objective truth.

As the locus of this thesis, language provides meaning that is temporally and spatially located to critique areas of enquiry such as the social and political dimensions of human existence – in this thesis, with reference to land. In the following section, the connection between social constructionism and politics is examined as a dimension of human existence.

2.3.1.3. ***Social constructionism and politics***

As is evident in the previous section, social constructionism encompasses a broad spectrum ranging across the humanities and it is therefore necessary to locate and narrow down its political positionality. In this regard, Gergen (1998: 34) identifies three key developments concerning social constructionism and its explanatory role concerning politics. A common factor in the three developments is the rejection of scientific language for objectively expressing the real world by policy-making authorities (Gergen 1998: 34). Each development

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calls for a re-examination of the modernist use of language that strives to produce verifiable truths based on empiricism (Gergen 1998: 35). The rejection of the language of absolute truth and its role in exercising authority allows the politically marginalised or dispossessed to be foregrounded. The three developments are firstly, "ideological critique and political commitment" (Gergen 1998: 35); secondly, "literary-rhetorical critique and the politics of the academy" (Gergen 1998: 37); and finally, "social critique and the liberal tradition" (Gergen 1998: 40) and are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The first development, "ideological critique and political commitment", came about in response to modernist institutionalism, which excluded normative approaches such as religion and ideology in, for example, policy-making and national planning (Gergen 1998: 36). This challenges the scientific postulation that normative concerns with description and explanation lead to untrustworthy and unreliable answers and a distortion of the truth, therefore legitimising science's 'neutral' stance (Gergen 1998: 36). Neutrality, Gergen (1998: 36) contends, allowed science to escape the drive for a deeper political understanding and was at best "a cheap means of escaping political deliberation; at worst, neutrality was just another word for legitimizing unjust and exploitative policies." Normative approaches permit an exploration of what ought to be and therefore incorporate concepts such as peace, justice, equality and freedom, thereby exposing the hegemonic dominance of authority and institutions (Gergen 1998: 36). In this way the ideological critique exposes the so-called authoritative truth claims by the "motivational unmasking" of phenomena such as power and wealth accumulation, cultural dominance or racial superiority (Gergen 1998: 37). It is of note that motivational unmasking was already grounded in the thinking of the Frankfurt School during the 1930s in the writings of Horkheimer, Adorno and Benjamin, whose works reached a zenith in the feminist movement by revealing how good intent may be a façade (Gergen 1998: 36-37). In essence "ideological critique and political commitment" calls into question the constructed nature of authoritative discourse through motivational unmasking.

The second development, "literary-rhetorical critique and the political academy", questions the arbitrary nature of language which, as a consequence, is governed by rules that are of themselves authoritative and can therefore be called into question (Gergen 1998: 37). While ideological criticism attempts to alter societal structures, literary-rhetorical critique is focused on dismantling power structures associated with intellectual politics, especially structuralist assumptions (Gergen 1998: 38). Chief among the intellectuals associated with this

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development was Derrida, who used deconstruction as a way of understanding word meaning in relation to other words, usage and context (Gergen 1998: 39). However, words are complex, with synchronic and diachronic meanings also relying on other words to exist, all of which are constantly changing.

The third development, "social critique and the liberal tradition", concerns the cultural context that shapes ideas and the manner in which ideas inform cultural practice (Gergen 1998: 40). In this regard, the work of Mannheim published in 1936, *Ideology and Utopia*, is considered a touchstone because of the four assumptions he proposes: firstly, theory is traced to a social – not empirical – origin; secondly, social groups are organised around theories; thirdly, theoretical disagreements are the result of group or political conflict; and finally, knowledge is culturally and historically dependent (Gergen 1998: 40). Because of an obsession with empiricism and the search for a unified science at the time, Mannheim's controversial ideas remained largely unnoticed, although there is evidence of an indirect correlation with the anti-institutional movements of the 1960s and 1970s and their critique of the "scientific knowledge industry", in particular the "military-industrial complex" (Gergen 1998: 40). In the work on social constructionism that followed from the 1960s through to the 1980s, the general theme followed the liberal tradition, placing the emphasis on individual freedoms and well-being, or as Feyerabend (in Gergen 1998: 41) stated, "scholarly work should strive to create a 'free society … in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power' …"

Although the three developments identified by Gergen share a commonality – a critique of language and authority – the outputs differ. While ideological critique is concerned with the needs of the marginalised, social critique is concerned with the middle class and literary-rhetorical critique straddles both. Therefore, all three critiques provide a convenient foundation for examining South Africa's land question and the involvement of the political elites, together with the articulation of 'land language' for constructing social communities and networks, prompts a deeper examination of social constructionism and language.

2.3.2. **Social constructionism and language**

In keeping with the aforesaid, language is a key component of social constructionism and in respect of the land question in all its guises and forms is communicated by among others

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political elites. Language, Burr (2003: 8) notes, is not simply a passive means for conveying thoughts and emotions, but is rather a form of action by people to construct their reality. Therefore, understanding how the land question is portrayed by the political elites, together with the proposed solutions, the finer nuances associated with the language deserve attention. An understanding of the social world and its associated phenomena, such as the land, from the perspective of individuals, communities or society at large, requires us to turn to the linguistic space that Burr occupies (Burr 2003: 54). However, before doing so, the seminal thinking of the 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger is briefly mentioned to appreciate the importance of language and understanding.

The nature of being human was a particular area of philosophical concern for Heidegger, who is considered among the most influential philosophers of the 20th century (Lock & Strong 2011: 58). For Heidegger (in Lock & Strong 2011: 58) *human activity* is *being human* and these routine or problematic activities are articulated in language. Key to Heidegger's approach is understanding how humans create, understand and participate in life contexts and what happens when contexts are disrupted (in Lock & Strong 2011: 59). Heidegger (in Lock & Strong 2011: 60-61) argued that two types of understanding are necessary. The first type occurs in routine, everyday environments, where it entails congruency, while the second type extends knowledge to revise our understanding of the self and the environment, central to which is the use of language.

Gergen (2009: 32-40) contends that social constructionism emphasises the role of narratives and metaphors as language vehicles for communicating reality. Narratives relate reality as a story by weaving together a construction ideally consisting of a "valued end point", the associated "events relevant to the end point", the sequential "ordering of events", and an elaboration of "the causal linkages" between the events (Gergen 2009: 37-40). A metaphor, he argues, involves taking a word out of a literal conventional context and placing it in another, more innovative context (Gergen 2009: 33). By way of example, Gergen (2009: 34) metaphorically equates war and argument, using "[y]our claims are *indefensible* (own italics)" or "[h]e *shot down* (own italics) all my arguments" as illustrations. He does not end there and goes on to aver that metaphoric language can be viewed not as a contest but as an opportunity to understand the other by changing metaphors in what he terms "a game" (Gergen 2009: 33). As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, metaphors and narratives play a key role in the multiple realities concerning land, the land question, and how the political elites relate to one another.

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In this context, the use of language assists in sense-making, for example to identify the motives of 'language games.'

2.3.2.1. ***Language games***

"Language games" originate in the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) who proposed that human interaction involves the use of language in a relational context where words are not merely an objective and systematic representation of things; they fulfil a more intimate purpose, to communicate according to rules (in Lock & Strong 2011: 156-161). Of crucial importance is Wittgenstein's observation (in Lock & Strong 2011: 157) that although language rules are flexible, they become "mis-steps" when established rules are ignored or circumvented. He nonetheless points out that the meaning of words is not fixed and words are used according to context and purpose, with conversations developing characteristic patterns that have particular connotations (in Lock & Strong 2011: 156, 158). Therefore, Wittgenstein (in Lock & Strong 2011: 156) contends, "speaking about how people 'correctly' talk and make sense of each other is something particular to expectations in their communications over time." Language cannot be assumed to be uniform in articulation and meaning. It is dynamic and develops in given contexts where words are sometimes ambiguous, vague and even contentious.

Numerous language rules can be used but for the purpose of this thesis, the Saussureian and Peircean essence of language is utilised, as it provides a comprehensive scaffolding for understanding complex matters such as 'land language' and what follows in the next section.

2.3.2.2. ***The essence of language***

This thesis relies on the work of Ehala (2018), *Signs of Identity: The Anatomy of Belonging*, which is based on Saussure's semiological system and Peirce's semiotic system. Both works provide an uncomplicated explanation of language and communication, which are complex and contested phenomena. For Ehala (2018: 48), language is used by humans to convey signs, which Peirce (in Innes 1985: 5) defines it as "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity." Signs are therefore widely used to communicate 'things' in a particular context, which is agency-dependent. Signs consisting of signals and

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their meanings convey reality using a combination of symbols, icons and indices, which are explained in the following paragraphs.

Firstly, language as a symbol can be linguistic-based and communicated in a written format or as spoken words (Innes 1985: 8). As Ehala (2018: 45-46) contends, words are a complex grammar for communicating reality or "imaginary situations (including lying)" and in this regard Swiss linguist Ferdinand Saussure contends that language is the study of signs. In his work, *Course in General Linguistics*, published posthumously in 1916, Saussure argued that language is a structured system of signs consisting of signifiers (signals that are empirically perceivable) and the signified (meanings that are concepts or mental representations), collectively termed symbols (Ehala 2018: 46). Signals are visible, audible, tangible, olfactive or tasted, while the meaning attached to a signal is random, diverse and depends, among others, on experiences and emotional attitudes (Ehala 2018: 46-47). For example, the word 'land' can be signalled orally or in the written word, but the meaning of land depends on the experiences of an individual at the micro-level. However, meanings are shared and therefore have characteristics that are collectively comprehended by individuals, implying that the sign is also understood on a macro-level in what is termed a "collective representation" (Ehala 2018: 47). In this sense, language is consensual in that it has an agreed and shared meaning among a collective. However, Ehala (2018: 47) is adamant that the mutual comprehension of a sign is a prerequisite for collective understanding at a macro-level, but he points out that miscommunication leads to erroneous mental representations. In this respect language, Burton (1990: 75) argues, is imprecise and ambiguous, since concepts have divergent meanings for individuals and communities that are decidedly context-dependent. By way of example he argues that there are many terms that do not have a precise meaning; for example, a table can be a desk, a counter or a worktop. Moreover, language ambiguity becomes more complicated in adversarial situations, for example in politics, when terms such as 'human rights', 'freedom' and 'justice' are employed but have differing connotations for those involved. Burton (1990: 76-77) thereupon points out that when constitutional – or political – oratory makes provision for these terms, they are not absolute and may simultaneously imply inclusion and exclusion, objectivity and subjectivity, or security and insecurity. In addition, language meaning in multi-lingual societies is an added layer of complexity, especially when the *lingua franca* of a country, for example South Africa where English is used, is not the mother tongue of many individuals or communities. Here Burton (1990: 80) observes that when multi-ethnic community authorities, for example political elites, label certain behaviour as deviant by using

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words such as 'street people', 'beggars', 'vagrants' or 'vagabonds', they designate individuals or communities whose motivations are not always fully understood or accepted (Burton 1990: 81). In summary, symbol-based communication uses signals that have meanings, which are arbitrary yet consensual, while in the case of icons and indices meanings are not arbitrary; meaning is instead linked to resemblance (Ehala 2018: 48, 49).

Secondly, language can be icon-based and communicated by visual imagery – real or imagined – such as drawings, diagrams, maps, cartoons or photographs that have embedded signals and meanings with an instinctive resemblance (Ehala 2018: 49-50). While Saussure's work was focused on signs in language, it was Peirce who pioneered icon-based communication (in Innes 1985: 2). By inherent cognition without conscious learning Ehala (2018: 49) notes that icons have an advantage over symbols since they can cross cultural and language barriers. An example of icon-based communication is a traffic sign such as a pedestrian crossing, which is recognisable in most countries across the world, although this is not always the case. Other icon-based communication conveys sounds, for example, words such as "groan" or "boom" (Ehala 2018: 49). In summary, icon-based communication uses signals that invoke an intuitive reaction that is based on a resemblance between a signal and its meaning.

Finally, language can be index-based and communicated by signs where the connection between signal and meaning is "natural, causal or logical" and the interpretation relies on experience and learning (Ehala 2018: 50). As Ehala (2018: 70) notes, the difference between an icon and an index is that in the former the meaning is instinctive while in the case of the latter the meaning needs to be learnt. Examples of index-based communication include the recognition of a human voice, the recognition of race, the displaying of flags or the wearing of particular dress colours or regalia (Ehala 2018: 71).

The essence of symbolic communication is summarised in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Symbolic language

Sign	Signal[11]	Meaning[12]	Cognition
Symbols	Spoken or written words	Arbitrary but consensual	Context-dependent

[11] Saussere originally used the term 'signifier' for a sign (Ehala 2018: 46).
[12] Saussere originally used the term 'signified'for a meaning (Ehala 2018: 46)

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Sign	Signal[11]	Meaning[12]	Cognition
Icon	Visual images	Instinctive and similar	Fairly uniform
Index	Visual images or spoken words	Learnt and acquired	Varied: natural, causal or logical

Burr (2003: 54) argues that Saussurean linguistics, which is structuralist, attaches particular meanings to signals that are fixed, but this approach accounts for neither the change in the meaning of words over time nor for signals that have multiple meanings. In response to this shortcoming, she maintains that the poststructuralist view of language as constantly changing and context-dependent means that language is "a site of variability, disagreement and potential conflict" (Burr 2003: 54). Equally important is Burr's (2003: 54-55) observation that conflict implies that power relations are "acted out and contested" in language during social interaction. Burr's argument against the structural approach to language must also be noted and accounted for because of the ideational context of this thesis and the use of 'land language' expressed in different symbols, icons and indices by political elites. Moreover, and in a South African context, it should not be forgotten that the use of language, especially English, is sensitive, as it is often viewed as a perpetuation of colonial domination to maintain and exercise power. Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2004: 6) correctly contends that

> [l]anguage is a means of organizing and conceptualizing reality; it is also a bank for the memory generated by human interaction with the natural social environment. Each language, no matter how small, carries its memory of the world. Suppressing and degrading the languages of the colonized meant also marginalizing the memory they carried and elevating to a desirable universality the memory carried by the language of the conqueror. This obviously includes elevation of that language's conceptualization of the world, including that of self and others.

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In summary and for the purpose of this thesis, the construction of language is graphically depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Language construction



The intimate link between language use and reality construction is a distinguishing feature of social constructionism. This section has shown that language to construct reality involves the use of signs as symbols, icons and indices. It requires a consensual meaning in the case of symbols, an instinctive meaning in the case of icons and an acquired meaning in the case of indices.

To complete this section, it is necessary briefly to mention how symbols, icons and indices are communicated through language. In this respect it is apt to highlight the work of Jakobson (1971), *Selected Writings Volume II: Word and Language*, that integrates Peirce's work with linguistics to understand how signs are communicated verbally (Narunsky-Laden & Tomaseli 2018: 159). Jakobson (1971: 697) contends that verbal communication has five elements: a message, a sender who codes the message, a recipient who decodes the message, an occasion facilitating contact between sender and recipient, and a historical, current or future account. The five elements combine in an "articulation" (Grossberg 1986: 53). Hall, one of the leading thinkers on this topic, is careful to point out that articulation is not the act of speaking but a way of connecting different elements so that they belong together (Grossberg 1986: 53). In particular, Hall refers to a theory of articulation which

> asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without

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> reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position (in Grossberg 1986: 53).

Hall's aforesaid explanation of articulation holds noteworthy relevance, since it allows connections to be made between the constituent elements of an articulation that include the social communities, their historical context and the social forces affecting the present. In particular, and when considering the ideational, the historical context that drives the politics of land must be considered when examining 'land language.' However, Weldes (1996: 281, 284) provides additional substance for defining articulation by averring that it is a "process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources." Weldes's reference to cultural raw materials should not be viewed restrictively, as she implies a much wider range of "objects" from the precise and tangible to the vague and ambiguous. Each object, she notes, "might be aggressive and hostile or peaceful and non-threatening; it might be potentially but not actually dangerous; it might be weak, strong or simply annoying" (Weldes 1996: 281-282). Fay (2015: 85) adds that the articulation of an object is embedded in "quasi-causal accounts" where factual accuracy is over-shadowed by "warranting conditions" (Fay 2015: 85; Weldes 1996: 282). For Fay (2015: 85), warranting conditions "make a particular action or belief more 'reasonable', 'justified', or 'appropriate', given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors." Articulation is historically context-dependent and it connects objects by giving meaning through warranting conditions in order to rationalise the actor's choices and the actions that follow.

Articulation is thereupon used by the sender to beckon to an audience, which Althusser (1971: 174) calls "*interpellation* or hailing." Fierke (2015: 90) points out that "[i]nterpellation assumes that different representations of the world incorporate patterns of identity and ways of functioning in the world." In this way she shows that the identity of individuals or social communities dictates the degree to which they recognise themselves in verbal communication and resonate with its articulation. However, Weldes, Fierke and Althusser do not argue that interpellation can be rejected or simply ignored by a social community on the grounds that it does not appeal to their identity. In the next section social constructionism and identity are explored.

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2.3.3. **Social constructionism and identity**

Social constructionism and identity have a close relationship because the way in which reality is constructed is also contingent on the identity of the individual or community and how identity is communicated through language.

Berger and Luckmann (1991: 84, 108) devote considerable attention to identity and in particular how it is constituted through knowledge, how it shapes the conduct of humans and how it is reified into "socially assigned typifications", which are "apprehended as *nothing but* that type." One of the consequences of identity, Berger and Luckmann (1991: 103, 194) note, is that identity flows from a prejudiced reality, leading to disputes between the communities that constitute society. The authors call for a de-reification of knowledge socialisation that includes dismantling institutional orders, promoting interaction between segregated communities and curbing social marginalisation (Berger & Luckmann 1991: 109). This is achieved through language because it is through language that identities are constructed, maintained or changed (Burr 2003: 55-56).

In their analyses, Berger and Luckmann and Burr demonstrate that an over-arching conception of identity is achievable but before this is discussed, an examination of identity and its constituent elements is explored. The following sections examine what constitutes identity, its relational components and its implications.

2.3.3.1. ***What is identity?***

Identity is described by Kowert (1999) as a two-dimensional phenomenon. The first dimension is endogenous and labelled "internal coherence." The second dimension is exogenous and termed "external distinctiveness" (Kowert 1999). Social constructionist Burr disagrees with Kowert and argues that identity is bestowed on an individual from the outside "social realm" and is relative to others; it does not originate from inside a person (Burr 1995: 36, 75). Both authors are deemed correct. For this thesis it is argued that identity is too complex to be binary and both insights are appropriate for understanding the construction of identity. The dimensions identified by Kowert are used in this thesis to establish the internal coherence and the external distinctiveness of the political elites and the social communities that have emerged since 2013.

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In the next section, the relational components of identity, the implications of identity, as well as agency and structure, are scrutinised. A twofold conclusion will thereupon be formulated concerning the extent to which internal coherence and external distinctiveness contribute to the formation of political elites together with their respective social communities and networks as well as a security community.

2.3.3.2. ***Relational components of identity: alterity, multiplicity and fluidity***

Identity exists in a relational context which, in turn, dictates how identities provide meaning to advance action. Identity manifests as alterity (hereinafter otherness), multiplicity, and fluidity, which lead to sameness or difference. Otherness in identity, Fierke (2015: 81) argues, means that identity is rooted not only in self-identity, but is also associated with an identity accorded by others (Fierke 2010: 76). Otherness, however, holds the risk that it could rely on power to protect and project self-identity and with it, difference. Multiplicity in identity is an additional feature for consideration, as actors all have a range of different identities that are contextually and relationally dependent. Burke and Stets (2009: 2) and Fierke (2015: 80) all note that multiple identities are the consequence of a collective membership and roles that are individually performed. For example, depending on the prevailing context and circumstance, an individual can have multiple identities that are expressed as a father, uncle, brother, friend, enemy. In the same way Tilly (1998: 401) reasons that multiple identities could be consistent with race, gender, class, or employment. Actors relationally respond to each other on the basis of one or more of the identities they perceive to be at play, with the result that ties are either enhanced or diminished. Tilly (1998: 401) is, however, at pains to point out the inherent danger in a singular, particular all-dominant identity, for example race, which he labels "a sickness" or "zealotry." Fluidity in identity shows that it is not stable. Fluidity is particularly prominent during times of change (Fierke 2015: 85). In fact, Fierke (2015: 85) suggests that fluidity can be approached from different angles: firstly, there are multiple discourses for giving meaning to identities in the context of the change itself; secondly, the temporal construction of different realities gives rise to diverse identities; and thirdly, historical encounters shape meanings that are carried over into future interactions and discourses. Referring back to the previous section regarding language, Burr (1995: 26, 27, 31) highlights that identity and language are intimately linked but she is adamant that the use of language in social interaction is circumstantial and inconsistent, implying that identity is temporary and fragmented. In this way Burr adds another layer to fluidity by highlighting that inconsistent language use makes identity malleable and

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adaptable, which simultaneously presents an opportunity and a threat. It is an opportunity in that fluidity means that an identity can be positively transformed and nurtured by promoting diversity or unity or it can be negatively transformed and nurtured by promoting conflict. Identity manifests as otherness, multiplicity, and fluidity and culminates in sameness or difference.

2.3.3.3. ***Identity sameness***

Sameness in identity is subjective and involves "alterations of consciousness, especially consciousness of shared fate with others previously considered as irrelevant, alien or even hostile" (Tilly 1998: 400). Identity with a sense of sameness can also change and incorporate communities that were previously imagined to be different. The question that follows is how sameness, rather than difference, can be fostered and nurtured. Tilly (1998: 400) proposes that precedence must be given to conversation, interaction and sociability, the last-mentioned being especially relevant in the South African context, as it encompasses strands of *Ubuntu*[13]. Fostering sameness is not farfetched, for as McSweeney (in Fierke 2015: 83) argues, it entails a transformation through a process of negotiation involving political leaders, academics and other role-players who construct, negotiate, manipulate or affirm responses for collective identities that are founded on sameness. Identity sameness is what Ehala (2018: 78) terms "collective identity", which Jasper and McGarry (2015: 1) define as:

> [A]n act of the imagination, a trope[14] that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories. It involves both cognition and emotions and can ultimately be traced to the universal human need for attachments to others.

While Jasper and McGarry (2015: 3, 4) are convinced that homogeneity, coherence and power are outcomes of socially constructed collective identities, they warn that guarded scepticism must be exercised when considering the concept. They are especially concerned that a fixed identity, such as a collective identity, is not necessarily an authentic representation of experience, as it resists adaption and reinterpretation when circumstances change and is

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[13] *Ubuntu* is a distinctly African identity vested in sameness. It is dealt with in more detail later in this chapter as it is integral to human dignity which is key to exploring an imagined pluralistic security community.

[14] A trope is a narrative form that follows a consistent and standard outline maintaining, for example, the same scenario or character relationships repeated in different contexts (Crang 2004: 62).

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therefore inflexible (Jasper & McGarry 2015: 4). Moreover, collective identities are adopted by individuals with varying degrees of commitment and resolve, which means that there is a core surrounded by a periphery of individuals whose commitment to a collective identity diminishes in intensity as the distance from the core increases (Jasper & McGarry 2015: 4-5). Therefore, a collective identity does not necessarily imply homogeneity, as it is underwritten by political concepts that shift according to priority and relevance and depend on the distance of the social community from the core. Core and associated adjacent and peripheral concepts are integral to sameness and are explained in the following paragraph.

Freeden (2003: 61) discusses the role of political concepts in an ideology and points out that the principal function of an ideology is to rank the underlying political concepts according to their importance. He argues that the core concepts are the minimum requirement that typify an ideology and distinguish it from other ideologies (Freeden 2003: 62). Core concepts are circumscribed by what he terms "adjacent and peripheral concepts" (Freeden 2003: 62), which operate concentrically and in tandem with core concepts to provide further substance and meaning to the ideology. Adjacent concepts, he argues, provide substance to the core by further defining parameters, while peripheral concepts are specific and detailed (Freeden 2003: 62). For Freeden (2003: 62), core concepts tend to be stable, while adjacent and peripheral concepts tend to be fluid and change over time. The significance of core concepts will be examined in more detail as a component of security communities.

Since social reality is subjective, it can be symbolic. Identities associated with social reality are therefore symbols that communicate the positions of individuals in society to reduce uncertainty or to exercise power (Ehala 2018: 78). Identity communication is important for exchanging and seeking information to reduce uncertainty concerning behaviour expectations during social interaction, also known as the uncertainty reduction theory, proposed by Berger and Calabrese in 1975 (Ehala 2018: 80). Power in identity communication entails seeking information to formulate hypotheses about the collective identity of the other party (or parties), which may or may not be correct (Ehala 2018: 81). The creation of different collective identities is dependent on shared cultural attributes that are bounded by distinction and characterised by a level of power (Ehala 2018: 82-83). Sameness in identity is a combination of transactions involving an exchange of information that encompasses affirmation, reduced uncertainty and shared cultural attributes.

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2.3.3.4. ***Identity difference***

The flipside of sameness is difference which manifests in a relational sense as socially recognised differentiation (Connolly 2002: 64). For Connolly (2002: 64) the "paradox of identity" rests in conditions of recognised dissimilarity between individuals or political elites, causing a complex contest between identities, which may culminate in an internal (or good) and an external (or poor) relationship or a hierarchical relationship (Fierke 2015: 82). Using Connolly's paradox, this thesis contends that identity competition manifests as material, ideational, historical, racial, or political difference which is explained in the following paragraphs.

Identity difference rooted in materialism tends to maximise interests, thereby promoting inequality and marginalisation (Fierke 2015: 83). This is therefore unhelpful, as entrenching division and promoting conflict undercuts the potential to foster collective identities. In this way Fierke and Kowert agree that perceptions of self and perceptions of others – concerning self – have a significant impact on the degree to which sameness takes root, especially in the light of material considerations. In order to overcome this, a higher order of interest, that of societal interest, must be aspired to.

2.3.3.5. ***Implications of identity***

Steans *et al*. (2010: 196) postulate that identity forms the foundation for policy, the roles that actors assume and the actions that follow in support of policy execution. However, McDonald (2013: 66) points out that identity is unstable, as it depends on a dominant narrative, the time when the narrative is propagated, the social community propagating the narrative and the language of the political elites to support of the narrative. This implies that when one narrative is privileged over another, the language invariably leads to a "we/they" divide that represents some and excludes others. Exclusion is often articulated in language that Fierke (in McDonald 2013: 68) describes as 'language games' in context-specific meanings, therefore accentuating contestation and conflict.

Identity is a given in today's world and is a source of division, unity or in some cases, indifference. For example, identity politics degenerates into disparate political elites vested in a we-they attitude characterised by resentment, division, tension and confrontation, all of which

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are best-avoided. Narratives, together with the associated language, promote a particular identity that creates a sense of security – freedom from want and fear – in one community juxtaposed with a sense of insecurity – bondage in want and fear – in the other community. The thesis contends that intransigence concerning the land question is also a consequence of the dearth of an overarching identity, which Erikson (in Kowert 1999: 5) describes as, "a persistent sameness within oneself (self-sameness) *and* (own italics) a persistent sharing of essential character with others." An additional area of enquiry located within constructionism concerns the relationship between the political elites and their social communities. Using the theory of social constructionism, agency and structure is key to explaining how actions within narratives and language are initiated.

2.3.4. **Social constructionism and agency**

Although social constructionism emphasises the significance of identity and its construction within relationships, a limitation is its failure to comprehensively explain the role of agency – in particular the agency of an individual to shape and influence society (bottom up) or the agency of society to shape and influence an individual (top down) (Burr 2003: 182). Agency – the capacity to act – includes a number of facets that dictate how actors use it to influence or transform society.

A concise yet insightful description of agency is provided by Fierke (2015: 60) and Pettiford (2015: 64) who describe it as the *capacity* (own italics) of individuals or states to change or influence their environment and *vice versa*. Individuals or states are collectively designated as agents and influence, or are influenced by, structures and action (McDonald 2013: 69). Agents, through agency and control of resources, are constituents of structure and are empowered by it to act in unison or against other agents using the same or differing structures. As Sewell (1992: 20) clearly notes, "[a]gency is implied by the existence of structure." Action – or agency – based on self-perception shapes the way people act as agents by exercising their agency and implies the ability to institute processes for achieving results (Steans *et al.* 2010: 14, 15; Mansbach & Taylor 2012: 23). The achievement of results is, in turn, dependent on structures that allow actors to act or prevent them from acting, thus empowering or constraining the actor in using structure; or using an alternative structure; or changing the structure.

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Options for exercising agency through structures are often explained by various scholars using rational choice theory (Homans 1964; Coleman 1986; Coleman 1994). In this regard, Hay (2011: 471-472) highlights a problem related to linking rational choice theory with agency by pointing out that since it is defined in terms of individualism and group interaction, it is predictable. Fierke (2015: 60) provides a way out of the rational choice approach by arguing that, for structures to be meaningful, they must have a wider social connotation to account for the complexities of social interaction.

In order to further account for the shortcomings of rational choice, it is necessary to turn to the work of Giddens (1986), *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, where he describes the complex relationship between structures (rules and conditions guiding social action) and actors – acting as agents – who are motivated to achieve a particular outcome using agency. The relationship between structures and agents is what Giddens terms structuration, which involves interaction to bring about mutual agreement on the meaning of reality (Jackson & Sørensen 2013: 210). This means that actors have the power to construct structures or not to do this according to a mutually agreed reality. In this way, social interaction creates prospects for understanding and action, although understanding and action associated with those prospects that fall outside this approach define what is "in" and what is "out" (Lock & Strong 2011: 215). Giddens (in Lock & Strong 2011: 215) is nonetheless adamant that humans are rational actors who are capable of interpreting and acting resourcefully within social contexts, but that this interpretation depends on a quality of being. Moreover, Giddens (in Lock & Strong 2011: 217) is of the opinion that the "top-down and bottom-up approaches" to agency and structure are reciprocal and function in tandem with actors and agency working from the bottom up within structures that are imposed from the top down. In summary, therefore, the central underpinning of Giddens' theory of structuration is that humans, "though immersed in the traditions of particular social orders, could agentively alter those orders" but that this takes place within a sense of being (Lock & Strong 2011: 215).

Sewell (1992) in an article, *A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation*, argues that agency is an activity involving interaction for controlling and maintaining social relations. However, agency cannot be uniform in application and use, as it differs both in kind and extent, since agency is itself linked to the structures informing a particular social world (Sewell 1992: 20-21). Moreover, agency is affected by social standing such as class, ethnicity or education and the associated knowledge which, in turn, affects the

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transformative actions that follow (Sewell 1992: 21). Although Sewell (1992: 21) maintains that agency can be exercised individually or collectively, he insists that it always involves communication, as it is an

> ability to coordinate one's actions with others and against others, to form collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous effects of one's own and other's activities (Sewell 1992: 21).

The "capacity for agency – for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting creatively – is inherent in all humans" (Sewell 1992: 20). This sage observation by Sewell (1992: 20) shows that agency lies at the heart of the human motivation to act, but he also warns that agency is an imprecise capacity, as it depends on resources, culture and historical context.

Emirbayer and Mische (1998), in their journal article, *What is Agency?*, argue a deeper approach that accounts for human agency – related to community – which has a temporal-relational context. The authors reframe human agency as a human engagement process within a timeframe that is simultaneously located in the past (manifesting as habit), the present (contextualising past habits within current possibilities) and the future (imagining alternative outcomes) (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 963-964). Temporal simultaneity enables actors to adapt their relationship to structures and in this way increase their "maneuverability, inventiveness and reflective choice … in relation to the constraining and enabling contexts of action" (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 964). They define human agency as

> *the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to problems posed by changing historical situations* (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 970).

Moreover, the authors provide a useful analytical framework, described as the *chordal triad* for human agency consisting of an "iterational element", a "projective element" and a "practical-evaluative element" defined as follows:

> [The iterational element is] *the selective reactivation of actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to*

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> *social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time* (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 971).

> [The projective element is] *the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future* (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 971).

> [The practical-evaluative element is] *the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgements among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations* (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 971).

The authors warn that the three elements neither operate in unison nor carry equal weight; it may well be that one element overshadows the other two in a given context (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 972). In a practical sense this means that agency, which is both social and relational, may be exercised within a community or between communities by an actor using predominately historical considerations (iterational element) rather than the feasibility of the outcomes (practical-evaluative element) (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 972-973).

2.3.5. **Social constructionism and structure**

Defining structure is elusive, but as Sewell (1992: 2) notes, it implies that something constructs something else. Structure is therefore an enabler. Social constructionism shows that language enables identity formation and that identity, in turn, enables the practices that are acted out in societies (Burr 1995: 37). This shows that language structures identity, which thereupon structures the actions that follow. Structure provides a channel for exercising human agency but as Sewell (1992) notes, it is "elusive and undertheorised." Sewell refers to Giddens's definition of structure as

> [r]ules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action (Giddens 1984: 377).

Structure empowers what is designated, for example, the "rhetorical conventions that structure texts or utterances" (Sewell 1992: 2). In the case of this thesis, for example, it is

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possession of land that structures white commercial farmers while the dispossessed class structure the approaches to the land that are advocated by the political elites, such as the EFF. Sewell (1992) accordingly identifies three weaknesses in the literature associated with structure that must be taken into account and resolved. Two of the weaknesses have direct relevance to this research. The first is that structure is associated with rigidity and is perceived as inflexible; and the second, linked to the first, that because of their rigidity, structures are perceived as stable and resist change (Sewell 1992: 2). He is adamant that rigidity – especially the "language of structure" – tends to underplay the role and worth of human agency, leading to the notion that structures are constraining and fixed (Sewell 1992: 2). In order to overcome the weaknesses, the author proposes a deeper understanding of the role of social actors and advances an argument for a nuanced understanding of changes in structures by suggesting that the gap between "semiotic and materialist versions of structure" must be bridged (Sewell 1992 3-4). In order to do this, Sewell uses the work of Giddens, in particular the dualism associated with structures, implying that "[s]tructures shape people's practices, but it is also people's practices that constitute (and reproduce) structures" (Sewell 1992: 4). The duality of structures is explained by Sewell (1992: 5) as:

> [H]ow historical agents' thoughts, motives, and intentions are constituted by the cultures and social institutions into which they are born, how these cultures and institutions are reproduced by the structurally shaped and constrained actions of those agents, but also how, in certain circumstances, these agents can (or are forced to) improvise or innovate in structurally shaped ways that significantly reconfigure the very structures that constituted them.

Sewell is correct in identifying that thoughts and motives, in other words, the ideational, are influenced by the cultural and social institutions where agents are situated. However, there is an underlying dynamic in that the institutions themselves structurally adapt and evolve as a consequence of the duality of the actions by agents.

Duality, according to Sewell, is vested in the way that agents act, but his introduction of an agent as "historical" (Sewell 1992: 5) is crucial, as he is of the opinion that agents replicate the institutions and the structures that are in existence. This means that, unless an agent deliberately makes a concerted effort to move away from replication – or duality – then structures are unlikely to change and will simply perpetuate the *status quo*. Countering duality

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and a perpetuation of the *status quo* therefore requires a conceptual broadening of social constructionism. The proposed conceptual additions are discussed in the next section.

2.4. Conceptual additions to social constructionism

Concepts are simple or vary in their degree of complexity and abstraction (Neuman 1997: 40). However, Neuman (1997: 40) warns that daily life often involves vague concepts that are influenced by different values, misconceptions and myths, which are underpinned by assumptions. In this regard he distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative concepts (Neuman 1997: 40) and it is the latter that will be used to extend the epistemological framework.

As explained in the previous section, identity, agency and structure manifest, among others, within and among political elites. Communities, as a social construct, give substance and meaning to the ideas that unite or divide individuals. While the initial building block for this thesis identifies the ideas that bind particular political elites with their social communities, the same ideas may be a vehicle for division between political elites who are designated as the other. In order to overcome the potential for discord between communities, an imagination of a higher order community is required, and in this thesis, imagination takes the form of a security community. Therefore, and in order to further substantiate and expand the epistemological framework, the following concepts are added: firstly, a community; secondly, an imagined community; and thirdly, a security community. Each concept is examined in the sections that follow.

2.4.1. Community

Humans are social beings and gravitate towards one another on the basis of commonality to establish social groupings in which identity and ideas are central. A particular manifestation of a social grouping found within societies, that of a community, is a conceptual building block, the essence of which is explained in the following paragraphs.

The community idea featured in the works of utopian sociologists such as Robert Owen and in 20th century ethical socialism. However, it was Ferdinand Tönnies who distinguished an ‘association’ (*geselleschaft*) from a ‘community’ (*gemeinschaft*) (Buckler 2007: 41). On

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the one hand, an association is a grouping that has purpose which, together with instrumental relationships, serves the interests of the members and is governed, for example, by contracts (Buckler 2007: 41). On the other hand, a community is a grouping that is "organic", based on shared characteristics and is structured by relationships that are constituted in the context of human activity (Wiesenfeld 1996: 337; Buckler 2007: 41). Definitions of community, according to Wiesenfeld (1996: 338), have a number of components ranging from the context where individuals define their activities to the processes (psychological, social and cultural) that bring humans together and motivate them to organise their activities to establish socio-emotional ties that unite them around a common denominator. A community is therefore a more substantial grouping than an association that places extensive and fundamental obligations on its members.

A community provides a vehicle for "understanding societies and social action" (Buckler 2007: 41). Moreover, it resonates well with interpretivism, which accounts for the constitutive and intersubjective rules that dictate meaningful conduct, and is therefore relevant to this research. Drawing on international relations theory, the concept of community, as conceived by Tilly (1998), is added, as he is adamant that an analysis of communities must be aimed at answering the following questions: firstly, what are communities? and secondly, how are communities constructed? (Tilly 1998: 398).

The first question is examined in the following paragraphs. A community is a social construction based on the individual characteristics of a group of people who share collective features, the most prominent being a common identity (Wiesenfeld 1996: 339; Tilly 1998: 400; Booth 2007: 135). The term 'community' is used by scholars and practitioners because of an apparently attractive appeal, labelled by Williams (2015: 40) as "warmly persuasive", since it evokes feelings of "common identity, shared interests, mutual obligations, a sense of interdependence, common social understandings, cultural habits" (Booth 2007: 134). Douglas (2010: 539-540) extends Williams's description by adding that communities are social institutions and consist of relationship networks that support common bonds to provide order and meaning that are underpinned by mutually agreed procedures and conventions. However, Booth (2007: 134) warns that defining a community is exceedingly difficult, as it is underpinned by identity, leading to complex questions related to "*who or what* are 'we', and *who or what* are 'they'?" He provides a simplified solution that a community is an expression of a politically relevant "*we*" (Booth 2007:134). Wiesenfeld (1996: 338) is, however,

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suspicious of a generalised myopic use of "we" and warns that the "we" must not overemphasise the importance of homogeneity, equilibrium and conformation. Buzan (2007: 138) supports Wiesenfeld's rejection of homogeneity as a pre-requisite for an identity and avers that humans can be themselves (or have an identity) in relationships with others. This approach has the added advantage that it enhances an overall sense of security. He cites *ubuntu* as an example of the interconnectedness of people and the accommodation of "self-in-community" or as "the I-that-is-another" (Booth 2007: 138). Yet, despite its vagueness, Booth (2007: 135) contends that the notion of community remains relevant to scholarly enquiry because "fuzzy concepts make the world go around." Founded on his idea that "[c]ontemporary politics should seek to mitigate generalized resentment and respond to historical contingency", Connolly (1991: 27) juxtaposes individualism with collectivism. He thereupon argues that resentment can be alleviated either by enabling individual autonomy or by diluting resentment through links with a larger community, the latter assuming that the envisioned community "establishes harmonious norms and ends for all" (Connolly 1991: 28).

The characteristics of social communities require consideration. Hillery (in Douglas 2010: 541) identifies four elements that characterise a social community namely location, kinship, self-sufficiency, common lifestyle and manner of social interaction. Building on the elements identified by Hillery, Worsley (in Douglas 2010: 540) argued that there are three community types: firstly, a community founded on locality reified as a "sense of place"; secondly, a community with a collective identity that manifests as a "sense of community" and draws on an identifiable attributes such as ethnicity or a sense of injustice that disadvantages the community; and thirdly, a community constructed on common feelings, understandings and a sense of belonging that manifests as "community spirit" founded on networks and interactions that are not necessarily material.

Mamdani (1996: 4) provides an alternative African perspective by contending that the idea of a community or communitarianism entails a return to Africa's "age-old communities", which are rooted in culture by placing them at the "centre of African politics", as they are marginalised from public life. The "communitarian" idea, he contends, is different from the "modernist" in that the modernist idea eschews liberalism and Eurocentricity by calling "for a return to the source" by championing rights (Mamdani 1996: 4). Mamdani (1996: 4) argues that each idea has merit, does not reject either and rather calls for their conflation.

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The second question, the construction of communities, means that there is an assortment of communities in societies. There are many reasons for the formation of communities. Brace (2016) offers a thought-provoking perspective that links the liberal notion of community to property and ownership. By identifying the association between community and property she shows that communities are created through property – by implication land – ownership. She is adamant that the normative dimensions of community are connected to power relations that are expressed through notions of "honour and dishonour, distinction and degradation" (Brace 2016: 41). Land ownership, Brace (2016: 42-43) cautions, can be the source of estrangement between individuals and entrench the notion of self and other, in a defensive relationship that is characterised by fear and mistrust. As a condition, she proposes that a community should be imagined around "the common and forged in relation to others" (Brace 2016: 43). Brace's research shows a clear link between property, in this case land, and its relevance to promoting community or in a negative sense, division. Division between communities is particularly prominent in this thesis, as it is underlain on the one hand by powerful ideas of inferiority, loss, victimisation, unfairness, injustice, oppression and unfulfilled expectations among those dispossessed of land. On the other hand, similarly powerful ideas of superiority, possession, denial, victimisation, fairness, fear and rule of law are observable among those possessed of the land. This illustrates that there is a complex diversity of contexts, activities and processes that motivate individuals to identify and associate with those communities that mirror an idea or ideas, for example peaceful change.

Conditions that precipitate peace or peaceful change among communities are complex and cannot be reduced to the generic description offered in the aforesaid paragraphs. In this respect, Tilly (1998: 398), maintains that a collective identity through social interaction is key to establishing and maintaining security communities. He stresses social relations as the main constituent together with relational thinking that employs social network analysis (Tilly 1998: 398). Neither individuals nor social systems, but the networks, he suggests, lie at the heart of communities, as it is the links between communities that facilitate social interaction. In this respect Tilly (1998: 399) identifies nine concepts for locating communities within social structures:

> Social site: any connected set of social relations producing coherent, detectable effects on other social relations.

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Actor: any site consisting of living bodies (including a single individual) to which human observers attribute consciousness and intention.

Category: set of sites distinguished by a single criterion, simple or complex.

Transaction: bounded communication between one site and another.

Tie: continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecast, rights and obligations.

Role: bundle of ties attached to a single site.

Network: more or less homogeneous set of ties.
Group: coincidence of a category and a network.

Identity: actor's experience of a category, tie, role, network, or group, coupled with a public representation of that experience; the public representation often takes the form of a shared story, experience.

Of the nine categories, Tilly (1998: 399) suggests that the categories, tie, network and identity enjoy primacy. Since identity is a focus, it is analysed in the context of the actors, the ties, the sites and the transactions and in this respect Tilly (1998: 400-401) argues that identity is "public and relational", is present in all of the concepts, and is characterised by multiplicity. Regarding multiplicity, he warns that rejecting multiplicity and focusing on a single identity such as race, class or gender is counter-productive to the notion of a security community and calls for "unitary identities." Tilly (1998: 401) is optimistic that identities can be negotiated and renegotiated through the use of language reflecting an actor's involvement in categories, ties or networks.

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Figure 2: Network configurations



(Tilly 1998: 403)

In his explanation of community configurations Tilly emphasises ties rather than transactions or networks. Ties are, by definition, “thicker” than transactions and “thinner” than networks, therefore presenting a middle path for analysing communication between sites and sits well with the approach that will be adopted when analysing communities. He suggests that rapid social change has an impact on the feeling of community and it is through “*charismatic renewal, or through forceful imposition of new controls*” (own italics) that it is refashioned (Tilly 1998: 397). Underlying identities are network configurations that reflect the creation of ties which are depicted in Figure 2 above.

Each network configuration is explained as follows:

> The chain consists of two or more similar and connected ties between social sites – persons, groups, identities, networks, or something else.
>
> Hierarchies are those sorts of chains in which the connections are asymmetrical and the sites systematically unequal.
>
> Triads consist of three sites having similar ties to each other.
>
> A categorical pair consists of a socially significant boundary and at least one tie between sites on either side of it.

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> Organizations consists of well bounded sets of ties in which at least one site has the right to establish ties across the boundary that bind members of internal ties (Tilly 1998: 403).

Tilly (1998: 403-404) points out that the five proposed configurations could be reduced to three, as a hierarchy could be classified as a particular type of chain and an organisation is an extension of a categorical pair. For the purpose of this thesis, three configurations will be used: the chain; the triad and the categorical pair, as they best exemplify how political elites create networks within and among themselves. Moreover, the configurations are not singular entities; they coexist, combine or transform. For example, hierarchies combine with paired categories to constitute categories of inequality, such as black-white, in possession or dispossessed (Tilly 1998: 404).

2.4.2. **Imagined communities**

While the idea of community is attractive because of its "feel good" appeal, it holds the risk that it generates division by creating a "we" and a "they" divide, which inhibits the potential for collaboration and cooperation aimed at achieving a higher order goal or purpose that serves the interests of a number of communities. While communities exist at lower levels, there is potential for various communities to strive towards a higher order community that can be imagined. An imagined community offers a way out of the current stasis related to the land question, which is characterised by entrenched social community identities and the associated language. In this respect literature is examined to understand the concept of imagined communities, while also considering the views of its detractors.

Anderson in his seminal work first published in 1983, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, provides insight into the imagination of communities at the level of a nation. Poole (1999: 9), in his work, *Nation and Identity*, accepts and expands Anderson's concept of the 'imagined community' by proposing that it permits the idea of a nation to respond to political and economic change. Poole (1999: 11) confirms the relevance of culture for imagining a community by suggesting it is commonly owned and based on a "gallery of meaningful or representative objects which those with the appropriate cultural knowledge and identity can interpret and evaluate." He emphasises that "cultural objects", in this case land, are the product of a process and can therefore be made and re-made (Poole 1999: 12).

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Anderson (2006: 6) observes that community, or sameness, must be "*imagined*", as it is unlikely that personal contact exists between all community members, but he emphasises that, "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." In this respect Anderson (2006: 70, 78, 116, 134) emphasises the centrality of language, in what he terms a contemporaneous community language that includes poetry and songs to create unison or division. Anderson therefore acknowledges the role of language, its relevance in uniting or dividing and how it contributes to a powerful imagination. He (2006: 4) additionally highlights the importance of historical context for imagining communities, how the imagined community changes over time, and why imagined communities "command such profound emotional legitimacy" in the world of today. For Anderson (2006) imagined communities evolved in a process that includes the following dimensions: culture, national consciousness, language and patriotism. As mentioned above, Anderson's work is focused on the nation, yet there is every reason to believe that an imagined community can exist at sub-national level as the same dimensions are also present there. However, and for the purpose of this thesis, two dimensions are highlighted; firstly, language as it resonates with social constructionism, and secondly, culture as it resonates with identity.

Some scholars, such as McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) and Chatterjee (1996) are, however, dismissive and cynical of Anderson's notion of imagined communities. McCrone and Bechhofer (2015: 11) argue that it has little to do with national identity and that

> [h]is is an historical-culturalist account in which the actual task of 'imagining' is talked about very little, if at all. One senses that people take what is on offer, that they buy passively and willy-nilly into the nation as "imagined", limited, sovereign and as community.

It is, nonetheless, unwise to dismiss Anderson's notion of imagined communities, as it is in human minds that understandings and misunderstandings, and representations and misrepresentations are conceived and propagated. Therefore, the importance of imagination cannot be discounted, as it provides a clue to integrating alterity, self-identity and perceptions of others. This plays directly into the potential for imagining a security community that incorporates the political elites when referring to the land question. Despite the aforementioned criticisms, imagining we-ness is indeed achieved – or undermined – by deliberate language acts. Unless there is language supporting the idea of we-ness, solutions to the land question

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will revert to a default, that of a quantitative (or material) redress, thereby perpetuating division and confrontation.

While Anderson's imagined community is a necessary concept for this thesis, the idea is insufficient and a further extension, that of a collective identity reflected in a common language, is required. Moreover, peaceful change, the meaning of which is contested and negotiated, is socially constructed in a specific context and will be applied to understand a security community.

2.4.3. **Security communities**

The emotions, hostility and fear associated with the land question are undeniable and are sometimes reflected in the 'land language' articulated by the political elites when constructing their social communities. Two of the more serious outcomes associated with 'land language' are pervasive insecurity within the social communities and the prospect of manifest conflict or violence. It is in this context that this thesis imports the concept of security communities from international relations theory as a counter to the threats of insecurity and manifest conflict inherent in the land question, in particular the inevitability of EWC.

In 1957 Deutsch developed the security community concept that was first proposed by Van Wagenen in the early 1950s. Deutsch proposed that when states are integrated to a point where they do not resort to war for settling their differences, these states become a "security community" that is characterised by "a stable peace" (Adler & Barnett 2000a: 3). As mentioned, Deutsch's work was in the field of international relations, but it is important to note that the security community concept was based on national integration in the context of domestic politics (Adler & Barnett 2000: 7). This "Deutschian perspective relies on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment" (Adler & Barnett 2000: 8) and it is therefore quite plausible that a security community can exist in a domestic setting with communities replacing states as actors.

Deutsch identified two types of security communities: an amalgamated security community where states have formally unified and a pluralistic security community where states retain their sovereignty (Adler & Barnett 2000: 6-7). It is the latter that is explored in this thesis because a pluralistic security community is more likely to be realised since it is less

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stringent in terms of requirements (Hroch 2020: 239). Deutsch points out that a pluralistic security community is characterised by a sense of mutuality or "we-ness" that, in turn, creates "dependable expectations of peaceful change" vested in communication that allows the community to think, see and act together (Adler & Barnett 2000: 7, 8). In emphasising inter-communication over intra-communication, Deutsch propounds the view that inter-communication is an indicator that barriers of insecurity are removed to make way for a feeling of security based on reciprocity, trust and interests that cumulatively create a collective identity (Adler & Barnett 1998: 14). The cumulative result of mutuality, we-ness and communication is reciprocity, trust and a collective identity that establishes a positive security condition among the actors involved.

In their work, *Security Communities,* Adler and Barnett (2000) further develop and expand on Deutsch's concept. They aver that a security community can be imagined (Adler & Barnett 2000: 33) and that "peaceful change" is defined as "neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes" (Adler & Barnett 2000: 34). Adler and Barnett (2006: 7) propose three requirements, namely compatible core values derived from common institutions, mutual responsiveness and a sense of "we-ness" based on a common identity. Taylor (2020: 24) underscores the importance of strong institutions and widespread practices that also contribute to fostering peaceful change among communities and in this way minimises the probability of a recourse to manifest conflict.

Overcoming ideational divisions associated with the land question involves a search for a collective identity that political elites and their social communities – as actors – endorse and promote to create a sense of we-ness. Adler and Barnett (2000: 34) highlight the crucial role played by these actors who share an identity and interests which, from a sociological – as opposed to a material – perspective is founded on knowledge, learning and norms that emerge in an inter-subjective context that is emancipatory. An emancipatory community – in this case a pluralistic security community – recognises "the right of individuals to express themselves through multiple identifiers of difference, celebrates equality over identity" (Booth 2007: 139). Equality, Booth (2007: 140) avers, is more important than difference, as difference seeks to promote co-existence by regulating identity at the expense of tolerance. Regulating identity holds an inherent threat in that it is controlled by power-brokers such as political elites who impose difference disguised as, for example, the celebration of difference which manifests as racism or religious intolerance. A pluralistic security community, which is also emancipatory,

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permits transcendence from a narrow identity to a wider, more encompassing identity, which is robust, to ensure security among individuals and communities and the networks linking them.

Applying the network configurations for inter-communication to a security community, Tilly (1998: 405) argues that the triad is the more appropriate, as it implies mutual monitoring, sharing information and sharing understanding. However, although triadic relations may appear to imply balance, this is not necessarily so, as two communities could unite against the third. In this respect Tilly (1998: 408) warns that there are "unfavourable triads" between communities that favour conflict. Juxtaposed to "unfavourable triads" are "favourable triads", which include relations that favour a valued activity such as fostering trust. However, trust is not engendered by two-party interaction; it rather emerges when there is interaction between three or more communities. "Favourable triads" are, therefore, a necessary but insufficient condition for the emergence of a security community and are characterised by networks between communities, which include intense reciprocal interaction eschewing the use of violence.

The viability of a security community and the likelihood that it can be achieved is the subject of speculation by various commentators. Smith (2001) is critical of the concept, noting that the Association of South East Asian Nations is touted as an example of a successful security community, yet it maintains a culture of conflict management which is, by implication, contra-indicative of a security community. Smith's argument is noted, but conflict within a community, even a security community, is an ongoing reality and should therefore be mitigated by conflict management structures and procedures to ensure that dependable expectations of peaceful change endure. Nathan (2006) adds that violence within and between communities generates instability, inhibits trust and breaks down the notion of a common identity, thus, by implication, negatively affecting a security community. Nathan's warning regarding violence is noted and will be further considered as an integral component of conflict when investigating the manifestation of conflictual othering regarding the land question.

Jones and Smith (2007: 175, 177, 181) contend that discursive practices promote an over-arching identity that seeks a "bigger, bolder and better arrangement." This is merely a chimera that could lead to a "community of ambivalence" that fails to account for deep-seated realities expressed in the language of self-interest, thereby negating commitment to solidarity. This potentially leads to seduction, illusion and misconception regarding the feasibility of a

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constructed security community imagined – or not – by the political elites and their social communities when referring to the land question. While the notion of a security community related to the land question is proposed in this thesis, the deeper dimensions of its application must be examined. Given the disparate and deeply divided communities involved in the land question, it is contended that an overall visualisation of an emancipatory and unified community provides a supplementary answer to the material approach to the land question. In the next section these requirements are contextualised for fostering the emergence of a pluralistic security community regarding the land question.

2.5. **Exploring the emergence of a security community**

Before exploring the emergence of a security community, it is necessary first to introduce identity politics and relational politics in the social constructionist context. As Gergen (2001b: 169) notes, social constructionism initially enjoyed a comfortable relationship with identity politics. However, the turn against identity politics was motivated, among others, by its antagonistic fundamentalist direction and polarising rhetoric to a re-orientation from identity politics to relational politics (Gergen 2001b: 175). Relational politics breaks from the binaries of, for example, the 'us' and the 'they' that are so prominent in identity politics by putting greater emphasis on aspects that support relatedness, for example, the 'us' and the 'we.' Relational politics around a common 'land identity' – as opposed to identity politics – is therefore a fundamental requirement for exploring a security community.

Returning to the work of Freeden (2003), this thesis proposes three relational concepts for forging we-ness and mutual responsiveness centred on a common 'land identity' and compatible core values. These are firstly, advancing societal interest; secondly, promoting human dignity; and finally, inculcating compassion as a virtue for imagining a security community. On the one hand, an imagined security community requires an over-arching idea – in this case land – for actors to think and act together to advance societal interest. On the other hand, human dignity governs all interaction between individuals. In the centre is human dignity, the glue that binds societal interest and compassion as a virtue. Collectively, the three relational core concepts form a cohesive ideational unit for a security community where the political elites, together with their social communities, think and act together to support dependable expectations of peaceful change when referring to the land question. The concepts are examined in the following sections.

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2.5.1. **Advancing societal interest**

Self-interest for optimising gains is often cited as a prime motivator of individual behaviour. While this may be true in many instances, there are occasions when it does not apply. In this regard Funk (2000: 41) reasons that under certain conditions there are cases when individuals are prepared to relinquish self-interest in favour of societal interest and she argues that for societal interest to exist, it must be underwritten by a commitment to values.

In his work, *The Nature of Human Values,* Rokeach (1973: 3) identifies five assumptions about human values (hereinafter values): firstly, humans subscribe to a limited number of values; secondly, all humans subscribe to the same values to varying degrees; thirdly, values are reflected in value systems; fourthly, values have their origins in culture, society and its institutions; and finally, values are encountered in most areas of academic enquiry, including the Political Science discipline. He argues that values are an intervening variable for unifying diverse interests associated with human behaviour (Rokeach 1973: 3). Diverse interests are rooted in values associated with either objects or people and he provides a compelling argument that values inherent in individuals are a substantive and meaningful field of enquiry (Rokeach 1973: 4-5). Rokeach (1973: 5) defines a value as

> an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.

Values are cognitive (conceptually desirable), affective (emotionally responsive) and behavioural (activated through action) (Rokeach 1973: 7). In addition, values are both lasting and mutable, are organised hierarchically in order to account for context and the importance of one value in relation to the others through a process of "maturation", and lead to the construction of an integrated value system (Rokeach 1973: 3), which he defines as

> an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance (Rokeach 1973: 5).

As a determinant of social behaviour, a value system permits "moral judgements and justifications of self and others, comparisons of self with others, presentations of self to others, and attempts to influence others" (Rokeach 1973: 24). Rokeach clearly contends that responses

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to values are vested in the individual relative to the other and provide justification for exercising discernment and influence which, in turn, may precipitate division and difference or unity and commonality. In spite of the aforesaid, Rokeach is adamant that there is an inherent value commonality between humans and this provides the basis for advancing societal interest over self-interest, which is supported by Funk (2000).

Societal interest has attracted the attention of some commentators who are adamant that self-interest predominates above all else and that, at best, societal interest masquerades as "disguised self-interest" (Funk 2000: 40). Despite the criticism, Mansbridge (1990) and Funk (2000) both contend that there is evidence to suggest that societal interests can prevail under certain conditions. Funk (2000: 41), for example, argues that advancing societal interests entails individual commitment to values. Linking interests to values bears scrutiny and in this regard the contention by Rokeach (1973: 22) that an interest is an expression of a value is useful, as it points to the manifestation of a value or value system reflected in an attitude to objects expressed as an activity. In the case of this thesis the object is the land and the activity is exploring a security community.

Funk (2000: 43) consequently notes that individuals who are committed to egalitarianism and societal needs – rather than individualism – are more likely to endorse the promotion of societal interests, but is subject to two conditions: firstly, it involves suspending self-interest; and secondly, it involves adopting the idea of self-sacrifice. However, it must be noted that regarding both issues, there must be sufficient individual compensation to justify the suspension of self-interest, especially when "personal stakes are clear and sizeable" (Funk 2000: 43).

Promoting the idea of societal interest involves what political theorists term "virtuous citizens" who effortlessly embrace the notion of relinquishing their self-interest (Funk 2000: 54). But this is not a given. In their work, *The Politics of Virtue*, Milbank and Pabst (2016) blame liberalism for replacing mutual recognition and prosperity with a quest for wealth and power, resulting in a "victory of vice over virtue – of selfishness, greed, suspicion and coercion over common benefit, generosity, a measure of trust and persuasive power" (Milbank & Pabst 2016: 2).

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The answer to overcoming liberal individualism, the commentators argue, lies in the adoption of post-liberal politics that emphasises virtue, economic justice and social reciprocity or a "politics of virtue" to advance the collective or common good (Milbank & Pabst 2016: 3, 5). The common good is not an aggregation of the material; it is instead vested in sharing that manifests as a culture of honour; a community that acknowledges virtue; incorporates socialism; respects pluralism and fosters corporatism (Milbank & Pabst 2016: 70, 72).

As the apex core concept, advancing societal interest may appear naïve or rose-tinted but it is nonetheless ideationally appealing, as it contributes to the formation of a security community because it is in the interest of the political elites and their social communities to resolve the land question in a manner that benefits all. Yet, because of its complexity, societal interest is often side-stepped, since liberalism with its emphasis on individualism remains an attractive – and convenient – default. Overcoming the convenience of liberalism and its inherent inertia implies the necessity to move beyond by exploring alternatives that promote collective collaboration and cooperation. In this respect, societal interest must be advocated, habitualised and practised by the political elites and their social communities.

2.5.2. **Promoting human dignity**

As the intermediate core concept linking societal interests and compassion as a virtue, the inculcation of human dignity by the political elites, when referring to the land question, supports the notion of a mutually inclusive identity for a security community.

Most humans have an inherent desire to gravitate towards an identity that simultaneously reflects an image of self, sameness and difference both individually and collectively. This reflection is conveyed inter-subjectively and relationally to give meaning to identity and in this context the importance of human dignity, as integral to identity, cannot be underestimated. Identity and human dignity are therefore powerful catalysts for collaboration or conflict.

A complex concept, human dignity defies clear definition. Ranging across almost all aspects of human existence, human dignity as an "individual status" (Kateb 2011: 11) has an intrinsic "unconditional [and] incomparable" value (Rosen 2012: 23), exhibits the presence of "humanity" (Gregor 1999: 557) in the self and something that can be demanded from the other

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in the form of respect to "recognize oneself as sharing in a common humanity with every human being" (Kateb 2011: 17). Individual status and identity deserve pause for reflection. As Kateb (2011: 11) notes,

> [i]ndividual status is a major part of the idea of human dignity because it struggles against such notions as the natural or divinely ordained superiority or inferiority of some human beings in comparison to others or in relation to them.

It therefore follows that human dignity is a leveller, as it applies equally to all human beings irrespective of their social standing. Human dignity is an integral component of identity, as it underpins what it means to be human. Not only does human dignity manifest in the self, it is also inter-subjective and provides meaning during human interaction by forming the foundation of a co-constituted common identity that fosters we-ness. And yet, with the exception of Fanon (1963), the underpinnings of identity offered by Adler and Barnett (1998), Tilly (1998), Kowert (1999), Fierke (2010), Steans *et al*. (2010) and McDonald (2013) do not acknowledge the relevance of human dignity as an integral component of identity. However, since human dignity is intrinsic to each individual, failure to acknowledge its existence in the self and the other is both degrading and existentially harming, as it constitutes an attack on one's identity as a human being. As Kateb (2011: 11) cynically notes, "[t]he pathetic fact is that the only enemies of human dignity are human beings." He goes on to write that an "assault on dignity has achieved its aim when the very possibility of the idea of human dignity is forced out of the mind of the victim by extreme suffering" (Kateb 2011: 20).

Fukuyama (2018: xiii, 163), in his work, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, also provides a useful motivation for linking human dignity and identity. He borrows Taylor's phrase, which suggests that identity is a "powerful moral idea" related to *thymos* or the craving in an individual for the recognition of human dignity (Fukuyama 2018: xiii, 163). If this desire is disregarded or snubbed, it gives rise to resentment that may be expressed in language (Fukuyama 2018: 163). Claiming and reclaiming identity are inherent in the identity politics of our contemporary world and make a distinct demand, among others, for the recognition of human dignity (Fukuyama 2018: 73). Moreover, Fukuyama (2018: 77, 80) contends that rising levels of inequality are another reason for the growing prominence of identity politics and goes on to note that, "[t]o be poor is to be invisible to your fellow human beings, and the indignity of invisibility is often worse than the lack of

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resources." While liberal democracies, such as South Africa, accord freedom and rights to individuals that encompass equality of choice and agency there is no guarantee that citizens will be equally treated and respected by governments and fellow citizens (Fukuyama 2018: 164). They are instead judged by race, gender, class or nationality and disrespected in different ways, which narrowly manifests as the politics of identity.

Identity politics initiates a unique dynamic "by which societies divide themselves into smaller and smaller groups by virtue of their particular "lived experience" of victimisation" (Fukuyama 2018: 164). While liberal democracies emphasise freedom and choice, disillusionment and frustration set in when these needs are not satisfied (Fukuyama 2018: 165). This emptiness is filled by yearning for lost ancestral communities of the past that were taken from them or possessed by their forefathers and it is this vulnerability that is often exploited by leaders who play on feelings of betrayal and disrespect (Fukuyama 2018: 165). While betrayal and disrespect are, in many cases a reality, Fukuyama (2018: 165) warns that unrecognised social communities are characterised by resentment and backlash accompanied by a withdrawal into narrow identities that threaten society as a whole. Fukuyama argues for recognition and acknowledgement of human dignity as a key component of a higher order identity. He also warns that failure to do so causes resentment and regression to a narrower form of identity and identity politics that entrenches division and confrontation.

Therefore, the authenticity and uniqueness of human dignity makes it an indispensable ingredient of identity, as it defines an individual in relation to other individuals (Kateb 2011: 10) because it advances internal coherence. As explained by Kowert (1999), one of the dimensions of identity is internal coherence, which is an underpinning of the emergence of a security community by fostering a sense of "we-ness" that bonds thinking and acting together. Human dignity fosters we-ness to think and act together. Thinking and acting together imply the existence of a community that coagulates around a central idea such as human dignity as a component of identity. However, Kateb (2011: 11) is adamant that human dignity is an individual and not a group trait. In this respect the importance of being one with the self is paramount, but is not a given and requires deliberate nurturing to entrench and share the idea of a common humanity as a unique feature of identity. It is therefore possible to assume that if individuals adopt human dignity in their identity it will ultimately culminate in a wider social community of like-minded individuals who are united around an existential value.

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Kateb (2011: 10) opposes Shultziner (2007: 79) and Fukuyama (2018) by maintaining that human dignity is not a moral value; it is an existential value and is therefore inextricably linked to identity. Existential values that support identity include, among others, "virtues for their own sake" (Kateb 2011: 12). Here Kateb's emphasis on human dignity as an existential value that relies on virtues is a ratification of the salience of compassion as a virtue acting as the glue that binds human dignity and societal interests in a common identity for a security community.

In the South African context, human dignity is synonymous with *ubuntu* (Nussbaum 2003; Gade 2012; Eliastam 2015; Stuit 2016). In its broadest conception *ubuntu* locates an individual within the wider community under the pretext that an individual's sense of human worth and dignity is dictated by inter-personal relations that promote respect and compassion for the other in a universal context (Louw 2001: 15). This implies that the community is placed ahead of the individual, which is explained by Tutu (1999: 34) thus: "A person is a person through other persons", interpreted as "I am human because I belong. I participate, I share." The *White Paper for Social Welfare, August 1997* promulgated by the RSA Department of Welfare officially defines *ubuntu* as caring for the well-being of the other by fostering a spirit of mutual support in order that

> [e]ach individual's humanity is ideally expressed through his or her relationship with others and theirs in turn through a recognition of the individual's humanity. Ubuntu means that people are people through other people. It also acknowledges both the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being (RSA, DOW: 1997).

The promise of *ubuntu* has been debated and continues to be debated in a post-1994 democratic South Africa. Many critics consider *ubuntu* ambiguous, irrelevant or misdirected and in this respect Cornell and Van Marle (2005: 196) argue that it is vague, patriarchal, conservative and of limited relevance to the youth; Gathogo (2008: 47) questions its emphasis on "our people" and who they are; Naudé (2013: 246) considers it corrupted when it becomes narrowly paternalistic, ethnic or nationalistic; and Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 97) identify it as elitist and therefore unable to account for the lived reality of South Africans. Despite the misgivings of the commentators, which are correct and must be taken into account, this thesis contends that *ubuntu* has sufficient attraction to be included in the essence of human dignity.

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Despite the many and varied appproaches to defining human dignity, one of the thematic commonaltities that consistently features is the link between human dignity and human rights (Kateb 2011: 10, 15). In this respect, the recognition of human rights by the state simultaneously acknowledges moral equality and the equal status of individuals (Kateb 2011: 30). With respect to the former, it means that no person may suffer or endure pain by having human rights restricted or denied and in the case of the latter, the state may not damage an individual's identity or dignity (Kateb 2011: 30).

Regarding property, in this case land, Kateb (2011: 51-52) argues that property as an absolute right confounds the human rights argument and he contends that property rights are different from other rights. He argues that property rights are different because they require state protection through regulation and support in the form of detailed rules and conventions (Kateb 2011: 52). In this context it is germane to introduce Fanon's observation that land dispossession, rooted in history, leads to marginalised communities with particular identities. He motivates his argument as follows: "[f]or a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, [human] dignity" (Fanon 1963: 43). Fanon's contention that land ownership provides a tangible means of ensuring economic prosperity rooted in personal worth is the key element of an identity. To this is added Burr's contention that, given the communities that have emerged, it is necessary to determine the nature of the identity accorded by one community to other communities with particular attention to human dignity.

Land is intimately linked to human dignity and the call for the restoration of human dignity lies as the heart of South Africa's land question. For example, the Social Justice Coalition explains that

> [w]hen we speak of land in South Africa, it is inextricably linked to [human] dignity. The challenges today faced by many people who were dispossessed of land are as a result of the failure of our government over the years in undoing the injustices of the past (Bornman 2018).

Similarly, Ramaphosa (2018) notes:

> Apartheid stripped black people – Africans, coloureds and Indians – of their land and their assets, impoverishing families for generations and robing (*sic*) them of their [human] dignity.

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> It is therefore vital, if we are to restore the [human] dignity of our people and break the cycle of poverty that we address the land question so that there can be peace and prosperity amongst our people. This will also give us a chance to heal the wounds of the past.

As the second concept for exploring a security community, human dignity with its concomitant focus on *ubuntu* at individual level was explained. Human dignity, which is present in the self and the other, contributes to a common identity, since it accords each individual personal status and worth irrespective of social standing. As a core concept human dignity has an added advantage in that it closely resonates with its African cousin, *ubuntu*. While *ubuntu* is criticised for its triteness, it remains a powerful concept that is worthy of inclusion in the construct for exploring a security community, since it mirrors the benefits of human dignity.

However, inculcating human dignity that acknowledges multiplicity – as an antidote to the we and the they – is difficult to achieve, for as Fukuyama (2018: 179) notes, "either you recognise me or you don't." In this regard countries, for example South Africa with its land question, are concomitantly confronted with racial, ethnic and other stratifications such as historical injustices, dispossession and inequality. This complicates the aspiration for an over-arching identity, as it is bedevilled by narratives and the associated language that identify the other, promotes othering and entrench otherness.

2.5.3. **Inculcating compassion as a virtue**

Values were highlighted as one of the components driving societal interest, but the term remains somewhat fuzzy and requires focus. Values are communal and lie at the core of a social community, while virtues are located in the individual. It is in the individual that the idea of the security community takes root. Therefore, fostering the emergence of a security community that promotes a sense of we-ness begins with virtues at individual level. A sense of we-ness in the ideational realm is fostered by promoting either of two opposing categories of virtues – competitive virtues and compassionate virtues – each with particular categories of actors using their agency to foster a common and greater good.

In an opinion piece, *The Fourth Great Awakening*, Brooks (2018) suggests that today's world contrasts competitive with compassionate virtues, each having a particular form of

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literary communication. On the one hand, competitive virtues are narrated in myths that are set in a "timeless Perilous Realm" involving mythical super-heroes fighting the forces of evil. "Myths tend to celebrate grandeur and superiority" (Brooks 2018). On the other hand, compassionate virtues are associated with parables that are set in a real world that incorporates human characters. Parables, Brooks (2018) adds, respond to a human desire to be in relationships and relate to an inner state – as opposed to external competition – and in this way present humans with a "moral dilemma or a moral occasion" that finds expression in "charity, faithfulness, forgiveness, commitment and love." "Parables tend to puncture the pretentions of superiority and celebrate humility and service to other" (Brooks 2018). Today's world, Brooks (2018) argues, is dominated by myths and competitive virtues where super-heroes are the main actors. While there is merit in competitive virtues, he warns that this approach ignores the importance of relationships depending on "fragile, intimate bonds of vulnerability, trust, compassion and selfless love", noting that humans have a preference for morality and spirituality (Brooks 2018). Brooks's opinion piece examines the manifestation of competitive and compassionate virtues and makes a strong argument in favour of compassionate virtues which are relational. However, he does not provide a clear explanation of what compassionate virtues are and in this regard the work of Peterson (2017), *Compassion and Education: Cultivating Compassionate Children, Schools and Communities*, provides useful insight, but a terminological clarification is necessary before proceeding. Whereas Brooks considers compassionate *virtues* (plural), most of the scholarly literature, including Peterson (2017: vii), theorise compassion as a virtue (singular). Compassion as a virtue will consequently be used.

Compassion is integral to the human condition and has enjoyed wide scholarly attention. While there are wide-ranging and differing opinions as to what it entails, the common thread that appears to run through most discourses is that it is a response to the suffering of the other. For Nussbaum (1996) and Crisp (2008), compassion is an emotion; Seppälä *et al.* (2017) maintain that it is a feeling. While it is important to understand what compassion is, it is perhaps more important to focus on what compassion can achieve and in this respect it is a powerful catalytic tool to initiate social activism, for example to remedy injustice and restore human dignity.

Peterson (2017: 13) notes that compassion in political thought has attracted both positive and negative critique and in respect of the latter, White (2008: 39) points out that

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> for the most part Western philosophers tend to look down on compassion since it is held to be more of a feeling than a determination of the will (and hence we appear to have less control over it); and because it seems to increase the amount of misery in the world by making us share in the sufferings of others.

Nussbaum (1996: 28) adds that modern moral theories – particularly liberal and individualist theories – regard compassion as "an irrational force in human affairs, one that is likely to mislead or distract us", while Crisp (2008) tends to believe that compassion is unreliable as insight into suffering and has no practical significance, as it rarely comes to the fore. Yet, despite the negative critique, there is a convincing case that favours the adoption of virtuous compassion as a core concept for exploring the manifestation of a security community.

While Peterson (2017: 13-14) argues that compassion certainly has an indispensable emotional element – a feeling – which cannot be ignored, he is firmly of the opinion that compassion is "*more than a feeling*." He explains that for compassion to have political substance, it must be converted into a virtue that can be measured by reasoned action (Peterson 2017: 16). Therefore, as a virtue compassion is a "cognitive, emotional and volitional response to the suffering" (Peterson 2017: 2) of the other. It is based on recognising and appreciating a common humanity in the self and the other; it requires the recognition of empathetic distress in and for the other, and it is caring for the other, which thereupon informs and leads to agency in support of the other to uphold and maintain human dignity (Peterson 2017: 2, 11, 26).

Compassion as a virtue does not automatically translate into a call for action based on the plight of the other. The self can choose to ignore the plight of the other, the self can choose to deny the plight of the other, the self can blame the other, and the self can choose to place the plight of self ahead of the plight of the other. Inherent in all of the aforesaid is the notion of "[t]urning a blind eye to the suffering of Others", which manifests as ignoring the other (Van Kleef *et al*.: 2008). In this regard Van Kleef *et al*. (2008) provide empirical evidence proving that individuals with higher societal power differentials display less distress and compassion when confronted with the suffering of the other. This finding is particularly relevant because it has the potential to weaken the worth of a security community.

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2.6. The other, othering and otherness

The first and second sections of this chapter identified social constructionism together with language, identity, agency and structure, leading to discrete social communities constructed by political elites. In reality, discretely constructed social communities are unhelpful for finding a solution to the land question, since political elites articulate language to forge distinctive identities, employ different forms of agency and utilise dissimilar structures. In the final section of this chapter the other, othering and otherness are explained as a framework for understanding the 'land language' articulated by the political elites when referring to the land question.

The manifestation of the other, othering and otherness has patent and enduring features of social constructionism and the role of language for constructing identities, for exercising agency, for utilising structure to form communities and networks, for imagining communities, and for exploring a security community. According to Chawla (2017: 1), othering and otherness are crucial for understanding identity, but it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the other, othering and otherness. In the following sections, the works of various commentators concerning the other, othering and otherness are explained.

2.6.1. Who is the other?

Chawla (2017: 1-2) notes a commonality among philosophers such as Hegel, Husserl and Levinas or scholars such as Mead, Buber and Bakhtin: that the other is a common connotation of "other than" and is therefore a binary "opposite of what exists" in relation to the self. The seminal work by Hegel (1807), *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, contains the original description of the other, which he described as a "Master-Slave Dialectic" (Brons 2015; Chawla 2017). Although ambiguous, the "Master-Slave Dialectic" provides a useful explanation for what Brons (2015: 69) describes as two intertwined dimensions of the other, which are firstly, the political/historical dimension, and secondly, the psychological dimension. The first dimension is tangible and refers to the relationship between medieval feudal lords and serfs, while the second, more abstract, dimension concerns an individual's self-conscious relationship with the other. In this sense a self-conscious relationship simultaneously views the other as self and not-self, meaning that there is a deliberate rejection of the other as an "essential being", leading to exclusion of everything that is not self and is authenticated as a self-identity (Brons 2015:

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69). In this respect Brons (2015: 70) argues that the other as not-self manifests as "distantiation" or othering. In this thesis the other is constructed in the political/historical dimension, which is characterised by difference and is enacted by the deliberate construction of distance and detachment between the self and the opposite in an act of othering.

2.6.2. **What is othering?**

Othering is unavoidable in any encounter involving human beings in an act that is political/historical, psychological or both (Brons 2015: 70). It is a process of disassociation or separation of the self from the other, which creates hierarchies (Chawla 2017: 2). Chang (2004: 61) explains that othering is a process that situates identities in unequal relationships and clarifies it as follows:

> The first group defines itself around a common feature (say *a*) and then defines all non-members as a residual (*not-a*). Obviously what is an elective identity for one group is not for the other. Furthermore, the tendency is to group around what are perceived as 'good' characteristics, thus whatever defines *a* will tend to be positively valued.

Othering and identity are intimately linked through shared elective or ascriptive characteristics (Chang 2004: 60) that distinguish an in-group from an out-group. Elective characteristics are deliberately chosen, for example, a white commercial farmer, while ascriptive characteristics are a given, for example, race or gender. However, Chang (2004: 60-61) pointedly argues that elective and ascriptive characteristics cannot be viewed as separate categories, as identities are not only biologically or deliberately assumed, but can also be imposed by an in-group on an out-group. There is very often a tendency by the in-group to project their fears, dislikes and deficiencies onto the out-group and in this way to exonerate the in-group for its exclusion of the out-group, which leads to the act of othering.

Brons (2015: 70-71) argues that there are two forms of othering, namely "crude othering" and "sophisticated othering", both of which presuppose that there is a perceived difference between the self and the other. On the one hand, crude othering involves the adoption of a perceived distance between the self and the other where the "(un)desirable characteristic is more or less assumed or posited" (Brons 2015: 70-71). Crude othering is embodied, for example, in Western notions of Orientalism where the West is posited as

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cultured and superior (or desirable) while the other is uncultured and inferior (or undesirable). In this case, undesirable characteristics are attributed directly.

On the other hand, sophisticated othering corresponds more closely with Hegel's dialectic and involves the adoption of a "*relatively* neutral distance", leading to the construction of another difference, which accordingly becomes the undesirable characteristic (Brons 2015: 71). By way of example and when referring to the land question, the EFF is of the view that white commercial farmers occupy land that was illegally taken from the indigenous population. This has consequently led to the construction of undesirable characteristics in white commercial farmers who are labelled colonisers or land thieves. In this case, undesirable characteristics are attributed indirectly or as a "conclusion of an argument involving self-other identification" (Brons 2015: 71).

Othering leads to the construction of otherness (Brons 2015: 70), but as Behr (2014: 41) notes, it is important to find ways of responding to differences and otherness in an emancipatory mode.

2.6.3. **What is otherness?**

There is a subtle yet crucial distinction between othering and otherness. While othering is an act of identifying undesirable characteristics, otherness is the enactment of a qualitative degree of difference based on those undesirable characteristics.

Otherness is loosely defined as the characteristic or characteristics that define the "Other as object" (Chawla 2017: 5). Otherness, as opposed to sameness, describes a condition or quality of difference and is especially prominent when degrees of differences are marked and involve strangeness or bizarreness (Miller 2012: 588). Research into otherness is prominent in the humanities to explore, for example, "intersubjectivity, identity, social stratification and moral order, development and maintenance" (Miller 2012: 588). Miller (2012: 589) points out that otherness is useful for understanding "processes of shaping, masking, and unmasking stigmatized identity, via a constructionist or deconstructionist approach", the former being appropriate to the methodology employed for this thesis.

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For Behr (2014: 41), otherness is temporal and marked by varying degrees or a quality of "hegemony, hierarchy, assimilation, and exclusion." Otherness, he contends, involves individuals and groups (in the case of this thesis, the political elites) who are simultaneously the "subject (of the creation/imagination/stigmatization) and object (of becoming created/imagined/stigmatized by another individual or group)" (Behr 2014: 41). It stems from the standards, definitions and expectations that originate in the self and lead to ideas of perception, evaluation, and attribution that are projected onto the other as domination and deviance (Behr 2014: 42). However, Behr (2014: 67) also concludes that projection by the self onto the other is not limited to domination and deviance: it can include other meanings such as beauty, excitement and fascination because otherness is not a real experience; it is a "linguistic and discursive construction." In this way, Behr (2014: 68) rejects otherness as narrowly hegemonic, hierarchical and exclusionary, and argues that it can also be accommodating and assimilating. He accordingly pleads for an alternative way of imagining difference and otherness and in this respect he proposes a "*transformity* of 'self'/'Self'[15] and 'other' and their relations" (Behr 2014: 71). Transformity, Behr (2014: 76) reasons, is relational and involves an understanding of the context of the other or a 'thing' (such as land) including, for example, history, culture and society as well as local and singular specifics. Behr's emphasis on imagining resonates well with Anderson's conception of imagined communities as it shows that an imagined community can be transformative in the sense that it eschews hegemonic, hierarchical thinking when contemplating difference and otherness.

The following sections examine the manifestation of otherness in three conceivable contexts when political elites use language to articulate the land question involving the self and the other as follows: firstly, when the other is seen as the enemy (otherness as conflict); secondly, when the other is seen as the collaborator (otherness as diversity); and thirdly, when the other is seen as an ally (otherness as unity). In the former instance this is described as the other as an enemy while in the latter instances it is described either as recognising the other or as celebrating the difference of the other.

[15] Behr (2014: xvi) defines 'self'/'Self' as a constructed entity. The construction of 'self'/'Self' "depends upon, relates to, emerges from, and is constituted by relations to another person/persons" (Behr2014: xvi).

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2.6.3.1. ***Otherness as conflict: the other as an enemy***

Julia Kristeva (1941-), a Bulgarian-French philosopher, researches a wide field of scholarly enquiry ranging from the semiotic to psychoanalysis and feminism. She is positioned within post-structuralist thinking and a large portion of her work is devoted to intertextuality, the semiotic (as opposed to Saussure's semiotics) and abjection. Among her many works is *Desire in Language, A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (Roudiez 1980) and *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (1982) which will be used for understanding otherness in conflict. To this is added the work of Mitchell (1981), *The Structure of International Conflict*, which provides substance regarding the mechanisms of conflict and the manifestation thereof.

Kristeva's work, *Desire in Language, A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art* (Roudiez 1980), consists of ten essays that explore the relationship between language and society in order to understand literary narratives and their meaning. As a critique of Saussurean linguistics, which emphasises a traditional and structuralist approach to understanding language and its meaning, she proposes intertextuality (Kristeva 1980). Intertextuality assumes that text cannot be viewed in isolation; it is instead a product of a societal and historical context and therefore affects the manner in which an orator or author articulates a message (Roudiez 1980: 37; Raj 2015: 77-78). This is encapsulated in what Kristeva terms an "ideologeme" that emphasises the importance of ideas as the origin for text and speech, therefore affording greater importance to the orator or the author rather than the text itself. Kristeva draws a distinction between "other" and "Other", wherein the former is the opposing or excluded, while the latter "refers to a hypothetical place or space, that of the pure signifier, rather than to a physical entity or moral category" (Roudiez 1980: 17). For the purpose of this thesis 'the other' will be adopted because of its binary and exclusionary connotation when articulating 'land language.'

Some of her earlier research is devoted to the darker side of the human psyche and its propensity for conflict. Her work explores the underlying urge among humans for conflict vested in language, and their attraction to this. In this respect Kristeva is adamant that identities only emerge when there is an identifiable enemy and therefore a source of conflict, but she does not problematise the manifestation of conflict (Pettiford 2015: 246). Conflict has its origins in abjection, which is "the state of being cast off", but it should not be interpreted as rejection, since it extends into an experience of "horror" (Kristeva 1982; Halder 2018: 70). This is vested in her work, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (1982), where Kristeva's

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place is a place of evil. Kristeva's use of horror is synonymous with revulsion, disgust and repugnance that manifest as loathing in reaction to a threat from the outside (Kristeva 1982: 1-2). Abjection therefore appears as a condition that is seemingly vague and it is not clear in Kristeva's explanation who is responsible for the abjection of whom. However, Abraham (2012) provides a useful distinction by extending the notion of abjection thus: "[an] *abjector*, [is the] one who expresses reaction to specified object, is in a position of power, while the *abjectee,* [is the] one who is identified as the abject object, "is robbed of power and the right to social inclusion" and equality."

Building on Kristeva, it is speculated that otherness brings about a sense of outrage and frustration in an abjector, leading to, for example, conflict and justification for visiting violence on the abjectee or it is a generalised response, such as the vilification or marginalisation of communities. Taking note of Kristeva, we observe outrage among the communities involved in the land question and associated with it the inevitable phenomenon of conflict.

Conflict is a field of scholarly enquiry that is extensively researched and a large body of academic literature is available. For the purpose of this thesis, the work of Mitchell (1981), *The Structure of International Conflict*, is used, since it has over-all relevance notwithstanding the context. Although Mitchell is concerned with the international dimension of conflict, his theoretical framework offers insight for understanding otherness related to conflictual language irrespective of who it involves, when and where it occurs.

Conflict, Mitchell (1981: 15) argues, is not synonymous with violent behaviour and may even be present in the face of apparently peaceful circumstances. As an initial point of departure Mitchell (1981: 8) asserts that a conflict-free society is unattainable, as avoidance, suppression, settlement or resolution will inevitably spawn successive cycles of conflict. Conflict is therefore endemic to societies and is, as a consequence, unavoidable owing to the underlying causes. The causes of conflict range from resource scarcity and inequality to discrimination due to social change – all of which are germane to the land question and the political elites involved. Despite the variety of angles for approaching conflict as a field of academic enquiry, the dominant features deserve investigation, especially regarding the land question and the political elites, together with their 'land language.'

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A conflict situation, Mitchell (1981: 35, 38) contends, is driven either by values and interests or attribution and means. In the light of the search for a security community and the salience of values, the former is used. Values comprise "ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are a characteristic of a particular social community" and result in groups that are distinguishable by particular identities (Burton 1990: 37). Values are therefore central to the creation of identity and in this regard Burton (1990: 37) notes that these are deeply ingrained and only alter over a long timeframe provided there is a sense of security underpinned by impartiality and an opportunity for development. It therefore follows that the identity of a social community is entrenched in the psyche of its adherents and is unlikely to change swiftly.

In this regard, and on the one hand, a conflict situation centred on values involves political elites and their social communities who are at odds over their perspectives, their beliefs, the desired future outcomes and the ways of achieving the outcomes (Mitchell 1981: 35, 38). Cases where conflict arises over values are more extreme and destabilise social systems and structure; as Burton (1990: 37) notes, the preservation of values causes a social community to behave both defensively and aggressively. Mitchell (1981: 37) accordingly warns that resolving such conflict is more difficult to resolve. On the other hand, a conflict situation centred on interests involves political elites who differ, for example, on the distribution of a scarce resource that is highly valued. However, the absence of shared values has a negative impact on, among others agreement on how to distribute scarce resources (Mitchell 1981: 36).

Conflict attitudes, together with the associated psychological conditions, have a particular bearing on the land question and the political elites. A conflict situation is likely to produce high levels of tension and anxiety between political elites (Mitchell 1981: 75). Conflict involving a situation, attitudes and behaviour is typified by three stages that track its progression. The first stage, incipient conflict, occurs when parties have complementary goals but leads to incompatibility resulting from differing interests, goals, or objectives, which are initially subliminal (Mitchell 1981: 50). The second stage, latent conflict, becomes apparent when goal incompatibility is consciously recognised and parties begin to consider options to pursue their goals (Mitchell 1981: 50). The third stage, manifest conflict, is evident when parties take tangible action to realise their goals in order to impel adversaries to either renounce or change their goals (Mitchell 1981: 50-51). However, Mitchell (1981: 51) points out that the stages are neither necessarily sequential nor dynamic. A conflict may, for example, remain

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stalled in a particular stage or shift from the first to the third. It is contended that the escalation of conflict, together with the situation, attitudes and behaviour, is vested in the development of identity.

Building on the language and the attitudes, together with the associated behaviour, Mitchell (1981: 91) explores the concept of identity and how it relates to characterising an enemy by othering. In its extreme form, conflictual othering identifies an enemy and it implies violence as a response. In its most dangerous form, conflictual othering culminates in ethnic cleansing or genocide. Fiennes (2011: 67-68) in his work, *My Heroes: Extraordinary Courage, Exceptional People*, draws on the 1994 Rwandan genocide to identify seven conditions for the creation of a genocidal mind-set in a given people or social community: a depressed economy, an uneven distribution of wealth, an identifiable minority, strong political ambition among an oppressor group, a sense of impunity among the members of the oppressor group, an exploitable cause rooted in social deprivation that generates tension, and a sense of unjust suffering, which is attributed to the minority that becomes the target of anger. He points out that the cultivation of the conditions for genocide takes time, as the social community responsible for initiating genocide must be indoctrinated and conditioned to overcome an intrinsic human abhorrence to killing or maiming fellow beings (Feinnes 2011: 68-69). In this respect, content disseminated by the media and other role players, such as popular artists, were crucial to the process of conditioning. Their language involved the use of derogatory terms such as "cockroaches" and this singular description of the minority Tutsi became a moniker for the focus of the anger and the ensuing genocidal violence (Feinnes 2011: 74-75). In another example, the February 1994 edition of the Kigali journal, *Kangura*, included a cartoon of a machete with the words, "We know where the cockroaches are … What weapons we shall use to conquer them for once and for all" (Feinnes 2011: 75). Fiennes (2011: 75) goes on to point out the deeper and sinister meaning of "for all", as the cartoon included the words, "A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly", which implied that even the children would not be spared in the coming carnage.

2.6.3.2. ***<u>Otherness as diversity: recognising the other</u>***

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a French philosopher of Jewish extraction, was captured by the Germans during the Second World War while serving as an officer in the French army.

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Captured in 1940, he survived as a prisoner of war until the war ended but his mother, father and brothers died in Nazi concentration camps.

Despite being exposed to the horrors visited upon Jews by Nazi Germany, his post-war work focused on "compassion and understanding" (Muhr 2008: 179) the other in diversity. In this regard he proposed that acknowledging individual differences presents an avenue for understanding diversity (Muhr 2008: 177, 179). Muhr (2008: 179) notes that "[a]t the heart of Levinas' writings lie the irreducible proximity of one human being to another, morality and through that encounter a relation to all others – justice." As his point of departure for understanding the other, Levinas observed that there is an innate tendency in humans towards egocentrism and that it reduces others to different versions of the self, seen as "alien objects to be manipulated or illuminated." As a consequence, this difference is eliminated by incorporating the other with the self (Muhr 2008: 179). Incorporation, warns Levinas,

> is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other's place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery (Hand 1989: 43).

The warning by Levinas is stern and may not be ignored, since an incorrect interpretation of diversity inadvertently changes the context to conflictual othering, as discussed in the previous section, by venturing into the realm of categorisation as an approach to incorporation. His thesis in response to the warning was "that ethics is first philosophy, where ethics is understood as a relation of infinite responsibility to the other person" (Critchley 2004: 6).

Ethics is therefore a method of suspending and interrupting categorisation by substituting the other with otherness through relationships. In his work, *Time and the Other*, Levinas (1987: 14) acknowledges an "*ethical* alterity" in human interaction, which he articulates as an "alterity of the *good* in the face of the Other", which extends beyond being and truth. In this way he overcomes the pessimism associated with alterity, rather conceptualising it as a force for good. Levinas (in Lock & Strong 2011: 79) emphasised the importance of face-to-face contact or relationships based on a maxim, "we place the needs and understandings of others before our own." He was especially concerned with inter-subjectivity, what it means to live with and for one another and highlighted the role of ethics, which promotes receptiveness to the meanings that others convey (in Lock & Strong 2011: 79-80).

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In her article, *Othering Diversity – A Levinasian Analysis of Diversity Management,* Muhr (2008) pointedly argues that Levinas's conception of diverse othering is infinite and therefore ambiguous. She adds that diversity is a "double-edged sword", as it either overcomes or enhances divisions between groups (Muhr 2008: 179). Muhr (2008: 179) nonetheless contends that this binary is reconcilable with Levinasian ethics since it unites diversity with social integration (Muhr 2008: 179). Levinasian ethics does not rest on using diversity as a means of categorising the other; it is rather aimed at disrupting the preconceived categories that are accorded to the other (Muhr 2008: 177). Levinas therefore transcends the other and its proclivity to categorisation by introducing otherness, which instead focuses on discovering "human qualities, but the qualities are in lived experience, which is temporal" (Muhr 2008: 180). As Muhr (2008: 181) rightfully notes, "Levinas teaches us to feel responsible to the Other, and thus become aware of and value the arbitrary views and attitudes diversity might bring us." This responsibility is described by Levinas (1987: 16) as "taking up a position in being such that the Other counts more than myself."

For Levinas otherness takes on two forms: the first form, "*autre*", designates an inanimate other such as a tree, building or land; and the second form, "*autrui*", designates human beings who are involved in an ethical relationship with the self (Critchley 2004: 16). This shows that otherness can be expressed or manifested in relation to inanimate or animate objects, for example land or humans.

Levinas paid particular attention to the role of language in otherness. Language, contended Levinas (in Lock & Strong 2011: 80), is a limiting factor for understanding the other especially regarding their perceptions and experiences, and he calls for intimacy as a response. However, he does not wholly embrace the structuralist approach advanced by Saussure and is only interested in the signifier (or sign) and an emphasis on diachrony[16] (Llewelyn 2004: 120, 136). This is entirely consistent with his preoccupation with understanding the human being as Llewelyn (2004: 123) notes, "Prior to my being possessed by language, Levinas maintains, it is my possession by the human being who speaks to me." Possession by other is key to understanding the approach to language advocated by Levinas, but this can be problematic, as the written word is often misinterpreted, hence the importance of diachrony.

[16] Diachrony is concerned with the historical development of language over time.

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At the heart of the approach advocated by Levinas is the Husserlian method of intentional analysis to identify the shared features of the everyday experience of life and the relevance of "historical embeddedness of lived experience" (Critchley 2004: 6-7). However, he also insists that understanding of everyday experiences extends into an ethical domain, which entails an "infinite responsibility to the other person" (Critchley 2004: 6,8).

2.6.3.3. ***Otherness as unity: respecting the other***

William Connolly (1938-) is an American political theorist who has published extensively on democracy and pluralism. In particular he has pioneered the concepts of identity and otherness, agonism, agnostic respect and otherness in unity.

In his work, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox,* Connolly (1991: ix) asserts that identity and difference present two "problems of evil." The first problem of evil is political, where a hegemonic identity with its proclivity for moral self-righteousness is protected at all costs from any differences, which are themselves viewed as sites of evil (Connolly 1991: ix,10). The second problem of evil involves the creation of an other in order to justify and maintain self-identity as a place of refuge (Connolly 1991: ix-x). However, and as Connolly (1991: 9-10) explicitly notes, it is impossible to be human without an identity, but it is crucial to understand how that identity is experienced and defined in relation to the other while concurrently accounting for the evils inherent in the identity of self.

Like Levinas, Connolly (1991: 9-12) is concerned with ethics, which he terms "*The Paradox of Ethics*." Emerging from the constitution of difference, Connolly (1991: 9) is specific about otherness and its link to identity. He consequently emphasises that while difference is a prerequisite for identity, it is a "temptation" to draw difference into the contemplation of otherness and warns that this predilection should be avoided (Connolly 1991: 9). Therefore, the temptation to perpetuate difference in otherness requires an examination of the methods – in particular the means – to foster self-identity, a probing of the structures to maintain the configuration of self-identity, and an understanding of the impact of the methods and structures of self-identity on the other (Connolly 1991: 9-10). As a response to the deliberate or inadvertent inculcation of difference, he proposes the ethic of cultivation which, incidentally, resonates with what Taylor terms the ethics of morality (Connolly 1992: 10, 223).

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The ethic of cultivation with genealogy[17] as its mode of reflection operates in tandem with achieving what Connolly (1991: 10) dubs as an "agnostic care for difference … that exceeds any particular identity." Agonism, as embodied by Connolly, emphasises "the value of struggle in sustaining freedom and plurality and resisting social identities that may be experienced as oppressive" (Schaap 2009: 7). During an interview in 2008, Connolly offered an explanation of agonism as follows,

> The idea of agonism conveyed there has two sides: the disturbance it poses to the constituencies that initiate these engagements and the disturbance to the others they address. Agonism as suffering and engagement (Wenman 2008: 208).

Struggle – or conflict – is therefore welcomed as a site of ongoing difference in order to resist a homogenised drive for social unity and thereby enables plurality to thrive (Schaap 2009: 7). Accordingly, genealogy and democratic agonism permit the practice of a contingent identity as a way of overcoming the urge to seek explanation for existential suffering in a realm that is external to identity (Connolly 1992: 11).

Connolly addresses conflict through the lens of difference as expressed in identity, in particular race, class, gender, ideology and ethnicity (Norton 1992: 919). He is of the opinion that while adopting an identity is a source of security, it also presents an opportunity to negate, punish or conquer the other (Wenman 2008: 208). In order to overcome the dangers inherent in identity difference as a source of conflict, Connolly proposes that an instinctive response to withdraw into a mistrustful realm be deliberately suspended, if not precluded, in order to pursue the notion of unifying within otherness. Suspension and preclusion of mistrust are achieved through the "ethos of agnostic respect" which is

> a civic way to both affirm our own identities (for identity always has relational, collective dimensions), while providing presumptive space for different and sometimes contending identities to be (Wenman 2008: 208).

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[17] "A genealogy is a historical narrative that explains an aspect of human life by showing how it came into being. The narratives may be more or less grounded in facts or more or less speculative, but they are always historical" (Bevir 2008: 263).

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Unifying within otherness, Connolly (1991: 27) argues, is located within "*Freedom and Necessary Contingency"* and is a "bent or direction in the world to which the self and the community must strive to become attuned." He goes on to explain that the self is emancipated within the community and with individual emancipation comes community freedom (Connolly 1991: 29). Connolly confirms that individual emancipation is key to otherness in unity and this is a one of the features of security community envisaged as the ideational solution to the land question. However, while he is narrowly focused on individual emancipation, the cumulative outcome is community freedom, which is in and of itself emancipatory in an overall sense.

2.6.3.4. ***Manifestation of the other, othering and otherness***

Language describing reality employs distancing devices that removes the self from the other by placing the other at a near or a distant metaphorical distance (Gergen 2009: 42). For Behr (2014: 72), the other and otherness are also connected by distance and proximity in relation to one another. Distancing extends from the subjective (near), which emphasises for example emotions or desires, to the objective (distant), which emphasises indifference or repugnance, both of which imply an inherent detachment. Here the warning by Behr (2014: 86) is particularly significant when he observes that distance and proximity should be substituted by an imagined meta-identity to overcome the limitations of detachment. In this respect the observations below are made concerning the manifestation of the other, othering and otherness in a conflictual, unifying or diversifying context.

Conflictual otherness manifests in placing the self and the other at a distance and is distinctly within a binary "we" and "they" genre. The emphasis is on creating ideational distance between communities by using polarising language, which precipitates incipient and latent conflict between political elites, notwithstanding a high potential for manifest conflict between their social communities.

Diversity otherness manifests by placing the self and the other in closer proximity and is distinctly within a non-binary "we" genre. The emphasis is on reducing ideational distance between political elites by using integrative language, which may precipitate incipient and latent conflict, but the potential for manifest conflict between the political elites and their social communities is reduced.

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When compared with conflictual and diversity otherness, unifying otherness manifests in also placing the self and the other in close ideational proximity (diversity), and is similarly a distinct binary "we" and "they" (conflictual), with the distinction that it is within the confines of a greater non-binary "we" genre (diversity). The emphasis is on reducing distance between the political elites and their social communities by using accommodating language, which may precipitate incipient and latent conflict, but the potential for manifest conflict is reduced.

2.7. **Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to conduct a literature review for demarcating an epistemological and conceptual research framework. An epistemological and conceptual framework to respond to the research question was demarcated in this chapter and consisted of four parts; the first part identified an epistemology. The epistemological component, rooted in social constructionism, provides an ideational extension to the material component of the land question, drawn from interpretivism. The second part, the conceptual component, expanded on the epistemological component by adding concepts to contextualise the research question better to synthesise a more comprehensive framework. The third part applied the relational dimension of social constructionism to the other, othering and otherness, and the final part explained the conditions for the emergence of a security community.

Social constructionism reaffirms that the meaning of objects determines the reaction and responses of social communities. Social constructionism highlights that reality is constructed by subjective knowledge that is based on the material and is socialised in the ideational context. Knowledge is derived from history and culture and in this sense social constructionism eschews the scientific empirical approach by calling for an ideological critique of knowledge. Moreover, the importance of language and its use in constructing reality and the social processes that give rise to the knowledge, the manner in which knowledge is conveyed and rejection of value-neutral realities lead to enduring enquiry, debate and questioning as each account has a unique context and construct. In this way, knowledge taken for granted is critically examined in its historical and cultural context, leading to action based on processes to socialise knowledge. Moreover – and crucially – social constructionism gives meaning to the material and ideational through interaction based on imagination. These ideas construct multiple realities based on different interpretations as opposed to a single reality that

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purports to be the truth. Ideas and the resulting interaction are rooted in history, culture and context, culminating in social action through the use of language.

The ideational extension demonstrates that language, as a method of communication, provides meaning that is temporally and spatially located in order to critique areas of enquiry such as the social, economic and political dimensions of human existence. Given that there is no single truth, multiple realities emerge. Realities are constructed using language together with signs that are employed to convey signals and meanings alongside symbols, icons and indices. However, in multi-cultural societies with different languages, realities are complex, even confusing, increasing the probability of misunderstanding and conflict. Moreover, words and their connotation change over time and need to be accounted for.

Ideational thought is verbalised in language. Owing to its subjectivity, the assumptions and views of the originator are often generalised but are nonetheless germane for understanding the context of language, the emerging identities and the associated language. As already stated, while the material is the point of entry for emerging discourses and narratives, it is through the ideational that further meaning is created, perceived, interpreted and shared. The ideational also shares an intimate link with identity formation.

Furthermore, it is meaningful that identity, as an inescapable feature of society and social communities, is articulated in four dimensions: alterity (or otherness), multiplicity, fluidity and sameness. Its multi-dimensionality accounts for the various roles that actors assume which are in some cases complementary and in others, contradictory. As is the case with language, identity is also context- and time-dependent, which accounts for fluidity and change. Inherent to identity is the way that individuals and, indeed communities, respond and react to their internal and external environments in a conflictual, diversifying or unifying mode. The most serious and dangerous manifestation of identity occurs when it takes on radical undertones or overtones of exclusivity, superiority or bigotry, all of which emphasise difference. Mitigating against radical identities involves fostering sameness and a collective identity in an ideational – not idealist – sense using agency and structure through structuration to work towards a mutually agreed reality. Agency is crucial, as it involves activating knowledge of the past to generate possible future outcomes imaginatively.

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The epistemological framework can be broadened by adding concepts to provide better focus. The overarching subject of the conceptual framework centres on social communities, the reason for their existence and whether they are rigid or adaptable. Communities are socially constructed to unite people and provide a framework for establishing and fostering ties to organise activities around a mutually agreed common idea. For the purposes of this thesis the elements of a community are a sense of location, a sense of a common idea and a sense of spirit. Location, either temporal or spatial (or both), has both material and ideational contexts. Identity is both material and ideational, but does not call for homogeneity as an essential condition, since it introduces the we/they divide into the spaces of collaboration or conflict. It is contended that communities are both rigid and flexible – rigid in the sense that they are identifiable by material and ideational characteristics, but flexible in that communities are imaginable. The imagination of communities has been extensively researched and there are both proponents and detractors of the concept. However, based on the epistemological framework for this thesis and on the arguments of the various commentators, it is contended that a security community can be either tangible or imagined and centred around a collaborative idea, that of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', with the added caveat that it is emancipatory. The idea of emancipation accommodates a multiplicity of identities in that a particular community, as part of a security community, is allowed to retain its identity, provided that it does not erode or work against the overarching notion of the security community.

It is demonstrated that, although security communities found particular traction in international relations, the idea of a higher order community coagulating around we-ness and dependable expectations of peaceful change, even in domestic circumstances, is not unfounded, as peace is not a phenomenon only associated with relations between states. Most, if not all, humans aspire to a peaceful coexistence. Key to fostering peaceful coexistence is a shared we-ness in identity, which is mutual. A mutual identity emerges through social interaction that is fostered by communities characterised by social sites, actors, categories, transactions, ties, roles, networks, groups and identities. Identities are, in turn, underpinned by networks that are constructed through chains, categorical pairs and triads. By incorporating imagination of mutual trust and reciprocity favourable triads, opposed to unfavourable triads, are a necessary but insufficient condition for exploring a security community. In view of the centrality of the land question and the communities involved, the triadic configuration is further strengthened by the addition of societal interest, compassionate virtues and human dignity.

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This confirms that the ideational context of the land question is given meaning by questioning its epistemological underpinnings that are expressed through social interaction by communities that have particular identities. In the absence of an overarching mutual identity that subscribes to an idea, political elites and their social communities are unfortunately locked in a seemingly intractable confrontation and it is for this reason that emancipation, in the form of a security community, is seen as a way out. However, a security community can only be realised when the language used by communities is comprehended. It is for this reason that the final section of this chapter examined how the other is articulated and expressed in othering and otherness, which manifest as otherness as conflict, otherness as diversity, and otherness as unity. Future outcomes depend on how identities are articulated and performed relative to the other and how othering or otherness is accomplished. Three possible outcomes are identified: the first is otherness in conflict when an enemy is identified; the second is otherness in diversity when the other is recognised; and the third is otherness in unity when the difference of the other is applauded. Not only do the three forms of otherness provide an understanding of how communities interact according to their identities; they are indicators of the degree to which sameness, and with it the idea of a security community, prevails or not.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

"Research helps us to solve complex problems and to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the world."
(du Plooy-Cilliers *et al*. 2017)

3.1. Introduction

By adopting an interpretivist paradigm, this thesis entails a descriptive-explorative study of the ideational context of South Africa's land question after 2013. It is descriptive in the sense that it examines how 'land language' – related to the post 2013 land question – emerged and developed within and between political elites and is explorative in the sense that it explores the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community. The descriptive-explorative approach is epistemologically situated within social constructionism that is conceptually expanded to include community, imagined communities, and security communities.

Given the epistemological and conceptual commitments made in the previous chapter, this chapter formulates an appropriate research methodology to position the research problem together with the concomitant research question and sub-question, stipulated in Chapter 1, within a descriptive and explorative framework. The framework is thereupon utilised in Chapters 4 and 5 to systematically examine the multifaceted ideational context of the land question that is articulated in the 'land language' used by political elites.

The aim of this chapter is to explain the research methodology for this thesis.

To achieve the aim, the chapter is structured as follows: it begins with an explanation of the research paradigm followed by the research design, the research method and finally, the technique for the analysis of primary and secondary data sources. Here the emphasis is on content analysis and specifically qualitative content analysis. The coding protocols[18] together

[18] Coding protocols consist of the categories, sub-categories, sub-sub categories, codes, terms and definitions (see Chapter 3 for details).

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with the two coding themes to conduct a qualitative content analysis are defined and appear in the appendix to the thesis. The conclusion provides a summary of the salient points in the chapter.

3.2. Research paradigm

The research paradigm is interpretivism. Inherent to interpretivism is "the systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct detailed analysis observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social worlds" (Neuman 1997: 68). Moreover, interpretivism accommodates hermeneutics that includes, among others, the study of texts, conversations and pictures to develop a nuanced understanding of embedded meanings and connections during communication to uncover the social reality experienced by the other (Neuman 1997: 68 & 71; Packer 2011: 82-98). Finally, interpretivism emphasises, among others, the importance of the ideational over the material without rejecting the salience of the latter (Neuman 1997: 68; Gray 2004: 17; Hay 2011: 473). As Hay (2011: 474) notes, "the complex interaction of material and ideational factors" must be taken into consideration, since material reality is given meaning in an ideational context that is perceived and interpreted by actors. In this respect social constructionism assists in understanding political elites as well as the social communities and networks they construct by making them subjects – not objects – of research.

3.3. Research design

The research design is the plan that will be followed by the researcher to ensure that sufficient evidence is gathered to answer the research question and sub-question, identified in Chapter 1, credibly. The research design includes descriptive and explorative dimensions**.** On the one hand, descriptive research presents an accurate depiction of a social phenomenon by paying particular attention to how that phenomenon came about together with the actors involved (Neuman 1997: 19-20; Davis 2017: 75-76). On the other hand, explorative research involves investigating an issue that is not well researched (Neuman 1997: 19; Davis 2017: 75). Each dimension of the research design is explained in the following paragraphs.

The descriptive-explorative research design comprises two parts. The first part of the research design is a systematic literature review, the purpose of which is twofold, firstly, to

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provide a theoretical and conceptual framework in Chapter 2 and secondly, to provide a detailed description of the historical and contextual framework of South Africa's land question from 1913 to 2013 in an ideational context in Chapter 4. Five key moments in the history of dispossession are selected to understand how particular ideational features of the 'land language' became prominent in the land question after 2013. The first key moment is the 1913 Land Act because it marked a continuation of colonial ideational – and material – dispossession that was enforced by the South African state. The second key moment is the emergence of the National Party (NP) in 1948 with its apartheid policy that, among others, institutionalised black land dispossession. The third key moment is the 1961 launch of the liberation struggle because the return of land, in response to dispossession, was a feature of the struggle. The fourth key moment is the advent of the democratic dispensation in 1994 because of the expectation that the land question would be resolved. The final key moment is the entry of the EFF into the political dispensation in 2013 because the party was pivotal in successfully placing the unresolved land question at the centre of the ongoing national discourse. The context of the land question is thereupon elaborated upon to trace the evolution from 1994 to 2013 to arrive at a post-2013 land question. This part concludes with the identification of the political elites, as a substantive category, who are involved in the post-2013 land question.

The second part of the research design, used in Chapter 5, entails a qualitative content analysis of themes related to 'land language' articulated by a substantive category – the political elites – involved in the post-2013 land question. The purpose to analyse the social construction of communities; the social networks that link the social communities; the prevalence of conflict, unity and diversity; and, finally in Chapter 6 to explore the potential emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change.

3.4. **Research method**

The research method identifies the data sources utilised to provide credible data to execute the research design with data drawn from primary and secondary sources. Primary data sources include videos (speeches, debates, interviews, and presentations), policy documents and the Hansard[19] for first-hand accounts related to the land question, ideational dispossession and the

[19] The Hansard is a verbatim report–omitting repetitions and redundancies–of parliamentary proceedings.

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'land language' used by the political elite. Secondary data sources supplement primary data sources and include authoritative works such as academic journals and research articles, media articles, opinion pieces, cartoons, posters, and songs.

3.5. Data analysis

Data analysis stipulates how the data sources, as identified in the research method, will be analysed and integrated by the researcher to provide a credible answer to the research question and sub-question that is supported by evidence. One of the approaches to analysing qualitative data is content analysis which involves formulating inferences from data, such as language, systematically and objectively by consistently assigning specific descriptions to connect related data items (Gray 2004: 328).

3.5.1. Content analysis

Because of the wide, diverse and often confusing approaches in publications on qualitative content analysis this thesis uses the works of four authoritative commentators. The first work is by Krippendorff (2004), *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, Second Edition*. Krippendorf is a leading international expert on content analysis whose work is extensively published. The second work by Drisko and Maschi (2016), *Content Analysis*, provides useful and practical insights into qualitative content analysis. The third work by internationally acclaimed academic Saldaña (2013), *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, Second Edition*, who provides a clear and understandable description of the coding process. The fourth work is research by a South African academic, Smit (2002), who draws on Krippendorff and Saldaña for qualitative data analysis in her research.

Although this thesis uses qualitative content analysis, it is a relatively new mode of analysis; it is therefore necessary first to explain content analysis as an over-arching analytical tool. As noted in the previous chapter, social constructivism as an epistemology permits an understanding of reality that is constituted through human interaction, relying on language and text. Content analysis has the advantage that large datasets from multiple sources can be analysed in order to reduce the substance and produce quantitative and qualitative descriptions and analyses. Some of the outputs include an analysis of the construction of facts, the

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conceptualisation of emotions, the emergence of identity, as well as conceptions of the other, othering and otherness. The intent with the social constructivist approach is not to critique the facts, the emotions, the identities or the other, othering and otherness – together with the unavoidable misrepresentations – but rather to analyse how and why they came about.

The data sources used for content analysis include printed matter, recorded speech, visual communication and works of art such as cartoons (Krippendorf 2004: 21) as well as words, symbols and ideas (Neuman 1997: 272), collectively designated as texts. The analysis of texts is founded on six assumptions: firstly, texts have no objective qualities; secondly, texts do not have a singular meaning; thirdly, the meanings of texts do not have to be shared; fourthly, meanings speak to something other than the text itself; fifthly, the meaning of text is relative context, discourse or purpose; and finally, the nature of texts demands that specific inferences are made relative to the context (Krippendorf 2004: 22-25). Inference identification together with an appropriate analytical technique is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

The following sections explain content analysis and how it will be used with specific emphasis on the analytical components (or the process) and the analytical techniques that will be used to interpret the data.

3.5.1.1. ***Analytical components***

Content analysis involves six analytical components that are applied so as to "proceed from texts to results": unitising, sampling, recording/coding, reducing, inferring and narrating (Krippendorff 2004: 83-85). Each step in the sequence is described in the following paragraphs (See Figure 3 below):

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Figure 3: Components of content analysis



(Krippendorff 2004: 86)

Unitising is the identification of suitable texts as sources of ideas related to the land question that are portrayed as symbols (spoken or written words), icons (visual images), and indices (visual or spoken words) that qualitatively signal meaning.

Sampling is the limiting of data that is, as far as possible, representative of the population of interest. For this thesis it is a substantive category; the political elite with their vested interest in the land question that are: Malema of the EFF (because of its pivotal role since 2013 in placing the land question squarely within the national discourse) and Groenewald of the FF+ (because the party represents the interests of white commercial farmers).

The process of recording and coding is the use of a unified classification system for indexing data texts to provide an understanding of what is seen in a text, image or other data source to compare and evaluate the content within a temporal and contextual framework. Coding is a word or short phrase that cogently captures the essence and attributes of language or visual data and is essentially heuristic (Saldaña 2013: 3,8). Generated by the researcher, the codes that are used are symbolic which implies that the attributes used to classify the data are an interpretation by the researcher for identifying patterns, themes or theories (Saldaña 2013: 3-4). Irrespective of the step, the underlying purpose of coding is to identify patterns characterised by similarity, difference, frequency, sequence, correspondence and, causation and it is either descriptive or in vivo (Saldaña 2013: 4 & 6-7). Descriptive coding reduces data

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to identified descriptors while in vivo coding uses exact words in the data (Saldaña 2013: 4 & 7); both will be used. Two coding steps, hereafter identified as themes, and the steps, together with the appropriate categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories, and codes are explained later in this chapter.

Reducing is the efficient representation of diverse data sets to identify the essence and crux by rearticulating and summarising content (Krippendorff 2004: 85).

Inferring is an abductive process to bridge the gap between data description to uncover connotations, orientations, demands, provocations, or causes that are based on warrants and evidence (Krippendorff 2004: 85).

Narrating is the comprehensive recording of results (Krippendorff 2004: 85) which is the most common form of reporting, the format of which is based on the coding categories. (Drisko & Maschi 2016: 109). A summary for each category is compiled and includes quotations to illustrate original views but Drisko and Maschi (2016: 110) warn that quotations must be typical of the data set. Moreover, in the summary category, development is explained with particular emphasis on how the category assists in answering the research question and sub-question and can be elucidated with flow charts, conceptual diagrams, and tables (Drisko & Maschi 2016: 109, 119); this will be used in Chapter 6.

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3.5.1.2. ***Analytical technique***

Figure 4: Comparing similar phenomena inferred from different texts



(Krippendorff 2004: 94).

Content analysis is defined as the "making of replicable and valid inferences from texts (and other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff 2004: 18) as indicated in Figure 4 above. Krippendorff (2004: 36-37) identifies three inference types: the deductive which moves from the general to the specific, the inductive which moves from the specific to the general and the abductive, which straddles both. He notes that only abductive inferences are applicable to content analysis. In this respect, abductive inferences "proceed across logically distinct domains, from particulars of one kind to particulars of another kind" Krippendorff (2004: 36). Inferences reply on analytical technique. According to Krippendorff (2004: 47) there are six analytical techniques that can be used to pinpoint inferences one of which, linguistic[20] re-presentations (Krippendorff 2004: 63), is appropriate for this thesis; it is used to analyse the articulation of the other, othering, otherness, conflict, diversity and unity in 'land language' and the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community. In this respect, he emphasises the importance of naming, involving the relationship between the person, the words, the things or experiences that are expressed in constructed narratives or

[20] Linguistics is the scientific study of language and includes its different forms, meanings and contexts.

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discourses. Re-presentations provide "*conceivable words*, spaces in which people can conceptualise reality, themselves and others" and the analysis thereof highlights the receiver, the imaginability of actors and actions and how the information items contribute to the overall picture that emerges to answer questions of interest posed by a researcher that are not found literally in the texts (Krippendorff 2004: 64 & 66).

As mentioned above, content analysis is the the over-arching analytical tool which is subsequently extrapolated in the next section to provide clearer analytical focus as qualitative content analysis.

3.5.2. **Qualitative content analysis**

Content analysis is the analysis of data sources to identify explicit and implicit meanings communicated in the written word, in the spoken word or in visual representations (Neuman 1997: 31, 272). As a technique it involves unitising, sampling, recording/coding, reducing, inferring and narrating so as to "proceed from texts to results" by continually revising and adjusting data interpretation (Krippendorff 2004: 83-85, 87-88).

Qualitative content analysis, as the specific technique for this thesis, relies on hermeneutics to facilitate multiple interpretations by considering diverse voices, alternative perspectives, opposing views and varied text use (Krippendorff 2004: 88). Interpretations are supported by introducing quotations for constructing parallelisms, triangulation, and metaphor elaboration that are context-sensitive (Krippendorff 2004: 88). As an analytical technique the application of qualitative content analysis is recursive, adaptive and iterative, involving organising data, collating data, and analysing data rigorously and systematically (Smit 2002: 66). In this regard Flick (2014: 5) defines qualitative data analysis as

> the classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) material to make statements about explicit and implicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it. Meaning-making can refer to subjective or social meanings. … Often, qualitative data analysis combines a rough analysis of the material (overviews, condensation, summaries) with approaches of a detailed analysis (elaboration of categories, hermeneutic interpretations or identified structures). The final aim is often to arrive at generalizable statements by comparing various materials or various texts or several cases.

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Smit (2002: 66) identifies the following principles, which are applied as a guide when conducting qualitative content analysis. Firstly, qualitative data analysis is repetitively applied during data collection to recognise "similarities, differences, categories, themes, concepts and ideas." Secondly, analysis begins with appraising data and thereafter reducing it to manageable and coherent units. Thirdly, units are systematically organised. Fourthly, categories are refined, conceptual similarities are pinpointed and patterns are identified. Fifthly, categories are adapted as the analysis unfolds. Sixthly, analysis must be an authentic reflection of the data. Finally, analysis entails interpreting, understanding or explaining emerging or substantive patterns, themes or theories.

In Chapter 4, three organisational categories are identified: firstly, the political elites; secondly, the traditional authorities and finally, the white commercial farmers. In Chapter 5 the focus is narrowed to one organisational category, that of the political elites as a substantive category[21], for the reasons motivated below:

> The first substantive category is the EFF because of its pivotal role since 2013 in placing the land question squarely within the political and national discourses with its successful advocacy of EWC. The 'land language' articulated by party leader Malema from 2013 to 2019 is qualitatively analysed.
>
> The second substantive category is the FF+ because it represents the interests of white commercial farmers[22] at the political level together with its opposition to EWC. The 'land language' articulated by party leader Groenewald from 2017 to 2019 is qualitatively analysed.

The social origins of knowledge, the centrality of language and the politics of knowledge – three propositions underpinning social constructionism – permitted the identification of the coding protocols that are tabulated in the appendix to the thesis. In this regard the social communities constructed by the political elites concerning land, the social networks they construct and the manifestation of conflict, diversity and unity are encapsulated in two themes that scaffold Chapter 5.

---

[21] Substantive categories describe the data content in greater detail (Maxwell & Chmiel 2014: 25).
[22] Commercial farmers are pivotal in South Africa's food security and produce 95% of the country's food (Jankielsohn & Duvenhage 2018: 46).

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The coding method is descriptive coding so as to summarise and identify "what is talked or written *about*" (Saldaña 2013: 88). *Atlas.ti*, a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software program, is used as an aid, since it is designed for large data sets, particularly text, visual and audio material, to be qualitatively analysed (Smit 2002: 65). This entails coding and retrieval within and across data sets in different formats for analysis and interpretation.

Data sets are selected from primary and secondary sources. Four primary sources were identified. The first is the parliamentary Hansard, as it is a verbatim record of proceedings and therefore an accurate first-hand account of the 'land language' articulated by the two principal actors. A total of 239 Hansard transcripts of the proceedings in the National Assembly (NA), the Joint Sittings (JS) and the Extended Public Committees (EPC) are reviewed for the period from May 2014 to December 2019 (which is the temporal cut-off date for the thesis). From the transcripts a purposive sample of 45 transcripts is selected for qualitative content analysis because these transcripts contain data related to the aforementioned two actors and the two themes. Secondly, video material involving both actors and consisting of debates, television interviews, speeches to an international audience and to supporters covering the same period to triangulate the Hansard transcripts. Thirdly, articles personally authored by the actors are selected to provide additional depth to the 'land language' they use. Finally, election manifestos and party policy documents for the EFF and FF+ over the same period contextualise the 'land language' articulated by Malema or Groenewald. Secondary sources, including political cartoons[23] and journal articles, contextualise the land question and the two themes so as to analyse the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald qualitatively. Together the four primary and secondary data sources constitute a between-methods approach.

Since a between-methods approach is used for data collection, data is qualitatively correlated using triangulation to investigate and identify three potential outcomes: firstly, convergences; secondly, inconsistencies; and thirdly, contradictions (Hastings 2010: 1538).

[23] Political cartoons are a fascinating data source because they "impart meanings and emotions almost instantaneously" and communicate "subtle, complex and multi-layered messages about people and events" (Gilmartin & Brunn 1998: 536). Moreover, they "often capture the intersections and experiences of power and resistance that constantly occur in the negotiation of identity, position and status" (Hammett 2010: 9). What makes them particularly attractive as a data source for this thesis is that they are "visual shorthand … that develop out of and reflect specific political, cultural and social contexts" that are "usually couched in easily recognisable metaphors, which delimit their content, form, meaning and interpretation" (Eko 2007: 222). Given the different meanings and emotions associated with the land question, the relevance of identity, as well as the positionality and status of the political elites, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers, political cartoons capture the mood of the moment and the ideational thinking behind it.

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Hastings (2010: 1538) additionally points out that, from a constructionist perspective, triangulation is mostly concerned with ascertaining inconsistencies and contradictions – as opposed to convergences – to identify multiple realities and perspectives. The qualitative content analysis therefore strives to answer the following questions:

> What is the nature and substance of the 'land language' that motivates the construction of communities by the political elites when referring to the land question?
>
> How do social networks manifest within and between the political elites when articulating 'land language'?
>
> How does the other, othering and otherness manifest in their articulation of 'land language'?

3.6. Application of qualitative content analysis

Given the aforesaid explanation of content analysis and qualitative content analysis, the following sections explain the application in Chapter 5.

3.6.1. *Unit of analysis*

The singular unit of analysis that is applied across the themes is the articulation of 'land language' by political elites to frame the ideational context of the land question. The ideational context consists of ideas that are shared beliefs expressed as metaphors, narratives or myths to convince the self and the other of the benefit, the certainty and, the advantage of a particular perspective.

The articulation of 'land language' to frame the ideational context of the land question assists the researcher to characterise the actors, identify their needs or motives for realising their goals and the ways in which they use their agency which may be thwarted or assisted by circumstance or the other and the constructive or destructive mindsets that are generated (Krippendorff 2004: 108). Krippendorff (2004: 110) warns that reasonable levels of analytical reliability are problematic and difficult to achieve, as achievement requires a refined

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methodology that relies on compromise. The compromises that will be made are explained in the next section.

A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' used by the above-mentioned political elites is accordingly undertaken in two concurrent steps, each single stage, as follows:

The first step involves a thematic analysis of the construction of social communities by each of the political elites.

The second step involves a thematic analysis of the social networks that link the social communities constructed by the political elites.

3.6.2. ***Step 1: Theme: The social communities constructed by the political elites concerning the land***

3.6.2.1. ***Aim***

The aim of this step is to code the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' articulated by the political elites when referring to the land question to establish the distinctive construction of social communities.

3.6.2.2. ***Purpose***

The purpose of this step is to analyse the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' articulated by the political elites when referring to the land question to establish the distinctive construction of social communities..

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3.6.3. ***Step 2: Theme: The social networks constructed by political elites concerning the land***

3.6.3.1. ***Aim***

The aim of this step is to code the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' of political elites for establishing the social networks and the configurations within and between social communities when referring to the land question.

3.6.3.2. ***Purpose***

The purpose of this step is to analyse the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' of political elites for establishing the social networks and the configurations within and between social communities when referring to the land question.

3.7. **Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to explain the research methodology for the thesis. The methodology stipulated the research paradigm, research design, research method, and process of analysing the data. It is emphasised that interpretivism, as the research paradigm, provides an appropriate foundation on which to base the study because it emphasises the construction of reality, the relevance of hermeneutics and the importance of the ideational without rejecting the salience of the material.

The descriptive-explorative dimensions comfortably accommodate the intended outcomes of the thesis which is to answer the research question and sub-question. More specifically, the descriptive dimension, in the form of a systematic literature review, is utilised for Chapters 2, the epistemological and conceptual framework and Chapter 4, the historical and contextual framework. Chapters 2 and 4 provide a firm foundation on which to base Chapter 5 which is a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' used by the political elites. Qualitative content analysis analyses the construction of social communities by the political elites involved in the land question as the first theme and the social networks configured by political elites as the second theme, together with the articulation of the other, othering and otherness that leads

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to conflict, diversity or unity and the potential emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community.

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CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

The seed is mine. The ploughshares are mine.
The span of oxen is mine. Everything is mine.
Only the land is theirs.
(Kas Maine in Van Onselen 2019)

4.1. Introduction

Having established the epistemological and conceptual framework, the previous chapter indicated that social constructionism lays store by the social origins of knowledge, the centrality of language and the politics of knowledge to understand socially constructed knowledge claims, how they are socialised and to what end. The social origins of knowledge related to the land question lie in its historical underpinnings and how history creates multiple realities that manifest as political elites and social communities, as well as networks and interaction articulated in 'land language.' Given that a single historical and contextual truth is indiscernible, relationships are reified in different social communities with particular structures and agency that reflect distinct identities derived from a reality that is peculiar to an identity. Identities are demonstrated, among others, by the politics of knowledge and its history. In essence the previous chapter shows how social worlds are created and maintained using history, knowledge and language.

The research question highlights the necessity for a deeper understanding of the post-2013 'land language' and it is the history and context of land that provides a vehicle for achieving this. The aim of this chapter is to conduct a systematic literature review of selected publications to describe a historical and contextual framework on which to base this thesis. To achieve the aim the chapter is structured in three sections. The first section addresses the historical framework. The historical framework is explained in terms of four inter-linked ideational drivers regarding land, namely autochthony, land tenure, land ownership and dispossession and land dignity. This is followed by a summary of land and its history concerning the European colonisers to understand their mindset, as a prelude to the arrival of the Dutch colonisers at the Cape and their encounters with the indigenous population.

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Thereupon a historical review[24], which examines five key moments that track the evolution of the land question over a timeframe from 1913 to 2013, is undertaken. The five key moments are

> the 1913 Land Act, because it marked the beginning of material and ideational dispossession that was enforced by the South African state;
>
> the 1948 election of the National Party (NP) with its apartheid policy that, among others, ideationally institutionalised black land dispossession;
>
> the 1961 launch of the liberation struggle because the return of land, in response to dispossession, was a key ideational feature of the struggle;
>
> the advent of the democratic dispensation in 1994 because of the ideational expectation that the land question would be resolved; and
>
> the entry of the EFF into the political dispensation in 2013 because the party was pivotal in successfully placing the unresolved land question at the centre of an ongoing national ideational political and social discourse.

The first section ends by drawing together the aforesaid in terms of historical narratives and counter-narratives. The second section entails the contextual framework of land and deals with the national question and then the land question from 1994 to 2013, as well as the post-2013 land question. The final section identifies three organisational categories of actors that have emerged, together with their involvement in the post-2013 land question. The chapter conclusion identifies salient points that will be applied in the next and subsequent chapters.

4.2. **Historical framework**

The historical framework is set against the backdrop of four ideational drivers that permeate the land question and set the context for the five key moments that will be explored later in the

[24] "Historical reviews trace the development of an issue over time" (Neuman 1997: 90).

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chapter. The ideational drivers are autochthony, land tenure, land ownership and dispossession, and land dignity.

4.2.1. **Autochthony**

Autochthony is introduced either implicitly or explicitly when examining the land question. Referring to its classical Greek origins of "self" and "soil" (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005: 386), autochthony means "to be born from the soil" (Geschiere 2009: 2) or "emerging from the soil" (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 2). For Geschiere (2009: 2), autochthony represents "the most authentic form of belonging", which has relevance for all humans, as we are all from the soil, which is ultimately the primary source for our existence. This is the broad interpretation of autochthony.

The term was especially prevalent in Francophone Africa when it was introduced by French colonists at the beginning of the last century to confront the challenges with promoting a sense of belonging among disparate communities in their colonial possessions (Geschiere 2009: 4). Bøås and Dunn (2013: 2), in their work, *Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict*, contend that autochthony refers to the original inhabitant with an indisputable historical link to land. This is a narrower interpretation than that offered by Geschiere. They view autochthony in a different context by arguing that it relates to a quest for belonging precipitated by the state's inability to provide in the material needs of its citizens, leading to a melancholic longing for a past, which was ostensibly better (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 13). While belonging satisfies a need for comfort and security, it could simultaneously foster feelings of discomfort and insecurity resulting from an exclusion of the other (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 1). Autochthony, they contend, is the right "to belong because of ancestral rights to land" and is a "powerful narrative" (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 1). Based on the claim that the land is ours because we were here first, autochthony promises to restore a sense of belonging that is often articulated in a political agenda (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 2). Such claims are reflected in "autochthony discourses" in which an orator as a "son of the soil" privileges a demand for the land that is founded on a claim of an original inhabitant (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 2). Autochthony discourses, they point out, are a veritable Pandora's box fraught with controversy and have no limits, which "leads political agents to act in an ad hoc, short-sighted and purely tactical manner, often at odds with long-term strategic interests" (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 9). Bøås and Dunn (2013: 8) maintain that identity and belonging in Africa are increasingly vested in land rights and autochthony, giving those claiming original ownership the right to "enter the struggle

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for resources." Bøås and Dunn (2013: 2) warn that autochthony and land disputes have often provoked "dramatic expressions of political violence", especially in Africa. They cite the cases of Liberia, Kenya, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivore as examples (Bøås & Dunn 2013: 2, 15). Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005: 385-386) identified a resurgence in "new autochthony movements" that began in the early 1990s to disregard "strangers" or expose "fake" autochthons – who may themselves be citizens of the same state – thereby generating latent and manifest conflict. In this regard Thornton (1996: 153-154) points out that in the South African context,

> [b]oth White and Black people who call themselves Africans identify with the land, and claim it as their inalienable right. Both appeal to the blood that has been spilt on it, the dead that have been buried in it, the food that can be coaxed from it and, again and again, the beauty of it.

In keeping with the spirit of autochthony, land has the potential to either draw communities together or tear them apart. On the one hand, when autochthony is based an optimistic and ontological certainty and the idea that all humans have their roots in the soil, identity can be explained in terms of a common origin and unify communities around land. On the other hand, when autochthony is fuelled by melancholic and ontological uncertainty, it potentially fuels a pre-disposition for manifest conflict.

4.2.2. **Land tenure**

Land tenure is simultaneously a legal and an emotional term, as it involves the way in which rights to land are held by an individual (Dekker 2016: 43). Land tenure is defined by Dekker (2016: 43) as

> the perceived institutional arrangement of rules, principles, procedures, and practices whereby a society or community defines control over, access to, management of, and use of means of existence and production.

While land tenure undoubtedly has material dimensions in that it includes the use of the land for personal or communal gain, it does not discount other dimensions such as social systems and symbolic relationship that individuals have with land (Dekker 2016: 43). From an individual perspective it is "the perception of rights, restrictions and responsibilities people

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have with respect to the land" (Dekker 2016: 43). The perception of land tenure also includes a sense of the symbolic meaning and is therefore ideational. Symbolic meaning attached to the land is vested in an ancestral connection with cultural connotations and is very often forgotten when contemplating land tenure, as there is confliction in Eurocentric and indigenous ideas concerning the meaning of land ownership.

History shows that land tenure is conflicted between Eurocentric and indigenous ideas concerning the meaning of land ownership and for Mafeje (2003) there has been a tendency to privilege and impose Eurocentric concepts at the expense of African concepts. As a consequence of the negation of the African approach to land tenure, myths such as that all land is communal and every person can lay claim to a portion of land are misconceptions (Mafeje 2003: 1-2; Weinberg 2015: 6). Historically, land tenure was conjured by colonists to create the idea that ownership was communal with absolute authority regarding its allocation residing in a supreme authority, that of a chief (Weinberg 2015: 6). In this way, the apartheid system established a direct link between a tribal ethnic identity and land ownership that manifested as the bantustans where chiefs held sway over the levers of power regarding the allocation of land. Communal tenure is therefore a misnomer. Cousins and Claassens (2005: 7) provide a more direct and better nomenclature, that of "group systems of land tenure", which provides better insight into the idea of land ownership.

4.2.3. **Land dispossession and ownership**

Undeniably, land is specifically linked to dispossession and conflict and is a characteristic of South Africa's history over centuries. Dispossession featured during the pre-colonial period during indigenous migration, extended into the colonial era when it was associated with wars of dispossession, and finally culminated during the apartheid era when land was both deliberately and systematically expropriated from black communities. In its wake dispossession created social communities that were both materially and ideationally scarred.

Given the hostility and confrontation that land generates, it is fraught with controversy. In South Africa, for example, demands for restitution are vested in historical interpretations that are simultaneously complicated by power, precedence and entitlement, all of which have diverse social, economic and political contexts (Berry 2002: 640). Friedman (2018) reasons that the significance of land extends beyond ownership, as it is a symbol of the return of the

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country (own italics) to its people, hence the hostility and confrontation generated by South Africa's land question, as the land has not yet been returned. Therefore, the land question in South Africa transcends the material and has become an overarching ideational rallying point regarding past indignities, injustices, marginalisation and exclusion as a consequence of historical dispossession and ownership patterns.

The idea of individual land ownership is alien to African customary law, as land holders include a range of actors within a social hierarchy that include the family, the clan, the lineage or the community, implying that ownership manifests within a variety of socio-political units (Okoth-Ogedo 2002: 2; Mafeje 2003: 2; Weinberg 2015: 8) but the land itself is not a communal possession (Mamdani 1996: 140; Cousins & Claassens 2005: 6). The idea of communality, according to Cousins and Claassens (2005: 6-7), means controlling community membership which, in turn, dictates who is allocated land as well as who is granted access to common property. In this way, land allocation to others is restricted and as a consequence a community is able to maintain its identity and coherence underpinned by "shared and relative rights" together with "flexible boundaries" between different communities (Cousins & Claassens 2005: 7). Moreover, Cousins (2007: 282) avers that individual land titles are inappropriate for African land reform, but simultaneously warns against returning to 'traditional' or 'pre-colonial' ideas, as colonial policies and current social change have permanently altered the conceptual landscape of land ownership. He goes on to note that while the colonial period was characterised by conquest and land occupation, indigenous land ownership regimes were not destroyed and replaced, but were instead craftily distorted to benefit the settlers and their heirs (Cousins 2007: 283). Mamdani (1996: 140) notes that there were three colonial distortions concerning land ownership: firstly, the community was the primary land custodian; secondly, the appointed political leaders were the executors of that custodianship; and thirdly, access to land was solely determined by tribal affinity. From an African perspective, the notion of ownership has important consequences for the ideational context of the land question, as it brings to the fore the relevance of community and role of the traditional authorities that buttress this system.

The idea of ownership as described above stands in opposition to the Western liberal concept of property – by implication land – ownership, particularly private ownership, which is prevalent among white commercial farmers. As Cousins and Claassens (2005: 7) point out, this form of land ownership entails defined boundaries that demarcate who has access to the

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land, as well as the right to use resources such as water and grazing. Ownership, according to this idea, therefore confers upon the owner sole custodianship and with it the responsibility for taking decisions regarding buying, selling, leasing and inheritance.

A particular idea that permeates language concerning land dispossession is that land was stolen or, in the words of Atuahene (2009: 835), it is "property theft" or "unjust dispossession" that occurs when "a society has a generalized belief that one group would not own their property if it were not for the past systematic and uncompensated confiscation of property from another group" (Atuahene 2009: 835). She notes that the idea of property theft is "primarily based on the average citizen's observed belief and values, although *objective* (own italics) historical facts play an important role" (Atuahene 2009: 835). The emphasis placed by Atuahene on objective historical facts gives pause for consideration; while history is undoubtedly relevant, objectivity is problematic. It is for this reason that social constructionism with its emphasis on multiple historical realities is introduced in Chapter 2 as epistemological underpinning. Therefore, and despite differing interpretations of the historical legacy associated with land dispossession in South Africa, Atuahene's insistence that land was stolen by white settlers is supported by Gibson's 2009 work, *Overcoming Historical Injustices: Land Reconciliation in South Africa*. In it he provides empirical evidence from a 2001 survey that explored "land reconciliation"[25], indicating that 85% of black respondents were of the opinion that "[m]ost land in South Africa was taken unfairly by white settlers and they therefore have no right to the land" (Gibson 2009: 31, 251).

4.2.4. **Land dignity**

The consequence of land dispossession is not only materially damaging; there are other consequences that run deeper, especially when land is confiscated by the state. This is because, as Atuahene (2016a: 172) contends, property (in this case land) has "social, emotional, political and cultural value." In particular, the emotional value of land is linked to a sentimental attachment in that when something, such as land, is taken without consent it cannot be replaced with another piece of land as the intrinsic worth in many instances outweighs the material, since the loss also involves a degree of pain (Radin 1982: 959-960).

[25] Gibson (2009: 1) uses the term "land reconciliation" to describe a wide range of issues relating to land claims. His term will not be used in this study, as the focus is on the land question.

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The intrinsic worth of land is also associated with a sense of dignity and here the works of Atuahene (2009; 2011; 2014; 2016a; 2016b) hold particular relevance. She advances the notion that land dispossession involves stripping individuals of their dignity in what she terms "dignity takings" (Atuahene 2014: 26). Atuahene (2016b: 817) theorises that dignity takings occur "when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization[26] or infantilization[27]", which is inherently racial. Epstein (2012; 2017) has extensively researched infantilisation in the international relations discipline, but her findings are germane to this thesis. She emphasises particularly identity difference as driver of infantilisation. She is adamant that the infantile is "like the child, [who] holds no prior legitimate identity, or whose identity is in need of being molded", implying that infantilisation does not change identity; it causes an identity deficiency (Epstein 2012: 142-143). The loss of identity is thereupon replaced with another identity, which is imposed by the other, and in the case of land it has a racial connotation.

In his work, *The Racial Contract,* Mills (1999: 56-57, 59) pointedly reasons that racism manifests as "white personhood" and "nonwhite subpersonhood" in a hierarchy where whites as persons claim the right to confer upon non-whites, as sub-persons, an inferior schedule of rights and freedoms that entrench paternalism and difference. This schedule includes the exploitation of land and the denial of equal socio-economic opportunities, because non-whites are deemed to have "different and inferior moral status" (Mills 1999: 11). In this way, for example, non-whites were considered incapable of owning land and in the light of this, confiscation (or dispossession) was considered acceptable.

Atuahene (2016a: 179) thereupon argues that, among the consequences, the act of confiscation leads to the negation of equal human worth, which manifests as dehumanisation and the elimination of "autonomy as independence", leading to infantilisation and the taking of dignity. Dignity takings have five constituent elements. Firstly, the state is either directly or indirectly implicated (Atuahene 2014: 26-27). Secondly, there is physical dislocation, which destroys property ties and results in trauma and loss of communality (Atuahene 2014: 27-29). Thirdly, property rights are annulled or diluted to a point where they have little or no meaning

[26] Dehumanisation is "the failure to recognize an individual's or group's humanity" (Atuahene 2016a: 178).
[27] Infantalisation is "the restriction of an individual's or a group's autonomy based on the failure to recognize and respect their full capacity to reason" (Atuahene 2016a: 178).

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(Atuahene 2014: 30). Fourthly, there are dehumanisation and infantilisation (Atuahene 2014: 30-34). Lastly, compensation is incommensurate with the true value or the true motive for confiscation is concealed and insincere (Atuahene 2014: 34).

Devoid of dignity and humanity, the act of confiscation relegates individuals and groups to the periphery of society where they "vanish from the political eye in a haze of otherness" (Atuahene 2007: 1425). Rendering the other invisible is synonymous with, among others, exclusion, subjugation, identity suppression and nominal political representation (Atuahene 2007: 1426).

4.2.5. **Land and history**

Land and history share an intimate link with the past, the present and the future. In this sense Berry (2002: 640) argues that land struggles have

> specific historical contexts, taking account of the way multiple interests and categories of people come into play, and impinge on one another, as people seek to acquire, defend and exercise claims on land.

The previous chapter identified social constructionism as an epistemology for understanding the historical and cultural contexts that directs interaction to construct ideas and multiple realities concerning land and its history – to understand the ideational – and is of particular relevance. While the temporal focus is limited to five key moments in the evolution of land dispossession in South Africa, the historical background of land dispossession and its ideational underpinnings is first explored. In this respect, it is emphasised that this section is not intended to provide an accurate account or critique that tracks the history of land dispossession. The focus is rather to highlight, from an ideational perspective, the prejudices of the colonisers, their encounters with the indigenous population, the reaction of the indigenous population and how the other was conceived.

4.2.5.1. ***Land and the European colonisers***

As the lead-in to this section, a non-African example, that of the voyages of Columbus to the New World, in particular present-day Mexico, demonstrates prevailing ideas underpinning

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European colonisation. In his work, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, Todorov (1999) provides an evocative description of Columbus's initial encounters with the indigenous population. Todorov (1999: 38) notes that Columbus was struck by the "generosity" of the Indians who gave "everything for nothing" and was somewhat dismissive of their naivety when it came to the value of material objects, failing to recognise that there was a different ideational system based on sharing. Columbus reasoned that there was no value system, but he acknowledged that, "the Indians are the most generous people in the world, thereby contributing to the myth of the noble savage" (Todorov: 1999: 39). Absent in these encounters was meaningful communication, as the language of the other held no appeal and this inhibited his understanding of the ideational, which was demonstrated by Columbus' "naïve conception of language." Todorov (1999: 29, 33) therefore pointedly observes that for Columbus, "[w]ords are, and are only, the image of things" since "[i]n Columbus's hermeneutics human beings have no particular place." "Things" and therefore the material, were an over-riding and dominant feature of encounters between the Spanish colonisers and the indigenous peoples. A product of the European Middle Ages, characterised by strict Christian religious convictions and a desire for the accumulation of material goods, Columbus pitied their lack of a value system reflecting individualised worth of material possessions (Todorov 1999: 39-40, 42). Indeed, the underlying motivation of the Spanish to acquire gold (and women) by fair or foul means formed a pretext for conquest and subjugation, as the other was deemed inferior and therefore not worthy of assimilation, but of enslavement (Todorov 1999: 42, 45, 46). In the place of individual ownership was communal ownership – a concept alien to the colonisers – and as a consequence Columbus changed his assertion, stating that the indigenous population, far from being generous, were "thieves" and should accordingly be cruelly punished (Todorov 1999: 40). Simply put, the Spanish in their colonisation of the New World

> followed no law except rapacious greed. Their campaigns of extermination against the Indians of the Hispaniola[28] left behind a legacy of dispossession and exploitation that plagues the region to this day (Fairweather 2006: 4).

Fairweather is correct in her observation that historical dispossession and exploitation cannot be regarded as something that happened in the past and that these therefore has little or no

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[28] Columbus encountered the second largest island in the Caribbean in 1492 and named it La Isla Española (Hispaniola). It is today divided into Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

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present-day relevance. On the contrary, it is the very act of dispossession and exploitation, irrespective of how long ago it occurred, that continues to plague the minds of indigenous peoples.

The ideational mindset of the Spanish colonisers was clearly at odds with the indigenous population they encountered. This mindset was perpetuated in binary otherness, which manifested as a 'civilised' identity characterised by materialism and exploitation and an 'uncivilised' identity characterised by the ideational and subservience. According to the coloniser, apart from being weaker and therefore vulnerable, the barbarous other had no relevance in the coloniser's world reality and could therefore be dealt with brutally. Moreover, the non-whites were savages born "unfree and unequal" in the eyes of European powers (Mills 1999: 16) and denied dignity because of their skin colour. These characteristics provide insight into the European mindset of the Spanish colonisers and are an entry point when examining the Dutch, who were also European, as colonisers of the Cape.

The Spanish colonisation of the New World reflected the same demographic dynamics experienced in the initial occupation of the Cape, that of an intrusive outsider minority seeking to dominate an insider majority indigenous population (Therborn 2019: 34). However, Therborn (2019: 34) highlights two important differences between the Spanish and Dutch colonisers: firstly, although the indigenous population of the Americas were weaker in terms of military capabilities, they had tangible material wealth in the form of gold; and secondly, Iberian racism eventually permitted integration with the colonisers. The latter contrasted directly with Dutch racism, which was binary and exclusionary – you were either "white or non-white" (Therborn 2019: 34). The ideational mindset of the Dutch coloniser is reflected in the following paragraphs.

4.2.5.2. ***Land and the Dutch colonisers at the Cape***

A detailed account, in the same vein as that of Todorov, regarding the Dutch colonisers and their encounters with the indigenous population[29] at the Cape from 1652, does not exist.

[29] The South African indigenous population refers to "descendants of the original or precolonial inhabitants of a territory or geographic area" (Fairweather 2006: 2). Apart from direct quotations naming the indigenous population, this thesis does not identify the tribes, clans or other groups that inhabited the Cape or the rest of South Africa.

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However, initial encounters are explicitly described by Van Riebeeck and a number of colonists in the following works: Thom (1952), *Journal of Jan van Riebeeck, Volume I 1651-1655*; Thom (1954), *Journal of Jan van Riebeeck, Volume II 1656-1658*; Thom (1958), *Journal of Jan van Riebeeck, Volume III 1659-1662*; and Raven-Hart (1971), *Cape of Good Hope 1652-1702: The First Fifty Years of Dutch Colonisation as Seen by Callers, Volume 1*.

An examination of the initial encounters is requisite for understanding what South African President Cyril Ramaphosa implied on 14 October 2018 when he – in an ideational sense – described land dispossession as "[t]he original sin" committed by colonisers of the Cape (ENCA 2018). Original sin has a Christian connotation and relates to the first sin committed by Adam and Eve when they defied God's instruction not to "eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil" (Bible Society of South Africa 1995: 3). Consequently, Christianity avers that all human beings are born with an inherited ancestral sinful nature that requires atonement and redemption. By claiming that land dispossession is an original sin, Ramaphosa infers that the first colonisers committed the sin of land dispossession and in order for successive generations to be forgiven, they are to account for this sin.

Understanding the nature of the original sin therefore requires an investigation into who the original colonisers were, how they arrived at the Cape and the nature of the land dispossession that they instigated. The investigation is limited to the original colonisers who arrived at the Cape in 1652 under Van Riebeeck. What follows is not a historical narrative of the occupation, but rather an account of the coloniser's identity and attitude to land and, in the style of Todorov, their conceptualisation of the other and how this manifested as othering and otherness.

Van Riebeeck represented a privately-owned company, the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC), which was managed by an executive council, the *Heeren XVII*, who accounted to shareholders (Brink 2004: 19). Mercantilism vested in the control of the sea routes between Europe and the Far East for the purpose of trading between the two regions was the underlying motivation of the VOC. As a strategic half-way point on the route, the Cape was identified as a replenishment station to supply fresh provisions to company ships sailing between the Netherlands and the East Indies colonies. Although Fourie and Von Fintel (2001: 19), Brink (2004: 19), Feinstein (2005: 22-23) and Changuion and Steenkamp (2012: 14) all agree that the original intent of the VOC was not to colonise the Cape, the mere establishment

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of the refreshment station was, *de facto*, a disguised form of colonisation, as it entailed the appropriation of resources, including the land, by eliminating the influence of the indigenous population.

Dutch rule in the Cape through the VOC lasted for 143 years until the VOC was declared bankrupt and liquidated in 1795. Founded on a material culture, the social order in the Cape mirrored that of the Netherlands and was characterised by a marked distinction between a wealthy upper class or "people of quality" and a poor lower class or "vile and inferior people" (Brink 2004: 23-24). Land ownership in the Netherlands, in particular agricultural land, was associated with high social standing (Brink 2004: 24) and it is likely that the colonisers brought with them a hunger for land. Land required by the VOC for the refreshment station was appropriated and allocated as deemed fit, turning peasants into land owners (Brink 2004: 34). Although the original colonisers were in the employ of the VOC as company servants, they could apply to break their service and become "free burgers" who were granted titled land by the VOC (Brink 2004: 27-28). Their numbers gradually increased from nine in 1657 when the first "free burgers" were released from service to 5 000 in 1751 and 10 500 in 1780 (Brink 2004: 29). Social standing based on class was therefore the hallmark of the colonisers, motivated by the material, including land ownership and from 1657 peasants who would never have had the opportunity to own land in their country of birth became landowners.

Undoubtedly, the indigenous population was deeply dissatisfied with the manner in which the colonisers occupied the land. As Van Riebeeck recorded in his journal on 10 February 1655:

> Only last night it happened that about 50 of these natives wanted to put up their huts close to the banks of the moat of our fortress, and when told in a friendly manner by our men to go a little further away, they declared boldly that this was not our land but theirs and that they would place their huts wherever they chose (Thom 1952: 293).

Conflict with the colonisers over land was therefore inevitable and despite two unsuccessful wars of resistance by the indigenous population, the first from 1654 to 1659 and the second – and final war – in the mid-1670s, they were irreversibly dispossessed of their grazing land, both by force and systematic encroachment. Van Riebeeck, in his journal, noted

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on 5 and 6 April 1660 during peace talks that the leaders of the indigenous population were fiercely opposed to the manner in which dispossession had taken place. He wrote:

> They strongly insisted that we had been appropriating more and more of their land, which had been theirs all these centuries, and on which they had been accustomed to let their cattle graze, etc. They asked if they would be allowed to do such a thing supposing they went to Holland, and then added: 'It would be of little consequence if you people stayed here at the fort, but you come right into the interior and select the best land for yourselves, without even asking whether we mind or whether it will cause us any inconvenience'. They therefore strongly urged that they should be given access to this land for that purpose. At first we argued against this, saying that there was not enough grass for their cattle as well as ours, to which they replied: 'Have we then no reason to prevent you from getting cattle, since, if you have a large number, you will take up all our grazing grounds with them? As for your claim that the land is not big enough for us both, who should in justice give way, the rightful owner or the foreign intruder?' (Thom 1958: 195-196).
>
> Thus they remained adamant in their claim of old-established natural ownership (Thom 1958: 196).

The response by Van Riebeeck was blunt:

> [W]hen they persisted in their request, eventually they had to be told that they had now lost the land as the result of the war and had no alternative but to admit that it was no longer theirs, the more so because they could not be induced to restore the stolen cattle which they had unlawfully taken from us without any reason. Their land justly fallen to us in a defensive war, won by the sword, as it were, and we intended to keep it (Thom 1958: 196).

In their reply, Van Riebeeck noted that the indigenous leaders

> complained bitterly, saying that the colonists and others who lived in the country had done them much mischief, by sneaking off with either a sheep or a calf on occasion, by snatching off their beads and armlets from their ears and arms and giving them to their slaves, or by beating and striking them, without the Commander's knowledge – and there is some truth in this. Unable to bear this any longer, they had determined to take their revenge by stealing the cattle, and they roundly declared they had had cause enough for this. In answer to this, they were reminded of the many exemplary punishments meted out by us to those against whom they had brought

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> in charges of such molestation. If they were not satisfied with that, but preferred every time to take their revenge by means of robberies and thefts such as those mentioned, peace could never be maintained between us, and then by right of conquest we should take still more of their land from them, unless they were able to drive us off. In such a case they would, by virtue of the same right, become owners of the fort and everything and would remain the owners for as long as they could retain it. If this alternative suited them, we would see what our course of action was to be (Thom 1958: 196).

In her work, *They Came to Stay: Discovering Meaning in the 18th Century Cape Country Dwelling*, Brink (2004), provides pointed insights into the original colonisers, their social structure, their approach to land and their attitude to the indigenous population. The original colonisers who arrived at the Cape of Good Hope under Van Riebeeck were from the "lower strata" of society in the Netherlands and were "poverty stricken, almost penniless peasants" who, because of their low societal status, could not own land in that country (Brink 2004: 24, 34). They were mostly men – with some women and children – and in all numbered around 100 souls who were mostly unskilled and illiterate (Brink 2004: 20). Irrespective of their social standing, the colonisers brought with them a European phenomenon regarding land ownership, that of "individual land tenure", which diametrically contrasted with the indigenous approach which was "social-communal" and did not make provision for individual land ownership (Changuion & Steenkamp 2012: 13). For the original colonisers, the Cape provided an opportunity to escape the hardship of poverty in their motherland to begin a new life but they were ideationally unsuited and inappropriately prepared for their encounters with the indigenous population.

Brink (2004: 29) points out that by the 1730s a second generation of farmers began emerging, who were either on the farms of their forefathers or who had acquired new tracts of land. However, when it came to land, ownership was in two categories: firstly, quit-rent or leasehold of state land, which entailed ownership of land for life (Changuion & Steenkamp 2012: 15); and secondly, "free burger" freehold titles to land for those released from VOC service (Brink 2004: 30,37). Brink (2004: 30) notes that most of the "free burgers" were illiterate and held captive by "textuality as their land became tied to diagrams and writing", opening the way for mismanagement, exploitation and cheating. In addition to the two afore-mentioned categories, a dispossessed category can be added, as land was taken from the indigenous population, which precipitated conflict with the colonisers. Despite being elevated

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to landowners, the "free burgers" were not deemed by the VOC to be worthy of any form of elevated social standing and remained in the lower rungs of society, as they were "unacceptable to the elite" (Brink 2004: 36). This situation perpetrated and perpetuated a society characterised by superiority and separation that inevitably pervaded relations between classes among the colonisers themselves and the indigenous population. As Brink (2004: 87-88) notes, the "free burgers" were cast off to the outlying areas of the settlement and were left to their own devices to survive. In practice, the "free burgers" were seen and treated as "dirt" by the VOC, which viewed them with disdain and disrespect, an attitude that was perpetuated even after Dutch rule ended (Brink 2004: 37). Moreover, the "free burgers" were marginalised and mostly excluded from the administrative structures of the refreshment station at the Cape. Although they were represented by a single member on the Council of Policy and three members on the Council of Justice, their presence on these bodies was largely symbolic and they had restricted, if any, authentic agency. On 23 December 1658 matters came to a head when the "free burgers" presented the first of a number of petitions concerning their grievances to Van Riebeeck. The matter of land was among the grievances and an excerpt relating to relations with the indigenous population is quoted from the petition:

> 14. We suffer great danger form the Hottentots, who may cause us great loss at any time; this does not affect the Company as we are defenders of our land. (They were told that they themselves would be the cause of the danger and remain so as long as they allowed the Hottentots to visit their houses and to observe the lie of the land, contrary to the orders of the Hon. Company. … As a result, they lost many cattle and allowed the Hottentots to rob them thereof to the great inconvenience of the Hon. Company, which was not obliged to give them others to save them from becoming impoverished, but also had great trouble with the Hottentots, to such an extent that there had been a war with the Hottentots on that account. Thank God, however, peace has been restored and the Hottentots have been brought to such subjection that they will not again dare to think of troubling the freemen or others, a great thing indeed for the Hon. Company, and no small source of security to the free burgers, who, by God's grace, have thereby been delivered from that danger …) (Thom 1954: 396-397).

Although the tone of the language in the petition was initially deferential, it became increasingly insistent and ultimately threatening (Brink 2004: 38). While the petition itself did not bring relief concerning their plight, the content illustrates the frustrations of the "free burgers" concerning their marginalisation to a hostile periphery. It also provides insight into the tension with the indigenous population and the brewing discontent and conflict over land.

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The "free burger" identity is implicit in the petition as well, and the content shows how their internal coherence and external distinction, as discussed in the Chapter 2, emerged and manifested.

When examined from the dimension of internal coherence (See Chapter 2), the identity of the colonisers, in particular the "free burgers" who occupied the land, was for the most part illiterate and poverty-ridden. Moreover, they were disdained by the VOC, as they were not deemed worthy of any form of respect or recognition. They were both materially and ideationally shifted to the periphery to fend for themselves and in this way, they were placed at the fore-front of contact with the indigenous population. Motivated by a desire to survive in these circumstances, the "free burgers", with their material identity, viewed land as a way of improving their living conditions, implying that as time progressed, the desire for more land became a driving force and exacerbated conflict with the indigenous population.

Similar to the Spanish in the New World, the VOC and the colonisers distinguished between "the civilised (European colonists) and the uncivilised (indigenous people)" (Brink 2004: 36) and in this way cast off the other in an abhorrent and repulsive manner. The physical appearance of the indigenous peoples – both male and female – was, for example, "sexualised and fetishized" (Ritchie 1990: 99). Derogatory descriptions of the other concerning beliefs, appearance, attitude and approach to daily life are included in the observations made by Gijsbert Heeck who arrived at the Cape on 3 April 1655 and departed on 15 April 1655 (Raven-Hart 1971: 33, 42). On 4 April 1655 – *one day* (own italics) after arrival – Heeck wrote in his journal the following concerning the indigenous population after he had gone ashore:

> [T]hey know nothing of *God* or His Commandments, living in the wilds little better than the beasts (Raven-Hart 1971: 35).
>
> But the women are quite shameless, exposing themselves for a little bread or other food, even if their husbands are standing near by (*sic*) (Raven-Hart 1971: 35).
>
> The men are tolerably tall and well built, and exceptionally fast runners but by nature cruel, sly and rascally: the women are quite short of stature and very ugly (Raven-Hart 1971: 35).

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> [T]hey also plait some little shells in their hair, smearing this, as also their whole body, with every sort of fat that they can get, and from this they stink exceptionally foully (as do most of the black peoples in general) (Raven-Hart 1971: 35).

> In a word, it is almost impossible, and quite unbelievable by those who have never seen such people, to realize their wild, strange, and altogether beast-like manners (Raven-Hart 1971: 38).

In the same vein, the journal of Georg Meister who arrived at the Cape on 14 September 1677 (Raven-Hart 1971: 198) contains the following observations concerning the indigenous population:

> The wild Africans living in this outermost seacoast are called bestial or animal-like for two reasons: their bestial life and their equally bestial deaths (Raven-Hart 1971: 202).

> When they are really hungry they eat the guts raw and uncooked, as also they do when the butcher or slaughterer throws them a piece of raw meat, as if to a dog: such they take, and lay it out on a stone and beat it with another stone until somewhat soft, and then tear and eat it, as a hungry wolf devours dead carrion in a severe Winter, as I myself saw in the year 1677 with my own eyes (Raven-Hart 1971: 203).

> Regarding their work and their doings, it could almost be doubted whether the daily work and toil laid by God on our forefathers and on us after them "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat thy bread" (Genesis I), can apply to these bestial folk, since they live like dumb beasts without care, from one day to the next. Their chief work is nothing more than to dig up and eat the roots at certain seasons (as with us in Autumn the pigs eat acorns) (Raven-Hart 1971: 203).

> As regards their speech, this is in no way whatever to be compared with any other language, but when they speak together of some serious matter, it sounds no otherwise than as the gobbling of angry turkeys. They click and smack with their tongues as French dancing-masters click with their castanets when teaching women to dance. Further, this bestial folk know nothing of letters, still less of reading and writing, so that no one of another nation can learn their speech, although in my time this was much endeavoured for the sake of trade (Raven-Hart 1971: 204).

> Among other customs, they have this – that those who have the most cattle and are thus the richest in their manner must be served by the others as if their serfs (Raven-Hart 1971: 205).

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> [T]hese savages have some agreement with the Devil, since they can safely bring this (*sic*) cattle hither without any fear of harm from their enemies (Raven-Hart 1971: 205).

> These miserable folk remain until now in the darkness of heathen atheism, since they neither believe in nor fear a God in Heaven or a Devil in Hell, and far less hope for another life after this one; but they revere certain created things such as the moon when it is full, which they worship as a god (Raven-Hart 1971: 205).

> This I admit freely to having seen, how more than one family dwelt all together in a hollow or cave like swine in a pigsty, young and old, male and female; and since their whole life is bestial their (*sic*) is no doubt that herein also they no bridle or barrier of chastity to their affections (Raven-Hart 1971: 206).

Although outside the timeframe of this section, the following offensive observation was made in 1649 by French merchant and traveller, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605-1689), concerning the language spoken by the indigenous population in the Cape and is worth noting. He wrote:

> Of all the people I met with my journeying I found none so horrible and beastly as the Camouks … and those of the Cape de bone Esperance, which are called Kaffers or Hottentots. When they speak they fart with their tongues in their mouths, yet, although their speech is almost without separation of word from word, they understand each other very readily (Raven-Hart 1967: 179).

> They have no knowledge of gold or silver, and properly speaking know nothing of religion (Raven-Hart 1967: 179).

According to the Dutch colonisers the indigenous population – who were called "Hottentots" – spoke in a stuttering fashion and had not mastered the art of civilised speech (Brink 2004: 78-79). This perceived "language deficiency" set the indigenous population apart from the colonisers, as they were deemed to be neither capable of taking an "Oath of Allegiance" to the VOC nor of subscribing to its values and laws (Brink 2004: 78). This provided further motivation for the colonisers to relegate the indigenous population to an even deeper level of otherness and abjection. However, South African historian Noël Mostert comments that African languages are "among the most beautiful in the world" (Mostert 1993: 35). For Mostert, African languages

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> seem to resound always with the very nature, the poetic character of the lands where they were used. The sand and dry heat of and empty distance of the semi-desert lands where the Khoikhoi originated are embedded in their speech. But it is softness and greenness. They run together like the very passage of their olden days (Mostert 1993: 35).

By their own admission and based on the evidence in the previous paragraphs, the colonisers conceived of the indigenous population as little more than depraved, barbarous animals lacking moral values. They were the other without a material culture, spiritually barren and unable to communicate. Yet it was the colonisers themselves who were unable to communicate meaningfully; although they were able to communicate to some degree through the spoken word (Mostert 1993: 129), they perpetuated Columbus' sin of ignoring the deeper and ideational context of language. They instead chose to regard the indigenous population with disgust and outrage (Mostert 1993: 35).

This historical disdain for the other adds to the commission of the original sin. The original sin, encapsulated in alterity, entailed a vile and offensive form of otherness, together with abjection of the other, and provided justification for simply taking land. In their minds the colonisers conceived a bestial indigenous population as incapable of and unwilling to use land in a way that was materially beneficial. Moreover, alterity also featured in the power relations between the colonisers and the indigenous population. The land could, and was indeed, taken and occupied by conquest at will and the indigenous population could do nothing to prevent this from happening. Conflict was therefore a distinguishing feature of the relationship between the coloniser and the indigenous population. However, while power prevailed in a material sense, it was in an ideational context that the colonisers were defeated, as they were unable to destroy the indigenous population's ties with the land and the sense of injustice associated with dispossession.

The motives of the colonialists were undeniably to occupy land and gain control of material assets to ensure that, as a minority, they were able to maintain the upper hand over the indigenous population. In the eyes of the colonisers, unscrupulous land dispossession was justifiable, for as Therborn (2019: 34) additionally observes, "[e]xpropriation and appropriation were much facilitated by racism, as a defining criterion of settler and non-settler, an ideology well entrenched by the time the Union of South Africa was founded through a merger of British colonies in 1910." It is a small wonder that the historical imprint and the

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perpetuation of the ideational, together with the associated conflict, carried over into the five key moments concerning land dispossession and the associated 'land language' that will be examined in this and the following chapters.

The historical imprint of a past characterised by a peaceful and beneficial relationship with the land was disrupted by material and ideational dispossession; the imprint resides in the minds of black communities to this day. In this thesis, community has an additional identifier, that of the 'historically dispossessed.' This implies that the historical context must be examined to establish the origins of the land question. In this regard five moments, as indicated above, are identified.

4.2.6. **Five historical moments concerning land dispossession**

4.2.6.1. ***The Natives' Land Act (Act 27 of 1913)***

The Natives' Land Act (Act 27 of 1913), hereafter the Natives' Land Act, was a pivotal moment in the history of dispossession. In the first instance it articulated the Union of South Africa's approach to land ownership and had a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it allocated land for settler agricultural activities and on the other, it forced Africans into native reserves serving as cheap labour pools for the burgeoning South African mining industry (Southall 2013: 19). The reserves initially comprised 7,3% of the surface area of the Union, but increased to 8,3% as more land was added to the reserves (Changuion & Steenkamp 2012: 134). It is undeniable that land dispossession brought about massive disparity in ownership by blacks and whites and accorded "the land issue huge symbolic status" (Southall 2013: 231). Apart from disparity that the Natives' Land Act brought about, Skosana (2019: 58) avers that it also undermined the authority of traditional authorities who played a role in land administration.

The Natives' Land Act has been the subject of wide-ranging research and many commentators have offered reasons for why the Act was passed. In his seminal journal article, *The 1913 Natives Land Act in South Africa: Politics, Race, and Segregation in the Early 20th Century*, Feinberg (1993: 67) is adamant that many commentators have failed to acknowledge the political context of the Act and he contends that politics and race "cannot be ignored in South African history." The divisive political and racial discourse in South Africa prior to the passing of the Act in 1913 contributed to the growing clamour among whites for segregation

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and Feinberg (1993: 65-66) highlights that the Act was "one of the most important segregation laws of the century" and would later become key in the apartheid legal structure. From an ideational perspective the Act was pivotal in linking race, segregation and politics and prevented indigenous Africans from playing a meaningful role in land matters. Any dissenting voices on behalf of African exclusion were othered. For example, Jacobus W. Sauer, a member of Botha's Cabinet, was branded a "white kaffir" because of his outspoken views regarding the importance of according political rights to indigenous Africans (Feinberg 1993: 73). (Incidentally, it was Sauer as Minister of Native Affairs who introduced the Natives' Land Act to Parliament on 25 April 1913). The Natives' Land Act became a 'land language' symbol for white supremacist politics, racial segregation and dispossession, which elicited strong reaction from black Africans.

The Act gave rise to landmark responses, one of which was the work of Sol Plaatjie (2007), *Native Life in South Africa*, in which he exposed the iniquity of the legislation and the response of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) established one year before the Act. In the second instance, it provided a legal framework for further acts entrenching dispossession and laid the foundation for racial segregation, based on land, with the enactment of the 1920 Native Affairs Act, the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act, the 1927 Native Administration Act and the 1936 Hertzog Bills, which *inter alia*, marginally added to the land reserved for black occupation in the 1913 Land Act. These acts paved the way for further land dispossession that became a permanent feature of the torrid period that followed.

The Natives' Land Act was connected to subterfuge and callousness. Plaatjie (2007: 50-51) notes that it was manipulated to create an impression that it was intended to prevent European encroachment on black land rights. Indeed, as he cynically observes, the Act is known as the *Natives'* (own italics) Land Act, contained no reference to Europeans, condemned natives to slavery and was "exploitation of the cruellest kind" (Plaatjie 2007: 51, 58, 59). L'Ange (2005: 199) regards the Act as unfair and notes that, apart from the Anglican church calling for its repeal, white response was muted. Whites were therefore mostly complicit in supporting a system that condemned blacks to a life of subservience and domination. Moreover, tribal and family structures, a cornerstone of black existence, were virtually destroyed, ensuring that there was little if any remaining social fabric other than a struggle to survive in impoverished and crowded reserves.

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The Natives' Land Act was responsible for the formation of dispossessed social communities that were resettled in rural areas under deplorable conditions of poverty. An important feature of the 1913 Land Act – and the Acts that followed – was the criminalisation of black land ownership and tenure. For example, the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act declared that Africans in white urban areas were permitted to remain only if employed for a specific purpose. When that purpose was served, they were to return to the reserves or face criminal prosecution.

In order to complete the segregation of races, and the concomitant dispossession of the land, attention was subsequently turned to the urban areas in the form of the Native (Urban Areas) Act (Act 21 of 1923), hereinafter the Native (Urban Areas Act). The Native (Urban Areas Act) was focused on controlling black movement from the reserves into urban areas set aside for whites (Ngcukaitobi 2018: 247). In this Act, reference is made to "location", "native village" and "native hostel" (Union of South Africa 1923: 142), all of which subsequently became terms associated with ideational dispossession and othering. Moreover, terms that are encountered in the present-day land question, for example, "expropriation of land for public purpose" and "a willing seller and a willing buyer" are found in the same act (Union of South Africa 1923: 150). Ideational dispossession, linked to identity, was further entrenched by requiring "every male native" to be in possession of a document authorising his presence in an urban area and to wear a badge to this effect (Union of South Africa 1923: 160-161).

In their response to rural and urban dispossession, the SANNC adopted *The African Bill of Rights* at its annual conference held on 28 May 1923, which stated that "the 'Bantu inhabitants' of the country have the indisputable right to a place of abode in the land of their fathers' and as 'sons of the soil', Africans have the right to 'unrestricted ownership of this land, the land of their birth'…" (Ngcukaitobi 2018: 247).

In his assessment, Daniels (1989: 335-336) identifies three outcomes of the 1913 Land Act. In the first instance, poor quality land was set aside for the reserves and could not sustain those who had to work it; in the second instance, land was used to enforce segregation along racial lines; and in the third instance, since it was impossible for blacks to meaningfully secure a livelihood in the reserves, they were forced to sell their labour in white areas to make a living. The three outcomes cumulatively contributed to the estrangement of blacks from land by turning possession into dispossession, while ensuring at the same time that whites had secured

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the largest share. Dispossession carried over into the second key moment, the emergence of the NP when it came to power in 1948.

4.2.6.2. ***The emergence of the National Party, 1948***

Land dispossession, although a central feature of apartheid policy instituted by the NP after coming to power in 1948, was presaged by a history beginning with the colonisation of the Cape in 1652 and access to land for black South Africans was restricted, even outlawed, before 1948. Alfred (A.B.) Xuma (1893-1962), a prominent African National Congress (ANC) activist in the 1940s, who rebuilt and expanded the party as president-general, was particularly vocal on land issues. As World War II was heading to its conclusion, he wrote an article in July 1945 for the magazine *Forum* – the first South African magazine for all Non-Europeans – titled *An African's Vision of a Post-War South Africa*. In the article his resentment over land is clear:

> Africans, through limited land and landless[ness] migrate from rural areas into urban areas to earn wages on which they may solely or partially depend for the support of their families. Even where there are small plots of land only women and children are kept and expected to till them with consequent repeated crops failures, loss of soil fertility, and soil erosion. The separation of families leads to broken homes, infidelity, lack of discipline for children, delinquency and destitution. The long absence of men from home, in short, leads to disorganisation of the whole social fabric in the community (Limb 2012: 323).

The 1948 elections, which brought the NP to power, further entrenched land dispossession along racial lines, which was justified under an overarching policy of separate development or apartheid. Apartheid lifted white supremacy to new levels as it was designed as a political and ideological tool to segregate races both materially and ideationally. The then Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, used land as a means of segregation by removing blacks from so-called white areas to what became known as "Bantu Homelands" (Fairweather 2006: 81-82). As Mamdani (in Fraser 2007a: 839) explains, the consequence was a 'bifurcated state' that consisted of so-called homelands or bantustans under 'decentralised despots' with extensive power over resources–including land–and white commercial farmers who enjoyed the patronage and protection of the apartheid government. For blacks the homelands were not 'home', nor was the allocated 'land' suitable for supporting a sustainable,

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dignified existence. In this respect Govan Mbeki's description of the homelands is worth noting:

> They are South Africa's backwaters, primitive rural slums, soil-eroded and underdeveloped, lacking power resources and without developed communications systems. They have no cities, no industries, and few sources of employment. They are congested and permanently distressed areas where the inhabitants live on a narrow ledge of starvation, where a drought, as experienced recently in the northern areas, leads inevitably to famine. They are areas drained of their menfolk, for their chief export is labour and while the men work on white-owned farms and in mines and industry, their women-folk and old people pursue a primitive agriculture incapable of providing even subsistence (Mbeki 1984: 16).

On the one hand, blacks were forcibly moved to the bantustans where poverty, overcrowding and unemployment were the order of the day (Vermeulen 2009: 18). They were linked to a tribal identity. For example, Bophutatswana was "allocated" to the Tswana tribe on the basis of historical occupation and ownership. Bantustans were 'conveniently' located in the rural areas and on the periphery of white areas. It was in these circumstances that the communities eked out a living, either by commuting to white South Africa to work or seek employment or to remain in the bantustan itself in deplorable living conditions. Moreover, in the bantustans traditional authorities held sway over land ownership and security of tenure which was in their jurisdiction, not that of their subjects. Importantly, blacks were prohibited from owning land outside the bantustans and in a step to "purify" land ownership further along racial lines, the apartheid government systematically identified and eliminated so-called 'black spots' – where blacks occupied land in white areas – by moving the occupants to the bantustans or other areas designated for blacks. According to Walker (2007: 137), by 1983 approximately 247 'black spot' farms were eliminated by removing some 475 000 souls to separate areas exclusively zoned for black occupation. The rural communities that emerged were therefore subject to the whims of the traditional authorities or the bantustan puppet regimes that were placed in power at the pleasure of the apartheid government.

Six months after the NP was voted into power, Xuma wrote to the United Nations (UN) on 25 November 1948, in a document titled *Apartheid and the Africans in the Union of South Africa*, and criticised the NP apartheid policies concerning the unequal apportionment of land as follows:

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> Africans in South Africa are opposed to the Union Native Policy of apartheid and segregation as being a euphemism for exploitation. 87% of the land of the Union of South Africa is reserved for 2½ million Europeans and 13% for the 7½ million Africans (Limb 2012: 349).

On the other hand, the emergence of the NP entrenched the white farming community who, in many cases, were the beneficiaries of black land dispossession, generous state subsidies and protectionist measures (Fraser 2007a: 840). The 1950 Group Areas Act aimed at further segregating urban areas along racial lines by creating residential zones for communities of whites, coloureds, Indians and natives (blacks). These communities were given exclusive use and ownership of land in the allocated zones. Unless authorised, other communities were disqualified from owning or occupying land in areas other than those that had been allocated. Dispossession was also the order of the day in urban areas.

Xuma, when presenting his *Evidence Given before the Commission Enquiring Johannesburg 1/3/50 into the Riots on Newlands, Krugersdorp and Randfontein (1950)*, spoke of the building resentment among Africans, warning that "many would [take] revenge if they could" but offered an ideational solution saying:

> African Nationalism is a self-realisation of a people [who] demand their full share in the land of their forefathers. It teaches self-reliance, self-determination and willingness and readiness to cooperate with all on a basis of equality (Limb 2012: 359, 360).

He concluded his evidence by suggesting that "I want to warn South Africa that her greatest need is moral rearmament" (Limb 2012: 361). Xuma's evidence identifies the estrangement of Africans from land and the resultant anger and thirst for revenge at their exclusion. It is this sentiment that drove a desire for equality and would permeate efforts to foster an African nationalist identity, linked to a sense of belonging in a country taken from the ancestors.

Xuma's *Memorandum to the Ad Hoc Committee on the removal of Non-Europeans from the Western Areas presented by the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers Association and Proper Housing Movement* on 8 October 1952 exposed black expropriation in the western areas of Johannesburg as follows:

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> The scheme has turned out to be a fight against freehold title held by Africans. The Minister of Native Affairs has made it clear that the African property owners removed from these areas must not have freehold title at Meadowlands. He is prepared for the present to let them have a thirty year lease. I suppose that is good enough for 'Natives' to confirm our contention, the Minister has declared his intention to remove the freehold African townships around Pretoria and elsewhere, so that, this scheme is a move to destroy freehold title for Africans and dispossess them of land ownership to facilitate undisputed control, subjection and white domination … We reject this Scheme as unnecessary, undemocratic, unchristian and disregarding human dignity (Limb 2012: 367).

Further frustration and bitterness concerning the Western Area removals were voiced by Xuma at the University of the Witwatersrand on 22 August 1953 when he presented a paper *'African Reactions'* describing the unfair treatment of Africans and their emotional attachment to property:

> With the greatest respect I want to state emphatically that Africans know clearly when they are wrongly or unfairly treated without outside direction or 'misapprehension' by others. In fact, in our Association we excluded European members on the grounds that they would be 'putting ideas in the heads of the Natives'. We preferred to use our own ideas and devise our own plans (Limb 2012: 36).

> The essence of the matter is that the Africans of the Western Areas do not want to be pushed around. They regard themselves as human beings, and object to being treated as something second-rate, removable at the will of other. It is their homes that are at stake. I wish to remind you that a home is something more than four walls and a roof. For many of us, this home was our father's home and for some of us our grandfather's home. We, too, form emotional attachments … So, too, even if they are not property owners, do they share the implacable resentment against forcible deprivation of freehold rights and the consequent loss of their own potential rights (Limb 2012: 373-374).

Xuma concluded his address with the stark warning that, "[t]he compulsory implementation of the scheme can only engender hatred and antagonism between white and black" (Limb 2012: 374).

Damning condemnation of the apartheid policy, together with its systematic land dispossession legislation, was provided by Chief Albert Luthuli during his Nobel Peace Award

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lecture, *Africa and Freedom*, delivered at Oslo University on 11 December 1961 when he attacked the ideational context of apartheid by declaring that:

> There is nothing new in South Africa's apartheid ideas, but South Africa is unique in this: the ideas not only survive in our modern age, but are stubbornly defended, extended and bolstered up by legislation at the time when in the major part of the world they are now largely historical and are either being shamefacedly hidden behind concealing formulations, or are steadily being scrapped. These ideas survive in South Africa because those who sponsor them profit from them. They provide moral whitewash for the conditions that exist in the country: for the fact that the country is ruled exclusively by a white government elected by an exclusively white electorate which is a privileged minority; for the fact that 87 per cent of the land and all the best agricultural land within reach of town, market and railways is reserved for white ownership and occupation and now through the recent Group Areas legislation non-Whites are losing more land to white greed (UN 1969: 15-16).

> Try as our government and its apologists will, with honeyed words about "separate development' and eventual "independence" in so-called "Bantu homelands," nothing can conceal the reality of South African conditions (UN 1969: 16).

Apartheid deliberately rendered inferior humans – in this case blacks – landless and invisible by moving them to the periphery as a vilified other. The emergence of the NP was therefore a catalyst for the emergence of deeply divided social communities that were racial in character and nature with land as the central feature under the grand idea of separate development that entrenched the other and extended otherness. Communities developed specific identities along with agency and structure that manifested in distinctive ways with land as a language sign which took on a particular meaning in the next key moment, the liberation struggle, which commenced in 1961.

4.2.6.3. ***<u>The liberation struggle, 1961</u>***

Land and its relevance during liberation struggles is introduced in Fanon's seminal work, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), which advances the notion that the brutality of colonial rule elicits a response that shapes an identity founded on violent struggle (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 69). In this respect, Southall (2013: 17) notes that the response to "settler colonialism" is "armed struggle." He crucially observes that, "[l]iberation movement ideology

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proposes that the seizure of African land by white settlers was a motivating force driving the liberation struggle" (Southall 2013: 231). This explains why land dispossession lies at the heart of many of the struggles for liberation that have taken place across the African continent, including South Africa (Cousins & Scoones 2010: 35; Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 34). However, Moyo contends that when national liberation ends with a clear victor, for example in Angola and Mozambique, the land question was resolved but in countries such as South Africa where there is no clear victor, the land question remained unresolved (Moyo 2005: 147-148). Violence and aggression linked to a liberation struggle is therefore implicit in the historical context of a land question, carrying over into the post-liberation milieu and culminating in enduring conflict. Since the land question remains unresolved in a post-1994 South Africa, the hallmarks of violence and aggression persist and are articulated in current 'land language.'

South Africa is no exception concerning the centrality of land in the liberation struggle (Walker 2005: 805). Not only was land dispossession a driver of the liberation struggle; it was also one of the factors that led to the breakaway from the ANC by Africanists who established the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). The PAC, critical of the weak stance adopted by the ANC concerning land, propagated the narrative that white settlers had stolen the land from the black indigenous peoples and that it must be returned to its rightful owners (O'Malley n.d.).

The land question featured in narratives and discourses during the South African liberation struggle when the liberation movements championed a return of the land to the historically dispossessed community. This is, for example, described in the Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress Alliance in 1955 that declares

> our people have been robbed of their birthright to land.
>
> THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!
>
> Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger; All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose (ANC 1955).

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Land dispossession, particularly in the rural areas, motivated the Africanist ideology adopted by the PAC (Kondlo 2009: 55). In support of its ideology, the armed wing of the PAC, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), implemented a rural strategy for their armed struggle or 'people's war' (Kondlo 2009: 240). In this way land, especially in the rural areas, was front and centre in the beliefs and convictions of APLA guerrillas. Moreover, to force them to relinquish their ownership of land, white farmers were singled out as the enemy. In this way APLA intended first to establish a presence in the rural areas in advance of an urban occupation. However, Kondlo (2009: 242-243) admits that the PAC armed struggle was unsuccessful and gives the underlying reason as inability to analyse and mobilise the peasants (rural population) effectively. The strategic inability of the leadership to accurately assess and analyse the role of the peasantry, according to Kondlo (2009: 242), was an unintended consequence of the 1913 Land Act that forced a large section of the dispossessed to relinquish their rural peasant identity in favour of an urban workerist identity. This eventually led to a strategic and ideological shift in focus from the peasantry to the working class, embodied in the *New Road of Revolution,* adopted by the PAC Central Committee in 1978 (Kondlo 2009: 250). Kondlo, however, is at pains to point out that the peasantry was never totally abandoned, as the same document highlights that the people's armed insurgency was an "agrarian revolution of the landless", identified as peasants in the countryside and landless farm labourers who intended to "confiscate by force of arms, the present land held by white usurpers, for distribution among themselves" (Kondlo 2009: 250-251). The land issue again came up in a 1988 position paper circulated by the PAC office in Dar-es-Salaam, *Some Considerations in Respect of the So-called Dialogue with White Ruled South Africa through its Government*, which framed the PAC's stance on the negotiations concerning the future South Africa (Kondlo 2009: 259-261). A particular feature of the stance was that negotiations would not realise the PAC struggle goals, which included "the restoration of the usurped land" (Kondlo 2009: 261). Kondlo (2009: 262) highlights that the PAC responded to its February 1990 unbanning by stating that it had no meaning as the organisation never recognised its banning in the first place. The impending negotiations were viewed with deep suspicion and the PAC spokesperson in exile, Cutter Seleka, emphasised that the PAC demanded "the return of land to its rightful owners" (Kondlo 2009: 262). The PAC belatedly joined the negotiations in 1993 and although the party participated in the first democratic elections in 1994, it did not fare well. However, when examining the context of the PAC's negotiating position, Kondlo observes that the party sought location in an apparently uncontested history by noting that, "The historical war for the return

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of ancestral land even though justified, was made to appear context transcendent and inflexible" (Kondlo 2009: 265).

It was also in the 1990s that liberation struggle 'land language' began to feature in the lexicon of South African society, in particular the slogan, 'One Settler, One Bullet.' Here it is pertinent to mention the rejection of Barney Desai of that slogan and his statement that driving white people into the sea was inconsistent with PAC aims (Kondlo 2009: 263). Despite Desai's rejection of militant slogans and war talk, a more radical land discourse continued until the mid-1990s and was even carried over into ANC discourses, such as the "One Settler, One Bullet" refrain used by the late African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) chair, Peter Mokaba and the "Kill the Boer" song of erstwhile ANCYL chair, Julius Malema.

4.2.6.4. ***The advent of democracy, 1994***

It is undisputed that South Africa's land question is founded on a long and fractured history where land ownership was linked to racial identity that accorded special rights and privileges to whites while simultaneously dispossessing and marginalising blacks. Land was therefore simultaneously a "symbol of colonial conquest, as well as a symbol of resistance against colonialism and apartheid" (Kepe & Hall 2018: 134). Economic prosperity and personal worth were, indeed, a white privilege and required restitution in the new political dispensation.

The advent of democracy in South Africa is prefaced by a wider Southern African context, as this remarkable event was accompanied by a sense of euphoria that the last vestiges of colonial domination had finally been eradicated from the region. Elation was eventually replaced by a reality consisting of compromises between the African nationalists and the "former White settlers" in Southern Africa (Mandaza 2001: 136-137). The first compromise was that the struggle did not culminate in an overwhelming victory for the liberators who would *carte blanche* dictate the terms and conditions of the new dispensation, which instead became a site of compromise. This meant, for example, that the South African constitution – specifically property ownership – was, in fact, "a formal 'blessing' of a scheme that had its origins in white settler colonialism and *apartheid*" (Mandaza 2001: 136). Compromises, such as Section 25 of the South African Constitution (1996), were viewed as an appeasement and a defeat for the aspirations of the previously oppressed and historically disadvantaged communities. These compromises would eventually return to haunt the new democratic

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dispensation, placing it under intense pressure to amend the Constitution to reflect an authentic version of the needs and aspirations of the majority. The second compromise was that the decolonisation project would continue in the new dispensation but became vested in an exceptionalist identity, which Mandaza (2001: 137) characterises as a component of a "*new ideology of self-deception*", which concealed the true realities, setting South Africa apart from the continent. Exceptionalism manifested in two ways. The first exception was the notion that South Africa was not a conventional colonial state and was, as a consequence, not subject to the types of decolonialism experienced by the rest of Africa (Mandaza 2001: 137). The second exception was that whites were accorded political and economic prominence in the new dispensation that far out-weighed their true status. Elevating the minority to this level has had serious consequences, not the least of which is an unrealistic view that the new dispensation needs them more than they need it. Whites were therefore under the misguided impression that they were indispensable to the success of the new dispensation and had a right to preferential treatment regarding issues such as the land. This is reflected not only in the material dimension of the land where whites continue to own a larger share of land (irrespective of the statistical controversy) but it extends to the ideational context which is given perfunctory consideration at most.

Before the scrapping of the 1913 Land Act on 30 June 1991 the ANC, in a press statement dated 14 June 1991, warned that deep and entrenched injustices would not simply be erased by an act of parliament (ANC 1991). In this regard the following excerpts are highlighted:

> [T]he removal of apartheid laws will not, on its own, bring about structural change in the in the inequitable distribution of land …
>
> The ANC is committed to fundamental land reform that will entitle all South Africans to equal access to land. This, of necessity, implies dealing with the legacy of apartheid … A consultative process through which people's demands could be tabled and discussed would be an important step towards addressing past injustices.
>
> Land is an emotive issue in South Africa. Decades of apartheid legislation have created profound inequalities concerning housing and land. One parliamentary session cannot redress the deeply felt injustices experienced by the disenfranchised (ANC 1991).

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Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the land question has continued to be extensively researched. The many examples include works by Beyers (2013), Buthelezi (2007), Chauke (1999), Cliffe (2000), de Villiers (2008), Hall (2010), Hornby *et al.* (2017), James (2007), Koopman (2014) and O'Laughlin *et al*. (2013) but there is to this day no consensus on the substance of the issue. Literatures concerning the land question encompasses a variety of perspectives and insights with facets that include, for example, ownership (communal, private and state), customary law, citizenship, and policies (land reform, restitution and redistribution). As a consequence, it can hardly be argued that South Africa's resolution of the land question since 1994 is a resounding success, as it appears that the question itself has never been pinned down to include an ideational perspective (Eloff 2017; Ntsebeza & Hall 2007: 3-4; Plaut & Holden 2012; Xaba & Roodt 2016). The underlying reasons for the divergent narratives and discourses are succinctly described by Du Preez (in Koopman 2014: 1), who notes:

> No national issue elicits as much anger, fear and fiery confrontation as the ownership of land. At the same time, few, if any, other national issues are as misunderstood, misrepresented and mismanaged as the land question.

Du Preez's argument that land ownership – by implication the land question – is misunderstood, misrepresented and mismanaged warrants further investigation, especially concerning the narratives and discourses and emotions it evokes. In particular, the underlying reasons for misunderstanding and misrepresentation are significant, as the land question continues to fester as unfinished business.

The land question remains unquestionably divisive and derives from a toxic combination of three factors that have a negative impact on identifying an acceptable answer. The factors are firstly, conflicting historical narratives; secondly, contestation over ownership; and lastly, how to resolve South Africa's land question.

4.2.6.5. ***<u>The emergence of the EFF, 2013</u>***

The entry of the EFF into the South Africa political arena in 2013 marked a turning point in the land question. Its leader or commander-in-chief, Julius Malema, was expelled from the ANCYL in April 2012 following a series of controversies that placed him at odds with the

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ANC leadership. As the leader of the ANCYL, Malema was "mediatized" (Kotzé 2012), which provided him with a platform for exercising his oratorial skills to create a persona for the masses by the masses. Malema's image as the "bad-boy of post-apartheid politics" was further bolstered by his calls – among others – for land seizure and occupation, a Zimbabwe-style land reform programme that forcibly removed white farmers from their land, and an economic war of expropriation and compensation directed against the white enemy (Posel 2014: 42-43). This placed him in a powerful position for re-entry into the political arena on his own terms when he established a new political party, the EFF.

Following its establishment in October 2013, the EFF immediately seized upon the unresolved land question and placed it at the centre of its political agenda, promising full land redistribution to dispossessed blacks without compensating mainly white land-owners (Forde 2014: 188). In this respect the party caught the attention of other political elites such as the FF+, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers because of its focus on symbolic politics. Symbolic politics, Brysk (1995: 561) contends, is "the maintenance or transformation of a power relationship through the communication of normative and affective representations." It involves a predilection for communicating an ideology, fostering a political culture and using charismatic leadership to legitimise collective action to affect social change (Brysk 1995: 562, 563, 566). The drive for change appeals to a marginalised community and in this regard Kaufman (2006: 52) contends that symbolic politics permits individuals to make emotional choices between values and leaders by "responding to the most evocative symbol presented to them." Symbols are powerful, as they "simultaneously refer to an interest and to an emotionally laden myth, often framing a conflict of interest as a struggle against hostile, evil, or sub-human forces" and "evoke emotions that include resentment, fear and hatred" (Kaufman 2006: 52). The charismatic leadership of Malema ensured that the EFF has appropriated the land question as a symbol of continued injustice, dispossession, oppression and white domination that evokes resentment and even hatred among blacks. Speaking during the party launch in October 2013 at Marikana, Malema said that "white South Africans were refusing to hand over land inherited through theft" and went on to say:

> The land of South Africa belonged to the landless. This is your land. You do not have to pay for the land. It has already been paid by the sweat of your fathers. When you [whites] took the land from blacks you committed black genocide (Seale 2013).

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The EFF's symbolic politics appeals to a broad spectrum of black South African society. Ranging from the unemployed and destitute to the young black middle class and university students and academics, the EFF maintains that "true economic and social power still resides in white hands" (Mbete 2015: 41) and is decidedly anti-white in posture and language (Forde 2014: 174). As the face of the EFF Malema is "a ghostly reminder of the abiding racial wounds that have endured, on the one hand, and of the power of violent anger to command political attention, on the other" (Posel 2014: 34). Malema as a symbolic reminder of the past to both black and white can be summarised in a single word, "haunting" (Posel 2014: 34). Gordon (2008: xvi) describes haunting as "one way in which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with." Symbolic politics, EFF-style, is undeniably haunting both black and white and is here to stay, especially regarding land dispossession that is articulated in historical narratives and counter-narratives.

4.2.7. **Historical narratives**

Autochthony, land tenure, land ownership and dispossession and land freedom are founded on a history which, social constructionism reminds us, concerns the construction of different realities concerning land, leading to the perpetuation of haunting and conflicting historical narratives and counter-narratives. Links between past and present cannot be ignored or taken for granted, as they form the foundation for the propagation of ideas which, in turn, create identities that reify as political elites, social communities and networks. Conflicting historical narratives, and counter-narratives form the essence of the land question and the associated 'land language' is the substance of othering or otherness in its various forms.

Irrespective of the implicit and explicit assumptions associated with the historical narratives and counter-narratives linked to the land question, two approaches permeate South Africa's land history. The first approach involves the black indigenous population and their link to land. As Hall (2011:18) notes, the black indigenous population was systematically deprived of its right to land over a period that spanned three centuries in a process that consisted of "direct coercion and indirect pressure." In his work, *The Mind of South Africa,* Sparks (2017) brings into sharp focus the presence of a black indigenous population that inhabited the interior, its relationship with the land and the material and spiritual dimensions of this relationship. Land was communal property and its use supported a subsistence economy,

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manifesting in a relationship described as "an intense life-long passion for land" (Sparks 2017: 18). The second approach is that, with the arrival of the colonialists, the relationship with the land changed, as colonialism proceeded to impose a mercantile liberal version of land ownership that emphasised land commodification and individualism. Land was purchased, or in many cases expropriated or simply occupied and thereafter tapped for commercial gain. Communalism conflicted with individualism and disrupted the black indigenous social system and way of life that had been in existence for centuries. Moreover, the same period exposed black people in South Africa to a dramatic and intense transition that, among others, dispossessed them of their land and "deprived them of their pastoral heritage" (Sparks 2017: 19).

As a consequence, two opposing historical narratives have been constructed. The first narrative is based on conquest, injustice, infantilisation, indignity and dehumanisation associated with illegal land dispossession by the colonialists. The second narrative is predicated on the supposition that land was mostly acquired from the indigenous population through negotiation, formal agreement or occupation of unpopulated land it was therefore legally acquired.

4.2.7.1. ***Historical narrative: unjust land occupation***

"Jan van Riebeeck did not found the Cape Colony in an empty land. In 1652, when he set foot on the shores of Table Bay, the territories to the north and east had been occupied for centuries" (Elphick & Malherbe 1979: 3). The authors note that Van Riebeeck set foot on land that was historically occupied by the Khoikhoi and hunter-gatherers but their presence was not always given sufficient prominence or acknowledgment by historians (Elphick & Malherbe 1979: 3). As a consequence, the history of dispossession is often written by scholars whose perspectives differ from their counterparts.

That dispossession of land as a historical reality has featured prominently in the historical narratives of indigenous tribes is undeniable. For example, Ndlovu (2017: vi) in his work, *African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom*, highlights that the commemoration of 'Dingaan's Day' on 16 December has, since the 1920s, included the theme that this day "ushered in the loss of African independence and land." This is a counter to the Afrikaner narrative exemplified by Hertzog who, on

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16 December 1929, claimed in his speech to commemorate the victory of the *Voortrekkers* over the Zulu at the Battle of Blood River that the

> arrival of the white man and the native's subjugation to his authority was an event of cardinal significance for the wellbeing of all tribes south of the Zambezi (Ndlovu 2017: 132).

He also stated in the same speech:

> [T]he victory of those few trekkers on the banks of Blood River achieved more than securing a fatherland for a few thousand expatriate farmers from the Cape … barbarism yielded before civilisation (Ndlovu 2017: 132).

James (2007) also offers insightful observations made during field work in her work, *Gaining Ground? 'Rights' and 'Property' in South African Land Reform.* She notes that the aspirations of South Africans concerning land are rooted in the anti-apartheid struggle and "*from memories of a deeper past*" (own italics) (James 2007: 1). This historical context points to a "public imagination (that) was nothing less than the complete redrawing of the map of South Africa" (James 2007: 1). She provides examples of how imagination, related to the land question, manifested in the minds of the dispossessed as follows

> Some people, having once owned farms but had them confiscated, now imagined their lands reinstated. Others had once lived on white-owned farms as tenants with no rights of tenure, and now imagined themselves moving back to supplant the farmers who had long ago evicted them. Yet others were continuing to reside, with scant or non-existent rights, on white farms: they now imagined themselves free to herd their cattle across the land, unrestricted by fences and formal boundaries. Even more ambitious, members of new regional elites, with links to hereditary chiefs, imagined themselves reclaiming, not single farms, but entire lost empires. Some spoke with enthusiasm of the abundant herds they planned to keep and the maize fields and orchards they would cultivate on what appeared to be barren ground. Others evocatively described the factories, towns, shopping centres and casinos they envisaged as springing up on dry and rock hillsides (James 2007: 1-2).

Land dispossession happened on a scale in South Africa that exceeded that in any African state (Lahiff 2007: 1578; Hall 2011: 18), bringing with it deep and enduring divisions between the dispossessed and land owners. Walker (2005: 807) adds to the ideational imprint

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by pointing out that the history of land dispossession played out at two distinctive levels: the first, a "general, popular account that informs our political life", and the second, a "multiplicity of actual dispossessions, with particular, usually strongly local contexts and dynamics." This distinction is useful, as it provides an entry point, which is a general, popular account of history rather than the dispossession of specific communities, all of which have a unique context and set of circumstances. According to Walker (2005: 808),

> [t]he popular account of land possession invokes a history of conquest and exploitation that black peoples have experienced as a unified collectivity, and thus supports a general claim for redress on behalf of all black South Africans.

It is only for illustration and example that particular cases of dispossessed communities will be used. In her research, James (2007: 79) alludes to surveys in the Mpumulanga province proving that historical rights play a central role in correcting past injustices by addressing aspirations to "… '[re-establish] traditional and cultural ties with the land' …" This example, highlighting the relevance of land to tradition and culture, also points to an identity linked to land and has, to date, only been dealt with superficially in research concerning the land question.

Walker (2008: 36) provides an outline of key elements related to the historical context of land dispossession:

> As a result of colonial wars of dispossession and the land policies of successive white supremacist governments, 87% of the land came to be owned by 15% of the population – by whites.
>
> Before that time, once upon a time, African people lived in peace and harmony with their neighbours, with nature, with ancestors.
>
> Under apartheid, some 3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their homes and dumped in relocation camps, closer settlements and apartheid townships.
>
> These relocation areas were deliberately located on the periphery, away from the centres of power and wealth.

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> People suffered enormously in the removals – families and communities were destroyed, lives were lost, economic potential squandered.
>
> Compensation received by those removed was minimal or non-existent.
>
> All this was done to maintain white supremacy or (depending on your ideological bent) to advance capital accumulation in the hands of the white ruling class.

She contends that the above is dramatically authentic, authoritative and featured in the struggle for liberation (Walker 2008: 36). Moreover, it is this narrative that gave rise to a number of leitmotifs, which were brought into the imaginations of the dispossessed, some of which included "forced removals", "dumping grounds", "GG trucks" and "toilets in the veld" (Walker 2008: 37). These leitmotifs contributed to narratives and community formation around dispossession and also provided themes for struggle and redress based on the denial of human rights associated with land ownership. It is also noteworthy that the above includes overtones of the historical romanticism where land was linked to peace and harmony and an almost utopian existence. While this may not be a true reflection of the state of affairs, this description shows that while imagination may extend into a fantasy domain, it must in no circumstances be discounted, ignored or belittled.

4.2.7.2. ***Historical narrative: just land occupation***

Seizure and occupation of land was a common feature of colonisation. In their desire to gain and control possessions, colonial authorities exercised the "right of conquest" to claim "vacant and ownerless land" (Berry 2002: 642). The predominant historical myth is that the Africans were inferior, uncivilised savages and white Christians had a duty to take care of these childlike people (Van der Westhuizen 2007). Colonial control over appropriated land was exercised either by formally granting property rights through legal and administrative instruments, through communal tenure or by designating land as state property. In the case of the former, property rights created privileged social communities – mostly white and European – while the latter created underprivileged social communities – mostly black and non-European. This colonial practice formed the underpinning of social communities that were racially divided and gave rise to contested historical counter-narratives concerning land ownership.

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The "Empty Land Myth" (Crais 1991; Marks 2015; Qunta 2016), the origins of which lie in a claim that the South African interior was largely uninhabited or empty and occupation was therefore justified and legitimate. The narrative suggests that the Bantu and Europeans migrated into the interior at roughly the same time and perpetuates a claim that both groups have a just right to land ownership. Although the theory has been discredited, it has carried over and is extended in narratives concerning the post-1994 land question and evokes confrontation and aggression. Qunta (2016) in her work, *Why We are not a Nation*, is pessimistic about the prospects for a South African national identity linked to land. She thoughtfully includes a summarised history of African civilisations and their identity linked to land, citing examples such as Mapungubwe, and goes on to lament the ignorance and exclusion of these contributions in a post-1994 South Africa (Qunta 2016: 1-10). The 'empty land myth' remains prominent to this day as a justification for legal land possession.

Eloff (2017) highlights the following perceptions concerning land history and possession in present-day South Africa:

> Soil is prosperity, and if you first possess land, you can buy all the other good things with that wealth." And this usually refers to agricultural land.
>
> Historically, white people stole the land from black people and it has to be returned.
>
> 23 years post-democracy, black people still only own 9.8% of the arable land in South Africa.
>
> There is a hunger for agricultural land among our people, like in Zimbabwe, and if we do not listen, we will follow the path of land occupation and confiscation.

Notably, Eloff is dismissive of the ideational dimension and he seeks to justify his arguments with a quantitative assessment of the land question. While his perceptions have some relevance Eloff avoids the underlying ideational issues related to the land question, which is the point of this thesis.

Pringle and Armour (2018: 2) in their article, *Historical Assessment of Land Occupation in South Africa*, correctly note that there are "different interpretations and mythologies" concerning white land ownership and that this requires the land issue to be placed

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in "its true perspective." In the main, the article describes how land was occupied either through purchase or treaty from traditional leaders who claimed jurisdiction over land, but Pringle and Armour (2018: 5) emphasise that the "new occupiers acted in good faith and that their occupation had been agreed to by both parties." They note that the land was procured by whites through methods such as "abandonment, purchase, treaty or simply not occupied." Therefore, land was neither stolen nor illegally acquired as land ownership by these methods is "perfectly legitimate" (Pringle & Armour 2018: 17). Finally, the authors are of the opinion that land reform to correct historical wrongs is unfeasible, as it means returning the land to the original inhabitants, the Khoikhoi and Bushmen, the former who have virtually disappeared while the latter have "lost their languages and culture, as well as most of their group identity" (Pringle & Armour 2018: 21). They warn that holding a race group responsible for past historical events they never participated in, or have no knowledge of, is unjust and collective responsibility is a destructive fallacy (Pringle & Armour 2018: 21).

In an opinion piece, *Six Myths About Land Reform*, Oppenheimer (2018), identifies what he calls myths to justify EWC, which are firstly, "Land has not been given back to its rightful owners"; secondly, "Home ownership is skewed along racial lines"; thirdly, "People are crying out for land"; fourthly, "Anyone can be a farmer"; fifthly, "The constitution impedes land reform", and lastly, "EWC won't damage the economy."

Executive Director of AfriForum, Kallie Kriel (2018), in his analysis contends that whites obtained land legally and provides six reasons to justify his position. Firstly, the Khoisan were "here first", which means that singling out whites as "colonisers" and "thieves" without placing blacks in the same category is inappropriate, as whites and blacks were responsible for dispossessing the Khoisan. Secondly, it is inconceivable that the whole of the country was inhabited when whites arrived. Thirdly, the *Mfecane* left large areas of the country uninhabited before the *Voortrekkers* moved into the interior of the country. It cannot therefore be argued that it was the Voortrekkers who were responsible for the large-scale dispossession of the indigenous black population. Fourthly, the *Voortrekkers* obtained their land through agreement with indigenous tribal authorities. Fifthly, white land ownership accorded by the 1913 Land Act is inaccurate. Finally, current land-owners obtained their land legally through purchase or inheritance and white owners cannot be called thieves. Kriel concludes his argument by acknowledging that there were cases where blacks were unfairly dispossessed of

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their land and that these cases must be rectified, but there are no grounds to argue that land was stolen by whites on a large-scale.

4.3. Contextual framework

The previous section provided the historical framework of the land question and the ideational underpinnings of the associated 'land language' that are *inter alia* currently articulated as an original sin. The next section aims to provide a contextual framework by first examining the substance of the national question before delving into the modalities of the land question itself.

4.3.1. The national question

In seeking to unpick the land question, it must be located in a wider context, the national question. Steeped in historical legacy and the subject of intense debate initially by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), Cronin and Mashilo (2017: 24) point out that the national question was raised in 1929. From its inception the national question was itself a site of on-going contestation[30] within the liberation movements and has carried over into the post-1994 South Africa. Even today there is no consensus on what it entails. The national question is, nonetheless, deserving of attention and reflection for, as Hart (in Webster & Pampallis 2017: 4) laments,

> I was inattentive to the National Question – a profoundly evocative term that for many South Africans conjures up struggles against colonialism and imperialism, the indignities and violence of racial injustice and dispossession, the sacrifices and suffering embodied in movements for national liberation, and the visions of social and economic justice for which many fought and died. I also failed to take seriously a key phrase of the ANC alliance – the NDR [National Democratic Revolution] – the meanings and ownership of which have become an increasingly contentious site of struggle within the ANC alliance over the decade of the 2000s.

In their work, *The Unresolved National Question: Left Thought under Apartheid*, Webster and Pampallis (2017) extensively cover a number of wide-ranging perspectives

[30] For an extensive critique of the national question, refer to the work of Sizwe (1979), *One Azania, One Nation: The National Question in South Africa*. The author contends that the national question is a nationalist struggle against "capitalist exploitation and racist oppression" and is an "uncompromising struggle against all attempts to divide the population" (Sizwe 1979: 178).

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concerning the national question. In particular, three perspectives within the national question hold particular relevance, namely colonialism of a special type (CST) theory, the land question and identity.

The CST theory is backgrounded in the CPSA's adoption of the Native Republic programme by the Comintern Congress in 1928, when it adopted a critical resolution regarding the land question, which called for "full protection and equal rights for all national minorities" and "the return of the land to the landless population and those with little land" (Ndlovu 2017: 135). In their articulation of the national question in 1929 the CPSA characterised South Africa as "a British Dominion of the colonial type" in which a white bourgeoisie – British and Boer – were "interested in the merciless exploitation of the negro population" (Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 24). The national question, as it was then conceived, brought to the fore the idea that colonialism dominated white South African thinking even after formal colonial rule ended with the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. It also became a key tenet of the CST theory that emerged during the 1960s.

Related to the historical context is the use of the term, colonialism, linked to the land question and its pre-1913 context. The CST was advanced by the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1962 when it described "White South Africa" as an "advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism" and a "Non-White South Africa" as a colony (SACP 1962: 26). The SACP concluded that "Non-White South Africa is the colony of White South Africa" (SACP 1962: 26)[31]. Moreover, Cronin and Mashilo (2017: 22) argue that colonialism – by implication CST – generated a particular type of binary identity based on racism and ethnicism which, in turn, fostered difference. They point out that the characteristics are interpreted differently by the oppressor and the oppressed (Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 23). On the one hand, the oppressors interpret their identity as racially superior, civilising, or a historical calling (Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 22). On the other hand, the oppressed may use the same argument to unite disparate ethnic groups around a common identity (Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 22). Cronin and Mashilo (2017: 23) point out that both interpretations and their resulting identities are unstable and founded upon "pre-existing realities (language, culture, geography, real or attributed human physical features, historical narratives and, *above all* (own italics) traditions

[31] Sizwe (1979: 103-107) dismisses CST, branding it a form of neo-colonialism that reinforces "nationalities and minorities", as it rejects black majority rule in a unitary South Africa. He does not, however, refer to the pivotal role of land.

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of struggle)." This, in turn, articulates into colonial identities in the case of the oppressor and a national emancipatory discourse in the case of the oppressed (Cronin & Mashilo 2017: 22-23). The national question and the emergent CST pointed to the advent of two opposing identities, that of an oppressor and an oppressed. The oppressor, with a racially superior and civilising attitude, set itself apart from the racially inferior, uncivilised oppressed. Each founded its own identity on differing historical narratives, languages and culture, which were subsequently carried over into the land question and its articulation.

The inclusion of land in the national question came about as a result of the 1913 Land Act and the Native Trust (examined later in the chapter) and Land Bill, which legalised dispossession, catapulting land into the domain of a wider national question. The land question first featured as part of the national question in 1937 when an organisation established in the Western Cape, the New Era Fellowship, identified four components of the national question: racialism, tribalism, imperialism and the land question (Brown *et al.* 2017: 81-82). The land question became "an urgent matter of social reconstruction in the nation" (Brown *et al.* 2017: 82). Webster and Pampallis (2017: xi) are adamant that the national question debate, raised over a century ago, remains unresolved in post-1994 South Africa. They emphasise the relevance of "an enriched debate on our identity." Identity as an ongoing term in the national question is undeniably linked, among others, to land ownership or dispossession but is also vested in a wider context of injustice and oppression with a colonial identity that has carried over into contemporary South Africa. The national question has become a symbol of all that is at stake in terms of the wider notions of authentic freedom and liberation, with the land question at its centre.

4.3.2. **The land question**

The land question has been, and continues to be, extensively researched. As the literature shows, there is limited consensus on its substance and as a consequence the answers that are proffered consist of wide-ranging views and opinions of commentators from all quarters. Rooted in a history that portrays multiple realities, the land question is a moving target that is contextually and temporally dependent. In order to narrow the locus and focus of the land question the works of leading academics, Moyo (2004), Ntsebeza and Hall (2007) and Walker (2005; 2017), are used.

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The substance of the land question is key to providing context. As a lead-in, it is important to clarify the essence of the land question. Moyo (2004: 1), a leading academic on land reform in in Zimbabwe, contended that "(l)and reform is a fundamental dimension of the agrarian question, while the agrarian question is a fundamental dimension of the national question." In this way Moyo demonstrates that the land question cannot be viewed on its own; it has a much wider reach with national implications involving the state and society and it is therefore located in a wider context: that of the national question. Ntsebeza and Hall (2007: 1), in their work, *The Land Question in South Africa*, formulate a pointed question as follows, "How can a large-scale redistribution of land provide redress for centuries of dispossession while contributing to the transformation and the reduction of poverty, both rural and urban?" In their approach Ntsebeza and Hall correctly highlight that dispossession was an on-going process and cannot be narrowly confined to a particular event or timeframe, but their contention that land redistribution will reduce poverty is simplistic. In this respect, Waldron (in Brace 2016: 45) warns against linking poverty to property – land possession – and argues that it cannot be simply construed as a "social problem to be fixed." For Waldron the issue of land ownership is not only material; it has an ideational context linked to what it means to be human. Drawing on the perspectives of Moyo, Ntsebeza and Hall and Waldron, it is evident that a singular land question lies at the apex of state and society and involves redressing historical injustices associated with past dispossession in order to restore a sense of humanity and human dignity among the historically dispossessed community.

Walker (2005: 807) poses an alternative view by averring that the land question is largely descriptive, with two main elements: the first, a colonial history linked to apartheid dispossession; and the second, the ongoing poverty endured by the black peasant population who eked out a living on the land they were "allowed" to occupy. She explains that the land question "is embedded in discourses around rights, social justice and identity that operate generally within a group rather than an individual paradigm" (Walker 2005: 807). Ntsebeza and Hall therefore differ from Walker in their contention that land claims of blacks and whites are two sides of the same coin.

It is in the context of a singular question that Ntsebeza and Hall (2007: 4) extend the argument by asserting that land claims by white and black communities cannot be viewed separately, as there is "only one land question." Undoubtedly Ntsebeza and Hall's views are trenchant but it must be stressed that there are powerful claims and counter-claims on both

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sides that are based on identity and agency concerning land ownership which are founded on converging and diverging historical discourses.

Later research by Walker (2017), *The Land Question in South Africa: 1913 and Beyond*, highlights two key elements of the land question: firstly, enduring disparities in access and rights to land involving black and white communities and secondly, how these disparities should be recognised and redressed. She emphasises that land is "a material and symbolic resource" but that there is complex interaction between the material and the symbolic, which is complicated by historical underpinnings (Walker 2017). According to Walker (2017), land was a symbol of "white hegemony" enforced by "territorial segregation" leading to socially engineered racial and tribal divisions that were incrementally enforced by draconian legislation. Walker (2017) notes that resolving the land question, vested in an elusive past, is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve and she is adamant that the land question will "continue resonating as a measure of current inequalities and a symbol of future well-being."

While it is agreed there is one land question, it is clear that dispossession affected black people only and that the land question involves a dispossessed community with a specific racial identity. Despite its singularity, dispossession of black people cannot be understood in isolation and it is for this reason that white commercial farmers are included. Here it is important to note Gibson's (2009: 31) observation concerning the land question that "[e]normous and profound racial differences exist with virtually all blacks and no whites believing that whites hold land illegitimately."

4.3.3. **The land question from 1994 to 2013**

With the advent of democracy in 1994 it did not come as a surprise that the land question featured in the policy document, "*Ready to Govern*" as a priority for the new government under the ANC (Hartley 2014: 34). This also brought into question the future prospects of a privileged – or predominately white community – whose land ownership lay in the legacy of apartheid.

Responses to the post-1994 land question are introduced with an examination of the CODESA negotiations which were embodied in the interim and final South African

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Constitutions that, among others, dealt with the land question. In *Chapter 2: Bill of Rights* in the 1996 Constitution, the provisions related to property are quoted as follows:

Property

25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.

(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application —

(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and

(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.

(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including —

(a) the current use of the property;

(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;

(c) the market value of the property;

(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and

(e) the purpose of the expropriation.

(4) For the purposes of this section —

(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and

(b) property is not limited to land.

(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.

(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.

(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.

(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of

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past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).

(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6) (RSA, DOJ&CD 1996: 10-11).

In his work, *Oliver Tambo's Dream*, Sachs (2017: 68) emphasises that land dispossession was a central term requiring constitutional redress in such a way that it would not perpetuate the unfair ownership patterns of the past. A new approach to land would be embodied in a constitution that, "in its entirety should proclaim a loud, clear and radical rupture from a disgraceful past and beckon towards a future based on respect for the [human] dignity of all" and provided a context for the land reform that would follow (Sachs 2017: 68). This meant that a constitutional property clause could not be dispassionately divorced from the history of land dispossession, the transformation it envisaged and the fundamental emancipation of the oppressed in a new democratic dispensation. Although the approach was laudable, the inclusion of the full text of Section 25 is deliberate because the language reflects a culmination of the measures intended to resolve more than 300 years of land dispossession. It was one of the last clauses agreed to before the interim Constitution was ratified. As Walker (2017) notes, the clause represents "a judicious compromise for some and a betrayal of the liberation struggle for others" and it is contended that this betrayal is evidenced by what Gibson (2009: 53-58) terms "land grieving." This grieving is described by Mngxitama (2013) as follows:

> Loss of land is altogether more devastating [than death] because we are condemned to encounter it every day – in passing koppies, smiling mountains and angry rivers – as a loss that exists as a gain for the other. The loss of land dramatises the loss of too much for the African who became the Black – a void and a great menacing silence. This loss is the most complete.

Land reform was a veritable can of worms for the newly elected democratic government that came to power in 1994 but as L'Ange (2005: 480) notes, "it [the can] had to be opened." However, subjecting the country's modern economy to ancient land ownership claims was deemed undesirable by the government of national unity. Accordingly, legitimate black demands for land would be met by purchasing land with state funds from willing sellers at market-related prices (L'Ange 2005: 480). This approach was essentially material and failed to include an ideational context as component for redress. In addition to setting up a commission to hear land claims, a special court would be established to rule on cases that the

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commission was unable to resolve. This was again a material solution. Of particular note was the decision that no claims that pre-dated 1913 would be considered. This decision attracted criticism from the outset as some activists felt that the fundamental issue was that most of the land taken by whites happened before 1913 and implied, in the opinion of the activists, that the land question would remain unresolved (L'Ange 2005: 480).

The *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) was the blueprint for a democratic South Africa under the newly-elected ANC government (ANC 1994). In it, colonialism and racism are singled out as historical features of South Africa's past, which entrenched racial divisions that steered the country to "under-developed bantustans and well-developed, white-owned commercial farming areas" (ANC 1994: 2). The RDP highlighted land reform as one of ten priority areas for meeting the basic needs of the South African population but went on to identify the rural community (in the reserves and homelands), as well as women, as the sectors most in need of redress (ANC 1994: 19-20, 21). It was proposed in the RDP that a land reform programme would be implemented and would make provision for redistribution and restitution (ANC 1994: 20). Redistribution would entail strengthening property rights; combining "market and non-market mechanisms to provide land"; and making unused government land available (ANC 1994: 20). Restitution, on the other hand, would take place to address those who had lost land because of apartheid laws, which included forced removals, evictions and denial of access to land (ANC 1994: 20, 22).

Among the many issues that had to be ironed out for a new and democratic dispensation in South Africa was the role and future of traditional authorities who were acknowledged by Nelson Mandela in his speech on 11 February 1990 following his release from prison when he said, "I greet the traditional leaders of our country – many of you continue to walk in the footsteps of great heroes like Hintsa and Sekhukune" (Mandela 1990). On the one hand, traditional leaders were viewed with suspicion because they were a cornerstone of apartheid policies but on the other, tribal leaders were of the opinion that they had retained agency, especially in the former bantustans, and would therefore play a key role in government structures (Buthelezi & Vale 2019: 6). It was during the CODESA negotiations that a compromise was reached that that traditional authorities[32] would have a place in the post-1994

[32] The term "traditional authorities" as opposed to "chiefs and chieftainship" (Delius 2019: 25-26) is contested and the explanations provided by Ntsebeza (2005) and Geschiere (2009) are adopted in this study. "Traditional authorities" have two connotations that are interlinked. The first connotation is that tribal authorities originated in

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South Africa, as the chiefs were adamant that they should continue to exercise authority which was mostly located in, but not limited to, the rural areas (Williams 2004: 114). As Williams (2004: 114-115) emphasises, owing to their support and influence in local communities, the political relevance of traditional authorities cannot be underestimated. Van Kessel and Oomen (1997: 561) point out that in 1996, 40% of the South African population – translating into approximately 17 million subjects – and 17% of land were under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities[33]. In this regard, Ntsebeza (2005: 22), argues that traditional authorities derive power not from popularity among their subjects but from their agency associated with controlling land allocation. However, the inclusion of the traditional authorities in the post-1994 dispensation was not without controversy. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose key constituency was located in KwaZulu, initially refused to participate in the CODESA II negotiations on the grounds the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelthini, had not been invited to attend (Buthelezi & Vale 2019: 6). The future role of traditional authorities in the land question has not been conclusively finalised, especially regarding custodianship of expropriated land (Ncapayi & Ntungwa 2018).

It was in 2011 that as the then ANCYL President, Julius Malema, began involving himself in the land question by advocating a Zimbabwe-style answer, that of EWC (Southall 2013: 240). In this regard Malema stated, “When the colonizers and those who have the land took it away from us, they did not compensate, so why should they demand anything from us?” but he also maintained that expropriation would take place within a constitutional framework, “because we respect the law” (Southall 2013: 240). In this regard, Southall (2013: 240) observes that the language used by Malema concerning replacing the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ principle with EWC correlates with the policies advocated by the PAC as far back as 1959 when the organisation broke away from the ANC.

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the indigenous and customary traditions of chieftainship, which was hereditary (Ntsebeza 2005: 5) or non-hereditary and subject to some form of tribal ratification. The second connotation is linked to the colonial and apartheid traditions of appointing chiefs as proxies to perpetuate tribalism and enforce colonial administration, such as the levying of taxes and the provision of labour (Geschiere 2009: 13-15). This thesis will not distinguish between the two connotations and uses “traditional authorities” as an overarching term for traditional leaders who are recognised by tribal custom and tradition and exercise authority by virtue of customary law.

[33] The Minister of Cooperative Governance, Mr D. van Rooyen, reported to parliament in August 2018 that as of June 2018 there were14 kingships, queenships and/or principal traditional leaders, as well as 844 senior traditional leaders in South Africa (Businesstech 2018). Most (six) kingships/queenships/principal traditional leaders were in the Eastern Cape while most (277) senior traditional leaders were in KwaZulu-Natal (Businesstech 2018).

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4.3.4. The post-2013 land question

The land question that has re-emerged during the post-2013 period extends far beyond the initial context of the land itself. As Cousins (2018) avers, since 2013 the land question has taken on a much wider meaning and significance as a "powerful symbol of the failures of post-apartheid democracy to adequately address the structural roots of poverty and racialized inequality." As such, land and the absence of meaningful redress has become a symbol of all that is wrong with the post-1994 dispensation, particularly an overall failure to address past injustices and to restore a sense of human dignity among the ideationally and materially dispossessed. The failure to resolve the land question meaningfully is therefore of and in itself a reminder that apartheid, which entrenched white privilege, has not yet been eliminated and continues to perpetuate poverty and inequality, spawning distinctive social communities with particular identities who have agency with contrasting characteristics. The ideational modalities of the post-2013 land question is characterised by three key developments, namely elevation to the national discourse by the EFF, the decolonisation project and the country-wide hearings concerning amending Section 25 of the Constitution to include EWC.

The land question was elevated to the national discourse by the political elites during the 2018 SONA parliamentary debate when EFF Commander-in-Chief Julius Malema, emphasised that, "This cannot be an issue to bluff about, this cannot be an issue to pass any time with. It's an emotive issue and you only mention it if you mean it" (Eyewitness News 2018). Clearly the land question remains a site of ongoing contestation that manifests as a consequence of past and present injustices, leading to frustration and anger, which culminate in confrontation. Malema is therefore correct in his frustration regarding the urgency of the land question and stating that the time for feigning a solution has elapsed.

The scourge of colonialism continues to feature in the post-2013 land question and its prominence cannot be downplayed or ignored. Hendricks (2013: 30) is unrelenting in his argument that colonial dispossession has an undeniable racial connotation, thereby placing identity at the centre of the land question. He is correct in pointing out that unpicking history is contentious, but argues that an acknowledgement that colonial dispossession by whites lies at the heart of debates concerning the land question, adding that that there is no "middle ground" (Hendricks 2013: 31). In their work, *Land Redistribution in South Africa: Towards Decolonisation or Recolonisation?,* Kepe and Hall (2018: 128) forcefully assert that the land

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question has regressed to a replication of apartheid practices that perpetuate a "colonial present." This claim demonstrates that the unresolved land question, as component of the greater decolonisation project, betrays the *idea* (own italics) of land reform and is now reflected in a hardening of attitudes where land is viewed by the dispossessed as exclusively "mine" (Kepe & Hall 2018: 128, 129-130).

Twenty-four years into the new democratic dispensation the land question, specifically EWC, continues as an exceedingly difficult topic to debate, laconically described by De Vos (2018) as a "fact-free zone." He questions why this is so and offers four possible reasons: firstly, white arrogance; secondly, economic survival; thirdly, emotions; and lastly, an absence of concrete proposals for amending Section 25 of the Constitution and what happens after it is amended. The first three reasons are worth examining in more detail. For De Vos white arrogance is exemplified in the absence of an honest and sincere acknowledgement of the pain and suffering inflicted by colonialism and apartheid, especially regarding land dispossession as an original sin (De Vos 2018). The threat to economic survival evokes fear among the privileged who cling to a disproportionally larger share of the land while the poor and destitute are left on the margins. This precludes any form of social solidarity. Emotions attached to land expropriation are, according to De Vos (2018), the most difficult to frame. Here is found the "idea among many Afrikaners that white Afrikaners have an almost numinous bond with the land" (De Vos 2018). De Vos points out that even if an individual acknowledges the original sin of colonial dispossession, the person will not negate the "intense emotional bond with the land your family has occupied for generations" (De Vos 2018). On the other hand, blacks also have an intense and emotional attachment to land and as Nzimande (2018) writes, "[l]and is therefore not just a primary economic asset, it is also a place of belonging and a source of identity"; it is therefore imperative that the "restoration of former and the protection of current land rights is grounded in the notions of identity, dignity and belonging."

The post-2013 land question is a social construction that draws on the historical antecedents of material and ideational dispossession that culminates in dichotomous communities who base their claims on differing interpretations of historical realities. Historical reality therefore accounts for the language used to articulate how dispossession has resulted in, for example, the negation of identity, an impairment of human dignity and the loss of belonging. The acknowledgement of identity, restoration of human dignity and a sense of belonging are therefore ideationally significant in the search for an answer to the land question

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and are key to understanding the political elites who are involved in the post-2013 land question.

4.4. Three organisational categories of actors in the post-2013 land question

The involvement of actors, together with agency, in the post-2013 land question covers a wide range. Academics, government departments and officials, political parties, non-governmental organisations, white commercial farmers, black communities and indeed, individuals, all have a stake in the land question. In some respects, all are on the same side and in other respects they are poles apart.

In order to narrow the focus, three organisational categories[34] involved in the post-2013 land question are identified. These are firstly the political elites; secondly, the traditional authorities; and finally; the white commercial farmers. All play significant roles in the land question but their agency is different owing to their identities.

4.4.1. Political elites

Following profound changes in the post-1994 dispensation characterised by the collapse of apartheid, South Africa with its the new democratic order emphasised, among others, the primacy of human rights and individual freedoms and the drive to undo injustices of the past that included the land question, all of which were written into the Constitution (RSA, DOJ&CD 1996). Political elites have a vested interest in the land question, which has become increasingly contentious since 1994, since it has not been satisfactorily resolved and there is growing impatience to find a solution, as it continues to fester in the political landscape of the country.

The political elites have competing agendas regarding the post-2013 land question and have particular appeal because the actors, their agency and the structures are reified in narratives and discourses that are conflictual, diversifying and unifying. In this regard the EFF and the FF+, are selected as they are on opposing sides of the political spectrum regarding the land question. On the one hand, the EFF supports calls to change Section 25 of the Constitution

[34] Organisational categories are used to classify data into broad categories (Maxwell & Chmiel 2014: 25).

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to explicitly allow EWC as well the nationalisation of land. On the other hand, the FF+ is vehemently opposed to changing Section 25 of the Constitution and argues that the unresolved land question is a consequence of government inefficiency rather than a constitutional shortcoming.

4.4.1.1. ***The Economic Freedom Fighters***

The historical reality propagated by the EFF is that land was stolen from blacks by colonisers and must be returned to the state without compensation. With the establishment of the EFF in 2013 came a more radical approach to land and the party undeniably elevated the land question to the forefront of the political landscape. As a consequence of the ANC government's intransigence and inability to return the land successfully since coming to power in 1994, land has increasingly become a highly politicised resource. As Ndlozi (2018) notes, "[t]here is no doubt that the country is finally grappling with the question of the land because of the EFF", while Malema is of the opinion that,

> We have to reconnect the voter with the land. They've lost interest, they've got no connection with the land and they think it's so meaningless. They don't know what land can do until you own one, so our intention is to reconnect the voter with the land. We will make the voter fall in love with the land again and understand that their problems can be resolved by the land because when the colonisers came in, the first thing they took was the land. That's how much they appreciated the importance of the land (SABCNewsOnline 2019).

> The land issue belongs to the EFF. Even if you're in a queue and someone is talking about land, someone is going to say are you EFF because you can't take it away from the EFF. It's a synonym for the EFF (SABCNewsOnline 2019).

Because of its later arrival on the political scene in South Africa, the EFF was not a party to the CODESA negotiations and as a consequence, does not view the agreements that were reached, especially regarding the land, as binding. Since its establishment the EFF has been particularly vocal in promoting radical solutions, such as EWC, to the land question in their narratives and discourses on behalf of the dispossessed community. Their narratives and discourses have, as their roots, the history of land dispossession that includes symbolic language such as 'stolen land', 'colonialism', 'white farmers', 'thieves' and 'gangsters' relating

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to the white community. The party is particularly focused on the ideational context of the land question and "the restoration of the [human] dignity of access to land" (EFF 2018a). In this way the EFF has entrenched its identity as a party committed to undoing the historical injustices associated with dispossession and is a torch-bearer for the landless (RSA, NA 2014d: 24). Moreover, the EFF identity includes an autochthonous dimension, entrenching the notion that blacks are the original land-owners and that whites, as colonisers, have no claim to any land as it was illegally occupied. In this respect, Bøås and Dunn (2013: 8) contend that "[a]ttempts to connect land and identity through autochthony discourses, are, first and foremost, *political* strategies." EFF identity has placed it at odds with the white commercial farming community and briefly with the Zulu monarch in 2018, particularly concerning the party's stance on EWC and its advocacy that all land must revert to state custodianship (EFF 2019: 28). This identity is reflected in various forms of agency ranging across the constitutional and legal to "constitutional delinquency" (Mokgatlhe 2019) and the illegal, such as inciting supporters to invade land (Timeslive 2018). In this regard, the EFF is a primary actor and placed the land question at the centre of their manifesto for the 2019 national elections under the theme "Our Land and Jobs Now!" (EFF 2019: 12).

4.4.1.2. ***<u>The Freedom Front Plus</u>***

The historical reality propagated by the FF+ is that land originally belonged to the Khoi and the San and not Xhosa-speaking peoples, evidence of which is provided in the diaries of Van Riebeeck (FF+ 2014a). The implication is that the FF+ considers the Khoi and San as autochthones who were also dispossessed of their land by the black bantu indigenous population (RSA, NA 2014: 65). In this regard, the FF+ argues that, "when we talk about history, all the facts, and not only the facts that suite (*sic*) us, should be placed on the table" (FF+ 2013). While it is prepared to acknowledge injustices of the past such as the Natives' Land Act, the erstwhile leader of the FF+, Pieter Mulder, is adamant that he does not see it as his "responsibility to try and defend 1913. What I do believe, is that it would only be reasonable, if in our criticism, we to (*sic*) try and understand all the arguments and thoughts of 1913." (FF+ 2013). He stated:

> It is not wrong to hold debates on the past. But such a debate is only sensible if something could be learnt from it from (*sic*) the future.

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> The past cannot be changed through a lot of talking. That is why the FF Plus does not believe in a better past but in a better future. Little has been said about what we have learnt from the past and how we can succeed with land reform in 2013 without causing famine (FF+ 2013).

Moreover, the "rightful owners of land and property in South Africa are those who had worked for it, who paid for it, and who has a title deed in the deeds office" (FF+ 2017).

The historical reality propagated by the FF+ is to some extent denialist, since it skirts the injustices of the past and focuses on the future. This approach is contentious since it fails to take into consideration the ideational dimension of dispossession and its impact on the ideational thought of the landless and dispossessed.

The political elites are an organisational category at the forefront of the post-2013 land question and have succeeded in locating it in the national discourse. With their opposing land agendas and differing historical realities, the EFF and FF+ have opened up the debate and have given it fresh impetus through the 'land language' articulated by party leaders Malema and Groenewald.

4.4.2. **Traditional authorities**

The propagated historical reality is that land was originally in the hands of traditional authorities, as it was from traditional leaders that land was acquired by the colonisers. As Delius (2019: 26) notes, traditional authorities are a precolonial and colonial African institution spanning centuries and South Africa is no exception. Because of their mobility, subjects of traditional authorities "came and went on a considerable scale"; this was made all the more possible by the relatively low population densities and the large-scale availability of land (Mamdani 1996: 138; Delius 2019: 26). Delius (2019: 27) nonetheless insists that control over people, not land, lay at the centre of the power of traditional authorities, implying that territorial boundaries were fluid and altered with population movement. He explains that the geographical areas controlled by traditional leaders were mainly dictated by the levels of security access to resources such as grazing and water they could provide to their subjects (Mamdani 1996: 42; Delius 2019: 27, 36). Accordingly, traditional authorities who were able to provide effective leadership and physical security to their subjects gained large followings, while incompetent leaders lost their following but there is no doubt that they wielded

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considerable authority and power (Delius 2019: 27). This dispels any notion that traditional authorities ruled over "culturally homogenous groups with clear political, social and geographical boundaries" (Delius 2019: 28). This historical reality was also overlaid by community conflict and subjugation, leading to a complex social system that was in a continual state of flux, further complicated by succession issues. This complex social system was essentially negated and replaced by a rule-based colonial version of tribal identity that was hierarchically fixed in terms of succession and geographically bounded in terms of land ownership. The colonial interpretation of land ownership, Delius (2019: 40) notes, was ideationally influenced by 19th-century Social Darwinism, which held that private property ownership lay at the apex of a civilised society while communal ownership of indigenous communities was viewed as backward and on the lower rungs of civilisational advancement.

The role of traditional authorities and their agency regarding land in the pre-colonial and colonial periods carried over into the post-1994 debates (Delius 2019: 39). The notion that traditional authorities were the *ultima ratio* in land issues was appealing to the colonial powers who usurped the traditional authorities and were therefore entitled to assume the same mantle of authority. This narrow and restrictive interpretation does not take into account the debates on whether pre-colonial traditional authorities were land owners or land trustees (Delius 2019: 40). Delius (2019: 42-43) is of the opinion that traditional authorities were neither and only played an extensive role in administering land. Their authority was not absolute; it was regulated by counsellors and consultation processes that were followed before land was allocated, in order to limit unfairness (Delius 2019: 37). Land administration and allocation were therefore undertaken within agreed norms and bounds and was land not granted in an *ad hoc* or random manner.

Traditional authority identity vested in culture, traditions, language and land simultaneously demonstrates characteristics of multiplicity, alterity and fluidity. Multiplicity of identity came to the fore during four broad timeframes related to the pre-colonial, colonial, apartheid and post-1994 periods. During the pre-colonial period, the identity of traditional authorities was associated with custodianship and administration of land within complex and sophisticated rules that balanced and checked their power. For the duration of the colonial period their identity changed to that of figureheads subordinated to the colonisers who appropriated tribal authorities to supplement and support the institutions of colonial power. When the NP was voted into power in 1948 the identity of traditional authorities split. Firstly,

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some tribal authorities had an identity as agents in the policy of separate development and the bantustans. These traditional authorities essentially perpetuated the colonial period. Secondly, some traditional authorities identified with liberation movements such as the ANC. Traditional authorities and their role in the liberation struggle was, however, contested within the ANC. On the one hand, traditional leaders were considered outdated and a vestige of feudalism and therefore irrelevant in the struggle, while on the other hand their inclusion was justified on the grounds that they enjoyed grassroots support and were therefore key in resistance – especially in the rural areas – against the institutions of apartheid and the policies of separate development. Despite reluctance to include the traditional authorities in the liberation struggle, participation was formalised in the 1987 with the establishment of the Congress of Traditional leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) by chiefs and headmen in KwaNdebele in opposition to the declaration of the territory as an "independent homeland" (Klopper 1998: 130). CONTRALESA's 1987 constitution

> stressed the need to educate all traditional leaders about the aims of the liberation struggle, to fight for the eradication of all 'independent homelands', to reclaim the land taken from their forefathers by white colonialists (Klopper 1998: 130).

The identity of traditional authorities during the post-1994 period has been the subject of intense debate and is characterised by fluidity. Commentators such as Ntsebeza (2005) are adamant that traditional authorities have an identity tainted by an association with colonialism and apartheid but have secured unwarrantable power and agency over land tenure that is constitutionally inconsistent with the post-1994 land question. However, and despite the arguments for and against traditional authorities in a post-1994 South Africa, the Constitution, in Sections 211-212, recognises "[t]he institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law …" (RSA, DOJ&CD 1996). By virtue of their constitutional status traditional authorities are involved in the land question and their language in this regard ranges from the bellicose to the cooperative, including:

> CONTRALESA General Secretary Zolani Mkiva said on 1 June 2018, "The custodianship of land will never be taken away from traditional leaders" (Bendile 2018).

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Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini said on 4 July 2018 that "this (the land) will be the second clash" (Stoddard 2018).

The chairperson of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyane, said on 6 September 2018, "[W]e don't want to really take up arms to defend the 13%, because you are our democratic government and we put you there" (Pather 2018).

The chairperson of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, Chief Mwelo Nonkonyane, also said on 6 September 2018, "Ever since we started dealing with this matter all our kings were united that they will defend the right of our communities to occupy the land that they occupy" (Breakfast 2018).

Tasked by President Ramaphosa to head a task team to clear confusion regarding the ANC's position on the land question, former President Kgalema Mothlante stated during the presentation of his findings to an ANC land summit held on 17 May 2018 that:

> The approach which confronts us as the ANC, must really be to understand that the ANC enjoys support from the people, not traditional leaders, some pledge their support to the ANC. Majority of them are acting as village tin-pot dictators to the people there in the villages (Madia 2018).

Mothlante went on to say,

> What we heard from public hearings, with the exception from the Eastern Cape … the only traditional leaders who understand they are representatives of the people are traditional leaders of the Eastern Cape. Others call themselves *beng mabu* (own italics) (owners of the land) (Madia 2018).

Although the historical role of traditional authorities is contested, there is no doubt that as an organisational category they have a vested interest and influence in the post-2013 land question and cannot be side-lined or ignored.

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4.4.3. **White commercial farmers**

The historical reality propagated by white commercial farmers is that land was legally acquired. However, as the beneficiaries of large-scale subsidies and other forms of government support during the apartheid period (Hendricks 2013: 31) they were able to acquire land and access to cheap black labour, which positioned this community as a politically and economically powerful sector that was largely ideationally conservative. In the post-1994 dispensation white commercial farmers often stand accused of thwarting government initiatives to resolve the land question, as they cannot be held accountable for the historical injustices associated with land dispossession.

Despite the negative attitude to land reform that is so often attributed to white commercial farmers, there are also indications to the contrary. Janse van Rensburg (2018), in an article, *Farmers Willing to Participate in Land Reform – Roelf Meyer*, reported that the former politician and businessman Roelf Meyer[35] was of the opinion that government did not acknowledge that white commercial farmers were willing to participate in the land reform programme. Meyer noted that land-related issues were initially avoided by white commercial farmers but that this had changed over time and there was willingness to engage with the topic. Moreover, Nick Serfontein[36] (2018), in an open letter to President Ramaphosa, associated the other with an identity as "emerging farmers" who are "black colleagues of mine" and are potentially "successful black commercial farmers." Serfontein is clearly using othering constructively and it is clear that "there are many white commercial farmers and other associated role players that really care and want to help and be involved" (Serfontein 2018).

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[35] As a member of the NP, Meyer played a key role in the CODESA negotiations ending apartheid and the transition to a new democratic dispensation in South Africa. His contribution was acknowledged with the Presidential award of 'The Order of the Baobab in Silver' in 2009 for "[h]is immense contribution in providing support in the birth of a new democratic South Africa through negotiations and ensuring that South Africa has a Constitution that protects all its citizens" (RSA, Presidency 2009). He remains to this day an authoritative figure and voice in South Africa.

[36] Nick Serfontein is a South African white commercial farmer and businessman who farms in the Free State province. His letter to Ramaphosa in 2018 was widely circulated and he was appointed to serve on the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform. Despite his advocacy in favour of emerging black farmers, he and Dan Kriek (AgriSA President and Advisory Panel member) distanced themselves from the Panel's report, specifically the recommendation supporting the constitutional amendment of Section 25 to make provision for expropriation without compensation (Kriek & Serfontein n.d.: 41).

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While it is true that there are white commercial farmers that are obdurate, denialist and unwilling to participate in solving the land question, it is also true that there are others who are prepared to make a meaningful contribution to resolving the land question.

4.5. **Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to conduct a literature review to identify a historical and contextual framework. The first section addressed the historical framework. The historical framework was explained in terms of four inter-linked and conflicting ideational drivers regarding land, namely autochthony, land tenure, land ownership and dispossession, and land dignity. This was followed by the land and its history, which were explained in terms of the historical mindset of European colonisers as a prelude to the arrival of the Dutch colonisers at the Cape and their encounters with the indigenous population. A historical review of five key moments was thereupon undertaken to track the evolution of the land question over a timeframe from 1913 to 2013. The first section ended by drawing together the aforesaid in terms of historical narratives and counter-narratives. The second section described the contextual framework of land and dealt with the national question and the concomitant land question from 1994 to 2013, as well as the post-2013 land question. The final section identified three organisational actor categories that have emerged, together with their involvement in the post-2013 land question.

It is noted that the historical framework is underpinned by four ideational drivers, namely autochthony, land tenure, land dispossession and ownership, and land dignity. Autochthony shows that there was original land ownership by an indigenous population that had a land tenure system that was disrupted and replaced by land dispossession and ownership by colonisers who stripped the indigenous population of their dignity and identity in what can be called land racism. Land racism involves the abjection of the other who is conceived as infantile and unworthy of owning land which, according to the abjectee, justifies EWC and constituted the commission of what is now articulated as an original sin.

The Natives' Land Act together with the emergence of the NP in 1948 constituted land racism. White land ownership entrenched individual worth and black ownership was based on an archaic and distorted version of communal ownership in the bantustans that was infantile and dehumanising. These two historical moments confirm a deliberate and systemic approach to land dispossession which entrenched segregation between white and black. Warnings and

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protestations by prominent figures such as Plaatjies, Xuma and Luthuli were essentially ignored and the return of the land subsequently became a feature within the broader idea of the liberation struggle. As a consequence, land featured as one of the motivations behind the liberation struggle and especially in slogans and songs that were divisively perpetuated in the post-1994 dispensation by the political elites, for example the ANC and EFF. As a consequence, land is still viewed as a site of struggle and remains ideationally intermeshed with violence as a means of resolving the land question.

It is observed that historical narratives and counter-narratives have become embedded in social communities that have taken on identities that reflect their association with the land, in particular a dispossessed identity or that of being in possession. Narratives by the dispossessed reflect memories that reflect injustice and oppression which, it must be acknowledged, have elements of a romantic association with the past and are incorporated in folklore.

The advent of democracy in 1994 was accompanied by high expectations that the land question would be resolved. However, attempts to resolve the issue further entrenched and perpetuated land racism and dispossession and the solution was reduced to a zero-sum game, EWC. As a consequence, anger and frustration and confrontation over land dispossession was perpetuated, culminating in increasing levels of confrontation in the post-1994 context because of the failure to resolve the land question.

It is therefore compelling that three organisational categories have emerged in the post-2013 land question: firstly, the political elites; secondly, the traditional authorities; and finally; the white commercial farmers. Each category plays a significant role in the land question but their agency differs owing to their historical realities, their identities and the structures that are utilised. In the next chapter, one organisational category – the political elites – is accordingly identified as a substantive category in order to qualitatively analyse the ideational content of the ‘land language’ articulated by party leaders Malema and Groenewald from 2013 to 2019.

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CHAPTER 5

A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 'LAND LANGUAGE' ARTICULATED BY THE POLITICAL ELITES FROM 2013 TO 2019

LAND MUST BE RETURNED BECAUSE IT BELONGS TO BLACK PEOPLE!
What we would do with the land is none of the business of the land thieves.
We want it back even if it's to look at it every morning and cry out loud IZWE-LETHU[37]
(EFF 2014a: 104)

5.1. Introduction

In the first chapter the land question was problematised by extending it into the ideational dimension and in the second chapter an epistemological and conceptual framework for the ideational dimension was developed. In the fourth chapter, three organisational categories concerning the land question, namely the political elites, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers, were identified. In this chapter the focus is narrowed to one category, the political elites, and the articulation of 'land language' by party leaders Julius Sello Malema (EFF) and Petrus Johannes Groenewald (FF+). Consisting of symbols, icons and indexes, ideational 'land language' articulates the construction of social communities and networks within and between these social communities. Set against multiple realities that have historical and contextual underpinnings, 'land language' has undertones of conflict, diversity and unity.

The research question highlights the relevance of the post-2013 'land language' articulated by political elites after 2013. This chapter integrates the epistemological and conceptual and the historical and contextual frameworks to show how the ideational context of the land question is reflected in 'land language.' The aim of this chapter is to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by the identified party leaders, as political elites, from 2013 to 2019. In order to achieve the aim, the chapter begins with a broad South African political context together with selected events concerning the land question from 2013 to 2019. Thereafter, a societal reality of present-day 'land language' is offered in the

[37] *Izwe lethu* is an Africanist slogan, "our land", "the land is ours" (Silva & Dore 1996).

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form of political cartoons. Following this, two principal actors and leaders of their respective political parties on opposing sides of the political spectrum, Malema (EFF) and Groenewald (FF+), are identified. Subsequently, a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by each actor is undertaken in respect of two themes, namely the construction of social communities concerning land and the networks within and between the social communities[38].

5.2. A broader South African political context and selected events concerning the land question from 2013 to 2019

The broader South African political context and the selected events concerning the land question over the period from 2013 to 2019 were dominated and over-shadowed by, among others, a growing sense of unease at the degree and depth of corruption and state capture that pervaded the South African state, the Zuma administration and South African society at large. In particular, Zuma found himself at the centre of a growing controversy and his position as president became increasingly untenable, ultimately ending with his resignation on 14 February 2018. It is against these developments that the land question played out.

The land question during the same period is best summarised in three words: 'expropriation without compensation.' These words are a source of division, heated debate and divisive politics. As will be shown in this chapter, EWC means different things to different social communities, especially in the ideational dimension of the land question together with the 'land language' articulated by political elites.

A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by the political elites from 2013 to 2019 must be understood in the context of selected political events and developments related to the land question that occurred chronically as follows:

- The centenary anniversary of the promulgation of the 1913 Native's Land Act in June 2013. The occasion was marked by various events across the country to

[38] The qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald is based on the themes, categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories and definitions identified in the appendix to the thesis.

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"reflect on the negative effects that this legislation had, and continues to have on our people" (RSA 2013).

- The launch of the EFF on 27 July 2013. With its call for the "[e]xpropriation of South Africa's land without compensation for equal redistribution in use" (EFF 2013), the party succeeded in placing the land question in the national discourse with new vigour and urgency.

- The national and provincial elections on 7 May 2014. While the land question featured in the election manifestos of the EFF (EFF 2013) and the FF+ (FF+ 2014b), one area of interest in the elections for commentators and the public at large was the popularity and performance of the EFF as this was the first election that the party contested. In this respect, the party managed to secure 25 seats in the NA and the FF+ four (Independent Electoral Commission 2019).

- The appointment by the Parliamentary Speakers' Forum of an independent high-level panel of eminent South Africans in 2015. Chaired by former President Kgalema Motlanthe, the panel was charged to assess the content and implementation of legislation passed since 1994 regarding its effectiveness and possible unintended consequences in three thematic areas: firstly, "poverty, unemployment and the equitable distribution of wealth"; secondly, "land reform: restitution, redistribution and security of tenure"; and finally, "social cohesion and nation-building" (RSA 2015). The report was significant in that the panel recommended repealing the Ingonyama Trust Act and it did not support amending the provisions of the Constitution that deal with EWC (RSA 2017 277; 300). The former recommendation was severely criticised and rejected by the sole trustee of the Ingonyama Trust, King Goodwill Zwelithini.

- The passing of a bill by the South African Parliament on 26 May 2016 to terminate the 'willing-buyer, willing-seller' principle (Businesstech 2016).

- Pieter Groenewald's take-over as leader of the FF+ on 12 November 2016 when the previous incumbent, Pieter Mulder, stepped down from this position.

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- The EFF proposal of a motion on 28 February 2017 in the NA to amend Section 25 of the Constitution to make provision for EWC (RSA, NA 2017a). The motion was defeated.

- The ANC adoption of a policy at its 54th National Conference in December 2017 to expropriate land without compensation (ANC 2017: 11).

- The election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of the ANC on 18 December 2017.

- The succession of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of South Africa on 15 February 2018.

- A motion tabled by the EFF to investigate mechanisms for EWC, is adopted with amendments by the NA on 27 February 2018 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2018).

- The ANC holds a land summit on 17 May 2018 to "clear existing confusion" on ANC's position regarding the land question (Madia 2018).

- The countrywide hearings from 26 June to 4 August 2018 announced by the Constitutional Review Committee on amending Section 25 of the Constitution to make EWC explicit. Spanning a period of six weeks and involving all provinces, a total of 34 public hearings took place in "one of the most extensive public consultations by Parliament" (Merten 2018).

- The land *imbizo* convened by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini on 4 July 2018 to pronounce on the Mothlante report and related matters regarding the role of traditional leaders and land (Hlope 2018).

- The Constitutional Review Committee, which held public hearings and accepted written inputs between 4 and 7 September 2018, as well as the adoption of their report on 11 September 2018, followed by Committee recommendations to both Houses of Parliament for approval.

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- The appointment on 21 September 2018 of an Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture by President Ramaphosa to provide policy advice concerning land reform (including restitution), redistribution, tenure security and agricultural support (RSA, Presidency 2018).

- The visit by AfriForum to the USA in April 2019 as part of an international campaign to raise awareness about EWC and farm murders in South Africa (AfriForum 2019).

- The national and provincial elections on 8 May 2019. In keeping with the previous elections, the land question featured in the election manifestos of the EFF (EFF 2019) and the FF+ (FF+ 2019). In these elections both parties increased their representation in the NA, with the EFF securing 44 seats and the FF+ 10.

The afore-mentioned summary provides a backdrop against which the main political events took place over the period from 2013 to 2019. These events provide the setting for the present-day 'land language' societal context articulated by the political elites in the same period.

5.3. Present-day 'land language': a broader societal reality

Chapter 2 contended that language conveys signs consisting of signals and their meanings. This thesis focuses on a singular sign, land, which is articulated and interpellated in 'land language.' Differing ideational signals and meanings attached to land are articulated by the political elites to interpellate with the social communities they construct, the networks that they construct by articulating language that is sometimes conflictual, sometimes diversifying and sometimes unifying.

Conflictual 'land language' has an adversarial binary connotation where identity is based on distancing the 'us' from the 'they' as the other. The 'us', as the abjector, justifies abjection of the other on the basis of loathing, repugnance or disgust in language that has a sense of outrage, frustration and exclusion. Some examples of the symbolic language of conflictual othering is 'Afrikaners', 'colonisers', 'Boers', 'settlers', 'thieves', 'white privilege', 'gangsters', 'whites', 'racists', 'oppressed blacks' or 'land grabbers.' Likewise, iconic

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language of conflictual othering draws, for example, on historical figures who are considered heroes in the struggle to return land to the historically dispossessed. The indexical language of conflictual othering is binary and expressed as 'black' to denote the landless and 'white' to indicate the landed.

Diversifying 'land language' reflects recognition, compassion and understanding when relating to the identity of the other. While there is distance between self and other, diversity overcomes a self-centred desire to dominate and control, and rather acknowledges the right of the other to exist in a relationship founded on responsibility. The important distinction is that diversity recognises others as a separate entity in their own right and it is this difference that mandates a relationship where the existence of the self and the other is co-dependent. The other is articulated in language that is emphasises responsibility in an ethical relationship where the other is considered more important than the 'us.' The essence of diversifying language of otherness focuses on shared features but with the difference that others are allowed to exist in their own right and are articulated, for example, as 'us', 'call on', 'appeal', 'recognise', 'understand', 'share', 'respect' or 'allow.' Iconic language of diversifying othering, for example, draws on figures associated with an approach to land that is inclusive. The indexical language of diversifying othering is binary and expressed as 'black' and 'white' but it is acknowledging and respectful.

Unifying 'land language' respects identity difference between the self and the other by paying agnostic attention to the freedom of the other and in this way there is little, if any, distance between the self and the other. Here the implications of identity are central and the focus is on how the identity of the 'we' is experienced by the other. In this way a compulsion to concentrate on – and perpetuate – difference is averted and replaced by social unity based on respect for the other. The essence of unifying language of otherness focuses on shared features and is articulated, for example, as 'we', 'sharing', 'ours', 'together', 'agree' or 'allow.' Iconic language of diversifying othering, for example, draws on figures associated with an approach to land that is inclusive. The indexical language of unifying othering does not make a 'black' or 'white' binary distinction and is rather articulated as we-ness.

Vested in the ideational dimension, 'land language' with its historical underpinnings is articulated and interpellated with powerful symbols, icons and indexes. The symbols, icons and indexes are articulated, among others, in the spoken word and in political cartoons.

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Meanings attached to the symbols, icons and indexes are often emotive, provoking strong reaction because of the sensitivity of the land question. South Africa's land question is littered with often imprecise but emotive symbols.

These symbols, icons and indexes are interwoven into 'land language', evoking powerful images, which are continually repeated to direct and reinforce ideational thought and have become a permanent feature in vocabularies that coagulate to construct a highly charged environment relating to the land question. In the next section political cartoons are analysed to demonstrate the ideational extent and nature of 'land language' in the wider public domain. Seventeen political cartoons by South African cartoonists Brendan Reynolds (*nom de plume* "Brendan"), Bethuel Mangena (*nom de plume* "Mangena"), Jeremy Nell (*nom de plume* "Jerm"), Jack Swanepoel (*nom de plume* "Dr Jack") and Jonathan Shapiro (*nom de plume* "Zapiro") visually depict symbolic, iconic and indexical 'land language' and are placed according to the organisational categories in the year they were published to provide a present-day societal context.

5.3.1. **'Land language': a societal perspective**

'Land language' is articulated in a present-day South African societal perspective and it distinguishes indexes, especially black and white, it is founded on differing historical realities, it reflects frustration at the lack of tangible reform and progress, it is a ticking time bomb and it is emotional.

In this example (Figure 5) below white, as an index, symbolically illustrates 'white amnesia' and denial concerning the privileged position and benefits of apartheid that were gained at black expense. Zapiro (2000) in his cartoon, although not directly referring to the land question, cynically observes that white amnesia (or denialism and ignorance) can be represented archetypically by the colour white as an index.

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Figure 5: White amnesia

(Zapiro 2000)

Hendricks (2013: 31) maintains that black experiences of colonialism, apartheid and land dispossession remain ideationally imprinted as a racial divide between landed white and dispossessed black social communities founded on "the simple reality of generalised land dispossession for blacks, and property and privilege for whites." He argues that a starting point for land reform is to recognise the "injustice of colonial land dispossession." However, Gibson (2009: 83) contends that "one reason why whites are so insensitive to the crimes of the past is that they are remarkably ignorant of South African land history" and as a consequence "[t]heir contemporary judgements therefore are insensitive to the historical context of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa."

Figure 6 below is an example of one historical interpretation and reality concerning the discredited myth that land was unoccupied. This shows how the material dimension affects the ideational dimension, leading to confrontation over differing interpretations. In a cartoon, published on 19 February 2012, Zapiro depicts Pieter Mulder, the leader of the FF+ and Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, as the central icon. During the debate on the President's SONA on 15 February 2012, Mulder drew on the discredited 'empty land myth'[39] to justify why black Africans cannot lay claim to 40% of South Africa's land, as they were not

[39] The 'empty land myth' is discussed in Chapter 3.

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present in the Western and north-western Cape, which together constitute 40% of South Africa's surface area (RSA, NA 2012: 30).

Figure 6: History, reality and 'land language'



(Zapiro 2012)

Mulder's comments attracted a storm of criticism from a number of commentators who called him out for giving the "hornet's nest of land ownership a sharp political poke" (Davies 2012), of speaking "nonsense" and not believing in "the project that is the new South Africa" (Hlongwane 2012), of suffering from "historical amnesia" (De Vos 2012) and positing "an argument predicated on elision" (Van der Westhuizen 2014). This cartoon is an example of how contradictory versions of history lead to different realities that are articulated and interpellated in conflictual 'land language.'

The centenary marking the passing of the notorious 1913 Land Act, designed to enforce racial segregation through black land dispossession, was commemorated in June 2013. Although the 1913 Land Act was repealed on 30 June 1991 with much aplomb, there was little to celebrate in 2013. Despite undertakings given by the ANC after the advent of South Africa's democratic dispensation in 1994 to resolve the land question, few will argue that South Africa's land reform programme is successful.

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Figure 7: 1913 Land Act centenary

(Zapiro 2013)

In the cartoon above (Figure 7) published by Zapiro (2013) the symbolism of the 1913 Land Act (which he incorrectly refers to as repealed in 1994), is articulated with three icons and one index. The first icon depicts the repeal of the Land Act on a signboard designated under the 'old' South African flag to provide temporal context for its adoption. Moving to present-day South Africa, the next icon is a snail symbolically representing the slow pace of land restitution in South Africa after 1994, confirmed by the 'new' South African flag. The last icon, together with a colour index, depicts the current conditions of a black South African woman living in deplorable conditions and trapped under the 1913 Land Act. What is notable is her hopeless facial expression, reflecting the slow pace of land reform and the frustrations of the black population regarding land restitution. After 19 years of democracy the 1913 Land Act continues to perpetuate its legacy among the poor and destitute in present-day South Africa.

In Figure 8 is a cartoon published by Mangena (2017a), commenting on the commemoration of Freedom Day[40] in 2017 that includes symbols, icons and indexes to point out that, despite breaking the chains of apartheid in the new democratic dispensation, blacks continue to be shackled by three symbols, namely "poverty", "racism" and "no land."

[40] Freedom Day is an official public holiday that is commemorated annually on 27 April to mark the first non-racial democratic elections held in South Africa in 1994.

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Figure 8: Unfulfilled land expectations as a freedom shackle



(Mangena 2017a)

Of particular importance is the rhetorical question posed by a central icon, a black man in tattered clothes, which is symbolically articulated as a question, “Freedom Day?”, ideationally linking land deprivation to absence of freedom for blacks. In this way the cartoonist interpellates with his audience to show that blacks are not yet free in South Africa, as they remain constrained by the unresolved issues he highlights. This cartoon is an example of how unfulfilled expectations are articulated and interpellated in ‘land language’ to unify the dispossessed.

In Figure 9 below, Mangena (2017b) depicts anti-apartheid activist, Steve Biko[41], as an iconic saint to remind blacks in South Africa that they continue to be side-lined and marginalised by a number of issues, including land dispossession, which he symbolically articulates as “give our land back.” In the cartoon four icons, two male and two female, who have despairing and dejected facial expressions, hold posters representing the issues, leaving

[41] Bantu Steven Biko (18 December 1946 – 12 September 1977) was the leader of the BCM, an organisation maintaining that land must be returned to the Azanian people. Biko was arrested and detained by the South African Police Security Branch on 18 August 1977 and died on 12 September 1977 from severe injuries sustained during torture. The BCM considers land theft by colonisers a “deep-rooted injustice against the majority” (Nefolovhodwe 2015). Biko still has iconic status in present-day South Africa. In this respect land and Black Consciousness are intimately linked and are, for example, adopted as cornerstones by the EFF to motivate a constitutional amendment concerning land expropriation without compensation (Ndaba 2018).

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the observer with a sense of frustration. This cartoon is an example of how blacks view marginalisation in the context of land return which is central to being human in black consciousness thinking.

Figure 9: Black marginalisation



(Mangena 2017b)

With its already burning fuse indicating urgency, Reynolds (2018b), in Figure 10 below, symbolically portrays “LAND” as the dominant iconic time bomb that is set to explode. Ramaphosa, as the smaller icon, indexically clothed in the ANC colours (gold, green and black) has the symbolic words “responsible land reform” emblazoned on his chest. In his hand, indexed in red, is a diminutive fire extinguisher aimed in the direction of the fuse in an attempt to extinguish the fire.

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Figure 10: Explosive land question



(Reynolds 2018b)

Together with Ramaphosa's symbolic words, "I've got this", the cartoon demonstrates that the ANC drive to resolve the land question is ineffectual and may ignite a much larger and uncontrollable outburst, accompanied by destruction and carnage when it detonates. In this way Reynolds has illustrated that the land question must be resolved without further delay to prevent a wider conflagration.

Figure 11 below depicts a cartoon Jerm (2019) published on 11 June 2019, 'Land Theft' in which he satirically uses indexical, iconic and symbolic 'land language', which is emotional. Three colour indexes represent two characters: firstly, the colour red, which is portrayed in dress as a beret and shirt, indicative of the EFF. Secondly, brown is a race index linked to the EFF and thirdly, white is a race index indicative of a white person clothed in random colours, signifying no particular affiliation and is therefore a societal representative. The icons are gender-specific – both caricatures are male, leading to symbolic language concerning land theft and rape. Symbolically, Jerm links the crimes of land theft and rape, which is each in its own right emotive, contentious and conflictual in present-day South Africa. Each character hails the other in an accusatory manner and both characters respond with denial. While it is noted that the cartoonist has made a category error by comparing two unrelated crimes, the overarching response, that of denialism by both parties, is prominent in the accusation voiced by the other.

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Figure 11: Emotional 'land language'

(Jerm 2019)

This cartoon is an example of how different realities are articulated and interpellated to personify the other, foster othering and create otherness with 'land language' that is vested in historical claims and counter-claims.

The afore-mentioned political cartoons provide a sense of the broader ideational disposition of South African 'land language.' They show how symbols, icons and indices have permeated conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' and highlight that the language has an indexical connotation, is based on contested historical realities, reflects frustration and marginalisation and is conflictual. In the next section political cartoons concerning the political elites, the traditional authorities and white commercial farmers are analysed to show how each organisational category is perceived by South African society.

5.3.2. The political elites

As an organisational category, political elites have a vested interest in the land question, which is undeniably political. They are at the forefront of articulating ideational 'land language' that interpellates not only with the social communities they construct, but also with the broader

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South African society. This section provides a concise reflection of the broader societal experiences of 'land language' related to the political elites and three political cartoons are used as an illustration.

Figure 12 below, published on 6 March 2017, is a cartoon by Reynolds, which features former President Jacob Zuma as the central icon rummaging in an iconic barrel of populism. The barrel has the connotation of a toilet bowl and is indexically posited as a cesspool of rhetorical excrement. Zuma, who cannot find anything appropriate, requests EFF leader Julius Malema to hand him the "expropriation without compensation" trope when Malema is done. Not only is the cartoon a comment on the use of populist rhetoric by the political elites, it also highlights the EFF domination of the land question at the expense of the ANC government and in this way accentuates EFF agency. This cartoon is an example of how different realities are articulated and interpellated in populist 'land language.'

Figure 12: Populist 'land language'

(Reynolds 2017)

Figure 13 below, a cartoon published by Dr Jack on 7 September 2017, iconically depicts the ANC as a slumbering 'fat cat' riding a donkey which is indexically a beast of burden simultaneously associated with stubbornness and obstinacy as well as suffering and service (Bough 2011: 58). Yoked to a heavy load symbolically representing the land reform project,

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the donkey awaits an instruction to move forward, yet all the rider can offer is a limp carrot as enticement. In this way the cartoonist shows that despite its intractability and weighty importance, land reform under the ANC has stagnated and the party demonstrates little initiative to move it forward towards resolution. This cartoon is an example of frustrated and impatient 'land language' directed at the ANC because of its inability to implement meaningful land reform policies.

Figure 13: Impatient 'land language'



(Dr Jack 2017)

On 27 March 2018 the NA adopted a motion for amending the Constitution to make explicit what is meant by EWC. During the lead-up to the debate on the motion and during the debate itself, it was clear that the land question is a site of contestation among political elites for controlling the land agenda and specifically EWC. Figure 14 below is a cartoon published by Zapiro (2018a) on 2 March 2018 symbolically demonstrating that the ANC has pulled the rug from under the EFF with the adoption of a motion in the NA on 27 February 2018 to allow EWC. The EFF was nonetheless instrumental in the process and claimed victory as the motion was overwhelmingly adopted (Goba 2018). The cartoon includes two icons: firstly, Malema representing the EFF; and secondly, the ANC as a front-end loader that has appropriated the land question, which the EFF symbolically regards as its sole province because of the agency

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it has demonstrated in motivating the NA and like-minded political parties to accept that the Constitution requires amendment to make explicit provision for EWC.

Figure 14: Hey, that's my turf

(Zapiro 2018b)

This section shows that society perceives populist 'land language' is used by political elites (in this case the EFF and ANC) and that the ANC has failed to implement meaningful land reform and use the land question, specifically EWC, as site of political contestation between the ANC and EFF.

5.3.3. **The traditional authorities**

Traditional authorities, as an organisational category, also have a vested interest in the land question and exercise power and agency to protect their interests. Of particular relevance is their contested role in land history, with some commentators who are of the opinion that traditional authorities are an outdated institution, while others aver that they have a significant role to play in resolving the land question. Irrespective of these opinions, the broader societal perception of traditional authorities is noteworthy and in this regard three political cartoons are highlighted.

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Figure 15: Tinpot dictators

(Zapiro 2018a)

Zapiro (2018a), in Figure 15 above, uses icons and symbols to depict the bellicose reaction of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini to the land report by Motlanthe, especially Motlanthe's portrayal of some traditional authorities as autocratic rulers who suffer from delusions of grandeur, but lack political credibility. The context for the cartoon is the Zulu nation *imbizo* called by Zwelithini at Ulundi on 4 July 2018 in response to the report, which recommended that the 3 million hectares belonging to the Ingonyama Trust be returned to the state. At the *imbizo* the Zulu regiments sang songs that included words such as, "*UMotlanthe uyadelela uyasidelel amaZulu*" (Mothlanthe is disrespectful, he is disrespecting Zulus) (Ngcobo 2018). In his address to his subjects at the gathering, Zwelithini said,

> What I want you to know about our history is that the issue we are faced with now is very similar to the one our forefathers were faced with. This will be the second clash. I was born from a brave man and that is why I know I will be victorious against those who are trying to take my land. We are faced with the same issue that we were faced with in the olden days. The difference is that it is now coming from a black man and not a white one. The war our fathers faced before is the same war we are faced with today (Mthethwa 2019).

The cartoon illustrates Zwelithini, as the central icon, beating the drums of war. He is flanked by IFP leader and Prime Minister of the Zulu nation, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and followed by his *indunas* (chiefs) dressed in traditional garb, marching in time to Zwelithini's drumbeat. All

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have tin utensils as head regalia. Of particular note is the land reform sign post on the right-hand side of the cartoon, which is pointed in the opposite direction to where Zwelithini and his cohort are headed. Zapiro portrays Zwelithini and his chiefs as autocratic, suffering from delusions of grandeur, anti-land reform and warlike and suggests that his subjects will aggressively follow suit.

Following the land *imbizo*[42] called by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini on 4 July 2018, Ramaphosa visited the King on 6 July 2018 to reassure him that the land under the custodianship of the Ingonyama Trust would remain in the hands of the King as the sole trustee (Mahlase 2018). The visit turned controversial after a photograph circulated on social media showing Ramaphosa kneeling next to the king. In his response to the photograph, Ramaphosa said:

> I find it quite laughable … it is laughable that people see how I was showing the king my book, I wrote a book on cattle, and I was showing the king my book. He was seated, it was just a posture and people are suggesting that I was kneeling before the king (Deklerk 2018).

Reynolds (2018c) nonetheless seized on the incident by publishing the cartoon in Figure 16 below on 11 July 2018, depicting the encounter between South African President Ramaphosa and Zulu King Zwelithini, sole custodian of the Ingonyama Trust, as icons. The first dominant and larger icon is a seated king dressed in traditional garb gazing down on a prostrated second and diminutive icon, Ramaphosa, depicted as bovine animal, possibly a bull. Cattle occupy a revered place in the black culture. Not only do they exemplify material wealth; they also have spiritual connotations in many customary rituals. In the cartoon, Ramaphosa is portrayed as a trophy and a seated Zwelithini looks down on Ramaphosa with a stern, if not contemptuous, gaze which projects authority and control. Reynolds captures the relationship between the Zulu King and South African President as one of subservience, with the King as the more powerful agent with the upper hand regarding land.

[42] An *imbizo* is a gathering called by a traditional leader to discuss important matters affecting the community at large.

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Figure 16: Trust issue

(Reynolds 2018c)

In Figure 17 below Zapiro (2019) comments on the Traditional Courts Bill that ostensibly provides "justice services by enhancing [the] effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of traditional courts in resolving disputes" (Mokgoroane 2019). It was eventually passed by the NA in 2019 after a series of setbacks in the NA and National Council of Provinces (NCOP) during 2008, 2011 and 2017. Derisively called a 'Bantustan Bill', it compels "18 million South Africans living in the boundaries of the former homelands to subject themselves to a legal system where traditional leaders are accorded coercive powers that surpass any that chiefs had during colonialism and apartheid" (Claassens 2019). Regarding land, the Bill confers on chiefs and their councils the power to unilaterally transfer land in the hands of their subjects to mining companies and other corporations (Mokgoroane 2019) and is therefore open to abuse.

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Figure 17: Traditional authorities and history

(Zapiro 2019)

This section shows that broader society has diverse views of traditional authorities. Emerging from a controversial history and viewed by some in society as outmoded, traditional authorities undeniably possess political influence that political elites cannot ignore and they are therefore obliged to consider them carefully in the 'land language' they articulate.

5.3.4. The white commercial farmers

The white commercial farmers, as the last organisational category, also have agency concerning the land question because this category plays an essential role in South Africa's food security and will be affected by EWC. However, they are sometimes perceived by society as obdurate, conservative and unwilling to participate meaningfully in resolving the land question. In this regard three political cartoons are highlighted.

In Figure 18 below is a cartoon published by Jack Swanepoel, Dr Jack, on 29 April 2016, which includes two icons to depict white commercial farmers and emerging farmers[43].

[43] Lipton (1976: 2) points out that there is a belief among most observers that South Africa's agricultural sector consists of two sectors, a white commercial sector, which is efficient, capital-intensive and large-scale and the

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The larger icon, in the form of an outstretched hand indexed in white represents white commercial farmers, while the smaller icon is an emergent farmer indexed in black and iconically carrying a hoe. Incidentally, the hoe as an icon is associated with agrarian farming, which could be interpreted as emergent farmers being regarded as peasants. The larger outstretched hand demonstrates that the more powerful white commercial farmers are willing to engage collaboratively with emergent farmers in an effort to improve their lot in life. This cartoon is an example of how different realities are articulated and interpellated in diversifying 'land language.'

Figure 18: Diversifying 'land language'



(Dr Jack 2016)

The cartoon in Figure 19 below by Mangena (2017c) is an iconic and indexical personification of a white commercial farmer typified as the other who is represented as an icon, Kallie Kriel from the Afrikaner civil rights organisation, AfriForum[44]. As the other, Kriel,

---

other, which is a black sector that is inefficient, traditional and small-scale. She further contends that this belief has created the myth that "blacks are hopeless farmers" (Lipton 1976: 42). In the post-1994 South African dispensation, 'emerging farmers' is a euphemism for black farmers who aspire to becoming commercial farmers but many have been systemically prevented from progressing to this level through, for example, limited access to capital, a lack of skills and development, poor infrastructure and inadequate property rights (Khapayi & Celliers 2016).

[44] Kallie Kriel is the chief executive officer of AfriForum. AfriForum is a "civil rights organisation that mobilises Afrikaners, Afrikaans-speaking people and other minority groups and protects their rights" (AfriForum n.d.). The organisation has been particularly vocal regarding the land question and is vehemently opposed to land

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and indeed white commercial farmers, are othered as a group who have in their possession stolen land which Mangena also symbolises as looted, in other words it is property that was taken with impunity during conflict. Otherness is characterised by denialist symbolism that the "ANC's plan to expropriate land without compensation is theft", where Kriel hypocritically condemns the ANC for its intention to expropriate land that was stolen in the first place. This cartoon is an example of how different realities are articulated and interpellated to personify the other, foster othering and create otherness through 'land language.'

Figure 19: The other, othering and otherness



(Mangena 2017c)

In Figure 20 below, Mangena (2018) depicts white commercial farmers as the obdurate other. The context for the cartoon is a visit by AfriForum to the USA during April 2019 as part of its #The*WorldMustKnow* international campaign to highlight a government proposal to review Section 25 of the Constitution, regarding the specifics of EWC. The word balloon highlights the AfriForum appeal to Trump for assistance to prevent EWC which was taken up

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expropriation without compensation. AfriForum is also adamant that land was not stolen from black South Africans (Levitt 2018).

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in a tweet on 22 August 2018 when Trump instructed Secretary of State Pompeo to "closely study the South African land farm seizures and expropriations and large scale killing of farmers" (McKenzie & Swails 2018). Mangena uses icons and indexes in his cartoon to depict white commercial farmers as stuck in the past by portraying a stereo-typical bearded white male dressed in khaki shorts with the old South African flag in hand. Symbolic language is particularly prominent on the placard, as it ironically portrays cultivated land, on which the farmer stands, as 'loot', implying that it is plunder taken from an enemy during times of conflict.

Figure 20: Stereo-typical white commercial farmer

(Mangena 2018)

The political cartoons are a sample of the symbols, icons and indexes that portray the ideational character in a broader societal context and indexically reflect white and black perspectives ranging from white denialism, differing historical interpretations, unfulfilled black expectations, an absence of freedom, black marginalisation, a volatile land question and the confliction of 'land language.' It is in this ideational context that the political elites navigate. In the next section two political elites substantively categorised as the EFF and the FF+ are identified to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated over the

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said period by two principal actors and leaders of their respective political parties, Julius Sello Malema (EFF) and Petrus Johannes Groenewald (FF+).

5.4. <u>Economic Freedom Fighters</u>

Founded on 27 July 2013, the EFF is a "radical and militant movement for economic emancipation, calling for 'economic freedom in our lifetime' …" (EFF 2017). The party's aim is to unite "revolutionary militant activists, community-based organizations as well as lobby groups" under its umbrella (EFF 2017). Drawing on a broad Marxist-Leninist tradition, the party labels itself as an internationalist "anti-imperialist and leftist movement" focusing on class contradictions to drive an emancipatory economic agenda (EFF 2017). The official logo serves as a rallying point and an expression of the party's identity, as seen in Figure 21.

Figure 21: EFF logo

(EFF 2020)

The EFF logo (EFF 2014c) consists of five icons and an index. The five icons are firstly, the "gold star representing the internationalist character of the African revolution, international solidarity and the pursuit of total emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the world"; secondly, the African map "representing a commitment [to] its people, resources and humanity"; thirdly, the clenched black fist representing the "unity and strength of the oppressed"; and fourthly, the red spear representing the "defence of the African revolution mired in the blood of fallen heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle"; and finally, the yellow mineshaft representing the "mineral resources that will be for the benefit of all." The index is the colour green, which represents the land that must be returned to its people. Finally,

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symbolic language in the form of an abbreviation, EFF, identifies the party name. While the logo has an eclectic iconic and indexical range, two outstanding features are highlighted: firstly, the spear, accentuating revolution and the struggle for liberation, and secondly, the indexical colour green – the colour dominating the logo – representing the idea of land as a key feature of EFF identity.

Despite being a new arrival on the South African political scene, the EFF claims a historical connotation pre-dating its establishment, which Mpofu[45] describes as follows:

> In truth, the history of the EFF did not begin in July 2013 in Soweto nor in October 2013 at its launch rally in Marikana. In proper perspective, the history of the EFF began in April 1652 with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck ostensibly to set up a vegetable garden and a refreshment station en route to trade in the East (Shivambu 2017: ix).

Mpofu associates the arrival of Van Riebeeck with the beginning of land dispossession in South Africa and avers that this event and the establishment of the EFF in 2013 are intimately connected because the party actively pursues the return of the land to the dispossessed (Shivambu 2017: ix).

Support for the EFF, especially among the black youth and impoverished sector of the population, increased over the period from 2013 to 2019. In 2014, less than a year after its formation, the party contested its first national election and secured 1 169 259 votes or 6.35% of the overall poll, translating into 25 seats in the NA (Independent Electoral Commission 2019). In the 2019 elections the party showed an upswing in support and secured 1 882 480 or 10.8% of the overall poll, translating into 44 seats in the NA (Independent Electoral Commission 2019). Although it remains a minority party when compared with the ANC, it ranked third overall in terms of voter support during the 2019 elections. Despite its numerical disadvantage, the EFF has been and remains a force to be reckoned with in the South African political arena. Its visibility is unmistakeable, although the party's political identity is, at times, confusing to the South African society at large.

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[45] Dali Mpofu is a South African lawyer who was an EFF office bearer and served in various party appointments from 2013 to 2019.

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The political identity of the EFF "continues to puzzle South Africans", with the party discordantly branded as populist, fascist, Africanist, as radical nationalist or as an external ANC faction (Ngqakamba 2018). Malema, as the party leader, has been at the receiving end of a number of iconic interpretations, which were vilifying and demonising. An example is the cartoon in Figure 22 below where Reynolds (2018a) iconically equates Malema with Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, and in this way projects him as fascist.

Figure 22: Mussolema

(Reynolds 2018a)

On the eve of the AfriForum visit to the USA to internationalise farm murders in South Africa, the cartoonist Jerm (2020) published in his blog (Figure 23) an iconic portrayal of Malema as an admirer of Nazi dictator Hitler. The cartoonist symbolically refers to the 25-point programme of the National Socialist German Workers' Party announced by Hitler on 24 February 1920. Article 17 reads, "We demand land reform suitable to our national requirements, passage of a law for *confiscation* (own italics) without compensation of land for communal purposes, abolition of interest on land loans and prohibition of land speculation" (Feder 1932: 19; Miller 1941: 175). In this way the cartoonist equates Malema and the EFF with Hitler, Nazism and, with it, images of genocide.

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Figure 23: Malema as Hitler



(Jerm 2020)

An expressive index that defines EFF identity is its adoption of the colour red; which gives it remarkable visual prominence. The historical connotation, Thelwell (2014) notes, is that red flags were used during the 1848 French revolution to signify "the blood of angry workers." It remains the colour index of the political left and is adopted by socialists, communists and other left-wing radicals. Malema explained the adoption of red by the EFF thus: "Red is originally an EFF colour because it represents the blood that has been shed by those who have died during the struggle for economic freedom", citing Marikana and Sharpeville as examples (Thelwell 2014). The beret has a militant connotation dating back to 1889, when the French adopted it as headgear and it is also synonymous with revolutionary leaders such as Ché Guevara, Fidel Castro and Thomas Sankara (Thelwell 2014). Figure 24 below is an example of the militant visual impact of the iconic and indexical costume worn by EFF members:

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Figure 24: Militant iconic and indexical costume

(Daniel 2018)

The identity of the EFF took root in Parliament when elected members were sworn in for the first time on 21 May 2014. Men wore red overalls, gum boots with hard hats and women domestic worker dresses, headscarves and aprons to send a strong message to the working class. As one EFF member remarked,

> "This is the dress of domestic workers," Maxon said, holding up her red apron. "We are trying to tell people that we are from the Economic Freedom Fighters, we are here for the workers and the poor. We are sending a message to say that the Parliament is for the people [it] is not a Parliament for the elite. So the workers at home, when they see us dressed like this, they will know they are represented" (Makinana & Underhill 2014).

The identity of the EFF in relation to the land question is historically rooted and centred on illegitimate colonial dispossession. The party, established in 2013, is a "different generation, with new demands" (Shivambu 2019). It was not a signatory to the 1994 CODESA negotiations for the new democratic dispensation which, in its view, was a compromise that handed political power to blacks but also "solidified unequal property relations between white and black people" (Shivambu 2019). Therefore, property rights as designated in the South

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African constitution are considered to be skewed in favour of a white minority, requiring constitutional amendment of Section 25 to define clearly what is meant by EWC.

5.4.1. **The ideational dimension of land: the EFF perspective**

The EFF's policy document, *EFF 1st National People's Assembly Discussion Documents People's Power for Economic Freedom* (EFF 2014a) is fundamental to the EFF approach that underpins the ideational dimension of land and to understand Malema's 'land language.' Written in advance of the party's inaugural National People's Assembly (NPA) in December 2014, the document made several ideational pronouncements that featured (and continue to feature) in the 'land language' articulated by Malema. Of particular note are ten key issues identified in the policy document that featured in the discussions at the NPA. Land featured at the top of the deliberations as "Land and Agrarian Reform" and later in the document under a revised title, "Land and Agrarian Revolution." In this regard the following are examples of 'land language' in the document:

> "Land is stolen property" (EFF 2014a: 4).

> "The 1913 Land Act, which legalised the land theft of (*sic*) Africans, gave 87% of land to white settlers and Africans were forced to 13% of the land" (EFF 2014a: 4).

> Section 25 of the South African Constitution is a clause that "gives protection of property rights to those who stole the land of Africans and says that land must be bought" (*sic*) (EFF 2014a: 4).

During the proceedings of the NA on 26 August 2015 EFF member Nazier Paulsen provided a succinct and thoughtful summary of the ideational dimension of the land question from an EFF perspective when he moved a motion regarding land expropriation:

> That the House debates the need to reclaim the African personality dispossessed by colonialism and apartheid, which led to the tearing apart of the African moral fibre; and at the centre of the reclaiming process, the need for the expropriation of land and the wealth of this country as real and symbolic representation of African dignity (RSA, NA 2015c: 107).

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The EFF 2014 election manifesto, launched on 22 February 2014, builds on the 2013 founding manifesto (EFF 2013) and emphasises that 20 years into South Africa's democracy "the black majority is still trapped in landlessness, homelessness and hopelessness!" (EFF 2014b: 1); "the land question has not been addressed and our land still does not belong to all who live on it" (EFF 2014b: 2); "black people still do not have their dignity" (EFF 2014b: 2); and to this end the EFF advocates "land expropriation without compensation" (EFF 2014b: 5, 25). While the EFF manifesto acknowledges the Khoi and San peoples as playing a pivotal role in the first wars against colonial settlers, it avoids casting them as autochthones:

> The ancestors of the Khoi and San people fought the first anti-colonial wars against white settlers in South Africa. Since 1652 white settlers violently plundered the livestock and stole the land of the Khoi and San people at gunpoint. They resisted colonialism forcibly (EFF 2014b: 30).

The 2019 election manifesto builds on the 2014 election manifesto by elevating "landlessness" to a specific election theme, "OUR LAND AND JOBS NOW" (EFF 2019: 5). Appearing in the manifesto in 22 different contexts, the word "now" creates a sense of urgency underpinned by the frustration that after 25 years in a democratic dispensation there are a number of expectations among black South Africans that remain unfulfilled. Chief among these expectations is land, which appears 63 times in the same document. The manifesto highlights the "[e]xpropriation of South Africa's land without compensation, for equal redistribution in use" as the first of seven cardinal "non-negotiable" (Malema 2016d) pillars constituting the essence of the revolutionary approach for authentically transforming South African society (EFF 2019: 9). It also notes an ideational inter-relationship between jobs and land, with the EFF believing that the "crisis levels of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment … can be ended by the reclamation and equitable redistribution of the land and the creation of millions of jobs" (EFF 2019: 10).

The EFF contends that being landless in the current South African scenario is a perpetuation of "the colonial crime of rendering the black majority landless" (Ndlozi 2018) and in this way the party establishes a common feeling among the landless that they are victims of a criminal act and therefore entitled to redress. Moreover, drawing on the word 'crime' evokes the idea of an unlawful deed perpetuated by a criminal and in this way the use of the word galvanises the social community around a common quest to seek justice and to punish the

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criminal other. As a consequence, the 'land language' generates a common feeling and a sense of belonging that is grounded in the construction of a landed white other, othering and otherness by the use of symbolism with signifying words such as 'criminals' or 'gangsters.'

5.4.2. **Julius Sello Malema**

Born on 3 March 1981, Julius Sello Malema is the leader of the EFF, which he founded on 10 July 2013. Prior to establishing the EFF, Malema was president of the ANCYL from April 2008 to April 2012, when he was expelled from the ANC for portraying the party and its leadership under then President Zuma in a negative light, as well as for statements he made concerning regime change in Botswana (Mail & Guardian 2011). He holds a BA degree in Communications and African Languages awarded in 2016. Following the 2014 elections, which the EFF contested for the first time, Malema was elected as a member of parliament, has served as a member of the *ad hoc* committee to amend Section 25 of the Constitution from 5 February to 7 May 2019 and has been a voting member of the same committee since 21 August 2019 (People's Assembly n.d.). It is in this way that Malema has used his institutional agency to place the land question at the centre of the national discourse and to aggressively advocate the EEF position which calls for all land to be placed under state custodianship after EWC has been implemented. A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by Malema, as leader of the EFF, is conducted in the following sections, according to two themes.

5.4.3. **Theme: The social community constructed by Malema concerning the land**

A qualitative content analysis of Malema's articulated 'land language' to construct a social community is located in the following sub-sub-categories: identity, agency, structure and community, which he projects with symbolic, iconic and indexical language. Qualitative content analysis reveals that Malema mainly relies on exercising iterational, projective and practical evaluative agency together with institutional and non-institutional structures to construct an identity that has an internal coherence and an external distinction for a social community that has a sense of kinship, place, purpose and feeling.

The epistemological and conceptual framework in Chapter 2 is a reminder that collective identity and common feelings typify particular social communities, setting them apart from other communities. For the purpose of this thesis, the EFF is considered a uniquely

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hybridised social community that has a strong collective identity, which includes the land as a central feature, together with a common feeling derived from an association with land. The hybridisation of the EFF community stems from the party's appeal to a cross-section of society as it includes "social movements, the dejected, marginalised youth, underemployed professionals, students, homeless, landless and the civil society organisations" (EFF 2014a: 29). The inclusion of the landless in the EFF as a social community attracts a mainly black section of the population that is excluded from being landed and in this way the EFF is a social community with a particular appeal. Unity concerning the land question, specifically with respect to EWC, is constructed by Malema in two domains. In the first domain, which includes political parties representing blacks, Malema appeals to "all political parties, particularly the ones that represent black people, today, let it be that day of black unity in honour of Robert Sobukwe" [Applause.] (RSA, NA 2018b: 32). For Malema land is ideationally associated with liberation and the two ideas therefore share a deep association. He made this association clear in NA on 23 July 2014 when he said,

> in all fairness, it will never be possible to liberate South Africa unless there is a radical change of property relations, wherein the wealth of those who stole it during colonial dispossession is transferred to the majority of the people (RSA, NA 2014c: 59-60).

For Malema land and dignity have an inter-twined association which he described in the NA on 27 February 2018, "All we want, all our people ever wanted, is their land to which their dignity is rooted and founded" (RSA, NA 2018d: 28).

Although Malema strives towards the construction of a multi-racial social community, stating in a television interview on 2 September 2019 that the EFF represents "everyone", he has also pointedly remarked that "at the centre of the people we represent are the oppressed and those are the people we prioritise and unfortunately the oppressed are black Africans" (Malema 2019b). He thus clearly singles out a black African identity for the EFF.

Identity is a reflection of the individual or collective self, sameness or difference expressed as a symbol, icon or index. It displays and promotes internal coherence (a persistent sharing of community self-sameness that it exemplified in a common and endogenous distinction) and external distinction (a distinctive exogenous quality, interest or ambition that sets the community apart from the other). A key feature of Malema's 'land language' is the

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promotion of a distinctive identity that is both directly and indirectly linked to land as a central underpinning to construct a social community that has an authochonous[46] identity (see Figure 25 below). The party confers upon Malema the symbolic title of "the victorious, unassailable son of the soil" (RSA, NA 2015b: 92). This symbolic title carries with it the respect of his social community, as it acknowledges Malema as an icon in the land question.

Figure 25: Son of the soil

(ZimOnline News 2019)

Unfulfilled promises are a feature that Malema uses to construct a social community regarding the land question. At a joint sitting to debate the President's SONA on 18 June 2014, Malema castigated then President Zuma over the ANC's failure to redistribute land and provide security of tenure to those living in informal settlements:

> You also promised to distribute 30% of the land in this very year. … You promised to provide security of tenure to 400 000 households of people who live in informal settlements. You keep making the same promises and misleading this House – and hon members clap hands (RSA, NA 2014d: 31-32).

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[46] Autochthony is discussed in Chapter 3. It is considered the most authentic form of belonging and it is invoked as a "powerful narrative" to claim the right to land by being original inhabitants (Geschiere 2009: 2; Bøas & Dunn: 1,2).

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The social community that Malema constructs has explicit internal coherence and an external distinction in relation to the land question and in this regard he relies on language symbols and indexes. He uses red as a language index as follows: the colour promotes militancy, cultivates internal coherence within the social community and is externally distinct to outside observers. As an institutional index, red features in a symbolic context, demonstrated for example by Malema's reference to the "Red Brigades" (EFF 2014a: 106), the "red berets" (RSA, NA 2018e: 156; RSA, NA 2018f: 16, 17), the "red overalls" (RSA, NA 2019a: 159, 421) and those who occupy the "red benches" (RSA, NA 2019a: 49) in the NA.

To this can be added military-style terminology to identify the social community. For example, Malema is referred to as the "President and Commander in Chief" and he is a member of party structures identified as the "Central Command Team" and the "War Council" (EFF 2014c) while all EFF members are referred to as "Economic Freedom Fighters" (EFF 2013) or merely as "freedom fighters." Malema also uses black and white in as a binary language index with a racial distinction. In Chapter 2, Ehala reminds us that language as a symbol has a shared meaning and in this context for Malema the shared meaning attached to being 'black' means "landless" and "conquered" (RSA, NA 2014d: 24; RSA, NA 2017a: 42), "African" and "oppressed" (RSA, NA 2018b: 83). Being black is juxtaposed to being white and for Malema the shared meaning is that white as an index is associated with "still own[ing] our land" (RSA, NA 2017a: 42), "dominance" (RSA, NA 2017a: 42), "white supremacy" (RSA, NA 2017a: 42), not "know[ing] the pain of being landless" (RSA, NA 2017a: 43) and being "superior" (RSA, NA 2019a: 60).

Agency is the capacity of agents to change or influence their environment. The identity that Malema propounds leads to a particular form of agency, which is best described as quasi-anarchic and militant. On the one hand, Malema works within acknowledged structures of state, such as the NA, to exercise projective agency for his political party and the social community he constructs. For example, on 7 November 2017 he referred to the cardinal pillars of the EFF manifesto, which "constitute the true future of South Africa" (RSA, NA 2017b: 155) and include the "[e]xpropriation of land without compensation for equitable redistribution" (EFF 2013). The projection of EWC as the only authentic vision provides clear direction regarding the EFF's future intent to resolve the land question. The power of this agency is described by Malema as follows: "Deputy Speaker, I think that South Africans will begin to appreciate that a party with 6% of the vote is doing what a party with 60% of the vote

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hasn't been able to do for many years" (RSA, NA 2018b: 81). On the other hand, his repeated call in the NA on 23 May 2018 for people to "occupy the unoccupied land", "occupy land", and "I want to repeat it. They must occupy land" (RSA, NA 2018d: 68, 69, 87) led to a final remark before the EFF expulsion from the Chamber that:

> You can do whatever you want to do. They must occupy land. There is nothing you can do. There is nothing this Parliament can do. With or without you, people are going to occupy the land! [Interjections.]
>
> We require no permission from you, from the President or anyone. We don't care! You can do whatever you want to do. Who are you to tell us whether we can occupy the land, or not? We are going to occupy the land. South Africans, occupy land! [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2018d: 88).

The call by Malema to occupy land is embodied in the *EFF 1st National People's Assembly Discussion Documents People's Power for Economic Freedom*, where it is stated:

> That a mass 'Back to Land" campaign be undertaken, were (*sic*) the land claiming communities reoccupy their land through mass action led by EFF (*sic*). (EFF 2014a: 4).
>
> That EFF support (*sic*) all actions of the communities where they occupy land and also to support communities to resist evictions from land and houses. The land belongs to the people! (EFF 2014a: 4).

It is therefore evident from the above that Malema uses practical/evaluative agency in a quasi-anarchic manner to direct his social community and to promote a community purpose based on an ideational sense of kinship around the possession of land derived from EWC. A particular feature of practical/evaluative agency is Malema's view that EWC is not a threat to food security. In this regard, he pointedly argued in the NA on 27 February 2018 that,

> Many want us to debate food security and economic development, but how can we do so if we do not have land? They want us to come to the table with their bosses as beggars (*sic*). That is unacceptable. The ability to develop policies on food security depends on land redistribution, not the other way around. Those who hold the land labour under the false idea that to distribute

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> it we must first establish a food security programme. No, we must distribute the land, then we can all talk about a food security programme (RSA, NA 2018b: 29).

For Malema EWC and the concomitant equal redistribution are a prerequisite for food security, not the other way around.

Iterational agency is "the selective reactivation of actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time" (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 971). The iterational agency used by Malema for social community construction is best demonstrated in a seminal address on EWC delivered in the NA on 27 February 2018. In his speech he provided, among other aspects, a historical narrative of the past in which he began by heaping scorn on Jan van Riebeeck[47]. He branded Van Riebeeck a "criminal" who "landed in our native land and declared an already occupied land by the native population as no man's land" and who brought about a

> full-blown colonial genocide, antiblack land dispossession criminal project; arguing that simply because our people could not produce title deeds, the land they had been living on for more than a thousand years was not their own (RSA, NA 2018b: 26).

He continued to lament the destruction of an indigenous community feeling concerning land by remarking that Van Riebeeck

> was disregarding their humanity, treating them as part of the animal world. To him and many who came long after him, Africans were less than human, not deserving of land ownership. On this basis, the project of disempowering Africans of the ability to call this place their land was initiated in blood and pain (RSA, NA 2018b: 26).

Malema extrapolated the historical narrative into the present by averring that icons such as

> Cecil Rhodes, Paul Kruger, Jan Smuts, General Hertzog, Verwoerd, Botha, even De Klerk, all laboured under the Van Riebeeck assumption that Africans were less than human. They all, one

[47] See the section, Land and the Dutch colonisers at the Cape, in Chapter 4 for accounts of Jan van Riebeeck's interaction with the indigenous population.

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> after the other, assaulted the humanity of Africans, keeping them dispossessed of land and as cheap and easily disposed of labour (RSA, NA 2018b: 26-27).

The parallels with the historical context of social constructionism in Chapter 4 are notable and worth highlighting, as they show a correlation between the past and the contemporary situation concerning land. The symbolic and iconic language articulated by Malema shows that his spoken word conceptualises a reality where Africans are imagined and infantilised as sub-human in the eyes of the coloniser and that this idea has carried over into the present-day minds of those who are possessed of the land. Therefore, as a political actor Malema uses a historical reality to employ agency for calling into being a social community constructed around the idea of land dispossession. As a consequence, Malema is of the opinion that that the land question and its resolution is the exclusive property of the EFF, for in the same speech on 27 February 2018 he insisted that:

> It took the formation of the EFF 20 years later to revive the question of the dignity of our people in the need for our land. It took the arrival of the EFF in these Chambers to return to the central agenda of human freedom the need for the land that was dispossessed through brutal crimes against humanity (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

Figure 26: Who is driving the land question?

(Business Day 2018)

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In February 2018 the NA and NCOP instructed the joint Constitution Review Committee to review Section 25 of the Constitution and other clauses to enable the state to expropriate land in the public interest and without compensation (RSA, NA 2018a). The cartoon in Figure 26 above by Reynolds was published in Business Day on 5 March 2018 and is a figurative comment regarding control of the land agenda (Business Day 2018). It consists of two icons and an index. In this cartoon the size of the icons is particularly relevant. It depicts the EFF, specifically Malema, in EFF colours as the smaller icon as a flag-bearer for land seated on a bicycle connected to the larger icon, the ANC logo, with a chain as the index. By placing Malema in the bicycle saddle the implication is that the EFF, not the ANC, is in the driving seat when it comes to the land question and specifically uses its agency to amend the Constitution to make EWC unequivocal.

A particular feature differentiating this social community is its Twitter following. The EFF is the first South African political party to reach 1 million followers, a milestone achieved on 25 March 2020 (Mtshali 2020). This means that the EFF has control over a digital footprint that is larger than some media outlets and television stations, allows the party to construct intra-social networks without relying on mainstream media to reach its main support base, that of the youth, who are particularly active on this social platform (Mtshali 2020). Malema is active on Twitter which he joined in February 2020 and currently uses the handle @Julius_S_Malema. On 28 August 2020 he had 3 198 160 followers and 37 500 tweets.

5.4.4. **Theme: The social networks constructed by Malema**

The social community constructed by Malema concerning the land does not exist in isolation and relies on the configuration of social networks that have both international and domestic links for exercising agency. International links are with an African country, Zimbabwe, and beyond the continent to include countries such as Venezuela. The domestic network extends to the ANC, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers.

The international component of the social network focuses mainly on Africa but also extends further afield. The EFF, Malema believes,

> gives a lot of inspiration to the African people not only in South Africa because the oppression of African people doesn't only take place here in South Africa or in the continent. Even the

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diaspora suffered serious exploitation and oppression because of their skin colour (Malema 2017).

An ideational feature of the international social network is the iconic status of former President Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean land issue. In a tribute to Mugabe, who passed away on 6 September 2019, Malema said on 12 November 2019 in the NA that the House must recognise that

> he stands head and shoulders above the rest in his commitment to resolve the timeless question of the return of African land back to the African people (RSA, NA 2019c: 35).

> the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe remains a lodestar for all those still fighting for the return of the land (RSA, NA 2019c: 35).

> in his lifetime, he faced unimaginable attacks in the quest for the return of the land to African people (RSA, NA 2019c: 36).

Historically dispossessed communities accord a liberation figure who returns their land an almost untouchable iconic status, as in their eyes the return of the land is more important than the consequences that follow. Therefore, in the view of Malema it does not matter that there was an agricultural implosion following Zimbabwe's land reform programme; the fact that Mugabe returned the land to his people trumps any of the disastrous outcomes that followed in its wake. In Malema's eyes Mugabe is an iconic African hero and this has not escaped the attention of commentators, because of Mugabe's controversial and catastrophic land reform programme.

The cartoon in Figure 27 by Zapiro, published on 21 June 2011, depicts Malema's iconic association with the former President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, regarding expropriation of land owned by white farmers.

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Figure 27: South Africa's ZANU dawn – land grab without comprehension



(Zapiro 2011).

In this cartoon, Zapiro integrates an iconic face of Mugabe with that of Malema to portray Malema as an advocate for land expropriation in similar vein to what was followed in Zimbabwe. Using symbolic language, Zapiro cynically titles the cartoon, "South Africa's ZANU Dawn – Land Grab without Comprehension", which is a pointed reference to Malema's failure to take into account the devastation that Mugabe's land policy visited on Zimbabwe. Moreover, the devastation implicit in the cartoon involves the production of a fear that EWC is destined to ruin South Africa and turn it into a wasteland. This cartoon is an example of the social construction of an asymmetrical network embedded in a social community hierarchy between Malema and the white landed community as the other. The asymmetry is evident in the opposing perceptions regarding the success of Mugabe's land reform programme, which vilifies Malema as a harbinger of land chaos and violence, bringing with it fear that is reproduced in the white landed community. Malema does not advocate violence. In his address to the Oxford Union on 10 January 2016 Malema (2016a) proclaimed:

> We are not going to do what the Zimbabweans have done of dropping blood of innocent people. There's nothing wrong with Robert Mugabe's policy of land. There's everything wrong with

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> the methods used to obtain the land. We cannot have people killed. We cannot have people injured because you want your land back.

The domestic network constructed by Malema has a number of distinguishing features. Firstly, the network configuration involving the EFF and the ANC, in particular Ramaphosa, is hierarchical and asymmetric. The asymmetry of the network is related to levels of mistrust between both actors, especially regarding four issues: the 1994 negotiations for the new democratic dispensation, the failure of the ANC government to address the land question satisfactorily after coming to power in 1994, the perceived ANC pandering exclusively to the land interests of the white community and suspicion concerning the ANC's sincerity to implement EWC.

Malema is of the opinion that the 1994 negotiations for the new democratic dispensation was an "elite pact that was forced upon the people" and it "defends the colonial and apartheid ownership patterns of the means of production, including property" (RSA, NA 2014d: 27). In this respect, he is willing to acknowledge that the negotiations took place amid difficult circumstances (Malema 2017) and the outcomes were not as favourable as expected. However, it is the failure of the ANC government to address the land question satisfactorily after coming to power in 1994 that is unforgiveable and is a topic that Malema often raises. During a discussion on the "2016 Local Government Elections" in the NA on 23 August 2016, Malema responded to an accusation by the ANC Chief Whip, Jackson Mthembu, that the EFF was embarking on coalitions with the Democratic Alliance (DA) as follows:

> You gave the National Party the Ministry of Land … Sitting in these benches are people who come from the National Party. Who are you to educate us about white people when you were so prepared to embrace murderers, the people who continue to kill black people? (RSA, NA 2016h: 14).
>
> We gave you 6% to take the land and you refused it. Now, those who want to sound more black conscious said to us, you can't disrupt the ANC and vote for the DA or the opposition (RSA, NA 2016h: 15-16).

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He concluded by saying, "… we were not disrupting the land question; we were not disrupting any black agenda. So, you can go and jump into the nearest hell. [Applause]" (RSA, NA 2016h: 16).

At a Parliamentary Joint Sitting on 19 February 2018, in response to the SONA address delivered by Ramaphosa on 16 February 2018, Malema questioned the ANC's sincerity and urgency regarding the resolution of the land question by warning that:

> This cannot be an issue to bluff about. This cannot be an issue to pass time with. It is an emotive issue, and you only mention it if you mean it. It's not a matter that you can go around joking about. There are no conditions attached to expropriation of land without compensation because when they took our land, they never attached any conditions; they just killed our people. [Applause] (RSA, NA 2018c: 62).

Malema again accused Ramaphosa of bluffing about the land question when he stated in the NA on 23 May 2018:

> President, I came here and told you that you are bluffing about the land. Now you are wishy-washy and saying all manner of things. It is clear that you are not going to expropriate land without compensation, but I need to tell you that we had issued an instruction in the EFF for people to scale down the occupation of land because we wanted to give you time. However, since you are no longer clear, we have made a call, and we make it even here, for our people to occupy the unoccupied land. It is their land because the ANC is not going to give them land anytime soon (RSA, NA 2018d: 68).

Particular ire is directed at the ANC for its ongoing pandering to whites and their land interests (Malema 2019c). He accused then President Zuma on 18 June 2014 that the ANC had abandoned the landless (amongst others) as the party is a "ruling elite, which is in bed with the oppressors and the imperialist forces" [Applause] (RSA, NA 2014d: 25) and stressed that Zuma was "extremely scared of white people" (RSA, NA 2014d: 27) and had "defended the privilege of the white minority and continued with the exploitation and exclusion of the oppressed black majority" (RSA, NA 2014d: 27). Malema was likewise scathing regarding the ANC's failure to restore the dignity of the dispossessed:

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> Those who came to power in 1994 carrying the popular mandate of our people to restore the dignity of the African child by reinstating land to the dispossessed forgot their mandate. They became drunk in luxury and glory, building false reconciliation without justice (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

Secondly, the network between the EFF and left-leaning parties has a triadic configuration that includes other political parties such the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and trade unions such as the National Council of Trade Unions. In a show of solidarity and unity other political parties were present at the launch of the EFF 2014 election manifesto held in Tembisa on 22 February 2014 and attended by approximately 50 000 supporters (Sosibo 2014). Concerning land, SOPA President Lybon Mabasa said his party was open to associating "with anybody who said the land must be returned to its owners", while PAC Deputy President Mike Muendane said in an apparently Freudian slip, "we will take back the land of this country – that's what we'll do as the EFF" (Sosibo 2014). Thirdly, the network involving whites displays the characteristics of both a chain and a hierarchy. The chain is constituted by emphasising that whites have nothing to fear from the EFF. As Malema pointed out in a radio interview on 5 December 2013, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. You are more than welcome. Let's contribute in (*sic*) building this country to become an equal society" (Malema 2013). In an interview with Al Jazeera on 24 April 2016 he emphasised, "we want a country where we're all equal. My fighting for black people does not mean the oppression of white people" (Malema 2016b). Yet he adds the hierarchical organisational caveat that

> before we can talk reconciliation we need to talk justice. You can't keep what you stole from me and then we reconcile and say no fine we're now friends again we can go on without you returning what you stole from me (Malema 2013).

During an address to the Oxford Union Society on 10 January 2016, he reiterated

> the EFF speaks of expropriation without compensation because we know that when the land was taken in Africa it was through genocide. Why would we reward genocide? We cannot reward genocide (Malema 2016a).

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The network constructed by Malema with traditional authorities is a paired category. This category has, however, been a site of conflict that came about as a result of the EFF call to place all land, including the Ingonyama Trust, under state custodianship. In this regard Malema stated at a media conference on 8 March 2018 that "there are no holy cows in this country. We must debate issues openly including disagreeing with the Zulu King" (EFF 2018b). Malema's utterances elicited a strong reaction from within his party when some members called on Malema to retract his statement, which he refused to do (Pillay 2018). Malema's stance nonetheless softened when he defended the King's right to contribute to the land question debate at a media briefing on 5 July 2018 by emphasising:

> We must immediately dispel the notion that putting all South Africa's land under the custodianship of the state will weaken the institutions of traditional leadership because it is not true … traditional leaders must consider themselves as part of the state (which means) the continued sharing in the custodianship of the land (EFF 2018c).

In the NA on 22 August 2019 Malema again insisted that neither the Ingonyama Trust nor the traditional authorities are sacrosanct and are all subordinate to the constitution, as "there are no holy cows here" (RSA, NA 2019b: 93).

The network that Malema constructs with whites is symbolically and indexically identified as "white people" (Malema 2019a). He singles out the white other as "very scared of equality. In their eyes I am a criminal, I am a lunatic because I am asking for equality. That is the only crime I have committed" (Malema 2019a). Using land as a sign, Malema attaches signals and meanings to the white other by using symbolic terms such as "Dutch gangsters" (RSA, NA 2017a: 42), "Afrikaners" (EFF 2018c), "colonisers" (RSA, NA 2015a: 50), "Boer" (Malema 2018c), "white minorities" (RSA, NA 2018b: 31), "whiteness" (RSA, NA 2018l: 112) and "white interest and privilege" (RSA, NA 2018f: 25) to name but a few. Although conflictual in his 'land language' regarding the white other, Malema carefully steered a path away from violence by saying when addressing supporters at Newcastle on 17 November 2016, "we will not chase white people to (*sic*) the sea" (Malema 2016d) and again in a television interview on 5 March 2017 when he pointedly stated, "I don't hate white people, I hate white supremacy" (Malema 2017) and in this way he abjects the manifestation and not the racial index. Although Malema is often criticised for using racist language, he has on some occasions also made an effort to reduce the level of otherness between himself and the white other. He

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appeals to the white other. In a radio interview on 5 December 2013 Malema reached out to whites by appropriating the Freedom Charter to advocate unity as follows:

> South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. You are more than welcome. Let's contribute in building this country to become an equal society. White people you've got nowhere else to go, especially the Afrikaner. Those ones who are brothers in love and hate. We're together here so we're going to fight it together and find and a correct solution, a sustainable one, not the one that will make people to pretend (Malema 2013).

Regarding other political parties, he extended an invitation in the NA on 27 February 2017, to join in the quest for EWC:

> We invite you to engage, not to pick up spears and guns, we invite you to come to the table and realise that nothing means anything for our people except their dignity in land ownership. For a lasting peace, security and justice, land must be expropriated without compensation for equal redistribution (RSA, NA 2018b: 29).

In the same speech, Malema was conciliatory towards the white other,

> "[w]e do not seek revenge, though they caused so much evil in our land; we do not wish for them to suffer, though they caused so much humiliation of countless generations" (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

In this respect he again made the following clear in the NA on 27 February 2018:

> We invite you to engage, not to pick up spears and guns. We invite you to come to the table and realise that nothing means anything for our people except their dignity in land ownership (RSA, NA 2018b: 29).
>
> … there is no blood of a white person I am going to drop (Malema 2019a).

The network that Malema constructs with white commercial farmers is asymmetrical and hierarchical and underpinned by the EFF drive to amend the Constitution to explicitly make provision for land EWC and to place land under state custodianship. This stance has triggered an overwhelmingly negative reaction and placed the white commercial farming community at

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loggerheads with Malema. His conflictual 'land language' is directed at the white commercial farmers and at the centre of his motivation for expropriation is the unfulfilled desire for restoration of dignity by returning land to dispossessed blacks. Here he impugns the "criminals who stole our land" (RSA, NA 2018b: 30) and makes it clear that:

> The time for reconciliation is over; now is the time for justice. If the grandchildren of Jan van Riebeeck have not understood that we need our land; that over and above that, it is about our dignity, then they have failed to receive the gift of humanity (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

In an apparent parody of the liberation struggle song "Kill the Boer" at an Africa Day celebration on 25 May 2018, Malema (2018c) first sang "shoot to kill" and later replaced the words, "kiss the Boer, the farmer." Then on 9 June 2018 he unapologetically repeated during an interview, "I don't know what's going to happen in the future. I'm saying to you we have not called for the killing of white people, at least for now. I can't guarantee the future" (Malema 2018b). In an address to white commercial farmers on 22 April 2015, Malema (2015) declared to his audience that "the EFF speaks about something that many of you are very scared of which is expropriation without compensation." He went on to explain that expropriation of land is "the most effective mechanism to redistribute the land into the hands of all South Africans" and that state custodianship means that "government must be the custodian of the land and the land that is abandoned and is idling (sic) should be expropriated to the benefit of all" (Malema 2015). He continued by elaborating that

> if there is a farm, a farm which is productive and we know that that land is used for agricultural purpose (*sic*) we don't have to interfere with the production in (*sic*) that piece of land, we ought to protect it (Malema 2015).

Nonetheless, Malema remained adamant that white property ownership patterns must change when he stated in the NA on 25 June 2019 that "white people will continue to think they are superior because they own the means of production" [Applause.], reiterating that "[w]e make no apology and neither are we ashamed to repeat the call that the land must be expropriated for equal redistribution" (RSA, NA 2019a: 61-62). Despite his reassurances regarding EWC there have been instances when Malema has raised the ire of whites because of veiled threats. On 7 November 2016 during a speech to supporters at Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal he said

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> We are not calling for the slaughtering of white people, at least for now. [Applause]. What we are calling for is for peaceful occupation of the land and we don't owe anyone apology about that (Malema 2016c).[48]

The social network constructed by Malema has international and domestic dimensions. The international dimension reflects both the party's iconic logo and the election manifesto, which highlight a distinctive Africanist identity. This dimension symbolically lauds icons such as Mugabe for their land reform programmes in the face of obstacles placed in their paths by imperialist countries but Malema is clear that Zimbabwe is not the blueprint for South Africa's land reform programme.

Malema (2016b) therefore envisions a society, consisting of social communities, that is equal and inclusive where "we don't see each other as black and white but we see each other as human beings" and in this way he envisages the achievement of identity sameness. He acknowledges the presence of whites and Afrikaners in particular. During an address to the Oxford Union on 10 January 2016 he repeated that "[w]e in South Africa, black and white, we co-exist as people. We fight colonialism, we do not fight white people" (Malema 2016a). In the same address he was adamant that "[w]e do not want to replace white supremacy with black supremacy. We want to create a society where all of us exist as human beings and not as white and black" (Malema 2016a). Speaking at the memorial service on 12 April 2018 to commemorate the passing of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela he adamantly stated that her stance of not wanting the "madness of driving white people to the sea" will continue to be advocated by the EFF since "[o]ur march for land is not driving whites to the sea" (Malema 2018d). Often unnoticed is Malema's call to whites to share land, which he has made on a number of occasions. For example, in an address to his supporters in Bloemfontein on 20 April 2019, he said, "let us share this land, let us share this world" (Malema 2019a).

5.4.5. **Conflict, unity and diversity: a summation**

The 'land language' articulated by Malema reflects the broader societal reality of the dispossessed and is sometimes conflictual, sometimes unifying and sometimes diversifying. It

[48] Malema's utterance prompted the FW de Klerk Foundation to lodge a complaint with the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) on the grounds that it constituted hate speech and an incitement of violence against white South Africans. The SAHRC ruled on 8 March 2019 that Malema's utterances did not constitute hate speech (politicsweb 2019).

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is conflictual in the sense that he argues that land has been stolen by whites and should be returned by EWC. For Malema, land and dignity are intimately linked and it is the deficiency of dignity that drives his resentment at being ideationally relegated to an invisible status. It is this disillusionment that motivates his confrontation with the ANC and FF+, which have not recognised that the return of land also holds with it the return of dignity to the dispossessed. As a consequence, the white other – the FF+ and white commercial farmers – is othered in 'land language' that is derogatory, vilifying and threatening, while the black other – the ANC – is framed as weak and lacking in resolve to address the land question meaningfully because the party is fearful of harming white interests. Here Malema has clearly appropriated the land question as EFF property and has successfully advocated for and driven the Section 25 amendment to the Constitution. However, it is the prevailing inertia that concerns Malema, as it perpetuates unfulfilled expectations among the landless, which increases the potential for a spontaneous uprising. An over-arching concern raised by Malema, not only in respect of land but also regarding unfulfilled black expectations, is his warning of an "un-led uprising which becomes anarchy and puts their lives in danger" (Malema 2013; Malema 2019b). His concern serves as a warning that spontaneous violent consequences could follow if the land question is not meaningfully resolved. Despite his conflictual 'land language' that creates a feeling of insecurity among white commercial farmers, Malema advocates for diversity and unity, but makes it clear that it is within the realm of EWC. He recognises the white other as having a place and purpose in South Africa and appeals for a collaborative effort in finding an authentic and sustainable solution to the land question. His invitation to engage is underpinned by a desire for restoration of dignity. Land ownership for the landless improves their lived experience and reduces marginalisation and hopelessness. This, in his imagination, involves narrowing the ideational distance between the white other and the social community he has constructed by emphasising a shared dignity. It is in this vein that Malema appears to call for the inculcation of shared values that are embodied in unity among blacks and unity between white and black, an absence of violence and sharing of the land.

5.5. **Freedom Front Plus**

The advent of the democratic dispensation in 1994 brought an end to the privileged position of whites who had benefitted materially and ideationally under apartheid. Although the newly negotiated dispensation made provision for the protection of minority rights, a significant degree of suspicion and mistrust remained, which brought about an upsurge in Afrikaner

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nationalism. The resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in post-1994 South Africa provided an opportunity for the establishment of the Freedom Front (FF) on 1 March 1994 under the leadership of General (retired) Constand Viljoen, a former Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF). This party was characterised as pro-Afrikaner and nationalist, with its original objective the establishment of a *volkstaat* (an independent state for Afrikaners) premised on a right to self-determination, as stipulated in the 1993 Interim Constitution (News24 2019). In 2004 the FF merged with the Conservative Party and '*Afrikaner-Eeheidsbeweging'* (Afrikaner Unity Movement) and with the Federal Alliance in 2006 and was subsequently re-named the FF+ (News24 2019). Since its establishment in 1994 its advocacy for a *volkstaat* has fallen away and it now concentrates on protecting the rights and interests of Afrikaners that include, among others, the rejection of land EWC (The South African Elections 2019).

Support for the FF+ increased over the period from 2013 to 2019, but it remains a minority party compared to the ANC; it ranked fifth overall in terms of voter support during the 2019 elections. In the 2014 elections the party secured 165 715 votes or 0.9% of the overall poll, translating into four seats in the NA (Independent Electoral Commission 2014). In the 2019 elections the party showed an upswing in support and secured 414 864 or 2.38% of the overall poll, translating into 10 seats in the NA (Independent Electoral Commission 2019).

Figure 28: FF+ logo

(FF+ 2020)

The identity of the FF+ is portrayed in its official logo as depicted in Figure 28 above, which consists of three icons and two indices. An analysis of the logo reveals that it consists of three stylised icons and two colour indices: firstly, on the left is a green flame, symbolising a connection with Africa, land and nature; secondly, in the middle is an orange flame symbolising Afrikaner freedom; and finally to the right is a jubilant person symbolising a Christian identity (Freedomfront Plus 2020). Yet interpretations differ. According to one

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commentator, Keith Gottschalk, the use of orange, white and green as an index is evocative of the *vierkeur* flag of Paul Kruger's *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* established in 1852 (News24 2019). This is indicative of the differing perceptions attached to the use of icons in the form of colours, which are socialised in various guises. Finally, symbolic language in the form of an Afrikaans abbreviation, VF (*Vryheidsfront*), identifies the name of the party. The use of Afrikaans is noteworthy in that it signifies the party as representing the interests and aspirations of the Afrikaner community.

5.5.1. **The ideational dimension of land: the FF+ perspective**

In the 2014 election manifesto the FF+ emphasises that South Africa is the Afrikaner's country of origin where they belong as a cultural group distinguished by the language they speak (FF+ 2014b). Another distinguishing feature is their ownership of land as "Afrikaners also want the peace of mind that a part of the African earth inalienably belongs to them" (FF+ 2014b). However, by negating white land ownership in favour of black land ownership, land reform is discriminatory and therefore "one-way traffic" (FF+ 2014b). The manifesto highlights that land ownership has an emotional dimension for Afrikaners and black South Africans; land is not simply a commodity with commercial value (FF+ 2014b). As a consequence, the FF+ vehemently opposes EWC. In his keynote address at the manifesto launch on 8 March 2014, party leader Pieter Mulder also alluded to the creation of expectations by the ANC to amend the law to re-open land claims. These expectations, Mulder asserted, are unlikely to be realised and constitute a "*resep vir 'n rewolusie*" (Translation: recipe for a revolution) (FF+ 2014a).

The agricultural sector, with white commercial farmers as primary role players, is a source of employment and provider of food security in South Africa. The manifesto lauds white commercial farmers for their resilience in the face of farm attacks, which bear the hallmarks of excessive cruelty directed against the victims. It is noted that it is "more dangerous being a farmer than a police officer" (FF+ 2014b). The manifesto highlights farm murders as a "crisis" and advocates that the government declares it a priority crime (FF+ 2014b).

"Fight(ting) back against expropriation without compensation" is the first of five focus areas identified in the FF+ 2019 election manifesto, *Manifesto 2019 Election: There is Hope*, and the party opposes the "myth that white people stole all the land in their possession" (FF+

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2019). It contends that "[l]and is used as a populist political weapon" and the FF+ rejects another myth that "owning land creates wealth" (FF+ 2019). The manifesto also points to EWC as a threat to property ownership, especially property owned by white commercial farmers, who have been reduced to "thieves who stole the land or property currently in their possession" (FF+ 2019). It also notes that whites are singled out as a causal factor in the failure of the ANC government as

> [t]he ANC is looking for a scapegoat to blame for everything that is wrong in South Africa; for all its own failures and for the country's overall deterioration. The party uses white people as the scapegoat and is trying to retain its supporters by blaming white people and apartheid for all the crises in the country. Racial polarisation is used for short-term political gain (FF+ 2019).

The same manifesto also emphasises that the FF+ is "strongly opposed to expropriation without compensation and is of the opinion that there is enough land available for redistribution" and repeats the party's ideational stance on land that featured in the 2014 election manifesto (FF+ 2019).

The FF+ election manifestos highlight the right of Afrikaners to belong in South Africa, that whites are scapegoated and are blamed by the ANC for the ills of the country, with racial polarisation as an outcome. Concerning land, the party rejects the notion that land is stolen property and as a consequence it staunchly opposes EWC.

5.5.2. **Petrus Johannes Groenewald**

Born on 27 August 1955, Petrus Johannes Groenewald is a career politician who entered politics in 1978 as a university student over differences he had with the erstwhile NP (People's Assembly n.d.). During his career as a politician he occupied various positions, ranging from member of parliament (1989), mayor of Stilfontein (1998) and member of the North West Provincial Legislature (1999-2000) before returning to Parliament in 2001 (People's Assembly n.d.). He is currently the parliamentary leader of the FF+ since his election to that position in November 2016 when he succeeded Pieter Mulder. He holds a BJuris from the University of the North West, a postgraduate diploma in Communications, a master's degree in Communications and a doctorate in Political Studies. The title of his doctoral thesis is "The South African National Electoral System – A Critical Analysis and Alternatives." Groenewald

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is "not ashamed to say that I fight for the rights of Afrikaners because Afrikaners must have a voice in Parliament and that is why most of my speeches are in Afrikaans" (People's Assembly n.d.), although he occasionally delivers some speeches or responses in English. Moreover, he is "passionate about the protection of minority rights in South Africa", has a steadfast belief in the Afrikaner's right to self-determination (People's Assembly n.d.) and he confirms his identity by using Afrikaans in the NA.

A qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by Groenewald, as leader of the FF+, is conducted in the following sections according to the two themes. The first theme is the social community constructed by Groenewald concerning the land and the second, the social networks.

5.5.3. **Theme: The social community constructed by Groenewald concerning the land**

A qualitative content analysis of Groenewald's articulation of 'land language' to construct a social community is located in the following sub-sub-categories: identity, agency, structure and community. He mostly projects these in with symbolic language. Qualitative content analysis reveals that Groenewald mainly relies on exercising iterational, projective and practical evaluative agency in institutional structures to construct an identity for white commercial farmers that has an internal coherence and an external distinction for a social community with a sense of kinship, place, purpose and feeling.

White commercial farmers are a "strategic minority enterprise responsible not only for food security but also job creation, economic growth and prosperity to (*sic*) the entire South African nation" (Groenewald 2015c) and are the essence of the social community that Groenewald constructs around the land question and the 'land language' he articulates. Groenewald states clearly that he represents white commercial farmers as a social community, whom he symbolically identifies as "*boere*"[49] (RSA, NA 2018g: 99). As the political voice of this community Groenewald cemented his position and attitude to land in the NA on 19 February 2018 when he said, "I am an Afrikaner and a son of the soil of Africa" (RSA, NA 2018c: 94). By evoking autochthony, he justifies his belonging that is founded on an original

[49] Different meanings are attached to the word "*boer*." The *boers* (literal translation: farmers) are the original Dutch settlers and are the progenitors of the Afrikaners (Van der Westhuizen 2018). It is in this context that Groenewald uses the word to signify a particular identity.

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right to land in Africa, providing him with validation to authentically represent in this case, land-owners, who also nurture an autochthonous claim of belonging to the soil.

As land-owners with a sense of place in South Africa, white commercial farmers, Groenewald repetitively contends, are pivotal in ensuring South Africa's food security (RSA, NA 2014b: 201; RSA, NA 2015d: 138; RSA, NA 2018i: 177) and therefore have a sense of purpose. Yet this sense of purpose is under threat, as whites are often scapegoated by the ANC and blamed for the ills of the country (RSA, NA 2018m: 36). Groenewald argued that the re-opening of land claims under the Restitution of Land Claims Amendment Bill passed by the NA on 19 February 2014 created uncertainly in the white commercial farming sector and as a consequence, farmers were reluctant to invest in their farms; this threatened food security (Groenewald 2015a). By appropriating food security on behalf of white commercial farmers Groenewald exercises considerable agency and in this regard he warned in the NA on 18 February 2014:

> Yes, you may shout to your heart's content here today, but when the day comes when you have no food on your table, then you will see how much you will shout. [Interjections].
>
> It is the agricultural sector that feeds the country (RSA, NA 2014b: 202).

He repeated the purpose of farmers and their role in ensuring food security on 14 March 2017: "I also want to say that everything you have eaten to this today (*sic*) – or what you have drunk, besides pure water – was the product of the agricultural sector and produced by famers" (RSA, NA 2017d: 4). Groenewald articulated a debt of gratitude owed to white commercial farmers by South Africans for their sense of purpose in the NA on 25 June 2019 as follows: "[t]he food you had this morning when you had breakfast … you must thank the farmers for it. Everybody who is going to have lunch must thank the farmers for it" [Interjections] (RSA, NA 2019a: 89).

Groenewald invokes his version of historical reality to explain how white commercial farmers came to own land and while he admits that there were past wrongs related to land dispossession, he is adamant that land was not stolen (Groenewald 2014a; Groenewald 2014b; Groenewald 2017c). He is of the opinion that "[t]here are many interpretations when it comes to history" (RSA, NA 2018b: 53) and on 1 December 2016 he vented his frustration in the NA:

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> *Agb Adjunkspeaker, ek is moeg daarvoor om elke keer hier in die Parlement te moet hoor dat die grond gesteel is …*
>
> *Niemand het grond gesteel nie. Die wettige grondeienaars in Suid-Afrika het betaal daarvoor. Hulle het gewerk daarvoor. [Tussenwerpsels.]* (RSA, NA 2016a: 28).
>
> Translation: Hon Deputy Speaker, I am tired of having to hear constantly in Parliament that the land was stolen …
>
> Nobody has stolen land. The legitimate land owners in South Africa have paid for it. They worked for it [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2016a: 29).

In response to the Deputy Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform who stated in the NA on 13 June 2017 that "the African people under the leadership of their traditional leaders fought fierce wars against the white colonial settlers whose only intentions was (*sic*) to dispossess them of their land and livestock" (RSA, NA 2017c: 61-62) Groenewald countered:

> *Ek wil ook vir die agb lid van die ANC sê … wat u sê, dat al die grond deur oorlog gevat is … gaan lees u geskiedenis. Daar was baie stamkapteine, selfs konings wat grond gegee het aan die Voortrekkers. Hulle het dit nie gevat nie. Hulle is gegee vir daardie mense in Suid-Afrika. [Tussenwerpsels]* (RSA, NA 2017c: 84).
>
> Translation: I also wish to say to the honourable ANC member … if you say that all of the land was taken by war … go and read your history. There were many tribal chiefs, even kings who gave land to the *Voortrekkers*. They did not take it. It was given to those people in South Africa.

Groenewald consistently endeavours to debunk the myth that whites have stolen land (RSA, NA 2016a 60,61; RSA, NA 2018b: 53) and he is particularly concerned by the populist, negative and one-sided portrayal of Afrikaner history, which depicts "Afrikaners and whites as criminals and land grabbers in their own country" (Groenewald 2016b). "[T]he narrative that the land was stolen must stop because it is false", he said in the NA on 27 February 2018 (RSA, NA 2018b: 53) and he has also emphasised the same point during interviews (Groenewald 2018a; Groenewald 2018b). He is of the opinion that rhetoric claiming that land was stolen criminalises land owners and it is irresponsible of politicians to make such statements, which are untrue (Groenewald 2017c; Groenewald 2018a). During a television interview on 19 June

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2017 Groenewald pointed out, when questioned about land and the potential for a civil war in South Africa, that

> if anybody thinks that they will be able to just come and grab the land in South Africa without compensation they are actually living in a dream world and I said then that if you want to start the civil war they must do just that and I'm quite serious when I say that because I also see it as a responsibility from my side to say to people stop this (*sic*) irresponsible remarks (Groenewald 2017c).

Following a remark made by Ramaphosa in the NA on 7 March 2019 "that there is land in our country that was stolen from the people of the country [Applause.]" (RSA, NA 2019e: 16) Groenewald challenged the President to identify which land was stolen, by whom and then prosecute those responsible (Naidoo 2019). In every instance the ANC and EFF have reacted with derision and hostility to Groenewald's claim that land was not stolen (RSA, NA 2017c: 126; RSA, NA 2018b: 74-81). During "Questions to the President" in the NA on 14 March 2018 Groenewald addressed Ramaphosa as follows:

> *Speaker, ek wil begin deur vir die agb President te sê dat hy 'n beredeneerde argument oor grondhervorming sal kry as die uitgangspunt aanvaar word dat bestaande wit eienaars van grond die grond op 'n regmatige, op 'n eerlike, en op 'n hardwerkende manier verkry het. Hulle werk hard om Suid-Afrika te voed. Dit moet die uitgangspunt wees.*
>
> *Verder wil ek vir die agb President sê dat onteiening sonder vergoeding nie sy grondhervormingsprobleem gaan oplos nie. U voormalige Minister, mnr Nkwinti, het in hierdie Huis erken dat 93% van begunstiges in terme van restitusie nie die grond wou hê nie. Hulle wou die geld hê. U eie Minister het erken in hierdie Huis dat die staat die titelaktes bekom het van 99% van grond wat in grondhervormingsprogramme verkry is.*
>
> *Nou is my vraag aan u, agb President: Dink u nie as u 'n sukses van grondhervorming wil maak dat die meer as 4 000 plase wat tans in besit van die die regering is eers verdeel moet word en aan mense gegee moet word nie? Dan wil ek laastens vir u sê dat ek saamstem dat regte beskerm moet word, maar agb President, op grondvlak, as 'n grondeienaar se grond onwettig beset word en hy skakel die polisiestasie, sê die polisie hulle kan niks doen nie. Dit moet onmiddellik reggestel word. Jy kan nie verwag dat 'n persoon eers by die hof 'n aansoek moet kry nie. Die polisie moet dadelik optree. Ek dank u. [Tyd verstreke].* (RSA, NA 2018n: 33-34).

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Translation: Speaker, I want to start by saying to the hon President that he will receive a reasoned argument about land reform should the point of departure be accepted that existing white owners had obtained land in a fair, honest and hard-working manner. They work hard to feed South Africa. That should be the point of departure.

Furthermore, I would like to say to the hon President, that his land reform problem will not be solved by expropriation without compensation. Your former Minister, Mr Nkwinti, acknowledged in this House that in terms of restitution, 93% of the beneficiaries did not want the land. They wanted the money. Your own Minister has acknowledged in this House that the state has recovered the title deeds of 99% of the land that was obtained in programmes of land reform.

Now, my question to you, hon President, is: Do you not think that, if you wish to make a success of land reform, that the more than 4 000 farms that are currently owned by the government should be divided and given to the people first? Then, I would like to say finally, that I agree that rights should be protected, but hon President, at grass-roots level, when a landowner's land is illegally occupied and he contacts the police station, the police tell him they cannot do anything. That situation must be rectified immediately. One cannot expect a person to lodge a court application first. The police must act immediately. I thank you. [Time expired.]

The misuse of the land question to acquire votes was raised in the NA by Groenewald when he observed on 13 June 2017, "*daar is 'n kompetisie tussen die ANC aan die een kant, en die EFF aan die ander kant om te kyk aan wie hulle die meeste beloftes kan maak in terme van grond*" (RSA, NA 2017c: 81). (Translation: There is a competition between the ANC on the one side and the EFF on the other side to see who can make most promises regarding land.) Here Groenewald highlights how the land question is misused by the ANC and EFF for a political purpose to leverage support by making election promises to voters, which are unlikely to be kept. He delivered a member's statement, "Abuse of the Land Issue" on 21 August 2018 to the NA in this respect:

Agb Voorsitter, ek het by verskeie geleenthede in hierdie Huis gesê dat grond 'n emosionele saak is. Ek het by verskeie geleenthede 'n beroep op politieke partye gedoen om met omsigtigheid met grond om te gaan.

Tans word die grondkwessie op 'n onverantwoordelike manier deur politieke partye vir populistiese steun misbruik, met die oog op volgende jaar se algemene verkiesing.

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Dis uiters onverantwoordelik; dit verdeel die gemeesnskap; en dit is 'n gevaarlike standpunt wat ingeneem word, wat die emosies in Suid-Afrika sodanig verhoog, dat ons op die einde van die dag met 'n verdeelde Suid-Afrika gaan sit.

Die VF Plus doen 'n beroep op alle politieke partye om rasioneel met grond om te gaan. Politieke partye moet ophou om die grondkwessie, veral onteiening sonder vergoeding te misbruik, as gevolg van hule eie onvermoë om kiesers te lok, ten koste van die ekonomie.

Die ANC, wat uit dubble monde praat en wat eindelik 'n gevaarlike standpunt inneem moet dit staak, anders gaan daar onvoorsiene gevolge vir Suid-Afrika wees [Tyd verstreke.] Dankie. (RSA, NA 2018h: 193-194)

Translation: Honourable Chair, I have on previous occasion warned in this House that land is an emotional issue. I have on numerous occasions called on political parties to address land with circumspection.

The land question is at present being misused in an irresponsible manner by political parties to garner populist support for next year's general elections.

This is highly irresponsible; it divides the community; and it is a dangerous stance that has been adopted, which heightens emotions in South Africa; we will at the end of the day have a divided South Africa.

The FF Plus calls upon all political parties to work rationally with land. Political parties must cease misusing the land question, especially expropriation without compensation, to hide their inability to attract voters to the detriment of the economy.

The ANC, which speaks dishonestly and adopts a dangerous point of view must cease this, otherwise there will be unforeseen consequences for South Africa. [Time expired.] Thank you.

The externally distinctive identity of the social community constructed by Groenewald concerning the land is particular to the Afrikaner, but also extends indexically to whites in general, "*die Vryheidsfront is nie skaam om te sê dat ons staan op vir die regte van die Afrikaner, en as ons gaan kyk na die debat vandag – die narratief soos hulle verwys – dan staan ons op vir die witmense van Suid-Afrika*" (Groenewald 2017a). (Translation: The Freedom Front is not ashamed of saying we stand up for the rights of Afrikaners and if we look

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to the current debate – the narrative which is referred to – then we also stand for the white people of South Africa.) The role of the Afrikaner in contributing to South Africa was articulated by Groenewald when he invoked the South African Constitution and Freedom Charter (indicated in italics) as follows:

> *South Africa belongs to all who live in it* (own italics) and the Afrikaner played an important role throughout the centuries to build it up for the benefit of all South Africans. Afrikaners can and should be proud of this contribution of construction and do not have to (be) apologetic about it (Groenewald 2016b).

By invoking the South African Constitution and Freedom Charter, Groenewald reminds his social community that they rightfully belong in South Africa and have played – and continue to play – a meaningful role in the country. He, however, maintains that this community risks domination; quoting Mandela at his 1964 treason trial, "I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination", Groenewald said in the NA on 15 March 2018, "[w]hat we are experiencing in this House, especially when it comes to the land issue, we are experiencing black domination. That is what you are trying to do" (RSA, NA 2018k: 87).

Internal coherence is achieved by mostly interpellating with Afrikaners and he draws on their historical roots, on their culture and on their traditions to promote a collective sense of identity linked to the land. A particular feature of the identity accorded to white commercial farmers, which promotes both internal coherence and external distinction, is the farm murder threat, which Groenewald describes as

> not only a crime against an individual; it is also a crime against a community. It is the women and children who pay the price of a farm murder when they are tortured, when boiling water is poured down their throats, when hot irons are used to burn the women, when they force a 12-year-old girl to watch her mother being raped. That's torture (RSA, NA 2019i: 89-90).

As the FF+ member on the Parliamentary Police Portfolio Committee, Groenewald has both institutional and structural agency to advocate that farm murders be given priority attention by government. On 15 March 2016 during a "Call on Government and Police to Investigate and Prioritise Farm Murders" he stated in the NA:

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> *Die ander werklikheid in Suid-Afrika is dat die wreedheid waarmee sekere moorde plaasvind ongekend en totaal onaanvaarbaar is. As ons byvoorbeeld kyk na die onlangse moord op 'n gesin op 'n kleinhoewe buite Randfontein, wat per definisie dan 'n plaasmoord is, vra mens jouself die vraag af: Hoe is dit dan moontlik dat 'n negejarige dogtertjie basies met 'n graaf doodgeslaan word en dit dan om niks eintlik te vat nie?*
>
> *Die regering het 'n vorige ondersoek na die wreedheid van moord geloods. Daar het niks van gekom nie. Die waarnemende Kommissaris van Polisie sê dat plaasmoorde 'n prioriteit is. Die VF Plus doen 'n beroep nie net op die polisie nie, maar ook op die regering om daadwerklik ernstig ondersoek in te stel, en dit as 'n prioriteit te beskou, na plaasmoorde en alle moorde in Suid-Afrika, veral die wreedheid waarmee dit gepaard gaan. Dit strek Suid-Afrika nie tot voordeel nie* (RSA, NA 2016f: 66).
>
> Translation: The other reality in South Africa is that the brutality of certain murders is unheard-of and totally unacceptable. By way of example, the recent murder of a family on a smallholding outside Randfontein – which by definition is a farm murder – begs the question: How is it possible that a nine year old girl is basically battered to death with a spade, yet nothing is actually taken.
>
> The government has previously launched an investigation into the brutality of the murders. Nothing came of it. The acting Commissioner of Police says that farm murders are a priority. The FF Plus not only call on the police, but also on government to really and seriously investigate farm murders and all other murders in South Africa, and to regard those as a priority, especially the brutality that accompanies it. This is not to South Africa's advantage (RSA, NA 2016f: 67).

On 14 March 2017 he called for a NA debate on farm murders which, Groenewald stresses, is "not an ordinary crime" (RSA, NA 2017d: 6) because of the brutality and callousness of the criminals:

> Willemien, a two-year-old toddler, her father and her mother were brutally murdered. When asked by state prosecutor, Jannie Botha, of his impressions of Potgieter's body, Dr Book, the coroner, said, "The deceased had been tortured to death." (RSA, NA 2017d: 6).
>
> … if you look, for instance, at the Swanepoel family in Bloemfontein. Investigating officer, Kobus Coetzee, told the court that the couple were tied to a single bed and tortured for hours.

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> The men took turns to rape Rienie, while her husband was forced to watch (RSA, NA 2017d: 6).
>
> … if you look, for instance, at the Schutter family of Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal. It says that Mrs Schutter's head was crushed with a heavy object and all three victims were set alight (RSA, NA 2017d: 7).
>
> … if you look at Dan Knight, also from KwaZulu-Natal, where it says that he and his partner, Beth Bucher, were attacked in their home by a gang of five men. Knight was beaten to death with hammers, while Bucher was forced to watch (RSA, NA 2017d: 7).
>
> … if you look at the recent case of Nicci Simpson. The perpetrators used a plastic bag on her, cut her arms, broke her ribs and one knee, and even used an electric drill to drill holes in her feet (RSA, NA 2017d: 7).
>
> … if you look at the farmer murdered near Parys. The murderers then actually took out his testicles, boiled them, cooked them, and ate them [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2017d: 7).

The speech by Groenewald concerning farm murders abjects the perpetrators by constructing horror, disgust and repugnance regarding the crimes visited upon white commercial farmers. As the abjector Groenewald interpellates with NA politicians in a bid to motivate them to reject the criminal abjectee by identifying the other as brutal and inhuman, which manifests as otherness. In an interview on 5 October 2017 he maintained that "some of these farm killings are racially motivated … but there is not enough research done on the matter"; the farming community "has been left exposed"; "there is a perception, politically, that farm murders are only affecting white people, which is completely wrong"; that farm murders must be prioritised; and that there must be "proper research on the reasons for farm murders" (Political Analysis South Africa 2017). He is particularly vocal in his call for farm murders to be "acknowledged and condemned" (Groenewald 2019a) by President Ramaphosa, whom he accuses of having no regard for the well-being of farmers (Groenewald 2019b). During the "Debate on Vote No 1: The Presidency Appropriation Bill" in the NA on 17 July 2019 Groenewald expressed his astonishment that Ramaphosa consistently and steadfastly refused to condemn farm murders:

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> Hon President, on a very serious note and with great respect, I want to ask you why you are afraid to condemn farm murders publically (*sic*). I just don't understand. The farming community of South Africa does not understand why you don't want to do it.
>
> Your premier in North West, your premier in Gauteng and even the hon Speaker behind me, when she was premier in North West, publically (*sic*) condemned farm murders. I appeal to you, hon President, publically (*sic*) condemn farm murders, because that is what the farming community wants to hear (RSA, NA 2019g: 97).

As a consequence, the farm murder threat is a call to action, as white commercial farmers cannot rely on the state and are obliged to address safety and security concerns as a community. In this respect Groenewald reiterates that the

> FF Plus is calling on all farmers to organise themselves so as to take care of their own safety. It is their constitutional right and cannot be put off any longer. The time has come for rural communities to ensure their own safety (Groenewald 2019b).

Groenewald speaks on behalf of white commercial farmers and makes use of structures and projective agency in tandem, specifically to counter EWC. On 26 May 2016 during the "Consideration of Expropriation Bill and of Report of Portfolio Committee on Public Works Thereon" he announced in the NA that:

> *Die beginsel van onteiening is nie 'n vreemde beginsel nie. Dit word wêreldwyd toegepas, in terme van noodsaaklike ontwikkeling wat moet plaasvind, byvoorbeeld as 'n brug of paaie gebou moet word.*
>
> *Maar die ANC in Suid-Afrika maak dit 'n politieke aangeleentheid. Die ANC wil hierdie wetsontwerp misbruik in terme van die politieke speelbal en die emosionele politieke speelbal van grond.*
>
> *Die agb President val in by die koor van die EFF wat sê dat die grond gesteel is. Daardeur wek hulle emosies op. Hierdie wetsontwerp sê ek weer 'n keer is net weer 'n stap om grondhervorming toe te pas, maar eintlik is dit maar net 'n verdere stap om wetlike grondgrype in Suid-Afrika toe te pas.*

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Ek weet dat die aanhef van hierdie wetsontwerp, artikel 25 van die Grondwet is. Ek wil asseblief vir die instellings wat beswaar gemaak het en gesê het dat hulle hierdie saak tot in die Grondwethof sal veg, vra om dit te doen. Ek wil dit ook op rekord plaas dat die Vryheidsfront Plus bekommerd is dat dit dalk wel in lyn kan wees met artikel 25 van die Grondwet en dan sal diegene wat artikel 25 in die Grondwet ingeskryf het end it ondersteun het,, saam met die ANC pa moet staan, as daar grondgrype in Suid-Afrika plaasvind.

Die President het ook gesê dat hy 'n nuwe wetsontwerp het, wat tans by die Kabinet is, wat na vore gaan tree om ook 'n beperking te plaas op grondbesit. Daardeur wil hy plase beperk tot 5 000 hektaar in terme van grootplase, en in die geval van plantasies ensovoorts, tot 12 000 hektaar. Daar word duidelik gesê dat die res onteien sal word.

Dit sal hierdie Onteieningswet wees wat gebruik gaan word, soos ons reeds gehoor het, om toe te sien dat 'n grondeienaar sy grond verloor en dalk niks daarvoor gaan kry nie. Dan sal diegene vir artikel 25 pa moet staan. Ons verwerp hierdie wetsontwerp. Ek dank u (RSA, NA 2016g: 68-70).

Translation: The principle of expropriation is not a foreign principle. It is implemented worldwide, in terms of essential development that has to take place, for example, when a bridge or road have to be build (*sic*).

But the ANC makes it a political matter. The ANC wants to misuse the Bill as a political football or emotional political football with regard to land.

The hon President joins the choir of the EFF who says that the land was stolen. By doing that, they stir up emotions. I repeat, this Bill is just another step to apply land reform, but ultimately it is actually just a further step to legally have land grab (*sic*) in South Africa.

I know that the preamble of this Bill is section 25 of the Constitution. I want to ask the institutions that objected to it, and said that they will fight the matter in the Constitutional Court, to please, do just that. I also want to put it on record that the Freedom Front Plus is worried that it might be in line with section 25 in the Constitution and then those who included section 25 in the Constitution and supported it, will have to, along with the ANC take responsibility if cases of land grab were to take place in South Africa.

The President also said that he has a new Bill, currently with Cabinet, that will come to the fore in order to put a limit on land ownership. Thus reducing the size of farms to 5 000 hectares in

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> terms of big farms, and in the case of plantations, etcetera, to 12 000 hectares. It is clearly stated that the rest will be expropriated.
>
> It will be this Expropriation Act that will be used, as we have already heard, to see to it that a landowner loses his land and might not get paid for it. Then those people will have to accept responsibility for section 25. We reject this Bill. We thank you (RSA, NA 2016g: 70-71).

By unmasking the motivation of the ANC concerning EWC, he says, is not only aimed at white commercial farmers but at all land-owners (RSA, NA 2018b: 54). Using Parliament as an institutional structure, he addressed the South African President in the NA regarding the attitude of white commercial farmers to EWC when on 22 August 2018 he made a veiled threat to Ramaphosa when he stated:

> *Agb President, daar is ook 'n boodskap van ander boere, en dis 'n ernstige boodskap. Met respek gesê, die boere se boodskap is hulle sal nie vrywillig afstand doen van hul grond nie [Tussenwerpsels.] Dit moet u ook verreken* (RSA, NA 2018g: 99).
>
> Translation: Honourable President, there is also a message from other farmers and it is a stern message. With respect, the farmers' message is that they will not voluntarily surrender their land. [Interjections.] You will have to take this into account.

On 12 March 2019 during "Questions to the President", Groenewald was unyielding in his opposition to expropriation and queried how it will contribute to land reform as the state has itself has unused and unproductive tracts of land that can be allocated to the landless:

> In the light of the statistics of the annual reports of (*sic*) land reform, where it has been found that, for instance, on the restitution claims, 94% of the claimants did not want the land; they wanted financial compensation. So, land was not the issue. It was not a problem. It is also stated in those same annual reports that when it came to land redistribution, that 90% of those projects were failures. So, the land is there. The government has millions of hectares of land available. So, the question is not land. So, how is expropriation without compensation going to accelerate land reform seeing that the land is available at present? (RSA, NA 2019f: 75-76).

On 17 July 2019 Groenewald nonetheless highlighted the inevitability of the envisaged change to Section 25 of the Constitution when he said:

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> *Die agb Adjunkpresident het hier verwys na die grondkwessie. Daar is nog liggelowiges wat glo dat die Grondwet nie gewysig sal word om onteiening sonder vergoeding moontlik te maak nie. Die agb Adjunkpresident het vandag in die Begrotingspos van die President gesê dat die regering voort sal gaan om artikel 25 van die Grondwet te wysig. Hy wag vir die Presidensiële verslag, maar hulle gaan steeds voort. Daarom wil ek vandag vir die mense van Suid-Afrika sê om kennis te neem dat dit gaan gebeur. [Tussenwerpsels.] (RSA, NA 2019g: 99).*
>
> Translation: The hon Deputy President referred here to the land question. There are still denialists who believe that the Constitution will not be amended to make expropriation without compensation possible. The hon Deputy President said today in the President's Appropriation Bill that the government will proceed with amending section 25 of the Constitution. He waiting for the Presidential report but they are going ahead. Therefore, I want to say to the people of South Africa, take note that this is going to happen. [Interjections].

Groenewald continues to maintain that EWC is unnecessary, as there is enough land for redistribution, especially in the rural areas. During deliberations concerning "Vote No 39 – Rural Development and Land Reform" in the NA on 23 July 2019, he declared:

> Hon House Chairperson, the Budget Vote is about rural development and land reform. The President himself said that according to predictions, by 2030, 70% of the population of South Africa will be urbanised. If we talk about rural development, the image is created that the land is the problem when you talk about rural development. The fact of matter is that it is just not true. There is enough land in South Africa for each and every one. [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2019h: 194).

Unity concerning the land question was constructed by Groenewald specifically with respect to cooperation by white commercial farmers when he stated in the NA on 13 June 2017 that:

> *Boere is bereid om te help. Hulle is ook gereed vir mentorskap. Hulle gee dit reeds. U maak nie gebruik van die welwillendheid van die boere nie, spesifiek as dit kom by landbougrond* (RSA, NA 2017c: 85).
>
> Translation: Farmers are willing to help. They are also prepared for mentoring. They are doing it already. You are not using the goodwill of the farmers, especially when it concerns agricultural land.

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In the NA on 19 February 2018 he repeated, “Afrikaners and white people want to contribute to a better future for South Africa. We can help to build a better South Africa but then we need to have mutual respect for each other” (RSA, NA 2018c: 94). When questioned in a television interview on 5 March 2018 regarding the sincerity of white commercial farmers concerning their support for land restitution Groenewald said,

> I can assure you … they are willing to participate in land reform in South Africa ... some of them are even willing to help people to gain the knowledge to become agricultural people and farmers in South Africa so there is goodwill (Groenewald 2018a).

On the 15 June 2019, Groenewald reiterated that “the FF Plus and its supporters want to build South Africa. We want to build a better future for all” (RSA, NA 2019a: 85).

A particular feature of this social community is its limited digital footprint. In this regard Groenewald makes use of the Twitter social media platform, which he joined in June 2013 under the handle @GroenewaldPJ; on 28 August 2020 he had 9 532 followers and 6 180 tweets. While all followers are not white commercial farmers, this is proof that this platform is not particularly popular as a means of communication with the social community he constructs, presumably because his overall constituency is older and not well-attuned to the use of social media.

The ‘land language’ articulated by Groenewald constructs a social community consisting of white commercial farmers with a mainly white Afrikaner identity and a commercial farming purpose that embodies the provision of employment and the assurance of food security for South Africa. He is nonetheless adamant that this community risks domination and is under threat, on the one hand from EWC and on the other, from crime and specifically farm murders. Land was legally acquired by farmers and in this regard, he is vehemently opposed to EWC as it is the ANC government, not the white commercial farmers, that is responsible for the failed attempts to address the land question. Moreover, he is of the opinion that there is enough land in state hands that can be redistributed, which negates the requirement to change Section 25 to make provision for EWC.

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5.5.4. **Theme: The social networks constructed by Groenewald**

The social community constructed by Groenewald concerning the land is widened and extended into networks that have international and domestic components for exercising agency. Groenewald constructs his international network component using agency that is practical/evaluative to "internationalise" (Makinana 2018) the land question, specifically EWC. In 2018, after the NA passed a resolution to amend the constitution to make EWC more explicit, he said that the FF+ would undertake an international campaign to "alert the international world of the intentions of the ANC", as South Africa would be on the same chaotic land reform trajectory followed by Zimbabwe (Groenewald 2018a). The network includes the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva and engaging with members of the European Parliament. In this respect he advocates that EWC violates Article 17 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects private ownership of property and prohibits EWC.

He was elected on 28 June 2017 to the executive committee of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) – an international body for the promotion of minority group rights – as the representative of the Afrikaner nation (Groenewald 2017b). On 27 June 2017 the UNPO General Assembly adopted a resolution submitted by Groenewald calling for measures to protect the rights of the Afrikaner, which noted the following:

> … the notable increase in the marginalization of minority groups in South Africa and the continuous racial polarisation perpetuated by the South African Government and its President against the Afrikaner minority;
>
> … the violence and atrocities targeted against a strategic minority enterprise responsible not only for food security but also job creation, economic growth and prosperity to (*sic*) the entire South African nation;
>
> … continued strives (*sic*) by Government to legislate the expropriation of land without compensation;
>
> … more than 2 393 farm murders and 14 589 farm attacks which have taken place since 1991;
>
> … [t]he brutal and violent nature of these farm attacks and murders;

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> Requests the United Nations Human Rights Commission to initiate a full investigation to pressurize the South African government to put an end to these atrocities. (UNPO 2017).

Using this forum, he attended a presidential meeting of the UNPO in Brussels over the period 23-24 March 2018 and used the occasion to highlight, among others, the ANC intention to expropriate land without compensation (FF+ 2018). In November 2018 he again visited the Human Rights Council of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the Forum on Minority Issues the ANC government's intention to amend the South African Constitution to permit EWC, the scapegoating of the Afrikaner minority for the ills of South Africa and the fact that Afrikaners are vilified as land thieves (Groenewald 2018c). With the international component of his network, he specifically raised the issues of EWC and farm murders in South Africa, threatening that, "if it is necessary that we have to request sanctions against the South African government to prevent them to not change the Constitution, we will do so" (Makinana 2018).

The domestic network constructed by Groenewald has a number of distinguishing features. Firstly, the configuration of the network between the FF+ and the ANC is hierarchical and asymmetric. It is hierarchic in the sense that Groenewald seeks to establish a dominant position over the ANC because of its failure to exercise agency meaningfully to resolve the land question. Asymmetry is a consequence of ANC incompetence when aligning its actions with land reform policies and Groenewald has repeatedly attacked the ANC in the NA concerning this. According to Groenewald, it is the incompetence of the ANC government and corrupt officials – not white commercial farmers – that has led to the failure of the willing-buyer willing-seller principle (Groenewald 2014c; Groenewald 2015b). On 13 June 2017 he repeated his contention that the collapse of land reform cannot be attributed to the failure of the willing-buyer willing-seller principle; it is a result of

> *onbevoegde amptenare, en as gevolg van korrupsie wat plaasvind met grondhervorming … Daarom, om die beginsel van vrywillige koper en verkoper te wil gebruik as 'n verskoning, sê ek vir u, mislei u uself. Kry skoon administrasie* (RSA, NA 2017c: 85).
>
> Translation: incompetent officials, and as a consequence of corruption with land reform … Therefore, by using the principle of willing buyer and seller as an excuse, you are misleading yourself. Get clean administration.

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He is equally dismissive of the ANC's intransigent stance on land invasions, which he articulated thus in the NA on 12 March 2019 during "Questions to the President":

> Hon Deputy Speaker, hon Deputy President, firstly, to only discourage land invasion is not good enough. The President said that it will not be allowed. So, you are wrong. You should not allow that (RSA, NA 2019f: 75).

The insecurity that the ANC creates in the "agriculture community" is a particular concern for Groenewald as "uncertainty exists as to whether they still have their land" (RSA, NA 2014e: 40). Groenewald was especially vocal concerning the second reading debate on the Expropriation Bill on 23 February 2016 when he said that the Bill will legalise land grabs by the state:

> I also would like people and every landowner in South Africa to know that this law is the second-last Act by means of which land grabs in South Africa will occur legally. In Zimbabwe this was done illegally. In South Africa the ANC government would like to execute land grabs according to law (RSA, NA 2016c: 156).

Mistrust is another feature of asymmetry in the domestic network constructed by Groenewald. His 'land language' accuses the ANC of doublespeak when dealing with white commercial farmers. On 13 May 2015 he admonished the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Senzeni Zokwana during an EPC debate on the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Appropriation Bill (Vote 24):

> I would like to say to you that you underestimate the intelligence of the farmers. It seems to me that you think they are stupid clever (*sic*), because as a representative of the ANC controlled government you are playing the "good cop, bad cop" game with them. Your colleague is the "bad cop" within that particular context. He must tell them what is going on with the land. They will be taking the famers' land away from them. You are the 'good cop.' You must comfort the farmers and tell them, please don't worry; the politicians should stop making emotional announcements (RSA, NA 2015e: 64).
>
> If you were honest and frank with the farmers, the you would have come here and told the politicians to stop making emotional statements [about the land] (RSA, NA 2015e: 65).

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Hon Minister, you should not try and (*sic*) mislead the farmers. You will be caught out. Then, I would like to say to you, the farmers' lack of trust will be tenfold worse. Once they have trusted you, and you disappoint them later on … You do not know the farmers of South Africa yet (RSA, NA 2015e: 66).

I would also like to say to you today, hon Minister, the task of agriculture is the production of food. They need land to achieve that. You know that (RSA, NA 2015e: 66).

On 1 March 2016 Groenewald took Ramaphosa to task in the NA concerning his failure to promote nation building and stated that he instead "sows racial discord" (RSA, NA 2016e: 124) by propagating that land has been stolen:

[D]ie agb President 'n toespraak hou, en in sy toespraak by die verjaardagvieringe van die ANC, sê hy, onder andere, dat grond die oorsaak van armoede in Suid-Afrika is ... [Tussenwerpsels.] ... van werkloosheid en ongelykheid. Dan sê hy die grond is gesteel (RSA, NA 2016e: 123).

[T]he hon President delivered a speech at the birthday celebrations of the ANC, and, in his speech, he said, amongst others, that land is the cause of poverty in South Africa … [Interjections] … of unemployment in South Africa. Then he says the land has been stolen (RSA, NA 2016e: 124).

… the hon President should apologise to the white people of South Africa … [Interjections] … for saying they have stolen the land. That is a lie. [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2016e: 124).

Later in the same proceedings he said, "the hon Chief Whip (of the ANC) should also apologise. He owes the white people of South Africa an apology because nobody is a thief" [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2016e: 125). Groenewald once again voiced his mistrust of the ANC concerning their intentions regarding EWC when he said on 12 March 2019 during "Questions to the President":

Tweedens, as die interministeriële komitee wel aanbeveel dat onteiening sonder vergoeding nie nodig is nie, gaan die regering dit aanvaar, in die lig van die fiet dat die ANC wel 'n resolusie aanvaar het dat dit moet gebeur, of is die interministriële komitee maar net 'n rookskerm om beleid van die ANC uit te voer? Dankie (RSA, NA 2019f: 76).

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Translation: Secondly, if the inter-ministerial committee recommends that expropriation without compensation is unnecessary, in the light of the resolution taken by the ANC at their conference, will the government accept that or is the inter-ministerial committee only a smokescreen to ensure that the policy of the ANC is being implemented? Thank you.

A specific component of the mistrust and dishonesty that Groenewald highlights is attributed to "lies" (RSA, NA 2016d: 54-57) about land reform propagated by the ANC. On 26 April 2016 he highlighted the following during an EPC debate on the Rural Development and Land Appropriation Bill (Vote 39):

Voorsitter, ek wil vandag praat oor die leuen van grondhervorming.

Wat is die leuen? Die eerste leuen is dat daar deur die regering van die dag gesê word dat 80% van grond in Suid-Afrika aan wittes behoort. Dis 'n leuen, en die agb Minister weet dit. Vir meer as die afgelope 16 jaar is die regering besig met 'n grondoudit, want jy kan net die stelling maak as jy weet aan wie die grond behoort. Die departement kom nie na vore met hierdie grondoudit nie, en dit pas die regering, want hy kan die leuen bly verkondig dat 80% van grond dan aan wittes behoort. Dit is 'n leuen.

Wat is die volgende leuen? Die volgende leuen is dat die regering vir die massas daar buite sê dat grondhervorming grond aan 'n persoon gee. Agb Minister, dis mos onwaar. Navorsing het getoon dat slegs vir 1% – en ek sê dit weer – slegs vir 1% van grond wat deur middel van grondhervorming deur die regering verkry is daar kaart en transport oorgedra is. Net 1%, so wie is dan eintlik die eienaar? Die eienaar is die staat, en u weet mos, agb Minister. As jy nie eienaar van jou plaas is nie, jy nie na jou bank toe gaan of enige ander instelling en om 'n lening vra waar die grond vir daardie instelling as sekuriteit dien nie. So, die regering wil dit nie gee nie, want hy wil hê dat die mense wat die grond kry 'n mislukking maak daarvan – en hulle maak 'n mislukking.

Die agb Minister skud sy kop; hy stem saam. Dit is 'n mislukking, en hy het erken dat 90% van grondhervormingsprojekte 'n mislukking is. Daar word ook bevind dat slegs een uit 10 kommersiële plase wat deur grondhervorming bekom is – slegs een uit 10 – steeds aangegeaan het. Die ander kommersiële plase het eenvoudig boerdery gestaak. U bedreig voedselsekerheid in Suid-Afrika. U het nou gesê daar gaan 'n wetsontwerp op kommunale grondbesit kom, maar u sê ook duidelik: Jy kan daar bly, maar jy gaan nie eienaar word nie. As die mansgeslag dan iets oorkom en nie daar is nie, het die vroue sekerheid dat hulle wel op die grond kan wees.

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Watter sekerheid is dit, agb Minister? Is dit sekerheid gegrond op die stamkaptein of die tradisionele leier se grille en giere? As die tradisionele leier besluit dat hulle nie meer daar kan bly nie, moet hulle af van die grond. So, u skep nie sekerheid nie. U mislei. Dis 'n leuen om vir mense te sê dat grondhervorming vir hul verblyfreg sal gee.

Wat is die volgende leuen? Die volgende leuen is dat u dink en die regering van die dag sê vir die mense as hulle grond het, word hulle ryk, want dit is die witmense wat die grond het, en hulle is mos nou ryk volgens u. Dis 'n leuen. Grondbesit maak jou nie ryk nie; inteendeel, dit maak jou arm, want dis harde werk om 'n plaas te kan bestuur. [Tussenwerpsels.] Dit is die werklikheid. Verder weet u mos dat van die grondeise wat ingestel is, verkies 93% van daardie bevoordeeldes kontant. Hulle wil nie die grond hê nie, want u sien, as hulle die grond het, is dit 'n groter las wat op hul is. Hulle wil die kontant hê (RSA, NA 2016d: 52-54).

Translation: Chairperson, today I want to talk about the lie about land reform.

What is the lie? The first lie is that the government of the day says that 80% of land in South Africa belongs to whites. This is a lie and the hon Minister knows it. For more than the past 16 years, Government has been conducting a land audit, because you can only make such a statement if you know who the land belongs to. The department is not coming forward with this land audit, and it suits Government, because then he can keep preaching the lie that 80% of land belongs to whites. It is a lie.

What is the next lie? The next lie is that Government is telling the masses out there that land reform will return land to a person. Hon Minister, this is not true. Research has shown that title deeds were transferred for only 1% – and I will say it again – for only 1% of land acquired by Government through land reform. Only 1%, so who is really the owner? The owner is Government, and you know this, hon Minister. If you are not the owner of your farm, then you cannot go to your bank or any other institution to ask for a loan where the land acts as security for that institution. So, Government does not want to give it, because he wants the people who get the land, to fail – and they are failing.

The hon Minister shakes his head; he agrees. It is a failure, and he has admitted that 90% of land reform projects have failed. It has also been found that one out of every 10 commercial farms that has been acquired through land reform - only one out of 10 - has continued. The other commercial farms simply stopped farming. You are threatening food security in South Africa. You have now said that a bill on communal land ownership is coming, but you also make it clear: You can stay there, but you will not be the owner. If something happens to the

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> men and they are not there, then the women will have the assurance that they can be on the land. What assurance is this, hon Minister? Is this assurance based on the tribal chief or the traditional leader's whims and fancies? If the traditional leader decides that they cannot remain there, they will have to get off the land. So, you are not creating security. You are misleading. It is a lie to tell people that land reform will give them security of tenure.
>
> What is the next lie? The next lie is that you think, and the government of the day tells people, that if they have land, they will become rich, because it is the white people who have the land and they are rich, according to you. This is a lie. Land ownership does not make you rich; in fact, it makes you poor, because it is hard work to manage a farm. [Interjections.] This is the reality. Furthermore, you are aware that of the land claims that were instituted, 93% of those beneficiaries prefer cash. They do not want the land, because you see, if they have the land, it will be a greater burden on them. They want the cash (RSA, NA 2016d: 54-56).

He continued:

> *Kom ek sê vir u die verdere leuen is dat daar n euforie geskep word dat grond net eenvoudig oorgedra sal word. Die werklikheid is die regering van die dag is besig om grond te nasionaliseer, want u word die eienaar, en u gaan so nasionaliseer dat die dag as die EFF dink hulle gaan grond nasionaliseer, het u reeds al die grond genasionaliseer* (RSA, NA 2016d: 57).
>
> Translation: Let me tell you, the other lie is that a euphoria is created that land will simply be transferred. The reality is that the government of the day is nationalising land, because you become the owner, and you will nationalise in such a manner that the day that the EFF think that they will nationalise land, you will have nationalised all the land already. I thank you (RSA, NA 2016d: 57).

Moreover, he blames the ANC for the woeful state of South Africa's economy, which Groenewald attributes to "the governing party's expropriation without compensation" policy (RSA, NA 2018i: 176, 177-178). "The manner in which the governing ANC is using it, is nothing more than abuse to stir up emotions and create the expectations with people which cannot be fulfilled" (Groenewald 2013). On 25 July 2019 he said

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[t]he ANC tells people that they want expropriation without compensation so that people have access to land. They also say there will be strict preconditions before expropriation without compensation takes place (RSA, NA 2019d: 90).

Figure 29: The land debate

(Mail & Guardian 2014a)

The network between the FF+ and the EFF is likewise hierarchically and asymmetrically constructed. The cartoon published by Zapiro on 25 July 2014 in Figure 29 above consists of three icons and two indices. It comments on a confrontation in the NA between two members of parliament, Andile Mngxitama (EFF) and Groenewald, during the debate on Vote No 33 – Rural Development and Land Reform on 23 July 2014 (Mail & Guardian 2014b; RSA, NA 2014a). The confrontation started when Groenewald stated,

[l]et me place on record here, hon Minister: If our land was stolen in South Africa, then I will tell you today that it was the blacks who stole the land from the Khoi and the San. [Interjections.]

Put that on record. Stop talking about theft, because that is where theft then took place (RSA, NA 2014a: 65).

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Mngxitama responded by saying, "[t]his man is lying. The Khoi are black Africans … [Interjections.]" (RSA, NA 2014a: 67) and again exclaimed later that "[t]his man's lies offend me, Chair" (RSA, NA 2014a: 68). He thereupon asked,

> [a]re these people who are land thieves going to continue disrespecting us? They are just a minority who come here to tell us they can give us free education when they have stolen our land (RSA, NA 2014a: 71).

In the cartoon is EFF member of parliament, Mngxitama on the left as the first icon, confronting the second icon, Groenewald on the right. The third icon, in the middle is the Rural Development and Land Reform Minister, Gugile Nkwinti, depicted as frustrated (note expletive symbol), feeble and cowering amid the confrontation between the two. The index in the face-off between Mngxitama and Groenewald is the fiery 'land language', leaving the ANC plan for land reform side-lined and a source of open conflict between the political elites using confrontational 'land language.' In the NA confrontation, 'land language' symbols used by both members involve words such as 'land thieves' to depict whites who had stolen land from blacks while it was also used to depict blacks who had stolen land from the Khoi and San. In this way there is a clear definition of the other along racial lines and entails an external identity distinction based on an index that is skin colour. Othering manifests in accusations by the white politician that blacks stole land from blacks and the black politician accusing the white politician of lying, thereby leading to a significant degree of otherness between the two. In this way, the cartoon confirms the fiery emotions that the land question induces, how it has polarised races, and above all, the extent of the otherness distance between the two political elites.

Groenewald accused Malema of inciting racial hatred after a speech following a court appearance in Newcastle on 7 November 2016 when Malema (2016e) said "[w]e are not calling for the slaughtering of whites, at least not for now", as it implies that there may come a time when this will occur. Groenewald wrote in an article he released on 7 November 2016:

> This is racial hatred and creates the potential for civil war in South Africa. Malema and the EFF should take note that white land owners will not just meekly sit and watch how their land is occupied and taken away.

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> In the end, Malema will have to take full responsibility for the conflict that he is busy stoking about land in South Africa. White landowners worked for their property and legally acquired it and are therefore entitled to their property (Groenewald 2016c).

A particularly resentful Groenewald delivered a member's statement, "Hate Speech Against White South Africans by Julius Malema" on 15 November 2016 in the NA when he accused Malema of making racist statements directed at Afrikaners when he said,

> He is underestimating the Afrikaner, and I regard it as totally unparliamentary for an hon member to proclaim this hate speech outside. It simply heightens emotions. It creates the potential for conflict, and this is unacceptable (RSA, NA 2016b: 175).

On 1 December 2016 he warned the EFF:

> *En u gaan dit nie reg kry om grondeienaars van hulle grond af te dwing nie. U gooi brandende vuurhoutjies in die gras. En dit gaan brand. Moenie Suid-Afrika aan die brand steek nie.*
>
> *Ek wil vir die EFF waarsku: hou op met u retoriek. Dankie* (RSA, NA 2016a: 60).
>
> Translation: And you are not going to succeed in forcing land owners off their land. You are throwing burning matches into the grass. And it is going to catch alight. Do not set South Africa on fire.
>
> I would like to warn the EFF: stop your rhetoric! Thank you (RSA, NA 2016a: 61).

Groenewald cautions against the potential for manifest conflict inherent in EWC when he stated on 13 June 2017 in the NA:

> Let me put it quite frankly: If anybody in South Africa thinks that you take the land without compensation, you are living in a dream. [Interjections.] Let me put it quite frankly to you: If you want to start a civil war in South Africa, do that! [Interjections.] Do that! (RSA, NA 2017c: 81).

Groenewald's warning sparked a strong response from the EFF who admonished him for introducing the possibility of a civil war during a parliamentary debate. He responded, "You

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must listen carefully to what I said. I said, if you are going to continue with this, that is going to happen in South Africa. [Interjections.]" (RSA, NA 2017c: 83).

The EFF is singled out as the other and Groenewald reflects its otherness in the EFF propensity for encouraging land grabs: "Investor confidence is further hindered by the EFF's land-grab rhetoric, in which EFF supporters are encouraged to occupy land" (RSA, NA 2018i: 180). In addition, Groenewald has fashioned a particular other concerning EFF leader, Julius Malema, whom he disparagingly identifies as "nothing else than a micky (*sic*) mouse Commander-in-Chief" (RSA, NA 2018j: 143). His ire was directed at Malema in the NA on 15 November 2016 when he threatened:

> I find it extremely irresponsible for a leader sitting here in Parliament, the hon Julius Malema, to make the utterances that he is making about whites. They are racist. They are totally unacceptable, and I want to tell the hon member that he should not understand the decency and friendliness of Afrikaners the wrong way as if they signify weakness. He says the sparks will begin to fly when he becomes the president. He needs to be careful when the sparks begin to fly (RSA, NA 2016b: 174-175).

Regarding the EFF's approach to the land question, he said in the NA on 25 July 2019,

> Chairperson, it is quite clear that there is a fundamental difference between the EFF and the ANC when it comes to land. The ANC tells people that they want expropriation without compensation so that people have access to land. They also say that there will be strict preconditions before expropriation without compensation takes place.
>
> I think the EFF is more honest than the ANC. For them it is an ideological issue where they say that they want all the land and they want to nationalise it. At least they are honest when it comes to the land issue (RSA, NA 2019d: 90).

Groenewald has apparently not used his agency to construct distinct domestic networks connecting white commercial farmers with traditional authorities or other dispossessed minority groups. Apart from commenting at an EPC on 26 April 2016 that the envisaged Bill on Communal Land Ownership would not guarantee security of tenure for people under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities (RSA, NA 2016d: 55-56), there is no other evidence that his domestic network extends to the traditional authorities. In the same vein, his network does

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not involve other dispossessed minority groups such as the Khoi and San. Here he is singularly of the opinion that blacks stole land from the Khoi and the San and that it should be returned (RSA, NA 2014c: 65; Groenewald 2018b). Another characteristic of the domestic social network is that it does not explicitly incorporate other organisations such as AfriForum and its affiliates such as Solidarity, which also advocate Afrikaner interests. Although Groenewald participated in a safety summit with Solidarity on 6 May 2017 over a common concern regarding citizen safety and fighting of crime in the country (Solidarity 2017), there is limited evidence of substantive ties. Recognition of the need to reduce the stark distinction of the other, the act of othering and the ideational distance that is reflected in otherness features to some extent in Groenewald's 'land language.' Key to diversity is the acknowledgment of human rights and in this regard Groenewald avers that mutual respect is of fundamental importance.

> *Adjunkspeaker, die Vryheidsfront Plus is verbind tot menseregte. Ons glo dat menseregte bevorder moet word en ons glo ook in gelyke regte. As ons egter hier kom en ons sê dat ons menseregte erken, dan begin dit by die aspek van wedersydse respek.*
>
> *Ek sê dit weer eens ek sal altyd hier sê dat Suid-Afrika moet leer om wedersydse respek vir mekaar te hê omtrent hulle geskille, verskille, en hulle verskillende tale en kulture* (RSA, NA 2018k: 86).
>
> Translation: Deputy Speaker, the Freedom Front Plus is committed to human rights. We believe that human rights must be promoted and we also believe in equality. However, when we come here and say we acknowledge human rights, then it starts with mutual respect.
>
> I say this repeatedly, and I will always say it here that South Africans must learn to have mutual respect for each other and regarding their quarrels, differences, and their different languages and cultures.

The social networks that Groenewald constructs have a specific focus and do not demonstrate an extensive reach. His international reach is limited to organisations such as the UNPO and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations where he highlights the increasing marginalisation of the Afrikaner, the racial polarisation in the country, the intention of the ANC government to expropriate land without compensation and the prevalence of farm murders. The domestic component of the network he constructs is likewise limited to hierarchical and

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asymmetric ties with the ANC and the EFF. With this component, he uses his agency to attack the ANC for its inefficient land reform policy, for spreading lies about land reform and for its intention to expropriate land without compensation, which will lead to unfulfilled expectations. Concerning the EFF, Groenewald is adamant that the utterances of Malema directed at whites are racist and are a recipe for civil war in South Africa, as white land owners will not be passive bystanders and permit their property to be expropriated without compensation.

5.5.5. **Conflict, unity and diversity: a summation**

The 'land language' articulated by Groenewald reflects the broader societal reality of land owners – particularly white commercial farmers – and is sometimes conflictual, sometimes unifying and sometimes diversifying. Conflictual 'land language' by Groenewald symbolically articulates threats to white commercial farmers and threats directed at the ANC and EFF regarding the land question. The conflictual 'land language' he articulates is mostly within the domains of incipient and latent conflict.

It is conflictual in the sense that he rejects the domination of the land question by the EFF and ANC. He is especially infuriated by claims that land was stolen by white commercial farmers and invokes his particular version of history to reject this narrative which he finds offensive. Moreover, he objects to specific utterances by Malema which, Groenewald's warns, are hate speech directed at whites that inflame tensions, create racial polarisation and heighten the potential for manifest conflict. Expropriation of land, he warns, is also a recipe for manifest conflict, which is likely to set the country ablaze. Groenewald is somewhat reticent regarding unity and in this respect he simply advocates the need to promote mutual respect as the gateway to settling differences. Finally, his approach to unity is based on the willingness and goodwill of white commercial farmers to assist emerging farmers by sharing their knowledge and experience, but he laments a lack of recognition and collaboration in this regard.

5.6. **Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by EFF and FF+ party leaders, as political elites, from 2013 to 2019. The content of their language was analysed by focusing on symbols, icons and indices. In order to achieve the aim, the chapter opened with a methodological explanation of qualitative data analysis and

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its application, which was followed by the broad South African political context and selected events concerning the land question from 2013 to 2019. Thereafter, political cartoons were used as examples to portray the 'land language' in a broader societal context. Following this, a qualitative content analysis of the 'land language' articulated by Malema (EFF) and Groenewald (FF+), two principal actors on opposing sides of the political spectrum, was done according to two themes. The first theme was construction of social communities; and the second theme concerned the networks within and between the social communities.

It is reiterated that conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' from 2013 to 2019 is constructed within a broader political context and the events related to the land question. Yet it is not simply limited to the political context; constructed 'land language' is reflected in a wider societal reality (as evidenced by the political cartoon sample), which shows that ideational 'land language' can and does matter because it is adopted and perpetuated in social knowledge construction that is imprinted and repeated. It is in this domain that 'land language' is symbolically characterised by denialism, differing historical realities, frustration over unfulfilled expectations, marginalisation and conflicting perspectives; all of which have an emotional impact. It is this emotional impact that has been repeatedly articulated and interpellated in the post-2013 land question by Malema and Groenewald.

The essence of the land question after 2013 is characterised by three underpinnings. The first underpinning is the focus on EWC that has increasingly featured in the 'land language' articulated by both Malema and Groenewald. Malema is at the fore-front of efforts to amend the Constitution to make explicit that land must be nationalised and placed under state custodianship and redistributed for equal use. In this regard EWC will take place and there is no need to compensate 'land thieves' by paying for land that was stolen in the first place. Groenewald is vehemently opposed to expropriation, saying that it will ruin the white commercial farming sector and jeopardise South Africa's food security. He is adamant that land was not stolen and was acquired mostly by fair means. The second underpinning is that both Malema and Groenewald blame the ANC government for their failure to address the land question meaningfully. Malema is adamant that the ANC has reneged on its undertaking to resolve the land question by returning it to the rightful owners and has turned its back on the landless who are impoverished and economically marginalised. Groenewald, for his part, blames the ANC as a government for its inefficiency in resolving the land question and argues that it is this incompetence that has brought about the current situation. He is convinced that

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the ANC is dishonest and is attempting to appease the EFF, while simultaneously endeavouring to calm the white commercial farmers. The final underpinning of the land question after 2013 is the constitutional amendment to provide explicitly for EWC, which will take place at some point in the future. One the one hand, there are concerns that EWC could elicit a response in the form of manifest conflict by white commercial farmers but on the other hand, if EWC is not implemented, it will perpetuate unfulfilled expectations of the landless, also a potential trigger for manifest conflict.

It is noteworthy that Malema constructs his social community and networks, which he articulates in his unique 'land language' that centres on landlessness. Landlessness is the consequence of historical land theft that left this community bereft of dignity and is perpetuated in present-day South Africa. For Malema the solution is to expropriate land and place it in the custodianship of the state. His motivation for expropriation lies in a historical reality that the white other took land from the indigenous population by subterfuge, occupation or conquest and in this way he justifies that it should be returned without any form of recompense. Yet this intention is bedevilled by the ANC other, which is in his eyes intransigent because the party panders to the interests of the white other out of fear. It is this intransigence that frustrates Malema and he has therefore taken it upon himself to drive the land question. In driving the land question, his 'land language' is conflictual despite sometimes being tempered with appeals for diversity and unity.

What cannot be ignored is that Groenewald also constructs his social community and networks, which he articulates in his unique conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' and he interpellates with whites, in particular Afrikaners, who are white commercial farmers. He is resolute that white commercial farmers have a right to belong in South Africa and, according to his historical reality, own land that was legally acquired and cannot be expropriated without compensation. For Groenewald, EWC is not only an infringement of the right to own property but will also lead to chaos and threaten South Africa's food security. It is in the realm of food security that Groenewald has succeeded in elevating farm murders as a national concern. Groenewald has constructed the EFF as the other, which he accuses of inciting racial hatred over the land question and using land expropriation as a means to score political points. The second other that Groenewald has constructed is the ANC, which he accuses of dishonesty when dealing with the land question as well as corrupt officials and their inefficient institutional structures that have failed land reform. In driving the land question, his

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'land language' is conflictual and there is limited reference to appeals for diversity and unity. In particular, Groenewald warns that EWC may trigger a civil war.

Finally, and in keeping with the research question, this chapter has deepened understanding of the post-2013 'land language' by qualitatively analysing the articulation of symbols, icons and indexes by the political elites for constructing social communities and networks in language that is conflictual, diversifying and unifying. The next and last chapter is the concluding summary and findings.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Some say that the earth has bounty enough for all,
and that more for one does not mean less for another,
that the advance of one does not mean the decline of the other.
(Paton 1948: 78)

6.1. Introduction

This thesis problematised the necessary but insufficient material approach to South Africa's land question after 2013 and thereupon explored the salience of the ideational dimension as a supplementary approach. Vested in social constructionism, the ideational dimension emphasises ideational thought that leads to the construction of multiple historical realities and the socialisation of knowledge through the articulation of symbolic, iconic and indexical language. Realities, knowledge and language have their origins in a historical and contextual framework that started in the colonial period and extends into present-day South Africa with the political elites, traditional authorities and white commercial farmers as organisational categories. As a driving force in the post-2013 land question, the political elites were accordingly identified as a substantive category and the qualitative content of the 'land language' articulated by party leaders Malema and Groenewald show how ideas can and do matter in the construction of social communities concerning land, as well as the networks within and between social communities. The key argument that is defended in this thesis is that there is some evidence supporting the emergence of an imagined community involving the political elites and their respective social communities advancing an imagined pluralistic security community typified by dependable expectations of peaceful change. The idea of a security community is intended to mitigate against the hostility, confrontation and fear that are consequences of the 'land language' articulated by the political elites.

The research problem highlighted the insufficient, yet relevant, material answer to the land question since 1994, which has triggered discontent, frustration and conflict. Rooted in positivism the material dimension of the land question is undeniably crucial to the land question but it is a partial solution. This is evident, for example, in the notion of EWC – potentially a

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zero-sum solution – which is a source of division and confrontation involving the political elites and the social communities they construct. Limited attention has been paid to an ideational alternative that examines the historical origins of land dispossession, the essence of the land question, the idea of land and how political elites articulated 'land language' after 2013. In this respect the following assumptions were highlighted in Chapter 1:

> The material dimension of the land question has provided a necessary but insufficient answer to the land question.
>
> The ideational dimension is an extension of the material dimension of the land question.
>
> The 'land language' articulated by political elites constructs multiple realities, social communities and concomitant networks within and between the political elites.
>
> The ideational extension permits an exploration of a security community, which accommodates change under peaceful conditions as opposed to violence.

This, the final chapter, proceeds in four sections. The first section entails observations concerning the research methodology. The second section is a concluding summary of social constructionism and the ideational context for understanding the 'land language' articulated by political elites, specifically Malema and Groenewald, after 2013 and in response to the research question. The third section, as a response to the research sub-question, entails exploratory findings concerning a security community intended to alleviate the antagonism, hostility and anxiety induced by the 'land language.' The final section highlights recommendations for future research.

6.2. **Observations concerning the research methodology**

The research methodology adopted an interpretivist paradigm, entailing a descriptive-explorative study of the ideational context of South Africa's land question after 2013. It was descriptive in the sense that it examined how 'land language' – related to the post 2013 land question – emerged and developed within and between political elites. It was explorative in the sense that it explored the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. The descriptive-explorative approach was

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epistemologically situated within social constructionism that was conceptually expanded to include community, imagined communities, and security communities. In the following paragraphs two over-arching observations concerning researcher positionality and reflexivity are highlighted as both were constantly taken into consideration when researching the post-2013 'land language' articulated by the political elites.

The 'land language' articulated by the political elites is vested in distinctive contextual realities based on subjective knowledge and different historical perspectives. When adopting interpretivism as a research paradigm it is obligatory to understand the motivations underlying how and why different realities are constructed by the political elites. In this regard, researcher positionality concerning the "outsider/insider" dichotomy (Savvides *et al* 2014) is highlighted as a component of the research process itself. As an outsider, the researcher was aware of the danger of not fully comprehending the finer nuances associated with the post-2013 land question and the associated 'land language' articulated by the political elites. Mitigating against the potential bias associated with outsider status required the researcher to adopt two measures. The first measure was to deliberately assume the position of an insider when it was appropriate and the second measure was to adopt an ongoing reflexive approach, specifically during the coding process. Deliberately assuming the position of an insider was important for understanding why and how the history and context of land possession and dispossession resulted in the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald when referring to the post-2013 land question. Assuming an outsider position was equally important, especially when selecting and analysing primary data sources. To provide balance, a temporal limitation was identified in Chapter 1 and it was within the temporal limitation that primary data sources were purposively selected to reflect the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald after 2013. This provided a degree of objectivity which ensured that neither actor was prejudiced by having more or less of his data analysed.

Reflexivity during the coding process of qualitative content analysis was crucial. During the initial stages of identifying the coding protocols there was a tendency to 'over-code', leading to an extensive and inevitably unmanageable list of categories, sub-categories and sub-sub categories. Not only did this bring about data fragmentation and loss of context and meaning; it also complicated data integration and interpretation. As noted by Saldaña (2013: 194), coding is iterative and in this respect reflexivity was important since it allowed the researcher to "turn back on oneself in order that processes of knowledge production become

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the subject of investigation" (May & Perry 2014: 109). The codes were therefore reflexively reconsidered and adapted during the coding process. During the qualitative content analysis, two points of reference were used to guide the redefinition and refinement of the coding protocols: the research question (specified in Chapter 1) and the unit of analysis (identified in Chapter 3). Moreover, three procedures termed 'clumping', 'bumping' and 'dumping' were used for redefinition and refinement. 'Clumping' involved taking related codes and creating a new code; 'bumping' involved integrating a code or codes with an existing code; while dumping entailed removing codes that were superfluous or became redundant as the coding process unfolded. In this way, coding protocols were systematically and methodically reduced to ensure a manageable system while simultaneously maintaining the overall integrity of the coding process.

The observations on the research methodology for this thesis highlighted two important aspects concerning qualitative research and qualitative content analysis. Firstly, in qualitative research insider/outsider positionality serves as a watchdog to guide a researcher. Secondly, reflexivity during qualitative content analysis is essential so as to ensure that the coding protocols yield a credible answer to the research question and sub-question.

6.3. Concluding summary: Social constructionism and the 'land language' articulated by political elites after 2013

Chapter 2 indicated that social constructionism is significant in that it highlighted that the meaning attached to an object – in this case land – determines processes, reactions and responses that have their origins in subjective knowledge and multiple realities. Social constructionism affords meaning to the material by extending it into the ideational through the socialisation of knowledge with language. The articulation of language involves the use of symbols, icons and indices to construct the other[50], to verbalise the other through othering, which manifests as otherness involving social communities and the networks within and between them. Given that the social communities have their own distinct construction reflected in a particular identity, an over-arching social community, a security community based on societal values, human dignity and compassion as a virtue, was investigated to surmount the divides.

[50] 'The other' is a binary distinction between the self and another and has a clear sense of 'we' and 'they.'

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Chapter 3 delineated the research methodology. Interpretivism, as the research paradigm, is a lens that permits an ideational understanding of how reality is socially constructed, maintained and reflected in written and oral communication by different actors. The design involved description and exploration. The first part of the design provided a historical and contextual framework for understanding how land dispossession evolved from the pre-colonial period up to the present day and manifested as the post-2013 land question in Chapter 4. The second part of the design explored the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security in the context of the post-2013 land question that was is articulated in 'land language' by the political elites, the content of which was analysed in Chapter 5. The research method identified the primary and secondary sources that were qualitatively analysed regarding 'land language' content according to two themes, namely social community and network construction, also in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4 highlighted the historical and contextual framework of the land question. The colonial land history of land dispossession was dehumanising, infantilising and stripped the indigenous population of land dignity which was perpetuated in the 1913 Land Act and when the NP came to power in 1948 and featured as one of the driving forces behind the armed struggle that was initiated in 1961 by the liberation movements. With the advent of democracy in 1994 there were high expectations that the land question would be resolved, but these expectations have not been realised by successive ANC-led administrations. It was into this breach that the EFF stepped in 2013 when the land question was placed front-and-centre in the national discourse. As a consequence, three organisational categories related to the land question have come to the fore since 2013, namely the political elites, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers together with their 'land language.'

Chapter 5 focused on one organisational category, the political elites, as a substantive category and specifically the content of the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald after 2013. Their 'land language' is constructed within a broader societal perspective where political cartoons showed that 'land language' is selective regarding historical interpretations, it is set against multiple realities, it reflects frustration regarding the lack of black freedom and concomitant marginalisation, it has a clear sense of urgency and impatience, it shows that both the black landless as well as the white commercial farmers are side-lined and it culminates in 'land language' that is conflictual, diversifying and unifying. 'Land language' related to the traditional authorities reflects them as obdurate and bellicose

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and fiercely protective of their traditions and their land custodianship. In this way their prominent role and political influence in the land question cannot be ignored. White commercial farmers are likewise depicted as obdurate and bellicose, fiercely protective of their land. They are generally portrayed as obstructive regarding land reform. Nevertheless, there is also some 'land language' suggesting the contrary: that white commercial farmers are, indeed, willing to share their expertise and to participate in resolving the land question. It is within the broader societal perspective that the EFF and FF+ as, the political elites, have emerged in the post-2013 land question. These elites have opposing agendas but both have succeeded in placing the land question at the centre of the national discourse. In this respect, party leaders Malema and Groenewald use symbolic, iconic and indexical 'land language' to construct social communities and networks within and between communities by using language that is conflictual, diversifying and unifying.

6.3.1. **Julius Sello Malema**

The ideational context, specifically ideational thought, as described in the literature review is clearly reflected in the deliberations, argumentation and persuasions articulated by Malema in the setting of the post-2013 land question. Central to his motivation is a historical reality that colonial 'gangsters' originally appropriated land through 'genocide' and subterfuge and he is adamant that white landowners in 2013 continue to reap the benefits of illegally acquired land. For Malema, land, as a site of struggle, has both material and ideational significance and in respect of the latter, landlessness is akin to the absence of freedom and dignity. Since land was stolen, it must be returned without compensation and placed under state custodianship for equal redistribution.

Table 2: Summary of Malema's symbolic and indexical 'land language'

Symbols	**Index**	
	Black	**White**
Condition	Landless	Landed
Result	Are the rightful land-owners	Are illegal land owners
	Oppressed	Privileged
Consequence	Lack dignity	Superior
Solution	Expropriation without compensation for equal redistribution	

A summary of the symbolic 'land language' articulated by Malema in respect of the indexes black and white appears in Table 2 above. The 'land language' articulated by Malema

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consists of a variety of indexes, symbols and icons. His primary index is black to signify the community he represents, the landless, together with another index, red, to signify his political party. White, as the last index, signifies the other and in the case of the land question, it signifies illegal ownership. The black index symbolically signifies the 'landless' and 'oppressed', while the white index symbolically signifies those who have a history founded on an 'antiblack land dispossession criminal project', who 'have stolen the land' and who have no regard for black dignity. Icons also feature in his land language, for example Mugabe, who is hailed as a hero because of his unrelenting commitment to return land to his people even in the face of severe criticism.

Figure 30 below is a diagrammatical summary of the social community constructed by Malema concerning land. This community is uniquely hybridised and it appeals to a wide cross-section of blacks, who are historically dispossessed and remain 'landless.' Starting with identity (Figure 28: Colour code green), the social community that Malema constructs has an identity underpinned by land as the central feature. The internal coherence of this community is indexically founded on blackness, while the externally distinct red colour, also an index, provides Malema and his community with remarkable visual prominence.

The community component (Figure 30: Colour-code orange) flows from the identity that Malema constructs. As a consequence of being landless, the community feeling is characterised by absence of dignity, marginalisation and invisibility, which culminates in lack of a physical place. Therefore, the community purpose is restoration of dignity, culminating in freedom. In this way there is a sense of kinship among the landless regarding the return of illegally acquired land to the historically dispossessed. As a political elite, Malema has been particularly successful in driving the process to amend Section 25 of the Constitution as the vehicle for land return and he is an iconic inspiration to his followers. This has undeniably secured Malema and his social community unmatched political space in the national landscape regarding the land question.

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Figure 30: Malema's social community construction



Turning to the structure component (Figure 30: Colour-code red) of the social community, Malema as EFF party leader and an elected member of parliament, has generated an ability to use his political power and authority to legitimately and publicly exercise his agency within the NA as a recognised institution. In this respect Malema has moved beyond party bounds by appropriating land reform and he views it as the sole purview of his party. On 27 February 2018 he proclaimed in the NA that:

> It took the formation of the EFF 20 years later to revive the question of the dignity of our people in the need for our land. It took the arrival of the EFF in these Chambers to return to the central agenda of human freedom the need for the land that was dispossessed through brutal crimes against humanity (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

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During a television interview on 3 February 2019, he reiterated "… you can't take it [the land issue] away from the EFF. It's a synonym for EFF" (Malema 2019c). Despite the occasional theatre associated with Malema's actions in the NA, such as when he and the EFF members of parliament left the NA on 23 May 2018 (Malema 2018f) over an altercation with the Speaker when speaking on the land issue, he was adamant during a television interview on 3 March 2018 that the

> land [question] shall be resolved through the institutions of democracy … I trust the country called South Africa and its constitution which makes it possible to resolve any other issue peacefully and allow the country to run smoothly (Malema 2018e).

Malema's propensity for working inside and outside the NA as an institution leads to confrontation, hostility and fear, especially regarding his utterances concerning whites who are recipients. For example, on 9 June 2018 he stated during an interview,

> I don't know what's going to happen in the future. I'm saying to you we have not called for the killing of white people, at least for now. I can't guarantee the future (Malema 2018b).

It is utterances such as the above that resonate with the social community that he has constructed because this constituency sees Malema as an icon who is prepared to challenge and even threaten whites with violent retribution.

Juxtaposed to the structure component is agency (Figure 30: Colour-code purple) and apart from exercising his agency institutionally, Malema relies on the practical/evaluative to interpellate with the social community he constructs. Here his 'land language' is mostly founded in EFF policy documents and he projectively focuses on land EWC for equal redistribution as a viable solution to the land question. This iterative solution can, according to him, justify land occupation since the land belongs to blacks who are the 'rightful owners.' He emphasised this in the NA on 28 February 2017 when he announced,

> We are already giving our people the land and we are not ashamed of that. People of South Africa, where you see beautiful land, take it! It belongs to you." [Interjections.] (RSA, NA 2017a: 45).

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It is this iterational agency that is significant since, it is driven by a historical reality that appeals to – and indeed motivates – his social community to action. Projection related to land occupation is nonetheless tempered in that Malema makes it clear that it is unoccupied land that is targeted.

Figure 31: Malema's social network construction



The social network constructed by Malema links the social community to an international and domestic context that is summarised in Figure 31 above. Concerning the international context, the primary focus is on Africa on the one hand as a site of colonial oppression, but on the other hand as a source of inspiration and emancipation owing to icons such as Mugabe, who championed the cause of returning land to the rightful owners. Extending beyond Africa, Malema is also mindful of the African diaspora, which he incorporates into the social network as well.

The domestic component of the network has a hierarchical and chain configuration. The hierarchical configuration is an unfavourable triad consisting of the EFF at the apex with

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the ANC and FF+ (and white commercial farmers as an extension) located in the lower corner vertices. The hierarchical configuration is a result of Malemas's dominance of the land question and his leading role in amending Section 25 of the Constitution which has allowed him to take the initiative away from the governing party, the ANC. His dominance of EWC has at the same time placed him at odds with the FF+ and by implication the white commercial farmers who hold no truck with EWC. The domestic component of the network includes traditional authorities in the chain. Although Malema was initially at odds with the traditional authorities, in particular Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini as the sole trustee of the Ingonyama Trust, over expropriating all land and placing it under state custodianship, he appears to have patched up the difference. In addition, the chain includes other political parties who share the same ideational views and in this respect the BCM, AZAPO, SOPA and PAC have voiced their support for land return as advocated by Malema. It is the final component of the chain, the whites, that bears consideration as Malema's 'land language' is contradictory. The 'land language' articulated by Malema is concurrently conflictual, diversifying and unifying.

When interpellating with the ANC, FF+, whites and white commercial farmers as the other, his conflictual language emphasises the weakness of the ANC in resolving the land question and he is especially suspicious of its sincerity as he is of the view that the party continues to pander to the interests of whites in general and white commercial farmers in particular. For Malema, the FF+ and party leader Groenewald are the other who are committed to maintaining the status quo regarding land possession and it is this status quo that must end. As an overriding ideational feature of his 'land language', Malema strives towards restoration of dignity accompanied by the ultimate achievement of authentic freedom. He is passionately convinced that land and dignity are intimately related and it is this association that is overlooked by whites and white commercial farmers as they are the other who have not endured the pain and indignity associated with dispossession.

> If the grandchildren of Jan van Riebeeck have not understood that we need our land. But over and above it is about our dignity, then they have failed to receive the gift of humanity (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

> All we want, all our people ever wanted, is their land to which their dignity is rooted and founded (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

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Malema is adamant that historical dispossession is akin to theft accompanied by genocide and EWC for equal redistribution is the only answer to the land question. He is nonetheless mindful of the food security imperative, but does not consider EWC as an impediment and is of the opinion that food security is axiomatic to land return. His conflictual 'land language' related to the white other has been construed as confrontational hate speech, which is racially polarising and promoting violence. This has placed him at odds with the FF+, whites in general and white commercial farmers in particular.

A conflictual rendering of Malema's 'land language' overrides his diversifying and unifying deployment thereof, but it is nonetheless notable that diversity and unity do feature when he interpellates with both with black and white social communities. Among black social communities he appeals for unity and solidarity concerning the return of the land to the dispossessed, while towards white communities he has, on occasion, been conciliatory:

> White people you've got nowhere else to go, especially the Afrikaner. Those ones who are brothers in love and hate. We're together here so we're going to fight it together and find and a correct solution, a sustainable one, not the one that will make people to pretend (Malema 2013).

> "[w]e do not seek revenge though they caused so much evil in our land, we do not wish for their suffering, though they caused so much humiliation of countless generations" (RSA, NA 2018b: 28).

> "[o]ur march for land is not driving whites to the sea" (Malema 2018d).

It is the contradictions in Malema's 'land language' relating to the white other that are apparent and perhaps confusing. On the one hand he uses 'land language' that is vilifying and threatening, while on the other hand he has been accommodating and conciliatory.

6.3.2. **Petrus Johannes Groenewald**

The ideational context and ideational thought associated with the land question are clearly evident in the 'land language' articulated by Groenewald after 2013. His 'land language' consists of symbols and to a limited extent, indexes and icons. What is notable is his limited

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articulation of indexes, in particular the indexical distinction between black and white. While he uses terms such as 'minority groups', 'Afrikaner' and 'racial polarisation' which have implicit indexical connotations, he occasionally uses the term 'black' and 'white.' The social community constructed by Groenewald around the land is almost exclusively focused on the white commercial farmers together with some outreach to property owners in general. White commercial farmers for Groenewald symbolise food security, are a source of employment and job creation and contribute to the overall stability and prosperity in South Africa.

> Yes, you may shout to your heart's content here today, but when the day comes when you have no food on your table, then you will see how much you will shout. [Interjections].
>
> It is the agricultural sector that feeds the country (RSA, NA 2014b: 202).

A summary of the symbolic 'land language' articulated by Groenewald in respect of the symbols appears in Table 3:

Table 3: Summary of Groenewald's symbolic and indexical 'land language'

Symbols	Index	
	Black	**White**
Condition	Duped by the ANC and EFF concerning land ownership as a means to creating wealth and prosperity	White commercial farmers have the right to belong in South Africa
Result	Unrealistic expectations	Acquired land legally
Consequence	Perpetuation of dissatisfaction leading to land grabs	Guarantors of food security
Solution	Rejects expropriation without compensation	

Figure 32 below is a diagrammatical summary of the social community constructed by Groenewald concerning the land. This community (Figure 32: Colour-code orange) is conspicuously constructed to serve the interests of white commercial farmers who have a legitimate historical place and purpose in South Africa. Based on his multiple identity as firstly, an Afrikaner – indexically recognised as white, and secondly, as representative of white commercial farmers, or *boere*, Groenewald invokes autochthony as a feeling of belonging to the soil of Africa, which underscores the legitimacy of the community and kinship based on physical presence and legitimate land ownership. He is unyielding in his stance that white

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commercial farmers – indeed all property owners – own land that was procured legally and it is on this basis that he vehemently rejects EWC.

Figure 32: Groenewald's social community construction



Pertaining to its identity (Figure 32: Colour code green), the social community that Groenewald constructs has historical and legitimate land ownership as the central feature of its identity. A unique concern with food security, employment and job creation underpins the internal coherence of the community and underscores its importance in the overall wellbeing of South Africa. Groenewald, as a political elite, has strongly advocated against EWC, which he views as a political ploy by the ANC and EFF to garner votes and to bolster social community support. He is resolute that the downfall of land reform in South Africa cannot be

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ascribed to the failure of the willing-buyer willing-seller principle; it is rather a consequence of the ANC's institutional inability and lack of will to administer and implement land reform policies successfully and fairly. According to Groenewald, it is the prevalence of farm murders that characterises the external distinction of the community, as the members are isolated and are obliged to take responsibility for their safety and security because the ANC government has failed to do so.

Regarding the structure component (Figure 32: Colour-code red) of the social community as an actor Groenewald, who is the FF+ party leader and an elected member of parliament, created an ability to employ his political power and authority within the NA as an institution. In this respect and in addition to his stance against EWC, he has also used the NA as an institutional platform to highlight farm murders as a national crisis and a persistent threat to this community.

> [A farm murder is] not only a crime against an individual; it is also a crime against a community. It is the women and children who pay the price of a farm murder when they are tortured, when boiling water is poured down their throats, when hot irons are used to burn the women, when they force a 12-year-old girl to watch her mother being raped. That's torture (RSA, NA 2019i: 89-90).

Moreover, Groenewald has repeatedly stated that, because of its emotionality, the land question should be handled with care and has voiced concern that both the ANC and EFF use 'land language' in the NA and on public platforms to further racial division and hatred. He avers that EWC creates unrealistic expectations, which cannot be realised, and this could trigger violence. In addition, he warns that expropriation of property without compensation will not be passively accepted by white commercial farmers, who will not stand by submissively and allow their property to be confiscated.

Juxtaposed to the structure component is agency (Figure 32: Colour-code purple) and apart from exercising his agency institutionally, Groenewald relies on the practical/evaluative to interpellate with the social community he constructs. When interpellating with this community as recipients his 'land language' is projective and he is adamant that the Afrikaner as white commercial farmers have played a constructive role in the country in the past, do so in the present and will continue to do so in the future.

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South Africa belongs to all who live in it and the Afrikaner played an important role throughout the centuries to build it up for the benefit of all South Africans. Afrikaners can and should be proud of this contribution of construction and do not have to (be) apologetic about it (Groenewald 2016b).

Groenewald's social network construction is depicted in Figure 33 below. It consists of domestic and international components, each with particular features.

Figure 33: Groenewald's social network construction



He uses hierarchy and asymmetry for the domestic component to interpellate with the ANC and EFF individually and collectively. Concerning the ANC, Groenewald holds the view that the party is exclusively accountable for its failure to protect white commercial farmers from the scourge of farm murders and to resolve the land question successfully. He makes it clear that he mistrusts the ANC's motives and is mainly concerned about its use of the land question to garner political support. Concerning the EFF, Groenewald is particularly focused on Malema's use of conflictual 'land language' that incites racial hatred and increases the potential

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for manifest conflict or violence. Also included in the domestic component is a chain that links Afrikaners, white commercial farmers and, to a limited extent, property owners in general. It is in this context that Groenewald strongly disagrees with EWC and is firmly of the view that it infringes individual property ownership, threatens food security and imperils the South African economy. As a consequence of this, international component of the social network is almost exclusively focused on institutions such as the UNPO to advocate against EWC and to bring farm murders to the attention of the international community.

The 'land language' articulated by Groenewald varies between conflictual, diversifying and unifying. His conflictual language is directed at the ANC and EFF, especially concerning their allegations that land owned by whites – in particular white commercial farmers – is stolen property, which both parties aver must be returned to the rightful owners without compensation. Diversifying 'land language' is mostly vested in his universal appeal to foster mutual respect for difference among South Africans, while the main focus of his unifying 'land language' is his contention that white commercial farmers are willing to participate in land reform.

6.4. <u>Findings: exploring an imagined security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change</u>

The concluding summary in the previous section (see 5.2 above) provided an answer to the research question. In this, the final section, findings are formulated to answer the research sub-question that explores how 'land language' articulated by political elites contributes to a pluralistic security community characterised by dependable expectations of peaceful change. This is not to suggest that Malema and Groenewald have wittingly set out to construct a security community. This section rather seeks to explore evidence concerning commonalities, divergences and silences, which show that political elites use 'land language' demonstrating that a higher order social community is achievable in the face of the post-2013 land question.

Chapter 2 examined a pluralistic security community that holds dependable expectations of peaceful change as an over-arching ideational extension to the land question and proposed that a common 'land identity' should be forged around three relational concepts. These are firstly, advancing societal interest; secondly, promoting human dignity; and finally, inculcating compassion as a virtue. Pluralism implies that constituent social communities

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retain some degree of autonomy, provided it does not compromise the security community as an over-arching idea. First and foremost, exploring the emergence of a pluralistic security community requires a reimagination of the land question and in this respect Hart (2006: 991) offers a thought-provoking and insightful departure by framing it as a "powerful moral force" that

> derives from histories, memories, and meanings of racialized dispossession, together with the imperatives of redress – may be harnessed and redefined to support the formation of broadly based popular alliances to press for social and economic justice.

The meaning of land in a post-2013 South Africa has moved beyond the material, as excessive focus on material dispossession masks the ideational motivations that underlie the land question. "[I]n Africa, land has cultural, sentimental and political meaning. It is a reminder of past dispossession, a symbol of present dignity and a source of future security" (McMahon 2013: 200). The meaning of land in a post-2013 South Africa is derived from differing historical perspectives concerning land dispossession and possession that are articulated in a 'land language' reality by the political elites.

As an overarching idea, the post-2013 land question has not been defined and agreed upon as a diversifying and unifying ideational concept involving broadly based alliances between the social communities. In its stead the land question has unravelled and has become a rallying point for political elites and their social communities with divergent networks, which are constructed according to differing historical narratives and counter-narratives, leading to the verbalisation of 'land language' that is sometimes conflictual, sometimes diversifying and sometimes unifying. The historical narratives and counter-narratives for the social construction of reality are of particular concern, as these serve to justify either land expropriation or land possession. As we are reminded, there is no single discernible and accepted reality on which the land question can be founded. Therefore, a new approach to the post-2013 land question demands the following:

> Firstly, common understanding of the land question that implies neither sweeping history and historical injustices under the carpet nor ignoring the plight of the currently dispossessed community. A common understanding is based on an honest recognition

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that during the colonial and apartheid periods land was sometimes taken unjustly but that there are also instances when it was obtained legally.

Secondly, a reimagination of the land question includes restoration of the humanity and human dignity of all South Africans and the inculcation of land compassion as a virtue among all South Africans.

Thirdly, a reimagination of the land question includes compassion to establish and provide a platform for rebuilding an all-inclusive land identity and culture taking into account the trauma and loss that accompanied land dispossession.

Fourthly, a reimagination of the land question is collaborative and inter-subjective and rejects terms that are 'owned' by the political elites, together with the social communities and the networks they have constructed. The 'us' and the 'they' are supplanted by the 'we' and the 'mutual' as overarching ideas to reduce othering and otherness regarding land.

Finally, a reimagination of the land question involves the reconstruction of 'land language' that is diversifying and unifying to connect social communities and networks. In addition, reconstructed 'land language' does not eliminate the conflictual; it deliberately avoids the language of violence.

Focusing on advancing we-ness to reduce uncertainty, mistrust and fear, an imagined pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change rests on a reimagined land question. It is imagined in the sense that it involves over-arching ideational thought centred on a common identity vested in the autochthonous idea that everyone has historical and cultural links to land. It is pluralistic in the sense that it acknowledges the role of subsistence and commercial farmers as social communities who both contribute to and stand as guarantors of South Africa's food security. In its construction, a pluralistic security community is a favourable triad that involves the political elites together with their social communities, traditional authorities and institutions of government. Pluralism, however, extends even further than the agricultural sector: it acknowledges and includes all South Africans who are dignified in land ownership by a government and political elites with their social communities who are involved in resolving the post-2013 land question. Finally, it has

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dependable expectations of peaceful change in that violence is rejected. It is, nonetheless, recognised that there is unavoidable incipient and latent conflict inherent in the ideational and positivist paradigms; it is the ideational that could prevent an escalation to manifest conflict by fostering an imagined pluralistic security community. An imagined pluralistic security that has dependable expectations of peaceful change is contingent on the articulation of an alternative 'land language' that acknowledges the identity of the other and includes acts of othering emphasising recognition, infinite responsibility and understanding. This leads to an agnostic otherness that affirms own identity while simultaneously accommodating the identity of the other even if it is dissimilar or competing.

The politics of an imagined security community are ideational and pluralistic. On the one hand, an imagined security community is an overarching idea that may well exist in the minds of all South Africans involved in the post-2013 land question. On the other hand, by embracing pluralism, the identity and role of various actors involved in the land question such as the political elites, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers – as well as other actors not included in this thesis – are constructively recognised and inclusively acknowledged. Furthermore, the research incorporates an underlying ethical dimension for advancing societal interest, promoting dignity and inculcating compassion as a virtue not only during interaction but also in the post-2013 policies and strategies for dealing with the land question. In other words, the ideational politics of an imagined security community are ultimately intended to establish and embrace dependable expectations of peaceful change when deciding who gets "what, when and how" (Lasswell 1936).

The emergence of an imagined security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change is contingent upon the 'land language' articulated by political elites and it should be approached with a degree of scepticism because of the prevalence of conflictual 'land language'. Nonetheless, this particular security community type involves other actors such the traditional authorities and white commercial farmers, who also play a key relational role when fostering its emergence by actively promoting diversity and unity in the post-2013 land question. In this regard convergences (or agreement), divergences (or disagreement) and silences in the 'land language' articulated by Malema and Groenewald from 2013 to 2019 are identified in the next section with respect to the three aforementioned relational concepts.

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6.4.1. **Advancing societal interest**

Societal interest, as opposed to self-interest, is advanced by a commitment to values that mediate social behaviour and reduce otherness between self and the other. In Chapter 2 it was noted that individuals committed to egalitarianism (as opposed to individualism) are more likely to subscribe to values that promote societal interest and in respect of the land question there is a notable dichotomy between the social communities constructed by Malema and Groenewald. The social community and the networks that Malema has constructed are centred on state custodianship of land and ownership and in this instance it the state that is the arbiter of land ownership and the concomitant dignity of the individual. Malema advocates maximised state involvement in advancing societal interest regarding the resolution of the land question. Groenewald's social community and network construction are essentially liberal and founded on individual property rights with the state only involved in promulgating and administering policies that guarantee individual property ownership. Since Groenewald is deeply suspicious of the state's ability to administer land reform successfully, he advocates minimalist state involvement in advancing societal interest to resolve the land question.

It is in the societal interest to take into consideration the emotionality of the land question. Both Malema and Groenewald agree that land is an emotional issue and the 'land language' used over the said period was undeniably conflictual but it should be noted that this happened mostly within the domains of incipient and latent conflict. Malema's conflictual 'land language' is directed at white commercial farmers and whites in general as they are historical beneficiaries of land appropriated through genocide and crimes against humanity, which created a black dispossessed community that must be compensated by changing the patterns of ownership through EWC to restore dignity and freedom. Malema is particularly focused on the return of the land as the key to the restoration of dignity and uses language to highlight his ambition. Groenewald, however, accuses Malema of using language that increases racial tension and hatred. In this respect he points out that it is Malema who will have to take responsibility for the conflict that he is instigating.

It is in the societal interest that the land question is meaningfully resolved by the governing party as a matter of priority. Malema and Groenewald agree that blame for the failure of land reform in the post-1994 dispensation must be placed with the ANC and they are both suspicious and mistrustful of the party's land question agenda. For Malema the failure is

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a consequence of the ANC being afraid of whites, leading to a propensity to pander to their interests. Groenewald is of the opinion that the failure is attributable to government inefficiency and ineptitude, especially the collapse of the willing-buyer willing-seller principle together with the 'lies' that the government propagates concerning land. He is especially dismissive of the move to amend the Constitution to make provision for EWC. In addition, he is concerned with farm murders, which threaten the safety and security of white commercial farmers and he emphasises the ANC's reluctance to address the problem meaningfully.

It is in the societal interest that a common land history is agreed upon and is adopted as a collective heritage in the form of parables celebrating humanity as opposed to myths that promote superiority and dominance. A common land history includes indigenous knowledge and acknowledges the damage done by dispossession, but also recognises the history and contribution of the white commercial farmers. In this regard it is clear that Malema and Groenewald disagree over South Africa's land history.

It is in the societal interest that food security is preserved and both Malema and Groenewald are unified over this as a common concern, but their approaches differ. Malema is of the opinion that EWC is a prerequisite for food security, while Groenewald is sure that it imperils food security.

It is in the societal interest that conflict is recognised as inevitable, but that manifest conflict – violence – is actively discouraged. However, it is the underlying emotions concerning land that very often come to the fore, inflame tensions and lead to miscalculations, which could result in violence. In this respect Malema and Groenewald are both bothered that the unresolved land question holds the potential to degenerate into violence if it not meaningfully resolved. Malema has voiced his worry of an 'unled revolution', while Groenewald has warned that EWC will lead to uncontrolled land grabs and may even unleash a 'civil war.' It is this convergence by Malema and Groenewald that cannot be ignored.

6.4.2. **Promoting dignity**

In Chapter 2 it was noted that dignity is indispensable to identity; it is a powerful catalyst for collaboration or conflict, as dignity is intrinsic in all human beings irrespective of their social status. Not only does it manifest in the self; it also provides a foundation for social interaction.

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In this interaction the degree to which the dignity of the other is recognised – or disregarded – that dictates how social communities and networks are constructed. In cases where dignity is ignored or down-played, identity politics based on resentment together with an exclusive identity will predominate. When dignity in the self and the other is recognised, the opposite occurs and there is a healthier sense of mutuality, respect and sensitivity. On the one hand, for the dispossessed community land has a meaning that is vested in lack of dignity, which perpetuates an invisible societal identity together with marginalisation that continues to fester among the landless. On the other hand, for the community possessing land, land has a meaning that is vested in a privileged identity, a sense of dignity and a high level of societal visibility.

It is against this background that Malema holds the view that EWC is the only authentic solution to restoration of dignity and freedom and is adamant that compensation cannot be paid for property that was acquired illegally. Groenewald is unyielding in his assertion that land was acquired legally and that EWC is an infringement of constitutional property rights and international law and threatens South Africa's food security.

Until and unless dignity in connection with land is recognised in 'land language' there will be no possibility of imagining a pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change.

6.4.3. **Compassion as a virtue**

Chapter 2 highlighted the significance of compassion as a virtue at individual level, as it is at this level that a sense of we-ness develops and in this regard parables, as opposed to myths, are foundational. Added to this is the need to recognise the plight of the other and to initiate action. Here is the loudest silence, as evidence of this relational concept is sorely lacking in the 'land language', the social communities and networks that have been constructed by the political elites. It is compassion that overrides the invisibility of the dispossessed other and is also a check and a balance against the emotions that so often dominate the land question and the associated 'land language' expressed as othering and leading to otherness. Perhaps the great advantage associated with the inculcation of compassion as a virtue is that it relies on the inherent propensity of humans to care for and assist fellow human beings and it is regrettable that in 'land language' this silence is prominent.

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This section provided findings to support or refute a security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. While most evidence supports the advancement of societal interest regarding the resolution of the land question, failure to acknowledge land dignity and a disregard for compassion as a virtue are problematic and will continue to refute an imagination of a pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. In this instance the land question will revert to a material answer that is vested in social communities and networks that entrench the self at the expense of the other, increasing the extent to which othering is fostered. As a consequence, otherness will mostly focus on the articulation of conflictual 'land language' at the expense of diversity and unity. Here the warning of Feinnes, highlighted in Chapter 2, regarding the creation of a genocidal mindset among those dispossessed of the land should be heeded as it the consequence of a depressed economy, strong political ambition among an oppressor group, a sense of impunity among an oppressor group and an exploitable cause rooted in social deprivation that generates tension and a sense of unjust suffering attributable to an identifiable minority. It is contended that irrespective of their opposing agendas the political elites, who are undeniably driving the post-2013 land question, should heed Feinnes' warning and articulate future 'land language' to strive towards an imagination of a pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change.

6.5. **Recommendations: future research**

Extending the future scope of this research involves two recommendations. Firstly, a qualitative content analysis of the articulation of 'land language' content by other political elites such as the ANC and the DA could be made to establish the potential emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community. Secondly, researchers could undertake a qualitative content analysis of the articulation of 'land language' content by other organisational categories of actors involved in the land question such as the traditional authorities and white commercial farmers to establish the potential for the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community.

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APPENDIX

CODING PROTOCOLS: THEMES, CATEGORIES, SUB-CATEGORIES, SUB-SUB-CATEGORIES, CODES, TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1.1. Introduction

The articulation of 'land language' by political elites is coded according to overarching themes, with categories, sub-categories and sub-sub-categories that are assigned codes, together with coding terms. The themes, categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories and codes together with coding terms and definitions were identified in the conclusion to Chapter 2: The Theoretical and Contextual Framework.

Two themes are coded in concurrent steps: firstly, the social community constructed by the political elites concerning land; and secondly, the social networks constructed by the political elites. Each theme is thereupon coded according to two standardised substantive categories: the EFF and the FF+. Each of the aforesaid categories is broken down into standardised analytical content sub-categories to classify 'land language' as symbols, icons and indices. The sub-categories are thereupon divided into standardised analytical content sub-sub-categories associated with the respective themes.

The aim of this appendix is to explain the steps, themes, categories, sub-categories and sub-sub-categories and codes, together with coding terms and definitions used in Chapter 5.

1.2. Step 1: Theme: Social communities constructed by the political elites concerning the land

Social communities are a social construction based on the individual characteristics of a group of people who share collective features, the most prominent being a collective identity and common feelings articulated in conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' by the political elites.

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The aim of this step is to code the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' articulated by the political elites when referring to the land question to establish the distinctive construction of social communities.

The categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories, codes and coding terms are defined in Table 4 below:

Table 4: Coding for social community construction by the political elites

Category	**Code**	**Coding term**
Political elite	EFF	Political Elite-EFF-Malema
	FF+	Political Elite-FF+-Groenewald
Sub-category		
Language	Symbol	Language-Community-Symbol
	Icon	Language-Community-Icon
	Index	Language-Community-Index
	Conflict	Language-Community-Conflict
	Diversity	Language-Community-Diversity
	Unity	Language-Community-Unity
Sub-sub-category		
Identity	Internal coherence	Identity-Internal Coherence
	External distinction	Identity-External Distinction
Agency	Iterational	Agency-Iterational
	Projective	Agency-Projective
	Practical-evaluative	Agency-Practical Evaluative
Structure	Actor	Structure-Actor
	Institution	Structure-Institution
	Recipient	Structure-Recipient
	Duality	Structure-Duality
Community	Kinship	Community-Kinship
	Place	Community-Place
	Purpose	Community-Purpose
	Feeling	Community-Feeling

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The coding term definitions are defined in Table 5 below:

Table 5: Coding term definitions: social community construction by political elites

Coding term	Definition
Political Elite-EFF-Malema	Political Elite. A small group that exercises disproportionate agency to influence political decision-making by virtue of their position within institutional structures Political Party. EFF Actor. Julius Sello Malema
Political Elite-FF+-Groenewald	Political Elite. A small group that exercises disproportionate agency to influence political decision-making by virtue of their position within institutional structures Political Party. FF+ Actor. Petrus Johannes Groenewald
Language-Community-Symbol	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Symbol. A sign consisting of words that signal empirical or conceptual meaning
Language-Community-Icon	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Icon. A sign consisting of real or imagined images that have an instinctive interpretation
Language-Community-Conflict	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Conflict. The other as an enemy
Language-Community-Diversity	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Diversity. Recognising the other
Language-Community-Unity	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator

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Coding term	Definition
	Unity. Celebrating the difference of the other
Language-Community-Index	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Index. A sign consisting of real or imagined images that have an instinctive resemblance
Identity-Internal Coherence	Identity. A reflection of individual or collective self, sameness or difference expressed as a symbol, icon or index Internal Coherence. A persistent sharing of community self-sameness that is exemplified in a common and endogenous distinction
Identity-External Distinction	Identity. A reflection of individual or collective self, sameness or difference expressed as a symbol, icon or index External Distinction. A distinctive exogenous quality, interest or ambition that sets a social community apart from the other
Agency-Iterational	Agency. Capacity of agents, for example individuals or communities, to change or influence their environment Iterational. Thought patterns involving the past that lead to actions that sustain identity, interaction and institutions
Agency-Projective	Agency. Capacity of agents, for example individuals or communities, to change or influence their environment Projective. Imagination of future action in relation to hopes, fears and desires
Agency-Practical Evaluative	Agency. Capacity of agents, for example individuals or communities, to change or influence their environment Practical Evaluative. Practical or normative judgements selected from alternative courses of action in response to demands, dilemmas, or ambiguities in evolving situations
Structure-Actor	Structure. Channel for exercising human agency in order to empower that which is designated Actor. Individuals or communities that are able to exercise power and authority legitimately or illegitimately
Structure-Institution	Structure. Channel for exercising human agency in order to empower that which is designated Institution. Tangible (for example, organisations) and intangible (for example, values) configurations and arrangements that are supplemented by structures and used by agents to exercise agency
Structure-Recipient	Structure. Channel for exercising human agency in order to empower that which is designated Recipient. The audience that receives a historical, current or future account from a sender
Structure-Duality	Structure. Channel for exercising human agency in order to empower that which is designated

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Coding term	Definition
	Duality. Constitution of an actor's thoughts and motives, how they are institutionally shaped and constrained, modified or reconfigured
Community-Kinship	Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics and where identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Kinship. Sense of affinity between individuals or groups that form the foundation for communities. Affinity involves (but is not limited to) blood ties, historical heritage, culture or language
Community-Place	Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics and where identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Place. Sense of place which may be physical or ideational
Community-Purpose	Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Purpose. Sense of community that draws on identifiable attributes such as injustice, or disadvantage
Community-Feeling	Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Feeling. Sense of we-ness or a common understanding that generates passion

1.3. Step 2: Theme: The social networks constructed by political elites concerning the land

Social networks rely on relational thinking and lie at the heart of political elites in order to forge links that facilitate social interaction using language.

The aim of this step is to code the conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language' of political elites for establishing the social networks and the configurations within and between social communities when referring to the land question.

The categories, sub-categories, sub-sub-categories, codes and coding terms are defined in Table 6 below:

Table 6: Coding for social networks constructed by political elites

Category	Code	Coding term
Political elite	EFF	Political Elite-EFF-Malema
	FF+	Political Elite-FF+-Groenewald

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Category	Code	Coding term
Sub-category		
Language configuration	Symbol	Language-Configuration-Symbol
	Icon	Language-Configuration-Icon
	Index	Language-Configuration-Index
	Conflict	Language-Network-Conflict
	Diversity	Language-Network-Diversity
	Unity	Language-Network-Unity
Sub-sub-category		
Community link	Social site	Community Link-Social Site
	Actor	Community Link-Actor
	Type	Community Link-Type
	Transaction	Community Link-Transaction
	Tie	Community Link-Tie
	Role	Community Link-Role
	Identity	Community Link-Identity
Network	Chain	Network-Chain
	Hierarchy	Network-Hierarchy
	Favourable triad	Network-Triad-Favourable
	Unfavourable triad	Network-Triad-Unfavourable

The coding terms are defined in Table 7 below:

Table 7: **Coding term definitions: social networks constructed by political elites**

Coding term	Definition
Political Elite-EFF-Malema	Political Elite. A small group that exercises disproportionate agency to influence political decision-making by virtue of their position within institutional structures Political Party. EFF Actor. Julius Sello Malema
Political Elite-FF+-Groenewald	Political Elite. A small group that exercises disproportionate agency to influence political decision-making by virtue of their position within institutional structures Political Party. FF+ Actor. Petrus Johannes Groenewald
Language-Configuration-Symbol	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Configuration. Arrangement of the links facilitate interaction between the political elites

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Coding term	Definition
	Symbol. A sign consisting of words that signal empirical or conceptual meaning
Language-Configuration-Icon	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Configuration. Arrangement of the links facilitate interaction between the political elites Icon. A sign consisting of real or imagined images that have an instinctive interpretation
Language-Configuration-Index	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs. Configuration. Arrangement of the links facilitate interaction between the political elites Index. A sign consisting of real or imagined images that have an instinctive resemblance
Language-Community-Conflict	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Conflict. The other as an enemy
Language-Community-Diversity	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Diversity. Recognising the other
Language-Community-Unity	Language. An articulation, explanation, understanding (compatible or incompatible) of a context using signs Community. Social grouping based on mutually agreed and shared characteristics in which identity and ideas are a central bond and a common denominator Unity. Celebrating the difference of the other
Community Link-Social Site	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Social Site. Connected set of social relations that produces coherent, detectable effects within and between political elites
Community Link-Actor	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Actor. Individuals or communities who have an ability to exercise power and authority legitimately or illegitimately
Community Link-Type	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Type. Set of sites distinguished by a single criterion, simple or complex

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Coding term	Definition
Community Link-Transaction	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Transaction. Bounded communication within or between political elites
Community Link-Tie	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Tie. Continuing series of transactions to which actors or communities attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights and obligations
Community Link-Role	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction Role. Assortment of ties associated with a social site
Community Link-Identity	Community Link. Links within and between communities that facilitate social interaction. Identity. Actor's experience of a type, tie, role, network, or group, coupled with a public representation of that experience; the public representation often takes the form of a shared story or experience
Network-Chain	Network. Set of ties that are more or less homogeneous Chain. Two or more ties between social sites that are congruent.
Network-Hierarchy	Network. Set of ties that are more or less homogeneous Hierarchy. Chains linking social sites that are asymmetrical and unequal
Network-Favourable Triad	Network. Set of ties that are more or less homogeneous Favourable Triad. Three social sites sharing similar ties
Network-Unfavourable Triad	Network. Set of ties that are more or less homogeneous Unfavourable. Three social sites sharing dissimilar ties

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SUMMARY

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 'LAND LANGUAGE' ARTICULATED BY THE POLITICAL ELITES CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND QUESTION AFTER 2013

An ideational exploration of an imagined pluralistic security community

SUPERVISOR : DR FG WOLMARANS
DEPARTMENT : DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEGREE : DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE)

The advent South Africa's democracy in 1994 was accompanied by high expectations that the land question would be suitably resolved. As an over-arching response, the land reform programme, consisting of land redistribution, land restitution and tenure reform, was implemented, together with other initiatives, but few will argue that that the programme and initiatives have been successful. Undoubtedly, the land question continues to fester and is characterised, among others, by increasing conflict, frustration, fear and mistrust. The failure of land reform can be partially attributed to the material approach to the land question which, although undeniably relevant, has provided a necessary but insufficient solution and has tended to aggravate the situation by reverting to a zero-sum solution, namely expropriation without compensation.

While the material cannot be ignored, less attention has been paid to the ideational dimension of the land question. Vested in social constructionism, the ideational context lays store by the social origins of knowledge and the importance of language for the construction of multiple realities leading to diverse communities, identities, agency and structures typified by the other, othering and otherness. Yet the ideational does not end there. It extends beyond multiple realties, allowing for the imagination of a particular community, which is a pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. In this respect, the security community is vested in the advancement of societal interest, the acknowledgment of human dignity and the inculcation of compassion as a virtue.

The aim of this thesis is two-fold. First, it applies social constructionism for deepening understanding of the post-2013 conflictual, diversifying and unifying 'land language'

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articulated by the political elites to construct social communities. Second, it explores the emergence of an imagined pluralistic security community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change as a response to the post-2013 land question.

The historical context of South Africa's land question shows that three organisational categories – the political elites, the traditional authorities and the white commercial farmers – with particular historical realities have emerged as actors in the land question. As a substantive category the EFF and FF+ as political elites have elevated the post-2013 land question to the national discourse because of the urgency associated with its resolution. This thesis presents an analysis of the content of the symbolic, iconic and indexical 'land language' articulated by party leaders Julius Sello Malema (EFF) and Petrus Johannes Groenewald (FF+) that demonstrates how they have constructed distinct social communities and networks around the land question. Typified by an identification of the other, actions of othering and the substantiation of otherness, their 'land language' is sometimes conflictual, sometimes diversifying and sometimes unifying. It is the sometimes diversifying and sometimes unifying 'land language' that allows for the exploration of an imagined pluralistic community that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. Given the intractability of the post-2013 land question the findings – perhaps counterintuitively – highlight that the ideational vestiges of an imagined pluralistic security community found in the 'land language' articulated by the political elites converge concerning the importance of societal interest, to some extent the relevance of human dignity, but lacks the inculcation of compassion as a virtue as an ideational answer to South Africa's post-2013 land question.

KEY WORDS

agency, conflict, diversity, EFF, FF+, Groenewald, ideational, identity, imagined pluralistic security community, 'land language', land question, Malema, networks, other, otherness, othering, political elites, qualitative content analysis, South Africa, social community, social constructionism, structure, traditional authorities, unity, white commercial farmers.

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