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Student number 17298645

**STATE RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS IN THE KENYAN
RIFT VALLEY**

by

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SUMMARY

STATE RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS IN THE KENYAN RIFT VALLEY

This thesis is about the struggles of communities inhabiting the Kenyan Rift Valley to assert their customary land rights. I focus on the Rift Valley because its interface of dominance by the state statutory system over the community systems continues to pose an existential threat to the Kenyan state. I chose the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis because the Maasai lost the largest amount of land to European settlement in the Rift Valley, the Kikuyu represent the latest community migrants to the region while the Nandi and Kipsigis claim the Rift Valley to be their ancestral land. I use theoretical concepts of systems theory, social dominance and legal pluralism to test whether the new interface model of recognition by the state of communal tenure will be effective in redressing the unhealthy competition for land resources, instabilities and conflict in the region.

The struggles of these Rift Valley communities against the state system date back to 1895 when the British established a protectorate over East Africa and implemented policies that disrupted the equilibrium between the communities and their environments. The colonial state and the neo-colonial state disrupted the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities by dispossessing them of their lands. As a result of this disruption, these communities, as systems, have been pushed to the fringes of the Kenyan socio-economic system.

The communities remained resilient and continued to resist the state's disruption by asserting their customary land rights. They organized local protests that grew so widespread and complex as to pose an existential threat to the state. The colonial state then decided to increase African participation in the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system through an assimilationist policy known as the Swynnerton Plan.

The Swynnerton Plan failed to adequately address the disruption because it favoured a progression in the direction of individual tenure and away from communal tenure. The first Kenyan Constitution of 1963 continued the trend toward individual tenure rights as it also failed to recognize communal tenure rights. Shortly after Kenyan independence, the state attempted to confer tenure rights to pastoral communities through the creation of group

ranches. However, this effort also failed mainly because of a disconnect between the communities and the individuals that they entrusted with the management of their land.

State intervention concerning community land rights in South Africa, Australia, Tanzania and Canada have shown that effective recognition and enforcement of such rights is possible where there is political goodwill. Recent legal developments in Kenya are also encouraging steps in the effort to create a stable interface between the state and community systems. Kenya promulgated a new Constitution in 2010 that finally recognizes communal tenure. It subsequently enacted legislation in 2012 to initiate investigations into historical land injustices and to recommend appropriate redress. Significantly for customary land rights, Kenya enacted legislation in 2016 that defines community land to include customary land. I conclude with suggestions on remodelling and implementation of this new communal tenure framework to effectively recognize the customary land rights of communities inhabiting the Rift Valley.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
KANU	Kenya African National Union
NLC	National Land Commission
PNU	Party of National Unity
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
AU	African Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PEV	Post Election Violence
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Forces
TJRC	Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AP	Administration Police
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry Into Post Election Violence
DC	District Commissioner
DCIO	District Criminal Investigations Officer
DO	District Officer

ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
GEMA	Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association
GOK	Government of Kenya
GSU	General Service Unit
IPCA	Independent Police Conduct Authority
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KAMATUSA	Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu.
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCPB	National Cereals and Produce Board
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NSAC	National Security Advisory Committee
NSIS	National Security Intelligence Service
OCPD	Officer Commanding Police Division
OCS	Officer Commanding Station
PPO	Provincial Police Officer
PSIC	Provincial Security and Intelligence Committee

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	1
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW.....	7
1.3 METHODOLOGY.....	11
1.4 CONCEPTS AND THEORIES	12
1.4.1 SYSTEMS THEORY.....	13
1.4.2 AUTOPOIESIS	23
1.4.3 SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY.....	26
1.4.4 LEGAL PLURALISM	30
1.4.5 CUSTOMARY LAW.....	35
1.5 OUTLINE OF THESIS.....	40
1.6 OVERVIEW.....	45
CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY	47
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	48
2.2 THE DUAL NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES IN KENYA.....	53
2.3 THE INFLUENCE OF "ENVIRONMENT" IN SHAPING NOTIONS OF PROPERTY	55
2.4 ILLUSTRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES AMONG THE PASTORAL MAASAI, KIKUYU, NANDI AND KIPSIGIS.....	56
2.4.1 THE PASTORAL MAASAI.....	58
2.4.1.1 THE ANGLO-MAASAI AGREEMENTS OF 1904 AND 1911.....	64
2.4.1.2 THE OLE NCHOKO CASE	67
2.4.1.3 THE GROUP RANCHES	68
2.4.2 THE KIKUYU.....	69
2.4.2.1 LANDMARK LAND CASE AGAINST CHIEF KIOI	75
2.4.2.2 THE MAU MAU UPRISING	76
2.4.2.3 KIKUYU RESETTLEMENT IN THE RIFT VALLEY.....	81

2.4.3 THE NANDI AND KIPSIGIS	87
2.4.3.1 TRIBAL CLASHES OF 1991-1998	96
2.4.3.1 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE OF 2007-2008	100
2.5 REVIEW	111
CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY	
SYSTEMS	113
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	114
3.2 THE RIFT VALLEY LAND RESOURCES	115
3.3 CREATION OF THE WHITE HIGHLANDS.....	120
3.4 THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF NATIVE RESERVES	125
3.4.1 AFRICAN SQUATTERS OR LABOURER-TENANTS.....	129
3.4.2 INSUFFICIENT FOOD PRODUCTION.....	130
3.4.3 WEAKENED LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES.....	132
3.5 REVIEW	134
CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND	
TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS.....	136
4.1 INTRODUCTION.....	137
4.2 SHADOW ECONOMIES OF AFRICAN COMMUNITIES	139
4.3 DISPOSSESSION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITIES WITHOUT	
COMPENSATION	144
4.4 THE SWYNNERTON PLAN.....	159
4.5 REGISTRATION OF LAND RIGHTS AND REFORMS.....	178
4.6 COMMUNAL TENURE UNDER THE 2010 CONSTITUTION	199
4.7 REVIEW	229
CHAPTER 5 TRANSFORMATIVE LAND TENURE REFORMS IN KENYA ..	232
5.1 INTRODUCTION.....	233
5.2 PARTNERSHIP-BASED MODEL OF RECOGNITION.....	238
5.3 COMMUNAL TENURE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN	247
5.4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR COMMUNITIES	250
5.5 REVIEW	253

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 256

BIBLIOGRAPHY 264

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I introduce my research topic that is focused on African communities' struggles for land tenure rights in the Kenyan Rift Valley. Using systems theory, I model these communities as systems whose land rights were disrupted beginning in the early twentieth century when the colonial state appropriated a fifth of their productive land for European settlement. I describe the state's attempt to remodel its interface with the community systems in efforts to address the unhealthy competition over land resources, instabilities and conflict that resulted from its disruption of the African community systems. In the second part of my introduction, I acknowledge other studies that have examined the interface between the formal state legal system and traditional tenure systems in Kenya. However, my study also deals with changed circumstances in Kenya with the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 that created a new communal tenure recognition framework. In the last part of my introduction, I describe my research methodologies and the theories and concepts that underlie my model of Rift Valley communities as systems whose very existence depends on the land that they inhabit.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This thesis is about the struggles by African communities inhabiting the Kenyan Rift Valley to assert their customary land rights.¹ I focus on the Rift Valley region because the

¹ In Chapter 4, I go into more detail on the terms “customary land rights” and “community land rights”. The immediate former Kenyan Constitution of 1963 did not recognize community land so that community land rights that were based on the customary practices of a community were considered “overriding interests” or remained unregistered and were referred to as “customary land rights”. See ‘Constitution of Kenya, 1963’ (10 December 1963) (as set out in The Kenya Independence Order in Council, 1963’, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 105). The new Kenyan Constitution of 2010 recognizes community land rights so that such rights that are based on the customary practices of a community now have equal footing in law as other land rights granted formally under Kenya’s constitutional and statutory framework. See ‘Constitution of Kenya, 2010, art. 63’ <http://www.kenyalaw.org> (accessed 2 April 2020); See also Land Act, No. 6 of

interface of dominance by the state statutory system over the communities inhabiting this region is more visible than in any other region in Kenya and continues to pose an existential threat to the Kenyan state itself. I chose the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis to represent the Rift Valley communities because the Maasai, as a community, lost the largest amount of land to European settlement in the Rift Valley region, the Kikuyu represent the latest community migrants to the region, while the Nandi and Kipsigis represent the largest communities by population that claim the Rift Valley to be their ancestral land. The labels ‘Maasai’, ‘Kikuyu’, ‘Nandi’, and ‘Kipsigis’, however, conceal much more internal variations than the differences between the individuals that make them up and that live in the Rift Valley region.

The struggles of these Rift Valley communities date back to 1895 when the British established a protectorate over East Africa and implemented policies that disrupted the equilibrium between the communities and their environments, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits. The colonial state system and its successor, the independent Kenyan state, disrupted the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities by dispossessing them of, and displacing them from the areas that they traditionally inhabited.² As a result of

2012, section 2, available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 27 April 2020) (states: “customary land rights” refer to rights conferred by or derived from Kenyan customary law whether formally recognized by legislation or not”).

² See Patricia Kameri-Mbote ‘Righting Wrongs: Confronting Land Dispossession in Post-colonial Contexts’ (2009) *East African Law Review*, pp. 103 - 124 (Professor Kameri-Mbote discusses the legal and political processes that were used by colonial-era settlers in Kenya to acquire land rights from African communities, including declaration of a protectorate, designation of the land as owned by the colonizer and use of legal instruments to legitimize their political acts. She further observes that the dispossession of peoples’ land severed their connection with their physical environment and resulted in historical injustices that must be addressed); ‘Report of the African Commission's Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities Research and Information Visit to Kenya’ (1 - 19 March 2010) United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) pp. 37 - 46 (discussing the state’s dispossession and displacement of the Maasai

this disruption, members of these communities have been pushed to the fringes of the Kenyan socio-economic system.³ However, the communities are resilient and have struggled to maintain their customary practices.⁴ These struggles have been well documented in reports by commissions appointed by the state to inquire into land-based conflicts in the Rift Valley region.⁵

I use the description of communities as found in systems theory (as the sum of interactive and interdependent component parts) to model these communities as systems and to highlight the importance that they attach to their customary land rights.⁶ Using systems

community in Kenya); ‘Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’ (3 May 2013) Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), Kenya, Vol. IIB, sections 41 - 55 (discussing the origins of land-related problems in mainland Kenya); ‘Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission)’ (31 July 1999) The Government Printer, section 94 (discussing European settlements in the Rift Valley Province).

³ In Chapter 4, section 4.2, I engage in more discussion of the economic disempowerment of these African communities.

⁴ See Chapter 2, I discuss the Maasai community’s landmark litigation against the European settlers, the Kikuyu community’s armed resistance against the settlers and the Nandi and Kipsigis’ tribal warfare to reclaim their land from other communities in the Rift Valley that they perceive to be foreign occupiers.

⁵ See Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2); TJRC Report (n 2); ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)’ (15 October 2008) Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf (accessed 2 April 2020); Paul N. Ndungu, et al ‘Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into The Illegal/Irregular Allocation Of Public Land (Ndungu Land Report)’ (2004) Government printer, Nairobi; ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy Framework, Constitutional Position of Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration (Njonjo Land Commission)’ (2002) Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (National government publication).

⁶ See section 1.4.1 of this chapter, where I discuss systems theory using the systemic characteristics

theory, I highlight the importance of customary land rights for communities living in the Rift Valley region. I use the systemic descriptions of German Sociologist Professor Niklas Luhmann and the pragmatic approach to social grouping identity developed by McGill University's Professor John Galaty.⁷ Luhmann describes systems theory as the idea that the system is different from, and greater than, the sum of its component parts.⁸ Luhmann's description of systems theory, as criticized and analysed by others, results in the following characteristics of a system: (1) it is a body or group of interactive and interdependent elements; (2) it self-defines or self-identifies; (3) its elements are functionally differentiated or structured to self-produce and self-preserve; (4) it uses feedback loop mechanisms to maintain its integrity and stability; (5) it is autopoietic; and (6) it uses communication to reveal and structure its interactions and to perpetuate its identity.⁹

described by German Sociologist Professor Niklas Luhmann. I also rely on the pragmatic approach to identifying social groupings suggested by McGill University's Professor John Galaty that focuses on identifying the social grouping as a whole without precisely and accurately describing their component parts or constituent elements.

⁷ See Luhmann, N & Baecker, D (ed) 'Introduction to Systems Theory' trans Gilgen, P (2013) Polity Press (containing a collection of Prof. Niklas Luhmann's lectures); John Gillespie 'Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia' (Spring, 2008) 40 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 657 (discussing Professor Niklas Luhmann's ideas); John Galaty 'Being "Maasai"; Being "People-of-Cattle": Ethnic Shifters in East Africa' (1982) 9 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 1, 3 (suggesting an approach to investigating Maasai identity).

⁸ See John Gillespie (n 7 above); Anthony J. Colangelo 'A Systems Theory of Fragmentation and Harmonization' (2016) 49 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1.

⁹ Anthony J. Colangelo (n 8 above); Hugh Baxter 'Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law' (July, 1998) 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987; Richard Nobles & David Schiff 'Using Systems Theory to Study Legal Pluralism: What Could Be Gained?' (June, 2012) 46 Law & Soc'y Rev. 265; John Gillespie (n 7); David N. Cassuto 'The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms' (2004) 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79; Perry G. Horse 'The Sacred and the Profane: Second Annual Academic Symposium in Honor of the First Americans and Indigenous Peoples Around the World: Spirituality and New Science Since in Organizations: A Tribal Perspective' (Fall, 1996) 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 49.

I conclude that African communities are systems because they are made up of interactive and interdependent individuals, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land, waters, and other essential elements focused on self-production and self-sustenance of the whole.¹⁰ The inter-dependencies and interactions between these component parts of the community system revolve around the land that they inhabit and depend on for their livelihood.¹¹ As I discuss in section 1.4.2 of this chapter under ‘autopoiesis’, these community systems are also autopoietic, meaning that they tend to regenerate and transform their component parts to more effectively achieve their self-production and self-sustenance objective. With the passage of time, community systems develop customary practices that are more suitable for the environment that they inhabit. I illustrate this dynamic nature of systems in chapter 2 by describing the increasing adoption of sedentary agriculture by some of the pastoral communities living in the fertile and well-watered areas of the Rift Valley even before colonial disruption.

Analysing communities as systems leads to a better understanding of their struggles for survival and continuity as community systems. The communities’ struggles for survival and continuity is at the root of their drive to assert their customary land rights as land is an essential component of the community system.¹² In comparing the experiences of African communities in the Rift Valley region with similar experiences in Tanzania and South Africa and of aboriginal communities in Australia and Canada, I conclude that the component parts

¹⁰ See section 1.4.1 below.

¹¹ As above.

¹² In Chapter 2 below, I go into more details on the importance of land to communities. See *Love v Commonwealth of Australia* (11 February 2020) B43/2018; *Thoms v Commonwealth of Australia* (11 February 2020) B64/2018 (collectively, *Love v Commonwealth*) (High Court of Australia) (emphasizes the importance of land as a component part of the Australian Aboriginal community); Michael Dodson ‘Statement on Behalf of the Northern Land Council’ (July 1992) *The Australian Contribution: UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Tenth Session, Geneva 35* (explaining that everything about Aboriginal society is inextricably interwoven with, and connected to, the land).

of systems are “inextricably interwoven with, and connected to, the land”.¹³ The Australian High Court’s ruling in Mabo v. Queensland, High Court of Australia, a landmark decision on formal state recognition of customary land rights captured the centrality of land to aboriginal communities by stating that “... the ancestral tie between the land, or 'mother nature', and the man who was born therefrom, remains attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with his ancestors...”¹⁴ An analysis of communities as systems, therefore, leads to the understanding that communities consider land to be very important to them and that its loss would result in their disappearance as a people.

I also analyse this clash between the formal state legal system and traditional tenure systems through the lens of social dominance theory. This is the notion that “all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies.”¹⁵ When social systems interact, they tend to structure themselves hierarchically, thereby resulting in one system dominating and suppressing the other.¹⁶ The interaction between the colonial state system and African community systems has resulted in the colonial state’s domination and suppression of African communities.

The Kenyan state’s dominance interface model with community systems in the Rift Valley has, therefore, been characterized by a perennial competition for land resources by the communities among themselves and also with state agents. This unhealthy competition over land resources has resulted in instabilities in the Rift Valley and conflicts, thereby

¹³ As above.

¹⁴ *Mabo v Queensland* (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1 (High Court of Australia).

¹⁵ See Erika K. Wilson ‘Why Diversity Fails: Social Dominance Theory and the Entrenchment of Racial Inequality’ (2017) 26 Nat’l Black L.J. 129 (for an explanation of social dominance theory); Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius & Shana Levin ‘Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward’ (2006) 17 Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 271; Jim Sidanius et al. ‘Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method’ (2004) 25 Pol. Psychol. 845. I discuss the theory of social dominance in more detail in section 1.4.3 below.

¹⁶ As above.

posing an existential threat to the entire Kenyan state system.¹⁷ Shortly after Kenya's independence in 1963, the Kenyan state unsuccessfully attempted to remodel this dominance interface by conferring tenure rights to pastoral communities through the creation of group ranches.¹⁸ The latest interface model by the state is through the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, the Community Land Act of 2016 and its implementing regulations that provide for the recognition, protection and registration of community land rights and the management and administration of community land.¹⁹ I use concepts of systems theory, social dominance and legal pluralism to test whether the state's recognition interface model will effectively redress the unhealthy competition for land resources, instabilities and conflict among community systems in the Rift Valley region.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In choosing this topic, I acknowledge other studies concerning customary land rights, legal pluralism and recognition of minority rights.²⁰ In this thesis, however, I deal with

¹⁷ See Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) (discussing tribal-based conflicts in the Rift Valley Province); CIPEV Report (n 5 above); TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB (discussing land-related conflicts in the Rift Valley region).

¹⁸ I discuss the introduction and failure of group ranches in chapter 4 below.

¹⁹ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(5); The Community Land Act 27 of 2016, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148 § 39 (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting); The Community Land Regulations, 2017, Legislative Supplement No. 87, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 178 (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting).

²⁰ See Kameri-Mbote, P 'Property Rights and Biodiversity Management in Kenya: the case of land tenure and Wildlife' (Dissertation) (1998) Stanford University, ProQuest's Dissertations & Theses database, available at <https://about.proquest.com/libraries/academic/dissertations-theses/> (accessed 20 December 2020); Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124; John Galaty (n 7) (suggesting an approach to investigating Maasai identity); TO Elias 'The Nature of African customary law' (1956) Manchester University Press 3 (citing C Dundas 'Native Laws of some Bantu Tribes of East Africa' (1921) 51 Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 217 - 78; E Cotran 'The future of customary law in Kenya' in JB Ojwang & JNK Mugambi (eds) 'The S.M. Otieno Case: Death

changed circumstances in Kenya with the promulgation of a new Kenyan Constitution in 2010 and the enactment of legislation in 2016 aimed at providing legally secure tenure to communities. This thesis adds to other studies which examine the interface between the Kenyan state legal system and customary land rights in the Rift Valley region from a legal pluralist perspective.²¹ In chapter 5, I also explore different models of recognition that have been tried in other countries, especially the partnership-based model of recognition that may be suitable for the Rift Valley region.²²

There are scholars that have dealt with customary land rights in the Rift Valley and in Africa, including those who have written articles on customary land rights in Kenya similar to the rights addressed by the Kenya Community Land Act No. 27 of 2016.²³ Professor Joseph Kieyah has also written on indigenous peoples' land rights in Kenya with a focus on

and Burial in Modern Kenya' (1989) 149 - 164; J Kenyatta 'Facing Mount Kenya' (1979) Secker and Warburg (London) 21 (discussing the importance of African customary systems); Collins Odote 'The Legal And Policy Framework Regulating Community Land in Kenya, An Appraisal' (2013) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Nairobi, Kenya.

²¹ As above.

²² See Chapter 5. See also *Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General)*, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the Aboriginal rights of the Nishga people of northwestern British Columbia based on the fact that their ancestors had occupied and used the land from time immemorial.); *Mabo & another vs. The state of Queensland and another* (1989) HCA 69; 166 CLR 186 (for the proposition that there was a concept of native title at common law and that the source of native title was the traditional connection to or occupation of the land); Ian Peach 'Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Future of Federal Regulation of Indian Status' (2012) 45 U.B.C. L. Rev. 103 (for a discussion of the struggles for recognition by the Indian community in Canada) (for different recognition models used in other countries); *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12).

²³ See Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20); Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124; Odote, C (n 20); Kameri-Mbote, P & Odote, C (eds) 'The Gallant Academic: Essays in Honour of H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo' (2017) School of Law – University of Nairobi.

the unjust land tenure policies targeting the Maasai and Ogiek.²⁴ The late Kenyan Professor HWO Okoth-Ogendo wrote about land tenure systems in Africa.²⁵ Dr. Liz Alden Wiley, another Kenyan scholar, and Professor Patricia Kameri-Mbote, a former dean of the law faculty at the University of Nairobi, have written on community land rights.²⁶ This thesis enriches the existing scholarship on customary land rights based on the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 and enactment of a new statutory framework in 2016 that expressly recognize customary land rights.²⁷

I am also aware of the emerging scholarship, particularly in Canada, rejecting recognition politics. For example, Glen Sean Coulthard,²⁸ Russell Diabo²⁹ and Taiiiake

²⁴ Joseph Kieyah 'Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya: A Case Study of the Maasai and Ogiek People' (Spring, 2007) 15 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 397.

²⁵ H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 'Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya' (1991) ACTS Press, African Centre for Technology Studies; H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 'Legislative Approaches to Customary Tenure and Tenure Reform in East Africa, in *Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa*' (2000) Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan eds., 123, 127.

²⁶ Liz Alden Wiley & Peter A. Dewees 'From Users to Custodians: Changing Relations Between People and the State in Forest Management in Tanzania' (2001) World Bank, Policy, Research working paper no. WPS 2569; Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 – 124; Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20).

²⁷ For the new communal tenure legal framework, see Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(1); Community Land Act (n 19); Community Land Regulations (n 19); The National Land Commission Act 5 of 2012. Revised Edition 2016 [2015] (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting).

²⁸ Glen Sean Coulthard 'Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition' (2014) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (arguing that the politics of recognition does not create partnerships but continues the suppression and domination of indigenous community systems by the state).

²⁹ Russell Diabo 'Harper Launches Major First Nations Termination Plan as Negotiating Tables Legitimize Canada's Colonialism' (10 January 2012) The Bullet, Socialist Project E-Bulletin No 756 www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/756.php (accessed 2 April 2020).

Alfred,³⁰ leading scholars on issues affecting members of the First Nations in Canada, have argued that recognition has been used by the Canadian state as a tool for reinforcing oppression.³¹ These scholars argue that communities should assert their inalienable rights to self-determination as a people by any means necessary.³² While I do agree that communities inhabiting the Rift Valley region have rights to self-define and self-identify,³³ I also recognize their limitations in carrying out armed struggles against the Kenyan state. In chapter 2, I discuss the most complicated and widespread armed resistance against colonial dispossession of land by the Kikuyu community that ended in their defeat by European settlers. Addressing the interface of dominance by the state through armed resistance is further complicated by the fact that the European settlers have been replaced by African elites who are themselves members of the African communities. Effective recognition of the African community systems by the formal state system is, therefore, not a tool of oppression, but the only viable path toward a sustainable nation.

This thesis also enriches existing scholarship on legal pluralism and customary land rights. Scholarship on legal pluralism also exists already. Alan Hunt,³⁴ David Howes³⁵ and

³⁰ Taiaiake Alfred 'Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto' (2009) Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed.

³¹ Some of these authors base their rejection of recognition politics on the writings of Franz Fanon. See Franz Fanon 'The Wretched of the Earth' (1963) Grove Weidenfeld A division of Grove Press, Inc. <http://abahlali.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Frantz-Fanon-The-Wretched-of-the-Earth-1965.pdf> (accessed 2 April 2020); Franz Fanon 'Black Skin, White Masks' (1952) Editions de Seuil, France (arguing basically that recognition is a tool used by the dominating social system to maintain its dominance and suppression of other social systems).

³² As above.

³³ In section 1.4.1, I discuss the self-identification characteristic of community systems based on system theory as described by Professor Niklas Luhmann. See Niklas Luhmann lectures (n 7); John Gillespie (n 7) (discussing Professor Niklas Luhmann's ideas).

³⁴ See Allan Hunt 'Foucault's Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval' (1992) 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 - 38.

³⁵ See David Howes 'From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law, 1875

Boaventura DeSousa Santos³⁶ have written extensively on the coexistence of two or more legal orders in the same time, space and context.³⁷ This thesis adds to the existing scholarship on legal pluralism by analyzing the difficult relationship between customary law and state law in Kenya, specifically. I adopt the legal anthropologist / naturalist approach to legal pluralism that demonstrates that the legitimacy of a community's customary legal system is backed by wide acceptance of the obligatory nature of the laws by members of the community. Most of the more widely-published books and articles on legal pluralism did not specifically address the relationship between African customary law systems and the state legal system³⁸ and, therefore, this thesis contributes to the scholarship on complex pluralistic societies in Africa.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

In this section, I describe my research methodologies. I set out to model Rift Valley communities as systems so as to analyse them using the theoretical concepts of systems theory, legal pluralism, and social dominance theory. The limited scope of my study does not allow me to conduct my own detailed legal anthropological study of these communities, but I rely on customary practices that have been summarized in court cases and on other studies that have been published in articles and journals. I also sought information about the theoretical concepts that would be useful for my analysis. I focus on the customary land rights of the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis. The Maasai community represent the Rift Valley communities because they lost the largest amount of land to European settlers in the Rift Valley region. The Kikuyu were the largest squatter or labour-tenant community in the Rift Valley region at the time of Kenya's independence in 1963 and therefore represent the latest migrants to the region. The Nandi and Kipsigis communities are the two largest sub-

- 1929" (1987) 32:3 McGill LJ 523.

³⁶ Boaventura deSousa Santos 'Law: A Map of Misreading' (1987) 14 J.L. & Soc'y 279.

³⁷ See also Mariano Croce 'A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart's (inadvertent) defence of the indistinctiveness of law' (2014) 27 Can JL & Juris 27 - 47 (discussing Hart's approach to legal pluralism).

³⁸ As above. See also Howes, D (n 35); Hunt, A (n 34) 1 - 38.

tribes of the Kalenjin community and therefore represent the largest communities by population that claim the Rift Valley to be their ancestral land.

I relied on doctrinal research and comparative research. I conducted doctrinal research from a variety of sources, including hardcopy books that I purchased and borrowed from libraries and also received as gifts from authors. I also purchased ebooks and accessed online journals and articles through the University of Pretoria Library Services. I subscribed to the LexisNexis digital library platform to obtain additional access to caselaw and journal articles on customary land rights from other jurisdictions. I also visited the University of Pretoria law library and the Kenya National Archives for additional doctrinal and comparative research.

Access to caselaw, journals and articles enabled me to compare Rift Valley community systems with other community systems in South Africa, Tanzania, the United States of America, Canada and Australia. I use the comparisons to test my theoretical concepts in analysing the African community systems.

I tested my use of the theoretical concepts to analyse community systems in front of live audiences at conferences focused on the interface between formal state laws and customary laws. In addition, I reviewed YouTube videos and conducted informal discussions with scholars on topics concerning customary land rights and the theoretical concepts that I chose for my analysis. Subjecting my theories to such scrutiny helped me to focus my doctrinal and comparative research on the search for an effective interface between the formal state legal system and traditional tenure systems in the Kenyan Rift Valley.

1.4 CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

In this section, I clarify the theoretical concepts of systems theory, autopoiesis, social dominance theory, legal pluralism and customary law that I use to test whether the state's recognition interface with Rift Valley communities will be effective in redressing the unhealthy competition for land resources, instabilities and conflict in the region. I rely on systems theory and the concept of autopoiesis to define community systems as whole entities made up of interactive and interdependent individuals, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land, waters, and other essential elements focused on self-production and self-sustenance of the whole. Using the lens of social dominance theory or the tendency for

human societies to hierarchize, I explain the state's dominance over the African community systems. To explain the internal variations and diversity that lie beneath the labels 'Maasai', 'Kikuyu', 'Nandi', and 'Kipsigis', I use legal pluralism or the theoretical framework for the existence of two or more legal systems within the same geographic space, time and context. I adopt the legal anthropologist / naturalist approach to legal pluralism that demonstrates that the legitimacy of customary law is backed by wide acceptance of the obligatory nature of the laws by members of the community.

1.4.1 SYSTEMS THEORY

In this section, I describe the theory underlying my model of Rift Valley communities as systems whose very existence depends on the land that they inhabit. I use systems theory to explain the struggles by communities in the Kenyan Rift Valley as efforts by these communities to construct and reconstruct themselves, so as to preserve their very existence.³⁹ Systems theory is premised upon the basic idea that systems evolve to secure their own continuity and survival.⁴⁰ Professor H. Patrick Glenn of McGill University's Faculty of Law and Institute of Comparative Law, traces the origin of the notion of "system" to the Greek "*sustema*", as "*assemblage*" or "*ensemble*".⁴¹ He explains that the concept of "system" was brought into the mainstream of western intellectual life with the development of taxonomic

³⁹ Niklas Luhmann lectures (n 7 above); Arthur J. Jacobson, '1989 Survey of Books Relating to the Law; VII. Legal Theory and Philosophy: Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann. Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society', edited by Gunther Teubner (1988) 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1647. (collectively, 'The New Science of Niklas Luhmann').

⁴⁰ Id.

⁴¹ H. Patrick Glenn, 'Special Issue/Numero Special: Navigating the Transsystemic: Tracer le Transsystemique: Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions' (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 863 - 898.

biology in the eighteenth century, using systems as units of analysis.⁴² Professor Russell L. Ackoff's definition of "system" is similar to Glenn's.⁴³ He defines a system as a whole being that contains inter-dependent component parts that can affect the properties or behaviour of the whole.⁴⁴

According to Professor Luhmann, a system has the following six main characteristics: (1) it is a body or group of interactive and interdependent elements; (2) it self-defines or self-identifies; (3) its elements are functionally differentiated or structured to self-produce and self-preserve; (4) it uses feedback loop mechanisms to maintain its integrity and stability; (5) it is autopoietic; and (6) it uses communication to reveal and structure its interactions and to perpetuate its identity.⁴⁵

The system is, therefore, different from, and greater than, the sum of its component parts. A system is able to use its own negative and positive feedback loop mechanisms to maintain equilibrium among its component parts.⁴⁶ A negative feedback loop is self-

⁴² Id.

⁴³ See, generally, Russell L. Ackoff & Fred E. Emery, 'On Purposeful Systems' (1972) London: Tavistock, 1972.

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ These characteristics are summarized from various articles discussing systems theory. See Niklas Luhmann lectures (n 7); John Gillespie (n 7) (discussing Professor Niklas Luhmann's ideas); Anthony J. Colangelo (n 8). See also Dimitris Michailakis 'Law as an Autopoietic System' (1995) 38 *Acta Sociologica* 323 - 337 (describing the characteristics of autopoietic systems and sub-systems). See Daniel Fitzpatrick and Andrew McWilliam 'Bright-Line Fever: Simple Legal Rules and Complex Property Customs among the Fataluku of East Timor' (June, 2013) 47 *Law & Soc'y Rev.* 311 (using the system theory notion of autopoiesis to find similar characteristics in the Fataluku community of East Timor).

⁴⁶ See Hugh Baxter 'Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law' (July, 1998) 19 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 1987 (discussing a system's use of feedback loop mechanisms to re-generate itself to ensure its own survival as a system); Alan Calnan 'Torts as Systems' (Winter, 2019) 28 *S. Cal. Interdis. L.J.* 301, 315 (describing a feedback loop as a "circular chain of causal connections that link past, present, and future events in many possible locations").

correcting and self-stabilizing; it can correct a systemic imbalance much like a thermostat rectifies a temperature imbalance.⁴⁷ A positive feedback loop is self-reinforcing; an initial perturbation to one component of the system is amplified as it propagates around the loop.⁴⁸ Unchecked by negative feedback, a positive loop will grow to the point of becoming unstable as will be seen in chapter 2 when discussing the Rift Valley communities' struggles to repossess their land.⁴⁹

The first characteristic of a system is that it is a body or group of interactive or interdependent elements or component parts.⁵⁰ The system is, therefore, different from, and greater than, the sum of its component parts. The core image of a system is the human body, a biological system with component parts such as cells or organs.⁵¹ The imagery of the body can be used to model a community as a system because the community also depends on the inter-dependence and interaction of individuals, laws, customs, land and other elements within it to survive as a community. The community, just like the body, cannot simply be reduced to its individual members in the same way that cutting a body in half does not produce two bodies. The notion of autopoiesis that I discuss in the next section is a response to the criticism often levelled against Professor Luhmann's systems theory that it leaves out the individual dimension.⁵² Viewing the system's component parts as interactions and inter-dependencies, their collective behaviour is, therefore, more than the sum of their individual behaviours.

The constituent elements or component parts of community systems such as African communities in the Rift Valley, Aboriginals in Australasia or Indians in the Americas are individual members of the community, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land,

⁴⁷ As above.

⁴⁸ As above.

⁴⁹ As above.

⁵⁰ As above.

⁵¹ See Michael King, 'The "Truth" About Autopoiesis' (Summer 1993) 20 *Journal of Law and Society* 2.

⁵² See Niklas Luhmann lectures (n 7) p. 7 et seq. (where Luhmann discusses Max Weber's theories).

waters, and other essential elements of the system.⁵³ Some elements or component parts of these community systems are essential to the system's survival and continuity.⁵⁴ An example of an essential component of African, Aboriginal and Indian community systems is land or territory.⁵⁵ Land is so important to the Maasai community in East Africa, for example, that the Maasai names, such as 'Masai', 'Wakuifi', 'Orloikob,' 'Loikob,' 'loigob,'

⁵³ See *Love v Commonwealth*, (n 12), pp. 124-125 (the Australian High Court recognized these constituent elements or component parts of a system when it stated that "the people, the ancestral spirits, the land and everything on it are 'organic parts of one indissoluble whole'").

⁵⁴ As above.

⁵⁵ *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12) pp. 124-125 (the Australian High Court in *Love v. Commonwealth* emphasized the importance of land as a component part of the Australian Aboriginal community when it stated that "[t]he very words "Aboriginal" and "indigenous", ab origine or "from the beginning", enunciate a historical, and original, connection with the land of Australia generally." The Court further observed: "Native title rights and interests require a continuing connection with particular land. However, underlying that particular connection is the general spiritual and cultural connection that Aboriginal people have had with the land of Australia for tens of thousands of years. In other words, underlying a connection to any particular land is a general, "fundamental truth ... an unquestioned scheme of things in which the spirit ancestors, the people of the clan, particular land and everything that exists on and in it, are organic parts of one indissoluble whole."). See also *Dodson, M* (n 12) (explaining as follows: "[e]verything about Aboriginal society is inextricably interwoven with, and connected to, the land. Culture is the land, the land and spirituality of Aboriginal people, our cultural beliefs or reason for existence is the land. You take that away and you take away our reason for existence. ... Removed from our lands, we are literally removed from ourselves). In the 1973 Canadian Supreme Court case of *Calder v British Columbia (AG)*, see *Calder v Attorney General* (n 22), the Canadian Supreme Court recognized the Aboriginal rights of the Nishga people of northwestern British Columbia on the concept of prior occupation of lands; that their ancestors had occupied and used the land from time immemorial.

all mean “*possessors of the land*”.⁵⁶ The Māori, an Aboriginal community in New Zealand, have a saying that, just as the individual rises out of the placenta of the mother, so does the community rise out of the territory in which it lives.⁵⁷ The importance of land to the Māori is further emphasised by the Māori language in which the word for land - ‘*whenua*’ - is also the word for placenta.⁵⁸

In analysing the group or body of interactive and independent elements that make up a community system, I rely on Professor Galaty’s pragmatic approach to identifying social groupings.⁵⁹ He focuses on identifying, generally, the body or group of interactive individuals that make up the system rather than engaging in an endless quest for an immutable, definite, bounded ethnic group.⁶⁰ He observes that there are inherent limitations that may impede efforts to identify any system.⁶¹ Language is one such limitation.⁶² The

⁵⁶ John Galaty (n 7) at 3 (citing Dr. Ludwig Krapf, ‘Notes written by German missionary (Krapf notes)’ (c. 1860)).

⁵⁷ See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, ‘Special Issue: Law and Language: The Use of Tangata Whenua and Mana Whenua in New Zealand Legislation: Attempts at Cultural Recognition’ (August, 2011) 42 VUWLR 259; ‘Report of the New Zealand Play Centre Federation from the Working Party on Cultural Issues (NZ Play Centre Report)’ (1990); Ani Mikaere, Nin Tomas and Kerensa Johnston, ‘Review: Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Land Law’ (2003) 2003 NZ Law Review 447; J.G.A Pocock, ‘Law, Sovereignty and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi’ (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 481.

⁵⁸ Id.

⁵⁹ John G. Galaty, ‘Animal spirits and mimetic affinities: The semiotics of intimacy in African human/animal identities’ (2014) 34(1) Critique of Anthropology 30 – 47; John Galaty (n 7).

⁶⁰ Id.

⁶¹ Id.

⁶² John Galaty (n 7) at 3 (observing that the term “Maasai” appears to have been applied

terminology used to identify social groupings may generate uncertainty around social grouping identity because many of the key terms used in the identity exercise, such as “community”, “system”, “ethnic group”, “Maasai”, “Kikuyu”, “Nandi”, “Kipsigis”, and other references to social groupings, lack consensus definitions and do not refer to consistent or coherent social groupings.⁶³ Language presents false choices if the exercise is reduced to an endless exercise of finding coherent and consistent definitions of these ambiguous and complicated terms.⁶⁴ The task of social grouping identification using language is further complicated by the existence of language barriers.⁶⁵ The language of identification may be different from the language used by the system itself in the same way that colonial powers sought to identify African, Aboriginal or Indian communities using the English language.⁶⁶

A second limitation that may impede efforts to identify any system is context, because systems are generally defined by contrasting who or what a system is with that which it is not.⁶⁷ In this sense, identity is inherently contextual because a system acquires an ethnic label or identity marker as against non-elements of that system. To define “Maasai”, for example, is as easy as pointing out those who are and those who are not “Maasai”.⁶⁸ Professor Galaty gives other examples of the contextual nature of identity in using objects that often exemplify this play on selfhood and alterity: landscapes (we are part of and like our natural surroundings, but not theirs), the social order (our institutions, their institutions), and practices or customs (we are what we do, or do not do).⁶⁹ These examples show that

inconsistently from the colonial period to represent alternative nomenclature for all sections of Maa-speaking people).

⁶³ Id.

⁶⁴ See Cassuto, (n 9) (explaining that the false choices presented by language can be due to linguistic subjectivity and ideological differences).

⁶⁵ Id.

⁶⁶ John Galaty (n 7) at 3.

⁶⁷ Galaty, JG (n 59).

⁶⁸ John Galaty (n 7).

⁶⁹ Galaty, JG (n 59) pp. 30-47.

constituent elements of a system that also embody its core characteristics are vital in its identification and distinction from the elements of other systems. In the face of the other, therefore, systems are able to see and come to self-define and self-identify. Identification of a social grouping is thus carved out of the “intricate interplay of differences and affinities, whether in the landscapes humans inhabit, social structures they enact”, or practices and customs that divide and exemplify them.⁷⁰ This contextual nature of identity dispels any assumption of a unitary meaning behind ethnic labels or identity markers.

Despite these linguistic uncertainties and the contextual nature of identity, Professor Galaty suggests a pragmatic approach to identity by focusing on the body or group of persons that we seek to identify.⁷¹ This body or group of persons still exists and persists despite our linguistic uncertainties or contextual limitations. Much the same way we discover an individual’s characteristics independently of their name, we can also discover a social grouping’s characteristics independently of the terminology used to identify it.⁷² In discovering an individual, the focus should be on the individual and not the profile associated with a certain name or label.⁷³ The individual’s identity with a community system is based on a sufficient and substantial connection to the community plus the community’s acceptance of that individual’s membership.⁷⁴ For example, “Aboriginal status” or “Indian status” or “Maasai status” is a conclusion about the relationship that the individual has with the social grouping or body of persons known by the identity-marker “Aboriginal”, “Indian”, or “Maasai”, as the case may be.

Professor Galaty suggests that our social grouping identity task should not focus on precisely describing the individuals or constituent elements of the system, but on accurately

⁷⁰ Id.

⁷¹ John Galaty (n 7) p. 3.

⁷² Id.

⁷³ Id.

⁷⁴ See Pamela D. Palmater, ‘Forum on R. v Marshall: An Empty Shell of a Treaty Promise: *R. v. Marshall* and the Rights of Non-Status Indians’ (Spring, 2000) 23 Dalhousie L.J. 102.

describing the social grouping as a whole.⁷⁵ This group of individuals that constitute a community system can be identified using an identity marker or ethnic label for the whole system. For example, a tribal name like the “Maasai”, “Kikuyu”, “Nandi” or “Kipsigis” allows us to refer to the community system without being forced to come to a consensus as to which descriptive characteristics precisely constitute its elements or constituent parts. The ethnic labels or identity markers thus assist us in condensing a system’s characteristics into a single symbol of generalized or collective identity for the whole. These ethnic labels or identity markers are, essentially, pegs upon which we hang a description of the community system so that we can have a coherent and consistent discussion about it.⁷⁶ Such identity markers or ethnic labels help us to avoid the endless search for a consensus on the identities of constituent elements or component parts of the system before having a discussion about the system as a whole. According to Galaty, the social groupings referred to by the identity markers or ethnic labels “Maasai”, “Kikuyu”, “Nandi” or “Kipsigis”, are, therefore, not immutable or unsusceptible to human modification, but constitute mythical unities concealing underlying symbolic constituents.⁷⁷

The other characteristics of a system are tied to its identity in that this body or group of interactive and interdependent elements or component parts is self-referential and tends to self-define and self-identify. Luhmann describes the self-replicating or self-referential feature of systems as “autopoiesis”, a notion borrowed from biological systems that are essentially units which repeatedly self-produce and thus become independent of their

⁷⁵ See Sol Tax [Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago’s Department of Anthropology], ‘Can World Views Mix?’ (1990) 49 *Human Organization* 3 (appears to agree with Professor Galaty’s pragmatic approach when he argues that customs and practices of social groupings refer to the deeper values, or structures that are not expressed but remain firmly embedded and relatively unchanging).

⁷⁶ Professor Galaty’s metaphor of an ethnic label or identity marker as a “peg” upon which to hang a description of the social grouping, is borrowed from John R. Searle, ‘Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language’ (1970) 167 – 172.

⁷⁷ Galaty, JG (n 59) pp. 30-47.

environment.⁷⁸ This self-definition characteristic of systems is the reason why a community system's self-identification should be the first among equals in describing the community system.⁷⁹ As the United States Supreme Court stated in *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, "a tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community."⁸⁰ The group or body of persons known as the "Maasai", for example, have essential characteristics defined by the Maasai themselves and that have led to this social grouping being referred to as the "Maasai". The Maasai people should, therefore, be the first among equals in pointing out those who are and those who are not "Maasai" so long as such customary practices are exercised in a manner that is not repugnant to the Kenyan constitution.⁸¹ The same logic should apply to the Kikuyu, Nandi, Kipsigis and other Rift Valley communities.

The boundaries of this self-identification characteristic of community systems tend to stretch only as far as state sovereignty permits.⁸² For example, the United States and Canada have exercised their sovereignty to require, generally, (1) blood quantum and (2) acceptance by the community, for an individual to claim Indian status.⁸³ In Australia, an Aboriginal

⁷⁸ See John Paterson & Gunther Teubner, 'Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis' (1998) 7 Soc. & Legal Stud. 451 (explaining the notion of autopoiesis).

⁷⁹ See Robert A. Williams, Jr., 'Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) DUKE L.J. 660, 663 n. 4 (describing the right of "indigenous peoples" to self-define).

⁸⁰ *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49, FN 32, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L. Ed. 2d 106, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 8 (U.S. May 15, 1978).

⁸¹ Christine Metteer, 'The Trust Doctrine, Sovereignty, and Membership Determining who is Indian' (2003) 5 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 53 (advocating for community self-identification).

⁸² *Love v Commonwealth*, (n 12) pp. 124-125 (discussing the state sovereignty limitations of community self-identification and self-definition).

⁸³ Ralph W. Johnson, 'Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians' (July, 1991) 66 Wash. L. Rev. 643.

community's determination of the Aboriginal status of an individual is subject to the Australian state's discretion to recognize or not to recognize that status determination.⁸⁴ The systemic characteristic of self-definition and self-identification is thus in inherent conflict with the principle of state sovereignty; if a community system is able to assert its right of self-definition and self-identification against the state, that community would be sovereign and hence become a state. If an individual's status determination by a community in exercise of its right of self-definition or self-identification is at variance with the same individual's status determination by a state in exercise of its sovereign power, the community must, therefore, yield out of a sense of self-preservation. A community system's characteristic of self-identification or self-determination is, therefore, subject to state validation through recognition.

Both Professor Luhman's outline of systemic characteristics and Professor Galaty's pragmatic approach to identity are helpful in identifying community systems in the Rift Valley region.⁸⁵ A community meets the definition of a system, because it has the six main characteristics identified by Professor Luhmann and discussed above. First, a community is a system because it is made up of individual human beings, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land, waters, and other essential elements of a system. As discussed, there are individuals who identify themselves as members of the Maasai, Nandi, Kipsigis and Kikuyu communities in the Rift Valley. Second, a community tends to self-identify as a community and to pass on that identity from generation to generation. Members of the communities inhabiting the Rift Valley, for example, are not required to register with any entity or to take any formal legal steps to obtain such membership. Instead, the communities have their own membership criteria that they have been applying to their members for thousands of years. The third systemic characteristic identified by Professor Luhmann is the functional differentiation or structure of a system's elements with the goal of self-production and self-

⁸⁴ *Love v Commonwealth*, (n 12) pp. 124-125.

⁸⁵ For a summary of Luhmann's systems theory and Galaty's pragmatic approach, see Michael King 'The "Truth" About Autopoiesis' (Summer 1993) 20 *Journal of Law and Society* 2 (explaining that "Autopoiesis is, then, a theoretical approach to the operations of social systems and their relationships with each other and with the general social environment") and John Galaty (n 7) 3.

preservation. The functional differentiation and structuring characteristic of systems is also tied to the fourth systemic characteristic in which systems use feedback loop mechanisms to maintain their integrity and stability. I illustrate these systemic characteristics in Chapter 2 where I describe the Rift Valley communities' traditional land tenure systems and the self-help tactics that some of them continue to employ in their struggle to assert their customary land rights.

1.4.2 AUTOPOIESIS

Professor Luhmann also describes a system as being autopoietic, meaning that a system forms its elements from itself.⁸⁶ The notion of autopoiesis captures the tendency of systems to regenerate and transform their component parts to perpetuate themselves.⁸⁷ According to Professor Niklas Luhmann, “autopoiesis” means “self-production” or “self-referential”.⁸⁸ The notion of autopoiesis helps to explain how the system is self-referential, self-sustaining and self-proliferating in a way that uniquely serves and symbiotically defines it.⁸⁹ Professor Luhmann borrows the term “autopoiesis” from biological research, where it is

⁸⁶ Autopoiesis is one of the characteristics of a system that is described in this chapter. Professor Luhmann borrows the term “autopoiesis” from biological research, where it is used to describe self-replicating organic sub-systems. See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 78) (explaining Professor Luhmann’s systems theory notion of autopoiesis); See also King, M (n 85) (explaining that “Autopoiesis is, then, a theoretical approach to the operations of social systems and their relationships with each other and with the general social environment”); Anthony J. Colangelo (n 8); Hugh Baxter (n 46). See also Michailakis, D (n 45) 323 - 337 (using Luhmann’s notion of autopoiesis to analyse law).

⁸⁷ As above.

⁸⁸ As above. See also Arthur J. Jacobson ‘1989 Survey of Books Relating to the Law; VII. Legal Theory and Philosophy: Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann. Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society’, edited by Gunther Teubner (1988) 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1647. (collectively, ‘The New Science of Niklas Luhmann’).

⁸⁹ As above.

used to describe self-replicating organic sub-systems.⁹⁰ The core image of autopoiesis in biology is the individual organism, such as a human cell, that continuously regenerates and transforms its elements from a complex base of energy and matter.⁹¹ Similarly, autopoiesis can be used to model the community as a system that continuously regenerates and transforms itself to survive.⁹² The opposite of autopoiesis is allopoiesis, meaning “other-produced” or a system whose elements do not generate their own network of production.⁹³ The core image of allopoiesis is a machine.⁹⁴ Just as human beings are not machines, communities are also not allopoietic.⁹⁵

The customary practices of Rift Valley communities are thus autopoietic subsystems of these communities and may be considered “autopoietic law” because they are used to guide each community’s process of self-definition as I illustrate in chapter 2.⁹⁶ These customary practises also embody the core characteristics that the community relies on for self-definition, self-production and self-preservation.⁹⁷ Just as individuals are biological systems comprised of many functional subsystems, so does a complex society develop functional specializations of their component parts that form themselves into autopoietic sub-systems.⁹⁸ These subsystems are autopoietic as part of the autopoietic system in the

⁹⁰ See King, M (n 85) (explaining the core image of systems as biological units); See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 78) (explaining Professor Luhmann’s systems theory notion of autopoiesis).

⁹¹ As above.

⁹² As above.

⁹³ See *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39).

⁹⁴ As above.

⁹⁵ As above.

⁹⁶ *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39).

⁹⁷ See also *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39) (recognizing that law constitutes a self-referential, self-generating system because law defines what is, and what is not, law). See also King, M (n 85) (explaining that the systems theory notion of autopoiesis is borrowed from biological research).

⁹⁸ This is consistent with Professor Luhmann’s third systemic characteristic of systems being

same way that the cell forms an organism within the larger organism also made up of cells.⁹⁹ For example, the economic, legal, medical systems and other functional subdivisions of the community are all subsystems that are themselves autopoietic in that they are self-referential and self-generating subsystems of the larger community system.¹⁰⁰ The customary practices of the communities of the Rift Valley that are part of the legal systems of those communities are therefore autopoietic subsystems generated by the autopoietic communities to ensure the survival and continuity of those communities.¹⁰¹ In sections 1.4.4 and 1.4.5, I explain that when a critical mass of community members accepts to follow a customary practice out of a sense of legal obligation, then the practice forms part of the customary laws of that community.

Professor Luhmann's notion of autopoiesis has been criticized for leaving out the individual dimension contrary to Max Weber's definition of social action as being oriented to the past, present, or expected future behaviour of other individuals.¹⁰² The criticism does not have to be addressed in this thesis, as the individual members of the communities in the Rift Valley will be examined only to the extent that they form part of the community system known by the label or identity marker 'Maasai', 'Kikuyu', 'Nandi', or 'Kipsigis'.¹⁰³ The inter-dependencies and interactions of individual community members can be separated from the individual members themselves in the same way that individuals come and go, but

functionally differentiated or structured to achieve the system's aims of self-production and self-preservation. See Cassuto, DN (n 9).

⁹⁹ As above.

¹⁰⁰ See John Gillespie (n 7) (describing law as a system of communications). See also *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39) (recognizing that law constitutes a self-referential, self-generating system because law defines what is, and what is not, law).

¹⁰¹ As above.

¹⁰² See King, M (n 85) (stating some of the criticisms against Professor Luhmann's systems theory of autopoiesis). See also *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39).

¹⁰³ This is also consistent with the reasoning in *Love v Commonwealth of Australia*, that the component parts of a community system, i.e. individual Aboriginals, are "organic parts of one indissoluble whole". *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12).

their communities remain.¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, to avoid “false choices”¹⁰⁵ that may arise if this discussion is reduced to an endless exercise of finding coherent and consistent definitions of ‘Maasai’, ‘Kikuyu’, ‘Nandi’, or ‘Kipsigis’, I do not delve deeply into the reasons why the individual community members consider themselves to be part of these communities. The notion of autopoiesis can thus help us to explore the ways in which communities of the Kenyan Rift Valley region, as systems, have maintained their customary practices across generations.

1.4.3 SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY

The interface between the state statutory system and African customary systems can be analysed through the lens of social dominance theory.¹⁰⁶ Social dominance theory is inextricably intertwined with the basic assumption of systems theory that systems evolve to

¹⁰⁴ As above.

¹⁰⁵ Cassuto, DN (n 9) (explaining that the false choices presented by language can be due to linguistic subjectivity and ideological differences).

¹⁰⁶ See Wilson, EK (n 15) pp. 133 - 134 (describes social dominance theory as a “theory of intergroup relations” that suggests that social groupings have the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies); Michelle Adams ‘Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action’ (December, 2002) 82 B.U.L. Rev. 1089, 1107 (describing social dominance theory as starting with the notion that “all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies”); Devon W. Carbado and Patrick Rock ‘What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?’ (Winter, 2016) 51 Harv. C.R. - C.L. L. Rev. 159, 175 (focuses on the strategies used by systems to maintain hierarchy by describing social dominance theory as the ‘idea that stability in hierarchical societies ... is sustained through the normative endorsement of ideologies that reinforce and even promote the status quo’). See also David Simpson ‘Fool me once, Shame on You; Fool me twice, Shame on you again: How Disparate Treatment Doctrine Perpetuates Racial Hierarchy’ (Spring, 2019) 56 Hous. L. Rev. 1033, 1040 – 1041 (stating that social dominance theory is a social psychology theory that is yet to fully permeate the legal field).

secure their own continuity and survival.¹⁰⁷ When these systems combine and form societies, self-preservation then becomes an inherent trait of the societies.¹⁰⁸ A society composed of multiple social systems may itself reflect the formative stages of a new integrated social system, hence the link between systems theory and social dominance theory.¹⁰⁹ Social dominance theory posits an integrated theory of intergroup relations, competition among groups and contests for power and resources, to explain the social inequality that is inherent in complex societies.¹¹⁰

Social dominance theory begins with the notion that "all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies."¹¹¹ In other words, human societies, consisting of a multiplicity of social systems, are structured such that some social systems are dominant, and others are subordinate.¹¹² These social structures arise when systems interact so that the group-based social hierarchies can ensure the provision of prestige, social power and privilege for individual members of the hierarchical society in a stable and sustainable manner that ensures its self-preservation. According to social dominance theory, this group-based hierarchical structure may be based on arbitrary-set systems which implement social hierarchy along socially constructed group categories of class, race, ethnicity, tribe, and other immutable characteristics.¹¹³ Stability in hierarchical societies is sustained through the normative endorsement of forms and ideologies that preserve,

¹⁰⁷ As above. See also Hugh Baxter (n 46) (using the systems theory notion of autopoiesis to explain a community system's ability to self-generate and self-perpetuate).

¹⁰⁸ As above.

¹⁰⁹ As above. See also Jim Sidanius & Felicia Pratto 'Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression' (1999) Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2 (discussing social dominance theory generally).

¹¹⁰ Adams, M (n 106) p. 1107 (December, 2002) (describing social dominance theory as starting with the notion that "all human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies").

¹¹¹ Wilson, EK (n 15) pp. 133 - 134.

¹¹² As above.

¹¹³ See Sidanius & Pratto (n 109) pp. 3 - 30 (analyzing various intergroup relations theories).

perpetuate and promote the hierarchical structures.¹¹⁴ Education and training are examples of vehicles used by hierarchical societies to perpetuate hierarchy-enhancing forms and ideologies. These hierarchy-enhancing forms and ideologies dictate how resources and social status ought to be distributed in the hierarchical society.¹¹⁵ Social dominance theory emphasizes the individual-level forces of discrimination that contribute to these hierarchy-enhancing forms and ideologies.¹¹⁶ Individual-level forces comprise a combination of aggregated institutional and individual discrimination and behavioural asymmetry.¹¹⁷ Aggregated institutional and individual discrimination occur when institutions and individuals adopt rules or practices that result in the disproportionate allocation of positive and negative social value across the social status hierarchy.¹¹⁸ Behavioural asymmetry suggests that the hierarchical society promotes behaviour in which the dominant group remains on top and the subordinate group at the bottom.¹¹⁹

By applying these individual-level forces of discrimination and asymmetrical behaviours, dominant social systems within the hierarchical society end up hoarding a disproportionate share of instruments that have positive social value, such as political authority and power, areas of high agricultural potential, labour, capital and other instruments of power and authority.¹²⁰ The subordinate social systems, on the other hand, absorb a disproportionate share of items that have negative social value, such as limited use and possession rights in areas of low agricultural potential, low status occupations and other attributes of an inferior social status.¹²¹ The end result is a hierarchical arrangement in which the dominant group is on top and the subordinate group at the bottom.¹²² The dominant

¹¹⁴ As above.

¹¹⁵ As above.

¹¹⁶ Carbado & Rock (n 106) p. 175.

¹¹⁷ As above. See also Simpson, D (n 106) p. 1040-1041.

¹¹⁸ Carbado & Rock (n 106) p. 175.

¹¹⁹ Simpson, D (n 106) p. 1040-1041.

¹²⁰ As above.

¹²¹ As above.

¹²² Carbado & Rock (n 106) p. 175.

social systems then use instruments such as education and training to preserve, perpetuate and promote this hierarchical arrangement.¹²³

The tendency for group-based hierarchies to form when systems clash is not unique to the African continent. In Canada, Aboriginal communities continue to suffer similar suppression and domination in their interface with European settlers. Taiaiake Alfred, in his seminal work, *Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto*, details the settler system's domination and suppression of Aboriginal community systems in Canada as follows:

“Aboriginal identity and culture were at first systematically and zealously suppressed. Aboriginal culture was derided and vilified as inhumane... This often entailed the forced separation of parents and children, the suppression of their languages, and the indoctrination of Aboriginal children with the exoteric trappings of religions and customs alien to their own esoteric spiritual, cultural traditions.”¹²⁴

In Canada, the British Crown thus abandoned its nation-to-nation treaty partnership with Aboriginal peoples in favour of domination, exploitation, and expropriation of Aboriginal land. The successor state has continued this asymmetrical power relationship with the Aboriginal peoples in Canada to this day.¹²⁵ Similarly, the interface between the state statutory system and African customary systems in Kenya has been characterized by

¹²³ As above. See also Sidanius & Pratto (n 109) pp. 3 – 30.

¹²⁴ Alfred, T (n 30).

¹²⁵ The Canadian state has acknowledged this asymmetrical relationship with the Indian community in Canada. See Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act, S.C. 2014, c. 38 (Assented to 16 December 2014) (available through the Canadian government's Justice Laws Website: <https://laws.justice.gc.ca/>) (states in its preamble that “[w]hereas the Indian Act is an outdated colonial statute, the application of which results in the people of Canada's First Nations being subjected to differential treatment; Whereas the Indian Act does not provide an adequate legislative framework for the development of self-sufficient and prosperous First Nations' communities”).

domination and suppression of African communities by the colonial state and its successor, the Kenyan state system as I discuss in chapters 3 and 4.

1.4.4 LEGAL PLURALISM

To explain the existence and validity of diverse African customary systems alongside the state legal system in the Rift Valley region, we turn to legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is useful to explain how African customary legal systems in the Rift Valley region have existed alongside the formal state legal system from the advent of colonialism in 1895.¹²⁶ Legal pluralist theory, generally, recognizes the existence of two or more legal systems within the same geographic space, time and context.¹²⁷ It holds that systems and subsystems within the same public space can produce their own rules, possess their own mechanisms for coercing compliance, and develop internal procedures for settling disputes.¹²⁸ Legal pluralism conceives of law and society as being inextricably intertwined and challenges the prescriptive, statist, monist and formalist theories of law.¹²⁹ According to Allan Hunt, “legal pluralism ... posits a plurality of legal forms over which state law persistently, but never with complete success, seeks to impose a unity”.¹³⁰ Legal pluralist theory, therefore, views

¹²⁶ See YP Ghai & JPWB McAuslan ‘Public law and political change in Kenya: A study of the legal framework of government from colonial times to the present’ (1970) Nairobi: Oxford University Press, pp. 25 - 30.

¹²⁷ Jamie C.Y. Liew ‘Finding Order in Calgary’s Cash Corner: Using Legal Pluralism to Craft Legal Remedies for Conflicts Involving Marginalized Persons in Public Spaces’ (2015) 52:3 *Alta L Rev* 605-634

¹²⁸ As above.

¹²⁹ See Matthew V.W. Moulton ‘Framing Aboriginal Title as the (Mis)Recognition of Indigenous Law’ (2016) 67 *UNBLJ* 336 - 368 (discussing the place of indigenous laws in a pluralist society)

¹³⁰ Allan Hunt ‘Foucault’s Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval’ (1992) 17 *Law & Soc. Inquiry* 1 - 38. See also Mariano Croce ‘A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart’s (inadvertent) defence of the indistinctiveness of law’ (2014) 27 *Can JL & Juris* 27 - 47 (discussing Hart’s approach to legal pluralism).

society as consisting of a plurality of normative orders.¹³¹ Under this theory, different legal systems, such as customary law, common law and the state system, are part of the dialogue of ideas that exist in society.¹³² According to this theory, communities living in the Rift Valley region of Kenya each have their own customary legal systems that coexist alongside the formal state legal system. Naturally, a balance must be found between the normative orders of these African communities and what can properly be defined as law. Legal pluralist theory, therefore, attempts to define criteria that would help to determine whether or not a given body of social norms could be defined as legal.¹³³

A bright line boundary between social norms and legal norms can be drawn using legitimate coercion or acceptance of the obligatory nature of a norm, depending on the type of legal theorist analysing the norm. Both critics and advocates of legal pluralist theory agree that social normativity is a social fact, meaning all societies have unwritten rules, called norms, that govern social behaviour.¹³⁴ Similarly, there is widespread consensus that some rules that govern social behaviour also have common features of legal systems, such as obedience and sanctions or threats of sanctions for noncompliance.¹³⁵ The contention, therefore, lies in the location of the boundary between social norms and law. Such a boundary would help legal pluralists to determine the proper definition of a legal norm as opposed to mere usage, behaviour or other types of social norms. In their quest for a

¹³¹ As above.

¹³² As above.

¹³³ For a discussion of legal pluralism theory, see Moulton, MVW (n 129) 368 (discussing the place of indigenous laws in a pluralist society); Hunt, A (n 130) 38. See also Croce, M (n 37) 47 (discussing Hart's approach to legal pluralism).

¹³⁴ See Lawrence E. Mitchell 'Understanding Norms' (Spring, 1999) 49 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 177 (acknowledging social normativity while discussing the bright line between norms and laws); Keith Culver 'Leaving the Hart-Dworkin debate' (Fall, 2001) 51 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 367 (explains the differing views on the nature of law while acknowledging the existence social norms); Croce, M (n 37) 47 (also acknowledges social normativity).

¹³⁵ For authors that agree that social norms may have the same features as laws, see Mitchell, LE (n 134) and Croce, M (n 37) 47.

boundary between legal norms and social norms, legal pluralists can be divided into positivists,¹³⁶ naturalists¹³⁷ and legal anthropologists,¹³⁸ depending on where and how they set their boundaries.

Positivists, generally, use legitimate coercion to mark the boundary between legal norms and social norms.¹³⁹ Legitimate coercion refers, generally, to the use (or threat) of force or sanctions by the state authority or agents of the state.¹⁴⁰ According to the positivist school of thought, the existence of the state simplifies the distinction between social norms and law, because law then becomes a special set of enforceable rules issued by a law-giver and administered by a group of officials.¹⁴¹ The positivist view is, therefore, that the law is the law because it has been generated by the individual or group of individuals recognized by the community as having the privilege to generate law.¹⁴² However, legal anthropology

¹³⁶ See J.L. Austin ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined’ (1954) Hackett Publishing [1998 edition]; H.L.A. Hart ‘The Concept of Law’ (1961) Clarendon Law Series; John Austin ‘Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law’ (1885) vol. I, 5th ed. R. Campbell. London: John Murray 316 - 317 (for more information on legal positivism).

¹³⁷ See Ronald Dworkin ‘Taking Rights Seriously’ (1978) Harvard University Press 30 - 43 (Dworkin’s natural law theory demonstrates the incapacity of positivism and pragmatism to account for common law, or, for purposes of this thesis, customary law, reasoning). See also Kevin T. Jackson ‘Rethinking Economic Governance: A Naturalistic Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence’ (Winter, 2013) 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39 (discusses Dworkin’s natural law theory).

¹³⁸ For a summary of legal anthropologists’ approach to legal pluralism, see Bronislaw Malinowski ‘Crime and Custom in Savage Society’ (1926) Littlefield, Adams & Co. [1967 edition]; Bronislaw Malinowski ‘The Functional Theory, in A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays’ (1939) University of N.C. Press [1944 edition] 145, 145 - 176 (collected essays of Malinowski). See also Croce, M (n 37) 47 (discussing both Hart’s positivist approach to legal pluralism and Malinowski legal anthropological approach).

¹³⁹ See Austin, JL (n 136) pp. 316-7 (for more information on legal positivism).; Hart, HLA (n 136).

¹⁴⁰ As above.

¹⁴¹ As above.

¹⁴² As above.

shattered the notion that only states can exercise legitimate coercion and extended such privileges to non-state actors as well.¹⁴³ According to them, formal state law is just one legal system among many others.¹⁴⁴ They argue that state law does not exhibit any special distinguishing feature from other systems of rules.¹⁴⁵ To buttress this view, legal anthropologists point to courts that have expanded the definition of “state” to include non-state authorities, such as the community or tribal authorities.¹⁴⁶ For example, the Court of Appeal of East Africa in the *Ole Nchoko Court of Appeal case*, held that the Maasai community was a sovereign entity with the capacity to make treaties with the British Crown.¹⁴⁷ Some legal anthropologists have even argued that state law is a species or type of “customary law”.¹⁴⁸

Natural law theory appears to agree with legal anthropologists on the lack of a clear distinction between state and non-state actors in the creation of legal norms.¹⁴⁹ Naturalists point to the failure of positivists to account for policy, justice and morality in their definition of law.¹⁵⁰ The positivist view does not account for laws that relate to nature (natural law), individuals’ value systems, policies, ideologies, ideas of justice, morality and other

¹⁴³ Croce, M (n 37) p. 47. See also Malinowski, B (n 138) (collected essays of Malinowski).

¹⁴⁴ As above.

¹⁴⁵ As above.

¹⁴⁶ See Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff “Symposium Issue: ‘Law as ...’ Theory and Method” in “Legal History: ‘Law as ...’: Theory and Practice in Legal History” (September, 2011) 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1039 (taking issue with the narrow interpretation of state power).

¹⁴⁷ *Ole Nchoko and others v. The Attorney-General and others*, 7/1913 (East Africa Court of Appeal, December, 1913) (hereinafter “*Ole Nchoko Court of Appeal case*”).

¹⁴⁸ Croce, M (n 37).

¹⁴⁹ See Dworkin, R (n 137) pp. 30 - 43 (Dworkin’s natural law theory demonstrates the incapacity of positivism and pragmatism to account for common law, or, for purposes of this thesis, customary law, reasoning). See also Kevin T. Jackson ‘Rethinking Economic Governance: A Naturalistic Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence’ (Winter, 2013) 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39 (discusses Dworkin’s natural law theory).

¹⁵⁰ As above.

conditions of validity of laws.¹⁵¹ For example, human beings have a natural inclination toward self-preservation and may accept rules restricting violence to ensure their collective survival.¹⁵² Human beings may also accept rules out of a sense of moral obligation, meaning that they agree to be bound by a rule simply because it is the right thing to do.¹⁵³ This introduces the notion of consent to be bound or acceptance of a legal norm as the basis of its validity.¹⁵⁴

Whereas positivists use legitimate coercion to draw a bright line boundary between social norms and legal norms, therefore, legal anthropologists and naturalists use wide acceptance of the obligatory nature of the norm to achieve the same goal.¹⁵⁵ Such acceptance is evidenced by the repeated or widespread practice of a custom.¹⁵⁶ If a critical mass of community members practice the custom out of a sense of legal obligation, a new customary law is created.¹⁵⁷ This nascent custom is seen by the community, generally, as better serving its needs and interests, as being more convenient, just, or fair.¹⁵⁸ In other words, the community accepts the new legal norm because it rhymes with the community's value

¹⁵¹ As above.

¹⁵² This is a conclusion based on the third systemic characteristic described by Professor Luhmann by which systems are composed of functionally differentiated or structured elements all aimed at self-production and self-preservation. See Cassuto, DN (n 9) (stating that “[a]ll systems, including the social system, share the twin imperatives of self-reproduction and self-preservation”).

¹⁵³ See Dworkin, R (n 137); Jackson, KT (n 149) (discusses Dworkin's natural law theory).

¹⁵⁴ As above.

¹⁵⁵ For more information on positivism, see Austin, JL (n 136) and Hart, HLA (n 136). For a summary of legal anthropologists' approach to legal pluralism, see Malinowski, B (n 138). For legal naturalist thought, see Dworkin, R (n 137) (Dworkin's natural law theory demonstrates the incapacity of positivism and pragmatism to account for common law or customary law because these types of laws do not emanate from an anointed law giver or authority figure).

¹⁵⁶ Croce, M (n 37) (summarizing the position taken by legal anthropologists and naturalists).

¹⁵⁷ As above.

¹⁵⁸ As above.

system, policies, ideologies, ideas of justice, morality and other conditions of validity of laws.¹⁵⁹ These sources of legitimacy cited by legal anthropologists and naturalists do not depend on the positivists' anointed law-giver, but on the community's value system that leads its members to accept a custom or practice as law.¹⁶⁰ In this thesis, I adopt the legal anthropologist / naturalist approach to legal pluralism that demonstrates that the legitimacy of customary law is backed by wide acceptance of the obligatory nature of the laws by members of the community. This approach is also consistent with different legal definitions of customary law, such as Roman law and international law as discussed below.

1.4.5 CUSTOMARY LAW

Roman law and international law both define customary law as general practice widely accepted as law. Book 1, title 2.9 of Justinian's Institutes (promulgated 533 AD) defines law as follows: "[l]aw comes into being without writing when a rule is approved by use. Longstanding custom founded on the consent of those who follow it is just like statute law."¹⁶¹ The same definition of customary law based on custom and usage can also be found in customary international law. Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute") describes the law to be applied by the International Court of Justice when deciding cases within its jurisdiction. It states that the Court shall apply "...international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."¹⁶²

Under Roman law and international law, therefore, a rule of customary law can be determined from a widely accepted state practice that is adhered to out of a subjective belief by the state that it is obligatory (*opinio juris*). Belief in the obligatory nature of the practice is implied from its wide acceptance or practice. Proof of the wide acceptance of a state practice can be found in the writings of learned international lawyers, judicial decisions of

¹⁵⁹ As above.

¹⁶⁰ As above.

¹⁶¹ See Thomas Cooper 'The Institutes of Justinian, With Notes' (1812) Philadelphia: P. Byrne.

¹⁶² 'Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)' art. 38(1)(b) <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute> (accessed 2 April 2020).

national and international courts and Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).¹⁶³ English courts also rely on past judicial decisions in similar cases to determine rules and doctrines of common law, which is a legal system similar to customary law.¹⁶⁴

Drawing from the definitions of customary law under Roman law and international law, I conclude that rules of customary law within states also require the same elements that were cited under Roman law and in international law: (1) a custom or practice (2) that is widely accepted by individuals within the community as being obligatory.

Kenyan Professor J. B. Ojwang agrees with this definition of customary law based on custom and usage when he describes the formation process for customary law.¹⁶⁵ According to Professor Ojwang, customary law begins to form when individual members of the community practice certain values, which guide their behaviour in the community. When these values gain widespread acceptance by community members, they become the customs of the community. A collection of customs practiced over time form the community's social norms and when the community's social norms are followed out of a sense of legal obligation by a critical mass of individuals in the community, they form the customary laws of that community.¹⁶⁶

Communities use customary laws as channels for self-perpetuation.¹⁶⁷ In this chapter, I identify autopoiesis as one of the systemic characteristics that communities use to self-perpetuate.¹⁶⁸ The concept of autopoietic law is also useful for understanding the dynamism

¹⁶³ William Thomas Worster 'The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law Analysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches' (Winter, 2014) 45 *Geo. J. Int'l L.* 445.

¹⁶⁴ *Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs* [1980] 1 All ER 529, [1980] 1 WLR 142, [1980] IRLR 116, [1980] ICR 161 (House of Lords) (explaining the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis).

¹⁶⁵ See C Juma and JB Ojwang (eds) 'In land we trust: Environment, private property and constitutional changes' (1996) Initiatives Publishers, Nairobi.

¹⁶⁶ As above.

¹⁶⁷ Use of communication for self-production and self-perpetuation is the last systemic characteristic described in this chapter. See *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39).

¹⁶⁸ See Viktor Winkler 'Immoral Law, Illegal Morals? NS Forced Labor Compensation and the Law'

of legal systems and their resistance to outside forces.¹⁶⁹ Professor Luhmann embeds the inter-dependencies and interactions of autopoietic systems in communication.¹⁷⁰ In order to communicate its essential characteristics or components internally and externally, the system first distils them into a code or mode of communication that is unique to it.¹⁷¹ This code or mode of communication can be conceived of as communicative acts. The legal system, for example, has a code of legal or illegal, such that norms, precepts, and practices from its environment are integrated into the legal system according to this legal or illegal criterion.¹⁷² This code of legal or illegal or communicative acts can then interact with the system's environment, thus guiding the behaviour of the system's constituent elements.¹⁷³ Autopoietic legal systems generate legal norms and have the dynamic capacity to transform communities or to resist their transformation when those communities interact with other systems.¹⁷⁴ The legal norms that are generated by the communities and accepted by members of the communities as binding are therefore autopoietic subsystems of those communities and can be described, generally, as customary legal systems.¹⁷⁵

(2002) 3 German Law Journal 1, 3 (describing this characteristic as the system's ability "to produce communications from within again and again, in order to "keep going""); John Gillespie (n 7); Nobles et al (n 9); Cassuto, DN (n 9) (discussing communication as a systemic characteristic).

¹⁶⁹ This is consistent with a system's self-definition and self-identification characteristic described in *The New Science* of Niklas Luhmann (n 39).

¹⁷⁰ As above.

¹⁷¹ See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 97) (citing Professor Luhmann's discussion of the binary coding characteristic of law).

¹⁷² As above. See also Karl-Heinz Ladeur 'The Theory of Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better Understanding of Postmodern law' (1999) EUI Working paper LAW No. 99/3 (discusses the systems theory notion of autopoiesis as creating a better understanding of postmodern law).

¹⁷³ As above.

¹⁷⁴ As above.

¹⁷⁵ Cassuto, DN (n 9) (making references to Prof. Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis and discussing law as a system of communication).

The customary practices of Rift Valley communities that I describe in chapter 2 are therefore the means through which the community system communicates its constituent elements from generation to generation.¹⁷⁶ These customary practices enable the community to adapt to its environment by continuously changing to maintain itself while maintaining its core essence.¹⁷⁷

Using the imagery of the waters of a river, customary legal systems are similar to the channels of the river that help the waters to keep flowing continuously.¹⁷⁸ With the passage of time, these river channels become well defined and can keep the waters of the river flowing for generations.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, the customary legal systems of the communities ensure those communities' continuity and survival through generations.¹⁸⁰ Just as rivers flow through different tributaries and channels, customary legal systems exist alongside other sub-systems of the community that all ensure the continuity and survival of the larger community system.¹⁸¹

Even if scholars find consensus on the definition of customary law, they will still face the challenge of proving widely accepted customary practices in the Rift Valley region in the same way that such proof continues to bedevil Roman law, English law and international law scholars. There are no recognized monographs on African customary law and courts

¹⁷⁶ See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 78) (citing Professor Luhmann's discussion of the binary coding characteristic of law).

¹⁷⁷ As above.

¹⁷⁸ Imagery of a river used to keep a community's values flowing from generation to generation is borrowed from African folklore from among the Luo community of Kenya who are described as River-Lake Nilotes. See Virginia Edith Wamboi Otieno vs Joash Ochieng Ougo and Omolo Siranga, Civil Case No. 4873 of 1986 (SM Otieno case) (describing the Luo people of Kenya).

¹⁷⁹ As above.

¹⁸⁰ See Winkler, V (n 168) 3 (describing this characteristic as the system's ability "to produce communications from within again and again, in order to 'keep going'").

¹⁸¹ See Winkler, V (n 168) 3 (read together with the imagery of a river used to keep a community's values flowing from generation to generation).

generally place the burden of proving customary law on the party alleging it.¹⁸² This is similar to Australian and Canadian aboriginal law and indigenous law in South Africa and Tanzania, which are also not written.¹⁸³ Instead, these customary laws are passed on from generation to generation through oral traditions and practices and are always evolving to meet the needs of the community.

Courts in Australia, Canada, South Africa and Tanzania, like in Kenya, rely on expert testimony to prove the existence and validity of the community's customary practices. In *Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd* (2003) 6 SA 104 (SCA) and *Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community* (2004) 5 SA 460 (CC), the South African courts relied on witness testimony that the Richtersveld community "had mined and used copper for purposes of adornment" long before 1913.¹⁸⁴ The community smelted copper and mixed it with molten metal to make rings, beads, and ornaments.¹⁸⁵ The witnesses also demonstrated exclusivity of use and possession of the land through testimony that outsiders were not allowed to prospect for or mine minerals on the Richtersveld community's land.¹⁸⁶ Similarly, the Kenyan High Court case of *Virginia Edith Wamboi Otieno vs Joash Ochieng Ougo and Omolo Siranga*, Civil Case No. 4873 of 1986 (*SM Otieno case*), involved questions of Kikuyu and Luo burial customs in Kenya. The Luo are another community living in Kenya. The Court in the *SM Otieno case* relied on an expert witness to determine that Luo custom required a deceased adult male to be buried in his homestead or next to his father to avoid

¹⁸² See Eugene Cotran 'Casebook on Kenya Customary Law' (1987) Professional Books Limited and Nairobi University Press (summarizing customary law cases in Kenya); *SM Otieno case* (n 178).

¹⁸³ Brian Z. Tamanaha 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (September, 2008) 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375 (stating that customary practices are usually unwritten in a fashion analogous to the common law).

¹⁸⁴ See *Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd* (2003) 6 SA 104 (SCA) and *Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community* (2004) 5 SA 460 (CC) (*Richtersveld Community case*) (discussing the struggles for recognition of communal tenure by the Richtersveld Community in South Africa).

¹⁸⁵ As above.

¹⁸⁶ As above.

calamity falling upon the whole clan.¹⁸⁷ Although there is little written evidence of the customary laws of the communities living in the Rift Valley, the customary practices that I describe in chapter 2 where I discuss the communities traditional tenure systems, have been gathered from case summaries, similar studies, journal and media articles and general literature.¹⁸⁸

1.5 OUTLINE OF THESIS

I divide the thesis into six chapters, with the first chapter being an introduction to my area of study and the last chapter concluding the study. As part of my introduction, I describe the background to my research on African communities' struggles for land tenure rights in the Kenyan Rift Valley. I also acknowledge other studies that have examined the interface between the formal state legal system and traditional tenure systems in Kenya. In the last part of my introduction, I describe my research methodologies and the theoretical concepts of systems theory, autopoiesis, social dominance theory, legal pluralism and customary law that underlie my model of Rift Valley communities as systems. The second chapter is focused on the traditional land tenure systems of Rift Valley communities that form the basis

¹⁸⁷ SM Otieno case (n 178).

¹⁸⁸ See Cotran, E (n 182); Chris Peers & Raffaele Ruggeri (illustrator) 'Warrior Peoples of East Africa 1840-1900' (2005) Osprey Publishing Ltd., (discussing the customs and traditions of the Maasai and the Nandi relating to militarization); See Dr. Ludwig Krapf 'Notes written by German missionary (Krapf notes)' (c. 1860) (accessed at the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, in August 2017) (writing about the Maasai). See also John Galaty (n 7) (citing Dr. Krapf's descriptions of the Maasai); *Munyao Ndolo & 3 others v Mary Nduku Mutisya* [2018] eKLR (describing customary practices of Kenyan communities); Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (Endorois case) (2003) 276 / 2003 (discussing customary practices of Kenyan communities); Various reports, letters and other correspondence between government officials before and after Kenya's independence in 1963 (Archived Documents)' (accessed at the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, in August 2017) (writing about all Kenyan communities).

of their customary land rights.¹⁸⁹ The communities that I have selected for this study have continued to maintain their diverse customary practices despite attempts by the colonial state and the neo-colonial state to suppress and eventually supplant these customary practices using the state statutory system. I chose the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis because the Maasai lost the largest amount of land to European settlement in the Rift Valley¹⁹⁰, the Kikuyu represent the latest community migrants to the region,¹⁹¹ while the Nandi and Kipsigis claim the Rift Valley to be their ancestral.¹⁹² I examine cases, studies, articles and literature to understand the four communities' historical practices concerning their ownership, possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of their land.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ See Chapter 2.

¹⁹⁰ See Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20); Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124 (discussing the dispossession and displacement of the Maasai community in Kenya); UNHCR Report (n 2) 37 - 46 (discussing the state's dispossession and displacement of the Maasai community in Kenya); TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB, sections 41 - 55 (discussing the origins of land-related problems in mainland Kenya); Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 94 (discussing European settlements in the Rift Valley Province).

¹⁹¹ As above.

¹⁹² TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB, sections 41 - 55 (discussing the origins of land-related problems in mainland Kenya); Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 94 (discussing European settlements in the Rift Valley Province); CIPEV Report (n 5).

¹⁹³ I engage primarily with the following in this respect: Various reports, letters and other correspondence between government officials before and after Kenya's independence in 1963 (Archived Documents)' (accessed at the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, in August 2017); *Ole Nchoko and Others, on behalf of themselves personally and on behalf of the Masai of Laikipia and on behalf of the Masai Tribe generally v. The Attorney General on behalf of the East Africa Protectorate Government and Others* ('Ole Nchoko High Court case'), High Court of East Africa at Mombasa, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912, (1914) 5 EALR 70; Macdonald, JRL (JRL Macdonald notes) 'Notes on the Ethnology of tribes met with during progress of the Juba Expedition, by Lt.-Col. (now General Sir) J. R. L. Macdonald' (1899) Journal of the Anthropological Institute for Great Britain and Ireland; A. C. Hollis (Text); Sir Charles Eliot (Introduction) 'The Nandi, Their

The third chapter of this thesis is about the colonial and neo-colonial state's disruption of traditional property rights regimes in the Rift Valley region that continues to pose an existential threat to the state due to unhealthy competition over land resources, instabilities and conflicts in the region. The disruption interfered with the stability and hence integrity of the community systems thus forcing them to take corrective measures in search of that stability. In this chapter, I generally analyse the interface between the state legal system and traditional tenure systems from the perspective of the colonial state and its successor Kenyan state. The state disruption of the traditional tenure systems started in the 1890s after the colonial regime decided to construct the Kenya-Uganda railway and recognized Kenya's rich agricultural potential, particularly in the Rift Valley region. The colonial regime then used various tactics, including, without limitation, predatory legislation, compulsory acquisition of land, agreements or treaties and forced eviction, to create a European reserve, known as the 'White Highlands' or 'Scheduled Areas'.¹⁹⁴ The actions of the colonial state and the subsequent Kenyan state effectively dispossessed the communities of their land.¹⁹⁵ In section 3.4, I describe the disruptive effect of land dispossession on the power ingredients that each African community system has traditionally deployed to better interact with its environment, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits.

The fourth chapter of the thesis is about the clash between the formal state statutory system and the informal African customary system.¹⁹⁶ I use the lens of social dominance theory, or the tendency for human societies to hierarchize, to understand the colonial state's dominance over, and disregard of, traditional tenure rights in the Rift Valley region through

Language and Folk-Lore' (1909) Oxford: Clarendon Press; G. R. Sandford 'An Administrative and Political History of the Masai Reserve' (1919) London: Waterlow & Sons Limited, London Wall.

¹⁹⁴ See J Lonsdale 'The conquest state 1895-1904' in WR Ochieng (ed) 'A modern history of Kenya 1895-1980' (1989) Cambridge University Press, 12.

¹⁹⁵ As above.

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter 4.

state action.¹⁹⁷ Case law and general literature demonstrate the tendency of the state to recognize and enforce rights to land based on title deeds issued by the state itself, while disregarding rights and interests based on African customary law.¹⁹⁸ Some of the case law and literature point to a discriminatory view of African customs and traditions on the part of state officials, whereby the state considers such customs and traditions to be primitive or uncivilized and proceeds to disregard them altogether.¹⁹⁹

In the fourth chapter, I also describe Kenya's new communal tenure framework. The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 ('the Constitution') recognizes community land that "shall vest in and be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar community of interest".²⁰⁰ The Constitution then provides for the enactment of legislation to give effect to its provisions that recognize community land.²⁰¹ The Community Land Act No. 27 of 2016 entered into force on 7 September 2016 and provides for the recognition, protection and registration of community land rights and the management and administration of community land.²⁰² Kenya also enacted the National Land Commission Act No. 5 of 2012,²⁰³ which outlines the functions and powers of the National Land Commission,

¹⁹⁷ See section 1.4.3 for a discussion of social dominance theory.

¹⁹⁸ See, in general, the following: PL Onalo 'Land Law and Conveyancing in Kenya' (1986) Heinemann Kenya 190 - 191 (discussing the extinguishment of customary land rights through registration); *Popatlal v. Reichand* (1963) EA 69 (voiding a loan transaction because of failure to register a memorandum of equitable mortgage as per the Money Lenders Act); *Sela Obiero v. Orego Opiyo and Others* (1970) (High Court Civil Case no. 44 of 1970) (also confirming the extinguishment of rights through registration).

¹⁹⁹ As above. In Chapter 4, I discuss in more detail how the government used registration to disregard customary land rights. See also J Kenyatta 'Facing Mount Kenya' (1979) Secker and Warburg (London) 21 (discussing the importance of African customary systems).

²⁰⁰ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(1).

²⁰¹ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(5).

²⁰² The Community Land Act 27 of 2016, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148 § 39 (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting).

²⁰³ The National Land Commission Act 5 of 2012. Revised Edition 2016 [2015] (Published by the

established under article 67 of the Kenya Constitution of 2010.²⁰⁴ This National Land Commission is a state organ with the mandate to investigate present or historical land injustices like those perpetuated by previous state officials.²⁰⁵ Kenya's new communal tenure framework, therefore, recognizes community land and provides a mechanism for communities to seek redress for their dispossession and displacement through the National Land Commission.

In the fifth chapter, I propose reforms to Kenya's new communal tenure framework to allow for more effective recognition and enforcement of customary land rights in the Rift Valley region of Kenya.²⁰⁶ Other communities involved in similar struggles in Tanzania, South Africa, Canada and Australia offer useful lessons for Kenya in its quest to successfully implement its new communal tenure framework.²⁰⁷ Court cases relating to customary land rights that have been brought before Kenyan courts, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, together with literature on inter-ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley, are also helpful in determining whether the new legal framework is a step in the right direction.²⁰⁸ The direction that I suggest in the

National Council for Law Reporting).

²⁰⁴ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 67.

²⁰⁵ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 67(2)(e).

²⁰⁶ See Chapter 5.

²⁰⁷ I discuss the recognition frameworks of other countries in Chapters 4 and 5. See also Moses M. Kusiluka and Dorice M. Chiwambo 'Acceptability of residential licences as quasi-land ownership documents: Evidence from Tanzania' (2019) 85 ELAUSP 176 - 182 (for a discussion of MKURABITA); Richtersveld Community case (n 184) (discussing the struggles for recognition of communal tenure by the Richtersveld Community in South Africa); *Mabo v Queensland* (n 22); *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12) (recognizing an Aboriginal status as creating a right to stay in Australia); *Calder v Attorney General* (n 22) (the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the Aboriginal rights of the Nishga people of northwestern British Columbia); Ian Peach (n 22) (for a discussion of the struggles for recognition by the Indians community in Canada).

²⁰⁸ See *In the Matter of the Ogiek Community Living in East Mau Forest (Joseph Letuya & 21 others v Attorney General & 5 others)* [2014] eKLR <http://www.kenyalaw.org> (accessed 2 April 2020)

fifth chapter is for the new communal tenure system to address the challenges that the Rift Valley communities have faced in seeking to enforce their customary land rights since annexation of Kenyan territory.²⁰⁹ I conclude that recent legal developments in Kenya are steps in the right direction and their implementation may lead to effective recognition of customary land rights.²¹⁰ Nevertheless, I propose changes to the current implementation framework for the Community Land Act to help the African communities with their transition from the periphery to the core of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system.²¹¹

1.6 OVERVIEW

This study is about creating a path for African communities to transition from the fringes to the centre of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system through formal state recognition of their customary land rights. Kenya can learn from communities in Tanzania, South Africa, Australia and Canada that have faced similar struggles. Scholars have done similar studies concerning legal pluralism and recognition of minority rights.²¹² However,

(discussing the international conventions that emphasize the importance of recognizing and enforcing indigenous rights); Endorois case (n 188); CIPEV Report (n 5); TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB (discussing land-related conflicts in the Rift Valley region); Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) (discussing tribal-based conflicts in the Rift Valley Province).

²⁰⁹ Chapter 5.

²¹⁰ By recent legal developments in Kenya, I refer to the promulgation of the Kenya Constitution of 2010 recognizing communal tenure and the legislation and regulations enacted to implement it. See Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(5), art. 63(1)(c); Community Land Act (n 19); Community Land Regulations (n 19); National Land Commission Act (n 205).

²¹¹ See Chapter 5.

²¹² See, for example, Taiaiake Alfred 'Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto' (2009) Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. (discussing Aboriginal self-determination in Canada); Bronislaw Malinowski 'Crime and Custom in Savage Society' (1926) Littlefield, Adams & Co. [1967 edition] (dealing with the concept of 'primitive jurisprudence'); Larry Chartrand 'Indigenous Peoples: Caught In a Perpetual Human Rights Prison' (2016) 67 UNBLJ 167 - 186 / (2016) 67 R.D. U.N.-B. 167 (dealing with indigenous rights versus state

this study is timely because of Kenya's recent enactment of a new communal tenure legal framework. Proper implementation of this new communal tenure framework presents a viable path toward socio-economic integration of African communities in Kenya.

sovereignty); Dr. Morad Elsana 'Legal Pluralism and Indigenous Peoples Rights: Challenges in Litigation and Recognition of Indigenous Peoples Rights' (2019) 87 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1043; Jamie C.Y. Liew 'Finding Order in Calgary's Cash Corner: Using Legal Pluralism to Craft Legal Remedies for Conflicts Involving Marginalized Persons in Public Spaces' (2015) 52:3 Alta L Rev 605; Brian Z. Tamanaha 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global' (September, 2008) 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375.

CHAPTER 2

**TRADITIONAL TENURE
SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT
VALLEY**

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
2.1 INTRODUCTION

Land tenure is a description of the “bundle of rights” that a person may possess over a parcel of land at a given time.²¹³ The bundle of rights includes rights of sale, possession, usufructus (use and enjoyment), lease and the rights to charge and to create easements over the parcel of land.²¹⁴ These rights denote a form of ownership of the parcel of land. Section 5 of the Kenya Land Act, No. 6 of 2012, names the following forms of land tenure: (a) freehold; (b) leasehold; (c) other forms defined by law, including easements; and (d) customary land rights, where consistent with the Constitution.²¹⁵ These land tenure rights can be held, generally, by individuals, groups and the Kenyan state. More recently, Kenya enacted a statutory framework for communities to hold these tenure rights as well under the Kenya Community Land Act of 2016 and its implementing regulations of 2017 and that I discuss in more detail in chapter 4.

In Kenya, the freehold, leasehold and easement forms of land tenure can be acquired through registration pursuant to the Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012, the current statutory framework for registration of land rights in Kenya. Registration refers to the entry of established rights onto the land register and issuing a title deed, which confers absolute and indefeasible property rights on the holder of the certificate of registration of title.

However, the customary land rights form of tenure is conferred by or derived from African customary law, customs or practices, provided that such rights are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any written law.²¹⁶ Such customary land tenure rights are, therefore, “traditional” in the sense that they are based on the communities’ customary practices. The customary practices of Rift Valley communities are useful in understanding the communities as systems. As discussed in the previous chapter on concepts and theories, a community’s customary practices are influenced by its social, economic and political context and are transmitted from generation to generation as a self-preservation mechanism for the

²¹³ Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20) Ch. II, p. 40.

²¹⁴ Onalo, PL (n 198) p. 19.

²¹⁵ See Land Act (n 1) section 5.

²¹⁶ Community Land Act (n 19) section 2.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

community system. These customary practices develop with the passage of time and are a product of the community system's interaction with its environment, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits.

In this chapter, I describe the customary practices of Rift Valley communities that form the basis of their customary land tenure rights. I analyse the interface between these traditional tenure systems and the formal state legal system from the perspective of the Rift Valley communities. The communities that I have selected for this study - the Pastoral Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi, and Kipsigis (collectively, the Rift Valley communities) have continued to maintain their diverse customary practices despite attempts by the colonial state and the neo-colonial state to suppress and eventually supplant these customary practices using the state statutory system.²¹⁷

Rift Valley communities differ greatly in their land use practices, economic specialization, social complexity, political organization, and material products, related to differences in population size and density, related in turn to differences in the areas they previously occupied, their fragmentation, and in opportunities for subsistence and for intensifying food production. The most glaring difference between food production practices among the pastoral Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis is the pastoral lifestyle of the pastoral Maasai, the crop cultivation of the Kikuyu and mixed pastoralism and crop cultivation of the Nandi and Kipsigis. These differences in food production constitute a major cause of the disparities between the Rift Valley communities that I discuss in this chapter. The Rift Valley communities, generally, also had major differences with the European settler community in the Rift Valley stemming from the European's much longer history of densely populated, economically specialized, politically centralized, interacting and competing social systems dependent on food production.

In describing the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities, I view them metaphorically as an onion with the practices that we can observe today constituting only the surface that, when peeled, leads to an understanding of older customary practices that

²¹⁷ See as above. See also Robert L. Tignor, *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939* (1976) Princeton University Press (discussing the colonization process from the perspective of three different African tribes).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
themselves need to be peeled back in search for a better historical understanding of the communities' customs and traditions.

I begin the chapter with a discussion of the dual nature of property rights regimes that we can observe in Kenya today. Whereas the act of registration confers freehold and leasehold tenure rights on the holder of a certificate of registration of title, customary land rights exist through customary practices subject to their recognition by the state. This dual tenure system is the metaphorical onion that we must peel to better understand the underlying customary practices.

I then outline the observable constellations of power that the communities have developed with the passage of time to effectively and efficiently interact with the environment that they live in. These power factors include intensive food production, high population density, economic specialization, social stratification, political organization, information, and technological advancements.²¹⁸ The power factors enable the communities that possess them to nourish themselves better, reproduce better and, generally, dominate other communities that inhabit the same area.

I end the chapter with illustrative descriptions of property rights regimes among the pastoral Maasai, the Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities, including concrete examples of the competition over land resources by these communities. These Rift Valley communities continue to demonstrate resilience and to resist the disruption caused by the colonial state system and its successor Kenyan state system. Resilience is the ability of the community to persist, recover and thrive in the face of disruption.²¹⁹ It is the capacity of a system to avoid disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change, in order to retain

²¹⁸ See Diamond, J 'Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies' (1999) W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, NY 15-16 (describing the power factors that systems use to attain and maintain dominance over others).

²¹⁹ B.E. Aguirre 'Dialectics of Vulnerability and Resilience' (Winter, 2007) 14 *Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol'y* 39, 41 (describing resilience as "an example of morphostasis--that is, a process directed to preserve the social system"); J. B. Ruhl 'Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation' (June, 2011) 89 *N.C.L.Rev.* 1373 (describing resilience in legal systems).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedback loop mechanisms.²²⁰ It is these negative and positive feedback loop mechanisms that help to maintain the system within a homeostatic range or equilibrium that ensures its survival or long-term stability despite disruption.²²¹ This resilience was evidenced by the communities' demands for repossession of their land and was one of the factors that led to Kenya's independence from colonial rule.²²² The communities' struggles for tenure rights have continued and state mitigation strategies through resettlement programs have been ineffective.²²³ I discuss the state resettlement programs in my discussion of Kikuyu land tenure systems because the programs resulted, generally, in mostly members of the Kikuyu community being settled in land that was formerly owned by European settlers.²²⁴ I also discuss the tribal clashes of 1991-1998 and post-election violence of 2007-2008 as self-help tactics by majority Nandi

²²⁰ As above. See also King, M (n 51) (explaining the operations of social systems in language similar to the self-preservation process or resilience).

²²¹ In chapter 2, I explained that a state of equilibrium between a system's component parts is known as homeostasis. See also Calnan, A (n 46) p. 325 (explains that social systems maintain social homeostasis in the same way that the human body maintains biological homeostasis).

²²² This will be discussed in more detail in section 2.4.2.2. 'Mau Mau' is a play on the words: 'Mzungu Arudi Ulaya, Mwafrika Apate Uhuru', meaning 'white man return to Europe, African get freedom'. See Wunyabari O. Maloba 'Mau Mau and Kenya, An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt' (1993) East African Educational Publishers Ltd., p. 144; *Kimathi and Others v Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Mau Mau litigation - Kimathi)* [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB), [2018] All ER (D) 145 (Aug).

²²³ The struggles for repossession of community land by Rift Valley communities is captured in various reports following ethnic violence in the Rift Valley. See CIPEV Report (n 5); TJRC Report (n 2); Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2).

²²⁴ As above. See also 'The Nakuru County Peace Accord' (19 August 2012) available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KE_120819_NakuruPeaceAccord.pdf (accessed on March 28, 2020) (a peace agreement between the Kikuyu community and, primarily, the Nandi and Kipsigis communities, to address the longstanding dispute over land ownership in the Rift Valley region).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
and Kipsigis community members to forcefully evict other communities from their alleged ancestral land.²²⁵

The descriptions of property rights regimes that I give in this section are not based on my own legal anthropological study of these communities but on customary practices that have been summarized in landmark court cases such as the *Ole Nchoko case* by the Maasai community²²⁶ and the case against Chief Kioi by members of the Kikuyu community²²⁷, articles and journals.²²⁸ Furthermore, I focus my descriptions on the constellations of power factors that have enabled these communities to better interact with their environments and to develop the resilience necessary to persist and thrive as systems despite colonial and neo-colonial disruption.

²²⁵ See also TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB; Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2); CIPEV Report (n 5) (discussing continuous ethnic-based violence in the Rift Valley region that typically coincides with national elections).

²²⁶ *Ole Nchoko and Others, on behalf of themselves personally and on behalf of the Masai of Laikipia and on behalf of the Masai Tribe generally v. The Attorney General on behalf of the East Africa Protectorate Government and Others*, High Court of East Africa at Mombasa, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912 (hereinafter “Ole Nchoko High Court case”).

²²⁷ *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920) (hereinafter “Landmark land case against Chief Kioi”, reviewed as part of the Various reports, letters and other correspondence between government officials before and after Kenya’s independence in 1963 (Archived Documents)’ (accessed at the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, in August 2017)).

²²⁸ See Peers, C et al (n 188) (writing about the Maasai and Nandi); Cotran, E (n 20) (contains case summaries of cases relating to customs and traditions of the Rift Valley communities and other Kenyan communities); Krapf notes (n 188) (writing about the Maasai). See also John Galaty (n 7) (citing Dr. Krapf’s descriptions of the Maasai); *Munyao Ndolo & 3 others v Mary Nduku Mutisya* [2018] eKLR (describing customary practices of Kenyan communities) (describing customary practices of Kenyan communities); *Endorois case* (n 188) (discussing customary practices of Kenyan communities); *Archived Documents* (n 227) (writing about all Kenyan communities).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
2.2 THE DUAL NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES IN KENYA

The possibility of individuals, groups and communities acquiring tenure rights through registration and titling, on the one hand, and through state recognition of customary land rights, on the other, is a result of the dual nature of property rights regimes in Kenya that started during colonial rule. The colonial state's policy of dispossession of African land without compensation created a dual tenure system in the East African territory; a colonial tenure system for expropriated land and customary tenure systems for lands that continued to be inhabited by African communities. According to section 2.2.3 (23) of the National Land Policy, 2009, the net effect of these tenure systems on land administration was to perpetuate a dual system of economic relationships consisting of an export enclave controlled by a small number of European settlers and a subsistence periphery operated by a large number of African peasantry.²²⁹ Whereas the colonial tenure system existed formally by statute, customary tenure systems existed by default in areas occupied by Africans and which had not been expropriated by the colonial state. Even today, customary tenure systems still exist by default over unregistered land awaiting confirmation through registration.

The colonial and neo-colonial state policy preference was to privatize property rights through registration and titling, but this process of consolidation, adjudication and registration of land rights is yet to be completed fifty-seven (57) years after Kenya gained its independence from British colonial rule. As a result, pre-colonial notions of property continue to prevail among African communities, especially those living in unregistered land. According to a study by the National Land Commission, a majority of Kenyan land remains unregistered and will continue to be owned, used and managed according to the customary practices of the African communities that inhabit the unregistered land.²³⁰ The African

²²⁹ Republic of Kenya (Ministry of Lands) 'Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy (National Land Policy of 2009)' (August, 2009) National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, chapter 2, section 2.2.3 (23), available at <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken163862.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2020).

²³⁰ Patricia Kameri-Mbote (Kenya Country Coordinator) 'Kenya Land Governance Assessment Report' (27 June 2016) World Bank Document, p. 21, available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/> (accessed 27 April 2020).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

communities that depend on these unregistered lands for their livelihoods continue to operate under customary tenure in an epic struggle to unshackle their customary tenure system from the shackles of inequality that the colonial state and neo-colonial state meted on it.

A discussion of the customary practices under both tenure systems is helpful to identify the power ingredients that each community system has deployed to better interact with its environment so that its members can still feed themselves, reproduce, and remain connected to each other. An understanding of these power ingredients may also shed more light on why the communities consider such practices or norms to be consistent with their value systems, their policies, their ideologies, ideas of justice, morality and other conditions of validity of laws. Identifying these power ingredients is also helpful in understanding the interaction between the diverse communities inhabiting the Rift Valley that also form part of each other's environment.

As I stated in the previous chapter on social dominance theory, when different community systems interact, they tend to create hierarchical social structures to ensure the provision of prestige, social power and privilege for individual members of the hierarchical society. Stability in hierarchical societies is then sustained through the normative endorsement of forms and ideologies that preserve, perpetuate and promote the hierarchical structures. Walter Rodney in his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, discusses the maintenance of this group-based hierarchical structure through an analysis of power relations.²³¹ He defines power as the ability to defend one's interests and, if necessary, to impose one's will by any means available.²³² Jared Diamond in his book, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, has argued that communities with a long history of living in densely populated, economically specialized, politically centralized social systems tend to develop constellations of power factors that enable them to dominate communities that lack the same power ingredients.²³³ He lists these power factors as intensive food production, high population density, economic specialization, social stratification, political organization, information, and technological advancements.²³⁴ In the next section, I focus

²³¹ Rodney, W 'How Europe Underdeveloped Africa' (2012) Pambazuka Press 224.

²³² Id.

²³³ Diamond, J (n 218) pp. 15-16.

²³⁴ Id.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
on how these power factors have enabled some communities to influence the distribution of land resources in the Rift Valley region.

2.3 THE INFLUENCE OF “ENVIRONMENT” IN SHAPING NOTIONS OF PROPERTY

This section is about the community systems’ interaction with their environments, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits. The environment of a community system constitutes the social, economic and political context in which the community operates. As described in the previous chapter under systems theory, the environment contains elements that are useful for a community’s self-production and self-sustenance. Within this context, a community eventually arrives at a framework of interaction with its environment that maintains an acceptable equilibrium between the various elements of the environment. This framework of interaction is developed and maintained based on the community system’s power or ability to defend its interests or to impose its will against other elements in its environment.

A community’s interaction with its environment helps it to identify power factors that can enable its members to nourish themselves better, reproduce better and, generally, dominate other communities that inhabit the same area. As outlined in the previous section, these power factors are intensive food production, high population density, economic specialization, social stratification, political organization, information, and technological advancements.²³⁵ The many distinctive features of the Rift Valley region’s geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory provide an explanation for the differences among the communities’ customary practices based on these power factors.

Starting with food production, a major difference between the pastoral Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis is the pastoral lifestyle of the Maasai, the crop cultivation of the Kikuyu and the mixed pastoralism and crop cultivation of the Nandi and Kipsigis. Food production and the accumulation of a surplus is critical for the development of other power

²³⁵ Id.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

factors. Food production leads to high population densities and the resources necessary to sustain more centralized militaries and political bureaucracies. Communities with food surpluses can also acquire technology and other ingredients of power through interaction with other communities, whether through intermarriage or trade. Colonialism had profound effects on customary practices of Rift Valley communities as well as on their interaction with their environment. In the next section, I discuss the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities based on these power ingredients and how the customary practices have contributed to their struggle to assert their customary tenure rights.

2.4 ILLUSTRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES AMONG THE MAASAI, KIKUYU, NANDI AND KIPSIGIS

In this section, I describe property rights regimes among the pastoral Maasai, the Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities, including concrete examples of the competition over land resources by these communities. The labels Maasai, Nandi Kipsigis and Kikuyu, however, conceal much more variation among the communities than the differences between the individuals that make them up and that live in the Rift Valley region. These illustrative examples of property rights regimes of Rift Valley communities are useful in understanding the communities as systems. As explained earlier in this chapter, Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoietic law helps to explain how the community system is self-referential, self-sustaining and self-proliferating in a way that uniquely serves and symbiotically defines the community even though individuals within it may differ.²³⁶ The community distils and integrates its norms, practices and other core characteristics into a customary legal system and then communicates these customary practices from generation to generation.²³⁷ Each of the communities first accept to be identified by an identity marker or name that embodies core characteristics of that community. The "Maasai" name, for example, refers to a Maa-speaking, pastoral and war-like social grouping as against those people who do not embody similar traits.²³⁸ The "Nandi" and "Kipsigis" identity markers

²³⁶ The New Science of Niklas Luhmann (n 39).

²³⁷ See John Gillespie (n 7) (describing law as a system of communications).

²³⁸ See Krapf notes (n 188). See also John Galaty (n 7) (citing Dr. Krapf's descriptions of the Maasai).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

also refer to social groupings that speak a Kalenjin dialect and that are cattle-keeping and known to ferociously defend their territory against foreigners.²³⁹ The “Kikuyu” refer primarily to an agricultural social grouping that practice a form of individual tenure known as “Gethaka” or “Githaka”, meaning bush or woodland in their language.²⁴⁰ The use of accepted identity markers or ethnic labels within the community is an example of the community system’s self-referential characteristic, as explained in the previous chapter.²⁴¹

The Rift Valley communities developed along very different lines and their development illustrates how environments can affect the customary practices of community systems. As I discuss in chapter 3 under the subheading ‘Rift Valley land resources’, only a small area within the vast Rift Valley region has sufficient rainfall for tropical farming. For most of the Rift Valley region, the inhabitants have no alternative but to resort to pastoralism which entails moving around in groups with their livestock in search of pasture and water. The pastoralists shift camp along regular seasonal routes to take advantage of predictable seasonal changes in pasturage.

This section begins with a discussion of the pastoral Maasai’s customary practices followed by the customary practices of the Kikuyu before describing a form of mixed pastoralism and farming of the Nandi and Kipsigis. I also discuss each community system’s struggle to assert its customary land rights, such as through court cases like the *Ole Nchoko case* by the Maasai community or the case against Chief Kioi by members of the Kikuyu community. I also discuss the forced eviction of foreigners by the Kikuyu community against European settlers during the Mau Mau uprising and by the Nandi and Kipsigis communities against other African communities during tribal clashes (1991-1998) and post-election violence (2007-2008). These descriptions of the Rift Valley community systems

²³⁹ Archived Documents (n 188); George Wynn Brereton Huntingford ‘The Nandi of Kenya: Tribal Control in a Pastoral Society’ (1953) Routledge & Paul; A. C. Hollis (Text); Sir Charles Eliot (Introduction) ‘The Nandi, Their Language and Folk-Lore’ (1909) Oxford: Clarendon Press; J. G. Peristiany ‘The Social Institution of the Kipsigis’ (1939) London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.

²⁴⁰ Archived Documents (n 188); Landmark land case against Chief Kioi (n 227).

²⁴¹ See The New Science of Niklas Luhmann (n 39).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
illustrate their resilience and ability to persist and thrive as systems despite colonial and neo-colonial disruption by the state.

2.4.1 THE PASTORAL MAASAI

The “Maasai” or “Masai” is an identity marker or ethnic label that describes a social grouping inhabiting the Kenyan Rift Valley. They are a Nilotic-speaking people, like the Nandi and Kipsigis, who in the late 17th century or early 18th century migrated in a south-easterly direction from the region north of present day Lake Turkana and near the River Nile.²⁴² Professor Galaty explains that “Maasai”, as a name, designates specific persons and groups; but as a concept, it embodies the specific values and qualities accepted and manifested by members of the community system.²⁴³ This identity marker helps us to identify this social grouping and to constructively engage in a discussion on how to recognize its customary land rights more effectively.²⁴⁴ Professor Galaty describes “Maasai” as embodying a generally accepted set of values referring to Maa-speaking people who are brave, strong and arrogant and who wear distinct and special ornaments.²⁴⁵ The name “Maasai” therefore refers to this social grouping of brave Maa-speakers to the exclusion of other non-Maa-speaking peoples and individuals inhabiting the same territory.

There are essential characteristics that have become associated with the group of individuals identified as “Maasai”, such as pastoralism, language, demeanor, dress, economic practice, and other core characteristics that are active in shaping their own customary practices.²⁴⁶ These characteristics are defined by the social grouping itself and have led to this social group being referred to as the “Maasai.”²⁴⁷ German missionary, Dr.

²⁴² See Dr. Ludwig Krapf ‘Notes written by German missionary (Krapf notes)’ (c. 1860) (accessed at the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, in August 2017).

²⁴³ John Galaty (n 7) p. 3.

²⁴⁴ John Galaty (n 7) p. 16.

²⁴⁵ John Galaty (n 7) p. 4.

²⁴⁶ See Peers, C et al (n 188) pp. 5-12 (describing the Maasai); Krapf notes (n 188) (writing about the Maasai). See also John Galaty (n 7) p. 9 (citing Dr. Krapf’s descriptions of the Maasai).

²⁴⁷ See also John Galaty (n 7) p. 3-4.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Ludwig Krapf, in his writings of around 1860 or 1861 that are available at the Kenya National Archives, described in detail some of the core “Maasai” characteristics that I discuss in this section.²⁴⁸

The Maasai community inhabited large territories of land in East Africa before the arrival of the Europeans. They are a nomadic and pastoralist people.²⁴⁹ Krapf refers to the Maasai by various names, such as “Masai”, “Wakuifi”, “Orloikob”, “Loikob”, “loigob”, all of which mean “the possessors of the land”.²⁵⁰ The description of this group as “possessors of the land” is appropriate, because, as pastoral tribes, the Maasai considered themselves the exclusive possessors of the plains and wildernesses, with their springs and rivers.²⁵¹ The initial British explorers in East Africa found the Maasai occupying large plains in the interior of Eastern Africa, which extend from about two degrees north of the Equator to about four degrees south of it.²⁵²

As pastoral communities, the Maasai invest their wealth mainly in livestock; cattle, goats and sheep. Around 1914, it was estimated that the Masai numbered about six-hundred thousand (600,000) people and owned approximately seven-hundred fifty thousand (750,000) head of cattle.²⁵³ The Maasai, as most pastoralist communities do, need livestock for their nourishment and live entirely on milk, butter, honey and the meat of black cattle, goats and sheep, and on the game which they hunt.²⁵⁴ In accordance with their custom, they believe that the nourishment afforded by agricultural produce leads to weakness and therefore they shun agricultural produce.²⁵⁵ Instead, they believe that they gain strength and

²⁴⁸ Krapf notes (n 188).

²⁴⁹ As above. See also Peers, C et al (n 188) pp. 5-12; John Galaty (n 7) p. 4.

²⁵⁰ John Galaty (n 7) p. 9 (describing Krapf’s ethnic labels for the Maasai). See also Krapf notes (n 188) (describing the Maasai).

²⁵¹ As above.

²⁵² Kieyah, Joseph (n 24) 400.

²⁵³ Krapf notes (n 188).

²⁵⁴ G. Nasieku Tarayia ‘The Legal Perspectives of the Maasai Culture, Customs, and Traditions’ (Spring, 2004) 21 *Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law* 183, 186-187.

²⁵⁵ John Galaty (n 7) pp. 6-7; Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 11.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

courage from feeding on meat and milk.²⁵⁶ The Maasai young men also need livestock to marry and, when advanced in years, to become elders of the community.²⁵⁷ The Maasai value their livestock so much, because they believe that Engai (God) bestowed upon them cattle and that no other nation or tribe had the right to possess any cattle.²⁵⁸

The Maasai also have a custom and tradition for centuries of moving around with their cattle, goats and sheep in search of water and pasture to feed them.²⁵⁹ Their movement was traditionally planned in a way that allowed vegetation in overgrazed areas to regenerate before moving back with their cattle.²⁶⁰ Wherever they found water and grass for their livestock, they would set up camp together for months until the rains stopped and the grass was gone.²⁶¹ They would then break camp and move again to greener pastures.²⁶² Their most-favoured grazing grounds in the Rift Valley region lay between Lakes Nakuru and Naivasha.²⁶³ The map of Kenya reproduced below, shows the location of lakes Nakuru and Naivasha in the former Rift Valley province.

²⁵⁶ As above.

²⁵⁷ E. Cotran 'Restatement of African Law: Kenya, The Law of Marriage and Divorce' (1968) London: Sweet & Maxwell, vol. 1, p. 159 (discussing marriage consideration under Maasai culture).

²⁵⁸ John Galaty (n 7) p. 6; Krapf notes (n 188).


²⁵⁹ As above.

²⁶⁰ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, chapter 2, section 58, pp. 181-182.

²⁶¹ As above.

²⁶² As above.

²⁶³ As above.



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html> (Accessed on March 27, 2020)

From around 1860 when Krapf came in contact with them, the Maasai maintained rights of access and control over pasture and water resources for their livestock.²⁶⁴ They

²⁶⁴ Krapf notes (n 188); Peers, C et al (n 188) pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER 2

TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

engaged in warfare with rival communities and even among themselves to safeguard their access and control rights to water and pasture.²⁶⁵ The Maasai also maintain a small number of kraals, which refers to a village made up of huts known as ‘manyattas’, typically enclosed by a fence.²⁶⁶ The Maasai warriors would return to their Kraals annually.²⁶⁷ The Kraals, however, remained few and frequently uninhabited.²⁶⁸ Below is a model of a Maasai manyatta:



Source: Picture taken by Author at an exhibition in Kenya in August 2019.

²⁶⁵ As above.

²⁶⁶ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 11.

²⁶⁷ As above. See also Krapf notes (n 188).

²⁶⁸ As above.

The Maasai customarily conducted raids against other communities to acquire livestock or to safeguard their access and control rights over water sources and green pasture.²⁶⁹ The custom of raiding led to the custom of militarization of their youth.²⁷⁰ All the male members of the community aged between approximately sixteen (16) and twenty-five (25) years submit to a special military discipline and constitute the warrior class of the community.²⁷¹ The males are divided into boys, warriors and elders.²⁷² The boys are uncircumcised and, after circumcision, become warriors or "muran" or "morán", meaning those who have been circumcised at about the same time and belong to the same age group.²⁷³ The political leadership of the Maasai is not with the elders or chiefs, but with the Muran or warriors who are governed by ideals of military comradeship and aim to distinguish themselves in battle.²⁷⁴ Under Maasai custom, elders can only advise; the actual decision in any particular case rests with a council of the moran/muran or warriors.²⁷⁵

The Maasai also traditionally relied on medicine men for the divination of future events, administering medicine, conducting rites associated with rainmaking or circumcision, directing raids, providing medicine and, generally, practicing witchcraft.²⁷⁶ The Maasai designate sacred areas where they traditionally performed socio-cultural rituals and ceremonies.²⁷⁷ For example, they worshiped their God (Engai) in the hills of the Rift Valley and in neighbouring areas like the Ngong Hills.²⁷⁸ The slopes of the Kinangop Hills, for example, were well known among the Maasai for circumcision rites and ceremonies such

²⁶⁹ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 6.

²⁷⁰ Peers, C et al (n 188) pp. 10-11.

²⁷¹ As above.

²⁷² As above.

²⁷³ As above.

²⁷⁴ As above.

²⁷⁵ As above. See also Krapf notes (n 188).

²⁷⁶ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 12.

²⁷⁷ Kieyah, Joseph (n 24) 431

²⁷⁸ John Galaty (n 7) pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
as the E-Unoto Ceremony, a rite of passage for young men from the warrior class to the council of elders.²⁷⁹

When the Europeans arrived, nomadic pastoralism prevailed among the majority of the Maasai because the lands that they inhabited were arid and semi-arid and, therefore, lacked sufficient rainfall and suitable soil for them to practice sedentary food-production. However, some subsets of the Maasai had begun practicing some form of mixed farming and pastoralism even before the arrival of the Europeans in some of the fertile and well-watered areas that were highly suitable for crop farming. Some sedentary Maasai villages based on crop farming were already in existence in the Rift Valley region before the arrival of European settlers. The European settlers did not want any members of the Maasai community inhabiting the land adjacent to the Uganda Railway line and therefore sought creative ways to dispossess them of all the land near the railway line.

2.4.1.1 THE ANGLO - MAASAI AGREEMENTS OF 1904 AND 1911

The community inhabiting the Rift Valley region that lost the largest acreage of land due to the creation of the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas was the Maasai community. The Maasai possessed the land on both sides of the Kenya-Uganda railway before the creation of the White Highlands. The land that European settlers wanted was adjacent to the Uganda Railway line and there was concern about the Maasai being allowed to also reside near it. The general preference was not to allow the Maasai near European settlements because of the militarization culture of the Maasai that the Europeans feared.²⁸⁰

The European settler community used the power ingredient of information to exert dominance over the pastoralist Maasai. Information about Maasai customary practices had already spread to Europe through writings by European explorers and missionaries such as

²⁷⁹ Tarayia, GN (n 254) 187.

²⁸⁰ See Archived Documents (n 188) (containing the colonial state's concerns about allowing the Maasai communities living near European settlers). See also W. T. W. Morgan 'White Highlands' of Kenya (June, 1963) *The Geographical Journal*, Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 140-141, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632> (accessed 24 April 2020).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Dr. Krapf. Such written information could be spread more widely and more accurately through writing than it could be transmitted by word of mouth. Writing was also used to create unilateral agreements with whole communities to the benefit of the Europeans. Because of lack of information, the Maasai community naively believed that agreements with the Europeans would benefit them as a community. They agreed to move whole communities from large areas of the Rift Valley to the benefit of the Europeans. The members of the Maasai community had no way of understanding that the Europeans were bent on dispossessing them of all their prime land. The information asymmetry between the European settlers and the Maasai enabled the Europeans to dispossess the Maasai communities of their land through the Anglo - Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911.²⁸¹

The aim of the 1904 agreement was to remove the Masai into reserves away from the railway line and away from any land that may be thrown open to European settlement.²⁸² The Masai agreed to vacate the Rift Valley and to retire into two reserves, one north of the railway line (Laikipia/Northern Masai Reserve) and the other south of the railway line (Narok/Southern Masai Reserve). A road communication was reserved between the two districts.²⁸³ On August 9, 1904, the British High Commissioner to the East African Protectorate, Sir Donald Stewart, held a meeting with the Maasai chiefs at Naivasha and asked them if they were agreeable to move to other lands of their own free will and to give up the Rift Valley to European settlement.²⁸⁴ The Maasai who attended the meeting agreed and Sir Donald Stewart made a formal agreement with them.²⁸⁵ Later, Sir Donald Stewart

²⁸¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘The Anglo-Maasai-Agreements/Treaties-A Case of Historical Injustice and the Dispossession of the Maasai Natural Resources (Land), and the Legal Perspectives (Anglo-Maasai Agreements)’ (Dec. 15-17, 2003) 2.0 HR/GENEVA/TSIP/ SEM/2003/BP.7; TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 56 et seq., p. 181, et seq.

²⁸² Morgan, WTW (n 280) pp. 140-141.

²⁸³ Anglo-Maasai Agreements (n 281).

²⁸⁴ As above.

²⁸⁵ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

held another meeting with the Maasai chiefs and other members of the Maasai community at another location at which the agreement was read and explained to them.²⁸⁶

As part of the 1904 agreement, Sir Donald Stewart agreed to reserve at least five square miles of land at a point on the slopes of Mount Kinangop where the Maasai community could perform their circumcision rites and ceremonies, such as the E-Unoto ceremony.²⁸⁷ Sir Donald Stewart also agreed to create a road across the Kinangop plateau by which the Maasai could travel between the areas reserved for the two sections of the community.²⁸⁸ Under the terms of the 1904 Agreement, the Maasai community agreed as follows: "...and by the removal of the foregoing sections to the reserve we undertake to vacate the whole of the Rift Valley to be used by the Government for purposes of European settlement."²⁸⁹ It is estimated that through the Maasai Agreement of 1904, approximately eleven thousand two hundred (11,200) members of the Maasai community, with over two (2) million heads of livestock, lost their land to only forty-eight (48) Europeans.²⁹⁰

The aim of the 1911 agreement was to reunite the Masai by the Masai of the Northern Reserve / Laikipia agreeing to vacate Laikipia and to occupy a reserve south of the railway line and directly east of the original Southern Masai Reserve.²⁹¹ The Maasai leaders agreed to the terms of the new agreement so that they would be united in an extended Maasai Southern Reserve rather than be split into the Maasai Northern Reserve in Laikipia and the Maasai Southern Reserve in and around present day Narok District.²⁹² The agreement, as drafted, was submitted to the Secretary of State, who approved of its terms, by telegram, on May 29, 1911, and by despatch on June 2, 1911.²⁹³ The Maasai and the Nandi communities lost an estimated five (5) million hectares of land to European settlers.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁶ As above.

²⁸⁷ As above. See also a summary of the E-Unoto Ceremony in section 2.4.1.

²⁸⁸ Anglo-Maasai Agreements (n 281).

²⁸⁹ Anglo-Maasai Agreements (n 281) (quoting the text of the Maasai Agreement of 1904).

²⁹⁰ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 59, p. 182.

²⁹¹ Anglo-Maasai Agreements (n 281).

²⁹² As above.

²⁹³ As above.

²⁹⁴ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 104, p. 198.

2.4.1.2 THE OLE NCHOKO CASE

The Maasai filed a lawsuit captioned *Ole Nchoko and Others, on behalf of themselves personally and on behalf of the Masai of Laikipia and on behalf of the Masai Tribe generally v. The Attorney General on behalf of the East Africa Protectorate Government and Others* (“*Ole Nchoko case*”), High Court of East Africa at Mombasa, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912, alleging wrongful removal by the colonial Government from Laikipia in violation of the Anglo - Maasai Agreement of 1904.²⁹⁵ The Maasai also claimed that the members of the community who agreed to the Anglo - Maasai Agreement of 1904 had no authority from the community and, therefore, the agreement was void ab initio. The Maasai community lost the case on jurisdiction grounds; the High Court dismissed the case on the ground that the agreements were treaties and acts pursuant thereto were acts of state.

The Maasai community appealed the High Court’s dismissal in a case captioned *Ole Nchoko and others v. The Attorney-General and others*, Court of Appeal 7 / 1913 (December, 1913), which they also lost, again on jurisdiction grounds.²⁹⁶ The Court of Appeal reasoned that the 1904 and the 1911 agreements were treaties entered into by two sovereigns; the representatives of the Crown in the East Africa Protectorate and representatives of the Maasai tribe.²⁹⁷ The appellate Court reasoned that since the lawsuit seeks to enforce obligations pursuant to a treaty, the paramount chief and his people are not the right party to bring such an action before the courts.²⁹⁸ The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision that acts of State, such as enforcement of treaties, are not cognizable by a Municipal Court as was held in *Raja Saligram v. Secretary of State for India in Council* (a case in British India holding that municipal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce engagements between sovereign parties founded on treaties).²⁹⁹

²⁹⁵ *Ole Nchoko High Court case* (n 226).

²⁹⁶ *Ole Nchoko Court of Appeal case* (n 147).

²⁹⁷ As above.

²⁹⁸ As above.

²⁹⁹ *Raja Saligram v. Secretary of State for India in Council*, (1872) L. R. Ind. App. Suppl. Vol. 119.

2.4.1.3 THE GROUP RANCHES

There was a serious and widespread attempt to confer land tenure rights to pastoralist groups such as the Maasai through the statutory creation of group ranches.³⁰⁰ On 26 June 1968, the President of Kenya assented to the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Chapter 287, Laws of Kenya, to provide for the incorporation of representatives of groups who have been recorded as owners of land.³⁰¹

The group ranches were established, generally, in the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya which are inhabited by pastoralist groups such as the Maasai. In these areas, communal lands were divided into smaller units known as ranches which were then registered in the names of representatives elected by members of the group.³⁰² A “group” under the Group Representatives Act had the same meaning as “group” under the Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284, Laws of Kenya, which meant “a tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons, whose land under recognized customary law belongs communally to the persons who are for the time being the members of the group, together with any person of whose land the group is determined to be the owner ...”³⁰³ The members of the Group

³⁰⁰ Kieyah, Joseph (n 24) p. 405.

³⁰¹ Robert M. Kibugi ‘A Failed Land Use Legal and Policy Framework for the African commons?: Reviewing Rangeland Governance in Kenya’ (Spring, 2009) 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 309, 319. See also Land (Group Representatives) Act, Laws of Kenya, Chapter 287 (assent on 26 June 1968; commencement on 28 June 1968) (now repealed) National Council for Law Reporting (Revised Edition 2012) available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 26 April 2020) (stating that a group ranch became the property of all its members in equal and undivided shares. A group ranch could be registered in the name of ten representatives as nominal title holders who held the land in trust for the other unregistered members of the community. The Act required the representatives to enact rules to govern the administration and execution of the group’s projects and activities in a democratic manner through involvement of all the members in decision making).

³⁰² B.D. Ogolla and J. Mugabe ‘Land Tenure Systems and Natural Resources Management’ in C. Juma and J.B. Ojwang (editors) ‘Land We Trust: Environmental, Private Property and Constitutional Change’ (1996) Nairobi, Kenya: Initiatives Publishers; London: Zed Books.

³⁰³ See Group Representatives Act (n 301); Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284 (assent on 26th June,

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

ranch elected between three to ten group representatives in whose name the ranch was registered.³⁰⁴ The group representatives were meant to hold the land as trustees and to consult the wider membership in dealings with this land.³⁰⁵

Unfortunately, the group ranches idea failed because of various shortcomings, including lack of legitimacy, accountability or transparency of the representatives, failure of the group ranches to enforce their own by-laws, exclusion of women and youth from decision-making and governance and conversion of group ranches to individual ownership.³⁰⁶ The group representatives entrusted with the management of the customary land under group ranches abused their trust by disposing of the land without consulting the other members of their groups, leading to the failure of group ranches as a communal tenure system.³⁰⁷ The Community Land Act, No. 27 of 2016 repealed the Land (Group Representatives) Act (Chapter 287 of the Laws of Kenya) thereby cementing the failure of the group ranches. As I discuss in chapters 4 and 5, the pastoral Maasai may seek recognition of their customary land rights through the new communal tenure framework established under the Kenya Constitution of 2010, the Community Land Act of 2016 and its implementing regulations of 2017.

2.4.2 THE KIKUYU

The Kikuyu community are the latest community to settle in the Rift Valley region in recent times. In this section, I discuss the individual form of land tenure that was traditionally practiced by the Kikuyu, the colonial disruption that led to their armed resistance, dispossession and displacement and eventual resettlement in large numbers in the Rift Valley region. Resettlement of the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley poses a critical test of theories about intercommunity differences and interactions in the Rift Valley region. In

1968; commencement on 28th June, 1968) available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 31 March 2020).

³⁰⁴ See Group Representatives Act (n 301).

³⁰⁵ As above.

³⁰⁶ Kibugi, RM (n 301) p. 309 - 336.

³⁰⁷ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
particular, I analyse the power factors that have enabled the Kikuyu community to thrive in farming in the Rift Valley region.

The Kikuyu or Agikuyu community has also practiced a form of individual ownership of land that allegedly existed in the community for centuries.³⁰⁸ As a community, the Kikuyu tended to interact and intermarry with other communities in Kenya and therefore have cultural similarities with other communities such as the Maasai.³⁰⁹ Unlike the Maasai and Nandi and Kipsigis communities, the Kikuyu are primarily agriculturalists.³¹⁰ Kikuyu farmers had discovered earlier on that they could obtain higher yields by tilling and watering the soil and then sowing seeds. For example, they learned that the potato can be grown up to higher elevations, grows more quickly, and gives higher yields per acre cultivated and per hour of labour. When the Kikuyu community in Central Province obtained more-productive crops through interactions with other communities, they took advantage of them, intensified their food production, and increased in population. The cycle of sow / grow / harvest / sow necessitated a sedentary lifestyle. Moreover, food production even in Central Province became enriched by the addition of crops, livestock, and techniques from other areas of origin. As a result, Central Province itself, which was occupied by the Kikuyu community, had the power factors of food production, high population density, political organization and advanced farming techniques even before the arrival of European settlers.

³⁰⁸ Arthur R. Barlow 'Kikuyu land tenure and inheritance' (1932) *The East Africa Natural History Society* (Introduction) available at <https://archive.org/search.php?query=Kikuyu%20land%20tenure> (accessed 22 April 2020).

³⁰⁹ William L. Lawren 'Masai and Kikuyu: An Historical Analysis of Culture Transmission' (1968) *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 9, No. 4 pp. 571-583, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/180145> (accessed 22 April 2020) (discussing the cultural similarities between the Maasai and Kikuyu).

³¹⁰ William Scoresby Routledge & Katherine Pease Routledge 'With a prehistoric people, the Akikuyu of British East Africa, being some account of the method of life and mode of thought found existent amongst a nation on its first contact with European civilisation' (1910) London: E. Arnold, p. 38, available at <https://archive.org/details/withprehistoricp00rout/page/n13/mode/2up> (accessed 22 April 2020).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

The Agikuyu or Kikuyu community migrated into the Central Province of Kenya in the late 18th century or early 19th century at a time when the area was mostly thick forest inhabited by a community known as the Wadorobo.³¹¹ The Wadorobo inhabited the forest and lived on hunting and gathering from the forest, especially collecting honey.³¹² The Wadorobo may have been motivated to sell their land because they needed protection from the Maasai who were prone to raid them for livestock.³¹³ The Agikuyu then deforested and cultivated the land that they bought from the Wadorobo.³¹⁴ Through the exchange of honey, beer, livestock, sisters and daughters, many Kikuyus bought rights to occupy and cultivate forest land from the Wadorobo.³¹⁵

As a result of the power factors of intensive food production by the Kikuyu community, human population densities in Central Province became so high that the Kikuyu community in particular placed a large premium on extracting more calories per acre. In their subsistence modes, Kikuyus practiced intensive food production and lived in densely populated areas of Central Province. With limited land to practice farming, the Kikuyu community in Central Province had to live together and farm the same piece of land, and to learn to get along with each other. They did so by making peace, trading, intermarrying and being careful to reduce potential conflicts with their neighbours such as the Maasai and the Dorobo. The economic basis of Kikuyu communities consisted of more or less self-sufficient households. The result was a largely agricultural population mostly focused on subsistence farming. This may also explain, in terms of land, why the most complicated and widespread armed resistance against colonial dispossession of land of the four communities examined was by the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu community had the most pressure on land resources because of the high premium they placed on extracting more calories per acre of land.

When the Kikuyu community were resettled in the Rift Valley region as I discuss later in this section, they were able to deploy the same power factors of intensive food production

³¹¹ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 58-59.

³¹² As above.

³¹³ See section 2.4.1 for a discussion about the Pastoral Maasai.

³¹⁴ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 61.

³¹⁵ Barlow, AR (n 308 above) pp. 58-59.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

and thrive more than the other Rift Valley communities. Kikuyu crops, livestock, and subsistence methods did very well in the Rift Valley environment and climate as these were similar to the environment and climate in Central Province without the added pressure on land resources. Food production in the Kikuyu community was still dominated by the crops and agricultural methods that Kikuyus perfected over the course of thousands of years.

The Kikuyu community practiced a form of individual land tenure system before the arrival of European settlers. Their traditional property rights regime therefore approximated more closely to the European settlers' notion of property than the other Rift Valley communities.³¹⁶ The Kikuyu land owners who purchased the land from the Wadorobo occupied the position of head of a section of the community that settled on a particular area.³¹⁷ The land owner would typically be an elder and, with his family, took up residence in the area purchased from the Wadorobo.³¹⁸ The area purchased would then be known by the Kikuyu as a "Gethaka" or "Githaka".³¹⁹ "Githaka" is a Kikuyu word meaning bush or woodland.³²⁰ Gethakas were large areas of land occupied by the Gethaka owner and his family and which were then parcelled out to members of the Agikuyu community by the Gethaka owner.³²¹ The grantees paid compensation to the Gethaka owner for the transfer of a part of the Gethaka.³²² The grantee then became a Gethaka holder by virtue of the compensation.³²³ The new Gethaka owner would then be able to also grant Gethaka rights to other Agikuyu.³²⁴ Should a Gethaka holder part with any part of the Gethaka, the new holder simply takes the place of the original holder, meaning he becomes the principal elder

³¹⁶ Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20) p. 82.

³¹⁷ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 60.

³¹⁸ As above.

³¹⁹ As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188) (containing a summary of the landmark case, *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920), that recognized the Gethaka system).

³²⁰ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 57.

³²¹ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 60.

³²² As above.

³²³ As above.

³²⁴ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

or headman of the particular area.³²⁵ All occupiers of a Gethaka area look up to the Gethaka holder in the same manner as children look up to a father or villagers to a village headman.³²⁶ However, only male members of a Gethaka holder's family have a say in his disposal of his Gethaka rights.³²⁷ It is claimed that the Gethaka land tenure system has been in place for generations and there are more Gethaka holders than mere occupiers of community land in the Agikuyu community.³²⁸

Descendants of the original Agikuyu who paid for cultivation and occupation rights over land in Central Province to the Wadorobo claim to be the heads of the Gethakas in the areas occupied by the Kikuyus in Kenya.³²⁹ An occupier has no Gethaka rights but only rights of occupation and cultivation.³³⁰ A non-Gikuyu cannot obtain Gethaka rights unless he first agrees to assimilate into the Gikuyu culture.³³¹ The Gethaka owners tended to remain the same over time as they are the original occupiers of the piece of land.³³² The incoming migrants usually paid goats, sheep, cows, and even their wives or daughters to the landowner in exchange for occupation and cultivation rights on the piece of land.³³³ A person had occupation and cultivation rights to a Gethaka and could pass on such occupation and cultivation rights to their descendant sons.³³⁴ Outsiders would need permission from the Gethaka head or the elder, to join the Gethaka.³³⁵ The elder would claim a right to occupy

³²⁵ See also Archived Documents (n 188) (containing a summary of the landmark case, *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920), that recognized the Gethaka system).

³²⁶ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 61.

³²⁷ See Archived Documents (n 188) (landmark case, *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920)).

³²⁸ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64 (describing the Gethaka tenure system and how it has been practiced by the Kikuyu community for generations).

³²⁹ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 57.

³³⁰ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 63 (discussing inheritance).

³³¹ Routledge & Routledge (n 310) p. 176 (discussing the reception of strangers by the Agikuyu).

³³² Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64.

³³³ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 62.

³³⁴ As above.

³³⁵ As above. See also Routledge & Routledge (n 310) p. 176.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

and cultivate the Gethaka and new immigrants to the area would look up to him as the person with the power to allot parts of this Gethaka to any new immigrant.³³⁶ This Gethaka owner also had the role of designating common areas or communal property, such as grazing areas, trees, wood in forests and salt licks.³³⁷ Because the Kikuyu were a migrant community, the allotments tended to go to individuals and the rights were usually occupation and cultivation rights only.³³⁸

The purchase of a Gethaka is for rights to occupation and cultivation but not to alienate the land except to the extent that the new immigrant wishes to alienate his or her occupation and cultivation rights only.³³⁹ Crops cultivated or trees planted on a Gethaka belong to the occupier and can be sold for value to anyone at the occupier's discretion even if the occupier leaves the Gethaka.³⁴⁰ The Gethaka owner remains the head of the particular section, occupying the position of chief/headman with the power to allot the land to other Kikuyu community members or even non-Kikuyu members who seek to reside or cultivate land in the area.³⁴¹ A Gethaka holder needs the consent of the whole of his family males before he can transfer part of his Gethaka rights to another Gikuyu.³⁴² Once a Gethaka holder has transferred part of his Gethaka rights, he cannot get them back.³⁴³ All male members of the Gethaka holder's family have an interest in the land and can object to its alienation.³⁴⁴ If the Gethaka holder does not have a wife, he can dispose of part of his Gethaka rights as dowry

³³⁶ Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 60.

³³⁷ As above.

³³⁸ As above.

³³⁹ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64.

³⁴⁰ See Archived Documents (n 188) (landmark case, Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi (c. 1920)).

³⁴¹ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64.

³⁴² As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188) (landmark case, Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi (c. 1920)).

³⁴³ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64.

³⁴⁴ As above.

and if the male members object, they should assist the Gethaka holder in paying the dowry.³⁴⁵

If the family males object, he cannot transfer any of his Gethaka rights.³⁴⁶

2.4.2.1 LANDMARK CASE AGAINST CHIEF KIOI

In *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920),³⁴⁷ the Kenyan High Court recognized the customary land rights of the Agikuyu based on the Gethaka tenure system. The dispute was by two sons of Kanoto – Kimani, about 32 years old, and Kitosho, about 25 years old, against a sub-chief, Kioi wa Nagi, about 55-60 years old.³⁴⁸ The dispute was over a piece of land in Dagoreti between the Ngara River and Mbagathi River.³⁴⁹ The brothers claimed ownership of the land through inheritance from their father, Kahoto, who died around 1898.³⁵⁰ Kahoto had bought the land from the Wadorobo before the Maasai raids that resulted in the Maasai-Dorobo peace deal.³⁵¹ Kioi claimed that he had bought the land from Kinyanjui wa Kashigumu (a local chief) around the time of Kahoto's death.³⁵² Chief Kinyanjui had bought the land from the Maasai following the Maasai-Dorobo peace deal.³⁵³ According to Kioi, all land rights that existed before the Maasai-Dorobo peace deal were extinguished by the deal.³⁵⁴ He then stored poles on the subject land for building houses and threatened to evict Kitosho who was residing on it at the time. The issue was

³⁴⁵ Barlow, AR (n 308) pp. 60-64.

³⁴⁶ As above.

³⁴⁷ See Archived Documents (n 188) (landmark case, *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920)).

³⁴⁸ As above.

³⁴⁹ As above.

³⁵⁰ As above.

³⁵¹ As above. See also Barlow, AR (n 308) p. 58 (describing the conflicts between the Kikuyu and the Maasai and the alliances forged with the Dorobo).

³⁵² Archived Documents (n 188) (landmark case, *Kimani wa Kanoto and Kitosho wa Kanoto vs Kioi wa Nagi* (c. 1920)).

³⁵³ As above.

³⁵⁴ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

whether the land had passed to the Kanoto boys through the Gethaka system or to Kioi through the willing-buyer-willing-seller system. The High Court held that the Masai-Dorobo Agreement of 1898 did not extinguish the rights of Kikuyu grantees of land from the Wadorobo who had maintained possession and cultivation rights at the time of the peace agreement, such as the sons of Kahoto.³⁵⁵ The Kenyan High Court held that the Kahoto sons' Gethaka rights were impliedly recognized by the peace agreement because the Maasai did not evict them.³⁵⁶

2.4.2.2 THE MAU MAU UPRISING

The Kikuyu struggle to assert their customary land rights in Kenya resulted in the Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s. The African participants in the uprising did not refer to themselves as "Mau Mau" but as the "Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA)".³⁵⁷ The origin of the term "Mau Mau" is unclear but it may originate from the Akamba word "Ma Umau", meaning 'Our Grandfathers'.³⁵⁸ 'Ma Umau' was first used by the Akamba community during a pastoralists revolt against de-stocking in 1938.³⁵⁹ The Akamba urged colonialists to leave Kenya so that they could live freely like in the time of 'Ma Umau', meaning 'Our Grandfathers'.³⁶⁰ As the Mau Mau uprising progressed, both Africans and British colonialists used the term "Mau Mau" to refer to it and also added the following Kiswahili definition to the words: "Mzungu Arudi Ulaya, Mwafrika Apate Uhuru", meaning "white man return to Europe, African get freedom".³⁶¹

³⁵⁵ As above.

³⁵⁶ As above.

³⁵⁷ See *Mutua v Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mau Mau litigation - Mutua)* [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB), [2011] All ER (D) 200 (Jul); *Mau Mau Litigation – Kimathi* (n 222).

³⁵⁸ See Maloba, WO (n 222) pp. 1-19 (introduction); Tabitha M. Kanogo 'Dedan Kimathi: A Biography' (1992) Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, pp. 23-25.

³⁵⁹ As above.

³⁶⁰ As above.

³⁶¹ As above. See also *Mau Mau Litigation – Mutua* (n 357) and *Mau Mau Litigation – Kimathi* (n 222) (for additional background information on the Mau Mau uprising).

At the center of the Mau Mau uprising was the Kikuyu community's struggle against a state system that maintained white Europeans at the top of the hierarchy in Kenya.³⁶² The white Europeans had access to and ownership of the best lands, and control over government and administrative structures, while many Kenyan communities, such as the Kikuyu, were pushed to the periphery of the Kenyan economy.³⁶³ The European settlers found the land inhabited by the Kikuyu community, especially in Kiambu, suitable for habitation due to its warm and temperate climate.³⁶⁴ The colonial administrators allocated freehold tenure rights to European settlers in the land actually inhabited by the Kikuyu and forced the Kikuyu occupants to move into native reserves.³⁶⁵ With the institutionalisation of the reserve system, the Kikuyu community members who had previously inhabited these lands found themselves living in overcrowded native reserves or as squatters or labourer-tenants on large European farms.³⁶⁶ The dispossession and displacement of Kikuyus created instability in the social and economic well-being of the Kikuyu community system and caused it to experience stress and to resist the disruption in a bid to regain its balance.³⁶⁷

Although there had been previous instances of violent resistance to colonialism in Kenya, the Kikuyu uprising referred to as the "Mau Mau" was the most expensive and violent form of resistance against colonial rule in Kenya.³⁶⁸ The Kenyan diaspora in Britain

³⁶² See Chapter 3 (for more discussion on the colonial system's disruption of African community systems by dispossessing and displacing African communities from their community land thus leading to the African communities' struggle for survival as systems).

³⁶³ As above.

³⁶⁴ Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20) Ch. III, p. 94.

³⁶⁵ Id.

³⁶⁶ See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 'Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya (tenants of the crown)' (1991) ACTS Press, African Centre for Technology Studies.

³⁶⁷ See Chapter 1, section 1.4.1 (for a description of systems theory, including how systems struggle for stability and survival when disrupted).

³⁶⁸ See Maloba, WO (n 222) Introduction, p. 2 (states that the Mau Mau uprising "cost the British government £60 million with the commitment of some 50,000 troops and police and result[ed] in 10,000 Africans killed and 90,000 others impounded in concentration camps under sometimes appalling conditions).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

at the time of the emergency described the uprising as being caused by land dispossession and displacement.³⁶⁹ The Kenyan diaspora in Britain organized themselves into the Kenya Committee in 1952, shortly before the State of Emergency and, in 1953, issued a statement of its aims, which included the statement that they “believed that the causes of the ... unrest in Kenya [lay] in the intolerable poverty and land hunger of the vast majority of the African people, and their complete denial of any democratic rights.”³⁷⁰ Rather than admit that the Mau Mau uprising was the community’s response to state-sanctioned dispossession and displacement from land and resulting economic distress, the colonial state preferred to describe the uprising as merely a “primitive irrational attack against the forces of law and order”.³⁷¹

The climax of the Mau Mau uprising was the assassination of Senior Chief Waruhiu Wa Kung'u (1890 - 1952) on October 7, 1952.³⁷² Senior Chief Waruhiu wa Kung'u was a prominent paramount chief in the Central Province of Kenya who the Mau Mau believed to be sympathetic to the state and against the struggle for community land rights.³⁷³ The Governor of Kenya at the time, Sir Evelyn Baring, declared a state of emergency in the territory on October 20, 1952, which lasted until January 12, 1960.³⁷⁴ The Wartime Emergency Powers Order-in-Council 1939 was invoked, which provided the governor with complete discretion to introduce any regulation that he thought "necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the territory, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and for maintaining supplies and services

³⁶⁹ Caroline Elkins ‘Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya’ (2005) New York: H. Holt.

³⁷⁰ Elkins, C (n 369 above) Section 4 (Rehabilitation), note 28.

³⁷¹ Will Podmore ‘British Foreign Policy since 1870’ (2008) Xlibris, p. 135 (quoting a statement by Oliver Lyttelton, then British Secretary of State for the Colonies).

³⁷² See Evanson N. Wamagatta ‘Controversial Chiefs in Colonial Kenya, The Untold Story of Senior Chief Waruhiu Wa Kung'u, 1890 – 1952’ (April 2016) Rowman & Littlefield; Maloba, WO (n 222) p. 2 (Introduction).

³⁷³ Wamagatta, E (n 372 above).

³⁷⁴ Elkins, C (n 369).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

essential to the life of the community."³⁷⁵ The Governor then passed a number of detention ordinances during the 1950s, providing the legal basis for the incarceration of Mau Mau suspects without trial.³⁷⁶ Operation Jock Scott was launched in Nairobi the day after the State of Emergency was declared, during which one hundred eighty (180) alleged Mau Mau leaders were arrested, including Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu leader who later became the first President of the Republic of Kenya.³⁷⁷ He was sentenced to seven (7) years' imprisonment.³⁷⁸ Operation Anvil, launched on April 16, 1954, gave rise to a new wave of arrests, and by December 1954, seventy-one thousand, three hundred forty-six (71,346) Mau Mau suspects were being detained in camps across Kenya.³⁷⁹

In Kenya and in Britain, the detention camps were promoted as places of rehabilitation, so as to relieve the Kikuyu of their Mau Mau 'psychopathology'.³⁸⁰ According to *Mutua and others v Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, a personal injury action against the United Kingdom by former Mau Mau detainees, the colonial state introduced three features of the detention process in the detention camps; "villagisation", "screening" and "dilution".³⁸¹ Villagisation referred to the removal of Kikuyus from their scattered homesteads and relocation into emergency villages, which were highly restrictive - surrounded by barbed wire, spiked trenches and twenty-four hour guard – and where the villagers were forced to labour on communal projects.³⁸² Screening was a form of interrogation that (a) determined a suspect's level of indoctrination; (b) gathered intelligence

³⁷⁵ See The Wartime Emergency Powers Order-in-Council (1939) available at

<https://onlinelibrary.london.ac.uk/resources/databases/justisone> (accessed 24 April 2020).

³⁷⁶ Elkins, C (n 369).

³⁷⁷ As above. See also Maloba, WO (n 222); Dr. Aoife Duffy 'Legacies of British Colonial Violence: Viewing Kenyan Detention Camps through the Hanslope Disclosure' (August, 2015) *Law and History Review*, vol. 33, No. 3, 489-542, sections 89-90.

³⁷⁸ As above.

³⁷⁹ As above.

³⁸⁰ Duffy, Aoife (n 377) sections 20, 93.

³⁸¹ As above. See also *Mau Mau Litigation – Mutua* (n 357) section 40 et seq.

³⁸² As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

for military and police operations; and (c) determined a suspect's screening category.³⁸³ To become "white" and successfully exit the detention pipeline, the detainee had to demonstrate an attitudinal change: to confess taking the Mau Mau oath, to provide detail on the crimes committed, and to further demonstrate that he or she was once again a "useful citizen" through hard work and labor.³⁸⁴ Dilution was a technique involving the isolation of small numbers of detainees from the larger group, and systematically using force, together with confessed detainees, to exact compliance and cooperation.³⁸⁵

By the end of 1955, one million, fifty thousand, eight hundred and ninety-nine (1,050,899) Kikuyu were removed from their scattered homesteads and forcibly relocated into one of eight hundred and four (804) villages, comprising some two-hundred thirty thousand (230,000) huts to undergo these rehabilitation processes.³⁸⁶ Following the personal injury action, *Mutua and others v Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, the UK Foreign Secretary announced in June 2013 that a settlement of nineteen million, nine hundred thousand pounds (£19,900,000) would be granted to five thousand, two hundred twenty eight (5,228) Kenyan detainee camp survivors, thereby acknowledging potential for succeeding at trial if the former detainees proceeded with their Mau Mau tort claims based on torture and abuse by British colonial officials.³⁸⁷

³⁸³ See Duffy, Aoife (n 377) (Dr. Aoife Duffy, a law lecturer at the Irish Centre for Human Rights National University of Ireland, Galway, conceptualizes the screening system as a "pipeline," with "hardcore" Kikuyu who were labelled as "Z" or "black", detained in remote high security encampments, eventually to be relabelled as "white," and passed through the pipeline to open camps before release and reintegration into society).

³⁸⁴ As above. See also *Mau Mau Litigation – Mutua* (n 357) section 40 et seq.

³⁸⁵ As above.

³⁸⁶ Elkins, C (n 369).

³⁸⁷ See Right Honourable William Hague, (Foreign Secretary) 'Statement to Parliament on Settlement of Mau Mau Claims' (June 6, 2013) UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims/> (accessed 30 March 2020).

2.4.2.3 KIKUYU RESETTLEMENT IN THE RIFT VALLEY

The Mau Mau uprising led to many members of the Kikuyu moving out of the native reserves in large numbers in the 1950s. By 1952 many members of the Kikuyu community were settled in various parts of the country.³⁸⁸ European settlers regarded the Kikuyu as providing better quality labour than the other communities because the Kikuyu community had experience with sedentary agriculture. European settlers therefore sought to relax regulations for members of the Kikuyu to enter into European farms. Olenguruone in the former Rift Valley province is an example of an area where the Kikuyu community settled as squatters or labourer-tenants in large numbers.³⁸⁹ In 1939, the Europeans settled over four thousand Kikuyu squatters in Olenguruone. During the State of Emergency declared in 1952 following the outbreak of the Mau Mau armed conflict, most of the Kikuyu who had been settled in Olenguruone were rounded up and repatriated to various places in Central Province. The Kikuyu also moved to Kericho district after 1952 to look for work in European farms and by 1957 they were so many Kikuyus in Kericho that the colonial state was forced to regulate their entry and stay in Kericho.³⁹⁰ In 1957, more than two thousand four hundred (2,400) additional Kikuyu families (men, women and children) were allowed to settle in Nandi Hills and other areas of Kericho. As at the time of Kenyan independence in 1963, the Kikuyu community constituted the largest squatters or labourer-tenant community in the Rift Valley region.

In the period immediately before Kenya's independence in 1963, the colonial government in Kenya embarked on an africanisation programme involving the resettlement of Africans in land owned by European settlers. The resettlement program, involving the introduction of settlement schemes countrywide, aimed to address the problem of landlessness facing many Kenyans at independence and to stimulate agricultural production.³⁹¹ The state resettlement program meant buying land from the Europeans and

³⁸⁸ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 105, p. 66.

³⁸⁹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 225, p. 123.

³⁹⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 143 - 144, pp. 84 - 85.

³⁹¹ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 372, p. 284.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

resettling Africans on them based on the willing-buyer-willing-seller land redistribution model, which had been endorsed by the Second Lancaster House conference in the lead up to independence.³⁹² This program had been proposed by the European settlers and commenced in 1962 with the resettlement of Africans in the Scheduled Areas/White Highlands.³⁹³

The Ministry of Agriculture, which was in charge of the resettlement program at independence, proposed two resettlement schemes: (1) a Yeoman Scheme, involving contributions from recipients and (2) the One Million Acre Scheme, financed mostly by the British government.³⁹⁴ The Yeoman Scheme was also known as the Yeoman Programme or the Assisted Farmers Scheme (AFS) or the Mackenzie settlement schemes.³⁹⁵ It was financed by the British government, with contribution from the World Bank, to the tune of seven million five hundred thousand (7.5 million). It was planned for establishment of smaller African farms in the borderlands between native reserves and the White Highlands. It envisaged buying two hundred forty thousand (240,000) acres of land in the White Highlands to be sub-divided into one-hundred (100) acre parcels and distributed to Africans to farm alongside European settlers.³⁹⁶ The African farmers would contribute anywhere from one hundred (100) pounds to five hundred (500) pounds depending on the size of the farm.³⁹⁷ Most of the land went to ex-loyalists of the colonial administration.³⁹⁸

The One Million Acre Scheme was the other state resettlement program which was to be implemented between 1962 and 1967, with financing mostly by the British government.³⁹⁹ The scheme's components included a loan facility with favourable payment

³⁹² TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 113, p. 31.

³⁹³ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 116, p. 201; Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 95, p. 62.

³⁹⁴ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 141 - 145, pp. 208 - 209.

³⁹⁵ As above.

³⁹⁶ As above.

³⁹⁷ As above.

³⁹⁸ See TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, sections 134 - 188, pp. 207 - 221; Akiwumi Report (n 2) sections 88 - 116, pp. 59 - 71 (for additional information on the state resettlement programs).

³⁹⁹ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 158 - 159, pp. 213.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

terms, settlement in one's former ethnic domain and priority to the most needy members of the community.⁴⁰⁰ Each African beneficiary was advanced a loan repayable in 30 years to purchase land so that there could be a rapid transfer of ownership of farms belonging to settlers who wanted to leave the country after independence. The British government advanced to the Kenyatta government a loan of twenty-one (21) million sterling pounds for the purchase of one (1) million acres of land out of the seven million, five hundred thousand (7.5 million) acres that was held by European settlers in the White Highlands. The incoming Kenyan government established an Agricultural Settlement Fund Trust whose trustees, in liaison with the British, controlled the fund into which all settlement loans were paid.⁴⁰¹ A Central Land Board with regional responsibility and chaired by a Briton was established to take responsibility for the land purchase.⁴⁰² Actual settlement of the landless was under the Ministry of Lands, which practically took over the functions of the Central Land Board.⁴⁰³ West Germany, the Land and Agriculture Bank (LAB), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the United Kingdom contributed to the development loan, but the World Bank declined to contribute because it was not comfortable with the resettlement arrangement. Approximately thirty-five thousand (35,000) families were eventually settled on the One Million Acre Scheme.⁴⁰⁴

Implementation of the One Million Acre Scheme was marred by irregularities. There was no competitive pricing for sale of prime land and other property such that houses in the White Highlands and many more were sold to ministers, members of Parliament, ambassadors, permanent secretaries and provincial commissioners.⁴⁰⁵ The willing-buyer-willing-seller settlement schemes allowed migrants from Central Province and the large Kikuyu squatter community in the Rift Valley to acquire white-occupied land in the former White Highlands.⁴⁰⁶ Land buying companies, such as the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru

⁴⁰⁰ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 162, p. 214.

⁴⁰¹ As above.

⁴⁰² As above.

⁴⁰³ As above.

⁴⁰⁴ As above.

⁴⁰⁵ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 167 - 168, pp. 216.

⁴⁰⁶ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 183, p. 220.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Association (GEMA), NDEFO and Nyakinyua, operating in the Rift Valley and other places, managed to acquire land and re-distribute it to their members who were mostly kinsmen of their founders.⁴⁰⁷

In parts of the White Highlands which had never been opened up, the Government embarked on state enterprise, through the management of farms for profit in these parts, by the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), either independently, or in joint ventures with private farms. Individual Africans, some sponsored by family groups, co-operatives, or land buying companies, bought large farms with single block titles, with loans from the Land Bank or other sources. The ADC took over the management of several farms in Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia Districts in the Rift Valley region. Most of these farms were subdivided and sold to various communities to alleviate landlessness. The individuals who settled on the farms had their plots demarcated and had thriving agricultural enterprises, including cooperative societies for developing, processing and marketing their farm produce. They were doing better economically than the communities that considered the area to be their ancestral homes. The majority of these farms were (and some still are) situated in a belt bordering the former Kalenjin native reserves.⁴⁰⁸

Whereas the majority of farm buying companies were formed in the former Central Province, there were many farms in the former Rift Valley Province where members of the Kalenjin community who were willing and able to buy such farms were denied the opportunity to do so and, instead, farm-buying companies from the Central Province bought the same.⁴⁰⁹ An example is Miteitei Farm in the Rift Valley. Most of the European settlements in Nandi District within the Rift Valley region were confined to Tinderet Division in present-day Nandi County.⁴¹⁰ The Government re-settlement programme did not impose any limitations as to which ethnic community would be settled on settlement

⁴⁰⁷ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 209, p. 227.

⁴⁰⁸ See TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, sections 134 - 188, pp. 207 - 221; Akiwumi Report (n 2) sections 88 - 116, pp. 59 - 71. See also CIPEV Report (n 5) (giving additional information on land ownership in the Rift Valley region).

⁴⁰⁹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 83, pp. 55 - 56.

⁴¹⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) sections 118 - 119, p. 72.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

farm schemes and European settler farms.⁴¹¹ Among the farms in Tinderet area which were sold to the Government was one previously owned by one DC Dansey of one thousand nine hundred and thirty four (1,934) acres.⁴¹² The farm was later sold for nine hundred sixty seven thousand shillings (Kshs. 967,000) to former squatters on the farm, all non-Kalenjin who, in 1976, jointly with other people formed a company known as Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd., which became the registered owner of the farm.⁴¹³ The Nandi later bought shares from some of the squatters.⁴¹⁴ The original number of shareholders of the company was four hundred and fourteen (414). Before Miteitei Farm was sold to these original shareholders, Nyakinyua Women's group, made up of Kikuyu women only, wanted to buy it and actually took possession but were forced out by members of the Nandi community. Shareholders of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd., could not agree on the acreage of the farm which each of them would get. The Nandi wanted five (5) acres per share, but others wanted equal sub-division. A committee of mostly Kalenjins was established to develop a list of shareholders and came up with a list of three hundred nine (309), mostly Kalenjin. There were about two-hundred eighty-six (286), mostly Kikuyus, who said they were supposed to be on the list. The dispute continued until the tribal clashes of October 1991.⁴¹⁵

Another example of the state's irregular resettlement program is Nakuru and Laikipia.⁴¹⁶ Nakuru district was part of the White Highlands and did not have native reserves in colonial times. Its current residents moved there under resettlement programs. By 1961, there were about forty thousand (40,000) Africans in Nakuru town and about one hundred sixty thousand (160,000) in the farms with more than fifty percent (50%) Kikuyus according to the 1961 Annual Report for Nakuru. Ol Moran (Laikipia district) and Njoro (Nakuru district) Divisions were part of the former European settlements.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹¹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 120, p. 72.

⁴¹² As above.

⁴¹³ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 120, p. 72.

⁴¹⁴ As above.

⁴¹⁵ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) sections 120 - 121, p. 72.

⁴¹⁶ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 207, p. 115.

⁴¹⁷ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 251, p. 138.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

After Kenya gained independence, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Trans Nzoia areas were taken over from European settlers by the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) under the state resettlement scheme and sold to individual Africans, some sponsored family groups, co-operatives, or land buying companies.⁴¹⁸ Members of the Kikuyu community formed the majority of the land buyers.⁴¹⁹ Example of the land-buying companies was Mutukanio Co. Ltd and Laikipia West Co. Ltd, which companies together with several other sister companies were associated with Dixon Kihika Kimani, a one time member of parliament for Laikipia West.⁴²⁰ The majority shareholders in the several land buying companies which Kihika Kimani helped to form were Kikuyu.⁴²¹ Njoro is one of the fifteen divisions in Nakuru district and lies to the South and South West of Nakuru with different ethnic groups but majority Kikuyu and shareholders of Njoro Mutukanio Co Ltd, a land buying company which in the 1960s and 1970s bought farms of over fifty one thousand (51,000) acres in the area through the efforts of Kihika Kimani, for settlement.⁴²² Kihika Kimani's family remains a prominent Kikuyu family in Nakuru. Each shareholder could buy shares in the company at the rate of one thousand five hundred shillings (ksh. 1,500) per share which would entitle him to two and a half (2.5) acres per share.⁴²³ Kihika Kimani himself acquired at least three-hundred fifty-three (353) acres.⁴²⁴

The Kenyatta family, the family of Kenya's first President and a prominent Kikuyu family, acquired vast farms in Nakuru, Njoro and Rongai areas in the Rift Valley region.⁴²⁵ Multinational corporations, such as James Finlay Company Limited/the African Highlands Produce Company Ltd and Unilever Kenya Ltd/Brooke Bond, which were mostly European, also acquired large tracts of land that was initially meant for the resettlement of African

⁴¹⁸ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 95.

⁴¹⁹ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 186, p. 221.

⁴²⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 267, p. 147. See also TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 134, et seq., pp. 207, et seq. (for more information on the state resettlement programs).

⁴²¹ As above.

⁴²² Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 267, p. 147.

⁴²³ As above.

⁴²⁴ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) sections 267 - 268, p. 147.

⁴²⁵ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 204, p. 225.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
communities. These multinational corporations used the land to cultivate tea.⁴²⁶ They were granted leases for 999 years from 1923.

The general result of the settlement schemes was that the majority of the people who were actually settled through the One Million Acre Scheme were mostly members of the Kikuyu community.⁴²⁷ By 1979, there were no more parcels of land in the former White Highlands/Scheduled Areas that could be purchased from European settlers for the resettlement of African communities that had been dispossessed of their land during the colonial period.⁴²⁸

2.4.3. THE NANDI AND THE KIPSIGIS

The Nandi and the Kipsigis are both Nilotic speaking and belong to the Kalenjin community with similar customs and traditions.⁴²⁹ The Kipsigis, Nandi and other sub-tribes of the Kalenjin community were practically one tribe some 20 generations ago, assuming a generation is about 32 and a half years.⁴³⁰ They lived at the North East end of present-day Lake Turkana, a lake in the Northern part of the Kenyan Rift Valley near Ethiopia.⁴³¹ The term ‘Kalenjin’ was allegedly coined by some high school students at the Alliance High School in Kikuyu, Kenya, in the 1940s and means “I tell you” or “I have told you”.⁴³² Before the term ‘Kalenjin’ came into popular use, all the Nandi, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Marakwet, Tugen

⁴²⁶ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 93, p. 193.

⁴²⁷ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 186, p. 221.

⁴²⁸ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 723, p. 299.

⁴²⁹ As above.

⁴³⁰ Kipkoech araap Sambu ‘The Misiri Legend Explored: A Linguistic Inquiry Into the Kalenjiin People’s Oral Tradition of Ancient Egyptian Origin’ (2011) University of Nairobi Press pp. 4-5. See also Archived Documents (n 188) (containing writings of Rear Admiral F.R. Dodge, U.S.N. (Retired) ‘Effects of Foreign Impact on a Single tribe over a period of time and Intra-family, inter-tribal Similarities’ (written around 1949)).

⁴³¹ As above.

⁴³² Araap Sambu, K (n 430) pp. 3-4 (describing the origin of the name ‘Kalenjin’).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
and other communities in the Rift Valley region had been designated as ‘Nandi speaking tribes’.⁴³³

The Kipsigis and the Nandi migrated from the area near Ethiopia because of natural calamities resulting in famine or the desire to seek better grazing for their livestock.⁴³⁴ They moved downwards and to the west of Mount Elgon and settled in their present homeland at the edge of and on the hills of the south western escarpment in the Rift Valley region.⁴³⁵ G. W. B. Huntingford, in *‘The Nandi of Kenya: Tribal Control in a Pastoral Society’*, has suggested tentatively that the first Kalenjin settlement in the area was started around the beginning of the 17th century.⁴³⁶

Their food production methods were thus similar to the pastoral Maasai. Like the Maasai, some members of the Nandi and Kipsigis communities had begun practicing some form of mixed farming and pastoralism before the arrival of the Europeans in some of the fertile and well-watered areas of the Rift Valley that were highly suitable for crop farming.

The Nandi principally inhabit Uasin Gishu County in the northern part of the Rift Valley region.⁴³⁷ Former Nandi district lies on a plateau, known as Uasin Gishu Plateau, which extends from the Mau mountain range on the east and south-east, to the Nyanza plains on the west and from Sosiani river in the north to the Kano plains in the south.⁴³⁸ The

⁴³³ Araap Sambu, K (n 430) pp. 4-5 (stating that the Kalenjin people in Kenya were previously referred to in most early colonial official documents and in general parlance as the ‘Nandi - speaking peoples’ and names these group of people as comprising the following sub-ethnic groups: Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Keiyo, Pokoot, Merkweeta, Eendo, Almo, Kiptani, Barokot, Senguer, Terik and Ogieek/Dorobo, Saboot clusters (Koony, Sapiiny, Pook, and the Pong’omeek)). See also Archived Documents (n 188) (referring to the Kalenjin as the ‘Nandi-speaking peoples’).

⁴³⁴ As above.

⁴³⁵ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 1, p. 19.

⁴³⁶ As above.

⁴³⁷ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37.

⁴³⁸ John A. Lomurut ‘A first generation digital soil map of a portion of the Uasin Gishu Plateau, Kenya’ (2014) Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN (Master of Science thesis, Open Access Theses. 649) p. 124, https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_theses/649 (accessed 22 April

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

southern and western limits of the Uasin Gishu Plateau are well defined by granite escarpments rising steeply from the plains.⁴³⁹ Its average elevation is 6,000 feet and easy access is available only from the extreme south-west, in which region hills are dotted throughout.⁴⁴⁰ Nandi oral tradition recounts a major confrontation with the Maasai in the Kipkarren valley in the 1880s that resulted in the defeat and expulsion of the Maasai from Uasin Gishu plateau in the Rift Valley region.⁴⁴¹ “Kipkarren” is the Nandi name for “the place of the spears”.⁴⁴² The Uasin Gishu plateau comprises some of the best pastures and salt licks in the entire country.⁴⁴³ Before the confrontation between the Nandi and the Maasai, these pastures and salt licks were not accessible to the Nandi community because of the Maasai occupation of the area.⁴⁴⁴ The defeat of the Maasai gave the Nandi community unchallenged access to the pastures and salt licks throughout the extensive Uasin Gishu plateau region stretching from the foothills of Mount Elgon to the Nandi escarpment.⁴⁴⁵ The Nandi used Kipkarren, which is a plateau, as their grazing land until the time of white settlement when the plateau was annexed by the government as part of the European White Highlands.⁴⁴⁶

The basic political unit of the Nandi is the Koret, (plural-Korotinwek), the smallest neighborhood unit.⁴⁴⁷ The Koret is made up of a group of homesteads, and a group of

2020) (for more scientific information on the Uasin Gishu Plateau).

⁴³⁹ As above.

⁴⁴⁰ As above.

⁴⁴¹ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 1, p. 19. Hollis, AC (n 239) part I, pp. 1-2 (discussing the Uasin Gishu plateau). Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁴² As above.

⁴⁴³ Lomurut, JA (n 438).

⁴⁴⁴ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37.

⁴⁴⁵ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37-38. Hollis, AC (n 239) part I, pp. 1-2 (discussing the Uasin Gishu plateau).

⁴⁴⁶ Archived Documents (n 188); Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 1, p. 19; Hollis, AC (n 239) part I, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴⁷ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2, pp. 22-23; Archived Documents (n 188).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Korotinwek make up the 'Bororiet'.⁴⁴⁸ Members of different clans traditionally lived in one Bororiet.⁴⁴⁹ The political institution which deliberates on the day to day affairs of the Koret is the Kokwet Council, a council of elders of the Koret.⁴⁵⁰ The chief functions of the 'Kokwet Council', at which all adult males of the 'koret' are expected to attend, is to organize collective activities, safeguard the natural resources of the 'koret', settle disputes among 'koret' members, investigate anti-social acts among its members and regulate certain agricultural and pastoral activities of its members.⁴⁵¹

The other social institution among the Nandi is that of the age set system.⁴⁵² Every male in the tribe belongs, from birth, to an age set.⁴⁵³ Traditionally, members of the same age set were circumcised together and engaged in political, military and social activities as one unit.⁴⁵⁴ There were seven age sets, comprising the warriors, the boys and the elders.⁴⁵⁵ All age set mates regarded themselves as equals and addressed each other as 'Ipindanyo', meaning 'our age set'.⁴⁵⁶ The warriors are responsible for military operations of the Bororiet and remain in power for a period of approximately fifteen years before retiring as the incoming warriors take their place and they, in turn, became elders.⁴⁵⁷ The Nandi warrior class are similar to the Maasai morans / murans.⁴⁵⁸ Once members of an age set age and die,

⁴⁴⁸ As above.

⁴⁴⁹ As above.

⁴⁵⁰ As above.

⁴⁵¹ Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12; Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2.

⁴⁵² As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁵³ Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵⁴ As above.

⁴⁵⁵ As above.

⁴⁵⁶ As above.

⁴⁵⁷ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37-38.

⁴⁵⁸ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

their name is transferred to a set of small boys, the most junior set.⁴⁵⁹ The age sets thus work in a recurring cycle, and the names appear again and again.⁴⁶⁰

The “Bororiet” Council is a territorial, military and political unit.⁴⁶¹ All adult males of the Bororiet unit are eligible to attend its meetings.⁴⁶² It traditionally had a well-defined geographical boundary marked by rivers or hills or forests.⁴⁶³ Within that geographical boundary, all warriors formed a fighting battalion for the “Bororiet”.⁴⁶⁴ Offensive and defensive warfare of the “Bororiet” were organized in this “Bororiet” Council.⁴⁶⁵ The decision for offensive war was made by the warriors in their secret lodges.⁴⁶⁶ This decision to go to war was placed before the “Bororiet” Council by the warrior leader.⁴⁶⁷ When the proposal to go to war had been formally accepted by the council, the Orkoiyot had to be informed for his approval of the operation and, through his magic, ensure its success.⁴⁶⁸ The “Bororiet” Council also deliberated on matters of war, circumcision ceremonies, planting and harvesting of crops.⁴⁶⁹ When the Nandi were defeated by the British and British rule established, the “Bororiet” council’s geographical boundaries were converted into locations.⁴⁷⁰

The land of the Nandi is regarded as the common possession of the tribe, but with special emphasis on “Bororiet” membership.⁴⁷¹ For within his own “Bororiet”, a man can

⁴⁵⁹ As above. See also Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12; Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁶⁰ As above.

⁴⁶¹ Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶² As above.

⁴⁶³ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2.

⁴⁶⁴ Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁶⁵ As above.

⁴⁶⁶ As above.

⁴⁶⁷ As above.

⁴⁶⁸ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37.

⁴⁶⁹ Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁷⁰ Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁷¹ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2, pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

choose land for cultivation without restriction, and his cattle are free to graze anywhere within the geographical boundaries of the “Bororiet”.⁴⁷² The land belonging to the Nandi community was traditionally divided into specific spheres with specific functions.⁴⁷³ The divisions were those for cultivation and grazing.⁴⁷⁴ Grazing land was further divided into grazing grounds and homestead land.⁴⁷⁵ The grazing grounds were owned communally, while the rights over the ownership of the homestead land were vested in the households.⁴⁷⁶ No cultivation or settlement was to be done on the grazing grounds.⁴⁷⁷ The land for cultivation was of two types. The first type was that immediately adjacent to a homestead, and the second was allotted by the Kokwet council.⁴⁷⁸ A man could cultivate as much land, around the homestead, as his wives and children could manage.⁴⁷⁹ The Nandi cultivated crops such as millet, maize, potatoes, pumpkins, bananas, sugarcane, and tobacco.⁴⁸⁰ The tenure of cultivated land was in the form of occupancy rights only, vested in the head of the family or his widows.⁴⁸¹ The land reverted to the kokwet once it had been abandoned by its owner.⁴⁸² This land could then be re-allocated by the ‘Kokwet’ elders.⁴⁸³

The Nandi economic way of life was traditionally centered on the well-being and increase of their cattle.⁴⁸⁴ The Nandi owned large numbers of cattle, goats and sheep.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷² As above. See also Hollis, AC (n 239) pp. 11-12.

⁴⁷³ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁷⁴ As above.

⁴⁷⁵ As above.

⁴⁷⁶ As above.

⁴⁷⁷ As above.

⁴⁷⁸ As above.

⁴⁷⁹ Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁸⁰ As above.

⁴⁸¹ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁸² As above.

⁴⁸³ As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁸⁴ Hollis, AC (n 239) p. 20.

⁴⁸⁵ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

However, the possession of cattle was essential to full participation in the social and political life of the community.⁴⁸⁶ Cattle was a form of currency that could be used to purchase property and to pay dowry.⁴⁸⁷ Even participation in a Kokwet council was dependent on cattle ownership.⁴⁸⁸ The first ambition of a Nandi youth was, therefore, to acquire cattle. Cattle was traditionally accumulated by inheritance or through raiding expeditions.⁴⁸⁹ The Nandi were constantly looking for good pastures and water for their cattle.⁴⁹⁰

The Kipsigis are the largest sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community.⁴⁹¹ They consider members of the Nandi community to be their cousins and understand each other's languages.⁴⁹² The Kipsigis occupy mostly Kericho and Bomet counties in the Rift Valley region and consider them to be their homeland.⁴⁹³

The Kipsigis are of Nilo-Hamitic origin and can be described as nomadic, depending on livestock for their livelihood.⁴⁹⁴ Cultivation was sporadic, in an area known as "Roret", which is a piece of land that members of the community are allowed to cultivate.⁴⁹⁵ The only land held in perpetuity by a member of the Kipsigis community was a "Karait" or a

⁴⁸⁶ As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁸⁷ As above.

⁴⁸⁸ Huntingford, GWB (n 239) chapter 2, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁸⁹ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37-38.

⁴⁹⁰ Hollis, AC (n 239) p. 20. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁹¹ Araap Sambu, K (n 430) p. 7 (stating that the Kipsigis comprise about 40% of the entire Kalenjin population who numbered about 4.96 million in Kenya as per the 2009 National Census).

⁴⁹² Samson Moenga Omvvoyo 'The Agricultural Changes in the Kipsigis Land, c. 1894- 1963: An Historical Inquiry' (2000) Kenyatta University (Doctor of Philosophy thesis in Environmental Studies) chapter 2, available at <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01236648> (accessed 22 April 2020).

⁴⁹³ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492 above) chapter 1.

⁴⁹⁴ Michael Saltman 'The Kipsigis: a case study in changing customary law' (1977) Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., p. 14 (describing the southward migration of the Kipsigis from the Upper Nile valley).

⁴⁹⁵ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 3, p. 59. J. G. Peristiany 'The Social Institution of the Kipsigis' (1939) London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

man's homestead, consisting of his house, stores and cattle shed.⁴⁹⁶ The owner of a 'Karait' would plant a hedge or fence around the Karait as proof of ownership.⁴⁹⁷ The custom was that of a member of the community clearing an area of forest, planting some crops, mostly millet, and reaping the crop.⁴⁹⁸ The person would also place a fence of thorns around the cleared area to keep off goats and wild animals.⁴⁹⁹ After approximately four harvests or roughly two years, the person would leave the land so that it would revert to communal use and he would move to clear another area.⁵⁰⁰

Some land use was communal.⁵⁰¹ For instance, access to water could not be denied as water was communal.⁵⁰² A person could construct a small dam to head off water for his cattle but could not deny others the same water.⁵⁰³

The Kipsigis' disputes over land were settled by a group of elders drawn from different areas and from a wide geographical area.⁵⁰⁴ The elders were known as a 'Kokwet'.⁵⁰⁵ All transactions involving land, such as demarcation of boundaries, resolving of land disputes, and transfer of ownership had to involve the Kokwet elders.⁵⁰⁶ A quorum

⁴⁹⁶ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 2, pp. 34-35. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁹⁷ Archived Documents (n 188).

⁴⁹⁸ As above. See also Peristiany, JG (n 239).

⁴⁹⁹ I. Q. Orchardson 'Some Traits of the Kipsigis in Relation to Their Contact with Europeans' (October, 1931) *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 467-468 available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1155433> (accessed 22 April 2020).

⁵⁰⁰ Orchardson, IQ (n 499 above) p. 467. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵⁰¹ Orchardson, IQ (n 499) p. 471-478. Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 3. Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵⁰² As above.

⁵⁰³ As above.

⁵⁰⁴ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 2, pp. 34-36 (discussing, generally, the Kipsigis' socio-political organisation). Orchardson, IQ (n 499) p. 469 (mentioning that the Kokwet council was made up of adult males).

⁵⁰⁵ As above.

⁵⁰⁶ Orchardson, IQ (n 499) p. 471-478.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

of Kokwet elders could be made up of thirty elders or more.⁵⁰⁷ Appeals from Kokwet elders would go to another group of elders known as the “Kipsarurunik”, which had great power to bring curses and death to the guilty party.⁵⁰⁸

Inheritance was patrilineal.⁵⁰⁹ The oldest son of the first wife inherited the right to distribute his father’s property equitably amongst his brothers and to make provision for his sisters, guided and advised by two elderly relatives of the deceased.⁵¹⁰ If there were no male children, the oldest living brother took the responsibility or, failing that, the oldest living uncle.⁵¹¹

Land transactions were possible. For example, crops on land could be bartered in exchange for livestock, but once the crops were harvested, the land reverted back to the community and, if overgrown, could be cleared and treated as a Roret.⁵¹² Dwellings on the land could also be sold but, if cleared, the land was treated as a Roret.⁵¹³ Leasing of land was also possible. A person could give a “Roret” on loan to a person living in its neighbourhood if the owner lived far.⁵¹⁴ The owner could request it back at any time after harvest.⁵¹⁵ Cultivation of a leased “Roret” was always subject to the consent of the owner.⁵¹⁶

The Nandi and Kipsigis have a rich history of asserting their customary land rights against other communities. By the middle of the 19th century, the Nandi and the Kipsigis joined hands to prevent the Arabs from opening up a direct route from the Rift Valley to

⁵⁰⁷ Orchardson, IQ (n 499) p. 469. See also Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵⁰⁸ Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵⁰⁹ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 2, pp. 37-38; Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵¹⁰ As above.

⁵¹¹ As above.

⁵¹² Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 3; Archived Documents (n 188).

⁵¹³ As above.

⁵¹⁴ As above. See also Peristiany, JG (n 239).

⁵¹⁵ Omvvoyo, SM (n 492) chapter 3; Archived Documents (n 188); Peristiany, JG (n 239).

⁵¹⁶ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Lake Victoria.⁵¹⁷ The Arab and Swahili traders coined the term ‘Nandi’ to refer to them.⁵¹⁸

Oral tradition in the Nandi community recounts a major event in the 1850s when the Nandi defeated gun-wielding Arabs at a place known as ‘Kipsoboi’ and expelled them from Nandi territory.⁵¹⁹ The Nandi also fought against European explorers and settlers from around 1890-1906 that resulted in the brutal murder of their leader Koitalel arap Samoei by the British in 1905 and the signing of the peace treaty of Kipture with the British on 15th December 1905. The colonial administrators used legislation - the Oiaibons Removal Ordinance of 1934 – to expel members of the Kipsigis community, known as the ‘Talai’, from Kipsigis territory because of their stubborn opposition to colonial rule. The Nandi and Kipsigis’ struggle to assert their customary land rights have continued to this day as will be discussed in the next section.

2.4.3.1 TRIBAL CLASHES OF 1991-1998

The Kalenjin community, that also controlled the state at the time, used tribal clashes between 1991 and 1998 to forcefully evict those that they considered foreigners from the Rift Valley region.⁵²⁰ These foreigners happened to be former squatters or labourer-tenants or resettled Africans and were mostly members of the Kikuyu community. The forceful evictions took the form of tribal clashes between 1991 – 1998 and primarily affected the former European settler farms situated in the belt bordering the former Kalenjin native

⁵¹⁷ Hollis, AC (n 239) p. vi (describes Nandi and Kipsigis resistance in the preface).

⁵¹⁸ Timothy H. Parsons ‘The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, And Why They Always Fall’ (2010) Oxford University Press, p. 290 (stating that ‘Mnandi’, which refers to one Nandi person, is the Kiswahili word for ‘Cormorant’, a bird with a reputation for rapaciousness or living by killing its prey).

⁵¹⁹ Hollis, AC (n 239) part I, p. 3; Archived Documents (n 188) (describing the confrontation between the Nandi and the Arab and Swahili caravans traveling from the Coast to Lake Victoria in search of ivory).

⁵²⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 31, pp. 23 - 24.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
reserves from Mount Elgon to Molo in the Nakuru District.⁵²¹ The residents of the farms were majority Kalenjin and Kikuyu.

On 1 July 1998, Kenyan President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi appointed a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate ethnic conflict in Kenya, including that which occurred in the Rift Valley region between 1992 and 1998. Appeal Court Judge Akilano Akiwumi was appointed chair of the commission, hence it was also referred to as the “Akiwumi Commission”. Its mandate was to establish the origin, immediate and underlying cause of the conflict and to investigate the action taken by law enforcement officers during the clashes, and their level of preparedness to contain them.⁵²²

The Akiwumi Commission examined nineteen (19) areas of the Rift Valley region; Molo, Njoro, Olenguruone, Londiani, Fort Tenan, Kipkelion, Thesalia, Kunyak, Sondu, Enosupukia, Ol Moran, Miteitei, Kamasai, Owiro, Songhor, Burnt Forest, Turbo, Saboti and Nyangusu. It found that the Kipsigis/Nandi were involved in fifteen (15) areas while the Kikuyu were involved in ten (10) of the areas and the Maasai two (2).⁵²³

The tribal clashes started on 29 October 1991 at the Miteitei farm, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in present day Nandi County, pitting the Nandi mostly against the Kikuyu, but also involving all other former squatters or labourer-tenants in the District.⁵²⁴ The clashes were sparked by the dispute between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu over Miteitei Farm in Tinderet. The Nandi had decided to resolve the dispute using a method that members of the Nandi community later described as the “Kipgaa” or “home way”, which essentially meant reverting to their customary practice of waging war to evict foreigners from their land.⁵²⁵ The secretary of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd., summarized the problem thus: “[t]he problem was tribal land. That the Kalenjin did not want other people to live on their land while they were landless.”⁵²⁶ The clashes were due to the Kalenjin custom and tradition of disliking strangers living in their midst, particularly on their ancestral land, which had in

⁵²¹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2).

⁵²² Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2).

⁵²³ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 31, pp. 23 - 24.

⁵²⁴ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 89, p. 59.

⁵²⁵ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 137, p. 82.

⁵²⁶ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 121, p. 73.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

colonial times been set aside for European settlement.⁵²⁷ The Kikuyu were driven out in the clashes, the farm later surveyed and shared among the Kalenjin community members and titles issued to them.⁵²⁸

The Nandi laid the same claim to other areas of the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas, claiming that their ancestral land had been leased to Europeans, and that the community members did not have to repurchase their land.⁵²⁹ In 1992, the clashes spread to Molo, Olenguruone, Londiani, parts of Kericho, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and other parts of the then Rift Valley Province. The clashes continued in 1993, spreading to Enosupukia, Naivasha and parts of Narok and the Trans Mara Districts, which together formed the greater Narok before the Trans Mara District was hived out of it.

The same situation persisted in Kericho and Nakuru, which also had European settlements. In Kericho, the clashes covered Kipkelion and Londiani, Chirchila (Fort Ternan), and Thessalia, among others.⁵³⁰ Nakuru district was the headquarters of the former Rift Valley province and was the most hard-hit by the clashes.⁵³¹ The 1992 and 1993 clashes in Nakuru affected mainly Molo and Olenguruone Divisions.⁵³² The Kikuyu stated that the clashes in Olenguruone had been planned and executed by the Kalenjin with a view to driving out of Olenguruone all the non-Kalenjin and more particularly the Kikuyu so that they would thereafter occupy their land.⁵³³

The state did not intervene to stop the tribal clashes of 1991 - 1998 because the government of the Kenyan state system during this period were majority members of the Kalenjin community.⁵³⁴ State officials in charge of the Rift Valley region were also

⁵²⁷ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 153, p. 89.

⁵²⁸ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 125, p. 75.

⁵²⁹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 126, p. 75.

⁵³⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 142, p. 83.

⁵³¹ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 207, p. 115.

⁵³² Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 237, p. 130.

⁵³³ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 230, p. 126.

⁵³⁴ See Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2), Chapter 5, section 523, p. 284 (supporting the view that the government of President Daniel T. arap Moi, himself a Kalenjin, connived in the clashes by

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

complicit in allowing the clashes to continue as a way of safeguarding the numerical superiority of the Kalenjin in the area during the electioneering period.⁵³⁵

The tribal clashes pertaining to Kalenjin community land appear to have achieved their intended purposes. Many of the non-Kalenjin left Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions in Kericho after the clashes and were not there as at the time of the December 1992 general elections.⁵³⁶ The Maasai also attempted to reclaim their ancestral land in some areas but their clashes were not as widespread as the Kalenjin. Clashes in Naivasha pitted the Maasai against the Kikuyu.⁵³⁷

The tribal clashes were demonstrations of resilience by Rift Valley communities in the face of disruption by the colonial state and its successor Kenyan state.⁵³⁸ The communities reacted to their dispossession and displacement from their community land by using self-help tactics to retain essentially the same land that they had before the displacement and dispossession happened.⁵³⁹ The community systems used their internal structures to effectively zone the Rift Valley region along community land boundaries as they were in the period before colonialism.⁵⁴⁰ During the tribal clashes of 1991-1998, there was an unprecedented sale of land by minority groups who then moved to areas where their tribesmen and women were predominant.⁵⁴¹ The Kikuyu, for example, moved out of Olenguruone and sold their land cheaply to the Kalenjin.⁵⁴² They did not return without risk

stating as follows: “[i]n our view, it is not the lack of adequate security personnel and equipment or preparedness that contributed to the tribal clashes. The Police Force and the Provincial Administration were well aware of the impending tribal clashes and if anything, connived at it.”)

⁵³⁵ As above.

⁵³⁶ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 158, p. 92.

⁵³⁷ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 232, p. 127.

⁵³⁸ See Aguirre, BE (n 219) (describing resilience as “an example of morphostasis--that is, a process directed to preserve the social system”); Ruhl, JB (n 219) (describing resilience in legal systems).

⁵³⁹ The self-help tactics are, are arguably, the systems’ self-preservation tactics under the descriptions of resilience in Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219).

⁵⁴⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 248, p. 137.

⁵⁴¹ As above.

⁵⁴² As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
to their lives and properties. Similar sales occurred in Molo South and Mau Summit areas.⁵⁴³

This demonstration of resilience became more intense and widespread after the tribal clashes of 1991 - 1998 as will be discussed in the next section on the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008.

2.4.3.2 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE OF 2007-2008

The self-help efforts by the communities to reverse decades of dispossession and displacement culminated in the unprecedented post-election violence experienced in the Rift Valley following the disputed presidential elections of December 2007.⁵⁴⁴ The tribal clashes and the post-election violence are examples of the stress that communities living in the Rift Valley region have experienced over the years because of the lack of equilibrium between their component parts.⁵⁴⁵ These communities have used every election cycle to express their dissatisfaction with their dispossession and displacement from their community land.⁵⁴⁶ Those clashes were the autopoietic communities' efforts to regenerate and transform the conditions of their validity to ensure their survival as communities.⁵⁴⁷ The 2007 - 2008 post-election violence was the culmination of self-help tactics by the Kalenjin community to evict non-Kalenjins from the Rift Valley.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴³ As above.

⁵⁴⁴ See CIPEV Report (n 5); Jerome Lafargue (editor) 'The General Elections in Kenya' (2007) *Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est*, n° 38, Nairobi, May – August 2008, available at <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/17071> (accessed 28 March 2020) (contains various articles describing the cyclic ethnic-based violence in Kenya that culminated in the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008); 'Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Kenya' (April, 2012) Kenya National Assembly, Tenth Parliament – Fourth Session.

⁵⁴⁵ As above. See also Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (describing resilience as a self-preservation process by the community); See Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124.

⁵⁴⁶ As above.

⁵⁴⁷ As above.

⁵⁴⁸ As above.

The genesis of the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008 can be traced to the presidential elections that were held on 27 December 2007. The presidential elections resulted in the country being split into two with the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki winning slightly more than half of the votes cast and the main opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, getting slightly less than half.⁵⁴⁹ These results were disputed and an unprecedented wave of violence erupted in several parts of the country. The violence quickly spread and became an ethnic conflict. However, the Rift Valley was the epicentre of the violence and Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Trans Nzoia experienced the worst of the violence in the region.⁵⁵⁰ The then Rift Valley Province accounted for seven hundred forty-four (744) recorded deaths, that is, sixty-six percent (66%) of all the recorded deaths that occurred during the post-election violence period.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁹ See Jeffrey Gettleman 'Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya Into Bloodshed' (Dec. 31, 2007) N. Y.


TIMES available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

(accessed on March 29, 2020) (stating that the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) declared Mr. Kibaki the winner, with 4,584,721 votes compared with 4,352,993 for Mr. Odinga; a spread of about 2 percent"); CIPEV Report (n 5).

⁵⁵⁰ As above.

⁵⁵¹ CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 9.



Source: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, Chaired by the Hon. Justice Philip Waki, chapter 9 (The Government Printer, October 15, 2008) (available at http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf)

In the Rift Valley region, the epicenter of the post-election violence can be traced to the former White Highlands. Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Trans-Nzoia districts led the death count with hundreds of deaths; two-hundred thirty (230), two hundred thirteen (213) and one hundred four (104), respectively.⁵⁵² The only other district which recorded over one hundred (100) deaths countrywide was Nairobi. The Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Kalenjin led the death count with two hundred seventy eight (278), two hundred sixty eight (268), one hundred sixty three (163) and one hundred fifty eight (158) recorded deaths, respectively. It is estimated that during the violence that ensued, one thousand one hundred thirty three (1,133) lives were lost, seventy-eight thousand two hundred fifty four (78,254) houses were destroyed country wide and some six hundred sixty three thousand nine hundred twenty one (663,921) people were displaced.⁵⁵³ Out of the six hundred sixty three thousand nine hundred twenty one (663,921), it is estimated that about three hundred fifty thousand

⁵⁵² CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 9.

⁵⁵³ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

(350,000) people sought refuge in one hundred eighteen (118) camps, three hundred thirteen thousand nine hundred twenty one (313,921) were integrated amongst various communities in the country while six hundred forty (640) Internally Displaced Persons (“IDPs”) households fled to Uganda. It is also estimated that economic and business losses were in excess of one hundred billion shillings (Kshs. 100) billion.⁵⁵⁴

The clashes and post-election violence are self-help tactics by the communities to reverse decades of dispossession and displacement.⁵⁵⁵ The violence meted out on non-Kalenjins is consistent with the Kalenjin custom of waging war to fight off invaders from their land.⁵⁵⁶ In Kalenjin oral traditions, the customary practice of violence against outsiders dates back to the 19th century when the Kalenjin community prevented Arab and Swahili traders from penetrating their territory, expelled the Maasai from Uasin Gishu plateau and fought ferociously against British invasion.⁵⁵⁷ One of the most tragic stories of the violence by the Kalenjin community against the Kikuyu during the post-election violence of 2007-2008 was the deliberate burning alive of mostly Kikuyu women and children huddled together in a church in Kiambaa on 1 January 2008.⁵⁵⁸ The Kikuyu women and children had sought refuge in the church following an attack on their village of Kimuri, bordering Kiambaa, on 30 December 2007. Seventeen (17) people were burnt alive in the church with eleven (11) dying on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital in Eldoret.⁵⁵⁹ It is no coincidence that the Kikuyu, who are the majority settler community in the Rift Valley region, were also the majority of those who were killed or displaced by the post-election violence in the Rift Valley region.

The pattern of violence in areas populated by the Kalenjin was very similar, starting with the burning of properties owned mainly by the Kikuyu, blocking roads and issuing

⁵⁵⁴ As above.

⁵⁵⁵ See also Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (describing resilience as a self-preservation process by the community); See Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124.

⁵⁵⁶ Archived Documents (n 188); Huntingford, GWB (n 239); Hollis, AC (n 239).

⁵⁵⁷ As above.

⁵⁵⁸ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 46.

⁵⁵⁹ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

threats to any Kalenjin deemed to be sympathetic to the outsiders.⁵⁶⁰ There were approximately seven thousand (7,000) youth erecting roadblocks, burning and looting Kikuyu-owned properties.⁵⁶¹ The number of attacks was so large that the police were generally ineffective and unable to control the marauding youths.⁵⁶² This method of attacking the enemy in large numbers is also consistent with the Kalenjin custom of militarizing their youth by having members of the same age-set comprising the warrior class and fighting alongside each other.⁵⁶³ A witness to the violence later testified that the large bands of youth of between five thousand (5,000) – seven thousand (7,000) that attacked Eldoret town after 27 December 2007 were from the “Kimnyengei age group” who had been part of a massive oathing ceremony in August 2007.⁵⁶⁴ The oathing ceremony allegedly took place secretly in Kipkulei forest within the Rift Valley.⁵⁶⁵ The purpose of the oathing was to conduct a cleanup operation to evict foreigners from Kalenjin community land. Some elders disputed the characterization of the ceremony as an oathing ceremony and described it as a simple circumcision ceremony which is part of the Kalenjin custom of initiating their young men into adulthood.⁵⁶⁶ However, both the witness and the Kalenjins do not dispute that the Kalenjin community had mobilized itself for a purpose and that purpose was most likely the expulsion of outsiders from their land in accordance with their customs and traditions.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁰ As above.

⁵⁶¹ As above. See also Gettleman, J (n 549) (discussing the violence by majority members of the Kalenjin community targeting the Kikuyu community during the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008).

⁵⁶² As above.

⁵⁶³ Archived Documents (n 188); See also Peers, C et al (n 188) (discussing the military tactics of the Nandi).

⁵⁶⁴ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 69.

⁵⁶⁵ As above.

⁵⁶⁶ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 69. See also Chapter 2 (discussing Kalenjin customs and traditions).

⁵⁶⁷ As above. See also International Criminal Court (ICC) ‘Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15, submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber II from the Office of the

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

Another aspect of Kalenjin custom that was observed in the violence was the involvement of elders.⁵⁶⁸ Under Kalenjin custom, the youth constitute the warriors, but are guided by elders who are themselves former warriors.⁵⁶⁹ The National Security Intelligence Services (“NSIS”) reports indicate that prominent businessmen and professionals were financing the acquisition of firearms for use in evicting the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley.⁵⁷⁰ The professionals had also started training the youth on how to use the firearms in the run-up to the violence according to the NSIS.⁵⁷¹

After the violence, the young warriors went through ritual cleansing in accordance with Kalenjin custom. A witness recounts a cleansing meeting on 28th February 2008 at Baharini in the former Molo district, that was chaired by a retired Assistant Chief and other elders.⁵⁷² The meeting sought to discuss measures for ensuring the ritual cleansing of the area youth, who had participated in the burning of non-Kalenjin homes during the post-election violence, as the burning of residences is considered an abomination under Kalenjin custom.⁵⁷³ The witness testified that in order to achieve the cleansing of local youths who had participated in the burning of homes, the meeting agreed that a goat would be slaughtered for use in conducting the cleansing.⁵⁷⁴

Some reports by the National Security Intelligence Services (“NSIS”) indicate that members of the Kalenjin community were prepared to carry out violence/self-help eviction tactics against members of the Kikuyu community no matter the outcome of the December

Prosecutor’ (Nov. 26, 2009), available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc785972.pdf> (accessed on March 28, 2020) (detailing the systematic actions of the majority Kalenjin community to expel foreigners from their community land).

⁵⁶⁸ CIPEV Report (n 5) pp. 104, 275-276

⁵⁶⁹ See section 2.4.3, generally, on the customary practices of the Nandi and Kipsigis.

⁵⁷⁰ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 72.

⁵⁷¹ As above.

⁵⁷² CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 147.

⁵⁷³ As above.

⁵⁷⁴ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

27, 2007 elections.⁵⁷⁵ The NSIS had in their election Security Situation paper noted that the ratio of the police officers to the population, which was already inadequate nationally, would pose potential problems.⁵⁷⁶ The police would be over-stretched by election-related duties such as escort and guarding of polling stations.⁵⁷⁷ During the 2007 campaigns, the politicians and leaders from the Kalenjin community made utterances that “kimirio” or “bunyot”, meaning “the enemy” must leave their area whether the incumbent President Kibaki, won the elections or lost.⁵⁷⁸ Witnesses testified that members of the Kalenjin community used the radio to say that whether the ruling Party of National Unity (“PNU”) or the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (“ODM”) won the elections, Kikuyu would be expelled from the Rift Valley. The District Security and Intelligence Committee (“DSIC”) Minutes dated 9th February 2008 observed that the Kalenjin appeared determined to displace the Kikuyu from their farms and that both communities had been arming themselves quietly. This demonstrates that the Kalenjin community used the election cycle to evict outsiders from their land.⁵⁷⁹

In the run up to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, communities in the Rift Valley used the media, mostly vernacular FM radio stations, to foment ethnic hatred and/or incite, organize, or plan for violence. KASS FM and Changey FM, the two vernacular radio stations operating in the Rift Valley region in the period before the general elections in December 2007, used derogatory language against Kikuyus, mouthed hate speech, and routinely called for their eviction, thereby helping to build up tensions that eventually exploded in violence. After the violence, KASS FM sent out a broadcast to its listeners

⁵⁷⁵ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 58, et seq. (see section on ‘Intelligence Concerning Post-Election Violence and Its Use’).

⁵⁷⁶ As above.

⁵⁷⁷ As above.

⁵⁷⁸ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 495.

⁵⁷⁹ As above. See also ICC Request for Authorization (n 567) (detailing the systematic actions of the majority Kalenjin community to expel foreigners from their community land); Report on IDPs (n 544).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
barring members of the Kalenjin community from disclosing whatever they knew about the post-election violence.⁵⁸⁰

Witnesses recount that the following threatening terms were used against the Kikuyu: madoadoa (spots), maharagwe (bean), bunyot (enemy), sangara (wild grass) with the additional notation that they should be uprooted.⁵⁸¹ This is a demonstration of the autopoietic community adapting to its environment through signalization and coded communication with its members to ensure its survival when it interacts with other autopoietic communities.⁵⁸² Thus the Kalenjin community developed coded language to identify outsiders and to communicate tactics for evicting them from their territory.⁵⁸³

Following a war/raids conducted under Kalenjin custom, the community would share the spoils of war.⁵⁸⁴ Accordingly, meetings were held to discuss how farms formerly occupied by the fleeing outsiders would be purchased or leased out affordably.⁵⁸⁵ After the outsiders were evicted, the Kalenjin leaders discussed how to purchase their farms cheaply.⁵⁸⁶ For example, the DSIC Minutes of 13th February 2008 state that Kalenjins in Eldama Ravine within the Central Rift Valley region had vowed not to allow displaced Kikuyu back but would instead buy their land at a ceiling price of ten thousand shillings (Kshs. 10,000) per acre and warned that if any Kalenjin paid a price beyond this sum, their houses would be burnt.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁰ CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 8, pp., 295 et seq., on the Media and the Post-Election Violence.

⁵⁸¹ CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 3 (on the tactics used by the perpetrators of post-election violence against their victims).

⁵⁸² See Hugh Baxter (n 46) (using the systems theory notion of autopoiesis to explain a community system's ability to self-generate and self-perpetuate).

⁵⁸³ CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 3 (on the tactics used by the perpetrators of post-election violence against their victims).

⁵⁸⁴ See section 2.4.3, generally, on customary practices of the Nandi and Kipsigis; Peers, C et al (n 188) (discussing the customs and traditions of the Kalenjin community).

⁵⁸⁵ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 148.

⁵⁸⁶ As above.

⁵⁸⁷ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 92.

The post-election violence of 2007 - 2008 led to the dispossession and displacement of mostly members of the Kikuyu community in the Rift Valley region. Unfortunately, internal displacement of communities in Kenya has been a permanent feature of Kenya's history dating back to colonial times. Those that were dispossessed and displaced to make room for European settlement were now dispossessing and displacing the squatters or labourer-tenants who had settled on European farms as labourers. According to the government there were three hundred fifty thousand (350,000) persons displaced as a result of post-election violence of 2007-2008.⁵⁸⁸ In some other cases the departure of individuals stemmed from threats or the anticipation of violence.⁵⁸⁹ However, in most cases, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were forcefully evicted physically through violence against them and the destruction of their property.⁵⁹⁰ IDPs settled in churches, trading centres, police stations, district officer's offices and administration police and Chief's camps as these were considered safe havens.⁵⁹¹ However, locals also attacked these safe havens and the IDPs had to be moved to larger and more secure camps in urban areas, such as stadiums.⁵⁹²

In a bid to resolve the root causes of the deepening polarization and divisions that had threatened to tear apart the social, political and economic fabric of the country, on 28th February 2008 and under the auspices of the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan, the Government/PNU and ODM signed the 'Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government.'⁵⁹³ Within the framework of reconciliation efforts under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR), the parties agreed to a National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement of 2008 and Parliament enacted the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 to end the political

⁵⁸⁸ CIPEV Report (n 5) p. 272; Report on IDPs (n 544).

⁵⁸⁹ As above.

⁵⁹⁰ As above.

⁵⁹¹ As above.

⁵⁹² As above.

⁵⁹³ 'Acting Together for Kenya: Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga' (Kibaki-Raila Coalition Agreement)', (February 28, 2008) available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2822580120080228> (accessed on March 29, 2020).

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
crisis.⁵⁹⁴ The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 laid the foundation for power sharing and for moving the country out of the crisis.⁵⁹⁵

The power sharing arrangement allowed the state to implement programs for resettling the internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁵⁹⁶ In April 2008, the government engaged in operation rudi nyumbani (operation return home).⁵⁹⁷ The aim of the operation was to encourage the IDPs to return to their homes.⁵⁹⁸ According to the government, as at 8th July 2008, two hundred ten thousand, five hundred ninety-four (210,594) IDPs had been resettled leaving twenty one thousand four hundred thirty one (21,431) in camps.⁵⁹⁹ The resettlement programme cost the government an estimated thirty billion shillings (Kshs. 30 billion).⁶⁰⁰ A Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons formed on November 17, 2010 found that out of nine thousand five hundred seventy one (9,571) IDPs in camps following the 2007-2008 post-election violence, only a small fraction of about twenty four percent (24%) was resettled within a period of four years.⁶⁰¹

A Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) or the Waki Commission, that was established by the state in February 2008 to investigate the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008 concluded that the successful return of IDPs following the 2007 PEV would be based on three outcomes: the safety of returnees, restitution and return of property to the displaced and the creation of an economic, social and political environment

⁵⁹⁴ National Accord and Reconciliation Act, No. 4 of 2008 (now repealed) (text available at http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalAccordandReconciliationAct_No4_of2008.pdf (accessed 29 March 2020)).

⁵⁹⁵ As above.

⁵⁹⁶ Report on IDPs (n 544). See also the Kibaki-Raila Coalition Agreement (n 593) and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (n 594) (for details of the power-sharing arrangement).

⁵⁹⁷ Report on IDPs (n 544).

⁵⁹⁸ As above.

⁵⁹⁹ As above.

⁶⁰⁰ As above.

⁶⁰¹ As above.

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY

that sustains them.⁶⁰² There is consensus that unless the root causes that led to internal displacement are resolved, the problem of displacement will continue.⁶⁰³ This insight highlights the extent to which colonialism's disruption of African customary legal systems may have long term destabilising consequences in the Rift Valley region if left unmitigated.⁶⁰⁴ The African communities living in the Rift Valley region have adapted to their dispossession and displacement by using the electoral cycle to reclaim their community land, which has led to political instability in Kenya.⁶⁰⁵ This instability has significant implications for the Kenyan state and, at a minimum, requires recognition that resort to pre-colonial customary practices by the communities themselves is a likely response to the continuing disruption.⁶⁰⁶ In the next chapter, I review existing legal instruments and

⁶⁰² See CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 7, pp. 291 et seq., concerning Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

⁶⁰³ As above.

⁶⁰⁴ See TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB, section 566, p. 341 (stating as follows in the conclusion: "...one thing is clear, the stability of Kenya depends to a great extent [on] the willingness of political actors to address these [land related] grievances and disputes"); Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) chapter 5, section 525 page 285 (stating that "land ownership and use in the various clash areas was given as one of the causes of conflict and tribal clashes"); Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103 - 124.

⁶⁰⁵ See Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (for descriptions of resilience that I relied on earlier in this Chapter to analyse the Kalenjin community's self-help tactics as demonstrations of the communities' resilience in the face of disruption caused by colonial and post-colonial state policies).

⁶⁰⁶ For a discussion of these customary practices that the communities are using as self-help tactics to retain essentially the same land that they had before colonial disruption, see discussion in section 2.4.3, generally, on customary practices of the Nandi and Kipsigis. See also Archived Documents (n 188) (detailing similar customary practices used against other community systems and the colonial state itself). See Kameri-Mbote (n 2) p. 124 (conclusion) (where Professor Kameri-Mbote sums up the instability risk as follows: "[f]ailing to confront dispossession and clamours for restitution is akin to ignoring a festering wound that is covered with a band aid. It is made worse by new forms of dispossession and any rights to land and resources are nuanced by the festering wound underneath. It may even flare up to become cancerous causing war and social disintegration").

CHAPTER 2 TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE RIFT VALLEY
institutions in Kenya to determine whether they are effective in mitigating this risk of instability in the Rift Valley region.

2.5 REVIEW

In this thesis, I analyse the struggles of four communities inhabiting the Kenyan Rift Valley using the lens of systems theory in the sense of the communities being composed of, but greater than, interactive individuals, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land, waters, and other elements that the community considers essential to its continuity and survival. In this chapter, I describe the customs and traditions of the four representative communities of the Rift Valley that I chose for this study; the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities. I use the four communities as illustrative examples to show that their customary practices are essentially autopoietic subsystems generated by the communities themselves to ensure their survival and continuity. The notion of autopoiesis is helpful to show that the customary practices of the Maasai, the Nandi, the Kipsigis and the Kikuyu are self-referential, self-sustaining and self-proliferating in a way that uniquely serves and symbiotically defines the community.

The limited scope of this study does not allow me to conduct my own detailed legal anthropological study of these communities but I rely on customary practices that have been summarized in landmark court cases such as the *Ole Nchoko case* by the Maasai community and the case against Chief Kioi by members of the Kikuyu community, articles and journals. Furthermore, I focus my descriptions on the constellations of power factors that have enabled these communities to better interact with their environments and to develop the resilience necessary to persist and thrive as systems despite colonial and neo-colonial disruption.

This chapter thus provides a descriptive summary of the communities' customary practices that will be helpful in analysing their ability to persist, recover and thrive when disrupted by other systems. The issue of systemic disruption is pertinent for Rift Valley communities, because the colonial state disrupted them by dispossessing them of, and displacing them from their land. The colonial state enacted state policies that formally set aside approximately twenty percent (20%) of productive land in the Rift Valley for European settlement and moved the majority African communities into areas known as "Native Reserves". This systemic disruption that I discuss in the next chapter, was a major test of

CHAPTER 3

COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I discuss the state disruption of traditional property rights regimes in the Rift Valley region that continues to pose an existential threat to the state due to unhealthy competition over land resources, instabilities and conflicts in the region.⁶⁰⁷ The disruption interfered with the stability and hence integrity of the community systems thus forcing them to take corrective measures in search of that stability. In contrast to the previous chapter, I generally analyse the interface between the state legal system and traditional tenure systems from the perspective of the colonial state and its successor Kenyan state.

The state disruption of the traditional tenure systems started in the 1890s after the colonial regime decided to construct the Kenya-Uganda railway and recognized Kenya's rich agricultural potential, particularly in the Rift Valley region.⁶⁰⁸ The colonial regime then used various tactics, including, without limitation, predatory legislation, compulsory acquisition of land, agreements or treaties and forced eviction, to create a European reserve, known as the 'White Highlands' or 'Scheduled Areas'.⁶⁰⁹ African communities who were living in the area at the time of creation of the White Highlands were dispossessed of their land and some were displaced to areas known as native reserves while others became labour-tenants or squatters on European farms.⁶¹⁰ The native reserves then became a source of

⁶⁰⁷ Jerome Lafargue (editor) 'The General Elections in Kenya' (2007) *Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est*, n° 38, Nairobi, May – August 2008, available at <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/17071> (accessed 28 March 2020) (contains various articles describing the cyclic ethnic-based violence in Kenya that culminated in the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008).

⁶⁰⁸ See Kameri-Mbote (n 2) pp. 103-124; UNHRC Report (n 2) pp. 37-46 (discussing the state's dispossession and displacement of the Maasai community in Kenya).

⁶⁰⁹ As above.

⁶¹⁰ See TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB, chapter 2, sections 41-55 (discussing land-related conflicts in the Rift Valley region); Akiwumi Commission (n 2) (discussing tribal-based conflicts in the Rift Valley Province).

cheap labour for the European farms thus continuing the social dominance of the European settlers over the African communities.⁶¹¹

I begin this chapter with a description of the Kenyan Rift Valley and its rich land and water resources in section 3.2 below. I then describe the legal and political processes that European settlers used to acquire the land in the area that became known as the “White Highlands” in section 3.3 and to push African communities to areas known as “Native Reserves”. In section 3.4, I describe the disruptive effect of land dispossession on the power ingredients that each African community system has traditionally deployed to better interact with its environment, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits.

3.2 LAND RESOURCES OF THE RIFT VALLEY

The attractiveness of the Rift Valley to the many African communities and, later, to the European settlers, lies in its rich agricultural land and abundant water supply.⁶¹² Kenya, generally, does not have sufficient mineral resources or a strong manufacturing base.⁶¹³ Land is the basic and only economic resource from which the majority of Kenyans eke out a livelihood.⁶¹⁴ The ability to access, own, use and control land has implications for a

⁶¹¹ I discuss the use of cheap labour in more detail as an example of the theory of social dominance in Chapter 4. See also Wilson, EK (n 15); Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius & Shana Levin ‘Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward’ (2006) 17 *Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol.* 271; Jim Sidanius et al. ‘Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method’ (2004) 25 *Pol. Psychol.* 845 (for descriptions of social dominance theory as the tendency of human societies to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies).

⁶¹² M.P.K. Sorrenson ‘Origins of European Settlement in Kenya’ (1968) Nairobi: Oxford University Press; Kameri-Mbote (n 2) 103-124; Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2).

⁶¹³ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 2, p. 165; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ‘The Economic Development of Kenya’ (1963) The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

⁶¹⁴ As above.

community's ability to feed and sustain itself economically and socially.⁶¹⁵ The idea of economies depending on a territory's land is not unique to Kenya or Africa.⁶¹⁶ Shawn A-in-chut Atleo, National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations in Canada, recently observed that "our lands are the backbone of the Canadian economy".⁶¹⁷ Like in Canada, the rich agricultural land in Kenya is its most valuable economic resource.⁶¹⁸

Kenya's Rift Valley region is approximately seventy-thousand (70,000) square miles in size and is located in the western region of Kenya in East Africa.⁶¹⁹ It runs along the Great Rift Valley from the Kenya-Ethiopian border in the North to the Kenya-Tanzania border in the South.⁶²⁰ The Mau Forest Complex is situated in Kenya's Rift Valley province, spanning four present day counties - Bomet, Kericho, Nakuru and Narok.⁶²¹ The Mau Forest Complex is the largest of five water towers in Kenya, with the largest forest cover.⁶²² The Mau forest is one of Kenya's largest forest areas, comprising about thirty-six percent (36%) of the total forest cover in the country.⁶²³ These forests form the catchment of the main

⁶¹⁵ As above.

⁶¹⁶ See *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12) (the Australian High Court recognizing the centrality of land to the identity and existence of Aboriginal communities in Australia).

⁶¹⁷ Hon. Harry S. LaForme and Claire Truesdale 'Section 25 of the Charter; Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982: Aboriginal and Treaty Rights -- 30 Years of Recognition and Affirmation' (2013), 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 687 – 740.

⁶¹⁸ World Bank (n 613).

⁶¹⁹ W. R. Ochieng 'An Outline History of the Rift Valley of Kenya up to AD 1900' (1975) East African Literature Bureau 10.

⁶²⁰ As above; Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 88, p. 59.

⁶²¹ 'Report of the Prime Minister's Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forest Complex' (March, 2009) Kenya National Assembly; See Philip C. Aka 'Introductory Note to African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Republic of Kenya (August 2017) (AFR. CT. H.P.R.), 56 I.L.M. 726 (discussing the Ogiek community's struggle to continue inhabiting the Mau Forest); John Charles Kunich 'Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out' (Winter, 2001) 14 Geo. Int'l Env'tl. L. Rev. 179.

⁶²² As above.

⁶²³ As above.

rivers that provide water to the Rift Valley region.⁶²⁴ The rivers include the Sondu Miriu, Yala, Nzoia and Nyando rivers, as well as the transboundary Mara river, all of which flow into Lake Victoria.⁶²⁵ Others are Kerio, flowing into Lake Turkana; Molo, flowing into Lake Baringo; Ewaso Nyiro River, flowing into Lake Natron; and Njoro River, Nderit River, Makalia River and Naishi River, all feeding Lake Nakuru.⁶²⁶ All but one of the rivers in the west of the Rift Valley originate from the Mau Forest Complex.⁶²⁷ The rich agricultural land and abundant water supply in the Rift Valley are conducive for large scale agriculture in the highlands and pastoralism in the grassy plains as has been practiced in the region for thousands of years by the Maasai, Nandi, Kipsigis and other Rift Valley communities.⁶²⁸

Some of the suitable agricultural areas in Kenya's Rift Valley include the former Molo district, Nakuru and Naivasha. The former Molo district is situated along the Mau Escarpment and is one of the most fertile farmlands in the country. It is famous for growing pyrethrum, potatoes and other agricultural crops due to its cool climate.⁶²⁹ Nakuru District is an agricultural region best known for Lake Nakuru, which is famous for millions of flamingos that nest along its shores.⁶³⁰ Naivasha (from Maasai name "Nai'posha", meaning "rough water") is a sprawling town in the Rift Valley region located on the shores of Lake Naivasha that is home to a variety of wildlife and a sizeable population of hippos.⁶³¹ Between 1937 and 1950, Lake Naivasha was used as a landing place for flying boats on the

⁶²⁴ As above. Archived Documents (n 188) (writing about all Kenyan communities).

⁶²⁵ See Elijah Oyoo-Okoth 'Monitoring exposure to heavy metals among children in Lake Victoria, Kenya: Environmental and fish matrix' (October 2010) 73 EECOES 7 1797 – 1803 (mentioning the rivers flowing into Lake Victoria).

⁶²⁶ As above.

⁶²⁷ As above.

⁶²⁸ *Ole Nchoko High Court case* (n 226) (discussing Maasai customary practices); Huntingford, GWB (n 239) (discussing the Nandi); Peristiany, JG (n 239) (discussing the Kipsigis).

⁶²⁹ World Bank (n 613).

⁶³⁰ As above.


⁶³¹ As above. See also Tarayia, GN (n 254) (explaining that Naivasha was a former Maasai territory).

Imperial Airways passenger and mail route from Southampton in Britain to South Africa.⁶³²

The main industry in Naivasha is agriculture, especially floriculture around the lake.⁶³³

There are about fifty-two (52) flower farms in Naivasha area, which accounts for almost 75% of all the flower farms in Kenya.⁶³⁴

Below is a map of Kenya with the Rift Valley region marked in red.



Source: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), *The Economic Development of Kenya* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963)


The below map shows the approximate location of the Mau complex (in green) and its many rivers.

⁶³² Archived Documents (n 188); World Bank (n 613).

⁶³³ World Bank (n 613).

⁶³⁴ World Bank (n 613).

CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS



Source: Report of the Prime Minister's Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forest Complex, Kenya National Assembly (March, 2009)

This rich agricultural land and the abundant water supply was the cause of the many battles for land in the Rift Valley that are recorded in the oral traditions of the Maasai, Nandi and Kipsigis.⁶³⁵ For example, the Nandi have stories of their defeat and expulsion of the Maasai from the Uasin Gishu plateau in the 1880s.⁶³⁶ Their oral traditions record a major battle between the Nandi and the Maasai communities in Kipkarren, the Nandi name for “the place of the spears”.⁶³⁷ European settlers, like the Nandi and the Maasai, also sought to possess

⁶³⁵ Archived Documents (n 188); Peers, C et al (n 188) (discussing the Maasai and Nandi military prowess); Huntingford, GWB (n 239) (discussing the Nandi); Peristiany, JG (n 239) (discussing the Kipsigis).

⁶³⁶ Peers, C et al (n 188) p. 37; Hollis, AC (n 239).

⁶³⁷ Archived Documents (n 188).

this rich agricultural land and decided to create their own European reserve in the Rift Valley and to expel the African communities from their community land.⁶³⁸

3.3 CREATION OF THE WHITE HIGHLANDS

This section focuses on the colonial state's disruption of the traditional tenure systems of communities inhabiting the Rift Valley region, primarily by dispossessing them of their land and confining them in smaller, marginal arid and semi-arid areas not suited to their traditional land use systems. The Kenyan state legal system can be traced back to the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 that allowed the British to create a sphere of influence in East Africa, including the Rift Valley region.⁶³⁹ The Anglo-German Treaty of 1st July 1890 temporarily settled colonial disputes between Germany and Great Britain, resulting in German abstention from further encroachment into British East Africa.⁶⁴⁰ The Indian Lands Acquisition Act of 1894 vested all unoccupied land, including all lands situated within one mile on either side of the Kenya-Uganda Railway that was deemed necessary for the construction of the railway, on the Commissioner for the Protectorate.⁶⁴¹ The Indian Lands Acquisition Act of 1894 had the effect of converting all land in Kenya that had not been appropriated by individuals or by the colonial administration into 'Crown Land', meaning land belonging to Her Majesty,

⁶³⁸ Sorrenson, MPK (n 612); World Bank (n 613).

⁶³⁹ *Mau Mau Litigation – Mutua* (n 357) section 14 (discussing the Berlin Conference); World Bank (n 613).

⁶⁴⁰ 'Wilhelmine Germany and the First World War, 1890 - 1918 Anglo-German Treaty (Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty)' (July 1, 1890) Das Staatsarchiv, Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart (The State Archive, 'Collection of Official Documents Relating to Contemporary History' (1891) Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, vol. 51, p. 151. See Tiyanjana Maluwa 'Oil Under Troubled Waters?: Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Malawi' (Spring, 2016) 37 Mich. J. Int'l L. 351 (discussing the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890); World Bank (n 613).

⁶⁴¹ See Dwasi Jane 'International Takings: Emergence of Takings Litigation in Kenya' (Summer, 2013) 19 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 445 (discussing the Indian Lands Acquisition Act of 1894); World Bank (n 613).

CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS

the Queen of England.⁶⁴² The Act also allowed for the acquisition of land for the construction of government premises and roads.⁶⁴³ In addition, it empowered the Commissioner for the Protectorate to allocate land to settlers on leases not exceeding 21 years.⁶⁴⁴

On July 1, 1895, the British established the British East Africa Protectorate that included territory within the Rift Valley region.⁶⁴⁵ A large part of the British East Africa Protectorate later became the Kenya colony in 1920.⁶⁴⁶ On 29 December 1897, the British administrators passed the East African Land Regulations, which extended the period lease granted settlers to 99 years.⁶⁴⁷ The regulations also sought to safeguard some areas under African occupation, which were described as those lands “that were cultivated or regularly used by any native or native tribes”.⁶⁴⁸ Alienation on such areas could only be permitted once the Commissioner for the Protectorate was satisfied that the land “was no longer in use by the native or native tribes and that the issuance of the certificate of title would not be prejudicial to the native interests”.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴² As above.

⁶⁴³ As above.

⁶⁴⁴ As above.

⁶⁴⁵ The East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance (Sept. 27, 1902) (reprinted in 1905) 95 British and Foreign State Papers 1901-02, p. 528. See also *Nyali Ltd v. AG*, [1956] 1 QB 1, [1955] 1 All ER 646, [1955] 2 WLR 649 (Court of Appeal, 21 February 1955) (discussing the British East Africa Protectorate).

⁶⁴⁶ See Kenya Protectorate Order in Council, 1920 S.R.O. 1920 No. 2343, S.R.O. & S.I. Rev. VIII, 258 vol. 87 p. 968; Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council, 1920, S.R.O. 1902 No. 661, S.R.O. & S.I. Rev. 246.

⁶⁴⁷ Sorrenson, MPK (n 612). See also the British East African Land Regulations (29 December 1897) available at <https://onlinelibrary.london.ac.uk/resources/databases/justisone> (accessed 24 April 2020).

⁶⁴⁸ British East African Land Regulations (n 647 above).

⁶⁴⁹ British East African Land Regulations (n 647).

The East Africa Order in Council of 1901 provided the Commissioner with full authority to alienate ‘Crown’ lands and to expand the definition of Crown Lands.⁶⁵⁰ The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 vested power in the British High Commissioner to acquire land, including land in native settlements and villages and to sell land acquired in freeholds to any settler in lots not exceeding 1,000 hectares.⁶⁵¹ Under sections 30-31 of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, any land which was unoccupied, temporarily or otherwise by the Africans, was available for alienation to the European settlers without reference to the Africans.⁶⁵²

The construction of the Uganda Railway was commenced in 1895, and the line reached the Lake in 1901.⁶⁵³ In May 1905 a Land Commission, consisting of European settlers in Kenya decided to create a European reserve.⁶⁵⁴ The area that the Commission settled on lay between the town of Kiu, in the Eastern Province and Fort Ternan in the Rift Valley.⁶⁵⁵ In July 1906, Lord Elgin, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed his approval of the Land Commission report, thereby formally setting aside the area of approximately sixteen thousand, seven hundred (16,700) square miles or a fifth/twenty percent (20%) of the Rift Valley region, for European settlement.⁶⁵⁶ The European settlements in the Rift Valley region were principally confined to the large belt of farmland

⁶⁵⁰ See East Africa Order in Council, 1902, S.R.O. 1902 No. 661, S.R.O. S.I. Rev. 246; Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645); The East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance (Sept. 27, 1902) reprinted in 95 British and Foreign State Papers 1901 - 1902, at 528 (1905); ‘Rules for the Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902 No. 76’ (1903) The Official Gazette of the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates, East Africa Protectorate.

⁶⁵¹ Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645).

⁶⁵² Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645), section 30-31.

⁶⁵³ See TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB, section 51, p. 180; Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁶⁵⁴ Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁶⁵⁵ W. T. W. Morgan 'White Highlands' of Kenya (June, 1963) The Geographical Journal, Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 140-141, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1792632> (accessed 24 April 2020).


⁶⁵⁶ As above.

CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS

stretching from near Nairobi to Mount Elgon, namely, Naivasha, Laikipia, Nakuru, Kericho, Nandi, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia areas.⁶⁵⁷ These areas were part of what became known as the ‘White Highlands’ or ‘Scheduled Areas’.⁶⁵⁸ The ‘White Highlands’ or ‘Scheduled Areas’ in the Rift Valley region are highlighted in the map below:

⁶⁵⁷ As above. See also Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁶⁵⁸ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 94, p. 61; Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).



Source: Jedwab, Remi and Adam Storeygard , Edward Kerby, and Alexander Moradi, History, Path Dependence and Development: Evidence from Colonial Railways, Settlers and Cities in Kenya, *The Economic Journal*, 2017, 127 (603), 1467 - 1494 (with formatting by author)

After the creation of the European reserve, the Africans who had been dispossessed of their land were driven into native reserves.⁶⁵⁹

3.4 THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF NATIVE RESERVES

As the European settler population increased and pushed African communities out of the White Highlands, the Africans were confined in “native reserves” through a law called the Kenya (Native Areas) Ordinance, passed in 1926.⁶⁶⁰ The 1926 Native Areas Ordinance and, later, the Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 had indications of intention to confer Africans use and occupancy rights over land in the reserves and to protect their rights but, in practice, was used to alienate African communities’ prime land.⁶⁶¹ The native reserves of the Rift Valley region comprised mostly the Kalenjin and the Maasai and formed a belt around the White Highlands or Scheduled areas.⁶⁶²

The British used the reserve concept to segregate whole communities of non-Europeans throughout the British empire. In Canada, for instance, the reserve concept was enshrined in colonial policy through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which established the Government of Quebec, Canada.⁶⁶³ The Royal Proclamation of 1763 provided in part as follows:

“And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest and the security of our colonies, that the several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as not having been ceded to or purchased by us, are reserved to them or any of them as their hunting grounds...

⁶⁵⁹ See TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 51, p. 180; Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁶⁶⁰ See Robert Home ‘Colonial Township Laws and Urban Governance in Kenya’ (1 October 2012) *Journal of African Law*, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 175 - 193.

⁶⁶¹ As above.

⁶⁶² See TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 51, et seq.

⁶⁶³ See LaForme, HS et al (n 617).

And we do further declare it to be our royal will and pleasure, for the present as aforesaid, to reserve under our sovereignty, protection and dominion, for the use of the said Indians, all the lands and territories not included within the limits of our said three new governments, or within the limits of the territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Company...⁶⁶⁴

Thus, the British confined members of the Indian communities found living in Canada in reserves in the same way that the Maasai, Nandi, Kipsigis and Kikuyu communities of the Rift Valley region were confined to native reserves in Kenya.

Communities inhabiting the Rift Valley region were confined to native reserves or became labour-tenants or squatters. These communities enjoyed a severely limited right of occupancy over their lands. According to Okoth-Ogendo, the African communities effectively became tenants of the crown.⁶⁶⁵ A colonial agent quoted by Okoth-Ogendo, stated:

I am afraid that we have got to hurt their (the communities) feelings, we have got to wound their susceptibilities and, in some cases, I am afraid we may even have to violate some of their most cherished and possibly even sacred traditions if we have to move communities from land on which, according to their own customary law, they have an inalienable right to live, and settle them on land from which the owner has, under that same customary law an indisputable right to eject them.⁶⁶⁶

The forced eviction of African communities from their ancestral lands to native reserves or settlement schemes was systematic and widespread in the Rift Valley region.

⁶⁶⁴ The Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. See also as discussed in LaForme, HS et al (n 525).

⁶⁶⁵ See Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O (n 78) (tenants of the crown); H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 'Legislative Approaches to Customary Tenure and Tenure Reform in East Africa, in *Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa*' (2000) Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan eds.,123, 127.

⁶⁶⁶ As above.

Some members of the Kalenjin community, such as the Talai community, for example, were forcefully evicted from their lands and moved to other parts of the colony to make room for European settlement. The Talai Community were evicted from their ancestral lands in 1934 through “[t]he Olaibons Removal Ordinance, of 1934” which facilitated and legalized their subsequent deportation to Gwassi in Western Kenya and other parts of the country.⁶⁶⁷ Their removal was motivated by the perception that they were instrumental in the Kipsigis uprising against colonial rule.⁶⁶⁸ After the Talai’s deportation, the colonial administrators demonized the community and ensured that the Kipsigis denounced their leadership.⁶⁶⁹

The Nandi were driven out of Tinderet Division of present-day Nandi District in or about 1905 after their unsuccessful rebellion against European attempts to settle them there.⁶⁷⁰ Europeans settled in Tinderet District after evicting the Nandi. The Nandi have over the years claimed that Tinderet District, which, according to them, comprises Nandi Hills, Fort Ternan, Songhor, Chemelil, Kibigori and Londiani, should be returned to them.⁶⁷¹

Below is a map of the former Native Reserves in the Rift Valley:


⁶⁶⁷ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, sections 79 - 80, pp. 189 - 190.

⁶⁶⁸ As above.

⁶⁶⁹ As above.

⁶⁷⁰ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 117, p. 71.

⁶⁷¹ As above.



Source: William T. W. Morgan 'The Ethnic Geography of Kenya on the Eve of Independence: The 1962 Census' (Jan - Mar, 2000) Bd. 54, H.1, (Erdkunde.).

As is visible on the map, members of the Maasai community occupied two native reserves known as the Northern Maasai Reserve and the Southern Maasai Reserve. Members of the Kalenjin community occupied several smaller native reserves such as the Nandi Reserve occupied by members of the Nandi community and the Lumbwa Reserve, the Buret Reserve and the Sotik Reserve occupied by members of the Kipsigis community. Members of the Kikuyu community moved into the Rift Valley region mostly as squatters or labourer-tenants on European farms.⁶⁷²

3.4.1 AFRICAN SQUATTERS OR LABOURER-TENANTS

Following the creation of the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas, the majority African population was rendered landless or hemmed in within native reserves.⁶⁷³ Having lost their communal land, some Africans were recruited by the colonial administrators to work as farm labourers on European farms in the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas.⁶⁷⁴ Over time, the population of Africans in the European farms increased and some were allowed to live in the farms as squatters. The Kikuyu community were the largest squatter community in the Rift Valley region as at independence, followed by the Nandi community, because they settled in European farms as squatters / labourer-tenants following their dispossession and displacement from their ancestral lands.⁶⁷⁵

Africans also left the native reserves to look for employment on European farms. Factors which drove Africans from the reserves were the introduction of the Hut and Poll taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910, requiring payment of taxes by Africans, the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1906, mandating Africans to provide forced agricultural labour to Europeans, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance and the

⁶⁷² P. D. Abrams 'Kenya's Land Resettlement Story' (1979) Nairobi: Challenge Publishers and Distributors.

⁶⁷³ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 80, p. 54.

⁶⁷⁴ Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2) section 94, p. 61.

⁶⁷⁵ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, sections 134 - 188, pp. 207 - 221; Akiwumi Report (n 2) section 105, p. 66.

kipande (pass book) system, which made it difficult for Africans to move within the country as they had to show their passes each time to be allowed to move.⁶⁷⁶

In this section, I describe the disruptive effect of land dispossession on the power ingredients that each African community system has traditionally deployed to better interact with its environment, broadly defined to include the geography, climate, ecosystem, biodiversity and ontological totality of the territory that a community inhabits. Confinement in native reserves disrupted the community systems' food supply chains and substantially weakened their legal and institutional structures as I discuss below.

3.4.2 INSUFFICIENT FOOD PRODUCTION

As discussed in chapter 2 on traditional land tenure systems, the Rift Valley communities had their own customary practices that enabled them to interact with their environments effectively and efficiently to feed themselves, reproduce and, generally, thrive as community systems. These customary practices helped them to develop constellations of power factors such as food production and the legal and institutional structural complexities necessary for their own self-preservation. Their land tenure systems reflected these customary practices. Pastoralists, for example, left their drier grazing lands for greener pastures to allow for re-growth during seasonal changes in pasturage.⁶⁷⁷ Crop farming communities also practiced shifting cultivation by allowing the land to lie fallow in preparation for the next planting season.⁶⁷⁸ A healthy balance also existed in the communities' food supply chain because of trade. The communities that produced surpluses in livestock, crop harvests or other commodities could exchange them for items which they lacked or use their surpluses for marriage and other customary practices. These customary practices ensured that the Rift Valley communities met their basic needs and also maintained an equilibrium between themselves and their environments.

Confinement in native reserves was devastating to the community systems' food supply chains. Pastoralists could no longer move freely with their livestock in search of

⁶⁷⁶ TJRC Report (n 2) vo. IIB, section 71, p. 186.

⁶⁷⁷ Kameri-Mbote Dissertation (n 20) ch. III, p. 84.

⁶⁷⁸ Id.

CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS

water and pasture, while crop farming communities lost much of the land that they previously allowed to lie fallow in preparation for the next planting season. The pressure on land was enormous, thus leading to lower yields and environmental degradation.⁶⁷⁹ In contrast, the European settlers who took over the most productive African lands were able to produce food surpluses due to their much longer history of food production in densely populated, economically specialized, politically centralized, and competing social systems.⁶⁸⁰ These European settlers thrived because they had already perfected the power ingredient of intensive food production within their European farming communities and only lacked the land resources on which to apply their power. In a sense, their strategy was to integrate the Rift Valley land resources into Europe's capitalist economies without regard to the effect that such a strategy would have on the African communities that previously inhabited these lands.⁶⁸¹ The result was a thriving European farming community and impoverished African pastoral and agricultural communities in the Rift Valley.

The inability of members of African communities to meet their basic needs was one of the main factors that forced them to flee the native reserves in search of employment opportunities in the thriving European farms as discussed in the previous section. The Africans had effectively lost their means of sustenance and had to sell their labour cheaply to European settlers in order to sustain themselves. For example, while Lord Delamare, a European settler in the Rift Valley region, acquired a hundred thousand (100,000) acres of African land to farm, his African labourers earned a wage of approximately twenty (20) Kenyan shillings each per month.⁶⁸² This migration of labour from African communities to European settler farms undermined the socio-economic bases of these African community systems and continued to relegate them to the periphery of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system.

In chapter 4, I analyse the relationship between the European settler community and the African communities using the theory of social dominance that I introduced at the

⁶⁷⁹ Rodney, W (n 231) p. 219.

⁶⁸⁰ Diamond, J (n 218).

⁶⁸¹ Rodney, W (n 231) p. 25.

⁶⁸² Rodney, W (n 231 above) p. 151.

beginning of this thesis. Under this theory - the tendency of systems to form group-based social hierarchies when they interact - the colonial administration enacted policies that were designed to maintain European dominance over the African communities. An illustration of the colonial administration's determination to suppress and dominate the African communities was their failure to invest in agricultural improvements in Africa beyond cash crop growing for export to Europe and the progressive weakening of African institutions.⁶⁸³

3.4.3 WEAKENED LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Colonial disruption of African community systems also resulted in a weakening of the communities' legal and institutional structures. As discussed in chapter 2, the Rift Valley communities had their own traditional political organizations that enabled them to better interact with their environment. The capacity of a community system to self-organize through effective institutions is one of the power factors that enables the community to feed itself better, reproduce better and, generally, dominate other communities that inhabit the same area. The pastoral Maasai, Nandi and Kipsigis, generally, practiced the custom of raiding to acquire livestock and land; a custom which was guided by a militarized youth led by councils of elders and respected spiritual leaders. Similarly, the Kikuyu practiced sedentary agriculture and relied on the leadership of Gethaka heads or elders and chiefs who were motivated to make peace, trade, intermarry and minimize conflicts with their neighbours.

Colonialism disrupted these institutional structures that the pastoral communities and the Kikuyu agriculturalists had developed with the passage of time. The communities' legal and institutional structures were unable to successfully resist the disruption and therefore lost their effectiveness internally within the communities and externally against the European settlers. The landmark litigation by the Maasai community leaders against the European settlers – the *Ole Nchoko case* – failed before the High Court and before the Court of Appeal. The Nandi and Kipsigis resistance resulted in the brutal murder of their leader, Koitalel arap Samoei, by the British in 1905 and the forced removal of the Talai clan from

⁶⁸³ Rodney, W (n 231) p. 221.

Kipsigis territory.⁶⁸⁴ The armed resistance by the Kikuyu community against the European settlers resulted in the forced removal of more than one (1) million community members from their homesteads and their placement in villages and huts to undergo psychologically damaging rehabilitation processes.⁶⁸⁵

The institutional structures that these communities had developed thus ceased to set the communities' value systems, policies, ideologies, ideas of justice, morality and, generally, lost control of the process of passing on the community's customary practices from generation to generation. Albert Memmi in *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, captures the effects of colonialism's disruption of a community's legal and institutional structures as follows:

The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and from the community. Colonization usurps any free role in either war or peace, every decision contributing to his destiny and that of the world, and all cultural and social responsibility.⁶⁸⁶

Memmi's statement is admittedly sweeping but covers the dramatic disruption of colonialism to communities' legal and institutional structures. The community leaders lost their power to European settlers even in situations where some of that leadership structure was left intact. The European settlers then imposed puppet leaders on the African communities as a way of integrating the Communities' legal and institutional structures into their European legal and institutional structures again without regard to the effect that such a strategy would have on the African communities. This puppet leadership was exposed when the Maasai community in the *Ole Nchoko case* challenged the legitimacy of the leaders who agreed to the Anglo-Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911. These challenges were futile because the entire community leadership, whether imposed by European settlers or not, had no power factors to deploy outside the narrow restrictions laid down by colonialism.

⁶⁸⁴ See Chapter 2, section 2.4.3 (discussing the customary practice of youth militarization among the Nandi and Kipsigis.

⁶⁸⁵ Elkins, C (n 369).

⁶⁸⁶ Rodney, W (n 231) p. 225.

Where community leaders refused to act within the narrow restrictions imposed by the European settlers, they risked forced removal from the territory as happened to the Talai clan and thousands of Kikuyu community members who resisted colonial rule.

At Kenya's independence in 1963, the gaps in African community leadership that had been created by colonial disruption of the communities' legal and institutional structures were filled by African elites who the European settlers had imposed on the communities to perpetuate their dominance. It is this dominance interface that the state system has been attempting to remodel so as to avoid the resulting unhealthy competition over land resources, instability and conflicts, most visibly in the Rift Valley region. The state's continued domination of the Rift Valley communities poses an existential threat to the Kenyan state itself. A rethinking of existential risk mitigation strategies around a deeper understanding of community resilience is essential and requires fundamental changes to the Kenyan state's legal and policy processes for addressing instability risks in the Rift Valley. The state should study and understand the communities' resilience by mapping their key structural attributes, essential dynamics, interdependencies and feedback loop mechanisms in order to create and sustain interventions in the Rift Valley that will help these communities to achieve stability.

In the next chapter, I examine the interaction between formal state law and these customary practices to test the state's effectiveness in affording community systems genuine options for self-corrective measures to mitigate the risk of instability in the Rift Valley region. These options for self-correction may be effective if the communities are able to regain their traditional power ingredients such as intensive food production and effective institutions that they lost when the colonial state and its successor neo-colonial state dispossessed them of their land.

3.5 REVIEW

In this chapter, I discuss the colonial state's disruption of the customs and traditions of the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities by dispossessing and displacing them from their most valuable resource; their land. Although I delve into the mechanics of the disruption – the settler's attraction to the rich resources of the Rift Valley for farming and use of the formal state system to acquire community land – the focus of this chapter has

CHAPTER 3 COLONIAL DISRUPTION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITY SYSTEMS

been on the disruption and destabilization of the African customary practices. There is some discussion of the legal and political process used by the settlers to dispossess and displace the African communities, such as the creation of a European reserve known as the White Highlands, the signing of Anglo - Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911, forced labour, forced eviction and confinement of African communities to native reserves. Using Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis, I show that the disruption interfered with the stability and hence integrity of the community systems, thus forcing them to take corrective measures in search of that stability.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸⁷ Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis has been discussed in section 1.4.2 of chapter 1. For more information on autopoiesis, see *The New Science of Niklas Luhmann* (n 39), King, M (n 51) and Hugh Baxter (n 46).

CHAPTER 4 **INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY
LAWS AND TRADITIONAL TENURE
SYSTEMS**

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I analyse the interface between the formal Kenyan state statutory system and the informal African customary legal systems to test whether Kenya's new communal tenure system will be effective in addressing the socio-economic marginalization of African communities. The interface between state statutory law and customary law relating to land in Kenya has been characterized by the tension between exploitation of the land to maximize agricultural output and equitable distribution of the land among the people that inhabit it.⁶⁸⁸ The colonial state system, at the outset, favoured policies and legislation that expropriated the land from the communities inhabiting it and allocated it to an elite that is purportedly able to effectively exploit it for optimal agricultural production.⁶⁸⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, these state policies and laws disrupted African customary systems and pushed Africans to the periphery of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system, thereby destabilising their community systems.⁶⁹⁰ The African communities are, however, resilient, and have stubbornly maintained their customary laws while mounting a spirited struggle to get back to the core of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system.⁶⁹¹

The struggle by African communities destabilized the entire colonial state system to the point of posing an existential threat to the state.⁶⁹² The colonial state's self-preservation strategy of assimilating a critical mass of the African community was insufficient to create the needed stability, hence the need for an effective pipeline for African community systems to transition from the periphery to the core of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic

⁶⁸⁸ I discuss the challenge of maximizing agricultural production later in this chapter under the "Swynnerton Plan". See R. J. M. Swynnerton 'A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Swynnerton Plan)' (1954) Department of Agriculture, Ref: AGR. 32 / 2 (available in hard copy at the Kenya National Archives); World Bank (n 613) (both discussing the challenge of maximizing agricultural production in Kenya).

⁶⁸⁹ As above. This is also discussed later in this chapter under the "Swynnerton Plan".

⁶⁹⁰ See Chapter 3.

⁶⁹¹ As above.

⁶⁹² This was discussed later in section 2.4.2.2 of chapter 2 under the "Mau Mau Uprising".

GDP can be measured using the value added, income or expenditure methods.⁷⁰³ The value added approach measures the gross output or the sum of total sales receipts across the economy, less the value of intermediate goods and services used as inputs to production.⁷⁰⁴ The income approach focuses on the sum of employee compensation, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and gross operating surplus.⁷⁰⁵ The expenditure method measures the sum of the value of "final" expenditures by consumers, businesses, and governments.⁷⁰⁶ Economists have developed a macroeconomic equation for measuring GDP which states that GDP equals income (Y) which equals final expenditures, consisting of personal consumption (C), private investment (I), government spending (G), and the net of exports less imports (NX). If the equation is extended to value added (VA), it can be expressed as $GDP = Y = C + G + I + NX = VA$.⁷⁰⁷

Whether value based, income based or expenditure based, GDP does not adequately measure all the components of an economic system.⁷⁰⁸ GDP ignores several components of the economic system that do not involve monetary transactions, excluding, for example, non-monetary production of goods and services in households, donations, wealth variation,

⁷⁰³ See Bureau of Economic Analysis 'Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA Handbook)' (May 2019) United States Government, Chapters 1 – 13, pp. 2-7 to 2-10 available at <https://www.bea.gov/resources/methodologies/nipa-handbook> (accessed 24 April 2020) (describes three ways to measure Gross Domestic Product or "GDP": (1) as the sum of goods and services sold to final users; (2) as the sum of income payments and other costs incurred in the production of goods and services; and (3) as the sum of "value added" by all industries in the economy).

⁷⁰⁴ As above.

⁷⁰⁵ As above.

⁷⁰⁶ As above.

⁷⁰⁷ As above.

⁷⁰⁸ See Tālis J. Putniņš and Arnis Sauka 'Measuring the shadow economy using company managers' (May 2015) 43 EJCECO 2 471 - 490 (shows the challenges of measuring shadow economies); Patrick S. Brogan 'The Economic Benefits of Broadband and Information Technology' (Spring, 2009) 18 Media L. & Pol'y 65 (describing the type of data that economists use to measure Gross Domestic Product or "GDP").

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

could be used to plant tea in Kenya.⁷⁴⁷ In the scheduled areas alone, nearly 75,000 acres had been licensed for planting tea at the beginning of 1961.⁷⁴⁸ For the non-scheduled areas, it was estimated at the time that at least 70,000 acres to 80,000 acres could be developed to plant tea.⁷⁴⁹ Pyrethrum grows very well above the 6,500-foot level.⁷⁵⁰

European settlers who first arrived in Kenya, therefore, appreciated the importance of the land and instituted a policy of land expropriation to acquire it from African communities. To implement the expropriation policy, the colonial state relied on the doctrine of discovery or doctrine of *terra nullius*, which is a Latin expression meaning "nobody's land".⁷⁵¹ International law at the advent of colonialism in Kenya recognised (1) conquest, (2) cession, and (3) occupation of territory that was *terra nullius*, as three of the effective ways of acquiring sovereignty over a territory.⁷⁵² The ICJ Advisory opinion on Western Sahara described occupation as a legal means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory provided that the territory is *terra nullius*, meaning a territory belonging to no-one at the time of occupation.⁷⁵³ In *Advocate-General of Bengal v Raneesurnomoye Dossee*, Lord Kingsdown went further to also describe the law that applied in the occupied territories by stating that "[w]here Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or barbarous country, they carry with them not only the laws, but the sovereignty of their own State; and those who live amongst them and become members of their community become also partakers of, and subject to the same laws."⁷⁵⁴ In *Johnson & Graham's Lessee v McIntosh*, the United States Supreme Court described the doctrine of *terra nullius* or doctrine of discovery as it applied to North America, including Canada, as follows:

⁷⁴⁷ World Bank (n 613) pp. 121-123.

⁷⁴⁸ As above.

⁷⁴⁹ As above.

⁷⁵⁰ World Bank (n 613) pp. 125-126.

⁷⁵¹ *Mabo v Queensland* (n 22) (explaining that the doctrine of *terra nullius* refers to the justification of a state's acquisition of territory belonging to no-one).

⁷⁵² See *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion*, ICJ GL No 61, [1975] ICJ Rep 12, ICGJ 214 (ICJ 1975).

⁷⁵³ As above.

⁷⁵⁴ *Advocate-General of Bengal v. Raneesurnomoye Dossee* (1863) 15 ER 811.

The British enacted the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance (1902 Order-in-Council), the predecessor of the Government Lands Act, for purposes of regulating the state's control of the Crown Lands.⁷⁶⁹ The 1902 Order-in-Council gave the Commissioner power to sell freeholds in Crown Lands to any purchaser in lots not exceeding one thousand (1000) acres, to lease land for periods not exceeding 99 years and to give licences for temporary occupation to non-whites.⁷⁷⁰ Under sections 30 - 31 of the 1902 Order-in-Council, any land which was unoccupied, temporarily or otherwise by the Africans, was available for alienation to the European settlers without reference to the Africans.⁷⁷¹ The 1902 Order-in-Council provided that in all dealings with Crown Lands, regard should be had for the rights and requirements of natives or Africans and, in particular, the Commissioner could not sell or lease any land in actual occupation of natives or Africans.⁷⁷² In 1915, the British enacted the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance or Order-in-Council which repealed the 1902 Order-in-Council and made it clear that "Crown Lands"⁷⁷³ meant all land in Kenya, inclusive of all land occupied by African communities. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance concentrated power over Crown Lands in the hands of the Governor, who had replaced the Commissioner as the highest-ranking colonial officer in the state.⁷⁷⁴ Under the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance, the Governor, at any time, could sell, lease or otherwise dispose of Crown

⁷⁶⁹ See Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645); East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645); Crown Lands Ordinance Land Purchase Rules (n 647).

⁷⁷⁰ As above.

⁷⁷¹ Crown Lands Ordinance (n 645) sections 30-31.

⁷⁷² As above.

⁷⁷³ The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance defined Crown Land to mean "[a]ll public lands in the colony which are for the time being subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention, or agreement, or by virtue of His Majesty's Protectorate, and all lands which have been acquired by his Majesty for the public service or otherwise howsoever, and shall include all lands occupied by the native tribes of the colony and all lands reserved for the use of the members of any native tribes".)

⁷⁷⁴ *Nyali Ltd v. AG* (n 645) (discussing the British East Africa Protectorate).

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND
TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

Lands.⁷⁷⁵ He or she could grant 999 year leases for agricultural land and had wide discretion to create reserves ('native land') and manipulate their boundaries.⁷⁷⁶

In 1920, the East African Protectorate was annexed by the Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council (June 11, 1920), under Section 2 of the British Settlement Act 1887, to create the colony of Kenya.⁷⁷⁷ The British Settlement Act further enabled the Crown, by Letters Patent, "to delegate to any three or more persons within the settlement" the powers conferred by Parliament.⁷⁷⁸ Letters Patent refers to legal instruments used by the British Crown to confer authority to perform particular functions, such as setting out the details of a new colony's governmental institutions.⁷⁷⁹ Article 1 of the Letters Patent set out the Office of the Governor General while Article 3 conferred powers on it.⁷⁸⁰

Africans were confined in "native reserves" through a law called the Kenya (Native Areas) Ordinance, passed in 1926.⁷⁸¹ The 1926 Native Areas Ordinance and, later, the Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 were used to alienate local communities' prime land and to confine the Africans in native reserves.⁷⁸² This segregationist policy of creating White Highlands for European settlers and native reserves for Africans was formally implemented through the Kenya Land Commission.⁷⁸³ The Kenya Land Commission was established in 1932 and,

⁷⁷⁵ As above.

⁷⁷⁶ As above.

⁷⁷⁷ See Kenya Protectorate Order in Council (n 646); Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council (n 646); British Settlements Act 1887, UK Public General Acts c. 54 (Regnal. 50 and 51 Vict) Section 2, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/> (accessed 25 April 2020).

⁷⁷⁸ British Settlements Act 1887 (n 777 above) section 3.

⁷⁷⁹ *Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha of Trinidad and Tobago Inc., and Others v. Attorney General*, [2009] 4 LRC 818 (Privy Council, 21 January, 28 April 2009) (describing "Letters Patent").

⁷⁸⁰ As above. See Kenya Protectorate Order in Council (n 646) and Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council (n 646) (implementing the Letters Patent).

⁷⁸¹ *Nyali Ltd v. AG* (n 645).

⁷⁸² *Sorrenson, MPK* (n 612).

⁷⁸³ As above. See also Sir William Morris Carter 'Report of the Kenya land commission: September 1933 (Carter Report)' (1934) London, H.M. Stationery Off.

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

under its chairman Sir Morris Carter, recommended in 1934 the division of land, generally, into Highlands for Europeans and Native Lands for Africans.⁷⁸⁴ The Governor was also given a veto over any land transaction as a way of protecting segregation.⁷⁸⁵ The British later modified the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance by enacting the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1939 that excluded land declared to be native lands from the wide discretion given to the Governor to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of Crown Lands.⁷⁸⁶ The Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council of 1939 vested the African lands in a Native Lands Trust Board as follows: “[s]ubject at all times to all such rights in respect of land as are or may be enjoyed by native tribes, groups, families or individuals by virtue of existing native law or custom, or any subsequent modification thereof, in so far as such rights are not repugnant to any law from time to time in force in the colony.”⁷⁸⁷ Following enactment of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1939, Africans were confined in native reserves where they could exercise their customary land rights.⁷⁸⁸

Although the African population outnumbered the rest by far and Africans occupied most of the land, they were excluded from the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system. The first population census in Kenya was taken in 1948 with its results being published in 1952.⁷⁸⁹ There were about six (6) million Africans in Kenya in the period between 1948-1952.⁷⁹⁰ With a rate of natural increase of approximately 2.25 percent a year since then, there were about 7.3 million people in Kenya as at 1961.⁷⁹¹ The number of European settlers in 1944 can be estimated at two thousand (2000) with about seven (7) million acres of land

⁷⁸⁴ Carter Report (n 783). See also Morgan, WTW (n 655).

⁷⁸⁵ Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁷⁸⁶ The Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council, 1939, S.R.O. 516. See also Simon Coldham ‘Colonial Policy and the Highlands of Kenya’ (Spring, 1979) *Journal of African Law*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 65 - 83.

⁷⁸⁷ Native Areas Order in Council (n 786) section 6.

⁷⁸⁸ TJRC Report (n 2) vol IIB, chapter 2, sections 66-70.

⁷⁸⁹ World Bank (n 613) p. 6.

⁷⁹⁰ As above.

⁷⁹¹ As above.

of which only eight hundred sixty-four thousand (864,000) were actually in cultivation or cropped.⁷⁹² In 1961, there were approximately three thousand six hundred (3,600) European and Asian farms occupying a cropped acreage of around 15% or 1.14 million acres of an estimated 7.5 million acres and bringing in an estimated gross income of £35.9 million.⁷⁹³ By 1965, the majority of the land held by European settlers in Kenya was under lease: 6,350,000 acres on 999-year leases; 591,000 acres on 99-year leases; and 560,000 acres on freehold.⁷⁹⁴ In 1961, the African or nonscheduled areas were composed of some 120 million acres, of which only 11.65 million acres receive sufficient rainfall in a normal year for cropping.⁷⁹⁵ There were an estimated nine hundred fifty thousand (950,000) African farms in the non-scheduled areas, with a gross income of approximately £10.4 million in 1961.⁷⁹⁶ The imputed gross value of African subsistence production was £47 million in 1961.⁷⁹⁷

In 1961-1965, therefore, most of the African communities were excluded from the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system. The below charts summarize Kenya's population growth and the African communities' participation in land use since 1944.

⁷⁹² World Bank (n 613) pp. 80-85 (statistics related to European settler agriculture in Kenya).


⁷⁹³ As above.

⁷⁹⁴ World Bank (n 613) pp. 65-66.


⁷⁹⁵ World Bank (n 613) pp. 70-80 (discussing agricultural production in the non-scheduled areas).


⁷⁹⁶ As above.

⁷⁹⁷ As above.



Source: Line graph created by author based on information from The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), *The Economic Development of Kenya* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963).





Source: Pie charts created by author based on information from The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), *The Economic Development of Kenya* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963).

The colonial state doctrine of terra nullius and policy of expropriation created a dual tenure system in the East African territory; a colonial tenure system for expropriated land and customary tenure systems for lands that continued to be inhabited by African communities.⁷⁹⁸ Whereas the colonial tenure system existed formally by statute, customary tenure systems existed by default in areas occupied by Africans and which had not been expropriated by the colonial state.⁷⁹⁹

There was a failed attempt to introduce a communal reserve for both African communities and Arabs by state statute to be known as the Digo-Shimoni Reserve.⁸⁰⁰ The

⁷⁹⁸ See Carter Report (n 783) (shows that the dual tenure system in Kenya was intended to protect European settler farms).

⁷⁹⁹ As above.

⁸⁰⁰ See Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) (8th June 1931) (for records of proceedings in the Kenya National Assembly relating to the Digo-Shimoni Reserve).

communal reserve was meant to allow the Arabs and two native tribes in the coastal strip - the Wasegeju and the Wakifundi – to exercise their customary rights over the land that they inhabited.⁸⁰¹ Both communities could not exercise customary rights over the same land because the statutory framework for such customary rights, the Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1926 and, later, the Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930, targeted African communities only and not Arabs.⁸⁰² The Bill was an amendment to the Crown Lands Ordinance, known as the Crown Lands (Amendment Bill) and was introduced in Parliament in June 1929.⁸⁰³ The Bill was ultimately unsuccessful because the Arabs resisted the idea of a communal reserve which they would occupy with Africans.⁸⁰⁴ They viewed such a communal reserve as an inferior type of tenure because occupants of such communal reserves had no ownership interest or any proofs of such ownership and lived on land that was not surveyed by the state.⁸⁰⁵ The Arabs wanted recognition of their freehold interest in the land and individual titles that would be confirmed by certificates of ownership issued by the colonial state.⁸⁰⁶ The colonial state, therefore, shelved the idea of formally creating mixed communal reserves for natives and non-natives and, instead, continued to implement the Native Land Trust Ordinance allowing native reserves for Africans only.⁸⁰⁷ The World Bank estimates that, as at 1961, the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, applied to approximately 31 million acres of Kenyan land.⁸⁰⁸

The next serious and widespread attempt to formally recognize communal tenure by statute after independence was through the creation of group ranches.⁸⁰⁹ On 26 June 1968, the President of Kenya assented to the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Chapter 287, Laws

⁸⁰¹ As above.

⁸⁰² See *Nyali Ltd v. AG* (n 645); Sorrenson, MPK (n 612).

⁸⁰³ See Coldham, S (n 786) pp. 65 - 83.

⁸⁰⁴ As above.

⁸⁰⁵ As above.

⁸⁰⁶ As above.

⁸⁰⁷ As above.

⁸⁰⁸ World Bank (n 613) pp. 63 - 67.

⁸⁰⁹ Kieyah, Joseph (n 24) p. 405.

Municipal/County Councils became the de facto trustees for African customary land within their boundaries.⁸¹⁵

It was also possible for communities that have had an association with a forest to register and participate in the management of that forest and its component resources through Community Forest Associations (CFAs) under the Forests Act (2005).⁸¹⁶ The Forests Act provided a procedure and mechanism for community participation in forest management under section 46 but did not make provision for individualized ownership of land that had been brought under the operation of the Act.⁸¹⁷ This affected only a few African communities. The Group Representatives Act of 1968, was, therefore, the second serious and widespread attempt to give statutory recognition to communal tenure after the failed Crown Lands (Amendment Bill) of 1929.⁸¹⁸

The group ranches were established, generally, in the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. In these areas, communal lands were divided into smaller units known as ranches which were then registered in the names of representatives elected by members of the group.⁸¹⁹ A “group” under the Group Representatives Act had the same meaning as “group” under the Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284, Laws of Kenya which meant “a tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons, whose land under recognized customary law belongs communally to the persons who are for the time being the members of the group, together with any person of whose land the group is determined to be the owner ...”⁸²⁰ The

⁸¹⁵ Kieyah, Joseph (n 24) p. 405.

⁸¹⁶ Forests Act, Laws of Kenya, Chapter 385 (assent on 18th November, 2005; commencement on 1st February, 2007) (now repealed) National Council for Law Reporting, available at <https://www.fankenya.org/downloads/ForestsAct2005.pdf> (accessed 30 March 2020).

⁸¹⁷ Forests Act (n 816) section 46.

⁸¹⁸ Kibugi, RM (n 810) p. 319.

⁸¹⁹ B.D. Ogolla and J. Mugabe ‘Land Tenure Systems and Natural Resources Management’ in C. Juma and J.B. Ojwang (editors) ‘Land We Trust: Environmental, Private Property and Constitutional Change’ (1996) Nairobi, Kenya: Initiatives Publishers; London: Zed Books.

⁸²⁰ See Group Representatives Act (n 301); Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284 (assent on 26th June, 1968; commencement on 28th June, 1968) available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 31 March 2020).

“Of course we can stretch such customs to be almost anything within their reasoning; if we say it means freehold, it means freehold, but in our interpretation of the laws and customs I think it wiser not to recognize any system of freehold, we want some control over non-native holders of land.”⁸²⁸

By reducing access to land and other resources for African communities, the dual tenure system helped to generate pressures for members of the African communities to search for low paying jobs in settler farms and, after independence, in towns and trading centres.⁸²⁹ The end result was a hierarchical arrangement in which the settler community stayed on top and the African communities at the bottom.⁸³⁰ The colonial state and its successor Kenyan state used legislation and implementing regulations to preserve, perpetuate and promote this hierarchical arrangement.⁸³¹

4.4 THE SWYNNERTON PLAN OF 1954

The colonial state’s policy of optimizing a subsystem of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system at the expense of the economic systems of the African communities was bound to run into resistance by the African communities.⁸³² The Mau Mau uprising of 1952

⁸²⁸ Sorrenson, MPK (n 612) pp. 178-179; see also Jacqueline M. Klopp & Odenda Lumumba ‘Reform and counter-reform in Kenya’s land governance’ (2017) *Review of African Political Economy*, pp. 4-5, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2017.1367919> (accessed 26 April 2020) (quoting the same words by John Ainsworth).

⁸²⁹ This economic marginalization will be discussed in the next section under the “Swynnerton Plan”.

⁸³⁰ This can be explained using social dominance theory; the interaction between the colonial state system and the African community systems resulted in a structure in which the colonial state system dominated and suppressed the African community systems and proceeded to maintain and promote that structure. See Adams, M (n 106) p. 1107; Carbado & Rock (n 106) p. 175.

⁸³¹ As above.

⁸³² See Chapter 1 (discussion on resilience and resistance of community systems when disrupted).

- 1960 was the climax of smaller, localised protests against the colonial system.⁸³³ It is a practical example of the African communities' struggle to persist, recover and thrive in the face of the disruption caused by the colonial land tenure system that threatened their very existence as communities.⁸³⁴ The smaller resistance movements amplified themselves and exploded into a widespread resistance movement that threatened the entire Kenyan state.⁸³⁵ These resistance movements by African communities forced the colonial state system to address the dispossession and displacement of Africans by seeking to assimilate a critical mass of Africans into the colonial state's economic system.⁸³⁶ The colonial state assumed that assimilating a critical mass of Africans in the colonial socio-economic system would create an equilibrium that would ensure the socio-economic system's survival or long-term stability despite the continuing disruption to the African customary system or eventual independence of the Kenyan state.⁸³⁷

This policy of assimilating a critical mass of Africans into the colonial socio-economic system was described in a colonial government report entitled, 'the Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya' (Swynnerton Plan), compiled by R. J. M. Swynnerton, an Assistant Director of Agriculture, in 1954.⁸³⁸ The colonial state system accepted the Swynnerton Plan as the general framework within which the development of African agriculture in Kenya should proceed and gave the colony a grant of approximately five million British pounds (£5M) to implement it.⁸³⁹ Section XII of the government report describes the Swynnerton Plan as follows:

See also Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (describing resilience as a self-preservation characteristic).

⁸³³ Maloba, WO (n 222) chapter 1.

⁸³⁴ See Chapter 2; Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (discussing resilience).

⁸³⁵ Maloba, WO (n 222) chapter 1.

⁸³⁶ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 12-15; Carbado & Rock (n 106) (discussing strategies used by systems to maintain hierarchy by using tactics that reinforce and promote the status quo).

⁸³⁷ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 12-15.

⁸³⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688).

⁸³⁹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) (introductory note by F. Cavendish-Bentinck, Minister for Agriculture

A five-year plan that has been prepared to intensify the development of African agriculture in Kenya, having as its main objective substantial improvement to the economy of the African producer and to the economy of the Colony by developing sound and intensive systems of farming.⁸⁴⁰

The colonial state's assimilation policy through the Swynnerton Plan is similar to the policy of assimilation that the British colonial state system adopted in Canada through the Indian Act of 1876.⁸⁴¹ The Indian Act was assented to on 12 April 1876 and described as “[a]n Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians.”⁸⁴² The Indian Act of 1876 is still in existence today although it has undergone several amendments that have not changed its policy of assimilation. It created a category of “enfranchised Indians” described in section 3(5) of the Act as follows:

“The term "enfranchised Indian" means any Indian, his wife or minor unmarried child, who has received letters patent granting him in fee simple any portion of the reserve which may have been allotted to him, his wife and minor children, by the band to which he belongs, or any unmarried Indian who may have received letters patent for an allotment of the reserve.”⁸⁴³

and Water Resources).

⁸⁴⁰ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section XII (I), p. 57, para. 1-4 (Summary).

⁸⁴¹ See Indian Act (12 April 1876) 39 Vict. c. 18, available through the Canadian government's Justice Laws Website: <https://laws.justice.gc.ca/> (accessed 26 April 2020); LaForme, HS et al (n 617).

⁸⁴² Indian Act (n 841 above); LaForme, HS et al (n 617).

⁸⁴³ See Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act, S.C. 2014, c. 38, section 3(5) (Assented to 16 December 2014) (available through the Canadian government's Justice Laws Website: <https://laws.justice.gc.ca/>).

In 1884, the colonial state in Canada amended the Indian Act of 1876 to provide for the creation of Indian residential schools that were intended to assimilate Indian children into the colonial state system or to ‘civilize the Indian’.⁸⁴⁴ In 1920, further amendments to the Indian Act of 1876 were passed to make it mandatory for all native children between the ages of seven (7) and fifteen (15) to attend one of Canada's Residential Schools.⁸⁴⁵ In all, about one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) Aboriginal children were removed from their communities and forced to attend the residential schools.⁸⁴⁶ Just as would happen later in Kenya, the colonial state in Canada thus used education as their main tool for assimilating the local Aboriginal communities into the colonial state system.⁸⁴⁷

The colonial state in Kenya sought to assimilate Africans living in the Rift Valley region through the Swynnerton Plan.⁸⁴⁸ The Swynnerton Plan's authors, like the African communities living in the Rift Valley for thousands of years, recognized that the main driver of the Kenyan economy is land.⁸⁴⁹ Accordingly, the Plan divided Kenyan land into four broad categories: (1) high potential areas; (2) semi-potential areas; (3) semi-arid and pastoral areas; and (4) special areas.⁸⁵⁰ High potential areas were areas that the colonial state deemed suitable for balanced mixed farming intensively and which, with the correct investment, could yield surplus crop and livestock products.⁸⁵¹ The Plan stated that these high potential areas should be able to support approximately six-hundred thousand (600,000) families with

⁸⁴⁴ Indian Act. R. S., c. 43, s. 1. 1884.

⁸⁴⁵ See Indian Act amendments of 1920, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) available at <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/Pages/home.aspx> (accessed 26 April 2020).

⁸⁴⁶ Kathleen Mahoney ‘The Untold Story: How Indigenous Legal Principles Informed the Largest Settlement in Canadian Legal History’ (2018) 69 UNBLJ 198 - 232 / (2018) 69 R.D. U.N.-B. 198 – 232 (discussing Prime Minister Harper's public apology to the Canadian Aboriginal or Indian or First Nations community).

⁸⁴⁷ As above.

⁸⁴⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) part XII, p. 57 et seq., (summary).

⁸⁴⁹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-10.

⁸⁵⁰ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 7.

⁸⁵¹ As above.

an output increase from a few pounds a year to something of the order of one-hundred pounds (£100) per family per year.⁸⁵² Semi-potential areas were lands on which the intensity of cultivation could be enhanced by irrigation, swamp reclamation or flood control.⁸⁵³ The total estimated amount of Kenyan land that fell within the high-potential and semi-potential areas was approximately thirty percent (30%) or, roughly, a third of Kenyan land.⁸⁵⁴ A World Bank assessment carried out around 1961 concluded that coffee of the mild arabica type could be successfully cultivated in physical conditions that exist in the middle altitudes in the Kenyan highlands.⁸⁵⁵ The same assessment concluded that tea could be grown at higher levels while sisal could thrive in the drier, semi-intensive farming areas.⁸⁵⁶ Three quarters of Kenyan land falls within the semi-arid and pastoral areas category of land which has low rainfall and can yield a constant and valuable flow of livestock and their products.⁸⁵⁷ Special areas or areas and projects requiring special treatment refers to areas such as the coastal belt.⁸⁵⁸ The Rift Valley region falls, generally, within the thirty-percent (30%) high-potential and semi-potential areas suitable for intensive and semi-intensive mixed farming.⁸⁵⁹

The colonial state embarked on a program to encourage individual African participants in the Swynnerton Plan to grow cash crops in the high potential and semi-potential areas just as the settlers had done in the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas from 1895.⁸⁶⁰ The government report described this policy trajectory as follows:

⁸⁵² Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section 114, p. 58.

⁸⁵³ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 7.

⁸⁵⁴ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 7-12.

⁸⁵⁵ World Bank (n 613) pp. 116-120.

⁸⁵⁶ World Bank (n 613) pp. 121-124.

⁸⁵⁷ World Bank (n 613) pp. 63-70.

⁸⁵⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 7.

⁸⁵⁹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 7-12; World Bank (n 613) pp. 63-70.

⁸⁶⁰ As above.

“[T]he bulk of the African population lies in areas suited to intensive or semi-intensive farming and the order of their contribution to the economy of the Colony should aim at raising the surplus output of 600,000 families from £10 or so per annum to £100 or more apiece.”⁸⁶¹

This policy of encouraging cash crop growing by Africans as a way of optimizing land use in Kenya was consistent with the colonial state’s policy of measuring economic development in terms of GDP.⁸⁶² The colonial authorities concluded that the colony could achieve a higher GDP by increasing net exports of cash crops.⁸⁶³ Since settlers were the ones growing cash crops, the strategy was to encourage select Africans to join the cash crop farming community.⁸⁶⁴ The government report described the strategy as follows:

“Provision was made to encourage the establishment of holdings of economic size, for security of tenure, for intensification of farming, for the growing and marketing of cash crops, for the better management and the improvement of livestock and for the provision of water supplies to individuals and groups of progressive farmers.”⁸⁶⁵

The colonial state reasoned that cash crop growing by Africans would continue the policy of developing a modern economy for the colony while at the same time assimilating a critical mass of individual Africans into the integrated socio-economic system. The colonial state was so bent on this strategy that, using the policy rationale that “money invested in development begets money for further development”, the state offered loans to individual Africans to grow cash crops.⁸⁶⁶ The Plan suggested that two hundred thousand

⁸⁶¹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section 134, p. 62.

⁸⁶² See Swynnerton Plan (n 688); NIPA Handbook (n 703) (describes ways of measuring Gross Domestic Product or ‘GDP’).

⁸⁶³ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section 115, p. 58.

⁸⁶⁴ Swynnerton Plan (n 688).

⁸⁶⁵ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section 115, p. 58.

⁸⁶⁶ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) section 118, pp. 55 and 59.

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

Specific to the Rift Valley region, the Plan envisioned large swathes of land being used to grow coffee, pyrethrum and tea as follows:⁸⁷⁰

District	Coffee	Pyrethrum	Tea
Kericho			16k
Nandi, Elgeyo, West Suk		5k	10k
Total for the country	71.5k	43.8k	70k

Source: Compiled by author using data from R. J. M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, Department of Agriculture, Ref: AGR. 32 / 2 (1954)

A later World Bank report of around 1963 – about a decade after the launch of the Swynnerton Plan – determined that it had succeeded in increasing African participation in cash crop growing. According to the World Bank’s assessment, cash crops for export formed by far the most valuable part of marketed production of agriculture.⁸⁷¹ Coffee, tea, sisal and pyrethrum have played a continuously important role in Kenya as export crops.⁸⁷² According to the World Bank mission, at independence in 1963, the greater part of the value of marketed agricultural output was derived from non-African farms and plantations, £36 million of a total of £46 million in 1961.⁸⁷³

The cash crop growing emphasis in the Swynnerton Plan paid off because the colonial state gave the progressive farmer a holding of economic size in a sea of fragmented land and all the available aids of survey, farm planning, registration of title and loans.⁸⁷⁴ The Swynnerton Plan’s authors believed that it is the progressive farmer who may well start the

⁸⁷⁰ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 18 - 19.

⁸⁷¹ World Bank (n 613).

⁸⁷² World Bank (n 613) pp. 115 - 125

⁸⁷³ As above.

⁸⁷⁴ See World Bank (n 613).

A recurring issue is why the colonial state became so determined to assimilate individual Africans into the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system through cash crop growing when it previously viewed the people and their resources merely as labour and capital for the settler economy.⁸⁸² The answer lies in the ability of a system – even the colonial state system – to maintain its own systemic integrity through regeneration and transformation until it finds a relatively stable equilibrium between its component parts.⁸⁸³ The colonial state system had become unstable and experienced stress as a result of the resistance movements by African communities.⁸⁸⁴ It needed to regenerate and transform itself to meet this existential threat.⁸⁸⁵ The resistance movements by African communities forced the colonial state system to address the dispossession and displacement of Africans by seeking to integrate the African communities, somehow, into the Kenyan socio-economic system.⁸⁸⁶ The Plan’s authors recognized that “in the long term, the greatest gain from the participation of the African community in running its own agricultural industries will be a politically contented and stable community.”⁸⁸⁷ However, instead of integrating whole African communities into the socio-economic system, the colonial state chose to assimilate only a select group of individual Africans through the Swynnerton Plan to ensure its own long-term survival.

Implementers of the Swynnerton Plan also had to find and recruit “progressive” or “able” or “well trained” Africans to implement the Plan.⁸⁸⁸ The targeted Africans are

⁸⁸² See Carter Report (n 783) (recommending separation of the European settlers from the African communities so that the settlers could engage in farming).

⁸⁸³ See section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1 for more discussion of the systems theory notion of autopoiesis. See also Hugh Baxter (n 46) (using the systems theory notion of autopoiesis to explain a community system’s ability to self-generate and self-perpetuate).

⁸⁸⁴ As above.

⁸⁸⁵ As above.

⁸⁸⁶ As above. See also Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (for further discussion about resilience).

⁸⁸⁷ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 8.

⁸⁸⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 13, section IX, pp. 52 et seq (Agricultural Education).

described in various sections of the Plan as “the progressive African farmer”, “able, energetic or rich African”, “a good and well trained African”, and other identity markers or labels of assimilated Africans.⁸⁸⁹ The strategy, as outlined in the government’s report, was to encourage a select group of African participants to farm their land well and to participate in general agricultural planning and co-ordinated development of their local communities and of specialized agricultural industries in which they may be concerned.⁸⁹⁰ The select Africans would be provided with security of tenure for their land through an indefeasible title as will encourage them to invest labour and profits into the development of their farms and as will enable them to offer the farm as security against such financial credits as they may wish to secure from such sources as may be open to them.⁸⁹¹

Again, the main obstacle to finding African participants in the Plan was the pre-existing African customary practices.⁸⁹² The customary practices by individual members of African communities have gained widespread acceptance and legitimacy within those communities over a long period of time.⁸⁹³ These practices are viewed by members of each community, generally, as better serving their needs and interests and being more representative of each community’s value system, policies, ideologies, ideas of justice, morality and other conditions of validity of laws.⁸⁹⁴ Examples of resilient African customary practices were the communal land tenure systems practiced in areas occupied by African

⁸⁸⁹ As above. See also Coldham, S (n 786) pp. 65 - 83 (describing a deliberate push to reward persons who were loyal to the state system).

⁸⁹⁰ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 7-10.

⁸⁹¹ As above. See also Jaramogi Oginga-Odinga ‘Not Yet Uhuru’ (January 1967) Hill & Wang, First edition, chapters 3 & 14 (using the title ‘the White Hand of Authority’ for chapter 3 and ‘Obstacles to Uhuru’ for chapter 14, Oginga-Odinga writes about the colonial state’s use of African elites to maintain their dominance over African communities post-independence).

⁸⁹² The African customary practices are described in more detail in Chapter 2.

⁸⁹³ As above.

⁸⁹⁴ See section 1.4.4 of Chapter 1 (discussions on legal pluralism that adopt the legal anthropologist/naturalist approach to legal pluralism; that the legitimacy of customary law is backed by wide acceptance of the obligatory nature of the laws by members of the community).

safeguard his labour and investment in the development of the land.⁹⁰² Third, the African customary system did not provide the farmer with any technical assistance to develop his land on sound economic lines, having regard to the ecological conditions under which he lived.⁹⁰³ Fourth, African customary systems did not encourage the growing of high-priced cash crops which were probably going to be in high demand for the long term and which would help to provide money needed to cover household expenses, to finance farming operations and development and as a backing for any agricultural credit required by the farmer.⁹⁰⁴ Fifth, African customary systems did not provide any yardstick by which a farmer may rear, manage, feed, select and breed livestock to yield an economic return from his pastures.⁹⁰⁵ Sixth, the pre-existing tenure systems had no ready access to water for a farmer's livestock or any marketing facilities to give a farmer secure and profitable outlets for his crop and livestock and to obtain finance for establishing processing factories.⁹⁰⁶ Lastly, the African customary systems did not provide any access to sources of agricultural credit sufficient to meet the requirements of very large numbers of very small farmers or an agricultural bias for the farmer to educate his children and to give them a progressive outlook on farming.⁹⁰⁷

These indictments of African customary systems were cited by state policy makers without reference to any source data showing that the African communities who had inhabited the land for thousands of years had misused the land.⁹⁰⁸ There is no reference, for instance, to customary practices that helped to conserve the soil and to help it regenerate.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰² Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-10.

⁹⁰³ As above.

⁹⁰⁴ As above.

⁹⁰⁵ As above.

⁹⁰⁶ As above.

⁹⁰⁷ As above.

⁹⁰⁸ See generally, Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-10, 58, section 113 (no data cited concerning African customary tenure systems). See also Chapter 2 (discussing traditional land tenure systems in the Rift Valley).

⁹⁰⁹ See Chapter 2 (discussing customary practices of the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi, and Kipsigis

The Maasai customary practice of allowing vegetation in overgrazed areas to regenerate before moving back with their cattle was useful for establishing and maintaining productive grass.⁹¹⁰ The Kipsigis customary practice of allowing land to remain fallow and thereby regenerate after approximately four harvests or roughly two years achieved a similar goal.⁹¹¹ The colonial state concluded, without any basis, that it is impossible under African customary tenure systems to develop sound farming rotations, to cart and apply manure, to establish and manage grass, to improve the management and feeding of livestock or to tend cash crops in any satisfactory manner.⁹¹² According to state policymakers, the African customary tenure systems had to be reformed or, in practice, extinguished, for the Swynnerton Plan to succeed.⁹¹³ The government report describes the necessity for reform of African customary tenure systems as follows:

“A reform of African customary land tenure, and legislation therefor, is essential if sound and productive farming, irrigation or settlement are to succeed. Without it, holdings of economic size cannot be established where land is fragmented...The African farmer should have access to medium- or long-term agricultural credit by offering his land as security to authorized bodies.”⁹¹⁴

Although the colonial state’s excuse for pushing for reform of African customary tenure systems was the need to consolidate the land and to institute better farming practices, their real fear was deeply rooted in the interface between the various African customary

communities of the Rift Valley).

⁹¹⁰ As above. See also Archived Documents (n 188); Tarayia, GN (n 254) (describing the Maasai’s pastoral identity trait).

⁹¹¹ The Kipsigis customary practices are also discussed in section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2. See also Peristiany, JG (n 239) (discussing customs and traditions of the Kipsigis community).

⁹¹² See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-10, 58, section 113.

⁹¹³ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 58, section 113.

⁹¹⁴ As above.

government report outlines the benefits of cooperative societies, generally, such as developing, processing and marketing cash crops.⁹²⁷ The report states that “[i]t is most important to establish a strong co-operative organization to weld the very large numbers of small producers into a corporate body and to collect their produce into a bulk and quality which will command the interest of buyers and markets, commanding a preferential demand over “penny packets” of variable quality.”⁹²⁸ Specific to African communities, the government report observes that cooperative societies are particularly desirable for educating Africans in running their own affairs, to train and pick out leaders and to raise funds through shares, commissions and levies for the operation of business affairs of members.⁹²⁹ The report even acknowledges that Africans had already formed their own cooperative societies despite the challenges posed to them by the state statutory system. The government report describes African cooperative societies as follows:

“In recent years in Kenya there has been a large development of African agricultural producers’ organizations which have frequently lacked stability because of inexperienced or irresponsible committees or management and because the staff available to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies has been quite inadequate to give them the necessary training.”⁹³⁰

However, the Plan’s authors gave three reasons for refusing to allow African communities to continue developing, processing and marketing cash crops through the cooperative societies that they were already forming.⁹³¹ First, the Plan’s authors saw the African cooperative societies as being too local and representing only a section of the community or a single market instead of a whole district and, ultimately, the entire colonial

⁹²⁷ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 26.

⁹²⁸ As above.

⁹²⁹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 55.

⁹³⁰ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 24 - 25.

⁹³¹ As above.

state.⁹³² Again, the Plan did not cite any comprehensive source data showing the state's understanding of the extent of the cooperative societies or whether encouraging them to be more national was not feasible.⁹³³ The second stated reason for denying African communities the opportunity to associate and collectively develop, process and market their produce was the alleged embryonic nature of the African cooperative societies.⁹³⁴ Again, the state had no source data to show the extent of complexity of African cooperative societies or even to attempt to drive the existing ones to the required complexity.⁹³⁵ The following statement from the government report demonstrates the extent of the state's ignorance of African cooperative societies:

“It will be extremely difficult to get and train Africans to carry responsibility at managerial level for organizations of this size until they have climbed the ladder of co-operative business experience for at least 15 to 20 years. The Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union built up its wide reputation because it employed and was prepared to accept a European general manager who inculcated co-operative principles into 30,000 coffee growers over a period 15 years, trained the committees and staffs of nearly 30 co-operative societies from whom were selected and promoted those capable of the senior and responsible managerial and clerical duties of the central union, handling with integrity the present annual turn-over of £1,065,000. Similarly the Union Committee received their baptism of public service on the primary committees. While the K.N.C.U. has had its own African general manager

⁹³² As above. See also Oginga-Odinga (n 891) chapters 3 & 14 (using the title ‘the White Hand of Authority’ for chapter 3 and ‘Obstacles to Uhuru’ for chapter 14, Oginga-Odinga writes about the colonial state’s use of African elites to maintain their dominance over African communities after independence).

⁹³³ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 24 - 25.

⁹³⁴ As above.

⁹³⁵ As above.

was that the African customary systems that have survived and thrived for centuries would eventually dominate and suppress the state statutory system.⁹⁴²

4.5 REGISTRATION OF LAND RIGHTS AND LAND TENURE REFORMS

Registration of land rights was the means by which the colonial state and the new independent Kenyan state aimed to achieve the goals of the Swynnerton Plan. The World Bank pushed forcefully for registration of land rights in the run up to Kenya's independence. The World Bank based its reasoning on the theory of Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto that secure property rights articulated in a written, formal, legal system of property titles can spur economic growth by allowing property owners to access credit.⁹⁴³

Tanzania has also experimented with De Soto's theory by formulating programmes aimed at giving land titles or other formal documents to property owners in informal settlements. The Tanzanian government started property formalization programmes seeking to give property owners land titles or some other forms of temporary documents to enhance security of tenure and enable them to access credit. For example, in 2004, the Tanzanian government formulated a programme known as the "Property and Business Formalization Programme", also known in Kiswahili as "Mpango kurasimisha rasilimali na biashara za

⁹⁴² See the discussion in section 1.4.3 of chapter 1 about social dominance theory.

⁹⁴³ Hernando de Soto 'The Mystery Of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs In The West And Fails Everywhere Else' (2000) New York: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group, p. 173 (concluding that capitalism can be a cause that promises opportunity for all if governments are willing to accept the following: (1) The situation and potential of the poor need to be better documented; (2) All people are capable of saving; (3) What the poor are missing are the legally integrated property systems that can convert their work and savings into capital; (4) Civil disobedience and the mafias of today are not marginal phenomena but the result of people marching by the billions from life organized on a small scale to life on a big scale; (5) in this context, the poor are not the problem but the solution; and (6) implementing a property system that creates capital is a political challenge because it involves getting in touch with people, grasping the social contract, and overhauling the legal system).

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

wanyonge Tanzania” with the acronym “MKURABITA”).⁹⁴⁴ MKURABITA was led by state officials working in the office of the President of Tanzania and appointed Hernando de Soto’s consultancy, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD) to assist in its implementation.⁹⁴⁵ It focused on issuance of either residential licences or Certificates of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCROs) to land owners in rural areas.⁹⁴⁶ The same concept of property formalization was also aggressively pushed in Kenya through registration of land rights.

The World Bank summarized its rationale for registration of land rights in a report following an assessment done in Kenya in 1961 as follows:

“...registered title is essential to the full development of agricultural land. It provides an incentive to improvement and it furnishes the security needed in order to obtain the loans required for development.”⁹⁴⁷

Registration refers to the entry of established rights onto the land register and issuing a title deed. A proper registration system requires accuracy (needs a proper survey followed by boundaries), cheapness (fees for registration and preparation of documents), simplicity, ubiquity (there should be more registries that are accessible throughout the country).⁹⁴⁸ The Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012 is the current statutory framework for registration of land rights in Kenya.⁹⁴⁹ It uses the words “rights” and “interests” interchangeably and defines registration of land rights or interests to mean bringing of a right or an interest in

⁹⁴⁴ Kusiluka, MM & Chiwambo, MD (n 207) pp. 176 - 182.

⁹⁴⁵ As above.

⁹⁴⁶ As above.

⁹⁴⁷ World Bank (n 613) p. 67.

⁹⁴⁸ Onalo, PL (n 198) p. 215.

⁹⁴⁹ Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012, Laws of Kenya (assent on 27th April, 2012; commencement on 2nd May, 2012) available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 31 March 2020).

land or lease under the provisions of the Act and includes making of an entry, note or record in the land register.⁹⁵⁰

The Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012 repealed the Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Government Lands Act (Cap. 280), the Registration of Titles Act (Cap. 281), the Land Titles Act (Cap. 282) and the Registered Land Act (Cap. 300) that also provided for registration of land rights in Kenya.⁹⁵¹ Section 24 of the Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012 provides that the registration of a person as the proprietor of land shall vest in that person the absolute ownership of that land together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant thereto.⁹⁵² Under section 26 of the Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012, the certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration, or to a purchaser of land upon a transfer or transmission by the proprietor shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions contained or endorsed in the certificate.⁹⁵³ The title of that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge, except— (a) on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party; or (b) where the certificate of title has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme.⁹⁵⁴ Section 29 of the Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012 also provides that “every proprietor, at the time of acquiring any land, lease or charge, shall be deemed to have had notice of every entry in the register relating to the land, lease or charge and subsisting at the time of acquisition.”⁹⁵⁵ Therefore, the act of registration confers absolute and indefeasible property rights on the holder of the certificate of registration of title.

The notion of conferring absolute and indefeasible property rights by the mere act of registration has been a feature of state statutory legislation since the advent of colonialism

⁹⁵⁰ See Land Registration Act (n 949) section 2 (Interpretation).

⁹⁵¹ See Land Registration Act (n 949) part XIII, section 109 (scheduled of repealed laws).

⁹⁵² Land Registration Act (n 949) section 24.

⁹⁵³ Land Registration Act (n 949) section 26.

⁹⁵⁴ As above.

⁹⁵⁵ Land Registration Act (n 949) section 29.

of Title is free from encumbrances and rights arising under customary law and that these are not among the interests formerly listed in section 30 of the RLA⁹⁷³ as overriding interests not requiring to be shown on the register. According to the High Court Judge in *Sela Obiero v. Orego Opiyo and Others* (High Court Civil Case no. 44 of 1970), if the legislature had intended that rights of a registered person would be subjected to customary law rights, it would have said so.⁹⁷⁴ Eventually, the state amended the Registered Land Act to introduce section 38(2) that gave recognition to cases holding that an unregistered instrument operates as a contract inter partes.⁹⁷⁵ However, according to state statutory law that was enacted as part of the state's implementation of the Swynnerton Plan, customary land rights were not meant to have any recognition within the formal state statutory system.⁹⁷⁶

The Swynnerton Plan's assimilation policy was incorporated into Kenya's state policy and legal framework following independence from British colonial rule in 1963.⁹⁷⁷ Kenya became independent on 12 December 1963, as a matter of English law by virtue of the Kenya Independence Act of 1963.⁹⁷⁸ Immediately prior to 12 December 1963 a new constitution for the independent Kenya was enacted by the Kenya Independence Order in Council 1963.⁹⁷⁹ Upon the attainment of independence in 1963, the Kenya Government took

stated that they were extinguished upon registration under the Registered Land Act. The Court thus gave ownership of a parcel of land to a widow over sons of co-wives who were claiming customary land rights over the same parcel of land).

⁹⁷³ As above. See also Registered Land Act (repealed) (n 964) section 30.

⁹⁷⁴ See also Onalo, PL (n 198) p. 190 - 191 (discussing the High Court Judge's decision in *Sela Obiero v. Orego Opiyo and Others* (High Court Civil Case no. 44 of 1970) and state statutory law's extinguishment of customary land rights through registration).

⁹⁷⁵ Registered Land Act (repealed) (n 964) section 38(2).

⁹⁷⁶ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-11, 58, section 113 (expressing the need to reform African customary land tenure through legislation)

⁹⁷⁷ Onalo, PL (n 198) p. 42.

⁹⁷⁸ Kenya Independence Act 1963, UK Public General Acts 1963 c. 54 (available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/>) (accessed on March 30, 2020).

⁹⁷⁹ See The Kenya Independence Order in Council, No. 1968 (1963) Kenya Gazette Supplement No.

first formal economic blueprint by the Kenyan state following independence was Sessional Paper No. 10, known as ‘African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya’, and was published in 1965.⁹⁸⁶ It recognized that land was previously owned communally with access regulated through membership in a particular group (clan or ethnic group).⁹⁸⁷ However, consistent with the Swynnerton Plan, it asserted that a system of secure private title to land was necessary to anchor economic growth.⁹⁸⁸ Therefore, registration of land rights remained a key tenet of the state statutory system following Kenya’s independence in 1963.

Despite the law of registration under the state statutory system that purports to extinguish customary land rights, customary rights remain resilient and state statutory law has been forced to recognize customary land rights in spite of registration.⁹⁸⁹ First, registration was not absolute even under the RLA 1963.⁹⁹⁰ Second, the courts also recognized unregistered interests such as overriding interests under section 30 of the Registered Land Act.⁹⁹¹ Customary land rights can still be found as “overriding interests”

⁹⁸⁶ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IV, chapter 1, section 231, p. 50.

⁹⁸⁷ As above.

⁹⁸⁸ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 116, p. 32; TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IV, section 231, p. 50.

⁹⁸⁹ Onalo, PL (n 198) pp. 199 – 205.

⁹⁹⁰ See Registered Land Act (repealed) (n 964) section 142-143 (section 142 permitted the Registrar to rectify the register in case of errors or omissions or where all interested parties consented to such rectification. Section 143 permitted rectification by the court where there has been fraud or mistake, with the exception of a first registration).

⁹⁹¹ See cases cited in Onalo, PL (n 198) p. 190 - 191: *Popatlal v. Reichand* (1963) EA 69 (the Court voided a loan transaction because of failure to register a memorandum of equitable mortgage as per the Money Lenders Act); *Sela Obiero v. Orego Opiyo and Others* (High Court Civil Case no. 44 of 1970) (the Court refused to enforce customary law rights and stated that they were extinguished upon registration under the Registered Land Act. The Court thus gave ownership of a parcel of land to a widow over sons of co-wives who were claiming customary land rights over the same parcel of land).

Judge C.B. Madan (as he then was) in *Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi*, Civil Case No. 176 of 1973, pp. 10-11, recognized a customary law trust as an overriding interest when he held that the plaintiff held the parcel in trust for himself and the defendant as tenants in common in equal shares and ordered the defendant's name to be entered in the register.¹⁰⁰⁵ Judge Madan stated as follows:

“[a]s regards section 126, there was no need to register the defendant ‘as trustee’. He was registered owner as the oldest son of the family in accordance with Kikuyu custom which has the inherent of trust in it. Ordinarily, in pursuance of Kikuyu custom he would have transferred a half share in ‘Marango’ (Land) to the plaintiff. In any event this section does not make registration as ‘trustee’ obligation. It sates that a person may be described by that capacity.”¹⁰⁰⁶


It provided in sections 28, 126 and 143(1) that, unless a registered owner was described as a trustee under section 126 in the instrument of title/of acquisition of land, there can be no trust and the land cannot be said to be held under trust. Section 126(1) stated that a person acquiring land, a lease or a charge in a fiduciary capacity may be described by that capacity in the instrument of acquisition and if so described shall be registered with the addition of the words “as trustee” to give purchasers notice of his capacity so that they can protect themselves with regard to receipts to purchase money. Under section 126(2), a settlement of trust may be deposited with the Registrar but it cannot be registered. Further, section 143(5) provides that a first registration may not be attacked even if it is obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake). See also Land Registration Act (n 949) section 66 (similar to section 126 of the Registered Land Act (repealed) (n 964), it stated that a person acquiring land, a lease or a charge in a fiduciary capacity may be described in that capacity in the instrument of acquisition and be registered with the addition of the words “as trustee”, but the Registrar shall not enter particulars of any trust in the register).

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi*, Civil Case No. 176 of 1973, pp. 10-11 (in the High Court at Nairobi), available at www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 27 April 2020). See also Onalo, PL (n 198) pp. 199-200 (summarizing the Court's decision in the case of *Gatimu v. Muya Gathangi*, Civil Case No. 176 of 1973).

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Gatimu v. Muya Gathangi* (n 1005 above) p. 9.

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND
TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

process leading to first registration.¹⁰¹⁵ Below is a chart of the status of first registrations in Kenyan counties:



Source: ‘Advisory on Comprehensive Programme for Registration of Title in Land (Draft Report)’ (2018) National Land Commission (NLC), p. 33 (pie-chart), available at <http://www.landcommission.go.ke/> (accessed 27 April 2020).

The table below illustrates the total number of titles from adjudication exercises in the counties or sub counties as of 31st August 2018.

County/Sub-County	No. of Parcels	Area in Ha.
Kericho	60,280	246,839.56
Nandi	37,577	145,962.62
Keiyo	30,632	49,443
Marakwet	17,459	52,943
Baringo	38,223	140,006.42
Koibatek	9,410	137.495.99

¹⁰¹⁵ ‘Advisory on Comprehensive Programme for Registration of Title in Land (Draft Report)’ (2018) National Land Commission (NLC), p. 5 (Executive Summary), 33 (pie-chart) available at <http://www.landcommission.go.ke/> (accessed 27 April 2020).

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

Narok	7,142	755790.82
Narok North	13,040	40,237.23
Narok South	149	117,726.58
Trans Mara	13,702	150,256.19
Kajiado	6,377	2,002,612.03
West Pokot	19,185	232,789.32
Samburu	611	924,716.15
Laikipia	70	44,664

Source: ‘Advisory on Comprehensive Programme for Registration of Title in Land (Draft Report)’ (2018) National Land Commission (NLC), pp. 49-50, available at <http://www.landcommission.go.ke/> (accessed 27 April 2020).

As is evident from the above chart and table, a majority of Kenyan land – approximately seventy percent (70%) - remains unregistered and will continue to be owned, used and managed according to the customary practices of the African communities that inhabit the unregistered land.¹⁰¹⁶ The informal nature of land rights in Kenya is similar to Tanzania where many members of the African communities inhabit informal settlements without any documentary proof that they own the land.¹⁰¹⁷ Similar to Kenya, informal settlements accounted for about 70% of urban settlements in Tanzania in 2012.¹⁰¹⁸ The African communities that depend on these unregistered lands for their livelihoods in both East African countries continue to exist and persist at the periphery of the integrated socio-

¹⁰¹⁶ NLC Advisory on Registration of Title (n 1015) pp. 33, 49-50.

¹⁰¹⁷ The United Republic of Tanzania (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development) ‘Habitat III National Report – Tanzania (Final Report)’ (July, 2016) p. 3, available at <http://habitat3.org/> (accessed 27 April 2020).

¹⁰¹⁸ As above.

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND
TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

stewards.¹⁰²⁵ In other words, the progressive Africans or the African farmers merely replaced the white settlers.¹⁰²⁶ So, the clash between the state statutory system and the African customary system continued; whereas it was formerly between visibly-distinct white settlers and black Africans, it now became a clash between a newly-minted African bourgeoisie and an economically-depressed and socially-isolated African majority.¹⁰²⁷ African communities resisted the state's assimilation policy, generally, and more particularly, the Swynnerton Plan's land registration system.¹⁰²⁸

This clash between the state statutory system and African community systems took the form of isolated or small, localised tribal clashes and protests against state policies.¹⁰²⁹ These smaller resistance movements by African communities were suppressed by the state system during the authoritarian rule of Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of Kenya, between 1963 and 1978.¹⁰³⁰ His successor, President Daniel Arap Moi, ruled Kenya for 24 years (1978 - 2002) and was also authoritarian with limited tolerance for resistance by African communities.¹⁰³¹ However, even during the years of oppression and suppression by the state system, the African communities adapted their resistance methods to use election cycles to

that suggests that social groupings have the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies).

¹⁰²⁵ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 12-15; See also Oginga-Odinga (n 891) chapters 3 & 14 (using the title 'the White Hand of Authority' for chapter 3 and 'Obstacles to Uhuru' for chapter 14, Oginga-Odinga writes about the colonial state's use of African elites to maintain their dominance over African communities after independence).

¹⁰²⁶ As above.

¹⁰²⁷ As above.

¹⁰²⁸ See Chapter 2 (discusses the traditional tenure systems of African communities and their resistance to state disruption). See also Aguirre, BE (n 219) and Ruhl, JB (n 219) (discussing resilience).

¹⁰²⁹ As above.

¹⁰³⁰ Laurence Juma 'Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya' (Spring, 2002) 9 *Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L.* 471, 490-492 (discussing the authoritarian rule of Jomo Kenyatta).

¹⁰³¹ Juma, L (n 1030) pp. 492-494 (discussing the authoritarian rule of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi).

The Njonjo Commission recommended, *inter alia*, the introduction of a National Land Policy, enactment of a law that would enable claims made under customary law concerning land to be heard in established courts and investigation of historical injustices dealing with the issue of land in the Coast and Rift Valley.¹⁰⁴⁶

On 21 November 2005, widespread socio-economic reforms were proposed in Kenya through a constitutional referendum. The proposed new constitution was gazetted on 22 August 2005 in accordance with Kenyan law.¹⁰⁴⁷ Section 81 of the proposed constitution dealt with community land and provided that “[c]ommunity land shall vest in and be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture, or community of interest.”¹⁰⁴⁸ Community land was to be registered and any unregistered community land held in trust by district governments on behalf of the communities.¹⁰⁴⁹ Parliament was then tasked with enacting more specific legislation to implement the new communal tenure framework.¹⁰⁵⁰ A National Constitutional Conference held at the Bomas of Kenya had also adopted a draft constitution known as “the Bomas Draft” on 15 March 2004 with a similar communal tenure framework in its section 80.¹⁰⁵¹ Kenyans rejected the proposed constitution during the referendum of 21 November 2005 but the clamour for land tenure reforms continued.

¹⁰⁴⁶ As above.

¹⁰⁴⁷ See ‘The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya’ (22nd August, 2005) Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 63 (2005) (Drafted and Published by the Attorney-General Pursuant to Section 27 of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, Cap 3A of the Laws of Kenya).

¹⁰⁴⁸ See The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya, 2005 (n 1047 above) section 81. The same language is used in Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) article 63(1) as follows:

“Community land shall vest in and be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar community of interest.” See Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63(1).

¹⁰⁴⁹ As above.

¹⁰⁵⁰ See The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya, 2005 (n 1047) section 81.

¹⁰⁵¹ See National Constitutional Conference ‘The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004 (Bomas Draft)’ (2004) Circulated to delegates and commissioners in hard copy on 23rd March 2004 and available at http://www.katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/3-Bomas_draft.pdf (accessed 31 March, 2020).

- (c) An autonomous and producer controlled legal and administrative structure for the management of the European sector, as opposed to a coercive and government controlled structure for the African areas; and
- (d) A policy environment designed to facilitate the development of the European sector of the economy by under-developing its African counterpart.¹⁰⁶⁴

The National Land Policy, 2009, then proposes land tenure reforms to formally recognize communal tenure systems that were practiced by African communities before colonialism.¹⁰⁶⁵ Section 3.1(33) under chapter 3 of the National Land Policy, 2009, describes Kenya's then proposed recognition framework for community land rights as follows:

It adopts a plural approach, in which different systems of tenure coexist and benefit from equal guarantees of tenure security. The rationale for this plural approach is that the equal recognition and protection of all modes of tenure will facilitate the reconciliation and realisation of the critical values which land represents.¹⁰⁶⁶

The proposed land tenure reforms therefore advocated for maintaining the dual tenure system while guaranteeing equality of the two tenure systems through anchoring the communal tenure system in the constitution and passing legislation to implement it.

4.6 COMMUNAL TENURE UNDER THE 2010 CONSTITUTION

The state found a unique opportunity to institute land tenure reforms through the constitutional review process that gained widespread political support in the period after the 2007-2008 post-election violence which led to the loss of approximately 1,133 lives, destruction of approximately 78,254 houses and displacement of approximately 663,921

¹⁰⁶⁴ As above.

¹⁰⁶⁵ National Land Policy of 2009 (n 229) chapter 3, section 33, paragraph 3.1.

¹⁰⁶⁶ As above.

efforts to establish the factors responsible for conflicts over land and to formulate and implement actionable short, medium and long-term recommendations on the issue.”¹⁰⁷⁰

The implementation agenda that was attached to the Statement of Principles included preparing a draft Constitution to be approved by the Kenyan Parliament and enacted by the people of Kenya through a referendum.¹⁰⁷¹ It also included factoring land reform into the constitutional review process to address fundamental issues of land tenure and land use.¹⁰⁷²

The Statement of Principles was formally enacted into law as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008.¹⁰⁷³ The Schedule to the National Accord and Reconciliation Act set out the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government (“Principles of Partnership”) that was formed following the crisis.¹⁰⁷⁴ The Preamble to the Principles of Partnership summarizes the existential threat that resistance by African community systems posed to the Kenyan state system as follows:

“The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed presidential elections has brought to the surface deep-seated and long-standing divisions within Kenyan society. If left unaddressed, these divisions threaten the very existence of Kenya as a unified country. The Kenyan people are now looking to their leaders to ensure that their country will not be lost.”¹⁰⁷⁵

¹⁰⁷⁰ Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Statement of Principles (n 1068) section B (Land Reform).

¹⁰⁷¹ Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Statement of Principles (n 1068) pp. 5 et seq., (Agenda Item 4 Implementation Framework).

¹⁰⁷² As above.

¹⁰⁷³ National Accord and Reconciliation Act (n 594).

¹⁰⁷⁴ National Accord and Reconciliation Act (n 594 above) section 9 (Schedule).

¹⁰⁷⁵ As above.

On 4 August 2010, Kenyans participated in a constitutional referendum to accept or reject widespread socio-economic reforms to address deep-seated and long-standing divisions within Kenyan society.¹⁰⁷⁶ Kenyans overwhelmingly voted in favour of the new constitution which was officially promulgated on 27 August 2010.¹⁰⁷⁷

The Constitution of 2010 has a whole chapter on land, Chapter 5, which includes Articles 60-68.¹⁰⁷⁸ Article 61 (1) is a major departure from the 1963 Constitution on who the land belongs to; whereas the Crown/Government owned all the land under the 1963 Constitution, Article 61(1) of the 2010 Constitution states that “[a]ll land in Kenya belongs to the people of Kenya collectively as a nation, as communities and as individuals”.¹⁰⁷⁹ This also differs from the situation in Tanzania where all land is public property vested in the President as a trustee and all individuals legally occupy or use the land by way of right of occupancy, deemed or granted.¹⁰⁸⁰ The Tanzanian laws vesting all the land in the President is a continuation of colonial land laws in East Africa, generally, that vested all land in the German colonial state and the subsequent British Crown.¹⁰⁸¹

The 2010 Kenyan Constitution further classifies land into three main categories: private land, public land and community land. Private land is that which is owned by an individual under freehold or leasehold.¹⁰⁸² Public land is vested in the government for the

¹⁰⁷⁶ The Constitution of Kenya Review Act (Referendum) Regulations, 2010, L. N. 66 of 2010 (23rd August 2010) The Kenya Gazette, Gazette Notice No. 10019.

¹⁰⁷⁷ 2010 Referendum Regulations (n 1076) (declaring that 68.55% of the total valid votes cast ratified the new constitution).

¹⁰⁷⁸ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) chapter 5, articles 60-68.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) chapter 5, article 61 (1).

¹⁰⁸⁰ See The Land Act 1999, section 4, The United Republic of Tanzania (available at <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan23795.pdf>) (accessed on March 31, 2020).

¹⁰⁸¹ See East Africa Order in council (n 762); The East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance (Sept. 27, 1902) reprinted in 95 British and Foreign State Papers 1901 - 1902, at 528 (1905); ‘Rules for the Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902 No. 76’ (1903) The Official Gazette of the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates, East Africa Protectorate.

¹⁰⁸² Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63.

The same assurance of validity of existing communal tenure systems is echoed in section 2 of the Transitional Provisions of the Community Land Act to make it clear and unambiguous that all unregistered community land rights before the Act may be deemed to be rights of the newly registered communities once properly documented in accordance with the Act.¹¹¹⁰ Accordingly, section 47 of the Act provides that respective group representatives of former group ranches together with the communities they represent may be registered as communities.¹¹¹¹ Customary land trusts may also be registered as community land under the Act.¹¹¹²

The Community Land Act and Regulations allow for conversion of community land to either public land or private land and vice versa.¹¹¹³ Section 25 of the Act and section 17 of the Regulations provide that private land may be converted to community land by transfer, surrender or operation of law.¹¹¹⁴ Section 24 of the Act and section 18 of the Regulations allow for conversion of public land into community land by the National Land Commission.¹¹¹⁵ However, for conversion of any community land into either public land or private land, the approval of the community is required.¹¹¹⁶ Under section 16(1) of the Regulations, a community may convert whole or part of its land to private land through transfer with the approval of at least two thirds of the community assembly.¹¹¹⁷ Besides the compulsory acquisition process involving the National Land Commission, community land may also be converted into public land through transfer and surrender with the approval at least two thirds of the community assembly.¹¹¹⁸ Section 19 of the Regulations allows the

¹¹¹⁰ Community Land Act (n 19) (transitional provisions) section 2.

¹¹¹¹ Community Land Act (n 19) section 47.

¹¹¹² Community Land Act (n 19) section 5(2).

¹¹¹³ Community Land Act (n 19) sections 24, 25; Community Land Regulations (n 19) sections 17, 18.

¹¹¹⁴ As above.

¹¹¹⁵ As above.

¹¹¹⁶ As above.

¹¹¹⁷ Community Land Regulations (n 19) section 16(1).

¹¹¹⁸ Community Land Regulations (n 19) section 19.

community, through the resolution of at least two thirds of the community assembly, to set aside land for an identified public purpose in a process involving the county government and the National Land Commission.¹¹¹⁹

The act of registration remains the key to formal recognition of customary land rights under the Constitution of 2010 and Community Land Act of 2016. The Act defines “registered community” to mean a community that has completed the registration processes and is recognized in accordance with its provisions and the provisions of the Land Registration Act, 2012.¹¹²⁰ Under section 16 of the Community Land Act, 2016, the registration of a community as the proprietor of land vests in that community the absolute ownership of that land, while the registration of a community as the proprietor of a lease vests in that community the leasehold interest described in the lease.¹¹²¹ The effect of non-registration of any parcel of community land is that it remains unregistered community land to be held in trust by the county governments on behalf of the communities.¹¹²² However, the trustee role of the relevant county government ceases upon registration of any unregistered community land.¹¹²³ The act of registration is therefore key to formal recognition of a community’s customary land rights under the new legislative framework.

Under the new communal tenure system, county governments perform an overall trustee role, especially with respect to unregistered community land.¹¹²⁴ The Act provides that county governments will hold in trust all unregistered community land on behalf of the respective communities and maintain a special interest-bearing account for any monies payable as compensation for compulsory acquisition of any such unregistered community land.¹¹²⁵ Such monies are to be released to the community upon registration of the

¹¹¹⁹ As above.

¹¹²⁰ Community Land Act (n 19) section 2.


¹¹²¹ Community Land Act (n 19) section 16.

¹¹²² Community Land Act (n 19) section 6.

¹¹²³ As above.

¹¹²⁴ As above.

¹¹²⁵ As above.



Source: Flow chart designed by author based on the Community Land Act 27 of 2016, KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 148 § 39 (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting) and the Community Land Regulations, 2017, Legislative Supplement No. 87, KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 178 (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting).

The land registration system envisioned by the Community Land Act of 2016 is similar to the land registration system advocated under the Swynnerton Plan.¹¹³⁸ The main difference between the two, however, is that whereas the Swynnerton Plan encouraged individuals to register their land rights,¹¹³⁹ the Act encourages communities (and not individuals) to register similar land rights.¹¹⁴⁰ Similar to the Swynnerton Plan, the communal tenure system also has its imperfections. Some of the criticisms of the new communal tenure recognition framework include: (1) continuing perception of inequality of the two land tenure systems; (2) scarcity of high-potential and semi-potential land that can be registered or converted into community land; (3) inability to address historical land injustices and the state's continuing domination of community systems; (4) vague language and conflicting legislation that may lead to enforcement challenges; and (5) budget limitations that may negatively impact implementation of the new framework.¹¹⁴¹

The first issue is whether the new communal tenure system that has been recognized under the 2010 Constitution and the Community Land Act of 2016 provides the same tenure security that a person would obtain under individual tenure.¹¹⁴² This issue is critical to the

¹¹³⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) and Community Land Act (n 19).

¹¹³⁹ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 24 - 25.

¹¹⁴⁰ Community Land Act (n 19) section 2.

¹¹⁴¹ See Kameri-Mbote et al (n 1087) (on communal tenure); NLC Advisory on Registration of Title (n 1015); Kameri-Mbote, P (n 1012) (World Bank); Klopp, JM & Lumumba, O (n 828); Liz Alden Wily 'The Community Land Act in Kenya Opportunities and Challenges for Communities' (19 January 2018) Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden Law School; Collins Odote 'The Dawn of Uhuru? Implications of Constitutional Recognition of Communal Land Rights in Pastoral Areas of Kenya' (2013) *Nomadic Peoples*, vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 87-105.

¹¹⁴² P.L. Onalo, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya, Jacqueline M. Klopp, a research scholar, and Odenda Lumumba, a land rights activist, have all identified the risk of continuing inequality of tenure rights between the formal statutory tenure and the informal communal tenure system. See Onalo, PL (n 198 above), chapter 9; Klopp, JM & Lumumba, O (n 828 above), pp. 5-6. See also NLC Advisory on Registration of Title (n 1015) p. 51 (stating that "[t]he vast majority of Kenyans in the unregistered areas prefer registration of individual titles to registration of Community land").

CHAPTER 4 INTERFACE BETWEEN STATUTORY LAWS AND TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

framework.¹¹⁶¹ Before enactment of the Canadian Constitution of 1982, the Canadian state system did not view the Aboriginal peoples in Canada as equal to the European settlers.¹¹⁶² The settlers viewed Aboriginal peoples as an inferior race, with inferior rights to land, dependent on the good will of the sovereign.¹¹⁶³ After enactment of the Canadian Constitution of 1982, the Aboriginal rights and interests in land remain sui generis.¹¹⁶⁴ They are neither rights to own in fee simple, nor rights to govern, but merely rights of use and occupancy.¹¹⁶⁵ They can be described as rights and interests that are only "personal and usufructuary", which makes them lesser rights than individual tenure rights enjoyed by other Canadians.¹¹⁶⁶

This inequality of tenure rights in Canada has resulted in conflicts and instability between the Canadian state and the Aboriginal communities.¹¹⁶⁷ The *Idle No More* movement in Canada, for example, is a network of Aboriginal communities that are struggling for recognition of Aboriginal rights.¹¹⁶⁸ The movement arose out of revelations of abject poverty in an Indian reserve community in the northern part of Ontario, a Canadian

¹¹⁶¹ See Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act, S.C. 2014, c. 38 (assented on 16 December 2014) available through the Canadian government's Justice Laws Website: <https://laws.justice.gc.ca/> (accessed 28 April 2020) (states in its preamble that "[w]hereas the Indian Act is an outdated colonial statute, the application of which results in the people of Canada's First Nations being subjected to differential treatment; Whereas the Indian Act does not provide an adequate legislative framework for the development of self-sufficient and prosperous First Nations' communities").

¹¹⁶² LaForme, HS et al (n 617) pp. 687 – 740.

¹¹⁶³ As above.

¹¹⁶⁴ Canadian Constitution of 1982 (n 1088).

¹¹⁶⁵ As above.

¹¹⁶⁶ As above.

¹¹⁶⁷ Mark Mancini 'Wandering Without a Torch: Federalism as a Guiding Light' (2016) 67 UNBLJ 369 - 394 / (2016) 67 R.D. U.N.-B. 369 – 394, at sections 58 - 65.

¹¹⁶⁸ Victoria Freeman 'In Defence of Reconciliation' (2014) 27 Can. J.L. & Juris. 213–223 (describing the Idle No More movement and its potential contribution to the push for reconciliation between the Canadian state and the Aboriginal communities in Canada).

In addressing historical injustices committed toward Aboriginal peoples, the Canadian state has publicly apologized for its policy of assimilation.¹²⁰⁰ On June 11, 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly apologized from the floor of the House of Commons for the state policy of assimilation that was implemented through the Indian residential school system.¹²⁰¹ An apology by the Kenyan state for historical land injustices would be a welcome acknowledgement of the dispossession and displacement of African communities by the colonial state and its successor Kenyan state.

Another example of the Kenyan state's domination and suppression of African community systems that has posed a challenge to implementation of the new communal tenure framework is the repeal of statutory provisions allowing for compensation of communities in resource-rich areas.¹²⁰² The Community Land (Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Legal Notice No. 180 deleted sections 23 and 24 of the Community Land Regulations that provided a mechanism for payment of royalties, rent, compensation and any other payments to the community for expropriation of natural resources on community land.¹²⁰³ Under the deleted provisions, the community land management committee was responsible for record-keeping and facilitating development of a benefit sharing plan approved by two thirds of the community assembly to ensure sustainable use and equitable distribution of benefits including the minority groups, women and persons with disability.¹²⁰⁴ The community land management committee was also charged with the responsibility of monitoring compliance with relevant laws when it came to prospecting for minerals or mining on community land.¹²⁰⁵ The state can thus expropriate natural resources from

¹²⁰⁰ Mahoney, K (n 846) pp. 198 – 232 (discussing Prime Minister Harper's public apology to the Canadian Aboriginal or Indian or First Nations community).

¹²⁰¹ As above.

¹²⁰² The Community Land (Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Legal Notice No. 180 (Published by the Government Printer, Nairobi).

¹²⁰³ As above. See also Community Land Regulations (n 19) sections 23 and 24 (before amendment).

¹²⁰⁴ As above.

¹²⁰⁵ As above.

community land without a clearly-prescribed mechanism for compensating the relevant community.

The fourth criticism of the new communal tenure framework is the vague terminology used and conflicting legislation that may lead to enforcement challenges.¹²⁰⁶ Dr. Liz Alden Wily, for example, has suggested that one of the indicators of a state's achievements in recognizing communal tenure is where "communities are legal persons for the purposes of land ownership; that is, they are not required to register companies, cooperatives, or other legal entities to own land on their behalf".¹²⁰⁷ The issue of what constitutes a community is crucial because the community is supposed to identify the community land and to elect a community land management committee, made up of its members, that will register the community and manage the community land on behalf of that community.¹²⁰⁸ The definition of "community" in the current communal tenure legal framework is problematic because it requires communities to register a legal entity before it can be recognized.¹²⁰⁹ Furthermore, it allows communities to self-identify on the basis a vague category known as "community of interests".¹²¹⁰ The Community Land Act gives a definition in the interpretation section of "community of interests" as "the possession or enjoyment of common rights, privileges or interests in land, living in the same geographical area or having such apparent association", which adds to the vagueness of the "community of interests" basis for creating a community.¹²¹¹

¹²⁰⁶ See Liz Alden Wily (n 1141); Patricia Kameri-Mbote and Others 'Ours by Right: Law, Politics, and Realities of Community Property in Kenya' (2013) Nairobi: Strathmore University Press (discussing communal tenure in Kenya); Odote, C (n 1141).

¹²⁰⁷ See Liz Alden Wily (n 1141) section 2.3 (discussing the need for progressive recognition frameworks to recognize the rights of communities that already exist).

¹²⁰⁸ Community Land Act (n 19) section 7.

¹²⁰⁹ Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art 63(1) (provides that communities may be identified on the basis of "ethnicity, culture or similar community of interest"). The same definition of "community" is contained in the Land Registration Act No. 3 of 2012.

¹²¹⁰ As above.

¹²¹¹ Community Land Act (n 19) section 2.

tenure framework has been attributed by the state and its officials to bureaucratic red tape.¹²³⁵

The lesson learnt from the Australian experience and the MKURUBITA experience is the need for goodwill and commitment from the state and state officials to ensure smooth implementation of similar property formalization programs and reforms.¹²³⁶ The state must provide an enabling policy environment through the establishment of essential institutions and provision of sufficient financial support.¹²³⁷

4.7 REVIEW

In this chapter I analyse the clash between state statutory law and the African customary law systems. Using social dominance theory, I demonstrate that when two systems such as the colonial state and African community systems interact, they tend to hierarchize. The colonial state system ends up using institutional and individual discrimination and asymmetrical behaviours to ensure that it dominates and suppresses the African communities. This hierarchization was the reason behind the colonial state's use of the theory of *terra nullius* to expropriate African community land and to create a modern economy for the colony that relegated African communities to the fringes of the integrated African socio-economic system. The socio-economic marginalization of African communities in Kenya is similar to the exclusion of Indian communities of Canada and Aboriginal communities of Australia.

In Kenya, the African communities continue to remain resilient and to resist their marginalization as they did under colonial rule and continue to do under independent Kenyan state rule. Their resistance against the colonial state climaxed in the Mau Mau uprising of 1952-1960. The colonial state realized the existential threat posed to it by these resistance movements and sought creative ways of creating an equilibrium within the state system. The colonial state then developed and implemented a policy of assimilation known as the Swynnerton Plan. The Swynnerton Plan encouraged individual African participants to grow

¹²³⁵ As above.

¹²³⁶ Tehan, M (n 1233); Lyons, M (n 1151) pp. 74 – 95.

¹²³⁷ As above.

cash crops in high potential and semi-potential areas mainly in the Rift Valley region just as European settlers had done in the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas. The aim was to integrate a critical mass of Africans into the colonial state's socio-economic system.

The flaw in the colonial state's policy of assimilation was its tendency to ignore whole African communities. Instead of integrating the African communities, as communities, into the integrated socio-economic system, the Swynnerton Plan targeted select Africans that were described in the Plan as "the progressive African farmer", "able, energetic or rich African", or "a good and well trained African".¹²³⁸ Indeed, the Swynnerton Plan advocated for extinguishment of African customary practices, including communal tenure, through formal registration of individual land rights. African communities remained resilient and resisted the Swynnerton Plan and its hostility toward their customary practices. The clamour for land tenure reforms grew as the state continued to implement the Swynnerton Plan. The independent Kenyan state then realized that the colonial policy of assimilation had failed to create an equilibrium that would ensure the state system's survival or long-term stability. The state then sought creative ways of building a pipeline for transitioning whole African communities from the fringes to the core of Kenya's integrated socio-economic system.

In 2009, the state enacted the Kenya National Land Policy, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009, that called for, inter alia, formal state statutory recognition of communal tenure regimes that pre-existed the state system. Such recognition came through a constitutional referendum on 4 August 2010 in which Kenyans voted overwhelmingly in favour of a new constitution that was promulgated on 27 August 2010. The Constitution of 2010 was the first constitutional recognition of African communal tenure systems in Kenya. The Community Land Act, No. 27 of 2016 was then enacted to implement the new communal tenure system and implementing regulations were also passed in 2017 with some amendments in 2018.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the criticisms of the new communal tenure recognition framework in Kenya. The criticisms are directed at the state and its duty to provide goodwill and commitment to ensure smooth implementation of the

¹²³⁸ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 24 - 25.

CHAPTER 5 **TRANSFORMATIVE LAND**
TENURE REFORMS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter, I return to the fundamental question of this thesis; exploring an ideal interface between the formal state statutory system and the customary law systems of the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis as representative communities of the Rift Valley region of Kenya. The ideal interface between the Kenyan state system and the Rift Valley communities should result in effective state recognition and enforcement of the customary land rights of these community systems as a path toward a stable coexistence between the multiple legal systems.¹²³⁹ The United Nations General Assembly and the African Union have both called for state recognition of customary land rights as an appropriate balance between the communities' right of self-determination and state sovereignty.¹²⁴⁰ However, there are scholars, mostly in Canada, who have rejected this politics of recognition as a waste of Aboriginal communities' time and called for a more aggressive assertion of self-determination rights, including civil disobedience.¹²⁴¹ The Canadian scholars view the

¹²³⁹ I refer to the state statutory system and the community legal systems as 'multiple legal systems' in line with the legal anthropologist/naturalist approach to legal pluralism that bases the legitimacy of customary law upon its wide acceptance by members of the community. See Croce, M (n 37) pp. 27 – 47 (summarizing the position taken by legal anthropologists and naturalists).

¹²⁴⁰ See 'United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration)' (2007) U.N.Doc.A/RES/47/1 U.N. General Assembly resolution 61/295 (stating the rights of indigenous peoples, including the "right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired"). See also See Philip C. Aka 'Introductory Note to African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Republic of Kenya (August 2017) (AFR. CT. H.P.R.), 56 I.L.M. 726 (discussing the Ogiek community's struggle to continue inhabiting the Mau Forest).

¹²⁴¹ Some of these authors base their rejection of recognition politics on the writings of Franz Fanon. See Fanon, F (n 31) (arguing that recognition is a tool used by the dominating social system to maintain its dominance and suppression of other social systems).

politics of recognition as another tool for domination and suppression of community systems by the state system.¹²⁴²

I discuss this delicate balance between the right of self-determination and state sovereignty before concluding that the win - win option for both systems is rooted in effective recognition. I first rely on Professor Luhmann's systems theory¹²⁴³ to acknowledge that a community, as a system, tends to self-define or self-identify. This self-definition or self-identity characteristic of systems denotes the system's ability to become independent of its environment and to understand the external environment from the system's own internal frames of reference.¹²⁴⁴ The Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities have lived in the Kenyan Rift Valley as community systems for hundreds of years.¹²⁴⁵ A comparison of community systems in the Rift Valley with the Indian and Aboriginal community systems in the United States of America, Canada, and Australia shows that self-definition or self-identification is a major character trait of community systems.¹²⁴⁶

The self-definition or self-identification characteristics is also tied to the community system's struggle to maintain its integrity and stability as a community. It is the capacity of a system to self- reorganize while undergoing change, in order to retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedback loop mechanisms before the change occurred.¹²⁴⁷ This is a separate systemic characteristic of a community that enables it to use feedback loop

¹²⁴² See Wilson, EK (n 15) (for an explanation of social dominance theory that supports the argument that the state system may use the politics of recognition as a tool of dominating and suppressing community systems).

¹²⁴³ See King, M (n 85) (explaining that systems theory, as borrowed from biological systems, posits that systems are essentially units which repeatedly self-produce and thus become independent of their environment).

¹²⁴⁴ As above.

¹²⁴⁵ See Chapter 2 (for a discussion of the customary land rights of the communities inhabiting the Kenyan Rift Valley).

¹²⁴⁶ As above.

¹²⁴⁷ See King, M (n 85) (explaining that systems theory, as borrowed from biological systems, posits that systems are essentially units which repeatedly self-produce and thus become independent of their environment).

mechanisms¹²⁴⁸ and communication¹²⁴⁹ to respond to disruptions emanating from its environment. Such disruptions interfere with the system's stability and causes it to experience stress. The ethnic strife that has occurred in the Rift Valley region because of disruptive colonial and neo-colonial state policies, is a symptom of the stress experienced by the community systems in a struggle to maintain their integrity and stability.¹²⁵⁰ For example, in Chapter 2, I describe how widespread ethnic violence led to one thousand one hundred thirty three (1,133) deaths, seventy-eight thousand two hundred fifty four (78,254) houses destroyed country wide and some six hundred sixty three thousand nine hundred twenty one (663,921) people displaced following disputed results of the presidential elections of December 27, 2007.¹²⁵¹

Through struggles rooted in their customary practices, the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis and other communities living in the Kenyan Rift Valley have continued to fight to repossess the land that they lost when European settlers decided to create a European reserve and to push the African communities into native reserves or to become squatters or labourer-tenants on European farms.¹²⁵² The attempts by state resettlement programs to correct the instabilities occasioned upon community systems through colonial disruption have failed to restore the land to these communities and, instead, rewarded political cronies and relatives, thereby creating more ethnic tension and more instability in the Rift Valley.¹²⁵³ So long as

¹²⁴⁸ See Hugh Baxter (n 46) (discussing the system's use of feedback loop mechanisms to re-generate itself to ensure its own survival as a system).

¹²⁴⁹ Cassuto, DN (n 9) (discussing communication as a systemic characteristic).

¹²⁵⁰ See as above. As I discuss in Chapter 2, the Rift Valley communities have used every election cycle to express their dissatisfaction with their dispossession and displacement from their community land. Relying on the systems theory notion of autopoiesis as I explain in section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1 and borrowing from the New Science of Niklas Luhmann (n 39), I analyse the communities' expressions of dissatisfaction as efforts to regenerate and transform the conditions of their validity to ensure their survival as communities.

¹²⁵¹ See CIPEV Report (n 5), chapter 9 (detailing the extent and consequences of the 2007-2008 post-election violence: deaths, injuries and destruction of property).

¹²⁵² This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

¹²⁵³ As above.

the Rift Valley communities remain unstable, according to systems theory,¹²⁵⁴ they will continue struggling to maintain their integrity and stability. If left with no other options for self-corrective measures, the African communities will naturally resort to their pre-colonial customary practices of violence as a response to the continuing disruption.¹²⁵⁵ Indeed, this systemic characteristic of self-identification or self-definition is the basis of scholarship rejecting the politics of recognition; that the struggle should continue until the system maintains its integrity and stability.¹²⁵⁶ It is also at the root of a recognition by the international community of a community's right to self-determination.¹²⁵⁷

However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the systemic characteristic of self-definition or self-identification is also in inherent conflict with the principle of state sovereignty; if a community system is able to assert its character trait of self-identification and self-definition against the state, then that community would be sovereign and, hence, become a state.¹²⁵⁸ If an individual's status determination by a community in exercise of its right of self-definition or self-identification is at variance with the same individual's status determination by a state in exercise of its sovereign power, the community must, therefore, yield out of a sense of self-preservation.¹²⁵⁹ A community system's characteristic of self-definition or self-determination is therefore subject to state validation through recognition.¹²⁶⁰

¹²⁵⁴ Aguirre, BE (n 219) p. 41 (describing resilience as “an example of morphostasis--that is, a process directed to preserve the social system”); Ruhl, JB (n 219) (also discussing resilience).

¹²⁵⁵ As above. See also Maloba, WO (n 222) (introduction) (describing the Mau Mau uprising as the majority Kikuyu community's struggle against a state system that maintained white Europeans at the top of the hierarchy in Kenya. The white Europeans maintained their dominance through access to the rich resources of the Rift Valley and Central Province and control over the state machinery, while many Kenyan communities remained marginalized).

¹²⁵⁶ Coulthard, GS (n 28) (arguing that the politics of recognition does not create partnerships but continues the suppression and domination of indigenous community systems by the state).

¹²⁵⁷ See UN Declaration (n 1240).

¹²⁵⁸ *Love v Commonwealth* (n 12) (the Australian High Court recognized the centrality of land to the identity and existence of Aboriginal communities in Australia).

¹²⁵⁹ As above.

¹²⁶⁰ As above.

Fortunately, as also discussed in Chapter 4, the Kenyan state system has chosen to recognize communal tenure under the 2010 Constitution, the Community Land Act of 2016 and its implementing regulations.¹²⁶¹ The challenge in this thesis has, therefore, been to test whether Kenya's communal tenure recognition framework is effective. As I state in the review section of Chapter 3, my goal has been to examine this new interface between the formal Kenyan state statutory system and the informal African customary legal systems to test the state's effectiveness in affording communities genuine options for self-corrective measures to mitigate the risk of instability in the Rift Valley region.¹²⁶²

In chapter 4, I rely on the analysis of Kenya's new communal tenure framework by Colins Odote, Liz Alden Wily and Patricia Kameri-Mbote to identify the following three (3) broad issues that Kenya's new communal tenure framework should address in order for it to be more effective: (1) Conflicting legislation and vague terminology, especially concerning the definition of "Community"; (2) lack of a clear implementation plan; and (3) failure to seriously and decisively address historical land injustices and other excesses of the state system.¹²⁶³

In this chapter I first discuss the partnership-based recognition model¹²⁶⁴ as an effective interface between the Kenyan state statutory system and the community legal systems of the Rift Valley region. A partnership-based recognition framework, as

¹²⁶¹ See Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (n 1) art. 63; Community Land Act (n 19).

¹²⁶² See Chapter 3 (REVIEW section).

¹²⁶³ See Kameri-Mbote et al (n 1087) (discussing communal tenure in Kenya); Liz Alden Wily (n 1141).

¹²⁶⁴ For examples of partnership-based models of interface between two systems, see The Two Row Wampum of 1613, text available at www.peacecouncil.net (accessed 2 April 2020). See also Larry Chartrand 'Indigenous Peoples: Caught In a Perpetual Human Rights Prison' (2016) 67 UNBLJ 167 - 186 / (2016) 67 R.D. U.N.-B. 167 – 186 at paragraph 38 (describing the interface based on the Two Row Wampum of 1613 as follows: "[i]t is said that the Two-Row Wampum confirms a treaty between the Mohawk and the Dutch, where the two rows of purple represent the ship of the European and the canoe of the Mohawk sailing down the same river in peace but that "neither of us will make compulsory laws or interfere in the internal affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.")

exemplified by The Two Row Wampum of 1613, ought to be founded on consensus, friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity between the formal state and the African customary systems.¹²⁶⁵ A partnership-based model of recognition will pivot the state system away from the tendency to dominate and suppress Rift Valley community systems and, instead, integrate them into the state's socio-economic system, including formally recognizing their customary land rights.¹²⁶⁶ A partnership-based model will also require the state system to develop a clear implementation plan for the new communal tenure system in the same way that the colonial state did for the Swynnerton Plan that advocated individual tenure rights.¹²⁶⁷ Kenya's constitutional and legislative framework for communal tenure is not the ideal partnership-based model. However, it is a step in the right direction and a departure from the colonial state's land expropriation and assimilationist models. In the last part of this chapter, I discuss the need for the state system to further demonstrate its commitment and resolve to recognize communal tenure by agreeing to subject itself to the court system for adjudication of any disputes arising in its interface with the customary legal systems, including allowing for historical land injustices to be submitted directly to the Environment and Land Court.

5.2 PARTNERSHIP-BASED MODEL OF RECOGNITION

In this section, I explore the possibility of a partnership-based model of interaction between the Kenyan state statutory system and the community legal systems of the Rift Valley region. At the outset, I acknowledge that such a model would require the state system, in particular, to reconceptualize its interface model with community systems within its borders, generally. State officials will need to first appreciate the existential threat that the continued dispossession and displacement of the Rift Valley communities poses to the Kenyan state itself. The state will need to then pivot away from intervention strategies aimed

¹²⁶⁵ As above.

¹²⁶⁶ As above.

¹²⁶⁷ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) part XII (Summary), XI (discussing the cost of the plan and speculating that the approximately five million British pounds (£5m) or fifty million ((£50m) today if adjusted for inflation, would not be enough to implement the Swynnerton Plan).

at suppression and domination of African community systems and, instead, involve the communities themselves into the state economy, including formally recognizing communal tenure.¹²⁶⁸ The colonial state, in the application of its assimilationist policies, tended to dismiss African customary systems summarily.¹²⁶⁹ The circumstances that led to the colonial state's assimilationist policy no longer exist because the current Kenyan state should no longer view members of African communities and their resources only as labour and capital for building a modern economy.¹²⁷⁰ As illustrated by the descriptions of their traditional tenure systems in Chapter 2, these African communities are systems that are resilient and will resist external disruption for as long as they exist as communities. A rethinking of existential risks to the state itself around a deeper understanding of community resilience is therefore essential and requires fundamental changes to the Kenyan state's mitigation strategies for instability risks in the Rift Valley. Effective recognition should thus involve interventions in the Rift Valley that will help the currently unstable communities to achieve stability.

As demonstrated throughout this study, the best recognition framework for Kenya would be a state system that creates an effective pipeline for African communities to transition from the fringes to the core of the integrated Kenyan socio-economic system.

¹²⁶⁸ I acknowledge that this is contrary to social dominance theory's prediction that systems will naturally seek to dominate and suppress each other when they interact. See Sidanius J et al (n 611) (explaining social dominance theory as the notion that human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies). However, even the colonial state itself acknowledged the need to change its social domination tendencies in its interaction with the African community for long-term stability in the state. See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 8 (the Plan's authors recognized that "in the long term, the greatest gain from the participation of the African community in running its own agricultural industries will be a politically contented and stable community".)

¹²⁶⁹ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) pp. 9-10, 58, section 113 (outlining reasons why African customary practices were hostile to economic development of the then Kenya colony).

¹²⁷⁰ See Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 (n 758) (legislation used by the colonial government to apply the doctrine of terra nullius and to declare Kenyan land "waste and unoccupied").

"Recognize" as a legal term means "to acknowledge the legal validity of something."¹²⁷¹ For recognition to be relevant, it has to have the force of law.¹²⁷² Since a system is a whole being, the ideal recognition framework for two or more systems should be based on the partnership model. Partnerships between human beings are formed on the basis of personal relationships and involve mutual trust and confidence. The existence of a partnership, therefore, requires consensus between the partners. Because the partnership is based on consensus, where there is no personal relationship, mutual trust or confidence, the partnership is unsustainable and untenable. In other words, if the terms of any agreement between two partners are such that it is technically possible for a party to dominate and suppress the other, the relationship between those parties is not one of partnership. The ultimate test of the existence of a partnership between two communities is the intention by both communities to create an integrated socio-economic system as co-owners.¹²⁷³

In Kenya, the colonial state's domination and suppression of African communities through the doctrine of *terra nullius*, land expropriation and assimilation policies resulted in the socio-economic marginalization of the African communities.¹²⁷⁴ Example of treaties that exemplified the colonial state's domination and suppression of African communities include the Anglo-Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911 that the British used to dispossess and displace the Maasai from their land.¹²⁷⁵ The British treaties with the Maasai community is an examples of the asymmetrical behaviours of a dominant social system and not a partnership based on mutual trust and confidence.¹²⁷⁶ The colonial state's treaty-based

¹²⁷¹ See Bryan A. Garner (Editor-in-Chief) 'Black's Law Dictionary' (1996) West Publishing Co., (defines 'recognition' as "[t]he formal admission that a person, entity, or thing has a particular status; esp., a nation's act in formally acknowledging the existence of another nation or national government".)

¹²⁷² As above.

¹²⁷³ See Chartrand, L (n 1264) paragraph 38 (describing the ideal partnership model using the imagery of two communities sailing down the same river in peace without either community seeking to dominate the other).

¹²⁷⁴ See Chapter 4 (discusses the Swynnerton Plan).

¹²⁷⁵ See TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB, section 56 et seq., p. 181, et seq.

¹²⁷⁶ As above.

recognition frameworks in Kenya ended up dispossessing and displacing the African communities and marginalizing them from the state's socio-economic system.¹²⁷⁷ Such recognition frameworks were not sustainable in the long term. The colonial state eventually acknowledged that "in the long term the greatest gain from the participation of the African community in running its own agricultural industries will be a politically contented and stable community."¹²⁷⁸ The recognition frameworks that are based on suppression and domination are, therefore unsustainable and untenable.

The Canadian Aboriginal communities have had a customary practice of treaty making for generations that is based on the partnership recognition framework. An example of an old partnership-based treaty that the Aboriginal communities entered into with European settlers was "Two Row Wampum" of 1613 between the Iroquois Confederacy and the Dutch.¹²⁷⁹ The term "Wampum" refers to "Wampum belts" that were customarily used by the Iroquois to document a treaty. The Two Row Wampum of 1613 was a treaty of peace, friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity. It stressed the importance of non-interference with each other's laws, customs and traditions. This treaty was later repeated with the British. The *Idle No More* movement, a network of Aboriginal communities in Canada struggling for recognition of Aboriginal rights, has called on the Canadian state system to "[h]onour the spirit and intent of the historic Treaties ... officially repudiate the racist Doctrine of Discovery and the Doctrine of Terra Nullius, and abandon their use to justify the seizure of Indigenous Nations lands and wealth."¹²⁸⁰

Another example of a mutual recognition framework that takes into account the validity and existence of both parties was the Treaty of Ghent that ended the war of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain concerning Canada.¹²⁸¹ The Treaty of Ghent was signed on December 24, 1814 and entered into force on February 17, 1815.¹²⁸² The first

¹²⁷⁷ As above.

¹²⁷⁸ Swynnerton Plan (n 688) p. 8.

¹²⁷⁹ LaForme, HS et al (n 617) pp. 687 – 740.

¹²⁸⁰ As above.

¹²⁸¹ 'Treaty of Ghent' (signed on December 24, 1814), text available through the Library of Congress website at www.loc.gov (accessed 2 April 2020).

¹²⁸² As above.

article of the Treaty of Ghent, with very limited exceptions, restores without delay or destruction all territory, places and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other.¹²⁸³ Under subsequent articles of the Treaty, the U.S. and Britain agreed on an amicable process, consisting of two Commissioners appointed by each side, to determine the ownership of the territory that fell within the limited exceptions cited in the first article.¹²⁸⁴ Under article 9, the U.S. and Britain agreed to end hostilities against all Tribes or Nations of Indians and to restore to such Tribes or Nations all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to before the War, provided that the Tribes or Nations of Indians also agreed to end hostilities against the U.S. and Britain.¹²⁸⁵

The Two Row Wampum of 1613 and the Treaty of Ghent of 1814 were entered into between communities that had agreed to enter into consensual relationships based on friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity.¹²⁸⁶ The key to such a treaty-based partnership between communities is their intention to create a new socio-economic system as co-owners.¹²⁸⁷

A partnership-based relationship can also exist between a state and communities inhabiting the state.¹²⁸⁸ Taiaiake Alfred, a supporter of the *Idle No More* movement championing Aboriginal rights in Canada, has argued that federalism in Canada can and should recognize a constitutionally entrenched inherent Aboriginal self-government.¹²⁸⁹ Such a partnership-based recognition framework includes co-management systems which effectively recognize the autonomy of community managers and their participation with equal authority, legal standing, resources and respect as the state managers.¹²⁹⁰ The formal

¹²⁸³ See Treaty of Ghent (n 1281) (ARTICLE THE FIRST).

¹²⁸⁴ See Treaty of Ghent (n 1281).

¹²⁸⁵ See Treaty of Ghent (n 1281) (ARTICLE THE NINTH).

¹²⁸⁶ As above. See also Chartrand, L (n 1264) paragraph 38 (describing the relationship of the parties under The Two Row Wampum of 1613).

¹²⁸⁷ As above.

¹²⁸⁸ Alfred, T (n 30).

¹²⁸⁹ As above.

¹²⁹⁰ See also Chartrand, L (n 1264) paragraph 38 (describing the relationship of the parties under The Two Row Wampum of 1613).

state laws in such a system are generally compatible with the communities' customary laws like a ship (state statutory system) and a canoe (customary law system) sailing down the same river in peace but neither making compulsory laws or interfering in the internal affairs of the other by trying to steer each other's vessel.¹²⁹¹

As discussed at the end of Chapter 4 and at the beginning of this chapter, Kenya's current communal tenure framework is not ideal and does not represent "a ship and a canoe" sailing down the same river in peace without seeking to "steer each other's vessel".¹²⁹² Kenya's communal tenure framework fails to acknowledge pre-existing communities, as I highlighted in the previous section, and remains vague on the status of such communities.¹²⁹³ The National Land Policy of 2009 proposed a definition that was closer to recognizing pre-existing communities when it defined a community to include users of the land who hold customary land rights.¹²⁹⁴ Dr. Liz Alden Wily has also suggested that one of the indicators of a state's achievements in recognizing communal tenure is where "communities are legal persons for the purposes of land ownership; that is, they are not required to register companies, cooperatives, or other legal entities to own land on their behalf".¹²⁹⁵ The issue

¹²⁹¹ This imagery of a ship and a canoe sailing down a river side-by-side to exemplify the ideal partnership-based interaction framework between two legal systems is adapted from Chartrand, L (n 1264) paragraph 38 (describing the partnership model as follows: "[i]t is said that the Two-Row Wampum confirms a treaty between the Mohawk and the Dutch, where the two rows of purple represent the ship of the European and the canoe of the Mohawk sailing down the same river in peace but that "neither of us will make compulsory laws or interfere in the internal affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.")

¹²⁹² As above. The 'ship and canoe' metaphor are used to represent the state statutory system and the customary legal systems and the imagery of "sailing down the river" represents coexistence between them.

¹²⁹³ See Chapter 4.

¹²⁹⁴ See National Land Policy of 2009 (n 229) p. 63 (GLOSSARY OF TERMS) (proposes the following definition: "[c]ommunity refers to a clearly defined group of users of land, which may, but need not be, a clan or ethnic community. These groups of users hold a set of clearly defined rights and obligations over land and land-based resources.")

¹²⁹⁵ Liz Alden Wily (n 1141).

of what constitutes a community is crucial because the community is supposed to identify the community land and to elect a community land management committee, made up of its members, that will register the community and manage the community land on behalf of that community.¹²⁹⁶

The definition of “community” in the current communal tenure legal framework is problematic because it requires a governance body elected by the community to apply to a Community Land Registrar to register their community using a Form CLA 3.¹²⁹⁷ This procedure apparently applies to the ‘Maasai’, ‘Nandi’, ‘Kipsigis’, ‘Kikuyu’ and other Rift Valley communities as well.¹²⁹⁸ This definition of community is problematic because it fails to “recognize” the pre-existing communities but appears to require their “creation” as legal entities.¹²⁹⁹ Recognition of a community is not the same thing as the creation of a community in the way that a state system does when it allows for the registration of companies, cooperatives, or other legal entities.¹³⁰⁰ As discussed in chapter 4, this requirement of “legal creation” of Group Ranches was a contributing factor to their failure as a form of communal tenure in 1968 because the community representatives simply registered themselves as individual owners of the land.¹³⁰¹

The ‘Maasai’, ‘Nandi’, ‘Kipsigis’, ‘Kikuyu’ and other Rift Valley communities already exist as customary legal systems as discussed in chapter 2. The Rift Valley communities have no doubt that they exist as unitary and coherent social realities because there are essential characteristics defined by their members that have led to them being referred to by those ethnic labels or identity markers. Accordingly, the Kenyan state system ought to recognize their existence as customary legal systems in much the same way that the

¹²⁹⁶ Community Land Act (n 19) section 7.

¹²⁹⁷ Community Land Regulations (n 19) section 8.

¹²⁹⁸ As above.

¹²⁹⁹ Requiring creation of communities was what Dr. Liz Alden Wily warned about in Liz Alden Wily (n 1141).

¹³⁰⁰ As above.

¹³⁰¹ See the Group Representatives Act (n 301) (repealed) (the “legal creation” requirement was for members of the Group ranch to elect between three to ten group representatives in whose name the ranch was registered).

United States and Canada have acknowledged the pre-existence of Indian and Aboriginal communities in their laws.¹³⁰² This may necessitate an amendment of the Community Land Act of 2016 and its implementing regulations, but may also be achievable in the short term through an amendment to section 8 of the Community Land Regulations of 2017 by the Cabinet Secretary to the effect that “registration shall not be required for a clearly defined group of users of land, which may, but need not be, a clan or ethnic community”.¹³⁰³

Recognition of pre-existing communities does not mean doing away with the current framework’s requirement for a community to first define itself as a socially collective landowner before acquiring formal tenure rights. However, the new communal tenure framework can go further and incorporate the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities into the recognition framework.

The partnership-model of interaction also requires the state to study and understand the customs and traditions of the communities that it interacts with. The state should study and understand the Rift Valley communities’ resilience by mapping their key structural attributes, essential dynamics, interdependencies and feedback loop mechanisms in order to create and sustain interventions in the Rift Valley that will help these communities to achieve stability. State policies that arise out of the community’s value system and behaviours are also easier to implement as the community would consider such policies as better serving their needs and interests. An example of a state practice coinciding with the customary practice was observed in the drawing of colonial administrative boundaries in the Rift Valley region.¹³⁰⁴ Instead of drawing arbitrary administrative boundaries for members of the Nandi community, the colonial state drew such locational boundaries to coincide with the Bororiet

¹³⁰² See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, clause 3 (creating a special relationship between the federal government and the Indian community); Canadian Constitution of 1982 (n 1088) sections 35 and 35.1.

¹³⁰³ See suggestion by Dr. Liz Alden Wily, see Liz Alden Wily (n 1141) p. 6 (stating that progressive communal tenure legal frameworks should ensure that “[c]ommunities are legal persons for the purposes of land ownership; that is, they are not required to register companies, cooperatives, or other legal entities to own land on their behalf”).

¹³⁰⁴ Archived Documents (n 188) (writing about all Kenyan communities).

which is the area where members of different Nandi clans traditionally lived together.¹³⁰⁵

The state renaming of each Bororiet as a “location” led to the location boundary being accepted by members of the Nandi community.¹³⁰⁶ Another example of state incorporation of a community’s customary practices would be allowing the Kikuyu community to confer tenure rights to their members as closely as possible to the Gethaka or Githaka system that is more familiar to the community. Similarly, the new communal tenure recognition framework should improve upon the failed group ranches form of tenure and enable the pastoral communities to interact with their environment through a framework that is more familiar to them.

The new communal tenure recognition framework should also recognize that communities are dynamic and, with the passage of time, will develop customary practices that are more suitable for the environment that they inhabit. As we discuss in chapter 2, some of the pastoral communities in the Rift Valley had begun practicing some form of mixed farming and pastoralism before the arrival of the Europeans in some of the fertile and well-watered areas of the Rift Valley. The trajectory of these communities was toward sedentary agriculture. The new communal tenure framework should, therefore, recognize this dynamism of communities and allow them to practice sedentary agriculture or to adopt individual forms of tenure according to each community system’s legal and institutional structures.

The constitutional and legislative recognition frameworks for communal tenure in Canada, Australia, South Africa and Tanzania are far from the ideal partnership-based model that Taiaiake and other members of the *Idle No More* movement in Canada are advocating.¹³⁰⁷ In Canada, although sections 35 and 25 of the Canadian Constitution of 1982 recognize Aboriginal rights, the Canadian Parliament can still unilaterally alter its

¹³⁰⁵ As above. See also Huntingford, GWB (n 239).

¹³⁰⁶ As above.

¹³⁰⁷ Alfred, T (n 30). See also Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act (n 843) (states in its preamble that “Whereas the Indian Act is an outdated colonial statute, the application of which results in the people of Canada’s First Nations being subjected to differential treatment; Whereas the Indian Act does not provide an adequate legislative framework for the development of self-sufficient and prosperous First Nations’ communities”).

relationship with Aboriginal peoples and legislate to modify the exercise of their rights without their consent.¹³⁰⁸ In Tanzania, the 1999 Village Land Act recognises a community's rights to manage its land, as well as extending the possibility of individualised tenure within that community land.¹³⁰⁹ However, Tanzania's communal tenure framework lacks a sufficiently-resourced implementation plan by the state.¹³¹⁰ Australia and South Africa both passed legislation recognizing pre-existing community land rights; the Native Title Act of 1993 in Australia¹³¹¹ and the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 in South Africa¹³¹², but have both been slow and ineffective in addressing historical land injustices. Kenya's constitutional and legislative framework for communal tenure is also not ideal but may create a viable path for including African communities in the socio-economic system with a sufficiently-resourced implementation plan.

5.3 COMMUNAL TENURE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The communal tenure legal framework should have included a requirement for the national government to publish a comprehensive document setting forth an implementation plan for the new communal tenure system similar to the colonial state's Swynnerton Plan. Each county should also be required by legislation or regulation to have a County Implementation Plan to identify how that County will implement the new communal tenure system. Kenya's communal tenure framework, therefore, urgently needs a well-articulated and well-resourced state and county government implementation plan. The implementation plan should cover at least five elements: (1) financial resources; (2) short-term and long-term priorities; (3) timelines and milestones (4) education and training; and (5) oversight through public participation.

¹³⁰⁸ See Canadian Constitution of 1982 (n 1088).

¹³⁰⁹ See Tanzanian Village Land Act (n 1145).

¹³¹⁰ Lyons, M (n 1151) (suggests that the pro-poor business reforms have foundered from lack of interest among both donors and senior government figures.)

¹³¹¹ See also Hunter, J (n 1105).

¹³¹² As above.

The new communal tenure framework needs a budget with sufficient funds for its implementation. The British gave the colonial state a grant of approximately five million British pounds (£5M) in the 1950s to implement the Swynnerton Plan, which would be approximately fifty million British pounds (£50M) today due to inflation.¹³¹³ The funds would be used to recruit and train sufficient numbers of Community Land Registrars to be responsible for the registration of community land as required under the new communal tenure framework. The funds would also enable county governments to participate effectively in developing and rolling out education and awareness campaigns on communal tenure. Similar to the Swynnerton Plan, the new communal tenure framework should also include an education and training component that will enable the recruitment and training of qualified staff to perform the inventorying of land, the surveys and demarcation and, generally, participate in the registration process. The training and awareness campaigns should also extend to the general public as envisaged under section 27 of the Community Land Regulations of 2017.

Education and awareness of the new communal tenure framework alone will not encourage community participation without loan incentives to individual community members and groups to organize themselves into communities and to take advantage of the new tenure system. Furthermore, county governments are supposed to be facilitating inventorying of all community land within their borders, but most counties have a cash flow problem and constantly have to cut budgets for crucial services. The end result is an unclear inventorying exercise without adequate public participation.

The communal tenure implementation framework suffers from lack of funding similar to the village land system in Tanzania in 2013 where only 1% of the funding required to implement their communal tenure framework was available from state sources. The Tanzanian government relied on foreign donors to fund implementation programs such as MKURABITA, which enjoyed limited success. The Tanzanian experience proves that the communal tenure framework cannot be implemented successfully without sufficient funding. Both Kenya's national and county governments, therefore, need to set aside sufficient funds for implementing the new communal tenure framework.

¹³¹³ See Swynnerton Plan (n 688) (opening note).

The communal tenure implementation plan must also develop priority areas with clear timelines and milestones. One priority area is knowing the extent of all unregistered community land within each county. Section 12(1) of the Community Land Regulations of 2017 provides that within eighteen months, from their commencement, every county government shall, in consultation with communities, prepare and submit to the Cabinet Secretary an inventory of all unregistered community land within the county. The inventories of unregistered community land should now be with the Cabinet Secretary who should develop and publish a comprehensive adjudication programme that should lead to demarcation, survey and registration of community land. This inventorying process is critical because the National Land Commission is yet to finalize the registration and mapping of public land, meaning unregistered community land may end up being registered as public land and therefore out of reach of the communities.¹³¹⁴ The state and county governments should publicize each county's inventory of community land and provide clear timelines for the Cabinet Secretary to also publish its comprehensive adjudication programme as a priority. To safeguard community land during the inventorying exercise, the state should take measures to ensure that the Land Consolidation Act of 1959, Cap 283, and the Land Adjudication Act of 1968, Cap 284, are not used to adjudicate unregistered community land. Indeed, these two pieces of legislation should eventually be repealed under the new communal tenure system.

A second priority area is the Chief Land Registrar's designation of Community Land Registrars. Without Community Land Registrars, the process of registration of community land, including the issuance of a Certificate of Title; cannot lawfully proceed. The Chief Land Registrar should therefore designate community land registrars in each county and have their names gazetted. The registration exercise will be followed by a dispute resolution process and verification, validation and review before the Certificate of Title is issued. The implementation plan needs to spell out clear timelines for these crucial steps in the registration process.

The implementation process should not be left to the national and county governments alone but also subjected to effective oversight through facilitated public participation. Article 201(a) of the Constitution of 2010 and section 115 of the County Government Act

¹³¹⁴ NLC Advisory on Registration of Title (n 1015).

of 2012 require public participation in finance matters at the national and county level. Article 196 (b) of the Constitution of 2010 requires the county assembly to facilitate public participation. For effective implementation of the new communal tenure framework, more is required than public meetings and the publication of information. The national and county governments need to establish mechanisms that create conditions for public participation and that build the capacity of communities to participate in the community land registration process. The state also needs to reintroduce a mechanism for payment of royalties, rent, compensation and any other payments to the community for expropriation of natural resources on community land so that the communities participate effectively in decision-making processes regarding their natural resources. The state and counties must, therefore, allocate sufficient resources to facilitate public participation and to ensure that the political and other structures established by the communal tenure legal framework are employed to meet the objectives of effective participation.

5.4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR COMMUNITIES

Effective implementation of the new communal tenure system in Kenya should also include addressing historical land injustices and other land-related disputes through the judicial system. The Kenya National Land Policy of 2009 called on the national government to address historical land injustices in the Rift Valley region to resolve issues of land registration, especially injustices done to African communities through the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915 that led to their dispossession and displacement.¹³¹⁵ Section 3.6.2 of the National Land Policy, 2009 provides:

“Historical land injustices are grievances which stretch back to colonial land administration practices and laws that resulted in mass disinheritance of communities of their land, and which grievances have not been sufficiently resolved to date. Sources of these grievances include land adjudication and registration laws and processes, and treaties and agreements between local communities and the British. The grievances

¹³¹⁵ National Land Policy of 2009 (n 229) section 3.6.2.

remain unresolved because successive post independence Governments have failed to address them in a holistic manner.”¹³¹⁶

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that was established on 22 July 2009 to promote peace, justice, national unity, healing, reconciliation and dignity among the people of Kenya also found that historical grievances over land constitute the single most important driver of conflicts and ethnic tension in Kenya.¹³¹⁷

Article 67 (2) (e) of the Constitution of 2010 mandates the National Land Commission to initiate investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint into historical land injustices and to recommend appropriate redress. To give effect to this Constitutional requirement, section 15 (9 - 11) of the National Land Commission Act provides the legal framework for redressing historical land injustices as follows:

(9) The Commission, after investigating any case of historical land injustice referred to it, shall recommend any of the following remedies—

- (a) restitution;
- (b) compensation, if it is impossible to restore the land;
- (c) resettlement on an alternative land;
- (d) rehabilitation through provision of social infrastructure;
- (e) affirmative action programmes for marginalized groups and communities;
- (f) creation of wayleaves and easements;
- (g) order for revocation and reallocation of the land;
- (h) order for revocation of an official declaration in respect of any public land and reallocation;
- (i) sale and sharing of the proceeds;
- (j) refund to bona fide third party purchasers after valuation; or
- (k) declaratory and preservation orders including injunctions.

(10) Upon determination of a historical land injustice claim by the Commission, any authority mandated to act under the redress recommended shall be required to do so within three years.

¹³¹⁶ National Land Policy of 2009 (n 229) section 3.6.2., paragraph 178.

¹³¹⁷ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IV, section 31, p. 7.

(11) The provisions of this section shall stand repealed within ten years.

Under the above provisions, the National Land Commission may only “recommend” remedies after investigating historical land injustices and “any authority mandated to act” shall be required to do so within three years.¹³¹⁸ This redress is non-binding on the state and vague on responsibility for action.¹³¹⁹ To add to its ineffectiveness, courts have shied away from dealing with historical land injustice matters using the rationale that the National Land Commission is the appropriate organ to investigate matters of historical land injustices.¹³²⁰

This redress mechanism needs to be reformed, to at least allow the Environment and Land Court to hear and determine such matters. Kenya needs to learn lessons from South Africa in dealing with historical land injustices. Although South Africa also has a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, similar to the National Land Commission, the South African Commission merely assists claimants in submitting their land claims.¹³²¹ The claimants in South Africa still have the option of submitting their claims directly to the Land Claims Court and all hearings of that Court are conducted in open court with very limited exceptions.¹³²² Kenyans should also have the option to submit their claims directly to the Environment and Land Court. Section 13(3) of the Environment and Land Court Act No. 19 of 2011 confers jurisdiction on the Environment and Land Court to hear and determine matters relating to breach or violation of rights or fundamental freedoms relating to the environment and land under Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution. The Community Land Act of 2016 or the National Land Commission Act No. 5 of 2012 should, therefore, be amended to clarify that matters of historical land injustices are matters touching on the violation and/or infringement of the fundamental bill of rights and freedoms and should be heard and determined by the Environment and Land Court. The African communities will

¹³¹⁸ See The National Land Commission Act 5 of 2012. Revised Edition 2016 [2015] (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting) section 15 (9 - 11).

¹³¹⁹ As above.

¹³²⁰ See The Chief Land Registrar case (n 1186) (discussing historical injustice and the mandate of the National Land Commission”).

¹³²¹ See Act 22 of 1994 (South Africa) (n 1104).

¹³²² As above.

CHAPTER 5 TRANSFORMATIVE LAND TENURE REFORMS IN KENYA
then be able to participate effectively in implementation of the new communal tenure system through direct access to the Kenyan judicial system.

Besides helping to resolve historical land injustices, the courts can also act as arbiters of disputes between the state statutory system and customary legal systems and, thereby, provide a much-needed guardianship of the new interface model. An arbiter is needed between the state system and the community systems inhabiting the Rift Valley region because of the social dominance theory of systems tending to hierarchize whenever they interact.¹³²³ Recall that it was the actions of the colonial state and the subsequent Kenyan state that effectively dispossessed the communities of their land and displaced them.¹³²⁴ More recently, as the communal tenure system is being implemented, the Kenyan national government and county governments have exploited the lack of clarity between public and private land to declare unregistered community land as public land and to expropriate it.¹³²⁵ There is therefore a risk of the state system continuing to use tools of domination and suppression, including using the communal tenure system to continue dominating the Rift Valley community systems.¹³²⁶ The new communal tenure framework's redress mechanism needs to be reformed, to allow the Environment and Land Court to hear and determine claims by community legal systems to create some symmetry in the inherently asymmetrical relationship between the state and the communities.

5.5 REVIEW

In this Chapter, I discuss the partnership-based recognition model as an effective interface between the Kenyan state statutory system and the community legal systems of the Rift Valley region. A partnership-based recognition framework, as exemplified by The Two

¹³²³ See Wilson, EK (n 15) pp. 133 - 134 (describes social dominance theory as a 'theory of intergroup relations' that suggests that social groupings have the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies).

¹³²⁴ See chapter 3 (for more in-depth discussion of the dispossession and displacement of Rift Valley communities).

¹³²⁵ See Liz Alden Wily (n 1141).

¹³²⁶ As above.

Row Wampum of 1613 between an Indian community and European settlers in Canada, is founded on consensus, friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity between the formal state and the community system.¹³²⁷ I use the imagery of a ship (state statutory system) and a canoe (customary law system) sailing down the same river in peace but neither trying to steer each other's vessel to describe the partnership-based model. I concede that Kenya's constitutional and legislative framework for communal tenure is not the ideal partnership-based model, but that it is a step in the right direction.

Kenya's new communal tenure framework is not partnership-based because its definition of "community" fails to "recognize" the pre-existing Rift Valley communities such as the Maasai, the Nandi, the Kipsigis, the Kikuyu, and others, but requires their "creation" as legal entities. This is problematic because the Maasai', the 'Nandi', the 'Kipsigis', the 'Kikuyu' and other Rift Valley communities already exist as customary legal systems as discussed in chapter 2. Therefore, these communities ought to be recognized and not legally created. This may be corrected through an amendment of the Community Land Act of 2016 and/or its implementing regulations.¹³²⁸

Kenya's communal tenure framework will also not be effective in functioning as a partnership-based model of interaction between the legal systems of the Rift Valley without a sufficiently resourced implementation plan. Generally, the state and county systems should allocate sufficient resources to establish the political and other structures provided for in the communal tenure legal framework for it to be effective.

Lastly, the new communal tenure framework's redress mechanism needs to be reformed to allow the courts to hear and determine claims by community legal systems in order to create some symmetry in the inherently asymmetrical relationship between the state and the communities.¹³²⁹ With a well-articulated and well-funded implementation plan and

¹³²⁷ See Chartrand, L (n 1264) (describing the partnership model as follows: "[i]t is said that the Two-Row Wampum confirms a treaty between the Mohawk and the Dutch, where the two rows of purple represent the ship of the European and the canoe of the Mohawk sailing down the same river in peace but that "neither of us will make compulsory laws or interfere in the internal affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.")

¹³²⁸ See Liz Alden Wily (n 1141).

¹³²⁹ See Wilson, EK (n 15) (explaining the inherent asymmetry in terms of social dominance theory).

a court process for addressing historical land injustices and other disputes between the legal systems, the new communal tenure framework may be effective in creating a stable environment where the Kenyan state and Rift Valley communities sail in peace down the river of time like a ship and a canoe with neither trying to steer each other's vessel.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This is a thesis about the interaction between the formal Kenyan state system and the customary land rights of the Maasai, the Nandi, the Kipsigis and the Kikuyu communities of the Rift Valley region of Kenya. The customary laws of these communities are not written down in any recognized monographs.¹³³⁰ However, they have been passed from generations to generations through oral traditions and practices and they are always evolving to meet the needs of the particular community. As summarized in Chapter 2, evidence of these customary laws and practices have been pieced together from case summaries, similar studies, journal and media articles and general literature.¹³³¹ I use this evidence to describe the customs and traditions of the Maasai, the Nandi, the Kipsigis and the Kikuyu communities as illustrative examples to show that their customary practices are essentially autopoietic subsystems generated by the communities themselves to ensure their survival and continuity.¹³³² These Rift Valley communities are systems, because they are composed of interactive individuals, their laws and customs, cultures, ancestors, land, waters, and other elements that they consider essential to their continuity and survival.¹³³³

In Chapter 3, I discuss the colonial state's disruption of the customs and traditions of the Maasai, Kikuyu, Nandi and Kipsigis communities by dispossessing and displacing them from their most valuable resource; their land.¹³³⁴ This disruption happened because the European settlers were attracted to the rich resources of the Rift Valley and used the formal state system to acquire the communities' land for farming. I rely on social dominance theory – the tendency of systems to form group-based social hierarchies when they interact – to explain these disruptive actions by the European settlers against Rift Valley communities.¹³³⁵

¹³³⁰ See Cotran, E (n 20) (summarizing customary law cases in Kenya).

¹³³¹ Chapter 2. See also Cotran, E (n 20) (summarizing customary law cases in Kenya); Archived Documents (n 188).

¹³³² See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 78) (explaining Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis).

¹³³³ Chapter 2. See also Anthony J. Colangelo (n 86) (describing a system as being composed of, but greater than, its component parts.)

¹³³⁴ Chapter 3.

¹³³⁵ See also Wilson, EK (n 15) (for a snapshot of social dominance theory as the tendency of human societies to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies).

The European settlers used formal legal and political processes to dispossess and displace the African communities, such as the creation of exclusive European areas known as the White Highlands, the signing of the Anglo - Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911, forced labour, forced eviction and confinement of Africans to native reserves.¹³³⁶ The domination and suppression of African communities by European settlers in Kenya is similar to the marginalization of Indian communities of Canada¹³³⁷ and Aboriginal communities of Australia.¹³³⁸ As viewed through the lens of Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis,¹³³⁹ the colonial disruption of the Rift Valley community systems interfered with their stability and integrity as communities, thus forcing them to take corrective measures in search of that stability.

Using the lens of systems theory, the corrective measures used by Rift Valley communities to regain their stability and integrity can be viewed as self-help tactics rooted in their customary practices described in chapter 2. The corrective measures are a demonstration of resilience by these communities that have continued to struggle to assert their customary land rights. The Kalenjin community made up of majority Nandi and Kipsigis communities have repeatedly used tribal clashes to forcefully evict those that they considered foreigners from the Rift Valley region.¹³⁴⁰ The resort by these communities to their customary practices to regain their stability as systems is consistent with the systemic characteristics of self-definition, functional differentiation to self-produce and self-sustain, autopoiesis and communication to maintain integrity and continuity.¹³⁴¹ In this chapter, therefore, I demonstrate how these systems respond to the disruption by invoking their systemic characteristics, basically of resilience and resistance to disruption. Some of the resilience and resistance offered by the African communities to disruption was instrumental in helping the Kenyan state to achieve independence in 1963 as discussed in Chapter 4.

¹³³⁶ Chapter 2.

¹³³⁷ Alfred, T (n 30).

¹³³⁸ See *Mabo v Queensland* (n 22) (details the struggles of Aboriginal communities in Australia).

¹³³⁹ See Paterson, J & Teubner, G (n 78) (explaining Professor Luhmann's systems theory notion of autopoiesis).

¹³⁴⁰ TJRC Report (n 2) vol. IIB.

¹³⁴¹ See section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1 (for a discussion of these systemic characteristics).

As the push for independence gained momentum, the state itself realized the existential threat that it faced as a state system from all the resilience and resistance by African communities. This was the reason for the state system, itself, recognizing the instability of the African community systems and taking measures to correct that instability. One of the measures was the development and implementation of resettlement programs to help the communities regain possession of their land as the European settlers left to return to their homeland. However, the successor Kenyan state failed to resettle the displaced and dispossessed Africans.¹³⁴² The state's resettlement programs had lofty goals of settling landless communities, but ended up rewarding political cronies and relatives, thereby creating more ethnic tension in the Rift Valley.¹³⁴³

The state's failure to correct the African communities' instabilities caused by colonial disruption was a failure in the interface between the formal state system and the African customary law systems. Besides the failed state resettlement programs following independence, the state's policy of assimilating individual Africans into the colonial socio-economic system known as the "Swynnerton Plan"¹³⁴⁴ that started in the pre-independence period was another failed interface experiment. The key tenet of the Swynnerton Plan's policy of assimilation was registration of land rights to give the Africans individual title to land on which they could grow cash crops and generate income for themselves and for the colonial state. The individual tenure system was in direct conflict with the communal tenure system practiced by African communities for generations. Instead of integrating the African communities, as communities, into the integrated socio-economic system, the Swynnerton Plan targeted select Africans. African communities remained resilient and resisted the Swynnerton Plan and its hostility toward their customary practices. The failure of state

¹³⁴² The state resettlement programs are discussed in section 2.4.2.3 of Chapter 2.

¹³⁴³ See TJRC Report (n 2) Vol. IIB; Akiwumi Commission Report (n 2); CIPEV Report (n 5) (discussing the failed resettlement programs).

¹³⁴⁴ The Swynnerton Plan is discussed in Chapter 4. The Swynnerton Plan encouraged individual African participants to grow cash crops in high potential and semi-potential areas mainly in the Rift Valley region just as European settlers had done in the White Highlands/Scheduled Areas. The aim was to integrate a critical mass of Africans into the colonial state's socio-economic system.

interactions with African community systems in Kenya was evidenced by the uprising referred to as the “Mau Mau”, the most expensive and violent form of resistance against colonial rule in Kenya.¹³⁴⁵

In Chapter 4, I explore this state interaction with African customary systems by focusing on their legal systems: the formal state legal system and the African customary legal system. In particular, I explore whether the state, through its formal legal system, recognizes that, if left with no other options for self-corrective measures, the African communities will naturally resort to their pre-colonial customary practices of violence as a response to the continuing disruption. The dispossession and displacement of African communities in the Rift Valley region and resulting resistance thus threatens the entire fabric of the Kenyan state. In recent history, the failure of Kenyan state interaction with African community systems has been demonstrated by the post-election violence of 2007 - 2008.¹³⁴⁶ The Kenyan state system continues to search for an interaction with community systems that will create a much needed equilibrium between the formal state statutory system and the informal customary legal systems to mitigate the risk of instability in the Rift Valley region and ensure long-term stability in the Kenyan state.¹³⁴⁷

An opportunity to define a mutually beneficial interactive framework or interface between the formal state statutory system and the customary legal systems of the Rift Valley in particular, presented itself during Kenya’s land tenure reform movement. The clamour for land tenure reforms in Kenya grew because the majority of African communities continued to use and possess their customary land without any tenure security. In the late

¹³⁴⁵ See Maloba, WO (n 222) p. 2 (states that the Mau Mau uprising “cost the British government £60 million with the commitment of some 50,000 troops and police and result[ed] in 10,000 Africans killed and 90,000 others impounded in concentration camps under sometimes appalling conditions).

¹³⁴⁶ See CIPEV Report (n 5) chapter 9 (describing the post-election violence as widespread ethnic violence that begun following the disputed results of the presidential elections of December 27, 2007 and led to one thousand one hundred thirty three (1,133) deaths, seventy-eight thousand two hundred fifty four (78,254) houses destroyed country wide and some six hundred sixty three thousand nine hundred twenty one (663,921) people displaced.)

¹³⁴⁷ TJRC Report (n 2).

1990s and early 2000s, the Kenyan state realized that its policy of assimilation was unsustainable and begun exploring ways of formally integrating whole African communities into Kenya's integrated socio-economic system. This was the genesis of calls for formal state recognition of communal tenure. The state finally enacted the Kenya National Land Policy, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 that called for formal state statutory recognition of communal tenure regimes that pre-existed the state system. Kenyans subsequently overwhelmingly voted in a referendum in favour of a new constitution in 2010 that recognizes communal tenure. The Community Land Act, Not. 27 of 2016 is the legislative framework that was passed to implement the new communal tenure regime.

Kenya's new communal tenure framework is not an ideal partnership-based recognition framework founded on consensus, friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity. In Chapter 5, I discuss the partnership-based recognition model as an effective interface between the Kenyan state statutory system and the community legal systems of the Rift Valley region. A partnership-based recognition framework, as exemplified by The Two Row Wampum of 1613 between an Indian community and European settlers in Canada, is founded on consensus, friendship, mutual respect, mutual dignity and mutual integrity between the formal state and the community system.¹³⁴⁸ I use the imagery of a ship (state statutory system) and a canoe (customary law system) sailing down the same river in peace but neither trying to steer each other's vessel to describe the partnership-based model.¹³⁴⁹

The new communal tenure recognition framework is not ideal, because its definition of "community" fails to "recognize" the pre-existing Rift Valley communities such as the Maasai, the Nandi, the Kipsigis, the Kikuyu, and others, but requires their "creation" as legal entities. These communities ought to be recognized and not legally created. Recognition of pre-existing communities does not mean doing away with the current framework's

¹³⁴⁸ Chartrand, L (n 1264) (describing the partnership model as follows: "[i]t is said that the Two-Row Wampum confirms a treaty between the Mohawk and the Dutch, where the two rows of purple represent the ship of the European and the canoe of the Mohawk sailing down the same river in peace but that "neither of us will make compulsory laws or interfere in the internal affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.")

¹³⁴⁹ As above.

requirement for a community to first define itself as a socially collective landowner before acquiring formal tenure rights. However, the new communal tenure framework can go further and incorporate the customary practices of the Rift Valley communities into the recognition framework. It should also recognize that communities are dynamic and, with the passage of time, will develop customary practices that are more suitable for the environment that they inhabit. As we discuss in chapter 2, some of the pastoral communities in the Rift Valley had begun practicing some form of mixed farming and pastoralism before the arrival of the Europeans in some of the fertile and well-watered areas of the Rift Valley. The trajectory of these communities was toward sedentary agriculture. The new communal tenure framework should, therefore, recognize this dynamism of communities and allow them to practice sedentary agriculture or to adopt individual forms of tenure according to each community system's legal and institutional structures. These community legal and institutional structures should also be empowered to seek court intervention on behalf of their members through representative land claims in order to create some symmetry in the inherently asymmetrical relationship between the state and the communities.

In addition, Kenya's communal tenure framework, like Tanzania's communal tenure system, lacks a well-articulated and well-funded implementation plan that is necessary to establish the political and other structures needed for it to function. Unlike South Africa's communal tenure system, the Kenyan communal tenure framework's redress mechanism needs to be reformed to allow the courts to hear and determine claims by community legal systems in order to create some symmetry in the inherently asymmetrical relationship between the state and the communities.

However, it is a step in the right direction when compared with similar communal tenure recognition frameworks in Tanzania, South Africa, Canada and Australia. With a well-articulated and well-funded implementation plan and a court process for addressing historical land injustices and other disputes between the legal systems, the new communal tenure framework may be effective in creating a stable environment where the Kenyan state and Rift Valley communities sail in peace down the river of time like a ship and a canoe with neither trying to steer each other's vessel.

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