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**THE TWITTER DIPLOMACY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT:  
AN ANALYSIS**

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree

**MASTER OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES**

In the Department of Political Science

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

at the

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

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December 2020

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

To God, who has provided me with the light to make this project possible, all the praise and glory!

I must express my gratitude to everyone who has given me support and encouragement to conclude this project. It is difficult to name them all, my family, friends and colleagues, I give my gratitude for their continue encouragement, support and patience. However, I must particularly thank my advisor, Professor Zondi, for his patience and guidance. I also owe a great deal of appreciation to the team of the Department of Political Science, including their information specialist and the library staff.

## DECLARATION

I, **Deborah Esther Siraze Garcia**, declare that this mini dissertation is my own unaided work, both in conception and execution. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Diplomatic Studies in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

Deborah Esther Siraze Garcia

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Pretoria, December 2020

## **ETHICS STATEMENT**

I, Deborah Esther Siraze Garcia, have obtained, for this research, the applicable research ethics approval and declare that I have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of Ethics for researchers and the Policy Guidelines for responsible research.

## ABSTRACT

International relations is constructed of ideas and concepts that have won legitimacy through the passage of time. Diplomacy is an ancient practice that has evolved and has become a practice that states have accepted as legitimate. The arrival of the digital world and the new Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) in the diplomatic world has made it possible to adopt trends like engaging in social media applications like Twitter to practice diplomacy. This creates the need to better understand the use of social media platforms as a tool of diplomacy. The growing engagement of Heads of States and Governments in communicating messages on Twitter, the so-called Twiplomacy, is changing from what was considered a mere “trend” to a “common practice” in the conduct of diplomatic practice. As authorities share their culture through their behaviour and it is further shared and emulated through the use of Twitter by other authorities, these actions create new collective identities and shared knowledge in the diplomatic practice. These trends may lead to new patterns of diplomatic behaviour that may transform the diplomatic practice. Abdullakkutty (2018:11) contends that as an extension of innovative digital diplomacy “the use of social media is so extended that it can easily realise the diplomatic functions of negotiation, representation and communication”. Using a case study of tweets by a few Heads of States and Governments tweeting on similar major diplomatic incidents, this study researches these trends in innovative diplomacy leading to Twiplomacy and how these are affecting the traditional roles of diplomacy, namely: negotiation, representation and communication.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus Disease 2019/ 2019 novel coronavirus/ 2019-nCoV.
<b>ICTs</b>	Information and Communications Technologies
<b>IGOs</b>	Intergovernmental Organisations
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>TPP</b>	Trans-Pacific Partnership
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>UNITAR</b>	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
<b>VCDR1961</b>	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
<b>VCCR1963</b>	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation

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April 2019**

## CHAPTER ONE

### RESEARCH FOCUS AND DESIGN

These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but the tranquillity with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized: we must define in what conditions and in view of which analysis certain of them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can never be accepted in any circumstances.

*Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge*

#### 1. Introduction

International relations are carried out by each state with reference to its established foreign policy. As du Plessis (2006:121) explains, foreign policy activities, actions and decisions are executed with a focus “to create, control adjust and alter external conditions” to obtain a desirable outcome. Diplomacy is one of the tools states can use to promote and reach their foreign policy objectives, as it “provides the information needed for the making of informed decision ” (du Plessis: 2006:125) and the elements to conduct it. Diplomacy has evolved over time, adapting to new technological advances. It continues to transform itself by incorporating digital technologies and social media, such as web sites and applications like Twitter. The use of the Internet and social media in diplomatic practice has been increasing, giving signals that it has ceased to be a fashionable or an informal activity; instead it has become a common practice embraced at the highest level of the diplomatic hierarchy, the heads of states and governments. The consequence of the current global pandemic of COVID-19 that began early in 2020 is that the conduct of a number of diplomatic functions have happened virtually. Whether this growing adoption of the new technologies in communication of a diplomatic nature is such that it is changing the nature of diplomatic practice, including communication, negotiation and representation, is a subject in need of analysis. This study analyses the use of these new technologies to advance foreign policy objectives and to innovate diplomatic behaviour using the Twitter diplomacy of a select number of Heads of States and Governments. This chapter justifies this study focus by giving background on digital diplomacy, presenting the research problem and by outlining the study design.

#### 2. The research problem and the articulation of the problem statement

The aim of this research is to contribute to existing knowledge in the area of digital diplomacy, as it has been studied by scholars such as Barston (2013), Wescott (2008), and Ahmed (2015). It follows from their scholarly observation that there is much to be explored in the field. Adesina and Summers (2017:3) notes that “current studies have only begun to scratch the surface of what digital diplomacy means and how it works”, making it necessary to continue analysing this new diplomatic practice. While there is clear evidence that digital diplomacy has grown astronomically alongside digital transformation generally, very little research has been conducted to understand how this manifests itself, how it might be changing diplomatic behaviour, and how this might be assisting in advancing foreign policy. While we have seen a growing use of digital tools like social media platforms by prominent political leaders, including heads of states, we have not seen systematic analysis of why this is the case and what are the implications of this. In the period of COVID-19, we have also seen formal diplomatic meetings, including United Nations forums, take place with the assistance of digital platforms and this trend is set to deepen and grow. This area is therefore ripe for analyses covering various aspects of the use of digital platforms in international relations, including the use of digital spaces by heads of states who, in foreign policy analysis, are regarded as key diplomatic actors and pillars of decision-making processes.

A qualitative research design is meant to generate knowledge through qualitative analysis based on qualitative data using extrapolation, observation and commentary (Willig 2013:26), and as such, this research has been crafted to add knowledge in the field of diplomatic theory and practice, especially knowledge related to how digital diplomacy by heads of state is affecting diplomatic practice as we have known it. In this regard, the research will help to identify and address new norms adopted by diplomatic practice to better understand the changes diplomacy is continuously facing in the 21st century.

The need to better understand of the use of social media platforms as a tool of diplomacy arises as a result of the engagement of Heads of States and Governments in communicating messages on Twitter. This practice seems to be changing from what was considered “trendy” to “common practice” in the conduct of diplomatic practice. The use of social media by Heads of States and Governments is of particular interest for the researcher since diplomacy has evolved using the tools and technologies available over time. Studies by scholars like Pigman (2010), Don Nanjira (2010), Hamilton, K. &

Langhorne (1995, 2011), among others, have shown how those in power use diplomatic tools of various nature to create different practices that states apply in diplomacy and thus advance foreign policy objectives. These practices then become norms for international society. How those involved in state negotiations and decision-making have been using the new technologies is then a matter for investigation.

### **3. Digital Diplomacy and Norms in Diplomatic Practice**

Krasner (in Goertz 1994:225) defines international relations norms as “standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”. Additionally, Hobson (2000:147) argues that norms establish what is considered appropriate or legitimate behaviour in international society. In this respect, the purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of the way this phenomenon of posting tweets to communicate diplomatic messages has changed from being a trend to becoming a common practice that has turned into an acceptable standard for all governments. It is to establish if it has modified diplomatic practice by fostering digital innovative diplomacy.

In this regard, some authors such as Pigman (2010:111) and Abdullakuty (2018:11) have suggested that the new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and social media platforms, including Twitter, can perform the functions of diplomacy, such as negotiation, representation and communication. This presumption requires us to analyse if the Twitter message, with its 280 characters per message limitation, could mean the replacement of diplomatic functions like representation. Diplomatic representation here is that which is described as the action of those "acting on behalf of the state" (Magalhães 1988:103). The research is also aimed at finding out if digital diplomacy can be used effectively as a negotiation tool. Negotiation here is what Magalhães' (1988:111) regards as that which entails arranging the resolution of common or reciprocal interests between international actors.

Therefore, it is necessary to understand how new technologies and innovations are changing diplomatic practice. One way to understand these changes is through the comparison of the way Heads of State and Government from different regions of the world are using Twitter to send messages globally under specific circumstances. While the number of digital platforms being used is large and growing, in this particular study,

the focus is on twitter where a number of Heads of States and Governments have been active in communicating various policy messages, including on foreign policy issues. Twitter is a platform used to reach a large number of people in a quick and efficient way. It is also easier to analyse and observe for purpose of study than other platforms.

#### **4. The Research Questions**

Following the above observation of a change in the nature of diplomatic practice, this research study's main research questions are as follows:

- How does the use of Twitter by Heads of States and Governments to convey foreign policy-related messages transform the core diplomatic functions of representation, negotiation, and communication?
- How does Twitter diplomacy affect the future of diplomacy?

#### **5. The Research Aim and Objectives**

This research aims to analyse how the introduction of new practices, such as tweets posted by Heads of States and Governments, is transforming diplomacy and introducing new challenges to the core functions of diplomatic practice like negotiation, representation and communication.

##### **5.1 Research Objectives**

- To explain Heads of State and Government's tweets in specific contexts in order to better understand how social media technology is transforming diplomacy.
- To explore how Twitter is changing the diplomatic core functions of negotiation, representation and communication.
- To explore diplomatic practices on Twitter in order to ascertain how it affects diplomatic agents.

## **6. Research Design**

In order to contribute to existing knowledge in the field of diplomacy, as well as to address the gaps relating to the changes brought about by the use of Twitter in diplomatic practice and diplomatic functions, this research will utilise a qualitative research design. Considering that “the main focus in qualitative research is to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, ... attitudes, values, beliefs and experience of a group of people” (Kumar 2019: 170), the research will explore and explain diplomatic practices on Twitter in regards to the field of diplomatic practice.

The researcher considers that a qualitative research approach can be applied to the proposed study. As Kumar (2014:201) explains, this type of research is suitable to explore “the spread of attitudes and establish the types of attitudes prevalent”. The research will look at better understanding how the engagement of Heads of State and Government through posting messages on Twitter is becoming a common attitude in diplomatic practice in the international community.

Furthermore, the researcher is of the view that the application of a qualitative research that focuses on the creation of knowledge will help address what Pamment (2010:35) considers to be “still at an early stage (of analysis of networks)”. The use of this type of research provides the tools necessary to better understand the behaviour and attitudes that are transforming diplomatic practice (Pamment, 2010:35; Willig 2013:26).

Moreover, it will help to understand the behaviour of Heads of State and Government as they engage in different social interactions and understand events that are taking place in their countries and the global scenario. They are constantly seeking to understand “the world in which they live and work” (Creswell and Creswell 2018: 8), developing what Willig (2013:7) explains is the construction of the social reality from human experience and social practice. As a result, Heads of State and Government are creating, through their own experience, new diplomatic practices.

### **6.1 Research Methodology**

To substantiate the proposed design and method for this proposed study, the researcher decided to use the Twitter social network as an example of a social media platform, and

as the field where the study was going to take place. For this purpose, the researcher opened a Twitter account in October 2018. The use of Twitter as a public social field of study would help the researcher to observe and participate in the process of reading and writing messages and would lead to a better understanding of the systems of followed and followers, and how these social interactions take place. This was done with the purpose to observe and to better understand the posting activity of the Heads of States and Governments on social platforms. It also helped the researcher understand the need to create a primary source of information to analyse messages published on Twitter.

### **6.1.1 Data collection methods and sampling**

The researcher will follow Kumar's (2014:44) prescriptions on non-probability sampling, having decided to use a primary source of information where the unit of analysis will be texts messages or tweets. In order to collect the samples, the researcher will select four events considering a specific time frame in 2019. The following events will be used as context to the messages posted: Juan Guaidó acting as Interim President of Venezuela in January 2019; the Terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019; the Effects of Cyclone Idai on Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi in April 2019; and the Notre-Dame fire in France in April 2019. The selection of events was made so as to represent different incidents of a different nature; such as an uprising, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster and a human-made disaster. The sample also seeks to be representative of regional events that transcended to the international scenario due to their dimension and complexities, thus providing a diversity of contexts. Because of their complexity, these situations transcended internationally, and it was necessary for the Heads of States and Governments to issue their positions on this matter, which they did through their twitter accounts.

The tweets that are going to be part of the sample correspond to the messages posted by the selected actors, under each one of the events described before. The selected actors, are Heads of States and Governments, including Australia's Prime Minister, Scott Morrison; Chile's President, Sebastián Piñera; United States' President, Donald J. Trump; These actors have been selected taking into consideration the language they use to text messages, identified as English and Spanish, and their geographical representation.

The purpose of this sample is to constitute the primary source of information and to provide the framework for the study of the messages posted by the Heads of States and Governments from different regions of the world on Twitter, under specific circumstances (Kumar 2019:307).

### **6.1.2 Data Sources**

The secondary sources of information will consist of books, journals, news, blogs, and the Internet. These sources will be covered under a thematic approach that will allow the creation of a conceptual map to guide the proposed study by themes of study (Efron and Ravid 2018:34). Taking this into consideration, the researcher has been examining and collecting secondary sources for review, using the Library of the University of Pretoria and through electronic databases (ProQuest, EBSCOhost, African Journal, Taylor & Francis, JSTOR Foreign Affairs) and Google Scholar. The collection includes a selection of books, journals and articles that will help to assess the different dimensions and complexities related to the study of Twitter diplomacy in the proposed study.

### **6.1.3 Data Analysis**

This research will apply two phases of analysis. The first phase will be used to analyse the tweets, divided evenly under the four events selected. The context will supply four analytical frameworks as it provides the topic of the incident (an uprising, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster and a human-made disaster), the time and place. Under each one of these four frameworks, one tweet of each actor will be allocated. The allocation will follow an alphabetical order using the name of the country and the actor that represents it. In the case that the selected actor has not posted a message, this no-tweet action will be properly identified, under the space allocated for him. This will provide a uniform format to analyse the messages under each event. Following this process, the analysis of each of the messages will take place.

The study will use critical analysis "to identify the obvious and the hidden messages" (Cottrell 2011:2) of each tweet. Therefore, the analysis will focus on content of the messages posted by the Head of State and Government, to identify which diplomatic function they are covering with the text (negotiation, representation or communication),



as well as the purpose, the intended audience of each message tweeted, and if it is possible its efficacy.

The secondary sources of information will provide the existing knowledge in the field of study and the theoretical framework. They will be used in the first and second phase of the thematic content analysis to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon under study, to find answers and to challenge the assumptions of the arguments that have been presented in the proposed research, such as how Twitter messages can be used or not in diplomatic functions, and if Twitter diplomacy is becoming a common diplomatic practice.

## **7. Ethical Considerations**

Leddy and Ormrod (2013:109) recommend avoiding causing a hazard to the participants in the research process. This proposed study will not constitute a hazard or harm to the participants. Regarding the need expressed by Willig (2013:26) to obtain the consent of the participants and respect the confidentiality of them, the information used by this proposed study to build the sample was obtained from the public domain, such as the Twitter social media platform. The Twitter accounts used are the authentic accounts of the selected actors and the messages identified have been posted in the public domain; this being the case, there is no need to request consent for the use of the information and no confidentiality issue can arise.

Creswell & Creswell (2018:289) recommend avoiding the mis-presentation of data. Therefore, all samples will be presented in the same format. In order to facilitate reading, a translation from the Spanish language will be included in the report when needed, but this translation will not replace the original message. Also, all sources used and cited for the proposed study will be duly recognised so as to respect the originality of the published works and avoid plagiarism.

## **8. Chapter Outline**

The structure of the research comprises five chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction, the research problem and aims, and the methodology. Chapter Two discusses the concept of diplomacy and the diplomatic functions. Chapter Three focuses

on communication, the technological innovations transforming diplomacy, and the introduction of the concept of Innovative Digital Diplomacy. Chapter Four discusses the creation of norms and customary international practice, and presents a brief of result of the analysis of the Twitter samples. Finally, Chapter Five includes a summary of conclusions and recommendations. The annexure includes the whole content analysis of the samples, including the concept, context, event and Twitter messages analysis, based on purpose, audience and efficacy.

## **9. Conclusion**

This research will provide the theoretical framework to explain the international relations field, and how the diplomatic practice has been constructed by ideas and concepts developed through time. Moreover, how cultures are part of the foreign policy and diplomacy. It will discuss the different reasons that may lead Heads of States and Government to adopt and follow practices that include the use of social media platforms, like Twitter, to deliver messages, and how this practice has transformed diplomatic practice. It will explain the argument of this research that diplomatic practice represents a universal shared knowledge, ruled by law Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR1961) and on Consular Relations 1963 (VCCR1963), that still constitutes itself, at the same time, in an activity that constructs new meanings, norms and practices through its implementation, leading to the establishment of a new international custom of an innovative digital diplomacy. Therefore, the starting point will be the general concepts of international relations, foreign policy, diplomacy and the diplomatic functions

## CHAPTER TWO

### DIPLOMACY AND DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS

#### 1. The International Relations Sphere and Diplomacy

States continue to play a vital role in the international scenario, along with non-state actors like Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), multinationals companies, and civil society, despite the academic debate about the diminished power that states hold in terms of borders, territory, and governance in the globalised and interconnected world of the twenty-first Century. This argument could be subject to debate, due to the return of nationalisms, self-isolating states and the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. These events have shown states are still in control of their borders, territories and governance. There is, as well, a prevalence in the international sphere that “it is only states that can still provide the broad base of political legitimacy to decisions and rules agreed upon on a global level” (Nowotny 2013: 227).

Nowadays, uncertainty prevails in the international system. The structure created at the end of the Second World War to avoid new military conflicts and to foster societies wellbeing has been fractured. States have neglected their duties and have preferred to withdraw from IGOs when they do not like decisions taken, instead of working towards a truly balanced system. Therefore, the *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are to be observed), a fundamental principle of international law that establishes that “treaties are binding upon parties to them and must be performed in good faith” (Green 1987:163), and which was so sharply defended by the Western States, has been adapted in their interpretation of the *rebus sic stantibus* (fundamental changes of circumstances), a fundamental principle to denounce the treaties, that points out that only an exceptional condition in which the object indispensable for the execution of a treaty permanently disappeared might lead to the termination of the treaty (Green 1995 175-176). One example is the United States: it has announced its withdrawal from international institutions like the World Health (WHO), and it has effectively left the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as well as international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). These actions bring back Wendt’s

(1999:9) argument that “system change ultimately happens *through* [emphasis added] states” and supports Nowotny’s (2013) argument of the prevalence of the State role. These changes are redrafting world perceptions and foreign politics; furthermore, they reflect dynamic in the international system.

The study of International Relations (IR) has been defined “as the study of relationships and interactions between countries, including the activities and policies of national governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations” (Jackson and Sorensen 2013:4). According to du Plessis (2006:123), IR involves “all forms of interactions between the members of separate societies”.

International Relations is a field of study with contested theories and debates. Western tradition is based on the study of the power relations and economic forces of countries, as well as on how they have exerted influence and control in the global arena. Debates surrounding IR have been opened to include new theories (Dunne *et al* 2016:5), and shared knowledge/common understandings as the fundamental of the international system has been discussed (Wendt 1999:31). However, it might be argued that the epistemology of knowledge in the field needs to be further analysed, or as Wendt (1999: 48) considers, the discussion should be focused on the ontology.

Considering Bull and Watson’s (in Buzan, 2004:9) and Wendt’s (1999) definitions of international society/relations, this research considers IR as the study of the interactions and behaviours of “a group of independent ... [structured] communities ... that have established [a international collective knowledge] ... for the conduct of their relations [recognising at the same time] their common interest in maintaining these arrangements [while it serves to pursue their interests]”.

It is this diversity of views that allows reflecting on the puzzles behind actions, ideas, and behaviours as foreign policy is applied and executed in the international system. This chapter discusses diplomacy and diplomatic functions, beginning with foreign policy and diplomacy. This is for the purpose of setting out the context of practices that digitisation is rising to affect.

## **2. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy**

There are different definitions and interpretations regarding what constitutes foreign policy, and as du Plessis (2006: 120) points out, foreign policy “suffers from ambiguity and a lack of definitional clarity”. In its broad sense, foreign policy can be understood as the different states’ objectives and interests that have been projected from their national interests towards the international scenario. The concept has been seen as a state’s exclusive activity (du Plessis 2006:120), but it has also been influenced by the changes in the perceptions of what constitutes an international actor nowadays. As du Plessis (2006:121) highlights, foreign policy activities, actions and decisions are executed with a focus “to create, control, adjust, and alter external conditions” to obtain a desirable outcome.

Therefore, foreign policy is no longer a states’ prerogative. It now also includes other international actors, such as intergovernmental organisations (IGO’s), non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), multinationals companies, the civil society, the media, and other groups, as they likewise pursue and promote their objectives (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995), (Pigman 2010), (Barston 2013). We consider that it can be argued that they also have an independently organised structure, and in their constitutional framework, not only is this structure hierarchically organised, but it also provides for goals, a mission, and a purpose for the institution. These constitutive elements might be regarded as policy, but they are aimed to guide the labour force efforts of the institution (NGO’s, Multinationals, Civil Society, and the Media) to reach them.

In the case of IGO’s, we are reminded that, although they also have a hierarchical structure, their constitutional framework and procedures have been agreed between states. Therefore, their objectives and their policies are a result of the decision-making process in which members states include their foreign policy. Hence, in a general perspective, state processes of exchanging views and understandings to reach an agreement, like a treaty to establish an IGO’s, might be regarded as an example of Wendt’s (1999) description of shared knowledge formation. Our experience has shown this is necessary as ideas and meanings contained in a treaty must be clarified in a broad sense to create an

outcome with the same value and content to all parties. This is one of several mechanisms states can utilise to pursue their objectives.

Foreign policy might be as broad as the independent structured communities consider necessary, as they must include their national interests. In the case of states, they should include a list of general principles of international law (Green 1987:20-23) regarded as the main public goal that states must follow. These may include the sovereign equality of states, the good faith principle, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, non-intervention and, principle of peaceful cooperation between states, among others, as contained in the Chapter of the United Nations (UN 1945). We consider history has shown these principles have evolved according to states' interests, even though states have agreed to act upon them as guidelines to foster friendships and relations and avoid confrontations.

It is in this idea of peaceful processes of reaching shared understandings that makes diplomacy a preferred tool for states to promote and reach their foreign policy objectives and interests in the international scenario.

### **3. Diplomacy**

In spite of its historical development, as De Magalhães (1988:51) points out, diplomacy “definitions are imprecise or incomplete” as they have been narrowed to “the art of negotiation” (De Magalhães 1988:50). They can also be defined as “a) an instrument of foreign policy b) for the establishment and development of peaceful contacts between governments of different states c) through the use of intermediaries (diplomatic agents) d) mutually recognized by the respective parties” (De Magalhães 1988:59). Pigman (2010:11) defines diplomacy as “the representation and communication between global actors, including (but not limited to) governments, multilateral institutions, civil society organisations and large firms”. He recognises that diplomacy can occur between actors other than the state. For example, IGO`s like the United Nations have officials and offices in New York, Vienna, Geneva and Nairobi, and regional offices in Africa, America, Asia and Europe that execute the political decisions of the institution.

From a legal perspective, it is regarded that only states' representatives appointed abroad might act as diplomatic agents (De Magalhães 1988:52-53). De Magalhães's definition considers traditional diplomacy and the further developed diplomatic framework, under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR1961) and on Consular Relations 1963 (VCCR1963), that will be referred to later. It is also a fact that modern diplomacy represents a group of diverse functions that might also be executed by representatives of IGO's and NGO's, among others, as Hamilton and Langhorne's (1995:1) definition of diplomacy summarises, it constitutes "the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities".

### **3.1 Traditional Diplomacy**

Traditional diplomacy refers to a tradition of diplomacy that was in vogue until the First World War. It is about diplomacy as an ancient practice extended and expanded in the modern era before major transformation changed the tradition, remarkably leading to the term new diplomacy we will discuss later. As humankind appeared in Africa, language, communications, societies, and economies were developed first by the communities in Africa. These societies evolved, and regardless of the lack of "records of historical prototypes of diplomacy" (Holsti 2004:160), they developed diplomacy to avoid perpetual confrontation in order to establish more prominent social formations or civilisations. As Smith (1989:7) highlights, "Diplomacy ...is found in some of the most primitive communities and seems to have evolved independently by peoples in all parts of the world". The archaeological evidence has shown that ancient civilisations like the Sumer, Ebla, Akkad, and the Egyptian used diplomacy in their relations with other societies.

Therefore, since the dawn of time, diplomacy has been part of the negotiation process and has been constantly evolving. The Greeks, under Alexander the Great, expanded their diplomatic relations to the north of Africa (Don Nanjira. 2010:15). Greek civilisation drew from the experiences of those kingdoms and civilisations from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. These customary practices transformed over time to European traditions. These traditions would be included in the famous Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) that for Western thought represented "the revision and regulation of established diplomatic practices" (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995:89). These borrowed traditions

form part of what is now called the “old diplomacy”, dominated diplomatic practice until the end of the World War I (du Plessis 2006:138).

This represents traditional diplomacy, with an aristocratic and elitist nature, that was focussed on the state, with resident missions focused mainly in bilateral activities (du Plessis 2006:139), and “concerned with matters of *haute politique*” (Pigman 2010:202). This concept of diplomacy would be transformed with the World Wars *a posteriori* with the end of the Cold War period.

### **3.2. New Diplomacy**

The end of World War I brought the introduction of the first attempt to have a world organisation and this dramatically altered the diplomatic environment. The period “introduced significant changes in the transition from old to new, mainly as result of the democratisation of foreign policy and diplomacy” (du Plessis 2006: 138). Nonetheless, it would only be after the end of World War II that diplomatic practices would change in their “nature, process, structure and agenda” with a pluralist diplomat, with a multicentric focus, and introduction of a multilateralism with a wide agenda” (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Pigman 2010)

This new contemporary or modern diplomacy included the arrival of new technologies and advances in communications, as well as the increase in the number and type of international actors involved, including the appearance of the IGO’s (du Plessis 2006: 138), as a result of the Bretton Woods agreements. However, the bilateral and state-centric approach of diplomacy has not disappeared, as the modalities of diplomacy include bilateral, multilateral or *ad hoc* (when needed) practices (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 221-227). Traditional diplomacy changed with the introduction of new technologies and actors and it will be continuously evolving as it is a dynamic practice that incorporates technological advances and the changes in the socio-cultural context of the states.

It is in this context that, in the twentieth century, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations 1961 (VCDR1961) and on Consular Relations 1963 (VCCR1963) were agreed between states to regulate the functions of the Embassies and Consulates, and to establish a universally shared knowledge of the diplomatic practice states that would follow (Holsti 2004:197). These conventions are still in force and are used to regulate diplomatic



practice. Therefore, this research will also analyse the diplomatic functions under the base of the VCDR1961, as these are where the markers of changes caused by the used of ICTs will be manifested when study findings are presented.

### **3.3. Diplomatic Functions**

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (VCDR1961) established in its Article 3 diplomatic functions as representation, protection of the interest of the sending state and its nationals, negotiation, information, promotion of friendly relations and the development of economic, cultural and scientific relations. All these functions should be executed following and respecting privileges, and immunities contained in the convention.

State diplomatic functions are executed at different levels including the Head of States or Governments, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the top governmental authorities that represent the state authority. It also includes the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Embassies abroad constituted by the foreign service, the ambassadors, diplomatic and consular agents, experts and administrative staff. Moreover, due to the broad international agenda and its diversity, other government authorities have created international affairs divisions that work with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their counterparts, participating as officials or experts at the multilateral level (Leguey-Feilleux, J-R. 2009: 359).

These authorities have the legitimacy to act representing the State they belong to, as their society, collectively, has granted them this right through the acceptance of norms and regulations that rule at the domestic level (Hall 1999:43). A condition that states have recognised at the international sphere through practice and at the normative level in the VCDR1961.

#### **3.3.1. Representation**

Representation is the faculty of the Head of States or Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassadors, or diplomatic agents to act on behalf of the State they are part as government officials (Green 1987: 131). We consider this function can bring confusion as in the case of an ambassador or a diplomatic agent, as they need to have been granted

the faculties by the sending state, while in the case of the Heads of States or Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs it is inherent to the government position. In the case of the officials or experts from other institutions participating in multilateral conferences, they require an accreditation granted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Representation enables the diplomatic agent to promote the sending state's interests and culture in the recipient state. Berridge (2010:117) highlights that it is "often overlooked or naively minimized function", as it additionally embraces entertaining, giving public lectures, attendance to receptions and state ceremonial occasions (Berridge 201:117). It also comprises the delivery of statements or positions in bilateral and multilateral issues.

This representation faculty is the one that gives the above-mentioned authorities the capacity to commit their country, therefore it creates responsibility. In the case of Heads of States or Governments, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, their declarations can represent an "unilateral act concerning factual or legal situations, [that] may have the effect of creating legal obligations..." (Green 1995: 27:28). However, it is important to notice that not all declarations might create an obligation; the intention behind a declaration is to be bound to it (Green 1995: 28).

### **3.3.2. Protection of interests**

The protection of the interests of the sending state and its nationals in the receiving state is one of the primary functions of a diplomatic agent. It can be seen as "the defence of the patrimony of the sending state in the receiving state" (De Magalhães 1988:124), such as the protection of the sending state's investments in the receiving state, as well as compliance with the bilateral treaties that states might have agreed on different areas. As our practice shows, international cooperation, taxation, and visa exemptions are the most common agreements.

In the case of the protection of nationals, this includes assistance in case of emergency, as in the cases presented during the COVID19 pandemic in 2020 when embassies advocated efforts to repatriated stranded citizens around the globe. De Magalhães (1988:124) explains this consists on the protection of "all legitimate personal and patrimonial interests of the nationals of the sending state who live in or are passing

through the country where the diplomat performs his or her function”. Our diplomatic practice has made necessary to point out that the protection of nationals is a shared function with the Consular agent, who is usually in charge of assisting their nationals in distress.

### **3.3.3. Negotiation**

It was widely thought that diplomacy was the art of negotiation. Barston (2013:51) defines negotiation as “an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting positions to reach an acceptable outcome”. Nonetheless, different types of procedures can take place in a negotiation process, and they are related to the matter that is negotiated. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations can use the same approach: meetings, informal consultations or drafting revisions to reach an agreement. It also includes the use of informal and formal communications as official notes, exchanges of drafts, emails, and nowadays they might even use the exchange of WhatsApp messages. Zartman (in UNITAR 2009-2010) explains that, negotiation is co-operative resolution seeking, not argument winning or debating-point scoring. The responsibility of the negotiator is to develop an atmosphere in which this can be achieved. Negotiation is the process of combining different positions into a single unanimous joint decision. It is the process of making a decision when there are no rules about how decisions are made, or when the only rule that exists is that the decision must be unanimous.

De Magalhães (1988:113) recognises the vast and complex methods that can be used during a negotiation process, highlighting the need to prepare the process as it will be as complicated as the matter under negotiation will be. It is essential to notice that a negotiation process has different phases. The preparation phase would require parties to prepare their position on the matter, their aims and their strategies before engaging in the negotiation process. The negotiation phase can be as long as it takes the parties to reach their desired outcomes. Still, if parties decided to use force or engage in dubious procedures or use deceiving mechanisms, the result would be tainted, and the parties would decide not to continue the negotiation process or decide not to comply with the agreement.

### **3.3.4. Information**

One of the most controversial functions in the diplomatic practice is the gathering of information, as it has been related with espionage and unorthodox mechanisms used to get secret information. Our experience shows that not all states have a budget to invest in agents and intelligence services to gather information. Diplomats have to report to the sending state about the governance, political, economic and social situation observed in the receiving state, as well as security and safety issues. Those with military attaches should also include police and military developments. De Magalhães (1988:106) explains it “is information collected by lawful means”, in practice it is obtained from public sources, statements, legislation, newspapers and media reports. Nowadays, the information published on official websites and social media platforms is also used. These reports are sent by the head of mission and should be “concise, highly selective, and honest” (De Magalhães 1988:109). As part of diplomatic communications, it is considered that diplomats also have to share information to the receiving state; however, this falls under the duty to promote friendly relations.

### **3.3.5. Promotion of friendly relations**

Berridge (2010: 118) highlights the promotion of friendly relations as the first duty of an embassy, as it represents the ‘cultivation of contacts’; it constitutes in the good relations with the representatives of the receiving state and among the diplomatic corps. Moreover, it would help to perform other duties as the gathering of information and obtain a certain level of influence. De Magalhães (1988:122) considers promotion as the “dynamic element of the diplomatic activity, through which representation is extended, negotiation undertaken or increased in scope, and other elements of diplomatic activity come to life”. It refers mainly to the set of different meetings, gathering and activities diplomats engage in promoting commercial, cultural and scientific relations.

### **3.3.6. Economic Promotion**

At the bilateral and multilateral level economics interests comprise the following major areas: “international trade, foreign investment, monetary stability, financial markets, economic development, and migration”, among other issues related to climate change (Pigman 2010:139). Some states designated specialised economists or trade officers in the permanent missions to promote their economic interests. Such specialists will study

and analyse the economic policy of the receiving state to identify trade, investments and other business opportunities.

Commercial promotion will be one of the prominent activities in which an embassy should engage. Berridge (2010:125) points out that “Important features of the work of the embassy’s commercial section are the supplying of market intelligence and helping to smooth the way for trade missions from home”. Several states have opened commercial offices under the umbrella of the Embassy to target specifically the economic and business interests and to facilitate the promotion of products, investments, and tourism.

### **3.3.7. Culture Promotion**

In the case of the culture, it is understood as the shared knowledge that comprises the collective identity of the state (Wendt 1999:44). There is a variation in its expression in the international scenario; language, art expressions, cuisine, architecture, law, governance, and sports, among others. The promotion of these values changes; in some cases, diplomats might focus on fostering the use of their language, and promote traditions from the folklore perspective using films, music, arts and festivals in the receiving states. At the same time, other states with resources, such as China, can establish study centres like the Confucius Institute to promote their culture. At the multilateral level the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) promotes and defends the global culture diversity (Pigman 2010: 181).

### **3.3.8. Scientific Promotion**

Scientific relations are presented in the form of know-how exchanges at the bilateral levels through the framework of cooperation agreements or cooperation agencies. It is also present at the multilateral level in the case of particular agendas like climate change, fisheries, and others, where decisions are based on a scientific approach. Nonetheless, specialised departments have been formed in the Foreign Ministers to foster what has been called economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and scientific diplomacy (Pigman 2010).

### **3.3.9. Propaganda**

De Magalhães (1988:123) explains that it is under this promotion aspect of the functions that the term propaganda has been associated with diplomacy. Furthermore, Pigman (2010:122) highlights it is the result of the false distribution of information by governments about their states and societies that took place in the twentieth century. Propaganda has been defined as “the organised attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent or surpass an individual’s adequately informed, rational, reflective judgement” (Marlin in Pigman 2010:123). The intention behind the use the mono-directional communication to win the public support to a position, situation, or country culture, among others, is regarded as similar to the aim behind the public diplomacy (Pigman 2010:123).

However, all the diplomatic functions require a core element that it is inherent to the execution of any of them: communication. Pigman (2010:7) points out that “the power of communication ... lies in its ability not only to achieve its primary objectives ... but also in so doing to modify the interests and even the identity of the actors communicating with one another”. The diffusion of information through media is regarded as part of the promotion of economic, cultural and scientific relations.

## **4. Conclusion**

This chapter provides the context for the study by discussing international relations of states, foreign policy and diplomacy. It shows that diplomacy has evolved over time from what was considered traditional diplomacy to what has been named new or innovative diplomacy with the incorporation of the technological advances of the twentieth century. This new diplomacy includes the extended understanding of the what was considered a diplomatic practice and functions, condensed in the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic and Consular Functions (VCDR 1961) and (VCCR 1963). Nonetheless, nowadays, technology has changed diplomacy and the tools utilised in the execution of its functions. These changes focus in the area of public diplomacy mainly and they will be discussed in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFORMING DIPLOMACY**

#### **1. Communications and Innovative Digital Diplomacy**

Burton (in Buzan 2004:67) considers that “communications, and not power, are the main organising influences in a world society”. It can be argued that traditional communication between the Foreign Ministry and permanent missions in the receiving state, known as “the Diplomatic Channel” (Green 1987: 33), is an example of this influence. Luard (in Buzan 2004:67) perceives communications as a “common pattern of belief ... and the behaviour within it seen as normal”. This is the case of diplomatic practice and its communications. These communications are also named the official channel, as they represent the official exchange between the states, which are part of the core functions diplomatic agents have to engage in. It comprises the drafting of letters, working meetings, exchange of emails, and protocolary activities, among others, that are developed in the executions of the five essential functions contained in the CVDR1961. All these exchanges are considered formal, but diplomatic communication can also take the form of informal gatherings, previous accord between the participants, like informal consultations or hallway conversations. These are regular practices and behaviour between diplomats.

Hamilton and Langhorne (1995:239) states that diplomatic relations have “been shaped by a response to, three factors: the evolution of the state, its governance and economic and social composition, and advances in science and technology, especially as they relate to transport and communications.” In this sense Pigman (2010:110) highlights “technology has the broadest and most far reaching effects upon how diplomacy is done and even what it is, extending from the structural and abstract level right down to the practical level of everyday diplomatic practice”. An example of this is how the use of new mechanisms of communication are considered informal channels until practice makes them customary; like the introduction of email communications.

The use of emails was possible as governments introduced the use of Internet to the communication platforms, making them digital<sup>1</sup>. They were introduced in diplomatic practice as an informal mechanism in the nineties. Today they are official communications that create responsibility. Foreign Ministries around the world have established communication parameters, confidentiality and security issues in the use of emails.<sup>2</sup> This is the path the exchange of messages through social media platforms like Twitter and WhatsApp are moving towards, as well as other innovative technologies that are now considered informal communication mechanisms. There are differences between the use of Twitter and WhatsApp; the first is a public account where the public can access and interact with the owner of the account. Meanwhile WhatsApp supposes a private channel of communication, similar to a phone conversation or an email exchange.

However, engagement in an official exchange of texts with authorities or representatives of other countries constitutes a formal exchange of communication. Even though the platform used might be a private account, the message can be considered as an official position, mainly when the account belongs to a Head of State or Government, Ministers, Ambassadors and other authorities. As an example, in August 2020, the Finance Minister of South Africa, Tito Mboweni, was reprimanded by South Africa's President for posting in his Twitter account his thoughts regarding the need of central bank's independence as a result of the Zambian government removal of the Central Bank Governor. Minister Mboweni had to erase his message, and President Ramaphosa issued an apology to Zambian authorities for Mboweni's comments (Fihlani:2020).

The world pandemic in 2020 has accelerated the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to share information. The use of social platforms has increased. For example, WhatsApp groups between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their ambassadors and diplomats abroad have multiplied to tackle issues related to the pandemic. At the same time, governments have used Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram official accounts to share information about COVID-19 cases and health advice related to the pandemic, mostly trying to keep in contact with the national public audiences and those nationals, and residents stranded abroad as result of the countries' lockdowns.

The COVID-19's pandemic forced countries to lockdown and to impose social distancing measures to preserve public health. Moreover, measures like meeting restrictions, and the



mandatory use of face masks have also introduced changes in the way the society behave, and in the way diplomatic practice is conducted. Nowadays, diplomatic practice includes intensive use of video conferences, virtual meetings, and webinars through applications like Zoom and Cisco Webex Meetings, where hundreds of participants are allowed. Even though the use of these platforms has helped to get some work done, they do not provide the human contact and the personal touch diplomatic practice requires<sup>3</sup>.

This chapter discusses the emergence and evolution of innovative diplomacy and how it affects diplomatic functions as well as the behaviour and tools used for its execution. It seeks to show that ICTs have evolved faster in recent years, bringing innovation to diplomatic practice. These changes were speeded up by the pressure the COVID-19 pandemic brought to the world. Communications play a vital role in the international scenario, and ICT's have introduced changes in the way the public is getting involved in the world affairs. One field where these changes are visible is on Public Diplomacy.

## **2. Public Diplomacy**

The term Public Diplomacy has been defined in different ways. For Sharp (in Melissen 2007:11) it is “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented”. For Tuch (in Melissen 2007:11-12) it is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”. Both definitions relate to the intention of one country’s advocacy to exert influence in public opinion in the international sphere, in what has been catalogued as “as a one-way information flow” (Melissen 2007:13).

This type of communication has been part of the diplomatic practice. Melissen (2007:3) explains that “communicating directly and indirectly with public audiences through image cultivation, cultural and educational exchange, and political rhetoric is ingrained within the fabric of diplomatic tradition, going back to ancient times.” For example, “Public opinion, noted Metternich in June 1808, is the most powerful medium of all. Like religion, it penetrates into the darkest corners” (Palmer in Hamilton and Langhorne 1995:124). However, during World War II, it turned into propaganda as governments

used to manipulate and exercise emotional pressure over public opinion during the war. Byrne (2016: 170-171) explains that it was under the American heritage that the term public diplomacy was established later in 1965. Nonetheless, it was as a result of the 11 September 2001 that public diplomacy was brought back to the international arena by the United States war on terror (Melissen 2007: 6-7).

Still, it is essential to consider that public diplomacy has been used since the end of the Cold War by Foreign Ministries, NGOs, IGO's, multinational companies and civil society organisations (Pamment 2012, Pigman 2010, Melissen 2007) to get public support. They have used communications tools like the media, conferences, and other events, becoming what Melissen considers is public diplomacy "the management of that changing environment through engagement with the public actor (in Pamment 2012:1)

It has been argued that public diplomacy is a key instrument of soft power (Melissen 2007:4), which, as described by Nye, "is intended to win hearts and minds" (in Pigman 2010:122). Pamment (2012:3) explains that actors that use public diplomacy rely on persuasion models to control the message "by ensuring limited interaction between communicator and 'recipient', and by maintaining focus on specific short-term objectives". In this sense, it is critical to recognise that public diplomacy needs to take into consideration certain elements to be effective. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 221) explain that information is the essence of the persuasion process and achieving the effects of communication as a persuasive power "depends on two factors: learning of message content and acceptance of what is learned" by the public.

Moreover, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980:221) emphasise that the process of persuasion requires "attention, comprehension, yielding, retention and action" in order to change the attitude of the audience towards what has been communicated (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980: 219-220). If these elements are not taken into consideration, the message might have the opposite effect of the one intended, mainly because those receiving the message would also have to analyse "who (source) says what (message) to whom (receiver) how (channel) and with what effect (destination)" (Laswell in Ajzen and Fishbein 1980: 221). This supports Pigman's (2010) perspective of the need for diplomats to engage in media relations to establish working-networks to get the best results as "many of the specific

techniques in conducting public diplomacy are the same techniques that are favoured by public relations practitioners” (Pigman 2010:124).

As previously stated, diplomatic practice is constantly evolving. Nowadays, in the twenty-first century, the range of actors have increased, from states, IGO’s, NGO’s to multinational companies, civil societies, and celebrities<sup>3</sup>, who engage in Public Diplomacy. With the creation of new ICT and social platforms, the way public diplomacy is conducted has changed, making central Burton’s concept of communications influences, as well as Nye’s concept of soft power fundamental. The incorporation of new technologies brought innovation to the field, changing the relationship with the public. This has led diplomats and academics to consider the existence of a New Public Diplomacy.

### **3. New Public Diplomacy**

The twenty-first century world has been considered globalised, interconnected, with almost inexistent boundaries between states, with freedom of movement of goods, persons, and information. This globalisation can be seen as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions ... generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held *et al* in Pamment 2012: 26).

These interconnections and constitutions of networks have been facilitated by the ICTs, as the Internet has been considered a space “for free expression and free movement of information” (Schmidt and Cohen 2014:3) that has transformed people’s beliefs and behaviours around the world. These technological advances in information and communication have brought a change in the way people can respond to media messages, bringing what Pamment (2012:27) calls a “sense of a paradigm shift” in the “communication models” including Public Diplomacy. This paradigm strictly refers to the conception of the one-way information flow of the communication patterns previously described. With the arrival of the new ICTs and social media platforms, like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and others, the audience can reply and react to the information that has been delivered, becoming an active audience. These changes in the flow of information, that was considered as a linear process, has eliminated the “single

message”, introducing “a context of polysemy in which meaning is made by groups and individuals in their interactions with complex social and media environments” (O’Sullivan *et al*) (Fisher & Bröckerhoff in Pamment 2012:27). This change in the communication flow has been described as one that “engages in two-way dialogue and interactions” (Byrne 2016:173) becoming the main characteristic of new public diplomacy.

Another distinction from traditional public diplomacy consists in the option that the public now has to search for the information specific of their interest, instead of depending on the information presented by the Media (Pamment 2012:27). This information can be commented on and discussed, creating groups that share similar ideas regardless of their physical location. Nonetheless, Pamment. (2012:27) recognises “this provides opportunities for the greater secularisation and tailoring of mediated knowledge, an important caveat is that people have to know where to look and make an explicit choice to access a particular information form”.

Pigman (2010: 115-119) argues that the ICTs bring innovation to the diplomatic practice, accelerating the speed of communications, but also the need to protect, secure and encrypt digital information. The digital revolution has introduced technological advances faster than governments can regulate and understand them, making it a challenge to adapt to them. As technologies improve and massify, search engines as well as the *like* response buttons and comments posted in social media platforms have become sources of users’ information. This data has given information about identities, preferences, religions, gender, and age, among other personal information that has been collected and analysed to persuade individuals based on their beliefs, without the need of a survey or authorisation. This data has been used by advertising companies and political campaigns. This was behind the 2018 scandal of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook involvement in the United States’ Presidential campaign and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Bartlett 2018). Moreover, it brought to public consciousness how these companies were working and it forced governments to regulate the use of these platforms through privacy laws to restrict the unauthorised data collection information, like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (Leetaru 2018) (Satariano 2018).

ICTs as new developments “have increased the power and the reach of media organizations” (Pigman 2012:112), civil society, influencers and celebrities to comment and demand accountability from their authorities’ actions in national and foreign policies. Private companies and foreign states have used algorithms, apps and programs (chatbots) to send information and reply to messages with prefabricated answers faster than what would take us to post a tweet. This has positively affected the need to influence national and international public opinion in order to change their behaviours while they are utilising the social media platforms (Miller 2019, Bartlett 2018). These examples highlight the need for governments today to invest in ICTs. Gillespie and Postigo (2015:3) highlights that, “the history of the Internet, like the history of anything that fosters cultures, can be a mirror that shows those lucky enough to write that history what they most want to see.” Arguably one of the reasons China has devoted itself to developing its own technologies, Internet, engine searchers, social media platforms, financial apps and cellular phones is to control the information flow and restrict the United States’ influence over its people, and at the same time it is using its technologies to export its own culture and influence to the international (Segal 2018) .

As ICTs evolve, they have impacted people’s behaviours in the social, economic and financial spheres. The same can be said of diplomatic practice. Some have questioned the need for diplomats when it is possible to introduce and use the ICTs to have an innovative diplomacy (Abdullakkutty 2018:11).

#### **4. Innovative digital diplomacy**

Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) have already transformed the way we do things, recalling Luard’s (in Buzan 2004:67) communication definition as the common pattern of beliefs and the normal behaviour associated with it. These new platforms are and have brought new *ideas* and *concepts* that can be considered the twenty-first-century *new shared knowledge*; they have become and have introduced new meanings and patterns of conduct relations. Hutchings (in Döveling *et al* 2018:1), explains that new technologies “have transformed into an invisible infrastructure of everyday life”. They include the massification of the use of the Internet, social media, meeting applications, intelligent devices, super computers, biotechnology, electronic finances, and the arrival of artificial intelligence (Harari 2018, Bartlett 2018, Schmidt and Cohen 2014).

As Adesina and Summers (2017:5) explains, “diplomats rely on the Internet to find information, communicate with colleagues via email...; diplomats are also increasingly using new social networks platforms such as blogs and Facebook”. It can be added to the vast use of Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and meetings applications like Zoom and Cisco Webex, that the COVID-19 pandemic has forced society to operate in all areas. In this scenario, the consideration expressed by Adesina and Summers (2017:3) that “current studies have only begun to scratch the surface of what digital diplomacy means and how it works” acquires more relevance.

Manor and Segev (in Adesina and Summers 2017:3) have defined digital diplomacy as “the growing use of social media platforms by a country to achieve its foreign policy goals and proactively manage its image and reputation”. This definition describes the ties between the new ICTs, the new public diplomacy, and current diplomatic practice. It underlines that at the foundation of this development is how innovation linked to technological advances have opened new ways in which diplomacy might be advanced. This ability of diplomacy to adapt and innovate may be one of the reasons why it has survived this long and changed over time without losing its fundamental essence, namely: advancing foreign policies of countries through negotiation and interfacing.

Diplomatic practice in the twenty-first century has been named by different terms, as Adesina and Summers (2017:5) summarize as e-diplomacy, diplomacy 2.0, open policy, among others. It has also been denominated cyber diplomacy (Westcott 2008). Barston (2013:117) argues that cyber diplomacy comprehends the adoption of interactive websites and the employ “of social network sites for diplomatic communications”. Yet, he considers it difficult to gauge the impact of these sites.

These definitions recognize the application of ICT in diplomatic practice. This research considers that the rapid development of ICTs and the adoption of trends foster a practice that has led to the creation of new patterns of behaviour which, as result of the use of new technologies, requires reference to an innovative digital diplomacy. Wescott (2008:17) considers that the Internet has provided a space where the active exchange of ideas is taking place. He highlights that this active virtual world of ideas cannot be neglected, suggesting state actors or diplomats should calibrate “the message” to audiences.

ICTs will continue to evolve, bringing new technologies and transforming practices, pressing governments and diplomats to adapt to the changes introduced. Since the arrival of the Internet several technological changes have taken place, and diplomatic practice has moved from the use of websites and emails to interactive platforms where networks and public exchanges take place immediately. This puts pressure on governments to respond accordingly, quickly and efficiently, and making it necessary to increase specialisation in the area of public relations and information departments.

Diplomatic practice has transformed to incorporate new technologies to the traditional diplomatic functions. These changes have brought questions on how the introduction of new practices such the use of social media, particularly Twitter, is transforming international relations and introducing new challenges to the core functions of diplomatic practice.

## **5. Social Media**

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Wescott (2008:19) highlighted the need for diplomats “to become masters of the Internet, not just to know where...to collect ...reliable information to meet deadlines for decision making, but also to know how to exert maximum influence on the public debate through that medium”. At this point, it is important to notice that the major technical shift that helped with the massification of the use of Internet was the introduction of the smartphone in 2008 (Miller: 2019:141). Because smartphones have been cheaper than a laptop or PC, they have allowed people to access and connect, reducing the digital divide and facilitating the use of applications of all kinds, as well as participation in social networks. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that have facilitated that non-states actors have used the Internet more efficiently to gain support and collaboration to their interests, whether positives or negatives. This was shown by the Arab revolution and Facebook and Twitter campaigns (Harari 2018: 91), as well as ISIS’s use of social media to recruit, to report live executions, and to spread hate speech (Zeitsoff 2017:2).

Arguably, this has also been possible because these non-state actors have been able to understand the social media platforms better than states, and because the regulation of these platforms has taken some time to arrive. Harju *et al* (2018:1) explains that

“developments in media technologies not only engender prompt exchange of information and opinion but also foster a globally mediatized emotional exchange”.

Considering that the “participation in the online debate” is [one of] the critical factor[s] (Wescott 2008:11) in innovative diplomacy, it is indispensable to comprehend how these social media applications work to use them effectively. Sommer *et al* (2018:1) pointed out that the “insight into this complex spectrum of mediatized emotion becomes highly relevant as we are witnessing flows of affect online that resonate with political campaigns, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and celebrity death”. Moreover, when analysing Barzilai-Nahon’s (in Khazraee and Novack 2018:3) explanation that social media platforms, like Facebook, use their technological infrastructure, “features and capabilities to enable, control and shape the behaviour of users”, it should be of the most interest of the states and diplomatic agents to understand how this can be possible, as they are forming habits in societies (Miller : 2019:286).

Harrison (2017:23) explains that the term social media is difficult to define because it evolves with technology and the Internet itself. He defines it as “the total of websites, networks, and apps to allow people to connect, create content, and share information”. Harrison (2017:57) highlights that “humans have always been social creatures”, and that online networks have let humans socialize, replicating “activities and behavioural expressions” typical of human beings, they have been brought from the everyday practice to the online system. The argument that they have helped in a “fast and easy way to make new friendships and maintain old ones” (Harrison 2017:43) is an example of this new social behaviour.

Nonetheless, the Internet, new apps and social networks are not a panacea; they have brought new behaviours and new dependencies. They allow users to create fictional versions of themselves, which has granted them the possibility to post messages that perhaps in a face to face conversations the person would not say as it will be perceived as disrupting the acceptable societal norms (Harrison 2017, Miller 2019). Additionally, it has brought the possibility of creating fake online identities, propagating fake news and new forms of crime and cybercrime. Slack (2016:1) explains the nature of the cyberspace complicates the efforts to govern it. Moreover, technological capabilities and strategies also influence the role of the state on “both national and foreign policy” (Slack 2016:1).



It could be said that this is the case of the United States. Big tech companies such as Google, Facebook and Twitter, were developed in that country; as a result, they include their cultural, personal and interest biases (Bartlett 2018). It is in interest of their leaders to promote these companies universally, like President Trump's use of social media, particularly Twitter.

## 6. Twitter

Twitter is one example of a social media online network. Metzl (in Sevin and Mannor 2018:4) explains that in a diplomatic context “a network is the sum of all connections between diplomatic actors”. Sevin and Mannor state that ICTs advances have allowed removing the financial and physical barriers allowing a new diplomatic practice to take place, a “networked diplomacy”, an innovative diplomatic practice through the digital space. Sevin and Mannor (2018:5) additionally consider that to increase their diplomatic prominence states should be intersection links in networks. In other words, they should be the connecting points of information sources.

Moreover, Twitter is defined “as a microblogging service that enables its users to post content about any topic and follow others to read their tweets” (Kwak *et al* in Sevin and Mannor 2018:6). This microblogging reference responds to the fact that a tweet message can only have 280 characters. It is also an interactive application that allows mentions using “@” preceding the name of the Twitter account, this will lead the message to the recipient's notifications tab and it will be seen by any of the followers of that user (help.twitter.com). It enables that “a tweet could be a reply or a retweet to an already existing tweet” (Sharma *et al* 2018:1512) and the message can include pictures and videos to make it appealing. It is relevant the explanation provided by Sharma and Bedi (2018:1513) that “the hashtag [#] function was created on Twitter to allow people to easily follow topics they are interested in”. The hashtag # symbol is used before a word to emphasise the importance of it and making the topic easy to find, like 🇳🇷 #StaySafe . According to Sharma and Bedi (2018:1513) “hashtags pertaining to some national/international events, disaster or major sports-related events readily become popular on the Twitter platform...to become trending topics often”. This makes them effective communication where ideas needed to be planted in minds of many people in a

short period of time. Unfortunately, this does not always happen, as hashtags can also be ignored.

It is necessary to consider that “by following and tweeting to any particular hashtag conversations, the tweeters may communicate within a particular community of interest” (Bruns *et al*, in Sharma & Bedi 2018:1513). That follows Khazraee and Novak’s (2018: 2) analysis that narratives and discourses in support of a cause in social media platforms allow the construction of a collective identity promoting collective action through the creation of shared knowledge that fosters the feeling of belonging to a group. These online groups, indistinctly of their geographical location, are the ones states and non-state actors are looking to influence and to obtain their support to their ideas/interests by trying to persuade them through the use of innovative practices and social media applications, like Twitter.

Adesina and Summers (2017) explain that countries are already pursuing their foreign policy interests through websites, blogs, and social media sites like Twitter and Facebook. Moreover, they highlight that “the first Foreign Ministry to establish a dedicated eDiplomacy unit was the US State Department” in 2002. This corresponded with the war on terror campaign this country launched after the 11 September 2001, tragedy in the US. The use of Twitter is continuously expanding. Schmidt and Cohen (2014:9) state that modern technologies ... represented a paradigm shift, where their power relies in their ability to grow “quickly, efficiently or aggressively”, changing power control to those controlling and building them. Therefore, States and Foreign Affairs Ministries have incorporated the digital space and ICTs in their national and international policies. For example, South Korea has promoted itself as a technologically advanced country, one that exports ICTs to isolated populations in Central Asia as part of their foreign policy strategy (Melissen and Keulenaar 2017). Under the leadership of President Xi, China has created its own authority called Cyberspace Administration of China; it is in charge of the digital regulations and developments in the country to reduce its dependency on the United States technological companies (Segal 2017). India considers “digital infrastructure as a public good and data as something that citizens deserves access to” (Nikelami 2017). Adesina and Summers (2017) explain that in the case of the African continent there has been and growing participation of Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the

digital space and on social networks. However, “many African Leaders do not have Facebook or Twitter accounts” (Adesina and Summers 2017:10).

The political spectrum of countries’ interests in ICTs is diverse, but Foreign Affairs Ministries and other government institutions have websites and official accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and other online social networks. This is why, President Putin “designated digital diplomacy among the most effective foreign policy tools” in 2012 (Permyakova in Adesina and Summers 2017:8). The use of Twitter is multiplying. According to Twiplomacy Survey 2018; 131 foreign ministries and 107 foreign ministers maintained active Twitter accounts in 2018. The study further indicates that foreign ministries encourage their missions and ambassadors worldwide to become active on social media. These actions respond to the idea to expand the reach of the information through the networks. Information flows from Presidents and Heads of State to Ministries, from the Foreign Affairs Ministries to the missions, also to/ and from Ambassadors to the diplomat agents; and each one of them reaches their public. The information expands beyond borders, getting to different groups of which each one is part. Nonetheless, in Twitter, the messages can move independently or vice versa originating from the public. This type of diplomatic exchanges has been called Twitter Diplomacy (Ahmed 2015) or Twiplomacy (Twiplomacy Website, Abdullakuty 2018).

## **7. Twitter Diplomacy**

Ahmed (2015) has defined Twitter diplomacy as “the use of social network and microblogging website Twitter by diplomats, heads of state, and leaders of intergovernmental organizations in order to perform outreach activities.” According to the Global Twiplomacy Survey 2018, the first leader to open a Twitter account was Barack Obama who did so on the 5th of March 2007, when he was still Senator of Illinois. Nonetheless, they highlighted that Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto (@EPN) and the U.S. State Department (@StateDept) are among the early ones to have signed up twitter ten years ago. They also indicated that “most world leaders followed suit between 2009 and 2015”.

Adesina and Summers (2017:9) explain that the global Twiplomacy survey conducted on Twitter showed that in 2016, 86 percent of the governments and leaders of 193 United

Nations Governments had a Twitter account, while 27 did not (Twiplomacy Survey Adesina and Summers 2017). This same global survey for 2018, pointed out an increase to 97 percent of the 193 United Nations countries, with only 6 countries without an official presence in Twitter (Twiplomacy 2018). This tendency has been shown in the new Twiplomacy Study for 2020, which indicates that governments and leaders of 189 countries had an official presence on Twitter, representing 98 percent of the 193 United Nations member states, except for Laos, North Korea, Sao Tome and Principe and Turkmenistan, which do not yet have a Twitter official presence.

The global survey conducted on 2018 highlighted the fact that the Head of State and Government with the biggest impact on Twitter was Donald Trump @realDonaldTrump, “since taking office on January 20, 2017 ... becoming the most followed world leader with more than 52 million followers”. The survey considers his influence has changed the tone of discourse on Twitter as he usually insults his opponents and lampoons other world leaders (Twiplomacy 2018).

In spite of President Trump’s style, his influence in Twitter pressed other world leaders to be more active and engage on Twitter, as the survey for 2018 indicated that “a very small group of world leaders who are personally active on their own Twitter accounts”. As an example they mention the European Council President (@DonaldTusk), Denmark’s Prime Minister (@LarsLoekke) and Foreign Minister (@AndersSamuelsen), Latvia’s Foreign Minister (@EdgarsRinkevics), and Norway’s Prime Minister (@Erna\_Solberg)” (Twiplomacy 2018). The increasing tendency in the use of Twitter accounts by the Heads of State and Government, the highest legitimate authority of the States, Ministries of Foreign Relations and the foreign service has led some authors such as Pigman (2010: 111) and Abdullakkutty (2018: 11) to argue that the new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and social media platforms including Twitter can easily perform the functions of diplomacy such as negotiation, representation and communication, limiting the need of representations abroad. These arguments make it necessary to consider how the use of Twitter, both personal and official accounts, are changing diplomacy, and the different types of norms and practices that are emerging from it in the form of innovative digital diplomacy.

## **8. Concluding remarks**

This chapter discussed the evolution of innovative diplomacy and the growth in the use of new technological platforms, including social media, in order to facilitate political communication and diplomatic exchanges. It shows that the use of ICTs in society and in diplomacy have expanded fast, bringing new innovations to diplomatic practice, of which the growing use of twitter diplomacy is an epitome. It brings leaders into conversations with millions across the world. It has also granted the public the possibility to engage in diplomatic affairs as never before.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### TWITTER, HEADS OF STATES AND INNOVATIVE DIGITAL DIPLOMACY: FINDINGS

#### 1. Introduction

Having discussed in Chapter Three the expansion of digital platforms and the increase of them by major political leaders and heads of states and governments, this chapter introduces a brief explanation on how diplomatic practice is created, as it establishes new knowledge accepted in the international scenario. This is because this study seeks to understand how Twitter diplomacy has a bearing on how diplomacy is conducted, which is a domain of norms and practices of diplomatic practice. This research discusses how political leaders, in particular heads of states' and governments' actions and behaviours impact the diplomatic practice, particularly when they are engaging in Twitter, as these practices are transforming diplomacy into a new innovative diplomacy and, at the same time, may be creating norms and state responsibility. This will be followed by the analysis of the messages posted in Twitter.

#### 2. The custom basis of diplomatic practice

Wendt (1999: 197) argues that “states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities, like desires, beliefs, and intentionality”. Therefore, the constitution of norms and practices is necessary to establish parameters of conducts among them, or, as according to Green’s (1987:2-3) explanation, “the purpose of the law [is] ... to introduce order into the relations of its members through the establishment of known and predictable barriers to conduct”; therefore, each member “requires to know what it can and what it cannot do”. Green highlights that laws have been developed for all societies to introduce norms of conducts for their members, establishing limits to some behaviours. However, there are other conducts whose limits will be only discovered when the action is first executed, as result of “the observing reaction of the rest of the international community afterwards [that the action has been executed]” (Green 1987:5). Therefore, a new norm would be developed based on the reaction of members to such a

first conduct. This is what constitutes the custom basis of state practice, and according to Green (1987:5) “[it] is and always will be the most important source of international law”. One of these examples is diplomatic practice as contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (VCDR1961) and on Consular Relations 1963 (VCCR1963).

Wendt (1999: 217) states that "individuals are the 'leading edge' of state action", as effectively authorities represent the society of their country. Consequently, these individuals who constitute the authority of the state have internalised the norms, rules, practices or understanding that define the interests and identities of that society and culture they represent. This explains how what is considered national is a powerful component of the development of individual identity precisely because it is based on popular culture. This popular culture has been built on the affective power of the meanings of images and activities of everyday life (Edensor 2002). It includes the beliefs, norms and practices learned through social interactions. Furthermore, Nowotny (2013:227) explains that the attachment to the home state, to the place one is born and raised, is an emotional embeddedness that corresponds to "the sum of the culture, family, formative early life experience and language ... that translates into a strong bond to the respective state". In other words, all individuals represent a set of beliefs, norms and practices that they have learned in their social collectiveness.

It is vital to remember that, in the digital arena, the public has created groups where individuals can perceive a sense of belonging, despite their physical location, as a result of the interactions in social media platforms. In this sense, research by Döveling *et al*, (2018:2) explains the need to pay attention to the way the "digitalised world is shaping the construction and expression of emotions worldwide". It should be added that they are transforming the meaning of place and event that are linked to "the process of knowledge production" adding the distinctiveness of the digital to the already "particularised ways in which knowledge is actually produced" (Janz 2019:55). Therefore, the digital society is shaping new ways to experience and express emotions that traditionally have been learned as a product of the local cultural norms.

Individuals who play authority roles are not exempt from these norms, rules and principles that they have learned through their practice because these make them part of

their culture as these are embedded in their self. These elements are "inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions" (Wendt in Hall 1999:26). This collective knowledge, or culture, is also contained in the ideas and interests of a country's foreign policy and in the way its agents engage in the diplomatic practice.

Although diplomatic practice is carried out with certain uniformity, at the same time, there are certain elements that are a unique characteristic of each country. These elements of differentiation are perceptible in diplomatic behaviours and communications where the accurate use of the language and the assertion of the meanings play an essential role. Heads of State and Government's tweets may be statements related to the same issue, for example, but the words and content varies according to the knowledge and culture of each. Furthermore, as it has been explained in Chapter Three, there are particular elements to the style that can be used to communicate using Twitter. This can be observed in the content analysis of the messages tweeted by the Heads of States and Government analysed in this research.

### **3. Heads of State and Government's tweets**

This research has analysed ten (10) Twitter messages posted by Heads of State and Government, nine (9) absences of tweets has been analysed. Of these nine, three (3) messages were delivered in relation with the issue on hand, and two (2) actions were realised as a response to the event. These tweets were collected following Kumar's (2014:44) prescriptions on non-probability sampling. They were posted in consideration to four events selected for the sample that transcended internationally, as detailed: Juan Guaidó acting as Interim President of Venezuela in January 2019; the Terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019; the Effects of Cyclone Idai on Mozambique in April 2019; and the Notre-Dame fire in France in April 2019. These events represented different regional incidents, and they are of a different nature: an uprising, a terrorist attack, a natural disaster and a human-made disaster.

The messages were posted by the selected actors, under each one of the events described before. The selected actors, as has been explained in Chapter One, are Heads of States



and Governments including Australia's Prime Minister, Scott Morrison; Chile's President, Sebastián Piñera; the United States' President, Donald J. Trump; Rwanda's President, Paul Kagame; and Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong.

To understand the need of communication posted in Twitter in a given specific time, and under a particular event frame, this research has included an analysis of the following elements: concept, context, event, and Twitter messages. In this order, the concept point was developed to illustrate the existence of a common understanding or a disagreement in the international sphere on the meanings of what constitutes an uprising, a terrorist attack, a Cyclone in the area of natural disasters, and a Cathedral as a national symbol. This topic has been followed by a brief explanation of the context in which the event took place, like the country or city where the situation happened, its geographical location on a map and the pre-existent conditions previous to the event when it has been possible. After this, a succinct account of the event has been made. All these elements help understand the time and space when the Twitter messages were posted, which constitutes the central element of analysis.

Therefore, a content analysis has been developed taking into account the following aspects: purpose, audience and efficacy of the use of words posted in each message. Those elements were selected considering the different interests in foreign policy a country expects to achieve through diplomatic practice. The analysis compares the effectiveness of the messages between President Trump and Prime Minister Morrison for each one of the samples, when possible, to have a broad spectrum of the efficacy of the use of Twitter.

Furthermore, taking into account Janz's (2019:58) considerations about how changes in procedures and habits transforms the production and application of knowledge. This analysis has been looking to answer the aims and questions proposed to better understand if the activities of Heads of States and Governments in Twitter are an extended practice; if they are transforming the core diplomatic functions of representation, negotiation, and communication, and to what extent this will affect the future of diplomacy and diplomatic agents. A brief account of the content analysis of the Tweet Messages is included.

#### **4. Sample Number 1: The Uprising of Juan Guaidó as acting Interim President of Venezuela, January 2019.**

The event took place on 23 January 2019. The Head of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, led an uprising against the government blamed for difficult socio-economic conditions, following elections that popularly returned the same government to power. He declared himself interim president of the Republic, in the centre of the capital. Taking the oath of office, he argued that the 2018 re-election of President Nicolás Maduro was illegitimate, and that the presidency was vacant, referring to Maduro as the usurper of the presidency. Guaidó promised to guide the country out of the crisis (BBC 2019).

Traditionally, the recognition of a government has been expressed, but it can also be implied (Green 1987:40). If an uprising is used by someone claiming to be the interim president of the government of the country, states in favour or against it may have to convey their messages in the fastest and most public way possible. In this case, the messages of the Heads of State and Government that were conveyed through Twitter were of forthright support for the interim government and President; President Piñera immediately declared “Chile recognises” while President Trump declared “I recognized”.

Recognition of a government is a traditional diplomatic practice. The role of the government, as the recognised institutional structure and norms that include the sovereign capacity of the state (Epstein *et al* 2018: 787–804), is that the state is legitimated by its citizens at the national level, and in the international sphere by the recognition of other states. International recognition usually happens through the conveyance of formal letters to that effect through diplomatic missions of respect countries.

The recognition of government is necessary for international processes since Heads of State or Government are "competent to speak for and bind the state in its international relations" (Green 1987:129). Nonetheless, it is also an old international practice to utilise non-recognition policy as a sanction against a government that has been signalled as a non-complier of the international law (Green 1987:40). It is done with the idea of isolating the country and convince it to apply international norms.

President Piñera expressed that "Chile recognises @jguaido as Interim President of Venezuela" making the Tweet message a new medium to express recognition. He conveyed Chile's "full support in its mission of recovering democracy, the rule of law and human rights". The last phrase explains that this recognition is needed because the non-recognised is not complying with international law. "Maduro is part of the problem and not the solution", read the tweet. Therefore, it said the solution to Venezuela's crisis is to have "free elections", recalling the Chilean position that the electoral process of 2018 was not recognised as it was not considered genuinely democratic elections. The use of the mention @jguaido was to ensure that Juan Guaido received the support message immediately on his Twitter account and that Guaido's followers were buoyed to continued supporting his stance. This post was followed by a press conference of President Piñera's and the release of an Official Statement.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Trump tweeted a strong message the same day of the uprising. He declared: "the illegitimate Maduro regime", describing the Maduro government. He also indicated that, he had "officially recognised the President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the Interim President of Venezuela". To make his message even clearer, he included a similar position in a tweet by US Vice President Mike Pence in his message. This action was to remove any doubt about the official position of the United States. The Vice President uploaded to his message the official "Statement from President Donald J. Trump Recognising Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the interim President of Venezuela". This statement is an example of an expressed recognition in its traditional way. It also confirms the determined interest of Trump's Presidency to restore democracy in Venezuela, as the non-recognised President (Maduro) is breaching the international law. The statement was shared through social media to make it public and reachable faster.

In Australia, Prime Minister Morrison did not tweet a message in this regard, but he endorsed a tweeted statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade dated 28th of January, expressing Australia's recognition and support to the President of the National Assembly in assuming the position of interim president, at the same time this recognition was "until elections are held". This action is also based on two premises that Australia is recognising Guaidó as he is acting "in accordance with Venezuelan constitution" and the call to "a transition to democracy in Venezuela as soon as possible".

Neither President Kagame of Rwanda nor the Prime Minister of Singapore tweeted a message related to the Venezuelan crisis. Neither did their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

In the particular case of the uprising, the messages were targeting an international audience, Venezuelans abroad and those remaining in the country. The messages were also posted considering each national audience. In this regard, when President Trump's tweet is analysed, the message received 181,500 likes and 73,100 retweets. With 66,962,402 followers in his Twitter account, the message received a 0.27% of likes considering the total number of followers. In Twitter perspectives, his message was not very successful. However, it received wide publicity.

Prime Minister Morrison did not tweet a message related to the Venezuela Crisis. However, the Australian recognition of Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela received publicity. It was mentioned in the international news, *The Guardian* (Karp 2019), AP (2019).

## **5. Sample Number 2: Terrorist Attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, March 2019.**

On 15 March 2019, a white supremacist terrorist attack took place in Christchurch, New Zealand. Two mosques were targeted, and 50 people died (Ainge Roy 2019b). The attack was recorded in a live-streamed video through Facebook. It was available on the Internet for approximately 30 minutes before it was blocked, given enough time to be copied and shared online (Ainge Roy 2019a).

### **5.1. Twitter Messages**

Terrorism is a word that carries much symbolism, while terrorism, as an act, also carries impacts as it disrupts and brings chaos and suffering to people and states. Bennett (in Harrison 2017:211) explains that terrorist attacks “are emotionally charged events” that are used by the media to entertain. Media reporting influences the perception of an event. As the attack provides publicity to the perpetrators and the victims, intended or not; it becomes a political opportunity as long as it attracts people's attention. It is used by the

media and lately, social media, to keep the public interested (Harrison 2017:209-214). Therefore, it is necessary to convey a timely message. The following tweets were posted by Heads of States and Government part of the sample. They were tweeted mostly the same day the terrorist attack had taken place, on March 15.

In the particular case of a terrorist attack, the event allows states to fulfil several ends. First, it allows the message sender to reiterate its position on the matter, using strong words: Morrison used the word, "horrified"; Piñera used the words, "strongly condemn"; Trump called it a "horrible massacre"; Loong used the words, "Horrific...Threat". These words specifically create a space of distance that reiterates these states do not support violence, or terrorism, as it represents a threat against civilians and the rule of law, following the line established in the United Nations framework to counter-terrorism. The leaders shared a common idea and position against terrorism, allowing them to be identified as peace supporters.

Moreover, the tweets expressed support to the affected government for the event already labelled a terrorist attack, while supporting the legitimacy of the state of New Zealand and calls for the rule of law, as expressed by Morrison or Trump who said, "the U.S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do". Even though Heads of State and Government have to choose the wording carefully, the fact they have posted a message condemning or expressing discomfort on the attack reflects implicit support to the Government of Jacinda Ardern, and in the context of the situation the country was facing. As an example, Prime Minister Loong expressed horror for the attack in Christchurch, but at the same time, he recalled the need for Singapore to keep vigilant and be prepared to respond to a similar threat.

President Piñera also tweeted: "I categorically reject all forms of violence, discrimination or extremism". He expressed support to the Islamic world targeted during the attack, expressing sympathy to them, without excluding them as a pacific group. He also invites the New Zealand Government to investigate the issue. He said, "I hope justice will be done" and reiterates Chile's position as a peaceful country with its last words being, "peace prevails".

President Trump's Tweet presented its condolences to the people of New Zealand by

saying, “My warmest sympathy and best wishes goes out to the people of New Zealand”. He not only described the situation as “horrible”. He also committed his country’s support: “The U. S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do”. It indicates to New Zealand’s Government the United States’ willingness to offer advice and support based on that country’s vast experience in counterterrorism, signalling perhaps a lack of capacity of New Zealand in this area.

In the case of Prime Minister Loong, his message highlighted that the attack was carried out on “two mosques in Christchurch,” highlighting the Islamic world as the victim of the attack and not the other way around. The tweet also categorised terrorism as a “threat” and signalled that it was a threat that had not yet been internationally solved as it still “remains”. Prime Minister Loong emphasised the need for Singapore to be “constantly vigilant and prepared”, implying that the possibility of suffering a terrorist attack in Singapore should not be disregarded. Moreover, as the tweet was brief he added the link: [bit.ly/2T4xYmt](https://bit.ly/2T4xYmt) that takes you to his Facebook account, where he posted a longer message indicating, “I am writing to New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern to express my deepest condolences to the families of the victims”. The link to the blue name of Jacinda Ardern in his message is redirected to Ardern's Facebook account, making it an instant delivery. His post includes a video from CHANNELNEWASIA.COM covering the terror news, thus strengthening his message, and the country's position on this matter.

Not all of the leaders chosen for the sample tweeted about this event. Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, did not. Nonetheless, the Rwandan Government issued an official Tweet that more likely resembles a mini-press release, expressing its rejection of terrorism while supporting Ardern’s administration “@RwandaGov will continue to stand firmly with #NewZealand in its fight against terrorism”. It is the only message that uses a mention and hashtag. The mention @RwandaGov focused on a commitment to stand with New Zealand. The #NewZealand hashtag emphasised the tweet to that particular moment where the issue was a trend to guarantee the message would be received.

The messages posted on Twitter can be understood as a manifestation of support for New Zealand’s Government and its counter-terror actions. They were also directed at its people as they were the victims of the violence, without forgetting the national audience in

tweeting heads of state's countries as any message posted by the leaders is a message to their own people that also reminds them of the danger terrorism represents.

Looking closely to President's Trump account, his tweet reached 158,000 likes, and 29,600 retweets, making only 0.23 % of likes considering the total number of 66,695,188 registered followers. However, his text was shared and analysed by national and international mass media like CNN (Klein 2019), *USA TODAY* (Jackson D. and Rossman S. 2019) and *The Independent* (Riotta 2019). Therefore, the message conveyed received international publicity, allowing it to reach a broad audience.

In the case of the Prime Minister of Australia, who got 4,228 likes and 873 retweets with 213,252 followers, he had more responses, reaching 1,98% of likes considering the total number of followers. These figures might change if we consider followers can unfollow themselves from accounts, while others may decide to begin to follow a leader. Due to the political proximity that Australia and New Zealand share, the Minister of Australia delivered several messages and visited the country. These actions were covered also by the national and regional mass media like ABC News Australia (N.D.), and TVNZ (2019), among others.

## **6. Sample Number 3: The Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, March 2019.**

On 14 March 2019, Cyclone Idai impacted the City of Beira in Mozambique. As the winds changed, it moved from category 2 to 3. Category 3 storms have a minimum wind speed of 178 km/h (Fitchett 2019). It caused devastation of human settlement across the coast, destroyed the physical infrastructure and adversely affected the economy.

### **6.1. Twitter Messages**

The international response to the disaster was not as expected. Solidarity tweets were absent. In spite of this, several countries contributed funds to the disaster's assistance, through direct donations to the Government of Mozambique or through United Nations agencies and the IFRC. International. Aid was also provided by the United States of

America and Australia. Other countries that are not part of the selected sample expressed their sympathy and support to Mozambique's Government. None of the Heads of State and Government considered for the sample posted a comment.

In an international scenario, messages are conveyed to the authorities, other international actors, national and international audiences. The absence of tweets may represent a lack of interest in the State of Mozambique, its authorities, and those in the country affected by the cyclone. Nonetheless, it is probable that support messages were conveyed in less public ways to Mozambique's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic representations abroad, like in statements during international meetings or through private correspondence using the official channels.

From another perspective, Mozambique's President used the national media to assure citizens that the situation was being handled. He was able to highlight that the international community was responding to the country's request for international assistance. This means countries responded through formal diplomatic channels. The government reported the support messages and the foreign aid that was transmitted to the President through the media and the Government's official web page. It could be considered that President Nyusi used the disaster in his favour. He conveyed the political message that he was able to get the foreign assistance the country needed to manage to the disaster. It is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of messages that were not posted.

#### **7. Sample Number 4: The Notre-Dame Cathedral Fire in Paris, France, April 2019.**

On 15 April 2019, the Cathedral of Notre Dame was going through a restoration process. It was surrounded by scaffolding when a fire started. Paris was in shock as the fire consumed the spire and most of the roof of the cathedral. More than 400 firefighters were deployed to fight the fire, even drones and robots were used, but the construction materials of the structure of the cathedral made the fire extinguishing process complex (Berlinger 2019).



## 7.1. Twitter Messages

Smith defines an iconic site as one that “provides individuals with ‘sacred centres’, objects of spiritual and historic pilgrimage, that reveals the uniqueness of their nation’s ‘moral geography’” (in Edensor 2002:45). Following this definition, Notre Dame Cathedral can be considered a symbol of the French nation as it caught fire in the heart of the capital. It can be understood that a landmark of French moral geography was on fire and suffering serious damage.

This type of calamity requires a rapid response and a quick message that has to be received during the event or as soon as it has been controlled. Due to the emotional characteristics of this event and the magnitude of having a major well-known building on fire it became the perfect piece of information to be shared in social media. Therefore, the Heads of State and Government hurried to convey a message in response to it.

Coppola (2011:29-30) defines disasters as events that “overwhelm response capacity” and that “are measured in terms of the lives lost, injuries sustained, property damaged or lost and environmental degradation”. It could be said that the fire of the Notre Dame Cathedral represented such an event even though there were no lives lost and the fire was controlled. However, for the French, the fire was a disaster. The country could not lose the building that, due to its antiquity, is one of the major symbols of French identity as a society and a nation. The twitter messages expressed the recognition of the cathedral as a crucial symbol of France. Otherwise, messages would not have been necessary, and it would have been treated as an ordinary event. Moreover, emotive words, used to convey their sentiments, followed. Morrison said it was “so sad”; Piñera called it a “tragedy”; Trump said it was “horrible”; and Loong said he was, “Deeply saddened”. These words created closeness with the French nation.

In this regard, Prime Minister Morrison used affective words to refer to the event. “I fondly remember standing outside Notre Dame with Jen almost 30 years ago”. He described the Cathedral as a place that brought back family memories, a way to express closeness to his heart and to his closest relatives. He was bringing the symbolism of the building closer to Australia. He established the recognition of the French people’s sorrow, conveying a sympathy message to the French People and to the emergency responders,

“Our thoughts are with the people of France and emergency services”. He also supported the idea that the building would be rebuilt in a way that only France could achieve. “They will rebuild as Parisians always do”. The message recognised and valued French culture as unique. It implicitly expressed support to President Macron although he is not mentioned in the message.

Interestingly, the original message from the Chilean President was made in French. More than showing the knowledge of the language, it made the message forthright. Using French represents recognition of the culture and the tradition that French people always prefers to use their own language. It means they could understand him in their own language. It sought to convey friendship, and it also guarantees the tweet would be understood without translation. The message also recognised the historical and architectural value of the building “the fire of #NotreDame of Paris is a real tragedy”. Using the #NotreDame ensured the post would be seen while the issue was still trendy. The tweet provides sympathy to the French and the firefighters, “a lot of strength and faith for all the French and those who work tirelessly to control the fire”. He added, “Our thoughts and prayers are with you” stressing that Chile and France have such a close relationship that Chile can empathise with their pain and supports the French Government and people during this process. The message also shows support to President Macron, even though he was not mentioned in the original tweet. President Piñera retweeted President Macron’s Tweet to make his message precise. Moreover, a Spanish translation was added to the message, in which the mention of @EmmanuelMacron was added to ensure President Macron received this message in his account.

President Trump’s tweet defined the event as horrible, heightening emotions for dramatic effect, while recognising the fire status as a disaster for France “So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris”. He urged the French government to “act quickly!” and to use “flying water tankers” to control it. While he recognised the situation, and the urgent call to act quickly, he was less supportive to President Macron than his peers, giving the impression that he considered they were not handling the situation correctly, and that some leadership was needed, even offering suggestions on how to control the fire. The suggestion of the use of water tankers also reveals a lack of knowledge about the architecture and construction materials of the building. These are essential elements that needed to be assessed to take measures to manage this type of

event (Berlinger 2019). It also means that probably he reacted and wrote the message without consulting anyone before posting it as @realDonaldTrump.

In the case of the message of Prime Minister Loong, he also used emotional words to express his deep understanding of the situation and his closeness to the French people, “I share the sense of loss of the French people”. He also expressed his desire to see the cathedral restored one day too, saying, “hope to see the cathedral restored one day”. His choice of wording left open the option of how, who and when the restoration would happen, but at the same time acknowledging the message of President Macron. To make his message precise and closer to the Singaporean people, he added the information of the fire to his message.

Not all the leaders chosen for the sample tweeted about this event. Paul Kagame did not, nor did any official public account convey an official public message on this issue. Whether the context of political differences between Rwanda and France over the genocide and over the French role in Africa played a role in this failure to express empathy is subject to a debate.

The rest of the tweets expressed support for the French nation and to the measures taken by the government to control the situation. They were also posted to target the broad world population that identified themselves with the cathedral, not only as a religious building but also as an historical and architectural masterpiece. Those that have been able to travel to France as tourists, students, or workers could identify themselves with the cathedral.

The efficacy of these tweets was not as expected. President Trump reached 35,100 retweets and 194,100 likes; with 66,964,402 followers, this represents only a 0,29% response of the total number of his followers. Nonetheless, the message received broad publicity in the international media through *The Guardian* (AFP in Paris 2019), CNN (Berlinger 2019), and Channel News Asia (AFP/de 2019).

In the case of the Prime Minister of Australia, who got 630 likes and 78 retweets with 213,252 followers, he had a greater reach to his followers, being 0,30% likes of the total number of followers. The media coverage was limited when compared to President

Trump's tweet, quoted only by *The Guardian* (Lyons and Busby 2019). This made the message noticeable in the international scenario, taking it from the national sphere to a broad international audience.

It has been observed that each actor used a particular language in their tweets, comprising its own synthesis of what they wanted to express in each event. In some cases, leaders followed a similar position towards the broad aspect of the event, as in the case of the sample number 2. In other events, they did not react, as in sample number 3. The general results of the analysis are detailed below.

## **8. Analysis of Results**

The content analysis has shown a mixture of results regarding how Twitter messages are transforming the core functions of representation, negotiation and communication as follows:

- 1) Diplomatic practice relies on the opportune time of conveying an appropriate message, making timing and content fundamental to make it effective. Twitter instant messages grants more importance to the delivery of the message than to content, providing new relevance to the timing framework and making it immediate.
- 2) It is already transforming diplomatic practice, as there was an increase in the use of Twitter to post messages in particular situations in 2019. The @realDonaldTrump tweeting example was spreading between the Heads of States and Government in certain regions like Latin America and Oceania. It is clear that in Asia, they were using the twitter app efficiently as the tweets of Prime Minister Loong show.
- 3) Moreover, the content of the message it has been transformed as Heads of State and Government need to choose the wording carefully to be sure the message arrives at the proper recipient. They needed to use the mentions of @ and hashtags # to be sure the message would pop up in the correct group, making it necessary to understand how the app works. It may be argued that as leaders, they should be the ones to be follow up, but as habits and procedures change (Janz 2019:58), actors should need to adapt, and not all leaders are as famous as influencers or artists.
- 4) The use of Twitter as a form of communication in diplomatic practice has been previously explained, and how Heads of States and Governments represent the highest-level authority of the state, meaning their statements are a "unilateral act

concerning factual or legal situations, [that] may have the effect of creating legal obligations..." (Green 1995: 27:28). So, when the Heads of State stated their recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela, they understood the weight of their tweets in relation to Guaidó's contested usurping of power. They bestowed on him a measure of legitimacy usually conferred via formal diplomatic communication. The posts made the use of Twitter as an innovative digital diplomatic practice to grant international assistance and support and to unilaterally commit the state.

- 5) Nonetheless, there is a tendency to keep the tweets on the regional level and between allies, which constitutes a traditional diplomatic practice. For example, Australia's Foreign Ministry message positioned the country in the group among the United States, Canada, some Latin American Countries and European Countries recognising Guaidó as interim president. In the case of sample number 2, however, for Australia and Singapore, the messages reflected the geographical closeness and the political interests shared, particularly between Australia and New Zealand. In the case of Chile, New Zealand is a close friend in international organisations, where they share common positions. Finally, for the United States, the tweet represents support to a strategic ally. In the case of Rwanda, the message posted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the case of the terrorist attack in New Zealand reflected the historical context of the country and its commitment with peace and the reconciliation process the country is still facing.
- 6) The absence of tweets in the case of the Cyclone Idai, sample number 3, shows that despite the number of people affected and the amount of damage the country suffered, it was seen as a regional problem; one that would be needed to be assessed through the regional organisations. Conversely, it was not perceived as an international political opportunity to convey support or recognition to the country nor to the South Eastern Africa region.
- 7) In the case of sample number 4, for Australia, Chile and Singapore the action of tweeting messages reflected geopolitical closeness to France, Western culture and shared political interests. These tweets reflect that these leaders are concerned with maintaining social cohesion of the national identity of the state. It can also be interpreted as states that follow western guidelines. On the other hand, the United States was trying to act as a dominant leader, demeaning towards Macron's actions, and telling him how to manage a national emergency. This showed an unease and

ambiguity in France-US relations. On the other hand, for Rwanda, the event was a regular event that did not require immediate international recognition. It was an ordinary fire that was being controlled by the competent authorities of the respective country. At the same time, it reflects that it did not occur in a geographic area of immediate political interest for the country.

- 8) The absence of Twitter messages in the case of sample number 3 signals that something is wrong in the area of international solidarity. Disasters are still viewed with reluctance. They are evaluated in terms of the international financial aid that would be required to assist countries in the processes of response and recovery. Moreover, international assistance is framed under the management of International Organisations, and NGOs specialised on humanitarian aid. These organisations are assigned with the task of collecting, allocating distributing and supervising the international assistance in case of emergency.
- 9) The tweets were also delivered with the intention that the media would report them to grasp wider general audiences, like the international community, other states, and international organisations and agencies, that were not following them on Twitter. The events were used to win support for themselves as leaders as well as their political views. Therefore, the efficacy of the Tweet is not only determined by the number of retweets or likes, but by the fact that the target audience has noticed the message, and that the media have reported it.

## **9. Concluding remarks**

The analysis has shown that if we consider that Tweets can be used to deliver messages in real-time, it may be argued that the posts, by themselves, constitute an act of representation as it will be seen. At the same time, they constitute a communication act that represents a state position. Nonetheless, the level of legal commitment the use of the application can give to the state, needs to be further studied to better understand how is going to keep transforming diplomacy in the future.

Despite some advantages, Twitter cannot replace the human touch required in Diplomatic Practice; neither can it be appropriately used in a negotiation process. Tweets will always be read through the lens of the beholder. Therefore, the best use for the Twitter application is to inform and to collect information. The application allows reaching a broad audience,

providing an excellent tool to promote states' foreign policies. Diplomats around the world need to better understand the use of this application and to be aware of the responsibilities each tweet represents. The use of Twitter as a diplomatic platform has increased among the Heads of States and Government from 2019 to 2020. This rise is the result of the growing dependence on ICTs, and one that the current pandemic has intensified as shown earlier. Schneider (2011:54) explains that existing social norms usually guide human interactions. "Standard forms of interactions, however, are upset when an unanticipated event occurs". Twitter and other social platforms were used as a mechanism to spread information fast, in real-time, and to reach a broad public with the health measures necessary to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Moreover, it was introduced as a necessary tool to keep social distancing between individuals.

It can be stated that Heads of State and Government have acted according to Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980:7) explanation that a person's conduct responds to their beliefs; therefore, "a person who believes that performing a given behaviour will lead to mostly positive outcomes will hold a favourable attitude toward performing the behaviour". Leaders included in the sample believed in the utility of Twitter to convey information. Nonetheless, they may have also followed Hobson's (2000:147) argument that norms establish what is considered appropriate or legitimate behaviour in international society. Furthermore, they may have responded to Norris's (2003:71) statement that "early adopters of new innovations are characteristically drawn from groups with higher socio-economics status ... [as factors such as] education, literacy, and social status provide access to essential financial and information sources required to adapt flexibly to innovative technologies". In any case, there has been an increase in the use of Twitter as the global survey Twiplomacy Study 2020 shows: "World leaders were quick to use Twitter to communicate and explain lockdown rules, often using the Twitter covers to encourage their followers to #StayHome, #StayAlert and #SaveLives. Making COVID19 the first topic of their messages".

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

#### 1. Introduction

Diplomatic practice has evolved over time, and the study aimed to analyse how the incorporation of ICT's, through platforms such as twitter, were already changing diplomatic practice, and to consider in particular if these new practices were changing the way the core functions of representation, negotiation and communication were done, and if these were being done electronically to the extent that governments would be able to replace the need for diplomatic agents in the future. The assumptions of the study were based in the extended engagement of political leaders on the use of Twitter to deliver political messages instantly, without using the diplomatic or official channels.

We have discussed methodology, diplomatic functions and innovative diplomacy. Chapter Four discussed how practice is transformed into knowledge and the researcher's findings. This chapter provides a summary of the conclusions of the study, which already feature as conclusions of each of the chapters prior to this one, providing that an innovative digital diplomacy is already taking place, creating new opportunities and challenges to the international actors and to the needs of the diplomatic agent.

#### 2. The rise of Internet and innovative diplomacy

This study has shown the significance of the Internet and ICTs in diplomacy by showing that technologies have a bearing on society. How these have revolutionised communication and interaction has a bearing on diplomacy where communication is crucial. At the beginning of the twenty-first century it was considered that going online, by itself, was not going to alter the values and priorities of most individual users because social and political values are understood as deep-rooted phenomena that are ground on early pattern of socializations in the home, school and workplace (Norris 2003:197). Furthermore, it was considered that being in the cybersociety was a choice where people would be oriented by their prior preferences and interests (Norris 2003: 197). However, as the access and use of Internet spread globally, being connected to the Internet is now



a common practice, and intelligent devices keep individuals plunged into the digital world.

Moreover, it has been stated in the research that the development of the new social applications and technologies are changing the collective behaviour, transferring the social components of real-life practices, values, norms, and conducts that constructs cultures to the on-line world, independently of location. People's patterns of conduct, values and ways of expressions have already changed. Since the arrive of social platforms, such as Twitter, intensive use of this application has introduced changes in the patterns of communications, fostering the use of public relations profiles as an additional component to make messages that appeal to the public through the use of their emotions in real time; therefore, responses will be less rational and more a reaction.

Norris (2003: 195) highlighted that the rise of the Internet will influence the predominant values and attitudes within society in the long term. Roland Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism and postmodernization suggested that an online community has a cyber culture "sympathetic toward postmaterialist values of freedom of expression, and tolerance of diversity, social egalitarianism, secularism, internationalism, self-expression, and participatory democracy" (Norris 2003:197). It is also important to take into consideration Harrison's (2017) explanation that young online communities are less able to perform social live interactions and communications, as they learn to interact through a screen instead of people, making them more dependent on new technologies.

Therefore, the Internet has helped spread Western collective knowledge while the digital divide persists. Moreover, it has become the principal element transforming people's conduct and the construction of synthesis.

As Lipschutz (1996:115) states, ICTs brought "the discovery of new ways of doing things, of acting, of engaging in political and other activities". This also can be seen in the diplomatic practice. As has been previously stated, this research argues that diplomatic practice represents a universal shared knowledge, ruled by international law (VCDR1961 and VCCR1963), that still constitutes itself, at the same time, as an activity that constructs new meanings, norms and practices through its implementation, thus leading to the establishment of a new international custom, like innovative digital

diplomacy. In this regard, the result of the analysis has supported this consideration, as Lipschutz (1996:115) also considers that “it is new forms of social organisations and social practice, and not hardware alone, that have global political effects.” Therefore, social media platforms such as Twitter provide the technology that enables the provider “to enable, control, and shape the behaviour of users” (Barzilai-Nahon, in Khazraee and Novack 2018:3) through the different levels of infrastructure mechanisms that conforms to the features and capabilities that constitute it as social media applications, in other words, what makes Twitter be Twitter.

### **3. Twitter Diplomacy and Heads of States**

The study has also sought to show that Twitter and other social media platforms have become key sites of diplomatic communication even by very senior state authorities. In this regard, Heads of States and Government’s tweets are becoming an universal practice. Event though the analysis has shown a certain tendency to post in relation to regional matters, the need to respond in real time to situations has made the Tweet a diplomatic tool, transforming the diplomatic practice in an innovative digital diplomacy.

Nonetheless, the need to respond in real time can make both public and diplomatic agents receive the information at the same time, making the priority the delivery of the message and not necessarily its accuracy. This may also leave the diplomats without enough information to respond to questions or to adopt actions related with the position expressed in the tweet.

Each year, the use of Twitter is becoming more common, at the level of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Embassies and at the individual authority levels. The modern digital world moves faster and not necessarily in an accurate manner; even so, the Twitter application will continue to be used as a fast way to reach and influence audiences at the national and international level. Twitter has already become the preferred social media platform to carry out diplomacy (Twiplomacy 2020).

Nonetheless, the features of the applications require states to have a detailed national and international policy towards the use of Twitter. Twitter is not common media; the delivery of the message that should be posted in real time to respond to a situation must be

carefully analysed before being posted in order to guarantee the efficacy, the purpose, and the audience of the message, and to have the capacity to respond. Heads of States and Governments, Ministries, and other relevant authorities should only use official accounts until their term of duty has finished.

This researcher considers Ministries of Foreign Affairs will need to have specialized departments to have a good result in the use of social media platforms, as Twitter requires commitment and permanent engaging. Furthermore, every tweet should need to be revised before being posted because of the level of commitment and emotions that need to be handled while using this application, as people are using it to demand responses from their governments.

In this regard, when considering the aim and objective of this research on how the introduction of new practices such as tweets posted by Heads of States and Governments is transforming diplomacy and introducing new challenges to the core functions of diplomatic practice like negotiation, representation and communication, we concluded that the use of Twitter provides an instant platform to convey political messages prioritising the delivery of the message and not the content of it, contrary to the diplomatic core function of delivering concise messages promptly. This affects communication efficacy, as the door for the interpretation of the message is wider. It is also important to notice that the tweet efficacy to reach a broad audience relies on the re-tweets and comments in the posted message, making it dependant on the number of followers and chain of distribution among political leaders who are followers, states authorities and diplomatic groups.

At the same time, the analysis results of the tweets in specific contexts allows us to recommend the use of the platform to convey sympathy messages, to promote friendly relations, to provide consular advice or, as in case of disaster, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to provide health guidance, in other words, to inform. This recommendation is based on the results contained in Chapter Four, which show that even though tweets are seen as an innovative digital diplomatic practice, political leaders' posts can be considered as an act of representation per se. Therefore, they (the tweeter) can also offer international assistance and support, and unilaterally to commit state responsibility, without the state actually having to accept such responsibility. In the particular case of

negotiations, the platform must not be used in the process. It is still necessary that a diplomatic agent or representative conducts them.

The research also found that as Public Diplomacy was used to reach the support of the audience towards specific objectives, the two-way communication characteristic of Twitter, used to win support and followers, has brought, at the same time broader dissemination of the messages. This has granted the audience the opportunity to engage in diplomatic affairs, requesting more transparency and accountability in this area than before.

The research results had also explored diplomatic practices on Twitter to ascertain how it affects diplomatic agents. In this regard the main finding shows that there is still need of diplomatic agents, not only to conduct negotiations, as expressed before, but also to exercise all the diplomatic functions as explained in Chapter Two. Individuals are needed to interact with other individuals. Still, we consider that in the future the number of diplomats representatives send abroad may be reduced to cut states expenses. However, Foreign Ministers will need more specialised Diplomats, not only in particular areas such as climate change, disarmament or trade, but also in the use of the ICT's, to keep the information uploaded, to revise the information posted by their authorities, and to keep track on all developments.

When analysing how Twitter diplomacy affects the future of diplomacy, we can consider that it has already begun its transformation. The use of Twitter is almost universal. Diplomats around the globe are following their political leaders on Twitter to keep themselves informed on the latest news of their own countries. The COVID-19 pandemic forced a change to the use of ICT's, not only Twitter, through the use of virtual meeting and webinars that have replaced the face to face meetings. It is common, at the end of 2020, for a country to have numerous virtual conferences and webinars. These technologies will foster innovations to incorporate simultaneous translations and other technologies that will keep transforming diplomatic practice.

#### **4. Contribution to Knowledge**

As it has been previously expressed, the content analysis has shown a mixture of results regarding how Twitter messages are transforming the core functions of representation, negotiation and communication. The analysis has shown how the use of tweets has become an extended practice among world leaders, creating new customary practice, by emulating old conducts and joining them with new uses of the digital social platform as an element to reach the international community and the public. In this regard, states need to develop and foster digital knowledge to properly utilise this platform. It has been said in this research that communication is the core element of the diplomatic practice, as it is needed to carry all the functions: representation, protection of the interest of the sending state and its nationals, negotiation, information, promotion of friendly relations and the development of economic, cultural and scientific relations.

The diplomatic practice will continue to become innovative. The use of Twitter and other social media applications requires learning how to use them. This makes it necessary for diplomatic agents to learn how to appropriately handle these applications, and how to introduce innovative ways to communicate ideas and emotions to the public, to connect through images, color, videos, mentions, and hashstags to have the expected outcome from each message. Therefore, the Foreign Ministries will need to focus more resources to incorporate officials to monitor and control the mentions, tweets and re-tweets, and to be able to reply to the posts received in real time, in Twitter, as well as in other social media applications. The digital divide between practitioners would become an important step to overcome.

This research has argued that the pandemic has fostered the use of ICTs, advancing what was seen coming and creating what has been named the new normal. The Twiplomacy survey for 2020 has highlighted that “leaders who only half-heartedly embraced digital platforms are now actively chatting via Google Meet, Skype and Zoom calls and engaging their followers via Periscope”. Moreover, they confirm what has been explained before, that “World leaders were quick to use Twitter to communicate and explain lockdown rules, often using the Twitter covers to encourage their followers to #StayHome, #StayAlert and #SaveLives”, making COVID-19 the first topic of their messages.

In this matter, it is important to highlight that the long-term effects of the COVID19 pandemic, where people have been forced to stay at home and needing to depend on the Internet to conduct all aspects of their lives, are yet to be seen. The Pandemic has imposed a change in norms, rules, and principles of conduct of social life around the world. Therefore, there has been a change in collective behaviour. These changes emphasise Schneider's (2011:55) consideration that profound "unanticipated events are so severe that universally understood and accepted values no longer appear to be relevant", as is the case of the pandemic world. There is much work that could not be done in this study due to time limitations, but future studies would need to analyse how this accelerated digitisation may have reinforced the growth of innovative diplomacy in the post-pandemic world.

## **5. Concluding remarks**

This chapter provided conclusions and recommendations of the study on the basis of the context chapters and the findings chapter immediately before it. It does so with a view to suggest recommendations. It affirms the study's finding that diplomacy is a traditional practice that has become innovative with the incorporations of the ICT's technologies; as it has happened over time, diplomacy methods have changed. Diplomats need to keep incorporating the use of technologies to perform their functions; nonetheless, it is necessary to reiterate that twitter cannot replace the human touch required in Diplomatic Practice.

ICT's, like Twitter and other social platforms, as well as other technological advances could introduce more changes into international relations, foreign policies, diplomacy and diplomatic practice, both in theory and practice. Until new technological advances are developed, the best use for the Twitter application will be to convey sympathy messages, to inform, and to collect information.

One of the most significant challenges international actors, in particular states, will need to overcome will be the divide in diplomacy between traditional and innovative diplomacy, leading to the potential for widening inequality among diplomatic actors on the basis of their access to infrastructure, technologies and capacity to use these technologies. A divide in diplomacy and diplomatic practice prevailed with the

introduction of Western countries individualist knowledge and pre-established meanings. Space is needed for other regions' collective knowledge to move diplomacy to create a real international solidarity.

Futures studies will be needed to assess the impact of the Twitter culture on international actors' decisions. The legal aspects of the use of social media have been focused on their use to spread hate and terror support. Nonetheless, the study of other areas of international affairs and diplomacy must be also considered. Finally, we consider it necessary to analyse the impact of COVID-19 Pandemic, as it forced the use of ICT's, bringing changes in diplomatic practice and social behaviour.

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**END**

## ANNEXES

### **SAMPLE NUMBER 1: Uprising of Juan Guaidó, as acting Interim President of Venezuela, January 2019**

#### **1. Concept**

Historically there have been different reasons that have motivated rebellions. Nowadays, intrastate conflicts are the norm. The roots cause of the civil unrest differs in each state because of different historical context and socio-economic conditions. According to Brown (in Jackson 2002:36), there are four main factors' clusters that lead to internal conflicts: structural, political, economic/social and, cultural/ perceptual. Some of these conflicts respond to the demands of those the system has left behind in some of those areas.

Galtung (1969) explains that violence takes different expressions; one of these is structural violence or social injustice, that can be present in the governance structures. This injustice is the result of the use of power to divert resources from their original purpose to other purposes. This redistribution of resources leads to unequal opportunities in different spheres of life to those away from the power structure. This social injustice is not related to a particular system or political ideology. It is the result of the decision-making process of those in power that are not complying with the state responsibility to provide good governance of the resources to warrant the wellbeing of their citizens. These conditions can be the precursors of conflict and violence between those who want to retain power and those left behind and who are looking for a change (Galtung 1969: 167-191).

The administration of the state lies on the shoulders of those who govern, who are the ones actually performing the state policies. Wight (2015:19) suggests that the "modern state has four main features: fixed territorial boundaries, a monopoly on force and the means of coercion; a sovereign political order embedded in well-understood and structured hierarchical relationships; and the legitimacy to represent the needs and interests of its citizens". Therefore, the State institutions, which hold the legitimacy of

power, should work to protect, assist and secure the wellbeing of their citizens, and not just exert control or reinforce the law to maintain social order.

State institutions should perform the activities for the purpose they have been established, as the social order is the result of the legitimacy citizens provide through consent to the state's authority (Hall 1999) (Wight 2015). Nonetheless, citizens rise up when they feel the need to challenge the state's actions. An uprising may take different forms of civil disobedience like protests, strikes, or revolution. As Wight (2015:88) explains "acts of civil disobedience aim to highlight the unjust nature of laws or policies that require change". When an individual or group feels the need to call the attention over an unjust law, they turn to civil disobedience as a way to preserve their rights.

Even though violence may not be the first resource used by those challenging the authority, it is often present. It may start by those protesting or by the forces repressing them. If the source of the malaise is not addressed, the confrontation in the long term can increase, bringing major instability to the country, and it may mutate to a revolution.

According to Wight (2015:70), revolution is civil disobedience that will "attempt to overturn the institutions of the state as a whole". Moreover, Hall (1999:45) explains, "Political revolutions transform states structures but not social structures.... What is unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in mutually reinforcing fashion". To maintain the status quo, the political powers of the state will try to control and repress rebellions. The state may succeed or not in this endeavour, and the dimension of the confrontation can increase or decrease depending on the internal factors, as well as the influence of external actors.

Civil uprising has different dimensions; it may be peaceful or violent. It can adopt different forms of expression to communicate the disconformity message. As Wight (2015:93) clearly explains, it is: "full of complexities, paradoxes, and fluid points of contrast that blur the lines between legality, violence, harm, communication, motivation and persuasiveness". Therefore, an uprising will not necessarily bring a change, as each scenario develops according to the states own contexts where the actions take place.



## 1. Context

Venezuela is located in South America, and it shares borders with Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. The first Spanish settlement was established in the country in 1522. It formed part of the Spanish colonies until 1821 when, under the leadership of Simón Bolívar, the people won their independence. It formed part of the Gran Colombia with Colombia, Ecuador and Panama until 1830 when it turned into an independent sovereign country (Venezuela Profile: 2004).

There is a vast source of information about the independence processes in Latin America. It has been said these were just processes to change those who were in power and not to transform the countries' structures of power (Mignolo 2007) (Mestre 2001). These changes led Venezuela and other Latin American countries to instability, turbulence and revolutionary movements (Leiwen, in Mestre 2001:151-152) through the hands of the *caudillos*<sup>1</sup> "who provoked innumerable civil wars during the nineteenth century and prolonged dictatorships in the twentieth century" (Montaner 2000:58).

Nichols *et al* (2010:51-55) explains that at the beginning of the twentieth-century companies had already begun to extract tar and oil in Venezuela. Gulf, Shell and Standard, established operations in the country with their petroleum enclaves and controlled 98% of the petroleum of the country. Since then, oil becomes the base of the economy and politics in Venezuela. President Gómez governed petroleum politics and the country from 1908 until he died in 1935. His death was followed by a period of violence that led to democratic elections in 1945 (Nichols *et al* 2010:54-55).

With the election of Betancourt, as President in 1945, more favourable terms were negotiated with the oil companies, allowing the state to begin to exploit its oil resources and refined it. Nichols *et al* (2010:55-56) explain that the Betancourt period brought some prosperity to the country in the form of public education, health and initial land reform. His period ended with a presidential election in 1947. Gallegos won the election and lasted one year in power before a coup removed him. Marco Pérez Jiménez, who led the coup, would become President from 1952 until 1958 (Nichols *et al* 2010: 55-58).

Nichols *et al* (2010:58) highlighted that the end of Pérez period marked the start of a more stable situation for the country that lasted until 1989, as parties "agreed to shared governance, no matter who won the election" (Nichols *et al* 2010:59). During these years the country invested in the public sector. The Government of Venezuela nationalise the oil in 1976, restructuring the system to allow more profits for the state, without the need of the oil companies to leave the country (Nichols *et al* 2010:60).

Nonetheless, the drop of the oil prices in the eighties impacted profoundly in the Venezuelan economy, which entered into a political crisis. Nichols *et al* (2010:77- 83) explain that the social and economic disparities on the oil prices provoked the middle class to disappear, the poor to become most impoverished and the rich to become wealthier. It seems socio-economic inequalities increased during this period. Taking into consideration Montaner's (2000:59) explanation that "in Latin America, the military has often assigned itself the task of saving the nation from the failures of the politicians", it was under this scenario that Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías lead a failed coup attempt in 1992.

Arguably Chávez, with his charismatic appeal and popular origins, was able to communicate and connect with those the system had historically left behind (Nichols *et al* 2010:86-87). For them, he may have resembled the figure of the *caudillo* with its revolution against the elite and imperialism. Winning the support of the masses, Chávez won the election in December 1998, and the re-election in 2000. Nevertheless, the opposition did not recognise his government as legitimate, nor its government plan, which was classified as authoritarian (Buxton 2005: 330).

Buxton (2005:328-337) explains that for those traditionally in power, Chávez became the authoritarian ruler that needed to be deposed. The legitimacy of his government programme was contested. The constitution and the governmental structures were changed, and the armed forces were introduced in the execution of policies. Despite these, Chavez endured in power for fourteen years until his death in 2013. Before he died, he recognised Nicolás Maduro, his Vice President, as his successor (International Crisis Group 2013:3).

A new election took place in 2013. It was a close one, Maduro won by less than 1.6 per cent difference over the opposition candidate Henrique Capriles (International Crisis Group 2013:5). Since then, Maduro has been the President of Venezuela.

Venezuela's society has remained divided between the opposition and the supporters of Chávez since 1998, when he became President of the country (Buxton 2005:328). This division has deepened under Maduro's Presidency. Despite the fragmentation of the opposition, Maduro's government has been confronting riots and civil disobedience since he took power. The political situation entered in a new phase in 2017 when the government instituted a National Constituent Assembly parallel to the National Assembly controlled by the opposition (León in International Crisis Group: 2018) and prepared a new election. The situation in the country would remain unstable, and Maduro's legitimacy would be in question after the presidential elections that took place in 2018.

## **2. Event**

The Venezuelan economy forecast has not been encouraging either. Since 2014, the country has been facing currency devaluations, a massive fiscal deficit, inflation and scarcity of essential goods (International Crisis Group 2014:4). It was reported that the economic crisis deepened in 2017, making "tens of thousands to leave the country" to go to neighbour countries in the region (International Crisis Group 2017:11). Moreover, the PRS Group (2018:30) estimated that "the economy would shrink by an average of 2.6% per year through 2022".

Under an economic crisis and polarised socio-political circumstances, in May 2018 a presidential election took place. Maduro won the election with a 67.7% of the votes. The opposition had called to boycott the election as they "warned that the election would not be free and fair" (BBC News: 2018). They argued that the election was brought forward from December 2018 on purpose to take advantage of the division of the opposition and that their relevant candidates were in prison or had been banned from participating in the process (BBC News: 2018).

Previously, the Lima Group formally invited the Venezuelan Government to cancel the elections (Grupo de Lima 2018a). After the elections took place, they released a joint statement highlighting that they did not recognise its legitimacy as it lacked the due process (Grupo de Lima 2018b).

The General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution AG/RES. 2929 (XLVIII-O/18) stating "that the electoral process undertaken in Venezuela, which concluded on the 20th of May, 2018, lack legitimacy, for not complying with international standards, for not having had the participation of all Venezuelan political actors, and for being carried out without the necessary guarantees for a free, fair, transparent and democratic process" (in OEA/Ser.P/XLVIII-O.2 2018:208).

In Caracas, on the 10 January 2019, Maduro was sworn for his second term (BBC News: 2019). Subsequently, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted Resolution CP/RES. 117 (2200/19) through which they expressed that they do "not recognize the legitimacy of Nicolas Maduro's new term as of the 10th of January 2019" and called for a new electoral process.

The Lima Group and OAS declarations opened the door in the international sphere to prevent the recognition of the electoral process and raised doubts about the new term of Maduro as President of the country.

On the 23 January 2019, an uprising led by the Head of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, took place. In the center of the capital, he declared himself interim president of the republic. Taking the oath of office, "he argued that the 2018 re-election of President Nicolás Maduro was illegitimate and that the presidency was vacant", referring to Maduro as the usurper of the presidency. Guaidó promised to guide the country out of the crisis (BBC 2019).

International media, including DW (2019), AP (Goodman 2019), *El País* (Moleria 2019) began to report the situation taking place in Venezuela. Media Twitter accounts were used

to report the event as well. Twitter would also be used by several Heads of States and Government to express support to the interim President or Maduro's Presidency.


For several days the media reported on Venezuela's uprising. Reports included Maduro's call over the military to control the coup (DW 2019) and the support Russia offered to President Maduro, "Putin "expressed support to the legitimate government of Venezuela amid the acute political crisis that has been provoked from the outside" (AP:2019).

As a result of the different support expressed, it created a duality of internationally recognised Presidents for the country. The messages conveyed expressing support took several forms; some were very advance in their tweet form, and others maintained the classic form. The Lima Group also stated its support to Guaidó as Interim President (Grupo de Lima: 2019), as well as other countries that tweeted support, like the United States. Since then, some European countries have recognised Guaidó.


### **3. Twitter Messages**

Traditionally, the recognition of a government has been expressed but it can also be implied (Green 1987:40). If an uprising is used by someone claiming to be the interim president of the government of the country, states in favour or against it may have to convey their messages in the fastest and most public way possible. In this case, the messages of the Heads of State and Government that were conveyed through Twitter were of forthright support to the interim government and President; President Piñera immediately declared "Chile recognises" while President Trump declared "I recognized".

Tweet Prime Minister of Australia	
<p>Even though the Prime Minister did not Tweet a message related to the Venezuelan crisis, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade released a Statement on Venezuela on the 28<sup>th</sup> January 2019:</p> <p>“Australia recognises and supports the President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, in assuming the position of interim president, in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution and until elections are held. Australia calls for a transition to democracy in Venezuela as soon as possible.” (Australian Government: 2019)</p>	

Tweet President of Chile	Translation
 <p>Chile reconoce a @jguaido como Pdte encargado de Venezuela, y manifestamos total apoyo en su misión de recuperar la democracia, Estado de Derecho y DD.HH. Maduro es parte del problema y no de la solución, y la única salida pacífica a la crisis de Venezuela son elecciones libres.</p> <p>21:47 · 23/1/19 · Twitter Web Client</p> <p>30,6k Retweets 63,1k Me gusta</p>	<p>Chile recognises @jguaido as Interim President of Venezuela, and we express full support in its mission of recovering democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Maduro is part of the problem and not of the solution, and the only peaceful way out of the crisis Venezuela's are free elections.</p> <p>30, 6k Retweets 63, 1k Likes</p>

<b>Tweet President of Rwanda</b>	
<p>The president did not Tweet a message related to the Venezuelan crisis. Neither, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation issued a communication on the matter.</p>	

<b>Tweet President of the United States of America</b>	
	

<b>Tweet Prime Minister of Singapore</b>	
<p>The Prime Minister did not Tweet a message related to the Venezuelan crisis. Neither did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs release a communication on this matter.</p>	

### a. Purpose

Recognition of a government is a traditional diplomatic practice. The role of the government, as the recognised institution structure that norms through it the sovereign capacity of the state (Epstein *et al* 2018: 787–804), is legitimated by its citizens and in the international sphere by the recognition of other states. It usually happens through the conveyance of formal letters to that effect through diplomatic missions of respective countries.

The recognition of the government is necessary for the international processes since Heads of State or Government are "competent to speak for and bind the state in its international relations"(Green 1987:129). Nonetheless, it is also an old international practice to utilise the non-recognition policy as a sanction against the government that has been signalled as non-complier of the international law (Green 1987:40). It is done with the idea of isolating the country and convince it to apply the international norms.

President Piñera, expressed that "Chile recognises @jguaido as Interim President of Venezuela" making the Tweet message a new medium to express recognition. He conveyed Chile's "full support in its mission of recovering democracy, the rule of law and human rights". The last phrase explains that this recognition is needed because the non-recognised contender is not complying with international law: "Maduro is part of the problem and not the solution". Therefore, it said the solution to Venezuela's crisis is to have "free elections", recalling the Chilean position that the electoral process of 2018 was not recognised as it was not considered genuinely democratic elections. The use of the mention @jguaido was to ensure that Juan Guaido received the support message immediately on his Twitter account, and that Guaido's followers would be buoyed to continued supporting his stance. This post was followed by a press conference of President Piñera's and the release of an Official Statement.

Meanwhile, President Trump tweeted a strong message the same day of the uprising. He declared; "the illegitimate Maduro regime", describing the Maduro government. He also expressed that he had "officially recognised the President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the Interim President of Venezuela". To make his message even clearer, he included a similar position in a tweet by US Vice President Mike Pence



in his message. This action was to remove any doubt about the official position of the United States. The Vice President uploaded to his message the official "Statement from President Donald J. Trump Recognising Venezuelan National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the interim President of Venezuela". This statement is an example of an expressed recognition in its traditional way. It also confirms the determined interest of Trump's Presidency to restore democracy in Venezuela, as the non-recognised President (Maduro) is breaching the international law. The statement was shared through social media to make it public and reachable faster.

In Australia, Prime Minister Morrison did not tweet a message in this regard. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade issued a short statement the 28th of January, expressing Australia's recognition and support to the President of the National Assembly in assuming the position of interim president; at the same time, this recognition was "until elections are held". This action is also based on two premises that Australia is recognising Guaidó as he is acting "in accordance with Venezuelan constitution" and the call to "a transition to democracy in Venezuela as soon as possible".

Neither President Kagame of Rwanda nor the Prime Minister of Singapore tweeted a message related to the Venezuelan crisis. Neither did their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In a region that is not geographically close, this absence of message can be considered an implied recognition to Maduro's new term. As the electoral process has already taken place, expressing support to an uprising may be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the country. It can also be pondered that a message can represent taking a factual position.

In the case of Australia, its recognition of Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela reveals its close collaboration with the United States, as several European countries would do later. In the case of Chile, it corresponds with the position of the Lima Group, where the country is one of its members. The Lima Group was at that time constituted by right-wing governments that were severely affected by Venezuelan migrants. Therefore, for them, the only proper way to halt this massive affluence of migrants was to support the change in the country conditions from the top to the bottom.

## **b. Audience**

In the particular case of the uprising, the messages were targeting an international audience, Venezuelans abroad and those remaining in the country. The messages were also posted considering each national audience.

President Piñera tweeted his message in Spanish, using the official language of the country, and his geopolitical position as an opportunity to reach a broader audience in South America and Spanish speakers. Despite that, his message did not mention the people of Venezuela. The tweet was posted to reach a broader audience in Venezuela as soon as possible to make it clear to Maduro's faction, that Guaidó was recognised and supported, with the intention to foster public support for Guaidó and to promote a change of sides within Maduro's followers. Moreover, the tweet showed to Chilean people that the government was supporting the interim president to propitiate a change to democracy and respect for human rights. In the long term, it would have helped to contain the Venezuelan migration once the country's socio-political structures had applied the rule of law.

In the case of President Trump, his message was posted in English, which reduced the targeted audience in Spanish speaking communities that do not also speak English, making it reachable only through third parties. However, his tweet was oriented to the international and national audience, as he mentioned "the citizens of Venezuela" it was referring to a group of people that he was helping because they "have suffered too long at the hands of the illegitimate Maduro regime". Therefore, Trump was explaining why it was necessary to help Venezuelans that were in distress. The inclusion of Vice President Pence's tweet was to highlight the United States support for Guaidó and to propitiate a withdraw from Maduro's supporters' lines, as the United States would be standing with Guaidó until "#Libertad (freedom) is restored". The tweet was also directed to the allied countries to increase the international pressure and to counteract Russia's and China's support to Maduro.

Prime Minister Morrison did not tweet about the situation in Venezuela. This showed that the crisis was far from the geopolitical interest zone of the country. Nonetheless, the issue of the "Statement on Venezuela" released by Australia, granting recognition to Guaidó as

interim president was conveyed to show to the international audience that the country was supporting the call to a "transition to democracy in Venezuela". The statement highlighted that Guaidó was acting under the rule of law "in accordance with the Venezuela constitution and until elections are held". The statement was released on the website of the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was shared by international media, positioning Australia, along with the United States, Canada and the Lima Group (Karp 2019).

The absence of tweets of both President Kagame of Rwanda and the Prime Minister of Singapore signals that the situation did not require their particular attention. The crisis was taking place in another region. The geographic proximity of the uprising is not an element that may imply a direct effect on both countries. Furthermore, they might have considered that Venezuela needed to resolve the crisis without international intervention. The situation in Venezuela recalled old practices of Western Countries as well as the Cold War period.

### **c. Efficacy**

Melissen (2007:5) explains that "the roles and responsibilities of actors in international relations" have changed in the "postmodern transnational relations". Diplomatic actions target a "wide variety of people that either involved in diplomatic activity or are at the receiving end of international politics". In the Venezuelan crisis, diplomatic actions were executed to influence states, factions, national and international audiences. The effectiveness of the tweets is ambiguous. The messages were supported in the international scenario by media publicity. Nonetheless, it seems they did not have the expected impact on the national level.

In this regard, when President Trump tweet is analysed, the message received 181500 likes and 73,100 retweets. With 66,962,402 followers in his Tweeter account, the message received a 0.27% of "likes" considering the total number of followers. In tweeter perspectives, his message was not very successful. However, it received wide publicity. The international media commented on the Tweet (DW 2019), and the Official Statement supporting Guaidó was reported by CNN (Diamond 2019). It was also analysed regarding Russia's and China's positions (Daniels *et al* 2019; AP 2019). Nonetheless, the message

of support was partially effective. It moved the United States traditional allies in Western countries, as the case of Australia and European countries, to recognise Guaidó, internationalising the crisis and moving it beyond the American continent. However, it was not successful enough to move military supporters from Maduro side.

Tweeter Account President of the United States of America	Translation
	<p style="text-align: right;"><b>66.692.402</b> followers</p>

Prime Minister Morrison did not tweet a message related to the Venezuela Crisis. However, the Australian recognition of Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela received publicity. It was mentioned in the international news through outlets such as *The Guardian* (Karp 2019) and AP (2019). It positioned the country in the group among the United States, Canada, some Latin American countries and European countries recognising Guaidó as interim president.

Arguably, the uprising did not succeed. At the end of 2019, there were two Venezuela's Presidents internationally recognised. However, it was Maduro who succeeded in keeping the control of the Government, while Guaidó seemed to have lost the strength and support of the opposition.

## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> The *caudillo* is a leader (usually a military) to whom many citizens, and practically the entire power structure, delegate full power of decision and control of the instruments of repression. (Montaner 2000: 60).

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**SAMPLE NUMBER 2: Terrorist Attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, March 2019**

**1. Concept**

There is no political or academic consensus on the definition of terrorism (Wight 2015:2). However, in 1996, the United Nations General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to develop a legal framework to deal with International Terrorism through Resolution 51/210. This Committee produced three international conventions related to bombings, financing of terrorism and nuclear terrorism: the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (United Nations: 2018). Despite this, the idea of a universal, comprehensive convention on international terrorism has not been possible to achieve.

Laurenti (2008), Wight (2015) and Miller (2013) have agreed that the terrorists acts of 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the US brought a change in the international terrorism regime for the twenty-first century, particularly in the United Nations System. Several Security Council Resolutions were passed on this matter, bringing the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, (CTC), the Terrorism Prevention Branch within the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and, the creation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Laurenti 2008 69:86).

As the Ad Hoc Committee was unable to finalise its work, a Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was created in 2013 under the wing of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The Working Group has not been able to find a consensus on the definition of terrorism; as indicated by the Chair of the working group “the view has been expressed that the definition of terrorism must be broad enough to encompass all terrorist acts, wherever and by whomsoever committed” (United Nations, General Assembly 2017:6).

Nonetheless, it is essential to recall that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2011:34) defined that “the notion of terrorism ... consists of the following elements: (i) the volitional commission of an act; (ii) through means that are liable to create a public



danger; and (iii) the intent of the perpetrator to cause a state of terror”. This definition became the first issued by an international tribunal on this matter. This decision has established a precedent in international jurisprudence and should be taken into account as a way to move forward to a possible agreement on an international definition of terrorism.

Wight (2015:2) explains that although all regions have their legal frameworks to counter-terrorism, the lack of a definition in fact conveys that “we are collectively unwilling to do so ... because its suits our political purposes to deploy the label in circumstances of our choosing”. This explanation is also related to the understanding that only States have the legitimate right to use force and to determine the measures to apply against the violence that might challenge this power (Wight 2015:5).

The lack of a definition of terrorism explains the increasing number of disruptive forces that have been labelled as terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001. There has been a change in the perception of the legitimate right to use force since the twentieth century from the fights for the liberation of peoples under colonial powers to the struggle that peoples present today against foreign powers, totalitarian regimes, unbridled capitalism and globalisation. In contrast, there has been discontinued labelling of insurgents or belligerents in an inner state conflict. If a state labels a group as one of these two forces, it will recognise them as subjects of international rights (Green 1987: 80-81), providing them with legitimacy to act, which will diminish the power of the government and its capacity to legitimate the use of force to counter-terrorism. While terrorism continues to exist countries will need to adapt and develop strategies to counter it. Those strategies usually include fostering intelligence services and the strengthening of the armed and military response.

States have an obligation to protect their citizens. In some cases, it is challenging to find an appropriate way to protect citizens from their governments, when they pursue power and greatness. Therefore, there are limited options for those that feel their governments have failed them. Nonetheless, the use of force usually harms innocent people and can worsen the situation of those in vulnerable conditions.

Terrorism can be used by different wings of thought and it can be manifested in different forms, even in those countries labelled as stable democracies, as the case of New Zealand.

## **2. Context**

New Zealand is located in the South Pacific; two main islands constitute its territory. A Dutch navigator, Abel Tasman, was the first to sight and sketch the North and South islands, in 1642. Later, in 1769, Captain James Cook explored the coastline in his voyages. Britain annexed the islands in 1840, and promoted settlements through land acquisition from the Maori population, despite the treaties signed with them to protect the rights of the Maori (Country Watch 2018:2-9).

Keeping its independence from Australia, New Zealand was proclaimed a British dominion in 1907. New Zealand reached autonomy in 1947. Until the 1990's, the Labour and National parties have taken turns to govern the country, when a new electoral system allowed the participation of new political parties. The last parliamentary elections were held in 2017; as neither of the parties won majority a coalition was formed between the leading Labour Party New Zealand First and the Green Party, with Jacinda Andersen as Prime Minister (Country Watch 2018: 9-29).

New Zealand is perceived as a stable and secure country in general. The country profile reports for 2019 informed: "New Zealand is almost completely free of terrorist activity" (The PRS Group Inc 2019:19); "New Zealand is unlikely to be targeted or used as a base by terrorist groups. The risk of domestic or international terrorism affecting New Zealand is low" (HIS Markit 2019:3).

"There is no specific threat of terrorism against New Zealand, nor has it been a traditional target of terrorist violence. It has actively cooperated with the international community to combat global terrorism" (Country Watch 2018: 97).

These country reports analysed the terrorism threat from the Western perspective; in other words, they discarded the possibility of an Islamic terrorist attack against New Zealand. However, a terrorist attack took place in Christchurch, New Zealand.

## **3. Event**

On 15 March 2019, a white supremacist terrorist attack took place in Christchurch, New Zealand. Two mosques were targeted, and 50 people died (Ainge Roy 2019b). The attack

was recorded in a live-streamed video through Facebook. It was available on the Internet for approximately 30 minutes before it was blocked, given enough time to be copied and shared online (Ainge Roy 2019a).

Several media groups reported the attack. Hond (2019: Video) reporting for Al Jazeera, said that "the attack was designed to get maximum coverage, teased on Twitter and 8chan", highlighting the difficulties big tech companies are having to stop live violent content from being shared online. As Zeitzoff (2017a:979) explains, the manipulation of information is also present on social media platforms, where actors engaged in conflict can shape the narrative of their group and not only use these platforms to mobilise supporters.

As citizens in the world learned to use these social media platforms, and while it was used during the Arab Spring, they were initially considered as tools for empowering the struggle for liberation and democratisation of the world. This view lasted until insurgent groups, and the Islamic State (ISIS), began to use the same social media to recruit, to report live executions, and to spread hate speech (Zeitzoff 2017b:2).

The Christchurch attack recalled the world attention to how social media can be used to spread hate, in the form of a white supremacist attack against Muslims and migrants. The copied and shared video evidenced that white extremist groups also share a "set of beliefs and justifications" a "collective identity" that glues them together (Miller 2013: 6). Moreover, it also showed how easy it was for the perpetrator to use social media to make his Manifesto and its intentions public (Holder 2019). The terrorist violence also reminded the world that not only ISIS or Islamic Terrorist groups could use violence to pursue their objectives.

The media's coverage of terrorist attacks occurs because they are "emotionally charged events that ... have a high entertainment value" (Bennett in Harrison 2017:211). As terrorism generates inner fear that leads to irrational responses, it can be used to exert influence or control over people (Harrison 2017: 209-214), making it a political tool. Nonetheless, as citizens need to be restored to calm through accurate information, proper management responses from the authorities would be required to take control of the situation.

Jacinda Ardern, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, declared the Christchurch events as a terrorist attack on the day they happened, March 15. The same day, Ardern reported in a press conference the results of the countermeasures taken by the government. She informed that the attack was planned and that two explosive devices were found and disarmed by the police forces of the country. She also highlighted that the Joint Intelligence Group was deployed and that the Defence Force transported additional police force to the region where the action took place (BBC News 2019: Video).

Baumgartner and Jones (in Schneider 2011:11) explain that "Dramatic events shake up the policymaking system", leading countries to the revaluation of their governmental activities. A terrorist attack is by its nature a dramatic event, one of the most feared events that can happen in the world. In the case of New Zealand, Arden was prised by the media. Her response was catalogued as extraordinary, compassionate and empathic (Lester, 2019). Gessen (2019) recognised Ardern's ability to avoid the traditional Western response to terrorism that has been used by leaders since 11 September 2001. She changed the war speech, thus avoiding giving relevance to the perpetrator and focusing on the victims.




During the day of the attack, while emotions for the event were still vivid, expressions of sympathy were conveyed to the Prime Minister and New Zealand people by Heads of State and Government from different countries around the world, through Twitter.


#### **4. Twitter Messages**

Terrorism is a word, an action that carries much symbolism, and also an act that carries impact as it disrupts and brings chaos and suffering to people and states. Bennett (in Harrison 2017:211) explains that terrorist attacks "are emotionally charged events" that are used by the media to entertain. Media reporting influences the perception of an event. As the attack provides publicity to the perpetrators and the victims, intended or not, it becomes a political opportunity as long as it attracts people's attention. It is used by the media and, lately, by social media, to keep the public interested (Harrison 2017:209-214). Therefore, it is necessary to convey a timely message. The following tweets were posted


by Heads of States and Government part of the sample. They were tweeted mostly on March 15, the same day the terrorist attack had taken place.

Tweet Prime Minister of Australia	
 <p><b>Scott Morrison</b>  @ScottMorrisonMP</p> <p>I'm horrified by the reports I'm following of the serious shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand. The situation is still unfolding but our thoughts and prayers are with our Kiwi cousins.</p> <p><a href="#">Traducir Tweet</a></p> <p>5:18 · 15/3/19 · <a href="#">Twitter for iPhone</a></p> <p>873 Retweets 4.228 Me gusta</p>	

Tweet President of Chile	Translation
 <p> <b>Tweet</b></p> <p><b>Sebastian Piñera</b>  @sebastianpinera</p> <p>Condeno firmemente los brutales y cobardes ataques ocurridos en Mezquitas de Christchurch y envío mis más sentidas condolencias al pueblo neozelandés. Rechazo categóricamente toda forma de violencia, discriminación o extremismo y espero q se haga justicia para q prevalezca La Paz</p> <p>1:14 · 16/3/19 · <a href="#">Twitter for iPhone</a></p> <p>970 Retweets 3.879 Me gusta</p>	<p>I strongly condemn the brutal and cowardly attacks in Mosques in Christchurch and send my deepest condolences to the New Zealand people. I categorically reject all forms of violence, discrimination or extremism and I hope justice will be done so that peace prevails</p>

Tweet President of Rwanda	
<p>Even though the president did not Tweet a message related to the Christchurch attacks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda posted a tweet:</p>  <p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs &amp; Int'l Co... @RwandaMFA</p> <p>Rwanda extends its deepest condolences to the bereaved families, those injured in the attack, &amp; stands united with them as well as the Government of New Zealand during this time of grief. @RwandaGov will continue to stand firmly with #NewZealand in its fight against terrorism.</p> <p>Traducir Tweet</p> <p>13:40 · 15/3/19 · Twitter Web Client</p>	

Tweet President of the United States of America	
 <p>&lt; Tweet</p> <p>Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump</p> <p>My warmest sympathy and best wishes goes out to the people of New Zealand after the horrible massacre in the Mosques. 49 innocent people have so senselessly died, with so many more seriously injured. The U.S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do. God bless all!</p> <p>Traducir Tweet</p> <p>13:41 · 15/3/19 · Twitter for iPhone</p> <p>29,6k Retweets 158k Me gusta</p>	

Tweet Prime Minister of Singapore	
 <p>The screenshot shows a tweet from Lee Hsien Loong (@leehsienloong) on March 15, 2019, at 12:33. The tweet text reads: "Deeply shocked by the horrific terrorist attacks on two mosques in Christchurch. A sombre reminder that terrorism remains a serious threat across the world &amp; that Singapore must be constantly vigilant and prepared. – LHL <a href="https://bit.ly/2T4xYmt">bit.ly/2T4xYmt</a>". Below the text are options for "Traducir Tweet", the time and client ("12:33 · 15/3/19 · Twitter Web Client"), and engagement statistics ("178 Retweets 562 Me gusta").</p>	

**a. Purpose**

In the particular case of a terrorist attack, the event allows the states to fulfil several ends. First, it allows the message sender to reiterate its position on the matter, using strong words: Morrison used the word, "horrified"; Piñera used the words "strongly condemn"; Trump called it a "horrible massacre"; Loong used the words "Horrific ... Threat". These words specifically create a space of distance that reiterates these states do not support violence, or terrorism, as it represents a threat against civilians and the rule of law, following the line established in the United Nations framework to counter terrorism. The leaders shared a common idea and position against terrorism, allowing them to be identified as peace supporters.

Moreover, the tweets expressed support to the affected government in what was already labelled a terrorist attack, while supporting the legitimacy of the state of New Zealand and calls for the rule of law, as expressed by Morrison "New Zealand" or Trump who said "the U.S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do". Even though Heads of State and Government have to choose their wording carefully, the fact they have posted

a message condemning or expressing discomfort on the attack, reflects implicit support to the Government of Jacinda Ardern and in, the context, of the situation the country was facing. As an example, Prime Minister Loong expressed horror for the attack in Christchurch, but at the same time, he recalled for the need of Singapore to keep vigilant and be prepared to respond to a similar threat.

President Piñera also tweeted: “I categorically reject all forms of violence, discrimination or extremism”. He expressed support to the Islamic world targeted during the attack, expressing sympathy to them, without excluding them as a pacific group. He also invites the New Zealand Government to investigate the issue. He said, “I hope justice will be done” and reiterates Chile’s position as a peaceful country with his last words being “peace prevails”.

President Trump’s tweet presented its condolences to the people of New Zealand by saying, “My warmest sympathy and best wishes goes out to the people of New Zealand”. He not only described the situation as “horrible” he also committed his country’s support: “The U. S. stands by New Zealand for anything we can do”. It indicates to New Zealand’s Government the United States’ willingness to advise and support through the vast experience in counter-terrorism in the U. S., signalling perhaps a lack of capacity of New Zealand in this area.

In the case of Prime Minister Loong, his message highlighted that the attack was carried out on “two mosques in Christchurch,” highlighting the Islamic world as the victim of the attack and not the other way around. The tweet also categorised terrorism as a “threat” and signalled that it was a threat that had not yet been internationally solved as it still “remains”. Prime Minister Loong emphasised the need for Singapore to be “constantly vigilant and prepared”, implying that the possibility of suffering a terrorist attack in Singapore should not be disregarded. Moreover, as the tweet was brief, he added the link: [bit.ly/2T4xYmt](https://bit.ly/2T4xYmt) that takes you to his Facebook account, where he posted a longer message indicating, “I am writing to New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern to express my deepest condolences to the families of the victims”. The link to the blue name of Jacinda Ardern in his message is redirected to Ardern's Facebook account, making it an instant delivery. His post includes a video from CHANNELNEWASIA.COM covering the terror news, thus strengthening his message, and the country's position on this matter.





Lee Hsien Loong

15 de marzo de 2019

Deeply shocked by the horrific terrorist attacks on two mosques in Christchurch.

New Zealand is far away from the upheavals and turbulence of the Middle East, and far away from Southeast Asia and its terrorist groups, yet it experienced this attack. It is a sombre reminder that terrorism remains a serious threat across the world, and that Singapore must be constantly vigilant and prepared.

This heinous act is an attempt to spread fear and hatred, and create divisions within societies. We need to respond with unity, fortitude and resilience. I am writing to New Zealand PM [Jacinda Ardern](#) to express my deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Singapore stands in solidarity with the people of New Zealand to strongly condemn such vicious acts of terror.

To Singaporeans in Christchurch: do stay safe and keep your families informed of your whereabouts. If you need consular assistance, you can contact the following:

Singapore High Commission in Wellington

Tel: +64-4-470-0850

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– LHL



CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM

**Christchurch mosque shootings: 49 dead, 20 injured in terrorist attack**

Not all of the leaders chosen for the sample tweeted about this event; Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, did not. Nonetheless, the Rwandan Government issued an official tweet that more likely resembles a mini-press release, expressing its rejection of terrorism while supporting Ardern’s administration, “@RwandaGov will continue to stand firmly with #NewZealand in its fight against terrorism”. It is the only message that uses a mention and hashtag. The mention @RwandaGov focused on a commitment to stand with

New Zealand. The #NewZealand hashtag emphasised the tweet to that particular moment where the issue was a trend to guarantee the message would be received.

The message indicated that for Rwanda, the event required an expression of sympathy to the Ardern administration, while it also condemned the attack. At the same time, as the message was posted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the message reflects that it did not occur in an immediate geographic area of political interest for the country.

While for Australia and Singapore, the message reflected the geographical closeness and the political interests shared, particularly between Australia and New Zealand. In the case of Chile, New Zealand is a close friend in international organisations, where they shared common positions. Finally, for the United States, the tweet represents support to a strategic allied.

#### **b. Audience**

The messages posted on Twitter can be understood as a manifestation of support for New Zealand's Government and its counter-terrorism actions. They were also directed at its people, as they were the victims of the violence. The leaders wanted to convey to the victims the acknowledgement that they were taken into consideration by them. As stated by Morrison "our Kiwi cousins"; Piñera "New Zealand people"; and Trump "the people of New Zealand".

The messages were also delivered with the intention that the media reported them to grasp wider general audiences, the international community, other states, and international organisations and agencies, that were not following them on Twitter, using the event to win support for themselves as leaders as well as for their political views, like their counter-terrorism measures and respect of the rule of law, among others.


All this action is of course conducted without forgetting the national audience, as any message posted by the leaders represents a message to their people as a reminder of the danger terrorism represents. President Piñera's tweet was posted in Spanish, focusing on his nationals and the Spanish speaking community. However, the best example was expressed by Loong, who said, "Singapore must be constantly vigilant and prepared", as

terrorism is something they need to be ready to face. In the selected sample no other Head of State or Government, addresses its country and its people so directly as Prime Minister Loong did in this scenario.

The messages were also intended for social groups with shared interests that interact together through social media platforms, indistinctly of their nationality and location, to help them identify themselves with those leaders and countries in favour of peace and the rule of law, and against terrorist violence.

**c. Efficacy**

Looking closely to President’s Trump account, his tweet reached 158,000 likes, and 29,600 retweets. Making only 0.23 % of likes considering the total number of 66,695,188 of registered followers. However, his text was shared and analysed by national and international mass media such as CNN (Klein 2019), *USA TODAY* (Jackson D. and Rossman S. 2019), and *The Independent* (Riotta 2019). Therefore, the message conveyed received international publicity, allowing it to reach a broad audience.

Tweeter Account President of the United States of America	Translation
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>66.692.402</b> followers</p>

In the case of the Prime Minister of Australia, who got 4,228 likes and 873 retweets with 213,252 followers, he had more responses, reaching 1,98% of likes considering the total number of followers. These figures might change if we consider followers can unfollow

themselves from accounts, while others may decide to begin to follow a leader. Due to the political proximity that Australia and New Zealand share, the Minister of Australia delivered several messages and visited the country; these actions were covered also by the national and regional mass media like ABC News Australia (N.D.), and TVNZ (2019), among others.

Tweeter Account Prime Minister of Australia	Translation
	<p style="text-align: right;"><b>213.352</b> followers</p>

The response generated is ambiguous. These tweets did not receive enough likes or retweets to become a trend in the social platform. They were partially successful. However, it is important to recognise the fact that these tweets were responded to, shared and discussed by the media immediately. Therefore, these political messages were also effective. Even though they required the support of the traditional media to reach their targeted local and international audience, these tweets allowed the Head of States or Government to be noticed and won publicity for their politic views in their country and on the global sphere.

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## **SAMPLE NUMBER 3:     The Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, March 2019**

### **1. Concept**

Coppola (2011: 64) describes tropical cyclones as “spinning marine storms that significantly affect coastal zones, but they may travel far inland under certain conditions. The primary characteristics of these events are their deadly combination of high winds, heavy rainfall and coastal storms surge”.

Cyclones are also known as hurricanes in the North Atlantic Ocean, the Northeast Pacific Ocean and South Pacific Ocean, while they are called typhoons in the Northwest Pacific Ocean. It is in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific Ocean where they are referred to as Cyclones (Coppola 2011:64) (Abbott 2014: 288).

Hurricanes have been categorised under the Saffir-Simpson scale in categories from 1 to 5, using wind speed as a measuring factor that addresses the threat they represent. While there is no consensus in the measure tables used to categorise these natural events, it seems to be the agreement that the highest the number assigned to the cyclone, the greater the damage it represents.

These natural phenomena, because of the intensity and energy they carry, have been the cause of natural disasters (Abbott 2014:14). Coppola (2011:30) explains that disasters are measured according to the quantified lost they cause in terms of numbers of fatalities, property damage and impact in the environment. Still, natural disasters often happen without notice to be prepared.

On 14 March 2019, one of these meteorological events, the Cyclone Idai, hit Mozambique, causing death and damages.

### **2. Context**

Mozambique is on the South-eastern coast of Africa. It is a country that experienced occupation and interrupted development, elements that have characterised the history of the vast African continent.



Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. It won its independence in 1975 through the rebellion of its people against Portugal's government (Dowden 2015:61). Its boundaries with Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa were also a result of the partition of Africa; those imaginary lines European countries drew on a map to determine their colonies extension. These lines have been the roots of civil conflicts in Africa as they do not represent the amalgam of their people, history and cultures (Meredith 2013:1-14).

Therefore, after the independence process, the country went through a long civil war from 1976 to 1992. This conflict ended with a General Peace Agreement. As Koko (2019: 81-108) explains, it “enabled the adoption of multiparty democracy” “with a peculiar territorial power-sharing model” between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).

This model fostered clashes between the parties after the peace agreement, and there was a “low-level armed conflict” in 2014 (Darch 2016:321-324). After the elections held in October 2014, the dispute between the parties continued until a cease-fire was agreed in 2016. The cease-fire would be extended until a complete peace agreement could be reached. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2018 between the Government and RENAMO, related to the disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion in the public life of the RENAMO. This MoU opened a door for the stabilisation of the country (Gobierno de España. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación 2019:2-3)

As expected, after a long civil war, the country was one of the poorest in the world. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provided the country with donations and financial aid, accompanied by the guidelines of the political and economic framework the country needed to apply. After public debt surpassed 100% of the GDP in 2015, the scandal of the secret debts and corruption caused a decline in donations. The country applied in 2018 a renovated monetary policy to control inflation and to try to stabilise the economy of the country (Gobierno de España. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación 2019:4).

With an estimated population of 29,7 million, and with 80% depend on subsistence farming, the vast natural resources of the country, such as carbon and gas, provide an opportunity for the economic growth of the country. The IHS Markit (2019:2), a private analyst, forecast at the end of 2018 a “favourable environment” for the 2019 country’s economy, with an expected GDP growth of 3.7%, with low inflation and a moderate depreciation of the national currency.

The forecast was positive, even though it considered public finances were “under pressure” by low incomes and high expenditure, and with limited support from donors. The cease-fire was evaluated strong enough to provide an improved business environment. Nonetheless, one of the significant risk factors to the 2019 outlook of the country was the “Adverse weather conditions” (The HIS Markit 2019:2-4).

### **3. Event**

This risk proved to be well assessed. On 14 March 2019, Cyclone Idai impacted the city of Beira in Mozambique. As the winds changed, it moved from category 2 to 3. Category 3 storms have a minimum wind speed of 178 km /h (Fitchett 2019).

The impact of the cyclone was terrible; as Celso Correia, the environment minister, expressed it, “I think it is the biggest natural disaster Mozambique has ever faced” (Maclean 2019). President Nyusi reported to the nation that the areas impacted by the cyclone were lacking electricity, drinking water and communications. He also reported that public and private institutions were also affected. The Defence and Security Forces were deployed to give humanitarian assistance, prioritizing saving lives as the first main principal response. Later the government, using its legitimate power, decided to declare a National Emergency and request international support (Governo de Moçambique [sa]: a,b,c,d).

Despite the different tendencies in the use of the term disaster (Hannigan 2012: 13-16), this research considers that a disaster takes place when a hazard has “the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damages, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the environment, interruption of business or other types of harms or losses” (FEMA in Coppola 2011:28) “overwhelming the response capacity” (Coppola 2011: 29). These

elements were present in Mozambique as a result of the passing of the cyclone in the country.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), (2019:2) stated that 1,85 million people were affected. The United Nations (UN News 2019) reported that “Severe flooding in Mozambique has created ‘inland oceans’ Some 1,000 people are feared dead”. Jeans Laerke, Spokesperson of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, declared, “we are talking about a massive disaster right now, where hundreds of thousands in the millions, of people, potentially affected” (United Nations 2019: Video). The UN agencies also reported “at least 385,000 hectares of crops” were damaged. Schools and factories were among other infrastructure destroyed (UN News 2019).

International support was needed not only for Mozambique, as the cyclone also affected Malawi and Zimbabwe. The UN reported it had released USD 20 million from its emergency fund to help these countries to begin the response phase to the disaster, but they needed more funds (UN News 2019). Mozambique’s Government received immediate support funds from the African Union, as did Malawi and Zimbabwe. There was also the dispatch of a mission to assess the situation of these countries (Governo de Moçambique [sa]e).

Hannigan (2012:9-11) explains that there is a “historical reluctance” of states to participate in disaster assistance in the international scenario that tends to be based in non-binding actions, and activities realised through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Despite its introduction in the discourse of the diplomatic world, international disaster assistance has been catalogued as a non-political action, in the UN framework, as well as in the case of the IFRC.

However, several political factors are in play when it comes to donations for disaster relief. Noticeably, if we consider that most of the humanitarian aid is collected through voluntary donations and a significant portion of them come from the generosity of Western rich countries and their agendas. Therefore, international humanitarian organisations need to plea for funds to be able to provide the assistance that has been required from them (Georgieva and Shah 2016). In some cases, countries have also

needed to acquire loans from the International Financial Institutions to respond and manage the post-disaster phase.

If we consider Schneider`s (2011:14-15) explanation, that natural disasters are visible problems, as well as a type of event that the media like to report and which also create an opportunity for political action, then disasters also become an arena for international political activities. The actions national and international politicians take to respond to the disaster will be reported by the media, allowing them free publicity. Moreover, it is essential to weight the response at the national level. Political leaders will be more visible if they successfully “address disaster-related problems” (Schneider 2011:15), allowing them to win popularity, strengthening their position and, if properly used, can give them opportunities for re-election. Conversely, those unable to properly handle the situation will allow opportunities for other players to win popular support (Coppola 2015:689).

Several international media reported the impact of the Cyclone Idai in Mozambique: the BBC (2019), CNN (Miller and Fox 2019), Al Jazeera English (2019), *The Guardian* (Maclean 2019), among others. Moreover, international organisations, like the United Nations Humanitarian Agencies, uploaded videos and information with the hashtag #Cycloneidai, #Idai on Twitter, while they reported on the effects of the Cyclone Idai (UN News 2019).

#### **4. Twitter Messages**

The international response to the disaster was not as expected. Solidarity tweets were absent. In spite of this, several countries contributed with funds to the disaster`s assistance through direct donations to the Government of Mozambique or through United Nations agencies and the IFRC.

<b>Tweet Prime Minister of Australia</b>	
<p>The Prime Minister did not Tweet a message related to the impact of the cyclone Idai in Mozambique.</p> <p>Nonetheless, through the Ambassador posted in Mozambique, H. E. Adam MacCarthy, Australia's Government, announced a donation of two million US dollars as a contribution to the humanitarian assistance destined to buy food and medicine to those affected by the cyclone. (Governo de Moçambique. [sa]:f)</p>	

<b>Tweet President of Chile</b>	<b>Translation</b>
<p>The President did not Tweet a message related to the impact of the cyclone Idai in Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs neither posted a statement nor tweeted a message.</p>	

<b>Tweet President of Rwanda</b>	
<p>The president did not Tweet a message related to the impact of the cyclone Idai in Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda neither posted a statement or tweeted about the issue.</p>	

<b>Tweet President of the United States of America</b>	
<p>The President did not Tweet a message related to the impact of the cyclone Idai in Mozambique.</p> <p>However, the Government of Mozambique reported that “The US armed forces received direct instructions from the President of the United States, Donald Trump, to assist Mozambique in efforts to repair the destruction caused by the passage of cyclone Idai on the 14th of March” (Governo de Moçambique [sa]: g).</p> <p>During 2019, The United States Agency for International Development allocated 118 million US dollars for humanitarian assistance for Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Comoros. (USAID 2019:1)</p>	=

<b>Tweet Prime Minister of Singapore</b>	
<p>The Prime Minister did not Tweet a message related to the impact of the cyclone Idai in Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs neither posted a statement nor tweeted a message.</p>	

**a. Purpose**

International aid was provided by the United States of America and Australia. Other countries that are not part of the selected sample expressed their sympathy and support to Mozambique’s Government. None of the Heads of State and Government considered for the sample posted a comment.

The absence of Twitter messages under the circumstances signals that something is wrong in the area of international solidarity. Disasters are still viewed with reluctance. They are evaluated in terms of the international financial aid that would be required to assist countries in the processes of response and recovery. Moreover, international assistance is framed under the management of International Organisations, and NGO's specialised on humanitarian aid. These organisations are assigned with the task of collecting, allocating, distributing and supervising the international assistance in case of emergency.

This absence of Twitter messages, also shows that despite the number of people affected, and the amount of damage the country suffered, it was seen as a regional problem, that it would need to be assessed through the regional organisations. Conversely, it was not perceived as an international political opportunity to convey support or recognition to the country nor to the South Eastern Africa region.

#### **b. Audience**

In an international scenario, messages are conveyed to the authorities, other international actors, national and international audiences. The absence of tweets may represent a lack of interest in the State of Mozambique, its authorities, and those in the country affected by the cyclone. Nonetheless, it is probable that support messages were conveyed in less public ways to Mozambique's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic representations abroad, like in statements during international meetings or through private correspondence using the official channels.

From another perspective, Mozambique's President used the national media to assure citizens that the situation was being handled. He was able to highlight that the international community was responding to the country's request for international assistance. This means countries responded through formal diplomatic channels. The government reported the support messages and the foreign aid that was transmitted to the President through the media and the Government's official web page. It could be considered President Nyusi used the disaster in his favour. He conveyed the political message that he was able to get the foreign assistance the country needed to manage to the disaster.

### **c. Efficacy**

It is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of messages that were not posted. This emptiness should not be regarded as total indifference or lack of recognition, as there was an international response in terms of international financial aid. Nevertheless, it reflects global behaviour toward the disaster's management field.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019a) realised an international pledging conference in Beira, Mozambique on 31 May and 1 June 2019. It was reported that the conference was attended by circa 700 participants that included the "United Nations agencies, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and others" (UNDP 2019b). At the conference, a total of US\$1.2 billion pledged was announced, of the US\$3.2 billion estimated the country needed for the recovery and reconstruction phases (UNDP 2019b).

The pledging conference is an example of the international tendency to regard the management of disaster as a specialised field. It indicates that, in practice, disasters should be addressed under the framework of the international humanitarian agencies, at the global and regional level, and with the support of NGOs.

International solidarity is still far from perfect. Western and emergent economic powers will continue to grant international donations based on political interests, the timing of events, and the advantage they will represent to their interests.



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**SAMPLE NUMBER 4:      The Notre-Dame Cathedral Fire in Paris,  
France, April 2019**

**1. Concept**

A cathedral is “the chief church of a diocese, in which the Bishop has his throne (cathedra) and close to which is his residence, it is, properly speaking, the bishop’s church wherein he presides, teaches, and conducts worship for the whole Christian community” (Herbermann 1913:438).

During the Middle Ages, major churches and cathedrals such as Notre-Dame became important constructions in European cities. Cathedrals were built to have the capacity to receive a large number of parishioners and to bring religious "light" through their decorations, relics, symbols and statues to the popular illiterate imagination (Ching *et al* 2017:441), reinforcing the ruling of the Catholic Church in society. Likewise, Fukuyama (2012:239) explains that previous to medieval times, Western Europe's social and cultural structures had already been changing social mores and family rules due to the influence of the Catholic Church.

Braun (1974:13) points out the importance of churches for a nation: “to the nation as a whole each parish church is a record of the country’s past, a monument to the days of which as children we read in the history books”. This reflection can be appreciated in France’s history and its national monuments.

The conception of the modern nation-state reflects the influence of the Catholic Church’s power during the Middle Ages. The religious values that were transferred to the secular discourse like the tradition of democracy, justice and the hermeneutics that came from the Cristian Church doctrine (Den Boer 2003:139) and were incorporated in the principles of the secular state during the French Revolution. All these historical processes are related to the deep symbolism that this cathedral represents for France and the Western countries.

## 2. Context

Paris, the city of lights, has been known for being the centre of fashion, luxury, arts, gastronomy, scholarship and the Enlightenment. This perception of Paris as the centre of European knowledge started in the Middle Ages. Sauerländer (1998:13-17) states that it dates back to the reign of the Capetian kings who made the city the centre of their kingdom and recognised the need to have local images and symbols, through art and buildings, to show Paris as "the centre of a new France" under their reign.

To achieve this purpose, Capetian kings started with the renovation of the Saint-Denis Cathedral, which is regarded as the first sample of Gothic architecture in Europe, designed to represent "the union of monarchy and church" (Sauerländer, 1988:17). Despite this, Sauerländer (1998:18) points out that it would be the Cathedral of Notre Dame that would give fame to the city, being recognised as "the first characteristically Parisian building in the history of architecture".

The cathedral has been valued as "a landmark in the history of building technology ... it stands at the very center of the development of High Gothic structure" (Mark 1988:80). It has also been stated that it was in France that Gothic style was created, and from here it spread to western Christendom (Brodrick 1949:[sp]).

Capetian kings seem to have succeeded in their endeavours. Sutcliffe (1993:8) has described that the city founded by the Romans in first century BC in the *Île de la Cité*, was transformed in the Middle Ages into "the largest city in western Europe" because it was the "capital of Europe's greatest kingdom".

The Notre-Dame Cathedral, a gothic structure that reflected the power of the Christian Church and the Monarchy, was built in the centre of the city. Wilson (2015:1-2) explains that the cathedral was built to be considered the tallest and the most impressive building in the city, visible throughout the entire city and becoming the heart of Paris.

Over time, the cathedral survived the vandalism of the French Revolution, becoming the site of Napoleon Bonaparte's coronation in 1804. It also endured two world wars. It was

transformed into a popular cultural symbol through Victor Hugo's novel "Notre Dame de Paris" in 1831, and its following adaptations to films in modern times (Wilson 2015:2-7).

### **3. Event**

The history of the Notre-Dame Cathedral is not over yet. On 15 April 2019, The Cathedral was going through a process of restoration. It was surrounded by scaffolding when a fire started. Paris was in shock as the fire consumed the spire and most of the roof of the cathedral. More than 400 firefighters were deployed to fight the fire, even drones and robots were used, but the construction materials of the structure of the cathedral made the fire extinguishing process complex (Berlinger 2019).

The fire started at 7pm local time, and almost immediately images and videos flooded social media, corporate media web sites and TV channels, all reporting live. CNN recorded a French politician, Arash Derambarsh, stating that "Notre Dame de Paris is a symbol of Paris and a symbol of France. This church, for us, for everybody, is a symbol of freedom, a symbol of fraternity, and is why we are so sad" (CNN Video: 2019).

Associated Press, among other media, reported in their Twitter account that "President Macron was treating the fire as a national emergency" (Hinnant and Petreuin: 2019), as he cancelled a programmed media delivery to the nation and met with authorities to assess the situation, while thousands of people gathered in the streets to witness the event.

Later, Macron declared: "We will rebuild this cathedral all together and it is undoubtedly part of the French destiny and the project we will have in the coming years, but I am committed to it. Starting tomorrow a national subscription will be launched and well beyond our borders we will appeal to the greatest talents and there are many who will come to contribute and rebuilt us. We will rebuild Notre Dame, because that's what the French expect, because is what our history deserves and because it's our deep destiny" (BBC News Video: 2019).

Information spread fast through social media. The mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo (2019, April 16), informed others, through twitter, that religious relics, the crown of thorns, the

tunic of Saint Louis, among others, were saved through a human chain formed by firefighters, police and municipal officials. Several statues had been removed from the cathedral before the fire as part of the restoration program.

The Archbishop of Paris, Michel Aupetit, (*L'Église Catholique À Paris*: 2019) delivered a message on Tuesday, April 16, 2019, in which he captured the sorrow of the French people for the loss of their Cathedral when he stated:

Notre-Dame, notre chère cathédrale, témoin de tant d'événements majeurs de notre pays, a été détruite par un incendie effrayant après avoir résisté si longtemps aux péripéties de son histoire. La France pleure et avec elle tous ses amis du monde entier. Elle est touchée au cœur car ses pierres sont le témoignage d'une espérance invincible qui, par le talent, le courage, le génie et la foi des bâtisseurs, a élevé cette dentelle lumineuse de pierres, de bois et de verre. Cette foi demeure la nôtre. C'est elle qui déplace les montagnes et nous permettra de rebâtir ce chef-d'œuvre. <sup>1</sup>

Notre Dame de Paris, the cathedral that has been the heart of the city landscape, part of the history of France, since the Middle Ages, is a major symbol for the French. Reflecting, it can be said it represents a symbol of the power of the Church, the Scholastica, the glory and decay of the Monarchies and the Enlightenment, and as such, a symbol of the history of western knowledge and culture.


#### **4. Twitter Messages**

Smith defines an iconic site as one that “provides individuals with ‘sacred centres’, objects of spiritual and historic pilgrimage, that reveals the uniqueness of their nation’s ‘moral geography’” (in Edensor 2002:45). Following this definition, Notre Dame Cathedral can be considered a symbol of the French nation. As it caught fire, in the heart of the capital; it can be understood that a landmark of French “moral geography” was on fire, and suffering serious damages.


Fires are usually considered events of “routine occurrences that are easily managed” (Coppola 2011: 29). They are usually not assessed as a disaster. However, the Cathedral’s

fire was treated by the President as a national emergency. If it is considered that emergencies are events that can endanger life and property (Coppola 2015: 322), the fire of Notre Dame de Paris, in the ‘heart’ of France, both physically and symbolically, required immediate attention and effective response to avoid a major critical scenario. It was necessary to handle it properly.


This type of calamity requires a rapid response, and the need to convey a quick message that has to be received during the event or as soon as it has been controlled. Due to the emotional characteristics of this event, and the magnitude of having a major well-known building on fire, it became the perfect piece of information to be shared in social media. Therefore, the Heads of State and Government hurried to convey a message in response to it.



<b>Tweet Prime Minister of Australia</b>	
 <p>The image shows a screenshot of a tweet from Scott Morrison (@ScottMorrisonMP). The tweet text reads: "I fondly remember standing outside Notre Dame with Jen almost 30 years ago. So sad to see this beautiful cathedral in flames this morning. Our thoughts are with the people of France and emergency services who are fighting this fire. They will rebuild as Parisians always do." Below the text, there is a link to "Traducir Tweet", the timestamp "23:06 · 15/4/19 · Twitter for iPhone", and engagement statistics: "78 Retweets 630 Me gusta".</p>	



Tweet President of Chile	Translation
 <p>Sebastian Piñera <a href="#">@sebastianpinera</a></p> <p>Fort de ses 850 ans d'histoire et de sa merveilleuse beauté, l'incendie de <a href="#">#NotreDame</a> de Paris est une véritable tragédie: beaucoup de force et de foi pour tous les français et ceux qui œuvrent sans relâche pour contrôler les incendies. Nos pensées et nos prières sont avec vous.</p> <p><a href="#">Translate Tweet</a></p> <p><b>Emmanuel Macron</b> <a href="#">@EmmanuelMacron</a> · Apr 16, 2019</p> <p>Cette cathédrale Notre-Dame, nous la réabîtons. Tous ensemble. C'est une part de notre destin français. Je m'y engage : dès demain une souscription nationale sera lancée, et bien au-delà de nos frontières.</p> <p>1:53 AM · Apr 16, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone</p> <p>179 Retweets 634 Likes</p>	<p>With its 850 years of history and its wonderful beauty, the fire of <a href="#">#NotreDame</a> of Paris is a real tragedy: a lot of strength and faith for all the French and those who work tirelessly to control the fire. Our thoughts and prayers are with you</p>

Tweet President of Rwanda	
<p>The president did not Tweet a message related to the Notre Dame fire, neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda posted a tweet.</p>	

Tweet President of the United States of America	
 <p>← Tweet</p> <p>Donald J. Trump <a href="#">@realDonaldTrump</a></p> <p>So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Perhaps flying water tankers could be used to put it out. Must act quickly!</p> <p>7:39 PM · Apr 15, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone</p> <p>35.1K Retweets 194.1K Likes</p>	

Tweet Prime Minister of Singapore	
<p data-bbox="225 230 798 257">← Tweet</p> <p data-bbox="225 280 430 324">  <b>Lee Hsien Loong</b> <span>✓</span>            @leehsienloong         </p> <p data-bbox="225 336 766 459">           Deeply saddened to see the Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris engulfed in flames. I share the sense of loss of the French people, and hope to see the Cathedral restored one day. – LHL         </p>  <p data-bbox="225 784 782 862">           Notre-Dame of Paris 'saved' after fire destroys steeple  <small>PARIS: French firefighters on Monday (Apr 15) won an hours-long battle to save the main structure of Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris, after a ...</small>  <small>channelnewsasia.com</small> </p> <p data-bbox="225 884 526 907">2:46 AM · Apr 16, 2019 · <a href="#">Twitter Web Client</a></p> <p data-bbox="225 929 406 963"> <b>87</b> Retweets   <b>310</b> Likes         </p>	

**a. Purpose**

Coppola’s (2011:29-30) definition of disaster refers to events that “overwhelm response capacity” that “are measured in terms of the lives lost, injuries sustained, property damaged or lost and environmental degradation”. Did the fire of the Notre Dame Cathedral represented such an event? There were no lives lost and the fire was controlled.

However, for the French, the fire was a disaster. The country could not lose the building that, due to its antiquity, is one of the major symbols of French identity as a society and a nation. Located in the heart of the capital, the Cathedral also represents the soul of France. Therefore, its intrinsic value and phycological power motivated the political action of the President to treat the event as a national emergency. Therefore, the twitter messages conveyed expressed the recognition of the cathedral as a symbol of France. Otherwise, messages would not have been necessary, and it would have been treated as an ordinary event. Moreover, emotive words were used to convey their sentiments as followed, Morrison said it was, “so sad”; Piñera call it a “tragedy”; Trump said it was

“horrible”; and Loong said he was “Deeply saddened”. These words created closeness with the French nation.

In this regard, Prime Minister Morrison used affective words to refer to the event. He referred to the Cathedral as a place that brought back family memories as a way to express closeness to his heart and to his closest relatives. He was bringing the symbolism of the building closer to Australia. He established the recognition of the French people’s sorrow, conveying a sympathy message to the French People and to the emergency responders by writing, “Our thoughts are with the people of France and emergency services”. He also supported the idea that the building would be rebuilt in a way that only France could achieve: “They will rebuild as Parisians always do”. The message recognised and priced French culture as unique. It implicitly expressed support to President Macron although he is not mentioned in the message.

Interestingly, the original message from the Chilean President was made in French. More than showing the knowledge of the language, it made the message forthright. Using French represents recognition of the culture and the tradition that French people always prefer to use their own language. It means they could understand each other, it sought to convey friendship, and it also guarantees the tweet would be understood without translation. The message also recognised the historical and architectural value of the building, “the fire of #NotreDame of Paris is a real tragedy”. He used the #NotreDame to ensure the post would be seen while the issue was still trendy. The tweet provides sympathy to the French and the firefighters, “a lot of strength and faith for all the French and those who work tirelessly to control the fire”. He added “Our thoughts and prayers are with you” stressing that Chile and France have such a close relationship, that Chile can empathise with their pain and supports the French Government and people during this process. The message also shows support to President Macron, even though he was not mentioned in the original tweet. President Piñera retweeted President Macron’s Tweet to make his message precise. Moreover, a Spanish translation was added to the message, in which the mention @EmmanuelMacron was added to ensure President Macron received this message in his account.

Tweet President of Chile	Translation
<p>Replying to <a href="#">@sebastianpinera</a></p> <p><a href="#">@EmmanuelMacron</a> con sus 850 años de historia y maravillosa belleza, incendio de <a href="#">#NotreDame</a> de París es una verdadera tragedia. Mucha fuerza y fe al pueblo francés y a quienes trabajan incansablemente para controlar el incendio. Nuestros pensamientos y oraciones están con ustedes.</p> <p><a href="#">Translate Tweet</a></p> <p>1:53 AM · Apr 16, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone</p>	<p>@EmmanuelMacron with its 850 years of history and its wonderful beauty, [the] fire of #NotreDame of Paris is a real tragedy: a lot of strength and faith for all the French and those who work tirelessly to control the fire. Our thoughts and prayers are with you</p>

President Trump’s tweet defined the event as “horrible” heightening emotions for dramatic effect while recognising the fire status as a disaster for France: “So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris”. He urged the French government to “act quickly!” and to use “flying water tankers” to control it. While he recognised the situation, and the urgent call to act quickly, he was less supportive to President Macron than his peers, giving the impression that he considered they were not handling the situation correctly and that some leadership was needed, even offering suggestions on how to control the fire. The suggestion of the use of water tankers also reveals a lack of knowledge about the architecture and construction materials of the building. These are essential elements that need to be assessed to take measures to manage this type of events (Berlinger 2019). It also means that probably he reacted and wrote the message without consulting anyone before posting it as @realDonaldTrump.

In the case of the message of Prime Minister Loong, he also used emotional words to express his deep understanding of the situation and his closeness to the French people, “I share the sense of loss of the French people”. He, too, expressed his desire to see the cathedral restored, saying, “hope to see the cathedral restored one day”. His choice of wording left open the option of how, who and when the restoration would happen, but at the same time acknowledging the message of President Macron. To make his message precise and closer to the Singaporean people, he added the information of the fire to his message.

Not all of the leaders chosen for the sample tweeted about this event. Neither Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, nor any official public account, conveyed an official public messages on this issue. Whether the context of the political differences between

Rwanda and France over the genocide and over the French role in Africa played a role in this failure to express empathy is subject to debate.

While for Australia, Chile and Singapore, the action of tweeting messages reflected geopolitical closeness to France, the Western culture and shared political interests. These tweets reflect that these leaders are concerned with maintaining social cohesion of the national identity of the state. It can also be perceived as states that follow western guidelines. On the other hand, the United States was trying to act as a leader, demeaning Macron's actions, and telling him how to manage a national emergency, showing the ambiguity of the relations France-US.

### **b. Audience**

Schneider (2011:12) suggests that “the symbolic aspects of an issue are the most important elements of agenda building”. Of course, this premise is based on the idea on how topics are included in the political agenda. Nevertheless, when President Macron began to handle the fire as a National Emergency, he was using the situation to show action and to give to it prevalence in the political agenda. He also used the situation, which was being reported worldwide, to provide proper assurances to its citizens and the rest of the world, that the Notre Dame Cathedral, property of the French Government, the heart and soul of its nation, would be properly restored.


The presidents and heads of state posted messages intending to win the media's attention as it was reporting the issue. At the same time, they were expressing support to the French nation and Government. Prime Minister Morrison, President Piñera, and Prime Minister Loong mentioned in their tweets the people of France, the French, or the French people. Morrison and Piñera both mentioned the “emergency services” and “those working tirelessly to control the fire”. They were expressing support to the measures taken by the French Government to control the situation.

In the case of President Trump, it was clear criticism of the Government action, the expression “Must act quickly” reflected he did not support the action, considering it insufficient, slow and ineffective.

These messages also were posted to target the broad world population that identified themselves with the cathedral, not only as a religious building, but as an historical and architectural masterpiece. Those that have been able to travel to France, as tourists, students, or workers could identify themselves with the cathedral. In order to make it closer to those that have only seen it through films or images, they needed to include a further reference in their tweets, to help them understand the situation they were addressing.


**c. Efficacy**

The efficacy of these tweets was not as expected. President Trump reached 35,100 retweets and 194,100 likes with 66,964,402 followers, representing only a 0,29% response of the total number of his followers. Nonetheless, the message received broad publicity in the international media, including *The Guardian* (AFP in Paris 2019), CNN (Berlinger 2019), and Channel News Asia (AFP/de 2019). It received world attention keeping him noticeable, making it effective, regardless of the critics.

Tweeter Account President of the United States of America	Translation
	<p style="text-align: right;"><b>66.692.402</b> followers</p>

In the case of the Prime Minister of Australia, who got 630 likes and 78 retweets with 213,252 followers, he had a greater reach to his followers being 0,30% of likes of the total number of followers, still not a good response. The media coverage was limited if

compared to President Trump tweet, quoted only by *The Guardian* (Lyons and Busby 2019). This made the message noticeable in the international scenario, taking it from the national sphere to a broad international audience.

Tweeter Account Prime Minister of Australia	Translation
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>213.352</b> followers</p>

In the case of the fire of the Cathedral of Notre Dame, the twitter platform served as a mechanism for conveying messages in real-time, but the mass audience was only reached through the traditional media, when they analysed the messages. Therefore, the use of the social network to win publicity was partially effective.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Free translation: Our Lady, our dear cathedral, witness to so many major events in our country, was destroyed by a frightening fire after having withstood the ups and downs of its history for so long. France mourns and with it all her friends from all over the world. She is touched in the heart because her stones are the testimony of an invincible hope which, by the talent, the courage, the genius and the faith of the builders, raised this luminous lace of stones, wood and glass. This faith remains ours. She is the one who moves the mountains and will allow us to rebuild this masterpiece

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