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THE LOCAL TURN IN PEACEBUILDING:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES IN SOUTH SUDAN

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the

Department of Political Sciences at the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

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Date of submission: October 2019

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I dedicate this work to the beautiful people of South Sudan. My hope is that the peace I saw in their hearts will be realised in their lands.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful first and foremost to God, who has sustained me throughout this journey; his mercies and grace have been with me throughout.

Many people contributed to this work until its completion, and this thesis would not be possible without their support. To my father, Aggrey Liaga, thank you for being my most treasured inspiration and for always pushing me to aim high and encouraging me to be determined, and consistent in my commitments. Thank you to my mother, Mary Liaga, who encouraged me to stay strong in moments I was doubtful and overwhelmed by the demands of this study. Thank you for your endless prayers and love. To my sister, Purity Vuhya Liaga, and brother, Chrispine Liaga, who filled my life with laughter and joy, you both made my days brighter and nights smoother. To my other brother, Humphrey Nabweya Liaga, thank you for taking care of technical issues when I was not able to and for running up and down to make sure I had everything, you were always ready to pick me up and drop me off at the airport. Your support is truly appreciated.

My study supervisors, Dr Cori Wielenga, whose untiring zeal walked me through the writing process, and Professor Oliver Richmond, who was conscientious in fine-tuning the details in my work: I thank you both for making time to mentor me and the meticulous advice you gave that sharpened my thinking. I appreciate the quick responses I received from you in the past three years; this helped me stay on track. Thank you for taking your time with me, looking at my work for endless hours, even over weekends.

To the many colleagues I met on the way, many of you advised me and turned into mentors. I am grateful for the support you gave me. At the University of Pretoria, a special thank you to the Political Sciences Department for your investment in me. I give special thanks to Professor (and former head of department) Siphamandla Zondi, and I thank God for you every day for your advice and time you took to groom all of us. Thank you for also the directions and the confidence you assured in us. To Professor Maxi Schoeman, for her incredible support and advice throughout my writing and tertiary academic career. Thank you to Professor James Ogude, for taking a chance on me and playing a big part in funding my fieldwork and to Dr Ruth Murambadoro, Ms Chenai Matshaka and Ms Marlie Holtzhausen for their peer support.

A special thank you to the Woodrow Wilson Center, and to Ms Monde Muyangwa, who taught me always to work and raise the bar for African women. To my former colleagues at GIGA, Dr Julia Grauvogel, Dr Simone Schotte and Dr Christian von Soest, thank you for the many lessons. Thanks to members of staff and doctoral students at the University of Basel. Professor Elicio Macamo, Dr Veit Arlt, Professor Ralf Weber, Dr Julia Büchele, Dr Noemi Steuer, Dr Lucy Koechlin, Dr James Lawrence Merron, and Dr Martina Santschi for their incredible support in my last year of writing in Basel University.

This research was made possible with financial support from the Social Science Research Council's (SSRC) Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship (New York); the University of Pretoria Postgraduate Research Support Grants (Pretoria); Oumou Dilly Foundation (Switzerland); Graduate School of Social Science (G3S), University of Basel; the Southern Voices for Peacebuilding Fellowship at the Wilson Centre African program (Washington) and the German Institute of Global and Area studies-African program – seed funding (Hamburg, Germany).

I am also grateful for the love, and emotional support offered by my friends and relatives, namely Rose Mosi, who read more than her fair share of my thesis, Fiona Okwiri, Rene Vest, Terushka Naidoo, Churchill Agutu – your support was uplifting, Fola Aina – for your inspiring words, Maxwell Mkinga, Eric Waicuga, Issac Namango – for your encouragement and friendship and Isaiah Agorinya – you literally suffered with me in the last moments. My friends in Juba, Reech Malual, Gabriel Madut, Gabriel Mading Apach, Bol Madut and Jens Pedersen, for all the technical and emotional support while in South Sudan.

Lastly, to all the people that came through for me, whom I could not mention by name, I appreciate you.

DECLARATION AND ETHICS STATEMENT

I, **Emmaculate Asige LIAGA**, declare that this thesis is my own unaided work, both in conception and execution. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

I have also obtained, for this research, the applicable research ethics approval and declare that I have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of Ethics for researchers and the Policy Guidelines for responsible research.

Emmaculate Asige Liaga

Pretoria October 2019

ABSTRACT

This research seeks to study the peacebuilding strategies used in South Sudan. It is interested in the interaction between the liberal peacebuilding framework and the "local turn" as manifested in the strategy adopted by peacebuilding organisations in Africa. The local turn and local ownership only enjoy rhetorical acceptance and prove to be challenging to operationalise. This research critically analyses the ideological policies and implementation impact of strategies used, especially relating to the inclusion as well as the exclusion of "the local".

As local ownership in peace processes is essential in ensuring sustainability, the research is interested in the position that the "local" voices and "local" peace actors occupy in post-independence peace strategies and policies employed mainly through the liberal framework in South Sudan. It is in the light of the top-down liberal peacebuilding framework that this research provides an analysis of the bottom-up strategies that can be identified in the case of South Sudan. The research will thus identify types of discourses, beliefs, practices and ideologies that have been adopted in South Sudan's peacebuilding interventions by both the local and external actors and their implications. Using the different strategies employed by the external and internal peace actors as a unit of analysis, the research will aim to find out how the peace strategies employed in South Sudan include "the local" approach, how local and external actors interact and the implications of this relationship for peace in South Sudan.

This research employs a critical theory approach to analyse the inclusion of "the local" in peacebuilding and the existing relationship between the liberal peacebuilding framework and the local turn. This will be done using a qualitative approach and a phenomenological design. Since the current strategies do not exist in a vacuum, historical process tracing will be conducted to understand and evaluate the effect and the change of strategies employed by external and internal actors in the past and possible current implications.

KEYWORDS: Local peacebuilding, local ownership, everyday peace, peace from below, post-liberal debates, South Sudan peacebuilding, civil conflict.

ACRONYMS

AACC	All Africa Council of Churches
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACROSS	Africa Committee for Rehabilitation of South Sudan
AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AU	African Union
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Oversee & Development
CEPO	Community Empowerment for Progress Organization
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Demobilization Disarmament Reintegration
DI	Democracy International
FFMAC	Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GREDA	Grassroots Relief & Development Agency
HoS	Heads of State
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDO	Integrated Development Organization
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons/People
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NCP	National Congress Party
NCRC	National Constitutional Review Commission

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NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPI-Africa	Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
NSCS	National Security Council and Service
ONAD	Organization for Nonviolence & Development
PAP	Participatory Awakening Process
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
RTGoNU	Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SCBR	Sudan Bishops Regional Conference
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IG/IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Government/ -In opposition
SSBC	South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation
SSCC	South Sudan Council of Churches
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSNGO	South Sudanese Non-governmental Organisation
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSuNDE	South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections
SSWB	South Sudan Women Block
SSWN	South Sudan Women Network

SWAN	Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi
SWVP	Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programmes
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VFC	Voice for Change
WCC	World Council of Churches

MAPS OF SOUTH SUDAN

Figure 1: Map of South Sudan and neighbouring countries.
Sources: Adopted and modified from:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/geos/od.html.



Figure 2: Map of South Sudan states
Source: Mapsof.net. South Sudan Map States - South Sudan maps. Available: http://mapsof.net/south-sudan/south-sudan-map-states.



Figure 3:South Sudan Former 10 states
Source: (2015), SOUTH SUDAN: Warring Parties Recommit to Deal. Africa Research Bulletin Politics. Vol 52 Issue 10: 20760B-20762A. doi:10.1111/j.1467-825X.2015.06683.x. Available: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2015.06683.x

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH INQUIRY

1.1. Introduction

Peacebuilding is at a crossroads. After the end of the Cold War, peace research was shaped by the state-centric discourses of liberal institutionalism (Sabaratnam, 2013:14). As peace developed over the past two decades, it has been characterised by a resurgent interest in "local" actors and institutions (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015). Whether it is invoked in debates about local ownership, "traditional" institutions, hybridity, or resistance against international intervention, the "local"[1] haunts peacebuilding and remains critical to peacebuilding studies. Self-reflection and a critical assessment of peace strategies are, therefore, imperative (Schmelzle & Fischer, 2009). This thesis provides a critical analysis of the interaction of peacebuilding strategies used by both internal and external actors in South Sudan, through the lens of the "local turn" approach.

In recent years, in both peacebuilding research and practice, there is a realisation of a growing interest in the "local" (Jabri, 2013). This research considers sub-national dynamics, which includes what Kalyvas (2008:399) addresses in relation to the "micro-theoretic turn"; what Oliver Richmond and Rodger MacGinty (2013) address in relation to the "local turn"; what Tim Murithu (2006) discusses in relation to "African Peacebuilding"; and what Siphamandla Zondi (2017) addresses in relation to "decolonial peace". These references are not synonyms – although they are often confused as such: they are, instead, representative of an approach with similar characteristics. Researchers who have realised that local dynamics or at least approaches beyond what is offered by mainstream theories of security, conflict and peace are diverse across a territory and more influential than hitherto believed motivate the focus of this thesis. These strands of literature are concerned with analysing and moving beyond the liberal paradigm (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005:454; Paris, 2010:341; Richmond, 2009a:559). Although peacebuilding used by various state and non-state bodies, as well as the international community, may vary and has slowly evolved, the widely criticised liberal peacebuilding model remains dominant (Joshi, Lee & Mac Ginty, 2014). The criticisms mainly focus on the implication of the re-ordering of politics and the reallocation of power, with the state and its institutions playing a central role in liberalism.

Along these lines, many peacebuilding projects have emerged in post-conflict societies and societies in conflict across the globe to secure sustainable peace within those contexts. Yet, such positive developments appear elusive, as the bulk of these societies continue to experience war-like conditions, characterised by low socio-economic development, high levels of group animosities, political tensions, and communal violence, not to mention the cases where full-scale civil wars have resumed (Öjendal,

[1] The "local" is put in inverted commas to emphasise the floating significations and ambiguity of the term in scholarly and practical use. In the following, the local will be defined according to the constraints and use of the paper.

Leonardsson, & Lundqvist, 2017). The overarching question then is, has international peacebuilding failed?

Several authors have analysed the successes and failures of international peacebuilding (Ottaway, 2003; Sambanis, 2006; Paris, 2004 and Omeje, 2018) with a focus on unintended consequences, constraints, and culture of peacebuilding (Hellmüller, 2018:4). Autesserre (2014) argues that although some peacebuilding mechanisms by international actors are supposed to bring positive results, they can yield unintended failures that come from the use of international tools such as elections, which can result in unhelpful political rivalry. Tull (2009) has drawn attention to constraints such as limited resources and to the ill-adapted mandates of international actors. On the other hand, Paris (2003) argues that a "global culture" influences the way international actors respond to conflict. The consequence of the wave of global culture in peacebuilding is problematized by scholars such as Murithi (2006) and Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen (2005), who argue that current peacebuilding policy is based on analyses that are far removed from the "everyday" practices (section 3.2.2.3.) of the actors engaged in peacebuilding.

Against this background, an increasing number of scholars and practitioners have come together in a forceful critique of conventional peacebuilding practices embedded in the notion of "liberal peace". This critical scholarship has come to be known as "the local turn of peacebuilding" (Öjendal, Leonardsson & Lundqvist, 2017). This critique is the "local level of analysis", where the "local" is generally seen as the place where bottom-up or grassroots peace is developed, in contrast to the liberal peace proposed by external international agents (Simons & Zanker, 2014:2).

Wielenga (2018) has argued that societies within Africa reflect the complex realities of the twenty-first century. In her examination of Rwanda, for instance, she argues that at the community level, many *micro*-interventions exist. In many countries, these *micro* occurrences have been overlooked, dismissed, or poorly understood (Wielenga, 2018). Wielenga further observes that a lot of "lip service" is given to the concept of local "ownership" and "agency" in interventions related to peacebuilding and transitional justice; however, little is understood of how the "local" is embedded in its systems of norms and values that may differ significantly from those that provide the basis for international interventions and national reforms. An analysis of the level and quality of local involvement in the peace process is warranted.

After a protracted conflict lasting almost half a decade and the presence of multiple peace actors, South Sudan offers a critical case of how contemporary peace and peacebuilding practice is performed. It provides a good measure of high-level peace negotiations (liberal top-level peace) and local (bottom-level) practices that haunt various aspects of the peacebuilding scholarship and the focus of this inquiry. This was especially the case after South Sudan's disquiet in its wake and secession from Sudan. This research seeks to understand the resultant environment of peacebuilding within the intersection of internal and external actors in South Sudan. The thesis aims at joining academic research on "post-liberal peace". Through explorative research, the research seeks to situate the "local" (also referred to

as “grassroots” in this research) strategies and actors in mainstream peacebuilding practice[2] and describe the dynamic environment that both the local turn approaches and the liberal approaches to peacebuilding exist and meet. The analysis will emphasise the strategies used and a focus beyond actors and binary consequence of the top-down and bottom-up actor and approaches to peacebuilding. Although the thesis will make references to actors as internal and external, or international and local/national/grassroots, the emphasis will be on the various strategies rather than the actors. It is the strategies that will define the kind of approaches to peacebuilding used by the different actors.

At this stage, it must be noted that no normative value is placed on either local turn approaches or liberal peacebuilding approaches. An emphasis on the local can be both constructive (Richmond & MacGinty, 2013) and destructive (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015), and lead to either peace or conflict. The local turn approaches and assumptions are therefore not viewed as a specific goal or ideal but rather as a process that leads to various outcomes. It is these various outcomes that the research will use to provide recommendations in the concluding chapter. The research inquiry, therefore, moves beyond the present argument of whether or not there is a need to promote integration of micro-level intervention for peacebuilding, as this has been done by many scholars (Zondi, 2017; Omeje, 2018; Wielenga, 2018; Richmond 2009, 2013, 2015; Murithi, 2006). The thesis seeks to question, understand and interrogate how the micro-level is being executed at present in society and its resultant impact on peace in South Sudan.

This chapter captures the context of the research by introducing South Sudan, and the local turn approaches to peacebuilding with a focus on both strategies and actors. It also provides a formulation of the research problem, questions and objectives; the justification and significance of the study; limitations and delimitations; the research of peace and approaches to peacebuilding; the structure of the thesis; and finally, the conclusion.

1.2. Context of research

1.2.1. Peacebuilding in context

Peacebuilding remains ill-defined, and it is notorious for conceptual muddles. Literature that has since appeared, for instance by Carbonnier (1998), Henning Haugerudbraaten (1998), John Paul Lederach, (1997) and Roland Paris (1997), has shown significant variations in the usage of the term. The term “peacebuilding” has been used both in a narrow and broad sense, and considerable differences have appeared concerning the different dimensions of peacebuilding. Even in the face of distinction, it is common for terms such a peacebuilding, nation-building, state-building, peacekeeping (described by Hudson (2016:3) as efforts to contain the violence in a conflict) and peacemaking (described by

[2] By mainstream, the researcher aludes the most commonly practices of peacebuilding currently. This is explained further in the chapter 2.

Duursma (2014) as a process of brokering a deal) to be used interchangeably (Call, 2008; von Bogdandy et al., 2005:580, 593).

The development of the concept of peacebuilding has evolved to assume different meanings for different scholars, policymakers and practitioners in different situations. Conceptualisations have revolved around the purpose, the method, time, actors, process versus actions, and organisation (Olivier, Neethling & Mokoena, 2013). Various definitions of peacebuilding exist, though one element that remains consistent is the aim of preventing a recurrence of violent conflict, and achieving lasting and sustainable peace (Paris, 2004:2; Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2008:2).

Johan Galtung popularised the concept of peacebuilding in 1975 with his pioneering work, *The three approaches to peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding*. His work led to the conclusion that the root cause of conflict is the nature of the social and economic structures. Later, in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then United Nations Secretary-General, presented the report *An Agenda for Peace*. In this report, Boutros-Ghali defines peacebuilding as a range of activities meant to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict, distinguishing it from both peacemaking and peacekeeping. Together, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding formulate a general theory of achieving or maintaining peace.

Schirch (2008:8) goes a step further and defines peacebuilding as a process of building relationships and institutions that support the peaceful transformation of conflict. Reychler (2001:12) adds that the defining objective of peacebuilding is to transform conflict in a constructively sustainable manner. It is apparent that to initiate the social reconstruction of war-affected communities in a way that correlates to the needs of the people affected, as summed up by Schirch and Reychler, there is a growing need to focus on more than just conventional peace methods (Preis & Mustea, 2013:2).

In this thesis, peacebuilding is defined as the medium- or long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This includes the process of rebuilding the political, security, social, and economic dimensions of a post-conflict society. This process aims to promote social and economic justice, erecting governance structures that will consolidate peacebuilding, reconciliation and development, as well as address the root causes of the conflict (Murithi, 2006:13).

1.2.1.1. Broadening of peacebuilding

The current peacebuilding development, however, calls for a broadening of the concept since the "*An Agenda for Peace"*. The broadening of peacebuilding is also further addressed in chapter 2, section 2.3. Haugerudbraaten (1998:6) problematises the measures listed in the *Agenda for Peace* by arguing that they do not necessarily support the notion referred to as sustained efforts that will address the underlying root causes of problems. The need for a broader definition and conceptualisation by Haugerudbraaten-led strategic peacebuilding theorist Lisa Schirch (2008) to recognise the complexity of the tasks required to build peace. She argues that peacebuilding is strategic when resources, actors, and approaches to

peacebuilding are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals and address numerous issues for the long term (Moses, 2014).

While Lewer (1999:12) and Llamazares (2005:2-4) are concerned about the inclusion of so many activities, levels, and actors under the umbrella term peacebuilding, thereby rendering its definition so broad that it is in danger of becoming meaningless, Haugerudbraaten (1998:7) warns against using too narrow a definition. Haugerudbraaten calls for an expansive view and identifies in the literature the dimensions of peacebuilding that can be used for expansion. These dimensions are intended to shift conceptual ambiguities from the back of the mind to conscious awareness and scrutiny by Shannon (2004). Towards this, Haugerudbraaten argues that peacebuilding can be broadened in the following aspects: the aim of peacebuilding, the means of peacebuilding, the temporal aspect of peacebuilding, and the organisational capacity of peacebuilding.

The aim of peacebuilding

Most peace scholars differ on whether peacebuilding is about removing the root causes of conflict, or about finding ways to resolve both old and new disputes peacefully. The post-Cold War UN and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were expected to intervene to find lasting peace, but due to the socio-economic decline that resulted from the protracted nature of the conflicts, economic development was limited (Neethling, 2005:34). The scarce resources that could support economic development were diverted to communities that were in urgent need instead of focusing on long-term development (Stremlau, 2013:1). This led to the limited success of peace missions that in turn led to a re-evaluation of the fundamental peacekeeping principles that were adhered-to during the immediate post-Cold War era. It prompted the expansion of what had been traditionally understood in terms of human security and peacebuilding concepts — leading Hendricks (2013:1) to contend that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflict, but also the political, humanitarian, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Taken from the emphasis by Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding should be a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict[3] argues that the aim should go beyond conflict resolution to conflict transformation where one cannot ignore structural forms of injustice and violence, and the need for appropriate measures is founded on an ethic of interdependence, partnership, and limiting violence to achieve sustainable peace. This expansion, Johan Galtung (1976) adds, will ensure that peacebuilding mechanisms, should be built into structures that the system itself can draw upon. He compares this to a healthy body, which generates its own antibodies.

[3] The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a global network led by civil society organisations (CSOs) actively working to prevent violent conflict and build more peaceful societies.

Peacebuilding should, therefore, endeavour to address the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts, which include structural, political, socio-cultural, economic, and environmental factors (Olivier et al. 2009).

The means of peacebuilding

The means of peacebuilding is concerned with what the efforts of peacebuilding should primarily entail. According to Gueli et al. (2007), it has become clear that the use of military force to dismantle war economies will be insufficient if applied independently of other crucial peace mission activities. Tschirgi (2003:9) argues that ongoing dilemmas regarding security situations in weak, failing, or vulnerable states have prompted both development and security agencies to initiate processes that guide cultural, structural, economic, and political issues. According to Clover (2005:104), all aspects are equally important.

Therefore, there is a need to integrate all issues through the provision of technical assistance, capacity support, transparency, and anti-corruption initiatives, as well as conflict resolution projects (Neethling, 2005:44). Against this background, Tschirgi (2003:1) argues that there is a gradual expansion of peacebuilding to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. That is before (prevention), during, and after conflict (see the application in chapter 5). Thus, the creation of such an environment has three central dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships, and dealing with psychosocial trauma at the individual level.

The International Crisis Group (2015) reports a result that confirms violence in South Sudan was made up of a combination of various historical, current, political, socio-economic, cultural, and politico-economic factors. This included factors beyond marginalisation, political sidelining, the fragility of the state, weak justice systems, and poor distribution of wealth and natural resources. These, they argue, were the main priorities of the United Mission in South Sudan (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2011). The failure to uphold peace in South Sudan during its transition period is supported by Maiese's (2003) argument that the creation of positive peace should be the central task of peacebuilding. Here, Maiese argues that when a "stable social equilibrium" is achieved, the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war.

The temporal aspect of peacebuilding

Beyond the surface definition, the timing of peacebuilding also plays a part in how it is practised. One school of thought believes that peacebuilding is a comprehensive operation. Others tend to see the relevance of peacebuilding only as a process in post-conflict situations that occurs at the end of a conflict's "life cycle". For instance, in Michael Lund's (1996) stages of conflict (figure 1 below), peacebuilding occurs as the very last stage after all other stages of diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping are successful (Lund, 1996). This position of peacebuilding seems to

have dominated the UN (until recently), often termed as "post-conflict peacebuilding" (Bryden, N'Diaye & Olonisakin, 2005).



Figure 3; Michael lund: Preventing violent conflicts. A strategy for preventive diplomacy. p. 38

The term 'post-conflict peacebuilding', also used in the UNSC documents, is intended to prevent the resurgence of armed conflict, reflects a concept of peacebuilding that is narrow (Hänggi, 2005). According to the UN structure, peacebuilding comes after peacemaking and peacekeeping, implying that peacebuilding is a separate entity which occurs after conflict and consists of a various activity including capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation. Indeed, the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000), defines peacebuilding as:

> "Activities [that] are undertaken on the far side of the conflict" (Durch et al., 2003).

This definition positions peacebuilding as a phase of the peace process that only takes place after violent conflict. There is a need for long-term peacebuilding techniques that are designed to fill this gap by addressing the underlying substantive issues that brought about the conflict. Hänggi (2005) argues that there is a need for a broader concept of peacebuilding that does not solely aim at avoiding the recurrence of war, but also at strengthening the fabric of peace. Woocher (2009) argues that this kind of peacebuilding should not be limited to averting a relapse into conflict in post-conflict scenarios, especially given the non-linearity (see chapter 2) of the "cycle of conflict", which does not provide a perfect timing for peacebuilding to start, thus, showing a less smooth process to the one demonstrated in figure 1 above. Lederach perceives these peace-building techniques as a long-term perspective crucial to future violence prevention, and the promotion of a more peaceful future. Understanding of peacebuilding has recently taken on a broader meaning (Lederach, 1997). In this thesis, peacebuilding is understood as a combination of what is described by Lederach as "a comprehensive concept that sustains a full array of processes and approaches within its various stages to transform conflict toward

more sustainable peace." This reduces the chances of relapse into conflict (Definitions of Peacebuilding, 2019). From this trajectory, this thesis understands peacebuilding not as separate from other peace processes, but as an umbrella concept that encompasses long-term transformative efforts that is a combination of classical peacebuilding strategies, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The temporal definition of peacebuilding is framed under what Michelle Maiese (2006) argues, should encompass the activities of peacebuilding, and includes:

> "Early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of peace zones."

The organisational capacity of peacebuilding

The general organisation of peacebuilding has shown the overall growth of peace missions. A shift has occurred from peace interventions that are only concerned with overseeing ceasefires towards peace intervention operations that moved towards inclusion, capacity building, and promotion of measures meant to pave the way for the local population to own and build sustainable peace.

This leads to the question of 'who plays what role' in peacebuilding. Fetherston and Nordstrom (1995) argue that the position of peace interveners allows them to interact extensively with communities in conflict. It is thus necessary to integrate macro- and micro-level activity aimed at long-term transformation (see section 3.2.2.4). Thus, the need for third-party interventions to be "guided by a broader definition of success that is not only deduced from the top but also articulated from local frameworks of peacebuilding" (Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1995).

However, Olivier et al. (2009) disagree that peacebuilding discourse should revolve around the discussion of actors, primarily the role of international and national actors of peace. Others view the debate about the role of international actors is important. It is especially for the purpose of efforts to avoid a return to conflict, that they argue in some cases, peacebuilding may require ambitious long-term nation-building efforts by international actors (Fetherston and Nordstrom, 1995).

Tschirgi, therefore, provides a middle ground by calling for a re-definition of peacebuilding from a macro (international) perspective. He emphasises that the doctrines and institutions that had been developed during the Cold War to deal with issues regarding global peace and security should be regarded as inadequate in dealing with conflicts in the new era (Tschirgi, 2003:1). The denominator is a holistic, transformative, and long-term perspective with the emphasis on a peace built on internal, domestic and local traditions as well as cultural practices (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). The UN (2001) "No exit without strategy" report of the Secretary-General further documents that outside actors can lend valuable support and can act as bystanders in decisions, where domestic peace would be achieved through "reformed systems of governance that are responsive to people's basic needs at the local, regional and national levels". This call contributed to the early 1990s shift from the liberal peacekeeping

approaches, to an understanding of peacebuilding that entails much more than the contributions of the military component of a peace mission, and active participation of local groups. It is on this call for a broadening agenda of peacebuilding and the subsequent *local turn* that this thesis is built. In parallel emphasis, the roles of the civil society, local communities, and local actors have been growing since the early 1990s, leading to the conceptualization of the idea of 'peace from below' (see section 3.2.2.1).

The focus is not on the top and bottom only (see section 1.2.2.2). The middle level includes the ambitious civil society also plays a part in this analysis. In South Sudan, civil society is narrowly defined as 'not for profit' organisations. This limited definition excludes the majority of what is the 'true' civil society of South Sudan. In this paper, "civil society is understood to comprise organisations that take voluntary collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values distinct from those of the state, family and market. It consists of large sets of organisations such as trade unions, professional associations, human rights groups, faith-based organisations, research institutions, social movements, and peacebuilding NGOs, as well as traditional and community groups". Civil society groups must also be civically minded, and it is important to note that these are much more than NGOs, even though the NGOs are the main interlocutors for international cooperation (Paffenholz, 2014).

1.2.2. The Local Turn

In academic research, there is an emergence of a school of critical scholars advocating for an emphasis on the 'local' in peacebuilding knowledge and practices. These scholars call for an alternative approach that accounts for the dynamic relationships and agency at the local level (Da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012). Essentially this shift, while problematising the liberal peacebuilding framework, called for an approach that emerges from the local level, not one imposed by external actors (Tschirgi, 2004). The emphasis on a focus beyond the liberal approach has argued for the importance of peacebuilding to include more local ownership (Donais, 2009) and consent. This emphasis is to promote legitimacy and effectiveness in peacebuilding efforts (Tadjbaksh, 2011: 26) and also provides a premise under which peacebuilding work can draw from the different other local understandings of the issues at hand (Jok, 1996).

Most of these conversations have primarily taken place under the inclusion umbrella. An example of this inclusionary approach can be seen in the 2016 United Nations Security Council, UNSC Resolution 2282, which was adopted unanimously and called for a reformation of the peacebuilding architecture to promote more inclusivity of local peace processes. The UNSC Resolution 2282 was later supported by the United Nations General Assembly[4]. Also, the G7+[5] developed a "New Deal" that highlights the

[4] Violence in South Sudan Continues, Confirming the ..., https://docplayer.net/78319325-Violence-in-south-sudan-continues-confirming-the- (accessed April 29, 2019).

[5] The G7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The group represents 20 member countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen. "Who We Are," G7+, http://www.g7plus.org/.

necessity of a "legitimate and inclusive politic" (Liaga, 2017) when it comes to peacebuilding (Donais & McCandless, 2016).

These developments signify some of the most significant attempts at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of peacebuilding strategies (Öjendal & Ou, 2015). These are all attributed to the fact that the question of sustained peace is not a naturally occurring phenomenon; it is often under construction and is ever-changing in nature (Jenkins 2013:1). However, as argued by Wielenga (2018), these attempts continue to give "lip service" to the concept of local agency and local ownership in Peacebuilding interventions. Peacebuilding practices continue to be liberal and "they do not include these important issues" at the bottom level, leading to the question of what or who is included? Moreover, how and to what degree are they included? This thesis will move beyond the evidence of lip service to critically analyse the evidence of local inclusivity in practice. The case of South Sudan will form the ground in which the type, level, and degree of inclusivity are tested to situate the position the local occupies in contemporary peace initiatives in South Sudan and Africa.

The critical approaches draw on, among others, include John Paul Lederach's (2001) elicitive approach, which, unlike prescriptive approaches to peacebuilding (such as the liberal approaches), recognises the existence of distinctive cultural understandings of conflict resolution, the primary notion here being that training model of universality needs to be rethought. Lederach's approach provides four key ideas, namely: people in a setting being seen as crucial resources; using indigenous knowledge as a key to discovery and actions; building self-sufficiency and sustainability from local resources; and empowerment that emerges from processes that promote participation in discovering appropriate solutions to identified needs and problems. This focus carries with it an emancipatory critique that emphasises giving agency to those who have so far been subject to, and objects of, intervention (Herbert, 2013:234). Emerging from these fundamental ideas, issues of local ownership, emancipation, and sustainability in peacebuilding are brought into focus. From this perspective, there is a need to engage with the non-liberal subjects (Young, 1998:211), especially ones without access to institutions of liberal peace – these are a range of institutions associated with "modern'" states as a driving force for building "peace'" (Zambakari, 2017). Lederach (1997), arguing along the same lines, proposes a grassroots approach where local leaders, NGOs, and international players take part in creating peace with an emphasis on strengthening relationships among the involved parties through psychological, spiritual, social, economic, and political dimensions of society (JepchumbaKidombo, 2013).

One important component of literature addressing the local turn is critical about the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. On the one hand, the project of liberal peacebuilding has been normatively accused of being an imposition of 'Western' values, with inherent ethnocentrism that presumes a universalism of liberal goals (Paris, 2010:344–345; Richmond 2009a:569). It is also pragmatically argued that liberal peacebuilding results in dysfunctional outcomes and that considering local realities is

> "not only an ethical necessity but also unavoidable for the aim of sustainability in peacebuilding endeavours" (Schaefer, 2010:504).

The "local" is generally seen as the place where the people at the grassroot's peace is developed in distinction to the liberal peace (Simons & Zanke, 2014). This is also what Richmond in his article 'Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace' terms as 'local local', an indicative of the existence and diversity of communities, where the "everyday" is at its most powerful as a critical tool (see section 3.2.2.4.). As The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (2014) defines it, the "local" represents local communities and includes the local efforts, local knowledge of citizens, and organisations formed by the communities, who in many ways share attributes such as messages of mercy and forgiveness that transcend ethnic, national, political, and religious divisions (Massoud, 2014). The inclusion of what has come to be known as "the local", also referred to as local ownership often remains in the form of rhetorical commitments (Donais, 2009:18). Nonetheless, there is a lot of literature on the benefits of local involvement, especially among critical peacebuilding scholar (for example, Mac Ginty, 2010). However, many scholars such as Hirblinger & Simons (2015) and 2015 and Simons & Zanker (2014) have also argued that this literature of the "local" remains under-analysed with weak empirical grounding. This research will, therefore, aim to fill this gap.

Much of the term "local" is flexible, and its exact meaning is debated. According to Leonardson's definition, the "local" refers to "the acts of a diversity that go beyond elites" (Leonardson, 2015:833), while Mac Ginty argues that "local" refers to the range of locally-based agencies present within a conflict. He shows that many of these can identify the processes necessary to promote peace, which in this context refer more to the everyday lives of people. The complicated nature of local conflicts, on many occasions, leads countries to need extra attention to defuse the causes of conflict (Mac Ginty, 2013:769). The advantage that critical scholars bring out is that local approaches allow "cultural appropriateness" among the local people to have their voices heard (Hughes, 2015:818). The "local" is usually those whose views are least likely to be heard in a liberal peacebuilding process (Ganson & Wennmann, 2012). These voices are what this thesis will refer to as voices from below: that is communities and organisations that engage in peacebuilding activities that spread to the communities with a bottom-up approach and have a majority of South Sudan staff have their headquarters in South Sudan.

Given the vagueness of such terms as "the local", it is imperative to define how these terms will be used in this thesis. "The local" or a "local peacebuilding actor" can mean two things. First, it can refer to a South Sudanese actor or organisation/institution, as a way to differentiate it from an external actor (regional/African or global). This thesis will use "internal" and "external/international actor" to mark the difference. Second, "local" can be used to differentiate between the different internal actors, a "local peacebuilding actor," and a "national peacebuilding actor." This differentiation is due to the geographic area of the implementation of their influence. For instance, a "national local NGO or organisation" has

wider coverage, mostly over different provinces (for example the government and subnational governmental bodies), but a "local actor" (for instance a community-based organisation or an NGO) has a local influence and is geographically constrained to the immediate community and geographic locus. Therefore, this thesis will refer to "a local NGO" or "a local community-based organisation" in the case of an actor with a limited geographical area and a "national NGO or organisation/institution" to describe a larger entity in terms of geographic influence and capacity.

There are advantages of promoting the local turn; in most cases, local communities know the causes and nature of conflict better than international actors. They form the best resource when solving conflicts (Leonardson, 2015:832). If the interveners do not have any connection with the local community or subculture, this can provide a reason for the "local" to resist international interventions. This can be due to them feeling threatened or suppressed in terms of their everyday life and traditions (Hughes, 2015:819). It has also been argued that the increase of employees from conflicting and post-conflict societies has led to the increase in the popularity of the local turn, thus raising the "cultural and historical awareness of different identities" on the international scene (Mac Ginty, 2013:776). This growing importance of everyday life and local people is slowly altering the nature of liberal peacebuilding processes. As Öjendal argues, that the global and the local now can equally be held responsible for suboptimal outcomes as they also have the incentive to build sustainable peace in their region (Leonardson, 2015:830-831). The decentralisation involved in the local turn can help with maintaining a stable and secure environment through increased levels of legitimacy, accountability, inclusion and participation (Leonardson, 2015:828).

In this research, the local can be defined and categorised in terms of strategies and actors, although the research will not be creating a clear distinction between actors and strategies. It is also important to appreciate that there are different implications in assuming that the "local" represents the everyday, and the international does not. This is discussed in chapter 3.

1.2.2.1. Strategies and approaches to peacebuilding

In terms of strategy, the local occupy different levels. Various policy actors such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID), UN, the World Bank, and municipality organisations such as the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, promote local ownership. They do this by supporting non-state and community actors to strengthen their position as an intermediary between the state and the citizen (Klem & Frerks, 2008). For instance, ACCORD supports local governance structures to provide channels for representation through the political organisation (Accord, 2014).

The top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding are two main approaches to peacebuilding that have been used in the past and are still in use in recent times to transform post-conflict countries

In the 1990s, towards the end of the cold war, the UN engaged in large-scale state-building operations in countries afflicted by civil war. What is now termed as comprehensive peacebuilding by the UN

trusteeship of institutions needed to establish liberal market democracies. These conventional approaches to peacebuilding refer to the formal and external bodies and structures, in an attempt to end the conflict and transform countries recovering from civil wars, violent conflicts, and natural disasters (Bukari, 2013). The prevailing paradigm, according to Newman, Paris, and Richmond (2009), is referred to as the transformation of war-shattered states into democratic market states and holding an immediate democratic election. In support of this view, Hoffmann (1995) adds market liberalism, humanitarian assistance, formal court systems, and the rule of law to the principles of the Western/conventional approach to peacebuilding. The strategy of peacebuilding (also known as the method of implementation or implementation programmes) is the concept of operations, which is engrossed in its design. Successful and sustainable peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Stedman (1997) argues that although we can imagine purely cooperative solutions to domestic peace, the confusion of the violence does not seem to be promising circumstances for rational cooperation among factions. They lead to the requirement of more effective alternative (and additional) strategies (Chandler, 1999).

Critics such as Paris have described this "top-down" approach to peacebuilding as authoritarian (Paris, 2002). As an alternative to the authoritarian practices of macro-level peacebuilding operations, several scholar-practitioners advanced arguments for an "elective" and "transformative" approach to peacebuilding "from below", also known as "bottom-up" or 'community-based peacebuilding. For instance, Betts Fetherston, argues that a bottom-up approach would be "counter-hegemonic" (Ramsbotham et al., 2005:217) with a focus on the capacities for peacemaking that are intrinsic to communities in conflict situations (Curle, 1994:96). Advocates of this approach argue that "bottom-up" peacebuilding, involves providing support and allowing those affected by conflict to develop more effective and voice their diagnoses of the problems they faced. This approach champions the thought that those who are most affected by violence, and who must live with its effects, are the ones to best determine the appropriate solutions and responses to it (McDonald, 1997:2).

On the other hand, Bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding refer to the process of identifying the structural cause of conflict and using elements such as mediation, truth-saying, joint problem-solving, rituals, negotiation, people-to-people dialogue, the exchange of cattle, and marriage rituals to promote sustainable peace (Issifu, 2015a). Udofia (2011) argues that the "indigenous peacebuilding approach centres primarily on negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, pacification, and appeasement". In support, Okrah (2003) opines that most traditional societies tend to resolve conflicts through internal social control mechanisms. This approach is seen as a promotion of a win-win or non-zero-sum game in the aftermath of violent conflicts (Issifu, 2015b). This led Zartman (2000) emphasis on the task of the indigenous approach to peacebuilding towards re-establishing contact between individuals, families and communities to rebuild social harmony. This approach, if well planned and managed, is a more durable and enduring option that may guarantee sustainable peace for war-torn countries. This has been the popular approach adopted in the process of peacebuilding in various West African countries.

Following the unfolding of the 2013 conflict in South Sudan, the top-down strategy used was largely based on peace negotiations between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO). The IGAD-led process culminated in the signing of an agreement to cease all military action that may undermine the peace process. The agreement was broken after two days, setting the premise for peace agreements in the future. Young (2007) argues that community-led processes of dialogue, truth, justice, and restitution could potentially tackle outstanding problems. This includes peacebuilding processes such as how to re-establish law and order at the grassroots, and the disarming and rehabilitation of armed youths (Bol, 2014).

While other prominent studies have turned their deconstructive attention to the liberal peace paradigm, this research is the first of its kind to extend to the latest post-liberal shift the same level of scrutiny mostly reserved for the liberal peace in South Sudan. This is not a descriptive engagement with the genesis of the local turn nor an extended literature review of the local turn. Rather, it is analytics of power, informed by methodological tools, applied to the shifting narratives and practice of peacebuilding. In sum, the research is essentially a reflection on narratives that have been taken for granted and naturalised, inspiring debates about whether non-linear alternatives for peacebuilding can cohere with a truly non-linear and post-modern epistemological framework.

1.2.2.2. The local actors

Following the definition by Hellmüller (2018), and as mentioned above, this thesis defines local actors as agencies, organisations, and groups within South Sudan that are largely led and driven by South Sudanese. This presents an amalgamation of civil society, communities, local government, traditional authorities, religious leaders and individual peacebuilding actors. A subsuming of all local peacebuilding actors into the general category masks the important peacebuilding. Attention is therefore called towards this category, and there is a need to treat them as an actors' category in their own right. Although these activities may overlap, at the same time, we should also more clearly distinguish them.

International peacebuilding actors are often having their headquarters outside of South Sudan and are active in different contexts and countries with expatriate staff in the country's office. They include a wide range of governmental, intergovernmental, and international non-governmental organisations (Liden, 2005:8).

Actors are categorised into different levels, which led Lederach (1997) to develop the pyramid approach as a base for analysing the intersection to understand the levels of actors (Knox & Quirk, 2000; Lederach, 2005, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001). In his pyramid approach, Lederach divides the pyramid into three sections representing the three levels. Certain common features characterise each level.



Figure 4. Lederach Pyramid

At the top-level elite leadership (Level 1), you find the key political, military, and religious leaders in the conflict. These are highly visible representatives of constituencies and elected political officials. Lederach argues that due to their high profile, they often find themselves in locked position regarding the conflict's substantive issues. This often leads to issues of inflexibility during negotiations, and that is why negotiations take a long time and are easily derailed.

The middle-range leadership (level 2) includes the mid-level NGOs (non-government organisations) and GOs (government organisations). This level is made up of those who have leadership positions not directly connected with formal government or major opposition movements. This is a considerable group compared to the top-level elite leadership. The focus at this level is not on the leader, but rather on the organisation as a whole and the mandate that it presents. The entities' status and influence derive from their relationships with others, both from the top-elite leadership and the grassroots leadership levels. Therefore, they are an important connector between the top and grassroots levels. Unlike the top level, lack of visibility and individuality of middle-range leadership affords them more flexibility to manoeuvre within their projects.

Finally, the leadership at the bottom/grassroots level (level 3) involves the community, indigenous community groups or NGOs, traditional and customary leaders, and local groups within everyday settings such as refugee camp leaders. These grassroots leaders represent the masses, the everyday, the experience of the day-to-day struggle of finding food, water, shelter, and safety in violence-torn areas. Daily peacebuilding occurs at this level, as explained in chapter 3.

Through these different levels, Lederach introduces the concept of inverse relationships. He argues that while top leadership have access to more information, resources and decision-making capacity, they are less affected by the daily war and the consequences of their decisions. Conversely, the base of the pyramid represents communities who are directly affected by the elite decision-making but with limited access to decision-making power. This inverse relationship results in difficulty in implementation of peace. It is these various activities that Lederach argues must be integrated into a comprehensive peacebuilding framework (this will be demonstrated in chapter 5 which will look at the top-down-bottom-up integration)

Having understood local actors and local strategy, which one of these (between the strategy and the actor) best defines the local? There is still a conceptual definition that the research will encounter, given the above definition of local actors and strategies, is the definition of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) based on the fact that itis a South Sudanese entity or on its top-down strategies? In most literature, there is a differentiation between local actors and international or external actors, as well as a differentiation between internal and external strategies. This points to the situational logic of peacebuilding that calls for a need for peacebuilders to define themselves as part of a certain peacebuilding logic, this propagates the assumption that "local" and "international" identities are in a mutual frictional relationship (Jabri, 2013). As explained before, the peacebuilding environment is not linear (section 1.2.2.1). While it is clear that an actor can either be a South Sudanese or not, the meaning of local thus goes beyond the actor and also incorporates the strategies. For instance, a local actor can adopt liberal strategies and vice versa. It is not enough to define local in simple terms as an actor or strategy, as these roles can interchange and intersect within one actor, or among the many actors in peacebuilding. This view is demonstrated to be vague and reductionist. A gap exists in evaluating these muddles and not so definitive spaces that both the internal and external actors and liberal approach and local approaches to peacebuilding exist at the same time and shifting sides.

In addition to defining local or non-local actors, it is also important to acknowledge that the issues being tackled reflect the dynamic area of intersection between the international and local (see Table 1). There are actors at different levels, tackling issues at their specific levels, and at the same time addressing issues that transcend their levels and cut across the entire structure to form a dynamic intersection.

Level	**Approaches seeing conflict issues as distinct**	**Approaches seeing conflict issues as being influenced at all levels**
Local ***Level 3***	Local peace (on issues such as cattle rustling)	Peace strategies (on local issues – cattle rustling). Peace strategies (on
National ***Level 1***	National peace (on governance issues)	

Regional ***Level 1&2***	Regional peace (on resource issues)	
International ***Level 1&2***	International issues (world peace/democracy)	

Table 1: Intersection of peace strategies on different levels of issues of conflictS

This exposes the fact that within this complex interaction, there is a constant re-localisation and de-localisation among the actors, depending on their chosen level of focus of different issues. Among these actors, there is also the localisation phenomenon. Localisation here "describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms, including norms previously institutionalised in a region, and consists of local beliefs and practices "(Acharya, 2004:241). Kappler refers to constant processes of [de]localisation (moving away from the local) and [re]localisation (moving towards the local) which serve as tools. Various actors are socio-politically affected in the landscape of peacebuilding (Kappler, 2015).

As Jabri (2013) demonstrates, the issue of localisation is a continuous process that a peace actor can possess at both different or same time and space. Jabri argues that there is a constant movement of entities to position themselves in the wider peacebuilding landscape. "This can be considered as taking on the form of 'de-localisation' (the deliberate attempt to avoid one's identity being framed as 'local') and the decision to frame one's identity as 'local', thus re-localisation" (Jabri, 2013: 878). Thus, localisation and the intersection of the local and international should be analysed not as a static space, but as a space riddled with power and hegemonic tensions (see chapter 2) where interactions are in constant movement, with fluid interactions.

This research's interest is, therefore, to situate the local in terms of both actors and strategies given various issues, and challenging the conception of the "local" as a static concept or a set position.

Thus, there is a need to engage with the current peacebuilding calls for a focus on "the local", that is local actors, strategies, and practices. As Wielenga (2018) stipulates, very little is understood in the local and its embedded systems of norms and values. These norms may differ significantly from those informing international interventions. This thesis will, therefore, join conversation on the local turn and southern voices, and contribute by providing exploratory research to understand the interplay between the liberal and the local turn's conceptual and theoretical framework, that is their contradiction (in other words, what dominates? can they be reconciled?) or their symbiosis (how do they work together, or inform each other?). The thesis will also situate local voices in peacebuilding practices in South Sudan, and view their prospects of achieving lasting peace through the lens of the "local turn".

There is consensus among local turn scholars that despite the importance of the local turn in dynamic conflict environments, literature and interventions continue to be understood and conceptualised within the liberal peacebuilding framework (Chandler, 2006). This requires the unpacking of the link between

the external and internal actors, their efforts, and strategies of peacebuilding. The understanding should not only focus on the local as an existing entity but where it exists in terms of mainstream peacebuilding that is increasingly practised.

1.2.3. South Sudan

South Sudan finds itself in a unique conflict–post-conflict setting. This research is conducted on this "grey" social setting of South Sudan during the civil conflict that started in 2013, after their 2011 secession from Sudan and after a protracted civil war that started in 1955 to 2005. This research is embedded in two settings: First, within the context of South Sudan before, during and after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. This peace agreement led to the self-determination referendum held in January 2011, and South Sudan's independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011. As will be explained in chapter 5, this period was preceded by two armed civil wars. The second setting is between 2013, when the civil conflict broke, and 2018, after several efforts to bring peace to South Sudan. It should be noted that to have a comprehensive analysis, occurrences beyond 2013 will be referred both for a comparative purpose and to show continuity or disjuncture.

Since her 1956 independence, Sudan has faced the continuous challenge of achieving and sustaining peace. This is evident in the conflict that erupted between the Muslim-Arabic North in Khartoum and southern Sudan, narrowly framed as an "Arab-African or Muslim-Christian conflict" between the predominantly Muslim North and predominantly Christian South. This contributed to the civil war that lasted half a century with millions of deaths on both sides. The causes of the civil war are diverse and emerge from various reasons such as political exclusion, racism, inequality, the "resource curse" and historical enmities (Ayers, 2010). The first civil war was from 1955 to 1972. Continuous negotiations took place as a way to achieve peace. In 1973, the Addis Ababa agreement was reached between the government of Sudan and the southern rebel groups. This agreement provided allowed South Sudan to have autonomy. In 1983, the regime in Khartoum breached the deal by integrating amendments into the autonomy system without the prior consent of the other party. This resulted in a new rebellion by the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) emerged (Magdi el Gizouli, 2017). The second war began in 1983 and continued until the Government of Sudan and the SPLM (see chapter 5) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005.

Based on the CPA, an Interim National Constitution of 2005 was enacted. This constitution provided for a decentralised government in Sudan and South Sudan. The Interim Constitution also stipulated that South Sudan should have the right to self-determination in 2011, six years from the date of the agreement. This was to be followed by proposed elections three years following the transitional term (OCHA, 2006). Thus, the 2005 CPA marked the beginning of a period of state-building post-war peacebuilding. South Sudan was seemingly set to transition into a peaceful and stable state.

In addition to the then Government of Sudan and the representatives from the South, international partners such as the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), it was subsequently transformed into the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); the TROIKA group – consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, Norway; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)[6]; and other non-governmental bodies were critical players during the first and second conflict.

Since the CPA of 2005, there has been an emphasis on achieving "peace through state-building", whose contribution is in a highly exclusive social, economic, and political order dictated by the leadership of the dominant rebel movement-turned-government, the SPLM/A (Ylönen, 2013). It is the overall process dictated by the SPLM/A leadership and international/external peace actors, focusing on security and state that has led to the exclusion of the majority of Southern Sudanese from the peace dividend (Ylönen, 2012). The exclusive top-down SPLM/A- and state-centric view of the nation marginalised part of the population and contributed to the continuing political instability and armed violence orchestrated by leading individuals and other military men (Ylönen, 2016:1).

While secession gave the impression of unity, the conflict that erupted in December 2013 indicated that the nation-building process has been more difficult than expected. Although the causes had changed[7], South Sudan was still facing the same issues of weak social cohesion and unsustainable peace (Zink, 2014:444). Despite the numerous efforts and resources designated by external and internal actors to achieve peace in South Sudan, peace appeared to be elusive and the young state relapsed into a civil war at the end of 2013. The relapse of war in South Sudan occurred at a time when global peace scholarship had reached a kind of impasse and was continuously being questioned (REF). This research inquiry will, therefore, find purpose in the coincidental timing of the elusive peace in South Sudan, which has mostly been through state-building and the continuous research over the past 20 years on pragmatic shifts and inclusivity (see chapter 3).

There is evidence of the considerable presence of the international community, and many projects have been implemented in an effort to cultivate peace. However, due to the ever-changing dynamics of the conflict, most actors changed their strategies, for instance, the international partners interacted more with the local partners and communities (see chapter 7) while the government also implemented the National dialogue (see section 5.4). For instance, one of the largest drivers of peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan was with the UNMISS. Previously, according to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (2015), between 2011 and 2013, the UNMISS deployed $14 million in its Peacebuilding Support Plan. This plan focused on building the state's capacity to manage conflict and strengthen the rule of law. However, the resurgence of the civil war in 2013 marked the failure of the efforts employed by UNMISS

[6] This consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya
[7] For instance, the framings of race were replaced by ethnic framing, the power battles were now between current president Salva Kiir and his rivals, mainly Riek Machar

and calls emerged for a rethinking of the strategies used. The UNMISS project was later suspended before implementation due to the outbreak of violence in 2013.

The approach employed by UNMISS focused on a high-level bilateral intervention between government signatories and international monitors. This caused a disconnection between the citizens and the peace processes (Salman, 2011:155). Although the problematic UNMISS approach is not the central focus of this thesis, it is important to note that the failure by UNMISS has further emphasised the focus on the local agency as necessary. The extent of the influence of high-level interaction on peace in South Sudan is not in doubt (Liaga, 2017); however, failure of peace and the outbreak of war in 2013 reiterates the need for a multi-level and integrated approach to tackling complex issues, especially in an era in which local actors have considerable agency and influence (Mac Ginty, 2010:395).

Two streams of peace and reconciliation activities are currently evident in the South Sudan context. First are the elite upper-level peace processes in South Sudan that are attempting to engage with the GoSS, the regional bodies and international partners. It includes the activities of IGAD-led negotiations and the revitalisation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (AGRSS) (see Chapter 5). As a top-down process, the first stream of activity is primarily interested in achieving some agreement with the conflicting groups, and its constituent fighters, to end direct violence suffered by the South Sudanese population. Second, grassroots bottom-up peace and reconciliation activities are focused on community conflict resolution, peace education, and addressing the predominant culture of violence.

The second stream of activities is more ad hoc and small-scale than the upper-level counterparts. These are the bottom-up strategies that South Sudanese themselves employ to reach a peaceful resolution (see chapter 6). There have been considerable local South Sudanese efforts to meet the need for peace in South Sudan; however, these bottom-up activities have received minimal attention from the international community. Despite the specific stream, there are influences from international and local actors, top-down and bottom-up strategies, as well as an influence at local, national, regional and international levels. These interactions are critical for this thesis.

During the period between 1956 and 2011, peacebuilding initiatives continued to rely heavily on international governments, warring parties and external NGOs; the post-2013 conflict has brought forward networks and the importance of peace activities of local and grassroots organisations that involve the population more than before (these are especially drawn from events before 2005 peace arrangement).

Despite the significant amounts of resources allocated to peacebuilding initiatives in South Sudan, which centred around state-building, sustainable peace remains elusive. The sheer volume of peace organisations and actors, both external and international, who work in and on South Sudan provide an interesting case on dynamics and the prospects of peace.

This research finds purpose in analysing the impact that the involvement or exclusion of local peacebuilding strategies can have on achieving peace in South Sudan. There is a need to analyse the efforts of enhanced localised structures and mechanisms that constructively respond to violence and conflict transformation by involving the local population who suffer in war, through displacement, trauma, and day-to-day community clashes, to forming a social fabric that builds durable peace. South Sudan, therefore, represents a case that requires scrutiny (Ajak & Hirsch, 2015; Theron, 2018; Kisiangani, 2015).

1.3. Formulation of aim and objectives and the research questions

In the peacebuilding context, the premises of the local turn and the idea of local ownership enjoy rhetorical acceptance and proves to be difficult to operationalise (Donais, 2012). Literature and current research have made huge strides in the theoretical and conceptual understanding of the "local turn". Scholars have worked in two broad areas. The first is the effectiveness of "the local" in peacebuilding, including the local dimensions of peace, confidence in "the local" by major (international) actors, and assertiveness of local actors. This largely addresses the local capacity for ownership and its essential part in peacebuilding. The second is as an emancipatory concept and the call for the inclusion of local agency. This is expressed through the emphasis placed on the voices from below. The two areas are often conceptualised in a general perspective of how "the local" fits into and compares to the liberal peacebuilding framework in international relations. These broad categories have generally been assigned a binary relationship to the liberal peacebuilding framework and the local turn approach (Paffenholz, 2014) and exposed the use of local as a rhetorical tool (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015:825). However, evidence on the nature of the existing interaction of the strategies employed by the two approaches to peacebuilding is limited and missing in South Sudan. Despite the growing number of research and policy papers, few attempts have been made to give an overview of which strategies incorporate the local.

As a result, there remains a gap, both in literature and practice, on how peacebuilders can practically incorporate and operationalise "the local" actors, strategies, and knowledge into their projects (Autesserre, 2011; Woodward, 2007). As argued by Hullemuler (2018), the lack of cooperation has led to inadequacies among both the local and international peacebuilding actors. In the case of South Sudan, these inadequacies have affected the responses to war in the country, where both types of actors had relevant programmes and contributed to ending the civil war. Their efforts continuously remain inadequate in addressing the multilayered conflict. Despite this, the current tendency is to prioritise the state as the critical focus of interventions, aligning peacebuilding to state-building. Few alternative strategies to peacebuilding as state-building are considered (Hutton, 2014:2). Beyond this emphasis on state-building, although the "alternative" local perspective is considered in the peacebuilding project, putting this into practice remains a problem, especially on the level of integration into official peacebuilding projects with the presence of an external actor. This is primarily due to the negative

perception of the local actor and local strategies, which are inferior to the dominant liberal framework. This is the case in most African societies, including South Sudan.

Current research has focused on two main areas: first, how different local contexts contribute to peacebuilding (Paffenholz, 2010b) and second, the best ways, international actors can support the local structures (Lederach, 1997). While highly valuable, the former does not provide an in-depth analysis of the interaction of the different actors, while the latter results in the treatment of the "local" as "objects instead of subjects" (Hellmüller, 2018:6). In addition, there is a lack of a critical outlook of the peacebuilding strategies that these actors strive to achieve. There is, therefore, a great need to interrogate and provide a cross-sectional analysis of actors as well as strategies; not as exclusive concepts, but as concepts that provide and are caused by the interaction of the different actors at different levels.

This research is an attempt beyond the methodological and ontological of the importance of the "local turn" (and the ensuing set of binaries), as many scholars have thoroughly covered and established this. The aim is to understand and critically analyse the role of the local turn approach in the contemporary dynamics of peacebuilding towards the achievement of sustainable peace in South Sudan. Thus, the main aim is to describe and situate the relationship of 'local turn' in contemporary peace processes towards the achievement of peace in South Sudan?

The specific objectives of this research are:

- To understand how contemporary peacebuilding is reproduced and practised
- To describe the evidence for the "local turn" in the mainstream peace strategies and describe their relationship and impacts towards peace in South Sudan.
- To examine how evidence of the bottom-up local approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan manifested.
- To examine the areas of overlap, collaboration, opportunity, and challenges in increasing and enabling more agency of the local by internal and external middle-level actors.

Given the current peacebuilding practices and the imperative of the local turn, this research will seek to answer the following question:

What is the role of 'local turn' approaches and its interplay with contemporary peace processes towards the achievement of peace in South Sudan?

Sub-questions include:

1. How do top-down approaches to peacebuilding engage with the local, and what are the impacts towards peace in South Sudan?
2. How is the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan manifested?

3. What are the areas of overlap, collaboration, gaps and challenges in the interplay between the internal and external middle-level actors in peacebuilding in South Sudan?

1.4. Justification and study significance

In reconstructing the approaches and meanings associated with peacebuilding by scholars as well as practitioners working in sub-Saharan Africa, this research contributes towards an enhanced understanding of the interaction of approaches to peacebuilding by actors at different levels (top, middle and bottom) in South Sudanese society.

On a theoretical level, this thesis finds justification towards providing less a "normative value" concerning peacebuilding, and rather a more in-depth analysis of the operationalisation of the local turn, whether and how it has been achieved and the dynamics of its interaction. It is also imperative to have a critical examination of the attempts at strengthening local structures and examine arguments of inclusion. While it should be a goal, inclusion – if done incorrectly – can have negative consequences and does not automatically serve as a panacea for problems facing peacebuilding (because certain conditions must be met to achieve success). This provides a critical angle that does not treat the local turn as a given or normative position, but as a perspective that needs interrogation. This will be the focus of chapter 3.

Secondly, the liberal peacebuilding model is based on the Westphalian assumption of a traditional nation-state. This is, however, not the case in Africa. For instance, state borders are largely and arguably artificial, and colonial powers imposed many state institutions to protect colonial interests. As a result, they often remain weak until today, with a notable divergence between de jure and de facto authority. Similarly, the dominant literature on peacebuilding has largely used a conceptual, empirical understanding as well as evidence from the Western and European context, and at the same time sidelining most of the African experience (Blaut, 1987:8). The thesis argues for the uncovering of the colonial legacy in peacebuilding and the interplay of power dynamics and relationship of this power to knowledge formations that advise the practice. This will be the focus of chapter 2.

The relationship between state and society, and the role typically fulfilled by the government found in most traditional states, may be found outside of the formal state and state actors in African societies. For instance, influence may occur between traditional leaders and community members, or even international actors and local society. In South Sudan, this can be seen where NGOs are the main service providers (Ajak, 2015:3-4; Kisiangani, 2015:3; Maxwell et al. 2014:18). Thus, many societies depend on traditional structures for governance and even militias or other non-state actors for security (African Union – AUCISS, 2014:47-48). It should be noted (as will be questioned in chapter 5 and 6) whether Western approaches to peacebuilding are conducted by non-African actors (chapter 7). The significance of this question ties to the second and third questions, as well as the second and third objectives, by

showing how the adoption of strategies after interaction occurs. This will be mostly discussed in chapter 5 and 7.

The conceptualisation of a local understanding and process allows one to investigate such relationships, as it is not restricted to the state-society framework. Using the lens of the local turn moves the debate beyond the language of the state in dealing with the realities of societies on the African continent. In this way, the lens of the local turn allows the researcher to challenge the liberal peace-building model by interrogating the power plays (however subtle) in peacebuilding. In this way, this research also provides an original contribution by broadening the understanding in the political sciences, thereby rethinking dominance of state-centric views, especially those on South Sudan and similar contexts. This research also contributes to the decolonial conversations of the subalterns who have to "de-link" (Mignolo, 2007) from power formations by forming a perspective that identifies these formations (see chapter 2).

On an empirical level, there is an argument for strengthening local organisations as vehicles for peace as building peace during and after the conflict has moved away from the conference tables of diplomats to informal settings created by local NGOs since the early 1990s(Hilhorst & Van Leeuwen, 2005). As argued, recent literature has focused its attention on local-level dynamics and its reciprocal relationships with national conflict dynamics (Felix da Costa & Karlsrud, 2013:1). Previous work, for instance by Bennett et al. (2010) also focused on the international community's efforts to support conflict mitigation and peacebuilding as well as to provide peace dividends to the South Sudanese people in the period following the signing of the CPA in 2005. There exists a need for interrogating local peacebuilding that places local social structures at the centre of analysis and action. Felix da Costa & Karlsrud (2013) argue that significant institutional obstacles limit the impact of efforts being made to contextualise peacebuilding activities for local circumstances in South Sudan. The empirical chapters (chapter 5, 6 & 7) find significance in the need for further empirical scrutiny of how international peacebuilders are engaging with the local dynamics of conflict.

The case study of the peacebuilding strategies used in South Sudan thus gives an essential addition to the empirical dimension of the "local turn". Furthermore, this research contributes to African studies by bringing out context-based findings that contribute to the growing body of knowledge on the efficacy of peacebuilding and situating local peacebuilding available and practised in South Sudan. Sharp (2014) argues that the conceptual framework to study African realities cannot be located outside the context of Africa.

South Sudan was purposefully chosen for two main reasons. First, as a country with a history of long, violent and protracted conflict, it provides an important test case to understand better the dilemmas of different actors and strategies that have been used over the years. It poses essential questions about

necessary peacebuilding measures for long-term and cohesive peace that would unify the country and facilitate healing of scars resulting from the past few decades of war.

Key works provide insight into the various peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan. The peacebuilding course adopted by South Sudan after the CPA was that of liberal peacebuilding and state-building (AUCISS, 2014:37-38; Gerenge, 2015:87). However, the outbreak of the war in 2013 indicates that these peacebuilding efforts failed. Other key peace processes such as the CPA of 2015, the National dialogues and Revitalisation of the ACRSS agreement provide an insightful understanding of the effects of peace at different levels, and on the local and the impact it had on the achievement of peace. There are also policy briefs and reports that evaluate the various peace processes in South Sudan. Some documents demonstrate their shortcomings, crucial issues raised are "a need for justice, a better plan for post-secession South Sudan, a failure to confront corruption and patronage, and the lack of an inclusive peace process" (Ajak, 2015:8; Akol, 2014; AUCISS, 2014; Deng et al., 2015; Kisiangani, 2015:1-5). It is counter-argued that ending the violence was more important at the time than seeking "fundamental political change" (Rolandsen, 2011:555). This depicts the complex debates that need to be considered between liberal and local turn peacebuilding.

Second, there is a need to study the ballooning of non-state, community, and grassroots peace actors and the shift of many peace actors from a focus on the state to a focus on the community. South Sudan exemplifies current trends in international peacebuilding. That is the primary focus on state, and a dominance of international actors, and lastly is the elite-centred peace process are key characteristics of peacebuilding in South Sudan that have done little to build the nation. However, local actors, for example, the South Sudanese religious groups, play an important role in mediation. In seeking to understand peacebuilding, there is a need to understand and evaluate the mechanisms of all players at different levels. However, this is often done in passing or in conclusion, with little effort to fully conceptualise the role of the peacebuilding measures that are in play. As a result, the intersection between top-down and bottom-up peace, as well as internal and external roles, remain muddy and blurred, which results in continuous cycles of little to no progress. The conceptualisation of this research will provide input for future studies (see chapter 8).

Finding common ground in South Sudan may come from the top-down approach, with negotiated cease-fires, or from the outside in, with the assistance of allies and aid groups. However, building peace must ultimately take hold at the grassroots level, as trusted civic groups come together in a common struggle for peace (Massoud, 2014). This research finds justification towards enhancing localised structures and mechanisms that constructively respond to conflict transformation by involving the local population who suffer in war, through displacement, trauma and day-to-day community clashes, forming a social fabric that builds durable peace (Chichaya, 2011). The extent to which high-level interactions have influenced contemporary peace is not in doubt. However, the outbreak of war in 2013 reiterates the need

for a multi-level and integrated approach to tackling complex issues, especially in an era where local actors have considerable agency and influence (Mac Ginty, 2010:395).

1.5. Delimitations and limitations of the research

The scope of the research involves the international and national actors (governmental and non-governmental organisations) of peace in South Sudan.

The research was narrowed down to the Central Equatorial region of South Sudan, focusing on Juba as the area of study. See chapter 4. The unit of analysis was the strategies employed by the external and internal actors (both will be categorised according to whether they reflect more of the liberal peacebuilding framework or more of the "local turn" approach).

The delimitation of this research is three-fold. First, it proposes the broadening of the lenses through which we see the world by providing a theoretical framework that problematises grand "truth claims" in peace studies and peacebuilding practice. This is used to explain the construction of top-down approaches as more dominant than bottom-up/local approaches to peacebuilding. The broadening of peacebuilding offers an original contribution to knowledge by exploring the intersection between power-knowledge formations between local turn approaches and liberal peacebuilding knowledge and practice, which leads to questioning of the framework for analysis used in peacebuilding. It also provides a broadened understanding of peacebuilding found in the political sciences (as described in the definition in section 1.2) and the uses critical assumptions to understand the relationships of different levels that contribute to the peacebuilding.

Mainstream theories, therefore, have been used as an exclusionary device that prioritises specific issues to the detriment of other perspectives. This emphasises the kind of reading and understanding that plays to the "deconstruction", which is closely associated with post-structuralist texts that were made popular by Jacques Derrida (Cheek, 2000). Derrida's focus (1998) was to show the binary oppositions developed in constructing meaning through language. He argues that the systems of meaning are developed by oppositions. For instance the formation of the "self" and "other". He explains that in each pair, one term (for example, "white") is valued over the other ("black"). That is the knowledge and practice of the north over the south, and at least it shows the "plays of dominations" (Burchill et al., 2009:185). This research thus presents a deconstruction of power and knowledge formations of both the liberal peace and local turn approaches to peacebuilding through a decoloniality of peace analysis. There is an under-conceptualised especially in the area of political sciences, which have neglected a robust enquiry into the relationship of actors of peace at different levels as an important aspect in a societal process that influences public life (Peele, 2005). By providing an understanding of power and knowledge formations in a world of non-linearity (see chapter 2), this research explores the efforts to move beyond truth claims and global understanding of peacebuilding based on top-down peacebuilding.

Second, it proposes a conceptual framework of the local turn that can be used to understand the peacebuilding architecture in South Sudan within the shifting paradigm where the local agency is slowly gaining prominence. Specifically, this research explores how the local turn approaches to peacebuilding scholarship and its development can shed light on some of the lesser understood aspects of peacebuilding practices in African societies. Here, a lens of the local turn was adopted to develop an understanding of peacebuilding strategies used in post-civil conflict states, drawing from the work of Richmond (2014), Mac Ginty (2013), Zondi (2017), Omeje (2018), Murithi (2006), among others. The framework offered by these critical scholars allowed for an exploration of the varying perspectives of the local approaches to peacebuilding, and the identification of the most suitable standpoint to describe the need for broader, more inclusive, and contextual peace approaches, especially in South Sudan, which is arguably in a post-civil conflict state. This research contributes to the efforts to move beyond a state-centric and institution-focused understanding of peacebuilding by providing an understanding of conflict that incorporates the multiple and complex dynamics and processes of conflict and peace in the empirical chapters (chapter 5 and 6).

The last delimitation is the geographical study on South Sudan. The proposed conceptual and theoretical frameworks are used in an analysis of South Sudan to understand why the country has been unable to build a nation that sustains peace. The research focused on the incidents of violence associated with the recent civil war between 2013 and 2018. However, it will also draw from a historical analysis. The historical analyses drawn in this research were on the conflicts occurring in South Sudan, and the subsequent peace activities, by examining literature from scholars such as Martin (2002:122); Johnson (2011a); Deng (1995); Thomas (2015); and Young (2003:423), among others. More so, government documents, IGAD mediation reports, civil society reports, accredited journals, and credible media sources were used to augment the literature that covers the civil conflict and peace process of South Sudan before and after 2005.

Limitations: External factors limiting this research include limited access to the broader population of peace actors in the selected conflict region. Not all NGOs and state representatives in the conflict region who were initially selected were willing to participate in an academic study, especially many international organisations. Also, some identified respondents and communities preferred to be off the record, meaning that the researcher used the information given to direct the research but could not quote them.

Another external factor was the constraints on travelling within the region. Due to the ongoing conflict in many parts of the country, including Juba, there was limited accessibility – particularly in the areas outside Juba. This challenge has implications for theory, policy and practice, as well as methodology, and suggests further areas for research (see chapter seven).

Several internal factors limited to the current study. The research is limited to the specific context of South Sudan. One case study in this research may limit the generalisability of the findings to other conflicts, other countries, and other people. The standard baseline of marginalisation of knowledge, practice and the general global South provides some relatability. Beyond this shared experience, it is not the aim of this thesis to perpetuate an understanding of general experience while having a minor understanding of countries in their unique contexts. In addition, most of the participants, especially from different organisations, were purposefully chosen. The responses may have been representative of the collected perceptions of the participants alone. This selection may limit generalisability.

1.6. Thesis structure

This thesis is organised into eight chapters.

This first chapter introduced and contextualised the research question to give a clear outline of the scope and focus of the research. Definitions of the key concepts and the need for a broader definition of peacebuilding were also provided.

Chapter two provides an argument of how power-knowledge dynamics contribute to the dominance of liberal peace approaches in scholarship and practice. A focus on a variety of critical theory assumptions thus provides a device for reflection and critique, enabling us to unearth that which is naturalised. It calls for an expansion of the conceptualization of peacebuilding towards decentralization in theorization.

A deeper understanding of the lens of the local turn peacebuilding approaches is provided in chapter three. The chapter provides a discussion on the dimensions of the "local turn" as a neo-trusteeship and a means for understanding subaltern critiques of modern peacebuilding. It also provides a discussion on various bottom-up narratives within the local turn and questions the local and assumptions within it, problematising the formation of the local but not its importance. The chapter then provides an African perspective through various African discourses of the "local turn".

The methodology chapter outlines the choice of theories, qualitative design, and case study approach within a phenomenological design. The researcher also details the fieldwork was undertaken in Kenya and South Sudan, as well as data collection and analysis methods.

The fifth chapter provides a brief background to South Sudan's political development. The chapter focuses on the analysis of top-down peace processes and evaluating how the strategies were executed and their level of local involvement. Here three peace negotiations (Addis Ababa, CPA and the ARCSS) and the national dialogues in South Sudan are analysed.

Chapter six provides an analysis of the role of local actors and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan. This is done in two parts, first, an overview of the role of different local actors in South Sudan, second, traditional authorities and lastly, the churches or religious groups, which constitute the largest and most influential local group. In the second part, the chapter demonstrates a major strategy

employed in South Sudan. Through the Wunlit conference, the chapter describes the people-to-people dialogue, which was successfully run through a bottom-up approach.

Chapter 7 deals with the operationalisation of the middle-level organisations within the dynamic environment where the internal and the external organisation mutually exist and affect and are affected by each other. The chapter discusses how these different local efforts interact with international peacebuilding programmes. It also provides a discussion on the challenge for local, national, and international peacebuilders in South Sudan towards effectively narrowing the gap between their efforts to improve operations.

In the concluding chapter, final comments are made, and conclusions are drawn. A summary of each chapter is offered together with a discussion of key findings are also provided. Lastly, the potential and real implications for practice and policy recommendations will be made regarding possible future research.

CHAPTER TWO: BEYOND DOMINANT PARADIGMS AND FRAMINGS OF PEACEBUILDING KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

The peacebuilding movement is so expansive that most scholars now prefer to create a distinction between the peace industry and the academy. This research inquiry moves beyond this distinction. In so doing, the research brings nuance to the multiple layers and the inherent politics that defines peacebuilding in contemporary South Sudan. Through the analysis of the mainstream and the critical theoretical frameworks, this chapter provides an opportunity to understand peacebuilding initiatives not as mere benevolence but as politics and as a product of power.

Given that most post-conflict societies have experienced some level of international intervention, an epistemological understanding of both the internal and external actors is needed. This chapter assesses and interrogates some of the relevant issues that underlie contemporary peacebuilding conceptualisation and theorisation that translates into policy and practices. Through this, the epistemological foundations that form different thinking and ideas around peace and peacebuilding are challenged. Given the conceptualisation of peace and peacebuilding as explained in chapter 1, chapter 2's inquiry is interested in the analysis of theoretical formations of ideas that inform peacebuilding academy and practice and how this representation affects peacebuilding understanding and practice. It is also interested in understanding the epistemological foundations that affect the different level of actors and the strategies used.

This chapter will make two contributions. First, it seeks to understand how representations of contemporary peacebuilding are understood and practised. Second, in line with the main question that seeks to understand the role of the 'local turn' and its interplay with contemporary peace processes, the chapter will present a discussion on the resistance to liberal peace and the post-liberal peacebuilding debate. This is done by unpacking the interplay between the "global" and the "local" in peacebuilding that is also unpacked in the interplay of power and knowledge (section 2.1.1.) and the dominance of the liberal democratic framework that advises contemporary peacebuilding practices (see section 2.1.2.). This chapter will be able to show friction between ideas that also contribute to relocalisation and delocalisation of peacebuilding strategies as a politic that exposes asymmetrical power relations.

The chapter will present two main sections. The first, the chapter explores the theoretical framings that affect contemporary peacebuilding; this will be covered in section 2.2. In this section, the following is discussed: The dominance of theory: revealing the politics within peacebuilding, and the construction of perspectives through power dynamics (why and how power constructs exist, and the importance of recognising it); liberal democratic frameworks that dominate peacebuilding as well as its impacts.

In the second section, the shifting paradigms and transformational ethos are discussed. The chapter will demonstrate that current patterns and trends in peacebuilding do not call for a minimalist approach, for a complete comprehension of the contemporary processes and practices will not be achieved by relying only on one theory or mainstream theoretical understanding alone, nor by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, their complex, multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theoretical approach that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions. This level of theoretical consideration thus makes us aware of the "hidden" prejudices and biases. This methodology will provide a device for reflection and critique, which will enable us to unearth that which is naturalised (Heywood, 2014:518). This provides ground for being critical and not taking terms, concepts and the resulting actions as a given.

The theoretical and conceptual frameworks that are used as a guideline in this chapter and thesis are provided in the form of a discussion of the critical debates (that borrow from critical, postcolonial and decolonial theory, and constructivist theories) on the construction of and source of knowledge (epistemology). Throughout the analysis, various questions that provide a foundation to the inquiry will be brought forward, thus providing a discussion on the intricacies of the relationship between "whose theory" and the construction of knowledge.

Chetail & Jütersonke (2014) argue that if the dominating field in political sciences and international relations has predominance in peacebuilding, there is the risk of perpetuating a one-sided debate on institutional dynamics of peacebuilding. More critical reflections on the role of such a hegemonic perspective and discourse, as well on the potential for transformative and emancipatory potential of peacebuilding activities are, therefore, a necessity and definitely a welcome addition. The chapter thus debunks the normalisation of "given norms" in peacebuilding. To situate the main inquiry on the intersection of both the local and the international, the research posits a pluralist methodology, what Mignolo (2007) terms pluriversality which draws attention to the possibility of multiple and parallel existences of realities and the non-linear reality of conflict and post-conflict situations.

2.2. Exclusionary theoretical framings of peacebuilding

In order to understand how contemporary peacebuilding is understood and practised, this section focuses on the nature of theories that are used in peacebuilding and their implications. Recent research has focused on understanding how norms "travel" to and travel within societies emerging from violent conflict (Belloni & Arstad, 2012). This impacts the type of relationship between actors and how different peace actors execute and implement most of their peacebuilding projects. As stated in the previous chapter, and what will be argued in this section, in much of the norm diffusion and mainstream peacebuilding literature, there appears to be an inherent normative bias towards liberal global norms and an assumption that the adoption of these norms represents positive progress (Tannenwald, 2007; Paris, 2004, 2010).

When one references to "global" in global norms, it is often a prefix for universal moral frameworks and cosmopolitan awareness, which also speaks to the ability to move across borders (Rossi, 2007). In contrast, "local" more often refer to particularities, contextuality, and lack of mobility. When it comes to peacebuilding, especially in conflict and post-conflict societies, "global" norms of liberal democratic peace are used to describe the internationally mediated peace agreements and the externally led process who fund the process of peacebuilding. Björkdahl and Gusic (2015) make an observation that the perception of the "universality" of global norms means that "norms rooted in other types of social entities — regional, national, and sub-national groups" — can be ignored and marginalised (Legro, 1997). Leading to the rare recognition of the dynamic in the intersection between the international and local in norms and practices of peace and democracy that are derived outside the global North/Western democracies. They are thus, absorbed and sidelined by the international peacebuilding discourse

That "peacebuilding" is now endorsed as a "norm" is not in doubt, nor is its hegemonic status in the discourses that inform its various normative underpinnings and legitimisation of particular types of intervention (Jabri, 2013). Jabri argues that this hegemon has been institutionalised in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and NATO. These organisations do not only possess specialist offices dedicated to "peacebuilding operations", but rather view their primary role in responding to conflicts in terms of peacebuilding. The question becomes: How is peacebuilding practice captured within the purview of today's world? As the next sections will show, what remains somewhat underappreciated are the profound consequences of the epistemological positions of most actors in peacebuilding dominated by the powerful. These epistemological positions, Jabri (2013:4) contends, have consequences that are not only manifested in the international space but also in the agency of those involved in local contexts of conflict.

Mainstream theories, therefore, have been utilised as an exclusionary device, whether intentional or consequential, that prioritises certain issues to the detriment of other perspectives. As a result, questions are raised in the era and space of the post-positivist movement (in which this thesis is anchored) that emphasises the existence of multiple realities and contexts. Are the intellectual and social structures of the discipline of IR equally considered perspectives on these different realities? This question enables us to reflect upon the tensions within the discipline and propels us to study its internal structure that most often provides scholars with the impetus to create accounts that explain these challenges. It is exactly here that this thesis seeks to contribute by highlighting that peacebuilding creation is not an objective endeavour that serves the interests of all. Thus, concepts, perspectives, paradigms, and theories do not emerge from a vacuum. This led Acharya (2004:239) to question norm diffusion in world politics, arguing that they are not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also which and whose ideas matter. Throughout the chapter, ideals on power relations that permeate the process of creating knowledge and its language highlight the profound implications it has on how we theorise about the

"real world" and its impact on progress with freedom (although a problematic concept) through emancipation as both a means and an end.

While the contemporary approaches to peacebuilding treat the local (and the national, global, and so forth) as ontologically given categories, this view has increasingly become untenable in light of constructivist approaches (Howitt, 2003). They suggest that the neat ontological oppositions between, on one hand, the local, and on the other the global or international, are incorrect and should be discarded in favour of intricate perspectives, and fluidity of scale in the discourse and understanding of their epistemological and ontological dimensions (Howitt, 2003 ; Marston, 2000; Delaney & Leitner, 1997). Importantly, there needs to be a redefinition of representation: "It is always for somebody and not for everybody" (Cox, 1998:44). These contributions emphasise on the need to explain not only how scales come into being, but their uses as tools in a "politics of scale", in which scale itself is a "political stake" Rather than understanding political realities using scale as an analytical framework (Cox, 1998:43), and how this can lead to a reality pf scaling where some actors are empowered at the expense of others (Marston, 2000; Moore, 2008). Scales can, therefore, be understood as "ontologically real ordering devices", as ontologies constructed with epistemic underpinnings, and characterised by a duality of use and production. They are, "epistemological infrastructures for action, produced textually and materially and help actors to order the world around them" (Simons et al., 2014).

2.1.1. Exclusion through power-knowledge formations

The concept of power and knowledge has been explored by many authors. This has been done by drawing on the work of Foucault (Hodgson & Standish, 2009). According to Foucault, knowledge is not objective nor value-free (1974; 1982; 1984). Instead, Foucault argues that knowledge is inextricably linked to power (Cheek, 2000). Often people are confronted with different frames of thinking, writing, and speaking about aspects of reality. The frames carry different weight and authority. Weedon (1997) explains that frameworks that order reality in a certain way offer both a possibility and a restraint on the production of knowledge. Cheek (2000) adds that they allow specific ways of thinking and ideas while at the same time they exclude others. Weedon, therefore, argues the frame that will carry much weight as a result of the effects of power relations (Cheek, 2000; Weedon, 1997). These dominant frameworks form sets of statements that everyone (or most people) measure their lives within a given society and that define people's identities and realities (Gavey, 1989). This dominant knowledge is transmitted trough ideology as, and it is embedded institutionally in the ways of language, and representing as Hodgson and Standish (2009) have argued. Van Dijk (2004) advances the argument that power and the powerful not only limit the freedoms of actions but also influences their minds through various recourses or through persuasion or manipulation. This crucial link between knowledge and power is demonstrated through his argument that

> "Managing the minds of others is essentially a function of text and talk" (2004:302).

The understanding of peacebuilding is still under contestation. However, the hegemony that is found in peacebuilding possesses in our international institutions is a reflection of the realm of knowledge production. Currently, peacebuilding forms a major "scientific research programme" (Lakatosian term) (Jabri, 2012:4). It has what Foucault (1997) terms "discursive formation" that reveals a level of agreement as to what the concept means and what practices it refers to. This "discursive formation" highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between knowledge production and relations of domination, specifically "tactics and strategies of power" (Foucault, 1997). Such consensus is perhaps surprising, given that the concept of peacebuilding is not value-free and it comes heavy with meaning and value. It is clear what is not peacebuilding, the distinguishing feature being its distinction from peacekeeping or conflict resolution (Fetherston, 2000). Peacebuilding thus has formations of signifier of what it is and what it is not (mostly understood by what it is not). The genealogy of the concept affirms once again that it results in profound values on the understanding of agency in relation to peacebuilding.

Various disciplines and theoretical underpinnings have been known to provide immense guidance on how the world is viewed and how it can be shaped. However, while theories help to simplify the world, they have also been known to generate conformity and epistemological scepticism and thus fail to explain events that do not fall within its boundaries (Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994: 251). Since peace is a long road, the theoretical underpinnings of mainstream theoretical frameworks (non-critical theories)[8] are missing strong foundational material for sustainable peace such as peacebuilding enterprises focused on grassroots-based micro-conflicts, and inter-community feuding within and between states are largely discountenanced, while little or no efforts are made to imagine and pursue peacebuilding outside the neoliberal framework (Alimba, 2013; Omeje, 2015).

There have been arguments made for the mainstream domination of international relations, which has resulted in the universalisation of a particular reality. Such dominance of IR theory embodies the subjectivity of our knowledge serving the interests of the dominant to the detriment of the subservient. This is reflected in the creation of the dichotomy between mainstream (considered as core) and alternative or critical theories (considered as peripheral) which challenge the Western-centric, male-dominated nature of the discipline and lament the knowledge structure that accrues benefits (Eldridge, 1971). It is, therefore, important to reflect on the impact and purpose of such theories.

Methodologically, the social world is complexly stratified, with different developing courses that arise in precise historical contexts. One of the assumptions carried by mainstream theories "is that there exists a social reality that is structured and relatively enduring over time and is, for this reason, open to scientific investigation. However, what produces social phenomena are underlying structures and causes

[8] Here, mainstream (social) theories represent the theories (including realism, liberalism, marxism, constructivism, and so forth, that offer a very linear explanation to knowledge production and society formations and structures oriented only to understanding or explaining it. Critical theory offer a reflective assessment and critique by applying knowledge from the social sciences and oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole.

that are irreducible to the conceptions that social agents might have of them" (Dean, Joseph, Roberts and Wight, 2006:8-9). This view, which is quite different from a positivist approach that reduces the world to our empirical observation of purportedly expected events.

In addition to this, mainstream branches of analytic philosophy see meaning as an independent semantic entity that can be defined through objective procedures of truth-value analysis in sentences. In critical scholarship, however, Hodgson and Standish (2009) argue that the ontological position of the nature of reality is that no single or universal reality exists, thus grand narratives and universal explanations of phenomena and reality are not only critiqued but also rejected. The emphasis on the constructed nature of reality through language and power implies that there exists more than one reality. Hence, there is an emphasis on plurality and tolerance for difference.

Critical scholarship questions and problematises the assumption that it is possible to step out of the world and observe it in a "God-like detached" manner. It also problematises the premise that these theories are used for naturalising occurrences. Post-structuralism claims that there is no point outside the world that one can observe. Edkins (2007) argues,

> "All observations and systems of natural, as well as social theories, are part of the world they are trying to observe."

Therefore, there is no outside world where one can make a free objective observation and make judgements free from values: thus, processes and practices that produce entities are not distinct from each other in the first place (Edkins, 2007:89). The "subject" and the "world" are not separable as they are produced together through social, cultural, and political processes. Additionally, the subject is not born into the world; the subject produces the world. Hence, they are mutually constitutive (Edkins, 2007:91). Thus, ideas on how peacebuilding discourses or practices are constructed are not value-free. Peace and peacebuilding discourses presuppose that reality is constituted through language: e.g. state-building and nation-building which promotes the value of the state as an actor (this exposes the linguistic structures of Peacebuilding).

In the Westphalian model of international politics, threats to international peace and security only come from powerful, aggressive states. However, the events of 9/11 showed that civil wars, state failure, and non-state networks pose enormous security concerns (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). Studies in conflict and instability have focused on state weakness as a key factor in the onset of violent conflict (Nafziger, Stewart & Väyrynen, R., 2000:44). As a result, a substantial amount of resources from powerful nations like the USA have been involved in many civil wars in many perceived as weak in order to contain, prevent, and resolve the civil war. Although the source of civil war and state failure is debatable, it is nevertheless associated with problems related to peace and security. Francis Fukuyama suggests that "weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order" (2004:92). Robert Rotberg concurs by saying that state-building has "become one of the critical

all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorised time" (2004:42). From this viewpoint, contemporary peacebuilding involves rebuilding state institutions in failed or conflicted states, restoring the rule of law, liberalising the economy, carrying out security sector reforms, and holding democratic elections. This practice has greatly influenced the work of mainstream peacebuilding theorists.

Branch (2007) elaborates that this prescription to international legal standards presumes that (i) international law is absolute, (ii) justice is best realised by conducting criminal prosecutions and that (iii) liberal-leaning initiatives for justice are best suited to transform a conflict-stricken society towards a democratic dispensation. When such Western perspectives are applied to peacebuilding and transitional justice processes in Africa, they give way to the spread of liberal fundamentalism.

The aspect of power asymmetry is identified in the frictional encounters that appear between the post-conflict societies and peacebuilding industry. These encounters have unveiled the unequal power relationship with the local subordinates and international domination in most spheres of peacebuilding. Both peacebuilding and norm diffusion scholarship provide analyses of the agency with a bias towards external agents' role and influence, that is, international peacebuilders acting as "teachers"of peaceful conflict resolution, and the rule of law (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The war-torn society, which is frequently ignored in the literature, is the "recipient" of norms. This results in view of such a society as tabula rasa with a resultant downplayed agency of local actors. If the recipients are involved and brought into the analysis, often the political elite is in focus. Checkel (1999) argues that through various "learning" processes, there is eventual socialisation of the local elite into accepting the new normative package through the adoption of these norms, gain legitimacy from the international community.

A major aspect of the conceptual and empirical focus of peacebuilding in Africa is the predominance of liberal peace philosophy. Western triumphalism in the Cold War rivalry between the Eastern and Western ideological blocs has since the 1990s rekindled the neo-Kantian liberal democratic peace debate (see section 2.2.2.), which in a nutshell postulates that liberal democracy promotes an enduring peace (Zambakari, 2016:1).

The critical perspective highlights the construction and power play that influences occurrences in international politics. Post-structuralism critiques and displaces the logic of the discipline of IR found in the hegemony of realism and state-centrism. Gavey (1989) elaborates that dominant discourses are those sets of statements by which everyone measures their lives, identities, and realities within a given society. The view of reality exposed to knowledge production is not value-free. According to Foucault,

> "There is general consistency between modes of interpretation and operations of power" (Foucault, 1977:27).
>
> Therefore "power and knowledge are mutually supportive, and they imply one another" (Burchill et al., 2009:184).

Given the relation of power and knowledge, Mamdani (2015) brings the notion of coloniality of power. Here, he argues that for the contemporary African society, the colonial era was the time when the capitalist system that was introduced to African society, forming the framework that is used in many policies today (Mamdani, 2015). It is established through a network of relations of exploitation, domination, and control of the means of production in ways that dehumanises and engenders socio-economic disparities and prejudice against some members of society (Quijano, 2007; Mamdani, 1996). This has led Madlingozi (2015) to point out that transposing practices of democracy valued by Global North actors through peace processes in their former colonies have pacified Global South communities. This has resulted in the re-capturing of Africans into the global matrix of coloniality[9]. Sharp (2014:179) regards this transfer of Western norms, values, and practices for peace through governance structures as the modern-day mission civilisatrice. The resulting peace dispensation reinforces the hierarchies within the global political society, undermines the values and customs of the affected communities and perpetuates the degradation of humanity (Madlingozi, 2015). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) finds that, due to continued dependence on colonial administrators, post-colonial states have not been able to offset the asymmetric global power structure, which enables actors in the Global North to subvert those in the Global South.

The incomplete transition of Africa from colonial to postcolonial, resulting in the persistence of neo-colonial conditions or what Ndlovu-Gatsheni terms "neo-colonised postcolonial" conditions, must be born in mind when analysing efforts at peacebuilding in Africa. This is where peace and development remain elusive for ordinary Africans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:3).

Nabudere (2011) contends that, for a process of decolonising knowledge, there needs to be a shift from a Western-centred value-system to a non-Western perspective, which embraces local understandings. In agreement, Harris' (2001:336) critiques suggest that the analyses provided within linear, modernist frameworks are social and political constructs, as well as representations whose only use is as units to be deconstructed (Harris, 2001:336). Non-linear approaches to peacebuilding analyse scientific and positivist methodologies in the way in which these deal with the sheer quantity of information provided by complex systems by grouping, generalising, and offering "correct" methods to make sense of the relations between elements (see section 2.3.2).

2.1.2. Contemporary peacebuilding practice: Liberal peacebuilding

Contemporary peacebuilding has frequently been referred to as liberal peacebuilding (as discussed above, see section 2.2.1), with the underlying theoretical assumption of liberal theory (Newman, 2009: 11). All peacebuilding practice is built upon theory, regardless of whether or not practitioners articulate their theories. Most of these assumptions are heuristic:

[9] Coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emanate from the colonial era, which continue to preserve the colonial culture, power relations and production of knowledge beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations as described by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013).

> "if (we do something), then (something will happen), because (explanation why this will happen)" (Stein & Valters, 2012).

To foster our understanding of the contemporary articulation of liberal peace approach to peacebuilding, Michael Doyle (2005) talks about the "three pillars of the Liberal Peace" in his article. The three pillars are a republican representation of human rights and transnational interdependence. According to Doyle, the principles of a republican representation are what we need to achieve in order to secure peace internationally, adhere to human rights and an understanding of transnational interdependence (bonds of interdependence). Preoccupation with the liberal peace has come about through the processes of internationalisation. For instance, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group, Group of Twenty (G20), Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), North-American Trade Organisation (NATO) and so forth. Throughout the world today, you can hardly find a place where there are no alliances with other states (Hove, 2015).

Post-Cold War era post-conflict intervention and peacebuilding can be better understood as a reflection of the disillusionment of classical liberal assumptions. This intervention and peacebuilding focused on the autonomous subject but framed in terms of a formal liberal institution framework of state sovereignty, law, democracy, markets, human rights, and democracy (Olivier, Neethling & Mokoena, 2011). The approach focused on a type of security and violence that aimed to prevent and highlight war and military conflicts among States. It follows suit that at its inception in the 1950s, peace studies focused primarily on responses to direct violence and warfare, which usually came in the form of peace treaties and accords. The main idea here is that the liberal (which is economical and political tenets) are combined and conflated with peace, conflict resolution, and social reconstruction in societies. The basic notion of liberal peacebuilding is based on ideas and values promoting liberalisation in both the economic (marketisation) and political (democratisation) realm (Belloni, 2012:22). The belief is that, in order to transform, war-torn societies should be rebuilt through strategies. Through this theory, peacebuilding and democratisation (political) and liberal economy are considered processes that reinforce each other. However, as Paris (2010) argues, these normative aspects of the democratic peace proposition have been institutionalised to provide an apparent and logical reason for the global spread of democracy, which will result in greater international peace (Paris, 2010).

The argument about liberal peace links to what is called the democratic peace argument. Although there is an overlap between the liberal peace argument and the democratic peace argument, there is also a difference. Liberal peace argument is much broader that refers to the spread of liberal values and institutions. The democratic peace argument, on the other hand, is much more specific, and empirically argues that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states; hence the focus on democratisation (Hove, 2015). This overlap of liberalisation both in the economic (marketisation) and

political (democratisation) realm referred to by Belloni (2012:22) leads to a neo-Kantian term that Zambakari (2017:1) describes as "liberal democratic peace" (initially mentioned in section 2.2.1). This term assumes that liberal democracy encourages an enduring peace based on accountable government, as well as a propensity towards shared libertarian values (political and economic) both within and among states and institutions (Zambakari, 2017:1).

It is within this framework that concepts such as peacebuilding are currently explored and defined (Olivier, 2013). Tellidis (2012) argues that, although there is an influx of literature regarding a post-liberal peace, we are still in a period in which our ideas about peacebuilding are dominated by liberal peace ideology.

This contributes to the spread of the principles of liberalism because most of these regional associations are led by liberal countries or promoted by liberal international organisations. Therefore, western liberal values have spread throughout the world. What is observed in the contemporary environment is, to some extent a polarisation of liberalisation to the extent that some equate this to a process of universalisation: a prediction made by Francis Fukuyama (2004). That is, while there are parts of the world going through this process of liberalisation, and other parts of the world that are resisting it (Hove, 2015).

Therefore, the liberal peace paradigm has served as the basis for internationally assisted peacebuilding, where the focus is almost exclusively on the relationship between peacebuilders (mostly international) and the central government (Lemay-Hébert, 2013:242). The majority of these have come in the form of nation-building and state-building. The focus of this type of peacebuilding is in favour of the state, elite bureaucratic, political, and business classes. Liberal peacebuilding works with a standardised blueprint, adopted in many operations. Its most important actors consist of civil servants, politicians, open civil society, free media, police and judges, while the most marginalised – the individual, community, kinship, agency, and context – have been subsumed. At best, Richmond (2010:667) argues that they are only recognised rhetorically. Thus, operations "do not solely aim at managing conflicts in conflict-affected states, but they also seek to build peace based on liberal democracy and market economics, which is a contested approach" (Newman et al., 2009:3-4; 7). It entails of liberal values like the rule of law, meritocracy, human rights, and transparency (Belloni & Jarstad, 2012:3).

The liberal paradigm resulted from an overabundance of UN-led peacebuilding operations in the 1990s. The idea was to promote peace through the "top-down encouragement of political and economic liberalisation, including democratisation, institutional reform, good governance, human rights, development, and free-market reform" (Richmond, 2009a:559; Paris, 2010:34; Krause & Jütersonke, 2005:454). However, this role has moved away from a state level, and there has been an increase of non-state actors assuming this role. Khadiagala (2012) has argued that aid agencies that were originally involved in humanitarian work, such as International Alert, Oxfam, and Doctors Without Borders, initially resisted efforts to integrate peacebuilding into post-conflict assistance. They often perceived the

dangers of injecting political objectives into their strictly "neutral" and apolitical sectoral work in a post-conflict context (Menkhaus, 2004:4). This scepticism has gradually given way to the general acknowledgement that the provision of security with a strong emphasis of building and rebuilding public institutions as a key to sustainable peace is, therefore, an essential condition of peacebuilding (Dulic, 2007). Hence, successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peacebuilding mission (Khadiagahala, 2012:108).

Peacebuilding in this sense is closely linked to liberal state-building, as peacebuilding measures always imply the reordering of politics and the reallocation of power, with the state and its institutions playing a central role (Manning 2003:28). This leads Olonisakin and Muteru (2014) to conclude that the notion of liberal peace has become a standardised blueprint that the international community adheres to and applies to all operations in their efforts to bring peace to war-affected societies. The most important group of actors consists of civil servants, politicians, open civil societies, free media, police and judges.

The implementation of Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* created a fertile ground for the evolution of the ideas behind liberal peace (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015:826). Boutros-Ghali's initial conceptualisation of peacebuilding in *Agenda for Peace* reflected a sequential approach, and at the same time served to build a consensus around the concept of "liberal peace". The interrelated but sequentially presented notions of post-conflict peacebuilding implied in *Agenda for Peace* have remained insufficient for a response to stabilise peace in a conflict- and war-affected societies. Certainly, this would entail a multi-level effort to build governance from local to international levels through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:25).

The propensity to regard peacebuilding as a technical process without local agency, in combination with an inclination to benefit norm senders in norm diffusion, magnifies the perception of passive local recipients of global norms lacking agency (Chandler, 2004). Thus, internationally sponsored peace is a political process (Cousens & Kumars, 2001). Critical scholars thus question the norm transfer through peacebuilding processes and the capacity and capability of the exportation of the liberal democratic peace by international actors and instead look to local agency and efforts to shape a peace of their own making.

It is argued that peace efforts, which are mostly carried out by international actors such as the UN, EU, and various international non-Governmental organisations, continue for the most part to adhere to the notion of a liberal peace by promoting democratisation, marketisation, and human rights, supposedly through a coherent and participatory approach (Paris, 2004:5-6). This is what Gillard (2010) describes as liberal discursive framings of the non-Western "victim" or "abusers" on one hand and international "external judges" or Western "saviours" on the other hand. He contends that these framings have arguably been replaced by a more critical and variant view of human security that is more internally oriented and with a strong emphasis upon ownership, emancipation, and empowerment (Gaillard,

2010:218). The new generation of peacebuilding efforts, despite its good intentions, has been criticised for shortcomings in implementing its liberal goals, for "ignoring the societal and human consequences on the ground, and for being a top-down, Western, external intervention" (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015:827).

In practice, peacebuilding has now turned into a technocratic set of projects that have the set aim of strengthening the government at the cost of state-society relations, responsiveness or accountability, thus often failing "to build either an effective state or sustainable peace" (Mac Ginty, 2012). However, many, if not most, practical peacebuilding activities occur at the sub-national or even local community level. Given the epistemological foundations of the various actors, there is an intrinsic tension and a fundamental contradiction, between achieving peace and democratising the state. If the focus is on liberal projections and democratising the state, Campbell and Peterson (2013:343) argue that international state-building threatens to eclipse efforts to build peace.

In addition, Spivak (1988) has argued that there are limits of discourse; he is always aware that "theory" may have limited value to what he refers to as the subaltern[10]. Maggio (2007) agrees and contends that there are limits to the ability of Western discourse, even postcolonial discourse, to interact with disparate cultures.

This offers an alternative view that shifts away from the discourse of intervention as a response and emphasises prevention and empowerment through a bottom-up process (Mac Ginty, 2010). Recently, there has been an increasing local dimension, with an increase in participation of local actors as a consequence of loss of confidence by major actors behind international peace-support actors (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013:763). The dominance and extent of liberal ideas influence in contemporary peace and interventions are not in doubt. Still, there remains a greater risk of overestimating the power and coherence of liberal peace in this era where local actors can have considerable agency (Mac Ginty, 2010:395). With the increasing interest in the role that the locals play in determining and improving the relations within communities, we are beginning to witness a growing focus on the impact of cultural beliefs and practices in peacebuilding (Murithi, 2006:26). In the early 2000s, as a response to the emerging critique of contemporary and traditional peacebuilding operations, a new generation of international peace operations emerged (United Nations. 1998). The then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, used an approach that emphasised the importance of building local capacity for conflict resolution (United Nations, 2001).

2.3. Resistance, post-liberal peace debates and expansive approaches

According to Paris (1997:56), "peacebuilding is in fact, an experiment in social engineering that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states

[10] Here, Spivak explains that the subaltern is a military term which means 'of lower rank'. In 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' she uses this to describe groups which were suppressed by the powerful. Subaltern groups include women, tribal people, Third World people, the Orient and so forth.

to control civil conflict" meaning pacification via political and economic liberalisation. Paris' assertions contribute to the on-going debate on the so-called "liberal peace". The liberal peacebuilding framework has strongly shaped peacebuilding strategies and interventions over the past few decades (Herbert, 2013). Thus, the framework is often defined as a formulaic synthesis of "Western" values, including good governance, the rule of law, human rights, and open market systems (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013:491).

As seen in the discussion on theory and its exclusionary consequence in section 2.1.1, Paris (1997:637), has discussed how liberal peacebuilding practices "resemble the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to 'civilise' the dependent populations and territories". These critiques do not come as a surprise. Their argument is amid failures and inaction, internal domestic politics, the failure of Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia (Howard, 2008), dynamism of wars that were accompanied by a recurrent lack of the political will within the international and the UN's peace intervention toolbox (of peacekeeping, peacemaking, diplomacy, and peacebuilding strategies) which are ill-equipped for managing intrastate conflicts (Miall, 2016). The international community was faced with a different challenge of violence that took an internal direction.

In the wake of these failures, the underlying assumptions of the liberal peacebuilding framework faced criticism, and the nature of its ever-increasing occurrence was increasingly questioned (Chandler, 2006; Duffield, 2001). The liberal framings of peacebuilding have come under considerable attack. There was a need to redefine peace.

There have been various criticisms on the empirical and normative views of liberal peacebuilding. This agenda has faced criticisms for attempting to reproduce hierarchies of power inherent in the structural constraints of neoliberal market relations, such as giving primacy to democratisation and marketisation as a way of managing post-conflict societies (Pugh, 2005; 2011; Pugh et al., 2008). These structural constraints aggravated the problems of neoliberal economic policies (Barbara, 2008; Cramer, 2006), particularly in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies where the same policies inevitably promoted conditions promoting conflict (Abrahamsen, 2000; Jacoby, 2007). Others argue that peacebuilding should be understood within the context of global governance and the inequalities and power relations. This argument leads to the conclusion that peacebuilding is an international political project for "normalised", stable and cooperative states, usually in the form of liberal democracies, this project as argued by Chandler (1999), Duffield (2001:11), Goetze & Guzina (2008:333-338) and Zanotti (2006), has been largely ineffective.

There is also a concern that liberal peacebuilding is a perpetuation interest of the liberal, neoliberal, or bio-political capitalism of the West. As a Radical critic of liberal peacebuilding and a Foucaultian scholar Mark Duffield (2001:11), argues that liberal peacebuilding is seemingly geared towards disciplining the poor instead of providing a transformative platform for their conditions (referred to as

the coloniser and the colonised above). Duffield further uses the Foucaultian conception of bio-politics, to argues that the liberal peacebuilding agenda endorses divisions between the developed and the developing world in the policies of containment espoused as sustainable development or community-based development. In support, Vivien Jabri (2010) agrees that liberal peacebuilding is not an articulation the peace project as such, rather it is a project of dispossession that tries to depoliticise all existing contextual understandings of selfhood.

In addition, human security theorists such as McRae & Hubert (2001) and Thomas (2001) have argued that liberal policies should be construed as power-based and political rather than as purely technical solutions. The main apprehension here is the assumptions about positivist and rationalist forms of Western knowledge rather than the assumptions about market relations or bio-political power. In support, Alex Bellamy (2004) shows concern over the problematic focus on the rebuilding of Westphalian state forms.

The local turn debate, however, brings in an interesting concern about the liberal assumptions of the political community in the liberal approach, as well as its shortcomings when it comes to recognising local identity and culture (Richmond, 2008). The ontological foundations of the state-centric approaches to peacebuilding have been argued to restrict peacebuilding's ability to account for various interests, actors, and processes by viewing the state as a single unit (Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2008:2). Donais uses a consumer metaphor: "International actors are both the producers and marketers of the liberal-democratic product (the only product available on the market), which local actors are expected to buy, and subsequently own" (this is norm diffusion as discussed chapter 1 and section 2.2).

This pitfall of current engagements with peacebuilding can also be understood from one of the central maxims of critical theory, namely that "theory is always for someone and some purpose" (Cox, 1981:128).

There seems to be a consensus among critics of liberal peace that contemporary liberal peacebuilding is an inadequate description of the policy frameworks that were devised and implemented since the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that this liberal peace maintains its dominance in current peacebuilding practise by states, regional organisations and NGOs.

Lucey and Kumalo (2018) argue that sustainable peace activities include "preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to the conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development" (UN News, 2017). Instead of this, Donais asks for an inside-out vision, where international actors should provide the space for sustainable peace to be locally produced and rooted. This resulted in the UN General Assembly and security council adopting parallel resolutions that emphasised the need to support national efforts to build an inclusive and people-centred vision of peace

in April 2016. This, he argues, may be possible if the liberal peace framework goes beyond "ownership as buy-in" and instead understands ownership as:

> "… the outcome of both negotiations and contestation, in which a range of actors, international and local alike, interact both competitively and collaboratively to define, refine, and shape understandings of what peacebuilding entails in terms of concrete outcomes" (Donais, 2012).

On a transformative level, there is an argument for the need to change. The focus is also on activities being conducted by international actors (Hellmüller, 2014; Donais, 2012:31). Pearce (1997:451) shows how external peacebuilding agencies tend to,

> "Focus the debate on their interventions (for instance, what they can do to articulate relief and development, or what they can do to prevent conflict and build peace), and much less on the dynamic of local capacities and how they can shape the prospects for peacebuilding."

International actors normally perceive such a range of actors and terrains as non-Western and non-liberal partners for liberal peacebuilding and state-building at the elite level and civil society. This goes to show that the local is not a static entity and that it instead is a social construction (of the powerful). Peace has been diverted away from the individual and community conditions of peace and organised around states and their territories, a close follow-up from a hegemonic liberal peace directed by a Western core of states and international organisations. This presents a dilemma in the conceptualisation of "the local" However, this aspect will be covered in chapter 3. Despite this, regardless of the actor or the strategy used, one aspect remains important: that epistemological underpinnings separate the two theoretical approaches in question in this thesis.

On the effectiveness of liberal peace, Paris (2010) argues that these efforts seem to have a hard time finding both effective and legitimate ways of promoting peace. The interveners are often forced to prioritise relief and short-term needs; this reduces the effectiveness of establishing institutions providing long-term solutions (Paris, 2007:4; 8). There has been minimal positive development towards the success in such models in the era of new challenges and cannot serve citizens' interests well in the end.

Cousens (2001:9) points out that the international has tended towards a more "deductive" peacebuilding approach, whereby peacebuilding activities are determined more by the capabilities of international actors than the needs of the country (Cousens, 2001:5-8). This has resulted in a blueprint or "cookie-cutter" approach, the recipe usually being that of "liberal peace" (Duffield, 2001:10-11; Paris, 2004:5).

Accordingly, the link between peacebuilding and democratisation, according to the democratic peace theory, are criticised in the academic world. Scholars have argued that there is a decline in ideological assumptions of the liberal peace theory as the main reason for why liberal peacebuilding approach struggles to attain sustainable peace (Hameiri, 2014:328), like Burnell, for instance, who claims that conflicts frequently emerge even under democracy's watch and that the sustaining of peace and

democracy at the same time is sometimes mutually exclusive, so the choice has to be made between the two (Burnell, 2006:21). Wielenga et al. (2015) point out that holding regular elections have become a form of constitutive power used to legitimise post-colonial states, but there is lack of evidence to support that election contribute to consolidating peace. In his writing in the 'Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace', Richmond (2010) brings attention to these framings. He argues that the focus has been diverted away from local contexts, communities, and agencies. Alternatives to liberal peace started to emerge with claims that local turn and hybrid peace could mean more stability (Wolff, 2015:279-281).

There has been a debate and a critical reflection on the critiques of peacebuilding, which have come under question for unjustifiably calling for an abandonment of liberal peacebuilding without providing a viable alternative (Paris, 2010:347-354, 362). While Paffenholz (2015:861) claims boldly that "the liberal model, in general, has lost its connection to the real world", Paris (2010) on the other hand, joins the scholars who rather calls for altering and improving liberal peace processes rather than completely removing them from the repertoire. He is supported by Öjendal (2015: 929) who also argues that "if the basic attributes of liberal peacebuilding have to be preserved, the main challenge is to alter the existing framework without moving beyond liberal values". This shows that in the current framework, the local factors like cultural and historical background are still left out of consideration (Öjendal, 2015:932).

While the aim of this research is not to reject the liberal peacebuilding model, it gives an argument that there is a missing piece to the puzzle. Hippler (2005:8) argues that local approaches to peacebuilding are one of the elements of peacebuilding that needs attention and investigation instead of being ignored. International attention, however, has come to see it as an end in itself. Perhaps this is as a result of an implicit assumption that liberalism will provide sufficient ideological unification to provide a sense of community. In the end, as various scholars have argued, peacebuilding needs to be a collaborative activity between the international community and local actors, in which the international community provide technical expertise, peacekeeping, and material support (Hippler, 2005: 7-8).

From this overview, it becomes clear that a gap exists, in both literature and practice, on how peacebuilders can practically incorporate the alternative of non-state centric views into their strategies that are necessary to move beyond a strictly institutional and state-centric approach to peacebuilding (Autesserre, 2011; Woodward, 2007). Through the thesis, a better understanding of the integration of the local strategies will build towards situating the local in contemporary peacebuilding and the interplay of the different approaches and peacebuilding actors.

Peacebuilding projects are more effective when designed and adapted to the socio-cultural, economic and political context and needs of the local people. There is no "one-size-fits-all" solution to African problems. These require analysis and understanding of complex indigenous African culture, values, norms, and traditions, even within a given African country (Murithi, 2006: 14). Murithi argues that African space is not monolithic. There is a multiplicity of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. It is

therefore impossible to generalise the extent to which these indigenes have or do not have progressive norms and knowledge that inform approaches to building peace. This turns the attention to the role culture plays in enabling people to resolve their disputes and to strengthen the social and political ties that bind them together through bottom-up strategies and traditional knowledge. Different approaches to sustainable peacebuilding have been argued about. In response to the prevailing policy of "liberal peace" in the 1990s, Paris (2004:7-8) posits a different model, that of "institutionalisation before liberalisation", to counteract the destabilising effects of democratisation and liberalisation. This has resulted in what is referred to as a state-building approach. Paris' advocation for a state-building approach cannot be seen as a drastic divergence from the liberal model for peace. He suggests that state institutions be built before consolidating democracy; however, this still reproduces a liberal democratic state.

In the analysis of peacebuilding, South Sudan provides a case that requires scrutiny. Since 2011, South Sudan has been consumed in multiple resource-, power-, and identity-based conflicts (Wassara & Al-Tayib, 2015). The failure of the GoSS and top-level regional and international actors to manage this has led scholars and practitioners to call for a special focus on bottom-up engagements that have in the past, and can in the future, result in positive efforts to achieve social cohesion and peaceful coexistence (Knopf, 2013). The emphasis here is that neglecting local realities poses severe implications for the prospects of cohesion and peace within the community. Between 2013 and 2015, at least eight peace deals have collapsed before implementation and there have been reports of clashes between the warring factions around the country even as the accords were being completed (The New York Times, 2015). Subsequent mediation fell into a cycle of ceasefires and power-sharing agreements (see chapter 6).

2.3.1. The shift of paradigm: The decentralisation debate

Mainstream peace thinking, which has dominated the subject for half a century, has been associated with the intellectual hegemony of theories like realism and liberalism. These traditional approaches to peacebuilding have been characterised by three elements: it has emphasised military threats, it has been status quo oriented, and it has centred on states. The epitome of this approach is seen in the liberal peace approach. The unease with mainstream peace thinking has expressed itself in a frequent call for a "broadening" or "updating" of the concept of peace. In practice, very little new thinking has taken place.

The need to broaden the concept of peace comes from two sources. To begin with, the problems with the narrow focus of liberal peacebuilding have become increasingly apparent. The second is the strengthening claim for inclusion on the peace agenda, for instance, the 2016 United Nations Security Council, UNSC Resolution 2282. Lastly, is the minimal success of international peacebuilding which has been explained through the pragmatic discourses of "liberal peace". Here it is assumed that Western "liberal" understandings and assumptions have influenced policymaking, leading to counterproductive results (as explained in section 2.2.2) (Tadjbakhsh, 2011).

Scholars like Lederach (2001) have argued that the greatest resource for achieving sustainable peace is rooted in communities and cultures (Maiese, 2003). While taking a holistic approach to peacebuilding, in which domestic actors at different societal levels as well as international actors are considered important, "citizen-based peacemaking", as he calls it, should also be recognised as a principal component in peacebuilding efforts (Lederach, 1997:94). In several studies, scholars like Bland (2007) claim that carefully designed and well-governed decentralisation can promote the "local turn" and can help achieve stability and peace by increasing legitimacy, accountability, inclusion, participation, and establishing stable sub-national arenas for citizens (Bland, 2007). However, this assumed success story of decentralisation does not come uncontested. Bracati (2006) claims that,

> "The conflict-mitigating potential of decentralisation is said to fail as a result of elite capture, low levels of administrative capacity and the inability to raise sufficient resources."

due to the need to look beyond national-level governance and see the conflict-mitigating potential of sub-national governments argument arose on the need to acknowledge that exclusion of local areas by the central state inhibits state legitimacy and that the post-conflict state is often too weak for efficient governance, arguments arose (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Due to the contested benefits of decentralisation, in a study, Siegle and O'Mahony found that decentralisation offers a high degree of legitimacy (Siegle & O'Mahony, 2010). Concepts such as local governance, local capacity, and local ownership became central in the now emerging peacebuilding discourse, as indicated by the increased number of references to the local in international peacebuilding policy documents (Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2013). Curle (1994), Rupesinghe (1999:81) and Fetherston (1998) argue that local actors are "the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders of peace" and ethnographer Nordstrom (1997) shows that local people and communities in unstable states use indigenous practices to handle post-conflict situations.

2.3.2. The shift of paradigm: Non-linearity and peacebuilding

The subject of the critique in this section is the universalist and linear frameworks of the liberal peace paradigm. These frameworks highlight the different categories of elements and factors to be included in any analysis of peacebuilding activities. They draw from a non-linearity and argue for an approach that not only champions peace but one that progressively aims for the emancipation of the society, thus basing the inquiry around key critical constructs of immanent critique and emancipation (Shields & Tajalli, 2006). Towards emancipation, Steinberg and Kincheloe (2010) argue that "those who seek emancipation attempt to gain the power to control their own lives in solidarity with a justice-oriented community".

Here, the critics attempt to expose what prevents individuals and groups from shaping the decisions that crucially affect their lives. This aligns to Antonio's (1981) definition of immanent critique as a way used to detect contradictions at a societal level, and it offers the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change.

The local turn in peacebuilding is endemically tied to non-linear approaches to peace and conflict studies. As such, it is necessary to contextualise it within the emergence of non-linear approaches to understand both its allure, its aims and objectives (Randazzo, 2017). This research articulates a form of theorising that does not claim to have access to universal answers but rather abandons truth claims by essentially shifting the focus of the approach to the question and the process of knowing rather than to the answer per se. This section of the research does not offer a new theory for peacebuilding but contributes to a critique hegemonic narrative. Later, an alternative is suggested (see chapter 3). Nonetheless, this exercise in critique is of value in that it establishes an approach that unsettles the foundational assumptions of any given paradigm, inviting the reader to question even the most "emancipatory" and seemingly benevolent paradigm. (Here this research can contribute on the same but maintaining an addition of the local. A perspective of the local is important). The assumption here is the importance given to local agency and inclusivity.

Indeed, many contemporary critical scholars have propagated the urge to employ non-linear approaches and call for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the methods employed to study the conflicts we try to resolve (Randazzo, 2017). Non-linear perspectives often refer to approaches in complex and system theories. One could look at John Paul Lederach's has done extensive work on the need to acknowledge the "web-like" relationships as an important factor within which conflicts take place (1997:78). Lederach's later work later elaborates on the web-like relationship by specifically advocating for the use of non-linear thinking in the analysis of conflicts and in the drafting of peacebuilding initiatives (2005).

More recently, these perspectives have been used by critics of peacebuilding to invite a deeper, less reductionist reflection on the complex realities of conflict territories on the ground. Thus, condemning previous paradigms that follow a linear causal methodology in the analysis of conflicts and draw solutions by pointing to some of their most notable fallacies. This is also because of the reductionist and generalising nature of approaches to conflict that merely seek to draw causal connections between actors, agendas, and actions. Randazzo, for instance, suggests that a linear, causal understanding of conflict brings forward limited solutions and options for action (Randazzo, 2017).

> "The notion that intervention A will lead to outcome B needs to be replaced by something more akin to intervention A may open up a space for action in this location, which might have an effect on people and relationships elsewhere, which may open up spaces for further action." (Bums, 2011:104)

Other scholars point to the inevitable tendency when employing linear-oriented solutions and methods to peacebuilding to display western assumptions regarding identities, race, and what would otherwise be culture-relative understandings of justice, peace, and conflict. This has been argued by the likes of Körppen (2013:86-93), and this perspective thus allows for pluralism of thought and introduces a culture to knowledge formations and thoughts. Boege suggests that culture-specific forms of knowledge may

be instrumental in proving that non-linear understandings, which exist and are important, are championed by local turn scholars (Randazzo, 2017).

Other perspectives focus on how linear approaches seem to "miss the point" often, suggesting that even research that is designed according to linear standards display severely limited understandings of the perspectives that permeate the issue of "success" and "failure" (Woodrow & Chigas, 2013: 210-211) when it tries to understand whether or not peace programmes are successful. The allure of employing a non-linear approach rests on some of the nonlinearity's most notable qualities (Randazzo, 2017).

To avoid simplistic cause and effect explanations, there needs to be a systemic process that focuses less on locating the origins of the "problem" or "conflict" towards avoidance of a generation of a cause-effect (Bemshausen & Bonacker, 2013: 24). This is because all socio-political and economic situations that shape conflict are complex. Coleman, Vallacher, Bartoli, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska (2013:42) argue that intractable conflicts are entrenched in a wide variety of mechanisms and is effectively decoupled from the perceived incompatibilities that launched it.

Furthermore, since it is suggested that linear approaches tend to rely on actor-based understandings of conflict, it has also been suggested that reflecting this contingent reality requires us to look beyond the "dualistic categories that many peacebuilding strategies are based on, such as inside/outside or global/local" (Körppen, 2013:90) (also discussed in section 1.2.1.1). The resulting analysis would take, as its object, a socio-political reality that is "constructed by self-organising and emerging networks of action and reaction" (Ibid.:90), and space whose main qualifying characteristic is its inherent, "messy" hybridity.

Non-linear approaches espouse the localisation imperative, often underlining the importance of placing local epistemologies and actors at the centre of new understandings of peace, particularly to detect the tendency to privilege local agency only when it is "in service of the liberal peace" (chapters 6) (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013:136)). First, non-linear approaches to peacebuilding have, in particular, challenged the orthodoxy and prevalence of the liberal peace model, particularly by outlining its reliance on causal mechanisms to understand conflicts and issue plans and projects. This is attributed to the modernist philosophy that underpins the liberal paradigm, with scholars tracing the roots of the liberal call for enlightenment and change to European rationalistic philosophy (Körppen, 2013:82). Second, the issue of liner understanding that non-linear critiques of liberal peacebuilding have brought forward is the normative framework that underpins the claims to universal solutions (Randazzo, 2017).

> "For liberal peace… producing 'lasting peace' therefore entails moving the state in question further towards this ideal through a variety of transformative measures. This is also seen as unquestioningly (wholeheartedly) possible; no state or society is too far beyond the pale to be engaged and transformed into this ideal, the only question being how this is to be done" (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013:136-137).

Körppen notes that

> "meaningful local ownership, social justice, and sustainable economic empowerment still do not belong to the guiding principles of many peace-building programmes" (2013:83).

This, the author suggests, limits local engagement and promotes the rhetoric of local ownership only to substantiate and legitimate interventions and their liberal values (Ibid.:83). De Coning suggests without exception, these approaches are highly sceptical of the possibility of drawing implementation plans for a different form of peacebuilding without falling into the trap of blueprints and maps that resemble earlier linear approaches, particularly when critiques only focus on altering the tools rather than the fundamental epistemological basis (De Coning, 2011). The importance of altering the fundamental epistemological basis is, therefore, the aim and importance of this chapter.

The emergence of methods that reject the simple causal connections endorsed by linear perspectives is not surprising within the theoretical context of contemporary critical IR. Several perspectives draw on postmodernist approaches, including post-structuralism and post-colonialism, to open up to the complexities and pluralities of the social and political characteristics of the post-conflict milieu. The scholarship engaged in this research is believed to be Western-born and Western-based. This is especially true for the debates, particularly those about the recent local turn. These are thus geographically limited and often UK-centric.

The Western nature of the prevailing scholarship adds to the importance of a focus on African methods and strategies as per the aim of this research. However, we shall see in chapter 3 that these ideas already existed and were practised in African countries but, as argued by Murithi (2006) only gained a voice through northern scholarship. Thus, this research makes a claim that, although "the local turn" scholarship was a northern invention, the practices existed before and it is an attempt by the northern scholarship to create a space for the southern practices through ideas such as localisation. In practice, localisation describes a complex process and outcome by which "norm-takers" build congruence between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalised in a region) and local beliefs and practices (Björkdahl, 2005). In fact, Mignolo (2007:452) develops the argument of pluriversality as a universal project in which he argues that the only thing universal is the micro-contexts within the different communities.

This leads to a key feature of the peacebuilding literature in Africa: the predominant focus on macro-level conflicts of mega-national and regional proportions. Many low-levelled conflicts in Africa are linked to issues such as land, cattle rustling, ethnicity and the age-old traditional economy of cattle raiding blood-feuding between the youth of various affected ethnic groups and communities (Omeje & Hepner, 2013). However, the significance of the micro-level communal conflict between grassroots communities is hardly acknowledged in the peacebuilding literature, yet these conflicts are not only destructive to large feuding communities but sometimes do feed into the discourses of national and

regional-level macro-conflicts (Omeje, 2018). Therefore, this helps us to answer the important question asked in section 2.3: "Will a better understanding of the integration of different actors at different levels, who use different strategies, illuminate a way to a sustainable peace?" (see chapter 7).

2.3.3. Transformative peacebuilding

Realist and liberal peace theories have been criticised for sharing an essentially negative conception of peace. Both consequently focus on the means to prevent and terminate violent conflict as the building blocks for peace. It is difficult to apply this strategy to conflict-prone and post-conflict societies because of the contextual difficulties inherent in such societies. A crucial development in later peace research has been the development of a positive approach to peace. Positive peace means much more than the absence of violence or war (Galtung, 1976).

Given the decentralising and non-linear argument of peacebuilding, one approach to peacebuilding that essentially focuses more on positive than negative peace is the transformative approach. The transformative peacebuilding approach is rooted in the conflict transformation theory, whose conceptual foundations can be found in Johan Galtung's theory of violence and peacebuilding (Galtung, 1969), and Edward Azar's work on analysis and management of protracted conflicts (Azar, 1991). It provides criticisms on most tenets of realist and liberal peacebuilding perspectives, especially on how they primarily prioritise means to both prevent and terminate violent conflict as the organising principles of peacebuilding. It also challenges the failure of the liberal and realist peacebuilding approaches to orient peacebuilding processes, initiatives, and activities towards the locals and the grassroots. Proponents of this approach argue that peacebuilding should be transformational and reflect the interests, identities and needs of local actors (Cejka & Bamat, 2003; Elnur, 2009; Mayo, 2003; Lederach, 1997). It must not be forced on others without their participation and consent.

The emergence and recurrence of violence in Somalia and Angola and the genocide in Rwanda provide a good demonstration on the limit of the externally-driven realist and liberal peacebuilding. In contrast, long-term processes of locally owned, bottom-up consultations led to relatively successful peacebuilding and reconciliation in Somaliland (Paffenholz, 2013:5). Transformative peace comprises of a broad range of peacebuilding dimensions including changes in the structural, personal, relational, and cultural aspects of conflict brought about over different time periods and affecting different system levels, or "tracks" (Diamond & MacDonald, 1996). This shows that the object of intention is the individual, as well as the community, society, and the state.

One of the main proponents of the transformative approach to peacebuilding is John Paul Lederach (1997) based on conflict transformation theory. He argues, that "peacebuilding is a long-term multi-track transformative contribution to social change, helping to create a just and sustainable peace beyond the narrow definition of a post-conflict period" (Lederach and Appleby, 2010). He argues that liberal peacebuilding is primarily preoccupied with the situation of stabilisation; it does not go beyond that to

talk about the engagement of the long term in bringing about societal transformation. In addition, the issues that you might want to engage in when talking about elites and peacebuilding are not necessarily the same issues that you talk about when engaging the grassroots.

Lederach divides the conflict societies into three tracks of actors and shows different approaches to peacebuilding that are required at various levels in the transformative approach (Table 2).

The Three Tracks of Actors in Transformative Peacebuilding	**Types of Actors**	**Approaches to Peacebuilding**
Track I	• Military • Political • Religious leaders with high visibility	• Focus on high-level negotiations • Emphasises cease-fire • Led by a highly visible, single mediator
Track II	• Leaders respected in sectors • Ethnic/religious leaders • Academics/intellectuals • Humanitarian leaders • NGOs	• Problem-solving workshops • Training in conflict resolution • Peace commissions • Insider-partial teams
Track III	• Local leaders • Leaders of indigenous NGCs • Community developers • Local health officials • Refugee camp leaders	• Local peace commissions • Grassroots training • Prejudice reduction • Psychosocial work in post-war trauma

Table 2: Derived from John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies *(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 39*

In Table 1 (chapter 1), the issues being tackled were demonstrated. It also showed that some issues are discussed at the top level and were different from the issues discussed with the middle level and the bottom level. In addition, there were issues which would transcend this division and affect all three levels; thus, they require attention from all levels. This demonstrated the interconnectedness of the issues.

Table 2 demonstrated the significance of context and particularism in approaching peacebuilding issues at different levels, the strategies used at these levels, and the actors involved. It strongly urges peacebuilders to look beyond elite politics and top-level; this forces peacebuilder to develop organic approaches to peacebuilding that assumes a strategic vision at each level. A key aspect of this model is the need for people to reshape their identities as they move through the transition to transformation and

then reconciliation (Taylor, 2004). Lederach argues that reconciliation (which is an important dimension of the model) comes from truth, justice, mercy, and peace (all aspects that are amiss or underplayed in liberal democratic frameworks). The transformative model, thus, stresses the importance of rebuilding the destroyed relationships by focusing on reconciliation within and between societies and strengthening its peacebuilding potential.

Furthermore, Lederach argues that, of the three tracks, Track II is the most important one because it has the "greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peacebuilding process over the long term" (1997:60). Support to the Track II actors is assumed to influence peacebuilding at both Track I and Track III levels (Paffenholz, 2013). This forms one of the motivations for chapter 7, which provides a midlevel analysis of organisations in South Sudan.

There have been various critics who have also discredited the transformative peacebuilding approach Fetherston (2000:207) is concerned with what he calls the lack of power analysis in the transformative approach, Thania Paffenholz (2001) problematises the seemingly limitation on the role of outsiders and uncritical discussion of "the local", stressing the need to focus on direct support to Track III actors (this will also be covered in chapter 3). transformative peacebuilding approach exerts a considerable impact on contemporary peacebuilding the policy and practice, despite these criticisms as well as further development. It has also greatly influenced the reorientation of NGO peacebuilding initiatives, processes, and activities (Hove, 2015).

2.4. Conclusion: Implications for theory, policy and practice

The theoretical discussions in this chapter contextualised peacebuilding in relation to the mainstream literature and critical discussions on peacebuilding. The chapter set out to inquire into how theory plays a role in understanding the practice of contemporary peacebuilding. This understanding will point towards the need to uncover the tensions and gaps between local peacebuilding in South Sudan and international actors' roles and perspectives.

Firstly, *ontologically,* the issue of the nature of reality and, therefore, what there is that can be known about it, is addressed. In this inquiry, the ontological question focuses on the nature of reality regarding peacebuilding knowledge formation. The aim was to first highlight the exclusion of mainstream theories within peacebuilding (section 2.2.), and second, to highlight multiple alternative and marginalised ways in which peacebuilding was understood and represented, rather than try to reduce these meanings to one singular meaning (see 2.3 and Table 2). In section 2.2, the theoretical exclusivity of mainstream theories was discussed. Although theories are set to help us see the world, they are also a means of domination, as argued by Cox (1981): "They are for someone and for some purpose." The use of these theories is therefore not neutral and can be a method of imprisonment, as argued to be the case in mainstream theories in section 2.2. Their assumptions that produce "truth" claims and their view of the "mind" and "body" disconnection by claiming that the world is out there to be discovered are argued to be

exclusionary of context and the consequence of construction or influence of the body and mind to the truth.

Secondly, the *epistemological*, on the nature of the relationship between the knower and the known, is explored. This relationship is argued to be a process with a power and knowledge production dynamic. This epistemological process was achieved by employing the key elements of a critical paradigm: in the creation of meaning in context, and knowledge and power. This power, in turn, gives them prominence in producing knowledge which is globally applied and even used. In peacebuilding, theory and practice are not easily distinguished, as practice emulates how the world is perceived. Thus, the popularity of the liberal peace and democratic peace adopted from the powerful West has dominated much theorisation and even practice of peacebuilding, leading to what is known as liberal peace theories. Section 2.3, however, presents critical contributions that have destabilised the boundaries between the global and the local and establishes a dynamic relationship between the international and local developed around friction, resistance, and agency. In consequence, it does not support the assumption that criticality could exist out there and waits to be uncovered and studied by us. Instead, there is need for criticality at the level of knowledge production: by creating knowledge, which is immanently critical, meaningful, and concerned with "considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another" (Campbell, 1993:7–8; Milliken, 1999).

The main point here is that nobody has access to ultimate truth, and, consequently, no one person (or entity) can offer a solution for the entire population. That is why, along with many critical scholars, the chapter points out, that universals and grand theories such as Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism continue to lose their relatability. There is, however, a vision of non-linearity that promotes a pluriversality of perspectives, increasing the visibility of those at the local level as being just as important a contributor to peace as the international top-down actors.

Finally, from a methodological point of view, in finding out how the reality regarding peacebuilding is constituted and influenced by power dimensions, a qualitative, interpretive research approach was used, since the aim was to interpret the peacebuilding practice and unravel how theory has been used to construct it. The methodological implications for the research design and process are further unpacked in chapter 4.

Beyond these tensions of knowledge and understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the local, there is also a need to understand the dynamics within the local peacebuilding approaches. Will a subaltern/local view of peace prescribe very different things to that of an external official or analyst? "If claims and theories about the local are always purposeful, then our concern should not be to produce images of the local as close as possible to the truth" (Hamati-Ataya, 2013:676). Peacebuilding thus requires a perspective where perspectives about the local are not to produce images of the local as close as possible to the truth. Rather, the methodological consequence, as Cox (1981:129) argued, "should

become more reflective (no dualism between “mind” and “world”) upon the process of theorising itself, and aim at a “perspective on perspectives”. Thus, an interrogation of the local turn is needed”.

This reflexivity process falls under the critical camp, as it will assume that there is no dualism between “mind” and “world” It, therefore, “warrants empirical claims by relating them neither to a mind-independent world nor to a set of cultural values, but to the practices of knowledge-production themselves” (Jackson, 2011:157). Consequentially, it follows that the local is out there waiting to be discovered; thus, any discussion on the local turn and how it is practised in post-conflict and conflict-ridden African societies still needs interrogation.

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUALISING THE "LOCAL TURN APPROACH"

3.1. Introduction

In understanding the dynamics of the interaction between internal and external peacebuilding actors, we have so far looked at what informs current contemporary peacebuilding theorisation and, in turn, practice. In this chapter, we will explore the alternative approaches to peacebuilding and how they are conceptualised. This will enable us to understand the local approaches against the approach presented in chapter 2 (section 2.1.2) and set us on the path towards describing the intersection of the local and international actors and the effect of their interaction on peace and peacebuilding.

The discussion in chapter 2 can be situated in a developing international debate on the meaning and practice of peacebuilding by focusing on the effect of theoretical framings in contemporary peacebuilding. The chapter argued that universal theories do not represent reality, as reality is constructed, and it is contextual. Thus, there is a need for a focus on a critical look at universalisation of theory which is a function of power. As argued in chapter 2, peacebuilding practice has largely had a liberal democratic theoretical focus with an emphasis on liberation for markets (free markets), democracy, and states as a pathway towards achieving peace. These norms in peacebuilding, Mac Ginty (2012: 288) claims,

> "… are bolstered by a mutually reinforcing set of institutions to create an increasingly hegemonic system of peacebuilding that is intolerant of alternatives and creativity."

Such a linear and universal approach has been problematic to critical reflections, which revealed exclusionary and non-reflexive theoretical frameworks. Given the reality of the environment of pluriversality, a rather robust approach is needed to achieve sustainable peace. This, Sambanis (2008) argues, contributes to long-term peacebuilding, as opposed to mere short-term peace operations. It also reinforces what Bush calls the "commodification of peacebuilding", which he describes as initiatives that are "mass-produced according to blueprints that meet Northern specifications (and knowledge specifications)". He warns that these initiatives are of short-term interests that appear only to be only marginally relevant to or appropriate for the political, economic and social realities of war-prone societies (Bush, 2004:24).

Over half of all post-conflict states slipping back into conflict within five years of the signing of a peace agreement. It then has become increasingly clear that the complex challenges of establishing sustainable peace in war-torn societies vis-à-vis peacebuilding toolkit of the international community remain underdeveloped. Despite good intentions, the new generation of peacebuilding efforts has faced many criticisms for ignoring the societal and human consequences on the ground, falling short in

implementing its liberal goals, and for being a top-down, Western, and external intervention (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983).

This leads Paris (2002) to question how we move beyond the cynicism that peacebuilding initiatives are simply the old mission civilisatrice in a new guise. To mitigate this shortcoming, the emergence of a school of critical scholars advocating for an emphasis on the local in both peacebuilding knowledge and practice calls for an alternative approach that accounts for the dynamic relationships and agency at the local level (Da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012) (see section 1.2.2. and section 2.3). There is an argument being made that, despite advances in our understanding of the dynamics of the international-domestic relationship and a strong formulation of the goals of local ownership in these policy instruments, practitioners continue to struggle with how to ensure local ownership of peacebuilding interventions (Donais, 2012; Narten, 2009; Richmond, 2011; Thiessen, 2014b). It is important to focus on the local turn.

With the aim of understanding the role of the local turn approach in the contemporary dynamics of peacebuilding and how it will move us towards the achievement of sustainable peace in South Sudan, this chapter will contribute in two ways. First, it will provide a conceptual understanding of the local. This will be in section 3.2, which provides a deeper understanding of the debates and narratives within the local turn. It will focus on the local turn approaches to peacebuilding by discussing the "subaltern"/local descriptions of peacebuilding and focusing on the operationalisation of the "local turn". Second, as it has been described, it will present a discussion of African communities and how bottom-up approaches have been implemented. In post-conflict and conflict-ridden African societies, the examination of the bottom-up (see section 1.2.2.) is more difficult to trace but is evident in the different kinds of unity it promotes at this level. These approaches emphasise indigenous traditions of arbitration, reconciliation, forgiveness, religious institutions, people-to-people dialogue, and resolution. Customary/traditional authorities are a long-standing institution in many African states and have had a socio-cultural influence through, for example, presiding over cases of divorce, land issues, and water point conflicts. This discussion aims to answer the first sub-question, which seeks to describe evidence of the local turn. The thesis will discuss the subaltern/local view of peace practices by providing an analysis of a focus on various African discussions.

This chapter is arranged in the following way. In section 3.2, the local turn assumptions are discussed. In subsection 3.2.1, a literature review of the dimensions of the local turn is provided, and in subsection 3.2.2. various narratives that fall under the local turn camp are discussed. These narratives are understood as concepts that complement each other. Section 3.3 gives a reflective and critical outlook on the 'local turn'. The African perspective is given in section 3.4, with a focus on the role of the local turn as the conceptualisation of peacebuilding in Africa. This provides a review of local approaches to peacebuilding in various African empirical studies of post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. These

debates on local turn in African peacebuilding are substantiated by narratives, which are provided in the form of the ubuntu discourses, which is discussed in section 3.4.1.

3.2. The Local Turn in peacebuilding

David Chandler (2013), argues that there is a need to shift away from a linear understanding of peacebuilding "blueprints" and focus more on non-linear approaches that assert the importance of "hidden agency" and "resistance" (see chapter 2). There is a certain type of recognition among critical scholars that peacebuilding "is caught in a web of constituencies that have different and partly competing interests" (Sending, 2011:66). Peacebuilding essentially becomes more about finding ways that these conflicting views and interests can be mitigated in a non-violent and sustainable manner. In this light, Ole Jacob Sending (2009) argues for more constructive approaches in which local and international stakeholders are involved in a complex system of "patronage and power". What this constructive perspective on local "realities" could look like continues to be the of much debate. Thus, there are a plethora of initiatives trying to find ways to relate to the "international" and the "local" in a meaningful way.

Towards this objective, some scholars contend that this can be achieved by allocating the central agents of peace to local people. The debate on peacebuilding in recent years has been marked by renewed attention at the local level. This development was labelled the local turn. By local, this thesis refers to locally-based agencies present within a post-conflict or conflict-ridden environment that create the necessary processes for peace, and frame it in a way such that the legitimacy of local and international terms converges (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Richmond (2010) adds that this kind of peace is an everyday peace (see section 3.2.2.3) and carries with it an emancipatory content and an immanent critique (see section 2.3.2.), which allows the configurations that form it to be constantly rethought and reflect both institutional and international architecture of peace approaches.

This offers an alternative view that shifts away from the discourse of intervention as a response and emphasises prevention and empowerment through a bottom-up process (Mac Ginty, 2010). Recently, there is an increasing local dimension, with an increase in participation of local actors as a consequence of loss of confidence by major actors behind international peace-support actors (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013:763). It is imperative for the aim of peacebuilding thus should aim to be towards the restoration or establishment of a political framework by being as inclusive as possible. If the focus is only on the state institutions and not the local, the chances are that "regular" citizens might feel "alienated" (Brown, 2009:61). In some cases, this can lead to a likelihood of protests and resistance.

Donais (2012) argues that a current local turn in peacebuilding is starting to form, emphasising "the local" in terms of the local context, local agency, and dealing with local partners (Donais, 2012). This is with the belief that locally-based agencies present within a conflict-ridden and post-conflict environment create necessary processes for the legitimacy of local and international terms to converge

(Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Such arguments, at a conceptual level, also form part of the local turn that represents a normative shift, arguing for increased and enabled agency in local participation, local ownership and away from the controversial notion of peace that stems from a liberal theoretical perspective. They, therefore, argue for an emerging norm that bridges the gap between "outside/ foreign" intervention and empowering civilians with the mentality to attain and maintain peace.

It could be debated whether the local turn can offer an alternative to liberal peacebuilding, but it seems necessary to move away from the universal model of Westphalian traditions of truth claims, statehood, and markets as the absolute way of achieving peace. Instead of linear solutions, the institutional framework should be built in a way to provide "best-fit" solutions (see chapter 2). While acknowledging the pioneering work of the "peace, peacebuilding and local turn approaches" that emerged in the 1990s, this section will expand more on the local turn approach and framework.

3.2.1. Dimensions of the local turn approach to peacebuilding

The local turn represents a somewhat wild space for the liberal peace epistemology where Western rationality, with its assumptions of universality, is challenged in different ways (Chabal, 2012:316). It has been stimulated by the convergence of the agendas of two dimensions. That is the general effectiveness and normative reflection of peacebuilding.

The first dimension is one motivated by the general effectiveness of peacebuilding and the desire to improve the peacebuilding interventions of international institutions; this literature sees the local turn as being a kind of neo-trusteeship (Caplan, 2007). This is what Giulia Piccolino (2019) calls the "problem-solving side". Scholars here see the local turn as a means for understanding subaltern procedures of contemporary peacebuilding (Väyrynen, 2018).

On the effectiveness of the local turn as a critique of the liberal peacebuilding framework, scholars like Paris argue that liberal international institutions of peace have indeed failed to achieve their promise of sustainable peace, especially those relatively new liberal states that have been recipients of peace operations in the post-cold war world (Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005). Although the liberal framework has achieved substantial progress, and internal intervention has become a reliable source, there are limits to both liberal approaches to peacebuilding and externally assisted peacebuilding. As the local turn scholars argue, a top-down, state-centric peacebuilding approach seems outdated as has been proved by the continuously inefficient results (Mac Ginty, 2013:774). This has been discussed in length in chapter 2, section 2.3.

The resultant mixed records of peacebuilding have led to questionable results on whether the international actors alone are able to establish and, more significantly, maintain peace in the long run (Paris, 2007:9). Most arguments along with this line point to the view that most peace agreements are managed by the west, in the light of Western values, and are only inclusive to a few elites whose right to represent regular citizens can also be questioned. According to critical theorists, this top-down model

ignores the local level. Thus it is ineffective in handling local conflicts. For instance, Mac Ginty (2013:771) interestingly point out the absence of the term "local" in the landmark 1992 document, *An Agenda for Peace*. Without an inclusive pluralist model, in many cases, this approach is unsustainable in conflict and peace analysis (see section 2.3.2) and see peace as a reward of cooperation between the local and the international.

More recent analyses of the failures of peacebuilding and implementation that Paris and Risk (2010) call shallow, too centralised and containing no local context have exposed the use of the local as a rhetorical tool, implemented in practice to a limited extent (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009). Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013), argue that, despite a growing number of research and policy papers focusing on the potential and liabilities of including the local in peacebuilding processes, there are currently minimal attempts being made to understand and give an overview of what constitutes the local turn (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

Additionally, as argued in chapter 2, based on real-life expressions of a local agency, some scholars were also inspired by postcolonial thinking. Vivienne Jabri (2010:42) claims that liberal peace is often framed in whispers of colonial undertones with racialised domination and subjugation, while Jones (2008:180) points to the fact that in the current liberal peacebuilding technology, Westphalian statism and motivation is flawed as citizens are often categorised as either the victims or the enemy and international society as the saviour (see section 2.2). Spivak speaks on the subaltern. These critiques see the local as the use of countless everyday practices that transmit critical local agency through a diversity of spheres, from the very personal to the transnational level (Spivak, 1988).

Additionally, in the context of effective peacebuilding, several analysts have pointed out the need to address sub-national level conflict and governance issues, and to involve local communities in peacebuilding. This trend has been encouraged by the evolution of recent scholarship on civil wars, which has increasingly adopted a sub-national research design and showed that in many countries labelled as "at war", violence is not distributed uniformly across the national territory (Allouche & Jackson, 2019). Speaking about the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Séverine Autesserre's 2010 book, '*The trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and Failures of International Relations'* has been particularly influential in pointing out the importance of local peacebuilding (Autesserre, 2010). The study argues that the international peacebuilding intervention in the DRC failed due to practitioners focused on the success of the national-level peace process and of the 2006 elections. They were also confident that peace would have "trickled down", ignoring the local conflicts over land and citizenship that were fuelling extreme violence in the Eastern Congo. Such violence, however, has endured in spite of the apparent progress of the national-level peace process and the installation of an elected president in Kinshasa. The effect of neglecting the local in peacebuilding is illustrated in Autesserre's rich analysis of the DRC. Autesserre argues that the failure of the massive peacebuilding efforts implemented in the DRC stems from "internationals" regarding local tensions and local conflict resolution as "unimportant,

unfamiliar, and unmanageable" (Autesserre, 2010). Hence the establishment of a one-sided, top-down, unsustainable peace in their peacebuilding approach that ignores the micro-level and is unable to handle local violence, which has continued after the national peace agreement was signed.

In relation to UN peace interventions, Fetherston and Nordstrom (1995:102) conclude that third-party interventions should be,

> "… guided by a broader definition of success that is not only deduced from the top but also articulated from local frameworks of peacebuilding, with outside actors lending valuable support but are never more than bystanders in decisions on what type of peace is to be built" (Leonardsson & Gustav, 2015:827).

In many cases, events on the local level are less researched and understood. Critical authors' thoughts on peacebuilding thus call for change, as peacebuilding is not a one-sided process where the international actors can do all the work; however, they need to instead continuously cooperate with local actors. In the case that this does not happen, there will be an increasing record of mixed results in international peacebuilding and in some extreme case, they may further the conflicts on some occasions (Leonardson, 2015:833).

The second dimension is the normative reflection on how to arrive at a more just and legitimate peace, transformative peacebuilding through local emancipation. While scholars for the first dimension like Autesserre do not really question the legitimacy of intervention with the aim to improve it, scholars of the second dimension have promoted the local turn as part of a more radical contestation of international peacebuilding interventions. This comes from the classic work of scholar-activists, for instance, John Paul Lederach (2005), these authors have presented the local turn as a way to develop an alternative approach to peacebuilding (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). This includes the work of scholars like Richmond (2010), who goes further to explain that this kind of peace is an everyday peace and carries with it an emancipatory content and an immanent critique, allowing the configurations that form it to be constantly rethought and reflect both institutional and international architecture. In this approach, scholars emphasise the need to listen to the voices from below and to criticise international peacebuilding agendas for ignoring the local beyond its rhetorical inclusion in policy papers.

As argued in chapter 2 and the previous section, liberal peacebuilding is presented as a hegemonic discourse that especially marginalises local processes, needs, and knowledge, and it creates what Richmond (2012:95) terms as a "virtual peace". On the other hand, there is the growth of scholars who have presented an emancipatory peace built from below as an alternative, through local initiatives and everyday interactions (see section 3.2.2.3. on everyday peace) that have a concrete impact on the life of citizens and communities which considered legitimate (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). It has become generally accepted that it is important to broaden conflict resolution and peacebuilding beyond an elite pact, taking into consideration the local dimension and the preoccupations of the population at large.

The local turn has today entered the mainstream discourse of international agencies and NGOs (Mac Ginty, 2015). This is usually in the form of conversations about inclusivity and localisation, which can also be largely categorised as having a position of cooperating with Western understandings of the "local" by the local actors. Acharya (2004) describes localisation as a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers (the local) build congruence between transnational norms, including the norms previously institutionalised in a region, and local beliefs and practices. Arguing from a norm diffusion perspective, Acharya argues that the successes of these norm diffusion processes include foreign norms, which may not initially cohere with the norm-takers but are eventually incorporated into local norms (2004:241).

Curle suggests that the best peacemaking potential is found in the communities in conflict themselves. Thus, efforts should be made to empower and develop "local peacemakers" and to build on indigenous sociocultural structures and practices (Curle, 1994). NGOs such as International Alert and Friends for Peace take a bottom-up approach by acknowledging that, as in the peace process, local communities are aware of the real causes of conflict and the ways to address them. It is therefore crucial to "understand people's perceptions of peace and their views about the basic pre-conditions for bringing sustainable peace in their communities" (Bouvy & Lange, 2012). Thus, instead of acceding to the presumed universal notion of liberal peace, building local peace and bottom-up peace approaches take their point of departure from local understandings of peace.

In addition, the inclusion of local minorities in peace negotiations is argued to play a crucial role in the termination of conflict. Paffenholz (2010) study makes an argument that civil society contributes to peace through a supportive role. In her studies, she also examines the role of local agency in peacebuilding processes. Studying the role of young men in post-conflict Papua New Guinea, Kent and Barnett (2012) emphasise that peace cannot be sustained without individuals choosing to sustain it and that the choice of sustaining peace largely depends on the availability of peaceful pathways as alternatives to violence (Paffenholz, 2010).

Additionally, Autesserre has provided a rich analysis of the effect of neglecting the local in peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Autesserre argues that the failure of the massive peacebuilding efforts implemented in the DRC stems from "internationals" regarding local tensions and local conflict resolution as "unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable" (Rupesinghe, 1995). Thus, peacebuilding efforts have established a one-sided, top-down unsustainable peace that ignores the micro-level and is unable to handle local violence, which has continued after the national peace agreement was signed (Kent & Barnett, 2012).

Based on real-life expressions of local agency such as those described above, and inspired by the postcolonial thinking of Spivak on the subaltern, these critiques see the local as the use of countless

'everyday' practices (see section 3.2.2.3) that transmit critical local agency through a diversity of spheres from the very personal to the transnational level (see section 3.4).

The two approaches to peacebuilding offer a slightly different view on what local is and ways in which to address it to achieve peace. The first focuses on the sub-national arena as an actor in peacebuilding and the second focusing on 'everyday' events. Nevertheless, despite being presented as separate here, it should be emphasised that, in the ongoing debate on peacebuilding, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, they continuously feed into each other, and there is an argument for the importance of both dimensions towards the conceptualisation of the local turn.

Although the local turn functions as an important critique of the neoliberal governance and peacebuilding, for the research agenda and purpose of this thesis, the arguments will move beyond the critique of liberal peace as it has been sufficiently laid out. This thesis aims to capture and understand the intersection of internal and external actors' strategies of peacebuilding in everyday peace. Therefore, in this thesis, the local turn is used to understand the subaltern, their strategies, and their position in the contemporary peacebuilding. The focus will be to situate them and their level of influence and interaction with the external actors within the environment of peacebuilding in South Sudan. This is motivated by two reasons. The first, given the arguments in chapter 2 on non-linearity and multiple perspectives, the aim is to highlight alternative views and disprove the universality of mainstream theories and move beyond liberal peacebuilding (Roberts, 2011) towards the importance of the "local turn" and local ownership (Donais, 2012; Reich, 2012). Second, the discussion and understanding of the everyday in the local turn literature are limited (Väyrynen, 2018). A diffractive reading of this is needed, and this will form the researcher's contribution to the literature.

3.2.2. Narratives of Bottom-up peace

Given the aim to understand the subaltern, the following section will break down some narratives within the literature of the local turn and the practice of bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding.

De Coning (2007) has argued against universal model concepts and theories on building peace (see chapter 2). He argues that the international actor can rather play an enabling role in facilitating societies to self-organise and build peace in sometimes very complex and non-linear ways. Fundamentally, he proposes a different form of peacebuilding where practices within the context play an important role. In the form that builds on the knowledge that all self-sustainable peace is context-specific, homegrown, and bottom-up, stories are told differently and contain different emphases, nuances, and silences.

Brewer (2010) argues that these narratives are revealing about issues of epistemological and positionality, as well as revealing about power, the power to write, over-write, and be heard, this is explained in chapter 2. Thus, the position of the bottom-up perspective is important to explore.

The sub-sections below will contribute both to the main question, "What is the role of 'local turn' approaches and its interplay with contemporary peace processes towards the achievement of peace in South Sudan?" and to the second sub-question, "How is the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan manifested?" It is therefore important to understand "the local narratives" that this thesis will use as identifiers in South Sudan. In subsection 3.2.2.1, the peace from below narrative lays out an argument of existing narrative to the liberal peace. This opens the door to the exploration of the local narratives and strategies in South Sudan. Subsection 3.2.2.2 deals with local ownership/agency and local capacity. This section will lay out the local turn argument on inclusivity and will later help the thesis to identify inclusive strategies that promote real agency and build capacity in South Sudan versus the ones that are superficial. Subsection 3.2.2.3, everyday peace, will lay out the experiences of how peace is approached by an everyday person in a post-conflict or conflict-ridden society. Later, in chapter six, this will highlight the day-to-day strategies within communities in South Sudan, where very little top-down process affects them.

3.2.2.1. Peace from below

The emphasis on local actors and their role has been a development since the 1990s, nurturing the idea of "peace from below". While taking a holistic approach to peacebuilding, where the domestic actors are considered as important as the international actors, Lederach emphasises the visions for peace inherent among local people and the need for the international community to recognise such people as resources and not recipients in peacebuilding. This is what he terms to as "citizen-based peacemaking" and should be recognised as a principal component in peacebuilding efforts (Lederach, 1997).

Boulding (2000) argue that peace from below has local actors as owners and builders of peace and that peace must be produced and reproduced by the people living in a specific post-conflict context (2006). Local actors are "the primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders" of peace (Curle, 1994). There is also documented evidence by war-zone ethnographer Nordstrom (1997), who demonstrates that local communities, groups and people are continuously affected by violent conflicts use indigenous practices to handle post-conflict situations. Boulding adds that "each social group has developed its own strategies of attaining peace, uniquely rooted in local culture" (Boulding, 2000:91). It is in this reality and emergency that Pouligny (2006) points out that present-day UN peace missions, described as "multi-dimensional" or "multi-functional", needs an intervention that implies deeper engagement in the restructuring of domestic political and social orders (Fetherston, 2000).

Peace from below can be a representative of different things. For the UN, local governance is "a vital means for the populace to have access to government" (DFID, 2010). By supporting local governance in peacebuilding, the UN seeks to promote democratic representation, improve service delivery, and encourage conflict prevention through dialogue: "… ideally, local governance can serve as a valve mitigating local claims for political and socio-economic power" (Donais, 2012).

There have been various actors who have similar approaches to peacebuilding. For instance, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) who promotes local governance by supporting non-state and community actors and building bridges between society and state (Fetherston, 1998); the World Bank who have been known to focus on local governments towards increasing efficiency in service delivery and foster dialogue between citizens and their government representatives (Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1995). This is especially important in decentralisation processes (see section 2.3.1), in which local governments are central in building the: social local contract" and in representing the voice of local electorates, but also in the provision of human security and public services and in fostering reconciliation between warring local groups (Greener, 2011).

The notion that the local governance and government being beneficial to peace is not new (Hasselskog, 2009), recent years have seen a rise in literature exploring the connection in depth. In several studies, the claim is that carefully designed, and well-governed decentralisation can help achieve stability and peace by increasing legitimacy, inclusion, accountability, and participation. This established stable sub-national arenas for citizen-state interaction; this is, however, in the cases that the sub-national level has sufficient means and autonomy to control resources. However, this assumed success story of decentralisation does not come uncontested. In some research, the conflict-mitigating potential of decentralisation is said to fail as a result of elite capture, low levels of administrative capacity, and the inability to raise sufficient resources. Such deficiencies may lead to widened economic and social gaps or the allocation of resources being perceived as unfair (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). In the decentralisation debate, Siegle and O'Mahony study shows that, when decentralisation is characterised by high degrees of legitimacy, local government control over expenditures, and capacity of local governments, it does have some conflict-mitigating effects (Hughes, 2013). Brancati (2006) in correspondence, also finds evidence of the positive effects of decentralisation in a study of 30 countries.

Due to the over-emphasis on security, democracy, and good governance, by liberal peace, other aspects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding – such as the socio-economic, and the need for dialogue and reconciliation – tend to be neglected. This leads to an even lower focus on the local and what Richmond describes as the "local-local".

Furthering the consideration from local governments and arguing from a Local Peace Committees (LPC) perspective, Abdul Karim Issifu (2016), argues that, in the past, LPC was an establishment that brought voices of communities and the so-called "unheard" to the fore. Issifu further argues that the establishment of the LPC gave voices to the locals because indigenous communities felt threatened by the rampant violence and lack of justice in their society. Tongeren (2013) adds that, due to the frequent violence and chaos in many rural settings and the delay in intervening during violence by the appropriate state agencies, local people took troubles into their own hands by finding a participatory method of resolving conflict or preventing violence. Among the major features of all LPCs include encouragement of active community participation by bringing the conflicting parties together, fighting against

marginalisation and discrimination to promote community empowerment and capacity building, and inspiring community-level peace initiative ownership to promote the sustainability of peace projects. In effect, by their nature, these community groups are inclusive of the different sections of the community that are in conflict and has the task to promote peace within its own environs (Olivier & Odendaal, 2008). Olivier and Odendaal (2008) reiterate that LPC's successes are characterised by their emphasis on strategies such as dialogue, promotion of mutual understanding, trust-building, constructive and inclusive solutions to conflict, and joint action that is all-encompassingly aimed at reconciliation. LPCs have been very instrumental in the search for peace and community development both at the local and national level. As LPCs are mostly found in conflict-affected countries, they have had a positive impact in these countries by keeping the violent conflict under control and empowering local peace actors to become agents of peacebuilding through their strategy of peace from the grassroots.

3.2.2.2. Local ownership, agency and local capacity

In his April 2001 report to the security council, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed the concept of "local ownership" in peace operations. He emphasised that the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate a process that seeks to dismantle structures that support violence and move towards the creation of a condition that is conducive to durable peace and sustainable development produced by the local people (United Nations, 2001).

The rationale behind the UN propagation of local ownership is to obtain greater efficiency and sustainability in peacebuilding activities (Mateos, 2011). Thus, local ownership, or the level of ownership here, is tied to capacity. The UN emphasises the vital link between local capacity and ownership in peacebuilding processes. The emphasis here is that local ownership with only remains a theoretical argument if the local actors are not equipped fully engaged in all phases of planning and implementation (Kent & Barnett, 2012). DFID and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) suggest building supporting systems that strengthen civil society and link traditional authorities with local governance structures is one way of strengthening capacity (Kim, Öjendal, Chhoun & Ly, 2012). For the World Bank, local capacity is strengthened by supporting local community committees and NGOs (Klem & Frerks, 2008). Thus, capacity is posited as a function of international support and intervention in most peacebuilding practices.

Hayman at Peace Direct emphasises that local capacity must be regarded as "a central element of any strategy for managing conflict," and that "what is needed is a new orthodoxy that places local capacity at the centre (far beyond the government)" (Leeuwen, Verkoren, & Boedeltje, 2012). Despite differing ideas on whose capacity it is to support, in other words, local government, local communities, or civil society, critics of local capacity approaches to peacebuilding argue that such approaches often assume a non-state and traditional local that is inherently authentic and legitimate, thus circumventing the need to critically assess who this local represents (Lidén, Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2009). Scholars like Chandler also suggests that, in the discourse of effective peacebuilding, supporting local capacity may

be viewed as a way for Western advocates of liberal peace to circumvent accountability for unwanted outcomes in policy interventions (Lijphart, 1997). Thus, by promoting local capacity, the question of responsibility for the outcome of the peace process is effectively transferred to those intervened upon.

The propagation for local ownership also hinges on ethics and legitimacy (Mateos, 2011). The lack of sovereignty in peacebuilding has also been another criticism of peacebuilding; such an activity portrays outsiders as the controller, as argued by Donais (2009). Local ownership with its moral notion of self-determination and representation comes to the rescue from this reproach. However, Leonardsson and Rudd (2015) see local ownership and agency as a process of consulting that involves locals in implementing externally designed models. This leads Wong (2013) to argue that solutions that come from within societies are also considered more suitable for application to specific local conditions and their activities are expected to encounter minimal resistance by the local actors. In addition, local efforts have a long-term effect on peacebuilding as their commitment, and the results are not dependent on the presence and dominant external actors who eventually leave (Van Brabant, 2010). In practice, the UN often discusses local ownership in relation to national ownership, in which civil society is seen as the local that legitimises elite-level national ownership (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). This raises questions about the role of civil society, who are presumed to operate through the grassroots in "locally" owned, bottom-up peacebuilding processes, but in practice, they consist of professionalised NGOs based in the capital (Mac Ginty, 2010).

Local ownership and agency should not be considered only at a level of inclusivity. ACCORD (2014) argues instead that local ownership should be understood as a concept based on agency of the local and the capacities of local societies to create their own social institutions and make their own decisions about the future instead of just having the local as an inclusive end. In addition, the issue with only including the local under the inclusivity project as an end is twofold. The first is who participates as local, and the second is the level of ownership.

The first is the question of who participates. Who are the "locals" that are allowed to participate? Who chooses the local? The literature provides a very limited discussion on which groups the "local" refers to (Diamond, 1999; Peck, 1999). Wong (2013) asserts that different "locals" can result in very different priorities and interests and cause different problems. For instance, in Sierra Leone, local ownership between 2002 and 2007 was limited to local elites who designed and implemented reforms. This process excluded other locals, for instance, civil societies and local organisations (Mateos, 2011). However, Donais argues that the local may not always trust the decision-making within small policy circles of international and national government actors. This threatens the legitimacy and thus, the implementation of the policy or decision made (Van Brabant, 2010). Due to this factor, there is an increasing discussion to alter the primary focus from political elites to civil society, who are viewed as being more prone to commit themselves to nation-building without problems (Donais, 2009).

There is, however, discussion on the legitimacy, independence, and "localness" of civil society and NGOs. The argument is that, rather than being a representation of local ownership, there is a tendency for these mid-levelled organisations to be viewed as an extra channel to exercise external influence. Jenny Pearce (2005) notes in the Guatemalan case that external funders viewed local civil society as,

> "… a tool for processes whose parameters were decided by donors and which turned NGOs and social organisations into projects for an externally driven agenda."

Orjuela (2003) also argues that the inclusivity of these local mid-level organisations has caused a dependency on donors financially, which renders self-determination difficult (see chapter 7, section 7.5 on a discussion on this in South Sudan). The lack of local resources in a post-conflict situation has resulted in local peacebuilding actors strongly dependent on external funding causing an asymmetrical relationship for locals to freely pursue what they aspire, as there is a large degree of dependency. There is an essence of conditionality regarding ensuring control of local organisations behaviours (Mateos, 2011). Thus, even with their project explicitly aimed at local ownership creation, it hinders substantive local ownership through budget control, providing the benchmark and designing participatory programme implementation.

The second puzzle is the level of ownership. To what extent do the locals have to be involved in the process to qualify as such? Edomwonyi (2003) argues that the reconstruction effort has to be locally conceived and led to have ownership. Boughton and Mourmouras (2002) allude to legitimacy by arguing that local ownership is more about the local's appreciation and acceptance of the policies' benefits and responsibility to uphold them, irrespective of who conceived them. On the other hand, Chesterman (2007) argues that there is no explicit and coherent meaning of ownership in post-conflict situations, as participation can be a form of,

> "manipulation (passive participation merely to show others that locals are involved), information giving, consultation, or it can be functional, interactive or even self-mobilization" (Pretty, 1995).

The meaning is slightly diminished by Shinoda (2008), who argues that even if locals possess the will to exercise ownership, they possibly lack political, economic, and social capacity in terms of human, institutional, material, and financial resources to perform essential roles (Shinoda, 2008).

Thus, local ownership and agency go hand in hand with the capacity of the actors, which in turn should be considered in the definition (Pietz & Carlowitz, 2011).

There have been suggestions that external actors should support local capacity by investing in local peace councils and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (Initiative for Peace, 2010). High local ownership thus follows "capacity strengthening". This type of development and increase in capacity should provide a sense of ownership (Van Brabant, 2010); this will avoid the perception of the

imposition of external ways and norms. Capacity building driven by external actor itself is in potential contradiction with the notion of local ownership.

Although the parameters of local ownership and local capacity for the purposes of this thesis have been set in the above paragraph, the concepts still have many gaps to fill as discussed above. Pouligny (2009) has argued that it has been rather slow and sometimes lacking in concepts and narratives such as local ownership, a local agency, and local capacity translated into implementation. This demonstrates the practical challenges of the applications of these concepts. In addition, Wong (2013) argues that such terms have increased risk of being abused as a tool to increase hypocritical legitimacy and mask the imposition of donors, or it may also present itself as a convenient excuse for early exit by donors. Thus it remains that no matter the moral and legitimate intentions of these concepts, they will remain problematic as long as some of the issues raised above remain unaddressed. Thus, the further need for clarification of its purpose and definition for its contribution to the field of peacebuilding to be conceivable.

3.2.2.3. Everyday peace

The notion of "everyday peace" is a part of critical research and the local turn agenda that seeks to recognise the agency and significance of actors at the sub-state level (Mac Ginty, 2014; Richmond, 2009). As described by Roberts, the everyday,

> "… refers to the ways people make their lives the best they can, manipulating with whatever tools and tactics are at their disposal the surrounding natural, social, economic and political structures, local and global, that empower or constrain their lives" (Roberts, 2011:413).

The everyday ties in with the post-liberal movements, as Richmond argues, for a need to focus on the agency of people rather than the existing focus on the state and the associated constellation of orthodox IR concerns (Richmond, 2006; 2009a & 2009b). His definition is pitted counter to the state and the international models to demonstrate a difference, He states,

> "… Everyday is a space in which local individuals and communities live and develop political strategies in their local environment, towards the state and towards international models of order" (Richmond, 2010).

According to his definition, this space is not the civil society, which he believes is a Western-induced artifice, but it is a space that provides representation at a deeper level, what Richmond referred to as "local-local" (section 3.2.2.1.). Yet, these are often hidden or deemed marginal by mainstream approaches to peacebuilding.

In this sense, rather than a geographical space, the local refers to the normal practices and acts of a diversity of individuals and communities which often goes beyond elites and civil society or any associative of liberal peacebuilding. This understanding brings to light the emphasises that

peacebuilding is a multidimensional process as opposed to a one-way project imposed from the top but is continuously changing through encounters with local agencies (Mac Ginty, 2011). Thus, it is potentially dissident to the orthodox and statist approaches that often focus on institutions and traditional views of security and peace. Drawing on human security (Bubrandt, 2005), everyday peace presents a context-specific approach that involves the observations and decisions made by individuals and communities as they navigate their way through life.

Everyday peace is important in all societies; however, it particularly finds great importance in deeply divided and post-conflict societies. In such contexts, seemingly small issues and isolated incidents risk becoming a trigger for something more serious. Critics of liberal peacebuilding operations posits that the ignorance of the everyday has led to very little achievement beyond rhetoric on local ownership and participation through the implementation of peace through international peacebuilding operations. The failure, they claim, stems from the very design that rests on externalised legitimacy and norms (Richmond, 2013).

The everyday peace framework coalesces around positive peace, human rights, conflict transformation, and critical peace education. Thus, setting the ground for the need of both structural and relationship change towards the need for both structural and relationship change in order to advance sustainable peace (Johnson & Johnson, 2010). This is in order to ensure sustainable peace in diverse and multicultural societies; thus, the vision must be democratised. The vision for everyday peace needs to be investigated, negotiated and deliberated upon by the members in a particular context or setting. Thus, as argued by Dutta et al. (2016), assert that for the conceptualisation of everyday peace, two elements are needed, that is, the process (for instance, democratic engagement and community building processes) and outcome (a shared vision of peace grounded in local contexts) components with the aim of achieving an interactive relationship.

The goal is to arrive at emancipatory, locally relevant, and collectively produced and owned knowledge by combining transformative education, inquiry, and action (Fals-Borda, 1987; Torre & Fine, 2011).

3.2.2.4. Hybrid peace

The term "hybridity" has been gaining more and more prominence in peace and conflict studies. It forms part of a critical outlook on liberal peace interventions conducted in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s (Dinnen, 2015:1). A discussion on hybrid peace, in relation to this thesis, will contribute to understanding the kind of relationship between the international and local peacebuilding actors in South Sudan. Hybrid spaces represent situations in which there is a meeting between international and local norms, actors and practices and that create new arrangements where for instance liberal and illiberal norms co-exist (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012).

Many scholars see hybrid peace as a nuanced form to liberal peace. However, in this case, the local is partly responsible for the building of process (Leonardson, 2015:834). This kind of relationship is a

constant bargain between the international and the local who can both be trying to defend their interests. A position that many argued can not be achieved by liberal peace.

In the global-local interplay, hybrid outcomes are often regarded as more authentic than the liberal democratic peace promoted by external peacebuilders or sole-local projects, which are viewed as constrained in level and amount of impact (Mac Ginty, 2010a; Belloni and Jarstad, 2012).

Hybrid variants of peace are created by the cooperation of external and local actors of peacebuilding (Wolff, 2015:279-281). As Booth (1991) contends, there is recognisable development in both local and more global identities, as these communities in conflict want more livelihood, economic prosperity, and general well-being. The development of these local and global identities in peacebuilding is not mutually exclusive as it forms part of a very complex system with overlapping identities, which will have an impact on peace and the future.

A plausible critique is that international actors are going to be more influential than the local. These power dynamics are hard to mask and defuse throughout the peacebuilding process. This presents a risk that despite the involvement of the locals in the process, international actors are going to repress them at the end (Dinnen, 2015:1-2). In addition, hybridity, as it stands, takes the positionality of the international and sees the local as a possible partner for the inclusive agenda. The result is a cooperation of outsiders and insiders through the local turn where neither the local nor the international have superiority.

This space is what Van Leeuwen et al. (2012) terms "Heterotopias" – a term to describe situations in which a plurality of peace(s) co-exists simultaneously. It is here that Björkdahl & Höglund (2013) introduce the concept of friction, which

> "defies a simplistic understanding of peacebuilding processes and instead recognises the inherent conflictual elements of such endeavours."

Björkdahl & Höglund (2013) argue that peacebuilding literature has not sufficiently demonstrated that the global and the local are in constant confrontation and transformation with each other. Instead, the literature constructs a dichotomy between those doing the peacebuilding intervention, and those for whom the intervention is designed. This works against gaining a nuanced understanding of the global-local interaction processes and outcome. Selimovis (2010) goes further and argues that such encounters "can be both a site for empowerment and for domination". Thus, the concept of friction defies neat conceptualisations.

While the focus in this thesis is on encounters between idea, actors, or practices, the subsequent result of frictional engagements is by no means automatically going to have negative consequences for the long-term prospects of peace. They may catalyse change, which challenges the status quo of societies trapped in a negative spiral of violence and instability.

Paffenholz (2015) explains the dynamics of a hybrid peace, describing it as the peacebuilding discourse that considers the entangled relationship of international and local, formal and informal, and liberal and illiberal forms of peace governance. She is supported by Kraushaar and Lambach (2009), who agitate for the formation of so-called "hybrid peace governance structures" that provide actors with a joint hybrid framework of norms, values and institutions. As such, Belloni (2012:21) argues that the notion of hybridity suggests the need to move beyond the ontological and methodological dominance of liberal approaches and actors to peacebuilding, and to engage with bottom-up, local views of politics and society.

However, despite the criticism that liberal peacebuilding projects exclude the everyday, most scholars keep envisaging a form of liberal peace through hybridisation (Richmond, 2010:12). Heathershaw (2013:277) cautions against hybrid forms of peace governance, as he argues they lack critical analysis of the international and the local within these hybrid structures. This perpetuates some structures of dominance, which might not be too apparent at first glance. This thesis will aim to contribute to filling this gap by providing a critical analysis from a positionality of the local/subaltern.

3.3. The local: A critical reflection

This section presents a critical look at the local spaces that are being operationalised in the context of peacebuilding. Over the past few years, international peacebuilding has made tentative attempts towards inclusivity. However, there have been criticisms on romanticising of the local and not constructively engaging with bottom-level actors (Richmond, 2009). This can partly be due to the uniformed kind of thinking and theorising that forms a big part of technical knowledge disseminated by peacebuilding and conflict transformation knowledge (Goetschel & Hagman, 2010). It seems that liberal peacebuilding is plagued by an illusion of local ownership constructed in efforts to keep "echoes of colonialism" at bay (Donais, 2009).

Through the calls for local ownership within the international environment of peacebuilding the hybridised peace and the liberal-local hybrid peace discourses have emerged (Mac Ginty, 2010). The peacebuilding understanding holds certain assumptions about the international, local agency, and post-conflict spaces. For instance, it holds that the "internationals" are better in peacebuilding than the "locals" due to its lack of agency and mobility. This has resulted in various implications on how international peacebuilding actors approach peace in post-conflict situations.

To begin with, a major problem with the local has been the struggle when defining, understanding, and deciding on which local entities are included in the definition. There are local low and mid-level actors as well as local elites. It is problematic to prioritise between the needs of these layers. All these levels of locals have proved to be incredibly helpful and destructive towards peacebuilding. Local forces that either support peace or cause conflict will always be present. It is thus important for the international

community to differentiate between this and cooperate with the most beneficial locals (Paffenholz, 2015:860).

Methodologically, the debate on the local can be seen to have moved closer to the mainstream discourse that it originally set out to criticise, which builds on the assumption that "the Third World and its peoples exist 'out there', and that reality and representation are separable" (Escobar, 2012:8) - (see section 2.2). There is representation in the definition and conceptualisation of the local. What is at stake here becomes evident by looking at discourses in human geography. While in contemporary approaches takes issues of scale such as national, global and local as ontologically given categories, considering constructivist approaches this is falsified (Howitt, 2003; Moore, 2008; Marston, 2000). Thus, there does not exist neat ontological oppositions between the local, on the one hand, and the global or international, on the other, this should, therefore, be discarded in favour of perspectives that are fluid, and relational properties (see section 2.3.2) while accounting for the interweaving of their epistemological and ontological dimensions (Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Marston, 2000; Howitt, 2003; Jessop et al., 2008; Moore, 2008).

There has been little attention paid on how the local is epistemologically produced. Scholars have rather focused on locating criticality within the local with the problematic understanding of the local being independent of the international peacebuilding practices under study. Mohanty argues that accounting for the local seems to be understood "merely [as] a matter of specifying the context after the fact" (Mohanty, 1988:68). An already constituted local (the fact) can be analysed in a given context (peacebuilding) in the place of considering how it is produced given the power-knowledge argued in chapter 2. Spivak's differentiation between two different but inseparable meanings of representation is helpful here, "namely "*Vertreten*" (speaking for) on the one hand, and "*Darstellen*" (speaking about) on the other" (Spivak, 1988:276). He argues that "one cannot speak for (in the name of) someone without simultaneously speaking about (describing) someone". Thus, this results in representations of the local as a product of what one is speaking about and speaking for(Hirblinger & Simmons, 2015).

Because of this construction argued above, the thesis approaches the research inquiry from a positionality perspective of the local. While there is an acknowledgement that anything local is complex, unstable, and relational, truth claims have constantly been made; such methods falling into the same pattern that liberal peacebuilding is being criticised (Simons & Zanker, 2014). This is what Hirblinger and Simsons consider an incomplete account of peacebuilding, as it conceals the powerful effects of representation, which shape our perspective on the local as well as the international. There is, therefore, evidence that not only is locally produced, but they are also used through different practices of representation. Thus, there is a need for perspectives on how representations of the local relate to political agendas in peacebuilding, and which can account for the effects of choosing one mode of representation over another (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015).

In addition, there exists a heterogeneity of the local. According to this logic, the "hard to catch" nature of the local does not allow for catching the voice of the local complex (Öjendal, 2015: 937). Nevertheless, the complex nature of the local does not present a sound argument for them to be left out of the peacebuilding processes, it goes to prove that peacebuilding process has to be unique and whichever approach applied in one country cannot be replicated in another.

Another criticism is that many of them could be "influenced by soft power". Despite the local turn, optimism should be managed when thinking of the local as a category of a "good society" without negative influence, interests or unable to be influenced (Paffenholz, 2015:862). The local might be corrupt, weak, or not even "local" at all through the networked world (Mac Ginty, 2013:765). Furthermore, Mac Ginty argues that local actors can also be "partisan, discriminatory, exclusive, and violent" (2013:770) just as much as international actors. It is inaccurate to assume all local does not have power relations and do are not conflict-oriented rather than peace-promoting (Paffenholz, 2015:863-86). Not only are the elite threatening these values, though. As explained in section 3.2.2.4, NGOs might also be elitist or business-oriented, for instance, some unions or student organisations are unorganised community-based organisations, and occasionally in the hands of a few influential people (Öjendal, 2015:942). These unacceptable norms make inclusion difficult (Mac Ginty, 2013:774). This is, after all, what makes the inclusion of the local a cumbersome process full of debate. Nevertheless, despite this value loss, academic scholars in support of the local turn argue that it serves peacebuilding efforts better than the purely liberal version that has failed so many times before (Öjendal, 2015:942).

Another criticism of the local turn is on its problem-solving arguments. In Lederach's Conflict Transformation theory (see section 2.3.3), for instance, grassroots peacebuilding was seen as part of a "multi-track" agenda, where it complemented "track 1" (national-level peace process) and "track 2" (dialogue at the level of middle-range elites, such as intellectuals and civil society activists) peace-making processes (Lederach, 2005). In recent discourses, for instance, Autesserre who has argued in her own view that peacebuilding at the local level is the true key to tackle conflicts and accused international peacebuilders of paying too much attention to elections and democratisation (Autesserre, 2019.). this argument has been criticised for replacing the expectation of a "trickle-down" effect with an opposite but equivalent expectation of the local triggering the national-level peace automatically (Ernstorfer, Chigas, & Vaughan-Lee, 2015). In their study, Simons et al. shows evidence in Liberia and Burundi had peace agreements that neglected contentious local issues, but a series of favourable factors resulted in the effective reestablishment of peace, such as high participation of local actors, at the local level(Simons, Zanker, Mehler, & Tull, 2013). In addition, and in contrast to Autesserre's analysis, the authors find despite the participation of the local and the involvement of local issues in DRC, and there has not been sufficient peace in conflict-affected areas (Stearns, 2013).

Lastly, there is a problematisation of the normative argument in favour of the local turn. With the recognition that bottom-up peacebuilding is vulnerable to being co-opted by international actors (Mac

Ginty, 2015)., there is also a co-optation of the local turn agenda not by the international community, but by the national government and the political elite. Much too often the national level is absent from the analysis of critical scholars, which tends to represent post-conflict spaces as places of tension between the international with liberal peace approach and a local dimension identified with customary practices (Richmond, 2012). Often the national is categorised under the international. Yet many cases show that state elites in post-conflict countries often play a central and an autonomous role with respect to both international peacebuilders and local communities (Heathershaw, 2009).

3.4. The African peacebuilding story: The role of the 'local turn'

This section represents the subaltern views that are often ignored or marginalised in mainstream peacebuilding. African examples are used to demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of approaches to peacebuilding that have been practised in many areas and different countries.

The elusive peace in the African context is a reoccurring issue often packaged differently in various contexts. The misconception and analysis of the type of conflict are seen as a meaningful factor in the approach to peace measures. Although wars and violence due to competition of resources, boundary disputes, hegemony, political rivalry and the struggle over power or authority in most western countries have been either resolved entirely or drastically reduced (DFID, 2001). However, in Africa, the story is different in some countries that have experienced dreadful violence, such as Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Ivory Coast, DRC, Algeria, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Namibia, Libya, Mali, Rwanda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, among others (Mbiti, 2010; Gordon-Summers, 1999; DFID, 2001). In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, government and armed resistance movements on opposite sides have split the country in two. Non-state actors have played a significant role in the conflict in most of these countries. In addition, Murithi (2006) describes three examples of some of Africa's deadliest civil conflict. The first is the clan-based militia in Somalia, which are in constant confrontation. Second is the case of ethnic militia in the Darfur region of Sudan, who have fought each other since early 2003 against Janjaweed militia (who have been alleged to have ties to the government). Lastly, Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda, which abducts children and uses them as child soldiers (Murithi, 2006). The above activities have undermined society's social fabric in these countries.

Another effect on peace stems from colonialism (see the debate on the colonial impact on peacebuilding practise in section 2.2). Post-colonialist theories have argued that, due to colonialism, individuals/organisations that co-opted the local structures, and mechanisms of ruling and dispute resolution were used to serve at the interest of the colonial administration. This type of governance led to the inheritance of the current nation-states heavily centralised in the capital cities. The population in the rural areas became marginalised and excluded from benefitting from the resources of the countries

in which they live. The overly centralised post-colonial nation-states have not been good at promoting social harmony (Murithi, 2006:11-12).

The local practices and traditions were, therefore, corrupted by the centralising power of colonialism. Thus, it is not only non-African states that perpetuate colonial power-knowledge, but it is also African countries and organisation that adopt liberal frameworks in their mandates. Asimeng-Boahene (2017) has argued that, since Africa is not a monolithic continent, the multiplicity of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups leads to the realisation that one cannot generalise progressive norms and principles, not even ones that can inform our approaches to building peace and social solidarity (Asimeng-Boahene, 2017).

Additionally, debates surrounding peacebuilding and Africa are based on the fact that the dominant and more Western perspectives of peace were not helping Africa find peace. This is because they were only addressing limited perceptions and practices of peace, which were not serving Africa (Hansen, 1987). One of the major narratives is the characterisation of peacebuilding intervention in Africa by international actors that completely lack or have limited local knowledge and lived experience, which Hussaina argues are essential to fully address complex conflict-related issues on the continent (Hussaina, 2017). A classic example is the case of Somalia, which sheds light on how distinctive the contours of civil strife have been in the past decade. This is the reality across many of the countries in Africa, where nearly half of the continent's now 54 countries are home to an active or a recently ended conflict (Gettman, 2010), with half of those falling back into the same cycle of violence a while later. However, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) argue that in a systematic comparison to other regions, there is a complex picture of the determinants of civil wars in Africa. Africa is plagued by deeply rooted historical political, social, and economic development failures as root causes of its problems (Elbadawi, 2000).

It has been widely recognised that context-sensitivity, local ownership, exchange of knowledge, expertise by international peacebuilders and the local influence the effectiveness of peacebuilding. Unfortunately, local stakeholders rarely participate in the design of a peacebuilding process – if the locals have a stake in peacebuilding objectives, but they are not engaged sufficiently, we need to question why. To explore this, it is imperative to interrogate the knowledge formations that inform the practices seen today.

In some of the African conflict, the issues do not always recede with the non-African states. For example, in South Sudan, attempts at peacebuilding from the top down have been problematic; the intervention of international actors has been known to reverse the peace. In this case, the government of Uganda has come under scrutiny for their deployment of the Uganda Defence Force (UDF) during the first three years of the conflict and only began withdrawing in 2015 when the mediated peace agreement was signed (Githigaro, 2016).

Another effect is the simplification of narratives by the liberal. For example, Autesserre (2010) argues that in 2010 and 2011, three narratives dominated international action in the peacebuilding process of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These focused on the role of natural resources in fuelling the conflict, the lack of good governance and sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war. While these narratives were beneficial in bringing the conflicts to the international agenda, they also gave the conflicts in the DRC a rather simplistic three-pronged explanation. With this narrow focus, attention was diverted from other root causes of the conflict (see Section on Root Causes of the War in chapter 1). By identifying only these types of simplified narratives, the risk of international intervention having unintended and even negative consequences increased.

In addition, peacebuilding can experience setbacks due to conditions extending to the peacebuilders' personal sphere and everyday practices. These cultural and everyday societal misunderstandings between the local and expatriate communities can perpetuate the distortion of the image and mutual perceptions of the other. Further, the redid methods and often-strict security standards of international organisations do contribute to this gap in understanding. Recruitment patterns seem to suggest that external expertise is indeed valued over local understanding: expatriates most often occupy leading posts. In order to engage more effectively within the peacebuilding context, the importance of acknowledging, appreciating, and including the local language, region and culture, contributes as much as technical expertise and international experience.

However, more recently, a resort to local turn towards justice, peace, and reconciliation called attention the assumptions underlying understanding of conflict and peace in Africa. This stems from questions such as: how adequately do interventions capture the African people's experience of war and aspirations for peace? The response is significant for crafting policies expected to transform destructive and debilitating conflict and move towards sustaining peaceful societies. This trend raises questions on the role of African scholarship and knowledge systems in the ongoing project of theorising peace and conflict. This necessitates the need to examine the understandings of peace and war suggested by indigenous ideas (Omeje, 2017), thus capturing people's experience of war and the everyday.

In countries like South Sudan, it has been these elected, appointed, or hereditary community leaders that possess a very strong claim in being representatives of the majority of the rural population. The role customary authorities have occupied in community life has undoubtedly had a positive effect over the past few decades. Where formal justice is not available to everyone, traditional justice mechanisms are available with which to address legacies of conflict and promote reconciliation and sustainable peace (UNDP, 2016). Traditional authorities remain an important institution to promote peace within communities. They retain an ability to mobilise communities, to settle conflicts, and to maintain judicial processes in adverse circumstances. Recently, however, the influence of traditional leaders has seen a decline as the shift is towards formal institutions. Despite this, organisations such as the United Nations Developmental Program (UNDP) still recognise the influence of traditional leaders and offer workshops

that provide basic training to increase their capacity, improve their leadership capability and skills to administer justice. Some of the UNDP strategic training impacts include community leaders in the town of Torit, Bor (capital town of former Jonglei state), and the cities of Wau and Yambio. The training has increased awareness of the rule of law and seen an increase in women adjudicating in customary courts. Neglecting local leaders poses serious implications for the prospects of achieving and maintaining a cohesive society.

Murithi (2006) gives a variety of case examples where the local bottom-up approaches meet the top-down approaches to peacebuilding. For instance, Somalia combines traditional structures with modern institutions of governance in its parliament. He attributes the consequent relative peace and stability to this fact.

> "In many ways, since Somalia emerged from the efforts and desire of Somali clans to unify into a state, Somaliland might be seen as a unique and genuine African nation-state because it was created using indigenous cultural norms of governance" (Omeje, 2017).

This is the opposite of many African post-conflict communities. Another example is in Rwanda, where the government instituted the traditional justice and reconciliation system known as *Gacaca* in order to deal with the perpetrators of the genocide in 1994 (which ran from 2005 to 2010). This system, although organised by the government, was deeply rooted in local community practices (Wielenga 2011).

There are, therefore, various peacebuilding approaches that offer opportunities to learn more about healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation, which create the basis for re-establishing social solidarity (Zartman, 2000). However, this is still a challenge in the conceptualisation and practice of peacebuilding.

3.4.1. African discourses on local peacebuilding

The African perspectives that resonate with the decolonial thinking examined earlier held that the project of liberating and emancipating African people that commenced during the war of liberation is far from complete (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). Thus, critical scholars situate most African perspectives in the argument that it is undeniable that local populations across the globe have been transformed by the influence of the European capitalist expansion, colonialism, evangelism, imperialism and now globalisation (Boege, 2011:437). These encounters have made it impossible to differentiate between the Western "modern" lifestyle and the local livelihood of population groups in Africa. Instead, a porous process of assimilation, articulation, and transformation has enabled the local population to adapt to their contemporary world in a manner that presents a new form of existence peculiar to each community (Boege, 2011). It would be misleading to over-homogenise the African population, but the critical scholars maintain that the conceptualisation of human beings in the African context emphasises values of cooperation, social harmony, respect, interconnectedness, and collective responsibility (Benyera, 2014b; Boege 2011).

From the critical scholars, what can be observed as an underlying thread in the African community is the understanding that human values are built on the reciprocal recognition of humanity and that rights are correlative with duties (Benyera, 2014a' Setiloane, 1978).

Ruth Murambadoro (2018) has also explored the question of what informs the view of African people. Far from being a monolithic continent, Murambadoro argues that there is a connection of the people to beliefs driven by their culture. She also argues that the set-up in sub-Saharan Africa is often a community made up of people who belong to the same ancestral family or bloodline, and a village chief or family elder serves as a representative of the community (Boege, 2011; Gelfand, 1973). These community leaders represent the community in the physical realm, but there is a metaphysical realm that is the backbone of the community, comprised of the ancestral family (Gelfand, 1973). The ancestral family are spirit beings of the departed members of the community, who form a generational pattern of communities that preceded the current living community. The ancestral community (living dead) serves as a protector and guardian of the "living-living" (the people in the physical realm) and intercedes for the people to God, who is the creator of all beings, be it in the physical or metaphysical realm (Gelfand, 1973; Nyathi, 2015).

Murambadoro also argues that spirituality[11] informs the worldview of many African people, and their understanding of reality is shaped by both the physical and metaphysical realms. She describes the physical realm as a sphere of existence occupied by living persons (the "living-living"), and the metaphysical realm is occupied by the "living dead" and "unborn living" (Gelfand, 1973, Nyathi, 2015). The "unborn living" (spirit of a person yet to exist in the physical realm) are future beings whose existence depends on the ability of the "living-living" and "living dead" to create a conducive environment. The living-living (spirit of the living person) are custodians of the physical realm, and the living dead (spirit of deceased persons) oversee the metaphysical realm, but both entities have an interdependent relationship that transcends the unborn living (Gelfand, 1973; Nyathi, 2015). This transcendental reduplication of the physical world in the metaphysical is arguably a fundamental component of life that brings social harmony to African communities (Ellis & Ter Haar, 2004; Lan, 2006). Resultantly, human dignity is built on the principle of reciprocal recognition of human beings as entities within a cosmological community that have duties and responsibilities to both the physical and metaphysical social world (Setiloane, 1978). Human dignity is deeper than human rights in that it beholds the essence of one's being, and without dignity, one's sense of being would have lost meaning (Setiloane, 1978).

It is, therefore, problematic to divest people from their culture, history, and their being, simply to make way for the modelling of the society in the Western perspective of human rights (Cobbah, 1987). Critical

[11] She describes spirituality to refer to the belief in the powers of the universe and this universe is made up of a network of actors that exist in the physical and metaphysical realm who all embody a spiritual component that guides their relations as entities in the universe.

scholars even argue that it is unimaginable that African people would be able to respond to their natural passions and wishes outside the realm of their social world (which is made up of the physical and metaphysical realms) (Cobbah 1987; Setiloane, 1978). Thus, the critical scholars hold that rights and obligations knit together the community in ascending order, which includes the individual, the extended family, and the whole society. There is much that can be learned and should be learned from African indigenous approaches to peacebuilding. The challenge that has always persisted has been the capacity, or lack thereof, to mobilise resources for such an initiative.

In the current African discourse, the notion of ubuntu is gaining much prominence. Although not a foreign concept, ubuntu is found in diverse forms in different societies throughout different parts of Africa. Murithi (2006) claims it is especially strong among the Bantu languages of East, Central, and Southern Africa, for instance, the Nguni of South Africa. It is a concept set in the cultural tones of societies that expresses what it means to be human.

Tutu (1999:34-35) observes that:

> *"Ubuntu* speaks of the very essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we say, *Yu, u nobuntu (Hey, he or she has ubuntu)*".

This expresses the warmth and the friendliness, generosity, compassion, and hospitability of an individual — a bond between two people or groups, or a connected sense of belonging.

Murithi states that the notion of ubuntu expresses the notion of belonging and connectivity as "*a person is a person through other people*" or the notion of "I am human because I belong". Tutu shares the same concept. He argues that the notion expresses "human being through other human beings". Thus, what we do to others feeds through the interwoven fabric of social, economic and political relationships to eventually impact upon us as well (Tutu, 1999).

It follows that through ubuntu, light is shed on the sense of shared destiny between people that magnifies principles of reciprocity and inclusivity. It creates space to both forgive and be forgiven and let go of revenge for past wrongs. It can also be used as a guideline on how societies can organise their political, socio-economic and legal institutions. In addition, the notion of ubuntu can be used to re-emphasise the essential unity of humanity and gradually promote attitudes and values based on the sharing of resources. cooperation and collaboration in the resolution of our common problems (Khoza, 1994; Maphisa, 1994). These principles "culturally re-inform" our practical efforts to build peace and heal our traumatised communities. It must be noted that these principles found within and that inform ubuntu are not unique.

In the event of conflict, the notion of *ubuntu* can assist in reconciling and transforming the community in that the exercise of upholding human dignity preserves the chain of communication that exists among the cosmological community, made up of the "living-living", "living dead" and "unborn living"

(Benyera, 2014a; Nabudere, 2011). These overlapping spheres of human existence run through the indigenous practices observed in Rwanda, Mozambique, and Uganda.

These practices observed by African communities are what emerging scholars have termed tradition-based, informal, home-grown, indigenous, unofficial, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (Huyse & Salter, 2008; Quinn, 2007). Critical scholars maintain that, when local practices are used to address disruptions to social harmony, the process allows for collective involvement in resolving the wrongdoing (Gelfand, 1973; Nyathi, 2015). This occurs through discussions that allow the affected parties to reflect upon the causes and consequences of a conflict. Traditional healers, diviners, herbalists, spiritual seers, and prophets often play an essential role in resolving conflicts and addressing injustices. These local actors are respected by the local community, which gives legitimacy to the process that ensues. However, in other African communities, for example, Ethiopia, the observance of African Traditional Religion (ATR) has been subdued by the influence of other religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, which have demonised worship and communication with African ancestors (Boege, 2011).

Nonetheless, critical scholars posit that what safeguards humanity in most African communities is not human rights or the rule of law, but the human beings themselves through an array of relationships and a social contract that binds the people within the physical and metaphysical realms (Ellis & Ter Haar, 2004). Resultantly, the essence of laws that regulate human interaction does not lie in the technical and technocratic processes of the formal legal system, but in the supremacy of certain ethical convictions, rules of decency, and the psychosocial and spiritual embodiment of the community (Bhebe & Ranger, 2001; Cobbah, 1987). It is this understanding of approaches to peacebuilding that feeds the focus of this research towards exploring how the local is realised and can be realised in South Sudan.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter set out to first provide a conceptual understanding of the local, and second discuss the "subaltern"/local prescriptions of peacebuilding by focusing on the operationalisation of the "local turn" approaches to peacebuilding in Africa. Towards the conceptualisation of the local, the chapter provided two main dimensions under the "local turn". That is, critical arguments on, first, the shift towards the local turn to improve the general effectiveness of peacebuilding, and second, as a reason to provide a normative reflection of peacebuilding which is reflected as exclusionary to non-liberal approaches (see chapter 2). It is also expressed that these concepts are not mutually exclusive, and there is an argument for the importance of both dimensions towards the conceptualisation of the local turn.

On the shift towards the local turn to improve the general effectiveness of peacebuilding, there is a strong argument by the local turn scholars towards acknowledging the diversity of conflicts and the need for diverse ways to meet such challenges. The lessons from the above empirical cases of societies emerging from violent conflicts clearly demonstrate the ambivalent and complex relationship between

internal and external actors. This contributes to the question of determining the short- and long-term impacts and consequentially the unintended and counter-productive results peacebuilding interventions may generate. Thus, this chapter attempts to engage with the subalterns' views and position, providing an understanding of the processes and outcomes that arise from different encounters in peacebuilding.

The chapter has done this by providing a description of bottom-up peace approaches. This includes peace from below; local ownership, local agency and local capacity; everyday peace and hybrid peace. Through the various approaches, the emancipatory agenda of the bottom-up was raised, and that is the agency of the people that peace is meant for. It is hence promoting a shift of agency from interveners to the local. Although peace from below was discussed through the lens of the local, it was also argued that these positions are not value-free and are in constant interaction with the liberal-peace approaches introduced through international intervention. Consequently, the approaches of the local turn are in constant friction with the liberal approaches and assumptions. This calls for more attention to international intervention which only includes the local on a very shallow level (see section 1.2.2.2) rather, and the argument is to focus on the peace approaches from below and the everyday peace, which promotes local agency and emancipation.

In addition, local turn shift provides a reflection of context, tradition and history. This has been done by providing an argument of African perspectives and the epistemological position of local African knowledge and practice. As demonstrated in the chapter, Africa is not a monolithic continent, and it is rather composed of a variety of beliefs and practices. In terms of conflict, the continent also presents a diversity of conflicts which differ from location to location. This is the same when it comes to peace; different regions will need different contextualised peace approaches which are recognised and tailored for the location in which the approaches are being implemented. The concept of ubuntu, for instance, is used to show an African philosophical understanding used to promote social interaction in a peaceful means in most African communities. The emphasis is thus on humanity, spirituality, beliefs and culture within these communities that lead to positive development.

The chapter also highlighted and cautioned against the romanticisation of the local approaches to peacebuilding. The definition of the local has presented a unique challenge to the local turn. This brings in question issues on who gets to define the local. This then ties back to chapter 2 and the power-knowledge formations. Thus, the local is described by the powerful. Thus, there is representation in the definition and conceptualisation of the local. There is also the co-optation of the local turn by the international and the local, national government and the political elite. Thus the local is not value-free, and whatever is described as local needs to be rethought.

As stated above, towards a reflective process, we ought to reflect the manner in which knowledge is constructed and the manner in which we do research. The next chapter will detail the procedures taken for this research.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

4.1. Introduction

This thesis so far has presented arguments on the conceptualisation of current peacebuilding practices, actors, and ideas in the global-local sphere, their relationships, and the need for local turn approach to peacebuilding (bottom-up approach).

The aim of this chapter is twofold: First, to describe the methodology used to answer the main research question, which is "What is the role of 'local turn' and its interplay with contemporary peace processes towards the achievement of peace in South Sudan?" This chapter lays out the procedures taken to contribute to the question in the case of South Sudan. These procedures will provide an answer to the three sub-questions outlined in the introductory chapter, namely, (1) how top-down approaches to peacebuilding engage with the local and what are the impacts on peace in South Sudan (this is discussed in chapter 5 and 7); (2) how the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan manifested (this will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7); and (3) lastly, the areas of overlap, collaboration, gaps and challenges in the interplay between the internal and external middle-level actors in peacebuilding in South Sudan (this is discussed in Chapter 7). The second aim is presented in the form of an argument that exists in methodological studies, that is concerning the neutrality of the researcher. This chapter outlines how current methodological research on peacebuilding in South Sudan can offer a reflexive process within the qualitative, non-positivist approach.

In chapter 2, the theoretical framings on knowledge were covered; it was argued that there is no dualism between the researcher and knowledge produced. In research, the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection (Creswell, 2003) and a co-creator of knowledge (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). Young (2005:152) describes the orientation of the researcher towards knowledge creation as emic, which is having "personal experience of a culture/society", and the second is etic, "the perspective of a person who has not had a personal or 'lived' experience of a particular culture/society". Eppley (2006) argues that the perspective of the insider/outsider is as a result of the social construction that entails a high level of fluidity that further affects the research. Eppley argues that it is unavoidable for a researcher, by nature, to have a level of outsider perspective while conducting the research. Although this does not necessarily mean that the insider perspective should be surrendered, he believes that both perspectives could exist simultaneously and that it is necessary to step back or distance oneself in varying degrees (2006:3).

Research, therefore, represents a shared space, shaped by both researcher and participants. Here the researchers' beliefs and values, cultural background (gender, race, class, socioeconomic status, educational background) and political stance form variables that may affect the research and its process. The identities of both the researcher and the researched have the potential to affect the research process

(Bourke, 2014). The biases of the researcher and the participants in this research shape the research process. The recognition of these biases allows for the gaining of insights into how to approach different research settings, and how to engage with the participants in the least compromising way.

The research process is, therefore made up of interpretations, and interpretations of interpretations. These interpretations happen in two ways: first, the ways in which the researcher accounts for the experiences of the subjects and the researches themselves, and second is the way the participants understand and make meaning of their experiences. In turn, the researcher forms a voice that reports these two interpretations. Thus, the researcher's own signature and subjectivities on the project are exposed (Bourke, 2014).

Research, therefore, needs elements of reflectivity to not only highlight the subjectivity of the research but also to be aware of its limitations and opportunities. Reflexivity encompasses a self-scrutiny; a level of self-conscious awareness of the relationship between the researcher and an "other" (Mortensen et al., 1996; Pillow, 2003). Notwithstanding its different understandings and practices, reflexivity is generally understood as giving "attention to the complex relationship between processes of knowledge production and the various contexts of such processes, as well as the involvement of the knowledge producer" (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009:8). Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009:9) contend that, because empirical data is the "results of interpretation", we need to pay attention to our theoretical assumptions, pre-understandings and the importance of language (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009:9). As qualitative researchers "doing reflexivity" we aim to "bend back" on (Archer, 2009) and turn "inwards" towards (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009:9) ourselves and to think seriously about our research practices.

There is a need to outline understandings of reflexivity as practices of appreciating our own positionality concerning questions about:

- What kind of knowledge is possible – our epistemology;
- The "doing" of research and our relations with research participants and others;
- Evaluating qualitative management research (Mavin, 2018).

The qualitative researcher plays critical roles in all phases of the research process, especially in the idea that it is through their eyes and ears that questions are formulated and data is identified, collected, analysed, and interpreted (Holloway & Biley, 2011:974). The next sections will outline how reflexivity was approached in the three aspects named above, namely the epistemology that influenced this research (research paradigm, section 4.2), the "doing" of the research through collection of data (research design and methods, section 4.3) and the evaluation and analysis of the data (analysis on section 4.5).

This chapter starts by addressing the researcher's role and positionality in sub-section 4.2, followed by a description of the interpretative paradigm approach used in section 4.3. This is followed by a description of the research design and methods in sub-section 4.4, the data collection techniques used in

subsection 4.5, description of the analysis in subsection 4.6, and lastly the verification, validation and ethical issues in subsection 4.7.

4.2. Research paradigm and approach

In this discussion, we consider questions about our epistemological position and assumptions and how these relate to questions of representation and truth. Johnson and Duberley (2000:177) argue that we need to ensure that we do research consistent with our epistemological positions, and maintaining such consistency "raises issues about reflexivity". For instance, in being aware and critical of the origins, assumptions, and implications of such positions. Epistemological reflexivity appreciates how the phenomena we study are seen through our ontological and epistemological lens. This then acknowledges our assumptions – about the world and about knowledge – and their implications for the research and its findings.

The researcher found importance in asking questions about representation and truth, acknowledging that social reality is constructed and appreciating how language frames our world view and paradoxically how it enables and inhibits understanding (see section 2.2) (Cunliffe, 2003:983). Cunliffe calls for "reflexive approaches to research" as themes which emerged from challenges to mainstream social science research, its absolute truth, and objective view of the world. Reflexivity "unsettles" representation by questioning the belief that "competent observers could, with objectivity, clarity, and precision report on their own observations of the social world, including the experiences of others" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011:11). As it was believed that a researcher's interests, values and theoretical presuppositions could not be eradicated from their work, reflexivity became focused upon rendering biases visible through personal disclosure so that audiences could take them into account (Alvesson et al., 2001). It also allows for the appreciation of biases, which are not yet known by the researcher.

In contrast to the dispassionate objectivity of positivist researchers, the research draws from an interpretative paradigm with a subjective approach (Frauenberger et al., 2010). Sociology has long challenged the naturalness and self-evidence of the modern subject and argued that its psychological inwardness, essential personality and such aspects are distinctly modern phenomena. The interpretive paradigm used in this research explores the complexity of contextual phenomena to gain an in-depth understanding of participant perceptions and perspectives (Vosloo, 2014). Interpretivists argue that individual opinions, beliefs, and attitudes dictate how situations can be interpreted, and as such, this "interpretive research is more subjective than objective" (Thanh & Thanh, 2015). Since the researcher intends to investigate and understand the "local" according to the experience of the participants, the researcher was very conscious, self-aware, and aware of the environment.

Interpretive research, Babbie argues, is recommended to grasp the perceptions of people's experiences, enabling the researcher to understand and interpret events and social structures attached to this research (Babbie, 2010:37). In this research, the paradigm enabled the researcher to focus on the coherence of

the research findings and how well one can predict certain outcomes, rather than focusing on certainty and absolute truth (Vosloo, 2014:306).

As this research is located within an interpretive research paradigm, the research lends itself to a qualitative research approach. Denzin and Lincoln (2000:3) describe qualitative research as a research paradigm that

> "… involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world".

This means that qualitative research aims to study phenomena and attempts to make meaning of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them within the surrounding of their natural settings. Therefore, the goal of qualitative inquiry is to understand the meaning of a phenomenon for the persons who experience it. This is what Neuman (1997) refers to as an *interpretive* methodology in qualitative methods.

Within qualitative inquiry, different knowledge claims, strategies, and methods of data collection and data analysis are used from those used in a quantitative investigation. The conceptual and theoretical framework of this research, as set out in chapter 2 and chapter 3, provides an overview of critical ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues as they relate to the focus of this research– the local turn in peacebuilding strategies.

Denzin and Lincoln (2000) emphasise that qualitative researchers approach their research from a certain view of reality. Thus, as represented above, there exist multiple versions of reality as they are socially constructed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Wood & Kroger, 2000). This points towards a *relativist* stance that Neuman (1997) argues means that the researcher has her own view of reality and is aiming to understand multiple truth or realities rather than one single reality or truth (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For this research, a qualitative interpretive approach fits with a critical and non-linear theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 and 3, where the social construction of the peacebuilding understanding and the representation of the local actors and approaches to peacebuilding was one of the points of departure.

The qualitative approach that is taken in this research guides the research towards inductive, context-specific findings as to the weaknesses, interactions, contradictions or strengths of liberal peacebuilding and the "local turn" and specific strategies employed by both in attaining and maintenance of sustainable peace in South Sudan. A qualitative method was found appropriate since the research involved the exploration of a topic or issue in depth (peacebuilding), the emphasis was also on seeking information from the people who are experiencing or involved in the issue (South Sudanese and international peacebuilding actors working in South Sudan. In the case that quantitative information is used, such data will mostly be used to reinforce the qualitative research, for instance with statistical facts such the military setup and the budget of the peace operations (Mouton & Marais, 1996).

4.3. Research design and methodology

This section explains the research design and methodology followed. The research is grounded within the interpretive research philosophy as detailed in section 4.2. The aim is to explore the subjectively constructed and interpreted social worldviews of war-affected South Sudan's peacebuilding environment.

The research design is carefully woven, given the reflexive processes explained above. This section questions the second aspect of reflexivity (see section 4.1), which is the relationships with the research context, the research subjects/participants, and the research data. If we see reflexivity as a process of opening ourselves up to scrutiny, then this involves questioning the way we do our research and "understanding how the process of doing research shapes its outcomes" (Cunliffe, 2011). Methodological reflexivity accepts that the researcher makes methodological and method choices, and acknowledges that research methods, as used by researchers, are not neutral tools – each has "philosophical baggage" (Gill & Johnson, 2002:6). Therefore, continuing the theme we introduced in the reflexive "thinking" part of qualitative research, we need to be aware of how our philosophical commitments (both the ones researchers are aware of and those that they are not aware of) influence our methodological choices (Gill & Johnson, 2010). Reflexive researchers make explicit this baggage to an audience and provide a convincing account of the knowledge "manufacturing conditions" (Pels, 2000). Indeed, Gabriel (2015:334) discusses how the reflexive researcher cannot separate the empirical material from the self. This form of reflexivity, exploring the researcher's relationship with the object of research (Harding, 1987), includes becoming conscious of our personal motivations and interests (James & Vinnicombe, 2002). The researcher's personal involvement in data production need not be constructed as bad practice or bias but as a source of data in its own right (James & Vinnicombe, 2002).

A phenomenological research design was employed to explore the phenomenon of the "local turn". Phenomenological research has the advantage of focusing on people's subjective explanations and interpretations of their social worldview (Robson, 2002:196). This qualitative and subjective design followed the interpretative approach (as indicated above), enabling the researcher to unpack the complexity of the local turn by using the interpretations of the participants' lived experiences of the community in Juba (who form part of the analysis) and their perception on the concept of the "the local" and "local turn". In dealing with the sub-questions, this design assisted in identifying the nature of peacebuilding strategies and the gap in the strategies, as well as provide a comprehensive understanding of these strategies.

The research presents a representation of the understanding of the experiences of various peacebuilders on how the local was represented within the peacebuilding academy and practice in South Sudan. Thus, the research conducted a case study of South Sudan.

Within case studies, Stake (2000:437) identifies three types:

- *Intrinsic case study:* This presents a case which is of interest in itself, and it forms the primary interest and base upon which the case study is conducted. It is employed when the researcher seeks a better understanding of a particular case.
- *Instrumental case study:* This is employed in order to use a case study to provide insight into an issue or to draw generalised findings. Thus, the case study is of secondary interest in that it only plays a supportive role.
- *Collective case study:* This is when a researcher uses several case studies in investigating a phenomenon.

In line with Stake's categorisation, this research is both an *intrinsic and instrumental single case study*. The case of South Sudan was selected for a further in-depth understanding of the phenomena, the local turn in peacebuilding. For example, analysis of various documents of the largely internationally sponsored peace process of South Sudan.

Within South Sudan, different levels of actors were engaged with the inquiry. The use of a case study research aims towards getting a deeper and more nuanced understanding of how the local turn approach to peacebuilding was constructed and represented (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The case study in this inquiry enabled the research to determine the level and manner in which strategies employed involve and include "the local" and its implications of this for peace in South Sudan. It also explores the resources that shaped these perceptions and the different forms in which subjectivity was constituted, and how the perceptions and experiences of academics contributed to the construction of current discourses on approaches in the peacebuilding academy and practice.

This research focused on a period of 10 years, from 2005 to 2015. This period offers sufficient opportunity in which the researcher can analyse peace strategies. The researcher will analyse peace strategies in two phases. The first phase is before South Sudan's secession of 2011. The second phase is the period between 2013 and 2018, a period when, due to the war, new strategies and actors emerged. The two phases offer a comparative measure of how peace strategies were conducted from the 1970s to 2005 and 2013, before the outbreak of the civil conflict, and the peace strategies post-2013 civil war, given the failure of the strategies in the first phase. The research was narrowed down to what was formerly referred to as the Central Equatoria region of South Sudan, with a focus mainly (but not only) on the capital, Juba, as the key area of study (see maps on page 10). The unit of analysis was the strategies employed by external and internal actors (both were categorised according to whether they reflect more of the Liberal Peacebuilding Framework or more of the "local turn" approach).

Additionally, in an effort to sufficiently answer the research sub-questions 1 and 2, which seek to understand the practical evidence of the top-down and the bottom-up approach, the research employed a historical processing method to the units of analysis. As the question suggests, due to some action or inaction of the official peacebuilding mechanism, resulting implications are now being felt. Since the

current strategies do not exist in a vacuum but rather as a result of previous actions, this historical study helped explain and evaluate the causal connections, and to systematically understand outcomes of the historical development of these different strategies. This method provided a broader temporal framework to the variables of the actors, the relationship between them and the absence or presence of the local in their strategies.

4.4. Research methods and data collection techniques

This sub-section justifies the selection criteria of the area where the research was carried out. The problems and limitations of a case study in sub-section 4.6, according to Yin (1986), is common to other research designs and strategies.

The research locations were visited from August 2017 to December 2018. These locations were chosen based on several strategic reasons, namely: the areas are accessible to the researcher; areas where there was little to no international influence, and areas where there was much international presence. Communities which received and some that did not receive support from international NGOs were selected as two different categories to facilitate comparison (see sub-section 4.4.1. below).

To begin, a reflection on the site where the research was conducted is important. The research was conducted primarily in the cities of Nairobi, Kenya and Juba, South Sudan. Kenya is the second-largest host of South Sudanese refugees after Uganda. The South Sudanese refugees and Diaspora who live in Kenya provide rich data on effects of the South Sudan civil war over the years and the effect it has had on their communities both in South Sudan and Kenya. In Nairobi, the researcher focused on two sub-locations: Kayole, where there is a large community of South Sudanese residents, and the city centre.

In South Sudan, research was conducted in the capital city of Juba (see the map of Juba city on page 10). Juba was relatively calm at the time of the fieldwork compared to other areas of interest. These included towns such as Yei, Bor in former Jonglei state, Yambio in the former Equatoria states, Wau in Bar el Ghazal, and Malakal in former Upper Nile state. These sites represented areas that would have been very informative. However, due to ongoing conflict, there was difficulty in accessing these regions. Despite not having visited all the intended towns due to the conflict, there are a few internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps and informal settlements in Juba from various regions. Thus, Juba provided a strategic area that will allow for data that will cover all the three major regions of South Sudan. In Juba, the research focused on the Muniki, Thonpiny, Hai Amarat, Hai Malakal, and Hai Jebel area (see maps on page 10). This geographical selection focuses on the areas in Juba where accessibility was possible in addition to focusing on residential areas where most of the people have chosen to settle and make a home.

In order to gain confidence and trust within communities, it was important to work with an assistant researcher (a Masters student at the University of Juba) who was more familiar with the surroundings and could speak the main languages spoken in and around Juba, therefore earning the trust of

communities quickly during the fieldwork. The researcher purposively chose a male assistant to assist where participants felt uncomfortable to be interviewed by a woman alone. This assistant, who prefers to remain anonymous for security purposes, also briefly conducted his own research in the Eastern Lake States, which he was able to share with the researcher. This is an area located in the Bahr el Ghazal region, and it borders the Western States to the west, Amadi to the southwest, Terekeka to the southeast, and Jonglei to the east. Specifically, he visited the Wunthiep camp, which is near to his own home. South Sudan is a difficult country to navigate, and it was challenging to secure safe passage as a non-South Sudanese and a woman at the time of the fieldwork. The researcher trained the assistant on how to pose questions, although this was not difficult as he was a master's student in Law at the University of Juba, and was an experienced researcher working as a freelance contractor for various organisations. He had also accompanied the researcher to all the interviews previously conducted in Juba and had conducted two interviews in the presence of the main researcher as the participants preferred to interact with a male. In this occasion, the researcher took notes while the assistant posed the questions as previously practised. The value of having input from the residents of the Wunthiep camp was threefold. First, the camp was a host to IDPs from various communities with various insights on cultural and traditional practices of peacebuilding within their various communities over the years. Second, South Sudan largely remains a country in which oral forms of knowledge are predominantly used, especially in rural areas. Wunthiep represented a large resource of raw primary data, all in one place. Lastly, the area represented an opportunity to have an alternative sight of South Sudan other than that of Juba, as was previously planned for the research.

4.4.1. Unit of Analysis and Sampling

The unit of analysis in this research was the strategies employed by external and internal actors. Both are categorised according to whether they reflect more of the Liberal Peacebuilding Framework, which is more top-down, or more of the "local turn"/ bottom-up, approach to peacebuilding. The chosen unit of analysis is also an effort (consciously so) to move beyond the binary formations of internal and external actors of peace. The research intended to study organisations as a whole, as opposed to individuals (within the organisations); therefore, the participants are viewed to represent the peacebuilding architecture of their respective organisations best.

The research deployed a purposive sampling technique, as opposed to random nor by convenience. In qualitative research, purposive sampling considerations often apply to the sampling of the cases in which the research is conducted and then to people within those cases (Bryan, 2008:414). The peacebuilding framework of analysis in chapter 2, and its classification of levels of actors, play a strategic role following the categorisation and typology of top leadership, mid-range and local levels of actors based and the roles and activities they play.

The purposive sampling was used to ensure a good deal of variety in the resulting sample, so that sample members differ from each other in terms of key characteristics. Heterogeneity of the sampled population varied to enable the research to describe and analyse the internal and external actors in South Sudan; trends, occurrences, experiences and perceptions not only of conflicting actors, but also of civil society groups, communities (elders, youth, women employed/unemployed, and so forth), South Sudanese NGOs (SSNGOs), INGOs, CBOs, local and national politicians and government officials. The purposive sampling technique aims to provide an in-depth description of the groups named above, their perceptions on the need to address the internal and external crises, coupled with prolonged internal displacements. Because the population is heterogeneous, the sampling provides a detailed investigation of different actors.

The problem facing the purposive sampling snowballing approach was that sometimes one can find that the sample may not always be adequately representative of the population covered. Within the population, there were also very many categories with diverse characteristics and circumstances that could have fitted the sample group; for example, people who were never displaced from their original villages. These categories were decided upon as not convenient. Thus, snowballing approach reduced the challenge of external validity and the ability to generalise in this qualitative study. Tellis (1997) argues that what is important is to clearly set the parameters of the study, methodology, and its goals. Once this is achieved with rigour, the validity of the research is beyond doubt. He all the challenges of data collection techniques can be allayed through methodological triangulation. That way, optimising the principle of validity and reliability through data and methodological triangulation is helpful. The purposive sampling technique with a snowballing approach guided the selection of the locations of the research areas above. A detailed description of how many categories were sampled and the numbers included in each category are discussed below.

The following represents the categorisation of the interviews conducted.

a) Representatives of an external (international) peacebuilding organisation interviewed

Organisation	**The capacity of the interviewee**
United Nations Mission in South Sudan	Director of UNMISS-Civil affairs division.
Search for Common Ground	Project Manager
USAID	Project Manager
Government of Kenya representative	

b) Religious organisation or leader interviewed

Organisation	**The capacity of the interviewee**
South Sudan Catholic Bishop's Secretariat	Secretary-general

Resource Centre for Civil Leadership	Secretary-general

c) Local Non-governmental organisations interviewed

Organisation	**The capacity of the interviewee**
South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Election	Executive director
Screen of Rights	Co-Founder and co-chair
Community Empowerment for progress	Peace project coordinator
Integrated Development Organisation	IDP and settlement officer
Grassroots relief and development agency	Peacebuilding, Governance and coordinator
South Sudan NGO Forum	Coordinator

d) Community-level groups interview.

Organisation	**The capacity of the interviewee**
Youth group	Executive director
Women's group	Co-Founder
Anataban	Visual coordinator

e) Individuals

Chiefs
Members of the SPLM
IDPs and refugees
Workers in Juba Market

f) Academics and researchers in Juba

Organisation	**Name of the Interviewee**	**The capacity of the interviewee**
University of Juba	Dr Leben Moro	Professor Institute of peace, Development and Security Studies.
University of Juba	Dr Mairi Blakings	Professor Institute of peace, Development and Security Studies.
Sudd Institute	Zacharia Diing Akol	Director of Training

4.5. Data collection

In this study, the research problem and questions demand both an intensive literature-based analysis of the similarity between mainstream or conventional strategies (which the researcher refers to as liberal peacebuilding approaches) and the local approaches (these are long-standing customary practices particular communities engage in). The research also heavily relied on an extensive and thorough empirical research and analysis of the strategies used in South Sudan. A variety of data collection tools and techniques were employed, including both primary and secondary data collection methods.

The data collection methods and techniques provided in-depth knowledge from people living and working in the conflict area. The length and quantifiable nature of the answers mean that data sets were created, and more broadly applicable conclusions were drawn. The fieldwork was important in reaching the conclusion of this research, providing invaluable insight into the progression of the local turn, as well as bridging conceptual and empirical gaps in the literature.

Data was collected to the point of data saturation. Data saturation implies that no newer categories emerge from the data, and there was a sense of replication in several cases (Morse & Richards, 2002:174).

This section explains the process of data collection. As already mentioned, these activities took place during the period of August 2017 and December 2018.

4.5.1. Primary data collection methods

The primary data collection method was field research, where many hours and days were spent in direct contact with participants. Participants were located both in Juba and Nairobi. The researcher chose to conduct the research in Juba, as it was easily accessible given the challenging conditions caused by the conflict. Nairobi, the capital of South Sudan's neighbour Kenya, is a hub from where South Sudan's governmental and non-governmental institution and organisations operate.

Using the unit of analysis, which was the strategies employed by both local and international actors, acquired through purposeful sampling method, the researcher employed different techniques and tools of data collection. The various techniques employed were: observation, focus groups, seminars, and interviews (both semi-structured and in-depth interviews).

First, observation as a method was key, as it enabled the researcher to gain a sense of subtle nonverbal communication or to understand the interaction in its real context (Neuman, 1997). This was mainly to note the kind of interaction and perception that exist between members of organisations that either employ the top-down or the bottom-up approach and was vital in answering sub-question 1 and 2. These perceptions can be detected from the verbal description of the "other". Note-taking was, therefore, a very important instrument of data collection.

The second method was conducting focus groups and seminars. One focus group and two seminars were held. The focus group was composed of current and former leaders, South Sudanese youth and women who live in the United States as refugees and immigrants. There were 12 participants in total in the focus group. The focus group aimed to gather thoughts and lived experiences of South Sudanese who now work on South Sudan issues for foreign NGOs in Washington, DC.

In addition, two seminars were conducted; the first was the 'Narrowing the Gap' seminar at the Wilson Centre in October 2017 in Washington, DC, USA. The second was the 'Narrowing the Gap' seminar in April 2018, Juba, South Sudan. The first seminar was conducted to understand and analyse international reactions to the conflict in South Sudan and to understand better how they conceptualise their procedures on engagement in South Sudan, especially from foreign countries, and this helped in gathering data on their interaction and expectations of local South Sudanese, the local organisations and the government of South Sudan. Here, the two institutions took part in the seminar were USAID and Search for Common Ground. The second seminar was to provide a more rooted approach and to better understand the functionality, challenges and capacity of local south Sudanese NGOs and their interaction and expectations of foreign organisations. Here, 13 South Sudanese organisations took part.

The third method was semi-structured and in-depth interviews. The researcher used semi-structured interviews, where she asked preliminary questions that allowed for a broad range of answers and allowed the respondent to provide anecdotes, cultural stories, and perceptions. This paved the way to in-depth interviews.

Importantly, using the pre-chosen interview techniques allowed the researcher to tackle research sub-questions. It also allowed for the flexibility of follow-up questions to probe and unpack certain answers. This was useful when answers appeared to be given for the purposes of social desirability, rather than truthfulness. Observations during the interviews were crucial, as it enabled the researcher to gain a sense of subtle non-verbal communication or to understand the interaction in its real context (Neuman, 2011:101). Observation also occurred during the interview and generally around Juba in day-to-day interactions.

Using the actors involved in restoring peace and peacebuilding in South Sudan, data was acquired through a purposeful sampling method to identify organisations that had to be studied. The interviews were conducted in organisations, individuals, and institutions, as shown in the table above (see section 4.4.1).

Open-ended, in-depth interviews were held with the selected sample and unit of analysis in the case studies. For the voluntary participants, a consent form was provided (Appendix C). The interviews conducted took place at a time and location that was convenient for the participant. The interviews lasted between 30 to 60 minutes. An interview schedule was provided to the participant in advance; this provided the participants with a guideline of the questions that would be covered during the interview

(see Appendix D). The interviewer was relaxed, interactive and encouraged the participants to talk freely while also guiding the conversation towards new questions and topics from time to time. This allowed the participants to give as much narrative as possible of their contexts and situations. While in-depth interviews provided insights and understanding of the context, the disadvantage is the generation of great amounts of data (Campbell. 1999). This resulted in a lot of time and effort spent on analysis of such large volumes of data. This was managed by having a small manageable size of participants.

Instruments of data collection included observation, note-taking, audio-recording, and collection of documents. Observation mainly took place during focus groups and seminar interactions. In interviews, the researcher expanded on the notes taken during the end of each interview session and after all the interviews of the day. All the interviews were audiotaped, except in one case where the researcher forgot to switch on the record button on the tape recorder. When this was revealed at the end of the day, the researcher reconstructed this interview from the notes taken. The researcher aimed to conduct all the interviews in a pre-arranged room that would ensure good acoustics and privacy. However, this aspect was out of the researcher's control when the participants insisted on being interviewed in their offices, some of which were quite noisy. This made transcription rather complicated and consumed a lot of time as the recordings had to be replayed several times to ensure the accuracy of the transcriptions. Audiotaping was supplemented by note-taking during the interview. Transcripts, conversations, and videotapes were also used as instruments of data collection. The semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to ask the preliminary question set that allowed for a broad range of answers and allowed the respondent to provide anecdotes, cultural stories, and perceptions. The advantage of audiotaping is that no information is lost and the researcher can listen to the flow of discussions and the exact words that were used. The intrusive characteristic of audiotaping is seen as a disadvantage, especially for sensitive topics (Campbell, 1999; Creswell, 2003). All of these items of data were kept on a Google Drive folder, and access was only given to the supervisors.

Lastly, the researcher also particularly studied certain documents that were received from various organisations, and also on the internet, and ensured their collection either through e-mail, post (registered or priority mail) or personal collection. The documents that were collected included:

- Analysis of impact from across projects
- Analysis of IDO Training program

4.5.2. Secondary data collection methods

Secondary data collection methods were beneficial and important to all the questions, as they helped to gain more knowledge to supplement the information that was gained through primary data collection methods. It also enabled the researcher to attain facts that were not encountered during fieldwork, or that seemed to contradict one another. It is also important to embed the facts within a framework that is

appropriate to the facts. These frameworks are found in academic journals, reports, statements, newspaper articles, transcriptions and public interviews online, and much other public and sometimes private sources. These were efforts to understand the theoretical consideration on the local turn as well as to analyse the peacebuilding efforts that have been previously deployed, especially in South Sudan, and evaluate the success of those that are incorporated in cultural and indigenous approach against those that did not.

The main secondary data collection methods included desktop research. Desktop research is used to provide a good overview and analysis of the scholarship. The researcher used it to conduct a thorough understanding on peacebuilding, and the scholarship of approaches to peacebuilding, including the liberal peace and the local turn and scholarship on unsettling both liberal and local turn approaches to peacebuilding.

A descriptive-analytical-explanatory approach was used after a selection of the theoretical literature on conflict resolution. These were used to analyse the South Sudan peace architecture and conflict, and the inability to end the conflict. This literature provided data that was triangulated to overcome access issues.

To form the focus of the discussion, this thesis is framed from the assumptions derived from critical peace studies which benefit from post-structuralism, critical studies, post-colonialist and decolonial theoretical approaches. The researcher acknowledged that, in making this choice, other approaches were left out. However, these seemed to be well represented in both theory and practice and stand together in quite radical contrast to orthodox scientific methods. The researcher also attempted to show the complementarity of the different approaches, which led to the robust "paradigm" of this research. The inductive approach – theories development, adding into the theory, talking about theories silencing (as opposed to deductive approach) – was also used to navigate the poststructuralism theoretical perspective.

Furthermore, historical process tracing was used in efforts to answer the research sub-questions, which seek to understand the practical evidence of the top-down and the bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. The research also applied a historical processing method to the units of analysis as secondary data collection techniques of this study.

Historical processing involves looking at historical progression in South Sudan and how institutions have generally operated in the past years, spanning years between their independence in 1956 until the CPA agreement in 2005. This is followed by an analysis of various attempts to resolve the conflict, with a particular focus on the peacebuilding process between 2005 to 2018. Many of the pre-secession years (before 2011) were used to guide the researcher as well as make the researcher aware of the progressions. An understanding of South Sudan's historical context provides a framework to explore factors that shape its current characteristics. It would also help to understand the value system and gain insight into the prominent variants that would help unlock the puzzle of the local turn of this study.

As the main question suggests, due to some action or inaction of the official peacebuilding mechanism, resultant implications are now being felt. Since the current strategies do not exist in a vacuum but as a result of previous actions, this historical study helped explain and evaluate the causal connections as well as to systematically understand outcomes of the historical development of these different strategies (Pierson, 2000 and 2004). This method provided a broader temporal framework for the variables of the actors, the relationship between them, and the absence or presence of the local in their strategies. This mechanism followed a path-dependent sequence, enabling the researcher to look at different outcomes at a critical juncture that were outcomes of different processes and strategies, especially in the exclusion (absence) of grassroots organisations (Thelen, 2000). The "local" here refers to instances of the local agency, local action, and local initiative in peacebuilding interventions.

The timeframe considered include:

- 1956-1972 – The independence of South Sudan – Spark of the first wave of civil war
- 1972 – Addis Ababa Agreement Agreement
- 1982 – Sharia law
- 1982-2005 – Second conflict to CPA
- 1991 – Division of the SPLM/A
- 1992 – Wunlit Conference
- 2013 – Current Conflict
- 2015 – Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS)
- 2016 – Failure of ARCSS
- 2018 – Revitalisation of ARCSS

4.6. Data analysis

As discussed in the introduction, reflexivity involves questioning what is considered "valid" and valuable research in the analysis of this research. Johnson (2015:322) argues for reflexivity to be brought to "the forefront of any research evaluation so as to enable criteriological judgements that fit the philosophical positioning of any research under consideration." His call for a "more permissive, pluralistic, and reflexive approach to research evaluation" (Johnson, 2015:320) is founded on the diversity of qualitative management research and its array of different epistemological and ontological stances. Johnson et al. (2006) elaborate this argument for the "reflexive application of the appropriate evaluation criteria" (2006:131) and suggest that this requires qualitative researchers to:

> "Subject their philosophical assumptions to sustained reflection and evaluation through their confrontation with possible alternatives; Deliberate the implications of their informed choices for research practice; Be consistent in their actual engagements with management practices and

be clear about how they meet specific but philosophically contingent evaluation criteria" (Johnson et al. (2006:148).

The research is based on the collection and analysis of qualitative data, words, phrases, and sentences using thematic identification, categorisation, and logical interpretations methods. Therefore, the lived experiences, perceptions, and views of people are qualitatively analysed to generate an in-depth understanding of the theory and practice of the local turn in peacebuilding informed by the South Sudan experience. In doing so, the theoretical and conceptual tools of the local turn and liberal peacebuilding model are to be applied. Given the method of analysis, and taking an explanatory case study, this research used the conceptual and theoretical tools as guides in the reaching of conclusion. Day (2012:76) proposes, that reflexivity problematises "the taken-for-granted use" of validity as a means of evaluating qualitative research. In the analysis of data, the reflectivity employed found the need to go beyond "a box-ticking exercise", as such a reductionist approach would not guarantee "good" quality qualitative research.

The data was analysed from each of the sources described above by coding transcripts, documents, and notes from observations. This process of coding and analysing took place during the time of data collection and was done as each instance during the analysis of any data collected which in turn was used to inform consequent data collection (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this way, the voices of the participants emerged throughout the themes, both in the analysis and collection of data. However, due to the discussion above on how values affect science, the researcher acknowledges that not all codes and themes that emerged from the sources of data were void of any other influences. It is therefore important to acknowledge that the researcher's voice and positionality are intermingled and intertwined with the project (Bourke, 2014).

This research employed a thematic analysis to analyse data. This approach was chosen as it is used to generate core meanings from the data relevant to research domains or objectives (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

The primary mode of analysis here is the development of categories from the raw data into a model or framework. The categories are labelled, described, grouped, and populated with text or data that illustrate the meanings associated with the category. The researcher spent time carefully reading the data severally to identify and highlight meaningful units of text relevant to not only the research topic and research questions but also nuanced and new questions that emerged. In the next step, units of text dealing with the same issue were grouped together in analytic categories and themes and given provisional definitions. The same unit of text could be included in more than one theme. Each category may also be linked to other categories with guidance from the conceptual framework. Thematic analysis was used to provide a detailed thematic description of the data in relation to the researcher's primary question.

Since this is an exploratory study, inductive thematic analysis was employed due to its robustness on a descriptive and exploratory piece of work (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011). Therefore, this approach was suited to this study.

Here, a theme was set to represent something important or repetitive in the data set. The "keyness" of a theme is not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures; rather, it is based on the extent to which a theme captures something important in relation to the overall research question. In each theme, a systematic process was employed within the explicit or surface meanings of the data (Boyatzis 1998). Clear definitions and names for these themes were generated. The data was reviewed to ensure that names, descriptions, events, and other data sets that support the chosen themes were identified. Finally, the researcher related the analysis back to our research questions and extant literature, which allowed us to theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications (Aronson, 1995; Patton, 1990). Through this process, the researcher identified the following major themes: legitimacy, inclusivity, the capacity of organisations, and historical events that lead to a peace that is sustainable, the role of collaboration, institutions of peace and, funding and peace finance in more depth.

In this study, the descriptive findings were used for the further development of an analysis of the representation of the local approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan. Cheek (2000) has some useful observations about moving from the descriptive to the "discursive". In the case of desktop research, texts are a form of data which was collected within the research. The meanings in these texts are considered as the product of dominant discourses that permeate those texts. These texts were interrogated in order to allow the uncovering of unspoken and hidden assumptions. Such analysis allowed the researcher to look beyond whether these sets of data were poor or a good record of the events, but rather interrogate the nature of the reality created, not what is recorded by why and why other accounts were not recorded. As Cheek (2000) argues, the aim is to bring out these underlying assumptions and dominant discourses that would then be taken for granted as knowledge (this focus has also been explored in chapter 2). The emerging themes and patterns explored in terms of the original research questions through the local turn literature and documents and perceptions of the local approaches to peacebuilding and actors from both the international and the South Sudanese actors were then triangulated between primary and secondary data to identify common and contrasting practices within the data sets.

4.7. Validity and reliability, trustworthiness and credibility

This section describes how validity and reliability form a qualitative paradigm includes "credibility", "transferability", "dependability" and "confirmability" The research aims to maintain the quality of the inquiry described in the sections that follow.

Credibility (internal validity) in this research refers to establishing that the results of the qualitative inquiry have credibility or are to be believed. In the thesis, credibility was established through rigorous

techniques and methods that were used, and the credibility of the researcher. Rigour in methods and techniques was done by providing a full description of the research design, methods, and the fieldwork procedures and processes have been given in this chapter. This detailed account gives a full account of all procedures taken, challenges experienced, and blind spots experienced. In addition, there is an account of the researcher's biography, values, experience, knowledge and biases that she brings to this inquiry (Appendix H). This self-reflection creates an open and honest narrative that resonates well with readers (Creswell, 2003).

Transferability, which is the external validity, answers the question of how research findings can be applied to other contexts or other respondents. This research's aim is not to provide an account that can necessarily be used to generalise to a population, as the research focus is based on a certain context (Marshall & Rossman, 1993). In addition, the argument brought up in chapter 2 and 3 shows that there exists pluriversality and context-sensitivity when it comes to different experiences. However, there is some level of transferability which can be achieved by what Lincoln and Guba (2002) suggest as "thick descriptions", by collecting detailed descriptions of data in context, and by reporting the data with detail and precision (see also Creswell, 2003). These thick descriptions allow the reader to be transported to the setting of the research and give them a sense of experience that the researcher shares. By using purposive sampling, the researcher maximised the range of information that can be collected (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). There was a great deal of detail given to the report on the findings in order to ensure transferability (Creswell, 2003).

Dependability (reliability): Merriam (1995) explains that reliability revolves around the ability that the measures of the same phenomenon can be repeated with multiple replications, which indicates the stability or reliability of the phenomenon. She goes further and problematises the notion of reliability in social sciences, as human behaviour is not static: thus, she argues that qualitative researchers ought to understand the world and thus the reality of events from the perspective of those in it. This ties to the argument of chapter 2 that there are many perspectives and the possibility of many possible interpretations – it is therefore not wholly possible to have a complete replication of the measures, as a replication of qualitative research will not yield the same results (Merriam, 1995:56). The aim of this research is not to produce a replicable result, as that will imply a hundred percent accuracy without a margin of error, as well as replicating the biases of the researcher and the researched who form the study. The result of this thesis can, however, be applied to various situations by taking into account the possibility of biases.

This dilemma is addressed by Lincoln and Guba (2000) by suggesting instead the use of the term "dependability" to check the consistency of the results and the data collected. They suggest the following strategies in promoting consistency:

Triangulation: This refers to multiple methods of collecting data. Triangulation was carried out by using both primary and secondary data sets and different methods of collecting data, including focus groups and seminars, documents, and in-depth interviews.

Peer examination: This is the process of checking the consistency of the emerging findings with the methods of data collection. In addition to providing sufficient details of the whole research process in this chapter, the researcher also presented her research in academic meetings and conferences. Here critical readers were used to checking the coherence and consistency between the findings and the methods of data collection.

Confirmability (objectivity): this is the degree to which the research focuses on the scientific problem rather than the biases of the researcher. Lincoln and Guba (2000) suggest a thorough account of appropriate methodology, which allows for an adequate audit trail. This can include raw data and a product of analysis. An audit trail describes in detail how data was collected, how categories were derived, and how decisions were made throughout the inquiry (Wideen et al., 1998). This trail should be able to guide readers on how the conclusions and interpretations were reached.

4.7.1. Ethical Considerations

This research's proposed methodology and plan was submitted to the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Humanities for approval (Appendix E). The principle of informed consent was applied. As indicated in section 4.5.1., in order to collect data from all the respondents, a letter was written to all intended responders to both clearly set out the aims and objectives of the research and elicit their consent and that of the staff to participate in the research (Appendix C). In this regard, nobody was coerced into participating in the study. One organisation refrained from being referred to in the study. However, their data was used to inform the inquiry and various questions used in other interviews.

For the in-depth interviews, the research participants were fully informed of the aims, benefits, and hazards of the research along with with the right to abstain and confidential nature of the research in the participant information leaflet (Appendix A).

Permission to conduct research for this research was granted by the relevant authorities, which included police clearance to conduct interviews in Juba (see Appendix F) and a letter of institutional support (see Appendix B). This research followed ethical practices that relate to being sensitive to age, gender, political affiliation, culture, as well as the voluntary participation of respondents. The research was conducted in a transparent manner, and the researcher ensured that no research procedures raised any ethical concerns for the research participants.

Only adult members of the community (over 18 years of age) took part in the research and participants were requested to give consent (see Appendix C) before participating. A formal consent form was included in the study, and the researcher gave participants information on the purpose of the research

(see Appendix A), how the research is conducted (for example the use of semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions), how information will be stored, and the method in which information will be disseminated (in other words, for academic purposes).

Research participants took part in the research willingly, and the researcher gave participants the option to withdraw from the research at any point. Research respondents could skip any questions they deemed unsuitable, and government officials had the leeway to waiver their titles and participate in their own capacity and not the office they hold.

All the materials gathered during the research were only used for academic purposes. Where appropriate, technical devices such as camera and audio recording machines were used to collect data, but with the consent of the research participants. All gathered material would be stored in a lockable safe at the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria for a minimum of 15 years and any access to these materials would be warranted by the relevant university authorities.

4.8. Conclusion

The chapter explored two main aims. Firstly, the chapter described the methodology used to reach the main aim of the thesis. The procedures to conduct both secondary and primary data collection methods were explored. In this chapter, methods and the methodology used in this research were explained. This allowed for the exploration of the main research method, design, and strategies that were used to guide the study.

The second aim was presented in the form of an argument that exists in methodological studies, which concerns the neutrality and reflexivity of the researcher. This chapter outlined how current methodological research within the qualitative non-positivist approach is not value-free, and there is a need for reflexivity on three levels. That is the epistemological position, data collection methods, and analysis. The research gave an account of the procedures of "reflexivity" during the research process. This was to account for any bias that may have affected the findings. This is also addressed through outlining and addressing the credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability concerns of the research. Lastly, the chapter also addressed the limitations faced by the study, and ethical considerations were highlighted.

CHAPTER FIVE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND TOP-DOWN PEACE PROCESSES IN THE CIVIL CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

5.1. Introduction

The post-cold war expansion and increase of international peacebuilding interventions in conflict-affected states have led to questions being raised about the nature of interventions that are argued to be neo-imperialist (Chandler, 2006; Duffield, 2001). As mentioned in chapter 2, the liberal peace paradigm has served as a basis for internationally assisted peacebuilding, where the focus is almost exclusively on the relationship between peacebuilders (mostly international) and the central government (Lemay-Hébert, 2013:242). Paris (2002:637) suggests that current peacebuilding practices "resemble an updated (and more benign) version of the mission civilisatrice of the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to 'civilise' dependent populations and territories".

Liberal peacebuilding works with a standardised blueprint generally applied to all operations. Its most important actors consist of civil servants, politicians, open civil society, free media, police and judges, while the most marginalised in society, including citizens, communities, kinship ties, and issues of agency and context, have been subsumed. With such a broad mixture of actors and strategies involved in peacebuilding processes, the question that confronts scholars in peacebuilding, and especially the local turn scholars, is whether and how the local actors and approaches to peacebuilding are recognised, accommodated and even further involved in top-down approaches to peacebuilding that are employed in post-conflict societies. At best, Richmond (2010:667) argues that they are only recognised rhetorically. As discussed in chapter 3, the interest of the "local turn" is that peacebuilding addresses issues of inclusivity, participation and ownership. Despite the increasing use of notions such as "local participation" and "local ownership" in the context of transitions from war to peace, peace interventions continue to be understood and conceptualised in an overwhelmingly "Western" rational framework (Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2005; Chandler, 2006).

Towards the contribution of literature on post-liberalism and peace-from-below, the chapter aims to contribute towards the gap in the literature on how liberal approaches to peacebuilding interact with approaches that would fall under the local turn. Here, liberal approaches to peacebuilding subscribe to and follow the Western epistemological approach, as explained in section 2.2 (Autesserre, 2011, Woodward, 2007).

In this chapter, a historical overview of the high-level peace negotiations in South Sudan is offered to analyse how inclusive they were. According to Wilén and Chapaux (2011), there are few successful examples that demonstrate how such negotiations take place in practice and within everyday peacebuilding and development activities. Thus, this chapter aims to engage with the first sub-question concerning whether there is evidence of the "local turn" in the mainstream and top-down peace

strategies. Further, as an empirical discussion of concepts raised in section 3.2.2, the chapter is interested in how these approaches engage with inclusivity, local agency, ownership and inclusivity of the bottom-level actors and what the impacts of these are. In order to tackle the question, the chapter will provide an analysis of peace negotiations and peace agreements as these are the most dominant peacebuilding mechanisms used by the elite of South Sudan and their international partners.

The consideration of peace negotiations and peace agreements as being a process of peacebuilding is twofold. Concerning the first, as WennMann (2009) argues, that there is a continuum in peacebuilding in the continuum of conflict management strategies. While the traditional flow is from a mediation process, a peace agreement, to a humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations, all the flaws of these presiding stages are inherently adopted by peacebuilding. Thus the position of peacebuilding allows in to look at the past decision-making stages and towards the future in preventing future-armed conflict. Secondly, it is important to realise that peacebuilding interactions do not stop during armed conflict or mediation processes and, it is essential to understand peace agreements as a continuous process of the transition to peace. This is argued by Olivier, Neethling, and Mokoena (2009), who state that peacebuilding should not be seen as completely separate to peacemaking and peacekeeping (as was also discussed in section 1.2.1.1). Thus, as mentioned in chapter 1, the following analysis defines peacebuilding as an umbrella concept that encompasses long-term transformative efforts that combines the classical peacebuilding strategies, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

This will be done by briefly presenting the historical progress of the North versus South conflict in Sudan between 1955 and, 2005, leading up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses various peace negotiations and peace agreements that took place between the same periods. In section 5.3.1 the North-South war's peace negotiations are discussed, while section 5.3.2 discusses the transition period. Here the effects and results of the previous peace agreements and the consequent civil war that broke out in 2013 (detailed in chapter 1) will be highlighted. Section 5.3.3 discusses the post-2013 civil war peace negotiations to analyse the mechanisms for inclusion in the mediation by IGAD. The final part of the chapter, section 5.4, discusses the top-down attempt of the GoSS to reach communities through national dialogue. Lastly, a conclusion is provided.

As mentioned in chapter 4, in the sections describing the South Sudan context, the discussion draws heavily on the interviews with South Sudanese informants as a way in which to contribute to the knowledge of a context being developed by people on their own terms. This aligns with the methodological aim of conducting phenomenological research that presents the interpretation and experiences as interpreted by the participants. The research findings presented in this chapter and (the two that follow) draw from the observations, semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group interviews conducted with key informants in South Sudan and Kenya (these methods were described fully in chapter 4).

5.2. North-South and South-South development of civil wars (1956-2005 and 2013-2018)

Since 2011, South Sudan has been involved in multiple; resource, power and identity-based, conflicts (Wassara, 2015). The failure of the GoSS to manage this situation has led scholars and practitioners to call for a special focus on bottom-up engagements that, have in the past and, can result in positive efforts to achieve sustained peace (Knopf, 2013). A representative from South Sudan Network for Democracy and Elections (SSUNDE), a local NGO in Juba, expressed this same sentiment during an interview:

> The common understanding is often that elite-based methods deliver national-level and nation-wide stability. This is true, but also misguided. Local approaches to community building at the sub-national level are not new in South Sudan, and there are decades of experience of working to support peaceful coexistence to learn from. Thus, alternative processes can achieve mobilisation of communities (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018)

The aftermath of Sudan's independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on 1 January 1956, saw a civil war, for greater autonomy for southern Sudan, break out (Natsios, 2012). This resulted in the Republic of South Sudan experiencing a protracted civil war that lasted over five decades.

> The first civil war started in 1955, a year before Sudan's independence. The conflict was majorly due to dissatisfaction in the South over their marginalisation in the political representation of the country. A member of the GoSS reports: In 1953, when we were supposed to get independence, the Egyptian condominium conference was held in the North in Egypt. That conference was dominated by northern elites. Southern elites and the educated were very few. Since the negotiations were not favourable to the southerners, on 18 August 1955, there were reports of mutiny in Torit by the southern soldiers. Southerners were saying if independence was going to be declared in 1956 we didn't want to be part of the North. This sparked the liberation movement, and that time it was rudimentary, there were no proper weapons nor a good strategic plan, most of the strategy depended on random attacks and ambush (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

The conflict escalated in 1962 owing to improved organisation and consolidation of Southern forces under the rebel group Anyanya[12] led by Joseph Lagu; who fought for independence for the South (Zapata, 2011). Other actors, including the church, were also responsive to the political tension of 1962. A member of the South Sudan Catholic Bishop's secretariat stated;

> Before 1962, the southern church and the northern government had an existing relationship; however, after that period, the northern government issued the 1962 Missionaries' Act, the persecution of the church. The then Sudan government also abolished Sunday, which used to be

[12] The Anyanya (also Anya-Nya) were a southern Sudanese separatist rebel army formed during the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972). A separate movement that rose during the Second Sudanese Civil War was called Anyanya II. Anyanya, named after a poison, means "snake venom" in the Madi language. Anya-nya reinvigorated the movement that erupted on 18 August 1955and continued the fight against the Sudanese government in the first Sudanese civil war (1955-72).

> the praying day of the Christians and turned it into a working period for the people of South Sudan. The Christians found it difficult to accept this. This 1962 Missionary Society Act was used to expel all the missionaries from South Sudan in 1964. Most of the churches in South Sudan were closed, the seminaries, missionaries left. Keep in mind that most of the services in South Sudan were rendered by the church; for instance, all the schools were under the church. Most of our church schools, particularly the seminary schools, moved to Uganda. They stayed in Uganda until 1972 (Interview with a representative of the South Sudan Catholic Bishop's secretariat. Juba. 12.05.2018).

That was the beginning of the church getting involved in politics on behalf of the people not only to advocate for their rights but also to fight. The latter of which is demonstrated through the use of the church and other religious bodies in the South to give momentum to the Anyanya. A member of the church explains,

> The Anyanya mostly depended on the support from the church because of their persecution by Khartoum and their covert nature. That's a crucial period that not many want to talk about (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018).

Aside from the civil war, intra-regional disunity within the individual North and South regions was also a source of instability. The North faced a series of coups; Sudan's first president, General Abboud, stepped down, and the democratic rule that followed him was toppled over by a coup led by Nimeiri in 1969. In 1985, Gen Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahabtook over from Nimeiri through a bloodless coup. Meanwhile, the South struggled to unify amid ethnic differences and internal conflict. The region was characterised by frequent violent conflict for the duration of both civil wars, with little overall unity (Branch & Mampilly, 2005). This civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (see chapter 6) between then Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu leader and founder of the Anyanya Rebel group. The GoSS representative explained that,

> In 1972, 27 February the Addis Ababa agreement was signed. That period witnessed a lot of rehabilitation, return and resettlement of IDPs, particularly from East Africa. We also observed reintegration of about 6000 Anyanya into the Sudan armed forces (SAF). Some of them were now sent to civil servants to act on other places. South Sudan at that time, had a local autonomy, they called it higher executive council, that was based here in Juba. There was a lot of development which took place. Roads were opened, infrastructure improved, schools and universities were opened here for the first time (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

The local autonomy created self-governance in South Sudan under the high executive council. This was structured to give primacy of autonomy to a select few who were to lead (and in many ways represent) the southern Sundanese: a decentralised system of government where the south had its own parliament,

own government and its own plans. A member of the church describes the inter-regional fundamentals of this arrangement;

> Khartoum only gave them [the Southern representatives/leaders] grants in aids while Khartoum controlled the other foreign affairs. Most of the things were under the high executive council. The problem was that the South was becoming a completely democratic society; the parliament in Juba was more democratic than the parliament in Khartoum. This cultivated the fear among the northerners to think that the South is developing more to become an independent country (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018).

Agitated by the Islamic revolution of 1983, Nimeiri singly revoked the Addis Ababa peace agreement and declared entire Sudan would be governed under Sharia law. This led to the outbreak of the second civil war of 1983-2005. His decision was based on the power of the Arab elite more than popular demand for Islamic statehood. In reaction to the outbreak of this war, Dr John Garang de Mabior, who was a soldier in Anyanya, formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983 (De Waal, 2009: 4). On the second war, the GoSS representative stated;

> In 1977, many things happened that contributed to the second civil war, for instance, there was an agreement between the northern political parties UMMA, DUP and National Islamic Front to ask the military government and former president Jaafar Nimeiri that if he didn't nullify the agreement, they would not support him in the next elections. Nimeiri began to create problems about the south developing a parliament in Juba until it became difficult for South Sudan high government to work. On 5 June 1983, the Addis Ababa agreement was totally abrogated. This sent people of South Sudan back to arms and the SPLA (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

Nimeiri would later be removed from power in 1985, and his army chief of staff, As-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the pro-Islamist leader (who had attempted a coup against Nimeiry in 1976) was elected to take over form Nimeiri in the1986 general elections. The next general elections in Sudan would only take place in 2010. Omar Al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) (the main party in Sudan) removed al-Mahdi in a bloodless coup in 1989.

The second civil war was fought largely between the southern parts comprising greater Bhar el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, with significant fighters and senior military commanders and elites from Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and other marginalised parts of Sudan – all attracted by the New Sudan metaphor. The war was the deadliest and one of Africa's longest conflicts, claiming more than two million lives and displacing thousands, mostly to neighbouring countries and further abroad (Blanchard, 2016). The high cost of war and sustained diplomatic engagement and articulation of the New Sudan vision by its well-respected leader Dr John Garang persuaded the international community to force peace on the parties. Dr Garang was a major influence on the movement that led to the

foundation of South Sudan and the vice president of Sudan for about 21 days before his death in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005.

Garang had been fighting for a "New Sudan" since 1983. His political ideology was for a united Sudan. He was a strong advocate for national unity: minorities together formed a majority and therefore should rule. Together, Garang believed, they could replace Omar al-Bashir with a government made up of representatives from "all ethnic groups and religions in Sudan". His first real effort for the cause, under his command, occurred in July 1985 with the SPLA's incursion into Kordofan (Cockett, 2010.). As a consequence, IGAD intervened and brokered the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the principal warring parties – the SPLM/A and the Sudan government and witnessed by the international community and regional governments – acting as guarantors and pledging considerable financial assistance (see chapter 6) (Zapata, 2011).

5.3. Top-level actors' and top-down strategies in peacebuilding: elite accords

The peacebuilding mechanisms employed in South Sudan during the civil war between the North and the South focused on state and institution building, with minimal local involvement and institutionalisation. Such strategies hinge on the notion of "liberal peace" that promotes peace through democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, and a free globalised market. This is done through institutional building/strengthening at a high political level and is often detached from local institutions (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz & Russett, 1996). Given South Sudan's protracted and violent conflict, such a high-level peace is not accessible and sometimes quite unrelatable to its people. The inadequacies of the approach expose the gap between the political elites (or the decision-makers) and the citizens, who are often thought of as recipients of, rather than participants in, peace.

In the previous peace negotiations between SPLA/M and the Khartoum government, two approaches to peacebuilding became evident in negotiations. First, termed Dr John Garang's approach, direct participation was restricted only to the SPLA and NCP while a consultative process in which all agreements were approved in South Sudan was instituted. Experts were later called in to define the strategy and negotiations and draft the text for the SPLA/M.

The second approach, the Salva's approach, also, the South-South dialogue, included the involvement of all civil society and other actors. This stopped the North from using South Sudanese militia against South Sudan and became the blueprint for the participation of actors apart from SPLA/M in the national government (Interview with GoS representative member, 2018).

The next section will show that the first war focused more on John Garang's approach, while the second focused on Salva Kiir's approach. Studies have found strong evidence that peace negotiations characterised by high involvement are more sustainable in the long term, while negotiations with low involvement result in resumed warfare (Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2006). Paffenholz, Kew, and John (2006) agree and state that direct involvement in negotiations is considered the most beneficial mode of

engagement in mediation. However, Wanis-St, John & Kew (2006) argue that, in situations where the local is weak and open to manipulation from other actors, the participation of the society in direct negotiations may encumber the entire process. In the South Sudan context, the case for a small number of participants in the negotiation process could be more efficacious, especially since most parties, aside from the Government, SPLM-IO, the political detainees and the Church, are deemed weak and inexperienced in peace negotiations. Kew and John (2008) note that in peace negotiations, disorganisation increases with the number of actors involved, and more parties can lead to a progressive deterioration of effective communication. Additionally, the normative belief that civil society groups will be "civil" and promote peaceful solutions does not always prove to be the case in post-conflict societies. This led Paffenholz, Kew, and John (2006), to contend that with a strong civil society, there will be a meaningful contribution to the process of creating a platform to link the needs of the people, with high-level discussions between the protagonists. This will be discussed in the post-2013 peace negotiations.

5.3.1. First war peace accords

South Sudanese leadership has promoted peace mainly through peace negotiations. This is demonstrated in three main peace accords: the Addis Ababa peace agreement that took place in 1972, and the 2005 CPA and the [Revaitalised] Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). In an assessment of these peace efforts in South Sudan, it is helpful to have a brief review of previous peace accords. This can help measure the strides made and to determine any accurate recommendation for future courses of action.

5.3.1.1. Addis Ababa Agreement (1972)

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was the outcome of negotiations in Ethiopia between the then-president Nimeiri's government and representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The agreement ended the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), established the Southern Region and fostered decade of relative peace. Several factors led to the signing of this peace agreement: the conflict had reached a stalemate (Schumann, 2010); Nimeiri, unlike his predecessors, made attempts at fostering a relationship with the South and had support on the ground; Joseph Lagu (who led the *Anyanya*- see section 5.2) united the southern rebellion into an organised force, making collective bargaining possible and Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, stepped in to oversee the mediation process with input from the World Council of Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches. The two parties entered into the negotiations with serious intent to reach an agreement; neither party was negotiating to play for time on the battlefield.

The agreement granted the South regional autonomy, a secular government and an independent presidential system (Battahani, 2006). During this period, there was provision for two vice presidents, appointed by the president, and historically one of them would be from the south. Lagu was appointed

second Vice President in Sudan (Nouwen, 2007). Unfortunately, this peace agreement would later be abrogated by President Nemeiri as he sought favour from the Arab elites to continue his reign.

The Ethiopian government's role in the negotiations, although indirect, offered a safe and neutral venue for the negotiations. Emperor Haile Selassie gave his advice only when appealed to by both sides; he delivered it diplomatically, unambiguously, and his position as an elder statesman of Africa meant that both sides respected his advice.

Participation of non-elite actors save for the churches, in these peace accords, was minimal. The church acted as mediator between the southern "rebels" and the GoS. The role of the religious bodies in endorsing the negotiations was critical so much, so the negotiation process was kicked off by several months of preliminary meetings between representatives of the two parties, in this case, facilitated by external agencies, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC)[13]. Section 6.1.3 discusses further the role of the church as a whole. As a member of the South Sudan Catholic Bishop's secretariat explains,

> [It was the] Sudan council of churches that began contact with the rebels and the government to bring about the 1972 Addis Ababa peace accord, which granted the local autonomy for people of South Sudan within the unity. It is through the SSCC that brought together the rebels and the government of Khartoum in Ethiopia to discuss peace. On 27 February 1972, they signed the Addis Ababa peace agreement (Interview with a representative of the South Sudan Catholic Bishop's secretariat. Juba. 12.05.2018).

The role of chair of the negotiations fell on Canon Burgess of the AACC. This role's responsibility was strictly that of a moderator and not mediator. Canon Burgess facilitated the negotiations by; summarising points made, asking the delegations to clarify their positions, keeping time, breaking for prayer to allow tempers to cool and reminding the parties of what was at stake should the negotiations end in failure. He was never expected to, and did not, provide drafts for the two sides to accept and sign.

There were other southern Sudanese "stakeholders" present as observers. They played no direct role in the formal negotiations. A member of the GoSS added that,

> I believe other people who were just observers in the Adiss Ababa meetings had an influence on the delegates in informal discussions outside the negotiations (Interview with a representative with an officer from SSuNDE, a local NGO, Juba. 14.04.2018).

[13] The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) was established in Kampala, Uganda in 1963. It currently comprises 173 Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox, Pentecostal and African-Independent member churches and organisations from 40 countries, representing approximately 120 million Christians in Africa

5.3.1.2. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

In 2005, the civil war between the NCP (who led the whole of Sudan, including the South) and SPLM/A (who for a long time operated covertly and in the bushes of Southern Sudan), the two parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA comprised of six peace protocols signed between 2002 and 2005, at various negotiation processes, by different representatives and actors, namely the Machakos Protocol; the Agreement on Power Sharing; the Agreement on Wealth Sharing; the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict; the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States; and the Agreement on Security Arrangements.

The Machakos Protocol (Chapter I) signed in Kenya on 20 July 2002, consisted of principles underlying the peace process as a whole and broad principles of government and governance. These included the prioritisation of unity over secession, the Southern right of secession based on a referendum, the importance of religion but the right of persons to be governed by their own beliefs, and "Transition Process" which set out the six-year interim period before the referendum on secession. It also created the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement, consisting of members from the SPLM, NCP, IGAD member states, observer states and any other "countries or regional or international bodies" the parties deem appropriate (IGAD Machakos Protocol, 2002).

The agreement on power-sharing (Chapter II) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004. It reaffirmed the principles the parties settled therein relating to the governance of Sudan (section 1.1-1.3 of Chapter II). The Principles of Administration sub-section states that the GoNU shall prioritise government decentralisation with more power in local administration (section 1.5.1.1. Chapter II) upholds the supremacy of the National Constitution (section 1.5.1.2. Chapter II), and creates the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan to operate in the Southern States (section 1.5.1.3-4. Chapter II). The Power Sharing Agreement also set up numerous institutions and commissions, including the National Security Council and Service (NSCS) (section 2.7.1-2. Chapter I), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), a Human Rights Commission and a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFMAC) (Section 2.10. Chapter II).

The Wealth Sharing Agreement (Chapter III), signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004. The preamble acknowledged the link between oil and the war. It acknowledged the need for peace, security and development in the South, and recommended adherence to international best practice and standards on resource sharing, suggesting more international input for this agreement. The agreement sought to establish who is responsible for the management of resources rather than determine ownership of land and subterranean resources (Section 2.1.-2.2. Chapter III).

The fourth agreement was the Abyei Protocol (Chapter IV), signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004. The principles of the protocol describe Abyei as a territory "defined by the nine Ngok Dinka

chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905". However, the "Misseryia and other nomadic people maintain their customary and traditional rights to move across the territory of Abyei to graze their cattle" (Protocol between the government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on the resolution of Abyei conflict, Naivasha, Kenya, May 26, 2004) (CHAPTER IV).

Fifth, the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (also Chapter V), signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004. Though dealing with similar issues to Abyei, this agreement goes into greater depth and encourages popular consultation of citizens in these areas to gauge their views on the agreement reached.

Lastly, Security Arrangements (Chapter VI) was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003. This agreement addressed ceasefire implementation, demilitarisation and organisation of the armies after the conflict. The "Status of the Two-Armed Forces" chapter stipulates that the SAF and SPLA forces would remain separate in the interim period. Both parties would agree to downsize their armed forces proportionately and that their mandate to maintain internal law and order following the ceasefire would cease except for state emergencies. These were also accompanied by Appendixes I and II, which dealt with permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 30 October 2004 and the Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 31 December 2004 respectively.

The agreement made the right to self-determination possible for South Sudan, as a result, facilitated the secession from the North, which occurred in July 2011 (El Tom 2009:1). The CPA, which was envisioned by John Garang, was accepted by both the president and vice president during the negotiation period, Omar Al-Bashir and Ali Osman Taha, as they hoped that the process would turn Sudan into a non-revolutionary model and democratic state (Verhoeven, 2012:2). For a time, a Government of National Unity (GoNU) operated in Sudan with John Garang acting as Vice President. In addition to these, the United Nations Security Council authorised the UN mission in Sudan (UNMISS) to support the implementation of the CPA, establishing several benchmarks for the peaceful end of the conflict, including a referendum on self-determination for South Sudan.

5.3.1.3. The inclusive outlook of the CPA

Dr Garang, former leader of the SLPA/M, and Sudan's former Vice President Ali Osman Taha for the NCP, were known as men capable of negotiation, compromise and decision-making. General Lazaro Sumbeiywo (who served as Kenya's Special Envoy to the IGAD-led Sudanese peace process (1997-98) and then as a mediator (2001-2005), was also a skilled chief mediator. However, this also represents a key failure of the CPA: the negotiations remained overly exclusive. In its preamble, the CPA purports to "guarantee lasting peace, security for all, justice and equality" (212). This meant that the CPA needed to rely on more stakeholders than simply the NCP and SPLM. Otherwise, it would be only the immediate

and the narrow that would be addressed, and long-term issues that were not priorities to the warring parties would be left off the table.

The request of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)[14], civil society and various political groups of Sudan to join the negotiations formally or as observers were not granted. This proved that the IGAD-led mediation from its inception was very exclusionary. This lack of inclusivity in the peace process later compounded many of the problems that have emerged in the post-CPA period. In some instances, the SPLM/A and the GoS appeared sympathetic to the interests of some of the other parties; they, however, did not want these parties to have an acknowledged role in the peace process. This also included some of their closest allies. While the GoS opposed the motion to bring the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to the negotiating table because they were afraid they might be outnumbered, the SPLM/A feared that members of the NDA might find a common cause with their northern brothers and their participation would detract from the north-south focus of the negotiations. Apart from the NCP and the SPLM, other political parties were denied participation in the Sudan IGAD peace process. Some parties did not fight for participation, as they did not believe it would be successful. For example, Sadig Al-Mahdi, the Umma Party leader, concluded that the negotiations would only reach a bilateral agreement, and only after would there be a need for wider consultation (Cliffe, 2004). These political parties were not ready for inclusion.

There was also very little engagement of the two parties and their constituents. The agreement, therefore, served to delay, and probably intensify, problems at a later stage. The SPLM/A was slow to appreciate the sentiments of the people of the Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile; although this made it easier to settle and sign the Machakos protocol. As a result, there was a political explosion that took place outside the formal negotiations. This was the same in the case of the Abyei dispute, where the government refused to implement the Abyei Border Commission's report when it caused outrage among its Missiriyia supporters.

Although there was generally a lack of consultation, to a small extent, the leaders of the South found the need to speak to their constituents. A participant who was involved with the church at the time notes that,

> Prior to the final text of the CPA, Dr Garang went to the grassroots level in 2003 to sensitise [the people] about [the] peace initiative and to gather the opinions of the local people with view to incorporate them in the peace agreement (Interview with a South Sudanese former church member, Juba. Skype call. 12-06-2019).

Civil societies were also denied participation in the negotiations. The North had a well-developed and politically active civil society in Africa in the post-colonial era, but by the late 1980s, it had followed

[14] The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is a group of Sudanese political parties that was formed in 1989 to oppose the regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir after he seized power in a military coup on June 6, 1989.

the general pattern of NGOs becoming service-oriented and heavily dependent on funding from the international community (Abdel, 2006). The South lacked in this aspect. What semblance of civil society they had, was a creation of the international community and was externally driven in the context of humanitarian intervention and as a result did not have deep roots (Young, 2002). In 1989, severe restrictions were placed on the political activities of NGOs, and the SPLM/A was only marginally more accommodating to civil society in the areas under its control. By the time the IGAD peace process began taking off, there was some easing of pressures on civil society. However, the more nuanced approach of the government also led to the emergence of NGOs in the North that were thinly disguised instruments of the NCP, while in the South a parallel but much weaker process was underway (Assal, 2016).

As the negotiations drew to a close, the IGAD mediators, the GoS, and the SPLM/A saw the need for the peace agreement to be accepted and legitimised through the support of the Sudanese public. This increased the SPLM/A's sensitivity to the demands of southern civil society as a result. One component of civil society was a strong commitment to self-determination and attempted to allay the fears of the NDA that its interests were not being considered in the negotiations. The GoS, in turn, took various non-governmental groups, tribal leaders, and civil society to some of the negotiations. Their role, however, was limited to providing legitimacy for an agreement that had almost been finalised "as an exercise in public relations" (Young, 2007).

Young (2007) also argues that there is no indication that either the Sudan IGAD Peace Secretariat mediators, the IGAD countries, United States, Britain, Norway and Italy who participated in the negotiations, considered the lack of broader participation a critical obstacle to the peace process. He adds that the mediators did not appear unsympathetic, but they were just "not particularly concerned" in the inclusion of the civil society (Young, 2007). They feared, however, that the presence of civil society groups would serve to harden the positions of the parties. Indeed, many clearly saw it as an advantage.

Summarising the role of civil society in the peace process, Hassan Abdel pointedly says,

> Civil society influence on the Naivasha process that led to the CPA was ultimately very limited. Like the northern opposition, political parties, civil society was marginalized, perceived by the government as backing SPLM/A positions on the main obstacles in the negotiations... Moreover, the other IGAD countries shared similar views to Sudan on the roles and rights of civil society, whose engagement in briefings and informal sessions was only made possible after the wider international community became involved (Abdel, 2006).

In addition, one component that the peace negotiations lacked was a commitment to reconciliation. The need for North-South reconciliation would only be realised by involving the Sudanese people, and the starting point was civil society. However, a component of reconciliation was suggested by the IGAD Secretariat during the CPA but was opposed by the GoS and later by the SPLM. Both parties knew they

had committed major crimes during the course of the civil war, which would be discussed in public forums taking up reconciliation, and they were reluctant to see that happen.

Young (2007) argues that the argument for narrow-based talks was based on several contentions. Firstly, it was held that the all-encompassing nature of the negotiations made the process extremely complex, and hence the participation of additional actors would make the process unworkable. Secondly, the mediators feared to enlarge the numbers around the bargaining table would inevitably lead to leaking of confidential information, and this, in turn, could be used to galvanise dissent that could disrupt the process. Thus, there was a strong view that "small was good", and hence a desire to keep participation at a "manageable" level. Lastly, civil society was seen as weak. Lesch (1998) argues, however, that even acknowledging the weaknesses of Sudan's civil society, it could still have played a constructive role in the peace process and served to reduce or eliminate some of the problems that increasingly have become known in the post-CPA period. By not engaging Sudanese civil society and failing to make the Sudanese people feel part of the peace process, the IGAD mediation had the unanticipated and wholly unconstructive effect of giving life to the top-down, and what young (2007) deems illegitimate, and no longer a viable political culture of the country.

5.3.2. Birth of a new state riddled with conflict

Despite the above processes, peace in South Sudan has remained elusive. During the CPA negotiations, attempts at peace from the top-down proved to be problematic and reduced to an exercise of the assertion of power by the international community and a platform to address self-interest by the GoSS and its opposition, rather than resulting in bringing about unity. A participant from GREDA mentioned,

> I think the peace agreement because the way it is portrayed is between the rebels on one side and the government on the other side. According to IGAD's analysis, this problem is related to power and security. The whole effort has been concentrated on power-sharing and security sector reform and such things. The small community peace agreement was not immediately included in the peace agreement. I believe they thought by signing a general peace agreement; consequently, the community conflict would end. It has not been included in the mainframe peace negotiations. The issue of accountability, [a] hybrid court came in, and I think it was focusing more on the crimes that have been committed between the fighting forces in government. If the hybrid court was formed, it was going to apply those to the community level because part of it there is truth and reconciliation commission where small conflicts will be catered for. But despite this knowledge, the formation of this court was still the decision and processes of the high government officials (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12. 04. 2018).

After the CPA (see section 5.3.1.2), South Sudanese participated in a referendum on January 9th, 2011 that determined their independence. With an overwhelming vote for secession, the country was declared

a new republic separate from North Sudan, and it would chart its own destiny (Crisis Group Africa, Report N°172, 2011; Nureldin Satti, 2010). The new government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) worked in making progress in establishing government ministries, adopting legislation and initiating key reforms in education curricula and the public sector. However, the government has been faced with innumerable demands and tangible peace dividends are minimal. As narrated by a member of the GoSS,

> After the referendum, we had many challenges. For instance, we had around 1 million South Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries; we had to open up the roads. People came with many expectations, such as people who dominated the war will be freed; health services and education will be free, among other things. Those became challenges to the government. This was a delicate set-up for conflict in such a tender state (Interview with a representative with an officer from SSuNDE, a local NGO, Juba. 14.04.2018).

As introduced in chapter 1, a few years after their secession and the end of the North-South conflict, the outbreak of the civil war in 2013 drew the attention of the international community, triggering substantial investments supporting national actors to achieve a lasting peace. Seemingly, there were issues that the CPA failed to address. Not only the ongoing violence in South Sudan but also unresolved political, cultural, ethnic, religious and economic problems have meant that numerous deadlines have passed without the hoped-for progress. There were several challenges. Besides the challenge of building a country, there were several post-referendum issues that remained unresolved and a threat to renewed tensions. As a member of the GoSS mentions,

> The period between 2005 and 2013 was a challenging period. The government in Khartoum was not really interested in the peace agreement. The core granters on the peace agreement were on the neck of Khartoum. First, Khartoum had an economic sanction from America. Secondly, Bashir was on the list of the people who were indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is why Bashir was not trusted much. But the co-granters were all there the UN, EU, and AU. It was difficult for them to dismantle the peace agreement. It was difficult because the South themselves had a lot of challenges (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

Some of the challenges included the following. First, there are contentions on issues of borders. For instance, as part of the CPA, the Abyei region was due to vote on whether to join South Sudan or remain North of the border. This voting would be between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Arabs. The CPA maintained that the Missiriya – nomadic cattle herders who spend up to six months of the year in Abyei – should be considered residents. However, the SPLM held that the Misseriya are only in Abyei for a short period each year and thus should not be granted this status. Without the referendum, the status of the territory and its peoples remains uncertain, causing deep tensions at the local level. There have been military assault between forces on the two sides over the years, and although on 20 June 2011 the SPLM

and the Government of Sudan (GoS) agreed in Addis Ababa to demilitarise Abyei, and authorised an Ethiopian force and the UN Interim Security Force to maintain security in the area of Abyei, there is still growing internal crisis, and as such a solution to the Abyei crisis will not be easy.

Apart from the Abyei border region, border movements have fuelled suspicions. There are specific areas of the international borders of Southern Sudan that are problematic. These areas are the Gambela, Baro and Pibor river areas on the Ethiopian border with Jonglei State; the Ilemi triangle of Eastern Equatoria state and Kenya; the central Equatoria state and Uganda boundary; and the Nile Congo watershed separating Western and Eastern Equatoria states between CAR and the DRC.

The second challenge is weak security. Pockets of insecurity in South Sudan are widespread, although security incidents appear to be selective. As narrated by a student at the University of Juba,

> Heavily reported areas often are from the bigger ethnic groups like the Dinkas and Nuers, and yet other smaller groups suffer equally deadly (but often unreported) conflicts, for example, Kyala in Torit, Kapoeta. If the government and other high-level actors engaged with the locals, they will be aware of these unreported cases (Interview with a participant at the University of Juba. 12.04.2018).

Oil insecurity is another issue in South Sudan, with estimates of 82 to 95 percent of the oil fields in the South (depending on where the border is drawn). In addition, southern armed groups and militia continued to overshadow South Sudan's post-independence period, causing fear and instability. Among the largest threats are insurrectionist forces in the oil-producing Greater Upper Nile region. These forces claim to seek systemic changes to the Southern government – or to overthrow it, citing. rampant corruption, nepotism and tribalism by the government. In October 2010, the SPLM/A started a string of campaigns through military and political efforts to quell internal dissent in the South.

At the political level, SPLM domination and constraints on political space remain sources of long-simmering discontent. Opposition voices, although still very weak, complain that the CPA unduly elevated the SPLM and inadvertently sowed the seeds for one-party rule. They argue that the accord's power-sharing formulas – which mandated 70 percent SPLM control of the executive and legislative branches at both state and GoSS level – unfairly anointed it and undermined the development of multiparty democracy.

This has led to the development of an idea of propaganda formation for consideration at the table. A participant from GREDA explains:

> Sometimes, if I am a member of parliament, and I want to get attention in the political space, I can mobilise the youth to create problems with another community. The government will realise there is a problem in that area and will want to come to my area and suppress the conflict. If they fail, they will make a peace agreement with me. Thus, some leaders in South Sudan have

> behaved like this at the local level. These leaders want to be integrated and their followers to be integrated into the army. In a way, they are trying to get into the government by rebellion. This rebellion is at the local level. Because of the insecurity of the government, there is a strategy of silencing opposition. It is not by political dialogue. It is first by force. After failing at ending the conflict, the government is often forced into accommodating the leaders' demands. This way, you will find multiple conflicts coming up at the rural and community level because they want to get attention. Eventually, the leaders getting this attention to enter the government, and they fail to bring peace because those who have not benefited will go back to fight. Sometimes, this strategy is not commonly known in the international arena, thus may not make it as an issue in high-level negotiations. Sometimes this is because the local in the villages people do not have any access to the mass media. This media suppression has resulted in painting a picture that the conflict in South Sudan is a political war between two personalities. If this was true, since 2015, Riek Machar has been in South Africa in exile, but war is still continuing (Interview with an officer from GREDA, a local NGO, Juba. 12.04.2018).

This culture was portrayed to gain prominence due to the set-up of peace negotiations which was set to benefit those at the table. Making a seat at the table a place someone can start a war for, instead of looking for local solutions towards peace and towards development. He went ahead to give two brief examples:

> First, there were two men; Joseph Baghasor, governor of Western Equatoria, and speaker of parliament James Baghe. They had a power struggle, as Baghe wanted the position of a governor and there was a rivalry that SPLM wanted to take over the governorship. They were both reported to be training their own forces to fight each other. However, Baghasor was relieved of this power, arrested and put in prison, while James Baghe was killed. Second, there is the example of the Murle leader, David Yau Yau, who was running as an independent candidate against the candidate in the ruling party. Initially, the Murle wanted a different state so they can be separate from the Dinka, as they believe they are a different ethnic group, and that is how the conflict started in 2010. However, in 2014 an agreement was reached with the government and retired Bishop Paride. Mr Yau Yau was incorporated into the government. While Mr Yau Yau was not the only cause of the conflict, he played a big role. But once he earned his position in the government, his area continued fighting because according to them, they did not get what they wanted (Interview with an officer from GREDA, a local NGO, Juba. 12.04.2018).

Cattle rustling is also a problem faced by many communities. Cattle are seen as a source of pride and wealth and are used in the payment of bride price. Inter-tribal cattle raiding results in revenge raids and counter raids. This is complicated by the politicisation of local problems by leaders. This situation is further capitalised on by the regime in the North. For example, in Warrap State, which is President Salva Kiir's state, the feuding goes beyond rustling and is largely political. In Jonglei state, the conflict is

between the Dinkas, Murles and Nuer. The issue is further compounded by the deep commercial links to cattle rustling, which can be traced to international criminal networks dealing with livestock, extending as far as slaughterhouses in the Gulf and in Nairobi, Kenya. A participant mentioned that,

> Cattle rustling tradition are so rooted among pastoralist communities, even if many of them understand the importance of education, families send some children to school, and others go raiding. In this way, the family ensures that they have enriched both ways (Interview with a member of the NPI- Africa, Nairobi, 24. 03. 2018).

Cattle rustling/raiding that is often accompanied by bitter tribal revenge killings, competition for resources, fights over boundaries and the presence of guns and ammunition. It has corrupted Sudanese youth who have not attended school for many generations. The slow process of Demobilization Disarmament Reintegration (DDR) and its close linkage with security sector reform (SSR)[15], the lack of service delivery, youth programmes, legislation and security at an operational level have hindered prospects of curbing cattle rustling. The arms complicate and bloody the conflict. The arms flow from Khartoum; others were acquired during the civil war, and others from the border regions of Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Ethiopia, who are also caught up in this raiding dilemma. During the decades of the North-South war, ethnic groups allied themselves with different sides, and this has become a defining factor in relations between ethnic groups, infusing old hostilities over land and water scarcity with a new political dimension.

Ethnic division (or domination) has been one of the major divisive issues in South Sudan. With the independence of South Sudan from Sudan, the emergent conflict driver within the power-sharing structure was the fear of dominance by the Dinka community over the rest of Southern communities. While South Sudan has over 60 ethnic groups, the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk are the three main communities. Ethnic disagreements often arise as a result of elite disagreements over power-sharing by the leaders of these three communities. The Dinka account for 25 percent of the population of South Sudan, which makes them a demographic minority but still large enough to influence the political climate of the country. The SPLA/SPLM rebel leadership and subsequent independent government are Dinka-dominated. The SPLA former leader and Vice President under the CPA, Dr John Garang, came from the Dinka community. His successor and first president of the independent republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, comes from the same community. The current vice president, Riek Machar, hails from the second most populous community, the Nuer. The ethnic friction also played a part in the 1990 split of the SPLM/A (see chapter 6, section 6.2). This also formed a reference point that was pivotal for the "new war" that erupted in 2013.

[15] DDR and SSR are considered by some to be paramount for long-term peace, stability and development. An example of a common approach includes merge of ex-combatants into the states military or police structures. This is seen when the SPLA fighters were intergrated into the wide Sudan army after the CPA.

It is evident that there are many and varying degrees of conflicts in South Sudan. As a participant from ACROSS mentioned,

> There are many conflicts for sure. In 2013, the Nuer-Dinka conflict had massive killings. If we go to the cattle camp, we find conflict between this clan and this clan over dowry and other cattle. There is also individual conflict at home; disagreement between husbands and their wives or disagreement between community and community. For example, last year, there was fear that the Dinkas are coming to kill Equatorias and vice versa. Also, the Dinka and Murle are in conflict. Last year when we were having the national dialogue (see section 6.5), some of the Dinka were saying to us that their biggest enemy is the Murle and that they wanted us to talk to them so that they can change, maybe if there are discussions, we will have peace. Local community conflicts are powerful and need attention. Like in Terekeka last year, a young man had left with someone's sister. That brought a big issue. People killed themselves. A whole village was burnt because a brother said so (Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018).

The 15 December 2013 civil conflict was emblematic of the state fragility and internal schisms within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The political conflict of December 2013 – coming a little over two years after the country gained independence from Sudan in July 2011 – was a culmination of the fallout between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President, Riek Machar, over the control of SPLM, as mentioned in chapter 1, following a weekend meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC), a party organ of the SPLM. The conflict was precipitated by the internal power dynamics of the ruling party, SPLM, dividing it into SPLM-in-Government and its supporters and SPLM-in-Opposition and its supporters (Githigaro, 2016). This factor, together with other interlocking issues, such as disagreement over the general election that was scheduled for 2015, as well as ethno-military patronage, contributed to the violence that broke out in December 2013 (Githigaro, 2016; Brosche & Hoglund, 2016).

South Sudan was thus inevitably led to the fragmentation of different supporters and communities along political lines. The factions, however, are by no means monolithic and there are factions that remain uncommitted. As a representative of GoSS mentioned,

> The Nuer soldiers in Bor, they fought in the barracks. The commander of that area by then was a Nuer, so they murdered most of the Dinka soldiers who were there. Moreover, the people from the town of Bor crossed to the other side of the river. When they finished fighting the battle, the town was empty. There is this inter-ethnic struggle of who is to be superior (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

The 2013 conflict has resulted in extraordinary acts of cruelty that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity where civilians were not only caught up in the violence, but they were directly targeted

(IGAD, 2018). This has expanded the conflict to include other armed groups, mushrooming into further outbursts of local level violence in the former Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr El Ghazal (Tchie, 2018). The Human Rights Watch reports (2014a) document widespread killings of civilians based on ethnic lines, mass destruction, and looting of civilian properties. Widespread civil carnage was caused by both the GoSS and opposition forces (Human Rights Watch. 2014b). For instance, it is alleged that the Presidential Guards (Tiger Battalion) conducted quarter-to-quarter searches in areas inhabited by the Nuer ethnic group in the capital Juba. In retaliation, Nuer soldiers reportedly killed Dinka families in Bor, Malakal and Bentiu (Human Rights Council, 37th session). Consequently, thousands of people fled their homes, making them more vulnerable to attacks from rival ethnic groups in addition to the refugee crisis. A member of GREDA stated,

> As a result of that transfer of the war, the government used its maximum force against the rebels in Equatoria. In the end, the civilians became victims because when the rebels attacked from an area, the government assumed the locals were supporting the rebels and the opposition and vice versa. The impact of the force ended up on the civilians. You couldn't go to cultivate your crops because you might find someone waiting for you. Crops were left, people abandoned their villages, and the army took over the crops. If you take the road that goes to the Ugandan border, you will find empty houses. The army went and took over the houses. They started removing their roofs and doors. They robbed the gardens and brought the crops here for sale. All their animals were sold. Eventually, it was total destruction (Interview with an officer from GREDA, a local NGO, Juba. 12. 04. 2018).

The 2013 violence in South Sudan confirms the fragility of the nation after the CPA and secession. The conflict has also pitted the Nuer and the Dinka against other ethnic groups, for instance, ethnic groups living in the former Equatoria region of South Sudan[16]. As a professor from Juba University commented:

> The Equatorians were generally neutral, as they did not have any alliances to the ethnic groups fighting for power; thus the government supporters, a militia group known as the *Mathiang anyor*[17] saw them as supporting the oppositions and enemies of the government, while the opposition thought they Equatorians were against them, as they were not supporting the opposition movements, so as to say if you are not for us, you are against us (Interview with professor at University of Juba. 25.05.2018.).

Post CPA lack of peace within communities has also fuelled the hate speech that is growing so rampant in the country. As the director of Screen of Rights described:

> We have developed a lexicon of words that are offensive and inflammatory, including the term 'MTN', which has been linked to incidents in 2017 when buses travelling along the road from

[16] Made up of eastern, central and western Equatoria former states
[17] A rebel militia group loyal to the government forces comprised of young, mainly ethnic Dinka fighters.

> Uganda were stopped by armed gunmen asking if any MTNs were on board. Dinkas were then pulled out and killed. At the time, the term MTN (a large mobile phone provider that uses the slogan "everywhere you go") was being widely used on social media to refer to Dinkas. Additionally, 'Nyagat' or a traitor is another common social media insult aimed at the armed oppositions, and 'Nuer Wew' (Nuer of money) refers to those politicians, regarded as sell-outs, who have opted to work for the government. This kind of language is used to catalyse violence (Interview with a representative from Screen of Rights, a local NGO. Juba. 03.04.2018).

As a consequence of the absence of government security, new groups continue to emerge (Adeba, 2015). This is seen with the Lou Nuer White Army[18] who, like other non-state armed groups in South Sudan, is purportedly set up to protect their communities against external threats and to defend property and livestock (Wild, Jok, & Patel, 2018). An officer of SSuNDE explains,

> Some groups performing this role are very common among pastoralist communities. For example, among the Dinka, they are called Gulweng, and among the Otuho of former Eastern Equatoria State, they are known as the Monyimiji, who have been known to at times mobilise for political purposes (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, a local NGO, Juba. 14.04.2018).

These kinds of challenges have led Knopf (2013) to point out the negligible investment by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in the South Sudanese people and infrastructure, which speaks to the degree of the breakdown of society spirit of ubuntu.

Despite the protracted regional and international conflict interventions, South Sudan continues to face intermittent rebel violence caused by either the disregard of ceasefire agreements or lack of political will in the peacebuilding process within the high-ranking echelon of government. Even after an agreement had been reached between the warring factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by Riek Machar, to form a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), the peace accord was not able to prevent a descent into another armed conflict in July 2016 reminiscent of the one that broke out in December 2013.

In the light of war unfolding in Juba and in other parts of the country, it is clear that South Sudan peace processes have not been well equipped to deal with the impacts of this war (Barbarani, 2018).

The international community's footprint in the country has not only been welcomed, and it has been much needed. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the presence of international actors in pursuit of peace in South Sudan has been recorded as overwhelming (Liaga, 2017). Even so, the question remains whether the international community will learn from past mistakes in their efforts toward achieving peace and eventually rebuilding South Sudan.

[18] The Nuer White Army (The White Army), originally referred to groups of Nuer pastoralists that formed to protect their cattle against raids

The international community are often seen as a third force and envisaged to be a buffer between government forces and those of the opposition. This can be seen, for instance, with the continuous request of external actors in crisis management expressed by the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission – a government-sanctioned committee that oversees peacebuilding within the country – for support from external actors in this crisis management (Enough project, 2016).

The role of the international community in building peace remains multi-dimensional, as stated by a member of USAID:

> There is a great material need in South Sudan. The international community has provided great humanitarian assistance, and they are also currently involved in training and capacity building of various institutions that promote instruments of national cohesion (Interview with USAID officer in Juba, South Sudan. 29.04.2018).

A participant from ACROSS explains how the presence of the international community has also been supported and needed by middle-level organisations.

> Many civil society organisations support the presence of a third force, envisaged to be a buffer between government forces and those of the opposition. The AU and IGAD support of a "third deterrent force" to stabilise the situation has definitely helped (Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018).

The post-2013 international presence has been actualised in several ways: the efforts around peace and security, which have a focus on areas such as mediation and peacekeeping; various humanitarian missions that cater for the war, famine and displacement; and lastly, monetary aid donations in form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from various organisations and countries. The most prominent external actors have included the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) under the auspice of the African Union (AU).

IGAD is comprised of seven member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda) that engage in supportive action on a range of collective peace, security, developmental, and environmental concerns (Vertin, 2018). IGAD is a regional body mediating peace negotiation to end South Sudan's civil war. IGAD assumed the role of the peacemaker since the North and South conflict. The IGAD Member States set up the Mediation Process for South Sudan as a response to the crisis that had erupted. Individual countries within IGAD have played a significant role in the unfolding crisis. For instance, the June 22nd to June 23rd 2017 Solidarity Summit on Refugees, co-hosted by Uganda and the United Nations, noted that the burden of refugees in Uganda has risen from 500,000 to more than 1.25 million. Ethiopia and Kenya have played a vital role and shown their commitment to peacebuilding in the country and the region by hosting some refugees from South Sudan. The 2013 civil conflict has made East Africa the fastest-growing refugee host in the world and further illustrates that the effects of the civil war in South Sudan are also borne by the neighbouring countries.

Another prominent actor is the United Nations (UN), represented by the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS is involved in the monitoring of human rights abuses and violations, the creation of a conducive environment for humanitarian work as well as providing support in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict and Peacebuilding. Another international player, the Troika Group, consisting of nations such as Norway, the USA and UK, has also complemented UN efforts. These countries have all been instrumental international players in peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives by holding various peace negotiations since 2013.

After the 2013 conflict, IGAD revised its strategy and expanded to "IGAD-PLUS" that includes the AU, UN, China, USA, UK, European Union (EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). These initiatives were set to present a united international front behind IGAD to the warring sides (International Crisis Group, 2015.). The United Nations, together with the United States, has also employed hard power in dealing with war perpetrators in South Sudan. This is seen in their strategy of targeted sanctions. In addition to the Troika group, China and the European Union have been key players by sending delegates and funding the peace process.

Despite the needed and somewhat welcomed international presence in South Sudan, there was also a note of resistance to the international by some South Sudanese.

> In July 2016, you can see that some residents of Western Lakes State converged in Rumbek State capital and presented strong protest against the proposal to invite foreign forces, by the AU and IGAD, which they saw as tantamount to foreign invasion (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018).

The intervention of international actors has also been known to reverse the positive progress towards peace in South Sudan. For instance, the government of Uganda has come under scrutiny for their deployment of the Uganda Defence Force (UDF) during the first three years of the conflict and only began withdrawal in 2015 when the mediated peace agreement was signed (Githigaro, 2016). The focus of the foreign is also applied to regional state and non-state actors. Another example can arguably be seen in what the self-interested actions of IGAD member states. Kuol (2018) gives an example of the oil pipeline was used as a negotiating tool during the ARCSS. There were three possibilities of potential pipelines to be built. The routes for the new pipeline routes were either through Kenya to the Indian Ocean, or through Ethiopia to Djibouti's, or through Eritrea's Red Sea ports. In the negotiations of the ARCSS, Kuol argues that the GOSS used the pipeline to influence the positions of some IGAD states. Thus, although it was feasibly better to have a pipeline to the Red Sea through Ethiopia and Djibouti, the GOSS reportedly indicated its preference for the Kenyan option instead.

Given the current trajectory of the unresolved conflict, as well as the political context in South Sudan, the international community will most likely remain a key stakeholder and partner in the efforts to reach

a peaceful resolution in the country. Despite positive efforts, there has been a failure to exert enough pressure on the leaders in order for them to abide by the various agreements signed over the recent years.

5.3.3. Post-2013 civil war peace negotiations: Mechanisms for inclusion in mediation

Following the unfolding of the 2013 conflict (as detailed in section 5.3.2), peace negotiations were yet again on the table, mainly between the SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO. This IGAD-led process culminated in the signing of various agreements with the general aim of "silencing the guns". Between 2013 and 2015, there were at least eight peace deals which were signed, and they later collapsed before taking effect. Clashes around the country continued to occur, even as the peace accords were being completed (Santora, 2015).

The role of the international community in building peace remains multi-dimensional, as stated by a member of USAID:

> There is a great material need in South Sudan. The international community has provided great humanitarian assistance, and they are also currently involved in training and capacity building of various institutions that promote instruments of peace (Interview with USAID officer in Juba, South Sudan. 29.04.2018).

5.3.3.1. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS)

Notably, on August 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed between the SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO, represented by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and by the first Vice President Riek Machar consecutively (IGAD, 2015). ARCSS called for a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), returning Machar, who had fled, in the aftermath of the outbreak of the civil war and the formation of the monitoring and evaluation body, to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC).[19]

The peace process began in Ethiopia under IGAD on 14 January. On 23 January, they signed two agreements. The agreement recognised the need for change in how South Sudan was governed. Socio-economic reforms acknowledged that although the fighting was between the SPLM, all South Sudanese are feeling the pain.

Despite the protracted regional and international conflict interventions, South Sudan continued to face intermittent violence caused by either the disregard of ceasefire agreements or lack of political will in the peacebuilding process within the high-ranking echelons of government. Even after an agreement had been reached between the warring factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG) led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition

[19] The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee is constituted under Chapter VII of the R-ARCSS and is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Revitalised Peace Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, including the adherence of the parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule. In case of non-implementation of the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, or other serious deficiencies, the JMEC shall recommend appropriate corrective action to the TGoNU.

(SPLM-IO) led by Riek Machar, to form a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), the peace accord was not able to prevent a descent into another armed conflict in July 2016 reminiscent of the one that broke out in December 2013 (Minde 2018). As a participant from IDO mentioned,

> This agreement was supposed to be implemented within three months, a pre-transition period of 90 days and 60 days for elections. However, it took almost eight months before the chairperson of SPLM arrived in Juba. When he arrived in Juba in April 2016, the transitional government of national unity, which was supposed to be formed in the first months after the agreement, was formed eight months later. It lasted only three months in office, when the principals started fighting again (Interview with an officer from IDO, Juba. 10.08.2017).

As mentioned, two days before the marking of South Sudan's fifth anniversary of independence, on 7 July 2016, violent confrontations broke out in Juba between the SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO. An officer of the well-known Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) mentioned that:

> The eruption of fighting obliterated any little progress that was seemingly made towards implementation of the 2015 compromise peace agreement. This quick return to violence collapsed all efforts that were made towards the achievement peace and restoration of social cohesion within communities (Author interview with Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) officer, Juba. 20.08.2017).

The signatories here were of four categories. First were the two warring parties, that is the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM-in-Opposition. Inclusive of these two was also the former detainees and "other political parties". Second were the representatives of "stakeholders". This included faith-based organisations, women groups, civil society and Distinguished Personalities. The third group were known as the "adherents". Lastly was the international community signed as "guarantors" (Idris, 2014).

The international community's role in these agreements remains important. It is largely due to the international community's involvement that the CPA was, at least temporarily and superficially, 'successful'. This was mainly due to international partners enormous diplomatic, funding and technical monitoring which was effective in forcing the warring parties to compromise and pursue a negotiated settlement rather than continue with hostilities. For instance, the United States sanctions, already imposed by the Clinton administration from 1997 onwards, had drastic effects on Sudan's international image (Ahmed. 2009: 136). However, in the ACRSS, there was a failure of those same countries to push the belligerent parties to implement the agreement reached robustly. Thus, the parties were seen to be reluctant in participation and keeping to the agreements (Blanchard. 2016). But the argument being made is that even the limited success of the 2015 CPA was not enough as it did not include 'bottom-up' approaches or secure the support of civil society at large.

5.3.3.2. Revitalised Agreement (R-ACRSS) campaign

The failure of the ARCSS to take hold frustrated the international community involved in the mediation process, as well as local communities. On June 12, 2017, the high-level revitalisation forum was formed by IGAD to revitalise the ARCSS. This was a joint action by major stakeholders on South Sudan, including IGAD, the AU, the UN and TROIKA. Their endorsement focused on strategies to bolster the defunct 2015 ARCSS through restoring the ceasefire, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and revise the ARCSS implementation schedule in order to hold elections at the conclusion of the agreement's timetable (United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2017). The High-Level Revitalisation Forum (HLRF) led to the signing of R-ACRSS on 12 September 2018 in Khartoum. This process was more inclusive, as a participant explains,

> The R-ARCSS was between TGONU, SPLM-IO, FDs, South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Other Political Parties (OPP), Faith Groups, Civil Society Alliance and eminent personalities including Francis m. Deng and Abel Alier. So we can see here that there were more categories of participants than the CPA (Interview with a member of the general public, Pretoria. 03.02.2019).

Both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have continued to pursue a new peace deal of the revitalised ACRSS that was signed at Khartoum in July 2018 and subsequently in August 2018 with the presence of both the Ugandan president, Museveni and the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, at the time of writing, which provided cautionary hope. As Kiir and Machar both admit, the peace deal will most likely succeed as it was a voluntary initiative rather than a result of pressure from the international community (Mbah, 2018).

5.3.3.3. IGAD's Inclusive peace process post-2013 civil conflict

After the eruption of violence in 2013, the Heads of States (HoS) of IGAD met on 27 December 2013 and issued the Communiqué of the 23rd Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Situation in South Sudan. In this communiqué, the HoS instructed an IGAD-led mediation mission. The mission was composed of three high-level regional personalities involved in IGAD's previous peacemaking accomplishments: Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, involved in the Somali peace process, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the Kenyan mediator in the 2005 CPA, and General Al Dhabi, the lead negotiator for Sudan in the CPA. This was a set up to a convening of a summit-level meeting that appointed high-profile special envoys aimed to highlight IGAD's serious commitment and history of competence in mediating a peace deal. Although the major component of these negotiations was high-level actors, unlike the previous mediation, this time, IGAD adopted a broader approach to resolving the conflict.

There was a consensus that the conflict was complex, multi-dimensional and appeared in various levels, it cannot be solved by the two warring parties alone and that the lasting solution to the crisis needs to

come from an inclusive dialogue involving all stakeholders (this is best demonstrated by the occurrences described in section 5.3.2). This inclusivity was seen in operation when President Kiir and Vice President Machar's names were always followed by the terms …"other parties"… or …"other stakeholders critical to bringing about peace"…. The released communiqué also required the creation of "a conducive environment for all stakeholders to participate. It also required a "face-to-face talks by all stakeholders in the conflict should occur by the 31st of December 2013". This mandate for greater inclusivity allowed IGAD to isolate the crisis into one that requires a different approach under the IGAD leadership (IGAD, communiqué of the 23rd extra-ordinary session of the IGAD, 2013).

As Pring argues, there is doubt among scholars that this notion of inclusivity at the HoS level was successfully carried out in all negotiations. For instance, the agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), signed at the end of January 2014 took out the two prominent leaders' groups from the pool of stakeholders, which referred to all domestic actors in the first HoS Communiqué, and identified the parties and exclusive signatories of the CoHA as the GoSS and SPLM/A-IO (Pring, 2017). There is however an allusion to other actors who were only mentioned to be helpful to the Monitoring and Verification Team, who would draw support from collaboration and consultation with local committees to be composed of traditional and religious leaders, women and youth representatives.

The bilateralism in the CoHA led the HoS to reiterate their original position of greater inclusivity. In the HoS Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session instructed the IGAD Special Envoys:

> "… to develop a framework for the next phase of negotiations in South Sudan, including structures of representation, and timeframe, so as to ensure dialogue is truly inclusive; and further instructs them to ensure that such a framework is developed with a view to involving a broad range of South Sudanese government, political, and civil society actors in a reinvigorated constitutional process" (Pring, 2017: 229).

This required them to organise a series of public consultations with various South Sudanese actors to generate input for a framework of political dialogue and national reconciliation. These consultations, as per the Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session, did include political parties, traditional and religious leaders, and groups representing women, youth, and intellectuals, refugees and IDPs, business communities and other stakeholders. As a member of Screen of Rights recalled,

> Around March 2014, IGAD Special Envoys organised a meeting of civil society organisations. But this became difficult to implement, and the exercise did not continue because IGAD was receiving pressure from the warring parties on the count that their various suggestions of CSOs were not selected (Interview with an officer from Screen of Rights, Juba. 03.05.2018)

According to Zacharia Akol (2014), their objection is rooted first in the power-centred mindset that the conflict can still be won militarily, and secondly in the two main warring parties' "unwritten agreement" on an "us only" approach. While the government negotiating team was open with its objections at the

beginning of the process, the opposition first explored the possibility of the inclusion of other actors to add pressure to the government. However, when the former detainees were released and became a separate party to the negotiations (not joining the opposition), the opposition made their objection against a more inclusive process public.

Many times, during the negotiations, there were discussions to uphold the intention of an inclusive process. This was also supplemented by IGAD's intention to socialise parties into compliance through "naming and shaming" and calling for sanctions to be imposed on non-compliant parties. Among these efforts, establishing the IGAD-Plus proved to be effective in putting pressure on the parties to sign the final agreement by consolidating international efforts and rallying them behind IGAD's initiative (Pring, 2017).

5.4. Top-Down National Dialogue

Another top-down initiative is the National Dialogue. The government has also engaged in protecting the space for independent voices through a National Dialogue. On May 22, 2017, President Salva Kiir officially launched the National Dialogue in South Sudan (The Independent, 2017). This is a space where the citizens can take part in the national reconciliation process, in hopes of achieving some tangible development progress to demonstrate the government's responsiveness to citizen expectations. This National Dialogue process aims to address the complexities of South Sudan's conflict through linking the national, regional, and grassroots levels in an effort to curb the civil war (Deng, 2017). Generally, national dialogues have been an effective tool which has not only highlighted the weaknesses of a narrow, top-down approach but has also highlighted the consequences of excluding bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding (Liaga, 2017).

National dialogues are increasingly regarded as a means for managing political crises and transitions. They are believed to be inclusive and provide a broad participatory to official negotiation framework, which can resolve political crises and lead countries into political transitions and can be used as instruments to sustainable peace through the building and broadening participation (Paffenholz & Ross, 2015).

Since the civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, after merely three years of relative peace, the war has quickly metamorphosed into a complex conflict that includes intense fighting within and between communities in different regions of South Sudan. The National Dialogue is a part of an effort employed by the government to, firstly, confront the causes of the war, and at the same time bring about peace and positive development as the country struggles towards a ceasefire.

The National Dialogue process in South Sudan is envisaged to be an inclusive process that employs bottom-up and top-down processes, and multi-levelled consultations. This will ideally involve vertical communication from the political elite and local communities in managing this dialogue process. The importance of inclusivity in the dialogues in South Sudan proves to be a great resource in working

toward peace (Deng, 2017). Generally, national dialogues have been an effective tool used by different countries to promote peacebuilding, such as South Africa in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Hayner, 2002) and Rwanda in their Gacaca process.

Due to the effectiveness of the dialogues in countries such as South Africa, it is no wonder that many hope that the dialogue would create a platform for people's voices to be heard and allow for a healing process to begin. Pessimistic voices, such as Dr James Okuk, renowned political analyst and lecturer at the University of Juba, however, fear that the dialogues would not accomplish its objectives, like some of the past peace initiatives (APA News, 2017).

This pessimistic view is drawn from the belief that past peace agreements in South Sudan have been found largely exclusive and have neglected the local voices. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement is one such peace negotiation, despite the fact that the SPLM leaders underwent grassroots peace sensitisation in 2003 prior to the signing of the agreement, it had limited inclusion of local voices (which mostly included religious groups) and largely failed to cater to internal conflicts in Southern Sudan in the agreements. These unresolved issues later played an integral role in the intensity of the 2013 civil war (this is explained in section 5.3.2).

True local participation remains important in the local turn analysis. As discussed above, months following the outbreak of the 2013 conflict, the IGAD led the 2015 high-level Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) that remains poorly implemented by the government, leading IGAD to form a high revitalisation forum with a mandate to restore a ceasefire, fully implement the ARCSS, and ensure elections take place according to the ARCSS. Most of these initiatives occur in high-level interactions and trickle down to the ground level in South Sudan with difficulty. As per the peace agreements, failure to secure genuine participation and buy-in from citizens in the national dialogue, peace will remain frail. The question now remains whether the National Dialogue will present an avenue for true reconciliation and peace, or if will it fail like all the preceding peace processes.

The National Dialogue's 100-member steering committee has been conducting consultations on the underscoring causes of the current violent conflict, with different stakeholders at different levels throughout the counties and states of South Sudan. The multilevel consultations are done to provide a report to the National Conference, which will prepare a report for the President and give final submission to Parliament for adoption and implementation (Deng, 2017). The National Dialogue presents an opportunity for both local and communal-level groups and organisations to express their grievances to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and at the same time, the GoSS has a chance to hear some of the issues affecting its citizens. This dialogue process could increase the diversity of solutions offered to mitigate the conflict. It could further allow the GoSS and international society to tailor solutions according to the specific communities and their emerging issues.

5.4.1. Importance of multi-level Integration

South Sudan's multi-tiered conflict calls for a careful rethinking of how the international community and GoSS approach peace processes. The complexity of this war affects society from top to bottom and therefore calls for a reconciliation of top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace efforts. The top-down approach seen thus far in the high-level negotiated peace agreements has failed to end the conflict and address underlying grievances. This has not only highlighted the weaknesses of a narrow and high-level approach but has also highlighted the consequences of excluding bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. South Sudan needs to strengthen both its top-down and bottom-up approaches through engaging local organisations, communal groups, religious organisations, and marginalised groups, such as women and youth.

The importance of multi-level integration in peace is often recognised in policy documents and public statements, such as the United Nations Resolution 2282 of 2016, but rarely acted on. As a member of the public commented,

> It is thus crucial that the National Dialogue maintains a very close relationship with local and national level actors in the conflict. The government should encourage participation from different states and counties in South Sudan (Interview with a member of the general public, Pretoria. 07.04.2018).

Previously excluded, South Sudanese communities are now able to discuss and engage with peace agreements due to the dialogues. This is a chance for both the National Dialogue Committee and the government to accommodate views and address issues that were not present in previous peace agreements. It could also be a great opportunity for citizens to hold the government accountable by expressing their sentiments, and by potentially finding possible alternatives to the government's failed peace agreement implementation (United Nations, 2017).

5.4.2. Challenges of local actors in the National Dialogue

Nevertheless, the potential obstacles facing the National Dialogue are significant. There is the challenge of bringing together communities that are currently in conflict with each other. Forcing interaction between groups in an active conflict has sometimes led to more aggravation, and has not achieved significant progress. Additionally, there is a challenge in the capacity of inclusivity. This refers to the ability of the committee to manage a large number of participants who represent different views and opinions.

The National Dialogue remains dependent on the ability of its leaders and steering committee to include relevant swaths of the population. This can include the youth, traditional leaders, representatives of the opposition, women, and religious groups, among others. Additionally, with such diverse participation, the facilitators need to be neutral and clearly set the parameters of discussion. Further, the moderators

of the dialogue must be trained to handle disputes that could occur that might negatively affect the productivity of the discussions.

Moving forward, the steering committee and the government have to remain committed to the National Dialogue in order for it to address the root causes of the crises afflicting the country. They must also sincerely consider the resulting recommendations and develop meaningful policies and mechanisms to address said recommendations.

As reported by a participant from SSuNDE,

> For me, doing this dialogue should have everyone involved so that they can bring what is in them to help solve problems. Our country is beautiful and God-given. It has resources and so on. If all of us are involved, and we talk about our issues, it will be very good. I believe solutions come from the owners of the problems. If I have a problem, it is us who will come up with the solution. If I have a problem with you, I have to compromise, and you have to compromise, for the sake of us having peace in the country. I appreciate the effort of cohesion, but it should include everyone. We are trying to do peacebuilding, though small, it is working. The challenges are the funding (Author interview with an officer from SSuNDE, a local NGO, Juba. 12.08.2017).

5.5. Conclusion

The chapter aimed to contribute to bridging the gap in the literature concerning the interaction of top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. Through the chapter, we have engaged with the first sub-question, concerning whether there is evidence of the "local turn" in the mainstream and top-down peace strategies. Questions of inclusivity, agency and local ownership in the peace negotiations also emerged.

The analysis was provided through an overview of three top-down strategies employed in South Sudan in the past and currently. To begin with, two high-level peace negotiations are discussed. The first took place between 1972 to 2005 during the civil conflict between the North and the South. The second peace negotiations and peace agreement occurred after the 2013 civil conflict in the new South Sudan. Lastly, an analysis of the national dialogue is also given. This was to analyse whether there is an element of bottom-up peacebuilding in the peace processes led by the government.

In their lifetime, most South Sudanese have lived through multiple episodes of the war. These peace processes, as with the wars, have reshuffled political alliances and positions, creating winners and losers in the architectures of power. Since the 1980s, these agreements have reshuffled power between circles of elites and largely excluded the locals. The agreements have often been made behind closed doors, in foreign lands, based on decades' worth of old relationships that have hugely excluded the local people and communities, as they are seen to be actors of low influence. The chapter has demonstrated that there has been a great change in interest in South Sudan. This is seen from the Addis Ababa peace agreement

and the CPA, which hardly included other parties, to the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, where there was minimal inclusivity of internal organisations/ groups and civil societies and other lower-level actors.

The peace negotiation in South Sudan has mostly been an exercise of the government and the international community. In the CPA negotiations, the IGAD Peace Initiative was narrowly focused on the SPLM/A and the GoS, and this has proven to be its biggest weakness. On the other hand, other organisations were denied participation despite multiple requests. This exclusion came both from the SPLM and the GoS, citing fears of confusion of many "people to share in the pie" during deciding-making and the weaknesses of Sudan's civil society. Even when included, especially in the final stages of the CPA, the mediators, the GoS, and the SPLM/A were more concerned about gaining legitimacy as the peace settlement needed the support of the Sudanese public. Hence the interest to involve southern civil society, one of which was a strong commitment to self-determination, as leverage.

While the IGAD peace process has suffered considerable setbacks in the past with the Addis Ababa and CPA agreement, it has taken further steps to move towards expansion of participation of the local. This is seen in the call for inclusivity in the new, revitalised peace negotiations that took place in Addis Ababa between 2017 and 2018. Effective feedback mechanisms are required to link the local, national and regional level, empower communities to hold their leaders accountable and create local ownership of current peace processes. Feedback mechanisms then must work in both directions; "bringing Addis [the peace process] to the people and back". On the one hand, feedback mechanisms are needed to raise awareness in the communities about the national and regional level processes and the actions of "their" leaders. The failure to explain proceedings and agreements resultant from ongoing national and regional processes also leaves space for misunderstandings, mobilisation and incitement. On the other hand, these leaders in Addis must hear community voices.

Through the national dialogue, we have also seen that they provide a possibility of an integrated approach, which connects the government to the people and the grassroots. Although the national dialogue process in South Sudan is envisaged to be an inclusive process that utilises both bottom-up and top-down processes, and multi-levelled consultations, it is also seen as a suspicious political move. This then defeats the attempts that are being made by the government and makes the efforts to include and involve the locals at best weak. Another disadvantage is the under-supported role of the national dialogue by international communities. Regional organisations can play an important role in pushing for an inclusive National Dialogue. This was the case of Somalia (Somalia National Peace Conference [Eldoret/Mbagathi]), where the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) found itself adopting a more active peace mediating role in the region. However, South Sudan's National Dialogue process remains unsupported by regional or international bodies.

Although there was not a strong connection between the bottom-up actors and strategies in the peace negotiations, the church continued to play a significant role in all three agreements discussed above. In the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, it persuaded the disputants to pursue peace negotiation, while in the CPA and the ARCSS it performed a more active mediatory role. Here, the connection of the top-down and bottom-up can be seen clearly, as the churches would attend the high-level meetings and later go to the communities and meet with local people to discuss with them the developments. This is further expounded in chapter 3.

The peace agreements have not addressed the psychological issues adequately. This has led most international responses from the international community to focus on the political conflict, forgetting the more deeply rooted cultural conflict that happens on the ground. There is a need, however, to understand the first layout of local actors and approaches to peacebuilding, and second to understand their importance in peace processes in South Sudan. The question is, therefore, what the local turn approaches in South Sudan are and who the key players are. The importance of looking at the alternative approaches to peacebuilding, as discussed in section 2.3. This will be the focus of chapter 6.

CHAPTER SIX: BOTTOM-UP PEACE STRATEGIES AND ACTORS IN SOUTH SUDAN

6.1. Introduction

This thesis is interested in the debate that exists among peace scholars writing within the "local turn" of peacebuilding. These scholars have been critical of the liberal peacebuilding framework for focusing on the autonomous subject, the state and international bodies as the main actors in peacebuilding. They also criticise the emphasis from the liberal peace perspective on the establishment of formal liberal institutions through state sovereignty, law, democracy, markets, human rights and democracy (Olivier, Neethling & Mokoena, 2009). These critics of the linear and top-down approaches to peacebuilding were discussed in chapter 2. This chapter takes a step beyond the critical outlook on liberal approaches to peacebuilding and provides an empirical encounter of South Sudan's bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding.

Within "local turn" thinking, the emphasis is on inclusive approaches and the need to pay attention to context and the heterogeneous environment in which civil wars and conflict take place in African countries. The argument made is that there is a need to focus on the "other", also sometimes referred to as the "subaltern", and to allow people to have their own voice (as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2). Despite the CPA peace agreement that ended the conflict between the North and the South, the fragility of the peace that was forged as the new state was born was confirmed by the fighting that broke out in South Sudan in late 2013 and later in 2016 (see chapter 5). It remains unclear whether the root causes and triggers of these conflicts are local, national, political, economic, social, or a combination. What remains clear is that the violence is a volatile mix of local, interethnic, and intra-ethnic conflict infused with political manoeuvrings on a national and sub-national level. Other issues such as cattle raids, attacks on traders, attacks on returnees and other violence can also be indirectly related to South Sudan dynamics, although the violence plays out on the local stage. The dynamic reality of South Sudan civil conflict and intrastate conflict has a trend where,

> "The fighters are usually drawn from numerous political factions with divergent agendas, lines of command are blurred or non-existent, and the battlefields are the very towns and villages where the combatants live" (Solomon, 2001).

Strong state control and structures in South Sudan now and before its secession has been absent; the responsibility for resolving these conflicts and protecting communities falls mainly on the shoulders of local actors, with or without an international peace structure. Despite their positive results, building local peace has proved exceedingly difficult (Wilson, 2014).

Taking into consideration the historical context that influences the challenges facing post-colonial South Sudan's "everyday" strategies to achieve peace, this chapter examines accounts of peacebuilding that have been documented and the various avenues that have been followed to address the violent past by

local actors. This chapter will explore other avenues for peacebuilding available to people, discuss whether they have been effective, and how have they been articulated. In this chapter, the aims are drawn towards bottom-up actors and approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan. It addresses the second sub-question of the thesis, on how the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches of peacebuilding in South Sudan is manifested. This will be discussed through two sections, first, actors, and second the people-to-people dialogue.

These bottom-up strategies represent peacebuilding ideas and practices that have existed within societies historically and those that are [re]surfacing. This is relevant both as a criticism of the linear relationship in liberal peacebuilding, as discussed in chapter 2 and to analyse the relevance of local alternatives in terms of sustaining the peace as discussed in chapter 3. The chapter will present this in two ways. First, the chapter presents a discussion of the southern "core". These are local actors who have been instrumental in South Sudan over the years. This includes civil society (discussed in section 6.2.1), the traditional authorities (discussed in section 6.2.2), and the church (discussed in section 6.2.3). This discussion is followed by an examination in section 6.3 of the bottom-up peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan, and, importantly, the people-to-people dialogue is used to showcase an approach that was largely (although not exclusively) conducted by the local South Sudanese actors who were discussed in the previous sections.

6.2. The southern core: The role of local actors

Apart from the formal peace negotiations, there has been a recognition of alternative means of achieving peace in South Sudan. As discussed in chapter 2, De Coning (2007) has warned against concepts and theories that suggest that peace can be built and achieved on a universal model. In a similar strand, Leeuwen, Verkoren, and Boedeltje (2012) argue that there is need to allow for "heterotopias" in peacebuilding promoting diverse and ambiguous alternatives to the single world view portrayed by the liberal peacebuilding framework. Building on the idea that sustainable peace is home-grown, context-specific, and bottom-up, in this chapter, it is evident that strategies by different actors vary, containing different emphases, inflexions and silences.

Along this line of argument, there is also the contention that people at the local level might understand critical concepts such as "peace" and "justice" differently from international peacebuilders (Murambadoro, 2017). Resonating with this, and speaking about the meaning of the concept "justice", a lecturer at the University of Juba noted that,

> The foreign way of justice is not the same as the traditional way. We advocate more for restoring, and they are more about punishing. There is an element of all this. This is a new country, institutions are being formed, and some of them collapse. UN, for instance, may want justice and to punish the guilty. The local people might say, if we have peace maybe we can forgive them. I think Rwanda's way of doing this is unique. In Rwanda we have the *Gacaca*, in Northern Uganda, they have the

> *omatuput*. In South Sudan, I think communities have their own way. That is part of the local justice and differs from community to community. In certain situations, people say that there are some rituals you have to do to restore relations. Like with the cattle keepers, there is a payment of cattle and farmers may batter trade their products (Interview with a professor at the University of Juba. 25.05.2018).

The top-down approach assumes that the micro level is a replica of the macro level and, consequently, developments on the national and international levels – or actions taken by interveners – may automatically result in similar transformations at the level of local society. In reality, the war and peace dynamics on the ground are usually quite different (Kalyvas, 2006; Autesserre, 2010). In relation to peacebuilding operations, instructions from the peace talks in various headquarters do not automatically translate into action in the "field". Orders are often interpreted by peace workers on the ground, these "decentralised interveners" leading to substantial leeway in conducting action on the ground (Da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012).

The Christian Aid (2018) report titled "In it for the long haul?" argues that conflict in South Sudan (or any other country for that matter) may never end and that peace is made and broken every day. They argue that the aim should be to strengthen the resilience in communities to manage these conflicts peacefully. Since these communities' experience of conflict varies greatly across South Sudan, resolutions are also addressed with approaches to peacebuilding that are suited to each context. As a lecturer from the University of Juba explained,

> It is true that conflict in South Sudan, even during the time when it was part of Sudan, is at both a national level and a local level. It is these seemingly small conflicts which are often ignored. These are issues of child abduction, cattle raiding, and pastoralists versus farmers. These things can be resolved. The biggest problem is the presence of armament among civilians. Elders were negotiating it, but they have no power. The traditional chiefs who were once powerful, their powers have eroded (Interview with a participant from the University of Juba. Juba. 25.05.2018).

Sørbø argues that in South Sudan peacebuilders need to acknowledge and become aware of the various local conflict dynamics and dimensions as being motivated by both localised tensions and top-down national or regional causes, instead of symptoms of "macro-political cleavages" (Sørbø, 2010:174). Autesserre argues that

> "... the continuation of violence during peace agreement implementation is at least partly driven by local agendas – at the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the municipality, the community, the district or the ethnic group" (Autesserre, 2010:250).

In line with this, Kalyvas (2006) argues that one must look beyond the national causes of conflict to explain violence; thus, there is need to address the personal and local foundations which offer richer

insights than the causal discourse of macro-politics, a position often adopted in contemporary peace interveners (Da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012).

As mentioned in chapter 2 and 3, local peacebuilding has been known to mitigate the worst effects of national conflict. In South Sudan, local processes have helped people resume their everyday life, in that it has allowed them to move around freely, earn a living, and trade with each other. This, it is argued, provides key entry points and opportunities for long-term, transformational change. An internally displaced woman remarked,

> When we discuss among us, peace and peaceful means, I find that it improves people's lives, even in the face of national instability. No one is going to go back on a peaceful means he agreed to unless the other has bridged the agreement. But very high-level peace resolutions seem like it was made in a faraway place and we are waiting for it to come. Waiting for our "enemy" to put down arms, instead of us who have agreed to it to lay our arms first, even if it is in faith (Interview with a participant, Wunthiep Camp. 05.05.2018).

Hodgson and Standish (2009) suggest that there various possible discursive frames for thinking, writing and speaking about aspects of reality. These discourses carry different weight or authority. The discursive frame that will end up carrying more weight is a consequence of the effects of power relations (see chapter 2) (Cheek, 2000; McLaughlin, 2003; Weedon, 1997). As a lecturer at the University of Juba stated,

> In general, you can say there's a lot that people know at the local level, and we reconcile communities. However, it is like oral history. The idea that there is a foreign way of how you approach conflict resolution or how you mediate conflicts, there is a completely indigenous way of doing this. You may question that because, in the context of today, there is a lot of movement back and forth, but some of the people there are highly Westernised and went to universities in developed states, who might come with some of their ideas from the West. Some of them are American; it is only that they are black. You can generally say that there is a more 'foreign' way of peacebuilding (Interview with a participant from the University of Juba. Juba. 25.05.2018).

Due to the power asymmetry discussed in chapter 2, peacebuilding and the research on norm diffusion suggest that agency is biased towards the role and norm export of the external, that is, international peacebuilders acting as "teachers" of good governance, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law, and so forth (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, there has always been evidence of existing bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding and local processes, which have been successful in South Sudan. But these fail to influence international peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan sufficiently.

In the 2019 Zambari report, Johnson (2019) argues that some of these local processes, although well understood by South Sudanese, have a colonial history. However, he contends that these processes were based on the pre-colonial system of arbitration that had become more formalised and structured during

the Condominium period under the British. For instance, the British introduced the *hakuma*[20] (government), which was a hierarchy of courts that passed judgments and formed a more regular means of implementing decisions. This grew from a court system that included various ethnic groups to include regular meetings between neighbouring communities. This was the method used to end or even to prevent conflicts from happening (Johnson, 2014).

The following sections explore in detail some of these bottom-up local actors and their role in South Sudan.

6.1.1. Civil society in the context

Bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan concern several actors, among them civil society actors. Civil society in the context of South Sudan is multidimensional and pluralistic in nature. As mentioned in chapter 1, civil society is defined in this thesis as referring to organisations often take voluntary collective action around shared interests and values distinct from those of the state, family and the market.

The formation of civil society organisations (CSOs) and their metamorphosis is consistent with how the state of South Sudan was formed. The majority of civil society leadership was co-opted into the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) after secession, mainly because they were seen as having been part of the liberation struggle, and because they tend to be more educated. The vacuum created by this within civil society leadership gave rise to a new civil society composed of individuals who felt left out of the GoNU and GoSS co-option, were in the diaspora, local citizens who wanted to participate in the building of their communities, opportunists who tapped into opportunities presented by increased international assistance. As a participant from CEPO explained,

> It is not surprising that the connection between civil society leadership and the larger society is weak. The genesis of their cause is cultivated out of specific interests and circumstances rather than [a] collective grassroots/citizens growth agenda. This has fuelled the rise of factions within South Sudanese civil society compounded further [by] the alignment of government leadership with civil society groups that support their cause (Interview with an officer from CEPO, Juba. 21.04.2018).

In the case of Liberia, civil society was engaged both directly and indirectly in the peace negotiations. According to Zanker, Liberian civil society was involved as official delegates, unofficial observers and pressure group activists. The civil society groups invited as official delegates were those that had played a role in previous conflict resolution efforts (Nilsson, 2009:22). In the case of South Sudan, among the non-warring and non-state actors in the current peace talk efforts in Addis Ababa, only the Church

[20] Broadly, 'government' – 'hakuma' in Arabic – has come to denote a bundle of influences and symbols, spatially located in the town. It encompasses armies and the military cultures originally introduced by the Turco-Egyptian army in the 19th century, and also the literate, bureaucratic cultures of schools and government offices.

falls in this category, having been instrumental in resolving inter-tribal conflicts between southern militias the 1990s (see chapter 6).

After the signing of the CPA, the emergent leadership of South Sudan civil society was incubated by and with the help of foreign regional and international organisations with the view that civil society would become the drivers of democratisation (see SSUNDE, SUDEMOP engagement in CPA milestones of Census, Elections and Referendum). This led to the idea that NGOs are the "true" civil society in South Sudan. This idea negates the broader understanding of civil society as including a diversity of social forces and power structures, which in South Sudan includes political, religious, ethnic, and women's groups, as well as military dimensions. It creates a void of legitimacy that negates the social practice of legitimate participation and inclusion of the people in politics (Munzoul, 2016).

However, other civil society members have also played a significant role in South Sudan. Some of these prospects are seen as more rewarding than working for CSO, the pay is often small, but the workload is immense, and conditions are extremely challenging (SPSBD-CSOWG, n.d.)[21]. In addition, Trade Unions and workers' organisations consequently formed the backbone of the struggle against colonialism in Sudan. The trade union movement in former Sudan formed completely independent of sectarian Sudanese organisations. They had their roots in an urban de-sectarianised organisation of society (Mustafa, 1993). Whenever the trade unions grew in strength, their influence would be stifled by military governments. After the signing of the CPA, the burgeoning trade union movement in the South was displaced from the sphere of citizen engagement and advocacy by two actions. The first is that international organisations began to support NGO/non-profit type organisations in the formation of formal civil society. The second is that government action resulted in a refusal from trade unions to register, thus leaving their legal operating framework undefined, thereby curtailing their participation in society. This has led to the corrosion of their participation as vital actors in societal processes. Today, the participation of trade unions in civil society is almost non-existent despite their once very vibrant and formidable place in the history of the country.

One noticeable key player and influential part of South Sudan civil society are the media. There is the operation of the controlled media, controlled by the government and the independent media. Some examples of FM radios include Radio Miraya, operated by the UNMISS. It is noted that between 2005-2011, Radio Miraya could not air messages about the independence of South Sudan because the government in Khartoum controlled it.

The constitution of South Sudan officially guarantees freedom of information through the Media Authority Act of 2013. However, freedom of the press remains a matter of concern, as media houses in South Sudan face oppression and abuse from the state security agents. This is evident from the 2016

[21] This document was provided to the researcher during the 2018 fieldwork in Juba. The document can be found by reaching the researcher or the NGO Forum in South Sudan.

closure of the Alwatan newspapers and subsequent arrest of its editor-in-chief (Sudan Tribune, July 25, 2016)

When it comes to television, the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation (SSBC) is only watched in the big towns. Potentially, the media could play a role in education and sensitisation, particularly in a society that is reconstructing itself. However, the media currently does not fulfil this role.

Additional key agents of peace in South Sudan are the women and women's groups. In South Sudan, women CSOs have been influential in driving national interests, particularly during the years of the struggle (1983-2004). The participation of South Sudanese women in formal peacemaking processes has been limited; there has been the systemic exclusion of women and a gendered perspective from the state, and nation-building processes such as the post-independence negotiations process (Mayen, 2013). The effect of women's contributions and leadership in peacemaking processes is more evident at the grassroots and community levels. For example, local women were very active in the 1994 People-to-People peace initiative in the region of Upper Nile (see section 6.2.2.). Women used their experience, knowledge and influence within their families and communities to work for peace (Osman, 2009).

According to Apuk Ayuel Mayen (2013), the participation of women as negotiators, mediators, technical experts and official observers in the post-independence negotiation between Sudan and South Sudan was quite limited, and gender was not on the agenda of peacemaking processes. Constitutionally, according to Article 16 of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011), the government of South Sudan shall,

> "promote women participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least twenty-five percent as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created by history, customs, and traditions".

Although this was to encourage the participation of women; it presents challenges in implementation.

Distortions of this government action are working against the cause of women's empowerment and are demonstrable in several ways. Iwilade (2013) argues that there is a discriminative selection of women to participate in key processes based on partisan politics (which is predominantly SPLM-led), providing opportunities for women who tow the party line. Secondly is the involvement of women associated with men in powerful positions. Iwilade explains further that

> In engaging the problematic of women participation, it is crucial to note that women, who get seats at peace negotiations by virtue of their sponsorship by dominant class interests or as consorts of men, cannot be expected to confront the unique issues faced by common women. To the extent that their claim to power derives from their social navigation of the structures of power through relationships with men, their representation can only reinforce the very basis of women's subordinate status (Iwilade, 2013:23).

Inclusion of women as decision-makers and not only as participants broadened the political space, forming a major step towards inclusivity. There was a need for participation of women with various backgrounds representing the range of experiences and perspectives of South Sudanese women (Mayen, 2013).

There as many constraints as there are opportunities for CSOs operating in South Sudan. Constraints include lack of infrastructure, lack of trained personnel, a traumatised society, insecurity, inability to balance conflicting priorities and need for the people, government/SPLM interference, suspicions between staff from different tribes and bureaucracy. For instance, Munzoul (2016) demonstrates the limited access the civil society in South Sudan has. He argues that certain key issues such as human rights or discussions about oil production and revenues cannot be addressed by civil society. He argues that due to capacity deficiencies and lack of interaction with government, civil society cannot respond or even react in a timely and coherent fashion.

Civil society provides a richer set of interests beyond the power-sharing discussion to create value and develop innovative, comprehensive solutions to stuck negotiations (Paffenholz, Kew & John, 2006). The opportunity exists for South Sudanese civil society leaders to develop a mechanism that will engage a broader civil society base and establish solid links with grassroots organisations to perform the necessary functions attached to their roles as representatives of the people in these peace negotiations.

6.1.2. Traditional and cultural peace actors in South Sudan

Another group in South Sudan that is perceived as critical in shaping the overall attitudes and behaviours of people in their communities are the traditional and cultural leaders. South Sudan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. This diversity has been both the cause of conflict and a source of peaceful co-existence. The strategies for peacebuilding of these actors have an immediate resonance with the communities as they engage in rigorous community consultation and community-led programmes and have a deep knowledge of the cultural dimensions underlying communities. They establish societal norms that either promote or discourage peaceful conflict resolution.

Under the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 and amended in 2015, there are three levels of government, namely "1) the National Level, which exercises authority in respect of the people and the states, 2) the state level, which exercises authority within a state, and renders public services through the level closest to the people, and 3) the local government level within the state, which is the closest level to the people". At this level, we have the county, the Payam (the second-lowest administrative division) which are further subdivided into Bomas (the lowest lowest-level administrative division containing a few individual villages). The Boma administration is an ethnic authority where the traditional authorities take on a significant role in influencing the livelihood and security of the rural majority. They represent and speak for their communities vis-à-vis neighbouring ethnic groups and state authorities. Many of the traditional authority was eroded during the war, in 1996 during Chukudum

Convention, which established governance institutions of including National Liberation Council (NLC) and an executive body called the National Executive Council (NEC) reestablished their importance. The SPLM thus brought forward the element of Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS) (Moro, Santschi, Gordon, Dau & Maxwell, 2017). However, due to poor infrastructure and underdevelopment (such as a poor radio broadcasting network) at the Boma level, especially in the wake of their secession, the traditional authorities were forced to travel on foot for several days to reach people and state authorities. Thus, authority at this level has proved to be important yet challenging.

An in-depth understanding of the realities, administrative, socio-political and legislative frameworks of Southern Sudan, the role of traditional authorities has remained important.

As a member of the public interviewed recalled,

> In 1995, the SPLM put forward a proposal or an idea to have a House of Nationalities, when it held a conference in Tonj, Bhar el Ghazal to have a house of ethnic representatives, this idea, however, did not go through. We ended up having Council of States established in 2011 under TCSS (Skype interview, 12.04.2019)

Despite this, the traditional authorities have proven effective at spiritual and lower administrative levels (Bomas and Payams). Due to the formalised systems of the traditional authorities, they occupy the title and roles as chiefs who can pass judgement on issues, cases and people. These chiefs rule according to the custom, norms and traditions of their respective communities, which are largely uncodified.

The administration of traditional societies, especially during the 1990s, occurred through the judicial system. The judiciary system was among the few institutions given special attention by the SPLM/A during the war. It is through the courts that the roles of traditional leadership had an immense impact on the people. At the same time, it was the court revenues that financed and supported the functioning of traditional authorities as well as the civil structures, which were in place by then. Between 1983 and 2000, the New Sudan court system/structure in SPLM-controlled areas was constituted in the form of a bottom-up structure. The first was the county judge, the professional judge who presides over the referral cases from the Payam judge. This was followed by the Payam judge, composed of a three-man committee of elders. Next was the regional court composed of a five-man committee, headed by the executive chief known as *Akut-thiec* (a group of five). Lastly, there is the executive chief who presides over lower courts with his sub-chieftaincy (Kuol, 2008). During their struggle with the Arabic north, it was apparent that the traditional leaders played an essential role in the levels of the court system.

All through the years of fighting (1950-2018), the two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and Nuer, the respected traditional leaders had sufficient power to broker peace between conflicting parties, despite not having political or legal authority. Within the Dinka, the traditional leader, whose office symbol is a "spear" is known as *Bany Bith*, and among the Nuer, it is the *Kuar Kwac*, with the "leopard skin" as their office symbol. These traditional authorities perform sacrifices, oaths, mediate in all types of

conflict, and often are looked like a sacred symbol (Johnson, 1994). This goes to show their different strategies in navigating war and conflict due to their unique position. It is reported that offenders who seek refuge in the residences of the *Bany Bith* or the *Kuar Kwac* were spared by the offended. In addition, in terms of the court system of the Dinka, the *Bany Bith* decides cases in the customary courts. The most familiar mechanisms of conflict resolution consist of customary mediation, compensation and restitution. *Bany Bith* or the *Kuar Kwac* also arbitrate in criminal and civil cases in the community (Wassara, 2007).

Another role of traditional leaders was to foster harmony, peace and reconciliation among their respective social communities. This task had historical roots; they have managed to maintain their peace. This stemmed from the realisation that, in addition to resource-based and political causes, some of the inter-community conflicts were triggered by ignorance. By means of re-affirming their social and cultural values, the traditional leaders manage to assert a way forward in building peace. A member of the public interviewed recalled,

> If you look at communities such as the Abiem, they have preserved their social being and peace among themselves during the hard times of the armed struggle, through processes such as traditional peer mechanisms. This has also helped them be at peace with their neighbouring communities, such as Baggara and Musiiriya Arabs on the Northern frontiers (Juba, 17.08.2017)

Traditional authorities have also served as a buffer between outside entities and the communities. During the worst of the inter-ethnic fighting, where more lives were lost in the common struggle against the northern government, Nuer and Dinka chiefs came together and started peace negotiations between their groups (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999). Ofuho (1999) brings to light a different experience of this bottom-up approach by the traditional authorities. He argues that communities in Eastern Equatoria had lived in hostility and co-existence for years, and their conflicts have recently increased to intolerable proportions due to the proliferation of modern weapons. These conflicts are due to cattle rustling, mainly carried out by a group of men widely known as *monyomiji*. He argues that one of the effective ways to peace is maintained in this valley is through the use of curses by elders to deter the young *monyomiji* from engaging in continuous raids. The curse of elders is believed to lead to a mysterious death. The word of elders is believed to be "bitter" and those who have caused troubles often vanish from society.

Although the emergence of South Sudan as a new republic has re-stratified society and changed the nature of the discourse, the role of traditional authorities remains a critical feature of the core value systems among communities in South Sudan.

6.1.3. The Church

Throughout fifty years of struggles, South Sudan's different churches have remained one of the country's few stable institutions, and in their workings toward peace, they have displayed a level of inter-religious cooperation rarely seen in the world. In the face of shared adversity, South Sudan's

Christian churches embraced an ecumenical approach to address the violence. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) was founded in 1965. However, it was unable to reach many in Southern and marginalised areas of Sudan. Thus, its member churches present in the areas that were SPLM territory formed the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in 1989. Despite operating as separate entities, the two councils worked together with their international partners and through the Sudan Ecumenical Forum for peace and justice in Sudan. In 1989-1990 under Bishop Paride Taban, the NSCC and SCC merged into the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), which spearheaded the churches' joint efforts to intervene in the conflict and was instrumentally involved in the 2005 peace agreement that ended the civil war between the North and the South of Sudan. Later they established the SSCC[22], as the South Sudanese branch of the SCC (South Sudan Council of Churches, 2019).

The interconnectedness of religious bodies in South Sudan can often cause confusion, and it is, therefore, important to clarify what kind of religious actors the research is referring to. For the purpose of this research, the actor description offered by Mans and Ali (2006) will be adopted, namely, that of "a national, faith-based organisation or an individual religious person with an organisation-like network in South Sudan". According to this definition, this research is interested in faith-based NGOs and individual religious leaders operating at the national level. This research uses a limited definition of a "faith-based actor" and excludes political parties with a specific religious leaning and individual politicians with explicit religious affiliations. "The Church" is referred to here as an amalgamation of the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Pentecostal and other Christian faiths that eventually formed and operated together as mediators under the Sudan Council of Churches.

Numerous denominations have brought humanitarian relief to civilians during the protracted conflict, and they are often considered a body that has promoted religious freedom for the mostly Christian south against the hard-line Islamist government to the north in Khartoum, Sudan. The religious composition of South Sudan is not yet accurately determined; however, Christianity is known to be the dominant religion. The 2012 Pew Research Centre report estimates that there are 60% Christian, 33% African traditional religions, 6% Muslim and the rest unaffiliated (Jeffrey, 2018).

Many academics have described religion as a key factor for peacebuilding; they are uniquely positioned and have some distinguishing features that make them particularly valuable as peacebuilding agents. Ter Haar argues that

> "… Religious actors tend to enjoy institutional legitimacy, have an available methodology, and possess the structures and networks necessary for the mobilisation of people" (Ter Haar & Busuttil, 2005).

[22] The South Sudan Council of Churches is an ecumenical body comprised of seven member churches and associate churches in South Sudan with a strong legacy of peacebuilding, reconciliation and advocacy. It is widely regarded as the primary Christian authority in the country.

The spiritual dimensions of religion draw on ubuntu (see section 3.1.1); however, insufficient attention is paid to the non-material aspects of social change:

> *"*The spiritual dimension of peace-building is largely neglected by secularists, who consider this more as a technical process" (Ter Haar & Busuttil, 2005).

Religious actors, therefore, play a constructive part in a post-conflict setting by merging spiritual guidance with organisational capacity.

In South Sudan, the Church had historically played a significant role in unifying southern Sudan since 1965 when the Sudan Council of Churches was formed to cater to Sudan. Later, there was a specific need to specifically serve the South, thus the establishment of the New Sudan Council of Churches (Onger & Wilson, 2014). A participant who was involved with the church at the time notes that,

> During the liberation movement and during the split of the SPLA/M, things got very bad in South Sudan. Most of the people moved out, and the country was divided in two. There were areas under government control and rural South Sudan, which was under SPLA. With this, the church decided to move with the people so that they can give services to the people outside the government control areas. This is where they created two institutions, namely Sudan Council of Churches remained within the government area and New Sudan Council of Churches, which was based in Nairobi. The Sudan Catholic bishops based in Khartoum and the Sudan Catholic bishops' regional conference based in Nairobi worked together on all peace, relief and development. They worked together to help people, particularly in areas of humanitarian assistance and peace programme (Interview with a South Sudanese former church member, Juba. Skype call. 12-06-2019).

The church and religious bodies of South Sudan were one of the major actors involved in the peace process during the first civil war. As one of the participants from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat mentioned,

> Starting from the 1960s, the church began behind the scenes engagement with the warring groups, which is the SPLM and the Sudan Government. It was done through the then Sudan Council of Churches and all African Conference of Churches in Nairobi. They were very instrumental in bringing the two groups together under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie. The church did all the first preliminary contacts of the discussions behind the scenes until the emperor said to bring them, we will work out an agreement. That is how the church started building peace in South Sudan (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, Juba. 11.04.2018).

Before 2011 independence of South Sudan, religious bodies played an instrumental role in bringing the conflicting parties together in former Sudan leading up to the CPA agreement. The SSCC continued to

be influential during the post-2005 CPA process until the January 2011 referendum on independence, where, in an overwhelming vote, South Sudan voted to secede. As a member of the church stated,

> What is important in 2002, the church leaders of the church of South Sudan decided that they can really clearly support the right for determination because the unity option with the north was no longer viable. In February 2002 in a forum in London, the church issued the famous statement "Let my people choose". That became the dynamics of how the advocacy for a referendum. I remember in July when the first meeting between the SPLA and the government was going on in Machakos. The church leaders called the ambassadors of East Africa to Uganda and gave them a classified document to justify how and why the people of South Sudan should exercise their right to self-determination. That document went to Machakos and was in the Machakos protocol, which gives the people of South Sudan a right to self-determination through an internationally supervised referendum. That is the work of the church (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, Juba. 11.04.2018).

Another instance is seen in 1997, where the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) brought together the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) after the split. These talks brought some form offshoots of the SPLM and subsequently reconciled communities that were at odds because of the factional fighting. This conference managed to bring about 1200 to 1500 ordinary citizens who expressed their grievances openly. This provided a platform for purification and cleansing process that helped each community to understand the other and agree to reconcile. Churches were given the mandate to launch their people-to-people projects to make and build peace, which is essentially peacebuilding at the grassroots level. This was decided especially in the case that there is a conflict in SPLM of any political group, the Church needed to step into the role of peacemaker. Peace was agreed upon, and 318 persons signed it.

However, in December of 2013, after just a few years of independence, all those achievements began to unravel when the heightened political tension within the ruling party, the SPLM, resulted in violent conflict. Although the civil war did not start along ethnic fault lines, it, however, pitted ethnic Dinka loyal to Kiir against Nuer led by Machar as the conflict developed (Jeffrey, 2018) (See section 1.2.3 and 5.3.2).

In the post-2013 civil conflict, the church was seen as trusted religious leaders and were thus assigned the role of trusted interlocutors and intermediaries. In this role, they have had access to the elites, the spoilers, the politicians, and the armed factions. As a member of the church described,

> When this thing started in May, the church leaders constantly went to the president. At that time Riek and Kiir, they met with them more than five times. "You are taking the country in the wrong direction; please change your attitude. This country is a new country; you don't need to put it through that." The church was constantly speaking to them not to go in that direction. We

> can interview any bishop. I have been telling them to go, and I have been following it up. Although the church had been very instrumental, some leaders refused to listen to the prophetic voice of the church (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, Juba. 11.04.2018).

The religious leaders were seen as effectively forming a group of believers that reaches across political and ethnic boundaries. A representative of the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat mentioned that,

> At the local, it was actually the church that built consensus of people through the diocese[23]. It was the church that made it possible for the people to understand and come together under one umbrella, one enemy which is Khartoum. They forgot about their differences, and they became united as one people to fight for the right of self-determination which they exercised on 9th January 2011 (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, Juba. 11.04.2018).

They were also the body that was seen as protecting the civilians and encouraging armed actors to put down their weapons. In addition, the religious leaders' most critical contribution was seen as their role in monitoring any agreement that emerged from political negotiations and in ensuring that its impact reached the grassroots. In monitoring the agreements, they held the leaders who signed ceasefire pacts and other agreements accountable, including by quickly reporting indications of insincerity and signs of continuing violence. In ensuring the impact would reach people on the ground, religious bodies used their role of convening people and sharing information to inform people of decisions made. They also facilitated dialogue processes, bringing together the government, traditional leaders, and broadly diverse civil society representatives. A representative of the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat mentioned that,

> I remember we used to broadcast radio programmes that would spread information and reassuring the followers about the complex and challenging process of building peace, but also encouraging everyone to seek peace with their neighbours (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, Juba. 11.04.2018).

The religious bodies are therefore seen as local actors who are "local enough" to share in the devastating effects of war at a local level and the devastating effects of violence on lives and livelihood but have a large enough platform to effect change. Religious leaders witness conflict firsthand and can help leaders and citizens walk the path back to reconciliation and forgiveness.

In addition, religious institutions are able to convey accurate and timely information to large crowds of listeners, their parishioners. As their influence increased in communities, the church reached out to the

[23] A district under the pastoral care of a bishop in the Christian Church.

leaders in the south, bringing them into the dialogue to reinforce the grassroots peace agreements they had negotiated. In total there were 23 people-to-people peace agreements facilitated by the church in 10 different regions. As a member of the GoSS mentions,

> The reunification of the SPLM by the Church has ensured that it is strategically placed. Even the president of southern Sudan himself, Salva Kiir, acknowledges that the SPLM would have never reunited and the Government of Southern Sudan would not be where it is today had the church not played a mediatory role (Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018).

Augustat (2017) argues that the Council of Churches is currently the only institution left in South Sudan that enjoys the trust of the whole population. This is due to its reputation of cooperation beyond ethnic boundaries and neutral peace mediation and reconciliation work. It achieves this through its nationwide network of ecclesiastical structures, employees, and Christian communities.

It has, however, been argued that religious activities and institutions can fall under the control of political agendas, they must thus find creative ways when faced with restrictions orchestrated by those in authority. The church in South Sudan is a structure within the SPLM. The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed in 1990 by the Catholic and Episcopalian Churches and with the support of the late John Garang. The extent of NSCC's independence on SPLA is, therefore, questionable considering its origins. Despite this, religious leaders in South Sudan bind South Sudanese geographical, across ethnic, political boundaries and religious closing a gap that no other actors can fill. In addition to religious ministry, churches are often important meeting points,especially in areas with different groups. Today in South Sudan, the Church remains quite influential.

6.1.3.1. Peace village and peace corps

In areas where there was no effective presence of the SAF or SPLA during the war, the religious bodies and NGOs created community-based bodies for the enforcement of peace and the law. The Peace Village was one of this establishment, and it was founded by Bishop Paride Taban. It was located in Kuron, near the Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria border. Also referred to as the Holy Trinity Peace Village, Kuron Peace Village is situated in the south-eastern part of former Eastern Equatoria State and was founded with the sole purpose of uniting the population in the area and setting an example of peaceful cohabitation in war-torn South Sudan.

In the peace village, different ethnic groups live and work together. This is unique in a country caught up in a civil war that emphasises ethnic divisions. It is also unlike the setup of refugee camps and Protection of Civilians' (PoC) sites within UNMISS bases where the Nuer are separated from the Dinka in different camps (with the exception of PoC sites in Malakal, which have a mixed population of Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka and Darfuri IDPs).

The Bishop is seen as an impartial authority by the mutually hostile local communities. The bishop, along with his trusted advisors, mainly deals with inter-communal conflict. In Kuron, the communities live together with highly effective facilitation of dialogues on a higher level. This meeting point forms another role of the Peace Village, where different warring factions can meet on neutral ground to discuss ways of moving beyond their conflict. An example of this is the 2014 peace agreement between the South Sudanese government and rebel faction of David Yau Yau in Jonglei province. Another good example is the 2016 traditional leaders meeting in Kuron, where about 17 traditional leaders across the country converged to deliberate on the roles of the customary authority in governance and peace.

6.2. Bottom-up peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan in South-South strife

The first part of this chapter discussed the different local actors. This section will go further and discuss one of the most popular bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding that was not only used by local actors in South Sudan but has historically proved to be effective. This is especially in the case of dealing with internal strife or what is known as "South-South" conflicts. This is best demonstrated by the 1991 split which occurred between the southerners while in the middle of the war between North and South Sudan.

Young (2007) has argued that in the wake of 1991, the SPLM/A had an internal conflict that could not be solved in the conventional ways that were used between the North and South civil conflict. He demonstrates that the southerners complain bitterly of the "war of the doctors". This was used to refer to the leadership of the liberation movement, that is Drs. John Garang, Riek Macher, and Lam Akol. The legacy of that bitter conflict had not died when the equally destructive (which was still related) civil conflict that occurs between the SSDF and the SPLA begun. This undermined the authority of the southern elites, and it was these same elites, both from the North and South that the IGAD based its mediation on. As IGAD focused on the main conflict, the way forward towards peace was also heavily influenced by bottom-up processes.

This section will start by giving a brief overview of the split and discuss the approach taken to reach a peaceful resolution.

6.2.1. The 1991 SPLM/A split

While the southern Sudanese were fighting the Arabs in the north, they were also experiencing their own internal strife. Just as Sudan overall was faced with an internal struggle, the south of Sudan also faced fragmentation within their largest liberation movement. The intervention of the international community between the 1950s and 2005 was primarily to address the violence of the North-South rift, which left a gap in the South Sudanese camp in dealing with the internal struggles in the South or with other localised conflicts.

The interest here is to see whether different strategies were employed to deal with the "inside conflict" among the South Sudanese themselves. Did this differ from the strategies employed in the broader conflict of the North and the South briefly demonstrated in chapter five (section 5.2)? This section will

briefly describe the internal challenges among the South Sudanese; however, the section will not analyse the causes and dynamics of the split outside of the processes of local peace engagement outside of it.

The nature of the historical progression of the civil wars since 1955 reveals a degree of unity of the South Sudanese in their fight against "Arab" oppression and domination (Metz, 1992). It has been argued that apart from such a unifying force, the peoples of South Sudan remain "socially and politically disparate, divided by geography, ethnicity and localised subsistence economies and kin-based loyalties" (Bradbury, Ryle, Medley & Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006).

This division can be traced to the nature of elite fragmentation at the national level (Brosché & Duursma, 2018), from the infighting of the SPLM as early as the 1990s. Theron (2018:117) states that a multiplicity of identities opened up new fault lines, leading to a disintegration of collective will and collective responsibility. She also states that the reason for the coup was the inability of the leadership to bring about democratic reforms and in response to the threat of Dinka domination. This resulted in the central power largely falling on Dr John Garang (a member of the Dinka group) and his in-group (Nyaba, 2000, Rolandsen, 2005:29). Their opposition thus disagreed with Garang's approach and ideas to unity and self-determination (Arnold & LeRiche, 2012:44; Rolandsen, 2005:35).

After failing to oust Garang, Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, an ethnic Nuer, broke away with several other discontented SPLA officers to form the "SPLA-Nasir" faction, following his failed coup attempt against John Garang, an ethnic Dinka from Bor, who was now the leader of the SPLM/A-Torit also known as the SPLM/A-Mainstream (South Sudan Humanitarian Project) (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999:126). This resulted in the weakening of the military and political arms of the SPLM/A, rendering the 1990s a turbulent time for the South (Rolandsen, 2005:38). The 1990s was then an exceptionally turbulent time in the South, and the legacy of this rift would have far-reaching consequences.

Although the rift was initially ideological difference among the highest ranks of the southern military leadership, it quickly became a full-scale conflict between the Dinka (Jieng) and the Nuer (Nei Ti Naath). (It should be noted here that the December 2013 war in South Sudan, as explained in chapter 1, was also fought along ethnic lines pitting Dinka and Nuer communities – See also section 5.7).

These are the two largest ethnic groups, who contributed most of the liberation fighters in the SPLA in the South (Jok, 1999). This tragic leadership split caused the rift between these two ethnic groups that have remained problematic and become more significant than the North-South conflicts that had previously dominated Sudanese politics (Kisiangani, 2011). Thus, the split created ethnic tensions that continue to reverberate in South Sudanese politics post-2011. This had an effect of creating an ethnic fault line between the majority ethnic identities of South Sudan (Dinka and Nuer). These two groups fought each other but also within themselves through clan mobilisation. There was thus the politicisation and the militarisation of ethnic identity since the 1990s (De Simone, 2015).

The split resulted in a massacre of soldiers and civilians on an ethnic basis and threatened to destroy any prospects for either independence of the South or the New Sudan project as Sudan government sought to exploit the division in the South by arming southern adversaries to fight one another. The Naser declarants later split and founded the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the SPLM united of Riek Machar and Lam Akol respectively. Their short-lived movements soon signed surrendering agreements with Khartoum – the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) of Riek's faction and the Fasoda agreement of Lam Akol – both of which "promised self-determination for the people of southern Sudan" (Santschi et al., 2017:14). Until 2002, when Riek Machar returned and rejoined the mainstream SPLM/A, his group fought the SPLA. As explained by a member of the SSuNDE,

> Riek Machar rebelled in 1991, and he went to Khartoum and in 1997 signed an agreement with Sudan's government for the secession of the South with him as the leader. In 2001, the North and Machar were supposed to conduct the referendum, but Khartoum dismissed and dishonoured it. Riek returned to us in the South in 2002. After the unification of the SPLM, the period that followed, 2002-2004, saw about six protocols that were negotiated. After the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, we had peace in front of us, and we sent a peace caravan to Khartoum. That was the first time that our people were to go to their army. About 100 people were delegated, were nominated, and we went to Sudan. Some went to Malakal, Wau and Juba to preach peace that we have signed the peace agreement and to disseminate the six protocols. Dr Garang and his team went first to disseminate the protocols to all areas in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. 'We have signed the agreement'. That is all we shouted. After this, a team was sent to South Africa, Pretoria. A team for reconciliation, reconstruction, taking up positions in the ministries went to South Africa for training (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018).

The pre-independence strategy for peace and peacebuilding has a great effect on the peace negotiations and peace agreements. For instance, three major peace negotiations took place between 1972 and 1989, and one peace agreement was signed on the North-South conflict. In addition, eight major peace agreements and six major peace negotiations and were concluded between 1992 to 2005, including the CPA. From 1992, the peace mediation processes were mostly orchestrated by IGAD[24]. This strategy adopted a top-down approach with most decisions made by the elite, most often in neighbouring states.

However, there were also peacebuilding approaches that took a more bottom-up peace approach. Outcomes of the bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding are more difficult to trace but are evident in the different kinds of unity. In bottom-up peace, the emphasis is placed on informal conflict resolution mechanisms and approaches to reconciliation, which is not often well understood by outsiders. Young John (2007) argues that "community-led processes of dialogue, truth, justice and restitution can

[24] Major Sudanese peace processes and agreements' (2006) 18 Peace by Pieces: Addressing Sudan's Conflict 17.

potentially tackle outstanding issues including how to re-establish law and order at the grassroots; disarming and rehabilitation of armed youths" (Young, 2007).

6.2.2. People-to-People dialogues and reconciliation process

As mentioned in the previous section, 1991 was the year in which the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) experienced a disastrous split. Ashworth (2019) has argued that this split of the SPLA leadership in 1991 led to violent interethnic massacres of thousands of civilians in the two main ethnic groups in southern Sudan, the Dinka of Dr John Garang and the Nuer of Dr Riek Machar.

In so far as the Wunlit Conference of February-March 1999 was a success, it was less to do with the meeting itself than the months of preparation that led up to it. Some of these meetings are detailed below.

The return of Riek sparked tension with the mainstream SPLM, as he was to assume the position of second vice-chairperson of the party, further pushing away comrades like Wani Igga, who had become third vice-chairperson of the SPLM when Riek left in 1991. Fortunately, the conflict was successfully suppressed in the Yei conference by the leaders of the SPLM, further consolidating the SPLM movement in the lead-up to the CPA negotiations.

This provided a platform for the traditional leaders and chiefs to compare their experiences, forming an opportunity for exchange visits and a way for them to persuade their people to participate in a conference that was to be hosted in a secure location in Bahr el-Ghazal. The sight of various chiefs coming from the other tribe into "enemy" territory, so to speak, managed to convince many that peace between their communities was possible. There was a lot of scepticism from both sides; the church and the chiefs worked together to provide security and prepare the site for the peace negotiations. The Loki conference concluded with a signed agreement, known as Nuer-Dinka the Loki accords. The establishment of the West Bank conference was the next key step in the Wunlit process.

In 1994, partly due to the split, the mainstream SPLA organized the Chukudum Convention. This convention brought together several hundred people from all over South Sudan. This convention demonstrated a change within itself towards improvement its human rights record, to institute a civil administration in the "liberated areas" controlled by the movement, a creation of a political wing – the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) – and a more democratic and accountable, to, to create a political. As a result of this convention, there was a meeting in Kajiko, near Yei in 1997. This meeting was to iron out differences that had developed between the church and the movement. Although it was a fiery meeting, it concluded with the SPLM/A mandating the church to handle peace and reconciliation and other roles such as the provision of chaplains to the armed forces (Ashworth & Ryan, 2013).

The ecumenical body in the liberated parts of Sudan, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), discerned that since it had failed to bring together the two principals, it would start at the other end of the spectrum, with the grassroots, initially integrating three different elements: traditional peacebuilding techniques, Gospel values and peacebuilding techniques.

After much meetings and deliberation, and the recognition of the failure to bring Dr John and Dr Riek, the two principles, the NSCC decided to start taking other alternatives, from the grassroots. Consequently, in June 1998, a meeting was held in Lokichoggio, northern Kenya. The Lokichoggio meeting was a meeting under the facilitation of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), where 35 Dinka and Nuer border chiefs and church leaders on both the west and east sides of the Nile River met in Lokichoggio, along with church leaders (Ashworth, 2019). For almost a decade, this was the first time that they had been able to meet, representing a step towards building trust. Trust building was to become one of the key elements of the People-to-People Peace Process. During the nine-day process, the traditional authorities and leaders began to recall how they and their ancestors had historically dealt with conflicts and restored peace. This was important in demonstrating the use of traditional peacebuilding techniques (PaanLuel Wël Media Ltd, 2011). They did this by telling their stories, another key element of the People-to-People Peace Process.

There was a lot of practical preparation then ensued between the local population, the military factions and rebel leaders controlling the area who had to be mobilised and the various organisers. A relatively obscure Dinka area called Wunlit was the sight for the first main peace conference in February-March of 1999.

The church and various religious leaders helped in the organisation of the historic civilian peace and reconciliation conference in Wunlit, Bahr El Ghazal. This meeting is known to have brought together Dinka and Nuer groups who had been fighting each other. Towards the conclusion of the conference, clergy helped solidify the new unity with various grassroots people-to-people dialogues, for instance in the east of Jonglei (see section 6.2.3.).

This is also one of the memorable contributions of actors such as the church and the traditional leaders in South Sudan in resolving a rift between two communities. It is known as the Wunlit conference. The Wunlit conference is one of the most comprehensively documented of all the local peace conferences held in South Sudan during the civil war (Hadley, 2000). This was set up by a coalition of churches that was later known as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in Wunlit village, in Bahr el Ghazal (NSCC, 2000e). The reconciliation between these communities that had been fighting for eight years was overdue. In the conference, 35 Dinka and Nuer chiefs were gathered together to discuss ways to bring peace to their people (Bradbury, Ryle, Medley & Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006). This demonstrated a cooperative effort of religious and traditional authorities in promoting peace.

The approach at Wunlit was to work through the locals and their civic leadership. Wunlit thus formed a forum of dialogue between civilians, rather than politicians. This formed a peculiar way of approaching peace; for instance, one of the highlights was the slaughter of a white bull (“Mabior” in the local language).

> "Mabior is the Bull of Peace that will be sacrificed for reconciliation and peace... Anyone who breaks this commitment to peace will follow the way of Mabior... The elders are making a peace and are taking an oath not to repeat atrocities previously committed. A curse is placed on any who partake of the Mabior sacrifice and later break the oath... It is a very serious curse; it is a curse of death" (Ashworth & Ryan. 2013:60)

As mentioned by an official in the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat, in Juba,

> The Wunlit Conference opened with the ceremonial sacrifice of a Great White Bull, provided as a gift by the local chief to represent peace. It made provision for addresses by the Church, SPLM/A, and women leaders and traditional and spiritual leaders of Dinka and Nuer. The Conference closed with the signing of the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant with its included resolutions. Each person placed his or her thumbprint, and some chose to sign the final document (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat. Juba. 12.04.2018).

A peacebuilding officer from Grassroots Relief and Development Agency (GREDA) added that,

> The original thinking about Wunlit was that it was useless for Nuer and Dinka to go on killing each other. We decided there would be no more Nuer/Dinka fighting (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

Although the initiative involved national players, its scope was to address a very important sub-national conflict. In addition, the cultural practice to sacrifice a white bull, a feature of Nuer and Dinka practice set the tone for the ritual component of peace meetings. This came to be known as "people-to-people dialogues".

The influence of religious leaders on peace was thus set. In the current conflict, the country's bishops continue to speak against the violence and acts of war crimes, pointing out the negative impacts of violence on economic and social development (Wandu et al., 2016). Thus, the steps taken by the church to promote peace have aimed to impact society directly. This is seen in the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), which implemented an Action Plan for Peace, which involved a series of community-level dialogues aimed at facilitating mutual understanding and respect among various groups, including religious groups. Churches are also often used as shelters for those seeking to escape violence (United States Department of State, 2016).

> In 1999, they had grassroots people – people talk that brought to an end the counter conflict between Nuer and Dinka at that time. It was conducted in Barh el Ghazal between Dinka and Nuer.

Wunlit appeared to be successful due to four main reasons, through truth-telling, broad participation, application of rituals and restitution matters, and support from the top level.

First, truth-telling. As a member of the church mentioned,

> We found this in Wunlit and other conferences after the people have expressed the bitterness and the anger; they are telling the truth. The truth has to be on the table if we are going to make peace (Interview with a representative from the South Sudan Catholic Bishops' secretariat. Juba. 12.04.2018).

In the Wunlit conference, members of each community aired their respective grievances openly and forcefully, and this enabled the communities to reach an agreement on what went wrong came from all parties and reached at least a partial reconciliation. Although not all issues were exhausted, there was at least an arrangement over issues such as shared pastures where there was an agreement that was successfully implemented (Johnson, 2014).

Before the signed agreement, there was a good measure of actions that had a show of good faith. In this case, these were things like returning stolen cattle, paying compensation for the killed people, resolving abducted people, assigning a community border police force, and providing humanitarian aid for the communities in need. Another very important part is the acknowledgement that the community is the primary actor, and the community must be ready to take responsibility. There was a key moment when the traditional authorities agreed among themselves that they must take responsibility for making peace and that any peace, which is imposed from the outside, will fail.

The second reason for the success of Wunlit was broad participation. As an individual participant recalled,

> The active agency is important rather than mere representation. Peacemakers and spoilers – including 'godfathers' and violent youth – alike must participate in local agreements to make them sustainable. In the Wunlit, the political leaders had to be involved; if they were not, the conference would not have been a success because they would not have supported in the implementation of the agreement. These are what we call the godfathers. These godfathers control immaterial and material resources, can offer incentives and impose sanctions. They may also be institutions, whether pre-existent ones such as churches (or church council) or organs specifically set up to fulfil these tasks (Interview with a member of the public. Juba 17.08.2017).

The broad participation allowed many actors to facilitate and participate in the conference. Churches were regarded as unrivalled in their role in facilitating local peace agreements and engaging "godfathers" in quiet diplomacy, followed by local traditional elders. Godfathers, in reference to the interview above, refers to political leaders, particularly in the SPLM, who had a large influence over their various communities. These political leaders were respected by their communities, and they were deemed important. It also included key rebel leaders who supported the initiative. This also illustrates the role of power between various participants in South Sudan in peace processes. This showed the vertical participation of the Wunlit conference through inclusive participation of the political elite, the middle-

level organisations (mainly represented by the church), and the bottom level community members. As he continued,

The dialogues were also inclusive of women, who played a central role. Some of the women groups who have been active in support of women's voice to promote peace and dialogue includes, the Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN), and Nairobi-based women's organizations (Jenner, 2000:16)

Third, rituals and restitution procedures are important. People-to-people peace processes addressed both the emotional and material needs of the communities in conflict through symbolic and material means in order to be sustainable. The historical Wunlit process, similar to other successful peace agreements at the community level and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in South Sudan and elsewhere, comprised dual elements of ritual and restitution. Rituals serve psychosocial needs and address trauma. They commonly include a component of self-disclosure or confessions, which link personal experience to the actions at leadership levels. Restitution, on the other hand, seeks to deliver tangible justice and material benefits from peace agreements. Both rituals and restitution contribute to a changing of the narrative from conflict to harmony. Rituals can also play a critical role in terms of ownership of responsibility for sustained peace by invoking negative – if spiritual – sanctions for the "undoing" of the peace attained (Ashworth, 2016).

Fourth, there was international support. For instance, there was the assistance of the UN "Operation Lifeline Sudan" (see section 7.2), who assisted the NSCC to be able to bring Nuer and Dinka chiefs out of South Sudan to meet in the neutral location. A member of the public who worked in South Sudan for many years mentioned that,

> Guarantors needed to ensure peace works. These guarantors and follow-up mechanisms help to ensure that peace agreements hold. But they must have credibility, capacity and legitimacy (A member of the public, Pretoria. 20.05.2017).

At Wunlit, a peace committee was constituted as custodian of the peace that would not only follow up implementation and sanction violations but also "take the peace home" by popularising the contents and spirit of the peace agreement(s) at the grassroots level. External actors, such as the United States, IGOs or INGOs, may also serve as guarantors. The latter particularly can play a constructive role through the provision of services and development activities.

Currently, there are people-to-people dialogues that still take place. As an example of the Wunlit in communities now, as a member of ACROSS explained, is as follows:

> In 2014, we did something similar in Daleka. We brought some Dinkas from Aweirial and some from Bor. There's a border town called Tombek, Bor is this side, and Aweirial is the other side. It took place for two days and had about 40 people. In 2017, ACROSS brought the Dinka and the Nuer from the protection of civilians' sites (POC) in Bor. We had about 15 Nuers and 15

Dinkas in attendance. We were also supposed to take 15 Mundari from there. But by then, there were some conflicts here in Jemeza. We even had to inform the government (Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018)

6.2.3. Replication of the Wunlit people-to-people dialogues in Jonglei State

In the former Jonglei state, the largest and presumably the least developed compared to the other 9 states, cattle raiding has always existed between the six pastoralist communities, (Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anuak, Kajipo and Jie). This brutality has soared since 2009 with the elderly, women and children targeted by being killed and mutilated, and community administrations vandalised and destroyed raising the death tolls into thousands of lives. The many contributing factors that lead to the rise of fatalities include; trauma from wars of the past decades, aggravated by the legacy of the split in SPLA; failure by the leaders to adapt to new peace situations; weak governance and policing; poor development or lack thereof combined with unequal distribution of wealth across the state; abundant availability of modern armament; political interests and distractions in the run-up to the 2010 elections; and the tried and tested "divide and rule" destabilisation tactics mentioned earlier (see section 5.3.2), from Khartoum used on the new nation of South Sudan. Even attempts of DDR of civilians in 2006 only led to more violence and distrust (Ashworth & Ryan, 2013).

The Sudan Council of Churches (which had merged with NSCC since the end of the war) began tackling these issues in 2011, emulating earlier personal efforts by Episcopal (Anglican) Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, a Jonglei state native. An SCC peace committee was formed under the chairmanship of the archbishop, and a series of fact-finding missions and consultations began across the state. At this point, the main conflict seems to be focused on the Luo section of the Murle and the Nuer, so peace between these two communities was essential, followed by a broader process to involve other communities. A ceasefire was negotiated for a limited time, and simultaneous conferences were held in Waat for the Nuer and Pibor for the Murle.

The initial results of the conference appeared to be promising, but it deteriorated very quickly with the resultant small-scale attacks which continued even in the face of a cease-fire, there were also reservations by some local politicians while traditional authorises found it hard to contain the violence in the youth. The Bishop made visits to both the Nuer and Murle sides but later withdrew due to failure of calming the situation. The church later called on the UNNISS and government to provide security.

In their assessment, the SCC concluded that the participation of the Government in bringing peace to the community is important. Thus, they suggested a two-Track process, with the government taking responsibility for Track 1, the higher-level process, and the church concentrating on Track 2, the grassroots process. While the government worked on a comprehensive disarmament process and setting up a Presidential Committee for Peace, reconciliation and tolerance in under the management of the archbishop, the church focused on the "Peace from the Roots" process.

In Jonglei, the church involvement did not meet the ideal circumstances, the people to people process it initially envisioned did not occur, leading to a process that was inextricable to higher-level government processes, including disarmament and provision of security. Despite this, the church used many grassroots approach elements such as telling stories, trust-building, listening to the members of the community and putting the community as the primary actor of peacebuilding.

6.3. Conclusion

As stated in the introduction, this thesis is concerned with the debate among peace scholars writing within the "local turn" of peacebuilding. The chapter thus moved beyond the critical outlook of liberal peacebuilding approaches and provided an empirical encounter of South Sudan bottom-up approaches. The chapter argued that the responsibility for resolving these conflicts and protecting communities falls largely on the shoulders of local actors; thus, there is a need to look at the local approaches to peacebuilding.

This chapter speaks to the "everyday" strategies to achieve peace in South Sudan. The discussion on the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches to peacebuilding speaks of actors and the strategies used by the local actors. The aim of the chapter was to map out bottom-up actors and approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan. The evidence presented from the chapter is that there are multiple local actors in South Sudan who work in strategies that are different from the contemporary liberal approaches to peacebuilding.

The chapter started by discussing the role of civil society in peacebuilding in South Sudan. From a liberal perspective, it is argued that the impetus for peacebuilding primarily stems from political actors and conflict parties; however, the chapter highlights that South Sudan civil society has the potential to play a central role in support of peace processes. However, during the war, space for civil society to act is drastically reduced, often seen and depicted as an instrument which can be used or discarded by the top-level at different times. The chapter also argued that civil society is not a homogenous category and that the roles played by different entities within it differ, although it remains important as the civil society in South Sudan have found a way to be directly connected to the people on the ground.

South Sudan's traditional leaders can play a key leadership role in enhancing reconciliation efforts among warring communities and building lasting peace. While the various positions traditional, community life has changed, and continue to change, over time, to maintain judicial processes in adverse circumstances, their ability to mobilise communities, to settle local conflicts, and to represent the views of their people is real.

The chapter also highlights the resurfacing of the church as a primary interlocutor in South Sudan, including the role of churches and religious leaders who reach resources in establishing peace. Amid flight and disintegration, one agency surfaced as a primary interlocutor: the southern Sudanese churches. These approaches include the NSCC pursuit of southern reconciliation through the people-to-people

peace initiatives. They bypassed elite military commanders and put their focus more in traditional mid-level leaders in a process that empowered grassroots communities to broker ceasefires, implement practices of good governance and restore communal boundaries of moral interaction.

The chapter also argues that the second civil war brought with it challenges that needed a different approach. The 1991 split of the SPLM and the South-South internal conflict thus ushered in a new focus on the local mechanisms that were more effective than the peace negotiations that had been going on at the time. Thus, the second civil war challenged peacebuilding strategies.

As explained in the chapter, one of the most effective bottom-up strategies is the people-to-people talks, which is best demonstrated by the Wunlit people-to-people conferences in 1999. The People-to-People Peace Process has been recognised as a model of grassroots peacebuilding. It fundamentally impacted and constructed the of the nation by rehabilitating traditional leaders and enhancing judicial accountability and promoting healthy interethnic cooperation and interaction.

Apart from restoring the roles of the traditional leaders the conference also reunited a fragmented southern populace, enabling military commanders to focus on resolving the conflict with the North from a position of unified strength and singularly voiced demands. This was important even for the elite and the international community who relied upon this southern reunification.

Indeed, it could be said that rather than designing a process, People to People opened up space whereby the people themselves could pursue peace and reconciliation; the process was designed as a result of what emerged within that space. Therefore, within the examined grassroots communities, it was southern Sudanese churches, traditional authorities, communities, and civil society that functioned as the predominant actor facilitating and securing communal stabilisation and national resolution. Another argument on the people-to-people dialogue is that it is often dependent on the international community and national government support. Once these elements were missing, the process did not work. This is displayed in the case of the people-to-people dialogue, which was replicated in Jonglei.

All in all, there is an importance of local actors and approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan, and their role has contributed to the achievement of peace in South Sudan over the years.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERSECTION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MIDDLE-LEVEL NON-GOVERNMENTAL PEACEBUILDING ORGANISATIONS

7.1. Introduction

As explained in chapter 3, there has been a shift in peacebuilding research, policy and practice. The current focus has increasingly shifted from international to local peacebuilding, and there has been an increasing interest in the potential role to be played by domestic actors (Paffenholz, 2013). There has been an emerging consensus that local conflict resolution is critical to building peace; this, coupled with international support, provides an increase in the chances of successful peacebuilding (Autesserre, 2017).

Previous studies have focused on the positionality of the domestic (internal) or the international (external) actors within the debate of post-liberal peacebuilding, and the local turn approaches peacebuilding. Drawing on the empirical findings of this study, this chapter attempts to bring attention to the complex way these actors interact. This includes an emphasis on the non-linearity of the relationship between domestic and international actors, and, going beyond understanding the relationship itself, exploring how this interaction has shaped peace objectives and strategies employed by both sets of actors. This will take the discussion beyond the binary of "the local" – often simplistically seen as either completely "good" (Donais, 2009) or completely "unstable" (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015) – and the international, which is often perceived to have colonial or neocolonial undertones (Jabri, 2013).

Section 2.3.3. presents an argument by Lederach that, between Track I, II, and III, Track II is the most important one because it has the "greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peacebuilding process over the long term" (1997:60). Paffenholz (2013) agrees by arguing that support to the Track II actors is assumed to influence peacebuilding at both Track I and Track III levels. This aligns with the justification of this chapter. Track II, in reference to Lederach's triangle in chapter 1, is executed by the middle-level actors. This chapter analyses the integration of local organisations into mainstream peacebuilding in South Sudan at the middle level. Middle-level organisations fall into the "middle-level actors" (see section 1.2.2.2) as described by Lederach (1997) in relation to the levels of actors involved in peacebuilding. Middle-level actors consist of ethnic/religious leaders, academics/intellectuals and humanitarian leaders (including those in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In order to have a structure of comparison, the chapter focuses on middle-level international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and South Sudanese non-governmental organisations (SSNGOs) operating at a middle level. Thus, throughout the chapter, SSNGOS will be used to refer to domestic organisations founded and predominantly organised by South Sudanese; on the other hand, will be used to refer to INGOs are international organisations founded outside of South Sudan.

In this chapter, the analysis seeks to describe the actors at this level by looking at the INGOs and NGOs. The chapter argues the assumption that liberal peace with a state-building approach is diminishing and that there is a shift towards the acknowledgement that the presence of domestic actors is gaining significance. Given their inevitable interactions, this chapter aims to explore the area of intersection that exists between mid-level peace actors that work in South Sudan. It also argues that the interplay that exists here has not only changed over time but continues to face challenges. This will contribute to answering sub-question four, which asks, "Are there identifiable gaps between the liberal and local turn approach and what are their implications?"

This question will be answered by presenting the historical progress and developmental role of INGOs in politics and the formation of SSNGOs from the 1970s to 2013 in section 7.2. Section 7.3 presents the post-2013 shift that moved from exclusion to inclusion of the local in peacebuilding efforts and actors. Towards inclusion of SSNGOs, it is important also to understand the strategies employed by various local organisations; this will form the discussion in section 7.4., given the increased interaction of INGOs and SSNGOs. The final part of the chapter, section 7.5, presents the consequential challenges from the interaction of INGOs and SSNGOs in South Sudan.

7.2. The development of INGOs and formation of NGOs in South Sudan, 1970s-2013

As mentioned in chapter 5, South Sudan experienced a protracted conflict between 1955 and 2005, with a period of relative peace between 1972 and 1983. During this time of relative peace, the international community organisations, consisting of aid agencies and South Sudanese NGOs (SSNGOs), mushroomed. This systematic involvement, from the 1970s, set to tackle complex emergencies that had resulted from the conflict. The humanitarian aid was not only needed but also welcomed. Despite this, the roles of both the INGOs and the SSNGOs differed.

The largest role of INGOs can be seen in Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which was founded in 1989. OLS was the largest-ever coordinated humanitarian effort through a consortium of UN agencies, specifically UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP), that enabled the participation of donors and NGOs to provide relief efforts, especially if they could not do it on their own (The New Humanitarian, 2014). Although there were INGOs active in Sudan before this time, for instance, the Norwegian people's Aid (NPA), the OLS was the largest project driven by the INGOs. African Rights (1995) reports that OLS was founded as a possible response to post-conflict conditions (Riel, 2001).

The OLS operated in a way that it provided relief and supplied relief to both the GoS territories and the SPLA-held territories. They also provided logistical support to other INGOs with a budget of about 100 million dollars a year (Macrae, 1996). Bradbury et al. (2000) argue that at this time, very few INGOs opted out of the OLS, as INGOs could only work legally and relatively securely under the OLS umbrella.

OLS was seen as flexible and adaptable to the changing reality on the ground, although it did have incidences of bureaucracy that can cause delays (Ashworth, 2014). OLS was criticised as being

unsustainable and for the fact that it was an emergency relief organisation that failed to address the root causes of the crisis. For instance, the food operation was often tied to immediate relief and not to any sustainable improvements in people's livelihoods (The New Humanitarian, 2014).

While the departure point pf the OLS was not to end hostilities between warring parties in Sudan, it did result in building peace, critics have argued that this peacebuilding could have been pursued further. Hulme (1991) has argued that between 1972 and 1983, INGOs' involvement in South Sudan provided a substitute for local administration of some sort. They effectively adopted the welfare functions of an ordinary state; this was in addition to and through their activities and effects on famine and emergency conditions in the South at the time. The material impact of the INGOs not only to the southerners but to the SPLM/A and local NGOs provided fertile ground for ------

The influence of the INGOs at this time can be seen in two ways, according to Riehl (2001). First, he argues that since INGOs functioned predominantly as public service providers, this enabled them to develop a strong social position to behave as regulatory agencies, and ultimately they act as dominant-political referees. There was a strained relationship where there was a realisation of the need to alleviate the most dramatic humanitarian need in various sectors. On the other hand, there was an understated political presence; this mostly demonstrated the shortcomings of the SPLA/M. Riehl also reports that most INGOs were also unwilling to report to the Sudan Relief Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), which was a regulating body of all foreign bodies, thus discrediting the SRRA's effectiveness. However, when it came to the OLS, it had recognised the SPLM and the SRRA as partners. Interestingly, by OLS forming an alliance and collaborating with the SPLM/A, which was at that time thought of as a rebel group, it had made a political statement.

Due to the fact that the SPLM/A was unable to fulfil its obligation of protection of civilians due to lack of resources, among other things, the OLS and INGOs filled this vacuum (Keen, 2000a:32). With the lack of any organised control or external supervision in the stateless state, an anarchic situation was formed. This led to the negotiation of the Ground Rules in 1995 and the Memorandum of Understanding of 2000 on the relationships of the SPLM/A, SRRA, INGOs and OLS (Riehl, 2001). They were built on the understanding of the need for an improved security situation for foreign and indigenous INGO staff and their assets, although no violations were subject to any formalised legal procedure. This led to the formation of the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (JRRC), whose members met frequently. Riehl goes further to argue that the motive behind the signing of the MOU was not necessarily the demand for fees but rather a symbolic recognition of the fact that the SPLM/A and the SRRA could not be circumvented. This represented a level of INGO cooperation and partnership with the local in South Sudan.

Secondly, Riehl argues that much of the work of the SSNGOs is a clear consequence of the political strategy of INGOs and their agencies. African Rights (1995c:33) argues that due to no inconsiderable

institutionalisation process that was present in Sudan before the OLS and after the Ground Rules of 1995, the SPLA civil wing struggled to impose civil culture. This led to the set-up of the creation of parallel relief structures, much like the SSNGOs of today. According to Bradbury et al. (2000:16), SSNGOs were also thought of as resources by the SPLM for the conflict rather than authentic and rightful actors to develop the civil society. Some of the institutions identified by African Rights (1995c:23) include the Joint Relief and Rehabilitation Committees (JRRCs), Community-Based Relief Committees (CBRCs), Inter-Church Committees (ICCs), and Village Health Committees (VHCs). Given this, Riehl argues that,

> There are doubts as to whether these local institutions can be interpreted as authentic and sustainable evolutions of civil institutions because they were externally imposed and serve only their own interest as well as the ones of local humanitarian entrepreneurs (2001:14).

Despite the origin of the SSNGOs, their activities and development, especially after the CPA, have proven not only to be effective but also to be much needed and welcomed. The origins thus have proved to be of less importance, especially when it comes to their role of contributing to the outcome and development output. Today, there is an increase in the number of SSNGOs, especially in Equatoria, where one finds the largest density of local and international institutions.

7.3. The post-2013 shift from exclusion to inclusion of the local in South Sudan's peacebuilding

As discussed, within a liberal framework, the state and its institutions are prioritised, and the local is included as an afterthought (see section 7.2 above). As a result, the local is under-prioritised and under-resourced (Rosenthal, 2017). This section describes the environment of middle-level organisation of peacebuilding in South Sudan after the 2013 civil war.

Section 7.4 has described how the strategies of INGOs between the 1970s and the 2000s focused more on humanitarian relief towards food, education, and health. Under the umbrella of OLS, INGOs' strategies engaged with the local at a state level, that is with the SPLM/A and the SRRA.

During the period after secession, between 2011 and 2013, the INGOs primarily focused on efforts towards state-building or towards a focus of state as the main instrument of operation. For instance, South Sudan achieved its independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, and was supported by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was subsequently transformed into the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The approach UNMISS employed during this time focused on a high-level bilateral intervention between government signatories and international monitors (see chapter 6). The mandate of the UNMISS focused on building the state's capacity to manage conflict and strengthen the rule of law in line with the overall principle of national ownership. However, the outbreak of the 2013 conflict provided a different environment, which led to the rethinking of strategies of INGOs.

The UN priority plan for South Sudan released by the United Nations Peacebuilding fund (2015) states that,

> "The approach of the UN to peacebuilding is articulated in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of Conflict. Drawing on two decades of experience and analysis, the report calls for sustainable peace, through building confidence in political processes; establishing security and strengthening the rule of law; supporting economic revitalisation; enabling the provision of basic services and restoring core government functions."

The report emphasised that the three objectives needed to be supported under the principle of national ownership. It also highlighted that peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility, with the international community in support of the national agenda. The report thus highlights how UNMISS aims to assist the GoSS through five peacebuilding goals, that is,

> "a) supporting legitimate politics by fostering inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; b) improve security by strengthening people's security c) promoting justice by addressing injustices and increase people's livelihoods d) laying economic foundations by generating employment and improving livelihoods; e) support basic services by building government capacity to manage revenues and establish accountable and fair service delivery systems."

Towards the above goals, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) employed a $14 million Peacebuilding Support Plan, which was suspended due to the outbreak of the 2013 conflict (see section 1.2.3). In light of the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in August 2015, the peacebuilding support office of the UN (PBSO) extended the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, which would allow for different projects than those initiated in 2013.

The strategies employed by UNMISS above hinge on the notion of "liberal peace", which promotes peace through democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, and a free, globalised market. This is done through institutional building/strengthening at a high political level and is often detached from local institutions (see chapter 2) (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996). Given South Sudan's protracted and violent conflict, such a high-level peace is neither accessible nor relatable to its people. This has been described as the need for the "exportation of Western knowledge" to the ideas and methodologies used by local peacebuilders (Richmond & Mitchell, 2011). International NGOs such as Oxfam and World Vision have faced criticism of "copying and pasting" projects in South Sudan and diverting peacebuilding resources from local organisations (Virk & Nganje, 2016). It also follows that the level of ideological ambition of external interveners will in most cases have significant implications for what type of projects they will support, and the sequencing of these activities, for instance, elections and

human rights, which have typically been a key ingredient of peacebuilding in the period between 2013 and 2015/2016.

The inadequacies of the approach expose the gap between the political elites (or the decision-makers) and the citizens, who are often thought of as recipients of, rather than participants in, peace. A member of the Integrated Development Organization (IDO) mentioned that,

> The immediate efforts made for signing the peace agreement in August 2015 to restore peace in the country failed at a national level with the outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016. Very little has been done to attempt to rebuild relationships, reconcile people as well as building trust between communities. Violence has increased; leaving citizens vulnerable with no resources to sustain their livelihood and making them entirely dependent on external aid assistance. If attention is paid, you can realise that most of the conflicts are localised. Communal conflicts over resources and land expansion demonstrate the multi-layered nature of the conflict. One way of looking at the conflict, therefore, will not help us get peace (Interview with an officer from IDO. Juba. 10.08.2017).

The inadequacies were once again realised when the July 2016 conflict in Juba left 300 dead and 35,000 people displaced (World Health Organization, 2016). This violence not only shows that the IGAD-Plus ARCSS failed, but also that the focus of the UNMISS peacebuilding approach did not provide the protection, resilience, and peace education needed for the citizens. Following this realisation, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2252, changing the UNMISS mandate from the support of the Government of South Sudan in peace consolidation, state-building, and economic development, to the protection of civilians (Security Council/12475, 2016). The UNSC also urged open and inclusive national dialogue, involving the participation of youth, women, faith groups, and civil society organisations, among others (Resolution 2241). While high-level interactions have had some success in peacebuilding, nationally negotiated conflicts have shown the persistence of instability if buy-in and accountability are absent at the local level (Anderlini, 2004). In South Sudan, the approaches to peacebuilding described above appear to favour state institutions and elites at the expense of local actors and processes.

The shift of mandate marks a time where South Sudan was witnessing a shift in international focus towards the state and the non-state peace actors, thus increasing their focus on the local. The expanding conflict in South Sudan exemplifies the need for an approach that is vertically inclusive of the local. Although the impetus for ending the conflict in South Sudan primarily stems from political elites, belligerent party members, and international state representatives, comparative research has shown the central position that local organisations can play in the peace process (Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative Event, 2017).

Although some organisations were inclusive of SSNGOs, this was not the case in most organisations until 2016, when there was a shift in the approach, from a more state-centric approach to one that included the local. This shift coincided with the global debate on inclusivity. This is evident in the significant policy developments from practitioners in the larger peacebuilding architecture. An example of this inclusionary approach can be seen in the 2016 UNSC Resolution 2282 on Review of United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. By that resolution, the Council urged the Peacebuilding Commission to hold a regular exchange of views with relevant regional and sub-regional organisations. This resolution was adopted unanimously and called for a reformation of the peacebuilding architecture to promote more inclusivity of local peace processes and was in turn supported by a similar adopted resolution on peacebuilding by the United Nations General Assembly on 27 April 2016 (Lebada, 2016). The G7+[25] has also developed a "New Deal" that highlights the necessity of a "legitimate and inclusive politic" when it comes to peacebuilding (Donais & McCandless, 2017). These developments signify some of the most significant attempts at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of peacebuilding strategies (Öjendal & Ou, 2015).

In the years between 2013 and 2018, many peacebuilding and donor organisations shaped their approaches to peacebuilding activities from state-focused and state-driven and more towards indirect peacebuilding, situating the local NGOs at the centre of peacebuilding frontline. For instance, UNDP, Democracy International (DI), and Catholic Agency for Oversee & Development (CAFOD) among others, directed their funding towards local CSOs for peacebuilding interventions.

In South Sudan, there are many INGOs that have adapted their approaches to build on, facilitate, and support the work of local actors and processes. Organisations such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), among others, work to ensure South Sudan's transformation into a stable country by supporting the increased participation and inclusion of local youth and women groups from various provinces into its decision-making and conflict resolution processes, especially in the implementation of the Agreement of Resolution of conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) (Liaga, 2018). Concurrently, the UN has also established a platform for local government officials and a range of other actors to deliver peacebuilding and development-related activities. There is great variation among external interveners about to which degree local, traditional authorities, NGOs and other representatives of local populations have been consulted in the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding activities.

Another example of how INGOs are including the local can be seen with the US-based NGO, Search for Common Ground, which has developed a 20-episode radio drama called "Sergeant Esther" that broadcasts nationwide in support of local media houses. It promotes peace and speaks against hate speech by telling the story of an officer who resolves conflicts with dialogue and nonviolence. This

[25] The G7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The group represents 20 member countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen. "Who We Are," G7+, http://www.g7plus.org/.

series is a collaboration between Search for Common Ground South Sudan, Common Ground Productions, local screenwriters, the Catholic Radio Network, the South Sudan Theatre Organization, and Radio Bakhita (Nyambura, 2017). In addition, Peace Direct (an American INGO) works in Unity State in South Sudan to train community leaders in conflict analysis and conflict mapping in order to manage appropriate responses (Hellmüller, 2014). From these two examples, we can see the shift of the strategies from a negotiation with state elite and government to engage in more long-term architecture to reach the "everyday" population (see section 3.2.2.3).

7.4. Local strategies

As stated in the introduction, this thesis is concerned with an understanding of "local turn" approaches to peacebuilding and their interplay with contemporary peace processes towards the achievement of peace in South Sudan. The involvement and inclusivity of the local have been argued by the local turn scholars to be beneficial (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). After secession, and with the outset of the new civil war, a shift from the exclusion of SSNGOs to their inclusion in contemporary peace approaches has taken place as described in section 7.3. As argued in chapter 6, local-level strategies are diverse and most often differ from the top-down strategies. This section thus aims to describe various strategies used by SSNGOs.

In their report "Missed Out", Tanner, Moro, Wani and Maburutse (2016) explore the roles that SSNGOs have played in the peacebuilding and humanitarian response in South Sudan. In their findings, local SSNGOs contribute significantly to the relevance of the peacebuilding in South Sudan through their proximity to disaster-affected communities, their understanding of culture and language, and their sensitivity to political and social dynamics. This promotes their flexibility through ad hoc timely action, communicating with communities and strengthening accountability to communities.

From their description of the importance of SSNGOs, it is observed that much SSNGOs focus on the engagement of the population, for instance of vulnerable groups such as women and the youth. Thus, the importance of bottom-up strategies used by SSNGOs remains important. As a member of ACROSS mentioned,

> In my own assessment, what local NGOs do [is] small, especially geographically, but it has an impact, especially on people's lives. Even for ACROSS, what we are doing in the Bor community has an impact, but it is small (Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018).

There are strategies championed by non-traditional peacebuilders that have proven to have an impact on communal disputes through community-led programmes that reflect the cultural significance of the groups involved. These peace programmes have created an avenue for communities to express their grievances.

For instance, there are various community peacebuilding projects in the Western Corridor in South Sudan's Bahr El Gazal region, where local SSNGOs organise conferences to solve disputes between Sudanese Missiriya (cattle-herding pastoralists) and the South Sudanese Dinka farmers, in partnerships with community leaders and religious groups who acted as negotiators and advisors by holding conferences. This has led to a coordination of peaceful grazing land and access to water and pasture (Wilson, 2014). This strategy borrows from the people-to-people dialogues that are also facilitated by SSNGOs (see section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3).

Dialogues are a common strategy used by many SSNGOs. These dialogues are known as intercultural dialogues, and they aim at laying a common understanding between ethnic groups involved in the conflict. These intercultural dialogues also brought together members of various ages and sexes, community elders, male and female, and youth, both male and female, making the dialogues inter-generational and gender-free dialogues, in order to discuss issues that are pertinent to them. Young people attributed the conflict to the elders, and elders to the youth until consensus was reached from the discussions. Through video records used and shared by communities across the different IDP camps, they provided a platform for communication to people who could not physically be present.

Among the SSNGOs interviewed by the researcher, the Grassroots Relief and Development Agency applied this strategy. GREDA focuses on the youth. They believe in training both groups who will, in turn, influence the communities in different ways to cultivate a culture of peace.

> We engage the community in discussing our day-to-day issues. In addition, we prefer to also engage in dialogue over sports activities, which brings the communities together and builds a relationship. This has proved to work effectively (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

Another SSNGO that has applied the dialogue strategy is the Screen of Rights. As explained by their representative,

> We engage in community dialogues as an organisation. Recently we arranged a community dialogue among the youth to tackle hate speech, which is rampantly spreading in Juba and South Sudan in general. The participants included teachers and students from local universities, shop owners and businessmen from surrounding areas, as well as other local community groups and NGOs. Therefore, the participation in this dialogue catered for the bottom-up process where they were interested in influencing the people who interact with the day-to-day hate speech in their communities and neighbourhoods (Interview with a representative from Screen of Rights. Juba. 03.04.2018).

In addition to dialogues, another strategy employed is community engagement in solving problems in the community. Integrated Development Organisation (IDO) is one of many organisations that practices the dialogue strategy. The IDO is involved in community engagement primarily among internally

displaced people (IDP) camps in Juba and surrounding areas. They also focus on the youth and representation of women as a way of impacting the community positively. As their representative mentioned,

> Their strategies involve using the community manpower to manage their resources that we employ. For instance; if a water pump is being built in a certain region, we find it necessary to have a water management committee, which will be engaged with tackling the day-to-day issues that arrive and are tied up with the water source. In this strategy, we train community leaders on how to manage disputes and build their knowledge on mitigation (Interview with an officer from IDO, Juba. 10.08.2017).

These local organisations work very closely with the communities in order to develop solutions to their issues. This is further elaborated by a representative from Ana Taban,

> What happens is, in the cattle keeping communities, we do workshops for them. We bring leaders together. In most cases, we go to the cattle camps ourselves. We form the groups there using the chiefs. These communities have leadership: chiefs from the homestead and chiefs in the cattle camps. You go through the chiefs, and they identify for you someone who will be responsible. He can identify a young man, an old man or a woman because we want to form women's groups. Unfortunately, women in these communities do not associate with men, [and] there is little realisation that if we do not involve them, they will miss out (Interview with an officer from Ana Taban, Juba. 05.04.2018).

In addition, organisations such as ACROSS employ a unique strategy of reaching communities through messages via the media. As explained by a representative,

> There's a programme on education, called Participatory Awakening Process (PAP). Here, we try to make the locals aware of their resources. We run the PAP programs in Our offices in Gorong, Yei, the Anua in Boma, where the Murle people come from. Through PAP, we deal with the production of messages of different languages and share this with local communities, mostly cattle-keeping communities. The messages we develop are known as cross-cutting messages. We talk about things like girl child education in devices. In some of these communities, they do not want to send girls to school. They have to stay home, get married and bring wealth to the family. This ensures that girls do not go to school. That is where we come in; we make messages to encourage girls and boys to go to school. We also have messages on HIV/AIDS awareness, trauma and counselling and peacebuilding messages. The peacebuilding messages could have messages like you should avoid cattle raiding because it has one, two or three …consequences that will follow you. To program the device, we copy the message into the memory chip and slot it in. The messages are in various local languages so they can reach local populations. We once did it with another programme in Tonj East, where we went to the

> communities and form groups for ladies, old people and youths. We give each group, one device, and about 30 people can listen to the messages at their preferred time and discuss how it affects their communities. As per now, since we are operating on Jonglei state and in former East Equatoria state. There is also a radio station called Liberty FM where we put the same messages to play to communities we did not manage to reach.

They have even reported positive results in their strategy of spreading peaceful messages via media devices. The representative of ACROSS recounts,

> We had a testimony in an area called Terekeka. There was a young man who used to steal cows, goats, people's groundnuts, and so on. One day he was listening to one of the messages that were prepared in their language. The message said, if you steal people's things, there is a curse that will follow you. We have some digital audio players which we put in the messages and deliver to them. It is solar-powered. When he heard this message that there is a curse, the word curse touched him so much. I understand he went to one of the churches and said, "Please forgive me. I used to be the one grabbing people's goats and groundnuts at night; I am leaving these things."

Another prominent strategy employed is what is known as "active citizenry". Organisations like the South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (SSuNDE), a national non-governmental organisation that promotes the active participation of citizens in peacebuilding, is one of the many organisations employing the active citizen strategy in South Sudan. As a representative from SSuDE mentioned,

> The strategies we use in peacebuilding is divided into three. First is the united resources strategy. Here, SSuNDE meets with local communities and discuss what it is that unites them, for instance, roads and water points, and [they] discuss ways of strengthening these dependencies by improving the areas which bring the different communities together. Second is the constituency dialogue, which we use in tackling governance programmes. These meetings are done in partnership with governmental bodies at the local level. This is to provide a platform where the legislators can dialogue with the communities on different needs and issues on the table (Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018).

The contribution of local organisations can be seen in their efforts of promoting direct communication and contact between communities. For example, South Sudan Women Network (SSWN), Organization for Non-Violent & Development (ONAD), South Sudan Women Block (SSWB) and Voice for Change (VFC) use a community dialogue strategy for women, youth, and community leaders whom they believe can influence the communities positively. They created many community peace clubs and encourage a non-violence conflict resolution approach, advocating for gender equality and encouraging women's participation both in politics and community peace initiatives at all levels. This strategy and level of

engagement have proved useful in addressing key areas of focus for communal disputes, and in strengthening interactions between conflicting groups.

The impact of both the INGOs and SSNGOs is mixed and differs from organisation to organisation. In the conflict environment of South Sudan, it might be easier for local organisations to navigate the terrain; for instance, due to underdevelopment, the transport system in South Sudan is relatively poor. This contributes to difficulty in the movement of INGOs to rural settings. However, the SSNGOs based in rural and difficult to reach areas are able to coordinate and conduct programmes on behalf of or in partnership with INGOs. A professor at the University of Juba remarked that SSNGOs will always remain an important and strategic partner to international organisations. He remarked,

> The flexibility within SSNGOs can put them at a position that they can respond to issues as quickly as they occur. You can say that there is a significant tendency for peacebuilders stationed at local levels to "bend the rules" to implement projects and programmes. For instance, many INGOs and UNMISS might need permission to react to various circumstances while the issues are immediate are require attention, you can see the consequences of this in the July 2016 violence (Interview with a professor at University of Juba. 25.05.2018.).

Given the evidence from section 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, strategies from both the international and the local actors are important. These strategies represent the everyday, as mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3. In reaching the local populations, the data points to a need to employ effort to localised structures. This has led Randazzo to argue that South Sudan needs to not only depend on the "orthodoxies and statist, territorial logic of mainstream liberal peacebuilding," but to "locate the possibility of peace in the agency of the local" (Randazzo, 2017).

The strength, opportunities and challenges faced by INGOs and SSNGOs can be illustrated as "two sides of the same coin". For instance, an organisation like the UN might have reasonable concerns for the security of its staff, but greater autonomy, while the SSNGOs lack the capacity but have greater flexibility. This is what Lederach (1997) refers to as an inverse relationship (see section 1.2.2.2). These inverse relationships pose difficulties for the design and implementation of peace processes. Thus, there is a need to interrogate the relationship between the INGOs and the SSNGOs.

7.5. Challenges in the interaction of INGOs-SSNGOs in South Sudan

Section 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 have thus far focused on the dynamism of the environment in which both INGOs and SSNGOs are situated and the shifts it has undergone. Section 7.3 described the movement towards the inclusion of local turn actors and approaches of the SSNGOs in mainstream peacebuilding. This peacebuilding results in the bringing together of different actors and key players who are engaged in the rebuilding of a country. This process will require cooperation and partnership among the actors working together. Here, cooperation and partnership are taken to mean a form of engagement where two or more actors of peace share ownership, as well as the responsibility for managing the peace objectives of the

country. An example of this collaborative effort is demonstrated by a participant from GREDA who recognises the importance of both international and local organisations,

> The major international organisations have serious protocol issues within their organisation that prevent them from going deep into the communities to do certain activities. That leaves only the South Sudanese organisations to go to the communities. This is one way the two types of organisations work together (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

From the fieldwork, empirical evidence shows that, although the cooperation and partnership of INGOs and SSNGOs have improved over the years, a meaningful partnership that fosters productive cooperation observed by the external, as well as the internal actors/organisations of peace in South Sudan, is weak (Tanner, Moro, Wani and Maburutse, 2016). This situation minimises the areas of overlap, collaboration, opportunity and increases chances of gaps and challenges towards building peace as a common objective.

This is not to say that there is a complete lack of collaboration. For instance, women's organisations within Juba seem to have mastered the art of working together at least in some aspects to bring about change. Organisations such as Eve Organization for Women Development, Women for Women International and South Sudan's Women Empowerment Network have partnered specifically with Peace Pax, a Dutch INGO. Together with various women's organisations, Peace Pax has managed to collaborate and organise women-led local dialogue groups, known as peace tables, in Bentiu. Their collaborative work facilitates dialogues to bring the Nuer community together and improve relations between those living in the Protection of Civilians site and those living in town. This particular project also includes the South Sudan Council of Churches through its Action Plan for Peace (APP) work on advocacy, neutral forums and reconciliation (Peace Pax, n.d.). In the Christian Aid report "In it for the long haul", it is argued that the manifestation of local conflict dynamics can change quickly, and small incidents can escalate. This might be due to a variety of reasons such as combinations of conflict memory, the widespread presence of small arms, or synergies with political divisions. Although helpful, facilitation of workshops (as seen with the collaboration of Peace Pax and women's organisations) are unlikely to be sufficient (Christian Aid, 2018).

In the interactions between INGOs and SSNGOs, there are various challenges and constraints. The data collected highlights challenges that develop from funding.

7.5.1. The funding environment of middle-level actors

To begin with, financial support towards SSNGOs is important in working towards developing a cohesive relationship between INGOs and SSNGOs and their collaborative efforts. This formed a major aspect developed from the fieldwork that describes the relationship between the INGOs and SSNGOs. South Sudan has a complex history when it comes to funding and receiving aid. As showed in section 7.2, during Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), southern Sudanese NGOs were not common. INGO

activities were an internationally coordinated, funded, and executed operation. Southern Sudanese national occupied the positions such as military liaisons for coordination, agency staff, aid and protection, and community volunteers. Although the church was instrumental at this time, they were also offered supportive roles. However, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, several southern Sudanese NGOs began to form and, with that came support from international partners to develop their structures and capabilities (Riehl, 2001).

The donors funding peacebuilding in South Sudan have recently changed and put policies towards partnerships with unstable regions in mind. They have developed mechanisms that make funds more accessible than in the previous period, especially marked by the OLS era. This involves a simplification of financial rules, flexibility by making more funds available on short notice, and incorporating a broader set of local actors beyond government elites. Peace donors have been attempting to address some of the critiques of liberal peacebuilding in their own actions by adapting inclusive peacebuilding mechanism, which has not yet fully materialised in South Sudan peacebuilding (Bennett et al., 2010). This is demonstrated by a member of NGO Forum who argues that,

> [There should be] [m]ore consideration for national organisations in fund allocation at a cluster level. Between 2015, the number of national organisations that have received the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) has been on a steady rise in comparison to the CPA and post CPA period (Interview with a representative from NGO Forum, Juba. 27.08.2017).

A participant from ACROSS, who work on spreading peaceful messages to different communities, described how they received support by international partners. He said,

> We have received a lot of international support from our international partners. We had a programme where they were helping refugees from Congo. It was funded by the UNHCR. Our head office work on helping the refugees in Gorong, the Anua and other refugees are also funded by UNHCR. This is one way we have managed to form a partnership with UNHCR and maintain it through the years (Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018).

There are, however, challenges in increasing funding for SSNGOs. As discussed in their report, Ali, Loduro, Lowilla, Poole, and Willitts-King (2018) highlight four main challenges regarding funding in South Sudan. First, donors do not have clear policies or guidance for intermediaries on collaborating with NNGOs. This results in a confusion of priorities and conditions between donors and intermediaries who may have different terms and conditions for them, even though the original donor is the same. Secondly, donor policies and procedures are complex for any recipient.

This results in need of the SSNGOs, who need funding to comply with donor regulations in order to continue receiving support. The funding structure in South Sudan can be described as a top-down approach. This ties back in with the post-colonial and post-structuralist argument in chapter 2. The third is the fact that there was little to no transitional planning after independence in 2011. After

independence, donors started working on transitioning of projects to their local counterparts. However, the renewed violence at the end of 2013 took South Sudan back into a humanitarian crisis and, subsequently, few agencies have had any sort of transition. Lastly, there is a feeling in the international community that NNGOs is better suited to development work rather than humanitarian work.

From a global perspective, funding for peace activities has substantially reduced in the international environment, consequently affecting the projects of various organisations (Bennett et al., 2010). South Sudan was one of the countries affected.

In South Sudan, a representative of GREDA mentions,

> Funding on peacebuilding has gone down. It is seen as some devolvement. Most donors are now devoted to humanitarianism, which is a quick fix. When someone is hungry, you give him or her food, when someone is sick, you give him or her medicine. It is a short-term kind of intervention. Nevertheless, the major donors in peacebuilding are like AECOM and USAID (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

The decrease in funding makes the bidding for funds more competitive and challenging to SSNGOs. However, some organisations, especially those that are referred to as national NGOs, did not find it hard to negotiate and leverage on their projects due to funding. SSNGOs are South Sudanese organisation who have a much wider reach, covering multiple states of South Sudan on diverse issues. They are also well connected to international circles. A participant from CEPO demonstrated this:

> I do not think we have that kind of disconnection. We have some forums that make us close to them. We used to have civil societies diplomatic forum mission. We sit with them and discuss the problems in the country. They also plan according to the problems that they have. We are close to that but do not have that kind of gap (Interview with an officer from CEPO, Juba. 09.04.2018).

Another issue rests not in difficulty in attaining funding due to the availability of funds, but the design of funding available, which does not include favour applications from small organisations. As a member of IDO explained,

> If you look at, for example, the European Union, they do not give small funds. Their funds begin from 700,000 to 3 million USD. The organisations need to have implemented a similar project or project of similar value. If you apply for USD 700,000, the EU will want to see that you have previously implemented such a programme. This puts small local or even national organisations at a disadvantage. UNDP gives a very big area. They put small money like 70,000 to be implemented in one year. They say salaries should not exceed 10%. Getting funding from them gets you in a very disadvantaged position not to do certain things. There are funds that are advertised publicly. When you apply for six months or one year, when it ends, sometimes the

> donor does not have any more money. We had implemented a project for UNDP which was only designed for three months, and it was hard to follow up on what was implemented (Interview with an officer from IDO. Juba. 10.08.2017)

This design of funding and funding opportunities results in impacting the kind and type of relationship INGOs, and SSNGOs have. The impact is that this partnership and collaboration between the international and the locals appear to be most favourable with bigger local organisations with more capacity (that is the "national NGOs"). A participant from what he referred to as a mid-level NGO indicated that,

> There is always a difference between organisations. Like international organisations are big, and some of the national organisations are one year old. It brings conflict, especially when working in the peacebuilding area. The initial claim by the international organisations say national organisations do not have the capacity, so the donors do not fund them. This has been a debate for quite a long time. Recently we have started seeing certain donors requesting international organisations to collaborate with national organisations in peacebuilding. Safer World has been collaborating with many organisations, including organisations for non-violence and devolvement. Here in Juba, there is Voice of Hope in Pibor and Nile Hope both in Jonglei (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

However, many NGOs, especially middle- to lower-level NGOs, indicated that flexibility would be favourable. A professor from the University of Juba remarked that,

> The funding organisations should be flexible in terms of implementation strategies and funds because our situation is very fluid. It changes from one day to the other in terms of this context. We can write a proposal based on today's context and tomorrow things change. We can sometimes be overwhelmed when the environment changes like that. The justification might be there, but the donor is rigid (Interview with a professor at the University of Juba. 25.05.2018.).

Another way that funding has an impact on the relationship between international and national/local actors is where the funders' and donors' expectations determine projects. A member of CEPO stated that,

> We are also connected to the international in terms of funding. Sometimes when they call for proposals, they request us to clearly indicate the areas of intervention, the locations that we need to implement these projects. Once you do that, you have committed yourself into doing the project. There are certain donors that are very flexible. Sometimes based on our context, they can say because there is war in point A, move the project to point B. There are others that will be very difficult; even looking at the economic situation in the country there's a lot of fluctuations. Most organisations will not change because they have already budgeted. USA funded organisations do not change; they do not add money because things have changed prices.

> Through the funding aspect, we are more connected to them (Interview with an officer from CEPO, Juba. 09.04.2018).

For instance, one very important issue brought up during the fieldwork that may go completely unnoticed was the issue of proposal writing for funding. Many organisations may have employees who are very experienced within the context of the conflict but may not necessarily have good English and lack the ability to frame their proposals. A participant from CEPO remarked,

> Some of us went to school in Sudan, and we studied in Arabic. When you look at most donors today, they come from the Western world, and they speak mostly English. It's the same way, some of us who went to English schools when we go to Khartoum if donors happen to come from Saudi Arabia communication becomes hard. A friend of mine was trying to write a proposal to be funded by a Saudi Arabian organisation; however, he couldn't get it because he only spoke English and could not afford a translator, at least not in time (Interview with an officer from CEPO, Juba. 09.04.2018).

These dynamics of funding have various implications for the relationship of both the INGOs and SSNGOs. The way that INGOs and SSNGOs work together results in a strained relationship between many international and local NGOs. From the data collected, in some cases, local peace actors are treated as sub-contractors who can help mostly in the implementation of externally conceived and funded projects (Carver, 2017). Such a strategy is unsustainable and usually leads to the disconnection of peace initiatives from the recipients of peace. This approach continues to weaken the sense of local responsibility and solutions and leads to a practice of peacebuilding as an exercise of intervention expected from external sources toward the post-conflict communities, which are often seen as the passive recipients of external assistance (Carver, 2017).

The subservient role of local organisations, which plays out through funding, can be observed in the management of projects. Since international organisations remain well funded, well trained and the elites remain well connected, most projects are implemented under their management. The local is often sidelined, and their ideas barely recognised, while they lack capacity in term of management, financial and innovative peacebuilding methodology. This is seen as a trademark of the culture during the OLS days.

The IDO expressed their sentiments that

> [The] [m]ajority of people in South Sudan are voiceless. The citizens and NGOs which are based in communities have important views and approaches that should be one of the targets of the international community. But the local organisations are not only ignored by international organisations but also [by] local and national governmental departments (Interview with an officer from IDO. Juba. 10.08.2017).

This demonstrates a disconnect between the international organisation and the national government, and the local/grassroots organisation. IDO has also expressed that in their experience, access to international organisations mostly happens only as far as funding is concerned.

First, it demonstrates the gaps that are observed in the cooperation of the INGOs and SSNGOs. Management of projects has also been a discussion that has been brought up quite frequently. This is important, as a participant from IDO indicated:

> Most small issues develop into bigger conflict over time. The approach taken needs to mitigate these issues (Interview with an officer from IDO, Juba. 10.08.2017).

There is also a noticeable pattern that when international actors provide already-made projects to be implemented, they sometimes overlook some crucial facts that local organisations are aware of, and can help in providing insights on. This accounts for why some local organisations do not speak up, due to the fear of possibly losing their funding.

Apart from the local being a source of help, they can also promote issues that contribute to the conflict. A member of GREDA also indicated that,

> The funny thing is that even in employment, you will find some of the international NGOs, they demand you come from a certain area. If a position is vacant in Upper Nile, they will want someone from Upper Nile. This feeds into tribalism. The people from Upper Nile will say we do not want someone from Equatoria or Barh el Ghazal. If employees come from the same area, they will be the ones advising you. In a way, you will not be able to change the situation. You are indirectly reinforcing the situation (Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12.04.2018).

However, they are well aware of seemingly small issues, which matter to the community but may not be so obvious. A member of IDO narrated one case saying that,

> One day we were contracted to set up a borehole where all communities in the area come to fetch water. Issues of misunderstanding arise. In every area where there are more than five people, misunderstanding arises. We did not want that to happen. Our approach is that in every water point, there has to be a water management committee who are trained on how they can settle the minor issues that arise within the water points. We as IDO build the capacity of every water management committee in all areas with water points. We also involve them in discussions. We ask them on their inputs and develop an action plan. Their work is to monitor whether it is being implemented. If the community wants to get connected to the government, we will help them out on the process. If communities are fighting because there is one water point, we communicate to the government that there is a need for more water points and they look for a solution. However, when the borehole breaks down, there is no one to get it repaired.

> The water department in the government will not involve the locals in water management. The people of the local authority water department do not have the time to come daily to check on the water management as they have their own offices. The local community identifies a few individuals, and we train them on all aspects of water management and repair of the boreholes. This becomes a more peaceful and durable solution (Interview with an officer from IDO. Juba. 10.08.2017).

He went on to explain that the international NGOs should, therefore, seek beneficiaries who are close to the cases to assist in managing infrastructure set-up:

> What international organisations should do is look at who is the best beneficiaries. The government are not the beneficiaries. When we were setting up water points, we did not want it to be a problem. We decided to put it next to the local authorities' office. When two people want to fight at the water point, they will fear the local authorities. That is why we want to put it somewhere where it is accessible to the community. In case the water management committee is overpowered by the beneficiaries, they have help from the local authorities. The government is there to support the community. If there is a gap, that is where the NGOs come in (Interview with an officer from IDO. Juba. 10.08.2017).

7.5.2. Capacity challenges of South Sudanese local non-governmental organisations

As argued in section 2.1.1, there is a need to be critical on the reflection of local spaces that are being operationalised in the context of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2010). Section 3.3 highlighted challenges caused by the local spaces themselves. Among other critiques, this includes a broad spectrum of challenges, including the heterogeneity of the local based on the logic of the "hard to catch" nature of the local. This does not allow for catching their voice easily (Öjendal, 2015:937).

Within the local NGOs, it was observed that there is a lack of capacity. This is the most financial and technical experience. Financial challenges have been dealt with in section 7.5.1 above. Lack of training and expertise leaves the local organisations in South Sudan hugely financially and strategically dependent on international organisations in forming peace objectives. Thus, the local turn approach is only used and exposed as a rhetorical tool (see section 1.3). This is discussed by a participant from GREDA. The issue of capacity also differs within the SSNGOs. Some lack total capacity and are fully dependent on aid and capacity building workshops, while others display a relatively good level of independence. A participant from CEPO stated that,

> South Sudan civil society organisations have been existing for many years. An example is us; we have been managing many projects. The donors have been there with us. The only capacity, which we do not have, is financial independence, but we already have our own tactics of approaching the community. The good thing is that we come from these communities, we know our culture. Our only challenge is that sometimes we are frustrated when we do not have the

> resources for doing other activities. We also have certain foreign bodies who continue saying South Sudanese do not have the capacity. I cannot say we have 100% capacity, but at least as CEPO we have 70% that is needed, and we can do the work ourselves (Author interview with a representative from CEPO, Juba. 20.08.2017).

In addition to this, in some cases, the relevance of national organisations has been challenged by concerns over neutrality and independence, exacerbated by the ethnic dimensions of the conflict, and their potential to reach women has not been fully realised. This reaction of the SSNGOs is also replicated back to the community. Some groups are also seen as both opportunities and liabilities for peace. For example, the youth are overwhelmingly perceived as being responsible for the conflict. If they have to be empowered, their capacity built and their knowledge on peacebuilding increased, they will provide an important avenue to build peace, despite the few opportunities for them to engage in peacebuilding processes. As explained by representative Ana Taban,

> We often face the challenge of being perceived to be supporters of the government or the opposition. This is a feeling we get both from the government and international. Most international organisations, therefore, try to be careful who they support. There is obviously a presence of local NGOs that have established themselves and the small start-up struggle a lot. As a youth group, we also have to prove our intentions often. I have seen many youth groups lack support because they may be seen as not responsible enough.

Lastly, INGOs and especially SSNGOs face the challenge of coordination as organisations within South Sudan. To foster more strategic NGO engagement with the GoSS, donors, the UN and other stakeholders have provided funding for the establishment of a dedicated Secretariat to support the NGO Forum. The NGO Forum forms one of the largest coordination and information-sharing body for international and national NGOs in Southern Sudan. As expressed by a representative from NGO Forum,

> There are many local NGOs in South Sudan. As a coordination body, we try and register as many people as we can. However, not all of them take steps to register, and not all of them have the funds needed to register. This leads to a lack of coordinated effort in South Sudan, especially if you look at synchronising of INGOs and the local NGOs. This leads to a situation where we see local NGOs doing projects very close or similar to other INGOs, but on a small scale and with lack of support (Interview with a representative from NGO Forum, Juba. 27.08.2017).

In moving beyond these challenges, both SSNGOs and INGOs can build on progress made. The support provided to the GoSS Ministry coupled with strong and consistent leadership by NGO Forum representatives, coupled with , can strengthen relationships between the actors concerned (Fenton & Phillips, 2009).

7.6. Conclusion

This chapter explored the intersection between mid-level international and local peace actors that work in South Sudan. It discussed the growing awareness in peacebuilding circles that the presence of domestic actors is important. The chapter also argued that the interplay between the different levels has not only changed over time but continues to face challenges.

Chapter 7 has demonstrated how the context of middle-level actors in South Sudan has changed dramatically over the last few years. The chapter outlined the development of top-down approaches to peacebuilding of INGOs through the OLS. Here, although there is an interaction of international organisations with organisations in South Sudan, this is done so at an elite level. This interaction was mainly through the SPLM/A and the SRRA. The efforts thus focus on the partnership between the OLS partners and the government. Their interaction resulted in the formation of the memorandum of understanding in 2000. At this period, most efforts were also focused on humanitarian relief as opposed to long-term peacebuilding. It is also argued in the chapter that this strategy by the international bodies was motivated by the fact that there were not many government structures in South Sudan and the INGOs assumed that role through their programmes.

There has been a particular need to ensure SSNGOs representation in South Sudan after the signing of the CPA peace agreement in 2005. The nature of that representation has evolved significantly. This is as a result of the considerable increase in the number of international NGOs in the country involved in the provision of peacebuilding. However, the chapter details the strategies of local organisations using bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. This is presented in section 7.4. Due to the difference in strategies employed by international organisations and the local organisations, there has been evidence of a dynamic environment. The interaction of this level of actors has, therefore, resulted in a dynamic environment.

From the data collected for this research, it is observed that, first, there are different approaches and strategies used by international and local peace actors. The second is that there is a lack of general partnership and cooperation between international and local organisations. This leads local organisations to hold a subservient position in relation to international organisations, making the partnership between the local and international organisations/actors of peace a difficult one. This results in a disconnection between the top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding employed by both the local and international actors. Thus, although there are plenty of opportunities, there are also various challenges that these organisations face in their interaction.

Despite the potential for meaningful local efforts in contributing to peacebuilding, the gap between the top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding remains large and worrisome. The persisting gap is exacerbated by the challenges facing local organisations and the difficulty of operating during the current war. Issues around funding, coordination, lack of skills, and security render local organisations

largely dependent on external actors. The challenge moving forward for both local, national, and international peacebuilders in South Sudan is to narrow the gap between their efforts in order to more effectively and sustainably solve the crisis.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1. Introduction

South Sudan's current civil war, which began in December 2013, remains of great regional, continental, and international concern. The conflict has led to 1.9 million internally displaced persons, over 400,000 of civilian deaths, food insecurity, violence, and an over 2.3 billion refugee crisis that continues to strain the region and humanitarian efforts (Human Rights Watch Report. 2019). At the conclusion of this research, five years since the outbreak of the 2013 civil war, peace continues to elude the efforts of both international actors, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the citizens of the country who continue to face daily insecurities. This comes due to multiple failures, including failures to implement various peace agreements negotiated over the years, breakdown of institutionalised procedures, unsustainable projects by mid-level organisations and lack of greater influence by local bottom-level actors. It is within the context of the uncertainty in South Sudan that this thesis questions the peacebuilding strategies used by various actors.

Top-down approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan have made a meaningful contribution; however, they have fallen short of achieving sustainable peace. The focus on more dynamic bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding which are close to the people most affected by the conflict is the focus of the thesis. Through this focus, the thesis has discussed three emerging themes. These themes include first, strategies at the bottom level, such as the people-to-people dialogues discussed in chapter 6 and community initiatives discussed in chapter 7; this formed the horizontal analysis. The second emergent theme discussed was inclusivity between the top- and bottom-level actors discussed in chapter 5 and drawing from discussions in chapter 3, forming the vertical analysis. The third theme is the dynamic environment of the interplay between these levels and various actors, discussed in chapter 5 and 7, and the implication of the interaction, which was further discussed in chapter 7.

The dilemma that faces South Sudan speaks to the impasse currently facing the peacebuilding community, where debates around post-liberal peace approaches are gaining traction. These debates speak about the importance of changing perspectives and looking at peace through the view of the subaltern (see section 3.2.2). This is what led to the local turn in peacebuilding scholarship, a "turn" to prioritising local ownership and local agency in peacebuilding interventions. Their main argument is that the inclusion of "the local" is critical for sustainable peace. This research aimed to critically analyse the peacebuilding strategies used to promote peace through the lens of the local turn. It questioned the level of inclusivity of the local, their role and impact on peacebuilding, as well as the impact of the interaction of liberal actors and local strategies in South Sudan.

As peacebuilding has the intention to enhance trust between individuals and groups in a society, it also needs to work to restore legitimacy within political processes and institutions. This results in efforts to

bring together different actors and key players who are engaged in the re-building of a country. This process requires a deeper and integrated approach that engages with different actors but is still accessible to the community, who are the custodians of their own peaceful transformations (see section 2.3.3). The thesis thus presents a thick description of peacebuilding actors in a post-conflict society from the top level, through the middle level, to the bottom level (see chapter 1, 5, 6 and 7). The argument is made that there is an interconnectedness between the actors, with none acting or existing in isolation, but who have influence and are influenced by each other in dynamic communities riddled with conflict.

Throughout the thesis, two main approaches to peacebuilding have been referred to in relation to South Sudan. First, from the framings of liberal peacebuilding, is the top-down approach, which is largely based on peace negotiations (see chapter 2, and 5). This analysis was used to determine the degree of inclusion of the local at this level, as well as describe the interconnectedness of the actors and the consequent impact of holistic peace on the people of South Sudan. The second was the bottom-up approach, which focused on the assumptions of the local turn approaches on peace from below and the subaltern perspective of everyday peacebuilding (see chapter 3 and 6). The interaction of the two approaches to peacebuilding provided a third discussion, which offered a middle-level horizontal analysis of INGOs, and South Sudanese NGOs (see chapter 7). This was used to analyse the relationship between the internal and external actors, and to describe the dynamics of their relationship, the interplay between these actors and its impact on peace in South Sudan. In illuminating the role of the "local" in peacebuilding, the thesis also demonstrates the interlinkages between national and local interests, making a case for why analysis that spans multiple levels is critical to inform understanding, strategies and approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan.

In the analysis, the top-down approach has proven to be exclusionary of local bottom-up voices and also prescriptive and insufficient to deal with the multidimensional characteristics of most conflicts. This is demonstrated by the formation and failure of implementation of the various peace agreements over the years, which have fallen short of curbing the conflict in South Sudan. The dynamism of the conflict, including a multiplicity of armed groups, revenge crimes and killings, political disagreements, explosive community divisions around ethnic cleavages, localised conflicts, opportunistic killings, and competition for resources, is a significant factor in the failure of this approach.

Interest is thus growing in grassroots and bottom-up peacebuilding strategies to both supplements and strengthen the top-down approaches to peacebuilding. However, they have largely been overlooked and considered a secondary measure by mainstream top-down peace approaches, which have formed much of the efforts by the GoSS and international partners (see chapter 5 and 7). The peace efforts and strategies employed by the local – such as community dialogue – which have a direct impact on the community, generally lack support. This creates a gap between the internationally-led processes and locally-conceived and -driven solutions, which undermines local bottom-up efforts towards peace in South Sudan.

As discussed in chapter 1, post-conflict peacebuilding remains a fragile undertaking with mixed results. More fundamentally, this environment of peacebuilding that existed in the 1990s has dramatically changed. This is well represented by the dynamic conflict of the last six decades in South Sudan. This is especially true in African countries and in reference to civil conflicts that do not follow any international law or any linear procedure; hence the argument on non-linearity towards efforts in peacebuilding as presented in section 2.3.2.

The thesis presented two arguments in relation to the debate about the local turn in peacebuilding. First, as mentioned in chapter 1 and 2, liberal peacebuilding has failed to achieve peace, as its top-down approaches to peacebuilding have proved to be exclusionary, particularly of the local population most affected by the conflict. While there is little doubt on the importance of international attention in peacebuilding, the interventions at this level over the past ten years have not had a successful record (see section 2.3). Most international actors' approach to responding to the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding was by special funding mechanisms and new policy instruments. While these innovations were important, they often lacked the grassroots perspective, making peace inaccessible to non-liberal subjects.

Second, and following from the first argument, there needs to be an increased focus on peace-from-below strategies through "local" bottom-up processes that contribute to long-term peace. Peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan should thus draw from the local approaches to peacebuilding. Working on grassroots peacebuilding with its links to national-level strategies on peace will provide more transformational changes such as, creating the conditions in which people can heal and move beyond decades of grievance. This is also discussed in section 2.3.3 and 3.2.2.

Current research emerging from the local turn has focused on two main areas. The first is related to how different local contexts contribute to peacebuilding. Scholars vary between interrogating the role of local actors and how international actors can best support the local structures. While highly valuable, this approach results in the treatment of the local as objects instead of subjects. The second focuses on the local in peacebuilding as a means of emancipation and inclusion of local agency, through voices from below, within the critical arguments on how the local has been interpreted in peacebuilding so far, arguing for peacebuilding that is essentially local. Given the importance of the local turn as detailed in chapter 3, there is, therefore, a need to interrogate and provide a cross-sectional analysis of actors as well as strategies, through the lens of the "local turn". This provides an analysis that acknowledges bottom-up and top-down approaches to peacebuilding not as exclusive entities, but as a function caused by the interaction of the different actors on different levels.

The main question set out to inquire what role the "local turn" plays in contemporary peace processes and the interplay between local and international actors towards achieving peace in South Sudan. The following sub-questions were asked: How is contemporary peacebuilding understood and practised?;

How do top-down approaches to peacebuilding engage with the local level and what are the impacts on peace in South Sudan?; How is the evidence of the bottom-up local approaches of peacebuilding in South Sudan manifested?; and what are the areas of overlap, collaboration, gaps and challenges in the interplay between the internal and external middle-level actors in peacebuilding in South Sudan?

In order to answer this question, the thesis used three levels of actors – that is the top-level actors, the middle and the bottom level as detailed by Lederach's pyramid (see section 1.2.2.2) using the lens of the local turn. The findings are discussed considering the objectives. Using South Sudan as a case study, four objectives were identified for this study. The first was to understand how contemporary peacebuilding is understood, represented and practised. The second objective was to determine how top-down approaches to peacebuilding engage with inclusivity, local agency, ownership and inclusivity of middle- and bottom-level actors and what the impacts are. Third, aimed to discuss how evidence of the bottom-up (grassroots) perspectives and local approaches of peacebuilding in South Sudan are manifested. Finally, the research assessed the areas of overlap, collaboration and gaps that exist and challenges between internal and external actors in peacebuilding in South Sudan.

Using the lens of the local turn allows us to move beyond the language of the state and government to deal with the everyday realities of post-conflict societies. In this way, the lens of the local turn allows for the challenging of the liberal peacebuilding model by interrogating the power plays (however subtle) in peacebuilding.

The findings reveal that the bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan have proved to be efficient and able to curb the civil conflict in South Sudan. This approach, however, needs the cooperation and coordination of actors from the top-, middle- and bottom-level actors. The thesis also finds that as far as top-level approaches are concerned, there need to be reformed to accommodate the bottom-level actors such as churches, civil society and traditional authorities through meaningful inclusivity. This forms an important path towards finding innovative peacebuilding strategies that will not only facilitate dialogue beyond the elites but also promote true inclusivity, ownership, and transference of agency to communities.

The chapter will provide concluding remarks on the thesis. This will be done by providing a summary of what was covered in the chapters in section 8.3. In section 8.4, the key findings that emerge from the analysis provided by the chapter will be discussed. Given these key findings, section 8.4 will provide lessons learned for peacebuilding. Section 8.5 then gives recommendations to the government, international actors and the local. Finally, the chapter then provides a conclusion where final reflections are discussed.

8.2. Summary of the chapters

As mentioned in chapter 1, the thesis finds justification towards providing an in-depth analysis of the operationalisation of the local turn, whether and how it has been achieved and the dynamics of its

interaction. Accordingly, while approaching peacebuilding using the lens of the local turn, it is imperative to have a critical examination of these structures and actors at different levels. This research is an attempt to move beyond the ontological and methodological debate of the importance of the "local turn" (and the ensuing set of binaries of international and the local) to analyse its applicability and interaction in post-conflict societies. There is also an emphasis in the thesis to not automatically think of the local turn approaches to peacebuilding as a panacea for problems facing peacebuilding or as a normative position but as a perspective that needs interrogation.

This first chapter introduced and contextualised the research question to give a clear outline of the scope and focus of the research. Definitions of the key concepts and the need for a broader definition of peacebuilding were also provided. The chapter argues that peacebuilding has come to a crossroads where the liberal approaches to peacebuilding are criticised for their failures in peacebuilding vis-à-vis the need to pay attention to alternative local turn approaches to peacebuilding.

Chapter 2 proceeded to deepen the literature review that was begun in chapter 1. This chapter provides an understanding of how power and knowledge dynamics contribute to understanding how the liberal peacebuilding has emerged as most central, and why there is such a dominance of liberal approaches in the practice of peacebuilding. The chapter thus reflects on critical theories as a device for reflection and critique, enabling us to unearth naturalised assumptions in contemporary peacebuilding. The chapter argues that there is a need to broaden the concept of peacebuilding in light of the failures of the narrow focus (that is state-centric and top-down approaches to peacebuilding) in liberal peacebuilding becoming increasingly apparent. This is argued from the point of looking at the understandings of peacebuilding as a construction of the powerful and the parallel need to decentralise knowledge to be sensitive of context and local experiences that provide different understandings and knowledge in different locales.

In chapter 3, a deeper understanding of the lens of the local turn and peacebuilding approaches was provided. Two focuses of the local turn were provided. The first was a focus motivated by the desire to improve the peacebuilding interventions of international institutions and the general effectiveness of peacebuilding; this literature sees the local turn as being a kind of neo-trusteeship. The second was a focus on the "local turn" as a means for understanding subaltern critiques of modern peacebuilding, which was unpacked. An account of the subaltern views that are often ignored or marginalised in mainstream peacebuilding was also presented through various African examples that demonstrated the heterogeneous nature of approaches that have been practised in many areas and different countries.

Chapter 4 outlined the choice of theories, qualitative design and the case research approach within a phenomenological design. The chapter detailed the fieldwork was undertaken in Kenya and South Sudan, and data collection and analysis methods. The chapter described the methodology used to reach the main thesis objective and the procedures to conduct both secondary and primary data collection. The chapter argued that there needs to be a reflexive process in research, as science and knowledge

production is not neutral. This chapter outlined the ways in which current methodological research within the qualitative non-positivist approach is not value-free, and there is a need for reflexivity on methodological procedures.

The analysis of the case research – South Sudan – began in Chapter 5. This chapter provides a brief background to South Sudan's political development, crises and development, looking at the historical processes of peacebuilding in South Sudan. The chapter focuses on the analysis of top-down peace processes and evaluating how the strategies were executed and their level of local involvement. Here three peace negotiations (Addis Ababa, CPA and the ARCSS) and the national dialogues in South Sudan are analysed. The chapter demonstrates the exclusivity of the top-down peace agreements between 1955 to 2005 and the inclusivity of the post-2013 conflict peace negotiations. However, the level and type of inclusivity are still criticised and argued to be surface inclusivity at best. This is demonstrated using the national dialogues in South Sudan, which. although they are believed to provide an opportunity for positive change, the data demonstrates are only a political tool from the elite in South Sudan.

Chapter 6 provided an analysis of the role of local actors and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding in South Sudan. The chapter is divided into two parts. First, the chapter provides an overview of the role of different local actors in South Sudan. Civil society is presented as a dynamic but difficult category to pinpoint in this debate due to the wide variety of actors it includes. Within it, groups such as women and the media are shown to have a direct impact on the community. However, their strategies are structured in a way that they can also be integrated into top-level strategies. Another group that is discussed is the traditional authorities. The level of their influence has proved to be as effective as powers on the ground over the years to the South Sudanese communities. Despite the importance of traditional authorities, the complexities of the current legal and political situations in the context of South Sudan complicate their position. The chapter also presents the churches or religious groups, which constitute the largest and most influential local group. Through the discussion about the actors, this section of the chapter argues that their role and strategy bring a valuable contribution to peace in South Sudan; nevertheless, their operations and strategies are caught in between bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding and the constraints of top-down high-level liberal strategies. In the second part, the chapter demonstrates a major strategy employed in South Sudan. Through the Wunlit conference, the chapter describes the people-to-people dialogue, which was successfully run through a bottom-up approach. Here the role of the religious bodies, the role of traditional leaders, and the role of the government in peacebuilding in South Sudan are tied together.

Chapter 7 provides an analysis of South Sudan's middle-level organisations. This chapter deals with the operationalisation of the middle-level organisations within the dynamic environment where the internal and the external organisation mutually exist and affect and are affected by each other. The chapter discusses how these different local efforts interact with international peacebuilding programmes. This chapter aims to analyse the current type of interaction between the internal and external actors. Although

the chapter demonstrates opportunities for collaboration, it also shows gaps in the relationships between the internal and external organisations.

8.3. Key findings

As discussed in the thesis, there is a realisation of the failures of the liberal peace framework, which has led to the emergence of alternative approaches to peacebuilding that focus particularly on "the local". The growing scholarship and reforms in peacebuilding practice incorporating this focus have been referred to as the "local turn".

In South Sudan, the challenge for local, national, and international peacebuilders is to narrow the gap between their efforts in order to more effectively and sustainably solve the crisis. The debates around the local turn have provided a nuanced understanding of the often-ignored perspective of the local, and by allowing an analysis of peacebuilding that is dynamic and multidimensional.

As the thesis discussed, power-based social construction has led to the dominant practice of state-centric approaches to peace and the exclusion of non-state voices in South Sudan. The South Sudanese high-level peace talks perpetuate this understanding. It is also evident through the analysis of South Sudan that there is evidence of bottom-up approaches. The main finding in this regard is that bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding and actors have made substantial contributions over the years. However, although most of their contribution draws from the indigenous knowledge and cultural practice, in making a large-scale impact on national peace, even these bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding have come to need the support of the top-level actors, even if it is to a minimal extent, in order for them to succeed. Consequently, with the existence of both top-down and bottom-up actors and strategies for peace grows concern of the interplay between internal and external actors in peacebuilding in South Sudan.

The next section will outline the key research findings.

8.3.1. Wunlit people-to-people dialogue displays a successful bottom-up approach to peace

The long and turbulent history of conflict and peace in South Sudan presents findings that contribute to the discussion of the local turn. Through the conflict between 1955 and 2005 and with the outbreak of the 2013 conflict, there has been a relative absence of formal governance; thus, local strategies to resolve the conflict have held society together. This is best seen in the Wunlit people-to-people dialogues, which represent an example of successful bottom-up peacebuilding in the country, as detailed in chapter 6.

The Wunlit conference is one of the most comprehensively documented local peace conferences held in South Sudan during the civil war between North and South Sudan. In the conference, traditional authorities, that is chiefs from both the Dinka and Nuer, were gathered to discuss ways to bring peace to their people. This supports the argument made in section 3.4 that traditional authorities remain an

important institution to promote peace within communities. It demonstrated a cooperative effort of religious and traditional authorities in promoting peace (see section 6.2.2).

The Wunlit people-to-people dialogue and conference also took a long time to prepare. This was outset by the shuttle and elevator exchange visits, diplomacy, and preparatory negotiations that took place, enabling the NSCC to marry the humanitarian, resource and cultural interests of the communities (see section 6.2.2). The months of various meetings enabled their communities to be open to reconciliation. This is unlike many peace negotiations, where trust building is not set as a priority and preparation at best takes place at a surface level. It also reflected a deep cultural understanding of the communities. The Wunlit conference observed the cultural significance of the processes. Ultimately, the Wunlit people to people process included over 2000 participants from the Dinka and Nuer. This culminated in the signing of the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant with its included resolutions. Each person placed their thumbprint on the paper, and some chose to sign the final document. This showed the level of inclusivity of all 2000 participants that attended.

The cultural aspect of the Wunlit reiterates the discussion in section 3.4, where the thesis presented an argument that resonates with decolonial thinking. The thesis observed as an underlying thread in the African community the understanding that human values are built on the reciprocal recognition of humanity and that rights are correlative with duties. In addition, there is a connection of the people to beliefs driven by their culture. The thesis demonstrated that spirituality informs the worldview of many African communities, and their understanding of reality is shaped by both the physical and metaphysical realms (section 3.4.1), the physical being the realm of existence occupied by living persons (the "living-living"), and the metaphysical realm occupied by the "living dead" (ancestors). The traditional and religious authorities and leaders represent the community in the physical realm, who are the custodians of the metaphysical realm that is the backbone of the community, comprised of the ancestral family. Thus, spirituality and cultural practices inform the world view of many communities of South Sudan people, and both the physical and metaphysical realms shape their understanding of reality. Such peacebuilding approaches offer opportunities to learn more about healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation, which create the basis for re-establishing social solidarity.

It follows that these people-to-people peace processes addressed both the emotional and material needs of the communities in conflict through symbolic and material means in order to be sustainable. The historical Wunlit process, similarly to other successful peace agreements at the community level and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in South Sudan and elsewhere, comprised dual elements of ritual and restitution. Rituals serve psychosocial needs and address trauma. They commonly include a component of self-disclosure or confessions, which link personal experience to actions at the leadership level. Restitution, on the other hand, seeks to deliver tangible justice and material benefits from peace agreements. Both rituals and restitution contribute to a changing of the narrative from conflict to harmony. Rituals can also play a critical role in terms of ownership of responsibility for sustained peace

by invoking negative – if spiritual – sanctions for the "undoing" of the peace attained. Rituals were indeed crucial elements of local peace processes in South Sudan. Facilitators of the Wunlit peace processes deeply understood conflict, long involvement in the country and moral authority.

In addition, the Wunlit conference involved the participation of the top-elite leadership, including the military and strategic interests of some key SPLA and South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) officers, middle-level actors such as the churches and the bottom-level actors, including the chiefs and the rest of the individual communities. This formed a good example of a well-integrated bottom-top process using bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. It is important also to note that the SPLA leadership were key participants, and without their blessing, the traditional authorities who fell under their ethnic groups would have a hard time proceeding with the intercommunal visits. This goes to demonstrate the engagement of the communities and their specific traditional leaders. In addition to the interaction of top elites, "spoilers" – including "godfathers", rebel leaders and violent youth –must participate in local agreements to make them sustainable. Formal and informal authority often overlap and must be involved. The trick is to overcome the conundrum that spoilers pose: "no peace with them – no peace without them". Although it was bottom-up, it reached the highest level.

The participation of international actors was also seen as important, as they acted as the guarantors of the conference. The NSCC lobbied international support through a conference they arranged in 1999. The conference brought donors on board to support and strengthen implementation. Guarantors and follow-up mechanisms help to ensure that peace agreements hold. This was used in Wunlit, as the international actors who control immaterial and material resources offered incentives and could impose sanctions. The Wunlit peace committee was constituted as custodian of the peace that would not only follow up implementation and sanction violations but also "take the peace home" by popularising the contents and spirit of the peace agreement(s) at the grassroots level.

Therefore, through Wunlit, we observed that inter-community violence significantly reduced between the Dinka and the Nuer. This was symbolised by the Nuer participants who walked home through Dinka territory; abducted women, children and cattle were returned; and the reopening of the grounds from various communities for grazing. There was also an increase in the moral authority and political influence of Dinka and Nuer traditional religious leaders. Through the conference, there was relative peace between the South-South communities on the western bank. Thus, sub-national peace processes can influence high-level political outcomes. Through the many years of the Wunlit conference, we learn that Wunlit was more of a "process" and not a "conference".

The Wunlit process thus speaks to the "everyday" which, as detailed in section 3.2.2.3, represents how post-conflict societies face their everyday situations.

8.3.2. A complexity of actors in peacebuilding

South Sudan presented a complex picture when it comes to the actors of peacebuilding and the relationship to one another.

Churches and religious bodies presented the most coordinated and arguably successful bottom-up actors. Throughout the civil wars, the church in South Sudan has remained one of the country's few stable institutions. This was due to a variety of reasons; they were believed to be neutral parties and believed to have the communities' best interest at heart. They were also respected by the communities as well as the elite leaders. They were trusted religious leaders and were thus assigned the role of trusted interlocutors and intermediaries. In this role, they had access to the elites, the spoilers, the politicians, and the armed factions. The religious leaders were also seen as effectively forming a group of believers that reaches across political and ethnic boundaries. The religious bodies are therefore seen as local actors who are considered local enough to share in the devastating effects of war and violence on lives and livelihood but have a large enough platform to effect change. These religious actors have, therefore, contributed enormously in the positive role by combining spiritual guidance with organisational capacity.

In the communities, the role of churches was found to be significant, as the communities believed in a higher level of existence and spirituality, where apart from traditional leaders, the church was a custodian of these beliefs. This ties in closely with the arguments on ubuntu and spiritual approaches discussed in section 3.4. This role provided the church with an upper hand in the people-to-people dialogue of Wunlit, where the church demonstrated one of their most memorable contributions. Churches and leaders of faith are regarded as unrivalled in their role in facilitating local peace agreements, as they are deeply aware of the cultural practices of communities and top-down actors and mechanisms in play.

In addition, traditional leaders are a long-standing institution in South Sudan and have had a high level of socio-cultural influenced by, for example, presiding over cases of divorce, land issues and water point conflicts. It has been these elected, appointed or hereditary community leaders who can be argued to have had a strong claim to representing the majority of South Sudan's largely rural population.

South Sudan community leaders and elders are perceived as critical in shaping the overall attitudes and behaviours of people in their communities. Their strategies have an immediate feel for the communities as they involve rigorous community consultation and community-led programmes and immense knowledge of the cultural significance that the communities have. They establish societal norms that either promote or discourage peaceful conflict resolution. For example, the youth are overwhelmingly perceived as being responsible for the conflict. If they have to be empowered, their capacity built and their knowledge on peacebuilding increased, they will provide an important avenue to build peace, despite the few opportunities for them to engage in peacebuilding processes. However, empirical as well

as theoretical evidence on the existing interaction of the strategies employed by the two critical approaches still seem to be missing.

There are various roles of traditional authorities in South Sudan, as explained in chapter 6. Thir position is one of the complex relations to their local constituencies and external powers, for instance, the state. Their role has also been affected and influenced by the subsequent colonial and post-colonial governments, and the civil wars were ravaging Sudan for decades. For instance, the 1983-2004 civil war. Often their position was undermined by the SPLA guerrillas and by SAF soldiers. Therefore, any separation between the traditional authorities, who get their legitimacy from the local population, and the modern states is misleading. Therefore, a way of dealing with the weak state's performance in many post-conflict societies has involved the integration of existing traditional authorities into government structures.

Another key local actor is civil society, which is identified as an important yet complex actor. Civil society in the context of South Sudan is multidimensional and pluralistic in nature. As mentioned in chapter 1, the civil society in South Sudan consists of a large and diverse set of organisations. The opportunity exists for South Sudanese civil society leaders to develop a mechanism that will engage a broader civil society base and establish solid links with grassroots organisations to perform the necessary functions attached to their roles as representatives of the people in these peace talks. Due to a lack of a long-term strategic vision for programmes and priorities leaves the work of civil society work in a relatively vulnerable position to external influence by the state or donors. Mostly, the projects by civil society that are guided by the funding trends and not necessarily from a response to critical societal needs as an initial motivator.

8.3.3. Framings of contemporary peacebuilding remain top-down

Top-down approaches that are largely liberal approaches to peacebuilding tend to form the greater part of contemporary peace approaches as described in chapter 2.

South Sudan tends to approach peacebuilding from the top-down liberal approach. This is seen in the three peace negotiations discussed in chapter 5. Given the history of the country and the conflict, peace negotiations have dominated the peace conversation in South Sudan. The peace negotiation in South Sudan has largely been an exercise of the government and the international community. In the first conflict (1955-2005), this was between the southern and the northern elite. In the 2013 conflict, it was between the SPLM-IO and SPLM-IG, among other elites. The international actors, including IGAD, AU, and the TROIKA groups also form an important part of the actors.

At the same time as the Wunlit peace process, the negotiations that culminated in the CPA were taking place. These negotiations, as explained in chapter 5, excluded the participation of many local actors; unlike Wunlit, which was very inclusive, the negotiations mainly took place between the warring parties in the North and the South of Sudan and the international actors, including IGAD as the main mediator.

This approach took the framings of the top-down approaches to peacebuilding, and Western models of social, political, and economic organization, into war-shattered states to control civil conflict, leading to the pacification peacebuilding understanding and practice that seems to be dominant.

This top-down peace-talk, therefore, falls within the liberal approach of statism, as the state and state actors have been emphasised and deemed more important than any other actors, more than the ones referred to in section 8.3.2 above. In the Addis Ababa agreement and the CPA, there is a considerable lack of participation by the civil society, traditional leaders and various other non-state actors. Thus, this peace was largely influenced by the top-down approach, where the peace agreement only settled grievances that most affected the elite.

While the IGAD peace process has suffered considerable setbacks in the past, for instance, the Addis Ababa and CPA agreement (see section 5.3.1), it has taken further steps to move towards expansion of participation of the local. In the peace negotiations that took place from 2015 to 2018, there was a call for inclusivity; this includes the new, revitalised peace negotiations that took place in Addis Ababa between 2017 and 2018 (see section 5.3.3). Effective feedback mechanisms are required to link the local, national and regional level, empower communities to hold their leaders accountable and create local ownership of current peace processes. This is seen as necessary, as it moves beyond the liberal approach towards inclusion if the local. However, the level of inclusivity of the local is still in question. Mainly, the involvement of civil society, churches and refugees are realised in an observer capacity and do not have a major role to play.

The peace agreements have not adequately addressed psychological issues. This has led most international responses from the international community to focus on the political conflict, forgetting the more deeply rooted cultural conflict that happens on the ground. There is a need, however, to understand that the first layout of local approaches and actors, and second to understand their importance in peace processes in South Sudan. This inspired the importance of looking at the alternative approaches in this thesis (see section 2.3).

Although there was not a strong connection between the bottom-up actors and strategies in the peace negotiations, the church played a significant role in all three agreements discussed above. In the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, it played a participatory role, while in the CPA and the ARCSS it performed a more mediatory role. Here, the connection of the top-down and bottom-up can be seen clearly, as the churches would attend the high-level meetings and later go to the communities and meet with local people to discuss with them the developments in these meetings (see section 5.3.5 and 6.1.3).

Through the national dialogue, the peace process in South Sudan is envisaged to be an inclusive process that utilises both bottom-up and top-down processes, and multi-levelled consultations. It will ideally involve vertical communication from the political elite and local communities in managing this dialogue process. The importance of inclusivity in the dialogues were proven to be a great resource in working

toward peace in South Sudan. Generally, national dialogues have been an effective tool used by different countries to promote peacebuilding, such as South Africa in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Rwanda in their *Gacaca* process. Due to the effectiveness of the dialogues in countries such as South Africa, it is no wonder that many hoped that the dialogue would create a platform for people's voices to be heard and allow for a healing process to begin.

The top-down approaches to peacebuilding were not enough to deal with the dynamics of the conflict, which did not only take place between the North and South political groups but also within southern communities and between the ethnic groups from the North and the South. This includes the conflict between the Misserinya of the North and Dinka of the South. The thesis thus contributes by arguing that culture-specific forms of knowledge may be instrumental in proving that non-linear understandings, which exist and are essential, are championed by local turn scholars.

8.3.4. The co-optation of middle-level actors

Within the middle level, there are three observable facts. There are different approaches and strategies used by international and local peace actors; there is a lack of general partnership and cooperation, and the difficult operationalisation of the partnership between the local and international organisations/actors of peace is problematic. There is, therefore, a disconnection of the top-down and bottom-up approaches employed by both the local and international actors and the local occupy a subservient role in mainstream peacebuilding.

South Sudan does not present a hybrid space, which denotes international-local interplay in which the meeting between international and local norms, actors and practices create new arrangements where liberal and non-liberal norms co-exist (see section 3.2.2.4). these hybrid spaces are often regarded as more authentic than the liberal democratic peace promoted by external peacebuilders (see section 3.2.2.4). The hybrid variants of peace are created by the cooperation of external and local actors of peacebuilding. Although the development of these local and global identities in South Sudan is not mutually exclusive and it forms part of a very complex system with overlapping identities as argued in chapter 7, there is still a power hierarchy between the two organisations.

The thesis also shows that INGOs are still mainly following a liberal model, constantly resisting the local turn approaches that call for more agency and ownership of civil society in South Sudan. Moreover, South Sudanese NGOs are seemingly not organised or prepared for the task at hand, seem to be in their inception phase and lack the coordination, which could be leveraged to gain more agency. This leads to them being susceptible to being co-opted by the norms of the INGOs. This speaks to the criticisms of the local turn, which were discussed in section 3.3. Thus, the result is often co-option by international organisations, which has primarily occurred through the instrument of funding, which presents one of the most substantial challenges among middle-level actors in South Sudan. Funding has not been

sufficiently flexible, which has forced the SSNGOs to change and adapt to the structures of international donors.

As a result, sufficient time and space are not spent on peacebuilding interventions that can bring about change. This turns the idea of peacebuilding into 'projects' with very little connection to the people they are supposed to help. There is instead a need to simultaneously address historical, contemporary, psychosocial and material, local- and national-level conflict dynamics. In summary, challenges to this include issues with funding, coordination, lack of skills, and security, which render local organisations largely dependent on external actors.

From the above, there is a realisation of the failures of the liberal peace framework to attain and secure peace in South Sudan. The intention of the local turn to bridge this gap has met with different forms of obstacles which led back to the subscription of pursuing peace through the liberal peace framework. Despite the potential for meaningful local efforts in contributing to peacebuilding, the gap between the top-down and bottom-up approaches remains significant and worrisome. The persisting gap is exacerbated by the challenges facing local organisations and the difficulty of operating during the current war. Towards the objective of the local turn, external actors who seek to facilitate conflict resolution must look at peace as "processes over projects", this requires the investment of time on not only ensuring the lives of people are protected but also their livelihoods. Also, external actors must be flexible in their engagement to allow for open-ended processes.

8.4. Lessons learned for peacebuilding in South Sudan

8.4.1. The missing link: Local Peacebuilding Approaches to Peacebuilding

The extent to which high-level interaction has influenced contemporary peace is not in doubt. However, South Sudan's case iterates how the top-down approach alone is not sufficient in tackling the complexities of the conflict, including ethnic violence, intra- and inter-ethnic wars, revenge killings, genocide, hate speech, a refugee crisis, and a population of internally displaced people from the civil war. There is a need for a multi-level and integrated approach. The failure of South Sudanese leaders in leading the country towards peace calls for serious consideration of reintegrating the bottom-up process in conjunction with top-down approaches to peacebuilding to provide and achieve sustainable peace.

The complex nature of this conflict, which involves multiple layers of society and impacts the entire region, further emphasises the need to consider peace efforts that involve more of the general population in approaches to peacebuilding used. This requires broadening the notion of peacebuilding to include mechanisms and initiatives borne from local contexts, involving and consulting local organisations, and direct outreach to the communities, mainly because it is at this level that conflicts develop.

These localised structures and mechanisms contribute to rebuilding the social fabric necessary for durable peace by incorporating local knowledge from local communities. This is due to maintaining close relations with communities in order to understand their local realities. Some of the bottom-up

approaches to peacebuilding employed by local grassroots organisations in South Sudan include strengthening communities by highlighting interdependence. Interdependence is where two or more communities come together, and combine resources that they have in common, such as boreholes and schools. The strategy is used so that communities can see the direct impact of their efforts and the efficacy of interdependence as a functional tool in day-to-day life. Communities also employ constituency dialogues, where communities create a platform to address their grievances in the presence of traditional, state, and legal representatives.

However, most of the local organisations' efforts are not recognised, monitored, or analysed, providing very little room for these organisations to grow and minimising their capacity to contribute to the peace agenda. Thus, local efforts appear unmanageable and continue to lack support, forming a cycle of unproductivity and fragility for the peace employed by both liberal and local turn approaches to peacebuilding. Therefore, they need to be strengthened in order to maintain these capabilities, especially during conflict. This is seen in many efforts that have tried to replicate the successful Wunlit conference, for example in Jonglei, which failed due to lack of commitment from the government and lack of support from the international system.

Considerable effort has been made by the Government of South Sudan to establish a National Dialogue to involve the population in consultations. Organisations such as the UNDP and UNMISS, among other international NGOs, have also shown efforts in partnering with local organisations. However, there is still a long way to go in building meaningful partnerships with local organisations.

Employment of top-down strategies as the sole means of peacebuilding will continue to disconnect citizens with the peace process meant to address their grievances. Local knowledge remains necessary for the achievement of sustainable and durable peace and given peacebuilding development over the years in South Sudan; it is crucial to consider the contribution of other approaches to peacebuilding. Stakeholders should analyse and improve their efforts to enhance localised structures. These strategies will provide a more expansive view of peacebuilding.

8.4.2. Towards waning international support?

As discussed above, the actions of external stakeholders have proven to be essential and much needed. The international community assists in peace funding and humanitarian efforts. In this intervention, however, the international community has focused on state- and nation-building. This is conducted through deals and negotiations with the government, as seen in the ARCSS agreement with IGAD, or the national ownership project by UNMISS. As a result, other than humanitarian work, local issues receive less attention. Furthermore, local involvement in peace efforts is often overlooked.

Given the current trajectory of the unresolved conflict, as well as the challenging political context in South Sudan, the international community's efforts have failed to exert enough pressure on the leaders to abide by the different agreements signed in past few years. Despite the negotiations that have taken

place, the conflict persists. This brings the fear of South Sudan possibly being forgotten by the international community due to funding drying up, and donor fatigue and frustration at the conflict's intransigence.

The possibility of less international involvement in the future for South Sudan reiterates the need for the international community to also invest in local actors. Local actors can supplement and complement the government's efforts in not only ceasing the conflict but also in working towards the longevity and legitimacy of peace efforts. Inclusivity should, therefore, be an important strategy adopted by international actors, state actors, and non-state actors. The international community can do so by broadening its efforts to include local-level peacebuilding approaches. In South Sudan, effectiveness in peacebuilding will most likely be found in efforts that are based on complementary relationships and partnerships, where the comparative advantages of local peace actors and organisations are recognised and supported.

8.5. Recommendations

Policy options and recommendations in ensuring sustainable peace through peacebuilding projects that develop effective relationships with local organisations and communities will require action on the part of both the international community and the Government of South Sudan.

Recommendations for the Government of South Sudan

a) Ensure the full participation of local leaders in the National Dialogue: The National Dialogue has been based on the notion of inclusivity, and the GoSS should consider further development of channels for inclusive and open discussion. Given the importance of the inclusion of marginalised voices in encouraging the buy-in of peace at the local level, the GoSS should strive to create the political space for such open dialogue. This could be done by identifying local leaders, peace actors and processes, and by actively engaging them in the National Dialogue as representatives of their communities.

b) Create a favourable environment for local NGOs to operate without intimidation: In the past, the GOSS has taken measures that have made it harder for NGOs and grassroots organisations to operate. Such decisions were ostensibly taken to prevent members of the opposition from operating in the guise of NGOs. The 2015 Nongovernmental Organizations and Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Bills require NGOs to register and submit to constant monitoring by the government, including making available all sources of funding and undergoing evaluations and audits. These measures have sometimes led to threats against local NGOs, both by the government and opposition supporters, and has diminished the confidence, and limited operational space and impact of local NGOs. The GoSS should consider lifting the burdensome registration restrictions on NGOs, ceasing their hostilities towards NGOs, and run campaigns to discourage intimidation of local organisations by government and opposition supporters alike.

Recommendations for the International State Actors

a) Restructure peacebuilding interventions to establish links with local organisations: Most international actors' engagement appears to be tilted in favour of elites, forgetting the potential power of local actors. The gap between international actors and the local can lead to misrepresentation or no representation of local grievances in strategies formed by international organisations. Fostering dialogue could bridge this gap. International actors can more thoroughly consult with local organisations in South Sudan. Consultations with genuine, open, and continual dialogue will promote the exchange of ideas and further collaboration to develop bottom-up peacebuilding approaches. The decentralisation of peace initiatives will help diffuse responsibility for peacebuilding from political elites to grassroots and local actors, further allowing for more effective and tailored processes.

b) IGAD-Plus should include local stakeholders in the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and revitalisation process: IGAD member countries, IGAD-Plus, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) should consider inviting local groups to the table for the revitalisation of ARCSS. The revitalisation process was born out of the need to implement the agreement, which initially had very minimal representation, excluding most local actors. The engagement of the locals will not only ensure group ownership of the peace agreement, but it will also facilitate citizens putting pressure on the government to uphold the agreement. Local groups to be included in the revitalisation process should represent youth, women, civil society, religious groups, traditional leaders from key areas (especially areas with much active conflict), local government, parliamentarians, and National Dialogue committees. These local groups can fill essential roles in the revitalisation process, including for direct representation, consultation, observers, and participants.

Recommendations for International Non-Governmental Actors

a) Focus efforts on building and strengthening the capacity of the local actors to build genuine partnerships: International NGOs could effectively use the financial resources they have to help build the capacity of local groups, especially the ones in states where there is active conflict, including Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Lakes, and Unity. However, in some instances, relationships between INGOs and local NGOs in South Sudan are characterised by paternalism. More could be done to develop meaningful partnerships that involve exchanging ideas and skills, with the intent of external organisations implementing projects that also include existing local ideas and methods. INGOs need to recognise the efforts of local peace initiatives as a potential project starting points and foundations, rather than necessarily introducing new, unknown programmes and strategies.

8.6. Final reflection and conclusion

The thesis has focused on two issues. The first was to problematize the top-down liberal approach to peacebuilding. The second was to provide a thick description of the bottom-up local approach to peacebuilding in the context of South Sudan and the linkages between the two approaches.

The layers of conflict in South Sudan are multiple and intertwined. Sub-national conflict can affect national dynamics of peace and war, not least because national leaders depend upon local constituencies to supply fighting forces and legitimacy. The design of high-level peace processes is often not accessible to the local groups who play a critical role in both peace and war. This can have negative effects locally when not aligned with the realities of multi-level conflict. This is what we currently see taking place in South Sudan.

South Sudan necessities innovative peacebuilding strategies. A sole focus on high-level elite bargaining will not deliver a long-term solution in the current context of South Sudan. Peace is a process: activity focused on isolated "peace meetings" misunderstand and undermine the potential of peacebuilding. In this context, the local aspect of peacebuilding becomes valuable in moving towards a transformed peaceful society.

There are several implications that can be drawn from this thesis. For instance, further interrogation is needed for the failure of power-sharing agreements in South Sudan and IGAD role. In addition, conceptually and empirically, the thesis alluded to the 'New Wars Thesis' by Mary Kaldor (2013). The framework could be especially useful in the South Sudan context where the analysis of the conflict touches on identity, resource struggles, militias and guerrillas. This can also be a path for further studies.

Further to this thesis, a wider scope for critical research can still be directed at analysing roles various local actors play in transforming civil conflict in an inherently local social context using various theories such as theories of change. Also, studies could be undertaken on the effects of the absence of formal reconciliation and transitional justice interventions. Possibly related to this, another important area of research could be why peace has remained elusive in the post-2013 period.

In conclusion, as has been reiterated throughout this thesis, peace will remain elusive if both top-down and bottom-up strategies to peacebuilding are not integrated. Peace needs to be more than elite accords. Everyday peace processes deserve more attention in terms of both their theoretical contributions and their practical implications.

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Interviews conducted

Interview with an officer from SSuNDE, Juba. 14.04.2018

Interview with a representative from GoSS. Juba. 25.05.2018

Interview with a representative of the South Sudan Catholic Bishop's secretariat. Juba. 12.05.2018

Interview with a South Sudanese former Bishop, Juba. Skype call. 12-06-2019

Interview with an officer from GREDA, Juba. 12. 04. 2018

Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018

Interview with a participant at the University of Juba. 12.04.2018

Interview with an officer from Ana Taban, Juba. 05.04.2018

Interview with a professor at the University of Juba. 25.05.2018

Interview with USAID officer in Juba, South Sudan. 29.04.2018

Interview with a representative from Screen of Rights, a local NGO. Juba. 03.04.2018

interview with a representative from CEPO, Juba. 20.08.2017

Interview with an officer from IDO, Juba. 10.08.2017

Interview with a member of the general public, Pretoria. August 2017 – September 2019

Interview with an officer from Screen of Rights, Juba. 03.05.2018

Interview with an officer from CEPO, Juba. 09. 04. 2018

Interview with a representative from NGO-forum, Juba. 27.08.2017

Interview with an officer from GREDA, a local NGO, Juba. 12. 04. 2018

Interview with a South Sudanese former church member, Juba. Skype call. 12-06-2019

Interview with a participant at the University of Juba. 12.04.2018

Interview with USAID officer in Juba, South Sudan. 29.04.2018

Interview with an officer from ACROSS, Juba. 13.04.2018

Interview with a member of the NPI- Africa, Nairobi, 24. 03. 2018

Various interview with a members of the public. Juba August 2017 – May 2018

APPENDIXES

Appendix A: Permission letter (sample)

[Interviewer's address]

[Interviewee's Address]

Dear sir/ Madam,

RE; Interview for PhD research

I am a student at the University of Pretoria, currently enrolled for my PhD, in the Department of Political Sciences. As part of the requirements for the fulfilment of the objectives of this thesis, I am conducting research on 'the local turn' in peacebuilding.

I would like to ask you whether you would be willing to participate in this research. The topic of my research is "The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical analysis of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan. As you know it very well, there have been numerous peacebuilding efforts by both the international community and local government and grassroots organisation. However, their efforts in peacebuilding have not borne the intended results, especially since the outbreak of the civil war in 2013,

Although various types of research have been carried out earlier about, no research has been done on why analysis of the specific strategies used on different levels. My research thus seeks to understand the view of the local, state and international as well as find better, more practical strategies that will ensure sustainable peace in the future. The research is meant to achieve the following specific objective:

- Describe the nature, organization and impact of peacebuilding strategies.
- Analyse evidence toward the importance of the local turn strategies in the peacebuilding in South Sudan.
- Examine the level and nature interaction of the strategies employed external and internal actors based in Juba.

The research will include an analysis of the views and experiences of the external, state and local actors in peacebuilding as the dependable sources of information about the true experience of their people.

If you agree to participate, you will be interviewed about this topic. The interview will take place at a venue and time that will suit you, but it may not interfere with your personal, social, religious or administrative activities and time; also, it will not take longer than an hour.

You do not have to participate in this research if you do not want to, and you will not be affected in any way if you decide not to take part. If you decide to participate, but you change your mind later, you can withdraw your participation at any time.

Your identity will be protected. Only my supervisor and I will know your real name, as a pseudonym will be used during data collection and analysis. Your clan will not be identified either. The information you give will only be used for academic purposes. In my research report and in any other academic communication, your pseudonym will be used, and no other identifying information will be given. Collected data will be in my possession or my supervisor's and will be locked up for safety and confidentiality purposes. After completion of the research, the material will be stored in University Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences according to the policy requirements.

If you agree to take part in this research, please fill in the consent form provided below. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact my supervisor or me at the numbers given below, or via Email.

Student:

Signature of the student ……..

Supervisor: ……

Co. Supervisor: ……..

Contact number of the student: …….

Appendix B: Letter of institutional support

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Department of Political Sciences

28 November 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Letter of Institutional Support For Ms. EMMACULATE A. LIAGA (10060007)

I write to confirm that the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria strongly support Ms Liaga's application for support in relation to her postgraduate studies.

Ms Liaga has demonstrated over a period of about 5 of association with the Department a few crutcial skills: strong academic acumen marked by a strong grasp of essential principles and practices of academic rigour. She has a strong ability to provide intellectual leadership including cocneptualizing new ideas and working with others to pursue them with a sense of hunger to change society for better. Thirdly, she has superiorr interpersonal skills, helping her to work very well with various other people. She is also a great asset in a team of researchers and can lead others to targets and goals set.

Her ambitions to pursue her research objective of the 'local turn' in peacebuilding in Africa with your possible support is grounded in her aim to share innovative ideas, tools and theoretical devices needed in order to understand the agency of local communities towards achieving peace objective, thus increasing the resilience of communities in conflict environments, particularly in Africa. Her PhD research, which has begun, joins the growing search for bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding, development and reconstruction.

I am confident that your support will be a perfect opportunity for her to deepen her research activities and help generate the insights Africa needs in order to build sustainable structures of peace and development.

I therefore highly recommend her for your support.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Siphamandla Zondi

Professor and Head of Department.

Building and Room no	21-21.1	Tel: Number	012 420-5182	Email address siphamandla.zondi@up.ac.za
University of Pretoria Private bag X20, Hatfield 0028 Republic of South Africa		Fax: Number	012 420-2693	www.up.ac.za

Appendix C: Letter of informed consent

I, _____ (your name), agree / do not agree (delete what is not applicable) to take part in the research project titled **The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: Critical analysis of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan, 2005- 2015.** I understand that I will be interviewed about this topic for approximately one hour at a venue and time that will suit me, but that will not interfere with my personal and official activities. The interview will be audiotaped.

Also, I have consented to allow the researcher access to access the requested documents, which are in the public domain, for the academic purposes indicated in the letter of request.

I understand that the researcher subscribes to the principles of:

_ *Voluntary participation* in research, implying that the participants might withdraw from the research at any time.

_ *Informed consent*, meaning that research participants must at all times be fully informed about the research process and purposes, and must give consent to their participation in the research.

_ *Safety in participation*; put differently, that the human respondents should not be placed at risk or harm of any kind, e.g., research with young children.

_ *Privacy*, meaning that the *confidentiality* and *anonymity* of human respondents should be protected at all times.

_ *Trust*, which implies that human respondents will not be responding to any acts of deception or betrayal in the research process or its published outcomes.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Appendix D: Fieldwork interviews guide

The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: Critical analysis of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan, 2005- 2015.

Time of interview: _____ Duration: _____

Date: _____

Place: _____

Interviewer: _____

Interviewee: _____ pseudonym: _____

Male / Female: _____

Developing a clear and comprehensive understanding about the peoples' lived experience of peacebuilding, their explanation and view of the strategies used by both the external and the internal peacebuilding actors and how they affect them. Pseudonyms will be utilized in the interviews, data analysis and the findings. The data collected in this research will serve for research purposes only and treated as confidential. Access to the data will be granted to the researcher and the supervisor only. Please sign the consent form at the back of this document. Thank you for your participation.

……

1. **Interview questions of a representative of an external (international) peacebuilding actor**

a. Do you think South Sudan will attain peace? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)
b. What is your opinion on some of the strategies in place last 10 years?
c. How do you find efforts of the International Community in helping South Sudan attain peace in recent years?
    - What specific mechanisms do you have in place? (If any).
    - What are the results?
    - What are the areas of weakness and/or opportunity
d. In your opinion, who are the main seekers of peace or contributors to peace in South Sudan?
e. What are some of the specific strategies you have in place from a policy and practical level?
f. Do you think the local (that is local communities and local organisation) plays a big part in peacebuilding?
g. What are some of the mechanisms used by the local that have played or will play an important role in peacebuilding?
h. Is your immediate local community leaders helping restore and maintain peace in your area?

i. How do you think the local and international community can work together? Do you think this will this be more impactful?
j. Is there anything you would like to add?

……

2. Interview questions of Clan, Religious, Customary and local organisation leader:

a. What is Conflict and/or peace to you?
b. Do you think South Sudan will attain peace? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)
c. What is your opinion on some of the strategies in place in the past 10 years?
d. How do you find efforts of the International Community in helping South Sudan attain peace in recent years?
e. What are some of the processes you are involved in to achieve and maintain peace in South Sudan?
    - What specific mechanisms do you have in place? (If any).
    - What are the results?
    - What are the areas of weakness and/or opportunity
f. In your opinion, who are the main seekers of peace or contributors to peace in South Sudan?
g. Do you think the local (that is local communities and local organisation) plays a big part in peacebuilding?
h. What are some of the mechanisms used by the local that have played or will play an important role in peacebuilding?
i. What are some of the shortcomings of mechanisms employed by the local actors?
j. Do you think the government and the local organisation of peacebuilding have the capacity to carry and implement successful mechanisms? What are some of their weak points or areas of improvement?
k. Do you think the external actors help improve the efforts made by the local (in what way?)
l. How do you think the local and international community can work together? Do you think this will this be more impactful?
m. Is there anything you would like to add?

……..

3. Interview questions of local Non-governmental and Intergovernmental organisations (both external and internal).

a. Do you think South Sudan will attain peace? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)
b. What are some of the processes you are involved in to achieve and maintain peace in South Sudan?

c. Are you involved and integrated into some of the mechanisms in place set by the government or international peace officers?
d. What are some of the difficulties you face in getting support from the government or international peace missions?
e. How different are you view in peace missions as compared to the ones being implemented by the regional and international bodies?
f. How do you think the local and international community can work together? Do you think this will this be more impactful?
g. Do you think the government and the local organisation of peacebuilding have the capacity to carry and implement successful mechanisms? What are some of their weak points or areas of improvement?
h. Is there anything you would like to add?

……

4. Possible Interview questions of academics and researchers in the region.

a. Do you think South Sudan will attain peace? (Kindly elaborate on your answer)
b. How are the mechanisms employed in peacebuilding in the Juba area lacking?
c. In your opinion, are local perspective and involvement in peacebuilding important?
d. In your opinion, who are the main seekers of peace or contributors to peace in South Sudan?
e. Do you think the local (that is local communities and local organisation) plays a big part in peacebuilding?
f. What are some of the mechanisms used by the local that have played or will play an important role in peacebuilding?
g. How involved and relevant do you think the communities should be in the achievement of their own sustainable peace?
h. Is there anything you would like to add?

Appendix E: Ethical clearance letter

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Faculty of Humanities
Research Ethics Committee

27 June 2018

Dear Ms Liaga

Project:	**The local turn in peacebuilding: Critical analysis of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan, 2005-2015**
Researcher:	**E Liaga**
Supervisor:	**Dr C Wielenger**
Department:	**Political Science**
Reference number:	**10060007 (GW2018 0220 HS)**

Thank you for your response to the Committee's letter of 8 May 2018.

I have pleasure in informing you that the Research Ethics Committee formally **approved** the above study at an *ad hoc* meeting held on 27 June 2018. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should your actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely

Prof Karen Harris
Acting Chair: Research Ethics Commitee
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

cc: Dr C Wielenger (Supervisor)
Prof S Zondi (HoD)

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Research Ethics Committee Members: Prof MME Schoeman (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Mr A Bizos; Dr L Blokland; Dr K Booyens; Dr A-M de Beer; Ms A dos Santos; Dr R Fasselt; Ms KT Govinder Andrew; Dr E Johnson; Dr W Kelleher; Mr A Mohamed; Dr C Puttergill; Dr D Reyburn; Dr M Soer; Prof E Taljard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa

NPI-Africa
A Peace Resource Organization

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to confirm that Emmaculate Asige Liaga came to our office and interviewed me on matter regarding peace in the Great Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region.

We have authorized her to use the information we provided and for further clarity we can be contacted on the above contacts.

Thanks a lot.

Sincerely yours,

Lionel Lepalo Gideon
Senior Research Fellow

+254 723 947337

NPI - AFRICA
P. O. Box 14894 - 00800,
NAIROBI, KENYA.

Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
5th Floor, New Waumini House, Chiromo Road-Waiyaki Way, Westlands,
P.O. Box 14894 - 00800, Nairobi-Kenya, Tel: +254 (20) 4441444/4440098/4440992,
Fax: +254 (20) 4440097, Mobile: 0720 988 384 / 0735 765 688
E-mail: info@npi-africa.org Website: www.npi-africa.org

Grassroots Relief and Development Agency

Fighting Illiteracy and Poverty in South Sudan

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20,
Hatfield 0028.
South Africa.

To whom it may concern;

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I Felix Sunday Khamis on behalf of Grassroots Relief and Development Agency (GREDA) has given Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'

Note: The information/data and materials permitted shall be used only for academic purpose.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you.

GRASSROOTS RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 24 MAY 2018

Felix Sunday Khamis

Program Director

Grassroots Relief and Development Agency (GREDA)

P.O. Box 85 Juba, South Sudan

Date: May 24th 2018

South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections
C/o South Sudan Council of Churches Compound Ministries Road, Juba South Sudan
Email: ssundedemocracy1@gmail.com, telephone: +211 927033022

Ethics Committee Review,

University of Pretoria,

Private bag X20,

Hatfield 0028.

South Africa.

To whom it may concern,

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I Mr.Achol Kuchdit on behalf of South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (SSuNDE) has given Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you.

Name: Achol Kuchdit

Signature: .....

Date: 23/05/2018

Integrated Development Organisation (IDO)

Juba, South Sudan | www.idosouthsudan.org| info@idosouthsudan.org|+211 922 222 906

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20,
Hatfield 0028.
South Africa.

To whom it may concern,

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I Mr. Gai Makiew Gai on behalf of Integrated Development Organization-IDO has given Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you.

Name: Gai Makiew

Signature: .....

Date: 18/5/2018

SCREEN OF RIGHTS
Your rights, our concern

Date:28/05/2018

SCREEN OF RIGHTS
Munuki block C / Plot 132, Juba-South Sudan
+2119 200 777 27 / +21192777 1999
rmalual@gmail.com / screenofrights@outlook.com

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20,
Hatfield 0028.
South Africa.

To whom it may concern,

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I, REECH MALUAL on behalf of SCREEN OF RIGHTS a national organisation registered in accordance with the laws in the Republic of South Sudan, do hereby give Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you

REECH MALUAL
Executive Director
Date: 28/05/2018

SSCBS – JUBA

South Sudan Catholic Bishops' Secretariat
P.O. Box 258 – Juba
South Sudan

TO: Ethics Committee Review,

University of Pretoria

Private bag X20,

Hatfield 0028,

South Africa

Date: 30th May,2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Re- LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH.

Dear Sir, Madam

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I Mr. Isaac Kungur Kenyi on behalf of South Sudan Catholic Bishop's Secretariat has given Ms. LaigaEmmaculate permission to use the information /Data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research project on her Topic " The Local Turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure)

I also understand where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous, I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you

Name: Mr. Isaac Kungur Kenyi

Signature: :_____

Date:

Private :Tel: - +211 955 000 075 / +211 911 000 075, office Tel:+211920099912 . E-mail: - catholicbishopssecretariat@gmail.com

RECONCILE Office – Sudan
1½ Mile Maridi Road, Yei, Sudan
c/o P. O. Box 110, Juba
Tel: +211955263232
Email: info@reconcile-int.org
RECONCILE
Resource Centre for Civil Leadership

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20,
Hatfield 0028.
South Africa.

Dear Sir/ Madam,

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I Rev. Peter L. Tibi on behalf of Resource Centre for Civil leadership (RECONCILE Int.) has given Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you.

Rev. Peter L. Tibi

Signature

Date: **30th May 2018**

Resource Centre for Civil Leadership, 1½ Miles Maridi Road * YEI *

#ANATABAN

MUDURIA ROUNDABOUT
FIRST FLOOR
JUBA TOWN
JUBA/ SOUTH SUDAN

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20,
Hatfield 0028.
South Africa.

To whom it may concern,

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission in acknowledgement that I YOUSIF MOHAMMED HAROUN KAFI on behalf of ANATABAN ARTS INITIATIVE has given Ms. Liaga Emmaculate permission to use the information/ data and materials that I will provide for her field research for her thesis and any subsequent research projects on her topic 'The local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'.

I acknowledge that I have also signed a consent form that outlines the research principles she prescribes to, that is of voluntary participation, informed consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (except where permission is given for full disclosure). I also understand that where specifically mentioned, the institution will also remain anonymous. I am also aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time.

Thank you.

Name: Yousif Mohammed Haroun

Signature:

Date: 20/05/2014

ANATABAN

UNIVERSITY OF JUBA
Investing the Future...Transforming Society

Ethics Committee Review,
University of Pretoria,
Private bag X20, Hatfield
0028.
South Africa.

RE: LETTER OF PERMISSION FOR MS. LIAGA TO USE MY CONTRIBUTION OF FIELDWORK DATA FOR HER RESEARCH

Dear Sir/ Madam,

This is a letter of permission to acknowledge that I, Dr. Mairi an employee of Juba University, has given Ms. Emmaculate Liaga permission to use the information I will provide for her thesis and her projects on 'the local turn in Peacebuilding in South Sudan'

I acknowledge that I have signed the consent form that outlines the research principles guiding her paper. The views provided will be personal and do not represent those of the University of Juba.

Thank you.

Name: Dr. Mairi J Blackings

Signature:

Date: 25.05.2018


Find messages, documents, photos or people
Compose
Inbox
Back
Archive
Move
Delete
Spam
Emmaculate Asige
Kindly noted. No prc
Jun 7 at 7:05 AM
Richard Hoffman
To: Emmaculate Asige
Jun 12 at 7:51 AM
Dear Emmaculate,
= acknowledge: "that any and all information provided by interviewee was background information, and that interviewee should not be quoted in your work in any capacity unless you provide the quote to interviewee's offices and request in advance that any such quote is cleared through US government processes."
= agree that, if you do want to use any quotes, you need to please E-mail them back to me so that I can get them cleared -- otherwise, no quotes from me should be utilized in any capacity.
Please acknowledge receipt and let me know if you have any questions.
Richard/OTCM
Show original message
Richard Hoffman
Team Lead
Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM)
USAID South Sudan
student int....docx
15.4kB

Appendix F. Local authority clearance in Juba



SCREEN OF RIGHTS
Your rights, our concern

Date:12/04/2018

To:
National Security section
Officer in Charge of approving events
Juba, South Sudan
Juba, South Sudan

SUBJECT: REQUEST TO FACILITATE THE CONDUCT OF A SEMINAR ON PEACEBUILDING

Dear Sir/Madam officer charged with approving the conduct of events at the National Security of the Republic of South Sudan, it is my sincere hope that you are doing well.

Having acknowledged your personal and institutional role in approving events conduct in our country, it therefore my sincere request for the approval of the conduct of a peace building seminar being conducted by the SCREEN OF RIGHTSin feature with the University of Pretoria, South Africa and the University of Juba in a peace building Seminar that aims at narrowing the gaps between international organizations and the efforts by local peacebuilding actors.

It is the interest of the Screen of Rights and Pretoria University of South Africa collaboratively conduct this seminar on 17th April 2018 from 9:00 AM through 17:00 PM, Oscar Hotel/Near James Hotel, Hai Malakal-Juba, South Sudan.

Dear Professor, sir/madam (officer in charge); it's the Screen of Rights wish to have the approval form your high office by Monday 16th April 2018.04.13 there will be panel discussion and presentations on issues as specified in the concept attached hereto, moreover it is subsequent to have a brief on what institutions have been doing and challenges as well as personal experience amongst gaps between peacebuilding initiatives by international organizations parallel to nationally initiated peacebuilding initiatives.
It is my humble and high hope that we collaborate in this regard.

Sincerely yours

Reech Malual
Executive Director, Screen of Rights
Munuki block C / Plot 132, Juba-South Sudan
+2119 200 777 27 / +21192777 1999
rmalual@gmail.com / screenofrights@outlook.com
@screenofRights /@ActionHate
www.facebook.com/ScreenofRights/

INTERNAL SECURITY BUREAU
CENTRAL SECURITY DIVISION

Appendix G. Map of Juba



Sources: Administrative boundaries: REACH, Open Street Map; Facilities: Open Street Map; Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS user community
Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984
File: REACH_SSD_Map_Juba_Basemap_22July2016
Contact: reach.mapping@impact-initiatives.org

Appendix H: Researchers biography

Ms. Emmaculate Asige Liaga is a former Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa. During her doctoral period, her research interests focussed on investigating the strategies of peacebuilding employed by both the local and the International Organizations of peace operations in post-conflict communities, analysing the top-down and bottom-up approaches employed by both foreign intervention and the local level organizations.

Emmaculate is a holder of a master's degree from the University of Manchester where she majored in International Conflict and Security Studies and received her undergraduate and honours degrees in International Studies and International Relations respectively from the University of Pretoria, South Africa.

Emmaculate is also a former visiting doctoral student at Basel University Switzerland, a former visiting fellow at the German Institute of Area and Global Studies (GIGA), Institute of African Affairs, Germany (2018). She also worked as a part-time researcher at the Center for the Advancement of Scholarship working on the effects of conflict and unlawful killings on social cohesion in Rwanda and South Sudan. She previously worked at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation as a Junior Researcher, Politics Tutor at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria and as an Intern at the United Nations Information Centre.

Ms. Emmaculate Asige Liaga is an awardee of the Oumou Dilly scholarship, GIGA seed funding for early career researchers (2017-2018), and Social Sciences Research Council Next Generation Scholars in Africa 2018/2019 cohort. Prior to this, she was a Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar at the Wilson Center (2017). She is also an awardee of the Chevening Scholarship, an honor awarded to outstanding emerging leaders to pursue a one-year master at any UK university.