A DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION'S INVASION OF LIBYA IN 2011

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

In the Faculty of

Humanities,

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DECLARATION

I, Chidochashe Nyere, declare that the thesis entitled: A Decolonial Perspective on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Invasion of Libya in 2011, which I hereby submit for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university.

Signed: Chidochashe Nyere

Date: 28 April 2020

ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPROVAL LETTER

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Faculty of Humanities
Research Ethics Committee

26 March 2018

Dear Mr Nyere

Project:	**The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Invasion of Libya, 2011: A Colonial Perspective**
Researcher:	**C Nyere**
Supervisors:	**Prof S Zondi and Prof S Ndlovu-Gatsheni**
Department:	**Political Sciences**
Reference number:	**18194631(GW20180317HS)**

Thank you for the application that was submitted for ethical consideration.

The **Research Ethics Committee** notes that this is a literature-based study and no human subjects are involved. The application has been **approved** on 22 March 2018 along these guidelines, data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. However, should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, a new research proposal and application for ethical clearance will have to be submitted for approval.

The Committee requests you to convey this approval to the researcher.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely

Prof Maxi Schoeman
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
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CC: Prof S Zondi (Supervisor)
        Prof S Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Co-Supervisor)

Research Ethics Committee Members: Prof MME Schoeman (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Dr L Blokland; Dr K Booyens; Dr A-M de Beer; Ms A dos Santos; Dr R Fasselt; Ms KT Govinder; Dr E Johnson; Dr W Kelleher; Mr A Mohamed; Dr C Puttergill; Dr D Reyburn; Dr M Soer; Prof E Taljard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the aspirations of decolonial combative ontology, decoloniality and the realisation of a decolonised world that is free from all forms of oppression.

I also dedicate this thesis to my wife, my son and daughter; only you know and understand what we went through in the duration of this study.

ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter, NATO) invasion of Libya in 2011 demonstrated and revealed the operative logics and technologies of global coloniality. Global coloniality names the trans-historic expansion of colonial domination and the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary times. This thesis critically examines how coloniality of power was manifested in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011. Deploying a decolonial epistemic perspective, the thesis delves deeper into the invisible colonial matrices of power, and in the process exposing and unmasking the very conditions that made the invasion possible in the first place. The decolonial epistemic perspective combines historical and world systems analyses to shed light on the convergences of local histories and global designs in creating conflicts. At the centre of the concept of coloniality of power is control, expressed in four main levers of analysis, namely: control of authority, control of the economy, control of knowledge and subjectivity and control of gender and sexuality. At the centre of global colonial matrices of power, is the United Nations (UN), which is controlled by the few powerful states of the Global North with *veto* power. The UN is used to justify liberal imperial invasions. Libya just like Iraq before it, and Venezuela today, are victims of neo-liberal imperialist onslaught. What emerges in this thesis is how global coloniality has appropriated liberal discourses of liberal democracy and human rights to justify liberal imperialism. The main findings are that a Euro-North American-centric power configuration was challenged by Qaddafi's introduction of the gold-backed dinar currency, the pursuit of acquiring a telecommunications satellite for information and knowledge-creation for Africa, Qaddafi's rising popularity in Africa and the Global South, and Qaddafi's conception and position on women-empowerment, thereby redefining the conception of gender and sexuality, which was antithetical to a Euro-North America-centric worldview. As a result, the delinquent Qaddafi had to be punished and eliminated.

Key Words: Combative-Ontology, Colonialism, Coloniality, Decoloniality, Invasion, Libya, Modernity, NATO, Responsibility to Protect, Power-configuration

Contents

CHAPTER ONE:

A DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION'S INVASION OF LIBYA IN 2011

1.1 Introduction and Background

This introductory chapter provides the research design of the thesis and introduces the overarching decolonial epistemic perspective. It begins with provision of a historical background, research question and research problem, study objectives, a brief literature review, before proceeding to detail some issues of methodology and the architecture of the thesis.

On the 20th of October 2011 President Qaddafi was assassinated by rebels with the assistance of NATO forces (Campbell 2013: 11). Fighter jets from France had struck his convoy, making him vulnerable to rebels, who then shot and killed him (Khan 2016). Citizens' protests against corruption, *inter alia*, that started in Tunisia in 2010, leading to Egypt's protests against high unemployment rates, among other grievances, in what became known as the "Arab Spring" or the "Arab awakening'' (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2011; 2016) was gaining momentum. The Arab Spring was far-reaching in the 'Arab world' as this movement affected countries like Bahrain and Yemen. Similar protests directed at the Qaddafi regime were experienced in Libya. The United States of America (hereafter, US) claimed that, fearing the anticipated response by Qaddafi on the protesters, Libya's citizens were in imminent danger (Campbell 2013: 17; 68). The UN Security Council deemed the Libyan government unwilling to protect its citizenry, resulting in the intervention by the NATO forces.

Prior to NATO's intervention, Libyan relations with the West, particularly with the US and Britain were precarious and laden with tensions. The most notable of this was the 1987 Lockerbie[1] crisis in Scotland, which investigations suggested to have been an order from Qaddafi, and the bombing of the US embassy[2] in Tripoli in 1979 (Bowen 2006: 14-17). The

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[1] Pan Am flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1987 killing all 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground. Investigations suggested that Libya, under Qaddafi, was responsible. Two thirds of the passengers were American citizens and 44 were British (Bowen 2006: 17).

[2] The US contended that the Libyan authorities did nothing to prevent a mob that was inspired by the Iranian revolution from committing the arson act (Bowen 2006: 14).

Libya/West relations also enjoyed relative cordiality and cooperation; Qaddafi was an ally[3] of the Atlantic states (Prashad 2011: 7). One can also not ignore the US' and Britain's diplomatic influence on Libya, which resulted in Libya's abandonment of the pursuit of developing ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear programs (Bowen 2006:7; 49; 50). It is not entirely surprising that the perilous relationship culminated in the invasion of Libya by NATO in 2011. What is of concern is that Qaddafi had been on the US' watch because of Libya's nuclear amassment (Bowen 2006: 18). Libya's amassment of nuclear capability meant the US could not trust Libya's intentions. Therefore, when the Benghazi conflict started, it was the pretext on which the US-led coalition of NATO "intervened" to eliminate Libya's "unpredictable" leader (Bowen 2006: 15). The Benghazi conflict was a *Casus Bello*; the real reason for the intervention was that the US-led coalition was threatened by the events in Tunisia and Egypt. The US-led coalition's regional stability was disturbed and "Libya provided a unique opportunity" (Prashad 2011: 6-7) to realise hegemonic American foreign policy objectives, in line with the National Security Council 68 (NSC) document of 1950 (Chomsky 1986: 10-11). Libya had been challenging the hegemony of the US as evidenced by the Lockerbie debacle. The bombing of Libya by NATO suggests sanctimoniousness and dissimulation in the Libya/US relations.

The NATO intervention in Libya was authorised by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970[4] and 1973[5]. Both Resolutions referred to the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the premise on which military intervention was justified (Campbell 2013: 10). Mainstream accounts on the Libyan invasion, such as, but not limited to, Daalder and Stavridis (2012), Western and Goldstein (2011), Weber (2013), Sayers (2011), Muravchik (2011), Rasmussen (2011), Gomis (2011), and Valentino (2011) argue, in various tones, that it was an intervention aimed at protecting the vulnerable population of Libya. This study argues that the so-called intervention was tantamount to an invasion. The implication of the terminology of intervention gives a false binary relation premised on equal, fair and just basis, whereas invasion implies an

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[3] After the 9/11, terror attack in the US, Qaddafi publicly made anti-terror remarks and provided "intelligence on al-Qaeda to the United States" (Bowen 20016: 57).

[4] The UNSC Resolution 1970, sanctioned and authorised by the United Nations Security Council was passed on February 26, 2011. It denounced the Qaddafi regime's use of force on protesting civilians in what was called Libya's civil war; in response to the ensuing chaos and pandemonium, the UNSC imposed a series of international sanctions that will be discussed briefly later in this work (Campbell 2013: 67).

[5] UNSC Resolution 1973 was endorsed on March 17, 2011 as a reinforcement and consolidation of UNSC Resolution 1970; France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom spearheaded its endorsement (Campbell 2013: 69).

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unequal relation where a megalithic force imposes its will on the weak and minute. This speaks of an asymmetrical power relation. The language of R2P is, cosmetically designed to camouflage the real intentions of the global power structural configuration. Human rights and democracy are ascribed to all of humanity to camouflage the asymmetrical global power structure, and can be suspended on some of humanity when the same human rights become obstacles to global power configuration as evinced by the NSC 68 document (Chomsky 1986: 8; 11). At the centre of the asymmetrical global power structure is a paradigm of war. The solution to the paradigm of war is violence (Mansfield 1985: 25; Skinner & Price 1988: 15; Ratliff 1986: 5). As such, global imperial designs such as NATO machinations hide the real intentions of Western interests, which this study identifies as coloniality of power, in institutions they readily and conveniently discharge such as R2P. This warrants a decolonial perspective which is meant to dismantle power relations and "conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the Morden/colonised world" (Maldonado-Torres 2011). Decoloniality sets "afoot a new humanity free from racial hierarchization and asymmetrical power relations in place since conquest" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 488). As such, decoloniality robustly explains why the *intervention* was in fact an invasion of Libya by demonstrating the asymmetrical colonial matrices of power that were, and are still, at play.

1.2 Literature Study

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report (*ICISS* 2001: xi), declared that the responsibility to protect is an inherent and obligatory duty of the state. The report postulated the basic principles as follows:

> State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for protection of its people lies with the state itself.
>
> Where a population is suffering serious harm, because of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

This means that the legitimate sovereign is compelled to accept the responsibility of ensuring security and safety of a populace in any given territory; in this case, the state or the leader of the state (Branch 2011: 116; Ayoob 2002: 84). The limitation of this view lies in that R2P

makes no provision for consultation with a state on whether or not the international community's intervention is needed and warranted. R2P is deafeningly silent on the actual processes of initiating its implementation in a given case. Hence, Mamdani (2011) suggests that R2P is a ploy of the West to re-colonise the spaces and places they once colonised, especially Africa. The risk there is with R2P is that global super-powers tend to abuse such instruments and use R2P as a tool to intervene in the internal and domestic affairs of other countries unwarrantedly. This position counters the argument of sovereignty, particularly state sovereignty as responsibility, rendering it weak and limited.

This study interprets the invasion of Libya and the application of R2P in demonstrating that coloniality of power, in the frameworks of Quijano (2000), was at play. The West has a bad record of intervening in the domestic affairs of sovereign states unwarrantedly (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan for example). This gives the impression that the West unilaterally and autocratically has potency and propensity to assume moral responsibility that it projects as humanitarian intervention. While the moral responsibility argument is noble, it is challenged by McCormack (2011: 37) who highlights that America "damaged the moral consensus in favour of intervention" particularly under the 2001-2009 presidency of George W. Bush. As such, this consolidates the view that R2P as a moral duty is applied sporadically, variably, selectively, pliably and intermittently rendering R2P a preference rather than a principle. If it is a preference, therefore it is an opinion; the question then becomes, whose opinion counts? It could be argued that the motive of the US' intervention in Libya was to gain access to fossil fuel, which was discovered in the 1950s (Campbell 2013: 85), this study will demonstrate that it is to this end, among other factors, that the US-led NATO, lobbied for intervention in Libya. Although, NATO can counter this argument by citing human rights abuses by the Qaddafi regime, what is questionable however, is that only in 2011, almost 5 decades later, did the West use the democracy and human rights abuse arguments against Qaddafi. Qaddafi had come to power through a *coup de ta* in 1969 (Davis 1987; El Fathaly & Palmer 1980).

The Sudanese Government (Cunliffe 2011: 39), and the Zimbabwean Government argued that NATO was deceitful in applying R2P in Libya (*New Zimbabwe* 2012). The West's hypocrisy is undeniable as evidenced by Ayoob (2002: 84), Chomsky (1986: 10), Devetak (2012: 39), Jackson and Rosberg (1986: 6), Mignolo (2009: 16) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 422). When it is consistent with their interests, the West identifies with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; but, when it suites their interests, they condone intervention

in other states on humanitarian grounds. Be that as it may, the anti-colonial utterances made by some African leaders for example the late and former President of Zimbabwe, Mugabe, the late President of Libya, Qaddafi himself, and the late and former Iraq leader, Saddam Hussein, equally lack moral authority particularly coming from leaders who, themselves behaved like the West and exhibited colonial-like forms in their own domains. This view is not consistently articulated and this study's argument will be enriched by exploring this gap further.

Literature on R2P (Bannon 2006; Evans & Sahnoun 2002; Crail 2008) and particularly post-NATO intervention of Libya is written from a Eurocentric perspective (Cerone 2011; Crook 2011; Gazzini 2011; Kila 2013; Lynch 2011; Powell 2012; Rasmussen 2011; Villar 2011; Western & Goldstein 2013). There are apparent biases that hinder objective analyses, these include perceptions of non-democratic leadership, dictatorship and autocracy by Libya's elite; these perceptions, notwithstanding, overlook the stability that Libya enjoyed prior to the intervention for example. By and large, R2P is written from the *interveners* side and perspective (Arbour 2008; Brooks 2012; Macfarlane 2004; McCormick 2011; Orford 2012; Stahn 2007; Taylor 2005; Thielking 2004; Waal 2007; Weiss 2004). Little has been written from the perspective of the *intervened* side, with very few exceptions, such as Gambino (2009), Braut-Hegghammer (2008) and Mohamed (2012). This necessitates a critical scholarly inquiry into the debate of R2P in the Libyan case particularly. This study unmasks the colonial asymmetrical global power structure embedded in the R2P discourse, by exposing coloniality of power entrenched in this *new* imperial design.

1.3 Research Problem

The global power structural configuration, which encompasses Libya, is asymmetrical and as such, problematic. Particularly problematic is the current political instability and governance crisis in Libya because of the bosky application of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Libya today has no recognised and acceptable government within Libya and the international community. This was not the case prior to the NATO *intervention*. The governance crisis in Libya is a result of the invasion whose justification was the R2P doctrine. Was R2P not developed in order to avoid a situation similar to the Rwanda genocide of 1994? Millions died because the Rwandan conflict was not apprehended in time. Informed by the Rwandan genocide, the UN Security Council deployed R2P in Libya to prevent a repeat of Rwanda. Yet

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in the Libyan conflict, at least 30 000 people died despite that the conflict was anticipated and apprehended in time, and therefore, could have been prevented (Campbell 2013: 30). In 2017, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), broadcasted a report by the United Nations Children Fund (Unicef) which revealed that "almost 26,000 children - most of them unaccompanied - crossed the Mediterranean last year [in 2016]" fleeing the ongoing Libyan conflict (Adams 2017). Some scholars, among them, O'Brien (2012) and Weiss (2012) have argued that in the instance of Libya, R2P was applied prematurely. This study believes that the application of R2P in Libya was not sincere, taking into cognisance the loss of lives that the *intervention* alone caused, and the continued loss of lives post-NATO *intervention*. Equally problematic is the fact that literature abounds, on R2P, which is written from a Eurocentric perspective and from the *intervener's* perspective, with very little, if at all, from the perspective of the *intervened*. The rhetoric of R2P does not tally with lived experiences of the application of R2P because its ideals and the reality are irreconcilable. The Libyan crisis therefore, points to something deeper than meets the eye, and it warrants scholarly attention.

Given the problematic asymmetry inherent in the global power structural configuration, there is even a greater need to interrogate the basis of that structure. The current global order, particularly the Modern state system, is a result of European modernity and the predicament with modernity is that it is two-faced. The one face of modernity is that of emancipation, progress, civilisation, development and freedom that comes with human rights. The other face of modernity is coloniality and a thirst for control of anything that differs or defies the Euro-North American perspective. Thus, coloniality is limiting to other epistemological creativity; it hinders knowledge of other ontological expressions than a Euro-North American perspective of what humanity is about and could be. This logic results in the social, political, economic and epistemic creation of the human and non-human. Modernity negates, forces and condemns parts of humanity found in the peripheries of a Euro-North American civilisation, and represents them as non-humanity. Non-human beings are considered beings of a lesser ontological value than humans of Euro-North American ancestry. Global coloniality privileges a Euro-North American part of humanity, at the expense of diminishing, dismissing and obliterating anything else other than a Euro-North American civilisation, in the process making Euro-North American modernity a global Empire. This intones geopolitics, where one has ontological density based on where s/he comes from, Europe and North America being the privileged places of ontological density. Africa in particular, and the global South in general, fall in the peripheries of Euro-North American modernity, hence Africans and other subjects

from the global South are deemed to be of a lesser ontological density as compared to their counterparts of European descent. These disparities and discrepancies between the promise of modernity and the reality of coloniality are problematic.

1.4 Research Question

How was coloniality of power manifested in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011?

1.4.1 Research Sub-questions

The following sub-questions undergird the discussion of this study:

- What does coloniality of power entail?
- How is the intentional fluidity of R2P related to coloniality of power?
- Why and how is decoloniality relatable to NATO's invasion of Libya?

1.5 Assumptions of the Study

The invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011 was a manifestation of coloniality of power; it consolidated Euro-North American interests of sustaining Modern empire (*NSC* 68; Chomsky 1986: 8). Modern empire is a consequent of Euro-North American dictates of what ought to be known, adhered to and espoused by all of humanity. In that sense, Modern empire declares itself the standard with which everything is judged and measured against. This study sets out therefore to establish how coloniality of power was made manifest in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces.

1.6 Objectives

The objectives of this study are to critically:

- Analyse the contestations of the 2011 invasion/intervention of NATO in Libya

- Examine the concept of coloniality of power in Libya

- Express the intentional fluidity of the doctrine of R2P

- Demonstrate how coloniality of power is linked to the doctrine of R2P

- Relate the decolonial perspective to the NATO invasion of Libya

1.7 Research Methodology

The study assumes a critical literature approach and uses the qualitative research methodology to enable its undertaking of re-interpreting the 2011 invasion of Libya. The primary advantage of this approach is that it allows for interpretation of phenomena (Johnson & Christensen 2014: 418; Strauss & Corbin 1990: 17; Walliman 2011: 174), making provision for "open-ended and emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data" (Creswell 2003: 18). It also "provides a bridge between objective neutrality and abject theorising, producing results that are academically credible and imaginative" (Thorne 2008: 23). Re-interpretation is of paramount importance in this study as the study refutes the universalistic nature of Euro-North American epistemological monopoly embedded in its framework. The study asserts that the locus of enunciation of a writer or researcher is of fundamental importance in understanding phenomena. The Western and Eurocentric perspectives averred so far, have not been able to capture the essence of the Libyan experience of coloniality because they are outsiders to the lived experience of the formerly colonised. The literature proffered thus far, particularly on the application of R2P in Libya, fails to appeal to the people on the *intervened* divide, because it reflects thoughts, expectations, analyses and experiences of the *interveners* divide. The research uses a case study of Libya's invasion by NATO in 2011, employing the critical literature analysis method. The study asserts that an African and decolonial perspective on the Libyan crisis is compelling and thus, it is what informs the approach, locale and positionality of this researcher.

1.8 Methods of Data-Gathering and its Rationale

Initially, the study opted for a triangulation of methods in its data-gathering. Of course, in the operationalisation of the study the triangulation strategy of gathering data proved to be very cumbersome, and so improvising was required. Data triangulation is about generating data in

three formats or streams of acquiring information, hence, *tri* (three). The three formats that were envisioned by this study were: Personal Observations, Expert-Panel Interviews and Critical Literature Analysis. There is therefore, no doubt that the triangulation of data was going to bolster the study's position and findings. However, as will be demonstrated in the following sections, this was without its shortcomings.

1.8.1 Personal Observations Method

Personal Observations in any given study are of valuable experience in that they have potential to generate meaningful insights on a phenomena. However, the political crisis in Libya today is such that there is no unitary government recognised in Libya and the world over, in spite of an UN-backed faction of government. This presented a major challenge to the researcher in that, since there was no central government in Libya, the issuance of visas in order to travel to Libya was problematic. There was no Libyan government official reachable in South Africa - where this researcher is based- at the time of commencing and conducting this research, as is still the case now (April 2020). There was no guarantee of the researcher's safety at least from a government's position, because there is no government. Given this scenario, it was compelling reason that necessitated therefore, the exclusion of personal observations that this study could have benefited from. Pursuing personal observations in the presenting precarious political environment and circumstances that Libya finds itself today would have been to the detriment of the person of the researcher.

The exclusion of Personal Observations as part of data-gathering methods for this study, resulted in adopting a *bi-angulated* data gathering strategy (two methods). However, using a *bi-angulated* strategy was to also prove to be problematic as will be demonstrated in the next section.

1.8.2 Expert-Panel Interviews Method

Ordinarily, Expert-Panel Interviews were going to be of benefit to the process of data gathering for this study. However, it was extremely difficult to secure interviews with most pre-identified experts in the field of decoloniality and the subject-matter of Libya in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings. Resources to gather these experts were also scarce and at times unavailable.

This was beyond the means of the researcher. In spite of not getting interviews with these experts, some of them were kind and generous enough to point the researcher towards their research which was already accessible in the public domain. The assurance was that, the expert interviewees had very little to add or nothing different to offer, other than their views that this research accessed in the public domain.

So, with the exclusion of yet another of the envisioned data-gathering methods, this resulted in a *Uno-angulated* research strategy (one method), that of critical literature analysis.

1.8.3 Critical Literature Analysis Method

With this scenario –the *Uno-angulated strategy*- having played out for more than a year, the researcher was left with the option to gather data for this research from the public domain. Suffice to note that, in the public domain –books, peer-reviewed academic articles, E-books, credible internet sources, governments' newspapers, E-newspapers, recorded interviews, commentaries, and encyclopaedias to mention a few- were readily available, and so the researcher had to select and sift through a myriad of sources in order to critically analyse this mammoth data and make sense of it. The study also made use of publications accessible in the public domain, from the pre-identified Expert-Panel interviewees themselves as were their recommendations. This is therefore, the fundamental reason of using only critical literature analysis in this study, the literature and data that this study needed was amply available in the public domain.

1.8.4 Data-Selection

The data-selection of this study was informed by its objectives. Among its objectives, was to assert Afrocentric positionalities. Therefore, in the selection of data and literature, this meant that the criterion was that which highlighted the struggles experienced by Africans in their quest for epistemic freedom. This also meant that preference was given to literature and data that asserted African positionalities, ontologies, ecologies and perspectives on the monolithic and current worldview. In order to circumnavigate Afrocentric biases, the study equally critically engaged and juxtaposed, in relation to itself, other literatures that include Euro-North

American centric literature, Arabic-centric literature and Middle Eastern-centric literature as well as South-American-centric literature, among others.

1.9 Combative Decolonial Epistemic Ontology

The Combative Decolonial Epistemic Ontology methodology is meant to disrupt the monolithic, objective, logical and scientific writing on Africa's experience of colonialism and domination in general, but Libya's invasion particularly. It seeks to disrupt the long-standing traditions that have been unquestionably accepted as objective epistemology, yet those ideas represent a particular Euro-North American-centric perspective. This work privileges perspectives from Africa that are embedded in ecologies emanating from Africa. It is subjective because it emanates from an existential positionality informed by a subjective colonial and coloniality experience of this researcher. The logic that informs this writing is inspired by Micere Githae Mugo, a Poet from Kenya who argues that "I write as I want" (Cited in, McFadden 2016). This position is also echoed by Steven Bantu Biko who opined "I write what I like" (Biko 1976). The subjective worldview of a Euro-North American-centric perspective would like to give an illusion that it is universal. In fact, a Euro-North American-centric perspective was universalised by the violence of colonialism and is perpetuated by coloniality. The silencing of subjective voices and experiences is just the muzzling of truth by a perspective that masquerades itself as objective. Colonialism and its after-effects (coloniality) privileges Euro-North American-centric perspectives and these are main-streamed by controlling vehicles of disseminating ideas and information, such as universities, media houses, publishing houses (academic, cultural, social and otherwise) to mention just but a few. This is coloniality of knowledge and it keeps a Euro-North American-centric perspective dominant over other subaltern perspectives. The domination of one perspective over others can be equated to what Lynch (2011: 63) and Fitrakis (2012: 15) called the Cable News Network (CNN)-effect; I add that the CNN-effect can be interchangeably referred to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)-effect. There is a concerted and deliberate effort to channel ideas and news into a global perspective dominated by the voices of Europe through communication channels such as CNN and BBC. African positionalities and ecologies are controlled and manipulated to fit into European culture, thought and context, at the expense of the rich and diverse African experiences, ways of life and African forms of being.

Colonialism was never an objective set of experiences or phenomena; it never affected every place and space and the peoples in those places and spaces in the same ways. As such, colonialism and coloniality were not *objectively* experienced, even by formerly colonised persons. Equally, coloniality continues to be perceived and experienced differently, subjectively and ambivalently.

1.10 Key Concepts

1.10.1 Colonialism

Colonialism refers to the invasion of Africa, and other places, by European imperial powers that included, but were not limited to Britain, France and Portugal; from the 1800s (Pakenham 1992), to their departure in the late-1950s to 1990s (Chamberlain 2010).

1.10.2 Coloniality

Coloniality refers the after effects of colonialism; coloniality outlived colonialism, thereby establishing "long standing-patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism" (Quijano 2000: 540).

1.10.3 Empire

Empire refers to a state or community of states that controls the sovereign, political and economic relations of another state (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243). In this study, the term is used to refer to the European and Western hegemonic project and ideology of domination (*NSC* 68, cited in, Chomsky 1986: 8-10).

1.10.4 Intervention

Intervention refers to the involvement or intercession of, one party on another, or between varying parties or positions. It can also refer to an action to correct or improve a given situation (Finnemore 2003: 24).

1.10.5 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

R2P is an UN-gazetted intervention doctrine that seeks to protect citizens in a given country should, the respective government of the country be unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. Under such circumstances, the responsibility yields to the international community (*ICISS* 2001: xi).

1.11 Delimitation

This study does not exhaustively historicise the political spectre of Libya from inception or give a detailed account of the Libyan state formation modelled on the Modern European concert of state. The study instead focuses on some principal events that led to Libya's invasion. As such, the study selectively focuses on the periods between 1951 (Libya's so-called independence) to 2015 (four years after the killing of Muammar al Qaddafi). The study also analyses some events that are post 2015 in very limited fashion.

1.12 Rationale and Justification of the Study

The discipline of international relations (IR) started in 1919 at Abe Ystwyth, University of Wales (now Abe Ystwyth University) following the First World War, which had ended in 1918. It was an attempt to prevent future wars (Wielger 1987). Current international relations (IR) theories, such as realism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism, structuralism, functionalism, neo-liberalism and post-structuralism have proved to be inadequate in achieving what the discipline of IR sought to do in the first place, to stop international wars and avert international conflicts. These theories have not been able to prevent and avert international wars and conflicts over the years. This is because these theories are located in a Euro-North American discourse and epistemology, which started and by implication preserves coloniality. The inadequacy of IR theories to avert conflict attests to the proverbial epistemic break of Modern social science theories and epistemology (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). This necessitates a different approach that is contingent with the idea that a solution to a problem cannot come from the very problem. As such, this study propounds to apply decoloniality as a theoretical framework in understanding the Libyan crisis because decoloniality has its roots outside of a Euro-North American Modernity and epistemology (*ibid*).

The novel contribution of this study to literature is three-fold. The R2P doctrine stands on three pillars; namely, protection, prevention and rehabilitation or reconstruction. The first pillar speaks to the actual protection of the vulnerable and weak. The second pillar relates to the prevention of situations that can likely escalate to conflicts that cause crises; and the third pillar is concerned with redress following conflicts and crises. In its current form, the rehabilitation/reconstruction aspect of R2P is under-implemented by the powers that be, more than it is under-investigated. Firstly, this study explains the nexus between coloniality of power and the deliberate fluidity of conception of the R2P doctrine. Secondly, the perspectives that have been proffered such as those of Broadwell and Loeb (2012) and Prashad (2012) analysed the intervention in Libya, from a legal perspective (international law), while Campbell (2013) and Forte (2012) analysed the Libyan intervention from a democratic perspective. This study acknowledges that these perspectives are credible, but do not suffice for absolute accounts of the invasion because they do not cover all perspectives, and therefore incomplete. This study interpreted the invasion of Libya from a decolonial perspective which had not been done to date. Thirdly, the study's critical analysis demonstrates that decoloniality, as a theory is opportune to studying international relations and other political and social sciences in pursuit of trans-disciplinarity, an embedded by-product of decoloniality.

1.13 Theoretical Framework

Decoloniality is a political and epistemological project seeking to liberate "(ex-) colonised peoples from global coloniality" by challenging the status quo of the global political power configuration (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 485). It emerged from the struggle against slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and imperialism among other forms of oppression. Decoloniality is necessary because some spaces *inter alia* "domains of culture, the psyche, mind, language, aesthetics, and religion" that experienced imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and underdevelopment, including Libya, "have remained colonised" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 485). As a political movement, it has "been subjected to surveillance of global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power" (*ibid*). As an epistemological movement, "it has always been overshadowed by hegemonic Euro-North American-centric intellectual thought and social theories" (*ibid*). It recognises the efforts of post-colonial thought, but departs from post-colonial thought on the ground that post-colonial thought speaks to conditions of ex-colonised

people without tempering with the global power structural conditions set up by colonialism and that sustain coloniality today.

Maldonado-Torres (2011) avers that decoloniality means to dismantle power relations and "conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the Morden/colonised world". Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015: 488) underscores that it is "aimed at setting afoot a new humanity free from racial hierarchisation and asymmetrical power relations in place since conquest". Decoloniality is liberatory and emancipatory of the human regardless of race, culture, religion or locality. The concept of coloniality of power is a unit of analysis of the broader decolonial theory. Quijano identified four levers of coloniality namely, "control of the economy", "control of authority", "control of gender and sexuality" and "control of knowledge and subjectivity" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 487).

At the centre of control is power, hence the concept coloniality of power. Coloniality of power is what this study uses in analysing the application of R2P in the Libyan case. Euro-North American modernity dictates, configures, regulates, designs and creates patterns and institutions that every civilisation is forced to imbibe and follow. Institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Health Organisation (WHO, International Criminal Court (ICC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) itself, are used to control authority structures globally. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Stock Markets and used to control the economy and fiscus of the globe by Euro-North American modernity and hegemony. Institutions such as universities, research foundations, and think tanks are used to control knowledge production and Euro-North American modernity decides what knowledge is and what it is not. The structures within which international relations are conducted are predetermined by Euro-North American standards and thereby controlled by Euro-North American civilisations. Perspectives such as realism, liberalism, institutionalism, functionalism and neo-liberalism are enabled by such structures and institutions, whereas the decolonial perspective has to be asserted in an environment that dismisses other perspectives as folk-knowledge and consequently, inferior. Coloniality of power is meant to unmask, demystify and uncover what a Euro-North American neo-liberal perspective conceals in its inquiry.

1.14 Limitations

Ideally, the study would have benefited from a triangulation of observation, expert-panel interviews and critical literature analysis. However, the study only makes use of the critical literature approach as there are ample open-written sources to evince the assertions of this study, and the study does not empirically observe the situation in Libya owing to the immediate danger that the current political situation could pose to the researcher. In-depth details that impose such limitations to this study are outlined under the methodology section earlier in this chapter.

1.15 Chapter Outline

1.15.1 Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter one provides the rationale for the study, outlines objectives, methodology and research approach including research questions and objectives. More significantly, it articulates the problem that gives rise to the thesis in the first place. The chapter also mentions the thesis' limitations and the delimitation within which it is written as well as the specific areas of focus of the study.

1.15.2 Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

Since a study of this nature requires theoretical clarity, chapter two provides a theoretical framework in the form of decolonial reading of international relations and provides a justification of this choice in relation to the research problem outlined in chapter one. Hence, this chapter articulates what coloniality of power entails, and how coloniality of power operationalises and reconfigures itself in the absence of colonialism.

1.15.3 Chapter Three: The Historical Background of Libya under Colonel Qaddafi

The historical background of Libya with a special focus on the period under the leadership of Colonial Qaddafi is provided in chapter three. This shows the importance of the state system

built after 1959 in the bigger scheme of fights against colonialism and coloniality. More importantly, the chapter positions the Libyan Modern state system in the broader discussion of colonialism and coloniality.

1.15.4 Chapter Four: The Arab Spring and the Libyan Crisis

Since the Arab Spring uprisings where the political context that gave reason for the NATO-led international community to invade and declare an illegal war on Libya, this chapter analyses what unfolded in five other countries in order to understand what really happened in Libya. It specifically situates the Libyan crisis within the debacle of the Arab Spring protests, thereby demonstrating the real motives of NATO's invasion of Libya.

1.15.5 Chapter Five: The NATO Invasion and its Aftermath

The chapter demonstrates that NATO's invasion of Libya was consistent with hegemonic Euro-North American ideology of domination by providing detailed evidence on what transpired in Libya prior to the NATO war, what transpired during the NATO war on Libya as well as what has been happening in Libya post-NATO war. The chapter also exposes how Western modernity's thirst for control reconfigured itself with the elimination of Libya's revolutionary leader, Muammar al Qaddafi.

1.15.6 Chapter Six: Conclusion

Chapter Six concluded the debate and analysis of this study as it answered the principal research question: How was coloniality of power manifested in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011? It concluded that coloniality of power was what provided impetus for the NATO-led invasion of Libya; it also revealed that domination by Western modernity and other individual agendas of some states and statesmen where motives that sought to eliminate President Qaddafi.

CHAPTER TWO:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

COLONIALITY OF POWER AND THE GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION: UNMASKING THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF EMPIRE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter elaborates on the decolonial-epistemic perspective as the overarching theoretical framework for the thesis. Global coloniality privileges a Euro-North American-centric form of humanity, at the expense of diminishing, dismissing and obliterating anything else other than a Euro-North American-centric civilisation, in the process making Euro-North American-centric modernity a global Empire. The politics of empire are problematic because they set precedence, justify and perpetuate global coloniality. This is the conundrum that confronted and enveloped Libya in 2011 with the NATO-led invasion and continues to entangle and disenfranchise the Libyan polity today. Hence the need for a, decolonial epistemic approach that seeks to re-humanise and affirm ALL forms of humanity. This chapter therefore, seeks to disentangle and strip bare the asymmetrical global power structural configurations that the current world order rests upon, that are camouflaged in the so-called objectivity of science and the skewed universality of knowledge. The current socio-economic-politico world order is a creation and direct result of Modern European thought and civilisation (modernity). It was scattered across the world through the violence of colonialism. In turn, colonialism produced global coloniality.

The turning point is that global coloniality entraps humanity to a pre-determined reality modelled on Euro-North American-centric modernity. Thus, coloniality is limiting, to and eliminates other epistemological creativity; it hinders other ontological expressions of what humanity is, and could be, other than the pre-determined Euro-North American-centric form of being and knowledge. This logic results in the social, political, economic and epistemic creation and definition of the human and the non-human by other human beings. Modernity negates, forcibly condemns forms of humanity found in the peripheries of Euro-North American civilisation, to non-humanity. Non-human beings are considered objects and of a lesser ontological value than humans of Euro-North American ancestry. Because it is assumed that there is no humanity in the peripheries of a Euro-North American-centric civilisation, any

enterprise or innovation from the zone of non-being cannot be good enough. Libya could have not been successful, it could have not been a leader and example of a decolonial state; hence, it had to fail because it threatened the established Eurocentric world order.

Epistemologically, this chapter unmasks the fault lines of the philosophy of the European-centric Empire as implicated in the generation of problems epitomised by the invasion of Libya in 2011 by NATO forces. It does so, by exposing some myths that inform and continue to precipitate global coloniality in the absence of physical colonialism. Current International Relations (IR) theories have proven to be limited and unable to solve and eradicate this epistemic challenge, partly because the dominant and traditional IR theories are located in the very European modernity, which they disguise and camouflage in the purported objectivity of science. The philosophy of the Eurocentric empire universalised these particular theories of IR by force (violence of colonialism) as they are part of the modernity project of colonisation (Howe 1990: 677). The chapter further demonstrates the deficiencies and bankruptcy that foregrounds traditional IR theories' assumptions, assertions and proclamations particularly that Western-centric IR theories are scientific, objective and universally applicable or replicable. Such proclamations overlook the fact that these IR theories are located in particular ecologies of Europe and therefore, subjective. All knowledge is particular and subjective to its ecology or locality.

Since 1919, the official initial academic inquiry of IR as a discipline, IR theories have not adequately addressed what the discipline initially set out to do – to curb and liquidate international conflict. This suggests that the epistemologies (particular epistemic ecologies and localities) that have informed IR theories to date are inadequate and have reached some sort of *cul de sac*, or a dead-end. These epistemologies beg the question and engage in circular reasoning. This necessitates an alternative frame of reference. Contingent upon Albert Einstein's idea that insanity is doing the same thing over, and over, again and expecting a different result each time, this study, in this chapter, opts to engage a non-conventional theory in the discipline of IR. As such, this work advances a decolonial perspective as a possible solution to problems caused by epistemologies located in the ecologies and localities of Western, Euro-North American-centric modernity that purport themselves as objective, scientific and universal. The chapter unmasks the inadequacies of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the face of mounting and current global problems, particularly those played out in the field of international relations.

IR as an academic discipline started in 1919 at Aber Ystwyth, University of Wales (now Aber Ystwyth University) a year after the end of World War I (Ziegler 1987). This however, as Nyere (2014: 18) argues "does not mean that intellectual origins of political realism and liberalism only started in 1919". The main objective and aim of IR theorising was solely to find peaceful solutions to international disputes and by that avert a similar conflict to World War I. IR failed in that regard because just barely after a decade, World War II started. Like the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations, IR as an academic discipline has failed in achieving what it set out to do in the first place. Since 1945, the end of World War II and the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, US, there has not been a single decade that the world has not witnessed an international conflict or war (Bennet 1998: 7).

Rational theories in the discipline of IR, such as realism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism and constructivism, to mention a few, are expressive of ideas, concepts and views located in modernity. The ideas expressed in IR rational theories are embodied by scholars that are, mainly located in modernity, particularly from the Global North, and reflect the rationale of European modernity. The major problem of modernity is the inexplicable discrepancy and inconsistency between its rhetoric and its lived-reality, its illusion *vis-à-vis* its essence, particularly from the experiences of people of the Global South in general, but by Africans in particular. As such, this chapter intends to unmask the inadequacy of mainstream theories and lenses in explaining the ghosts and blind spots of empire, as it were, because these ghosts and blind-spots are born within the empire. The European-centric Empire is not sufficiently able to be reflexive on its theories to see beyond its assumptions and assertions. As such, this chapter suggests the need to explore outside the lenses of established theory.

2.2 The Masquerade of Colonialism in the Peripheries of the Euro-Centric World

Throughout history, there has been different colonial establishments, for example, the Spanish colonial order of Latin America (Grosfoguel 2000: 355), the Islamic colonial order of Africa (North Africa particularly), Asia and the US (Kissinger 2014: 5), and the British colonial order of the whole world (Quijano 2000: 533; Grosfoguel 2000: 360). As far back as the 17th Century, the Islamic civilisation and the European (Western) civilisation competed for dominance and each sought to define itself and the other, around itself. The two civilisations each thought of themselves as the legitimate standard of ordering human society. Each civilisation imagined

that all it knew and was conscious of, was all of humanity imagining that by ordering its immediate locality, it was governing the entire world (Kissinger 2014: 4). In relation to these civilisations (Islamic and European) and their conceived or established orders of the world, Africa was afflicted and assailed by the European order of the world the most, which arguably has affected the whole world. Hence, the European colonisation of Africa is the most, immediate one in the African experience. As such, colonialism in this work is to be, understood as phenomena that affected Africa specifically - the locus of enunciation of this researcher. Physical colonialism in relation to Africa refers to the invasion and occupation of spaces and places in Africa, among other spaces/places, by European imperial powers that included, but were not limited to, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal from the 1800s (Pakenham 1992) to their departure from the late-1950s to the mid-1990s (Chamberlain 2010). European colonialism of Africa centred Europe to Africa's psyche, being, epistemology, religion, spirituality, the arts and imagination. The self-imposed centring of Europe in Africa through the violence of colonialism, and by extension, Europe's central positioning of itself to the whole world, reveals the attitude of Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism perceives itself as superior and therefore, has a right to order, control and name everything around it.

2.2.1 Eurocentrism

European modernity and empire tended to centre itself as a measure and standard with which everything else is, judged. It centred itself as the focal point of all inquiry as well as the centre that contains all knowledge. By doing this, it negated the fact that it was just one among other civilisations and orders of the world. European modernity pathologised anything else other than itself, or anything else that was different to it (Pillay 2018: 33). This resulted in Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism in this sense became the attitude of superiority of being, epistemology and the standard therefore, of being and epistemology. Hence, Eurocentrism in its epistemic enquiry, centred itself as a doyen of scientific enquiry and knowledge; by so doing, it dismissed any other form of knowledge as opinion or perspective, but not scientific knowledge, therefore, inferior. Euro-centric scientific enquiry gave rise to epistemological enterprises that produced current IR theories that centre Europe and its standards. Current IR theories cannot stand without Europe at the centre of their enquiry. This limits the lenses through which IR could be conceived and conducted and renders IR theories redundant and limited.

2.2.2 Theory and International Relations Theories

The very idea of theory is Eurocentric and compels some attention. Theorising and epistemic enterprises that emanated from the European civilisation regarded themselves as the standard and measure with which every other theorising or epistemic enterprising ought to refer to. This further entrenched Eurocentrism. Consequently, Eurocentrism justified and gave rise to European colonisation. If Europe was the standard with which all being and knowledge was to be modelled on, this then justified and suggested to Europeans, that they ought to control and order the whole world. This was the onset of colonialism. Kissinger notes that the contemporary world order, which is Eurocentric and a creation of modernity, has attempted to circumscribe the anarchical structure that international relations are conducted. It does so through international relations theories and international legal networks, such as: international law; international organisational structures, such as, the United Nations; international financial systems such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the latter two endorse and sustain capitalism, and through establishing conflict/dispute-resolution mechanisms, as well as, codify the rules of engagement or conduct in war for warring parties, should war occur (Kissinger 2014: 7). In other words, there is an acceptance of the *status quo* in relation to the current world order such that it is codified, legislated and institutionalised. Nevertheless, why not abolish wars in the first place or stop the domination of one civilisation by another civilisation? The paradigm that presents war as an acceptable means of dispute-resolution is problematic because the solution to this paradigm is violence. One wonders therefore that, is the UN perpetuating coloniality of power in itself, or the UN is used as an instrument to perpetuate coloniality of power by the Euro-North American-centric modernity that has captured this institution for its own agenda of domination. On the other hand, worse still, was there ever a time when the UN was not captured by the Euro-North American-centric modernity?

2.2.3 Colonialism

Colonialism resulted in the establishment of the European empire within and outside Europe. Although one could also argue that empire actually invented or created colonialism. However, for the purposes of this argument, it suffices to note that the two are mutually defining and therefore could very well be the proverbial *egg and chicken* case of which came first.

Valentine Mudimbe, an African scholar, born and raised in the then Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, wrote a book that he titled *The Invention of Africa*. In that book, he submits that the term colonialism is derived from the Latin word *colere* which means to "cultivate or to design" (Mudimbe 1987: 1). Mudimbe notes that despite the noble meaning of the word *colere*, the experience of European colonialism in Africa is far from the semantics of the word. The lived-experiences of colonialism by the formerly colonised populations in general, but by Africans particularly, were dehumanising and often violent experiences. The experiences and encounters of colonialism in Africa, specifically in the perspectives and views of Africans, were of a condescending and imposing monolithic European culture and civilisation. This points to the ambivalent character of modernity contained in colonialism; its rhetoric means one thing and its lived reality thereof, quiet another (Gould 2010: 112).

To better clarify this point, Mudimbe highlights two major myths about Africa by drawing the readers' attention to Hodgkin (1957: 174-175), who identified the first myth as the Hobbesian picture which is informed by the writings and imagination of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. The myth speaks of an Africa prior to European encounters, where "there was no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continued fear, and danger of violent death" (Quoted in, Mudimbe 1987: 1). To Hodgkin's credit, it could be argued that he was right as evidenced by reflections and thoughts of a Lord Macaulay, a British explorer and Member of Parliament who once visited India in the 1800s and made some very condescending remarks that nonetheless disproved this myth. While it can be argued that what Lord Macaulay stated was in relation to India, it is the attitude that Europeans embodied that is of merit in this case and is relatable to the European settlers' attitudes in Africa. Lord Macaulay stated the following observations, while addressing the British Parliament on 2nd of February 1835:

> I have travelled across the length and breadth of India and I have not seen one person who is a beggar, who is a thief, such wealth I have seen in this country, such high moral values, people of such calibre, that I do not think we could ever conquer this country, unless we break the very backbone of this nation, which is **her** spiritual and cultural heritage and therefore I propose that we replace **her** old and ancient education system, **her** culture, for if the Indians think that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their esteem, their Native culture and they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation (Quoted in, Ghosh 2016: 64).

Lord Macaulay's statement speaks of an organised civilisation that existed in India prior to India's encounters with European civilisation. Yet, European literature and discourse portray spaces and places that Europe colonised as though they were *tabula rasa*, empty slates that got discovered and civilised by European modernity. Without doubt, Lord Macaulay's observations expose the first myth – that of a civilisation without any form of account of time and organisation or order. Further, his address reveals vacancy, ignorance, arrogance and misogyny of patriarchy that is located in the European-centric worldview by referring to the continent of India as a gendered place. This work notes that Lord Macaulay used the pronoun *her* while referring to India, by that he demonstrated the inherent patriarchisation of the world by European civilisation and thought. His speech, to the British parliament, reveals how European thinking has always been geared towards the ascribing of the female gender to that which it considered inferior or weak, to the superior or strong male, such as India and Africa were, and still are, in relation to Europe. In protest to, and combat of, the patriarchisation of the world by the Eurocentric civilisation's worldview, this work asserts that India, and Africa particularly, are places and spaces without gender, they should be referred to as "it" respectively (McFadden 2016).

The second myth that Hodgkin (1957: 174-75) draws the reader's attention to, he called the "Rousseauian picture", named after Jean Jacques Rousseau, the French philosopher. The Rousseauian picture speaks "of an African golden age of perfect liberty, equality and fraternity" (Quoted in, Mudimbe 1987: 1). Lord Macaulay's address to the British Parliament again exposes the second myth. His beautiful and wonderful experience of India paints a picture of a golden age in a space undisturbed by European colonial encounters. His experience of India in the 1830s cannot have been representative of all of the experiences of India's localities of the time. If anything, it was Lord Macaulay's particular experience of India, and therefore cannot be equated to all of Indians' experiences of their localities. Meaning his reading or perception of India, glorious and flattering as it sounded, was limited to a particular local space or place in India. Yet, he universalised and absolutised his experience of a particular locality of India, Bengali specifically, to represent all of India.

So, deducing from Lord Macaulay's reading of India as a unitary country, while ignoring its diverse typology and ecologies, what is revealed by that assertion is the attitude of naming, and thus controlling the named, that is located in the Euro-centric civilisation. In relation to Africa therefore, the point that Mudimbe succinctly makes is a call to exercise caution by avoiding an over- romanticising of experiences of African ecologies and localities before colonial

encounters with Europe and also challenging and correcting the idea that Europe discovered Africa and that Africa was devoid of civilisation. Put differently, the second myth is that of thinking that Africa lived in harmony and perfect liberty before European colonial encounters. There may very well have been places in Africa that lived in harmony, but that cannot have been entirely true of all of Africa at that time.

Mudimbe goes further to note that colonialists in Africa "tended to organise and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs" (Mudimbe 1987: 1). Africa as a non-European area suffered the same fate of being forcefully transformed into a resemblance of Europe. It is also important to note that the two philosophers that Mudimbe draws the readers' attention to, are European, an English man and a French man. Both men had no lived-experience of any ecology or locality of Africa, neither had they had any contact or encounters with Africans and yet they pronounced on Africa as authorities on Africa. This reveals the Eurocentric nature of epistemology and theory. African scholars such as Mudimbe, have to refer to Europe and its epistemology for them to make a point if they are to be understood, almost as if to appeal for validation and approval. European colonialism entailed the "domination of physical space, the reformation of Native's minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective" (Mudimbe 1987: 2). This phenomenon is what Mudimbe identified and called the "organising structure" of European colonialism and domination (*ibid*). The idea of the *organising structure* is what this work identifies as representative of coloniality. In other words, Mudimbe identifies that Eurocentrism tended to re-order and re-organise spaces and places that Europe invaded to suite European order. Eurocentrism negated the local orders in spaces and places Europe imposed itself on.

Similarly, Ngugi wa Thiongó in his book titled *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (1986) speaks of what he called the "organising principle" that European literature taught in African schools and universities in Africa in general, but Kenya - wa Thiongó's Native birth place - in particular. European literature, the likes of Shake Spear, was used in universities in Kenya as a standard with which all writings on experiences of Kenyan ecologies and localities were judged (wa Thiongó 1986: 94). European literature spoke of experiences located in the ecologies and localities of Europe and thus it made sense to Europeans. This imposition of European literature on Kenya meant that Natives of Kenya were made to imbibe values, information and education that was foreign to them and often contrary to their experiences of Kenya. In that process their minds and psyche, as Natives of Africa, were captured by the minds and psyche of Natives of Europe.

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This Western-centred education taught Africans to order their lives, thoughts and eventually action, around European thought and action (wa Thiongó 1986: 94). This intones coloniality and control of knowledge produced in African ecologies by foreign forces, in this case, the foreign force was European. The *organising principle* that wa Thiongó speaks of is that of methods of inquiry, organisation and presentation of Kenyan literature according to European standards and ideals. This idea of the *organising principle* is what this work isolates as representative of coloniality. Whereas wa Thiongó's idea of the *organising principle* relates to literature, what is of value to this work is the very idea of transplanting theory that is particular to European reality to Africa and trying to get Africa to conform to European theory and standards. The centring of Europe in Africa is the gist of colonialism and, as such, problematic. This is one of the fault lines of European theorising in general, but equally a fault line of IR theorising as well, that Europe seeks define and control all knowledge by centring itself in the enquiry. This produces no new knowledge or information; what Eurocentrism does is that it simply galvanises what could have been new knowledge to what it already knows.

2.2.4 Colonially Established Relationships

The other myth that came with colonisation is the natural acceptance of the hierarchical order of colonially established race-relationships. If to colonise is to design as revealed in Mudimbe (1987: 1), then there must exist a designer, and by extension the designed. Eurocentrism ascribes itself the position of the designer and therefore, it designs everything including everyone else around it. Europe claims to have discovered the world and therefore entitles itself to naming its discoveries. The very notion of discoverer implies the discovered. The designer is European and the discoverer is European, this narrative reinforces Eurocentrism. The centring of Europe in the world is the beginning of coloniality.

The idea of coloniality, *i.e*., the rationale and ultimately, the reinforcement of colonialism can be traced as far back as 1492; the year European-centric literature claims Christopher Columbus discovered America (Otfinoskir 2011: 2). Mamdani (2004: 4) argues that the year 1492 signalled the beginning of European Renaissance and the nativity of political modernity. Columbus, an Italian explorer, was headed west on route to the West Indies, Asia for mercantile pursuits, that included gold and oriental spices, when he got lost and landed in the present-day vast area of the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Porta Rico and Dominican Republic, in the

territory that is under South America (Cohen 1969: 7). Columbus sailed for the "New World" as an emissary of the King, Ferdinand and Queen, Isabella, the conquerors of the city-state of Granada, which was perceived as the last Muslim citadel in the Western-centric Christian stronghold (Mamdani 2004: 4). When Columbus landed in America on the 3rd of August 1492, he thought he had landed in the Indies (India), hence the erroneous ascribed reference of Native Americans as Indians (Cohen 1969: 9).

One can deduce the arrogance that accompanied Columbus' positionality. This same arrogant tendency accompanied many, a, European voyagers and explorers who purported to discover the already existing ecologies and localities outside of Europe's consciousness. For example, David Livingstone a British Explorer maintained that he discovered the Victoria Falls between 1852 and 1865, one of the eight natural wonders of the world (Udeze 2009: 604). Natives of that ecology, located in present day Zimbabwe, were aware of the gorge and called it *Mosi oa tunya*, meaning the "smoke that thunders" referring to the mist and showers created as the water gushed down the more than 100 metres-deep falls, for example (Udeze 2009: 604). Eurocentrism negates the existence of local orders and imposes itself in other spaces and places. This suggests that Eurocentric modernity cannot live with other civilisations in one and the same space/place at the same time. Competition is inherent in this civilisation, if it is civilisation at all. Hence, in this *civilisation*, annihilation of the other is seen as progress, enhanced control and enlarged influence.

The very idea of discovering an already existing ecology or locality, suggests the very problem of coloniality and, by extension, European modernity. This idea of discovering something, centres the discoverer as the agency of consciousness over the discovered. One can only discover what is hidden or what is not known, or one can discover what is not in one's consciousness. Columbus' position of discovering America negates the ontological being, agency and consciousness of the Natives of America who already were occupying that space and place when Columbus 'discovered' it. That position totally negates and pathologises the existence of people in that so-called discovered space.

The colonisation of America resulted in the colonised Natives of America assuming an inferior position to that of the White colonisers of British descent. This domination of Native Americans signalled the beginning of "legitimising the already old ideas and practices of relations of superiority/inferiority between dominant and dominated" (Quijano 2000: 535). This relationship of the conquered and the conquerors produced social relations that were based

on race and subsequently, class. The conquering race apportioned itself a superior status to that of the conquered. The Natives of America who are erroneously referred to as Indians occupied the bottom position in the hierarchy of the *New World Order*. It is argued therefore that modernity ordered human society in a hierarchy, where the White race occupies the top position in the hierarchy. The Europeans who had conquered the Natives of America - *Indians - unnaturally* assumed a position of subservience to Portuguese, Hispanics or Spanish and other White-looking races. Modernity is also credited for the creation of the capital system. The conquering race structured a new world order in such a manner that they controlled the means of production. The conquered race, *Indians* and *Mestizos* (children born of Spanish men and Indian women) were made to work as labour/ers for the conquering race. From the onset of the colonisation of America, "Europeans associated nonpaid or non-waged labour with the dominated races because they were 'inferior' races" (Quijano 2000: 538). Europe was centrally located to the sites of mercantile activity and hence Europe became the "central site of the commodification of the labour force" (*ibid*). Suffice to note that the central location of Europe to mercantile activities was just an accident of geography-turned-natural ordering of the so-called new world.

Grosfoguel (2000: 349) submits that in Latin America, following the nineteenth century Revolutions of independence, White elites "maintained after independence [a] racial hierarchy where *Indians*, Blacks, Mestizos, Mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom". Grosfoguel points the reader to Quijano (1993) who called this hierarchisation of races "coloniality of power" (*ibid*), and it is this hierarchical ordering of humanity - coloniality of power - that is of relevance to this work.

2.2.5 Partitioning of Africa: European Modernity's Double-Standards

Another myth that festers and perpetuates modernity is the idea of accepting present day Africa as an organic and natural occurrence in relation to state-formation. Europe is organised mainly along kinship ties, one speaks of the French who are in France, the English or British who are in England and, or Britain, the Germans who are in Germany, the Swedish who are in Sweden and so forth and so on. European modernity saw the value of maintaining kinship ties and they formed states organically. Yet, Europe denied Africa the same kinship and organic structures by partitioning Africa according to Europe's fancies and interests. The contemptuous

partitioning of Africa by imperial powers (1885/6), followed by the "unjust wars of colonisation" of Africa particularly (1890s onwards) disposed Africans - the rightful owners - of their land (Ramose 2003: 2). These two injustices - the distribution of Africa to European imperial powers and the colonial violent takeover of Africa by Europeans - were in direct contrast to the principles of sovereignty that Europe had recognised and adopted in 1648. Imperial conquests over Africa meant the loss of sovereignty of Africans, thereby institutionalising European empire in Africa. What this also reveals is that sovereignty and universal human rights including property rights were never meant for the beneficiation of Africans. When these so-called principles were crafted and designed, they did not have the African, as a part of humanity, in mind.

There is a consistent inconsistency of European modernity; at one point it says one thing [state sovereignty that presumes equality of states, 1648] and at another point it does the opposite [Africa is Europe's property and can be divided according to Europe's whims, 1885/6]. In other words, the rhetoric of European modernity is seemingly consistent, it is the reality or lived experience of modernity that is unequivocally inconsistent. An example of this is that, while Europe ascribed universal human rights including property rights to all of humanity, it by the same token, denied those rights to non-Europeans and the Black African race particularly (Carey 1966: 972; Fantina 2016; Turner 2003). The dispossession of Africans of their land by Europeans, signalled the expansion of European empire. Kissinger speaks of European expansion that came with the "blue print of their [Europeans] international order" (Kissinger 2014: 6). What is of interest is the very idea of European expansion. The concept of expansion reveals the problematic nature of European domination of other civilisations. How does Europe expand, and into what? Expansion speaks of matter and space; how could Europe possibly expand? It is this expansion that controlled where Europe expanded into, how it expanded and consequently, how it sustained the expansion that resonates with the concept of coloniality. This is Eurocentrism *par excellence*.

2.2.6 Universal Human Rights

The other myth that is at the foundation of Eurocentrism and European modernity is the veneer of the rhetoric of universal human rights. The so-called human rights are applicable and ascribed to everyone when it suites European modernity (*NSC 68* 1950). The *universal human*

rights can be easily denied other races, particularly the Black race, when it is convenient for Europe. This epitomises Eurocentrism. Europe seemingly is the only *civilisation* that dictates what goes and for who it goes. In convergence with this notion, Ramose (2003: 2) speaks of an intrinsic link between land and human life. Life exists somewhere; the attachment of human life to land is unquestionable. In other words, life is geographically located. The colonisation of Africa – "losing land to the conqueror" – therefore, was tantamount to losing a "vital source of life" for the Africans (Ramose 2003: 2). Hence, European colonial conquests not only entrenched its domination in foreign spaces and places, it literally killed and murdered other civilisations that occupied those spaces and places it invaded and conquered. So far, this work has noted the inconsistency of the lived experience *vis-à-vis* the reality of European prescription of modernity to other civilisations. The inconsistency lies in that the rhetoric speaks of ideals presumably ascribed for, and on, everybody. The reality proves the rhetoric to be untrue.

The United Nations was created in 1945 following the so-called World War II, formed to liquidate and obliterate international wars (UN, 2018). The irony is that when the UN was formed, colonialism was at its peak in Africa. So, the formation of the UN did not include Africa because Africa was just Europe's extension, if not property. In other words, Africa was forcibly incorporated into the international system without its involvement, consultation, consent or ascent. Not only was Africa forcibly incorporated into the international system, it was forcibly incorporated into the capitalist market system as well (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 485). Ramose concurs with Ndlovu-Gatsheni's view and submits that Africa's loss of sovereignty meant that:

> [T]he African was compelled to enter into the money economy. Having been thus rendered poor by the stroke of the pen backed by the use of armed force, the African was compelled to find money to assure not only individual survival but also to pay tax for owning a hut, for example. In this way, the African's right to life—the inalienable right to subsistence—was violated (Ramose 2003: 2).

The assumption of sovereign equality bequeathed on all states in the 1648 Westphalian Treaty, and the un-recognition of Africa as a sovereign space and place in 1886 by European imperial powers, and the re-incorporation of Africa, in 1945, into the European international system, proves the consistent inconsistence and the absurdity of European modernity. Ramose (2003: 2) asserts that human rights "revolve around the recognition, protection, and respect of the right

to life". As such, the continual violation of human rights by the current world order is problematic and unjust, which renders the rhetoric of *universal human rights* meaningless to Africans. If the rhetoric about human rights is to arouse or evoke any meaning in Africans, it must reinstate and rehabilitate materially and bestow recognition of, and uphold Africa's "inalienable right to subsistence" (*ibid*).

The UN, a perceived global authority that seeks to champion *universal human rights* by some states and actors, and if at all well-meaning, should it not then seek to revisit the colonial question for redress especially to victims of the greatest crime against humanity – colonialism? It cannot be that Africa's human rights continue to be trampled on and that continues to go unchallenged! Kissinger (2014: 7) draws the readers' attention to the current "world community" modelled on the European Concert of state which was formed as a result of the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. The modelling of the entire world on the European Concert of state is representative of Eurocentrism and the idea of coloniality.

In August 2001, the United Nations held a Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa. At that Conference, the US withdrew its delegation together with Israel, in protest of demands put by Africans that the rights of Africans particularly be recognised and that crimes against humanity committed by colonial masters be accounted for and recognised for what they are. Ramose (2003: 3) submits the following view in support of the aforementioned observation:

> The majority of the Western countries present at the conference insisted that the prevailing inhumanity of the global structural violence and poverty should be maintained. This they did by ensuring that the conference would adopt resolutions that would absolve them from both the moral and the legal guilt of the violence of colonisation and the inhumanity of racism.

Accounting for colonial injustices would mean acknowledging the dispossession of Black people of their land, among other elements; a thorny issue that capitalism cannot admit to, seeing that the dispossession was covered up by property rights – a fundamental principle of capitalism – and contained in a façade of legal documents including international law and national Constitutions of various countries. Colonialism and capitalism are thus protected by law, particularly the Roman law and the Roman-Dutch Law.

2.3 Modernity and the Global Power Structural Configuration

A study of European history, especially the histories of Britain, France and Germany, reveals that the Seventeenth Century Reformation, the Enlightenment period and the French Revolution are commensurate with what has come to be known as the beginning of the modern era (Escobar 2007: 181; Grosfoguel 2000: 348; Mamdani 2004: 4). In the words of Escobar (2007: 181), "historically modernity has identifiable temporal and spatial origins in seventeenth century Northern Europe". Modernity is the corollary of colonialism because the former was scattered across the world through the latter. Hence, a discussion of one, necessitates the interrogation of the other. The problem with colonialism is that, while it could be argued that, in Africa, it ended when European countries embarked on decolonisation in the 1960s, it was survived by coloniality. In the same fashion as modernity outlived the modern era, coloniality outlived colonialism as it produced, among other things, patterns of thought, being, culture, epistemology and consciousness modelled on European thought and standard. As such, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, correctly argues that:

> [T]he problem is not colonialism, [today], but coloniality, which emerged from colonialism and has assumed global proportions to the extent of being best understood as global coloniality. This global coloniality is a leitmotif of the current existing empire, that of the United States of America (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: viii).

This work acknowledges Ndlovu-Gatsheni's position that argues that coloniality emerged from colonialism. However, this work makes further observations and departs from that position, and advances the argument that coloniality preceded colonialism. In other words, this work asserts that, it is coloniality that produced colonialism. Colonialism was informed by some rationale – coloniality. What Ndlovu-Gatsheni's position reveals is that had it not been for colonialism, anyone outside the positionality of Euro-North America-centric modernity, would have not been aware of coloniality. Borrowing from Nyere (2015: 95), an analogy can help put this point across succinctly. If one is in a house or room, one cannot see the car parked outside unless one looks through the window. Yet, the car would have been there in spite of one who is not aware of its presence. Put differently, colonialism is the glass window through which one who is in the house (peripheries of modernity) sees the parked car outside - coloniality. Therefore, coloniality is the source and summit of colonialism; it sustains the latter, in the latter's absence.

According to Quijano (2000: 533), modernity can be specifically traced to the constitution of America. America was constitutionally founded on the 4th of July 1776 by a Europe-based religious order, the Puritan Order who are known as the "Founding Fathers" of America and the founding was based on Christian principles. So, Britain was an instrumental signatory to the US Declaration of Independence of July 4th, signalling the beginning of the colonisation of America (Lambert 2003: 2). What is noteworthy is that America, unlike Africa, was colonised by negotiation. The founding of America through colonialism by Europeans resulted in the current global power structural configuration. Quijano avers that "America was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power of global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the first identity of modernity" (Quijano 2000: 533). Grosfoguel concurs with this view and submits that by the nineteenth century Great Britain had positioned itself as the central power and the prototype of 'modern' civilisation. He argues that in "the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and new model of civilisation" (Grosfoguel 2000: 349). Kissinger equally evinces the centrality of Europe to modernity and submits that "Europe loomed as a geographic designation, as an expression of Christianity … centre of enlightenment of a community of the educated and of modernity" (Kissinger 2014: 11). Hence, Europe purports itself as the centre of civilisation, knowledge and geo-political power.

Modernity is clouded with, and equally credited for, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' wars and violence. Mamdani (2004: 3) argues that the "world wars and colonial conquests; civil wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions" attest to that. Modernity is violent and is tolerant of violence because it sees violence as a necessary means to progress. Mamdani (2004: 4) observes that "the modern sensibility is not horrified by pervasive violence". Implying that, modernity is accepting of violence and it reinforces it in its operationalisation of the developmentalist agenda.

The modern era's conception evolved and resulted in the production of patterns and soft-structures that pre-determine, control and regulate being and epistemology that are modelled on European thought and standards. Those patterns and soft-structures that continue and perpetuate the dictates of Seventeenth Century European culture and thought, are what identifies modernity. The main idea that came with modernity is an implied "idea that everything new is necessarily good and desirable" (Grosfoguel 2000: 348). This idea of esteeming anything new, was mistakenly believed to represent progress and development.

Escobar further defines modernity from a sociological perspective and asserts that modernity is "credited with the creation of modern institutions such as the nation-state and basic features such as self-reflexivity" (Escobar 2007: 182). The concept of nation-state is modelled on the European concert of state, which is still the prototype of statehood to date. Habermas (1973; 1987), quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: vii), avers that from a cultural perspective, modernity is credited for the "substitution of folk-knowledge by expert and techno-scientific knowledge". To its credit, modernity valued literature - the written word - and the advantage of that is, it is better kept and preserved, almost in its original state. Of course, the written word can always be interpreted and re-interpreted. The problem with modernity is that in its quest for scientific knowledge, it negated orature - the spoken word - a value and practice that is ancient and sacred in African ecologies and localities. Modernity substituted orature for literature in African ecologies and localities particularly, and relegated orature to "folklore" or "folk knowledge" (Zondi 2017). Modernity is further accredited with the creation of the "Cartesian subject as the fountain of all knowledge about the world" from a philosophical perspective (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: vii).

In affirming the afore-mentioned views, Biakolo (2003: 14) advances the argument that the "Western civilisation owes its origin to writing". The invention of the alphabet by the Greeks proved to be an unprecedented catalyst to the organising and storage of information and consequently, knowledge-production. The point that Biakolo makes is that the archival and retrieval of information in Western civilisation meant that access to knowledge and information was unrestricted, save only for one who was illiterate perhaps. Whereas in oral traditions such as most cultures in Africa, "the poets, sages, and thinkers depend on poetic rhythm and narrative structure to ensure the remembrance of past utterances" (Biakolo 2003: 15). Of course, this was somewhat cumbersome. Information and knowledge storage and retrieval that depended on memory was not always accurate in the oral traditions and so remembering alone sets the limitation to knowledge production in oral cultures. The inscribing of information and knowledge on manuscripts – the art of writing – made for easier "storage and retrieval of knowledge" (Havelock 1963, quoted in, Biakolo 2003: 14-15). Kissinger converges with Biakolo's (2003) assertions and notes that, fifteenth century Europe saw the "invention of movable type printing … [which] made it possible to share knowledge on a hitherto – unimaginable scale" (Kissinger 2014: 19). This speaks to the lever of control of knowledge and subjectivity that the industrialisation of knowledge-production came with; mass printing allowed the dissemination of accounts and views from a Euro-centric perspective (*ibid*).

Biakolo (2003) evinces Kissinger's (2014) view while noting that, the change in the presentation of knowledge, i.e. the mass printing of writings and accounts, resulted in the "dominance of discourses that were more and more definitional, descriptive, and analytical" (Biakolo 2003: 15). What remains is that, whatever description or qualifier that the accounts were ascribed, they were written from the perspectives of their writers, which essentially were European. Hence the Euro-centric domination in literature, and "the origin of Western science and philosophy" (*ibid*). Havelock (1991: 24), quoted in, Biakolo (2003: 15) argues that "without modern literacy, which means Greek literacy, we would not have science, philosophy, written law, nor the automobile or the airplane". Havelock's view is problematic because it assumes that if something is not written down on a piece of paper or typed and stored away in a computer, it does not exist or will never exist. Yet, writing down ideas on paper, presumes their existence in the first place.

Biakolo (2003: 15) is of the view that the cultural invention of print media by Europe became its currency of its domination of literature. He argues that "the transformation of the mode of codification and structuration of knowledge led to a cultural regimen which placed greater premium on innovativeness, inventiveness, and objectivity" (*ibid*). Biakolo further highlights that the narratives that came from this cultural regimen of literature tended to be "analytic, syllogistic, and definitional, and their immediate context of production is generally privatist", whereas oral cultures took the form of a traditionalist and conservative outlook (Biakolo 2003: 15). The accumulation of knowledge in the oral cultures entailed a participatory and pragmatic realm where its members interiorised communal knowledge (*ibid*). This is arguably the bone of contention between ontology and epistemology; the Western civilisation tended to separate the *episteme* from the ontology of the knowing-subject. This does not in any ounce give the literature tradition superiority over the oral African ecologies and localities that valued the participatory and practical accumulation of communal knowledge. Communal knowledge is valued in African ecologies and localities, and the Western civilisation espoused a privatist *episteme*. It is a matter of difference of modes of accumulating knowledge and information, rather than superiority and inferiority of one mode over another.

The knowledge that is valued by modernity is that which it considers scientific − abstract, objective, rational, logical and syllogistic. As evinced by Grosfoguel (2000: 348), modernity valued scientific knowledge over religious knowledge, thereby peripherising religion and its values and virtues. Grosfoguel's observation highlights an implied attitude by Western scientific knowledge's conception. It implies that if knowledge is primitive, it is illogical,

irrational and unscientific. Western knowledge therefore, puts itself as the standard by which all other forms of knowledge are judged. It gives the illusion that only it is valid and true. However, Biakolo (2003), reveals that, despite what Western modern knowledge wants to purport itself to be, it is only just but a façade. He argues that the so-called primitive thought is at worst "rational but illogical and not scientific", or at best primitive thought is "rational and logical and scientific within its own cultural context" (Biakolo 2003: 18). What Biakolo manages to succinctly reveal is that Western knowledge purports itself as objective, yet in actual fact, it is subjective to its own cultural context.

Therefore, from this perspective, what Western modern science calls primitive thought is, in fact, rational and logical in the oral traditions' views, very much in the same fashion as *science* is to the literary tradition's view. If Western modern scientific thought seeks order, unity, regularity underneath the seeming diversity, and simplicity, the African oral traditional thought "also seeks this through the structure of the pantheon and the categorial relations of its spiritual forces" (Biakolo 2003: 18). In other words, just as Western modern scientific methods, the African oral tradition seeks to explain causal connections between phenomena, for example between "disease states and social conduct" (*ibid*). Western modernity expressly names one thing and ascribes particularly meaning to the named thing, and by the same token, implies the opposite to that which it views as opposite to the named thing. For example, the description of one society as civilised implies that the opposite is savagery and uncivilised, or framing an argument or writing as logical, implies the illogical of the other, and in relation to Africa particularly, the written tradition's opposite is oral, and the Scientific's, magical (Biakolo 2003: 20). In the conception of Western modernity, one cannot live or survive as one and the other, it is always an *either or* scenario. Modernity always distinguishes between being and non-being and never being together with 'non-being'.

2.3.1 The Irrationality of Modernity's 'Rationality'

The Enlightenment period (18th Century Europe) emphasised rationality. Aristotle argued that "man (*sic*) is a rational animal" (Quoted in, Ramose 2001: 2). In the words of Ramose this means that "those animals whose being or nature includes reason as their distinctive characteristic fall within his definition" (*ibid*). Rationality therefore sets apart man (*sic*) from animal. Suffice to note that this definition of "man (*sic*)" as a rational animal is proffered by a

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Greek, and therefore White European man. Ramose interprets Aristotle's definition of man (*sic*) to mean that "any other animal which might look like a human being but be without reason does not qualify as a human being" (Ramose 2001: 2). Non-human beings are defined by lack and therefore precast as victims of the human beings because they are disadvantaged and without reason. Ramose highlights that the demarcation between reason and unreason "established the nature of the relationship between those inside and those outside the line of reason" (Ramose 2001: 2). The lines that Ramose speaks about are in fact similar to the "Abysmal lines" that Maldonado-Torres (2002:998) speaks about. The lines do not exist in reality, they are only imaginary lines meant for demarcation of imaginary zones that are then internalised and materialised by beings to represent, either their status in the zone of being, or by non-beings who also internalise and materialise their zone of non-being.

Aristotle's legacy or tradition is what informed European conquerors of Africa, this European-centric definition of humanity excluded animals without reason (Ramose 2001: 2). The definition of man (*sic*) as a rational animal proffered by Aristotle excluded the African, among others. The conundrum of this definition lies in that the conqueror applied it religiously when he came into contact with the "African, the Amerindian and the Australasian" (Ramose 2001: 2). This speaks of a Euro-centric definition of humanity that is limited to a geographical location of the Northern hemisphere; any other human being not located in the geography of Europe, is deemed to be with "unreason" or without reason (*ibid*).

The exclusion of the African, and other non-European races, in Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal, gave grounding for treating the African "only as an animal" (Ramose 2001: 2). This definition provided justification therefore for the enslavement and subjugation of Africans among other non-European races, as it was in the African's nature to be without reason. If unreason defined the African, what would be the reason to not conquer the African? In this line of thought, it was "necessary and proper" for the conqueror to subjugate the African, after all this was contingent upon the practical application of Descartes' "I think therefore, I exist", only it practically meant "I think therefore, I conquer" (Ramose 2001: 3). This is the very problematic fabric of thought that justified, and continues to perpetuate, coloniality of power. Ramose quips therefore that, it is of no surprise that European conquests of Africa and the slave trade particularly, are conspicuous features that defined the asymmetrical relationship between the conquering Europeans from the West and Africans, but specifically Africans from *sub-Sahara* (Ramose 2001: 2-3).

In the European conquerors' framework, civilisation was possible only in so far as the agent of progress, or the recipient of progress, was capable of rationality. Since Africans were equated to animals without reason, they were deemed incapable of progress. The incapability to progress meant that Africans could not attain civilisation to the European standard or to the satisfaction of the European. Ramose adds that "this line between civilisation and barbarism was an extension of the boundary between reason and unreason" (Ramose 2001: 3).

Europeans' self-acclaim to the exclusive possession of civilisation was contingent upon a belief that they were superior or they possessed superior civilisation to that of the African or any other non-European civilisation for that matter. As such, they encountered non-Europeans, particularly Africans, with a predetermined attitude that negated, belittled and inferiorised non-Europeans. Hence the European conqueror thought of himself and herself as civilised and the African as barbaric, with the latter's rights, competences and obligations predetermined by the former (Ramose 2001: 3).

The European conqueror thus determined and established a gulf between the civility of the self and the barbarity of the other, and by the same token, between superiority in the self and inferiority in the other. The othering of others was thus established and secured. This imaginary or constructed chasm meant that the relationship between the European conqueror and the conquered African was devoid of reciprocity. It was a unilateral mono-ship, as opposed to relationship, where "the African had only obligations towards the conqueror but no rights" (Ramose 2001: 3). This could be argued as the genesis of hierarchisation of human beings according to race, reason, and civilisation according to a particular European-centric standard projected as universal in Africa. This is the crux of coloniality of power, the ordering and organising of all civilisations according to a particular, Euro-centric standard. The very idea of centring Europe in the development of every civilisation speaks of Europe's insatiable thirst of controlling all of humanity.

2.3.2 The Façade of Modernity

America is the first space to have been colonised by Britain, and turned out to be the prototype of modernity and the *New World Order*. It follows then that Britain, located in Europe, has become the centre of the world, hence this work's assertion that the current world order reflects a Euro-North American-centric conception of the world. Kissinger submits that America

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idealises and projects itself as a "city on a hill"; America thinks of itself as an ideal of the world possessing values that are universally applicable and relevant (Kissinger 2014: 16). To evince this observation, in 1961 the then American President Harry S. Truman in response to Kissinger's question on "what in his presidency had made him most proud", quipped, how Americans had entirely annihilated their nemeses and in turn brought their former enemies to the "community of states" (Kissinger 2014: 1). American Presidents have over the years urged other governments to accept the conservation and consolidation of universal human rights (Kissinger 2014: 2). Yet, while making that call to the world, the US at that time was simultaneously embarking on what it called the "role back strategy" that was meant to fester destruction in the Soviet system. So, does it mean the so-called universal human rights were not applicable to the Soviet Union? This reveals the double-standards embedded in the Euro-North American-centric civilisation and modernity.

The destruction of the Soviet system was to compel the Soviet Union to renegotiate a settlement on America's terms (Chomsky 2011: 10). America had the upper hand in the negotiation. Besides the unmatched economic and military power of America, it enjoyed a perceived legitimacy in the negotiation owing to the mass media and propaganda machinery that propped America up as a legitimate party to the negotiations. At the time of the end of World War II in 1945, America had 50% of the world's wealth, yet its population was a mere 6.3% of the entire world's population (Chomsky 2011: 11). This speaks of an uneven and asymmetric economic and power balance when the US is compared to the rest of the world. This makes the US an empire that can and will do anything and everything to maintain that status quo as evinced by this declaration from the National Security Council (henceforward NSC) Document 68 attributed to an US Planner of post-World War strategy, George Kennan, 1948:

> Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity…We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards and democratisation…The day is not far when we are going to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealist slogans, the better (Quoted in, Chomsky 2011: 12).

The problematic nature of Euro-North American-centric modernity is that it condemns one thing, in this instance, and appropriates the same thing, in the next. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) core objective is to conduct secret activities that are not in line with legal norms for the US' executive branch. The executive does not want these secret

activities to see the light of day, as they are potentially disastrous to their reputation, popularity and acceptance from the general public, should they be in the public domain. What this reveals is that, contrary to populist propaganda of the US, within its government machinery, it notably goes against democratic principles (Chomsky 2011: 162).

At the height of the Cold War, America was devising a plan that sought to dominate what was to be a *New World Order* modelled on its own terms. The plan was called the "Grand Arena" (Chomsky 2011: 13). The Grand Arena plan included:

> [T]he Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Far East, the former British Empire (which was being dismantled [through Britain's decolonisation]), the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East (which were then passing into American hands as we pushed out our rivals France and Britain), the rest of the Third World and, if possible, the entire globe. These plans were implemented as, as opportunities allowed (*ibid*).

The Grand Arena entailed that every part of the world, meaning every geo-locale in the *New World Order*, was allocated a particular purpose or role. The industrialised or developed countries – developed on the basis of unpaid labour provided by the Black race particularly, but by non-European races generally – were to be led by Germany and Japan, the so-called "great workshops" (Chomsky 2011: 13). Germany and Japan were revered as the great workshops following their show of military superiority during the Cold War, this bearing testimony to the Euro-North American-centric civilisation's esteem of war; violence is used as a tool that brings honour and prestige. The two great workshops were to work "under US supervision" (*ibid*).

So, the Northern and Western Hemisphere were placed at the apex of the hierarchy of this *New World Order*, with the rest of the world – labelled as "the Third World" at the very bottom and peripheries of the Euro-North American-centric civilisation's *New World Order*. The periphery was meant to meet its primary function of providing labour, raw materials and the consumer market of finished products. The periphery was meant to be "exploited" to the benefit of Europe and Japan (Kennan, quoted in, Chomsky 2011: 13). Kennan worked as a US State Department Official in 1949, and is credited to have drafted the memo that exposed the US's plans (*ibid*). It can be deduced from Chomsky's analysis that the US as the architect of the "Grand Arena" determined and controlled who did what, when and how, as for the *why*, it rested with itself. This speaks to coloniality of power at a global level, hence this work's assertion that the Euro-North America-centric modernity continuously pursues global coloniality. Anything or anyone

that stands antithetical to this *New World Order* becomes a threat that is, more often than not, dealt with violently. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Patrice Lumumba of the then Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya are cases in point. The common element that the afore-mentioned figures shared is their locality in the peripheries of the Euro-North American-centric civilisation.

2.3.3 Modernity's Creation of Zone of Being and Zone of Non-Being

In the Euro-North America-centric worldview, the accident of geography is esteemed more than the essence of humanity. There is more value placed on the geography of where human beings originate from, than the actual humanity in human beings. This worldview perceives two distinct zones, the zone of being and the zone of non-being. The division of zones is based on the exclusion that emanates from geography and subsequently, race. Kissinger highlights the fact that, despite the global power structural configuration that was created and is perpetuated by the Euro-North American-centric global domination, it is in fact a European accident that was realised and now purports itself as an essence, that realisation was, and is, maintained by force and aggression. He argues that the "international relations" of the 1490s were a mere European regional undertaking which was to be globalised through the violence of colonialism. Thereby, centring Europe which initially developed "the concept of world order" and defined and determined its implementation (Kissinger 2014: 18).

The Euro-North American-centric *New World Order* was born out of political imagination. The socially constructed borders of what determined humanity and non-humanity were realised by force and are consistently consolidated by either the use of aggression or its threat, thereof. The demarcation is not only imaginary, it was materialised. Ramose (2001: 5) submits that, the "amity lines" that enveloped the Euro-North American-centric civilisation while isolating the rest of the "overseas zone" were geographically located "along the equator or the Tropic of Cancer in the South, along a degree of longitude drawn in the Atlantic Ocean through the Canary Islands or the Azores in the west, or a combination of both". This demarcation, that separated the Western Meridian from the Azores, was to not be shifted under whatsoever circumstances.

In other words, this Western Meridian separated the Western Hemisphere and the overseas zone signalling the end of Europe and the geography that existed beyond the "amity line"

signalled the beginning of the "*New World*" (Ramose 2001: 5). The overseas zone was not governed by Europe and hence no law applied there, except for the "laws of the stronger"; this meant civility was curtailed to exist only in the Western Meridian, beyond that lay a territory of barbarity. Kissinger (2014: 18) quips that as far back as 1550-1551 King Charles V, a Christian, summoned a council of theologians for deliberations and that council concluded that "people living in the Western Hemisphere were human beings with souls – hence eligible for salvation". That pronouncement implied that people who lived beyond the Western Hemisphere where therefore, non-human beings and without souls. In fact, that conclusion justified "conquest and conversion" (Kissinger 2014: 19). This then speaks to the audacity with which Europeans imposed their religion, even forcefully at times, on people in spaces and places they colonised and conquered. Coloniality of power was henceforth, geographically and asymmetrically constituted in favour of the Western Hemisphere. This was the creation of the European-centric "zone of being" and the "hellish zone of non-being" for non-Europeans, but Africans particularly.

What is noteworthy of the amity lines is that, unlike the "*Rayas*" lines, they represented a zone that was subject to conflicting interests arising between a duo of "contractual parties" that sought to seize land and commandeer the inhabitants of that land. The conflicting parties only shared consensus on the "freedom of the open spaces that began beyond the line" (Ramose 2001: 5). This speaks of the condescending attitude that engulfs the Euro-North American-centric civilisation. It ascribes humanity to itself and, beyond the geography of what it knows and the proximity to it, denies other humans of their humanity. The interaction between the conflicting parties in the zone of being are amicably resolved through a contract, whereas beyond the zone of being, the barrel of the gun, aggression and violence become the order of the day – the 'hellish zone of non-being'.

In the 'hellish zone of non-being' "force could be used freely and ruthlessly" because there existed no humanity in those spaces and places (Ramose 2001: 5). This meant that anything that happened outside the Euro-North American-centric world, did not have legal merit nor consequence, had no moral worth and had no political merit. Hence John Tully's (2011: 85) observation that "there is no sin beyond the equator". Sins and transgression are only committed in the zone of being, where civility, legality, morality and reciprocity are located and enforceable. In the hellish zone of non-being, chaos, pandemonium and disorder are the norm. To this effect, Mamdani (2004: 4) argues that "when violence does not cross the

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boundary between 'the west' and the rest – it is called 'communal conflict', as in South Asia, or 'ethnic conflict', as in Africa".

Chossudovsky (2015) evinces what he terms the "hegemonic project" of the "globalisation of war" by the US. He submits that there are major US-sponsored military and under-cover intelligence operations that are run concurrently in regions such as, but not limited to, the Middle East, *sub-Saharan* Africa, Eastern Europe, the Far East and Central Asia. These covert operations are designed to destabilise sovereign states, particularly those states that defy the global power structural configuration of the Euro-North American-centric world-view. The US and its allies, Western Europe, does this to consolidate its grip on the control of the *New World Order* by so doing, continuously defines and sustains global coloniality through the control of colonial power matrices - coloniality of power.

2.4 Coloniality

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 7) defines coloniality as the "dark side of modernity" that has been consistently packaged to camouflage the inconsistency and discrepancy between the rhetoric of modernity and its lived experience, thereof. While modernity esteems principles and values of democracy, human rights, progress and development, the implementation of these values is often violent and disastrous when outside the Western Hemisphere, that is, outside the Euro-North American-centric space and geography. One wonders if this rhetoric of the universal human rights covers spaces and places outside Europe and North America – the epitome of the Western world!

So, coloniality is the rationale that gives rise and justifies colonialism. Coloniality is the software of colonialism; the latter being the physical and violent conquering of a people/civilisation by another, arising from the former. Coloniality could also be understood as the after-effects of colonialism; it refers to "long standing-patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 487). This affirms that coloniality is the source and summit of colonialism.

2.5 Coloniality of Power

The concept of coloniality of power is a particular strand that lies within the broader decolonial theory; it is informed and attributed to Peruvian national and Professor of Sociology Anibal Quijano who identified four levers of coloniality. The first is "control of the economy". The second is "control of authority". The third is "control of gender and sexuality". The fourth is "control of knowledge and subjectivity" (Quoted in, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015: 487). Mignolo (2001: 424) submits that, it is the "colonial experiences" that "outlived decolonisation" and thereby continue to provide a template of thought and action that reproduces colonial-like forms that is problematic; furthermore, these patterns or structures constitute coloniality of power. The patterns that emerged as a result of colonialism and continue to fester and consolidate modern empire and its operations are constitutive of coloniality of power.

At the centre of control is power, hence the concept of coloniality of power. "As the centre of global capitalism, Europe not only had control of the world market, but it was also able to impose its colonial dominance over all the regions and populations of the planet, incorporating them into its world-system and its specific model of power" (Mignolo 2001: 424). It is this concept of coloniality of power that this study appropriates to itself in analysing the application of R2P in the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011 mindful that this study establishes and determines that the Libyan invasion was linked to the dynamics of coloniality of power. According to Quijano (Quoted in, Grosfoguel 2000: 368) coloniality of power is the classification of people through "historical process of colonial/racial domination".

Coloniality of power is manifested especially after the independence of former colonised countries in the form of the continuation of "control of economic, cultural, and political structures of society" (Quijano 1993, quoted in, Grosfoguel 2000: 368). Grosfoguel (2000: 368) adds that the continuation of "power relations from colonial to postcolonial times allowed the white elites to classify populations and to exclude people of colour from categories of full citizenship in the imagined community called the 'nation'". Civil liberties, rights and privileges of citizenship were never truly extended to colonial subjects such as Blacks, *Indians*, Mulattoes and Mestizos. The control of the internal grouping of populations by colonialism, is the perpetuation of colonialism in *abstentia*. This is the essence of coloniality of power.

Kissinger (2014: 2-3) echoes what Mignolo (2001) observed, that coloniality of power is represented by the long-standing patterns that emerged as a result of colonialism; he argues

that "what passes for order in our time was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago, at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilisations", such as Africa. Yet, the so-called World Wars involved Africans as foot soldiers who were used as proxies of the global powers. They required of Africa, what it provides best, cheap (military) labour for the industrialised and capitalist world. South Africa, under the apartheid regime, sent its contingent of soldiers comprising of more than 600 Black men who were to perish at sea when their ship, the SS Mendi, sunk on route to participating in World War I on 21 February 1918, yet South Africa as part of Africa[6] had nothing to do with World War I, for example (*South African Navy* 2014).

Europe is unquestionably the originator and epicentre of the crafting of colonial conditions that were to be "approximated" globally to what is now understood as the contemporary world order. In other words, a particular, subjective, shallow and narrow perspective, and to use Kissinger's words, "an accident" of Europe's imagination of order "became the hallmarks of a new system of international order" (Kissinger 2014: 3). This is essentially where coloniality of power lies, in Europe's accident that "shaped and prefigured the modern" times of Europe into a universally pertinent structure (*ibid*: 4). It is this universally/globally appurtenant structure that determines the global power structural configuration. It is pre-figured and can only be re-configured by the originator - Europe and its allies, particularly the US and much of the Western world. Europe's allies often endorse and never are opposed to this global power structural configuration that is inherently asymmetrical in favour of the Euro-North American-centric alliance's perspective. Anyone or any entity that dares to oppose the global power structural configuration is dealt with violently, including death, as was President Muammar Qaddafi. This makes Europe an empire. In other words, Europe's accident was scattered across the globe in an intentional and malicious manner that sought to expand Europe's centrality, influence and territory.

Contemporary global society is ordered around the patterns that emerged from British colonialism of America and the rest of the world. America hence, became the prototype of a colonial state. Kissinger (2014: 6) points out that "in time, the US would become the

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[6] Admittedly, South Africa under the apartheid regime, did not identify with Africa's quest for decolonisation and political freedom of the Black race particularly; this could very well explain its participation in World War I and its insistence of sending Black men to war for its self-serving interests probably as sacrificial lambs.

indispensable defender of the order Europe designed". The US of course will defend the system that Europe designed because it was included in the prefiguring of the global power structural configuration based on the imagined superiority of race, and hence races were ordered hierarchically with the White race occupying the apex of the hierarchy. The influence that Britain and America have in the contemporary world order is unparalleled. The Euro-North American-centric orientation is thus monolithic and imposing. Today's society is dominated by Europe and North America as the two protagonists of the current world order or the global power structural configuration.

Kissinger further reveals that "in the American view of world order, peace and balance would occur naturally, and ancient enmities would be set aside – once other nations were given the same principles say in their own governance that Americans had in theirs" (Kissinger 2014: 6). But, who are *they* that give other nations those so-called American principles? What Kissinger reveals here is that America sees itself as part of the design team of the global world order. It too, is above the world system as it is the designer of the current world order. The Euro-North American-centric modernity hence is supra the global power structural configuration because it prefigured it. It cannot be that the designer of a thing, will be governed by the same rules that govern the designed thing.

In 1648 the doctrine of sovereignty was officially codified, it conferred sovereign rights and autonomy to all states. All states were to be treated as equal in authority as sovereigns in their domains and in relation to other sovereigns, regardless of economic stature or arsenal power. Yet in 1815-1886, this sovereignty was denied to Africa particularly. Kissinger intones the double standards of Europe in the haphazard and spurious application of the principle of sovereignty, if at all it is a principle; he argues that "they [Europeans] often conveniently neglected to apply concepts of sovereignty to the colonies and colonised peoples" (Kissinger 2014: 6). Since the current global power structural configuration was an idea of Europe, it is only the Euro-North American-centric modernity that can reconfigure the design because modernity is outside the design. To evince this assertion, it is argued that "Europe has set out to depart from the state-system itself designed and to transcend it through a concept of pooled sovereignty" (Kissinger 2014: 7). The European Union (EU) is the case in point; ironically Qaddafi was calling for a United Africa (UA) at the time of his assassination.

Admittedly, the utility value of these institutions (EU, AU, UN etc.) lies in that they have potency to provide an even-handed and impartial framework for the engagement of a diverse

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community of states, if handled fairly, justly and with symmetrical influence of the involved parties (Kissinger 2014: 7). The current global power structural configuration was an invention of Europe, and as the architect of this system of world governance, Europe championed the "balance of power concept" with itself as the author and adjudicator of that system (Kissinger 2004: 7). This reveals the genesis of the asymmetrical power configuration in this *New World Order* or system. This means that the rationale of colonialism is coloniality. Coloniality propelled the Europeans to conquer other civilisations in order to impose their sense of order on every other civilisation.

The Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed in 1648, indicating the official codification of the doctrine of state sovereignty. The Berlin West Africa Conference, known for the slogan "Scramble for Africa", occurred between 1885 and 1887 (IIife 1979; Pakenham 1992; Chamberlain 2010). The Versailles Treaty was signed in 1919 signalling the end of World War I (Kissinger 2014: 24) demonstrating the European double standards and asymmetrical power relations. This also speaks of the inconsistencies of European modernity. The double-standards applied by Europe in its interactions with the rest of the world are conspicuous. Another example of this is that, the same European-centric worldview developed international law. International law entailed that "if a state would accept these basic requirements, it could be recognised as an international citizen able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion and internal policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention" (Kissinger 2014: 27). Europe as the self-appointed architect, arbiter and adjudicator of states' behaviours considered international law "as an expandable body of agreed doctrine aimed at the cultivation of harmony, with the Westphalian treaties themselves at its heart" (Kissinger 2014: 27). It can be deduced therefore, that international law was designed for Europe and had only Europe at the centre of its creation and intended application. Which then explains why international law was not upheld at the Berlin West Africa Conference, Africa was partitioned to the whims of European imperial powers without any consequence. This renders international law whim-some as it is selectively applied, revealing the impunity of international law.

International law speaks of recognition as the precondition for the acceptance of a state in the fold of the international community of states. It consequently speaks of states being shielded and protected from external intervention. Recognised by who? Shielded from who? This is problematic for the African polity. How can an imposed order maintain a culture, politics and internal processes of African ecologies and localities, when an outside imposition has already been put? If a state does not accept or conform, it is not protected from outside intervention. Is

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this not coloniality of power at its highest expression? Europe is the recogniser of states and therefore, the guarantor of the political independence of states; Europe is the power that recognises states, protects states and policies states into conformity and order. The European civilisation is the ordering civilisation, from which all order is derived. Such is the control that Europe has on the current global power structural configuration. This undoubtedly makes Europe an Empire.

A British statesman Lord Palmaston once quipped that "our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow" (Quoted in, Kissinger 2014: 29-30). Europe prescribes what order is and what it is not, if a state conforms to the prescribed order it is insulated from Europe's wrath, but a deviant state is meted with violence. The problem with the order of Europe is that it is foible and it varies and changes depending on whom is in question. The Euro-North American-centric modernity is not even apologetic about this matter. Kissinger evinces the rationale behind this arrogance; he notes "we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the interests of our country one's guiding principle" (Kissinger 2014: 30). This in fact, is not a principle because it is whim-some, always depending on circumstances; should a principle not be mandible depending on circumstance(s)?

2.5.1 Control of Economy

European colonialism and the capitalist market-system are intrinsically linked. The definition of one is constituted in the other, thereby making colonialism and capitalism mutually defining. Capitalism was a result of the colonial system to control labour; it maximised profits of Whites at the expense of non-Whites' labour force. Capitalism is an instrument of colonial domination of other races by Europeans. As expounded by Quijano (2000: 539) "capital's specific social configuration was geographically and socially concentrated in Europe, and above all, among Europeans in the whole world of capitalism". The Black labour force was forcibly imported through the Slave Trade, from Africa to Europe for unwaged or nonpaid labour. Arguably, this move signalled the beginning and legitimatising of slavery and subjugation of the Black race as "slavery was assigned exclusively to the 'black' population brought from Africa" (Quijano 2000: 539). The conceptual link of colonisation, racism and slavery can be traced to capitalism; Ramose (2003: 3) avers that capitalism provides a "conceptual link between colonisation,

racism, and slavery". In the grand scheme of things, Africa's only utility value was to provide unpaid and unwaged labour for the Euro-centric world.

Therefore, cheap labour in the view of the Euro-North American-centric colonial project is a necessary component of the organisation and control of the labour market. Put differently, capitalism is by design meant to consolidate the modern system of power distribution and maintaining and preserving the social structures of the dominated and the dominant, the conquered and the conquerors. Capitalism is embedded in, and sustains, coloniality which safeguards the perpetuation of colonialism, in the physical absence of the conquerors and colonisers. Quijano (1993), quoted in, Grosfoguel (2000: 368), argues that modernity is responsible for the social and historical construction of classifications of "labour and capital; … between Europeans and non-Europeans". These classifications perpetuate the colonial order. In other words, the global power configuration is such that capital resides with Europeans, and labour, with non-Europeans. This asymmetry is a construction of the European-centric capitalist system. This epitomises coloniality of power through the means of the economy, means of production and financial resources. Institutions such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are vanguards of European modernity that control and regulate the global economy today.

Since the colonisation of America, European colonisation was expanded to the rest of the world from the Eighteenth Century and progressively controlled what has been the world order since (Quijano 2000: 536). Essentially, and because of the capitalist configuration, "Europeans were enabled to increase their wealth" at the expense of non-European civilisations but particularly the unwaged and enslaved Black race (Kissinger 2014: 19). The start of capitalism was never on fair or just basis, this was the beginning of the asymmetrical economic relations, and capitalism enabled economic superiority of Europeans, signalling the beginning of the control of the economy. Hence this study's position on decolonial ontology of the Euro-North American-centric civilisation.

2.5.2 Control of Authority

Authority speaks of legitimacy, whereas legitimacy speaks of the rightfulness of that which is said to be legitimate (Ramose 2003: 3). The Euro-North American-centric modernity claims universal legitimacy to existence and it further claims legitimacy to ordering other existences

modelled on its own. The authority of the Euro-North American-centric modernity is geographically derived from the Western Hemisphere. It is specifically derived from five European countries, namely: Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Greece. In all European writings that are considered as Classics, one finds that they either are informed by the thoughts and works of writers that include, but not limited to, Aristotle, Plato, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Antony Giddens, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Niccolo Machiavelli and Karl Max, or they refer to authors that are located in the five afore-mentioned European countries.

It is this citation of these so-called authority-figures in various academic disciplines, especially the humanities and social sciences that is an appeal to the European authority for the endorsement of individuals' research, knowledge production, or opinion pieces for that matter. While this could be viewed as coloniality of knowledge, it is equally coloniality of authority as the Euro-North American-centric modernity views itself as the only legitimate authority of knowledge and truth, and hence the only legitimate authority to produce knowledge and order other civilisations (Ramose 2003: 5).

European modernity is also responsible for creating institutionalism as a way of controlling global affairs. Institutions such as state, citizenship and democracy are products of European modernity. Institutionalism, both as a theory and practice emanate from the Euro-North American-centric discourse and rhetoric of accountability that seek legitimacy. On the international level, institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organisation WHO), International Law (IL), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are used to camouflage coloniality of power by the Euro-North American-centric civilisation. Which makes these institutions nothing more than representatives of coloniality of authority.

2.5.3 Control of Gender and Sexuality

Coloniality of gender and sexuality speak to the broader concept of coloniality of being. It has to do with the role geography plays in sustaining coloniality. It speaks to the actual and physical space, time and the subjection that these aspects impose on human beings, particularly colonial subjects. It further speaks of the objectification of beings in the colonised spaces and places. In turn, the objectification of the colonial subject result in the self-objectification of the colonial

subjects themselves, hence coloniality of being. Humanity is divided into two zones, the zone of being, which is located in Europe and North America, and the zone of non-being which is all of the Global South, but particularly Africa. Being is apportioned to Europe and North America and anyone that is non-European and non-North American has no ontological density in the framework of coloniality.

In most African localities and ecologies, the colonial order established colonial societies that were based on the illusory *superiority* of the male gender over the illusory *inferiority* of the female gender, modelled on European male chauvinistic and bigoted society. Europe transplanted its society to colonial places and spaces and Africa was not spared. Europe imported its hierarchised and patriarchised society and infiltrated the fabric of African societies. Men provided labour in colonial settlers' towns and more often than not, would leave their families in their rural and natural localities and migrate to settler towns hence, there was a creation of townships (Turino 2008: 28). Before colonialism there was no concept of township in African localities and ecologies. Colonial establishments forcibly evicted Black people from their homes and forcibly relocated them to "townships" and "ghettos" (Desai & Vahed 2013: 14). What the colonial establishment did in the psyche of the conquered and colonialised Africans, is that it taught African men particularly to treat their women with disregard. Men, as labourers and latter earners of a merge income, became breadwinners in a fast-changing world were labour replaced subsistence farming due to the loss of land of the Africans to colonial settlers. The colonial establishment taught the African what it was to be, a man or to be a woman in the colonial order. It hierarchised race and gender, with Whites as superior to the inferior Black, and male as *superior* to the *inferior* female. The inferiority of the female probably emanated from the fact that men were stronger physically and could provide the commodified labour much better than women. The labour system and, by extension, the capitalist system espoused physical strength in order to provide labour as a cheap commodity for the capitalist industry.

2.5.4 Control of Knowledge and Subjectivity

Ramose (2003) argues that the rationale that European colonialism operated on was an unsubstantiated belief that Africans, among other non-European races, were not rational beings

hence, they were not entitled to what rational beings claimed as their entitlement and rights. He argues that:

> One of the bases of colonisation was that the belief 'man is a rational animal' was not spoken of the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian. Aristotle's definition of man was deeply inscribed in the social ethos of those communities and societies that undertook the so-called voyages of discovery—apparently driven by innocent curiosity. But it is well known that these voyages changed into violent colonial incursions. It seems then that the entire process of decolonisation has, among others, upheld and not jettisoned the questionable belief that 'man is a rational animal' excludes the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian (Ramose 2003: 1).

What Ramose manages to unmask is that, the imaginary right and exclusive claim to rationality by Europe-(ans) is only realised because of material power fashioned to guard and preserve the myth that Africa is unable to rationally construct knowledge. The power of the gun is what Europe used to scatter its patterns, templates, designs and standards across the globe. Power in European terms is tantamount to instruments of control emitted by violence. This imaginary exclusive right to rationality by Europe-(ans) has wide-ranging and extensive implications for knowledge production about Africa by Africans. This is meant to cast doubt and reinforce modern bias on Africa and other non-European races; it is also meant to make the non-European doubt her/himself as to her/his capacity to rationalise, think and philosophise. European imagination, and hence modernity, "is doubtful [that] Africans are wholly and truly human beings" and it questions the Africans' capacity to philosophise (Ramose 2003: 5). The pattern that European imagination implanted in the mind of the African is to doubt herself and himself. This pattern is relatable to what Mudimbe (1987: 2) called the "organising structure" and what wa Thiongó (1986: 94) called the "organising principle". This work adds the ordering structure to the long-standing patterns of control that a European civilisation subjected Africa to. The self-doubting African cannot and is not meant to know anything or produce knowledge about herself and himself, let alone her/his surroundings and localities.

Europeans, as self-acclaimed exclusive recipients of rationality, have thus put themselves on a pedestal of knowledge-production, and at the apex of correct and therefore truthful knowledge. There is an underlying attitude that exudes itself as though Europeans were the only race and civilisation that holds and embodies the truth. As a result, an African's right to knowledge is contingent upon a "passive as well as uncritical assimilation" of the knowledge produced in Europe for Europeans and the whole world (Ramose 2003: 2). Africans are then supposed to

faithfully implement the knowledge that is constructed, defined and designed "outside Africa" (*ibid*). Coloniality of knowledge therefore refers to the Euro-North American intellectual thought as the referral point upon which all other epistemologies and knowledges are measured against. Decoloniality as an epistemological movement, "has always been overshadowed by hegemonic Euro-north American-centric intellectual thought and social theories" (Ramose 2003: 2). Knowledge-production, and the capacity to think and generate knowledge is a preserve of Euro-North American-centric modernity resulting in the creation of "border thinking" (Arturo Escobar, cited in, Mignolo 2001: 179). The thinking subject is located in the Euro-North American civilisation, beyond that geography, there exist no rationality. Such is the thinking of Euro-North American-centric civilisation.

2.6 An Analysis of Coloniality of Power

To control is to induce/evoke in another a reaction/response, or take a course of action that they would not otherwise willingly choose. As such, control is the essential and primary currency of empire. Coloniality of power is a unit of analysis that unmasks the control patterns of modernity. The architects of modernity and colonialism had in mind, the control of the world, for the survival of their colonial project. The coloniser and the colonised are by design unequal. An inherent asymmetrical power relationship exists between the two. The design cannot be greater than the designer, neither can a creation be greater than its creator. A creator cannot be part of the creation or the created. The creation is a product of the creator, so too is the design a product of the designer. What (cause) limits and regulates (control) the design is the designer (agency). As such, the rules that apply to the design may not be applicable to the designer. The creator is above and beyond the creation or the created. This scenario places the creator in an asymmetrical power relationship with its creation, the two are incomparable.

What are the implications of the asymmetrical power relations? The Euro-North American-centric civilisation is outside the global power structural configuration. It created this configuration and it is the force that does the configuring. All other civilisations are the ones to be configured. Any deviant civilisation or perspective to the established global order becomes a threat to the functioning of this global imperial design. In this paradigm, there can never exist more than one centre of power; the Euro-North American-centric civilisation views itself as the only legitimate seat of power and control.

The designer regulates and controls the design. The design could have not existed without the designer. This is the bone of contention; since the design could have not been without the designer, how then can the same rules that regulate the design be applied to the designer? As such, coloniality of power perpetuates the patterns and designs of Euro-North American-centric modernity. The perpetuation of modernity's designs, patterns and structures is the essence of coloniality. Coloniality is the vehicle that transports and transplants modernity. Coloniality of power is the vehicle that transports and transplants the controlling of institutions of authority, the running of the markets, the framing of sexuality and gender as well as the producing of what is acceptable as knowledge from Europe to the rest of the world.

What would be of value to the analysis that this work embarks on is the four levers of control that Quijano identified as core to the understanding of, and the unpacking of, the concept of coloniality of power. In analysing and assessing the events that occasioned the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011, this work analyses how Libya was a threat to the current global power structural configuration on four levels – on the level of the control of authority, the control of knowledge and subjectivity, the control of the economy and the control of gender and sexuality.

Going forward, this thesis analyses how Libya's stance on, and the call to, forming a United Africa, as evinced by Koenig (2017), went against the authority component of the current global power structural configuration. This work also goes on to demonstrate how Libya's proposal for African countries to develop and adopt their own monetary currency that was to be backed by gold reserves, as submitted by (Koenig 2017), went against the Western-centric world's control of the economy and markets in the Euro-North American-centric power structural configuration. Libya's quest to develop a communication satellite that was to improve communication technologies in Africa, as averred by (Bowen 2006: 14), went against the Western-centric world's control of knowledge and subjectivity component in the global power structural configuration. At the time of Qaddafi's demise, Libya was increasingly beginning to be seen as a good example of a decolonial state, as opined by (Bowen 2006: 15), and that was a threat to the control of the gender and sexuality component in the global power structural configuration. It is therefore conceivable that, the NATO-led UNSC acted against the Qaddafi regime, as it did, in order to consolidate the global power structural configuration. As such, this work will now go on to demonstrate and evince these assertions and convictions in the subsequent chapters.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the conundrum of European colonialism to todays' society, particularly in the view of African ecologies, localities and civilisations. It also evinced how modernity has continued to perpetuate colonial orders, particularly in African societies and localities. The chapter further discussed the concept of coloniality of power and demonstrated how coloniality of power particularly, has thwarted African ontology and epistemology and keeps Africa at the bottom of the hierarchy that was socially constructed by European architects of modernity that favoured the male gender over the female, and privileged masculinity over femininity, and the White race over the Black race and other non-White races, thereby, presented itself as *superior* and all other civilisations as *inferior*.

This chapter also highlighted how the Euro-North American-centric modernity convolutes appearance and essence; it deliberately presents an attractive appearance of universal human rights, sovereign equality and yet the essence of implementing those universal human rights is marred by violence, inequality, impunity, underdevelopment and barbarity. This chapter also evinced how capitalism is intrinsically linked to modernity and coloniality of the global power structural configuration. At the centre of the control of global socio-economic-politico affairs is the Euro-North American civilisation that has potency to act unilaterally to pursue its own agendas that are particular and subjective, but it purports its agendas as universal and objective.

CHAPTER THREE:

DECOLONIAL METHODOLOGY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LIBYA AND COLONEL MUAMMAR al-QADDAFI

3.1 Introduction

This chapter performs three key tasks. Firstly, it lays down an alternative methodology (decolonial methodology) which assists in the unmasking of global colonial dominance and a skewed perspective proffered by Western-centric modernity and its theories. This is in refutation of the Cartesian duality between ontology and epistemology. This thesis rejects this very idea of compartmentalising human beings' experiences, it recognises that human beings are unitary beings as such, their experiences affect their being in its entirety.

Secondly, it situates the Libyan modern state system in the broader discussion of colonialism and coloniality. It elucidates the erratic and precarious nature of the relations between Libya and the West, particularly with Britain, France and the United States of America. It further dispels the myths about Libya's autocratic and dictatorial rule of oppression of its people, notwithstanding, by neo-liberal media and scholarship. Furthermore, the chapter reveals that, despite the dictatorial and sometimes cruel antics of the late leader of Libya, his rule and sound economic, health, financial and social policies among others, earned him respect in some quarters of his domain, and on the African continent and beyond. Qaddafi in this sense was seen as an authority figure and a good example of a decolonial statesman. Qaddafi's tenure proved to be too challenging to Western Modernity. It is necessary to understand how Libya was affected and still is affected by the global colonial power structural configurations that sought to control Libya, culminating with the NATO invasion in 2011. This chapter employs a combative decolonial epistemic ontology methodology, to offer a critical literature analysis to evince that the monsterisation of Qaddafi by Euro-centric Western media mouth-pieces and scholarship was meant to sanitise the Euro-North American-centric modernity's desire to control Libya and garner legitimacy in the view of the *international community* in preparation of the invasion of Libya in 2011.

Thirdly, this chapter contextualises Libya's colonial history in order to appreciate the role that Qaddafi played in shaping and uniting Libya to what it was at the time of his death. The chapter does so by elucidating the problematic state-creation of Libya that sought to perpetuate the

historic clash of the Islamic civilisation with the Euro-centric Christian civilisation, the latter is convoluted and entangled in modernity. The chapter also adumbrates on Libya's relations with the West, particularly relations with Britain, the US and France, as well as, analyse the debates surrounding the Lockerbie crisis. It is also this chapter's task to reveal Qaddafi's fight against global colonial imperial forces from within Libya and in foreign lands. The chapter brings the discussion to a conclusion with an in-depth analysis that unmasks and reveal asymmetrical global imperial power structural configurations that eventually killed President Muammar Qaddafi.

3.2 Combative Decolonial Epistemic Methodology

Decolonial epistemic ontology methodology is in combat of the monolithic and domineering Western Eurocentric theories, perspective and methodologies. It stands in refutation of the Cartesian duality between ontology and epistemology by rejecting the Eurocentric idea that privileges epistemology over ontology. Rather, this thesis recognises that human beings are unitary beings that are ontological primarily.

3.2.1 Free Floating and Objective Analysis

Aime Cesaire (1972: 2) concedes that Europe is at the centre of modern colonisation which resulted in the current world order and modernity. Thus, Europe warrants attention and scrutiny when grappling with issues surrounding the colonial question. He contends that "the great good fortune of Europe is to have been a crossroads, and that because it was the locus of all ideas, the receptacle of all philosophies, the meeting place of all sentiments, it was the best centre for the redistribution of energy" (Cesaire 1972: 2). This thesis notes that Cesaire' reference to Europe as having been at a crossroad suggests that, had Europe sought the civilisation of the whole world in sincerity, it would have succeeded in bringing together various cultures' and civilisations' values, ontologies and epistemologies as the accident of geography was in its advantage. Clearly this was not what Europe sort in its expansion. Hence, Europe failed to provide for a redistributive agency to correct its wrongs – of killing, maiming raping, torturing, moral relativism, violence, racism, intolerance, and hatred; instead, it let its

appetite for force dehumanise, not only itself, but the human civilisations it encountered in places and spaces it colonised.

In order to correct and combat this Eurocentric narrative that has been consistently peddled by Europe and its allies as universal and objective, decolonial epistemic ontology asserts itself on this monolithic 'scientific' narrative in order to receive the attention that Afrocentricity/Africanity and other perspectives rightfully deserve. In convergence with the idea of Europe's periphery (subaltern) asserting itself against this gigantic monolithic European narrative, Asante (2009), advances the idea of Afrocentricity. He asserts that "Afrocentricity is a paradigm based on the idea that African people should reassert a sense of agency in order to achieve sanity" (Asante 2009). So, the idea of asserting an Afrocentric narrative is a necessity in order for the African to realise her/himself in this fictitious and untruthful, therefore, fake world created by Europe.

As a result, this thesis refutes the so-called objectivity of science or the universality of knowledge that is purported by the canon of Western modernity and neo-liberal scholarship. By so doing, the thesis equally refutes the so-called balanced accounts of what transpired in Libya leading to the killing of President Qaddafi; it asserts that the killing of Qaddafi is down played by neo liberal scholarship and mouth pieces as a non-event. A sitting Head of State was slain through direct foreign involvement in a sovereign country in direct contradiction of the doctrine of state sovereignty that guarantees the political independence of states and the non-interference of states in other states' domestic affairs, thereof. Yet, there has not been any consequence on the part of the foreign forces that invaded Libya and killed its leader. This cannot be. A new narrative must emerge that must address the inadequacies and biases of European-centred narratives, theories and perspectives. Decolonial epistemic ontology seeks to combat such obvious biases, irreconcilable discrepancies, unjustifiable injustices and absurd anomalies located in the Euro-centred narrative.

3.2.2 The Negation of Negation

Decolonial ontology is cognisant of the fact that European-endorsed narratives tend to cast what they do not agree with in negative light. For instance, when European modernity thinks of itself as *civilised* it, by the same token, thinks of another civilisation as savagery and barbaric. Aime Cesare succinctly explains this view when he traces the basis of such absurd

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justifications. He notes that the "chief culprit in this domain is Christian pedantry, which laid down the dishonest equations Christianity = civilisation, paganism = savagery, from which there could not but ensue abominable colonialist and racist consequences, whose victims were to be the *Indians*, the yellow peoples, and the Negroes" (Cesaire 1972: 2). Valentine Mudimbe equally evinces the problematic dichotomy that exists in the Eurocentric modern world. Mudimbe (1988: 33) highlights the erroneous conclusion that "civilisation" is equal to "Christianity" and that "primitiveness" is commensurate with "paganism". Clearly, Western modernity had to appeal to a higher power or deity, in this case the Christian God, in order to ease its conscience because such justification is unreasonable and irrational. It follows then that, European civilisations negated the humanity of people that appeared different to its people. This distinction is really based on appearance more than substance. In other words, because of the differences in appearance, Western modernity negated the humanity of others.

It follows that Western modernity's narrative is bent on negating the humanity of different people to that of its own people. As such, the negative casting of President Muammar al-Qaddafi by neo-liberal scholarship and media is meant to monsterise Qaddafi and present him in a negative light. Consistent to the script of Western modernity, Qaddafi was presented and framed as a barbaric dictator who savagely brutalised his own people, that notwithstanding the fact that, Qaddafi used force against his own people. Equally, Libya was framed and cast in a negative light by neo-liberal mass media prior to the invasion of 2011 by NATO. Africa generally is presented and framed as a place of lack and disease, mainly by Eurocentric mass media and its scholarship (IMF 2018; UN 2019; WHO 2019). It is therefore, this thesis' contention of negating this particular negation of Qaddafi, Libya and Africa in order to assess Qaddafi in his own locus of enunciation and assess Libya in its own ecology, and Africa as it sees itself, rather than analyse Qaddafi, Libya and Africa according to the lens offered by Western modernity and expect the analysis to arrive at new knowledge and insight or an analysis that favours Africa and its interests.

3.2.3 Africanity and Positionality: Seeing from within Africa

The positionality or locus of enunciation of the research is of vital importance. The critiquing of Qaddafi and Libya thus far, proves that much of the critics are, and were, actually located in modernity and its thought patterns. The result of analyses arrived at by using tools located in

modernity are predictable and therefore, produce no new knowledge or insight. This thesis analyses Libya and Qaddafi by inquiring from the ecology of Libya, where Qaddafi was located and positioned. This is likely to produce unfamiliar dynamics that are over looked by theories, epistemologies and tools of analyses located in modernity.

To this effect Asante (2009) supports this perspective and advances that it is time to look "at information from "a black perspective" as opposed to what had been considered the 'white perspective' of most information" emanating and located in the Eurocentric world. It is this "black perspective" that is relatable and feeds into the Africanity positionality that is advanced by this study in demonstrating how coloniality of power was manifested in the Libyan invasion of 2011 by NATO forces. Ngugi wa Thiongo (1986: 4) converges with this view; he argues that "the language of African literature cannot be discussed meaningfully outside the context of those social forces which have made it both an issue demanding our attention and a problem calling for a resolution". While he writes specifically on African literature, his ideas are commensurate with the ideals of Africanity. This thesis interprets wa Thiongo to mean that, we cannot meaningfully discuss problems of politics in Africa without looking at the very social conditions that give rise to those political problems in the first place. Hence, the colonial question must be interrogated by African scholarship taking into consideration uniquely African social conditions and the perspectives that such conditions give rise to.

In order to arrive at new knowledge, a knowledge that would be different to what Western modernity has already proffered about Qaddafi, Libya and Africa, a novel analysis would have to take into consideration the unique Africanity perspective that is informed by Africa's positionality in global affairs. Africa's positionality must be informed and influenced by Africa's interests in world affairs specifically, in terms of what Africa can access and gain rather than what Africa can provide only. In the Western modernity's perspective Africa is only good in so far as it provides cheap or unwaged labour. This narrative must be abated by asserting Africa's interests in world economic affairs particularly; this is done through asserting Africa's interests in global economic affairs. As such, the Africanity positionality is meant to sensitise the Eurocentric world of an Africa that is equal to other civilisations, as Africa asserts itself.

3.2.4 Africa-Centeredness about the World

Africa-centeredness about the world has to do with analysing the world through the lens of Africa as the centre of the African scholarship world. Zeleza (n.d.) reminds us that "African history has yet to rid itself of the epistemic violence of imperialist historiography, with its erasures, omissions, fabrications, stereotypes". Africa is yet to banish the "silences, [and] … the wilful distortions and denials of Africa's historicity and humanity, its agency and autonomy (*ibid*). As such, this thesis seeks to advance the idea of analysing phenomena through the lens of the Africa-centeredness about the world. It aims to give interpretations of historical facts concerning and surrounding the invasion of Libya by NATO forces and the killing of Qaddafi in and through the lens of Africa-centeredness of the world. It will privilege narratives that seek to advance Africa's position in the world and centres Africa in the world, narratives that advance Libya's interests and Qaddafi's interests without the unduly over-glorifying the subjects of this research and analysis.

Zeleza (n.d.) further underscores that:

> African history continues to be enveloped in the Eurocentric shadows of silence and subjugation that seek to hide, on the one hand, the horrendous pain and costs of Europe's barbarities from the slave trade to colonialism, neo-colonialism to globalisation, and on the other the memories of resistance and the possibilities of renewal embedded in those memories and in reconstructed pasts and futures imagined outside of European time, of Europe's usurpation of world history.

As such, it is a necessity for Africans' sanity, to use Asante's (2009) words, to chat a new discourse that combats this reality by asserting Africa's centeredness positionality in the world. Libya's Qaddafi sought to centre Africa in its engagement with the rest of the world, especially in Africa's engagement with the West particularly. Given the history of European colonialism, Qaddafi sought to assert Africa as the centre of understanding African politics that emanated from ecologies of Africa. As such, it is this thesis contention, aim and objective to centre Africa's interests in the world as it makes analyses of what transpired during the Libyan invasion by NATO forces in 2011.

3.2.5 Situated-ness

Libya is situated in the north of Africa, in an environment that is classified as the *third world* or the Global South. That classification is ascribed to Africa by the Global North and the *first world* which are essentially European and Euro-centred. That in itself is not problematic. The problem is that with the naming and classification emanating from a Euro-centred world, it fuels the perceptions that Africa lacks agency, Africa is diseased, poverty-stricken and lacks leadership. That notwithstanding, those analyses overlook the reasons, that are of European origin and creation, that give rise to such appearances and apparitions. Given the geography that is largely occupied by Afro-Arabic Islamic ethnicities and identities, there are dynamics that are peculiar to those circumstances that must be considered in order to arrive and generate new knowledge and craft a new narrative that is relatable to the inhabitants of Libya particularly and its surrounding places, but Africans generally.

Particular economic and social values and perspectives that are found in Libya's ecology must inform research, if meaningful results are to ensue. The political dynamics of Libya must also inform research if an accurate account and analysis of Libya and Qaddafi is to emerge. The political dynamics must take to account both Libya's internal or domestic dynamics and relations between its people and Libya's external relations (foreign relations and foreign policy), especially Libya's external relations with other African countries and, of course, Libya's turbulent relations with the West particularly. Given the turbulent nature of Libya's relations with the West, an accurate account of Libya's political history cannot emerge from a narrative that is embedded and favours a Eurocentric world, as such, an Africa-centeredness positionality is likely to give an accurate account and narrative that takes into consideration Libya's situated-ness in terms of time (temporal and spatial space), political and economic history and aspirations.

3.2.6 Cultural Context

Qaddafi's and Libya's cultural context was largely influenced by politics of ethnicity and tribe. As will be evinced later in this chapter, Qaddafi grappled with ethnical divisions that were peculiar to the Libyan polity given that the state creation of Libya was a contested exercise which still, to some extent, is today. As such, in order to understand Qaddafi's ecology and

local circumstances, a correct narrative has to acknowledge this fact and accommodate it in its analysis. The political culture that Qaddafi had crafted in Libya seemingly worked and created social cohesion, if compared to the goings on today after the invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011.

3.3 An Overview of Libya

The population of Libya is largely a mixture of people of Arab and Berber lineage, and is pegged at approximately 6.3 million people. Libya's capital city is Tripoli, which is also Libya's largest city, with an estimated population of approximately 2.5 million people. The population identifies with the Islamic religion, making almost all Libyans Muslims. Libya is a country in the northern region of Africa, it shares political borders with Egypt and Sudan to its east, and shares political borders with Niger and Chad in the south, as well as, shares political borders with Algeria and Tunisia in the west. In the north of Libya lies the Mediterranean Sea that separates it from the continent of Europe (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 264). In other words, Libya's topology is diverse and exhibits signs of a complex society in spite of a relatively small population.

Libya consists of mainly the Sahara Desert and has very few natural resources. However, "the discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959 and the subsequent income from petroleum sales enabled one of the world's poorest nations to establish an extremely wealthy state" (Schiller 2009: 161). It is the World Book Encyclopaedia's contention that the discovery of oil "injected huge sums of money into [Libya's] economy" (2013: 264). What perhaps is of importance is to ascertain wherefrom did the money come and what terms and/or conditions accompanied it. That notwithstanding, the Libyan government and to its credit, was to later utilise its wealth to improve the vast farmland and provided its people with essential services (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 264). Zoubir (2002: 31) reveals that much of the money that was "injected" into Libya's economy, to use the terminology of the World Book Encyclopaedia, came from the US in exchange of an airfield, the Wheelus Air Force Base. For this, the US provided an average of $2 million per year, beyond other aid it rendered to Libya (Zoubir 2002: 31). Zoubir, further reveals that, although the US gave considerable amounts of money, this did not benefit the generality of Libyans, as the then government of Libya, under King Idris al-Sanusi, was corrupt and authoritarian (2002: 31).

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Most Libyans, more that 90% of Libya's population, is of mixed Arab and Berber ancestry. The Berbers are believed to have lived in Libya as far back as A.D. 600, way before Arabs inhabited Libya. Arabic is the official language of Libya, and almost everyone speaks it. The educated Libyans would speak a second language, mainly English and Italian (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 65). The majority of Libya's population lives in urban areas. In other words, much of Libya's population today is urbanised; arguably, Libya is an urbanised country. Rural living in Libya is structured in villages and desert oases; there is also a presence of nomadic populations who move around in search of pasture for their livestock which include goats, sheep and camels.

In the main, the Libyan population migrated from rural areas to cities following the discovery of oil in the1950s that helped expand Libya's economy. Certain demanding adjustments had to be made following the transition from rural living to urban living. For instance, most Libyan families lived with extended families, where several generations shared one homestead; this arrangement was not practical anymore given the developments of urban living which are generally crowded. Another adjustment that rural folk had to contend with was in relation to women. The emancipation and empowerment of women occupied centre stage when compared to previous societal arrangements and traditions. Women who previously received little, to no education, began to receive education as a result of societal demands compelled by urban living. Woman could now participate fully in the affairs of society and had legal rights to do so, albeit only 10 per cent of the Libyan workforce is female, the numbers are increasingly changing in favour of women, as more women get educated and empowered. The Islamic faith is the official religion of Libya, with almost all Libyans identifying as Muslims who belong to the Sunni bifurcate of Islam. In 1977 Libya's Constitution decreed and codified the country's legislation in affirmation and agreement with Islamic law (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 265-266).

In the year 2011, President Muammar al-Qaddafi was overthrown by what some have described as a rebellion (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013; 264) and others as an unwarranted overthrow of a democratically and constitutionally-elected government by NATO forces (Campbell 2013), while others described the 2011 NATO invasion as "Libya's eight-month war" (Gazzini 2011: 2) with some yet, labelling it the "Libyan war" (Campbell 2013: 19). Qaddafi had been the leader of Libya since 1969 (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 65). Before this thesis gets into the details of how and why President Qaddafi was killed by the US-led NATO coalition, this work

will start off by discussing what it terms the problematic state-creation of Libya modelled on the European Concert of state.

3.4 The Problematic State-Creation of Libya

For the purposes of this work, the historicisation of the state-creation enterprise in Libya will be limited to the period beginning from the end of Second World War (1945) to 1951 when Libya was officially recognised as politically independent, much to the exclusion of otherwise valuable information of state-creation in Libya prior to WW II. While this work recognises the long standing and problematic patterns of state-creation played out in the geography of present-day Libya under various administrations and over the years, the limited selection in terms of time-frame seeks to highlight how Western Eurocentric modernity particularly, manifested and exhibited dynamics that are consistent with the concept of coloniality of power. As such, this exposé is a brief historical account to the exclusion of accounts prior to the end of World War II.

Libya began its statehood under very traditional circumstances as erroneously concluded by El Fathaly and Palmer (1980: 1). The paradigm that El Fathaly and Palmer used to define what is traditional *vis-à-vis* what is modern, is in itself problematic. The table below will elucidate the main differences that El Fathaly and Palmer identified between traditional societies and modern societies in general and specifically categorised Libya as a traditional society. What is of interest to this study is the implication of that categorisation and naming, and by whom it is named and categorised.

Table 1 Comparison Between Traditional and Modern Societies

The table below indicates identifiers and coordinates associated with traditional societies as well as those associated with modern societies. Traditional coordinates identify with African societies; whereas, modern coordinates resonate with European societies.

(El Fatherly & Palmer 1980)

Traditional (African) Societies	Modern (European) Societies
Rural	Urban
Illiterate	Literate, universal education
Oral communication, face-to-face	Media-intense
Extended family	State
Agrarian economy, butter trade	Industrialised, market-based
Subsistence	Surplus and abundance
Tribal Chieftaincies	Political elites, achievements
Particularistic	Universalistic

Table 1 reflects the researcher's initiative

While El Fathaly and Palmer (1980), may have got some basics right in their general analysis of traditional versus modern societies; however, it is the stereotyping of the traditional with Africa and modern with Europe. The framing and naming of this analysis are problematic because the solution to this categorisation is the development of the undeveloped by the developed. In other words, Europe places itself on a pedestal that has to develop the undeveloped or the under-developed Africa. This is the very problem of Western modernity that it universalises itself and its knowledges. It is this study's contention that the so-called universalistic nature of education/knowledge that modernity is acclaimed of, is in fact a particularistic notion, turned universal by colonialism by means of violence.

The popular narrative is that Libya was a British colony, indeed it was. However, before it was administered by Britain and France, it was under Italian colonial rule and only sided with Britain, France and the US as they were fighting Germany and Italy during World War II. It was only in 1943 that Italians seemingly conceded defeat, not by Libyans, but buy the trio (France, Britain and the US) (Lange 2005: 23). Following the 21 November 1949 United Nations General Assembly's Resolution 289(IV) that sought the "disposal of the former Italian colonies [Libya, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea]", it became clear that the processes of Italian decolonisation of its former colonies was inevitable. Naturally, these processes meant that

Libya was to be shaped by the traditional colonial powers of the North African region, namely: Britain, France and the United States of America (Simons 2003: xi).

It is claimed that Libya declared itself independent from Britain on the 24th of December 1951 (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980:15; Ronen 2008: 9). This followed several centuries of Ottoman control, three decades of Italian occupation that lasted between 1911 and 1943 (Ronen 2008: 4), and a decade of British and French administration of what is present day Libya (Simons 2003: xii). Libya has been known by different names over the years; some of those names that have been used to refer to Libya are: The Libyan Arab *Jumhuriyya* Republic (1951-1969), Kingdom of Libya (1969-1977), Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya* (1977-2011), and Libya (2011-to date). These names all refer to present-day political orders and European-determined political border-demarcations of 'modern' Libya in this study (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 267). For the purposes of this work, each period will be analysed separately to succinctly present the merits of this categorisation.

3.4.1 The Libyan Arab Republic (1951-1969)

The Libyan Arab Republic (1951-1969) consisted of three states; Cyrenaica (Benghazi) in the east, Tripolitania (Tripoli) in the west and Fezzan in the south (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 15). The World Book Encyclopaedia (2013: 264) corroborates the view that "until the early 1900's, Libya consisted of three separate geographical and historical regions. It became a united, independent country in 1951". The British administration pushed for independent Cyrenaica under 'Emir' Idris who had been proclaimed Emir of Cyrenaica in 1921 (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 15).

It is debatable whether Libya indeed declared itself independent from Britain as evinced by Schiller (2009: 161) who argues that "on 24 December 1951, Libya declared its independence as the United Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris, Libya's only monarch" or, Britain appointed Emir Idris al-Sanusi as the first Head of State of Libya as wittingly revealed by Ronen (2006: 271) who intones that Emir Idris was "named" King and Head of State because he enjoyed British endorsement. Ronen's view is similarly mirrored by El Fathaly and Palmer (1980: 15) who imply that Emir Idris was "proclaimed" Head of State of Libya by Britain. The first question therefore, becomes, on what basis was King Idris 'named', 'proclaimed', 'appointed' or 'elected' as the first Head of State of Libya?

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The second question is, by whom was King Idris 'named', 'proclaimed', 'appointed' and or 'elected' Head of State of Libya? Answers, if any, to these questions tell of the problematic state-creation of Libya. If it was not Libyans who 'named', 'proclaimed', 'appointed' or 'elected' King Idris as the Head of State of Libya, this tells of an external force or element that was central to the determination of Libya. That is problematic.

In order to answer the two questions posed above, one has to understand the political context of the times of World War II in North Africa, where Libya is located. During WWII, the Allied Forces, which were composed of Britain, France and the US, fought their wars on African soil, North Africa to be exact. The Allied Forces fought against the European Axis, which was composed of Germany and Italy. At that time, Libya was under Italian rule and, because of the war between the Allied Forces and the European Axis, Libya took advantage of that situation and inclined itself with the Allied Forces leading to the temporal administration of Libya by Britain and France in 1943 (Lange 2005: 23). As a result, Libya wrestled itself out of the Italian clutches of colonialism by taking advantage of the fact that Italy and Germany were nemeses of Britain, France and the US. At the end of WWII, Italy renounced its claim on the Libyan territory leading to the 1947 Treaty signed by Britain, France, the US and Russia in order to "determine Libya's future" (Lange 2005: 23). This determination of Libya's future proved to be difficult for the 1947 Treaty signatories as, at that time, oil was discovered in Libya. This meant that Libya was to be resourceful and its close proximity to the Mediterranean Sea, also meant its close proximity to Europe. So, the determination of Libya's future was problematic for the 1947 Treaty signatories as each member sought and pursued its own interests in Libya.

Consequently, the UN, in 1949 "called for the establishment of an independent state in Libya" (Lange 2005: 23). In other words, the independent state of Libya was as a result of the UN intervention of 1949. Lendman (2012, 100) uses a more accurate word in revealing who really was behind the inauguration of king Idris' reign; he notes that it was "Britain [that] enthroned king Idris, who let America, Britain and France retain military bases and purse corporate interests". Suffice to note that the UN, in spite of its perceived or real neutrality, is a foreign force to Libya. Put differently, Libya had no official government at that time, therefore, it could have not been a willing signatory to the UN processes, if anything Libya at that time was only grateful to have been rescued from the Italians and had no grounds to refuse the help from an institution such as the UN. This process, the 1949 UN 'intervention' in Libya, culminated in 1951 when a "National Assembly was established and a Constitution of independence was written and adopted" (Lange 2005: 23). It was at the establishment of that National Assembly,

Libya's first government, that the country was named the United Kingdom of Libya. Furthermore, it was at that point that Libya was "set up as a monarchy under the rule of King Idris I" (*ibid*). The language used by Lange's (2005) narrative is telling of the real force that was behind state-creation of Libya. Britain, France and the US, the original members of the Allied Forces during WWII were responsible for the state creation in Libya. This trio, using the UN – perceived as a neutral arbiter in global affairs – manipulated Libya and duped Libya into believing that king Idris was appointed by them, when in actual fact, king Idris was a stooge and acolyte of the alliance composed of the Western trio. Britain's, Frances' and the US' involvement in the very state-creation of Libya is problematic because it necessarily links the founding of Libya to the volition of a foreign force and not necessarily that of Libyans and therefore, the course and future of Libya was founded on the basis of coloniality of power as the founding was in the hands of the Western trio – that spells Western modernity.

El-Fathaly and Palmer (1980: 16) opined that Omar al-Kikhya, was the most notable Cyrenaican leader after King Idris, who is on record to have asked Sir Edmund Grigg[7] in a letter, for Britain to recognise Idris as the Emir of Cyrenaica and to recognise Cyrenaica as an independent country in return for Cyrenaica/British comradeship. Writing to Sir Edmund Grigg, King Idris himself on the same day as al-Kikhya, endorsed Omar al-Kikhya's proposal stating that "the proposal conformed with our (*sic*) desires and the desires of our (*sic*) Cyrenaican nation" (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 16). Tripolitanian leadership recognised the leadership of Emir Idris al-Sanusi but opposed the idea of an independent Cyrenaica preferring instead a unified country. On the issue of maintaining a unified country, the Tripolitanian leadership enjoyed the support of the Fezzan leadership. Al-Kikhya rejected Tripolitania's proposals.

What is telling in the Omar al-Kikhya and Idris al-Sanusi's writings to Sir Edmund Grigg is that Britain was the king-maker in Libya. The very fact that the Cyrenaican leadership sought and craved for British endorsement and affirmation in their territory speaks of the very problem of Libya's state creation. That problem suggests coloniality of power. In whom did power actually lie, was it in the leadership of Cyrenaica (Libya) or did it lie in Britain, who had to endorse or recognise Cyrenaican (Libyan) leadership? In order to answer this question, one has to appreciate that the concept of coloniality of power has to do with the control of leavers of

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[7] Sir Edmund Grigg was the then British Minister of State in Cairo, Egypt (El-Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 15).

power. The levers of power that are of merit to this narrative, at this juncture, are that of control of the economy, control of knowledge and information as well as control of authority. As such, coloniality of power permeates the entirety of the colonised subjects generally, such that the colonised subjects become frivolous. They become frivolous in the sense that the colonised subjects seek affirmation and endorsement from their oppressors or the very system that oppresses and subjugates them as they perceive it as a source from which their authority is derived and their being comes. This is the problem with the very idea of state-creation in Libya as it was not Libyans who led the discourse of plotting the political trajectory that Libya was to take; foreigners did, Europeans to be particular, the British and the French specifically.

Meanwhile, Italy renewed its claim to sovereignty over Libya in spite of the fact that Italy had signed the Italy Peace Treaty of 1947 meaning that Italian colonies were to be left in the hands of major powers and the United Nations. During that time, Great Britain also abandoned its pledges of independence it had made to the people of Libya and instead joined Italy in the Bevin[8]-Sforza[9] Plan named after that UN trusteeship over Libya. The Bevin-Sforza Plan suggested, among other things, giving the UN trusteeship over Tripolitania, while Cyrenaica and Fezzan were to be placed under the trusteeship of Italy, Great Britain and France (Ronen 2006: 271). Suffice to note that the generality of the Libyan public rejected that plan and as a result there was an upsurge as strikes, demonstrations and protests against the trusteeship plan ensued.

Ronen (2006: 271) argues that when Libya became independent in 1951, Emir Idris al-Sanusi, "who was politically close to Britain, was named King and first Head of State". What perhaps is missing in this narrative is, by whom was Emir Idris al-Sanusi named the first Head of State of independent Libya. Put differently, and to use the language of El Fathaly and Palmer (1980: 15), on what basis was King Idris al-Sanusi "proclaimed" the first Head of State of Libya, and by whom was he proclaimed? Was his naming or proclamation on the basis of an outcome of an election? Of course not! This thesis notes that, while Britain is singled out in Ronen's (2006) narrative, Britain was not acting alone. It is an established fact that Britain was a member of the Allied Forces together with France and the US stemming back from World War II (Lange 2005). As such, while this thesis' narrative in the following section would speak of Britain as

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[8] Ernest Bevin was the then Great Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 16).

[9] Count Carolo Sforza was the then Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs (*ibid*).

a singular and specific actor, it has in mind the fact that Britain was acting in tandem with its allies, France and the US. The answers to the questions posed above lie in understanding the levers of control embedded in the concept of coloniality of power. Because of King Idris' close ties to Britain, the latter appointed the former to be king. The appointing power, or the proclaiming power of King Idris' appointment or nomination as king, was Britain. In other words, the basis of King Idris' appointment as king was based on the authority of Britain. This speaks directly to the lever of control of authority. Without Britain as a basis, King Idris would not have been king of Libya. Put differently, the monarchy of Libya was given authority by Britain particularly which means it was Britain that controlled King Idris' authority, and not King Idris himself because his people did not control his appointment or nomination as king. This was the genesis of Libya's problems and disputes over political legitimacy.

The very fact that there is mention of a foreign country (Britain which acted in tandem and consultation with its alliance partners, France and the US) in the naming and proclamation of a Libyan Head of State is problematic because, that does not reflect the volition of the Libyan population rather that of the foreign country that essentially dictates what goes and what does not, in Libyan affairs. The appointment of the Head of State was not based on an electoral outcome as would happen in Britain, France or the US for instance. The appointment was based on the authority of a foreign force, hence, the control of that authority that is discharged on Libyan soil has its origins in a foreign force to Libya or land even. This points toward coloniality of power, particularly the control of authority in Libya, by Britain and its allies. However problematic as it is, what remains is that 1951 is the *official* year that Libya was considered to be independent of European colonial rule. Libya got political independence from Britain in 1951 (Ronen 2006: 271).

3.4.2 Kingdom of Libya (1969-1977)

For almost two decades, from 1951 to 1969 Emir Idris al-Sanusi was the Libyan Arab Republic's Head of State and he enjoyed financial and military support of Britain and the US; and in return, al-Sanusi granted Britain and the US permission to set up their military bases on Libyan soil (Ronen 2006: 271). Following periods of resistance, and in protest of the presence of foreign militaries on Libyan soil, Muammar al-Qaddafi led a military *coup d'état* that effectively overthrew King Idris al-Sanusi. The Libyan *coup d'état* signalled the beginning of

what became known as the *Al Fateh* Revolution on the 1ˢᵗ of September 1969. The 27-year old army officer, Qaddafi became known as the "Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution" (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980); this was how Qaddafi was addressed formally in government communique and Libyan media.

Since his ascension to power through a *coup d'état*, Muamar al-Qaddafi was to change the name that Libya had been known as. Libya was to be known as the Libyan Arab *Jumhuriyya* Republic became known as the Kingdom of Libya. As it was Qaddafi's first and initial tenure as the leader of Libya, he wanted his tenure to differ from that of his predecessor's in terms of how he exhibited legitimate authority that he had usurped from an appointee or nominee of Britain and its allies. Qaddafi espoused nationalist aspirations that sought to nationalise Libya's resources to the benefit of every Libyan citizen, in contrast to the megalomaniac tendencies that the former leader, Kind Idris exhibited. For instance, Lange (2005: 24) evinced this observation and argues that "when oil was discovered on Libyan land in 1959, the resulting wealth was hoarded by Idris (*sic*) and his associates, despite the poverty of the masses". Qaddafi was to play into this perspective as, arguably, is what could have inspired him in carrying out the *coup d'état* in the first place. In other words, Qaddafi wanted to set a different political trajectory, from that of King Idris – if he had any, for the Kingdom of Libya (Davis 1987; El Fathaly & Palmer 1980; Simons 2003: xii; Haley 1984). As such, it was a turbulent period in the internal affairs of Libya, as well as the external affairs that involved Libya and Libyan citizens in the diaspora particularly. While Qaddafi sought to consolidate his power internally within Libya, he also sought to gain legitimacy in the *international community's* perspective seeing his ascent to power was through a military takeover of an established government. He faced a lot of resistance from Libyans who were in exile, either as voluntary exiles or exiled by the state of Libya, particularly those who sought refuge in Western countries, specifically in Britain (United Kingdom further referred to as UK) and the US.

3.4.3 Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya* (1977-2011)

The Kingdom of Libya changed its name to The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya* on the 2ⁿᵈ of March 1977. The word *Jamahiriyya* is an Arabic word which means "state of the masses"; it is a term that is attributed to have been coined by Qaddafi, meant to replace the former *Jumhuriyya* – meaning "republic" (Ronen 2006: 273).

3.4.4 Libya (2011-2015)

According to the National Transitional Council (NTC)'s figures, at least 30,000 Libyans died in the civil war (Gazzini 2011: 9). Mustafa Abd al-Jalil is of the view that about 20 000 to 50 000 people lost their lives as a result of the NATO invasion (Cited in, Gazzini 2011: 9), while the NTC's ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, quips that "more than 30 000" people lost their lives (Quoted in, Gazzini 2011: 9).

3.5 Libyan Relations with the West

For the purposes of this work, the UK, France and the US particularly, will be referred to, collectively, as the West. The trio has a long history in Libyan affairs prior to the latter's independence, they featured prominently in the Libyan geo-space during WW II as they were an alliance that fought against Europe's Axis, Germany and Italy. This is by no means to the exclusion of other western countries; should other western countries be singled out, a note to that effect will be made. The Libya/West relations can be described as precarious at best and turbulently suspicious at worst. There have been periods of mutual hostility and distrust, and there has equally been relative cordiality and correlative cooperation (Ronen 2006: 271; Prashad 2011: 7). The low points of Libyan relations with West are encapsulated in the downing of flight Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the downing a *Union de Transports Aériens* (UTA)-operated French Airliner DC-10 over Niger (Brady 2013; Huliaras 2002: 12). Both incidents, in the perspectives of Britain, France and the US, pointed to Libyan interference. Libya's relations with the West experienced their highpoint "after the 9/11, terror attacks in the US, [where] Qaddafi publicly made anti-terror remarks and provided "intelligence on al-Qaeda to the United States" (Bowen 2006: 57). This section will go on to offer insights into the precarious diplomatic relations that characterised Qaddafi's Libya in relation to Britain, the US and France particularly.

3.5.1 Libyan Relations with Britain

Ronen (2006: 271) traces the Libya/British relations back to the two's first encounter of each other during World War II, at a time when Britain defeated Italy in the battle of *El Alamein* in

November 1942. Following Britain's defeat of Italy which was an ally of Germany in the *El Alamein* battle, that incident brought an end to Italian colonial rule in Libya. At that juncture, it could be argued that Britain was considered as an ally by Libya, this is more plausible seeing that *Emir* Idris al-Sanusi "was politically close to Britain" (Ronen 2006: 271). Despite the fact that Britain had defeated Italy, an event that ended colonial rule in Libya, it was not an altruistic gesture out of benevolence for Libya. Britain and France soon entrenched themselves in Libya through military administrations. In other words, Britain and France administered Libya simultaneously. Britain took charge of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; this was a strategic move for Britain to take charge of the northern parts of Libya as they were close to Europe and only separated by the Mediterranean Sea. France administered the Fezzan region in the south; this was also for France's strategic reasons as the south of Libya lay closer to Chad and Niger that were France's colonies.

It is noteworthy that the military administration arrangements in 1947 over Libya were negotiated between the two 'civilised' equals - Britain and France – who are galvanised by, and embody, the zone of being. As such, the two could impose themselves on Libya because it is located in the zone of non-being – Africa; at least in the eyes of Europe. Since, in the perspectives peddled by Western European modernity's narrative, Africa is a place of lack, disease, poverty, barbarity and savagery. Meaning, it lacks human rights because Africans are denied the same humanity that modernity appropriates for itself and claims its exclusive location in the geo-space of Europe, the zone of non-being is outside Europe's zone of being. While the two negotiated between themselves, Libya was victimised in the sense that Britain and France had to offer military protection for Libya as if Libya was a victim that needed rescuing. Furthermore, Libya suffered partitioning, yet again, in the sense that Libya's territories had to be divided between Britain and France and were in the administrative hands of, and for the conveniences and interests of, the latter in echo of the 1885-7 Berlin West Africa Conference (the partitioning of Africa) (Ronen 2006: 271).

Following Qaddafi's military takeover of Libya from King Idris al-Sanusi on September, 1, 1969, Qaddafi closed down the British military base known as the *al-Ádm* Military Airbase which was situated in the south of the city of Tobruk in 1970. Qaddafi's move was in pursuit of closing down Britain's access to Libya via the city of Tobruk which is a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea, which in turn, provided for easy linkage with Europe, Britain's home ground. This move by Qaddafi, naturally infuriated Britain who had enjoyed King Idris al-Sanusi's courtesy and endorsement at the expense of Libya's natural resources. During that

time, Qaddafi also nationalised several properties and companies that were British-owned. Of the closed-down companies, chief among them was the British Petroleum (BP) (Ronen 2006: 271). Gaddafi's nationalisation project ensured that Libya's government took 51 per cent control of oil mining by 1973 (Campbell 2013: 86). Libya argued that its decision to enforce the closing down of the British Air Base in its territory and the nationalisation of British-owned companies and properties was in revenge of Britain's dereliction in preventing Iran's occupation of the "Abu Musa and Tumb islands in the Persian Gulf" (Ronen 2006: 271). Libya perceived Britain as an accessory to the occupation of the Abu Musa and Tumb islands by Iran as the former thought that it was in the latter's power to halt Iran's occupation of the islands. It is observed that Britain and America erected military airbases in Libya to safeguard their own respective national interests, in the form of oil. This very idea of nationalising private companies that belonged to Britain and America, Libya was tinkering with the West's hold on its economy. In that way, Libya was challenging the West's control of economy, a crucial tenet of the concept of coloniality. Therefore, Libya was engaging and tinkering with Eurocentric domination of the global economy by attempting to free Libya's economy from the clutches of modernity on its resources and in its domain.

Hence, Qaddafi's quest to nationalise key industries in Libya meant that there was to be accountability in terms of the resources that Britain and America, particularly, were externalizing to their domains. This observation is based on the fact that during the reign of King Idris al-Sanusi, there could never have been symmetrical relations between Libya and Britain or between Libya and America owing to the fact that the former depended on the latter, respectively, for financial aid and military assistance. Besides, Libya owed its *independence* from Italy to Britain's, France's and the US's 1947 *intervention* (Lange 2005: 23). Deducing from the section that dealt with the problematic state-creation of Libya discussed earlier in this chapter, Britain and America possessed asymmetrical influence over Libya as the king makers who appointed and nominated King Idris as the Head of State of Libya in 1951 (El Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 15; Lange 2005: 23). This meant that Britain and the US did as they pleased without accounting to the generality of the people of Libya, save for possibly limited accountability to their appointee and nominee in the person of King Idris. It is plausible that Britain and America did not account to their own people in their respective domains on the gains they made through the syphoning of oil from Libya. The nationalisation of British and American companies in Libya meant that Qaddafi was essentially challenging the West's control of the Libyan economy certainly; but it was equally a challenge of the West's control

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on the global economy in the sense that the local is the global, as such, what happens in the domestic political domain of a state, affects and influences what happens in the international political domain. Therefore, Qaddafi's victory in regaining the control of the economy of Libya by nationalising British and American companies who were greatly benefiting from Libya's resources more than Libya itself, would have affected the international economy of the US and Britain who control the international monetary system that was devised at the Bretton Woods conference anyway (*US Department of State* 2001-2009).

The US dollar's strength is underpinned by gold and oil. Now, when Qaddafi was taking back control of the very means that give the US dollar its value, it was tantamount to unrolling the carpet beneath the West's feet. The US dollar becomes crucial in this analysis because all major currencies are pegged against the US dollar as was determined by the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944[10] and is perpetually maintained and monitored through the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gavin 2002).

3.5.1.1 Fundamental Reasons of Disputes between Libya and Britain

The fundamental reason behind the tense Libya/Britain relations emanated from Qaddafi's position on issues of national security and territorial integrity. Firstly, Qaddafi enforced the closing down of the British Air Base on Libyan soil, in Tobruk in 1970, after he took power from *Emir* Idris al-Sanusi in 1969. Again, between 1971 and 1972, Qaddafi offered support to the Prime Minister of Malta, Dom Mintoff, in opposition of Britain, at a time when Malta was in a dispute with Britain over British Military bases on the Island of Malta (Ronen 2006: 271). This move by Libya, infuriated and further antagonised the British. Libya compounded the situation by endorsing the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were challenging the British and furnished it with arms (*ibid*). The IRA had been outlawed in Europe and Ireland, incidentally in 1969 the year Qaddafi took over from King Idris, following intra-party violence within the IRA, which eventually led to the splitting of the IRA (Ronen 2006: 272; Zalman 2018). Qaddafi

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[10] The Bretton Woods Conference is officially known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which was held in New Hampshire, USA from the 1st of July to the 20th of July 1944 (*US Department of State* 2001-2009).

was to renew his support of the IRA in the 1980s following "Britain's decision to allow US, jets to bomb Libya from its bases" (Parr 2010: 14).

Another reason that widened the gulf between Libya and Britain was Qaddafi's close alignment of Libya with the Soviet Union. Given the tensions between Libya with the West, epitomised by Britain and the US, the chief nemeses of the Soviet Union, it was imminent that Libya's association with the Soviet Union was to be interpreted by Britain and America as antagonising Libya's relations with the two countries (Ronen 2006: 272).

During the 1980s the differences and antagonism between Libya and Britain deepened and worsened. Libya unleashed a violent crackdown on what it considered dissidents to its regime. Those dissidents were residing in the diaspora, mainly in Britain and the greater UK and the US. Libyan nationals, who were in forced and self-imposed exile in Britain, were killed by suspected Libyan agents who allegedly operated under the instructions of Qaddafi. Bookshops in London that sold Libyan opposition literature were torched and burnt down (Ronen 2006: 272). In other words, the Libyan government under Qaddafi, pursued its citizens who had either left in protest of the manner of Qaddafi's ascent to power or escaped the regime's violent crackdown of what it considered dissenters to the regime in foreign territories.

Britain did not take kindly to this as it "protested about the turning of its territory into an arena for Libya's internal political conflict" (Ronen 2006: 272). Ironically, the West and certainly Britain, France, Italy and the US fought their own 'domestic battles' in foreign lands, in North Africa particularly in the territory of Libya during the so-called WW II (Lange 2005: 23-24). Britain's stance on Libya's pursuit of its citizens in Britain, notwithstanding the violence of that campaign by Qaddafi, reveals the double-standards with which European modernity operates. Europeans fought their domestic battles in foreign territories, especially in Africa, and yet at the instance of this happening in their domain, they cry foul to the extent of threatening to sever diplomatic ties (Ronen 2006: 272).

Libya's relations with Britain were further damaged, following Britain's decision to allow the US to bomb Libya in 1986 from Britain's bases (Parr 2010: 14). Put differently, the British's complicity in the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi by American F-111 aircraft from its bases on the 15th of April 1986 further marred relations between itself and Libya (Ronen 2006: 276). The incident led Muammar Qaddafi to label Margaret Thatcher, Britain's then Prime Minister as a "stupid woman" (*ibid*). Sixteen days later, following the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi by the US, Qaddafi retaliated by expelling one hundred Briton expatriates who were resident

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in Libya (Ronen 2006: 276). This incident further damaged the Libyan/Britain diplomatic relations.

In what seemed to further reprisal, a December 1988 bombing of a plane over Lockerbie, Scotland happened (Huliaras 2002: 11; Zoubir 2002: 34). The downing of Pan Am flight 103 killed all 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground was suspected on Libyan nationals at the command of the Libyan Leader, President Qaddafi. Following investigations led by Britain, Scotland and the US, it became apparent that Libya was implicated in that explosion (Anon 2004: 195). That incident marked a watershed moment in Libya's tremulous relations with Britain and America respectively. Two-thirds of the passengers were American citizens and 44 were British citizens (Bowen 2006: 17). Investigations by the US-led coalition including the UK and NATO forces concluded that Libya as a state was responsible for the downing of the plane.

In response to the preliminary results of the Lockerbie investigations, the US and the UK took legal action against two Libyan national, Lamin Khalifa Fhimah who was a former manager of the Libyan national carrier, the Libyan Arab Airlines, in Malta Island, and Abdel Basset Ali al-Maghrahi, a high-level intelligence officer at the time. They sought the extradition of the two suspects to face trial in either, the US, or the UK (Zoubir 2002: 34). Libya responded by saying it had no treaties with either the US or the UK. Libya was cognisant of the probable fact that the two countries were hostile to Libya and so the political tensions between Libya and the US and the UK provided no guarantee that the two Libyan nationals were to be tried in an impartial court (*ibid*).

Alternatives to the legal impasse were proposed by Libya. The first alternative put forward was that the two suspects, Fhimah and al-Maghrahi, be tried in Libya in acquiescence of the 1971 anti-hijacking Montreal Convention (Zoubir 2002: 35). The second alternative was for the two suspects to be tried in a neutral country, as Libya was of the view that its nationals were to not receive a fair trial, given its political tensions with the US and UK (Zoubir 2002: 35). The third alternative that proposed was that the two suspects be tried at The Hague, in the International Court of Justice, in the Netherlands and the trial be conducted by Scottish Judges (Zoubir 2002: 35). Camp Zeist was the venue that the trial was to be held. It was an abandoned US air force base, outside The Hague (Schwartz 2007: 565).

What can be appreciated here is the fact that Libya was cooperative to the legal processes as stipulated by international law. While sceptic of its adversaries, and rightly so, Libya submitted

itself to international standards; for example, Libya questioned the absence of bilateral and, or, international treaties of extradition with the US and the UK. Libya volunteered to put its citizens under trial in accordance with the anti-hijacking Montreal Convention of 1971 and was willing to subject its citizens to a neutral country in respect of fair trials and the pursuit of justice. In fact, Qaddafi "contended that the Libyan suspects should be put on trial in the jurisdictions where the offenses took place" (Zoubir 2002: 35). This demonstrates that actually Libya was willing to surrender its citizens to face justice. Libya was even willing to surrender the two suspects who were accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 to the US if the US was willing to re-establish normal and formal relations with Libya (Zoubir 2002: 35).

Suffice to note that both, the US and the UK, out rightly rejected the propositions made by Libya (Zoubir 2002: 35), because they (the US and UK in following the script of modernity) make the rules and everyone else must act as they dictate, and not the other way around. The refusal by the US and the UK to entertain the propositions advanced by Libya, gave credence to the perceptions of Libyans themselves that "the real US target was the Libyan regime itself; they were persuaded that the US sought no less than the overthrow of Qaddafi and his replacement by the [Central Intelligence Agency] CIA-trained opposition" (Zoubir 2002: 35). This reveals yet again, the double standards of modernity. It purports itself as law abiding, yet it uses the so-called law as instruments to punish the so-called rogues. Most importantly, Zoubir (2002: 35) succinctly unmasks the regime-change agenda that the US had long been pursuing in Libya.

It is the argument of this thesis therefore, that both the Lockerbie incident and the Niger incident -the downing of UTA 772 by suspected Libyan intervention- were used by the US and the UK, and France respectively, as instruments to manipulate the Libyan regime by holding Libya at ransom for the crimes that were committed by its citizens, and as a premise with which they mobilized the UN to impose sanctions against Libya with the use of the UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748. The Resolutions were passed in January and March 1992 respectively, and were instructions to Libya to surrender the two suspects to the US and, or the UK, and the six suspects to France, and to cooperate with investigation of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, as well as, to compensate the families of the victims who perished in those fatal incidents (Zoubir 2002: 35).

The UN Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 did not yield the desired outcomes for the US, UK and France. The sanctions failed to get Libya to surrender its citizens to the demands

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of the trio. In March of 1993, two years after the Resolutions 731 and 748, Libya still stood its ground, and that further infuriated the US particularly. This prompted the US to seek the foisting of a world-wide oil embargo on Libya through its influence on the UN Security Council which it influenced to pass UNSC Resolution 883, which stipulated, among other things, the banning of air travel to Libya and tightly controlled, and restricted the sale of spare parts for the oil industry which relied on international sources. The US also imposed an arms embargo and an abridged diplomatic presence (Zoubir 2002: 35).

Libya was resolved and was unmoved by UN sanctions and it remained resolute that it would not expedite its citizens to an environment that was antagonistic to its own. European countries depended on Libyan oil and the US' sanctions caused some tension between the US and its allies who had need for Libyan oil. The Lockerbie debacle was concluded when Libya finally reconsidered its position and offered to pay compensation to the families of the victims of Pan Am 103 and the Libyan state took responsibility for the downing of Pan Am 103. The US, Britain and France insisted that Libya must denounce terrorism and coincidentally, after the 9/11 terror attacks, Qaddafi publicly condemned the actions of the Osama Bin Laden-led contingent that participated in the terror attacks; that saw the re-engagement of Libya/US and Libya/UK diplomatic relations (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 70; Ronen 2006: 280; Zoubir 2002: 49).

Libya and Britain endured turbulent diplomatic relations for the greater part of Qaddafi's tenure. Animosity, antagonism, contemptuousness and under-handedness characterised the relations between the two countries. This very nature of precarious diplomatic relations that had prevailed between Libya and Britain offer lenses into the real motives of the UK and US-led NATO coalition that was to later invade Libya and, in that chaos, was to kill Libya's long-time leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi.

3.5.2 Libyan Relations with the United States of America

As far back as 1952, a year after Libya declared itself independent from Britain, America's ally, the Soviet Union proposed to admit 14 states, including Libya, into the UN memberships. That proposal was blocked and vehemently opposed by the US (Simons 2003: xii). In 1955 however, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution 109(1955) that recommended that the General Assembly could admit 16 countries to the UN membership, of those 16 countries,

Libya was included. This recommendation was taken up by the General Assembly which in turn passed Resolution 995(X) that admitted Libya and fifteen other countries into the UN membership (Simons 2003: xii).

The US and Britain had military bases in Libyan territory that were used for the strategic purposes of the two countries after World War II. The Wheelus Air Force Base was an US military base which was referred to as "a Little America" (Zoubir 2002: 31). The US also had interests to protect oil from the Gulf through to Europe, Japan and North America (Haley 1984: 3). The US was to voluntarily evacuate Wheelus Air Force base as a gesture of good will and to foster cordial friendship with the Qaddafi regime after Qaddafi toppled King Idris al-Sanusi in a bloodless coup in 1961 (Zoubir 2002: 31). The evacuation of the Wheelus Air Force base particularly, was necessitated by the fact that the Wheelus military base was no longer serving the strategic purposes of the US government given the high anti-US sentiment from the Libyan new Qaddafi government that sought to define itself as a nationalist project (Haley 1984: 3; Zoubir 2002: 31). Put differently, the US' withdrawal from Libya was a gesture of good will towards the new establishment of the time and consistent with the US's national interests.

The US' insatiable thirst for Libyan oil, had outweighed the need to maintain the Wheelus Air Force Base as the US was now focusing on economic returns from Libya's oil (Zoubir 2002: 32). US oil companies made considerable profits in Libya, particularly Esso (Zoubir 2002: 31). Bowen (2006: 14) concurs with this view and adds that some of the American companies that held oil concessions in Libya, included Marathon Oil, Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips and Occidental Petroleum.

The fundamental reason of the tense relations between the US and Libya was over Qaddafi's regime that sought to control Libya's resources by nationalising its key industries, especially and specifically, the oil sector (Zoubir 2002: 32). The main strategic purpose of the US following World War II and the Cold War was to thwart and prevent anything that was seen to befriend, or be sympathetic to, the Soviet Union (Haley 1984; 3). The Libyan government, under Qaddafi, openly supported the Palestinian cause against its struggle with the US-backed Israel. Furthermore, by so doing, Libya aligned itself closer, politically and militarily with the Soviet bloc. There is no evidence to suggest that Libya was ideologically in sync with the Soviet bloc, but its close proximity to Russia which is a US' *bête noire*, naturally metamorphosed Libya into another US' *bête noire* in the US' view. Bowen (2006: 15) converges with this view and argues that in the 1970s Libya developed and strengthened its

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ties with Moscow in the then Soviet Union, at the height of the Cold War. The relations were primarily commercial; but from a Libyan perspective, the relations were intended to lead to Libya's amassment of sophisticated weaponry to deter "external aggression" (*ibid*). Hence, Libya was perceived by Washington as a "Soviet satellite" (Zoubir 2002: 32). The political animosity and antagonism that accompanied the Libya/US relations cemented the ideological differences of the two countries such that the "Libyan leader [Qaddafi] almost always supported governments and movements of national liberation who were on Washington's black list" (*ibid*). This already speaks to the score the US was to later settle with Qaddafi decades later, which resulted in the demise of the latter.

In 1974 Libya purchased from the Soviet Union, more weaponry than it required such that it began to supply other governments in the developing world. This development could have fed into the US' perception that Tripoli was involved in sponsoring terrorist activity. In 1975 Moscow agreed to provide Tripoli with a nuclear research reactor (Bowen 2006: 15).

Barely two years after Libya changed its official name from The Kingdom of Libya, to The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya* in 1979, the US embassy in Tripoli was bombed (Bowen 2006: 14-17). Naturally the US blamed Libyan authorities and accused Libya of having been behind the attack. The US contended that the Libyan authorities did nothing to prevent a mob that was inspired by the Iranian revolution from committing the arson act (Bowen 2006:14).

3.5.2.1 The US's *Casus Belli* in Libya

The 1980s saw the worst of the relations between Libya and the US, particularly under the Ronald Reagan administration. The extensive souring of relations between the US under Reagan and Libya under Qaddafi had to do with a change of the US' government. Reagan (whose Presidential term was between 1967-1975) wanted to appear different from his predecessor, Jimmy Carter (whose Presidential term was between 1977-1981), who was perceived as pacifist, owing to his Christian values, in dealing with Libya (Ballmer 2014). Strong (2019), singled out Presidents Qaddafi of Libya and Kim II Sung of North Korea as "the most volatile of foreign leaders" that President Jimmy Carter had to mediate disputes with, attesting to Carter's predicament of dealing decisively with Libya. The US actively sought to overthrow Qaddafi's regime because it was proving to work against the US plans and

objectives of a world order modelled on the US' terms. The US went further and orchestrated assassination attempts on the Libyan leader. The willingness of Qaddafi to retaliate only provided 'justification' for future US' aggression. It is on record that the US, in collaboration with some of its allies that were geographically closer in proximity to Libya, specifically, Egypt and Israel, intentionally made attempts in provoking Qaddafi to take actions that "would elicit 'legitimate' US retaliation" (Zoubir 2002: 32).

In 1981 further deals were sealed between Moscow and Tripoli involving "nuclear technology transfers" (Bowen 2006: 15). That same year, 1981, in an unprovoked assault of Libya the US aggressively downed two Soviet-made Libyan fighter jets that were downed over the Gulf of Sidra. In a show of malice and ill-intent, the US immediately ordered its citizens residing in Libya to evacuate, following its aggressive and unprovoked actions (Zoubir 2002: 32-33). Zoubir (2002: 33) highlighted the deceit of the US and revealed the admissions made by some high-ranking US officials:

> We wanted to provoke Qaddafi into responding so we could stick it to him, and we knew he would oblige us …we are arching for a go at Qaddafi … if Qaddafi sticks his head up, we will clobber him; we are looking for an excuse.

The following year, 1982, President Reagan imposed a ban (embargo) in the US on oil imports from Libya and stopped the selling of oil technology to Libya, knowing that Libya depended on the US for its oil technology and know-how (Zoubir 2002: 33). This was meant to punish Libya and paralyse and isolate the Qaddafi regime.

In 1986, at the height of the Cold War, Qaddafi fell into the trap laid by the US and its allies. On the 5th of April, where two US service men were killed in a bomb blast in West Berlin's *La Belle* disco, and another serviceman would die later in hospital. 229 people were injured, and of the injured people, 79 were American citizens. American soldiers were stationed in Berlin on national duty owing to the Cold War (Malinarich 2001). The *La Belle* disco was popular and known to be frequented by US service personnel.

In response to the *La Belle* disco bombing, the US bombed Tripoli and Benghazi, Qaddafi's home town (Hweio 2012: 112), on the pretext that Qaddafi's regime was hostile and that altercation resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians (Zoubir 2002: 33). Braut-Hegghammer (2008: 64) is of the view that the US attacks "appeared to target the leadership, they represented a threat security to regime security". It is observed that since Qaddafi's adopted daughter lost

her life in the air strike assaults (by the US) of the 15th of April 1986, it is conceivable that Qaddafi may have been the real target of those attacks. Several attempts on Qaddafi's life were made by the US but were not successful (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 64; Parr 2010: 14) Ronen (2006: 273) corroborates this view by evincing that in 1983 Qaddafi's headquarters and residence were attacked in an attempt on Qaddafi's life. In 1984 an explosion in Benghazi at a military installations exercise, injured Qaddafi's prominent aide Qadhaf al-Damm and Libyan investigations pointed to dissidents who were planted by the US and the incident was also treated as an attempt on Qaddafi's life and security.

The Libya/US diplomatic relations were equally precarious and were characterised with antagonism, under-handedness, plotting and counter-plotting, feigned intentions and actions, insincerity and contemptuousness. The nature of the relations between Qaddafi's Libya and the myriad of American administrations during Qaddafi's tenure tell of a bitter end and a long-time score to settle particularly by the US. The annoyance of the US over Qaddafi's stance on global coloniality and policies, particularly foreign policy, provide a historical antecedent and reading into the real motives of Qaddafi's killing by the US/UK-led NATO coalition that invaded Libya and killed Qaddafi in 2011.

3.5.3 Libyan Relations with France

After the November 1942 *El Alamein* battle, France in cohorts with Britain annexed Libya in two territories; France administered Fezzan in the south of Libya, while Tripolitania and Cyrenaica where self-apportioned by Britain (Ronen 2006: 271). This could arguably be the first instance that France had direct contact with Libya. Libya's diplomatic relations with France were marred by yet another controversy that involved the downing of yet another aeroplane.

On the 19th of September 1989, barely a year after the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland, a *Union de Transports Aériens* (UTA) operated French Airliner DC-10, flight 772 passenger jet was bombed and crashed in the dessert of Niger (Davies 2013; Huliaras 2002: 12). All of the 155 passengers, "including Bonnie Barnes Pugh, wife of the US Ambassador to Chad" (at the time) and 15 crew members on board UTA flight 772 perished (Brady 2013). This compounded Libya's perceived position as a terrorist-sponsoring state. France's investigations concluded that six Libyan nationals were responsible for placing explosive on

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the UTA flight 772 which was flying from Ndjamena, Congo Brazzaville to Paris, France (Davies 2013).

France instituted legal processes towards the six Libyan nationals thought to have orchestrated the bombing, for them to be extradited to France to face criminal charges for their actions. Although there was no evidence to the claims that followed the outcome of France's investigations of the bombing of UTA flight 772, France concluded that the motive for that plane was influenced by Libya's revenge on France, who supported Chad in the border dispute between Chad and Libya (Brady, 2013). France, like the US and the UK, sought recourse from the UN Security Council and urged the UN to impose sanctions on Libya (Zoubir 2002: 35). Davies (2013) notes that the six Libyan nationals were sentenced, in *absentia*, to life in prison by a French court. Brady (2013), concurs with this submission.

France was to be directly involved in the invasion of Libya in 2011. France, through its citizen, Bernard-Henri Levy, who was in Benghazi just at the time the Arab Spring protests commenced in Libya, sought the intervention of the French President at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy by exaggerating the so-called bloodshed that was imminent if France did not intervene. Bernard-Henri Levy (Cited in, Gazzini 2011: 4) advised the French President "there will be a massacre in Benghazi, a bloodbath" if the President of France did not intervene. In response to this ill advice, President Sarkozy subsequently met with the National Transitional Council (NTC) leadership at the Élysée Palace, the official residence of the French President, on 10 March 2011. In that meeting, the French President granted the NTC "official recognition as the sole legitimate representatives of Libyan people" (Gazzini 2011: 5). This is problematic because, once again, the fate of Libyan people lay in the hands of a foreign and outside force. The French displayed the attitude that accompanied colonisers - that of deciding and naming and therefore, framing the trajectory of the colonised. The fact that the French President 'officially' recognised the NTC speaks to the frivolous enterprise that the formerly colonised subject themselves. This is, indeed coloniality, which perpetuates colonial-like structures in formerly colonised spaces.

It is no wonder then that Qaddafi was killed after French fighter jets stuck his motorcade which was fleeing from Benghazi, thereby making him vulnerable and was assassinated by Libyan rebels (Gazzini 2011: 3). What is important to note here is that, had it not been for the French intervention that assaulted Qaddafi's convoy militarily, it would have been impossible for the

so-called rebels to attack and kill the Libyan leader. Hence, the French played a crucial role in the killing of Qaddafi, not surprisingly, for the French had a score to settle.

3.5.4 Libya's Renunciation of Nuclear Ambitions

The UK and the US played a significant role in Libya's disarmament of its nuclear capabilities. Bowen (2006: 7; 49-50) credits the diplomatic influence of the US and Britain particularly that resulted in Libya's abandonment to pursue ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear proliferation. An anonymous source, in The American Journal of International Law (2004: 195), is of the view that Libya's announcement that it was abandoning its pursuance of ballistic capabilities and nuclear programmes can be traced to the 1980s where the US adopted a policy of bilateral, multilateral and international sanctions against Libya. The sanctions were meant to isolate Libya, as the US asserted that Libya "was supporting international terrorism and attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" (Anon 2004: 195). In retrospect, the US claimed this in a pre-emptive way in order to deter Libya from pursuing nuclear programmes. This work notes the fact that an anonymous source that provides the above-mentioned 'facts' in a supposedly respected international journal, is telling of suspicious 'facts' that accompany this narrative.

In 2003, at a time when the US invaded and bombed Iraq in search of nuclear weapons, that were never found, and in that process, killing Iraq's President Saddam Hussein, "Libyan officials secretly approached the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom about disclosing and ending Libya's WMD program" (Anon 2004: 195). Libya was to make public its plans of rolling back its nuclear proliferation in December 2003 (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 55). But, is it not the nature of diplomacy that negotiations are in secret or in confidence between the concerned governments? The highlighting of Libyan officials' secret approach to the US and the UK is an exaggerated emphasis meant to denigrate Libya's diplomatic move to renounce its nuclear capabilities in conformity to international standards. It is this thesis' assertion that Libya voluntarily renounced its nuclear programmes and invited the governments of the US and the UK, in accordance with the demands that the latter governments had persuaded Libya through the UN, to be part of the inspection and de-escalation. In fact, Libya's renunciation of its pursuit of nuclear capabilities was as a result of "trilateral negotiations between the United Sates, Libya and the United Kingdom" (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 56).

Ronen (2006: 271) submits an account of how Tony Blair had, in March of 2004, visited his counterpart Muammar Qaddafi to consolidate Britain's and Libya's relations following a period of about 15 years of what Ronen called a "diplomatic rapture" of the two countries. The visit to Tripoli by Britain's former Prime Minister signalled the normalisation of diplomatic relations of the two countries as a result of Libya's renunciation of nuclear missile capabilities. What Ronen, erroneously presumes to be the normalisation of relations between Libya and Britain is that the normalisation is symmetrical. It, in fact, is asymmetrical and it favours the Euro-North American-centric agenda. Why should it be that America and its allies are the only legitimate holders of nuclear power capabilities? The answer to this question lies in understanding how Eurocentric modernity controls power and WMD. The codification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968, effective 1970) aims to curtail nuclear capabilities to a few countries that are allies with Britain, France and the US.

3.6 Qaddafi's Fight against Global Imperialism

Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi rose to power in a *coup d'état*, that toppled Britain-backed King Idris al-Sanusi, in Libya on the 1st of September 1969 and stayed in power until the 23rd of August 2011 when he was killed by France, Britain and the US-assisted "Libyan" rebels (Gazzini 2011: 5). This work posits that given Qaddafi's ascent to power, he faced a lot of resistance, albeit subtle, from the US, Britain and France, precisely because Qaddafi's ascent to power threatened European interests in that North African country. This was to be realised when Qaddafi nationalised Britain and US owned-companies and nationalised the oil industry (Ronen 2006; Gazzini 2011; Braut-Hegghammer 2008). Naturally, this meant that the Qaddafi's regime would face dissent and resistance, not only from Western states, but from within Libya as well (Ronen 2006: 274).

Modernity permeates all fabric of human society such that even the victims of modernity would read from modernity's script and defend it. Such was the issue in Libya. Ronen (2006: 273) speaks of how some Libyan nationals vehemently opposed the Qaddafi regime from within Libya, as well as, outside the borders of Libya. An expatriate group of Libyans who lived in the UK who called themselves the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, actively sought to discredit Qaddafi in exile (UK and US particularly) by intensifying propaganda against Qaddafi and his regime. The propaganda material was also smuggled into Libya in a bid to stir

a revolt from within. A closer look at these events reveal that, the resistance of Qaddafi from within Libya and the Western world was prompted by a regime-change agenda led by the US, Britain and France who were naturally aggrieved at Qaddafi's ascent to power and the subsequent closing down of the US and Britain military airbases on Libyan soil. Needless to state that the real reason why the US and Britain insisted on having air bases in Libya was to guard their interests, Libyan oil. Western states depended on Libya's oil and even after the US and Britain called for UN sanctions that were enforced through the UNSC Resolutions 731, 748, 883 among others (Huliaras 2001: 11), Qaddafi emerged as a "beleaguered revolutionary, standing firm against the forces [of] imperialism and neo-colonialism" (Zoubir 2002: 36).

Qaddafi stood resolutely firm against foreign occupation of Libya and equally stood against foreign occupation of other places and spaces particularly by the representatives of western Modernity, the US and Britain. Qaddafi backed the Palestinian cause against the US sponsored Israeli occupation of Palestine (Ronen 2006). Qaddafi's resolution to fighting global imperialism was rhetoric, in as much as it was backed by action. He offered financial and military assistance to fellow African countries who were prepared to terminate their diplomatic relations with Israeli (Huliaras 2001: 6). Libya equally involved itself in the 1987 scuffle between itself and the French and Britain-backed Chad in a dispute over Libya's borders with Chad (Ronen 2006: 274). Libya aligned itself with the Soviet bloc precisely because the Soviet stood antithetical to the US and Britain's domination and naturally Qaddafi stood in support of that cause, much to the chagrin of the West (Zoubir 2002: 32).

Huliaras (2001: 6) writes that, as far back as the 1970s, Qaddafi supported African countries in their quests for political independence. This was possible for Qaddafi owing to his county's wealth from oil, especially at a time when "the country was at the height of its oil wealth and influence". Qaddafi supported liberation movements in African countries that included: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe (*ibid*). Naturally, these countries perceived Qaddafi as a pan-African personality who was pro-African liberation and indeed Qaddafi was pro-African liberation from Western domination and coloniality. Hence, on the 12th of December 1994, "the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAU member states passed a resolution urging the UN Security Council to revoke the sanctions on Libya" (Huliaras 2001: 12).

3.7 The clashing of civilisations: Libya's Islam and Euro-North American-centric Christian modernity

As noted in *Chapter Two*, European modernity rose to prominence in the seventeenth century, at that time Islam had spread and enveloped much ground in the Middle-East, Asia, the north Africa region where Libya is located, and some parts of Europe; it was a religion and civilisation that many people of the stated regions identified with. Kissinger (2014: 5) evinces this assertion and argues that "in the seventeenth century Islam had landed itself across three continents in an unprecedented wave of religious exaltation and imperial expansion". Hence, it is the contention of this thesis that the NATO invasion of Libya was not necessarily about upholding universal human rights by the US-led United Nations Security Council that deemed Qaddafi a threat to the human rights of some populations of Libya. To the contrary of what claimed and attributed to Qaddafi as having breached, the invasion of Libya was about reinforcing the Euro-North American-centric modernity in the place and space that had a presence of Islam, the religion that Muammar Qaddafi identified with. So, it was a war about the dominance of European modern civilisation over Islam as a civilisation, more than it is a religion. Although on the face value, the NATO invasion could be mistaken to have been about the Islamic faith and religion. Qaddafi was just the opportune occasion to re-assert the Euro-North American-centric dominance over the Islamic civilisation or any other civilisation for that matter.

What America, Britain and France particularly feared in Libya was the steady rise of Libya's economy through the policies that Qaddafi pursued domestically and internationally. For insistence, Libya's Qaddafi championed vibrant and viable national policies on health, education, housing and Libya's economy grew from strength to strength under Qaddafi (Lendman 2012: 101; Fitrakis 2012: 15; Nazemroaya 2012b).

Furthermore, America perceived Islam as a religion that sought to govern the world religiously by following religious Islamic religious laws. Kissinger evinces that "in much of the region between Europe and China, Islam's different concept of world order held sway, with its own vision of a single divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world" (Kissinger 2014: 15). This particular view of Islam from a perspective outside Islam, as held by the US, perturbed Euro-North American-centric modernity such that it was threatened. Cognisant that in the paradigm of war that the US espouses, threats are dealt with force and violence, including death, it is not surprising therefore, that Libya as a country that is located in the Islamic

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geographic domain and Qaddafi who espoused Islam, had to be dealt with violently and forcefully.

The irrational threat that the Euro-North American-centric modernity perceived of Islam is an unfounded idea that Islam sought to obliterate the Western-centric modern empire. This is actually the projection of modernity on other civilisations, and it acts on the projection because it creates a security dilemma for itself. Yet Islam unified the Arab world, established itself on remnants of the Roman Empire and embraced some parts of Europe, and thus Islam reigned in the Middle East and North Africa – the location of Libya, and portions of Asia (Kissinger 2014: 5).

While modernity could argue that its stance on Islam is influenced by the idea that Islam sees itself as an ordained and legitimate civilisation and religion that has at its core a desire to create a unitary system modelled on the Prophet Muhammad's (*peace be upon him*) message as evinced by Kissinger. He argues that Islam's "version of universal order considered Islam destined to expand over the 'realm of war, as it called all regions populated by unbelievers, until the whole world was a unitary system brought into harmony by the message of the Prophet Muhammad [*peace be upon him*]" (Kissinger 2014: 5). The problem still remains that both Islam and modernity in that sense seek to dominate each other and subsequently, the whole world. The problem still persists of coloniality; it is the argument of this work that Islam, modernity and all other forms of civilisations can and must coexist, one by the side of the other.

During President Bill Clinton's administration, following the end of the Cold War, America devised what it called the "anti-rogue strategy" to deal with what America perceived as rogue or dissident states (Zoubir 2002: 33). The anti-rogue strategy was a brainchild of a Colin Powell, the then Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff. The strategy was devised in preparation of the imminent disintegration of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) of the 1989-90. Among other things, it outlined the military strategy that would inform America going forward; it became the roadmap and defining paradigm that informed American security policy. Zoubir (2002: 33) is of the view that, because of the geographic proximity of the Middle East to Israel, and the region's importance to America's economic and strategic interests, the so-called rogue states are *coincidentally* and conveniently located in the Middle East region.

Furthermore, the so-called "'rogue states', Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria are all Muslim, Iran being the only non-Arab country among the five" (Zoubir 2002: 33). It is common knowledge that America has an inherent distrust of Islam (Mamdani 2011; Zoubir 2002: 33).

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Since, modernity has an inherent distrust of Islam; it considers Islam to have a "quest of visons of global revolution based on fundamentalist version of their religion" (Kissinger 2014: 7). What perhaps it not always interrogated is the reason why America distrusts Islam so much. Given that America is the epitome of Western modernity, America automatically wants to preserve and protect modernity which forced itself on Islam, thereby establishing a relationship of mistrust with Islam as a civilisation.

It is conceivable that the Libyan debacle was influenced by an inherent distrust of Islam by Euro-North American, Christian and Western modernity on an ideological level. Modernity has always perceived Islam as a major challenge to its hegemony. Qaddafi being a professed Muslim was deemed or perceived by Euro-North American modernity to be influenced by the principles of Islam and in Euro-North American perspective, are uncompromising. Compromising with that position would translate to compromising with its very foundation of dominance and hegemony perpetuated and guaranteed by an asymmetrical power balance that favours Euro-North American modernity's perspective.

3.8 Analysis

Coloniality of power in Libya can be traced at the very onset of state-creation in Libya, the 2011 invasion was simply a manifestation of the long brewing war of the politics of empire. The involvement of Britain, France and America at the founding of the state of Libya spells of the European template that was cast over Libya's state-creation and Libyans had to just follow that script, agenda and trajectory set by Europe. That speaks to coloniality and the control of Libya and Libyans by non-Libyans (Europeans). On a world systems level, Qaddafi's policies especially towards the West were influenced by a need to respond to a monolithic and imposing European empire that sought to obliterate Libya. While the imposing monolithic European empire did not specifically seek to obliterate and single out Libya, it was the perspective of Qaddafi that Libya was equally affected by European conquest and colonisation. European colonisation was an evil that had to be eradicated and corrected. As if Italian colonialism was not enough for Libya, Britain and France took over the administration of Libya in a case of handing down Europe's property to its owners, who could do anything with their possession and the possession would not question that, because it cannot.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter exposed the problematic nature of state-creation in Libya. It evinced that the very idea of a modern state in Libya was influenced by Britain particularly, and did not reflect the will of the generality of the Libyan populace. Instead, state-creation in Libya relied on the British endorsement of a sectional leadership of Cyrenaica-turned-Libyan national leadership. The creation of the modern state in Libya resembled Europe's partitioning of Africa which ignored the local and organic arrangements and conditions. This chapter has also demonstrated and evinced that the invasion of Libya by the US, Britain, and France-led coalition of NATO forces was a long time coming. The invasion of Libya owed to Qaddafi's quest for political and economic freedom of Libya and the freeing of Libyan resources. Given the diplomatic turbulent relations that Libya had gone through with Britain, France and the US it was only a matter of time before the Western bloc found a binding *Casus Bello* for a seeming legitimate intervention in Libyan affairs. The passing of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 by the UNSC was the opportune moment that the West had always been looking for in order to strike at Muammar al-Qaddafi and effect their long-standing regime change agenda.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE ARAB SPRING DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE LIBYAN CRISIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter contextualises the Libyan crisis in 2011 within the discourse of the Arab Spring while at the same time highlighting how global imperial designs took advantage of the situation to militarily invade Libya and kill its leader. What is posited here is that the Libyan crisis was re-articulated as a threat to the global colonial power structural configuration. As such, the NATO-led UNSC as custodians of the global power structure had to act and punish the deviant and delinquent Libya. Hence, the invasion of Libya was a consolidation of global coloniality of power.

The genesis of the 2010-11 Arab Spring demonstrations is, traced back to the Tunisia Revolution of the 17th of December 2010 against the Ben Ali regime. The revolution soon took root in Egypt, and eventually in countries in the Middle East such as, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. The Arab Spring revolutions were far-reaching and widespread with countries such as Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Iranian Khuzestan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan affected in various degrees. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led United Nations did not intervene in the 'internal affairs' of the majority of countries that were riddled by the Arab Spring protests. Yet, at the first sight of protest in Libya (on the 15th of February 2011), the UN Security Council expeditiously met and issued Resolutions 1970 (on the 26th of February 2011) and Resolution 1973 (on the 17th of March 2011) authorising military intervention in Libya resulting in Qaddafi's demise (Campbell 2013: 67-68). The question becomes, why the sudden action from the NATO-led UNSC in response to Libya's protests? The intervention from the NATO-led UNSC suggests deeper interests than the veneer that was, reported particularly by neo-liberal media and neo-liberal scholarship. This chapter sets out to interpret the events that engulfed the Arab Spring protests generally, but particularly isolate the events that led to the invasion of Libya by NATO forces.

The Libyan invasion by NATO forces was a calculated and meticulous plan by the US, Britain and France to put in motion a long-standing regime-change agenda that sought to topple Libya's then President Muammar al-Qaddafi. The Arab Spring protests were the political context within which the NATO invasion of Libya was carried out. As the Arab Spring

demonstrations were far-reaching and affected more than 12 countries, the analysis of this work will be limited to six countries, namely: Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. The selection of the countries to be analysed was motivated by a desire to centre an African perspective (four African countries that were severely affected by the Arab Spring protests); the selection also privileged two Middle-Eastern countries (Yemen and Bahrain), as the Arabic world forms a part of the Global South. The Arab Spring uprisings were a popular citizen-led protest movement that started in Tunisia and soon spread to Egypt, Sudan and affected other countries in the Arab world such as Bahrain and Yemen. The protests signalled the discontent of citizens of the respective countries of their governments; the uprisings were in protest of high costs of living, unemployment, poor healthcare, exorbitant costs to get an education *et cetera*.

What boggles the mind though is that, of all the countries that were affected by the Arab Spring uprisings, Libya was the only country that the so-called international community - which is really the global NATO to use Campbell's (2013) words – militarily intervened in. The premise of the furtive intervention was the R2P doctrine. The UNSC Resolution 1973 referred to the R2P doctrine as an instrument it used in the invasion that killed Qaddafi and consequently, plundered Libya's resources. Hence, it is necessary to inquiry into the Arab Spring uprisings, as they were a precursor to the Libyan invasion by NATO forces. This work posits that the NATO invasion of Libya, in the context of the Arab Springs, was a selective, *parti pris* and targeted application of R2P. As such, the Libyan Arab Spring uprisings were an occasion to invoke and operationalise the *Casus Belli* that the US, UK and France had in place for a long time standing.

4.2 Tunisia in the Arab Spring Demonstrations

The 17th of December 2010 is a date that is synonymous with the beginnings of the Arab Spring uprisings (Hess 2013: 254). On that date a Tunisian national, Mohamed Bouazizi an ordinary street trader, set himself alight and died in protest of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's government policies that were described as repressive, authoritarian and dictatorial (Hess 2013: 254; Plaetzer 2014: 258). President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia since 1987, meaning he had been in power for 23 years (*The Guardian* 2011). The time that President Ben Ali had spent in office was regarded as undemocratic and dictatorial in the frameworks of

Western liberalism as evinced in the works of scholars such as, Wang (n.d.: 2), Moravcski (1995: 160) and Jain (2006: 149).

4.2.1 The Cause of the Tunisian Arab Spring Protests

Plaetzer (2014: 259), points to the origins of the Tunisian revolt of 2011 as caused by "socioeconomic grievances such as inequality, unemployment and rising food prices" as well as the marginalisation of the greater part of the Tunisian population, politically. Graham-Harrison (2018) corroborates this view and avers that the price hikes of basic commodities such as fuel and food were at the centre of the civilian protest against the Ben Ali regime. In convergence with the two aforementioned views, the Al Jazeera News Agency (2015) reported that, the unbearable "living conditions were the underlying reasons for the demonstrations". It is evident that the Tunisian demonstrations were a response to an economic quagmire that beseeched the general populace of Tunisia. The Tunisians had legitimate concerns that they sought their government to address in the Arab Spring protests. Therefore, after registering their displeasure and dissatisfaction through protests, the government of Tunisia, whom the protests were directed at, was to respond and address the citizens' concerns.

4.2.2 The Tunisian Government's Response to the Protests

Ben Ali's government responded to demonstrations by using state-security apparatuses who engaged force and violence to supress the dissenting voices of the citizens of Tunisia (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2015). In other words, state-security forces used violent means to put an end to otherwise peaceful, demonstrations (Cordall 2018). The UN and the Cable News Network (CNN) postulate that, about 300 people died in the protests following the Ben Ali's government responses to the protests, and a further 700 were injured (*CNN* 2011). Rettig (2011) corroborates these figures and avers that, "A UN torture expert who visited the country in May reported that as many as 300 were killed and 700 injured during the revolution". The Firstpost (2012), puts the figure at least to 383 people who died in the Tunisian Arab Spring uprising.

The police claimed their use of armed force was in "self-defence" (Cordall 2018). What is noteworthy in the Tunisia case is that, although President Ben Ali was to later flee Tunisia on the 13th of January 2011, he had initially resisted the will of the people who wanted him "lost"

from Tunisia (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2015). Eventually, Ben Ali fled Tunisia and went into exile in January of 2011 (Hess 2013: 254). Fleeing Tunisia at a crucial time such as that (time of the Arab Spring protests), meant that President Ben Ali was to miss the 23rd of October 2011 election, which was subsequently followed by the passing of a "liberal constitution" on the 26th of January 2014 (Plaetzer 2014: 258-259).

In the view of neo-liberalism and Eurocentric modernity, the Tunisian leg of the Arab Spring uprisings, the Tunisian electorate got rid of the 'dictator' in President Ben Ali. Hence, today Eurocentric and neo-liberal scholarship hail the Tunisian Arab Spring uprisings as a success; this is evinced by the works of Plaetzer (2014: 260); Hess (2013: 255); McKernan (2018); Khan and Mezran (2015: 1) and Cordall (2018), among others. Ali Mazrui (in, Tanoukhi & Mazrui 2012: 151-152) correctly asserts that the only success there was in Tunisia, and to some extent Egypt, was that there was regime change. Of course, the regime changes had shortfalls in that there were change of Presidents and not necessarily the systems of governments that sustained the former incumbents. Of course, there is another view that, those systems of governments that sustained the former incumbents were actually created by them. In other words, while the faces of leaders changed, the systems that they created, and sustained them, remained (*Global Security Organisation* 2019a; *Global Security Organisation* 2019b. Therefore, the success was only limited in that the calls and advances expressed in the Arab Spring protests simply endorsed the current world order; they did not disrupt the *status quo* of the European-centred world order. Tunisia was to remain another state that mimics Eurocentrism and dictates, a state that would remain just another country in Africa that resembles European dictates and norms.

4.2.3 Analysis of the Tunisian Arab Spring

President Ben Ali of Tunisia had the same kind of framing as Qaddafi; both Ben Ali and Qaddafi were framed as leaders of authoritarian, dictatorial and repressive regimes (Breen 2018; Taylor 2017; *The Guardian* 2011; *Times Live* 2018). This, notwithstanding that they may have had dictatorial tendencies. The framing of President Ben Ali by Western scholarship as dictatorial as expressed by Plaetzer (2014), Taylor (2017), *The Telegraph* (2011), the *Firstpost* (2012), the *Euronews* (2011) as well as Breen (2018), points to the problematic nature of Western scholarship, the colonial canon and the colonial tendencies, thereof. The common

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theme that binds the aforementioned sources is that they are all located in Eurocentric modernity. That opinion (the framing of Ben Ali and Qaddafi as dictators) reflects the thinking of pundits and media houses that are largely located in Europe and espouse neo-liberalism. This illustrates that what Western modernity does not agree with, is pathologised, demonised, bastardised and peripherised by casting and framing it in negative light, it is negated. As such, the framing of President Ben Ali as a dictator was a result of his style of politics that stood antithetical to the script of Western modernity on what democracy ought to be - not that Western modernity follows the tenets of democracy religiously itself. Western modernity hence, assigns what stands contrary to it an identity that is negative, pathological, bastardised and leprosised thus, justifies condemnation of such an identity. Those condemnations can be fatal as they allow for the elimination or riddance of the condemned, as was to be with Libya's President Qaddafi. Aime Cesaire (1971: 2; 2000: 27) sums up the above observation by noting that, the Eurocentric-worldview tends to name things, in the process, demonising and thingfying that which is unfamiliar to it, or does not know, or that which it does not agree with.

Plaetzer (2014), in his analysis of the involvement of civil society in Tunisia's Arab Spring demonstrations, unwittingly reveals the real motive of the Tunisian revolt. His analysis speaks of the Tunisian leg of Arab Spring uprisings as modelled on, and following the script of "the liberal 'road map'" (Plaetzer 2014: 259). In this light, the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia were a veneer to occasion the implementation of the Eurocentric modernity's template of development that is inherently contained in the so-called liberal roadmap. Besides, the so-called liberal roadmap had its vanguards in the form of liberal institutions and organisations. As evidenced in the work of Plaetzer (2014: 259), of the neo-liberal vanguards that unwittingly ensured that the *status quo* of the current world order was to remain intact in Tunisia included, but were not limited to:

1. The Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, of Political Reform (HCAORPL)
2. The Transition to Democracy (TD), led by renowned intellectual, Yadh Ben Achour, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (IMeRA, 2018)
3. The Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)
4. The Human Rights League of Tunisia (HRLT)

The political agenda that these institutions stood for, or endorsed, is an agenda that is under-written by Western modernity. Deducing from the Libyan crisis, many so-called Non-

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Governmental Organisations and Human Rights Organisations that reported on the Arab Spring demonstrations, were a part of the neo-liberal agenda of spreading falsehoods about the crises. These organisations colluded with Western countries in peddling misinformation as part of the propaganda to incite and create an impression that the demonstrations were violent and therefore, *interventions* were imminent (Nazemroaya 2012a: 127-128). This therefore, renders the independence and neutrality of these institutions questionable, if not compromised, if at all credible. Was it out of their own volition to pursue the agenda of reform as professed by the Arab Spring uprisings, or were these institutions simply taking instructions from their Euro-North American handlers and funders? It is this thesis' assertion that the latter is more plausible. Coloniality sustains colonialism in the absence of the latter. The institutionalisation of colonial structures by the current world order ensures that coloniality is sustained. In that regard, the institutions that are located, designed and mimic European modernity are part of the problem that endorses the current asymmetrical world order.

This work contends that the so-called Tunisian 'success' is in convergence with a Eurocentric modernity's reconfiguration of the asymmetrical power spectrum that constitute the current Eurocentric world order. Gosh (2011: 16) downplays the fact that the Ben Ali regime responded violently in pursuance of quelling the local version of the Tunisia Arab Spring protests, by highlighting the "quiet escape" of Tunisia's former President Ben Ali. What the text in Gosh (2011: 16) conveniently overlooks is the fact that 383 people died as a direct result of the protests and a further 700 people were injured. More importantly however, is that the Tunisian Arab Spring uprisings did not pose any threat or danger to the current asymmetrical power spectrum configuration that the current world order rests upon. The Tunisian version of the Arab Spring uprisings could have not made much deference on a global scale as the government of Tunisia, unlike that of Libya, did not have the kind of resources in the form of oil that the Euro-North-American-centric world depends on. Therefore, there was no need for the US, UK, France and NATO – the custodians of Eurocentric modernity to intervene in the domestic affairs of Tunisia. In the physical absence of Eurocentric modernity in Tunisia, its institutions (*inter alia*, the very idea of the State, HCAORPL, TD, UGTT, HRLT) and therefore, vanguard-levers of coloniality were intact. In other words, while the physical colonialism had arguably ended in Tunisia, it is survived by coloniality today.

Those institutions ensured that they controlled legitimacy, authority, the economy, the relaying of information and therefore, knowledge and the very being of Tunisians. Those institutions ensued the control of the State and other coordinates of a democratic polity by endorsing and

affirming the dictates of a Euro-North American-centric worldview of an ideal state, without which, the state and regime would be named as dictatorial, undemocratic *etc*. Any contender to the Presidential race had to be perceived as meeting the criteria created by Western modernity, and had to be endorsed by the so-called liberal institutions if the incumbent was to be successful. To further consolidate this point, Yadh Ben Achour who, as the interim President of the Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, of Political Reform, and a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee - while a patriotic Tunisian - has all the hallmarks and certifications of Eurocentric modernity. The fact that Achour's appointment to the Presidency of that Commission followed President Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia has all the bearings of a Eurocentric modernity's script of a regime change agenda. The appointments of political office leaders are initiated and endorsed by the Western-centric world view as revealed by Nazemroaya (2012a: 128), without which, succeeding at such a high-level political race is futile. Achour's involvement after the ouster of President's Ben Ali reduced his credibility to a compromised, unwilling and probably unaware, accessory of Eurocentric modernity. At best, he unreflectively cooperated with the dictates and script of a Eurocentric modernity.

In the frameworks of a Eurocentric modernity, the closest there is to a credible international community is essentially the UN General Council, but the more powerful structure of the UN system is the UN Security Council which endorses and works in tandem with Eurocentrism. Of course, the UN Security Council possesses asymmetrical power that sustains the current Eurocentric world order. As such, the Tunisian situation did not warrant the international community's intervention. The Tunisian situation was in no way a threat to the asymmetrical, UN-crafted and endorsed, Eurocentric world order.

4.3 Egypt in the Arab Spring Demonstrations

In the Egypt scenario, the Arab Spring demonstrations were also known as the January 25, 2011 Revolution, in recognition of the date that the local version of the Arab Spring protests escalated in that North African country (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2016). Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, became a corollary of the Egyptian Arab Spring demonstrations (*British Broadcasting Corporation* 2011; Tharoor 2016). Hosni Mubarak had been Egypt's Head of State since 1981 (*British Broadcasting Corporation* 2017). The Mubarak-led government had relatively good

relations with the West, particularly America (Gosh 2011: 18). The relatively good relations between Egypt and the US were perceived as beneficial to both countries; America used its ties with Egypt as a gateway to the Arabic world. Egypt benefited from the US militarily and economically (Tharoor 2016; Gosh 2011: 18). It is this thesis' contention that, whereas there was mutual co-operation between the two states, their relationship had been asymmetrical in favour of the US Like most countries in the world, Egypt depended on the US more than the latter to the former.

4.3.1 The Cause of the Egyptian Arab Spring Protests

Plaetzer (2014: 261) argues that the causes of the Egyptian Arab Spring uprisings were similar to the Tunisian case or cause; he attributes the demonstrations to have been caused by the "discontented" and the "dispossessed" masses of Egypt owing to the corruption and maladministration of arms of government by the Hosni Mubarak regime. Hess (2013: 255) cites socioeconomic inequalities, corruption, high unemployment rates particularly of the youth and technological diffusion as the main drivers of the Egypt Arab Spring uprisings. The Al Jazeera News Agency (2011) corroborated the aforementioned views and added that Egypt's local version of the Arab Spring protests were a result of government's failure to address key economic, health and social issues in Egypt. Similarly, like Tunisia's Ben Ali-led regime, the Mubarak-led regime in Egypt had to respond to those peaceful protests.

4.3.2 The Egyptian Government's Response to the Protests

The Hosni Mubarak-led regime responded to its local version of the Arab Spring protests by violently quelling the dissention of protestors. State resources and forces were discharged to deal with the protests and adversely, the dealing with protestors resulted in the use of force. To this effect, Elliot (2011: 22) argues that the demonstrations for constitutional reforms in Egypt were "combated with deadly force". The Al Jazeera News Agency (2011) reported that about 150 people died during the Arab Spring protests in Egypt and a further 2000 people were injured in that process. Rettig (2011) reveals that according to the Egyptian Commission Report about 846 Egyptians lost their lives as a result of government forces' clamp down on the Arab Spring protestors. Rettig (2011) further states that, according to the Egyptian Commission

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Report, "[a]bout 6,400 people were injured through acts of government violence, such as police vehicles intentionally running over citizens". Gosh (2011) unwittingly reveals the double standards embedded in Eurocentric-modernity and its coordinates. The particularly Eurocentric coordinates of modernity that were used included, but were not limited to, mass media. In his own words Gosh (2011: 16) argued that, the Mubarak regime's response to its local version of the Arab Spring demonstrations was "broadly peaceful".

The Mubarak regime's response to the protests cannot be classified as peaceful, believing this narrative is problematic because it could never account for the 150 deaths and more than 2000 people who were injured in the protests. Rather what this misnomer by Gosh (2011: 16) reveals is that when it suits Western-centred modernity, facts are twisted and some overlooked, whereas, if it suits the Euro-centric worldview, facts are bolstered, underscored and blown up to more than what they represent. The fact is that the Mubarak regime equally used force in response to its local version of the Arab Spring protests. Egypt's response was similar to the Tunisian response, as much as it was similar to the Libyan response. Violence and state-force were used in the various and respective local versions of the Arab Spring protests, yet the reportage underscores and emphasises some situations and, by the same token, overlooks and under-reports some facts. This is the problematic nature of Eurocentric modernity; it is laden with double standards.

4.3.3 Analysis of the Egyptian Arab Spring

Comparably with the Tunisian case, civil society organisations' involvement in the Egyptian Arab Spring uprisings leaves one with more questions than answers. America's foreign policy made monetary provisions for Egypt's army and several civil society organisations; as a result, those organisations were tolerated by the Mubarak regime (Plaetzer 2014: 261). Therefore, it cannot be that the Egyptian army could have not been to some degree loyal to America as its funder and possibly handler. It could neither be that the civil society organisations were indifferent to America's foreign, and local to Egypt's, interests; they were certainly not loyal to the Mubarak regime either.

A national army represents the highest form of state security apparatus, an army is the last line of defence in a country; and if that apparatus becomes compromised by way of foreign sponsorship, as was the case with American sponsorship of the Egyptian army, then it is

conceivable that a foreign force, American in this case, was actually in charge. Gosh (2011: 18) confirms this observation when he argues that in Libya, "unlike in Egypt … the Obama Administration ha[d] no leverage". In the case of Egypt, it is that foreign force (America) that this thesis contends constitutes coloniality of the highest form. Because of the severity of a state institution that America controlled in Egypt (the Egyptian Army), it is not only coloniality, but coloniality of power, as America controls the very expression and means of Egyptian sovereignty, the army and its arsenal. The control of Egypt's military was actually in the hands of the Americans. This means that, if America decided that it was time for regime-change in Egypt - its sponsorship-recipient - not even President Hosni Mubarak could have resisted, because the arsenal and source of power of President Mubarak was funded by America and therefore, curtailed Mubarak's offensive or defensive options. The US had an unwarranted but calculated say in the internal affairs of the Egyptian military and therefore, state. That scenario encapsulates how coloniality of power operationalises itself. It permeates all fabric of a society and civilisation such that resistance to forces that perpetuate coloniality of power would actually come from within the colonised polity.

Civil society organisations are not apolitical organisations; they champion and propagate particular causes that are sometimes vey political in nature as well as their spheres of operation and their scope and reach. The funders of civil society organisations normally bare some control on the scope that these organisations influence. Civil society organisations can be proxies of their funders. America and the Eurocentric world order are notorious for using underhanded avenues such as funding of particularly civil society organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to effect regime change agendas, especially in Africa (Sehloko 2018; Fafchamp & Owens 2006; *World Bank* 2012). The use of financial power through funding civil society organisations reduces the, sometimes noble, work of such organisations to Trojan horses of their funders. The control of the agendas of civil society organisations through funding is tantamount to coloniality of power, as it speaks to the lever of control of the economy that was discussed extensively in *Chapter Two*.

The Eurocentric modernity's double standards were again exposed in the Egyptian case following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak. In the Egyptian case, a military *coup d'état* was carried out (by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) in July 2013 that displaced President Mohammed Morsi who had been democratically elected to replace Hosni Mubarak (Plaetzer 2014: 261). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Rosen 2012: 61; Plaetzer 2014: 261) is an ideology that subscribes to two basic principles. Its first principle is a desire to adopt *Sharia* law as a basis

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to regulate and administer state affairs (Ghanem 2016: 12). For the Muslim Brotherhood, this is contingent on the idea that state and religion are indistinguishable. The second principle is a quest to "unify Islamic states and free them from foreign imperialism" (Ghanem 2016: 12). The unity of Islam is at the centre of the Muslim Brotherhood which explains why the Muslim Brotherhood perceive "any single Arab country as just one small part of a large Islamic empire (or caliphate) stretching from Spain to Indonesia" (*ibid*).

Suffice to note that the so-called NATO-determined *international community* did not intervene in the Egypt case in the same manner it did in Libya, 2011. Yet, arguably, the fundamental tenets of democracy were disregarded and therefore were flaunted in Egypt's military *coup*. There was a military *coup d'état* in Egypt following Morsi's takeover of power from Mubarak (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2018; Plaetzer 2014: 261); the Army General, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi unconstitutionally wrestled power from Mohammed Morsi, and yet no *international community* militarily intervened in that situation, albeit the *coup d'état* was post-Arab Spring uprisings. Which is the more reason why, if well meaning, the so-called *international community* which really is the "Global NATO" (Nazemroaya 2012c: 17) should have intervened in defence of democracy and the so-called human rights in the Egypt case, particularly in 2013.

It is evident that in the case of Egypt as a captured state of, and by, America, the Western-centric modernity agenda was not at stake as it was in Qaddafi's Libya. The *coup d'état* was an inconvenience but not a catastrophe for Western Eurocentric modernity because the internal fight for power in Egypt was less significant to the Eurocentric modernity as it did not disrupt the matrices of global coloniality. The Egyptian local version of the Arab Spring protests and its aftermaths were of no consequence to the Eurocentric asymmetrical power configuration of the *World Order*. Egypt had no means or resources, unlike Libya which had oil, to effect any meaningful change to the Euro-North-American-centric conception of power. This thesis therefore, asserts that the Egypt case, unlike the Libyan case, did not threaten the current world order and therefore, in the frameworks of modernity, *intervention* and invasion were not necessary. If anything, the Egypt case proves the asymmetry in power relations as exemplified by the US's involvement in Egypt's national army and defence force.

4.4 Sudan in the Arab Spring Demonstrations

The Sudanese citizen's protests against their government, in solidarity with the Arab Spring uprisings, have come to be known as the Sudanese *Intifada*[11]. The Sudanese protests were, directed at the Omar Hassan al-Bashir-led National Congress Party's (NCP) regime (McDoom 2011). It is salient to note that the al-Bashir's regime was accused of genocide and he was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Rosen 2012: 57). The Arab Spring protests in Sudan began in January 2011; they were led mainly by young people (Abdelaziz 2011). Medani (2013: 37) concurs with these observations and opines that the protests were led by women and men who were "in their late teens, twenties and thirties" others were students, and yet others were unemployed. Like Qaddafi, Omar al-Bashir came into power through a bloodless military *coup d'état* on June 30 1989 (*Al Jazeera News Agency* 2010). It is therefore not surprising that the West had negated, demonised, bastardised and pathologised the framing of al-Bashir in the same manner as Qaddafi and Ben Ali, as dictators that have to be 'cleansed'. Medani (2013: 37) underscores that female students particularly played a crucial role in the Arab Spring uprisings in Sudan. The Sudanese Arab Spring uprisings were inspired by the protests that were simultaneously going on in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt.

4.4.1 The Cause of the Sudanese Arab Spring Protests

Indistinguishably from its neighbours, Sudan's protests were aimed at the country's leadership that stood accused of hampering people's "freedom" and was responsible for the escalating fuel prices, rising food prices and other "key commodities" (Medani 2013: 37). The Sudanese people were essentially demanding for "the fall of the regime" and for "liberation" from the regime of al-Bashir under the banner of the National Congress Party (NCP) (*ibid*). Rosen (2012: 57) corroborates the view that Sudan dealt heavy-handedly with protestors and highlights that of all the countries that experienced the winds of the Arab Spring protests, Sudan's regime was "the most oppressive and violent". As such, citizens protested against the hampering of basic freedoms such as the freedom of expression and speech, the freedom of association and the freedom of movement (Medani 2013: 37). Kushkush (2013) also

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[11] The *Intifada* Revolution (December 1987) was the first Palestinian revolution of resistance of Israel's occupation (Lockman & Beinin 1989: 81).

considates that government corruption exacerbated the appalling socio-economic circumstances that the majority of Sudanese were living under, thereby providing impetus for the revolt against the government.

Put differently, the perception that was prevalent prior to the local version of the Sudanese Arab Spring protests was that the al-Bashir government had failed to rule and govern. Another factor that precipitated the Arab Spring revolt in Sudan was that basic commodities such as flour, cooking-oil, sugar and other household necessities had become increasingly exorbitant (Kushkush 2013). In other words, the local version of the Arab Spring protests in Sudan had the same reasons or rationale as the Arab Spring protests in other places that were riddled with the protests.

4.4.2 The Sudanese Government's Response to the Protests

The Sudanese government's response included the clamping down of protestors that saw the death of a university student, Mohamed Abdelrahman who was studying at the Omdurman Ahaliya University in Khartoum. In defiance of police brutality and violence, Abdelrahman was celebrated and venerated as a hero of the struggle; furthermore, the support for Mohamed Abdelrahman, was witnessed by a post on a social media site, Facebook, with words that read: "You are our martyr Mohamed Abdelrahman" (McDoom 2011). Abdelaziz (2011), while corroborating this position, highlighted that police responded brutally and violently by beating up students who were involved in protests with batons and fired teargas on them. Medani (2013: 37) highlights that security forces violently "quashed the demonstrations"; in the process, they indiscriminately beat up women. What is conspicuous is that the al-Bashir regime responded heavy-handedly to the protests. Ironically, unlike in Libya, the NATO-led *international community* under the banner of the UN did not intervene in the domestic affairs of Sudan.

4.4.3 Analysis of the Sudanese Arab Spring

Medani (2012: 37) opines that part of what the protestors demanded were the "implementation of wide-ranging neoliberal economic reforms". Just the mention of the idea of "neoliberal reforms" spells the real motive of the Sudanese Arab Spring uprisings and whose script the

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uprisings were following. It is this thesis' contention that while the generality of the Sudanese citizens called for freedom, state-controlled fuel prices and food prices, Western modernity controlled and dictated "economic reforms". Western modernity reconfigures economies around the world to resemble and mimic its dictates. This is coloniality of power in the sense that modernity controls the levers of the economy of a given country, in this case, Sudan. Yes, the economic reforms would have benefited Sudan's citizens no doubt, but the levers of control of that script rested in Western modernity. While it was Sudan's citizens who led the protests against the, Omar al-Bashir-led regime, it is also argued and asserted that modernity authored that script and as such, the Sudan Arab Spring uprisings did not reflect the volition of Sudanese citizens, but rather, that of Western modernity. While Sudan's citizens' calls for reform were genuine, Western modernity appropriated and overtook that agenda to suite itself.

This work observes that in Sudan the *international community* did not intervene in Sudan's 'internal affairs', despite the fact that Omar al-Bashir's regime responded violently to quell the protests (Medani 2012: 37). It is ironical that the *international community* did not deem the Sudanese situation in the same light as it did the Libyan situation. No UNSC Resolutions were issued and no foreign military intervention was initiated, despite a similar set of conditions as those that were prevailing in Libya at the time. Why was that? The real reason is that Omar Hassan al-Bashir was not a threat to the global power structural configuration as such; his life was of no consequence to Western modernity. Put differently, al-Bashir's existence as President of Sudan did not pose a threat to the interests of the US, the UK and NATO alliances. Sudan, unlike Libya that has oil, had no resources to effect any meaningful change to the Euro-North American-centric global order. Sudan did not threaten any levers of control of the Western-centric world's control of the economy, or of the gender and sexuality aspect, or the control of knowledge and information aspect, neither had Sudan's existence had any effect on the control of authority aspect of the global power matrices configuration. Therefore, according to the Eurocentric modernity's script al-Bashir was just an inconvenience in so far as the internal and domestic affairs of Sudan; al-Bashir was a manageable nuisance, and at worst, he posed a threat in the form of ethnic conflict or civil war, either of which did not and does not concern Eurocentric modernity. Ethnic conflict, tribal wars and civil wars are preserves of the African polity anyway in the frameworks and conception of Eurocentric modernity they are to be expected in Africa for they are characteristic of the zone of non-being. As such, modernity wants to sell the story that Africa is a place of strife, disease, hunger, war, violence, genocide, drought, lack and poverty, a zone where non-humans reside. Africa is supposed to be the exact

opposite of the Western world, particularly Europe, which is presented as a place of plenty, civilisation, abundance, progress, development, human rights, peace, and accord. Therefore, Sudan's version of the Arab Spring uprisings served to evince this *African* story of war, lack, barbarity, lack of development *etc*.

Rosen (2012: 57) in faithful narration and parroting of the Eurocentric modernity's script labels Omar Hassan al-Bashir as an "Arab dictator" who like other Arab dictators must come to his last days in office. Rosen notes that the al-Bashir regime was the "most oppressive and violent of those that have come under the winds of the Arab Spring" (*ibid*). It is patent to note that the framing of al-Bashir as dictatorial is embodied and located in Western modernity, as expressed by proponents such as Rosen. The apparent contradiction with Rosen's admission is that, if indeed the al-Bashir regime was the most oppressive and violent, why did the NATO-led *international community* under the banner of the UN not intervene in Sudan, and yet intervened and invaded Libya which according to Rosen's line of thought, was moderately violent? It is evident therefore that the Sudanese Arab Spring demonstrations posed no threat to the colonially-established, asymmetrical power configuration, and therefore warranted no military *intervention* nor consequence.

4.5 Yemen in the Arab Spring Demonstrations

According to the Cornell University Library [n.d.]a, about 16,000 people marched in Yemeni's capital, Sanna on the 27th of January 2011 and called on the stepping down of the then leader of Yemeni, Ali Abdullah Saleh. President Saleh was the incumbent-leader, at the time, of the ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC) (*Cornell University Library* [n.d.].)b. The local version of the Arab Spring protest in Yemen was in tandem and in solidarity with the Arab region which was experiencing waves and winds of change, as it were. The protests were to last a whole year; they lasted until 27th of January 2012. So, the dates 27th of January 2011 to 27th of January 2012 commensurate with the popular uprisings that are known as the Arab Spring. In Yemen, the Arab Spring uprisings were directed at the Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime (Rosen 2012: 57). Yemen's President, Ali Abdullah Saleh had been at the helm of Yemen for about thirty-four years (Ghanem 2016: 24). Naturally, this was a sore point for citizens of Yemen who yearned for democratic reforms and equal representation.

The Yemen populace put up a sustained campaign from January 27 until November 2011 when Abdullah Saleh gave in to the demands of the revolution and handed over power to his then Deputy President, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. In the protracted demonstrations over the months, President Abdullah Saleh brokered a deal that saw him receive amnesty from prosecution and amnesty for his "inner circle" (Ghanem 2016: 24). However, before the handover of power in Yemen, about 225 people had lost their lives during the protests and counter protests by government forces. The Human Rights Watch (Cited in, Rettig 2011), postulates that about 225 people lost their lives in the Yemen local version of the Arab Spring protests.

4.5.1 The Cause of the Yemeni Arab Spring Protests

Socio-economic difficulties as experienced by Yemenis led to its local version of the Arab Spring protests. President Ali Abdullah Saleh-led government was perceived to have failed to alleviate Yemen citizens from poverty (Bakri & Goodman 2011). While it can be argued that at the time, the Arab Spring protests were in full swing in other countries and that the Yemen populace opportunely appropriated the revolt, it remains that the Saleh-led government had failed to provide sustainable solutions to their electorate's content. In corroboration of this view, the British Broadcasting Corporation (2013) similarly reported that "poverty and malnutrition" was the primary cause of the revolt in Yemen. It further noted that "an Islamist insurgency led by al-Qaeda, a secessionist movement in the south, and Zaidi Shia rebels in the north" contributed to providing impetus for the protests in Yemen in their local version of the Arab Spring protests. In other words, Yemenis perceived that the Saleh-led government had failed them in addressing elementary issues of poverty and livelihood. Invariably and comparably, these are the real reasons that sparked off and sustained the Arab Spring protests in the Arab world that are explored in this thesis.

What is of interest to this thesis is the fact that during the protracted revolution in Yemen, the power vacuum created serious problems that warranted international attention and intervention and, like in Libya, the protracted revolution led to deeper crises. In the north of Yemen, a rebel group called the Houthis took over that territory without any consequence from the Eurocentric and biased *international community*, probably because the rebels were sponsored by the architects of Western modernity. Equally, a *Zaydi* rebel group and the *Hirak* (a southern

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secessionist movement) advanced and illegally occupied more territory within Yemen (Ghanem 2016: 24). That too, was with no consequences to the Yemen government, it did not excite foreign *intervention* from the 'international' community, also because the rebels were probably sponsored by an *invisible force* located in Western modernity.

4.5.2 The Yemeni Government's Response to the Protests

The British Broadcasting Corporation (2013a) reports that, in Yemeni, "security forces and Saleh supporters launched a crackdown that eventually left between 200 and 2,000 people dead". Suffice to note that the crackdown by state-security forces of the Saleh-led regime used force and violence in a bid to quell the uprising and protests in the Yemen local version of the Arab Spring. Put differently, the Yemeni governments' response is not any different to the responses of other governments whose countries were riddled with the Arab Spring protests. There was explicit use of force and violence which resulted in the deaths of about 2000 people (*British Broadcasting Corporation* 2013a; Gosh 2011: 16). The Cornell University Library [n.d.].b, corroborates the view expressed by the BBC, and maintain that the Saleh regime, not only used the threat of violence to the protestors, it actually emitted violence on protestors in its local version of the Arab Spring protests. The Cornell University Library [n.d.].b, further argues that there was a slaughtering of peaceful protestors in Yemen by government forces. If protestors were peaceful, this suggests that they were not violent and probably unarmed. Yet, the response of the Yemen government-forces on the protestors did not alarm the *international community* in the same manner as it was alarmed in the Libyan case.

Much to the credit of the Yemen government, the Saleh-led regime also responded by offering incessant talks and not only violent and defensive muffling of protestors' voices (*Cornell University Library* [n.d.].)b. The talks were to later yield the handover of power to the then Deputy President of Yemen, Mr. Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi (Ghanem 2016: 24).

4.5.3 Analysis of the Yemeni Arab Spring

There was not much *international* outcry in condemnation of the violent quelling of the Yemen Arab Spring protests from Western countries, as there was in Libya. The Euro-North American-centric control of levers of coloniality of power were not threatened by the Yemen uprisings

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and the Yemen government. Unlike the Libyan government which had resources, the Yemen government did not threaten the Euro-North American-centric power configuration of the global order in the way in which Libya did. The comparison and analysis centres Libya as the country that was most affected by "international-sponsored" war and conflict in its domain as a result of the direct invasion of the French and British forces in Libya particularly (Gazzini 2012: 3). Besides, as this thesis demonstrates in *Chapter Five*, Libya had the will, intention, capacity and resources to diverge from the dictates of the Euro-North American-centric control of the world. Needless to note that the Yemen version of the Arab Spring uprisings, particularly the Yemen government's response in quelling the demonstrations, also happened without any consequence from the selective and arbitrary Euro-constituted and centred *international community*.

4.6 Bahrain in the Arab Spring Demonstrations

In Bahrain, the Arab Spring uprisings began in March 2011 as peaceful demonstrations that called for political reforms and equality of the *Shi'ite* Muslim majority (Barovick, Romero, Sanburn, Suddath, Tharoor & Webley 2011: 7). Essentially, King Isa al Khalifa had been at the helm of Bahrain for about 12 years.

4.6.1 The Cause of the Bahraini Arab Spring Protests

The context and genesis of the demonstrations emanate from the fact that King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa had ruled Bahrain since 1999 as an absolute monarchy (*Cornell University Library* [n.d.].)b. During the Bahrain local version of the Arab Spring demonstrations, there was equally a call for the ruling family's downfall. Like Egypt's Tahir Square, the Pearl Roundabout was the focal point that became synonymous with the Bahrain's local version of the Arab Spring protests. The Pearl Roundabout is located in the Capital City, Manama (Barovick *et al.* 2011: 7; *Cornell University Library* [n.d.].)b. Indistinguishable from other protests elsewhere, the Bahrain local version of the Arab Spring protests was propelled by socio-economic conditions that were unbearable to the Bahraini citizenry, especially among the youth (Elliot 2011: 22). The cause of the protests, or the circumstances that gave rise to the

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protests in Bahrain, were similar to the causes and circumstances that gave birth to the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Libya.

The lack of provisions was at the centre of the Bahrain local version of the Arab Spring protests. The Director of the Middle-East Centre at Oxford University's St Anthony's College, Eugene Rogan stated that the provision, or lack of it, of basic necessities was crucial and at the core of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain (Cited in, Elliot 2011: 22).

4.6.2 The Bahraini Government's Response to the Protests

The bin Isa Al Khalifa government responded to the peaceful protests by citizens with heavy-handedness, repression and state-sponsored violence (Gosh 2011: 16). McEvers (2012) tables the view that Saudi Arabian forces were used to quell the protest in Bahrain at the behest of the Bahrain Monarch, of course. This account by McEvers corroborates the observation that Bahrain's government responded violently to the otherwise peaceful protests by Bahrain's citizens. The Human Rights Watch reported that about 30 people died as result of the violent response of the Bahrain's government on unarmed protestors (Cited in, Rettig 2011). As in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Libya, the Bahrain government used force to quell the protestors. McEvers (2012) actually argues that the Bahrain government used excessive force in that regard. Yet, there was no military intervention from the *international community*.

Therefore, a precedent had been set and so, a standard had been set in the 'international' arena concerning responses of governments who used force in their domains and on their own populations by the time the Libyan local version of the Arab Spring protests begun. The precedent and standard were to have an exception in the Libyan case. This demonstrates the selective and targeted responses from the Euro-constituted and centric *international community*. It is this idea and attitude that exhibits a biased, targeted and custom-made a response to incidences of similar magnitude that suggests and unmasks the instrumentalisation of international legal instruments, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the institution that applied R2P in Libya, the NATO-led United Nations Security Council. This makes Libya an interesting case of analysis as to why it elicited the type of response it did from particularly the UK, France and the US. These three camouflaged themselves as the so-called *international community*.

4.6.3 Analysis of the Bahraini Arab Spring

Like Yemen, Egypt and Sudan, Bahrain stood in no position to pose a real threat to the current global power structural configuration as Libya did. The current *World Order* has at its apex the UN Security Council and its allies (NATO, the US, Britain and France) and at the bottom, the so-called rouge states, demagogues and despots. The bottom of the pyramid is far-reaching, affecting most countries in the Global South. The power is concentrated in the top echelons of the global power structure embodied by the UN system, particularly the UN Security Council.

4.7 The Libyan Crisis in the context of the Arab Spring Demonstrations

The British Broadcasting Corporation (2013b) quips that, "Libya's uprising began in February 2011 after security forces in the eastern city of Benghazi opened fire on a protest". While this statement is misleading, it is valuable to note that indeed in February of 2011, the local version of the Arab Spring protests had beckoned in Libya. 15 February 2011 was the beginning of the local version of the Arab Spring protests in Libya (Ghosh 2011: 16). Campbell (2013: 67) converges with the fact that the Libyan rebellion broke out on the 15th of February 2011. About 3500 people died as a result of the Syrian Arab Spring protests compared to about 1000 people who died in the Libyan leg of the Arab Spring protests as revealed by Rettig (2011). He argues that, "before the NATO mission to protect rebels began in mid-March, reports suggested that Qaddafi's forces had already killed over a thousand people" (*ibid*). The NATO invasion, ironically explained as preventing deaths, in fact resulted in about 30000 people dead (Campbell 2013:30; *Al Jazeera News Agency* 2016; Khan 2016; Rettig 2011).

As has been demonstrated by this work, Qaddafi's response was similar to those of other regimes that did not get invaded in that, he resisted the advances in protest of his government's failure to find amicable solutions to the plight of Libyans. In other words, the Muamar al Qaddafi regime's response to the Arab Spring protest in Libya was not unique when compared to how other regimes that were afflicted by the Arab Spring protests handled the uprisings in their respective domains. Qaddafi's regime responded with force to its local version of the Arab Spring protests in Libya. However, Libya's response to the protests of the time was to be with consequence in Libya and *internationally*. The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia resisted the protests by unleashing state-security forces to quell the rebellion. The Mubarak regime in Egypt,

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invariably suppressed the citizens' protests and used state-sponsored force to liquidate the protests. Similarly, the Al Bashir regime in Sudan identically crushed citizens' protests by unbridling state-security forces on protesters. Furthermore, it is indistinguishably noted that the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime in Yemeni equally responded with violence to its local version of the Arab Spring protests. Invariantly, the Isa al Khalifa regime's response was that of violent resistance to the peaceful protests of the local Arab Spring protests (Ghosh 2011: 16). Suffice to note that, of all the countries that were affected by the Arab Spring protests, with the exception of Libya, the respective governments' violent responses were without consequence from the so-called *international community*. Yet, at the first sign of protests in Libya, the UN - through the tripartite alliance of Britain, France and America- expeditiously convened and passed UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that made it possible for the trio-led *international community* to interfere in, and invade, Libya. The international community's reaction to the Libyan government's response to its local version of the Arab Spring protests is what is divergent in the context of the region's Arab Spring protests generally.

The framing of Qaddafi as a dictator, tyrant and a despot by Western media as evinced by a view expressed by Gosh (2011: 16) and neoliberal scholarship, pathologises, bastardises and demonises and therefore, legitimatises the elimination of Qaddafi. The very pathologising of the other by Western media, while purporting itself to be the canon and only legitimate source of information and knowledge demonstrates an insatiable thirst to control knowledge and information. The branding of Qaddafi as an outlaw was done in preparation and justification of his impending elimination. Suffice to note that while the regime-change agenda in Libya was effected militarily, all coordinates of Western modernity were involved in the massive campaign against Qaddafi. "Western intelligence services that had cooperated with Qaddafi were now stroking propaganda against him and mobilising the media to argue that there was imminent massacre of civilians in Benghazi" (Campbell, 2013: 67). The manipulation of mass media platforms of communication and the dissemination of news and information by Britain's (*British Broadcasting Corporation*) France's (*France 24*) and the US' (*Cable News Network*) in the wake of Qaddafi's massacre was especially at play. It manifests the levers of control of knowledge and information, which is a fundamental part of coloniality of power. These three, news outlets were on overdrive with anti-Libya and anti-Qaddafi propaganda and rhetoric.

4.7.1 The Cause of the Libyan Arab Spring Protests

Following the Tunisian revolution and Libya's immediate neighbour Egypt's revolution, Libya's soon ensued over a crisis of governance in Libya. Hweio (2012: 112) highlights that the social unrest and uprising in Libya started on 17th of February 2011 with simultaneous protests across several Libyan cities, but particularly in the Eastern part of Libya, Qaddafi's home turf. The protestors cited government corruption and favouritism as well as regionalism as primary factors that fuelled the local version of the Libyan Arab Spring protests (Abdessadok 2017; Serafimov 2012). Libya stood in need of political reforms and a democratic society (Hweio 2012: 112). Some literature point to dictatorial tendencies of Qaddafi himself and his government as the primary cause of dissent in Libya, 2011 (*Middle East Monitor* 2017). Others yet cite that human rights abuses that were inflicted on, and were suffered by, ordinary Libyans by the Qaddafi-led government were compelling reasons for Libyans to engage in the civil protests (Serafimov 2012). What can be ascertained is that there is a myriad of reasons and causes for the Libyan version of the Arab Spring protests.

4.7.2 The Libyan Government's Response to the Protests

Gosh (2011: 16) notes that Qaddafi personally issued a notice to Libyans that his rule was not to "succumb to revolutionary rap songs, Facebook pages and nonviolent demonstrations". Like most countries that experienced the Arab Spring protest, Qaddafi's regime dispatched state-security personnel and amour in preparation of eventualities that normally occurred in such events. Hweio (2012: 112) avers that the Libyan regime responded violently to the initial peaceful demonstrations. However, the peaceful demonstrations suddenly turned violent as Western powers and some Arab countries funded and sponsored Libyan rebels with guns and armour to consolidate the Western-centric *Casus Belli* in Libya (Nazemroaya 2012a: 127-128; Campbell 2012: 59). In other words, Western powers planted the so-called rebels and provided them with guns and ammunition in order to create an impression that a civil war had ensued, thereby creating the grounds for a military invasion of Libya (Gazzini 2011: 2-3).

4.7.3 The Killing of President Muammar al Qaddafi

Gazzini (2012: 3) evinces that Qaddafi's convoy was fleeing Sirte after a battle against Western-sponsored and Western-planted Libyan rebels. A remotely piloted missile was fired at Qaddafi's convoy "from a US Air Force base in Nevada that compelled the [Qaddafi] loyalist convoy of 75 vehicles to disperse". Gazzini further reveals that after the strike by the US remotely piloted missile, NATO issued commands to a jet under the captaincy of the French to release "two 500-pound bombs" that charred "a dozen vehicles and kill[ed] at least 25 loyalists" (*ibid*). It is presumed that this second attack may have left Qaddafi exposed and injured such that he had to walk on foot and sought refuge at a nearby makeshift shelter where the Libyan rebels found him and killed him (Gazzini 2012: 3). The NATO, the US, Britain, France and Qatar armies had a hand in the killing of Muammar al Qaddafi (*ibid*). After the killing of Qaddafi, the then interim Premier, Mahmoud Jibril, offered contradictory explanations as to who killed Qaddafi. The first statement he issued was that Qaddafi had died in an ambulance en route to receiving medical treatment. A statement that was refuted by the ambulance driver who indicated that "I did not try to revive [Qaddafi], because he was already dead", when the driver attended the scene (Gazzini 2012: 2).

As indicated by Gazzini (2012: 3) and Campbell (2012: 125), Hweio (2012: 112) similarly notes and corroborates the views that opposition fighters in Libya were armed by foreign forces. He avers that it was this "armed opposition" that was to "quickly form the Transitional National Council (henceforward, TNC)" that was going to usher in 'democratic' reforms to the new Libya. This development is telling in itself; the so-called opposition whose arms were foreign-sponsored in a bid to topple Qaddafi, is the same opposition that constituted the TNC. According to Gazzini (2012: 4) the then French President, Nicolas Sarkozy "met the fledging NTC leaders at the Elysee Palace on March 10 [2011] and surprised everybody (including the opposition themselves) by granting them official recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people". France having set the precedent, other European countries as well as the US followed suite (*ibid*). Suffice to note however, that the power to recognise governments does not exclusively belong to Europeans.

This reveals that the foreign forces sponsoring those rebels were actually in charge of the regime change agenda. As such, the regime change was not necessarily in the hands of Libyans nor did it indicate necessarily the volition of Libyans. France, a European force representative of European-centric modernity was actually in charge of the regime change in Libya. To further

highlight this fact, the so-called TNC, 3 days after the demise of Qaddafi, on the 23 October 2011, made public commitments that it was going to ensure that democratic elections would take place within eight months (Hweio 2012: 113). Needless to say, up to this date (2020), elections in Libya are yet to be conducted. It is convenient for Eurocentric Western modernity to have chaos and disorder in Libya. In the absence of order, there is no accountability. If there is no accountability, it is opportune for European countries, particularly Britain and France and the US to syphon Libya's oil without having to account to the Libyan population nor account to their own populations in their domains. Therefore, democratic elections that benefit and stabilises Libya will be inconvenient to Eurocentric modernity. Libya being in Africa -the zone of non-being- must be seen to be chaotic, to be a failure, disorderly, uncivilised, war-ravaged, diseased and in need of European saving and a European messiah.

4.7.4 Analysis of the Libyan Arab Spring

The singling out of the Muammar al Qaddafi-led Libya's regime's response to its local version of the Arab Spring protests, tells of the long-standing regime-change agenda that had been in place and awaited *Casus Belli* to implement it. The *Casus Bello* was to be the Arab Spring protests in Libya, apparently driven by Libyans themselves. The un-reflected utterances by Qaddafi that spoke of "fighting to the end" (Gosh 2011: 18) in defence of the state of Libya, proved to be problematic in the sense that Qaddafi's utterances, that seemed to threaten some parts of the population in Libya, in themselves were not wrong. As a state leader, Qaddafi had to defend the sovereignty of Libya and Libyans. Unwittingly, his utterances were misconstrued by particularly Britain, France and the US to mean that the Libyan population was in imminent danger. Yet, Qaddafi was justifiably speaking against Western imperialism in Africa (Tanoukhi & Mazrui 2011: 151).

Qaddafi's position of resisting imperialism in Africa and the Arab world is important to the African civilisation. While, Qaddafi identified himself as a Berber first, Mazrui (in, Tanoukhi & Mazrui 2011: 150) insisted that "Qaddafi is the first major leader of an Arab African country who regarded himself as an African first and an Arab second". The importance of Mazrui's assertion on Qaddafi's positionality is that it is rooted in how Qaddafi saw and understood himself, as an Arab of Berber origin first, but primarily as a Berber who was rooted in Africa, whose geo-locale was Africa. To this effect and in defence of Qaddafi, Professor Mazrui tells

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of Qaddafi's regard of "his African constituency as more-sincere and carrying greater promise for fulfilment than his solidarity with the Arabs" (Tanoukhi & Mazrui 2011: 151). Qaddafi himself is on record asserting his African heritage and identity. At the Opening of the African Union in July 2011, he argued that:

> The European experiment is of no use to us … the area known, as North Africa should be Africanised. Either it will be an anomaly, and will therefore have no future. As an inhabitant of North Africa, I have always rejected the Barcelona agreement, which regards North Africa as part of the Middle East, with a vocation to integrate with Europe. This is a conspiracy against the integrity of Africa. They have said to me the Barcelona agreement and cooperation with the European Union will be to Libya's advantage. They want to draw us in and make use of us, through the Barcelona agreement, to dismember the African continent, stealing North Africa to make it join with the European Union. This is unacceptable. In any case, look at what has already become of the Barcelona agreement. It is in a comatose condition and could well disappear (*sic*) (Quoted in, Campbell 2013: 19).

Qaddafi was right in asserting his locus of enunciation, which is Africa. It is of paramount importance to think from one's location. This action (of thinking from one's locality) asserts and counters the argument embedded and disguised in Western modernity's knowledge and information that purports itself as a canon with which every information or knowledge, either of the self or anything else, is a standard. Given the history of European colonialism in Africa, Qaddafi was justified in defending Africa's position in the world and advancing Africa's interests. It was Africa's interests that Qaddafi defended against a monolithic and gigantic Euro-centred imperial NATO led by the US, Britain and France. As evinced by the work of Chomsky (1986: 8; 11), Qaddafi's assertions of centring Africa were antithetical to the rationale of the US National Security Council (NSC) document 68. Similarly, as manifest in the works by Kukushev (2010) and the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), Qaddafi's defence of a unitary Africa further countered the rationale behind the 1995 Barcelona Agreement, which had representation from four African countries, namely: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The Barcelona Agreement primarily pursued a political and economic Euro-centric agenda. The centring of Africa by Qaddafi as divulged by Huliaras (2001: 11) and Zoubir (2002: 35) reflected his positionality. It equally proved problematic to the long-time standing regime-change agenda of the US, Britain and France in Libya. Unsurprisingly, Western canon omits and silences such dynamics in its reportage and analyses of the Libyan situation in the Arab Spring protests.

By his assertion of his African positionality, Qaddafi alluded to the issue of instrumentalisation of Treaties, Agreements and international legal outfits such as R2P and International Humanitarian Law by imperial powers for their own power pursuits. Qaddafi actually was exposing how western-centred coloniality operates in reconfiguring its power matrices. The Barcelona Agreement was meant to partition the North African region and join it with the Arabic world for the purposes of unifying the Arabic region with Europe. In other words, the Barcelona Agreement sought to Europeanise North Africa via the Arab world. Qaddafi was not one to fall for this ploy. Even more reason why Western modernity and coloniality loathed Qaddafi; he could see through the mask and charade they put up.

The response by the *international community* to Libya's case of its local version of the Arab Spring protests demonstrates an asymmetrical, targeted, vilifying and selectively responding to invariable circumstances. Rosen (2012: 57) described the National Congress Party's regime in Sudan as the worst repressive regime of the countries that were affected by the Arab Spring protests (Rosen 2012: 57). Yet, there was no *international intervention* in Sudan. This shows that the invasion of Libya was a *prima facea* of a long-standing regime-change agenda of the West. The West in its collective, awaited for a convenient *Casus Bello* to launch the attack. There is clear uniformity in the responses of the *international community* in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Bahrain. The common thread is that there is non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. There is a sudden variance in the response when it comes to Libya because Libya stood antithetical to Western domination and Western control on power matrices and levers that perpetuate coloniality and modernity.

On 20 February 2011, Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam, cautioned of the impending danger that would accompany his father's forceful departure from office, or elimination, or demise. He "warned that the country would regress into tribal wars and turn into a place where 'everyone wants to become a sheik or an emir'" (Gosh 2011: 19). Al-Islam's warnings were, dismissed and branded as a case of sour grapes and did not receive much attention and airplay. Instead, in typical form of Eurocentric modernity, it was instead the views such as those held by Abdelnabi Yasin, a Libyan citizen and writer who was in self-imposed exiled in Athens, Greece at the time, that dismissed al-Salam's forewarnings and rebutted al-Islam's view and argued instead that "we are not the medieval society that Saif described" (Quoted in, Gosh 2011: 19). Hweio (2012: 112-113) validates Saif al-Islam's caution to Libya and the world as "Qaddafi's regime ended when Qaddafi was captured in his tribal homeland of Sirte and killed by the opposition fighters on October 20, 2011". Saif al-Islam was right in that without Qaddafi, Libya

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was to descend into tribal wars and conflicts. The chaos and vacuum of leadership to date bears testimony to it.

Professor of Political Science, Fathi Baja, was part of the protestors who denounced Qaddafi's rule and was active in the Benghazi region. He now forms part of the Committee that leads Benghazi. He argues that, the revolution was about the "creation of a modern Libya, freedom and democracy based on a pluralistic society, based on human rights, participation of all parts of Libya in creating their government and their institutions" (Quoted in, Gosh 2011: 19). The chaos that was to later visit Libya from the first day that the US, French, British and Qatari armies (Gazzini 2012: 3; Campbell 2012: 100) engaged in combat with Qaddafi's forces in 2011, is felt today still. To this date (2020), there is not a credible national government in Libya that is recognised by all Libyans, with perhaps the exception of the UN-Backed faction of *government* in Libya. The chaos that manifests today was foretold by Saif al-Islam, needless to note that his warnings were negated and dismissed as "dire prophecies [that] are typical of failing regimes" (Gosh 2011: 19).

4.8 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): An Overview

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Report (*ICISS* 2001: xi), declared that the responsibility to protect citizens is an inherent and obligatory duty of the state. This view reveals that the sovereign state is answerable and responsible for guaranteeing citizens' security and safety in its territory, thereby endorsing realism (Ayoob 2002: 84; Branch 2011: 116). The limitation of this view lies in that R2P in its current form makes no room for consultation with a state in trouble on whether or not the *international community's* intervention is needed and warranted. R2P is silent on the actual process-es of initiating its implementation in a given case. Hence, Mamdani (2011) suggests that R2P is ploy of the West to re-colonise the spaces and places they once colonised, especially Africa. The risk there is with R2P is that global super-powers tend to abuse such instruments and use R2P as a tool to *intervene* in the internal and domestic affairs of other countries unwarrantedly. As such, the paranoia and fear, as exhibited and expressed by some African states particularly, is justified and founded. That counters the responsibility component embedded in the state sovereignty doctrine, rendering state sovereignty weak and limited. Besides, it is worrisome that the very "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was set up by the British and

Canadian governments" (Lynch 2011: 66). These two governments, through the lobbying of their NATO allies were responsible for "Operation Allied Force, the 78-day campaign of aerial bombardment against the rump federal state of Yugoslavia in 1999" (Lynch 2011: 66). The sincerity and neutrality of the ICISS is questionable anyway because its protagonists are Euro-centred and located in modernity which perpetuates global coloniality.

While it is important to have checks and balances to circumscribe states' behaviours, the West have a bad record of *intervening* in sovereign states unwarrantedly (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan for example). This gives the impression that the West unilaterally and autocratically has a propensity to assume moral responsibility projected as 'humanitarian intervention'. McCormack (2011: 37) challenges this view and highlights that "America under the 2001-2009 presidency of George W. Bush is widely seen to have damaged the moral consensus in favour of intervention". As such, this explains the view that R2P as a moral duty is applied sporadically, variably, selectively, pliably and intermittently rendering R2P as a preference rather than a principle. If it is a preference, then whose preference counts?

The motive of the USA's intervention in Libya is thought to be fossil fuel which was discovered in the 1950s (Campbell 2013: 85). This study asserts that it is to this end that the US as leader of NATO states, lobbied for NATO's intervention in Libya. Although this view can be defended by the US and NATO by citing for example, human rights abuses and dictatorial tendencies of Qaddafi at the time. It is however, questionable that only in 2011, almost 5 decades later, given that Qaddafi had come to power through a *coup d'état* in 1969 (Davis 1987; El Fathaly & Palmer 1980) did the West use the *rule of law* and *democracy* arguments against Qaddafi. The Sudanese Government (Cunliffe 2011: 39) and the former Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe argued that NATO was deceitful in applying R2P in Libya (*The New Zimbabwe* 2012). The West's hypocrisy is undeniable as evidenced from the works of scholars such as, Ayoob (2002: 84), Devetak (2012: 39), Jackson and Rosberg (1986: 6), Mignolo (2009: 16) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 422). When it is convenient and consistent with their states' interests, Western countries tend to identify with the *principle of non-intervention* in the internal affairs of other states, but when it suites their interests, they condone *intervention* of one state by another on the grounds of humanitarian principles. Nevertheless, the criticism aimed at Western leaders by some African leaders for example Mugabe, Qaddafi himself, and the former Iraq leader Saddam Hussein (Valbjorn & Bank 2012: 3) equally lack moral authority and therefore, invalid.

Literature on R2P (Bannon 2006; Evans & Sahnoun 2002; Crail 2008;) and particularly post-NATO intervention in Libya (of 2011) is written from a Eurocentric perspective (Cerone 2011; Crook 2011; Gazzini 2011; Kila 2013; Lynch 2011; Powell 2012; Rasmussen 2011; Villar 2011; Western & Goldstein 2013). There are apparent biases that hinder objectivity, these include perceptions of a non-democratic leadership, a dictatorial government and autocratic rule by Libya's elite; these perceptions overlook the stability that Libya had prior to the NATO intervention, for example. Furthermore, of the available literature the R2P issue is written from the 'interveners' side and perspective (Arbour 2008; Brooks 2012; Macfarlane 2004; McCormick 2011; Orford 2012; Stahn 2007; Taylor 2005; Thielking 2004; Waal 2007; Weiss 2004). There is not much literature written from the perspective of the 'intervened' side, with very few exceptions, as evidenced by works of authors such as Gambino (2009), Braut-Hegghammer (2008) and Mohamed (2012). This compels some attention on the thorny issues around R2P.

4.9 The Rhetoric of Intervention and Reality of Invasion: R2P Unmasked

In his seminal work entitled *The Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish*?, Mamdani (2010) historicises and reveals how the Euro-centric power configuration has always tended to position itself at the apex and vantage point and purported itself as a saviour and messiah whose 'moral' duty was to save the weak and defenceless. At the apex of this power spectrum is the European civilisation, today encapsulated by the UN system, the Security Council particularly, and at the bottom of the pyramid are non-European civilisations in general, located in the Global South, but the African civilisations in particular. Modern Western colonialism was, championed by the UK; the European Concert of State was born in 1648 at the signing of the Westphalia Treaty (Barnett 2011: 160; Makinda 2001: 406; Krasner 2006: 86). Western powers, particularly the UK, France and Russia, have a notorious history of claiming to protect "vulnerable groups" in other territories other than their own (Mamdani 2010: 55; Lynch 2011: 69).

Western-powers tended to impose intervention on the Ottoman Empire in the name of saving the vulnerable "Christian denominations and Jews"; with this background, France was to bequeath a Constitution to the independent and sovereign Lebanon (Mamdani 2010: 55). The Ottoman Empire existed between the 15th Century and the 20th Century (*British Broadcasting*

Corporation 2009; *South African History Online* 2019). This goes to evince that Western modern colonialism has, as far back as the 15th Century always sought to control, determine and dominate other civilisations. At that time, most parts of Africa and some parts of Asia were not colonised yet. Western modern colonialism was to invite itself to such un-colonised lands on the guise of coming in to "protect victims [from] rulers" by highlighting "local atrocities" (Mamdani 2010: 55). As such, colonialism endeared itself to some locals even, by feigned "promise[s] of civilisation against the reality of barbaric practices" (*ibid*). There was some evidence to what Western modern colonialism purported to 'condemn'. For example, in India, it sought to bring-to-an-end cultural practices such as "*sati*, child marriage, [and] infanticide"; in Africa, it purported itself as seeking to bring to an end practices such as "slavery in the nineteenth century, female genital mutilation (FGM) in the twentieth century and, now, genocide" (Mamdani 2010: 56).

This history brought the *international regime* which justified the trusteeship machination that was exercised by the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. Mamdani (2010: 54) argues that after the Second World War, "the international order could be divided into contradictory parts: on the one hand, a system of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere and, on the other hand, a colonial system in most of Africa, Asia and the Middle East". The argument proffered by Mamdani is important because it tells of the inherent asymmetry and inequality in the UN sovereign state system that came as a result of World War II – at the demise of the League of Nations and the birth of the United Nations. The UN-affirmed and endorsed sovereign state system presumes equality of states in spite of individual states' statures, geographical size, size of the economy, military might *etc*. Yet, the composition of the United Nations Security Council particularly, is not reflective of the equality guaranteed by the sovereign state system.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine therefore is not new to the Western-centred *international* order. If anything, it is a re-invention and a reconfiguration of the European modern power spectrum that governs the global order of today. So, how exactly is this R2P doctrine phrased? At this, juncture, this work will focus on the actual R2P doctrine as it was passed by the UN General Assembly in 2005.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine can be operationalised, and only, if a situation satisfies the following two conditions. The first condition is that a government must have demonstrated that it is unwilling to protect its citizens. Needless to note that this condition is

vague, as it does not specify to whom exactly the demonstration of unwillingness to protect citizens must be geared towards. The second condition is that, it must be ascertained that a government is unable to protect its citizenry; meaning, even though a government be willing to protect its citizen but it is unable, for whatever reason, the responsibility to protect is yielded to the *international community* (*ICISS* 2001: xi). This ascertaining is obviously the preserve of the UN Security Council. Therefore, the very two conditions that must be met, or satisfied, are problematic in themselves because they are vague and as such, open to abuse and instrumentalisation for political agendas of the powerful. Hence, while Western modernity and coloniality would want to argue that R2P is really about protecting civilians, it is more a *Right to Punish* delinquent states, rogue states and states that are termed despot, such as Qaddafi's Libya, Hussain's Iraq and Afghanistan, to mention a few examples. Suffice to note that the above-mentioned states are all located in the Global South, the zone that R2P was designed for to 'monitor' and 'moderate'.

The same *modus operandi* of Western colonialism is at play today. Western modernity today continues to put up a humanitarian-crisis-show that it, in turn, uses as motivation to invite its 'international regime' to intervene and invade other territories in pursuit of control and reconfiguring its global power spectrum. To this effect, Lynch (2011: 66) argues that "there is abundant evidence of hidden interests, and of agendas, being set in advance to produce predetermined outcomes" by Western modernity and Eurocentric coloniality. The R2P in Libya is a typical case where Western and Eurocentric powers in the persons of the respective Presidents, Barack Obama of America, Nikolas Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain, determined a parallel agenda to the UNSC Resolution 1973. The rhetoric of the *intervention* was that of finding a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis. This was how the façade of a story was peddled at the UNSC that the 'intervention' in Libya was meant to be a diplomatic engagement. As evinced by the UNSC Resolution 1973 that started by "demanding the immediate establishment of a ceasefire", while calling for the:

> Secretary-General [of the UN] to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High-Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution (UN 2011 in, Lynch 2011: 68).

In other words, the first channel that the UN trusteeship should have taken was that of diplomacy; it was supposed to have engaged with the Qaddafi regime diplomatically. Nevertheless, we know that this was never the intention of the trio, Britain, France and the US, collectively NATO. The real motive and intention was to eliminate Qaddafi using the prefabricated argument that was sustained by the use of the *CNN*-effect regime (Lynch 2011: 63). I add, the *BBC*-effect and the *France24*-effect, collectively the Euro-centric mass-media-effect. The prefabricate argument was that the UNSC Resolution 1973 was passed in order to save lives of Libyans who were in imminent danger following Qaddafi's threats on them. Of course, there was indeed a clause in Resolution 1973 that specified that the member-states were authorised to use "all necessary measures" (Lynch 2011: 68). However, believing this narrative begs the question, it is circular reasoning and a futile pursuit. Not surprisingly, and true to Western imperial character Obama, Sarkozy and Cameron had their own caucus that actually determined that Qaddafi was to go; "Qaddafi must go and go for good" (Obama *et al.* 2011, cited in, Lynch 2011: 69).

The Western-centric modernity's façade of an argument continued, in line with the reconfiguration of the asymmetrical power spectrum. The trio argued that there was need for "a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process … led by a new generation of leaders" (Lynch 2011: 69). The 'new generation of leaders' was to be determined by the trio, as France recognised -and in essence- constituted the National Transition Committee (NTC) that took over power in Libya after the killing of Qaddafi. If this was not the manifestation of a regime-change agenda pursued by the chief proponents of Western modernity, Britain, France and the US, then Santa Clause may as well be real. This was the real motive and intention to invoke R2P which was to insulate NATO from facing possible rebut in the face of mounting pressure from other states, especially African states, and indeed the fronted UN. In any case, if well meaning, the UNSC Resolution 1973 did not bring the desired outcome, if that outcome was to save lives as about 30000 people lost their lives because of the invasion of Libya by NATO forces (Lynch 2011: 68). Many more have, to date, since lost their lives as both, a direct and indirect, result of NATO's invasion of Libya.

To further evince the machinations and operations of Western modernity and coloniality, this section will present how modernity through its agents advance arguments that are on the surface, appear sincere and well meaning, yet they lack ontological authority and are just epistemological baloney. In the following section, Antony Gambino's views will be given much airtime as his views represent the Western canon that this thesis intends to unmask.

Gambino, an American citizen and a former director (2001 to 2004) of the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID), stationed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at that time, is of the view that the DRC government failed to protect its civilian population from "harm" caused by the military and political crises specifically in the eastern provinces (2009: 51). He argues that the government of Joseph Kabila had "failed to end the longstanding suffering of the population, which continue[d] to be subjected to horrific massacres and brutal sexual violence" (*ibid*). The Lord Resistance Army (LRA), whose leader is Joseph Kony had caused untold suffering on Congolese civilians and had killed "nearly one thousand Congolese [nationals] in late 2008 and early 2009" (Gambino 2009: 51). The LRA is an armed and military-trained rebel group that opposed the Joseph Kabila-led government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

To add salt to injury, the so-called "UN peace-keeping force, the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, [which is known] by its French acronym, MONUC" had also proven ineffective in protecting the civilian population in the DRC. This is in spite of the fact that, it is the "largest peace-keeping force in the world and now authorised to deploy over twenty thousand soldiers and police" (Gambino 2009: 52). As such, Gambino calls for the invocation of R2P as the DRC government has failed, albeit not willingly, to protect its citizens (*ibid*). Gambino's argument has the basis for the invocation of R2P right. However, the very concept of R2P becomes problematic if it is called for, or advocated for, by an agency located in modernity and an urgency pursuance of an internationalist development agenda, such as the USAID. The 'objectivity' of the agency's invocation of R2P is obfuscated as its interests, not only lie in the protection of the civilian population (if at all there was a genuine interest of protecting the vulnerable population there), but its developmentalist and internationalist agendas. The French agent who advised the then President of France, Nicholas Sarkozy is the case in point. It was not Libyans who called for the invocation of R2P; instead, it was a French citizen and intellectual, Bernard-Henri Levy who lobbied the French President to seek the *intervention* of the UN which applied R2P through the UNSC as a basis for the NATO-led air strikes that eventually killed Qaddafi. Such are the operations of modernity (Gazzini 2012: 4).

Gambino also says the problems and challenges he identified occurred prior to the NATO invasion of Libya, as his piece was written in 2009. What it reveals is that the problematic nature of R2P was identifiable even before its rushed invocation in Libya 2011. Had the challenges that Gambino identified been addressed with the same sense of urgency as the invocation of R2P itself by NATO forces, a different outcome could have emerged in the

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Libyan case of 2011. However, it is clear that, that was not the intention. The real intention was to eliminate the threat that Qaddafi was to western modernity.

Gambino's view presumes that the DRC government is a failure because it failed to arrest dissention and, admittedly violence in its territory. There are two major limitations with Gambino's view. While it is the respective duty and obligation of a government, Gambino's view is biased because it is informed by his agency, the USAID that is pro-America and pro-international development, a central agenda of modernity. Gambino's views are, informed and located in the logic of modernity. To evince this assertion, Gambino (2000: 52) in his own words argued that, the "US policy should place greater focus on protecting the civilian population in the context of the responsibility to protect". In other words, Gambino perceives the US as the *international community* that should protect the civilians in DRC.

Elsewhere Gambino submits that "the protection of civilians and the Congo's transition to a more stable democracy depend to a great degree on a high level of international engagement, led by the United Sates" (Gambino 2009: 52). This points to the limitation of the R2P doctrine itself. It does not specify who the 'international community' is. Granted that Gambino writes as someone who had some experience in the ecologies of DRC, what hinders his analysis is his positionality on the issue of what he termed "state failure". The positionality that informs his view is oblivious to its particularity and purports itself to be an 'objective' positionality. The 'failure' that Gambino emboldens in his analysis of the state of DRC is as a result of the state that is actually modelled on the European concert of state which was transplanted and instituted by colonialism in Africa. Arguably, the concept of state is a failed one in Africa in the first place because, unlike Europe which has largely homogeneous and organic states, African 'states' have nuances that are particular to Africa. African states are largely heterogenous, with a few that are homogenous, such as Lesotho and Swaziland in the southern part of the continent, and Gambia and Senegal in the western part of the continent for example. African states did not come up organically, they were imposed by colonialism. It demands therefore, that an analysis on African states should factor the particularities of Africa if meaningful results are to be achieved. Gambino is speaking for Congolese nationals, not even on behalf of them! Where are the voices of Congolese nationals in this debate? Why are their voices not audible? Could it be a deliberate silencing and muffling of those voices by neo-liberal scholarship and media, including publishing houses and journals through their monopoly?

The second limitation is that Gambino's view assumes a messianic and saviour's position, where a Euro-American comes into a 'disorganised' Africa and has to organise and *colere*[12] it on behalf of Africans, and organises he does, but according to his fancy and standard. Gambino does not say how he arrives at the point where he advocates for the invocation of R2P in the DRC. Euro-North American-centric scholarships gives an impression that local Congolese nationals are seemingly not perturbed by the ongoing conflict in their country, and an outsider comes and identifies that as a problem that needs 'intervention'. This is the problem with R2P, it does not deliberately and categorically state who (person[s]) or what (agency) should call for its invocation.

It is also worthy to note that Gambino did not consult any Congolese nationals in his quest for the calling for the invocation of R2P, otherwise if he did, where is the evidence? Gambino's approach is prescriptive and is from a positionality of privilege, politically, economically, socially and epistemologically. He quipped that "the ultimate objective of US policy should be a peaceful, stable and democratic Congo" (Gambino 2009: 55). While this could be perceived as noble, the problem is the double standards of Western modernity. On one hand, it speaks of peaceful democracy and the upholding of human rights for the same reason it advances coloniality, as the terms of the peaceful democracy are those of the US and not necessarily the DRC's. This is also evinced by Gambino himself who prescribes that "therefore, a central organising principle for the Obama administration's support for MONUC should be the responsibility to protect" (*ibid*). This view positions the US as the centre of an ideal peaceful democracy for DRC. It further seeks to insulate the US from criticism as it lacks the moral authority to be central in DRC, or anywhere else outside of its domain for that matter. Gambino's view presumes that the R2P concept is the script that must be followed in resolving the crisis in DRC; he does not question its validity, objectivity and relevance to ecologies of DRC. Gambino's view represents the 'interveners' perspective rather than the view of the 'intervened' side.

Jake Lynch analysed the concept of R2P in the aftermaths of its rushed application in Libya 2011. He correctly noted that scholars often adopt "a position of advocacy" (Lynch 2011:59), as have been demonstrated by Gambino's (2009) work, overlooking, presuming and underscoring R2P's validity, unquestionability and therefore, its infallibility. The importance

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[12] *Colere* is from the Latin, meaning to design. Suffice to note that *colere* is the term from which the term colonialism comes from (Mudimbe 1987: 1).

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of Lynch's observation is that it recognises the researcher's positionality. What it fails to do is realise that there are different positionalities that scholars assume even when undertaking research on the same phenomena. The scholar's locus of enunciation informs largely what that research's outcome would be or what the research results would be.

Furthermore, Lynch points the reader to Indyk (2009: 308) quoted in, Lynch (2011: 60) who, as an US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, noted the "'asymmetry' of America's relations with the two parties" in reference to America's negotiation with, and between, Palestine and Israel. He notes that in the course of the negotiations, America used what was to be known as the "black channel", referring to the US communicating secretly its preferences to one party over the interests of the parties it sought to be arbiter to (Lynch 2011: 60). That move alone rendered the US as a compromised actor in negotiations, a position that was evinced by Gambino's (2009) views discussed earlier. One cannot not appreciate Lynch's analysis of America's asymmetrical relationships that lean in favour of the Euro-North American centred modernity and its preferences.

Besides the fact that the US and the UK, and by extension France, are compromised actors when it comes to negotiations, they operate on deceit and double-standards. Horace Campbell (2013: 64-65) reveals how, as far back as 2004, Britain, through its Military Intelligence Section 6 (MI6) helped Qaddafi with his speech writing. This was after Qaddafi renounced ambitions to pursue nuclear capabilities. The UK's MI6 and the US' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "worked closely to bring Libya 'on side' and turn[ed] a brutal regime from foe into friend after Mr. Qaddafi in 2003 vowed to give up weapons of mass destruction, end support of military groups, and take on Al Qaeda" (Campbell 2013: 65). Naturally, this meant that the Qaddafi regime aligned itself with the US and the UK in the fight against the so-called *Global War on Terrorism* (GWOT) (*ibid*: 66).

What Campbell's observations reveal is Qaddafi's vacancy in agreeing to let the MI6 and the CIA work closely with the Libyan state-intelligence. Given the precarious history that Libya had had particularly with the UK and the US, Libyan intelligence should have known better that the West would use any occasion to plant a Trojan Horse in its midst. That collaboration exposed Libya and, in turn, the Libyan leader, Qaddafi. This speaks yet again to the *modus operandi* of Western modernity and the frivolousness of ex-colonised people's affinity of their former colonisers. It was yet another *Casus Bello* that the West had been looking for in order to bring Libya to its knees. Western modernity was reconfiguring itself as it recruited Qaddafi

into its system, narrative, perspective and war, especially the so-called *Global War on Terrorism* as if terrorism was a global concern, yet it really was targeted at the US and its Western allies. The instigators of what was termed global terrorism are known to belong to an extremist outfit of Islam whose objective is to counter the Euro-North American and Western-centric domination (Campbell 2013: 63, 66).

The double-standards of the US and the UK were typified when the conflict broke out in Libya on the 15th of February 2011. The same MI6 and the CIA who had worked closely with Qaddafi, worked against him and went on a propaganda-spree, spreading on a global scale, false information of the imminent danger of Libyan civilians who faced death at the command of Muammar al Qaddafi (Campbell 2013: 67). Western modernity was to use its monopoly of the control of knowledge and information, hence they used mass-media to invoke in the minds of people of their countries that intervention was necessary. This intervention was to be achieved through the problematic R2P doctrine, as has been demonstrated in this chapter.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that during the Arab Spring protests that engulfed the North African and Middle-Eastern Arabic regions in 2011, the respective governments responded violently to the protestors in their domains. The chapter further evinced that the so-called, and loosely defined *international community* did not intervene in the majority of the countries that were confronted by the Arab Spring protests. The chapter further noted that this precedent by the *international community*, to not intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states was to have an exception in the Libyan case. The idea and response to the Libyan case revealed a long-standing regime-change agenda by Western modernity that is epitomised by the trio, Britain, France and the US. The targeted application of R2P through UNSC Resolution 1973 revealed an arbitrary response by the *international community*. The Libya issue further brings doubt to the already embattled set of international norms such as R2P, Humanitarian Intervention and Humanitarian Law. R2P is rightly described as the right to punish (Mamdani 2010).

In conclusion, the *international community's* response demonstrated the asymmetrical and unequal composition of the UN system as it unwarrantedly favours the Euro-centric Western states that are located in the Global North to the detriment and manipulation of states in the

Global South. The chapter also revealed that the bifurcation of the Global North, zone of being and the Global South, zone of non-being are a creation of Western modernity and are part of the intention to reconfigure the Global power structure that is in the hands of the Global North.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE GLOBAL POWER RECONFIGURATION AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE NATO INVASION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that NATO's invasion of Libya was consistent with hegemonic Euro-North American-centric ideology of controlling the levers of power and domination on a global stage. It reveals the real reasons that threatened the Euro-North American-centric civilisation when it came to Libya, especially when viewed in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings. The chapter also highlights the reality of what has transpired in Libya after the departure and death of Qaddafi. The analysis is done by critically looking at the rationale that NATO and its allies provided as the basis of the invasion *vis-a-vis* the reality that the actual invasion exposed. It is the contention of this chapter that the current, and ongoing, political instability in Libya was the end-goal of the Euro-North American-centric modernity which was achieved through the NATO-led invasion of Libya.

At the core of coloniality of power is the control of levers of power by the Euro-North American-centric modernity of other forms of being, which is camouflaged as regulation by the rhetoric of modernity. Put differently, control is the leitmotif of coloniality, be it control of the economy, gender and sexuality, knowledge and subjectivity or authority. This chapter explains how these four levers of coloniality of power, namely: the control of the economy, the control of gender and sexuality, the control of knowledge and subjectivity and the control of authority, were manifested in the NATO invasion of Libya. The explanation reveals how European modernity reconfigured itself in the Libyan invasion as it sought to eliminate the challenge that was advanced by Qaddafi's efforts at liberating Libya, and by extension Africa, from the European-centric imperial domination and world systems that are purported to be global and necessary for survival in the 'modern' times.

5.2 Control of the Economy Versus the Gold-backed African Currency

It is an established fact that the global economy is in the hands of Western-centric modernity which is under the custodianship of capitalism that was instituted in the Brenton Woods

institutions. Furthermore, capitalism ensures that Africa particularly, remains peripherised and subservient to Eurocentric modernity (Gavin 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 6). As such, Quijano (1993), quoted in, Grosfoguel (2000: 368) explains that it was modernity that socially and historically constructed categories of "labour and capital … between Europeans and non-Europeans". This work notes that the commencement of the capitalist system of world economies was never on the basis of fairness or justice. In other words, the beginning of capitalism equally signalled the beginning of asymmetrical economic relations between civilisations and states. The states and civilisations that were under the ambit of European descent were privileged by this system and hence, are superior to other states and civilisations economically, financially and consequently, socially and culturally. Quijano (2000: 536) consolidates this view arguing that, since European colonisation of the US, the expansion of European colonisation has incrementally controlled what has been and has become the current world order.

Quijano (2000: 539) further intimates that, the specific social configuration of capital was socially and geographically condensed in Europe, and moreover, among Europeans in the entirety of the capitalist world. Grosfoguel and Georas (2000: 88) also evince that the core zones of the capitalist world system revolve around "White/European/Euro American societies" predominantly, while the peripheral zones of the capitalist system are concentrated in non-European areas and countries. To this effect, Samir Amin (2013: 15) argues that capitalism has become "constitutive of an integrated [Euro-centric and therefore, modernistic] system". This means that Europe manipulated geography to its advantage by concentrating wealth to this specific portion if the globe, thereby giving the illusion that the capital of capitalism is Western and modern. That Europe concentrated wealth to itself is in itself not problematic, Europe was only looking out for itself. The problem is that European expansion and profit came at the expense of black unwaged labour. Kissinger (2014: 19) evinces this assertion and writes that "Europeans were enabled to increase their wealth" at the exploitation of the Black race that they used as slaves. The exploitative nature of white capital to black labour is the problem of capitalism. Europeans profiteered immensely at the expense and exploit of Black labour, particularly through the brutal and dehumanising enterprise of the Black slave trade, as "slavery was assigned [by Europeans] exclusively to the 'Black' population brought from Africa (Quijano 2000; 539). In other words, African labour built Europe and America.

The other problem with Western modernity is that, while it is Africans who provided the labour that developed Europe, it considers itself the only and legitimate author and guardian of development in general, but in this case, economic development particularly. Otherwise had European modernity not been obsessed by controlling other civilisations, they would have not killed Muammar Qaddafi, Patrice Lumumba of the then Zaire (Ademola 2019; Akwei 2019), Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso (Ray 2008; Suleiman-Issah 2019), Saddam Hussein of Iraq (Gwaambuka 2016a; Koenig 2017) – who variably were fighting for the emancipation of their peoples. To this effect, Tatenda Gwaambuka (2016a) evinces that similarly between the Qaddafi situation of Libya and Saddam Hussein's quest for economically emancipating his people in Iraq by choosing to trade in euros was to not be without problems. The European currency (euros) provided for a healthy competition to the capitalist system which had been dominated by U.S dollar – a currency that was perceived as the "currency of the enemy" by the US and indeed by Iraq's Hussein (*ibid*). The animosity between the US and the European Union resulted in what was termed "currency wars" (*ibid*). In other words, the currency wars were a result of both the US' and Europe's bluff to give an illusion that the latter was to pull out of the dollar system. The US and Europe are instigators and beneficiaries of capitalism and therefore, ought to be treated as one entity. They are both located in, and work to sustain, Western modernity. Hussein's sin was that of choosing to trade in a currency that gave competition to the US dollar, thereby giving the illusion that there existed a "currency war" between the US and the European Union, not-with-standing the violence he inflicted on his own people. While currency wars are indeed a fact of history, the manifestation of this sort of war between the European countries and the US are dismissed as just but a front and veneer to camouflage the fact that, in fact, there is only one modernity.

Peter Koenig (2017) corroborates Gwaambuka's (2016a) view and avers that Saddam Hussein embodied and pursued, pliably, the same idea as Qaddafi, that of emancipating his people and citizens of Iraq through viable economic means and reforms. Despite the fact that Hussein was aware of, in the words of Koenig (2017), the "murderous and criminal embargo imposed by the UN – of course dictated by Washington" he however, had hoped that the embargo was to end in the year 2000, and then "he would sell his petrol in euros. He was killed" (Koenig 2017). Put differently, Saddam Hussein was killed for attempting to partake in the global economy by demanding payment in lieu of oil and petrol from his country in a European currency (euros) in order to make profit for his country. Western modernity's capital was not to allow that.

Nazemroaya (2012b: 178) advances the argument that "in the eyes of NATO, Libya's crime was how it distributed and used its wealth, its lack of external debts, and the key role it was attempting to play in continental development and curtailing of external influence in Africa". Madsen (2012: 35) concurs with the narrative that Libya's population, during the Qaddafi era part took in the Libyan oil wealth as the government of Libya provided for each family "a monthly payment of 500 dinars" from the share of oil reserves. This bares testimony to how Qaddafi ensued that the generality of the Libyan population was economically emancipated. Put differently, Qaddafi's conviction of liberating Africa and ridding Africa of Western domination and control is the reason why the US-NATO-UK-France consortium bombed Libya, and in the process, eliminating its uncompromising leader. Therefore, the killing of Qaddafi was motivated by modernity's thirst for control of the economy of the world, since Qaddafi was set to liberate Libya particularly, but Africa in general, from the monopoly of the capitalist, hierarchised, racialised, American-dollarised and Euro-centric world order in his call for a gold-backed African dinar currency. As correctly pointed out by Ramose (2003: 3), capitalism gives rise, endorses and avers a "conceptual link between colonisation, racism, and slavery". Therefore, capitalism has no interest to level the economic playing field and Qaddafi was aware of this fact, and therefore, sought to liberate Libya and Africa by introducing an alternative currency (gold dinar) that stood in opposition of the overbearing US dollar. That position of wanting to liberate the African economy from its dependency on the US dollar would have had implications for labour in relation to capital; it sought to emancipate the Black race as it is at the base of the capitalist and labour-dependent world order.

Western modernity understood the extent of the threat that Qaddafi posed by calling on for an African currency that was to run parallel to the US dollar because they understood that Qaddafi had the resources to bring to material the idea of the gold-backed dinar. Oil reserves that Libya has and the world needed was enough capital that Qaddafi needed to consolidate the plans to suspend the US dollar on the African continent and promulgate the African dinar. The rise of the African dinar is the real threat that Western modernity was aware of and could not allow to happen as the dinar threatened modernity's very economic power base and configuration.

Western modernity as a custodian of the global economy, controls economies that are monitored and customised by the Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group (WBG), the World Trade Centre (WTO), among others. An economist by the name of John Perkins (Cited in, Gwaambuka 2016a) argues that "the United States controls about 16% of the World Bank while the second largest member,

Japan has a paltry 7%. The United States again has around 17% voting rights in the International Monetary Fund". This goes to show the asymmetry that exists in these structures that are born of, endorses, and sustains Western modernity. As further evinced by Gwaambuka (2016a), the IMF and the World Bank are institutions that "were and still are extensions of the Western foreign policy". In other words, these institutions are located in, grounded in and seek to further the interests of European modernity. Qaddafi's call for a gold-backed single African currency (the dinar) stood antithetical to Western modernity's capitalist system. This move was going to benefit Africa as it meant that Africa was not going to depend on the Bretton Woods institutions for credit lines to keep African economies afloat in a Euro-North America-centric capitalist system. The gold-backed dinar was set to liberate Africa from economic subjugation by the capitalist system which clearly was not designed to benefit Africa; if anything, the capitalist system was designed to exploit Africa and keep it at the very bottom of the hierarchy of humanity, civilisations and economies.

Qaddafi's call was a real threat to the global capitalist economy which has, at its apex, the dominant US dollar in that the dinar was to provide an alternative and viable currency for Africa. The amalgamation of African currencies was to signal just the beginning of other spheres of African countries' amalgamation, including the amalgamation of the African countries to one country and continent. This development was the real threat to western modernity which partitioned Africa; as a result of the division, it was easy for European nations to defeat, manipulate and conquer a divided and uncoordinated Africa. The real threat to the current global system is that when Africa amalgamates (in the economic and nationhood senses), it would be unstoppable in terms of development as it has all the resources (human capital, labour, knowledge, mineral resources etc.) to prosper.

Furthermore, Peter Koenig (2017) in an interview by the Russian News Agency, *Russia TV24* demonstrates the substance of this thesis that President Qaddafi's vision was to empower Africa. More importantly:

> He [Qaddafi] had a plan to create a new African Union, based on a new African economic system. He had a plan to introduce the 'Gold dinar' as backing for African currencies, so they could become free from the dollar-dominated western monetary system that kept and keeps usurping Africa; Africa's vast natural resources, especially oil and minerals. As a first step, he offered this lucrative and very beneficial alternative to other Muslim African states, but leaving it open for any other African countries to join. At the time of Qaddafi's atrocious murdering by Hillary Clinton, then Obama's Secretary of State, and the French President

Sarkozy, driven by NATO forces, on 20 October 2011 – Libya's gold reserves were estimated at close to 150 tons, and about the same amount of silver. The estimated value at that time was $7 billion (Koenig 2017).

Koenig's views are corroborated by Gwaambuka (2016a) who rebuts the claim advanced by NATO and its neo-liberal machinery that Qaddafi's death was a necessity in order to usher in a democratic dispensation in Libya. He argues that "Qaddafi was not killed for humanitarian purposes but for the oil and for money. His ideas of an African gold-backed currency were his major undoing". This finding is important as it tells us of the real motive behind the killing of Qaddafi than the veneer of rationalising that has been proffered by Western-centric and neo-liberal scholarship thus far. The finding is telling in that the IMF itself, an institution that is founded, located, instrumentalized and controlled by architects of Western modernity, observed that in 2011, prior to NATO's killing of Qaddafi, the Central Bank of Libya was "100% state-owned"; moreover, the bank had an estimated "141 tons of gold in its vaults" (Gwaambuka 2016a). As such, Qaddafi believed that, with reason and facts, his plan of introducing a gold-backed currency would provide for an alternative currency for Africa primarily, but for the Muslim world as well, as he himself was a self-confessed Muslim. In the words of Gwaambuka (2016a) Qaddafi "felt it [the dinar monetary currency] could rival the euro and the dollar, and rightly so too". This was not to be accepted by imperial "monopoly finance capital", to use Samir Amin words (2018), that is located and advances the interests of modernity.

Sidney Blumenthal (Cited in Gwaambuka, 2016a), who in an email to the then Secretary of State, Madame Hillary Clinton confirmed that the Qaddafi regime had in its possession "143 tons of gold, and a similar amount in silver". Sidney Blumenthal further confirmed that, and in convergence with Koenig (2017), the value of both the precious metals (gold and silver) was pegged at approximately US $ 7 billion and "was one of the reasons Nicolas Sarkozy embarked on a French attack of Libya" (Gwaambuka 2016a). This further consolidates the already established fact that Libya was not invaded for humanitarian purposes, but for economic sabotage of that African country, particularly by France. As further revealed by Blumenthal (Cited in, Gwaambuka 2016a) that, the then President of France Nicolas Sarkozy's plans were in pursuance of the following matters:

a. A desire to gain a greater share of Libya oil production,

b. Increase French influence in North Africa,

c. Improve his [Sarkozy's standing and public perception] internal political situation in France,

d. Provide the French military with an opportunity to reassert its position in the world,

e. Address the concern of his advisors over Qaddafi's long-term plans to supplant France as the dominant power in, Francophone Africa (Gwaambuka 2016a).

These are exactly the configuration matrices of Western modernity; indeed this is how European modernity reconfigured itself in crushing Libya's Qaddafi and in the process reasserting itself and its dominance on particularly the African civilisations and their ecologies, but on generally, the civilisations in the Global South and their ecologies.

The African Economic Outlook Organisation (2012: 3) states that Libya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was -41.8 per cent in 2011 following the invasion of Libya, having fallen from 2.9 per cent the year before (2010). It further states that in 2012 and 2013, Libya's GDP rose to 20.1 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively. This would seem to indicate that there was growth of the Libyan GDP following the invasion of Libya and the demise of its leader, al Qaddafi. However, it is this thesis' contention that such are the operations and rationalisations of modernity. These figures indicating Libya's GDP growth rates are false. A country's GDP is as a result of what a country produces and earns per annum.

How could have Libya produced or earned so much when it was under siege and as some have described it, Libya was at war? What did Libya produce that could account for such an exponential growth of 20.1 percent, save for syphoned oil that the West is addicted to? The African Economic Outlook Organisation (2012: 4) unwittingly offers self-contradicting information to evince the falsehood of a GDP increase following the 2011 NATO invasion of Libya. It argued that "in addition to the impact that the freezing of the country's assets had on liquidity, the economy was disrupted by the shutdown in oil production and exports, as well as the decline of productivity resulting from the loss of human capital and the destruction of infrastructure" (*African Economic Outlook Organisation* 2012: 4). How could such a dire economic situation account for a 20.1 per cent increment in GDP? Western modernity would want the world to believe that the 143 tons of gold and a further 141 tons of silver that belonged to Libya cannot be accounted for to this day. It is plausible that the West used some of this loot to inflate and spike Libya's GDP figures.

However, it is this thesis contends that it is actually the stolen and looted gold and silver by the West that is dangled in the markets to give the illusion that, following the 'intervention' Libya is on the path to economic recovery. In other words, Western modernity manipulated the markets that are in their command and control, to give a false reading that Libya is improving economically. This is entirely false as it will be evinced later in this chapter. Libyans themselves have expressed the dire economic conditions that have resulted from NATO's invasion of their country. This is the West's ploy to bluff the world in making it believe that the intervention was necessary for Libya's economic recovery and democracy. Yet, it is the West's ploy to reconfigure the Libyan economy into the modernity system of economics dominated by the Euro-North American centric capitalism.

To further corroborate the argument that Western modernity manipulated the markets and Libya's resources to pass as evidence the bluff of an economic growth in Libya, statistics provided by the World Bank attest to this. The World Bank (2019) evinces that in Libya's recent past, prior to the killing of Qaddafi, Libya recorded a US $ 20.482 billion GDP in 2002, which was the lowest in decades. Libya also recorded a US $ 74.773 billion GDP in 2010. In 2011, the year NATO killed Qaddafi, Libya recorder a US $ 34.699 billion GDP. Like the African Economic Outlook Organisation's (2012) report, the World Bank's report suggests an exponential rise in Libya's GDP for the year 2012, following the killing of Qaddafi and invasion of Libya; it notes that Libya's GDP in 2012 and 2013 was pegged at US $ 81.874 billion and US $ 65.503 billion respectively.

This thesis notes with suspicion that the data provided by the World Bank to account for Libya's GDP for the years 2012 and 2013 shows that it was tempered with and manipulated. It was manipulated in the sense that in 2011, the year of the so-called war, there was an exponential growth of Libya's GDP. Since Libya was at 'war' and frankly, not producing anything officially, what then would account for such a sharp spike! How could it be when the country was having a war? Suddenly in 2012 and 2013, there is decrease in Libya's GDP. Unless it is the loot that the trio-led Western bloc squandered and want to pass as if the 144 tons of gold were uncounted for. Or the 141 tons of silver that are not known where they vanished to. In 2014 however, Libya recorded a reduced US $ 41.143 billion GDP and in 2016 a significantly lower US $ 26.222 GDP. The 2016 GDP figure is as low as close to the 2002 figure. This is significant because it demonstrates that the Euro-North American-centric modernity desperately wanted to pass the front that the Libya economy was doing well after Qaddafi. But that stunt is unsustainable because Western modernity is never meant for the

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benefit of the periphery Libya and Africa as well as the Global South, hence the more realistic figures of 2016's Libyan GDP.

5.3 Control of Knowledge and Subjectivity versus the Communication Satellite

Western modernity has always privileged rationality, as such it appropriated rational superiority to itself and, by the same token, apportioned inferiority to other non-European races. Ramose (2003: 1) highlights that, in the perspective of European modernity, rationality was not a preserve of particularly African people, neither of Amerindian people nor of Australasian people, for these civilisations are to be found outside of European modernity. With European modernity's position of rationality comes the belief that those civilisations without *rationality* can therefore, not have knowledge. As such, knowledge production is an exclusive preserve of European modernity. The control of what knowledge is and is not remains an exclusive preserve of European modernity. The control of knowledge and information is today channelled through mass media (*CNN, BBC, France24*-effect that this work spoke of in *Chapters Two, Three and Four*), as well as, through publishing houses and scientific or academic journals such as Palgrave Macmillan, Springer, Oxford, Harvard and Taylor Francis to mention just but a few. By and large the so-called academic or scientific journals subscribe to the Harvard System which essentially is in the hands of European modernity, both in the literary and actual sense. This system sustains the coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of an emancipatory and de-colonial knowledge. The Euro-North American-centric system that controls the levers of what knowledge is, and is not, implies that – while it is an imaginary claim - only it has the exclusive right to rationality. Ramon Grosfoguel (2008) concurs with Ramose' observation. He evinces that in the 17th century Western modernity tended to characterise non-Europeans as "people without writing", therefore, without knowledge. This characterisation of people of a lack or 'without' continued in the 18th and 19th centuries as non-Europeans were characterised as "people without history". This was to further continue in the 20th century when non-Europeans were characterised as "people without development" and to this day, in the 21st century Western modernity characterises non-Europeans as "people without democracy" (Grosfoguel 2008).

However, the imaginary claim to exclusive rationality by modernity has overarching and comprehensive innuendo for knowledge and the control of knowledge production for other

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civilisations, particularly the African civilisations. From an Afrocentric view, modernity's exclusive claim to rationality and knowledge negates other civilisations' claims to rationality in a bid to cast doubt on the rationality and ability of Africans to produce their own knowledge that works for them. Since modernity doubts the rationality of Africans as amply demonstrated by Ramose's (2003: 5) expose that European modernity undermines Africans' capacity to philosophise, as well as, demonstrated by wa Thiongó's (1986: 94) expose on European modernity's quest to control the "organising principle" of what knowledge is and is not, together with Mudimbe's (1987: 2) expose on the control element that he called the "organising structure" to evince modernity's control of knowledge and information, Qaddafi stood to challenge this control of knowledge and information by sponsoring the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM)'s initiative to liberalise communication and knowledge/information communication from the Western-dominated mass-media outlets.

RASCOM in a 2005 initiative of 45 out of 54 African countries that came together to work towards developing a communication satellite that was set to provide cheaper communication rates to Africa (RASCOM [n.d].). Qaddafi's sponsorship of the African Union's initiatives provided evidence to Western modernity of Qaddafi's capability in bringing to reality the objectives of RASCOM. Pougala (2012: 170) evinces that the antecedents of RASCOM are found in Libya's initiatives. These include, "connecting the entire continent by telephone, television, radio broadcasting and several other technological applications such as telemedicine and distance teaching". It was Libya's initiative using the "WMAX radio bridge" that low-cost tele, digital and data connections were made available across the entire African continent, especially in the rural areas. At the time, Europe would pocket about US $ 500 million per annum in telephone and communication fees from Africa, yet a once-off fee of US $ 400 million would have been enough to build Africa's own satellite (Pougala 2012: 170).

For almost 14 years, Africa had sought a loan from the World Bank, IMF, the US and Europe to facilitate the building of the satellite without any success. The stalling of approving the loan for Africa by Western modernity and its institutions was not surprising at all seeing that Africa sought to liberate itself from modernity anyway. Qaddafi's Libya offered to pay US $ 300 million towards the establishment of an African satellite. A further US $ 50 million was sourced from the African Development Bank and the West African Development Bank tabled US $ 27 million, thereby making it possible for Africa to launch its first communications satellite on the 26th of December 2007 (Pougala 2011). That move by Qaddafi, of substantially sponsoring the bulk of the money, was to usurp from Europeans an amount of US $ 500 million per annum.

The capitalist system was upset. Qaddafi's sponsorship was aimed at liberating the African continent economically as well as facilitate the ease of communication and relaying of information intra-continentally.

Pougala (2011) further tables the view that "the first totally indigenously built satellite and manufactured on African soil, in Algeria, is set for [the year] 2020. This satellite is aimed at competing with the best in the world, but at ten times less the cost, a real challenge". This is exactly what Western modernity was fighting Qaddafi over. This move signalled to the colonial masters that the formerly colonised subjects are freeing themselves from the clutches of coloniality of knowledge and information. Furthermore, Qaddafi's position and quest for an economically liberated Africa demonstrated that, while the exclusive claim to rationality by modernity may be what appears to be the reality, it was in fact only through the control of the economy that Western modernity could pull this myth off. Material power channelled by modernity to sabotage and dominate other forms of civilisations gave the illusion that, because European modernity had rationality, it could therefore construct knowledge and that knowledge gave modernity success over other civilisations. Of course, this is not true. In fact, the power of the gun – in other words, the paradigm of violence and war – as proven by the killing of Qaddafi who stood antithetical to the dictates of modernity, was what was behind Europe's smoke-screen of success and expansion and not rationality at all.

The violence which propelled Western modernity's expansion is the real reason that modernity has established itself. Western modernity almost claims exclusive right to this paradigm of violence and war. Samir Amin evinces that weapons of war including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are almost a preserve of Western monopoly (Amin 1974: 467). It is the violence and war that Western modernity uses to discipline, ostracise and dispense its opponents, hence the violent death of Muammar Qaddafi and the coerced relinquishing of nuclear capability by Libya in 2003 (Davenport 2018).

Qaddafi's sponsorship of the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM) project that stood to provide telecommunications at a cheaper rate for Africa was tinkering with Western Modernity's control of knowledge and information. RASCOM [n.d.] tables its objectives as follows:

- Provide a large-scale telecommunications infrastructure at a lower cost to rural areas of the continent using appropriate technology;
- Improve and / or develop long distance communications in each country;

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- Establish direct lines between all African countries without exception;
- Provide facilities for radio and television broadcasts in each country and enable the exchange of radio and television programs between African countries;
- Support international connectivity: continue the connection where others cannot go;
- Provide a range of services, voice, data, multimedia, tele-education, tele-medicine, video conferencing, etc.

Amin (2018) referred to modernity's thirst to control knowledge and information as the monopoly of [mass] media by imperial powers. It is this monopoly of knowledge and information that demonstrates that modernity is incapable of co-existing with other civilisations. Modernity was not to allow such liberatory initiatives such as RASCOM that stood to benefit Africa. As such, the killing of Qaddafi ensured that the financial and/or economic muscle that he provided for RASCOM would be obliterated. The real threat for modernity lay in that, with RASCOM the masses of African people would be able to be provided with information (content with substance) that suited them and sooner rather than later, they were going to see Western-centric mass media for what it actually is, an instrument that perpetuates Western propaganda and carries no African interests at all. To this effect, Phelan (2012: 38) argues that in the Libyan case of 2011, the "excuse of protecting life" was peddled in Western media "as a pretext to cause mass death and destruction". Libyans cried out "in their millions" to the world as their country "was being bombed into extermination" by NATO, yet Western journalists refused to "relay the very sights they [were] seeing" (*ibid*). The journalists from the West did not report on the fact that Libyans in fact defended their Leader Muammar Qaddafi by surrounding his compound at Bab al-Aziza every evening forming a human chain against NATO military assaults. Furthermore, Libyans formed neighbourhood watch committees as a measure to protect their communities and villages from "NATO proxies" who were terrorising citizens (Phelan 2012: 38).

The contention of this thesis is that had RASCOM succeeded, Libyans were going to be able to reach out to the world and show the world the brutality and cruelty of the NATO assault on their country and citizens. This is exactly why Western modernity was not to allow an initiative such as RASCOM to succeed, as it would be easy to expose its double-standards, disingenuity and crimes that it continues to perpetuate unabated. NATO committed crimes in Libya – massacred 33 children and unarmed and defenceless 52 women in Zlitan for example – "while

the world was being told that the Libyan people were being 'liberated'" (Phelan 2012: 39). Similarly, Nazemroaya (2012a: 128) avers that the UNSC launched its "aggression against Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians and enforcing a no-fly zone over the country". The control of the airwaves – which constitutes coloniality of knowledge and information - was utilised to manipulate information and misrepresent facts in the Libyan invasion. The pretext of the invasion of Libya, which really is the *Casus Bello* was staged. There was a consortium of organisations that had been working towards creating a conducive environment to justify intervention as well as establishing "a net of individuals needed for creating a proxy government in Libya" (Nazemroaya 2012a: 127). Nazemroaya's revelation answers the controversy that surrounded the establishing of the NTC, particularly that the NTC was officially recognised by the then President of France, Nikolas Sarkozy on 10 March 2011 (Gazzini 2011: 5). The network of organisations working for the "justifying interventionism" had in its fold Non-Governmental Organisations and Human Rights Organisations, that included but were not limited to, the Human Rights Council and the Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDR), National Endowment for Democracy (NED) that were used as vehicles to propagate lies about the reality of the situation in Libya at the time (Nazemroaya 2012a: 128-132). Some of the lies told and peddled in international news networks included claims of African mercenaries that threatened civilians in Libya and "Libyan military jet attacks on civilians and civilian massacres by Muammar Qaddafi" (Nazemroaya 2012a: 127). Suffice to point out that the Libyan authorities requested for international investigating teams to come into Libya to establish the truthfulness of the NGOs' claims. The requests by Libya fell on deaf ears and were initially ignored (*ibid* 132). It was upon the recommendations of the Human Rights Council that the United Nations Security Council, without investigating the veracity of the claims, launched its military assault on Libya (Nazemroaya 2012a: 127). Pressurised by international curiosity as to why there was no substantiation of the massacres claims, a Dr Sliman Bouchuiguir who was the General-Secretary of the Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR), was to latter admit that "a network of close relationships was the basis of this support" (Nazemroaya 2012a: 132). The support referred to the lobbying of the UNSC's support for the military intervention in Libya. This revelation was to prove the disingenuity of Western modernity through its control of mass-media outlets and the control of relaying of information. Qaddafi's influence on the African continent threatened modernity because it knew he was uncompromising when it came to emancipating and liberating Africans from the clutches of Western modernity. Hence, he had to be eliminated.

Similarly, Campbell (2013: 67) corroborates Nazemroaya's argument that there was no real evidence that the Qaddafi regime had committed atrocities against its own people. He notes that, it was further demonstrated at the UN where South Africa argued that "there had been no jets used in attacks by Qaddafi against his own civilians" (Campbell 2013: 67). Campbell (2013, 67) further reveals that, while at the Pentagon giving a press conference on the 1st of March 2011, the US' Secretary of Defence at the time, Robert Gates, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen confirmed that there were media reports that told of Qaddafi's unleashing of state violence on his people, but they had "no confirmation whatsoever". Yet, on the 17th of March 2011, barely two weeks after the US made such vindicating admissions on Libya, the US actively lobbied, together with France and Britain for the UNSC to act "under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [which] passed Resolution 1973" (Campbell 2013: 69). What this boils down to is that because the US, Britain and France controlled and therefore, monopolised the airwaves, there was one-sided information that got through to the world. This unilateral view of information to the world is exactly what Qaddafi intend to counter by getting Libya significantly involved in the RASCOM initiative. Qaddafi wanted to disentangle Africa from the monopoly, monolithic and biased narrative of the Euro-North American-centric modernity.

5.4 Control of Authority versus an Authoritative Call for a United Africa

Authority has to do with legitimacy; invariably, legitimacy has to do with the truthfulness and the correctness of an entity or phenomena that is referred to as legitimate (Ramose 2003: 3). Western modernity's assertion and claim to exclusive rationality positions itself to claim universal legitimacy to existence. This claim and assertion by Western modernity, distorted as it is, bestows on itself legitimacy to order anything else that exists in its proximity and environment. Of course the problem is that, not only does modernity order everything [civilisations/nations/states etc.] around it according to its whims and terms, it is illegitimate for it to order other civilisations in the first place. The ordering of other civilisations by modernity gives the illusion that the authority that Western modernity claims is geographically determined, yet it is the manipulation of geography by modernity that gives rise to that spoof. The veneer that feebly grounds Western modernity's purported authority emanates from 5 particular European countries; these countries are close to each other in proximity and are

located in the Western hemisphere. They are, Britain as the chief proponent of modernity, then France, Germany, Italy and Greece (Grosfoguel & Georas 2000: 97, 98).

What fuels this perception of an authoritative Europe is the reference to European writings by literature in the social sciences particularly, as if to appeal to the European authority for validation. Classical European writings appeal to thoughts and views held by, amongst others, Aristotle, Plato and Socrates who were Greek, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes who were English, Jean Jacque Rousseau who was French, Immanuel Kant, Rene Descartes and Karl Marx who were German and Niccolo Machiavelli who was Italian. This standard of appealing to authority figures in a discipline is, by and large, of European making which makes authoritative reference to authors who are located in the five afore-mentioned European countries thereby appealing to a particular section of geography. This practice further cements Eurocentrism. Therefore, it gives the illusion that authority is located, centred and derived from Europe. This is how modernity further inculcates itself in the psyche and thinking of the formerly colonised. This thesis asserts therefore, that the citation of the purported 'authority-figures' in the academy particularly is constitutive of coloniality of authority. Arguably, the appeal and referencing of authority figures manifest as coloniality of knowledge, but equally it is coloniality of authority as research or knowledge-production is then left to the mercy of Western modernity.

Qaddafi's call for a United Africa was perceived by most African leaders as a legitimate and a long- overdue call. Most African leaders at the time perceived Qaddafi as an ideal leader who had fought for the liberation of Africa. Qaddafi's sponsorship of liberation movements across Africa legitimatised his call for a United Africa in the perspective of African leaders and the general African populace at large. There are some pundits, such as Professor Adebayo Adeyeke, who have argued that Qaddafi's standing in the perspectives of African leaders of the time did not amount to much; in fact, it was nothing more than a grandstanding to appease Qaddafi for his sponsorship to important platforms such as the African Union (Ghosh 2011; Elliot 2011). Notwithstanding, this narrative is problematic because it fails to account for philanthropic initiatives by Qaddafi's Libya such as the sponsorship of RASCOM, for example. Therefore, not only did Qaddafi have the authority to make the call for a United Africa, he also had the financial muscle to follow through with his call and intentions, and that particularly is what threatened Western modernity' grip on the control of authority in Africa, at least on the perception that Qaddafi had legitimate authority and material resources to bring to fruition the United Africa.

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The West knew that Qaddafi's authority on calling for a United Africa was to be ignored at its own peril. Historically, Qaddafi had managed to influence other countries in taking decisions that were antithetical to Western capitalism, thereby hurting the so-called global markets. For instance, in 1973 Qaddafi nationalised oil companies in Libya rendering the Libyan government control of a 51 per cent stake in all oil companies in Libya (Campbell 2013: 86). That move influenced and allowed other countries who formed part of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the time, such as Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia to start charging taxes for oil companies in their domains. Consequently, other countries followed suit; these included: Nigeria, Iraq, Venezuela, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates that "fully nationalised the holdings of the Western oil companies" (Campbell 2013: 86). This was largely because of Libya's influence that emanated from its own national policies. This goes to prove that Qaddafi's call for a United Africa had the potential to cripple the Western-centric capitalist system if other African countries heeded his call. The Euro-North American-centric world would not have allowed this to happen as Qaddafi had not only the authority to make such a call, but had the resources to bring to fruition that call. The Euro-North American-centric civilisation knew all too well that "Libya is well-endowed with oil and gas resources, [geographically] located close to European markets" (Campbell 2013: 87). Qaddafi had to be eliminated at the conception stages of the idea of a United Africa, had it been left to simmer and gain traction in the discourses of other African nations, it was going to be disastrous for the Western-centric capitalist bloc.

Libya's influence and authority could not have been ignored in the West's imagination. In 1977, through Libya's influence and agitation within structures such as OPEC, Libya confronted the West over the exploitation of oil resourced-countries, which culminated in Libya ranked the fourth "in the list of potential enemies of the US" (Campbell 2013: 87). Following from that ranking, Libya and the Reagan Administration confronted each other, and because the tensions were unresolved, that led to the bombing of Libya by the US in 1986, in a bid to eliminate Qaddafi.

It follows then that, Qaddafi's authority emanated from the fact that his people [Libyans], peers [fellow Heads of State and Government] and fellow Africans perceived him as an influential leader who had his people's interest at heart. What he promised, he would do; what he stood for, he would provide resources for therefore, he was a man of his word. This made him an authority figure that his peers and people, and indeed, all of Africa, would listen to and find

resonance with. This is precisely what threatened the Western-centric worldview, and as such, Qaddafi had to be eliminated.

5.5 Control of Gender and Sexuality versus an Exemplary African Decolonial State

European brutal colonial encounters with Africa resulted in the political construction of an Africa that mimics European societies and order. In the process, the newly established colonies assumed the illusory perception of the Euro-North American-ascribed *superiority* of the male gender as opposed to the ascribed and equally illusory female gender's *inferiority*. Arguably, this was so because the European colonial order instituted this gender disparity, based on European bigotry and chauvinism, in its new-found colonies. By gender, this work understands it to "refer to those female-male differences which are given by [European] society and perpetuated through upbringing, as distinct from differences which are dictated by biology" (Taylor 2011). In the conception of the Euro-North American-centric world, the male gender is considered the protector of the female gender as it is "more macho" (Barr 2018). As recent as the year 2018, a study conducted in Britain revealed that "British men often have a more traditional perception of relationships, while women from Europe prefer to uphold egalitarian beliefs" (Barr 2018). By traditional, it means the sexist and chauvinistic conception of women. Put differently, the founding of European colonies in other spaces and places ensured that Europe transplanted its culture, civilisation, worldview and psyche, and imposed these dimensions of European societies on its colonies, Africa – the geography where Libya is located - included. As such, Europe forcibly imposed on Africa – the locus of enunciation of this writer – the racialised, hierarchised, patriarchised and sexist values and standards of European modernity to the very core and fabric of colonised places and spaces.

Colonialism and capitalism were simultaneously introduced to Africa as the former is a corollary of the latter. This meant that when capital came to Africa and other colonised places, it came to exploit African peasant labour. It is colonialism that brought the concept of working for someone else in order for that someone to make profit out of another's labour. Hence, with colonialism came the phenomena of township-dwelling (Ladd [n.d.]; Turino 2008: 28; Wallace 1998). Townships and "hostels" were residential places that were exclusively a preserve of Black labourers in the case of Africa (Kekana 2018; Serino & Dludla 2015; Poplak 2015). In colonial times, townships were known as "segregation locations" (Wallace 1998: 131),

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suggesting that townships were synonymous with places of seclusion, lack, disintegration and alienation of the Black indigenous and Native race.

Township-dwelling at its core, was sexist in the sense that men were the preferred gender to carry out the extremely labour-intensive tasks that came with city-building, manufacturing and textile industries *etc*. This necessitated that men and boys (the male gender specifically) would leave behind (sometimes forcibly) their families at their homes to come and provide, more often than not, unwaged labour in the would-be new and emerging cities. As Desai and Vahed (2013: 14) would argue, sometimes colonial establishments forcefully evicted and uprooted Natives, Black people in the case of Africa, from their natural surroundings that were home to them, and would relocate them to arid places and sub-standard places for human settlements. These were referred to as "townships" and "ghettos" (Desai & Vahed 2013: 14). In other words, there was no concept of townships in Africa before colonialism, although the concept of village existed. The problem with this narrative is that, because labour for industry was provided by males, when it speaks of people being forcibly displaced, it refers to men only. In other words, this narrative conceals the fact that when it speaks of people, it is only men that are considered. This is the beginning of the exclusion of the female gender in the frameworks of colonialism and modernity as it relates to African societies.

Colonial labour came with the conditioning of gender-specific roles. Men were expected to provide labour, and in exchange for their labour, a merge income would be generated. The separation of men from their families meant that the family system and fabric was gradually eroded and dismantled. The merge income generated by men, gave them a false sense of *superiority* over the female gender, arguably this false sense of *superiority* emanated from the very fact that colonial masters had in themselves superiority and sexist tendencies. As labour exponentially replaced subsistence farming in many African ecologies and societies, due to the loss of land of Natives to the whim-some theft of, and by colonial masters, African men particularly – because they earned some sort of currency – became the breadwinners of families. So, the structure of colonial societies was gendered in that the male gender was perceived as *superior* and as more important than the *inferior* female gender and therefore, sexist. The superior-inferior dynamic also applied to race, the White race was the privileged race and the Black race disadvantaged. The colonial societies were also hierarchised as the White race occupied the apex and the Black race was at the very base. Therefore, colonial societies were both racist and sexist.

In going against the Western canon of what men and women should be (gender and sexuality), Qaddafi's Libya introduced a new thinking and conception of women in light of their colonially-assigned roles. In what is referred to as the Green Book which was Qaddafi's blue-print enshrined in Libya's national policies, he recognised every human being as equal, woman or man, girl or boy. Qaddafi's Libya not only spoke about women empowerment and gender-mainstreaming, but made sure that "women, like men [where treated with the same dignity and respect as they] are human beings" (Lendman 2012: 101). Suffice to note that this was not just a mantra that sounded *nice* and relevant, it was a mantra that was applied and implemented at state or national level in and through the implementation of the ideals and ideas expressed in Qaddafi's Green Book. Qaddafi recognised that "housing [was] a basic need of (*sic*) both the individual and family, therefore it should not be owned by others", but by everybody (Lendman 2012: 101). That move affirmed the place of women in Libyan society because they were treated as individuals whose needs where no different from everybody else's. As noted by Lendman (2012: 101), all Libyans regardless of gender "received free healthcare, education, electricity, water, [vocational] training, rehabilitation, housing assistance, disability and old-age assistance, interest-free state loans as well as generous subsidies to study abroad, buy a new car, help when they marry, practically free gasoline and more". Not even in the so-called developed world can governments be able to provide for their citizens as Qaddafi's Libya did for its citizenry. The main point that Qaddafi's Libya underscored was that of equality of individuals, and individuality itself. Elsewhere in the Green Book it is written "all individuals have a natural right to self-expression by any means" (*ibid*). What that statement affirmed was the individuality of persons and their equality regardless of sex or gender.

By the year 2011, the year that Qaddafi was killed in the NATO invasion of Libya, the rural-economy and outlook that Qaddafi inherited from the 1969 *coup d'état* had transformed into an urbanised outfit (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 264). As noted in *Chapter Three* of this work that the majority of Libya's population lives in urban areas therefore, suggesting that Libya is an urbanised country, the transition from the rural setup to modernisation included women emancipation and gender mainstreaming, socially, economically, educationally and entrepreneurially (*World Book Encyclopaedia* 2013: 262-265). More importantly, Qaddafi's stance on surrounding himself with female body guards and security detail went against what the Western-centric notion of the model of violence that presents men as the only people that can engage in war and therefore, offer protection to the female gender. It is an established fact that Qaddafi surrounded himself with female personnel as his personal security details; Lange

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(2005: 12) writes, "[t]he half-dozen or so female members of his personal guard, wearing their camouflage uniforms and signature red berets, surrounded him and scanned the crowd for any sign of danger". Qaddafi revolutionalised the notion of females providing protection to a powerful man like himself (Gosh 2011: 18). This conception of women protecting the Head of State and government meant that Qaddafi perceived women as important even to his own personal security. National armies and Very Important Person(s) (VIP)-protection services across the world are still a predominantly male-dominated industry, with Britain and the US having allowed women to participate in all army ranks and positions only in 2016 (*British Broadcasting Corporation* 2016; Miklaszewski & Abdullah 2015). Qaddafi departed from these Western-centric notions that only males could serve in the army or provide personal security to VIPs. This challenged the Euro-North American-centric notion of power, security and protection.

5.6 The Clashing of Civilisations: Reconfiguration of the Christian-centred European modernity

The inherent distrust of Islam by European and Christianity-centred modernity has always affected relations between Libya and Western states over the years. It is plausible that because of Qaddafi's self-identification as a Muslim and with the Islamic faith, and given the paradigm of violence that is espoused by Western modernity, the Islamic faith and the Muslims themselves, could not be trusted and therefore, should be eliminated. Therefore, in the elimination of Qaddafi, the thousands of people that died were not collateral, they were in actual fact targets. If the conflict was anticipated, as suggested by the invocation of the R2P doctrine, it is irreconcilable that about 350 000 people lost their lives as a result of the NATO 'intervention' and more people continue to lose their lives as an indirect result of the 'intervention'.

It is now evident that NATO could have not intervened in the Arab Spring demonstrations in countries like Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain as these countries belong to the "anti-Qaddafi Arab front" (Madsen 2012: 31). The so-called Libyan rebels who opposed Muammar Qaddafi's regime belonged to this Al Qaeda-linked guerrilla outfit of "Salafists"; they are known for their practice of *Wahhabism*, a sect which aligns itself with the extreme version of Islam that is promoted by "Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar". The Salafists

– Al Qaeda-linked guerrilla outfit - are recruited from different countries, amongst them are: Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The notoriety of Salafists is well documented. For instance, in raw video footage, Salafists were seen "cutting the throat of a Qaddafi supporter and severing his head", with no consequence (Madsen 2011: 31). However, this kind of barbarism was not aired by international media houses such as CNN, BBC, France24 or Al Jazeera because it indicts the formers' narratives. This control of, and selection of, what footage is aired for public consumption is what Madsen (2012: 32) called the "corporate control by the western war industry" and is relatable to coloniality of knowledge and information; it is the control of levers of knowledge and information by the Western-centric world.

5.7 The Irreconcilability of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine versus the (Un) Just War Theory

Western modernity thrives in creating the so-called international instruments that are used on Africa, turning Africa into a guinea pig for testing the feasibility of such new instruments, without consequence. The Libya case of 2011, in this case was just one of Western modernity test cases to judge the feasibility of R2P versus the Just War Theory. This study contends that the invocation of R2P by permanent members of the UNSC, as the premise for the invasion of Libya by NATO forces, was in fact a *Casus Belli*. The (un)-just war theories or treaties of Thomas Aquinas also elucidate the conundrum of the R2P application in the Libyan case of 2011.

The *Jus Ad bellum* treaties refers to the permissibility of war and the *Jus in bello* treaties refers to the conduct of war (Ramose 2001: 4). This study argues that there was a contradiction of *principles* in the application of R2P when compared to the (un)-just war theory. Following the Thomas Aquinas treaties on just war, as adumbrated by Ramose (2001), war may be deemed as just when: "a) It is waged at the command of the sovereign; b) there is a just cause (*iusta causa*); c) there is right intention (*intentio recta*)" (Ramose 2001: 4)*.*

The aforementioned principles presume that war is only waged should exhaustive peaceful processes and resolutions fail (Ramose 2001: 4). Clearly in the Libyan case these principles were overlooked when the UNSC passed the UNSC Resolution 1973 which authorised the application of R2P in 2011.

Furthermore, the notion that the sovereign is the only authority that may declare war "lends credence to the suggestion that war is exclusively a matter between sovereign powers" (Ramose 2001: 4). The contradiction however is that the so-called right to self-determination and humanitarian intervention are antithetical to the claim of exclusivity that is purportedly guaranteed by the principle of sovereignty. Already this exposes the deficiency contained in this *principle*, if at all it is a principle. Are NATO and the UNSC sovereigns? Clearly, they are not, which then raises fundamental questions as to whether international principles are in fact principles. The Libyan case exposes how international principles are arbitrarily applied as a convenient cover for ulterior motives of the powerful, thereby giving credence to the impression that these so-called principles are just opinions and therefore, optional for the powerful and mighty.

Additionally, the just cause principle is laden with contradiction in relation to values of international peace and it is laden with vengeance that leads to more conflict and chaos. The principle states that war may be declared or initiated in pursuance of the following: "a) Repel an injury (*ad repellendas injurias*); b) Gain vindication against an offence such as national honour (*ad vindicandas offensiones*); c) Redress an injury or regain the thing lost (*ad repetendas res*)" (Ramose 2001: 3-4).

In the Libyan case, none of these recourse measures were applicable, and then the question becomes, why then was war waged on Libya by NATO and the UNSC who both are not sovereigns? The only plausible explanation to the declaration of war on Libya by the NATO-captured UNSC is that of vengeance that loosely hinges on the so-called just cause principle.

It is this arbitrary principle that NATO and the UNSC could want to appeal to and argue that as a basis for the invasion of Libya. Of course, Western modernity that these two actors epitomises would not admit to this, but the invasion and bombing of Libya in 2011 by the Britain/France/US-led NATO was in vengeance for the downing in 1987 of the Pan Am flight 103 that killed 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground, and a *Union de Transports Aériens* (UTA) operated French Airliner DC-10, flight 772 that was downed in the dessert of Niger in 1989, respectively (Davies 2013; Huliaras 2002: 12; Zoubir 2002: 34). Flounders (2012: 117) evinces that the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, particularly played a role in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces. The US had forced Libya to accept full responsibility for the downing of that plane and ordered Libya to pay 2.7 billion US dollars as compensation to the victims' families and indemnities. The US wanted revenge

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for Libya's downing of Pan Am flight 103. It is therefore, conceivable that the downing of the UTA DC-10 flight over Niger in 1989 was to be avenged too, seeing that modernity is vengeful especially towards any entity that stands antithetical to it.

The peaceful resolutions that were at the disposal of the Western-centric modernity regarding the resolution of the Libyan case of 2011 included diplomatic engagement, a move that was supported by the African agenda as espoused by the African Union's recommendations (Campbell 2013: 117). Suffice to note that by the 27th of June 2011, Qaddafi had accepted to step down as President of Libya and President Jacob Zuma, the then President of South Africa, met with the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh to discuss those developments (Campbell 2013: 117). Not only did the NATO-captured UNSC not allow for that process to happen, the UNSC did not even allow the Libyan government delegation to represent itself at the UN hearings following the outbreak of the 2011 violence in Libya. In fact, the UN allowed questionable NGOs and 'human rights' groups the right to appear at the UN hearing platform where they out rightly lied and exaggerated so-called 'facts from the ground' with the intention to plod the UN to take the action it did against Libya (Forte 2013). These organisations peddled lies and misrepresent facts, spread and promoted "racial fear mongering that served to sanction atrocities and ethnic cleansing in the name of democracy". In the words of Forte (2013), "the rush to war [in Libya, 2011] was far speedier than Bush's invasion of Iraq" in 2003.

There is now damning evidence against NATO's claim that the intervention was for humanitarian purposes and was for the purposes to saving lives of Libyans who were in imminent danger form the Qaddafi forces. Forte (2012) argues that:

> On numerous occasions, NATO refused to protect innocent civilians and knowingly let them die. This was the case with over 1,500 African refugees who died at sea, fleeing Libya, while in close proximity to NATO vessels that monitored all traffic and blockaded Libya's ports, with some vessels coming into direct contact.

Despite the warnings from entities and institutions located within Western modernity such as Amnesty International, the European Council and the Italian government as well as from the Goldsmiths Report that found fault with NATO's invasion of Libya which resulted in refugees that were fleeing Libya who were ignored by NATO forces when they were adrift, thereby violating international law, none have been held accountable for those violations (Campbell 2013: 118-120; Nazemroaya 2012a: 127). This further reveals the double-standards inherent in Western modernity; a crime was committed and the perpetrators of the crime are known, but

the perpetrators are not held to account because they are above the law. It reaffirms the impression that law is designed for colonial subjects and not Western modernity's citizens.

Nazemroaya (2012a: 127) further reveals and concedes that Western imperial modernity's humanitarian intervention is always premised on the suffering it causes and then appears as a messiah to save the situation. This stance was exemplified in the Libyan invasion of 2011 in more ways than one. The Libyan citizens fleeing Sirte, where Qaddafi's forces were concentrated during the uprisings, sort refuge from the NATO forces' bases and "desperate to finally be seen as the liberators of Arabs, rescuing poor victims [Libyans from Sirte] with the finest American exports (human rights), some [within the NATO forces felt] … compelled to exploit the suffering of others (residents fleeing Sirte) and turn that into a worthy celebration" (Forte 2012: 96). This is typical of how Western modernity operates; it creates a crisis that it in turn comes to the rescue in order to peddle a narrative of humanitarian care and concern. This narrative is premised on the notion of "creating the suffering of others, and by then seeing every hand as an outreached hand, pleading or welcoming" (*ibid*). Forte (2012: 97) reveals that it is actually "the abduction process [that is] at the centre of Western liberal humanitarianism"; it is never altruistic, it has personal and collective gain especially economic gain on the part of Western modernity. This narrative places on Western modernity a sense of control and agency on the dire situation of those that require 'saving'. This narrative exposes the fact that the so-called humanitarian relation is asymmetrical and never between equals. It places agency and asymmetrical power on the 'intervener' more than the 'intervened'. The humanitarian relationship is reduced to "an animal management technology" implying that the relationship that Western modernity has with the rest of the world is a "zoological one" more than it is the purported humanitarian (Forte 2012: 97).

5.8 The Aftermaths of NATO's bombing of Libya, 2011

Fitrakis (2012: 15) quips that in 2009 "Libya had the highest standard of living in Africa and was comparable to the so-called Middle East oil-rich nations". This view is supported by Lendman (2012: 100-101) who avers that, "before the [NATO] war began, Libyans had Africa's highest standard of living".

The year 2019 [the year of writing of this thesis] marks eight years after the bombing of Libya by NATO, Libyan citizens are still fleeing the conflict that the CIA, M16, the UNSC and

NATO claimed to have warranted the invocation of the R2P doctrine, and as such the R2P was to halt the injustices toward, and human sufferings of, Libyans. Why has there been continued conflict if Qaddafi who was said to be the problem was assassinated and removed from the picture? This suggests a deliberate destabilisation of the Libyan state apparatuses by Euro-North American-centric hegemony.

The result of the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011 is largely political instability, chaos and disorder in Libya and for Libyans. The *Cairo Post* (2016) reported that in 2016, five years after the demise of Qaddafi and the duplicitous NATO's 'humanitarian intervention' Libya had two centres of power. It argued that Libya was "run by two parliaments and two governments in its east and west" (*ibid*). This result, the chaos and disorder, is not an accident or collateral from the 2011 'intervention', it is exactly what NATO and its allies intended. The UK, France and the US are thriving in the chaos that they caused in Libya.

As a direct result of the NATO invasion of Libya, the Africa News agency (2017) reported that "today, Libya is split between rival governments ruling different parts of the oil rich country. Insurgent group ISIS until recently had seized parts of Sirte only driven out by a government fightback". Libya is riddled with insecurity and its citizens feel exposed and vulnerable as witnessed by one resident in 2016 who argued that "we are in a period that is much worse than the last [referring to Qaddafi's reign], and Libya is threatened with extinction" (*Africa News* 2017). Not that Western modernity was not aware that the situation would escalate to such levels, they intended it to. For this was how the Western model of power reconfiguration was to re-invent itself in Libya by destroying an entire civilisation and then purport to rebuild it, only at the whim and control of the 'rebuilder'; in this case, the reconstruction would be at the behest and control of the Euro-North American-centric civilisation. Thereby, Western modernity would reassert itself and sustains itself as a global and dominant monolithic power.

Libya's economy was grossly disrupted in 2011. As a result of the conflict, oil output in Libya – the primordial resource that generates revenue - was curtailed. The African Economic Outlook Organisation (2012: 2), evinced this fact when it reported that in 2011 Libya's economy contracted by 41.8% as a result of the curtailed oil output due to the NATO invasion. Libya's foreign sponsored conflict "effectively brought the formal economy to a halt, resulting in an estimated 41.8% contraction in real GDP in 2011" (*ibid*).

That Libya's economy was impressive before the NATO military invasion of 2011 is not debatable, Libya's economic growth and stability was based on its oil and gas industry. It is

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this industry that was hard hit and was targeted by the trio-led NATO as earlier efforts to frustrate Libya's economy had drastically failed. In the 1980s the UK, France and the US had tried to hit Libya 'where it hurt most' – its economy - by galvanising support from the UN, only to be frustrated because other European states depended on Libya's oil. This gives credence to the notion that the West, particularly the US, is addicted to oil; hence, for oil, the West will not hesitate to kill (Mamdani 2013: 45).

Prior to the barbaric killing of President Qaddafi, as articulated by the African Economic Outlook Organisation (2012: 4), "Oil production and exports account[ed] for the majority of Libya's GDP, approximately 70%". Be that as it was, because of the 2011 NATO invasion foreign investors who had established companies in Libya had to do the sensible thing and evacuate their staff. As a result of the NATO invasion, infrastructure and facilities that were built for the oil production industry were bombed and attacked by NATO including Qaddafi's forces in defence of their domain. The result of that fighting is dilapidated infrastructure now tuned ruins. Because of the 2011 NATO invasion, consequently, the once vibrant and booming oil export industry was almost completely collapsed between April and August of 2011. This development negatively impacted Libya as it shrunk its economy by 41.8% in 2011 when compared to the 2.9% growth that it had previously gained in 2010 (*African Economic Outlook Organisation* 2012: 4).

Although foreign oil companies, the so-called foreign investors, have since made a return to Libya, what is of note is that in the main, they are Euro-North American-centric. The oil companies that have returned to Libya include, among others, "France's Total, Italy's ENI, Spain's Repsol and Occidental of the United States" (*African Economic Outlook Organisation* 2012: 5). While this could be hailed as the return of investment to Libya, the investment is not geared to advance Libya's economy *per se*. The investments are there to favour capital at the expense and brunt of Libyans. This manifests the reconfiguration of Western modernity particularly, coloniality of power through the control of the Libyan economy. The revelation and or admission by the African Economic Outlook Organisation (2012: 5) that France's total is back in Libya after France's leading role in invasion of Libya, gives credence to Gwaambuka's (2016a) observations that Nicolas Sarkozy, the then President of France, only sort to reassert France's influence on Africa, and Libya was to be the channel and gateway for France's reconfiguration and reclamation of its power on the African continent. Furthermore, France, in the person of Sarkozy sought to have greater access to Libya's oil production industry, and judging by France's involvement in Libya today, it is evident that the 2011

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purported 'intervention' was never for humanitarian purposes but rather for economic gain, dominance and control of Africa's resources generally, but Libya's oil particularly.

Besides the many deaths of innocent people now on record, the NATO invasion left a terrible trail of human suffering that continue to haunt the Libyan society today. Gwaambuka (2016b) details the continued suffering of ordinary Libyan citizens, whom the R2P invocation was supposed to have redeemed, as stated by a 31 years old Libyan, Mahommed, who in his own words argued that "I joined the revolution in the first days and fought against Qaddafi. Before 2011, I hated Qaddafi more than anyone. But now, life is much, much harder, and I have become his biggest fan". Mohammed's words have been echoed by many Libyans as they reminisce of the old Libya when Qaddafi was still in power. Libya today has seen a "five-fold increase in the cost of food, unpaid salaries for months, the rise of Islamic State terror and worsening electricity black-outs" (Gwaambuka 2016b). It is noteworthy that the escalating food prices and those of other basic commodities, *inter alia*, were the drivers of the Libyan version of the Arab Spring demonstrations in the first place. Now that the problem, Qaddafi, has been eliminated, why do these issues (rising costs of living, among others) persist? Clearly the Benghazi uprising that formed part of the so-called Arab Spring demonstrations was fuelled by Western forces that had been trying for long to destabilise Libya, did not yield the expected or desired outcome especially for Libyans. This further suggests that the Arab Spring demonstrations could have been fuelled by Western modernity and its agents in the first place. Or, the Arab Spring uprisings were hijacked by Western modernity in order to reconfigure itself by using the protests as the pretext. In other words, the Arab Spring demonstrations were a staged crisis that was propelled and exacerbated by foreign [Euro-North American-centric] mass media outlets, as is the common script of modernity as it has played out and have been witnessed in Africa particularly. Put differently, nothing has improved in Libya since the demise of Qaddafi and that cannot be, if according to the narrative that was peddled by Euro-centric mass media in the form of the CNN, BBC and France24 and neo-liberal scholarship, Qaddafi was the central problem that Libya faced.

As a result of the invasion and killing of Qaddafi, as evinced by a view expressed by yet another ordinary Libyan citizen, Mahmoud, who in his own words expressed that:

> [W]e have had seven governments since 2011 and what have they achieved?' The only thing we can see is new dustbins because one of the early governments installed these new large

bins across Tripoli. We still point to them and laugh, saying it's the only achievement of the revolution (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b).

Libya has not been able to form a stable government to lead the rehabilitation from the Western military invasion in support of rebel forces. It is alarming as Mahmoud expressed, Libya had had seven governments in a space of five years none of which were stable or able to arrest political instability. Such volatility cannot be healthy for any economy or state. This thesis argues that this volatility and instability is exactly what Western modernity intended, as an aftermath of the invasion, for Libya. The political instability that ensues in Libya today is thus, used as a smoke screen that distracts the generality of the world from what is really going on behind the scenes, as it were. The political instability and in-fighting among Libyan political elites is the veneer that Western modernity was going for; while the focus and attention is given to efforts around solving the political impasse in Libya, its resources, oil especially, are being plundered by particularly France, Britain and the US, without having to account to any authority in Libya. To whom will the so-called foreign investors give account of their operations, if there is no stable and acceptable government in Libya, or any domain for that matter? This further gives credence to the argument that the Libyan version of the Arab Spring protests was just a front for the operationalization of an economic plan to reconfigure Western modernity's grip and control of power, especially economic power in Libya.

To further illustrate the double standards of Western modernity that were revealed in the Libyan invasion, Haroun, yet another ordinary Libyan citizen, who is an oil worker, be-cried how the undefined *international community* forgot about the Libyan plight after the killing of Qaddafi. Haroun concedes that eliminating Qaddafi "was clearly a mistake because we were not ready for democracy and we needed support from the international community, which just was not there" (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b). Cognisant of the fact that Haroun's utterances were an after-thought, or were in hind sight, he expresses regret over Libyans' support for the NATO *intervention* in Libya because of feeling betrayed by the so-called international community. Haroun's sentiments are expressive of the view advanced by this thesis that prior to the invasion of Libya in 2011, the so-called international community was very vocal about Qaddafi's departure epitomised by the convening of the UN Security Council to issue out Resolutions 1970 and 1973 respectively that ultimately and literally delivered Qaddafi's head to the Biblical reference of Potiphar's wife, Western modernity. Gwaambuka (2016b) further demonstrates the disingenuous nature of Western modernity when he argues that "Libyans were left to figure out a democracy they had not had for more than four decades on their own

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resulting in numerous groups claiming power using military means". This reveals that the intention of Western modernity was never to usher in democracy to Libya; if anything modernity was very much aware of the outcome of NATO's intervention and was intent on causing the chaos that ensues. Besides Western modernity's intention, if genuine, was to result in a Western-centric conception of democracy, not that that conception is without limitation and challenges itself. To this effect, one of Libya's prominent political analysts, Fadiel, in a piece in the Daily Mail (2016) argued that given the time that had lapsed between Qaddafi's demise and the ensuing political and economic environment in Libya, life should have "been better than [during] Qaddafi's time", yet "chaos and everyone fighting each other" ensues, and as such, "it is just a mess" (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b).

So vocal, intent and visible was Western modernity on Libya's issues prior to the invasion, yet after the invasion and destruction of both, Qaddafi [Libya's software] and Libya's infrastructure and economy [Libya's hardware], the so-called international community is conspicuous by its silence on Libya, yet physically present in Libya. Mass media which had become the mouthpiece of Libyan's concerns to the world, is nowhere near when it comes to reporting on the after effects of NATO's bombing of Libya. To this effect, Gberie (2017) argues that "although the New York Times in September 2017 published a total of seven articles mentioning Libya, only one of them touched on the violence ripping it apart". Violence as an after-effect of NATOs' invasion in downplayed and almost denied, yet it is part and parcel of Libyans in the aftermath of the invasion of their country by foreign forces in the entity of NATO. This thesis makes mention of, and singles out, the New York Times in highlighting the fact that Western-centred mass-media outlets are today (at the time of writing this thesis), very quiet on the after effects of NATO's invasion of Libya and yet they were very loud and audible prior to the invasion. This reveals the double-standards inherent in Western modernity.

Coupled with the double-standards of Western modernity, and linked to the concept of R2P, is the fact that "the West was eager to bomb but aborted the mission to restructure and help rebuild the ruins left in the aftermath of the bombings" (Gwaambuka 2016b). R2P is prescriptive of what needs to be done prior to an intervention; but, the same R2P is deafeningly silent on reconstruction after an intervention, as is the case in Libya today, yet R2P speaks of the reconstruction component post-intervention. This conspicuously reveals the disingenuity of Western modernity and its associated political concepts that are arbitrarily applied to suit Western modernity's interests. The result of Western modernity' self-serving interests - that

are purported as global - is encapsulated in a scathing statement by yet another ordinary Libyan citizen who lamented that:

> Libya died with Qaddafi. We are not a nation anymore, we have become just warring groups of tribes, towns and cities. Before, there was just one Qaddafi but now we have six million little Gaddafis (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b).

This situation (ongoing and ensuing political, social, economic environment in Libya) could not, not have been anticipated, especially by the 'intervening' party – Britain-France-US-led NATO. R2P is meant to be pre-emptive of crises and not fuel crises. So, on the basis of the R2P invocation, the West cannot argue that the resultant situation was not comprehended and anticipated before the 'intervention'. In other words, the West's failure to show as much energy for the invasion as for the reconstruction process, suggests a half-hearted commitment to R2P and in fact, it reveals that the R2P principles were a convenient cover for other motives. It is conceivable therefore, that the West intention was what is exactly manifesting in Libya today, chaos and disorder. In effect, Libya has three governments and no central government. There are two governments that are warring and battling each other for dominance and as Gwaambuka (2016b) puts it, there is a third government that "has been imposed on the country [Libya] by the West through the United Nations". This speaks to coloniality of power generally, but specifically the levers of control of authority. On what authority does the UN impose a government in Libya? This suggests that the ensuing political crisis is what the UN together with NATO intended in order to re-establish a Western-centric political system in Libya. The result of the chaos that was caused by the 2011 invasion is a divided nation, a divided Libya. A former Libyan diplomat is on record expressing the crisis of the division that was caused by the NATO invasion in today's Libya; he conceded that Libya has "two governments, two parliaments, two Central banks and two National Oil Companies", something that was never an issue during the time of Qaddafi's regime (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b).

As a result of the 2011 NATO invasion, Libya has been reduced into a failed state, to fit into the Western-centric narrative of yet another African rogue state that has finally crumbled. In spite of often expressed Western claims to be fighting against terror, accusing Qaddafi of being an accessory to international terror networks they supported elements of rebel forces that included terror-linked groups and left a vacuum for the expansion of such terror groups as the Islamic State. There are reports indicating that the Islamic State (IS) continues to besiege the city of Sirte and naturally this sounds security-scare bells. Opportunely, "[t]he West has

however jumped into the fray helping regain some ground from the IS fighters" (Gwaambuka 2016b). The West has responded to such 'threats' not for security purposes, neither has the West responded for humanitarian purposes, but rather the response is in pursuance of giving credence to a narrative that postures it as the saviour in the situation. This narrative seeks to legitimatise the invasion in the first place. Of cause this logic is flawed since the chaos is an aftermath of the West's unwarranted 'intervention' in the domestic matters of a sovereign Libya.

Britain, France and the US continue to conduct 'security' monitoring exercise in Libya today. In 2016, on the 1st of August the US conducted an airstrike in Libya to further cause and perpetuate the commotion and perpetuate a narrative that it is needed in Libya to guarantee the safety and security of Libyan citizens (Gwaambuka 2016b). Of course, the other Western powers that are fighting for the disenfranchisement of the Libyan polity are silent and secretive of their combative operations in Libya. However, as a result of the continued foreign occupation of Libya, "a new militant group, Benghazi Defence Brigades killed three French in July 2016" (Gwaambuka 2016b). In other words, details of foreign occupation and casualties emerge only when it is Western modernity's citizens - people of the zone of being - that suffer casualties, and never the everyday causalities that involve Libyans as they are considered people of the zone of non-being by the Euro-North American-centric narrative.

A view that was expressed by a former Libyan diplomat, Abdusalem, who told of the anguish that Libya has been subjected to as a result of the NATO invasion. While this work concedes that Abdusalem's view is not representative of all of Libya's citizens' perspectives, he however made a compelling case for the view that NATO's invasion complicated an internal uprising, thus helping to turn Libya into a site of mammoth political, economic and social crises like never before. He stated that:

> The so-called revolution was lies, all lies. We Libyans did not even know what the word revolution meant. We had been sheltered under Qaddafi for 42 years. It was not Libya's revolution, it was NATO's revolution because they wanted to get rid of Qaddafi (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b).

The importance of Abdusalem's view is that while it represents a portion of Libya's citizens' perspectives as there are equally, Libyans who believed that Qaddafi had overstayed his welcome in political office, it reveals the totalitarian and an all-encompassing nature of Western modernity in that the invasion was to bring a totally different outcome than anticipated

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even by Libya citizens who genuinely wanted Qaddafi out of office. However, this view also minimizes and obliterates the agency of the people of Benghazi, as a portion of them had reached a point of discontent and wanted Qaddafi to step down like other longstanding leaders of the North African region. Be that as it may, life is totally different for Libyans now that Qaddafi is no more, the difference is not a pleasant one unfortunately. NATO overtook Libya's revolution and diverted it to its own gain so much such that former US President Obama remarked that the Libyan intervention ceased to be "an intervention for the right reasons [which ever those are] but had become (France's) Sarkozy and (Britain's) Cameron's shit-show" (Quoted in, Gwaambuka 2016b). To this effect, Wintour and Elgot (2016) reported on the British Members of Parliament's verdict that condemned Cameron's involvement in the bombardment of Libya in 2011. Cameron's own country's legislature has pronounced that he was found wanting in relation to his (Britain's) involvement in the invasion of Libya, but up until today, he has not faced any legal consequences. France's recent (*The Guardian*, 2019) admission that missiles that were found in a military base that belongs to Khalifah Haftar, one among many of Libya's warlords, is damning evidence of France's sponsoring of continued violence and terror in Libya. However, what Obama conveniently omitted in that remark was his own (US') involvement in the "shit-show" that was the invasion of Libya.

President Muammar al Qaddafi has had no successor as yet (*All Africa News Agency* 2017). This means there is a political leadership vacuum in Libya. Without a government to account to and enforce accountability, external forces such as the US, Britain and France are operating in Libya under the guise of humanitarian assistance while plundering the resources of Libya without accounting to Libyan authorities, nor accounting to their own respective countries. The levers of control of the Libyan state and economy are non-existent at the moment and therefore, Libyan resources cannot be accounted for. The oil reserves of Libya are being depleted and syphoned out of Libya without benefiting Libyan citizens in the same way they benefited while Qaddafi was still alive. It is this study's thesis that the political crisis that Libya is in today, was the end-goal that Western modernity sought in the first instance, and without any authority that demands and enforces accountability, Western modernity through its imperial powers such as the US, Britain and France capitalise on this intended tragedy of Libya.

In support of the argument that was advanced by this study in its first chapter, a medical student named Salem, who was 26 years of age in 2016 and was based in Libya's capital, Tripoli, argued that "[f]ar more people have been killed since 2011 than during the revolution or under 42 years of Qaddafi's rule combined. We never had these problems under Qaddafi" (Quoted

in, Gwaambuka 2016b). Salem's argument bolsters the perception that the NATO 'intervention' in Libya was never in pursuance of humanitarian purposes, but rather coloniality of power. Had the 'intervention' been about averting a genocide, or the killing of civilians by their government as was the narrative proffered by Western-centric mass media outlets, then NATO's 'intervention' catastrophically failed because, following that 'intervention' more people lost their lives than during the Libyan version of the Arab Spring protests.

5.9 Conclusion

Qaddafi was a perceived delinquent who could not be trusted by the Western-centric world system and as such, he had to be eliminated in order to abate the competition and challenge he posed to the asymmetrical power spectrum that the UN-centred world system rests upon. The ensuing political impasse in Libya was anticipated and in fact the NATO invasion intended for the chaos that manifest today so as to dominate and subjugate Libyans, and Africans by extension to the dictates of Western modernity. In the absence of a government which holds authority in its domain, manipulation of the citizenry, economy, politics and society by foreign forces becomes easier. The perpetuated conflict in Libya today bares testimony to Western modernity's *modus operandi* in reconfiguring its power matrices in every space and place in today's world. Since Libya had demonstrable political will and resources to diverge from the *status quo* of global politics, the West - the owners and privileged beneficiaries of the current world system − had to act in self-defence rather than for, the purported and perpetuated narrative of, humanitarian intervention.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

This chapter brings to conclusion the debates, theses and antitheses that have ensued and seeks to synthesise the discussion in answering the research question: How was coloniality of power manifested in the invasion of Libya by NATO forces in 2011?

6.2 Synthesis of Chapter One

Chapter One outlined the problematic and Euro-centric nature of the narratives surrounding the murder of the former sitting Head of State, Muammar al-Qaddafi, particularly by neo-liberal scholarship and by the reportage from neo-liberal mass-media houses and institutions. The biased nature of this reportage and study leaves history devoid of particular truths other than the truths as perceived by Western and Euro-centric modernity and its lenses of analyses. The chapter started off by observing that International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline has not yielded the desired objectives as envisioned at its genesis, that of obliterating international conflicts. Since the inception of IR, international conflicts have been a corollary of the current international system.

In spite of the so-called academic and therefore, scientific inquiry into the origins of international conflicts, they have not been abated nor have they dissipated. As such, this suggests a failure in the so-called scientific inquiry of conflict resolution or its theories, or methodologies, or its tools. Since IR as an academic discipline is undergirded by IR theories, the very theories that underpin the field of IR, of necessity, were interrogated and scrutinised. At the centre of the failure of IR theories to solve international conflict is the intrinsically embedded Eurocentrism. Hence, this study, in *Chapter One*, suggested how the current discipline of IR cannot stand without Eurocentrism. The assumptions and ecology that inform IR theories as they are known today is largely European. IR theories are designed for Europe, as the centre of inquiry is the geography of Europe and therefore, peripherises non-European ecologies and assumptions.

The failure of IR theories in curbing international conflict was conspicuous in the 2011 invasion of Libya by NATO forces. Had international theories and doctrines worked, the

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invasion of Libya by foreign forces would have been abated. President Muammar al-Qaddafi was assassinated because of the failure of the so-called international doctrines such as the doctrine of state sovereignty, the frivolous doctrine of Responsibility to Protect and the theory of political realism especially.

Firstly, the doctrine of state sovereignty, recognised as binding to/on all states by according them equal status, in spite of differences in size, economy, military might and influence as expressed in the UN Charter, was flaunted by NATO as it unduly interfered in the domestic (internal) sphere of politics of Libya (Arab Spring uprisings). According to the doctrine of state sovereignty, each sovereign, Qaddafi in the case of Libya, is the highest authority in his/her domain (internal) beyond which no other authority is recognised. Yet in 2011, NATO was to suspend this right and privilege and deny Libya to its inalienable right to determine its political trajectory as expressed and guaranteed by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which is anchored in the UN Charter.

Secondly, and closely linked to the doctrine of state sovereignty, the theory of political realism endorses and supports the doctrine of state sovereignty in that its very assumption is that states are sovereign and they do not, and must not, recognise any other authority other than themselves. Realism explicitly states that no state or entity, in the Libyan case, no regional organisation in the form of NATO is above the authority of another state. Yet with Libya, foreign forces – NATO – were directly involved in the shooting of Qaddafi's convoy, an incident that left Qaddafi vulnerable and in jeopardy of being killed either, as result of the French air strikes themselves, or the so-called 'rebel' forces that were on the ground.

Thirdly, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect proved to be problematic in its application in Libya, 2011. Bigger states in the form of Britain, France and the US used their influence in the UN system, especially the UN Security Council to lobby other states, mostly Euro-North American-centric states to pass Resolutions 1970 and particularly, 1973 as a basis to invoke R2P which in the end favoured the regime-change agenda that the US and its allies had been promoting in Libya for a long time. The state of Libya under Qaddafi was neither unwilling to protect its population nor was it incapable of protecting its citizens, those two conditions are what qualifies and justifies the invocation and application of R2P in any domain. Yet Libya was invaded under the guise of R2P. The basis of the invocation of R2P in Libya was flawed, unjust and illegal. The two conditions for the application of R2P were not satisfied in the 2011

Libyan case. This speaks of a catastrophic failure of R2P's conception and especially, application in the case of Libya.

6.3 Synthesis of Chapter Two

Following from the suggestion of Eurocentrism undergirding IR noted in *Chapter One*, *Chapter Two* delved deeper into this by highlighting the observation that since the year 1919, the year when the academic discipline of International Relations was founded following the end of World War I, while acknowledging that IR as a discipline was started in order to prevent another world war, this was not to be as World War II started in 1939, after nearly two decades. This development, World War II, signalled the deficiency of IR theories that sought to explain the causes of conflict and propose preventative measures to avert future international wars. Admittedly, IR's propositions on the causes of international wars are valuable, but as a discipline IR has failed in what it set out to do which is averting future international wars – future is/was measured against the timeframe of 1919 going forward, when the discipline of IR was started. The prescriptive nature of IR theories that have come out of European locale was identified as problematic because the analyses contained therein in those theories, centre Europe. That in itself is not problematic, the problematic issue is that European IR theories, or theories that arise from European ecology/ies are forcibly imposed on a global scale and are purported to be *scientific* and therefore, *objective* and *replicable* anywhere else in the world.

This thesis rebutted the notion that European IR theories that endorse and sustain modernity are replicable and applicable elsewhere outside Europe. Equally, this chapter rebutted the problematic nature of an imaginary *objectivity of science* and a *universality of the application* of that science. As such, the chapter maintained and asserted that the idea of the *objectivity of science* is a misnomer. It conceded that, while we can learn from them (European theories or theories that are located in European ecology/ies), they do not necessarily hold all truth everywhere and as such, cannot be used as the standard or model everywhere, every time.

The IR theories proffered thus far use Europe as their centre or locus of enunciation. This means they are specific to the ecology of Europe, not that Europe itself is a homogenous ecology. Those theories may be right and correct in so far as they are applicable to Europe's ecology/ies, and not necessarily other ecologies. While the chapter demonstrated the monolithic nature of Western modernity's canon on what knowledge is, from what it considers not, it determined

that in the monolithic and gigantic narrative peddled by Western modernity and its mouth-pieces, a different narrative must be asserted if real freedom and emancipation of the Black race and the African civilisations are to be realised. Hence, this thesis advanced the notion of exploring epistemic pursuits outside the confines and ecology of Europe's established theories.

Decoloniality was advanced as both an epistemic and political enterprise that seeks to especially liberate politically, epistemologically and otherwise, humanity located in the peripheries of Europe. Decoloniality was advanced as an alternative pathway for people who endeavour to assert their existence and therefore, what they know – epistemology – against an established and monolithic view imposed by Europe. In pursuance of an alternative frame of reference, the chapter interrogated the very basis and assumptions of Western canon and revealed that Eurocentrism is at the very base of this narrative, particularly of social science theory (theories). Without Europe, the so-called theories do not stand and do not make sense especially to civilisations that are born or located outside of Europe. This necessitated an alternative frame of reference. The chapter advanced a particular narrative – the decolonial perspective - that this thesis uses in order to arrive at innovative models of interrogating ecologies of human societies instead of transplanting European-centred theories to realities that exist outside Europe.

6.4 Synthesis of Chapter Three

Chapter Three outlined the methodological position that this study used in order to arrive at the determination that coloniality of power was at play in the Libyan invasion of 2011 by NATO forces. That in turn, was demonstrated by this thesis by evincing how coloniality of power was manifested in the invasion of Libya. The chapter asserted that decoloniality as an epistemological frame of reference, or theory - to use modernity's language - is a corollary of a methodology. In other words, decoloniality is both an epistemological frame of reference, as it is a methodology. A theory implies control of what knowledge is and what it is not, and as such, if knowledge is to be controlled, it follows that there are particular methods that are to be followed in order to arrive at a *logical* and *scientific* conclusion. The problem with this sort of reasoning is that one can already conclude before s/he embarks on an enquiry or research because the likely conclusion is embedded in the methodology. The chapter advanced the idea that if innovative research is to be achieved, research should not be confined to particular and

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predetermined methodologies. In other words, a researcher has to engage in research and as an after-thought or reflective enterprise, determine what methodology s/he (or the research) used in order to arrive at new information or innovative ideas.

This chapter outlined the history of Libya. In that history, it highlighted the genesis of sour relations with particularly three Western countries, namely the UK, France and the US. The precarious nature of Libyan relations has over the years been fuelled and precipitated by the West's suspicion of Libya. The West unjustifiably questioned Libya's alliance with Communist Russia fearing Russia's prowess regarding nuclear capabilities. The association with Russia and the inclination of Libya towards Russia proved to be a sore point for the West in relation to Libya. Admittedly, ideological differences existed between the US (and its Western allies) and Russia. The US (and its Western allies) favoured and forcibly imposed capitalism on a Eurocentric world order that was resisted by Communist Russia. The battle of ideologies between communism and capitalism were a precursor to how a Euro-centric world was to deal with any country that was to associate itself with Communism and Russia. In other words, Libya was a collateral of the West's response to Communism. The rise of Qaddafi to the helm of Libya in 1969 saw Western oil companies losing the monopoly that they had enjoyed in the Arab region regarding oil-drilling and harvesting. This was as a result of Qaddafi's stance on nationalisation of oil mines for the benefit of the Libyan polity. Other countries followed suit; consequently, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) especially in the Persian Gulf in countries such as Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, started taxing Western oil companies, oil tax. This meant that Qaddafi had started a revolution that destabilised and disrupted the levers of a Western-centred economy because he introduced measures that countered the exploitation of Libya's oil in his domain.

Qaddafi tinkered with Western modernity's anchoring lever of control of the economy, and that made him an enemy of Western countries, particularly the US, France and the UK. The plan to eliminate Qaddafi therefore, was set in motion as far back as 1977 when the US placed Libya fourth on the list of potential enemies of the US. This is to highlight that the 2012 invasion of Libya was a long way coming. Western countries had a score to settle with Qaddafi as a person.

6.5 Synthesis of Chapter Four

Chapter Four outlined the history of the Arab Spring protests, the political context within which Libya was targeted and hit by Western states through the fatuitous UNSC Resolution 1973 particularly which authorised NATO to 'intervene' and invade Libya, resulting in the killing of its leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. This work outlined and noted that the Arab Spring protests were wide spread; they affected the North Africa region as well as the Arab region. The responses to the Arab Spring protests from the respective governments that were affected were invariable. In other words, on the one hand, the respective responses from those governments were uniform in that they all resisted the demonstrations and they all used force in a bid to quell the situations. The *international community* responded by sometimes encouraging the demonstrations as they signalled democratic emancipation of citizens.

The *international community'*s response was also variably uniform in that there was no military intervention from any international or foreign forces in a given country. However, this work notes that when it came to Libya this precedent that had been set -that of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign countries- was to be deviated from. This meant that the invariable response from the *international community* to variable domestic situations within sovereign states was a targeted assault on the sovereignty of Libya.

More importantly and specific to the Western modernity' operations, the real target was Qaddafi whom they had targeted since 1977. An opportunity for operationalising the plan to eliminate Qaddafi opportunely presented itself in the context of the Arab Spring protests. The West having been looking for an opportunity to kill Qaddafi only capitalised on the Arab Spring protests. The West captured and overtook the Arab Spring protests to reconfigure its grip and control over the *delinquent* Libya.

6.6 Synthesis of Chapter Five

Chapter Five demonstrated and evinced how coloniality of power was reconfigured in favour of Western modernity in the invasion of Libya and its aftermaths. The killing of Qaddafi itself was aided by France, the US and the UK (foreign forces) in a sovereign state (Libya), thereby blatantly transgressing international laws and protocols. These states that were involved in the killing of Qaddafi had scores to settle with Qaddafi the person, more than they had with Libya

the state. Qaddafi's tinkering with changing the economy as conceptualised by the capitalist system threatened the very fabric of modernity – that of exploitation of people (labour) and resources (in the case of Libya, oil).

Qaddafi's active involvement in the emancipation of the African civilisation in general, by way of paying for more than three quarters of the expenses needed to build a communication satellite that was to benefit Africa proved to be problematic for the West. The West could not have allowed that Africans be in control of information that they relay in the African domain. So, (mis)information was used as a tool to continue the subjugation of the African psyche. The West feared that the control of the communication satellite by Africa would take away from modernity the control of what modernity considers legitimate knowledge as Africans would have been able to process information on their own without the manipulation of the West.

Qaddafi's economic muscle in Africa made it possible for him to earn respect of his fellow African brothers and sisters in leadership. His leadership style when it came to the ways in which he dealt with the imperial West particularly, earned him much admiration on the continent and abroad. This presented Qaddafi as an authority figure in the Africans' perspectives, thereby challenging the control of Western-centric conception of authority. Qaddafi's economic muscle allowed for him to make pronouncements that he would back up, or follow through, with material wealth. This threatened the West as it knew that in the perspectives of Africans, Qaddafi was a visionary who invoked respect and admiration in Africans. Furthermore, because of the authority that Qaddafi possessed, and which stood antithetical to the dictates of modernity, he was an inconvenience to the modernity-agenda.

The emancipation of women in Libya was a deliberate attempt by the Qaddafi regime to detangle and disentangle Libya from the Western narrative of gender imbalances. Women in Libya received state attention and emancipation that Western states in all their ideologies of human and gender equality could not match up. In the security industry, which is viewed as a domain of men, Libya's Qaddafi even had personal bodyguards who were women to dispel the myth of patriarchy embedded in the Western modernity narrative and 'civilisation', if at all it is being civilised to oppress and suppress women.

6.7 How was Coloniality of Power Manifested in the Invasion of Libya in 2011?

Firstly, the Western modernity system controlled, and still controls, mass media. It further controls neo-liberal scholarship and it used these mouth-pieces to peddle a narrative that sought to monsterise Qaddafi, the narrative under-rated Libya and vilified Africa. This gave rise to an impression that Africa, in general but Libya particularly, needed the saving west. This script is typical of imperial powers that invaded Africa as a whole from time immemorial. Imperial Western countries, such as Britain, France and the US, provided intelligence to insurgents that belonged to the opposition terraces of Libya and advantaged rebel groups in terms of providing power artillery, weaponry and ammunition that were used to fight and kill Qaddafi. Libya's resources in terms of oil, gold and silver were plundered and as such, they remain unaccounted for to this day. Hence, information was manipulated and therefore knowledge was controlled in order to reconfigure Western modernity's grip and control of the world.

Secondly, Libya's resources were stolen and no one can account for the missing gold and silver that belonged to state coughers of Libya that *mysteriously* and conveniently disappeared at the time of NATO's invasion of Libya. Libya's stolen resources meant that the state of Libya was deprived of pursuing Qaddafi's idea of creating an African currency, the Dinar which was to be backed by the gold and silver that were stolen. Without the financial material and resources, Libya was left vulnerable to manipulation and the control of the West. Thus, without material resources and a revolutionary in the person of Qaddafi, the exploitation of Libya's resources continues and the West dominance is reasserted in Libya today.

6.8 Conclusion

This thesis argued that the epitome of coloniality of power in the Euro-North American-centric modern world is having a bifurcation of powerful states who set standards that they are at liberty to not follow and punish those states that often are weak, when they do not tow-the-line that is set for them by the powerful. In other words, the variance in consequences of invariable actions is problematic because it renders the standard response optional. Yet, when the weak take the option that is antithetical to that of the powerful, they get punished as they are policed by the powerful. The setting of standards, the self-exclusion in enforcing those standards and the obligation to punish those that do not follow or mimic the standards is what epitomises

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coloniality of power and that is problematic. No one policies and punishes the powerful who set the standards in the first place.

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POSTSCRIPT: REFLECTIONS ON MY PHD JOURNEY

The journey of writing my PhD has been one of adventure, joys and sorrows, academic stress and personal stress, and triumph and, at times, discouragement. I applied for PhD studies at the University of Pretoria and approached the university in June 2017 to inquire on whether or not I could get a supervisor for my study. I was fortunate to have found a supervisor who was willing to work with me in the person of Professor Siphamandla Zondi. My study was co-supervised by Professor Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni; the two supervisors worked well together, always with my interests in mind and at heart. It is important to identify supervisors who are competent, supportive and who will challenge you intellectually in order to reach your full potential. Both, Professor Zondi and Professor Ndlovu-Gatsheni believed in me. Supervisors will either break you, or make you, choose them wisely!

I registered for my first year PhD in February 2018, and I was to submit my thesis for examination in November 2019, barely two years later. Yes, I did my PhD studies in 'record time'. I stuck to the timeframes that I had crafted for myself in consultation with my supervisors. I did not always know how to write, I wrote anyway. I sometimes did not feel like reading, I kept reading anyway. Sometimes I did not think I wrote well enough, I kept writing anyway. I sometimes did not feel that my work was ready to be presented to my supervisors, I presented it anyway. I was relentless. I kept pushing myself.

My family motivated me, I was away from them for long hours, and at times, during the weekends; I had to make it count. My family and some of my friends kept asking "how are your studies going?" Their asking and inquiring kept me going. At times I did not know how "my studies" were "going", but their asking gave me courage to wake up every day and pursue something towards the completion of my study. So, it is important to surround yourself with supportive people; family is a good source of a support structure. Speaking of family, my wife and I were blessed with the arrival of our daughter Matipa, who was born in June 2018. That meant that I had to juggle between work, studies, family-time and the caring for a new born infant, together with the caring for our four year old son, Tino, at the time. It was a particularly challenging time in all spheres of my life; I had to take it one day at a time, literally.

Work also occupied its rightful place in my life; I was spread between two universities. I had to find a balance between family time, work time and study time. Travel for work purposes and study purposes also occupied my time and I had to factor that in relation to finding a balance

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between equally competing aspects of my life. My faith in God kept me 'going' as well. I would pray and meditate before reading and writing; I would continue to meditate and reflect even after reading and putting my thoughts on paper. I was amazed at how, after reading and sometimes forgetting what I would have read, ideas and insights would just present themselves. Ask your higher power for insight and guidance, in my case I asked God; it was a necessary part of my PhD journey. It was really hard and painstakingly detailed a process, but worthy it; equally, it is rewarding and fulfilling.

It is doable; it is possible; it is achievable; it is feasible. I made it! I remained resolute! I remained unrelenting in my pursuit! Be unrelenting and remain unrelenting!