

## **Supplementary materials for Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations**

### **1 Coordinates of chosen countries**

Prior to data analyses, cases with essential missing data were discarded from the sample, resulting in 14,509 observations available for analyses (98% of cases). The main goal of the present study was to investigate the influence of trust in authorities and power of authorities on intended, voluntary, and enforced tax compliance as well as on tax evasion in an experimental scenario study using a sample from an extremely broad range of environmental contexts. Thus, we ensured a high degree of country diversity by including states that differ significantly in relation to economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural coordinates, as can be seen in Table S1 and Table S2. In the following section we describe these differences between countries. However, because we want to show the general effect of trust and power as predictors of tax compliance across diverse country characteristics, the following coordinates will not be entered into the statistical models as potential moderators or mediators. The coordinates were retrieved from established international rankings and databases produced on representative samples by the Heritage Foundation, Hofstede Center, International Monetary Fund, Legatum Institute, Population Reference Bureau, Portland State University, Social Progress Imperative, United Nations, World Bank, World Economic Forum, and the World Justice Project.

Because our sample pool was surveyed during the period summer 2011-winter 2013, we regarded 2012, the middle of our collecting period, as a benchmark year for the majority of coordinates retrieved. Therefore, we endeavored to retrieve information that refers to the year 2012.

Table S1 depicts 12 coordinates classified in two categories, i.e., economic, sociodemographic, and cultural coordinates, on one side, and tax compliance related coordinates on the other side.

**Table S1** *Economic, sociodemographic, cultural, and tax compliance related coordinates*

		Economic, sociodemographic, and cultural coordinates							Tax compliance related coordinates					
Continents	Nations	Population (mil.)	Geographical position (Centroid latitude)	Geographical position (Centroid longitude)	GDP per capita (\$1,000; current prices)	Foundations of well-being	Expected years of schooling	Power distance	Shadow economy	Fiscal freedom	Governance	Freedom from corruption	Favoritism in decisions of government officials	Irregular payments and bribes
Africa	Egypt	82.3	27	30	3.11	68.98	12.10	70	39.53	89.70	-1.19	31	3.00	3.40
	Ghana	25.5	8	-2	1.61	65.63	11.40	80	61.09	81.90	-0.08	41	3.00	3.10
	Morocco	32.6	32	-5	2.99	62.57	10.40	70	40.69	69.70	-1.01	34	3.60	4.20
	South Africa	51.1	-30	26	7.64	66.76	13.10	49	30.06	70.70	0.25	45	2.60	4.60
Americas	Brazil	194.3	-10	-55	12.34	75.78	14.20	69	37.52	69.10	-0.08	37	2.90	4.00
	Canada	34.9	60	-96	50.83	80.31	15.10	39	16.66	79.20	3.69	89	4.20	6.00
	Colombia	47.4	4	-72	7.84	75.72	13.60	67	29.18	76.00	-0.16	35	2.60	3.50
	Mexico	116.1	23	-102	10.12	67.37	13.70	81	32.91	80.70	-0.72	31	3.00	3.70
	USA	313.9	40	-99	49.8	75.96	16.80	40	8.63	69.80	3.53	71	3.20	4.80
Asia	Bhutan	0.7	28	91	2.29	n/a	12.40	94	33.04	83.80	n/a	57	n/a	n/a
	China	1350.4	35	105	6.09	63.78	11.70	80	13.93	70.40	-0.49	35	3.80	4.00
	Hong Kong	7.1	22	114	35.96	n/a	15.50	68	21.81	93.10	2.01	84	3.90	6.10
	India	1259.7	20	77	1.59	56.84	10.70	77	22.25	76.10	0.10	33	2.80	3.40
	Indonesia	241.0	-5	120	3.66	69.42	12.90	78	19.25	83.50	-1.11	28	3.80	3.20
	Iran	78.9	32	53	6.36	58.36	14.40	58	16.84	80.60	-2.40	22	3.60	4.10
	Israel	7.9	32	35	32.06	71.57	15.70	13	19.82	64.10	1.58	61	3.50	5.40
	Japan	127.6	36	138	46.90	79.25	15.30	54	15.50	67.10	2.16	78	4.80	6.20
	Pakistan	180.4	30	70	1.29	47.75	7.30	55	34.28	80.60	-2.01	23	2.40	3.10
	South Korea	48.9	37	128	23.02	76.26	17.20	60	34.15	72.80	1.22	54	2.80	4.40
	Thailand	69.9	15	100	5.85	71.97	12.30	64	63.68	75.10	-0.37	35	2.80	3.70
	UAE	8.1	24	54	65.38	76.74	12.00	90	21.27	99.90	0.62	63	5.00	6.40
	Europe	Austria	8.5	47	13	46.33	86.35	15.30	11	10.18	50.50	3.23	79	3.80
Finland		5.4	64	26	45.54	84.17	16.90	33	22.44	65.40	3.70	92	5.10	6.60
France		63.6	46	2	40.69	79.37	16.10	68	14.98	53.80	2.42	68	3.70	5.40
Germany		81.8	52	11	41.17	84.96	16.40	35	15.91	61.30	2.59	79	4.50	5.90
Greece		10.8	39	22	22.76	74.85	16.30	60	43.67	65.30	0.11	35	2.50	3.40
Hungary		9.9	47	20	12.93	71.91	15.30	46	24.37	78.60	0.93	47	2.60	4.30
Iceland		0.3	65	-18	41.15	88.19	18.30	30	15.42	73.50	2.22	85	3.80	6.40
Ireland		4.7	53	-8	44.78	75.89	18.30	28	16.65	73.90	3.17	80	4.10	6.10
Italy		60.9	43	13	32.52	77.48	16.20	50	32.02	55.00	0.77	39	2.50	3.90
Lithuania		3.2	56	24	12.87	77.96	15.70	42	21.85	93.60	0.41	50	3.10	4.50
Malta		0.4	36	14	19.74	n/a	15.10	56	21.50	67.80	2.29	56	3.00	4.50
Norway		5.0	62	10	99.32	86.94	17.50	31	20.52	52.50	3.20	86	4.90	6.30
Poland		38.2	52	20	12.30	81.10	15.20	68	26.87	74.40	0.91	53	3.30	4.90
Portugal		10.6	40	-8	19.77	76.11	16.00	63	25.97	59.00	1.00	60	3.00	5.10
Romania		21.4	46	25	8.03	74.54	14.50	90	32.13	87.40	-0.77	37	2.40	3.70
Russia		143.2	60	100	13.76	63.66	14.30	93	44.94	82.50	-2.11	21	2.40	3.10
Slovenia		2.1	46	25	22.46	83.60	16.90	71	29.97	64.80	1.26	64	2.60	4.90
Spain		46.2	40	-4	28.98	76.90	16.40	57	27.62	61.30	1.66	61	3.30	4.80
Sweden		9.5	62	15	54.88	84.71	16.00	31	18.65	39.10	3.77	92	5.30	6.20
Switzerland		8.0	47	8	77.84	89.78	15.70	34	9.18	67.90	4.28	87	4.90	6.20
Turkey	74.9	39	35	10.46	64.36	12.90	66	41.38	77.70	0.23	44	3.00	4.30	
UK	63.2	54	-4	38.59	79.47	16.40	35	13.84	56.40	3.66	76	4.20	5.90	
Oceania	Australia	22.0	-25	135	67.98	80.27	19.60	36	14.28	63.40	3.65	87	4.20	5.80
	<b>Sample mean</b>				27.08	74.48	14.75	56.59	26.24	71.80	1.12	56.02	3.48	4.77
	<b>Sample min</b>				1.29	47.75	7.30	11	8.63	39.10	-2.40	21	2.40	3.10
	<b>Sample max</b>				99.32	89.78	19.60	94	63.68	99.90	4.28	92	5.30	6.60
	<b>Global mean</b>				13.34	67.53	12.50	64	35.21	76.89	-0.30	40.44	3.23	4.16
	<b>Global min</b>				0.24	41.34	4.50	11	8.63	0.00	-3.65	5	1.80	2.20
	<b>Global max</b>				105.72	89.78	19.70	100	78.47	99.90	4.28	93	5.40	6.70

In the following we present an overview of the coordinates in Table S1 to demonstrate that the countries in our sample represent a diverse selection with observable variance in the coordinates considered.

### **1.1 Economic, sociodemographic, and cultural coordinates**

The 44 countries in our study contain more than 70% of the world *population*, ranging from several hundred thousand (e.g., Bhutan, Iceland, Malta) to over one billion inhabitants (e.g., China, India). In fact, eight of the ten most populous countries in the world are represented in our sample pool (Population Reference Bureau, 2015). Regarding *geographical position*, our sample includes countries stretching to the four cardinal directions with South Africa furthest south and Iceland furthest north, as well as Japan furthest east and Mexico furthest west. In order to check the distribution of wealth levels of the countries included (Zak & Knack, 2001), the *per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)* as estimated by the International Monetary Fund for October 2012 was considered (International Monetary Fund, 2014). Our sample comprises countries ranging from low income levels (e.g., Ghana, India, Pakistan) to high income levels (e.g., Norway, Switzerland, UAE). The coordinate *foundations of well-being* encompasses aspects regarding access to basic knowledge, access to information and communications, health and well-being or ecosystem sustainability, is summarized in the Social Progress Index 2014 (Porter, Stern, & Artavia Loría, 2014), and rates circumstances enabling life satisfaction within a society. Our sample includes nations ranging from weak (e.g., India, Pakistan) to strong (e.g., Iceland, Switzerland) foundations of well-being. Education level is considered by the 2011 values of the *expected years of schooling*, as reported in the Human Development Report 2013 (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). Our sample comprises countries reporting a low number of years of schooling (e.g., India, Morocco, Pakistan) to countries indicating a high number of years (e.g., Australia, Iceland, Ireland). As one of the six constituents endorsing Hofstede's theory of cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2014), *power distance* captures the willingness of less powerful individuals to accept pervasive inequalities and hierarchies within societies. In other words, individuals residing in high power distance countries believe that power and authority are "facts of life" (Samovar et al., 2013), while individuals from low power countries assume they have the right to challenge and curtail disparities, and require explanations for power inequalities. The values of power distance range from 11

(very low power distance) to 100 (very high power distance) (Hofstede, 2001). In our sample values of power distance range from 11 (Austria) to 94 (Bhutan).

## 1.2 Tax compliance related coordinates

The concept of *shadow economy* (Hassan & Schneider, 2016) comprises all legal economic activities generating revenues otherwise taxable if declared according to the law (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, & Schneider, 2004; Smith, 1997). The present sample pool is extensive, as it includes both countries with single-digit estimations of the shadow economy (Switzerland, USA) as well as countries where more than 60% of the GDP goes untaxed (Ghana, Thailand), according to the 2012 estimates (Hassan & Schneider, 2016). The 2013 Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal, 2013) constituted the source for the *fiscal freedom* coordinate, which rates the level of tax burden established by authorities. It encompasses top marginal tax rates levied on individual and corporate income, but also the tax-to-GDP ratio. Our sample pool comprises jurisdictions where tax systems range from mostly unfree (Austria, France, Norway, Spain) to free (Bhutan, Egypt, Lithuania, UAE) in terms of fiscal freedom. *Governance* is one of the eight sub-indices determined by the 2012 Legatum Prosperity Index (Legatum Institute, 2013). It pinpoints the governmental institutions and functions linked to higher per capita income and higher levels of well-being. Our sample pool encompasses both countries that score lower on the governance scale (Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Russia) and countries where governments secure high levels of economic growth and well-being (Australia, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland). *Freedom from corruption* as reported in the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal 2013) assesses the level of corruption among civil servants. The countries represented in our study feature a high variance in scores, registering from extensive corruption (Iran, Pakistan, Russia) to low corruption (Finland, Norway, Sweden). *Favoritism in decisions of government officials* as indicated in the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) ranks countries based on answers to the query: “To what extent do government officials in your country show favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?”. Our study includes nations characterized by extensive (Greece, Italy, Romania, Russia) to limited favoritism in such decisions (Finland, Norway, Sweden). The variable *irregular payments and bribes* also originates from the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013

(World Economic Forum, 2012) and captures experts' perceptions regarding the willingness of public officials to accept extra payments. The countries in our sample span from registering bribery acts quite often (Ghana, Indonesia, Pakistan) to somewhat rarely (Finland, Iceland, United Arab Emirates).

Considering all these economic, sociodemographic, and cultural variables it becomes evident that the countries in the present sample show a wide variation and represent the global spectrum in a convincing fashion, since means, minima and maxima for sample countries are highly similar to the respective global parameters. In the subsequent paragraphs, we additionally characterize our country sample pool by means of several proxies related to trust in authorities and power of authorities, i.e., the two main variables defining the slippery slope framework. To this end, Table S2 presents 12 more variables, with the first half considered as proxies for trust in authorities (trust related coordinates) and the latter half as proxies for power of authorities (power related coordinates), in order to emphasize that the experimental scenarios used yield a robust effect independent of the different situations in the respective countries.

Table S2 Trust and power related coordinates

		Trust related coordinates						Power related coordinates					
Continents	Nations	Political instability	Diversion of public funds	Public trust in politicians	Transparency of government policymaking	Government provision of services for improved business performance	Wastefulness of government spending	Rule of law (WGI)	Rule of law (WJP)	Reliability of police services	Judicial independence	Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	Willingness to delegate authority
Africa	Egypt	5.40	2.60	2.80	3.80	3.50	2.50	-0.45	0.45	3.50	4.10	3.20	4.00
	Ghana	5.90	3.20	2.60	4.00	3.60	3.30	-0.03	0.57	4.60	4.10	3.50	3.30
	Morocco	5.60	3.70	3.20	4.40	4.00	3.40	-0.19	0.51	4.30	3.50	3.80	n/a
	South Africa	7.00	3.00	2.40	4.80	3.10	3.40	0.08	0.55	3.80	5.30	4.80	4.30
America	Brazil	5.40	2.50	2.00	4.00	3.60	2.10	-0.11	0.54	4.40	3.80	3.80	4.20
	Canada	2.80	5.60	4.40	5.40	4.10	4.40	1.75	0.78	6.20	6.30	5.10	5.20
	Colombia	7.00	2.30	2.30	4.10	3.70	2.80	-0.38	0.49	4.20	3.20	3.30	3.80
	Mexico	6.10	2.90	2.30	4.40	3.80	3.30	-0.56	0.45	2.80	3.40	3.40	3.80
	USA	5.30	4.60	3.10	4.40	4.20	3.20	1.60	0.71	5.50	4.90	4.20	5.10
Asia	Bhutan	5.30	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.19	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	China	4.80	3.70	4.10	4.50	4.30	3.70	-0.49	0.45	4.50	3.90	3.90	3.80
	Hong Kong	4.00	5.70	4.10	5.90	4.70	4.50	1.56	0.76	6.20	6.00	5.40	4.60
	India	4.50	2.80	2.20	4.30	3.60	3.40	-0.10	0.48	4.30	4.50	3.90	3.90
	Indonesia	6.80	3.40	3.00	4.20	4.50	3.80	-0.60	0.52	3.90	3.60	3.80	4.10
	Iran	6.20	3.50	3.70	3.60	3.30	3.50	-0.90	0.44	4.50	4.00	3.10	3.10
	Israel	5.50	4.90	3.00	4.40	4.20	3.40	0.92	n/a	4.80	5.90	3.90	4.70
	Japan	3.80	5.30	3.10	5.10	3.60	2.90	1.32	0.78	5.70	5.80	4.00	4.50
	Pakistan	7.80	3.00	2.30	3.80	3.00	2.90	-0.91	0.36	3.00	4.10	3.20	3.40
	South Korea	5.10	3.50	2.10	3.30	4.00	2.70	0.97	0.77	5.00	3.70	3.20	4.00
	Thailand	7.00	3.00	2.20	4.00	3.80	3.20	-0.17	0.52	3.60	4.00	3.60	3.70
	UAE	4.10	5.70	5.80	5.10	5.70	5.70	0.56	0.65	6.10	5.40	4.50	4.80
	Europe	Austria	3.60	4.50	3.00	5.10	3.60	3.70	1.84	0.82	6.00	5.20	4.60
Finland		3.20	6.20	5.10	6.10	4.80	4.80	1.94	0.84	6.60	6.50	5.90	5.50
France		5.30	4.80	3.40	4.60	3.60	3.10	1.43	0.74	5.30	4.90	4.50	3.50
Germany		3.80	5.50	3.70	5.00	4.50	4.00	1.64	0.80	5.90	6.20	5.00	4.90
Greece		6.30	2.50	1.50	3.70	2.30	2.00	0.39	0.59	3.90	3.10	2.60	3.20
Hungary		6.10	2.60	1.80	3.80	3.00	2.60	0.60	0.61	4.20	3.70	2.50	3.00
Iceland		5.30	5.30	2.80	5.00	3.40	4.10	1.67	n/a	6.20	5.70	4.50	5.10
Ireland		4.60	5.60	3.20	5.00	4.10	3.20	1.73	n/a	6.00	6.30	4.50	5.00
Italy		5.00	2.90	1.80	3.10	2.90	2.30	0.36	0.63	5.10	3.80	2.60	3.30
Lithuania		6.10	3.00	2.10	4.60	3.70	3.00	0.81	n/a	4.30	3.50	4.00	3.80
Malta		4.70	4.10	3.20	4.40	4.10	3.60	1.34	n/a	5.00	5.00	3.70	3.60
Norway		1.20	5.90	5.70	5.10	4.20	4.50	1.95	0.88	6.00	6.20	5.30	5.70
Poland		4.50	4.00	2.40	3.80	3.10	2.90	0.74	0.67	4.30	4.20	3.20	3.70
Portugal		4.80	3.90	2.80	4.30	3.70	2.20	1.04	0.66	5.20	3.90	3.20	3.40
Romania		6.40	2.50	1.80	3.30	2.70	2.50	0.02	0.59	3.40	2.70	2.70	3.20
Russia		6.50	2.40	2.50	3.60	3.00	2.80	-0.82	0.45	2.80	2.60	2.70	3.20
Slovenia		3.80	3.40	2.10	4.70	3.10	2.40	0.98	0.65	4.70	3.80	2.90	4.00
Spain		5.50	3.70	2.60	4.20	3.40	2.70	1.04	0.67	6.00	4.00	3.80	3.80
Sweden		3.20	6.00	5.50	5.50	4.30	4.90	1.93	0.85	6.10	6.20	5.50	6.00
Switzerland		3.40	6.00	5.20	5.90	4.50	5.20	1.81	n/a	6.40	6.30	5.60	5.20
Turkey	6.80	3.60	3.40	4.70	4.50	3.80	0.04	0.50	4.00	3.50	3.90	3.30	
UK	4.60	5.70	3.80	5.30	4.10	3.80	1.69	0.78	5.90	6.20	5.10	4.90	
Oceania	Australia	3.60	5.50	4.00	4.90	3.90	3.60	1.75	0.80	6.10	6.00	4.70	5.00
	Sample mean	5.08	4.06	3.12	4.49	3.79	3.39	0.63	0.64	4.89	4.63	3.97	4.15
	Sample min	1.20	2.30	1.50	3.10	2.30	2.00	-0.91	0.37	2.80	2.60	2.50	3.00
	Sample max	7.80	6.20	5.80	6.10	5.70	5.70	1.95	0.88	6.60	6.50	5.90	6.00
	Global mean	5.89	3.56	3.01	4.31	3.67	3.30	0.00	0.57	4.29	3.89	3.69	3.79
	Global min	1.20	1.60	1.50	2.60	1.70	1.80	-2.45	0.35	2.00	1.30	1.70	1.90
	Global max	8.80	6.50	6.30	6.20	6.00	6.00	1.95	0.89	6.60	6.70	5.90	6.20

### 1.3 Trust related coordinates

*Political instability* as reported in the Political Instability Index 2009-2010 estimates the likelihood that governments face social unrest. The present country sample includes a variety of environments, from the more susceptible in the face of economic and civil turmoil (Colombia, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand) to the more stable (Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden). *Diversion of public funds* is taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) and rates the extent to which tax money is embezzled in a country. Our sample includes countries characterized by recurrent (e.g., Colombia, Russia) to seldom in terms of public funds diversion (e.g., Finland, Switzerland). *Public trust in politicians* was again provided by the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) and estimates perceptions regarding citizens' level of trust in public officials. In our sample pool, some of the most trusted politicians are to be found in countries like Finland, Norway, and Sweden, while very low trust in politicians is indicated for Greece, Italy, and Romania. Once more consulting the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012), *transparency of government policymaking* measures perceptions about the degree to which governing powers disclose policy related information to the general public. The sample comprises nations reporting from barely (Italy, South Korea) to mostly transparent policymaking (Finland, Hong Kong). The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) also constitutes the source for the coordinate *government provision of services for improved business performance* assessing the extent to which authorities financially support the public system. The present study includes countries providing scanty support (e.g., Greece) to extensively improved public goods (e.g., UAE). *Wastefulness of government spending* captures perceptions regarding a government's efficiency in managing public outlays as evaluated by experts and was also selected from the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012). The countries investigated range from nations registering extremely wasteful (e.g., Brazil, Greece) to others with highly efficient public outlays (e.g., Switzerland, UAE).

### 1.4 Power related coordinates

We considered the 2012 *Rule of Law* indicator provided by the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) as well as the World Justice Project *Rule*

*of Law* Index 2012-2013. In the present sample, there are countries characterized by weak (e.g., Pakistan, Russia) to strong rule of law (e.g., Norway, Sweden). The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) provides information on the *reliability of police services* capturing perceptions regarding the capacity of police forces to enact the rule of law and secure public safety. The jurisdictions within our sample pool that registered the highest degrees of perceived capacity were Finland and Switzerland. At the other end, police officers from Mexico and Russia were perceived as the least capable. *Judicial independence* was also taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012). From our sample pool, countries like Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Switzerland register the highest level of perceived independence, while Greece, Romania, and Russia score lowest on this scale. *Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations* as indicated in the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) shows that our sample includes countries having an extremely inefficient (e.g., Greece, Hungary, Italy) to a highly efficient legal framework (e.g., Finland, Sweden, Switzerland). *Willingness to delegate authority* was also retrieved from the Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 (World Economic Forum, 2012) and measures perceptions regarding the degree to which subordinates are granted the power of decision. In the present sample, the Nordic countries (i.e., Finland, Norway, Sweden) have favored decentralization and give their subnational governments significant fiscal authority, while on the other side, governments in countries like Greece, Hungary, and Iran tend to refuse to do so.

Table S2 featuring trust and power related variables displays, among others, the congruence between our sample minimum and maximum values, on the one side, and the global extremes, on the other. Therefore, one can recognize that the 44 countries selected are appropriately widely distributed.



## 2. Manipulation checks

### 2.1. Manipulation check trust

The first and second sequence of models with perceived trust and power scales as dependent variables serve to confirm that our manipulations of trust in authorities and power of authorities were successful.

With regard to the manipulation of trust (Table S3), in model 1 gender was identified as a significant predictor of perceived trust ( $B = -0.09, p = .027$ ), indicating that men reported slightly higher trust than women. Age showed no effect on perceived trust ( $B = 0.00, p = .754$ ), which is not surprising considering our homogeneous sample regarding this variable. In model 2, the fixed effects of trust, power, and their interaction were added. Describing authorities as untrustworthy versus trustworthy was found to be a significant predictor for participants' level of perceived trust ( $B = 3.07, p < .001$ ). Power ( $B = 0.24, p < .001$ ) also influenced perceived trust positively. The interaction term was also significant ( $B = 0.78, p < .001$ ), implying that a combination of high trust and high power led to higher perceived trust than the additive effect of the two main effects. None of the demographics proved to be significant in model 2.

The random effects of trust, power, and their interaction were introduced in model 3. The fixed effects showed no major changes after accounting for random effects. With respect to random effects, the highest variation was observed for trust ( $\sigma^2 = 0.35, \chi^2(4) = 189.10, p < .001$ ), indicating that the effect of the trust manipulation, which was the strongest fixed effect, had the largest effect variation regarding between-country comparisons. Table S4 and Figure S1 illustrate these country differences. Note that in Table S4 regression coefficients for trust, power, and their interaction are presented for each country, including 95% confidence intervals. The reported random effect of trust with  $\sigma^2 = 0.35$  is based on these between-country variations depicted in Table S4. At a single country level, an effect is regarded as significant if the confidence interval does not include zero. Additionally, Figure S1 illustrates the country-specific effects reported in Table S4, complemented by the overall fixed effects of trust, power, and interaction as a vertical line, extended by a red shaded area that represents respectively the 95% confidence interval of the overall effect. If one of the country-specific confidence intervals does not overlap with the shaded area, we regard the respective country as deviating from the overall fixed effect. Note that this is for exploratory purposes and that we do not expect single countries to deviate. Also,

based on  $\alpha = .05$ , we can expect 5% of countries to deviate from the 95% confidence interval of the overall effect. Furthermore, this would not mean that the effect itself is not significant for this respective country, but first and foremost that there is a significant deviation in effect size from the overall effect. Note also that this test is conservative, as the overall fixed effect includes data also from the country which is compared against the overall effect. For instance, if we compare the effect of trust in the UAE against the overall fixed effect, we actually compare the effect in the UAE against the effect in the UAE plus the remaining 43 countries. In this case this is acceptable, as we do not hypothesize country differences. In case of proper hypotheses testing, one would have to compare the UAE against the remaining 43 countries.

A case in point, the overall fixed effect of trust was  $B = 3.04$ , whereas in the case of the UAE it was  $B = 1.49$  with 95% confidence interval [1.09, 1.89] (see Table S4). This interval does not overlap with the overall fixed effect 95% confidence interval [2.86, 3.23]. For exploratory purposes we can thus conclude that the UAE significantly deviates from the overall fixed effect, which is graphically confirmed in Figure S1. Nevertheless, the fixed effect of trust is still significant in the UAE, since the confidence interval [1.09, 1.89] also does not include zero. From an exploratory standpoint, for our example provided, we can conclude that the effect of trust on perceived trust is smaller in the UAE compared with the total average of all countries, yet still observable. Regarding the general pattern of trust, the effect was significant in all 44 countries, as none of the country-specific effect intervals includes zero, although to different extents, as in ten cases the intervals do not overlap with the overall effect interval, which is represented in a significant random effect of trust. The random effect of power was less pronounced, with  $\sigma^2 = 0.09$ ,  $\chi^2(4) = 28.60$ ,  $p < .001$ . As one can see in Table S4 and Figure S1, at a single-country level power was not significant in predicting perceived trust in a number of countries, while the overall fixed effect was significant. The interaction effect of trust and power had a variation of  $\sigma^2 = 0.18$ ,  $\chi^2(4) = 35.80$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Model 3 had the lowest AIC with 55,012 indicating best model fit with an explained variance of 56% on level 1. In summary, participants in the high trust conditions perceived authorities in Varosia as more trustworthy in comparison with participants in the low trust conditions, thus revealing that the experimental manipulation of trust was successful.

Table S3: Results from multilevel modeling for the dependent variable manipulation check trust


Fixed effects	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	4.60***	0.04	2.73***	0.04	2.73***	0.07
Gender	-0.09*	0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.05	0.03
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Trust			3.07***	0.04	3.04***	0.10
Power			0.24***	0.04	0.25***	0.06
Interaction			0.78***	0.05	0.79***	0.08
Random effects	$\sigma^2$		$\sigma^2$		$\sigma^2$	
Intercept	0.04		0.05		0.17	
Trust					0.35***	
Power					0.09***	
Interaction					0.18***	
Residual	5.80	2.41	2.67	1.63	2.54	1.59
Variance explained						
Level 1	0.00 of 0.993		0.54 of 0.993		0.56 of 0.993	
AIC	66749		55525		55012	

Note.  $N = 14,509$ . Trust and power were coded with 0 = low and 1 = high. The variable gender was coded with 0 = male and 1 = female. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table S4:** *Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for the manipulation check trust by country*

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			LL	UL		LL	UL		LL	UL
Australia	2.56	3.55	3.17	3.93	0.19	-0.16	0.53	0.59	0.12	1.05
Austria	2.55	2.64	2.24	3.04	0.08	-0.27	0.43	1.37	0.89	1.86
Bhutan	3.48	2.04	1.64	2.44	0.42	0.07	0.78	0.18	-0.31	0.67
Brazil	2.55	3.27	2.87	3.67	-0.01	-0.36	0.34	0.61	0.12	1.09
Canada	2.89	3.22	2.80	3.64	0.12	-0.25	0.49	0.48	-0.01	0.98
China	2.94	2.97	2.59	3.36	-0.02	-0.36	0.32	0.86	0.39	1.32
Colombia	2.32	3.81	3.33	4.30	0.03	-0.38	0.45	1.14	0.59	1.69
Egypt	2.77	3.36	2.99	3.73	0.24	-0.09	0.57	0.37	-0.08	0.83
Finland	2.50	3.48	3.11	3.85	0.07	-0.26	0.40	1.00	0.54	1.45
France	2.73	2.95	2.55	3.35	0.16	-0.19	0.51	1.13	0.65	1.62
Germany	2.35	3.27	2.86	3.67	0.16	-0.19	0.52	1.06	0.58	1.55
Ghana	2.90	3.42	3.02	3.81	0.28	-0.07	0.63	0.75	0.28	1.23
Greece	2.34	3.51	3.10	3.92	0.19	-0.17	0.55	1.11	0.61	1.60
Hong Kong	3.08	2.45	2.04	2.85	0.16	-0.19	0.51	0.72	0.23	1.20
Hungary	2.64	2.61	2.19	3.03	0.72	0.36	1.09	0.82	0.32	1.32
Iceland	2.26	3.07	2.65	3.49	0.54	0.19	0.90	1.38	0.88	1.88
India	2.95	3.49	3.09	3.89	0.52	0.17	0.87	-0.10	-0.58	0.39
Indonesia	3.44	2.46	2.05	2.86	-0.04	-0.40	0.32	0.60	0.12	1.09
Iran	2.63	3.35	2.95	3.76	-0.07	-0.42	0.29	0.81	0.32	1.29
Ireland	2.87	3.07	2.70	3.44	0.66	0.33	0.99	0.25	-0.20	0.71
Israel	2.86	3.08	2.68	3.48	0.15	-0.20	0.50	0.73	0.25	1.21
Italy	2.36	3.33	2.92	3.73	0.79	0.43	1.14	1.02	0.53	1.51
Japan	2.50	3.07	2.68	3.46	-0.02	-0.36	0.32	0.87	0.40	1.34
Lithuania	2.86	3.11	2.71	3.51	0.20	-0.16	0.55	0.77	0.29	1.25
Malta	2.50	3.28	2.88	3.67	0.35	0.00	0.69	0.71	0.23	1.18
Mexico	2.60	3.50	3.09	3.91	0.45	0.08	0.81	0.45	-0.03	0.94
Morocco	3.84	1.88	1.48	2.28	0.50	0.15	0.86	0.51	0.03	0.99
Norway	2.12	3.51	3.12	3.90	0.22	-0.13	0.57	1.63	1.15	2.10
Pakistan	2.59	3.70	3.30	4.10	0.27	-0.09	0.62	1.07	0.59	1.55
Poland	2.83	2.83	2.43	3.23	0.28	-0.07	0.63	0.71	0.23	1.19
Portugal	2.43	2.67	2.25	3.10	0.30	-0.06	0.67	1.45	0.95	1.95
Romania	2.70	3.00	2.64	3.37	0.20	-0.13	0.53	0.62	0.16	1.07
Russia	2.58	2.87	2.48	3.26	0.15	-0.20	0.50	0.91	0.42	1.39
Slovenia	3.38	1.66	1.27	2.05	0.17	-0.18	0.52	0.56	0.08	1.03
South Africa	2.77	3.41	3.10	3.71	0.08	-0.20	0.37	0.48	0.09	0.88
South Korea	2.61	2.76	2.36	3.15	0.44	0.09	0.79	1.06	0.58	1.53
Spain	2.52	2.91	2.51	3.31	0.74	0.39	1.09	0.90	0.42	1.38
Sweden	1.91	3.89	3.51	4.26	0.20	-0.13	0.53	1.19	0.73	1.64
Switzerland	2.37	3.80	3.43	4.17	0.09	-0.23	0.41	1.03	0.59	1.48
Thailand	3.05	3.17	2.79	3.55	0.18	-0.17	0.53	0.52	0.05	0.99
Turkey	2.69	3.27	2.86	3.68	0.34	-0.02	0.70	0.80	0.31	1.29
UAE	3.70	1.49	1.09	1.89	-0.27	-0.62	0.08	0.65	0.17	1.13
UK	3.00	2.25	1.74	2.77	0.76	0.34	1.17	0.62	0.06	1.17
USA	2.73	3.53	3.13	3.93	0.05	-0.30	0.41	0.27	-0.21	0.75
Overall	2.73	3.04	2.86	3.23	0.25	0.14	0.37	0.79	0.62	0.95

*Note.* CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit. Gender and age were held constant.



**Figure S1.** Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for the manipulation check trust by country. For each subfigure, the black vertical line represents a null effect. The thin vertical line illustrates the overall fixed effect parameter, which is augmented by two red lines representing the limits of the 95% confidence interval of the fixed effect, further highlighted by red shading. Black dots indicate country-specific effects, with 95% confidence intervals. If a country-specific interval does not include the null effect line, the country-specific effect is significant. If a country-specific interval does not overlap with the red shaded area, the country-specific effect significantly deviates from the overall fixed effect.

## 2.2. Manipulation check power

Considering the power manipulation (Table S5), the analysis in model 1 revealed a significant influence of gender on perceived power of authorities ( $B = 0.09, p = .042$ ), with women showing slightly higher perception of power than men. Age again showed no significant effect ( $B = 0.01, p = .167$ ). After introducing the experimental manipulation in model 2, the effect of gender remained significant ( $B = 0.08, p = .009$ ). Perceived power was most strongly predicted by portraying the authorities as powerful ( $B = 3.67, p < .001$ ). Both trust ( $B = 0.29, p < .001$ ) and the interaction of power and trust ( $B = 0.31, p < .001$ ) were positive predictors of perceived power, but had less impact. In model 3, the fixed effects showed no major deviation from model 2.

Introducing random effects (Table S6 and Figure S2) revealed a relatively high variation for the effect of power ( $\sigma^2 = 1.28, \chi^2(4) = 792.20, p < .001$ ). While the effect was significant in the same direction in all 44 countries, the most prominent deviations were the UAE on the low end, where the change from low power to high power increased perceived power only by 1.17 units; and Germany on the high end, where the same manipulation impacted on perceived power by 5.68 units, whereas the overall fixed effect was  $B = 3.66$ . The random effect of trust was not significant ( $\sigma^2 = 0.04, \chi^2(4) = 8.80, p = .070$ ). With respect to the interaction effect ( $\sigma^2 = 0.28, \chi^2(4) = 68.10, p < .001$ ), the variation was significant, although in relative comparison with the random effect of power, rather small. There were two prominent outliers, namely India and Pakistan. India was the only country with a significant negative interaction coefficient ( $B = -1.22$ ), while both main effects were positive. A closer look revealed that perceived power was highest in the condition of low trust and high power, while in all other countries it was highest in the condition combining high trust with high power. The case of Pakistan revealed an opposite interaction term, where a combination of high trust and high power led to especially high perceived power.

Despite evident deviations in impact, these results clearly show that the manipulation of power was successful in all countries. The highest model fit was observable in model 3 (lowest AIC), where explained variance was 60% on the individual level.

**Table S5:** Results from multilevel modeling for the dependent variable manipulation check power

Fixed effects	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	4.90***	0.04	2.85***	0.04	2.86***	0.09
Gender	0.09*	0.04	0.08**	0.03	0.06*	0.03
Age	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Trust			0.29***	0.04	0.29***	0.05
Power			3.67***	0.04	3.66***	0.17
Interaction			0.31***	0.06	0.32***	0.10
Random effects	$\sigma^2$		$\sigma^2$		$\sigma^2$	
Intercept	0.02		0.03		0.34	
Trust					0.04	
Power					1.28***	
Interaction					0.28***	
Residual	6.73		3.02		2.68	
Variance explained						
Level 1	0.00 of 0.997		0.55 of 0.997		0.60 of 0.997	
AIC	68884		57267		55793	


Note.  $N = 14,509$ . Trust and power were coded with 0 = low and 1 = high. The variable gender was coded with 0 = male and 1 = female. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table S6: Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for the manipulation check power by country**

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>
Australia	2.59	0.31	0.04	0.57	4.33	3.92	4.74	0.24	-0.22	0.70
Austria	2.65	0.09	-0.19	0.36	4.16	3.73	4.58	0.32	-0.15	0.80
Bhutan	4.02	0.51	0.23	0.78	1.72	1.28	2.15	-0.15	-0.64	0.33
Brazil	3.15	0.32	0.04	0.59	3.59	3.16	4.02	-0.13	-0.61	0.34
Canada	3.02	0.24	-0.04	0.52	3.75	3.29	4.21	0.01	-0.49	0.51
China	2.96	0.15	-0.12	0.42	2.88	2.47	3.29	0.88	0.42	1.34
Colombia	2.42	0.34	0.04	0.63	4.60	4.03	5.16	0.21	-0.37	0.79
Egypt	3.42	0.26	0.00	0.53	2.77	2.38	3.15	0.36	-0.08	0.80
Finland	1.97	0.31	0.04	0.57	5.57	5.18	5.96	0.10	-0.35	0.54
France	3.11	0.47	0.19	0.74	3.27	2.84	3.70	0.16	-0.32	0.63
Germany	1.97	0.11	-0.17	0.38	5.68	5.25	6.11	-0.01	-0.49	0.47
Ghana	3.05	0.37	0.10	0.64	3.56	3.14	3.98	0.21	-0.26	0.68
Greece	2.38	0.27	-0.01	0.55	4.53	4.09	4.97	0.28	-0.21	0.77
Hong Kong	3.08	0.24	-0.04	0.51	2.97	2.54	3.40	0.70	0.22	1.18
Hungary	2.26	0.13	-0.15	0.41	4.19	3.74	4.65	0.92	0.42	1.42
Iceland	2.36	0.20	-0.09	0.48	4.08	3.65	4.51	0.71	0.22	1.19
India	3.43	0.66	0.39	0.94	3.77	3.34	4.20	-1.22	-1.70	-0.74
Indonesia	4.13	0.43	0.15	0.70	1.66	1.23	2.10	0.14	-0.34	0.63
Iran	3.02	0.39	0.11	0.67	2.82	2.38	3.25	0.58	0.10	1.07
Ireland	2.87	0.37	0.11	0.64	2.90	2.50	3.30	1.11	0.65	1.56
Israel	2.78	0.37	0.10	0.65	4.29	3.86	4.71	-0.14	-0.62	0.33
Italy	2.20	0.41	0.14	0.69	5.28	4.84	5.72	-0.14	-0.62	0.35
Japan	2.41	0.10	-0.17	0.37	4.39	3.98	4.80	0.54	0.08	1.00
Lithuania	3.25	0.23	-0.04	0.51	3.47	3.04	3.90	-0.01	-0.49	0.47
Malta	2.51	0.28	0.00	0.55	4.37	3.95	4.79	0.28	-0.19	0.75
Mexico	2.90	0.20	-0.08	0.48	3.99	3.54	4.43	-0.03	-0.52	0.45
Morocco	4.13	0.43	0.15	0.70	1.47	1.05	1.90	0.06	-0.41	0.54
Norway	2.19	0.14	-0.13	0.41	4.78	4.35	5.20	0.55	0.08	1.02
Pakistan	2.77	0.24	-0.03	0.52	2.22	1.79	2.65	2.04	1.56	2.51
Poland	2.32	0.10	-0.18	0.37	4.84	4.41	5.26	0.29	-0.18	0.77
Portugal	2.72	0.42	0.14	0.70	3.98	3.53	4.43	0.26	-0.23	0.76
Romania	3.28	0.39	0.13	0.66	2.25	1.86	2.64	0.77	0.33	1.21
Russia	3.01	0.13	-0.15	0.40	3.26	2.83	3.69	0.48	-0.01	0.97
Slovenia	3.54	0.25	-0.02	0.52	2.19	1.76	2.61	0.42	-0.05	0.89
South Africa	3.24	0.34	0.10	0.58	3.15	2.84	3.47	0.14	-0.24	0.52
South Korea	2.44	0.18	-0.09	0.45	3.95	3.52	4.38	0.80	0.32	1.27
Spain	2.60	0.30	0.03	0.58	4.00	3.57	4.43	0.52	0.04	1.00
Sweden	2.08	0.19	-0.08	0.45	5.47	5.08	5.86	-0.01	-0.46	0.43
Switzerland	2.28	0.22	-0.05	0.48	5.04	4.68	5.41	0.06	-0.37	0.49
Thailand	2.83	0.40	0.13	0.67	4.14	3.71	4.57	0.02	-0.46	0.49
Turkey	2.22	0.23	-0.05	0.51	4.59	4.15	5.02	0.66	0.18	1.14
UAE	4.24	0.40	0.13	0.68	1.17	0.75	1.60	-0.04	-0.51	0.43
UK	3.17	0.55	0.25	0.85	2.45	1.88	3.02	0.85	0.28	1.43
USA	2.91	0.12	-0.16	0.39	3.67	3.24	4.10	0.29	-0.18	0.77
Overall	2.86	0.29	0.20	0.38	3.66	3.32	4.01	0.32	0.13	0.51

*Note.* CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit. Gender and age were held constant.





**Figure S2.** Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for the manipulation check power by country. For each subfigure, the black vertical line represents a null effect. The thin vertical line illustrates the overall fixed effect parameter, which is augmented by two red lines representing the limits of the 95% confidence interval of the fixed effect, further highlighted by red shading. Black dots indicate country-specific effects, with 95% confidence intervals. If a country-specific interval does not include the null effect line, the country-specific effect is significant. If a country-specific interval does not overlap with the red shaded area, the country-specific effect significantly deviates from the overall fixed effect.

**Table S7: Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for intended tax compliance by country**

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			LL	UL		LL	UL		LL	UL
Australia	4.82	1.70	1.24	2.16	2.25	1.73	2.78	-0.87	-1.49	-0.25
Austria	4.76	1.23	0.75	1.70	1.89	1.35	2.43	-0.54	-1.18	0.10
Bhutan	4.32	1.43	0.95	1.90	1.31	0.76	1.85	-0.38	-1.02	0.26
Brazil	6.15	0.70	0.22	1.18	1.09	0.55	1.64	-0.28	-0.92	0.36
Canada	4.62	1.50	1.00	2.00	2.24	1.66	2.83	-0.69	-1.35	-0.02
China	4.50	1.35	0.88	1.81	1.78	1.25	2.30	0.01	-0.61	0.63
Colombia	5.84	0.93	0.37	1.49	1.07	0.37	1.76	0.03	-0.71	0.78
Egypt	4.94	1.74	1.29	2.19	1.28	0.79	1.77	-0.20	-0.80	0.40
Finland	5.26	1.62	1.17	2.07	2.11	1.61	2.61	-0.76	-1.36	-0.17
France	4.75	1.62	1.15	2.10	1.44	0.90	1.99	-0.20	-0.84	0.44
Germany	4.79	1.19	0.71	1.67	2.21	1.66	2.75	-0.47	-1.11	0.17
Ghana	4.37	1.79	1.32	2.26	1.58	1.04	2.11	-0.05	-0.68	0.58
Greece	5.42	1.09	0.60	1.58	1.57	1.02	2.13	-0.18	-0.83	0.47
Hong Kong	3.93	1.63	1.14	2.11	2.37	1.83	2.92	-0.48	-1.12	0.17
Hungary	5.33	0.98	0.48	1.48	1.44	0.86	2.01	-0.13	-0.79	0.53
Iceland	5.34	1.33	0.84	1.83	2.29	1.74	2.84	-0.96	-1.61	-0.31
India	5.20	1.92	1.44	2.40	0.70	0.16	1.25	-0.19	-0.83	0.45
Indonesia	5.49	1.35	0.87	1.83	0.71	0.15	1.26	-0.18	-0.82	0.47
Iran	3.42	1.97	1.49	2.45	0.77	0.22	1.33	0.33	-0.31	0.98
Ireland	4.74	1.14	0.69	1.58	1.32	0.82	1.82	0.28	-0.32	0.88
Israel	5.27	1.71	1.23	2.19	1.73	1.18	2.27	-0.65	-1.29	-0.02
Italy	5.71	1.19	0.71	1.66	1.82	1.27	2.37	-0.66	-1.30	-0.01
Japan	4.46	1.50	1.04	1.97	3.08	2.55	3.61	-0.83	-1.45	-0.21
Lithuania	5.25	1.29	0.82	1.76	1.26	0.72	1.81	-0.21	-0.85	0.43
Malta	4.71	1.58	1.11	2.05	1.79	1.26	2.32	-0.49	-1.12	0.14
Mexico	5.66	1.56	1.08	2.05	1.25	0.69	1.82	-0.82	-1.47	-0.17
Morocco	4.56	1.17	0.69	1.65	1.16	0.62	1.71	-0.08	-0.71	0.56
Norway	5.24	2.14	1.67	2.61	2.19	1.65	2.72	-1.15	-1.78	-0.52
Pakistan	5.57	1.01	0.53	1.48	-0.11	-0.66	0.43	1.43	0.79	2.07
Poland	5.04	1.31	0.84	1.79	2.27	1.73	2.81	-0.84	-1.48	-0.21
Portugal	4.99	1.50	1.00	2.01	1.62	1.04	2.20	-0.32	-0.98	0.34
Romania	5.10	1.09	0.64	1.53	0.77	0.28	1.27	-0.03	-0.63	0.57
Russia	4.69	1.30	0.84	1.76	1.56	1.03	2.10	-0.18	-0.82	0.46
Slovenia	4.86	0.75	0.27	1.22	0.84	0.30	1.38	0.16	-0.47	0.79
South Africa	5.72	1.13	0.75	1.51	1.14	0.73	1.54	-0.48	-1.00	0.03
South Korea	3.57	1.42	0.94	1.89	2.96	2.42	3.51	-0.43	-1.07	0.21
Spain	4.23	1.42	0.94	1.90	1.88	1.33	2.42	-0.32	-0.96	0.32
Sweden	4.54	2.13	1.67	2.58	2.72	2.22	3.22	-1.18	-1.78	-0.57
Switzerland	4.27	1.66	1.21	2.10	2.55	2.07	3.02	-0.95	-1.54	-0.37
Thailand	4.69	1.48	1.02	1.94	1.64	1.10	2.18	-0.25	-0.88	0.38
Turkey	4.59	1.79	1.30	2.28	1.68	1.12	2.23	-0.17	-0.81	0.48
UAE	4.08	1.14	0.67	1.62	0.91	0.37	1.45	-0.19	-0.83	0.44
UK	4.75	1.70	1.12	2.29	2.40	1.68	3.12	-1.00	-1.75	-0.24
USA	4.39	1.71	1.23	2.19	1.93	1.38	2.48	-0.34	-0.98	0.30
Overall	4.86	1.43	1.28	1.58	1.65	1.42	1.88	-0.36	-0.57	-0.15

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Gender and age were held constant.

**Table S8: Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for voluntary tax compliance by country**

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			LL	UL		LL	UL		LL	UL
Australia	5.08	1.26	0.98	1.55	-0.33	-0.70	0.03	0.66	0.47	0.85
Austria	5.95	0.08	-0.22	0.37	-0.06	-0.44	0.31	0.14	-0.06	0.34
Bhutan	5.68	0.78	0.48	1.07	0.15	-0.23	0.53	0.23	0.03	0.44
Brazil	5.43	0.57	0.27	0.86	-0.47	-0.85	-0.09	0.52	0.32	0.72
Canada	5.41	0.97	0.66	1.28	0.01	-0.39	0.40	0.38	0.17	0.59
China	5.32	0.94	0.66	1.23	-0.46	-0.83	-0.10	0.62	0.43	0.82
Colombia	5.29	0.93	0.56	1.29	-0.26	-0.71	0.20	0.51	0.26	0.76
Egypt	5.43	1.01	0.74	1.28	-0.31	-0.65	0.04	0.56	0.38	0.74
Finland	5.52	1.14	0.87	1.40	-0.23	-0.58	0.12	0.54	0.36	0.73
France	4.97	1.05	0.76	1.34	-0.42	-0.80	-0.05	0.65	0.45	0.85
Germany	6.10	0.21	-0.09	0.51	-0.05	-0.43	0.33	0.16	-0.04	0.36
Ghana	5.21	1.24	0.95	1.53	0.22	-0.15	0.59	0.35	0.16	0.55
Greece	5.72	0.60	0.30	0.90	-0.50	-0.89	-0.12	0.53	0.32	0.73
Hong Kong	5.03	0.98	0.69	1.28	-0.18	-0.56	0.20	0.50	0.30	0.71
Hungary	5.75	0.77	0.46	1.08	-0.55	-0.94	-0.15	0.60	0.39	0.81
Iceland	6.13	0.84	0.53	1.15	-0.15	-0.53	0.23	0.38	0.18	0.59
India	5.45	1.30	1.00	1.59	-1.02	-1.39	-0.64	1.00	0.80	1.20
Indonesia	5.93	0.70	0.40	0.99	-0.06	-0.44	0.33	0.31	0.10	0.51
Iran	3.88	1.82	1.53	2.12	-0.06	-0.45	0.32	0.74	0.54	0.94
Ireland	5.38	0.79	0.52	1.05	0.05	-0.30	0.41	0.31	0.12	0.50
Israel	4.86	1.23	0.93	1.52	-0.96	-1.34	-0.58	0.99	0.79	1.19
Italy	6.03	0.75	0.45	1.04	-0.36	-0.74	0.03	0.47	0.27	0.68
Japan	5.10	0.96	0.67	1.24	-0.47	-0.84	-0.10	0.64	0.45	0.84
Lithuania	5.71	0.85	0.56	1.14	-0.35	-0.73	0.03	0.52	0.32	0.72
Malta	5.36	0.62	0.34	0.91	-0.22	-0.59	0.16	0.40	0.21	0.60
Mexico	5.68	0.73	0.43	1.03	-0.05	-0.44	0.33	0.33	0.12	0.53
Morocco	5.42	0.97	0.68	1.26	0.23	-0.15	0.60	0.26	0.06	0.46
Norway	5.85	1.41	1.13	1.69	-0.67	-1.05	-0.30	0.83	0.63	1.03
Pakistan	6.46	0.45	0.15	0.74	-0.07	-0.45	0.30	0.22	0.02	0.42
Poland	5.24	0.95	0.66	1.24	-0.42	-0.80	-0.05	0.61	0.41	0.81
Portugal	5.77	0.53	0.21	0.84	-0.09	-0.48	0.31	0.28	0.08	0.49
Romania	5.75	0.62	0.35	0.88	-0.04	-0.39	0.31	0.29	0.10	0.47
Russia	5.04	0.86	0.57	1.15	-0.55	-0.93	-0.17	0.66	0.46	0.87
Slovenia	5.16	0.45	0.17	0.74	0.16	-0.22	0.53	0.17	-0.03	0.37
South Africa	5.72	0.49	0.27	0.70	-0.38	-0.68	-0.09	0.43	0.28	0.59
South Korea	5.07	0.71	0.42	1.00	-0.21	-0.59	0.16	0.44	0.24	0.64
Spain	5.48	0.65	0.35	0.94	-0.09	-0.47	0.29	0.34	0.14	0.54
Sweden	5.56	1.21	0.94	1.48	-0.98	-1.33	-0.63	0.95	0.77	1.14
Switzerland	5.93	0.46	0.21	0.72	-0.14	-0.47	0.20	0.28	0.11	0.46
Thailand	6.19	0.76	0.48	1.04	-0.04	-0.41	0.34	0.30	0.10	0.50
Turkey	4.99	1.56	1.26	1.86	0.00	-0.38	0.38	0.57	0.37	0.77
UAE	4.53	0.95	0.66	1.24	-0.08	-0.46	0.29	0.47	0.27	0.67
UK	5.71	0.52	0.14	0.90	-0.14	-0.60	0.32	0.32	0.07	0.57
USA	5.24	1.03	0.73	1.32	-0.36	-0.74	0.02	0.60	0.40	0.80
Overall	5.47	0.86	0.72	0.99	-0.25	-0.38	-0.12	0.48	0.35	0.61

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Gender and age were held constant.

**Table S9: Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for enforced tax compliance by country**

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			LL	UL		LL	UL		LL	UL
Australia	2.99	0.44	-0.05	0.92	4.01	3.49	4.52	-0.80	-1.47	-0.13
Austria	5.02	-0.22	-0.73	0.29	0.97	0.44	1.50	0.36	-0.33	1.05
Bhutan	4.27	0.61	0.10	1.13	1.43	0.90	1.96	-0.44	-1.14	0.26
Brazil	4.24	-0.33	-0.84	0.18	1.99	1.46	2.52	0.23	-0.46	0.92
Canada	3.76	-0.32	-0.86	0.22	3.13	2.56	3.71	-0.11	-0.84	0.62
China	4.56	-0.08	-0.57	0.41	1.97	1.46	2.48	0.17	-0.50	0.84
Colombia	3.09	0.18	-0.44	0.80	3.05	2.35	3.74	-0.48	-1.32	0.35
Egypt	3.94	0.57	0.10	1.04	1.86	1.38	2.34	-0.40	-1.04	0.24
Finland	2.95	-0.14	-0.61	0.33	4.20	3.72	4.69	-0.43	-1.07	0.21
France	4.00	-0.01	-0.52	0.50	2.40	1.86	2.93	0.07	-0.62	0.76
Germany	5.00	-0.31	-0.82	0.20	1.09	0.56	1.63	0.81	0.11	1.51
Ghana	3.17	0.24	-0.26	0.74	2.95	2.43	3.47	-0.33	-1.01	0.35
Greece	3.39	-0.29	-0.82	0.23	3.55	3.01	4.10	-0.20	-0.91	0.51
Hong Kong	4.21	0.23	-0.28	0.75	2.18	1.65	2.72	-0.26	-0.96	0.44
Hungary	3.73	-0.30	-0.84	0.23	3.00	2.44	3.57	0.01	-0.72	0.73
Iceland	2.93	-0.06	-0.59	0.47	3.16	2.62	3.70	-0.70	-1.42	0.01
India	1.89	2.42	1.91	2.93	4.85	4.31	5.38	-3.15	-3.84	-2.46
Indonesia	4.85	0.22	-0.30	0.73	0.97	0.43	1.51	0.06	-0.64	0.75
Iran	3.02	0.25	-0.27	0.77	2.61	2.06	3.15	-0.06	-0.76	0.64
Ireland	3.50	-0.07	-0.54	0.40	2.41	1.92	2.89	0.94	0.31	1.58
Israel	3.64	-0.07	-0.58	0.44	3.10	2.56	3.63	-0.46	-1.15	0.23
Italy	2.77	0.27	-0.23	0.78	3.63	3.09	4.17	-0.32	-1.01	0.38
Japan	4.14	-0.38	-0.87	0.12	2.90	2.38	3.42	0.18	-0.49	0.86
Lithuania	3.84	-0.19	-0.70	0.32	2.56	2.03	3.09	0.12	-0.57	0.81
Malta	3.62	0.45	-0.06	0.95	2.90	2.37	3.42	-0.43	-1.11	0.25
Mexico	3.85	-0.29	-0.82	0.23	2.40	1.84	2.96	0.15	-0.56	0.85
Morocco	4.53	-0.42	-0.93	0.09	0.54	0.01	1.07	0.21	-0.48	0.90
Norway	2.61	-0.09	-0.59	0.41	4.01	3.48	4.54	-1.40	-2.08	-0.72
Pakistan	3.95	-0.17	-0.68	0.34	1.21	0.67	1.74	0.03	-0.66	0.72
Poland	3.58	-0.28	-0.79	0.22	3.16	2.63	3.69	0.08	-0.61	0.77
Portugal	3.13	0.33	-0.21	0.88	3.07	2.49	3.64	-0.59	-1.32	0.14
Romania	4.26	-0.42	-0.89	0.05	1.83	1.34	2.31	0.66	0.02	1.29
Russia	3.88	-0.28	-0.78	0.21	2.65	2.13	3.17	-0.22	-0.91	0.46
Slovenia	4.26	0.11	-0.40	0.61	2.13	1.60	2.66	-0.43	-1.11	0.25
South Africa	3.87	-0.09	-0.47	0.30	2.12	1.73	2.52	0.23	-0.30	0.76
South Korea	3.43	-0.12	-0.62	0.39	3.43	2.90	3.96	0.05	-0.63	0.74
Spain	3.60	-0.14	-0.65	0.37	2.83	2.29	3.36	-0.14	-0.84	0.55
Sweden	2.86	-0.16	-0.64	0.31	4.39	3.90	4.88	-0.68	-1.32	-0.03
Switzerland	4.17	0.42	-0.05	0.89	1.63	1.16	2.09	-0.66	-1.28	-0.03
Thailand	3.95	0.55	0.07	1.04	2.63	2.11	3.16	-0.42	-1.09	0.25
Turkey	2.79	0.07	-0.46	0.59	3.90	3.35	4.45	-0.15	-0.86	0.55
UAE	4.17	0.60	0.09	1.11	1.71	1.18	2.25	-0.86	-1.55	-0.17
UK	3.58	0.87	0.20	1.53	2.44	1.71	3.17	-0.54	-1.42	0.33
USA	3.30	0.19	-0.33	0.70	3.45	2.91	3.99	-0.49	-1.19	0.21
Overall	3.69	0.09	-0.10	0.27	2.65	2.33	2.96	-0.25	-0.49	0.00

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Gender and age were held constant.

**Table S10: Regression coefficients of trust, power, and their interaction for tax evasion by***country*

	Intercept	Trust	95% CI		Power	95% CI		Interaction	95% CI	
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>
Australia	5.93	-0.71	-1.12	-0.30	-0.27	-0.65	0.10	-0.31	-0.76	0.14
Austria	6.50	-0.83	-1.25	-0.41	-0.41	-0.79	-0.03	0.24	-0.22	0.70
Bhutan	5.51	-0.08	-0.50	0.34	0.10	-0.28	0.47	-0.23	-0.69	0.23
Brazil	4.91	-0.26	-0.68	0.17	-0.08	-0.46	0.30	-0.31	-0.77	0.15
Canada	6.40	-0.68	-1.13	-0.24	-0.48	-0.88	-0.08	-0.07	-0.53	0.40
China	7.21	-0.92	-1.33	-0.51	-0.34	-0.71	0.03	-0.07	-0.52	0.38
Colombia	5.02	-0.23	-0.73	0.27	0.05	-0.38	0.49	-0.40	-0.89	0.09
Egypt	5.40	-0.38	-0.78	0.01	0.02	-0.34	0.38	-0.40	-0.84	0.04
Finland	5.45	-0.98	-1.37	-0.58	-0.54	-0.90	-0.18	-0.18	-0.62	0.26
France	6.09	-0.63	-1.06	-0.21	-0.17	-0.55	0.21	-0.21	-0.66	0.25
Germany	6.21	-0.66	-1.09	-0.24	-0.33	-0.71	0.06	-0.10	-0.56	0.36
Ghana	5.71	-0.92	-1.33	-0.50	-0.52	-0.89	-0.14	-0.16	-0.62	0.29
Greece	6.03	-0.66	-1.09	-0.23	-0.35	-0.74	0.03	0.03	-0.43	0.49
Hong Kong	6.94	-0.77	-1.19	-0.34	-0.38	-0.76	0.00	-0.21	-0.67	0.25
Hungary	6.41	-0.71	-1.15	-0.27	-0.25	-0.64	0.14	-0.14	-0.61	0.33
Iceland	5.34	-0.65	-1.08	-0.22	-0.56	-0.94	-0.17	-0.16	-0.63	0.30
India	5.62	-0.13	-0.56	0.29	0.22	-0.16	0.60	-0.34	-0.80	0.12
Indonesia	5.75	-0.01	-0.43	0.42	-0.05	-0.43	0.34	-0.14	-0.60	0.32
Iran	5.68	-0.91	-1.34	-0.48	-0.43	-0.81	-0.04	-0.32	-0.78	0.14
Ireland	6.03	-0.62	-1.01	-0.23	-0.32	-0.67	0.04	-0.01	-0.45	0.43
Israel	5.53	-0.72	-1.15	-0.30	-0.48	-0.86	-0.10	-0.12	-0.57	0.34
Italy	5.03	-0.53	-0.95	-0.11	-0.14	-0.52	0.24	-0.16	-0.62	0.30
Japan	5.49	-0.46	-0.87	-0.04	-0.30	-0.68	0.07	-0.35	-0.80	0.11
Lithuania	5.82	-0.47	-0.89	-0.05	-0.11	-0.49	0.26	-0.22	-0.68	0.24
Malta	6.32	-0.64	-1.06	-0.23	-0.31	-0.68	0.07	-0.01	-0.47	0.44
Mexico	5.94	-0.27	-0.71	0.16	-0.07	-0.46	0.32	-0.13	-0.60	0.33
Morocco	5.46	-0.14	-0.56	0.28	0.01	-0.37	0.39	-0.24	-0.70	0.22
Norway	5.52	-1.40	-1.81	-0.99	-0.81	-1.18	-0.43	-0.07	-0.52	0.39
Pakistan	4.40	0.18	-0.24	0.60	0.04	-0.34	0.42	-0.80	-1.26	-0.34
Poland	5.88	-0.60	-1.02	-0.18	-0.32	-0.70	0.06	-0.17	-0.63	0.28
Portugal	6.27	-0.65	-1.10	-0.20	-0.41	-0.81	-0.01	-0.07	-0.54	0.40
Romania	5.74	-0.68	-1.08	-0.29	-0.44	-0.80	-0.09	0.02	-0.42	0.46
Russia	6.29	-0.61	-1.02	-0.20	-0.36	-0.73	0.01	0.10	-0.36	0.55
Slovenia	6.18	-0.52	-0.94	-0.11	-0.10	-0.48	0.28	-0.27	-0.72	0.19
South Africa	5.40	-0.36	-0.69	-0.02	-0.23	-0.55	0.08	0.06	-0.34	0.46
South Korea	6.74	-0.53	-0.95	-0.11	-0.20	-0.58	0.18	-0.06	-0.52	0.40
Spain	6.21	-0.49	-0.92	-0.07	-0.33	-0.71	0.05	0.00	-0.46	0.46
Sweden	6.08	-1.13	-1.53	-0.73	-0.77	-1.14	-0.41	0.21	-0.24	0.65
Switzerland	6.50	-0.82	-1.21	-0.43	-0.53	-0.88	-0.17	-0.07	-0.51	0.37
Thailand	5.87	-0.19	-0.59	0.22	0.03	-0.34	0.40	-0.25	-0.71	0.20
Turkey	6.09	-0.87	-1.30	-0.43	-0.38	-0.77	0.01	-0.10	-0.56	0.37
UAE	5.04	0.05	-0.37	0.47	0.29	-0.09	0.67	-0.32	-0.77	0.14
UK	6.05	-0.80	-1.32	-0.28	-0.56	-1.01	-0.11	-0.04	-0.54	0.46
USA	5.64	-0.15	-0.57	0.28	-0.11	-0.49	0.27	-0.31	-0.77	0.15
Overall	5.86	-0.56	-0.70	-0.41	-0.27	-0.39	-0.14	-0.16	-0.31	0.00

*Note.* CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit. Gender and age were held

constant.

### 3. Experimental questionnaire

All scenarios started as follows:

*Please read the following description of a country:*

*In the last census of population in April 2009 Varosia had [number of inhabitants in each participating country] inhabitants and the territory of Varosia occupies [area of each participating country]. The unemployment rate is at an average.*

Subsequently, information regarding the manipulation of trust (**[low] high**) differed from one condition to other:

*Since Varosia's autonomy it has been marked with a [low] high political stability and an [oligarchic (authority of few)] democratic government. [Seldom] Regularly referenda are held, in which the citizens of Varosia can co-decide in the legislation.*

*The government enjoys a [bad] good reputation in the population. It can be concluded from opinion polls that 70% of the citizens are [not] satisfied with the current government.*

*Varosia's legislation is [not] transparent and the government offers [no] the opportunity of free counselling on judicial subjects and tax issues in information centers. Furthermore, Varosia's public authorities are [little] very service-oriented and [not] interested in supporting Varosia's citizens.*

*The budget expenditures of the state are [not] traceable for Varosia's citizens, because they are [not] regularly informed about the use of tax money. In an opinion poll in October 2010 78% of Varosia's citizens indicated to have the impression that their tax money is [not] used reasonably.*

*Besides [a lot of] little tax money is embezzled by politicians. According to an international corruption index (CPI), Varosia is one of the countries with the [highest] lowest perceived corruption.*

*All these factors cause that the citizens of Varosia trust their country a [little] lot.*

Afterwards, information concerning the manipulation of power (**low high**) was adapted to each condition:

*The prosecution of tax evaders is [not] very effective. Because of the tax legislation it is [difficult] easy for the government to conduct audits on its citizens and therewith to chase tax evaders.*

*The government assigns a [low] high budget to the tax office to punish tax evasion. With the means at hand it is [not] possible for the tax office to employ qualified tax inspectors. In addition the members of the tax office of Varosia are perceived as [little] very present.*

*The chance to be audited for self-employed people is very [low] high. This is to say that self-employed are [not] audited very often. Therefore, [not] very many of the committed tax offences can be detected. Moreover, the fines for tax evasion are [not] very severe in Varosia. When tax evaders are detected, they do [not] have to anticipate severe fines. The tax office does [not] exercise benignity.*

*All these factors cause that the citizens of Varosia assess their government as [little] very powerful.*

## **Questionnaire**

*Imagine that you are living, working and paying taxes in Varosia. You are working as a self-employed and your business is running good. Your tax declaration is due and you have to pay taxes.*

*Manipulation check trust*

The governmental authorities in Varosia act fairly towards their citizens.

In Varosia the interests of a few are considered stronger than the interests of the community.

The governmental institutions of Varosia act upon their citizens' interests.

*Manipulation check power*

Chances that tax evasion will be detected in Varosia are high.

It is easy to evade taxes in Varosia.

The governmental institutions in Varosia are very effective in the suppression of tax criminality.

*Intended tax compliance*

How likely would you be to pay your tax completely honestly?

How much of your yearly income would you declare completely honestly?

How likely would you be to retain part of your taxes?

*Voluntary tax compliance*

When I pay my taxes in Varosia as required by the regulations, I do so...

...because to me it's obvious that this is what you do.

...to support the state and other citizens.

...because I like to contribute to everyone's good.

...because for me it's the natural thing to do.

...because I regard it as my duty as citizen.

*Enforced tax compliance*

When I pay my taxes in Varosia as required by the regulations, I do so...

... because a great many tax audits are carried out.

... because the tax office often carries out audits.

... because I know that I will be audited.

... because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe.

... because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention.



*Tax evasion in the form of strategic tax paying*

A customer paid in cash and did not require an invoice. You could intentionally omit this income on your tax return. How likely is it that you would omit this income?

You bought some of your goods privately. You could resell those goods later to established customers and omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return. How likely is it that you would omit the profit from this sale on your income tax return?

You could intentionally declare restaurant bills for meals you had with your friends as business meals. How likely is it that you would declare those restaurant bills as business meals?

You have been abroad to meet relatives and to have a short meeting with one of your suppliers. Regardless of this you could declare your expenses for the hotel and for the meals you invited your relatives to as business travel and business meal. How likely is it that you would declare your expenses as business travel or business meal?

Recently you took part in a project in an acquaintance's company. Now you could conceal this taxable additional income on your income tax return. How likely is it that you would conceal this additional income?

*Perceived similarity of Varosia and the home country*

How similar do you perceive the country of Varosia to be in comparison to your own country?

How similar do you perceive the power of authorities in the country of Varosia to be in comparison to your own country?

How similar do you perceive the trust in authorities in the country of Varosia to be in comparison to your own country?

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