Knowledge as Political: The Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA) and the Geography of Dissent

by

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
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Abstract

This study analyses the politics of knowledge, through the political that was the call to dissolve the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA); a call that was made at the 2017 January Annual Conference at Rhodes University, Eastern Cape – South Africa. An analysis of knowledge as political seeks to demonstrate how the philosophical community situates decoloniality in our context, necessitating that social theorists respond meaningfully. The study demonstrates how an analysis of the PSSA, highlights the political and historical machinations that influence the knowledge project. The call to dissolve the PSSA revealed the political and historical machinations of the knowledge project, along with the rationale of the decolonial philosopher, i.e. revealing loci of enunciation(s). The study therefore, locates the discipline of Philosophy within the decolonial debate that presently preoccupies the contemporary scholar and the University, more broadly. I highlight how the call to dissolve the PSSA offers insights into decolonial struggles while substantiating the claim of *Knowledge as Political*.

The speakers' loci of enunciation reveal the author's political underpinnings and how these influence their knowledge claims. Revealing the politics of knowledge is aligned with the aims of the decolonial philosopher who attempts to respond to epistemic injustices.

In response to epistemic injustices that are both historically situated, while highlighting the political motivations of the knowledge project, I propose the use of the Black Archive. The Black Archive is constitutive of the works of Black/Indigenous literato, poets, musicians and artists who were thinking through and theorising the *Fact* of Blackness/Indigeneity even as they were excluded from knowledge production institutions; i.e. the South African University.

Key Terms

Epistemic justice; Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA); Philosophy as discipline; Decolonisation; Sociality of epistemic practice; and Black Archive

9 April 2019

Dear Mr SH Kumalo

Project Title: Knowledge as Political: The Philosophical Society of Southern African and the Geography of Dissent

Researcher: Mr SH Kumalo

Supervisor: Dr. F.G. Wolmarans

Department: Political Sciences

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Degree: Masters

Thank you for the application that was submitted for ethical consideration.

The Research Ethics Committee notes that this is a literature-based study and no human subjects are involved.

The application has been **approved** on 4 April 2019 with the assumption that the document(s) are in the public domain. Data collection may therefore commence, along these guidelines.

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We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely

Prof Maxi Schoeman
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Ethics
Faculty of Humanities

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA e-mail:PGHumanities@up.ac.za

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe
Lefapha la Bomotho

Acknowledgements

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the phenomenal women in my life whose feminist struggles have always been an instantiation of the political. I dedicate my efforts in my scholarly undertakings to my mother, umaDzanibe, intombi kaS'hleza nomaJilajila. U-Nqolo, uGaba, uNongawuza – the womxn who taught me to love and pursue knowledge always; Phindile Kumalo.

I further dedicate this project to the amazing black womxn who have been my pillars of strength, sisters, friends and colleagues with whom I could decry the pains of writing a dissertation. I count among these phenomenal womxn Lwanda (Lulu) Maqwelane, Londiwe Mntambo, Sinazo Nstonge, Banyana Mshungu, Kholeka Majola (the womxn who will always have my heart), and Fanelesbonge Khuzwayo.

I am grateful to and incredibly humbled by the strength exhibited by women who have consistently defied the expectations of misogynist and patriarchal men along with society by making a lasting mark in Higher Education. The subtle resistances of these women are what remind me of the opportunities for epistemic disobedience through our daily existence in spaces that were not designed for women or Blackness/Indigeneity. I dedicate this dissertation to these women; Professor Pamela Maseko, Professor Maxi Schoeman, Professor Sharlene Khan, Professor Andrea Hurst, Professor Heila Lotz-Sisitka, Professor Sioux McKenna, Professor Chrissie Boughey, Professor Mpume Zondi, Dr. Siphokazi Magadla, Dr. Zamansele Nsele, Dr. Amanda Hlengwa, Dr. Nosiphiwe Nqgwala, Dr. Sibongile Masuku (*Make*), Dr. Sharli Anne Paphitis, Dr. Lindsay Kelland, Dr. Same Mdluli, Dr. Nomusa Makhubu, Mbali Khoza, Athambile Masola and last but not least Nomangwane Mrwetyana.

Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the womxn who passed away over the course of my pursuit of this Masters; Nonhlanhla Khumalo, Khensani Maseko, Uyinene Mrwetyana and Khanyisile Melanie Mboya. Lalani ngoxolo manenekazi, sohlala njalo sinikhumbula.

Makubenjalo – Kude kube ngunaphakade
Kude kube ngunaphakade!

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This study analyses the politics of knowledge production, through interrogating the call to dissolve the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA), with the intention of better situating the decolonial agenda in the South African context. This is to say that the study is concerned with demonstrating, from a contextual analysis, the political and historical machinations that influence knowledge production, with these (the political and historical machinations) characterised by epistemic injustices as argued by Gordon (2008); Grosfoguel (2007 and 2013); Mignolo (2009); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015 and 2018) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi (2016). Resolving or working through these epistemic injustices, as per the scholarship cited above, instantiates two conceptions of the political; the first referencing the political as power. In the study, the political as power is detailed using the work of Lewis Gordon (2014) and Walter Mignolo (2009), who describe the links between the political as power and knowledge production. The second deals with the political as consensus. The study draws from Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (2011: 4) who use this second conception of the political to describe a pluralistic political order when they detail it as the "respect for the moral equality of individuals and the protection of freedom of conscience."

The concern with the PSSA debacle, which saw the society being called on to dissolve, demonstrates the agenda of the decolonial philosopher, in the demand that the knowledge producer reveal their loci of enunciation[1] so as to realise epistemic justice. Epistemically just conditions for the knowledge project highlight the political components as addressed in the

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[1] By loci of enunciation is meant the place from which the author is writing, their political underpinnings and how these influence their knowledge claims. This framework is adopted from Grosfoguel's (2007: 213) argument when he writes "[this] is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks."

study. To term the call for the dissolution of the organisation a debacle comes from the protracted struggle that ensued after a plenary panel[2] was held at the PSSA Annual Conference that took place at Rhodes University (Grahamstown, Eastern Cape – South Africa), on 16th January 2017. Those calling for the dissolution of the PSSA premised their demand on the historical realities that characterise Philosophy as discipline in South Africa. The call to dissolve the organisation was predicated on a panel discussion on the state of South African identity, at the PSSA meeting in 2016 at Chintsa, East London – in the Eastern Cape, South Africa and was only resolved in the 2018 vote on the Transformation Recommendations[3]. The vote, which was held via electronic ballot, saw the PSSA surviving and committing to the institution of transformative measures that work to undo the raciality that still characterises Philosophy as discipline in the country.

It is important to note that the PSSA has been in existence in southern Africa for over a century. The dissolution of the PSSA was backed (explicitly and implicitly) by numerous philosophers, seen in public resignations from the society and in the collection of essays edited by Edwin Etieyibo (2018) titled *Decolonisation, Africanisation and the Philosophy Curriculum*. Some philosophers believed that the society had outlived its purpose(s) and was amplifying rather than ameliorating social divides; a point that is historically substantiated by Welsh and Savage (1977) when they write about the future of the University in South Africa. Through an analysis that excavates the role of the University in the country, Welsh and Savage highlight how the divide between the Afrikaans and English universities reflected and deepened the divide rather than aiding its conciliation. In the contemporary dispensation, the divide was no longer characterised by language, but rather by race, with Blackness/Indigeneity side-lined and even

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[2] This panel was titled 'Liberating Philosophy from Racism: On the Ethical and Political Necessity of Dissolving the PSSA Now'.
[3] These recommendations were drafted by the PSSA Working Group on Transformation that was Chaired by Siseko H. Kumalo, and constitutive of Dr. Monique Whitaker, Zinhle Manzini, Dr. Ryan Nefdt and Professor Samantha Vice.

erased from the discipline of Philosophy. In this study, this debacle is framed through the geography of dissent. By 'geography of dissent' I mean thinking that challenges the established and existing paradigms, within the discipline, and more broadly, the University[4] in the country[5]. To frame the analysis using the concept of a geography is useful for two reasons. The first speaks to the importance of where the dissent emanates from. This is to say that geography, as it is used here, denotes the loci of enunciation that has been historically and factually devalued owing to the political realities that define the knowledge project (see Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). The devaluation of this geography is rooted in the devaluation of Black/Indigenous knowledge(s) as will be detailed in this study. In the second instance, the concept of a 'geography' is taken from Gordon's (2014: 89) analysis when he writes "[shifting] the geography of reason means, as we take seriously such developments as South-South dialogue and what the Caribbean Philosophical Association has called 'shifting the geography of reason', that the work to be done becomes one that raises the question of whose future we face." The concept is adapted to the South African context wherein Blackness/Indigeneity dissented from the adopted norms, values and traditions that govern Philosophy as discipline and the Historically White University (HWU).

The dissertation analyses the PSSA debacle from the lens of decolonial theory, framed as a radicalised political philosophy in chapter two. This is inspired by decolonial thinkers who require that the speaker/author reveal their loci of enunciation. This is to say that several

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[4] To make no distinction from Historically White and Historically Black Universities in the country is based on the scholarship of Almeida and Kumalo (2018: 4) who maintain that, "[…] we must acknowledge the similarities between Historically Black Universities (HBUs) and HWUs. By similarities, we allude to specific forms of administration, direction and structure which stifled the capacity of HBUs to define themselves either in opposition to or against the apartheid state."

[5] The PSSA debacle is demonstrative of how the HWU – the University – in the country functions in that the claims brought against the PSSA by the Azanian Philosophical Society have been raised historically by Black/Indigenous people who have highlighted their feelings and experiences of abnegation in these institutions. These concerns are best captured by Lebakeng, Phalane and Nase (2006), the edited collection by Pedro Tabensky and Sally Matthews (2015) *Being at Home: Race, Institutional Culture and Transformation at South African Higher Education Institutions*. Kumalo (2018a) and Almeida and Kumalo (2018) also trace the historical underpinnings of these concerns, therefore showcasing why the study looks to the PSSA debacle as a case-in-point of the challenges that continue to plague the University in our context.

decolonial theorists have challenged the zero-point position of western philosophical traditions, that conceal their loci of enunciation and make universalising claims that occlude the experiential knowledge of Subaltern/Black/Indigenous subjectivities; a contestation that reveals the provinciality of each knowledge framework/tradition, while highlighting alternative thought from the global South. Revealing the loci of enunciation signals an engagement with the political, with the political here denoting power, in disciplines that conceptually conceal how power functions to occlude and negate the contributions of Subaltern/Black/Indigenous bodies[6] to their thinking. My analysis uses Philosophy as discipline in the South African University to demonstrate this point.

In what follows, this chapter frames what is meant by the political as power, with the intention of complicating a simplistic and reductionist definition that flattens the topographies of traditions[7]. The intention here is to work towards a conception of the political as consensus as discussed by Maclure and Taylor (2011). The PSSA blow-up subsequently, is framed as a synecdoche of a broader philosophical problem that gives us insight into the reasoning behind the contestations that have resulted in the HWU being defined as anti-Blackness/Indigeneity, which requires systematic theorisation and detailing (see Boughey and McKenna, 2016; Kumalo, 2018a; Mirza, 2006). Put differently, the aims of analysing the PSSA blow-up in South Africa are rooted in imaginatively initiating contextually responsive solutions to a broader problem in the socio-political make-up of knowledge production; delivering on the calls for epistemic justice in the era of decoloniality. Simply put, I aim to answer the question of how the PSSA blow-up highlights the politics of knowledge production, as a historical reality. This is to say that the knowledge project cannot be viewed outside of the political and

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[6] This claim is substantiated by Todd (2016) when she writes of 'An Indigenous Feminist's Take On The Ontological Turn: 'Ontology' Is Just Another Word For Colonialism'.

[7] I use the concept of a tradition in a philosophical sense, denoting a corpus of intellectual works that constitute a movement or mode of thinking.

historical context in which it is located. In more radical terms, the knowledge project is itself an instantiation of its socio-historical and political context.

From the call to dissolve the PSSA, one can suggest that its proponents – the Azanian Philosophical Society – spoke from a preconception of the political that frames it as a contestation of power. This frames the political as the use of coercive measures – both tacit and overt – for the purposes of maintaining the status quo in the discipline and the University (see Almeida and Kumalo, 2018). The maintenance of the status quo signals the epistemic practices that govern the discipline and define the standards by which it functions[8]. In sum the use of the political as power in knowledge production translates into the *sociality of epistemic practice*, which from a political theory view-point, demonstrates the usefulness in analysing the political in the knowledge project. With the preconception of the political as power, philosophers that called for the dissolution of the PSSA understood the society (PSSA) to be functioning as an oppressive, coercive institution that used power to erase and negate the place and role of Blackness/Indigeneity in the discipline through racist and unethical epistemic practices. This conception of the political, while useful – as it facilitates insights into the tensions of the philosophical community, is limiting as it arrests the possibility to imagine the world anew. This is to say that the limitation arises from an understanding of the political as power and not as consensus. This definition of the political is reductive in that it frames the political as a contestation of power, subsequently arresting our capacity to imagine new possibilities, in the South African context. Conceptually framing the political thusly, calls for a rebuttal of this position, specifically in relation to the theoretical propositions suggested in chapter five. While I appreciate and acknowledge the factual realities of groups that have existed at the margins in the philosophical community, and in no way downplay or seek to undermine the claim of

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[8] This gives us insight into the traditions, values and mores of the discipline, evinced in publication fora, the debates that unfold in these disciplinary domains and more importantly, how the discipline guards and protects its boundaries.

epistemic injustice, there is a dire need to conceptually liberate the academe from a reductionist understanding of the political as a mere power contestation. This conceptual lexicon creates a dearth of novel and innovative solutions to historical problems.

To this effect, I make the case for the paradigmatic shift of the political from power to consensus so as to expand the conceptual language and lexicon in thinking about and through the PSSA debacle. Analysing the PSSA debacle is useful insofar as it aids our thinking about the University in our context. Articulating power as consensus is rooted in an attempt to address the challenge that one encounters when thinking about epistemic justice, using the conceptual tools developed by Fricker (2007); a point that is detailed in chapter four. The use of the conception of power as consensus will become clearer to the reader when I begin engaging the potentialities that exist in the use of the Black Archive as a response to the two approaches that emerge in the literature, i.e. the integrative and additive approaches.

When thinking about the responses to epistemic injustices there are two questions that frame the geography of dissent. First, are the functionalities of this geography; inquiring about its logic(s) and suitability to contesting a context defined by established traditions of knowledge production. Furthermore, one needs to investigate why and how a group of philosophers would rebel against or reject established traditions. Second, is the constitution of this geography. Who are the political actors driving this dissent, in a community predefined by widely accepted standards? As such, there are a variety of ways in thinking through these questions, with each response bringing up more issues than it resolves. The starting point therefore, in answering these questions, is an analysis of the historicity of the discipline and how it has considered the political question of and in Philosophy.

From an historical perspective, which is detailed in chapter two and three, Blackness/Indigeneity has been excluded from the epicentres of knowledge and its production,

owing to the claim that the European enlightenment gave birth to all contemporary thought. This view of the positionality of knowledge is critiqued substantively by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) in *Epistemic Freedom in Africa*. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) inaugurates a debate from the African perspective that requires further attention, through unpacking the question of how the geography of dissent functions. While South African decolonialists appreciate the modes of thinking that have come from scholars working in the South American (Latin American) tradition of decoloniality (see Dussel, 1985; Grosfoguel, 2007 and 2013; Mignolo, 2009), there is a need to develop decoloniality locally. This observation comes from the reality that African scholars and leaders have engaged the question of decolonisation in the quest for independence since the 20th century evinced in the scholarship of Amilcar Cabral (1975), W.W Gqoba (1888) and Julius Nyerere (1978). Understanding the functionality of the geography of dissent is useful insofar as it illuminates the contemporary debates in the South African context, wherein scholars have been calling for the epistemic and ontological recognition of African thought, following in the tradition of scholars such as Wiredu (1980) who call for the decolonisation of African thought. This call is premised on the move, in the South African University, to ensure that curricula are responsive to the lives and experiences of the students and communities that the University – as social institution – is now meant to respond to and contend with[9].

This demand, a responsiveness to contemporary society, reintroduces the question i.e. why have established norms been rejected by philosophers who dissented from the PSSA. The rejection of established norms can be viewed as a response to the historical occlusion of Blackness/Indigeneity. Put differently, why should Blackness/Indigeneity embrace a system predicated on their erasure and occlusion. One can go further to suggest that the inclusion of

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[9] This idea is derived from the White Paper 3 of 1997, which frames higher education as a social institution intended for the amelioration of the socio-political ills and dysfunctionalities inherited from the apartheid state. This comes from the framing of higher education by former minister of education, Minister Bengu, who states in the preamble to the White Paper that, "The higher education system must be transformed to redress past inequalities, to serve a new social order, to meet pressing national needs and to respond to new realities and opportunities" (Department of Education, 1997: 1).

Blackness/Indigeneity in higher education institutions has been under their tolerated existence that is not fully embraced, specifically in the HWU in the country (see Lebakeng, Phalane and Nase, 2006; Kumalo and Praeg, 2019; Outlaw, 2018; and Ramose, 2004). With toleration in HWUs, in a context where the majority have existed under the oppression of a minority, the reader begins to appreciate the reasoning behind the rejection of established knowledge traditions, calling rather for the inauguration of alternatives. This brief analysis helps to clarify why some scholars demanded the dissolution of the PSSA, claiming that it continues to perpetuate historically divisive and racially preconfigured thinking.

The second question, which investigates how this geography is constituted, aims to better understand why the PSSA was called on to dissolve, a move that subsequently gave birth to the Azanian Philosophical Society. Understanding the constitution of this geography is useful insofar as it reveals those that have historically been marginalised; a point that is teased out substantively in chapter four using the Perfect Storm model (Antony, 2012). The constitutive make-up of this geography gives some substance to the historical claim of epistemic injustice. Fundamentally, this analysis, of the constitution of this geography, is understood when the reader appreciates the historicity that informs the politics of knowledge production. This point substantiates the claim made earlier, which frames the knowledge project as imbricated in the socio-historical and political conditions in which it is located. The historicity of epistemic injustice, elaborated upon above through an analysis that traces how the PSSA came to be called on to dissolve, illuminates why a large number of the philosophers who make-up this geography of dissent are bodies that have been framed, factually, as Black/Indigenous and/or female. To frame the study thus, *Knowledge as Political: The Philosophical Society of Southern Africa and the Geography of Dissent*, is premised on the useful insights arising from analyses that demonstrate the geography of dissent and its alignment with decoloniality. Aligning decoloniality with the geography of dissent, is inspired by the scholarship of

intellectuals who were/are concerned with substantive justice on the African continent as a response to colonial incursion and subsequent imposition. To this effect, I argue that while political colonial imposition may have been done away with, its residual implications continue to define the knowledge project, subsequently curating the political stage for the geography of dissent that demands epistemic justice.

The geography of dissent plays a crucial role in the development of a conceptual schema that teases out the overlaps between knowledge and the political; knowledge and its production as a political and historical enterprise. This point is substantively defended in the dissertation using SEK Mqhayi's work as he details, historically, the implications of coloniality, as it was manifesting in the country – as well as on the subcontinent – in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Subsequently, I contend that the thinking of oppressed peoples has grappled with epistemic justice since the decolonial moment, the moment wherein peoples of the periphery encountered European coloniality. The geography of dissent therefore, critically frames the role of the Black Archive in that in its resurrection (the Black Archive) we begin to work towards epistemic justice through a democratisation of the knowledge project.

1.2 Mapping the Geography of Dissent – Chapter outline.

Chapter 1: Introduction – This chapter introduces what is meant by *Knowledge as Political*. In this instance, political denotes the contemporary – even episodic[10] – contestation of knowledge that is defining the contemporary higher education landscape, not only in the South African context, but globally, as will be detailed in the following chapters. The event[11],

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[10] This concept is used in line with the argument of Wolin (1996: 31) when he writes, "politics refers to the legitimized and public contestation, primarily by organised and unequal social powers, over access to the resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity […] in contrast, the political is episodic, rare."

[11] While the notion of 'event' is useful in detailing the contemporary contestations around knowledge production, it elicits a sense of discomfort when analysing the South African context. The discomfiture is rooted in the reality that in framing the contemporary contestation as an 'event' misses the point of the historicity behind calls for decolonisation and institutional transformation in the South African University. However, owing to a limitation in vocabulary, the concept of an 'event' is used here.

that defines the political in the instance of knowledge production as political, can be traced back to the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements that spurred intellectuals across the country to rethink taken-for-granted practices in the academe. The actions of student activists cannot, however, be read/understood as removed from the contestations that define Philosophy as discipline in the form of the PSSA debacle that is chosen as a case-study of analysis in this dissertation. Put differently, this introductory chapter outlined the rationale and reasoning behind what is being termed the geography of dissent in this study, while giving some indication of the arguments that will be advanced in response to the epistemic injustices that characterise the South African University, resulting in the episodic demand that the University be decolonised.

Chapter 2: Decoloniality as Radicalised Political Philosophy – Chapter two begins by analysing the antagonisms of and in philosophy, in order to explain this historicity. Resultantly, this chapter deals with 'Decolonial Philosophy' assuming the double burden inaugurated by its alignment with political philosophy – historically the 'step child' (Arendt, 1994: 428-447) of Philosophy. My argument highlights how Decolonial Philosophy radicalises the political significance of thought by investigating, not just the political significance of thought but the very canon that, even in Arendt's (1994) case, allowed for the articulation of this phenomenon. Theoretical responses to this problem have historically included Critical Race Theory, Black Feminist Thought and Marxist analyses. I implicitly contend that each of these responses conceals various challenges even as they shine the light on some problematics. I subsequently avoid the challenges that these analyses run into through developing a conceptual framework that reduces the reproductions of these historical discourses. The conceptual schema developed in this study reveals how the tension of the decolonial philosopher is premised on their stepping into the realm of the political philosopher. Decolonial Philosophy as aligned with political philosophy, reveals two things. First the politicisation of Philosophy as discipline; the

politicisation of the knowledge project. Second, the politics of Philosophy as discipline. Chapter two therefore traces and details the *arché* of Philosophy as discipline consequently facilitating the consideration of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. It might be useful to clarify for the reader that by *arché* is meant the origin, or the first cause – as in the Greek sense. The concept is used in the dissertation to foreground Hannah Arendt's argument when she deals with the root cause of the tension between Philosophy as discipline and Political Theory (or Science). This provides the backdrop against which the study proceeds with the analysis of epistemic injustice(s) and how they have been evinced through the PSSA.

Chapter 3: Detailing the Sociality of Epistemic Practice – With chapter two detailing the historicity of epistemic injustice(s), the study then considers the constitutive elements of said injustice that is characterised as '*the sociality of epistemic practice*'[12]. This allows me to consider the politicised nature of canon formation in Philosophy as discipline. The analysis indicates that *the sociality of epistemic practice* is constituted by two elements; claims making processes and material conditions as detailed below in footnote 12.

These two elements when combined produce the sociality of epistemic practice. The first denotes ontological recognition i.e. knowers who are taken seriously when making epistemic claims while the second speaks to the material conditions of possibility such that the speaker can be viewed as capable of making epistemically worthy claims; a point that is substantiated in footnote 12. These two components are framed as *the sociality of epistemic practice* based

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[12] The sociality of Philosophy as epistemic practice is constituted by two elements that, combined, perpetuate epistemic injustice: the first relates to the identity of knowers who make epistemic claims (testimonial injustices) while the second addresses the material conditions of possibility that exist such that the speaker is framed as lacking the epistemic credibility/capacity of making worthy claims. By material conditions of possibility is meant the enabling or inhibiting factors such as the Bantu Education Act of 1953, The Extension of University Education Act of 1959 and the Group Areas Act of 1950; all of which are legislative mechanisms whose residual effect still impacts the educational desire and attainment of Blackness/Indigeneity in South Africa. These legislative mechanisms were used to limit resources to Blackness/Indigeneity in the country with Kumalo (2018a) demonstrating this point aptly when he writes of a learner from a rural school. He maintains that, "[the learners] admission into the intellectual community [a HWU] characterises her as deficient, because of an education system which was deprived of resources therefore depriving her of an *adequate* educational experience." (Kumalo, 2018a: 9).

on Fricker's (2007: 3) account that 'a socially situated account of human practice is an account such that the participants are conceived not in abstraction from relations of social power … but as operating as social types who stand in relations of power to one another.' Tracing these two components of *the sociality of epistemic practice* allows for a nuanced claim of epistemic injustice, while paying specific attention to epistemic injustice of the 'testimonial kind' Fricker (2007).

Chapter 4: Exacerbating the Perfect Storm through the Claim of Epistemicide – Keeping in mind the PSSA debacle, this chapter analyses epistemic injustice as a sociality of practice within the discipline which, through decolonial scholarship has been termed epistemicide, (see Mudimbe, 1988; Ramose, 2002b and 2003; Lebakeng, Phalane and Nase, 2006; Grosfoguel, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; De Sousa Santos, 2016; Paraskeva, 2016; Masaka, 2018). *The sociality of epistemic practice* reveals epistemic injustice as a function of teaching methodology/praxis, publication control and subsequent output/productivity, prescribed reading materials and staff composition (see Boughey and McKenna, 2016; and Vorster and Quinn, 2017). What has been termed epistemicide, Fricker (2007) defines as an epistemic injustice, with Paphitis and Villet (2017: 19) framing this injustice as stemming from prejudices inculcated through *the sociality of epistemic practice* or what they call 'intellectual schemas'. These are reinforced or challenged by students' capacity to identify with the publication materials they read, which are written by womxn and people of colour in areas traditionally defined as Philosophy. *The sociality of epistemic practice* as it manifests in this way either leads to attrition from the discipline or continued studies. Paphitis and Villet (2017), drawing on the work of Thompson, Addleberg, Sims and Nahmias (2016) suggest that this *sociality of epistemic practice* produces prejudicial schemas that result in the retention or attrition of womxn and people of colour from the discipline. Conceptual schemas are derived from the coalescing factors that demonstrate the social power of individuals as epistemic agents. These

forces characterise the Perfect Storm model developed by Antony (2012) to explain the attrition of womxn in Philosophy as discipline. Through the analysis developed using Antony's (2012) work, I base my analysis of the attrition of Blackness/Indigeneity on the attrition levels of womxn from the discipline. To demonstrate and fully detail this injustice contextually, I use uMqhayi's (1914) *Ityala Lamawele* along with subsequent and previous publications to reveal the constitutive elements of injustice, which are;

- Dismissing Subaltern/Indigenous knowledge on the basis of its lack of epistemic merit (Bhabha, 1983; Coetzee, 1988; Spivak, 1988; Mudimbe, 1988 and Ramose, 2002a);

- The re-presentation of this knowledge as the invention of colonialism/coloniality i.e. concealing the progenitor groups of knowledge re-presented as the invention of colonialism (Mudimbe, 1988; Martin, 1992; Lebakeng *et al*, 2006; Grosfoguel, 2007 and 2013);

- The physical erasure of evidence linking this knowledge to Subaltern/Indigenous groups through the seizure of land, property and other cultural artefacts (Mqhayi, 1914; Soga, 1910; Plaatje, 1916 and Mda, 2000);

- The forced assimilation of Subaltern/Indigenous identities into colonial cultures and mores; (Nkosi, 1989; Gqola, 2001; Grosfoguel, 2013; Gordon, 2014; Kumalo, 2018a); and

- The refusal to acknowledge any of the above as demonstrative and constitutive of epistemic injustice and/or harm (DiAngelo, 2011; Tuck and Yang, 2012; Kumalo, 2018a).

This chapter highlights the problems with Fricker's (2007) suggestion of virtue epistemology as a tool that counteracts epistemic injustices, as it conflicts with her basic assumption of a 'shared ethical intuition', which rests on a communitarian ethic. I, however, leave this problem to be addressed by Fricker scholars and social epistemologists as I am specifically concerned

with the lack of a shared ethical intuition in the context of the South African philosophical community. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Antony's (2012) notion of *the Perfect Storm*, with the proposition of the Black Archive as an alternative. The Black Archive is constitutive of the works of musicians, literato, poets and artists who continued to think through/about the *Fact* of Blackness even as they were excluded from knowledge production institutions, i.e. the University.

Chapter 5: Detailing the Political through the PSSA – Chapter five, analyses how the call to dissolve the PSSA forcefully brought to our attention the lack of a shared ethical intuition in the community. To substantiate this claim, the analysis turns to *The Demographic Diversity of Philosophy and the Possibilities for Transforming Philosophy in South Africa*. This study/report was commissioned after the 2016 PSSA meeting at Chintsa, Eastern Cape. The analysis presented is informed by Fricker's (2007) assumption – which she frames as a precondition for dialogue on epistemic injustice – i.e. that there ought to be a shared ethical intuition, which portends a community.

I first demonstrate that the PSSA debacle points to a broader challenge that goes beyond Philosophy as discipline and speaks to the realities of the South African University. Paphitis and Villet (2017: 2) maintain that 'at a global level the discipline of philosophy remains largely demographically unrepresentative'. Furthermore, 'the situation for black philosophers, especially female black philosophers, is particularly dire at an international scale' (Paphitis and Villet, 2017: 2). The curriculum taught through the canon of the discipline which comprises 'predominantly male and white' thinkers (Dotson, 2011) demonstrates this lack. These factors highlight *the sociality of epistemic practice*. Detailing the geography of dissent, the analysis works through the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. The argument here is a rejoinder to the second chapter, which unpacks the concept of the *Cultural University as a Bastion of Coloniality*. In explicating this proposition, I do two things. Detail what I term an

Archaic Institutional Vanguard, and *An Ideological Tension and its Implications*. The literature implicitly suggests two approaches as a way of dealing with this quagmire, adding materials that are relevant to the lived experiences of underrepresented groups or integrating their knowledge(s) into the mainstream. These suggestions pose considerable challenges. The additive approach may be viewed as superficial transformation while integration invites the objection that it reproduces epistemic injustices through assimilationist thinking.

      Chapter 6: Conclusion – In the concluding chapter, I investigate what the implications are for neglecting the Black Archive. The analysis presented in this chapter points to the richness that is the Black Archive, which remains neglected for two possible reasons. First, in its written form, its music and its poetry, the Black Archive is written in and communicated through/by Indigenous languages. It is only in the paintings that this Archive becomes open to those who are not conversant with Indigenous languages. The lack of engagement with the Black Archive then might be premised on the reality that decolonial thinkers are not effectively trained in working with/in Indigenous languages. This reality, in and of itself, is indicative of the extent of colonial imposition on the African continent, and more specifically in our context. In the second instance, I make the case – in this concluding chapter – that the Black Archive remains neglected owing to the reality that knowledge in our context is knowledge, only insofar as it is developed by white scholars. It is important to note that these scholars can neither read, write nor speak Indigenous languages, therefore maintaining the claim that there is a dearth of knowledge produced by the African/Black/Indigenous subject. This position is, however, contested through and by the analysis presented throughout the study.

Chapter 2

Decolonial Philosophy as Radicalised Political philosophy

2.1 Introduction

Historically, Philosophy as a discipline has always distanced itself from the lived realities of the polity –from the political– claiming that it is rather concerned with the abstract; thought. Thus Philosophy as discipline, only came to think about the political owing to social conditions that "were least propitious for philosophising" (Arendt, 1994: 428). Inspired by Enrique Dussel's (1985) *Philosophy of Liberation*, this chapter traces the historical transformations that birthed the current socio-political condition of the university[1]. Subsequently, three issues are dealt with here. First, the historical conditions that birthed the contemporary University therefore, highlighting the re-instantiation of the *arché* as located in the political and historical influences of knowledge. A move that is constitutive of the second aspect of the argument developed in this chapter. I frame this debate using Readings' *The University in Ruins* (1996). The *arché*, which helps one to understand the genesis of the tension in the contemporary South African University, feeds into and is derived from the social conditions that constitute the locale in which the University is situated[2]. The second part of the argument details how the social conditions that lead the philosopher to an unwilling inclination towards the political -human affairs- is derived from the political conditions that shape both the University and the state, institutions which are premised on European modernity[3]. This argument is derived from Readings' (1996) when he argues that the University that prides excellence is birthed by

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[1] Reference to the current socio-political condition of the university, denotes how the contemporary University functions with its traditions, regulatory mechanisms through teaching, learning and research.

[2] This framework is, in some part, derived from the previous chapter that defines the University as a social institution intended to bridge historical divides as detailed in footnote 9 of the previous chapter.

[3] European modernity, the blue-print of the contemporary state and the westernised university, has been critiqued as the manifestation of coloniality in the decolonial tradition, derived from the historical actions of European colonial forces (see Grosfoguel, 2007; 2013; Lebakeng, Phalane and Nase, 2006; Martin, 1992; Mignolo, 2009; and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015).

modern capitalism. Thirdly, the aim is to defend the proposition that disdain towards the political is an unwillingness on the part of the philosopher and Philosophy as discipline, to acknowledge its historical implications and complicity in injustices that curate the contemporary world.

As such this chapter reveals the author's loci of enunciation, a matter dealt with systematically using Mignolo's (2009) argument. By loci of enunciation, is meant the space from which the knowledge producer speaks. This is aligned with the acknowledgement of the socio-cultural and socio-historical elements that influence and shape the thinking of the author/speaker, while highlighting the politics of knowledge production, subsequently locating decoloniality as historically antagonistic towards Philosophy as discipline. This framework lays the foundation for an analysis that details the knowledge project as a historical and political enterprise.

2.2 The Resurgence of the *Arché* in Institutional Transmutations

The relationship between the University and Philosophy as discipline, is conceptualised in this study, from a Kantian position as detailed by Readings (1996: 14). This is to say that the University – and I confine my conceptualisation to the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences – is governed by and organised around the notion of reason, in the philosophical sense. Reason as the premise of and justification for the University, a matter which will become clearer momentarily, is the basis for the claim that Philosophy as discipline is the mother of all disciplines. It is on the basis of this taxonomy that the analysis presented here understands the machinations that govern Philosophy as discipline to also inform the rationalities of the University.

To understand the contemporary University then, one needs to first understand the context in which it functions. Bill Readings' in *The University in Ruins* (1996: 2), argues that the western[4] University "has been widely exported [with its] current mutations… likely to continue to frame the terms of transnational discussion" on the future developments of the University. This claim is substantiated by the western university that finds itself in Africa and other geographical locales that are termed territories of the "people of the periphery" by Dussel (1985). In turn, owing to an alien institution[5] that was transposed from Europe, the westernised university gives rise to a number of challenges that are taken-up and addressed by the decolonial philosopher. Contextualising the critique of the decolonial philosopher, I begin by analysing the history of the westernised university.

2.2.1 The History of the Westernised University

Mudimbe (1996: 5) notes that prior to the nineteenth century the distinction between science and Philosophy was not as clearly enunciated. The strife between these two disciplinary domains that characterises the contemporary University is detailed most aptly by Readings (1996: 2) when he writes, "I want to perform a structural diagnosis of contemporary shifts in the University's function as an institution, in order to argue that the wider social role of the University […] is now up for grabs." Acknowledging the framework established by the first democratic administration in South Africa, the proposition of the social role of the University as 'up for grabs' needs some considered evaluation. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I will not delve into this critique here. Readings' reasoning is inspired by his stated aims i.e.

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[4] The reader will notice my deliberate decapitalisation of 'western'. With decolonial praxis as the basis of this study, I decapitalise 'western' so as to reveal the provinciality of western universalisms, following in the scholarship of Almeida and Kumalo (2018), who problematize (de)colonial strategies that reproduce coloniality in knowledge production processes, globally. Furthermore, the decapitalisation of 'western' aligns this study with decoloniality, which attempts to democratise knowledge production by way of revealing the loci of enunciation.

[5] By alien institution, the reader must pay careful attention. This is to suggest that the westernised university, is not an institution conceptually developed in its locale. The University as institution was transposed from Europe to further the aims of colonial expansion.

detailing the relationship between the contemporary westernised university and the European state. It must be stressed that the relationship between the state and the University is no longer what it used to be, in that "the University, I will claim, no longer participates in the historical project for humanity that was the legacy of the Enlightenment: the historical project of culture" (Readings, 1996: 5). The abandonment of culture centres an analysis of the relationship between the University and the European nation-state. The analysis subsequently hinges on the assumption that the contemporary European state is fashioned by the culture and traditions of the Enlightenment, from which the contemporary University has deviated. The shift from the project of culture is contextualised by Readings (1996: 6) as follows,

> I would prefer to call the contemporary University 'posthistorical' rather than 'postmodern' in order to insist upon the sense that the institution has outlived itself, is now a survivor of the era in which it defined itself in terms of the project of the historical development, affirmation, and inculcation of national culture.

The University as a bastion of national culture can be deduced from Readings' (1996: 6) conceptual framing when he writes "after all, the specificity of the modern University that the German Idealists founded was its status as the site of critique." He subsequently suggests that, "[the] history of previous ways of understanding the function of the University can be roughly summarised by saying that the modern University has had three ideas: the Kantian concept of reason, the Humboltdian idea of culture, and now the techno-bureaucratic notion of excellence" (Readings, 1996: 14). To frame the University in this way is interesting in that it sets-up the claim that Philosophy, as discipline, is the mother of all disciplines evinced in the argument that;

> The University becomes modern when all its activities are organised in view of a single regulatory idea, which Kant claims must be the concept of reason. Reason, on the one

hand, provides the *ratio* for all disciplines; it is their organising principle. On the other hand, reason has its own faculty, which Kant names 'philosophy' but which we would now be more likely simply to call the 'humanities.' In his thinking on the University, Kant also begins to pose the problem of how reason and the state, how knowledge and power, might be unified. (Readings, 1996: 14-15)

In the claim of a Kantian conception of unearthing 'how reason and the state, knowledge and power, might be unified', the reader understands the reasoning and motivations behind the stated aims of this project, i.e. an attempt at understanding the knowledge project within the limitations of the political and historical elements in which it is situated.

However, the claim that Philosophy is the mother of all disciplines is contested by the arrangements that came to constitute the University in the eighteenth century. The University as governed by reason, or as Readings (1996: 15) suggests the humanities, is historically showcased when one looks to the differences between the thinking of Arendt and Leo Strauss (Villa, 1998). The divergences between these two scholars – Arendt and Strauss – enriches our thinking about the philosopher; as citizen or as philosopher-citizen. Villa (1998: 159) argues that the project of the political philosopher, "is neither partisan nor constrained by the 'here and now'. His inquiry into the 'What is?' questions life and the society; it enables him to address what Strauss calls the 'essentially controversial' meaning of the common good in a comprehensive rather than partial or partisan, fashion." This substantiates why the University was framed as the site of 'reason' from a Kantian perspective, as reason facilitates thinking that recalls a Socratic model of the citizen. I understand Villa (1998) to be suggesting that this debate reflects on the notion of the University 'as site of reason' (from a Kantian perspective), while "[pointing] to the possibility of a philosophical or Socratic form of citizenship, one that undercuts the dichotomy of philosophy versus politics" (Villa, 1998: 149). Arendt (1994: 428)

argues that, "[the] event which started our tradition of political thought was the trial and death of Socrates, the condemnation of the philosopher by the *polis*." This conceptual framing, the dichotomy between philosophy and politics, inaugurates the question of how the philosopher engages with the polity, and in a deeper consideration – suggests the question of the political as power.

This observation conceptually facilitates a nuanced understanding of the relation between the University and the state, as it points directly to how the two social spheres interact and form/influence one another, both historically and contemporarily. Systematically analysing the relationship between the University and the state highlights some of the changes instituted by the university of excellence; a point addressed by Readings' (1996) analysis of the techno-bureaucratic approach adopted as of the twentieth century. Recalling that the university of excellence is preceded by the University as a site of culture invites the question posed by Readings, 1996: 63),

> The problem of institutionalisation in Kant's work is phrased by Schiller as the difficulty of how one is to move from the 'state of nature' to the 'state of reason' without destroying nature. The answer, briefly, is through culture as a process of aesthetic education. Culture, that is, allows us to move from nature to reason without destroying nature.

This reasoning is based on the fact that "humanity does not achieve the moral state by rejecting nature but by reinterpreting nature as a historical process" (Readings, 1996: 63) and is corroborated by Gadamer (1975). This conceptual shift substantiates the notion that "the University exists to produce reason without revolution, without destruction" (Readings, 1996: 64). To frame the University so alludes to Arendt's (1994) claim above, regarding the dichotomy between politics and philosophy as instituted by the trial and murder of Socrates.

This is to say that the interpretation of nature as a historical process gives rise to the claim that nature acts as aesthetic education, which allows (wo)man to move from nature to reason without destroying nature. The move from nature to reason without destruction signals the possibility of the Socratic model of citizenship. Furthermore, as Readings suggests (1996: 64), "on the other hand, culture names a *process of development*, of the cultivation of character – *Bildung*." On the principle of culture leading us to reason without destruction, Readings (1996: 68-69) argues that, "[the] extent of this reorganisation can be grasped if we remember Humbolt's observation that the autonomous work of philosophical reflection must be preserved from the Scylla of mere leisure… and the Charybdis of practical utility (total subservience to the direction of the state)." In that,

> Such freedom [from the state through the functions of the University] permits the autonomous work of philosophical reflection, the working out of the inner necessity of knowledge itself that requires no external structuring, no fixed order of course and disciplines. For Schleiermacher, the benefit for the state is not a direct one of utility… Instead, the benefit is indirect: the University produces not servants but *subjects*. (Readings, 1996: 66-67).

With the University producing subjects the entanglements between the European state and the University are highlighted. This relationship is envisaged in the partnership between the University and the European state in the project of colonisation/coloniality; a matter that I will detail in more systematic consideration in the following chapters. There are, however, changes in the contemporary University that are characterised by techno-bureaucracy. Techno-bureaucracy invents a new institution (see Amos, 2010) with Readings (1996: 11) arguing that, "this seems to me directly symptomatic of the re-conception of the University as a corporation, one of whose functions (products?) is the granting of degrees with a cultural cachet, but whose

overall nature is corporate rather than cultural." The third shift as noted by Readings signified a move away from the reproductions of culture to corporate governance with excellence as the prime marker of the contemporary University; one which is critiqued in *The University in Ruins*. Critiquing the university of excellence means that "to understand the contemporary University, we must ask what excellence means (or does not mean)" (Readings, 1996: 12).

The shift from the University as a site of cultural reproduction, and subsequently the state, is initiated by the fact that "the University no longer has to safeguard and propagate national culture, because the nation-state is no longer the major site at which capital reproduces itself" (Readings, 1996: 13). This is substantiated when Readings (1996: 41) further argues that "as an autonomous system rather than an ideological instrument, the University should no longer be thought of as a tool that the left will be able to use for other purposes than those of the capitalist state." Furthermore, Readings (1996: 45) suggests that, "Miyoshi's recognition of the complicity of the discourses of Cultural Studies and multiculturalism with the needs of [Transnational Corporations] TNCs has to be analysed at the level of the University, where the University is understood as a bureaucratic institution developing toward the role of the TNC in its own right."

This, Readings argues (1996: 17), "even like 'excellence' itself, 'culture, no longer has a specific content. Everything, given a chance, can be or become culture'", see also the work of Tony Becher and Maurice Kogan (1992). This is said as the contemporary culture of the University is seen to be epitomising the TNC and arguably reflective of the TNC in its own right. Readings 1996: 3) subsequently writes,

> The current shift in the role of the University is, above all, determined by the decline of the national cultural mission that has up to now provided its *raison d'être*, and I will argue that the prospect of the European Union places the universities of Europe under

a similar horizon, both in the states of the European Union and in Eastern Europe, where projects such as those of George Soros sketch a similar separation of the University from the idea of the nation-state.

In order to better understand the shifts that constituted the changes within the University, it is wise to do a more systematic analysis of the differences that constituted the disciplines. This is as the University is no longer identified with the role of engendering reason, in the university of excellence. The move away from reason, a Kantian conception of the University, has its historical roots in the split that gave rise to the hierarchal ordering of disciplines. This reality was first formalised by the shift that saw the University, a place of cultural production under the Humboltdian conception, being transported to the colonies, a move that is well detailed by Gordon (2014).

2.2.2 The Cultural University as a Bastion of Coloniality?

Readings argues that the University of culture is defined by the production and reproduction of subjects, subsequently the contemporary University can possibly be viewed as a bastion of coloniality. My claim here is rooted in Gordon's analysis when he suggests that,

> Along with the expansion of Christian kingdoms into nation-states and their colonies, which resulted over the course of a few hundred years into European civilisation on a global scale, was also a series of epistemological developments that have literally produced new forms of life: new kinds of people came into being, while others disappeared, and whole groups of them occupy the age in an ambivalent and melancholic relationship by which they are indigenous to a world that, paradoxically, they do not belong to. (Gordon 2014: 84)

Gordon's analysis highlights the expansion of the European state through its acquisition of colonies, while demonstrating the relationship between the University and the state. Douzinas (2013) demonstrates this point by detailing the *Seven Theses on Human Rights*, while Mudimbe (1996) showcases how the disciplinary hierarchy that saw Philosophy being cast aside was instituted. Contextualising the debate using Douzinas and Mudimbe will be crucial in dealing with the relationship between the University, the modern European nation-state and the colonial project. Dealing with these intricacies homes in on what we bear witness to in the contemporary University, and specifically in Philosophy as discipline. I tease out this argument by mapping the critique of the decolonial philosopher.

Gordon (2014) therefore, lays the foundational premise that shines the light on why the University instituted the hierarchy of disciplines. This points to the framing of the University as a bastion of culture, leading to a consideration of Mudimbe's (1996) analysis that details the changes and institutionalisation of the hierarchies between the social sciences and the hard sciences.

It was on the basis of the fascination of science with experimentation and empirical knowledge, first expressed in the seventeenth century through the statutory principles laid out by Thomas Hooke in 1663 (Mudimbe, 1996: 2), that Philosophy was to be relegated to the realm of the speculative. This relegation was premised on the natural sciences ability to garner social support as this disciplinary domain produced immediately useful results (Mudimbe, 1996: 7). Suspicion of Philosophy as discipline, held by natural scientists, challenged the relations between the two domains and fashioned a new relationship that was no longer premised on the assumption of "separate but equal knowledge systems" (Mudimbe, 1996: 5). Rather the relationship assumed a status of hierarchy with the natural sciences possessing more legitimacy and currency than the philosophical discipline as they were concerned with immediate reality

and tangible concrete outcomes. In the nineteenth century this tension was formalised with the sciences assuming the prominent position (Mudimbe, 1996: 5). With the natural sciences clearly defined, the social sciences initially constituted an elusive set of disciplines somewhere between the natural sciences and those disciplines which, at times, were alternately referred to as the arts, the humanities, and/or Philosophy (Mudimbe, 1996: 6).

The shared commitment to validity by the natural and social sciences through empirical knowledge, initiated a further struggle to determine which domain could legitimately make claims about the human world (Mudimbe, 1996: 6) – a struggle that unfolded against the backdrop of "the state [requiring] more exact knowledge on which to base its decisions" (Mudimbe, 1996: 6). The need for results on which to base state decisions is indicative of the colonial expansions of the European nation-state; expansions that saw some people erased from world history (Gordon, 2014). As Mudimbe (1996: 6) states "it was in this context that the university was revived in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." The resurrection of the University birthed disciplines which could offer the kind of knowledge required by the state, i.e. sociology, economics, and anthropology.

To demonstrate the decolonial critique – i.e. speaking back to the atrocities of colonial power – and introduce the claim of the contemporary University as a bastion of coloniality, Walter Mignolo (2009: 176) suggests that "theology [prior to the eighteenth century] was the overarching conceptual and cosmological frame of knowledge-making in which social actors engaged and institutions (monasteries, churches, universities, states, etc.) were created." The University becomes a bastion of coloniality premised on the conception of this institution as the producer of culture. This follows from the logic that this institution was to create, of the natives in the colonial territories, obedient subjects of the metropole located in Europe. Mignolo further argues that "secularisation [of the University] in the 18th century, displaced

Christian theology and secular philosophy and science took its place" (2009: 176). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the search for the scientific laws of nature made little distinction between the two domains, Philosophy and science. Mignolo reveals how Philosophy, theology and science aided the colonial mission. He maintains that "theology and philosophy-science […] the two cosmological frames, [were] competing with each other at one level, but [were however] collaborating with each other when the matter [was in disqualifying] forms of knowledge beyond these frames" (Mignolo, 2009: 164). Mignolo (2009) substantiates the claim of the University as a site of cultural reproduction in the colonies and is backed up by Gordon (2014). As a site of cultural production, the University enculturated those it came to civilise in the colonies. It is in civilising the colonised that the University would continue its mission of producing subjects as argued above using the work of Readings (1996: 67). To demonstrate the reproduction of subjects through colonial education in South Africa we have figures such as Tiyo Soga (1829-1871), Sol Plaatje (1876-1932) and John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1921).

From the preceding argument, the relation between the University and the nation-state as defined by European categories of thought is present even in the locales of the margins; the colonies of European empire. The University as an aid of the European state is premised on the University as a site of cultural reproductions. Readings (1996) and Gordon (2014) are useful insofar as they lay the foundations for the critique offered by the decolonial philosopher. In setting up the decolonial critique, I must showcase that the colonial European state – instantiates differential categories between humans and those relegated outside of this category. This distinction is premised on the conception of the citizen of/in the polity. Classification, in this regard substantiates or de-legitimates access to rights in the polity. Access or denial of these rights was premised on how effectively the native could demonstrate a sense of culture; a culture inculcated through colonial education. The reproduction of subjects in the case of

colonial education was a way of incorporating those who were defined as natives into the intimacy of the polity, by enculturating them into the mores, values and traditions of the European nation-state.

The entitlement of rights rests on ones' citizenship in the polity which means that one is viewed as a human. The category of human is defined by Douzinas (2013) as porous and one which has been used historically to marginalise others who are considered non/in-human. Douzinas' (2013) observation is contextualised by the debates between *amaGqhoboka* and *amaQaba* a matter detailed by Zakes Mda's *The Heart of Redness* (2000). These definitions and distinctions between humans and non-humans is given considerable thought by scholars like Nontsizi Mgqwetho and Gqoba as early as the nineteenth century in South Africa. Douzinas (2013: 8) goes further to argue that "he [the subject without rights in the polity] does not have rights because he is not part of the state and he is a lesser human being because he is not a citizen", a claim that reinforces Readings' (1996: 67) claim when he writes that it was the project of the University to create 'subjects'[6]. Douzinas's claims support Nontsizi Mgqwtho's composition in *Ingxoxo yomGinwa kumaGqobhoka!* Mgqwetho is inspired by Gqoba's *Ingxoxo enkulu ngemfundo* (1885), when she writes:

> Ziph' iintombi zenu? Izwi liyinto ni?
> *Zigqibe lo mhlaba, zifuna ukwenda*
> *Ziqeshe zindlwana; zishweshwe uthuli*
> *Zibeth' onomtatsi kwaThulandivile!*
>
> *Oonina balila amehlo azidudu*
> *Kushiywa lusapho; lumka bekhangele*
> *Beyala belila bengenakuviwa*
> *Zintombi zemfundo noonyana bemfundo!*
>
> *Kuzel' iintolongo kwaphuk' iiHovizi*
> *Ngala matshivela asezikolweni.*

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[6] It is interesting to note how the category of 'subject' – one who is able to claim rights from the state – also relegates the white womxn outside of the political as curated by European modernity. This caveat is useful in substantiating Douzinas's (2013) analysis, insofar as it allows for an intersectional reading of decoloniality in allegiance with the feminist tradition(s).

IiSatifikethi zaseSimnareni
Ziyinto yentsini ebukwa zijaji.
Onk' amabhedengu asezikolweni
Onke namasela asezikolweni
Onke namagqwirha asezikolweni
Ninga bokusikwa ndifung' uNontsizi[i].[7]

Mgqwetho takes issue here with the uses of education by colonial imposition and incursion. Education functioned as a distinguishing category between those who were a part of the polity and those were considered *amaQaba*. Classification as *amaQaba* disqualified uneducated subjects from the polity and subsequently from an entitlement to human rights. Through the incorporation of native subjects into the European political framework of the colony, an incorporation that was facilitated by education, Mgqwetho's composition which was a critique of European colonial education subsequently substantiates Douzinas's argument that it was this notion – human rights – that disqualified some from the category of human while substantiating the inclusion of others. The disqualification of the uneducated native from the category of human, and thus citizen, who could claim rights from the polity rested on this uneducated subject being called/classified *iQaba* (singular for the plural *amaQaba*). This rationale informs my understanding of Douzinas' (2013) work when he avers that the category of human rights has always been used to distinguish between those who were included and excluded from the polity. This inclusion and exclusion in our context rested on the native subject either embracing or rejecting European colonial education. The disciplines of the modern University and their use in entrenching coloniality through studying the native subject, i.e. sociology, anthropology and economics buttress the distinctions between those who are part of the polity and those who are excluded; distinctions that continue to characterise the modern state, which is premised on a European conception of statehood. The continuation of these categories is seen in the differences between those who have access to education and those who are excluded from

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[7] The translation of this poem given in the endnote cannot do justice to the original work done in isiXhosa. I invite the reader to see Jeff Opland's *Nontsizi Mgqwetho: A stranger in Town* (1995).

education, thus are unable to participate in the socio-political and democratic practices of the state.

With statehood derived from European impositions, consider Douzinas (2013: 5) when he writes "social anthropology studies diverse non-western peoples, societies, and cultures but not the human species in its essence or totality. These peoples emerged out of and became the object of observation and study through discovery, conquest, and colonisation." Douzinas (2013) elaborates on Gordon's (2014) work and substantiates the claim that European colonial expansion inaugurated categories of being that created natives in a land to which they did not belong. Furthermore, Douzinas elaborates on Mignolo's (2009) position with regards to the tension between the social sciences and Philosophy; disciplinary domains that collaborated with each other in disqualifying knowledge that was outside the epistemic frameworks instituted by European thinking.

Resultantly the University through sociology, anthropology, economics and history, became more than just the archive of transmitted knowledge (Mudimbe, 1996: 6) owing to their function in aiding the colonial agenda on the continent. Knowledge produced by the University served European colonial domination and violence. This assertion is based on Mignolo's (2009: 176) work when he writes about the body-politic of knowledge as "it is the Negro body that engages in knowledge-making to decolonise the knowledge that was responsible for the coloniality of his being." Revealing the 'body-politic' (by this is meant the physical body – i.e. the author who embarks on the knowledge project) of knowledge allows the decolonial philosopher to put the case that the 'pure' philosopher reveal their loci of enunciation, subsequently revealing the provinciality of (European) thought. Revealing the provinciality of thought heralds the project of contesting western universalism(s) that was/were instituted by knowledge organisation that defined the European university; an institution that became the

locus of knowledge production along with culture. This institutionalisation was marked by the 'disciplinarisation and professionalisation' (Mudimbe, 1996: 7) of knowledge with the sociological, anthropological, historical and economic disciplines defined as the structures that produced knowledge and its knowledge producers.

The social sciences, as such, sought to produce valid knowledge outside of theology and, by association, Philosophy - which was defined as incapable of producing "practical" results (Mudimbe, 1996: 6). Burdened with the objective of producing practical results the social sciences legitimated their existence by associating with the natural sciences in the University and profited from the positive profile of the natural sciences (Mudimbe, 1996: 8). Drawing the natural sciences into the University *institutionalised* the enduring tension between the "arts (humanities) and the sciences, which were now being defined as quite different, and for some antagonistic, ways of knowing" (Mudimbe, 1996: 8). In light of this reality which instituted the hierarchy between the two disciplinary domains, the social sciences and the natural sciences, there were further disciplinary contestations within the social sciences themselves. I pay specific attention throughout this study to a contestation which frames and substantiates the claim of decolonial Philosophy as a radical/radicalised political Philosophy. This claim, however, can only be made by way of systematically considering the contestation between Philosophy and Political Science.

2.2.3 The Tension between Politics and Philosophy

With the proliferation of the social sciences, and the emergence of disciplines such as history, economics, anthropology and sociology; political science, in attempting to establish itself, encountered resistance from Law owing to Law's refusal to concede its monopoly on its subject matter. As a derivative of the tension between political science and Law, political scientists gave priority to the study of political Philosophy, "sometimes under the name of political

theory" (Mudimbe, 1996: 19). This historical fact lays the foundation for Arendt's (1994) argument that it was as a result of professional interests, during eras (such as the European wars of the 20th century) that did not permit propitious conditions for philosophising that Philosophy concerned itself with the political. Arendt (1994: 433) framing the *arché* suggests that "meanwhile the more permanent [and pertinent] questions of political science, which in a sense, are more specifically philosophic – such as What is Politics? Who is man as a political being? What is freedom – seem to have been forgotten altogether." In forgetting these questions, Philosophy was haunted by their pertinence which re-emerged after the second European wars. These questions stress the debate between Strauss and Arendt, i.e. 'how do we conceptualise the philosopher's role in the polity' (Villa, 1998). Villa (1998: 148) argues that "Arendt insisted on thinking politics, political action, and 'the realm of human affairs' in their own terms, with the greatest possible autonomy, whereas Strauss maintained the need to subject political action and judgement to the moral certainties discoverable by reason." With political science laying claim to the canonical texts of Philosophy, the discipline could subsequently align with a heritage of thinkers who had long been established in the University through the discipline of Philosophy (Mudimbe, 1996: 19). In short, political science "was not enough to justify creating a new discipline" and continued to exist in Philosophy departments (Mudimbe, 1996: 20). This continued existence of political science in the discipline of Philosophy, re-inscribed the historical tension between the two disciplines. By political science, I am here referring to the discipline that emerges in the 19th century as part of the Social Sciences that Mudimbe (1996) makes mention of.

Political science - now as political Philosophy – owing to its inability to justify the creation of its own department aligned itself with the canon, not of Law, but of Philosophy, albeit with a specific canon *within* Philosophy. By this I mean authors of western Philosophy whose concern had historically been mostly, if not exclusively, with the political.

I should make some distinctions concerning the evolutions of the University as institution; evolutions which have a direct bearing on the conception of the state through the configurations of the disciplines. Mudimbe (1994: 6) maintains that the social sciences functioned with the intention of aiding the state in making more exact decisions about the governance of the state – along with its colonial project. Put differently, disciplines such as sociology and anthropology were created with the crude task of studying the colonial subject, their traditions, values and moral economies so as to aid European powers in colonising these people (see Martin, 1992; Mudimbe, 1988 and Modiri 2018). The political, in this regard served the interests of the western/European/Anglo-American heterosexual male subject who could claim rights in the polity, seen through Douzinas' (2013: 8) argument that "one is a man to a greater or lesser degree because one is a citizen to a greater or lesser degree." Decolonial Philosophy then is best understood against the backdrop of the political as it relates to colonial imposition; the political as power.

Owing to colonialism and coloniality (political institutions that framed the 'people of the periphery' as non/in-human) the Black/Indigenous subject was denied citizenship through the classification of subject (Mamdani, 2005). This classification facilitated the conception of the Native/Indigenous/Black subject as 'gradual, retarded and backward' (Mudimbe, 1988: 3) in accordance with European colonialism/coloniality. Furthermore, in defining the political, Lewis Gordon maintains that "to be political is to emerge, to appear, to exist"[8] (2014: 88). In line with revealing the historico-ideological genesis of knowledge as a political and historical enterprise, using Gordon's (2014) argument, I suggest that Blackness/Indigeneity has always been erased from the political, resulting in the exploitation of labour for the continued beneficiation of coloniality (to substantiate this point, see Morreira, 2017; Sullivan, 2006;

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[8] The political presented in this sense is conceptualised as consensus.

Yancy, 2008; and Zondi, 2017). Gordon suggests that those who have been historically oppressed are rendered mute through an erasure from the dialectics of recognition when he writes "as faceless, problem people are derailed from the dialectics of recognition, of self and other, with the consequences of [an inability to recognise] neither self nor other" (2014: 88). Primarily, Gordon (2014) is suggesting that the erasure of historically depoliticised peoples i.e. Blackness/Indigeneity has signalled the instantiation of the political as power. Simply put, this erasure is of no consequence to those who define themselves as concerned with the political in Philosophy, for their concern has always been with the *traditional* political subject, the heterosexual, cis-gendered, western/European/Anglo-American male subject. This history substantiates the claim of knowledge as a political and historical enterprise, which invites the critique of the decolonial philosopher.

The political as it relates to those who are defined as human, speaks to those who "can successfully claim human rights and the group of rights we have determines how 'human' we are; our identity depends on the bunch of rights we can successfully mobilise in relation with others" (Douzinas, 2013: 19). Furthermore, it is worthy to note how Douzinas (2013: 16) contextualises his definition of the political, he maintains that "the 'political', on the other hand, refers to the way in which the social bond is instituted and concerns deep rifts in society. The political is the expression and articulation of the irreducibility of social conflict", demonstrating the conception of the political as power. The 'irreducibility of social conflict' concerns social conflict for the political actor who is considered human on the basis of their capacity to claim rights from the polity and have these rights recognised owing to their legitimacy in the "dialectics of recognition" (Gordon, 2014). This schema highlights the political, as addressed by the political philosopher only in relation to the white male subject. To substantiate, Villa (1998) is instructional in my project. He argues that "for Arendt, a healthy politics is an agonistic politics of open, never-ending debate; a politics that takes place in a public realm free

of force or coercion, on a 'stage' suitable for the expression of human plurality and civic equality" (Villa, 1998: 148). These categories that define the political apply only insofar as they advance the civic equality of the white/European political subject whose identity was to be reproduced by the westernised university that was transported to the colonies. Gordon (2014), substantiates this position noting the systematic erasure of the Black/Indigenous subject, who has factually and historically been denied rights in the polity. In the appropriation of the canon of Philosophy, political Philosophy stepped into a binary distinction that marked the origin of western philosophy, a distinction between "pure" Philosophy as removed from the practicalities of everyday social and political life and therefore superior to another mode of philosophy that, because of its proximity to the practicality of everyday concerns, was deemed 'less philosophical' for being less abstract.

Arendt situates this strife at the origin of western Philosophy itself, an *arché* that is derived from the negative and hostile attitude adopted by the philosopher towards the *polis*[9] (1994: 428). At the heart of this aversion was a concern with how Philosophy could protect and liberate itself from the realm of human affairs (Arendt, 1994: 428) which explains why "philosophy has frequently shown an unhappy inclination" (Arendt, 1994: 430) towards political Philosophy, often treating it as a stepchild in the history of the institutionalisation of the social science disciplines. Strauss, differing from Arendt, argues that "thinking that takes place in the agora, which is truly open to everyone, will have a 'corrupting' effect on those whose character is insufficiently virtuous to withstand the disorientation caused by Socratic negativity" (Villa, 1998: 163). Villa goes on to substantiate this point by pointing out that,

> This, it seems to me, is Strauss's primary response to the Arendtian attempt to harmonise philosophy and politics through the figure of Socrates. His preference for

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[9] The previous section highlights how this position was instituted by the trial and death of Socrates (Arendt, 1994).

the Socrates of the *Republic* and the *Gorgias* over the 'philosopher-citizen' of the *Apology* flows from this fear. His intense concern with the relation of philosophy to poetry and rhetoric mirrors his conviction that philosophical insight will not draw the truth out of the citizen's doxa, but rather be transformed into the most dangerous form of untruth (1998: 163).

From this position one might infer why philosophy as discipline has always had an aversion to the political, as the political can arguably be viewed as that which is fraught with the messiness of the limitations of the political actor

This analysis brings into sharp focus why the philosopher has an aversion to the political. Douzinas suggests (2013: 16) "politics proper erupts only when an excluded part demands to be included and must change the rules of inclusion to achieve that." This gives rise to two further considerations, first, that Philosophy as discipline acknowledge and confront its historical implications and complicity in the imbalances of power, socially. In this regard, acknowledgement would mean that the discipline confront how it has historically been used for the colonial missions of European powers. Second that western Philosophy rid itself of the continued position that conceals the "geo and body-politics of knowledge" (Mignolo, 2009: 174). However, I will deal with this in more detail when I consider the continued perpetuation of epistemic injustice(s) by the discipline in the following chapter.

In *Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought*, Arendt (1994) notes a renewed interest in the political significance of thought post the second European wars. While Philosophy may have an aversion to politics, the fundamental questions that drive political science, "who is man as a political being? and "what is freedom" (Arendt, 1994: 433) are inherently philosophical in nature. Recognising the philosophical implications of these questions points to what Arendt suggests might be "a new political science" (1994: 430) which

is principally concerned with the political significance of thought. The political significance of thought is central in Arendt's (1994) argument. She argues,

> It is here [in the recognition of the philosophical import of these questions as the political significance of thought] that the concept of historicity appears, and this concept, despite its new guise and greater articulateness, shares with the older concept of history the fact that, despite its obvious closeness to the political realm, it never reaches but misses the centre of politics – man as an acting being (Arendt, 1994: 433).

Re-invoking the debate between Arendt and Strauss, let us consider the Arendtian position that, "the abandonment of the position of 'wise man' by the philosopher himself is politically perhaps the most important and the most fruitful result of the new philosophical concern with politics" (1994: 432). This comes as Arendt suggests that,

> In our context, this means that the philosopher has left behind him the claim to being 'wise' and knowing eternal standards for the perishable affairs of the City of men, for such 'wisdom' could be justified only from a position outside the realm of human affairs and be thought legitimate only by virtue of the philosopher's proximity to the Absolute (1994: 432).

The political significance of thought centres the work of decolonial philosophers such as Mignolo (2009) and Gordon (2014), which requires that the discipline confront its position of power in maintaining problematic forms of knowledge production. This new political science, which is centred around the political significance of thought, will only find articulation if Philosophy were to acknowledge the legitimacy of politics and go beyond the tension that historically marked the relationship between the two traditions. However, it is necessary to note that this acknowledgement would mark something akin to the internal implosion of the discipline as it has historically and contemporarily maintained injustices as a mode of asserting

its legitimacy. These injustices are maintained by the philosopher's appeal to the 'proximity of the absolute'. My argument in this respect, echoes the work of Lebakeng et al (2006: 72-73) who maintain that "[the] thrust of western education was to deny the colonised indigenous people of South Africa useful and relevant social knowledge about themselves and their world, and in turn, transmit a culture that embodied, and was designed to consolidate dependency and generally undermine the colonised people's capacity for creativity in all the spheres of life."

The war in Europe promulgated the 'political significance of thought' along with the imminent threat of atomic warfare. Arendt writes, "[i]n one respect philosophy [owing to the two European wars was] better prepared for and the philosophers more willing to acknowledge the relevance of political happenings than they had been in the past" (Arendt, 1994: 430) thus foregrounding the emerging inescapable interplay between politics and philosophy, which frames the knowledge project as a political and historical enterprise.

With the definition of the traditional political subject developed using the work of Douzinas (2013) and Gordon (2014), I suggest that the preparedness of the European philosophers to engage with the political stems from the threat that heralded the annihilation of the traditional political subject of the European state. The aversion of the political by Philosophy and "pure" philosophers, has its roots in the historical question posed by Arendt (1994: 428) when she states that the nature of Philosophy, as discipline, was always to "protect and liberate itself from the realm of human affairs." This is as "pure" Philosophy was framed as concerned with abstract thought. However, in order to secure the position from which to be concerned with abstract thought, the philosopher was charged with first and foremost resolving the political crisis of/within Europe. This contextualises Arendt's (1994) argument that the concern with the political by philosophers who define themselves as "pure" philosophers arises from conditions least propitious for philosophising. These conditions render the traditional subject

of the polity in a similar context as those who have been historically marginalised from accessing rights that would have them seen/defined as a legitimate member of the polity. If the reader accepts this argument, I contend that the philosopher concerns themselves with the political when it is least propitious to philosophise, merely to re-inscribe the order that secures the apoliticisation and ahistoricisation of the knowledge project. This position provides the background for the claim of the complicity of Philosophy as discipline, in historical imbalances of power.

I contend that the antagonism raised by "decolonial Philosophy" in contemporary Philosophy departments is constituted by two hostilities. First is the antagonism or strife that is the *arché* of western Philosophy which always valorised 'pure' abstract Philosophy over political Philosophy. Second, much like western Philosophy in the context of Arendt's writing, it recognises and insists on 'the political significance of thought'. 'Decolonial Philosophy' assumes the double burden of being aligned with political Philosophy – historically the 'step child' of Philosophy – and of radicalising the political significance of thought. In short, the double 'burden' of decolonial Philosophy is that it not only speaks from the historically devalued place accorded *political Philosophy*, but that in addition, it also radicalises the place Arendt accorded it by asking questions about the *politics of Philosophy*. Decolonial philosophers radicalise the position of political Philosophy, firstly by interrogating the purist conception of Philosophy and secondly by revealing to the discipline itself the politics of the discipline, i.e. the *arché*.

Decoloniality, now considered as the historical continuation and radicalisation of political Philosophy, demands that the discipline reveal its loci of enunciation (Grosfoguel, 2007: 214) through removing the "point zero perspectives of Eurocentric philosophies." It agitates for accountability subsequently situating Philosophy outside of the universal claims, which as

Mudimbe (1996: 5) aptly puts it, created the suspicion that Philosophy is a substitute of theology as it makes *a priori* claims that cannot be tested. Political philosophers and subsequently decolonial thinkers demand that Philosophy reveal its space of enunciation. In what follows, the analysis traces the case for the claim that the aversion to the political by the "pure" philosopher might be an aversion of acknowledging the historical complicity of Philosophy as discipline.

2.2.4 The Arché Articulated

The analysis has so far located the discourses of decoloniality in the institutional disciplinary arrangements that characterise the contemporary University. More specifically, I have situated decolonial Philosophy – by which I mean philosophy that directly addresses the question of decoloniality[10] – in the historical trajectory of the tension between political Philosophy and "pure" Philosophy. This allows for the exploration of the notion of the *arché* as it manifests in the contemporary University. This has been done through tracing the historical evolutions of the University, an undertaking which serves to substantiate Arendt's (1994: 428) claim that "self-protection as well as outright defense of professional interests have more often than not prompted the philosopher's concern with politics." Simply put, the philosopher who is concerned with thought rather than action comes to concern themselves with action out of a desire to protect their professional interests. According to Arendt (1994), this tension has its roots in the *arché* of Philosophy which defined the discipline as pure thinking and as categorically distinguished from action and the political. Against the backdrop of this historical debate, which sees Philosophy coming to concern itself with the political and action only in

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[10] Decoloniality here, is used as per Kumalo and Praeg's (2019) framing which defines it as justice *a priori*. By this they mean decoloniality as the pursuit of substantive epistemic justice, a conception of epistemic justice that considers the political, economic and social conditions which either inhibit or facilitate the capacity of Blackness/Indigeneity to be viewed as possessing 'ontological legitimacy' (Kumalo, 2018a).

times which are least propitious to philosophising, it is necessary to consider the claim that this state of affairs elides the complicity of the discipline in curating the contemporary University.

2.3 An Elided Complicity?

To frame Philosophy as discipline, as historically implicated and complicit in the injustices addressed by decolonialists can be construed as a contentious move. As I am concerned, more broadly in this study, with knowledge as a political and historical enterprise, it is useful to consider this framing in more detail. To begin with the challenges witnessed in South Africa, through the PSSA blow-up, are not exclusive to our context but rather representative of the global problem in the knowledge production economy (see Grosfoguel, 2013; Paphitis and Villet, 2017; and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018). The global academe, is presently thinking critically about the notion of decolonisation and epistemic justice so as to correct the historical injustices of colonialism and contemporary coloniality[11] (see Grosfoguel, 2007). This position is not, however, new and framing it as such undermines the historic intellectual traditions that have consistently resisted co-optation into global paradigms of thought that erase the colonial subject and their disrupted histories owing to colonialisms and imperialism. This can be framed as historical resistance. Historical epistemic resistance is witnessed through the scholarship of Du Bois (1903), Fanon (1963), Jabavu (1963), Nkosi (1989) and Plaatje (1916). Epistemic resistance has always signalled the fight against the claim that African people are devoid of thought and knowledge; a claim which substantiated the systematic attempt at the erasure of African knowledge systems through colonial imposition. In Philosophy as discipline, this resistance has been framed through the scholarship of African philosophy and what scholars of

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[11] This position is supported by Mirza (2017: 51) who details how the #RhodesMustFall campaigns were also witnessed in the UK higher education sector.

the African diaspora term 'Africana Philosophy' (Gordon, 2008). It is important to note Outlaw's contribution to this debate when he writes,

> For centuries the standard claim of western practitioners and historians of philosophical thought was that philosophy was the creation *sui generis* of Greek thinkers, of none other on Earth, a legacy that was somehow bequeathed to western Europe and, along with defining and leading the 'progress of civilisation,' has been cultivated and conveyed by Europeans across history and geography to other locales where, supposedly, neither civilisation nor philosophy existed (2018: 245)

The development of the European University further aided and advanced the European state's mission of colonialism and dispossession, as argued above. This claim finds substantiation in Dismas Masolo's argument that,

> Colonial power [on the African continent was buttressed by] the social scientists who quickly became to the colonisers an invaluable source of knowledge of the variety of African social structures and ways of life… anthropologists [for instance] became responsible for how Africans were perceived in their home countries and almost all over the world (2018: 61).

Mignolo (2009) maintains that while the social sciences and Philosophy were in competition with one another, these frames of knowledge collaborated in disqualifying knowledge that fell outside the ambits of European categories of thought. To demonstrate this point further, so as to emphasise Philosophy's position in the historical injustices contested by the decolonial philosopher, I turn to the work of Lucius Outlaw (2018). Outlaw maintains that "central to these ventures [of European colonial expansion and dispossession] was the denial of the humanity of African peoples… denials that required elaborate rationalisations from those most 'able' of European thinkers, among them the long-since canonised philosophers Kant, Hegel,

Hume" (2018: 246). This position leads Outlaw to argue that the "enterprise of philosophy then, was made a handmaiden to racialized imperialist colonialism, enslavement and genocide" (2018: 246) suggesting that indeed it is the "Negro body that engages in knowledge-making to decolonise the knowledge that was responsible for the coloniality of his being" (Mignolo, 2009: 176).

This historical account highlights the usefulness of the consideration that Philosophy as discipline, is implicated in the contemporary world that is defined by epistemic injustice(s). This is as the historical figures of western Philosophy championed the relegation of the peoples of the periphery to the margins. Furthermore, Thompson, Adleberg, Sims and Nahmias (2016) write about the attrition levels of womxn in the undergraduate introductory courses of Philosophy in the United States. These scholars base their work on one institutional analysis, and suggest an interesting consideration for the discipline in how it is taught and framed contemporarily. Investigating the teaching methodologies in the discipline is interesting insofar as it reveals the perpetuation of historical problematics that define Philosophy in narrow and Eurocentric modes.

Thompson et al. (2016: 8) indicate that womxn find the discipline alienating and unwelcoming writing, "[a] mere sense of social belonging can influence people's goals and motivations, but only for people with at least some identification with the field." Alienation from the discipline is rooted in the ways in which womxn, and people of colour relate to the discipline with Dotson (2011) indicating that the attrition, specifically, as it relates to people of colour is rooted in the feeling that the discipline has failed people of colour. Dotson's (2011: 403) argument quotes from Solomon (2001) when he writes "our critical scrutiny today should be turned on the word 'philosophy' itself … to realise that what was once a liberating concept has today become constricted, oppressive and ethnocentric." This position frames the debate on epistemic

injustice exhibited by European modes of knowing that claim universal knowledge of the world. European preponderance is contested by Gordon (2014: 81) when he writes:

> The formulation of knowledge in the singular already situates the question in a framework that is alien to times before the emergence of European modernity and its age of global domination, for the disparate modes of producing knowledge and notions of knowledge were so many that *knowledges* would be a more appropriate designation (emphasis added).

These constrictions of the discipline define Philosophy as fundamentally rooted in Eurocentric ideals that define Philosophy as criticism. This leads Thompson et al (2016) to the conclusion that the methodological approach in Philosophy – the adversarial method – is what drives womxn to leave the discipline as it is unaccommodating to womxn even as they may seek to play by the stipulated rules. Philosophy therefore, positions itself as a discipline that has historically been dominated by the subject of the polity, the western/European/Anglo-American heterosexual male subject who can legitimately claim rights from the polity and be recognised as human on the basis of their capacity to claim said rights.

Furthermore, in her critique of Philosophy as discipline, Dotson (2011) contends that the existing methodological approaches that resist pluralism, limit the kinds of questions that the discipline can pose. Resistance to methodological pluralism is witnessed through questions that deviate from historical methodology being dismissed as unphilosophical. An example would be a philosophical treatise that investigates the role of music as a legitimate epistemic resource. Traditional Philosophy would classify such an undertaking as best suited for disciplinary domains such as ethno-musicology and anthropology, while failing to see the treatment of ethical and moral questions through lyrical compositions in the work of musicians such as Miriam Makeba and Letta Mbulu. This dismissal is premised on the reality that the traditional

subject of the polity and the discipline has always been a subject who enjoys the freedoms and liberties of the polity, therefore allowing this subject to define the categories that constitute the discipline. Dotson aptly demonstrates this when she writes, "[too] often, people who voice scepticism about canonical questions and methods find they face a recurrent question: 'How is your project philosophy?'" (2011: 406). Dotson further goes on to suggest that this question by its very nature "presupposes that all parties to the discussion accept a common answer to an underlying question: 'what is philosophy'" (2011: 407). This position indicates an inherent divergence between the philosophical concerns of the peoples of the centre and the peoples of the periphery as per Dussel's (1985) work.

Almeida (2015: 86) maintains that this position shores up the idea that Blackness/Indigeneity exist as a mode of 'substantiating' western civilisation in the academe. This difference lies in the reality that, historically, Blackness/Indigeneity has been defined as existing outside of the parameters of the philosophical as defined by European modernity; a definition whose substantiation is rooted in the dehumanising project of peoples of the periphery. It is on the basis of this historical reality of injustice, which defines some people as human while others were relegated to the position of "non/in-human" (Douzinas, 2013) that we see the complicity of Philosophy as discipline in the historical injustices derived from the imbrications of the modern European University and its state. The reader will recall that the social sciences were developed to produce concrete answers to be used by the state as a form of making practical decisions (Mudimbe, 1996). In the aversion of human affairs, I would suggest that "pure" Philosophy expresses an aversion to confront its complicity in systems of exploitation, injustice and domination.

2.4 Conclusion

The aim in this chapter was to do three things that demonstrate the historico-ideological position, as per the suggestion of Dussel (1985). This has been done, in this chapter, by way of tracing the historical transmutations that define the relationship between the University and the state. This chapter subsequently situates my study within the decolonial tradition in Philosophy; a tradition that has been constituted by acts of resistance that seek to foster epistemic justice in the knowledge project. First was to trace the historical tension that exists between the pure philosopher and the political philosopher. This was done through tracing the historical mutations of the University as institution, while further revealing the position of Philosophy as discipline within disciplinary arrangements. Secondly, was to showcase how the decolonial philosopher speaks from a devalued position of the political philosopher, while also radicalising the position of the political philosopher in the demand that the philosopher (pure and political) reveal their loci of enunciation. The devalued place from which the decolonial philosopher speaks was linked to the historical tension that exists within the discipline, with Arendt (1994) framing this tension as the *arché* of the discipline. My argument revealed that this place – from which the decolonial philosopher speaks – is further burdened, owing to the challenge posed by the decolonial philosopher – which requires that the philosopher reveal their loci of enunciation, but further that the politics of Philosophy as discipline be revealed in the project of knowledge production. The last and final move was to defend the position that the aversion towards the political in the discipline might be rooted in the reality that the philosopher – through revealing the politics of Philosophy, might also be implicated in the historical injustices that constitute the discipline. This last move facilitates the contextual analysis that reveals the constitutive components of epistemic injustice in the third chapter. These are framed as constitutive components of the *sociality of epistemic practice*.

The analysis indicated that the *arché* which defines the discipline of Philosophy is derived from the development of the European University – a development that is closely wedded to the development of the European state. It further showcased how the close relationship between the European state and the University has been defined by the historical and continued marginalisation of peoples of the periphery. This marginalisation has its roots in the historical reality that has always attempted the systematic erasure of peoples of the periphery as argued by Gordon (2014). Furthermore, using Douzinas (2013), the analysis highlighted how the erasure of the peoples of the periphery is premised on the denial of their humanity. This denial showed the need for the decolonial philosopher to reveal the body-politic(s) of knowledge production, as the body-politic is associated with the *politics* of Philosophy as discipline.

Thirdly, the analysis showcased the aversion that the pure philosopher exhibits towards the political, an aversion that is rooted in the *arché* of the discipline. In detailing this aversion, I considered the complicity of the discipline in the historical injustices contemporarily addressed by the decolonial philosopher. Revealing the body-politic of knowledge production in Philosophy as discipline substantiates the claim that the aversion of the pure philosopher/Philosophy, with regards to the political, can be construed as an aversion to contend with historical complicity. This discussion elaborated on the reality that the pure philosopher was only concerned with the political in times least propitious to philosophising. It is on the basis of this historical trajectory, that the following chapter deals with the constitutive components of epistemic injustice, which are derived from the historical position; the *arché*. These constitutive parts are framed as the *sociality of epistemic practice* in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

Detailing the Sociality of Epistemic Practice

3.1 Introduction

Having framed decoloniality as radicalised political philosophy, this chapter moves on to consider the core argument of decolonial philosophers[1], namely that Philosophy still perpetuates epistemic injustice and its institutionalisation. To frame Philosophy as discipline in this way comes from the argument that details the role of the University in instituting social injustices evinced by the relationship between the University and the modern European nation-state. This chapter therefore, aims to defends the claims made in the preceding chapter, while contextualising the idea that when the contemporary philosopher deviates from the traditional questions considered in the discipline, they are framed as working outside the discipline, i.e. out of Philosophy proper. My argument is based on Miranda Fricker's (2007: 5) work, when she argues that, "[a]ny claim of epistemic injustice must rely on a shared ethical intuition." An ethical intuition plays a significant role in Fricker's (2007) theory as it undergirds her argument to the extent that without said intuition, there can be no dialogue or conversation around the claim of epistemicide. The analysis here demonstrates how the South African context lacks a shared ethical intuition owing to colonial imposition using uMqhayi's (1914) work.

To claim that Philosophy as discipline perpetuates epistemic injustice and stifles the articulation or claims thereof, rests on *the sociality of epistemic practice*. Subsequently, I offer a critique of Philosophy as discipline considered in terms of the sociality of its practice. By *the sociality of epistemic practice*, is meant the socially constitutive parts of the discipline, which encompass – in part – the reading material taught. The material taught forms the first element of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. The analysis showcases that there are two things that

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[1] The argument that has augmented what is conceptually framed as the geography of dissent in this dissertation.

constitute said practice, these being, curricula and the conditions of possibility that facilitate either the articulation of the injustices or the stifling of the conversation. Simply put, this analysis breaks down the two constitutive parts of epistemic injustice as developed by Fricker (2007) which are testimonial and hermeneutic injustices.

This chapter analyses the constitutive elements of *the sociality of epistemic practice*, while contesting the notion that knowledge that exists outside of the canon lacks epistemic merit. In the previous chapter, this point is highlighted using Outlaw's (2018) argument which is substantiated by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018). Analysing contemporary knowledge production globally, and subsequently critiquing it, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018: 1) frames the discussion as follows, "'Europe' remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call 'Indian,' 'Chinese,' 'Kenyan,' and so on." This critique is bolstered by Atieno-Odhiambo (1996: 31) through the pivotal question raised when he writes, "[has] the time come to question the unitary acceptance of the hegemonic episteme which posits that the discipline of history uniquely belongs to western civilisation?" This question facilitates an entry point into the constitutive parts of *the sociality of epistemic practice* in Philosophy as discipline. It allows for the demonstration of how epistemic injustice has manifested in the South African context. I use uMqhayi's (1914) work in the third section of this chapter to respond to the question posed by Atieno-Odhiambo (1996).

In teasing out *the sociality of epistemic practice* as it manifests in Philosophy as discipline, the argument that the sociality of Philosophy as epistemic practice is constituted by two elements that, combined, perpetuate epistemic injustice – is advanced: the first relates to the identity of knowers who make epistemological claims (testimonial injustices) while the second addresses the material conditions of possibility that exist such that the speaker is framed as lacking the epistemic credibility/capacity of making worthy claims. This second component constitutes hermeneutic injustices. Epistemic credibility deficit is derived from Fricker when she writes;

> I introduce the notion of *identity prejudice* as a label for prejudices against people qua social type, and this allows me to home in on the central case of testimonial injustice: the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer's part, as in the case where the police don't believe someone because he is black (2007: 4).

Using Dotson (2011) in the previous chapter, the analysis teases out how this phenomenon plays out in the discipline, perpetrated by scholars who (are traditionally considered to) exist in the domain of 'pure' Philosophy, when they ask, 'how is this work philosophical'. Practices of inclusion and exclusion hinge on the distinction made by traditional Philosophy scholars which invites the question of what should be considered Philosophy. This frames Philosophy as discipline as principally concerned with second order questions and as such the notion that the 'pure' philosopher is not concerned with the political. This is detailed by Mncube[ii] (2019) who analyses the standards that continue to govern the domain of Philosophy of science; the notion of objectivity is taken to be the driving principle in this domain. Objectivity as the prevailing standard is premised on rationality and scientific methodology. This position can, however, be critiqued using Snow's work on *The Two Cultures* (1959). However, it is not my aim to interrogate notions of objectivity. It is useful however, to indicate that this position – as taken up by the philosopher – is buttressed by the claim to the absolute as detailed by Arendt (1994: 432).

I therefore, combine these two elements, the identity of knowers who make epistemic claims and the conditions of possibility such that this identity yields credibility deficits from those who are listening to the speaker, to form what I call *the sociality of epistemic practice*. This is derived from Fricker's (2007: 3) work for whom "a socially situated account of human practice is an account such that the participants are conceived not in abstraction from relations of social power … but as operating as social types who stand in relations of power to one another." This

move further substantiates the suggestion made previously that decoloniality in Philosophy as discipline, is aligned with the work of the political philosopher.

3.2 The Politics of Epistemic Practice

A politics of epistemic practice is what gives birth to *the sociality of epistemic practice* as developed here. It reveals the political significance of thought while making visible the 'point zero' perspectives of Eurocentric philosophy(ies). The point zero position curates a 'perspective from nowhere' (Mitova, 2019), with Fricker suggesting that "confining oneself to [a highly abstracted conception of human subjects] restricts the sort of philosophical questions and insights one can come up with" (2007: 3). This is to say that Philosophy as discipline, through the *sociality of epistemic practice*, has delimited the possibilities of expanding the horizons of philosophical thought by privileging one epistemic framework, namely the western tradition. Dotson (2011) maintains that in privileging one epistemic tradition one runs the risk of instituting ignorance(s) owing to the blind spots elided by the limitations of the framework privileged. It might be useful here to inquire as to what might be gleaned from an engagement with alternative modes of thinking. This question is addressed using the Black Archive.

Limitations derived from privileging one mode of knowing are addressed by Mitova (2019) when she considers the role of decolonisation and the rationales produced by the decolonialist who argues in favour of decolonisation. Mitova's (2019) argument attempts to safeguard the decolonial agenda from becoming a relativist project that takes each knowledge framework as equally authoritative. While there can be a great deal said about this limitation, as it invites considerations of the ethics of knowing and the power dynamics implicit in epistemic frameworks, it is not dealt with here, as these considerations are too broad for this analysis.

While this debate is not addressed directly, it reveals the power relations that Fricker (2007) speaks to, while surfacing the importance of the politics of epistemic practice. Furthermore,

the ethics of knowing are directly linked to de-legitimating moves that critique alternative epistemic traditions on the basis of relativism. Relativism frames competing or opposing epistemic paradigms as equal, subsequently surfacing the contestations that may ensue. Contestations highlight the power dynamics at work in any given epistemic exchange. Simply put, a question can be posed to an individual who claims that their epistemic position should be given the same if not greater authority as another. The question is 'why should your knowledge claim be given more weight than that of another'? Insofar as this question highlights the contestations around knowing, it also offers us an opportunity to think creatively about how we may resolve these contestations through a political solution. To suggest that a contestation of knowledge claims may be resolved by a political solution locates knowledge squarely in the terrain of politics, i.e. *Knowledge as Political*.

To dismiss one epistemic framework while privileging another is telling of the *a priori* judgement(s) that continue to hold western epistemic traditions as authoritative in the knowledge economy. With this debate in mind consider the possibilities of bringing diverse epistemic traditions into the University as a way of gleaning philosophic insights so as to advance the knowledge project. Simply put, the debate on epistemic authority is limiting in that it plays into the pitfalls of crudely framing the debate in terms of a linear understanding of the political as a contestation of power; with power framed as primarily the coercive use of force.

As indicated by Outlaw (2018), European thought, and by implication Philosophical traditions, have always assumed their authority on the basis of a historical affinity with the works of Greek antiquity (Masolo, 2018). To claim epistemic authority or legitimacy by appealing to Greek antiquity has seen modern European thought disqualifying other modes of knowing. This is interesting for two reasons; first, Fricker (2007) suggests that epistemic justice is better grasped when we consider it in relation to epistemic agents who exist in relations of power to one another. The point that I aim to flesh-out here is that in privileging one mode of knowing while

silencing others is instructive of these power relations. Outlaw's (2018) argument clarifies the role of power dynamics in knowledge when he speaks of the rationalisations offered by European thinkers as the basis for the colonial expansion witnessed through the rise of European empires across the globe. Simply put, to buttress European thinking/thought by way of appealing to Greek antiquity instantiates power relations that continue to haunt the peoples of the periphery by resurrecting the yoke of coloniality. The burden of coloniality arises from the claim that European Philosophy was and continues to be the sole inheritor of Greek antiquity; a move that subsequently classifies other knowledge(s) as lacking any epistemic merit or value. This mode of reasoning delimits the kinds of questions available to the contemporary philosopher, with entire knowledge systems disqualified as irrational. Fricker (2007) points out the limitations of this reasoning when she argues that a highly abstracted conception of the philosophical is limiting in its capacity for inspiring more systematic and novel questions.

The debate on epistemic authority therefore, implicitly discards all other forms of knowing, on the basis of the authority derived from the epistemic arrogance of European thinking, which is rooted in the claim that modern European thinking is the sole inheritor of the knowledge produced in Greek antiquity. This has implications insofar as it relates to how the contemporary decolonial philosopher critiques this form of epistemic arrogance by way of questioning the rationale used by European modernity (see Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996). In what follows, the analysis subsequently does two things. It uses Marinda Fricker's (2007) theory to both critique Philosophy as epistemic practice and, through a critical response to her work, lay the foundations for a contextually relevant conception of epistemic justice in the following chapter.

As a response to this limitation, (that may be derived from a highly abstracted conception of Philosophy) Fricker (2007: 4) suggests that we ought to start from "the socially situated conception of the social power that agents have in relation to one another." It is on the basis of

this recommendation that *the sociality of epistemic practice* in the discipline is dealt with. By her contention (Fricker, 2007: 4) "this [move] allows us to trace the interdependencies of power, reason and epistemic authority." Tracing these components suggests the mechanisms, epistemological and material, that contribute to canon formation which is analysed with reference to, among others, Graneß (2018). Graneß's (2018) work poignantly facilitates an analysis of the politics of epistemic practice, while revealing how this is derived from its sociality.

3.2.1 Canon Formation and the Decolonial Critique

Graneß (2018) reveals how the politics of the discipline play out in canon formation, which makes her work useful for detailing this component of the project. Graneß (2018: 35) maintains that the act of writing the history of Philosophy, and or the study of the history of the discipline, is itself a philosophical and political project. Graneß's (2018) argument is substantiated by Bhambra (2007: 16) when she argues that, "what is required is a more thoroughgoing analysis of the underlying assumptions upon which discourse [and by extension disciplines] and practices come to be premised." Graneß argues that, "[t]he history of philosophy is not just a sub-discipline of philosophy, but is considered a philosophical activity in itself. It has been instrumental in shaping our understanding of the very nature of philosophy, our philosophical canon and our curriculum" (Graneß, 2018: 35). The argument for the politics of epistemic practice, as they manifest in the curriculum, reveals the usefulness of Standish's (2003: 221) work who maintains that "education is a highly contextual and personalised, historically and politically construed concept."

The historicity of education manifests through the point zero position, or as Mitova (2019) puts it, through the position that aims to speak from nowhere. Speaking from nowhere, enables the contestations that 'define the fraught nature of education in society' (Standish, 2003: 221).

These contestations come from the reality of the context specificities from which education is taught, with these specificities -in the case of Philosophy as discipline- being taken across the globe as the standard by which the world should come to know and with which it has to comply. The argument of the University as a site of cultural reproduction is resurfaced if one adheres to this line of thinking. It was in exporting the European conception of the University to the colonies that the mother country initiated the task of creating subjects of the natives in the colonised territories. Compliance, with this exported notion of culture, means that the canon of the discipline privileges European men who dismiss non-Europeans and (wo)men as knowers.

Graneß argues that "[u]ntil the present day, philosophy departments have defended an American-centric and Eurocentric paradigm of philosophy and have not incorporated non-Western traditions and texts into their curricula" (2018: 33). Boughey and McKenna (2016), South African educational theorists – corroborate this claim, when they think through academic literacy and the decontextualised learner. Through imposing knowledge, by way of teaching, that is most apt for students who are located in the northern hemisphere, the discipline decontextualises those who find themselves in universities that are defined by the structure of knowledge in westernised universities (as per Grosfoguel's 2013 contention). In this regard Boughey and McKenna argue

> As we have shown in our previous work (Boughey, 2002, 2012a; McKenna, 2010, 2012), language has always been a contentious issue in South African higher education. As long ago as 1993, Bradbury pointed out that it is politically expedient to argue that the difficulties black students experience as they engage with learning in higher education are because of their status as speakers of an additional language. (2016: 2)

Boughey and McKenna (2016) assist us in understanding the canon formation processes of disciplines such as Philosophy. By imposing decontextualised knowledge imported from the

London, Hull, Manchester and Paris, what Graneß (2018) terms the preoccupation with Anglo-centric and Eurocentric philosophies, Philosophy departments fail to deal with the testimonial injustices perpetuated by the discipline. I cautiously suggest that the discipline maintains these injustices, while eliding its complicity in their maintenance. Questioning the notion of truth in Philosophy –as discipline– Jullien and Lloyd (2002: 805) argue that the obsession with truth in Philosophy resulted in a dichotomous world of truth and falsity. Falsity, as a category construed to denote a number of African traditions of thought, is taken up by Kumalo (2018a) when he thinks through the epistemic slighting that renders Black/Indigenous epistemic positions as mute. Kumalo argues, "the ontologies of Blackness, specifically, are made unattainable owing to how they are framed as mythological and fictitious through the denial of Indigenous epistemic frameworks. This denial is envisaged in the continued imposition of colonial languages as a mode of instruction in the academe" (2018a: 4). To speak to a broader context, it is not merely the languages of instruction that are at issue here, for as Dotson (2011) has showcased the challenge that non-traditional subjects of Philosophy face, is that of their work being questioned as to its suitability within the discipline.

Supporting this position, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) suggests the project of "rethinking thinking" as a mode of grappling with the imposed silences that 'abject the epistemic contribution' of Blackness/Indigeneity (Kumalo, 2018a). Using Garfield and van Norden's (2016) work, Graneß (2018) highlights that "those departments at universities and colleges that ignore the need for greater diversity ought to be called what they actually are, 'Departments of European and American Philosophy'" (2018: 34). The position developed by Graneß might lead us to take seriously what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) suggests when he maintains that we ought to rethink thinking if we are to reach the desired goal of reimagining the disciplinary domains. This demand reveals the politics of the discipline or what Grosfoguel (2013) terms 'the structure of knowledge in the westernised university' – a revelation routinely 'justified' (in

order to allow it to remain concealed) through arguing that "[t]he western philosophical canon formed the foundation of our concepts of human rights, civil liberties, and government. As such, it deserves our focus and priority, especially for undergrads" (Graneß, 2018: 34).

However, Douzinas (2013) cautions us against the uncritical acceptance of categories that have been used historically and contemporarily as modes of justifying the exclusion of some from the enjoyment of political liberties that secure the propitious conditions for philosophising by the 'pure' philosopher. This formulation confronts canon formation as a constitutive part in the perpetuation of epistemic injustices in the discipline. Dealing systematically with this reality recentres the political significance of thought which means; questioning the 'content' or 'canon' of Philosophy which ultimately reveals the geography of reason and dissent in the discipline. Simply put – canon formation allows us to consider the knowledge and experiences that are considered to have epistemic merit or warrant inclusion in the discipline. This presents the second consideration i.e. interrogating the material conditions of possibility, and by material conditions I mean the socio-historic and socio-economic conditions that inform the experiences considered to have epistemic merit. Essentially then, the experiential knowledge which denotes/encodes epistemic access – through including specific knowledge systems in the canon – and the material conditions, both inform canon formation. This claim is rooted in the work of Martin (1992: 45) wherein he details the power dynamics at play in epistemic practices by arguing that,

> [h]owever, if Africanism is understood as the wish, academic or journalistic, to report the continent in a double unity – it is one, it is unique – that is, to isolate it within specificities that are attributed […] in order to create a unity that is artificially reinforced by the generalising temptation to infer general facts from the imperfect knowledge of local phenomena [we run the risk of further perpetuating epistemic injustices].

Martin's (1992) concern specifically as it relates to writing about Africa and its people, signifies the encoding processes of canon formation and the imposed deformations and distortions of particular knowledge frameworks, in line with the desire to conceal the politics of Philosophy as a discipline. Kumalo (2018a) corroborates this notion by showcasing how the obsession of philosophy with objective 'truth'[2] leads to the erasure and silencing of epistemic positions that exist at the margins. This is not to say that there are no *a priori* truths about knowledge and to read my argument in this regard would be to miss the point completely. Rather, I suggest that notions of objective 'truth' as critiqued by Jullien and Lloyd (2002) should be understood as acting in consort with colonial thinking that structures the canon in the discipline and in the University more broadly.

These modes of representing the knowledge of African peoples (as fictitious and mythological) has been accompanied, in many instances, by misrepresentations that frame Africa as ahistorical and incapable of a knowledge contribution witnessed from other regions of the world in the global trajectory of human development. To this end, Outlaw (2018) points out how the enlightenment agenda of European modernity employed the most erudite of European society in disqualifying entire peoples from the historical trajectory that has led to the contemporary social make-up. This obsession with truth, and a truth defined by western epistemic traditions, erases African people from history, therefore substantiating the move to enculturate the natives using European standards of culture through the University that acts as the bastion of cultural reproductions. Martin (1992: 45-6) clarifies this by echoing Outlaw's (2018) suggestion when he argues that Africa,

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[2] With regards to the notion of truth, it is useful to note that this is a category that excludes any knowledge that may contest claims to truth from an alternative perspective. To put it crudely, truth, is truth only insofar as it is developed by European thinkers.

> Like all other parts of the planet, […] has lived in open communication to the outside, in relationship of interaction – be that peaceful, conflict laden, dramatic or hateful – which implied both its transformation through foreign contributions and interventions as well as its influence on the societies with which it had contact.

Martin (1992) problematises an Africanism that conceals the dynamism that characterised epistemic interchange between Africa and other parts of the world. This relegation of African knowledge to the dumpsites of world knowledge and history is rooted in the erasures instituted by European modernity as detailed by Outlaw (2018) who makes reference to the works of Kant, Hume, Heidegger and Locke. Resultantly, Africanism is framed by Martin (1992) as stressing "alleged characteristics or evades the confrontation of [the results of said interchange]. It makes of Africa, a closed universe, an incomparable world that in its most pessimistic versions is doomed." These modes of writing about the African continent and its people, reveals the power dynamics at play in the epistemic practices and exchanges that subsequently inform the knowledge systems that constitute the canon formation processes in the discipline. It is useful here to recall Fricker's (2007) suggestion that in order for us to understand epistemic justice wholly, we have to consider the power relations that exist between social agents.

Martin's (1992) position is substantiated by Nyoka (2013) who laments the nature of social theory and its generation in South Africa. Nyoka contends that "Sociology, quite like Philosophy, is said to be characterised by critical self-awareness. That is to say, sociologists do not only write about societies, which are the objects of their enquiry; they tend also to write about the discipline self-consciously as sociologists" (2013: 2). In his critique of social theory, Nyoka argues, using the work of Syed Farid Alatas (2003: 600) that, "[t]o the extent that the control and management of the colonised required the cultivation and application of various disciplines such as history, linguistics, geography, economics, sociology and anthropology in

the colonies, we may refer to the academe as imperialistic." It is important to note how deep this imperialism goes, as Nyoka uses Zeleza (1997: ii) to argue that, "[s]o ubiquitous [were the self-referential modes of writing about Africa in the Northern academe] that 'each generation [of western scholars] produced its Livingstones who rediscovered Africa through the prevailing epistemological fad. Thus, Africa always appeared as nothing more than a testing site for theories manufactured in the Western academies' (Zeleza 1997: ii). Nyoka (2013) and Martin (1992) both highlight the epistemic practices that encode canon formation of the discipline, thus showcasing the politics of the discipline.

These strategies reinforce the standards by which Africa is included or excluded in what constitutes the canon. This ahistorical and apolitical slant that elides the politics the of the discipline is contested by decolonial philosophers, requiring that we reveal the politics of philosophy. Martin (1992) and Nyoka (2013) are further useful as they illuminate the double tension of epistemic access/exclusion, which rests on the epistemic practices of Philosophy as discipline. Revealing the epistemic practices of the discipline initiates the interrogation of its politics, which are denied by a framework of the discipline as a second order discipline, thus removing it from the realm of the political. Simply put, canon formation is constitutive of deliberate, politically motivated exclusions and inclusions.

Exclusion of non-western epistemic traditions is derived from the debate that has been highlighted using Nyoka (2013) and Martin (1992), who suggest the social practices of the discipline, that reveal the politics of Philosophy. Furthermore, it is necessary to look to the implications of the exclusion of African epistemic traditions from the teaching of Philosophy in the contemporary University, specifically in the South African context that is being defined by decolonisation. To this end, "those departments at universities and colleges that ignore the need for a greater diversity ought to be called what they actually are, 'Departments of European and American Philosophy'" (Graneß, 2018: 34).

A failure to reveal the loci of enunciation of Philosophy by appealing to the absolute, reveals the politics of Philosophy that cower behind the point-zero position (Grosfoguel, 2007), and conceals the epistemic practices of the discipline which encode canon formation. To conceal the political is derived from the notion that "[t]he western philosophical canon formed the foundation of our concepts of human rights, civil liberties, and government. As such, it deserves our focus and priority, especially for undergrads", a claim challenged by Graneß (2018: 34). In an African context, (Nyoka, 2013: 7) that "has been written by South African sociologists [and] consists mainly in 'borrowings' i.e. applying uncritically western theories to African conditions", wherein there exist European philosophy departments that are also defined by 'borrowings' and one would further state -impositions-, it becomes clear why calls for decolonisation have been so prominent.   Centring western thought, through European Philosophy departments on the African continent, substantiates the claim that the epistemic practices of the discipline attempt to conceal its politics while excluding African thought from the canon centring the claim that "Philosophy traditions of non-European origin are only marginally taught" (Graneß, 2018: 34).

Lebakeng et al. (2006: 70) argue that "[t]he higher education institutional cultures which have been spawned through epistemicide at universities in South Africa perpetuate epistemological injustice and, therefore, their retention is unjustified both ethically and politically." This contention substantiates the claim that presses at the political significance of thought as suggested by Arendt (1994), while illuminating how we ought to understand the material conditions of possibility in the contemporary University and subsequently in the discipline of philosophy; a point to which I will return in the following section of my analysis.

However, what is meant by the notion of 'institutional cultures, spawned through epistemicide' (Lebakeng et al., 2006: 70)? It is important to quote Lebakeng et al. (2006) at length here; they maintain that

As part of structural transformation and mergers, universities changed their mission and vision statements to appear more politically correct. This was intended to provide an intellectual focus and a sense of a 'new' identity for the institutions. Among these can be mentioned self-descriptors such as 'premier university of African scholarship', 'first class African university' and 'world class African university'. Despite such self-descriptors which imply a relationship between the university and the African continent, there has been no visible transformation of institutional cultures to reflect such a relationship (2006: 70-1).

Furthermore, "this Eurocentric attitude simultaneously valorised and affirmed western epistemology and absolved it from its existential and epistemological violence against indigenous epistemology" (Lebakeng, et al., 2006: 71). Lebakeng et al. (2006) here are in concord with Graneß when she argues that "[t]he presupposed concept of philosophy – which varies according to time and place – is decisive with respect to who (which thinkers) and what (which theories, concepts and categories) will be included in or excluded from the narrative of the history of philosophy" (2018: 35). Philosophy in South Africa has been defined by Eurocentric attitudes owing to the preponderance of white intellectuals who view the South African University as an institution situated in Hull, Manchester, London or Paris (Lebakeng et al., 2006). Lebakeng et al. (2006) point to the denial, erasure and systematic silencing of African epistemic positions in our context. Epistemic erasure is rooted in the thinking of western colonial incursion which assumed that a higher education system that was fitting for the European in Hull, Manchester, and London would also be fitting for Africans reared in Kumasi, Kampala and Legos (Lebakeng, et al., 2006). This transposition of knowledge that was accompanied by the erasure of indigenous epistemologies "[o]ften […] does not speak to the experiences of learners since the curriculum does not reflect the philosophical, social and technological realities of their environment" (Lebakeng et al., 2006: 74). Quoting from Ramose

(1999), Lebakeng et al. (2006: 74) contend that "despite the pervasive philosophic racism in the philosophies of such philosophers as Locke, Hume, Kant and Hegel, indigenous African learners in philosophy were (and still are) treated to an overdose of the epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of history and even the philosophy of religion and law of these and other [w]estern philosophers."

This brief historical exposition highlighting the epistemic harms of colonial imposition, was challenged by the students during the #MustFall movements. The demand from students was that they be granted epistemic access through decolonised education and material access, framed as the call for *fee free* decolonised education. *Fee free* education points to the material conditions of possibility, which denote that which is included and excluded from the institutional framework. This line of thought/inquiry interrogates the politics of Philosophy and thus requires a considered analysis of the material conditions of possibility within the institutional framework of Philosophy as discipline and the South African academe. To deal with this second tension, I focus on the factors that facilitate epistemic access i.e. financial access, language of instruction and institutional cultures.

3.2.2 The Material Conditions of Possibility

On the first of the three factors that I will be dealing with, Anderson's (2002) *Building a People's University in South Africa: Race, Compensatory Education, and the Limits of Democratic Reform*, is useful. The University of the Western Cape in the 1980s gives us some insight into the historicity of the financial access debate that was rearticulated as the demand for *fee free* education by the #Fallist movements three decades later. This demand is best captured through its outcomes that culminated in the announcement by the former president of South Africa, Gedleyihlekisa J. Zuma, who on the 16th of December 2016 as reported by Van

Rensburg and Fengu[3] (2016) announced *fee free* education across all public institutions of higher learning in the country. However, one must frame this announcement within its historical specificities. President Zuma announced the fee moratorium after a turbulent year that saw institutions of higher learning rocked by violence and damage to institutional property owing to student protests across the country.

The protests sought to assert the place of Blackness in the country of their forebears, where Blackness/Indigeneity has constantly occupied the role of second-class citizen[4], as stated by Simpson (2015), who in describing the character of John Cecil Rhodes writes, "[h]e [Rhodes] wasn't a nice man, even by the standards of the time. Outspokenly racist and imperialist, he could sometimes sound Hitlerian: 'Just fancy those parts [of Africa] that are at present inhabited by the most despicable specimens of human beings – what an alteration there would be if they were brought under Anglo-Saxon influence![5]'." The reader, might here be reminded of the argument developed in the previous chapter, which considered the European University as complicit in the colonial project of imperialism.

It was on the basis of this reality that the student body demanded access to institutions of higher learning, which would also account for the historical injustice that had been endured by Blackness/Indigeneity as suggested by Simpson's (2015) description of Rhodes. However, more than this, the declaration by the former president was premised on the desire to quell the violence that was witnessed between institutions and students.

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[3] For more details on this issue, see the link (https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zumas-fee-free-chaos-20180107-2).
[4] The debate on the second-class citizenship status of Blackness, specifically in institutions of higher learning in South Africa which culminated in the #MustFall movement is best articulated by the work of Simpson in his analysis of the origins of the debate as it developed in the country. See https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2015/11/rhodes-must-fall-chants-crowd-bringing-down-imperialists-s-statue-won-t-change
[5] https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2015/11/rhodes-must-fall-chants-crowd-bringing-down-imperialist-s-statue-won-t-change

Malgas and Koyana[6] (2015) suggest that the issues that fuelled the #MustFall movement, were both political and historical owing to the second-class citizenship status of Blackness in the country, but more pressingly, the protests were further driven by the desire for the recognition of the ontological legitimacy of Blackness. They write, "[a]mong their grievances in a memorandum to the institution, students are calling for residence fees to be reviewed and for student debt and outsourcing to be scrapped" (Malgas and Koyana, 2015). Due to the nature of their protests, students highlighted considerable debates that had been muffled by a number of coalescing forces in the sector. Amongst these were the issue of language and the continued use of what students saw as languages of colonialism and oppression. Writing about the protests which were dubbed #AfrikaansMustFall at institutions such as the University of Pretoria, the University of the Free State and Stellenbosch University, Graham (2019: 354) argues that,

> The movement was portrayed as being anti-Afrikaans but that is not an accurate characterisation. Although students challenged the utilization of Afrikaans as a language of tuition and communication their opposition to the language was in fact an opposition to what the language stands for within the institution, which is racial segregation and white privilege.

Using the work of Pavlenko and Blackledge (2002), Kapp and Bangeni (2011: 199) make the argument that language and its uses in higher education institutions cannot be divorced from identity and power in society. In challenging the use of Afrikaans in HWUs, but more specifically – traditionally Afrikaans speaking universities, the #Fallist movements were demanding epistemic access as well as ontological recognition. It is useful to recount the issues raised under the consideration of the conditions of possibility in the academe. First, students took issue with fee increases in the sector, which resulted in the call for *fee free* higher

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[6] See https://ewn.co.za/2015/11/12/UWC-gets-ultimatum-as-protests-continue-into-the-night

education. Second, were the issues of insourcing and residence accommodation fees. Third, was the issue of language in HWIs. To frame these three components, in the meantime, as indicative of the desire for ontological recognition is linked to the argument that frames these issues as hermeneutical injustices. These issues are also telling of those who are seen by the University and are therefore reflected by and through institutional cultures.

Epistemic access and ontological recognition are further tied to the curriculum that is taught within the university sector and who teaches this curriculum. The link between these elements is specified when one considers how the curriculum reflects the lived realities of those who occupy the role of students in the contemporary University. This suggests that those whose lives and experiences are reflected are those who we can assume are seen; both ontologically and in the epistemic sense. As students demanded *fee free* decolonised education under the banner of the #MustFall movement, they were challenging the epistemic injustices maintained through modes of institutional gate-keeping that continue to peripherise Blackness/Indigeneity. On the question of who gets to teach, as will become evident in the fifth chapter, student's further challenged the racial demographics that continue to define the higher education landscape of the country. Kapp and Bangeni (2011) documented the lived experiences of students who were oscillating between the institutional identity and their home identity, what Boughey and McKenna (2016) call the decontextualised learner and Kumalo frames as the *Native of Nowhere* (2018a). Kapp and Bangeni argue that "[i]n Bhabha's terms, our students had become 'unhomed', [which suggests] the sense of occupying an ambivalent space, of 'being in two places at once'" (2011: 202). This experience is facilitated by curricula taught as it reinforces the identities that are made to feel a sense of belonging and those that are erased. Boughey and McKenna's (2016) description of the decontextualised learner is useful. They suggest that this mode of being is created by the prescription of wrong remedies to the supposed

deficits in the learning experiences of students. These out of step solutions that have historically and contemporarily misread the Black student lead to the creation of the *Native of Nowhere*.

Kumalo (2018a) describes the *Native of Nowhere* as a student who can neither identify with their own epistemic traditions owing to the reality that they have been unhomed as detailed by Kapp and Bangeni (2011) nor can they identify with the identity of the colonial descendant owing to the reality that they are not a colonial descendant. Furthermore, not only do these students fall outside of the identity created and curated for and by colonial descendants they are further reminded of their lack of belonging. McKenna, Madiba, Bokana, Bozalek, Sabata, Scott and Waghid (2016: 143) maintain that "the form of disciplinary knowledge may vary from the more subjective and contentious to the more objective and broadly accepted, but teaching and learning remain highly political acts across all institutions." McKenna et al. (2016) point to the kernel of the issues that were raised by the student body of #MustFall who were making the demand that they be seen in the HWI. These factors; financial exclusion, the use of languages which are framed as oppressive, and the selective curricular taught showcases *the sociality of the epistemic practices* of the University. McKenna et al. (2016) highlight these politics by suggesting that "teaching and learning are highly political", which substantiates Fricker's (2007) argument, that we ought to view our approaches to epistemic justice from a perspective that takes seriously the role of social agents and the power dynamics that define their relationality to one another. Furthermore, this sociality, which reveals the second tension in relation to the doubly charged position from which the decolonial philosopher speaks, works in tandem with the first tension defined as the selective processes that inform canon formation. These selective processes showcase the political charge that is constitutive of the project of teaching and learning as suggested by McKenna et al. (2016) as well as Standish (2003). Canon formation, working in consort with *the sociality of the epistemic practices* of the University and in turn the discipline, defines the doubly charged tension.

The doubly charged tension is significant in the problem that it presents when dealing with the project of developing a framework of justice from a position concerned with authentic justice. The challenge arises when we use Fricker's notion of epistemic justice which is premised on a communally "shared ethical intuition" (2007: 5). A communally shared ethical intuition illuminates how we understand "[a]ny claim of injustice [which] must rely on [said intuition]" (Fricker, 2007: 5), which – it can be argued – does not exist in the case of the South African philosophical community, and in the broader community of the University. The second point rests on the literature which has to date, called for the decolonisation of the contemporary institutional framework of higher education institutions across the country.

Both the critique of *the sociality of epistemic practice* and the task of developing a contextually responsive conception of epistemic justice, which responds to Fricker's (2007) theory, require a detailed exposition of these components that have played out in the South African context. I do this through an invocation of SEK Mqhayi's (1914) *Ityala Lamawele*. An analysis based on uMqhayi's work sets-up the conceptual schema for a contextually responsive conception of epistemic justice. In detailing the experiences, included in the encoding processes of canon formation, we are invited to consider the material conditions of possibility which are subsequently included or excluded from the canon. Principally, understanding canon formation along with conditions of possibility foregrounds knowledge as political which is expressed as *the sociality of epistemic practices* in Philosophy as discipline.

3.3 Illustrating Epistemic Injustice in South Africa

The sociality of epistemic practice homes in on Fricker's (2007: vii) main argument that traces "epistemic practices as they are, of necessity, played out by subjects that are socially situated." If, as I have argued, the double 'burden' of decolonial Philosophy consists in politicising

(political) Philosophy both in terms of content and practice, the 'decolonisation of Philosophy' requires elaborations on what 'the sociality of philosophy as epistemic practice' means.

What in the general literature on decoloniality is often referred to as 'epistemicide' (De Sousa Santos, 2016; Grosfolguel, 2007 and 2013; Lebakeng et al., 2006; Mignolo, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi, 2016) Fricker terms 'testimonial injustice' because the African knower was prejudiced against, owing to the claim that their modes of knowledge is fictitious and mythological. An example of this would be uMqhayi's *Ityala Lamawele* (1914). U-Mqhayi writes:

> *Kweli balana ndizama ukubonisa imigudu… nexesha elithatyathwayo ngamaXhosa xa [elandela] umthetho, kuba kaloku kuzanyelwa ukuba uzekelwe kwisibakala esakhe saakho. Ndizama nokubonisa ukuba inkosi asinguyena mgqibi wezinto yedwa, nje ngoko izizwe ziba zona kunjalo kuthi. Intetho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zase Ntshona-langa* (1914: v).[iii]

U-Mqhayi (1914: v) claims that "*[i]ntentho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zaseNtshona-langa*" suggesting an epistemic colonial imposition, but what does this claim tell us about the nature of the wrong inflicted? In these introductory words, uMqhayi (1914) laments, at the end of the nineteenth century, and foretells at the beginning of the twentieth century the epistemic erasure of Xhosa cosmology owing to colonial domination. This reveals the first move that is constitutive of what some decolonial scholars have termed epistemicide. In this formulation the reader is privy to the moves that erase Black/Indigenous modes of knowing in order to substantiate that Black/Indigenous beings were always lacking vis-à-vis coherent knowledge systems. U-Mqhayi's scholarship is also telling inasmuch as it heralds the debate addressed by Fricker

(2007) in her theory on epistemic injustice. As early as the twentieth century uMqhayi raised the question of an ethics of knowing and pointed to the importance of knowledge systems as they are subordinated due to the power relations that social agents and their relationality to one another. To further elaborate, uMqhayi's historical account of *Imfazwe yamaLinde* is useful,

> *Ngemfazwe yama Linde eyayingo 1818 pakati ko Ngqika no Ndlambe, imikhosi ka Ngqika yayipetwe ngu Maqoma lo ese lirwala. Acitwa kwamdaka ama Ngqika akalipe kunene, aye ecitwa yinkungu nelanga yakwa Ndlambe, kudibene zonke izizwe zasema Xoseni; wabhungca elijaja ngamanxeba ezikhali no-Maqoma lowo. Kukuze kufe u-Jotelo uyise ka Soga, no-Nteyi uyise ka Tyala, no-Ntlukwana uyise ka Neku, amagora ka Ngqika. Kukuze ke uNgqika aye kuhlabela eyomlungu, ize kumnceda, ize ke yona izisikele ilizwekazi elukulu ukuzivuza, imise i-Ngqakayi isiti yenza ukumgcina u-Ngqika.*[iv] ([1917]/2001: 125)

This historical account highlights the second move that is constitutive of the epistemic slighting that leads to the claim of epistemicide. This second move is constitutive of the theft of land, artefacts and cattle, to mention a few components. Substantiating this claim Msimang's (2018) analysis when she discusses the life of Winnifred Nomzamo Madikizela-Mandela is useful. Msimang writes,

> When the 1820 settlers arrive, the pressure on the Xhosa communities accelerates. No longer simply fending off the Boers, they are now confronted with a massive influx of new British farmers who have been given the lands on which their cattle have grazed and their people have lived for centuries (2018: 37).

Msimgang notes the aftermaths of u-Ngqika's decision to implore aid from the white man, as discussed by u-Mqhayi (1917). The challenge that arises out of the historical interplay between amaXhosa and the white settler, in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, points to what I consider

to be the constitutive parts of the epistemic injustices perpetrated by whiteness in our context. This is not the only aspect that we need to take heed of, as it is merely a constitutive part of epistemic injustice. Further to this is the physical erasure that ensues as whiteness clears the area of colonisation as a mode of imposing its knowing and being; a matter that is lamented by uMqhayi.

Understanding the wrong/harm inflicted (as per the requirements in accordance with Fricker's theory) requires nuance that is only possible through acknowledging historical accounts. Epistemic erasure as used here denotes the physical erasure, illustrated by uMqhay's contextual framing when he writes "*[e]li tyala lalithethelwa eGcuwa, kulendawo inendlu yenkonzo yabantsundu baseWesile ngoku, apho yayikhona iNkundla yaKomkhulu*"[v] (1914: vii). Further to the physical erasure that denotes a wrong "in a capacity essential to human value", (Fricker, 2007: 44) which culminates in suffering an intrinsic injustice, the concept of epistemic erasure, denotes the erasure of knowledge systems. Erasure of knowledge systems is detailed through uMqhayi's contention that "*[i]intlanga eziMhlophe zithe zakufika kweli lizwe zafumana ukuba abantu [...] baphanse ukuba ziincutshe zomthetho bonke, namasiko abo asekwe phezu kwezibakala, baze ke bacunstula nabo kanobomi kuloo masiko*"[vi] (1914: v). To substantiate, I turn to the descriptions of arbitration systems used by uMaqoma. uMqhayi writes,

> *Izizwe ezimaziyo u Maqoma, ezimhlope nezintsundu, zivumelene ukuba ubeganele kuba likalipa negora emfazweni kodwa: koko ube kwaliciko elikulu ekuteteni, incutshe ngokupengulula inyaniso, ayifumane pakati kwe mfungumfungu enkulu yenkohliso, nobuxoki, nogqweto olukulu lwenyaniso. [...] Ityala kwinkundla ka Maqoma belitabata ituba elinobom, likolisa ngokuvavanywa nje liyekwe, lipindwe ngomnye umhla, libuye liyekwe, zide inyaniso zidandalaze, amazwi apindapindiwe, ngokunjalo imibuzo kwa nempendulo zayo*[vii] ([1917]/2001: 129)

U-Mqhayi's (1914) assertions, with respect to physical erasures, vividly showcase what is meant by the notion of epistemic erasure, which rests on physical erasure, colonial incursion, and the theft which accompanied said erasure. This point is further detailed by the work of Zakes Mda (2000) when he writes of *The Heart of Redness*. Kumalo's (2018b: 209) analysis of the novel, makes reference to an aphorism in the isiZulu language, when he writes "*impi ise sendini*"[7].

According to Fricker a testimonial injustice -which is not only confined to testimony- is only understood as a testimonial injustice in relation to its ethical blameworthiness. U-Mqhayi's claim of physical erasure owing to colonial incursion, "*apho [kwakukhona] iNkundla yaKomkhulu*"[viii] (1914: vii), which is substantiated by his previous claim, "*[i]ntentho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zaseNtshona-langa*"[ix] (1914: v) clearly demonstrates ethical culpability through dispossession. Ethical culpability in these acts of erasure, is evidenced in the claim of physical erasure "*apho yayikhona iNkundla yaKomkhulu*"[x] (1914: vii) and the actions of colonial settlers who undermined the epistemic practices and systems of knowing of Indigenous peoples, specifically amaXhosa showcased in the claim "*[i]ntentho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zaseNtshona-langa*"[xi] (1914: v).

U-Mqhayi's (1914) work in foretelling epistemic erasure in the nineteenth/twentieth century marked the continuing struggle against narratives that frame Indigenous Knowledge Systems as deficient and lacking on the false presupposition of white supremacist ideology expressed in the point-zero position detailed by Grosfoguel (2007) and substantiated by Arendt (1994) through the philosophers claim to the absolute. This ethical blameworthiness invites analyses that seek to understand the epistemic erasures documented by uMqhayi (1914).

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[7] For a translation of this aphorism, see the work of Kumalo, S.H., 2018. 'Defining an African Vocabulary for the Exploration of Possibilities in Higher Education'. *Alternation*, 23: 197-223.

The preceding claim that contextually frames the narrative developed in *Ityala Lamawele*, "*[i]intlanga eziMhlophe zithe zakufika kweli lizwe zafumana ukuba abantu [...] baphanse ukuba ziincutshe zomthetho bonke, namasiko abo asekwe phezu kwezibakala, baze ke bacunstula nabo kanobomi kuloo masiko*"[xii] (1914: v) contextually and historically substantiates Grosfoguel's (2007) argument of the point-zero perspectives adopted by Eurocentric philosophies, in South Africa. To understand this better, consider uMqhayi when he writes "*bacunstula [...] kanobomi kuloo masiko*"[xiii] (Mqhayi, 1914: v). The point zero perspectives that steal from and conceal the origins of indigenous knowledge while claiming said knowledge as their own was contested by uMqhayi (1914) and surfaces one of the constitutive components of epistemic injustice. The question posed by uMqhayi, "*[kuyanyanzeleka uba um]lisela nomthinjana wasemaXhoseni [a]khangele ngokucokisekileyo ukuba iya kuthi, yakutshonela iphele le ntetho nale mikhwa inesidima yakowawo, kutshonele nto ni na emveni koko*"[xiv] (1914: v), challenges the epistemic harms of Eurocentric perspectives while foretelling the systematic testimonial injustice witnessed all to today. To maintain that Fricker's (2007) project was foreshadowed by uMqhayi as early as the twentieth century, the question from which uMqhayi begins his analysis is useful for the purposes of the argument presented here. With the systematic erasure of ways of knowing and the imposition of western modernity, what is referred to as coloniality in the scholarship of Tlostanova and Mignolo (2009), it is necessary to consider what else has been lost in the South African context owing to colonial incursion. Kumalo (2018b) deals with this question in seriatim, advocating curricula that is locally responsive and globally relevant, using the Black Archive. According to Fricker, systematic testimonial injustices are "prejudices that track the subject through different dimensions of social activity – economic, educational, professional […] and so on" (2007: 27). U-Mqhayi's (1914) question subsequently suggests the systematic testimonial injustices that came with the epistemic erasure of Xhosa cosmology.

However, argues Fricker, "[a]ny claim of injustice must rely on a shared ethical intuition, [as we better understand] why something constitutes an injustice if we can analyse the nature of the wrong inflicted" (2007: 5). A shared ethical intuition suggests an intellectual sociality that has endured or perpetrated injustices. According to Fricker (2007: 5) epistemic injustices are therefore better grasped by analysing the kind of wrong inflicted. The analysis presented highlights the wrong inflicted through a detailed and systematic analysis of the constitutive parts of epistemic injustice that endure to the contemporary day in the University. This is as the contemporary University, and by association Philosophy as discipline, have failed to confront their complicity in these systems of injustice. Two components detailed above, canon formation and the conditions of possibility that allow for the claims of epistemic injustice to either be thwarted or to be articulated, highlight *the sociality of epistemic practices* – as they relate to the knowledge project globally. U-Mqhayi (1914; 1917) therefore, highlights how these components have worked and continue to work synchronously to fashion epistemic injustices against the Black/Indigenous subject.

Epistemic slighting of the colonised subject, in the case of this analysis – Xhosa peoples, rests on two aspects that define colonial settler descendant futures; the presupposition of whiteness as intellectually superior. The notion of the superiority of western epistemic traditions is premised on the point-zero perspective as argued by Grosfoguel (2007). Indigenous knowledges are reduced to fragmented systems of knowledge[8] as a result of this presupposition. The fragmentation of indigenous knowledges facilitates and heralds the second characteristic of colonial settler descendant futures which is the theft of indigenous knowledges and concealing the origins of the knowledge proclaimed as Eurocentric invention. This

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[8] The fragmentation of systems of knowledge and ways of being in our context is detailed substantially by Yvette Abrahams in 'Colonialism, dysfunction and disjuncture: Sarah Bartmann's resistance (remix)'. In the analysis, Abrahams traces the discontinuities which were wrought by colonialism on the indigenous people of South Africa, she does this by way of looking at the case of Sarah Bartmaan and her being dislodged from her community owing to whiteness advancing colonialism/civilisation. The text explicitly reveals both the structural and agential identity power, which culminated in the systematic attempt at the erasure of epistemic frameworks of indigenous peoples.

phenomenon is described by uMqhayi's contention that "*[abaseNtshona-langa] nabo baze ke bacunstula kanobomi kuloo masiko*"[xv] (1914: v). The interface of these two characteristics showcases the agential and structural identity power that innately impacts the credibility judgement that the hearer affords the speaker (Fricker, 2007: 91). In these unequal epistemic relations derived from structural and agential identity power arises the need for the epistemic virtues developed by Fricker (2007). These virtues denote a form of epistemic reflexivity that curates a just interaction between the speaker and the hearer regardless of the identity power that each bring to the epistemic exchange.

There is, however, a shortfall with the epistemic virtue model developed by Fricker (2007) as it is fundamentally premised on virtue ethics leaning on an ethical economy of duty. I will detail this in the following chapter.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the structural and agential identity power that shapes and influences the institutional arrangements of Philosophy as discipline, which sustains epistemic injustices against Indigenous epistemes. Analysing two components of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, showcased *the sociality of epistemic practice*. However, as Fricker (2007) suggests, we can only come to speak of epistemic injustice only after having established a shared ethical intuition. As the argument indicated, in South Africa we lack a shared ethical intuition on the premise of historical realities.

Explicating the intricacies that frame these epistemic injustices lay in setting-up the framework for articulating a refined model of epistemic justice that recognises the relationality between Indigeneity and colonial descendant futures, subsequently necessitating an *obligatory* framework of epistemic restitution. The notion of epistemic restitution will be dealt with in the following chapter. As this chapter highlighted epistemic injustices that define Philosophy as

discipline for the purposes of articulating a refined model of epistemic justice, in what follows I begin by making the case that what we see in the South African context is not epistemicide, but rather systematic attempted epistemic erasure. I make this claim by revealing that the 'Black Archive' (Kumalo, 2018b) plays an effective role in articulating a refined model of epistemic justice that is locally responsive.

Fricker (2007: 1) describes her task as bringing "to light certain ethical aspects of… two epistemic practices [the first being] conveying knowledge to others by telling … and [the second aspect being] making sense of our own social experiences." The ethical dimensions in Fricker's project arise from "the operation of social power in epistemic interactions, [which] expose a politics of epistemic practice" (2007: 1-2), a politics that has been detailed in this chapter, specifically using uMqhayi's (1914; 1917) arguments. The concept of a 'politics of epistemic practice' combines two aspects of the argument advanced in the previous chapter: firstly, it confirms the *general* political significance of thought; secondly, and of particular concern to the decolonial philosopher, it makes visible the 'point-zero' perspectives of Eurocentric philosophy(ies). With regard to the first, Fricker suggests that "confining oneself to [a highly abstracted conception of human subjects] restricts the sort of philosophical questions and insights one can come up with" (2007: 3). Through the argument developed in the previous chapter as well as in this chapter, I demonstrate what Fricker (2007) means by this. As a response to this limitation, Fricker (2007: 4) suggests that we ought to start from "the socially situated conception of the epistemic agents, [which] allows us to trace the interdependencies of power, reason and epistemic authority." Doing this gives us insight into *the sociality of an epistemic practice*, which she defines as individuals forming social cooperatives that sanction permissible action, while highlighting the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices both at an individual level as well as from the perspective of disciplinary knowledge and canon formation. Understood in this way one can argue that the politics of an

epistemic practice give rise to the kind of ethical injustices that harm the speaker "in their capacity as a knower" (2007: 1).

Chapter 4

Exacerbating the Perfect Storm through the Claim of Epistemicide

4.1 Introduction

This chapter considers by way of critique, how the 'Perfect Storm' (Antony, 2012) is exacerbated by the claim of epistemicide in our context[1]. Presenting the analysis by way of critique, suggests surfacing the components that are constitutive of the Perfect Storm which are defined by Antony as "convergence, interactions, and intensification" (2012: 234), while further indicating how these play into the continued relegation of Black/Indigenous knowledge(s) owing to the claim of epistemicide. The analysis begins by contesting the notion of epistemicide in the South African context. While acknowledging historical epistemic slighting, the aim is to defend the claim that our context was not subjected to epistemicide but rather systematic attempted epistemic erasure that was and continues to be unsuccessful. This is not to say that there aren't a number of interacting factors, as per the argument developed by Antony (2012), but rather to showcase that the claim does more to erase and intensify attrition from the discipline than ameliorate it. Simply put, the notion of epistemicide plays into the challenges that continue to plague Philosophy as discipline, as opposed to aiding the case of those who are making it.

The South African context, owing to historical injustices, is defined by the Black Archive. In dispelling the myth of epistemicide, the aim is to showcase the systematic attempted erasure that has been unsuccessful owing to the place of language. Language allows the contemporary scholar the capacity to access the Black Archive, which is constitutive of the works of

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[1] The argument developed in this chapter, subsequently tests the proposition of self-negation and how it plays out as the maintenance of historical realities in Philosophy as discipline, i.e. the continued privileging of knowledge emanating from the north.

Black/Indigenous literato, musicians, poets and artists who continued to think through/about the *Fact* of Blackness even as they were excluded from institutions of knowledge production.

In acknowledging the discontinuities of our context owing to the 'disruptions of colonialism' (Abrahams, 2003), and as Quayson (2002) states it, 'we have always been consigned to responding from the place where we ought not to have been standing', the existence of the Black Archive aids the contemporary scholar to conceptualise the role of epistemic harms in South Africa[2]. While these might have been inflicted from as early as the seventeenth century as detailed by Coetzee (1988) in *White Writing: The Culture of Letters in South Africa*, these epistemic harms have not been as successful as detailed by some scholars who claim epistemicide. Consider the work of (Lebakeng et al, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015 and Ramose, 2004) who have made this claim. This is to say that the claim of epistemicide is a misnomer, contextually. This proposition comes from the knowledge that remains untapped by the HWI in our context[3]. By inviting[4] this knowledge into the contemporary University, intellectuals and scholars unlock the potential of thinking critically about the question of epistemic justice and restitution. However, the possibilities of epistemic restitution are annulled owing to the lack of a shared ethical intuition; a point that is substantiated by the fallout between the PSSA and Azanian Philosophical Society in the 2017 academic year. This point demonstrates once again the notion of knowledge as politically and historically situated. This is to say that we cannot

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[2] The reader will note the different formulation in my work from the standard accepted notion of 'epistemic violence'. Cognisant of the scholarship from where this formulation comes (see Heleta, 2016; Keet, 2014; Todd, 2016), I am suspicious of using the term epistemic violence, I rather prefer the notion of epistemic harm, as detailed in the scholarship of social epistemologists (see the scholarship of Fricker, 2007; Kvanvig, 2011; Zagzebski,1996).

[3] Appreciating and acknowledging the scholarship of epistemic justice and decoloniality in South Africa, one should caution the brazen claim of epistemicide. This cautionary remark comes as the academe continues to perpetuate erasures through such claims that showcase a slack engagement with the Black Archive and its uses in the University. Furthermore, I acknowledge the scholarship of thinkers working in cognate areas (see Oyèwùmí 1997 and Amadiume, 1987) which has actively brought into the mainstream Black/Indigenous scholarship, however, the Black Archive as constitutive of artists such as Sekoto, Makeba and literato such as Gqoba, Mgqwetho and Mqhayi has received slack uptake by thinkers working in the decolonial tradition in South Africa.

[4] By this is meant the resurrection of the Black Archive in our context. See Kumalo, S.H. 2019a. 'Khawuleza – An Instantiation of the Black Archive'.

begin to make sense of any knowledge claim without understanding its socio-political and socio-historical context. Furthermore, this possibility is reduced to a nonstarter when thinking about the strategies that have been deployed by Black/Indigenous scholars who shore-up the notion of epistemicide in our context. To frame the ideal of epistemic restitution as a nonstarter owing to the claim of epistemicide, I invite the reader to consider the following questions. If indeed Blackness/Indigeneity has been subjected to epistemicide, how then does one undertake the task of epistemic restitution; a call advanced by all working in the decolonial tradition? Moreover, is the task of epistemic restitution subsequently meant to be a form of cultural invention? These questions, in and of themselves, highlight the political as consensus in knowledge and the critique of epistemicide advanced in this chapter.

The second section of this chapter deals with the lack of a shared ethical intuition, and showcases that Fricker's (2007) proposition does little to resolve the contestations of knowledge in our context. I maintain that philosophers lack a shared ethical intuition not only in relation to the colour line/divide, but that more so, amongst decolonialists; those who are invested in resisting epistemic impositions that displace Blackness/Indigeneity. The lack of a shared ethical intuition amongst Black/Indigenous philosophers exacerbates the Perfect Storm, owing to a minimal engagement with the Black Archive, specifically by those philosophers who are claiming epistemicide in South Africa. To be so bold, the claim of epistemicide rests on not having fully engaged the possibilities that lie untapped in the Black Archive. This chapter dispels this myth, and showcases the uses of the Black Archive in working towards epistemic restitution.

In detailing the short falls with Fricker's (2007) theory, for our context, the analysis showcases how the continued silences imposed on the Black Archive lead to self-negation and erasure. The discipline fails to acknowledge knowledge that exists outside the ambits of Philosophy as discipline, resulting in the continued Eurocentric notions that prevail. This reality is contested

using Dotson's (2011) argument in the second chapter, which argues that this arrogance inculcates ignorance and limits the kinds of questions possible. This is to say that in privileging a western-centric and Eurocentric conception of knowledge, one institutes ignorance. Ignorance so construed, is witnessed in our context, as the lack of engagement with the work of literato such as Gqoba, Mgqwetho, and Mqhayi as indicated in footnote 3 above.

In showcasing the shortcomings with Fricker's (2007) proposition, the intention is not to dismiss her contribution, rather the aim is to showcase how the South African context is such that there is no shared ethical intuition. Fricker (2007: 86) suggests the cultivation of virtuous traits in hearers subsequently counteracting the risk of prejudice(s) distorting the perceptions of the hearer. The virtue of testimonial justice, Fricker (2007: 86) argues, examines the "anti-prejudicial current that the virtuous hearer's sensibility needs to contain in order" for the hearer to steer clear of committing further testimonial injustices against the speaker. Fricker subsequently inquires of "the critical awareness needed for a hearer to be able to correct for identity prejudice in a given credibility judgement" (2007: 90). In the example used in the previous chapter, wherein uMqhayi notes that "*[i]ntetho nemikhwa yesiXhosa iyatshona ngokutshona ngenxa yelizwi nokhanyo olukhoyo, oluze nezizwe zase Ntshona-langa*"[xvi] (1914: v), the reader observes epistemic injustices owing to colonial imposition. Furthermore, this credibility deficit is perpetuated by scholars who claim epistemicide in our context. Owing to the sociality of epistemic injustice, with the example used surfacing both the agential and structural operation of identity power (Fricker, 2007: 90), it is useful to carefully read Fricker's suggestion:

> For a hearer to identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgement, they must be alert to the impact not only of the speaker's social identity but also of the impact of their own social identity on their credibility judgement (2007: 91).

In showcasing the shortcomings with Fricker's model the analysis will have to deal with the Perfect Storm that erupted in the philosophical community of the country. The third section of this chapter will detail the Perfect Storm model, setting up a conceptual schema that deals with the problem of epistemic injustice as presented in the fifth chapter.

4.2 Distinguishing between Epistemic Harms and Epistemicide

What is being termed epistemicide is best conceptualised as an attempted epistemic erasure that was unsuccessful. This claim rests on the realities of African identities across the breadth and width of the continent. Language on the continent, substantially restricts the claim of epistemicide. This claim is substantiated by the code-switching evident all throughout this dissertation. Code-switching demonstrates, in a preliminary mode, the potentiality of the Black Archive as inspiring novel considerations of social, political and economic problems; a point that will be fully explicated through a critique of the proposed solutions to epistemic injustice, i.e. the additive and integrative approaches. Code-switching further demonstrates how seemingly "new" questions, have been considered historically albeit in different forms and in varied mediums. Lastly, code-switching demonstrates epistemic justice in praxis; it is only in actioning epistemic justice that its possibilities are realised.

To make the point of a systematically attempted epistemic erasure as opposed to epistemicide, it is useful to begin by analysing Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2015: 493) argument when he writes,

> At another level, the decoloniality articulated here involves re-telling of history of humanity and knowledge from the vantage point of those epistemic sites that received the 'darker side' of modernity, including re-telling the story of knowledge generation as involving borrowings, appropriations, epistemicides, and denials of humanity of other people as part of the story of science.

Re-telling history from the vantage point of those epistemic sites that received the 'darker side' of modernity is interesting in how Ndlovu-Gatsheni seems, in this instance, to be flattening the topography of the peoples of Africa. To demonstrate, consider Kumalo's (2018b) argument wherein he discusses two houses zika Kumalo noMagubane, conceptually framed as dialogically responding to one another. Kumalo contends that, "claiming the innocence that is created by *Inyosi* as he reframes, remembers and re-members history, uMagubane is created as an innocent actor in his nation building project." (2018b: 210). It is useful to clarify remembering and re-membering as used by Kumalo (2018b). In these two instances lies the role of orality as a legitimate knowledge source, that is used as a tool of education inter-generationally. Orality in the case of remembering relays and inflects historical narrative with the names of the men and womxn who were to be remembered and are remembered through izibongo (clan-names). Remembering and memory is the basis from which one can claim an Indigenous identity as the names of one's forebears are inscribed in the landscape, bestowing an 'Adamic language' as detailed by Coetzee (1988) when he writes of a language that is born of the landscape and not imposed on it.

On the second matter, re-membering, Kumalo (2018b) highlights the role of political negotiations in the project of telling these histories. In the analysis below, the name of the Kumalo house as detailed through the actions of uMzilikazi is important. In uMzilikazi's nation building project, izithakazelo celebrate his cruelty; a celebration seen in the claim, *yena omuzi wakhe wagcotshwa ngegazi lesitha sakhe*.[xvii] Remembering and re-membering therefore, is at all possible, owing to language and the capacity of the contemporary Black/Indigenous scholar to recover this knowledge through indigenous language(s). This point is substantiated when Kumalo (2018b: 197) details excavation. He argues that excavation is precisely the processes of unearthing and surfacing aspects of history that have been buried due to colonial impositions

that define African modes of being. Consider the notion of excavation as detailed by Kumalo (2018b: 202) when he writes,

Ngibingelela koNkomose, koJiyane, koNdlandla, wena wakwaMpahle'mhlophe, ingabamnyama yeza nomdlakazi. Ngibingelela oMagubane, oNkomose, oJiyane izithuthwa ezidala, ezahamba lomhlaba, zithungatha zakh'isizwe. Isizwe esakhuluma nezizwe, kaze izikhali babezithathephi? KungezaMantungwa, oMbulaze abamnyama, abaletha ubumnyama beza nomdlakazi. OMabaso, ababas'entabeni ilanga lishona, bebikezela ukuza komDlakazi ngokukhothamisa izizwe zabangesheya koThukela! Isandla sikaMzilikazi esakha isizwe, omuzi wakhe wagcotshwa ngegazi lesitha sikaNdaba. Sikhulekile![5]

Excavation here highlights precisely the act of recalling and re-membering those who inflected history with their actions. This is best demonstrated in the case of uMagubane who is portrayed with childlike innocence, in the assertion "*wena wakwaMpahle'mhlophe, ingabamnyama yeza nomdlakazi*" (Kumalo, 2018b: 202). The telling of history is also seen in how uMzilikazi is framed through the preceding names of "*oMbulaze abamnyama […] oMabaso ababas'entabeni ilanga lishona, bebikezela ukuza komDlakazi*" (Kumalo, 2018b: 202). Excavation demonstrates the acts of remembering while further facilitating the capacity to re-member in questioning the actions of those who are remembered. Excavating the graveyards of history is demonstrative in how exhumation facilitates our capacity to confront history, while critically analysing the actions of those who are remembered for said history. Consider for instance when Kumalo (2018b: 199) writes,

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[5] As these names are clan names that tell the histories of the two houses, it would be remiss to translate this formulation outside of the context in which it is discussed. The reader can glean the translation of this text from Kumalo (2018b).

Through the invocation of the old names, *uS'hleza, uSandile, uDzanibe kaDzakatshane, uNqolo, uMahlamb'ehlaletsheni ngenxa yokwezwela ithawula* – the lives and stories of these men and [womxn], remembered through the clan names of uScina[6] inform my ontological foundations and epistemological inclinations. In their erasure, through relegating this knowledge to the realm of mythology, a relegation similar to Maitra's (2010) [exposition] of testimonial injustice, I am faced with the inherent ontological denial derived from colonial imposition continued by the contemporary South African university.

Kumalo (2018b) here highlights an important observation regarding the role of language in the life of the contemporary Black/Indigenous subject. This subjectivity, through language, traverses between modernity and Indigeneity. It can only be in the erasure and complete negation of these modes of being and the complete annihilation of this knowledge that we can claim epistemicide. While the Black/Indigenous subject still has access to this knowledge, the claim of epistemicide and linguicide is a fallacy.

Secondly, and derived from the first contention, the claim of epistemicide in the context of South Africa is misplaced. This is not to suggest a dismissal of the challenges that came with colonialism and coloniality on the continent. Rather the intention is to showcase how this claim is perhaps better suited for contexts such as the Iberian Peninsula where it was not only language, but also culture that were erased owing to impositions derived from the Christianisation of these territories. With this said, nuance is required when reading contemporary accounts by decolonial scholars. Consider as a way of demonstration the work of Grosfoguel (2013: 77) when he writes,

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[6] The names of the Scina clan, denote and acknowledge the role of the matrilineal line ancestrally. While I am defined by a patrilineal conception of lineage, the matrilineal line defines my identity as I am formed by historic figures; omaJilajila, omaNdlangisa, oQhudeni, who constitute my ontological foundations.

It is the logic of genocide/epistemicide together that mediates the "I conquer" with the epistemic racism/sexism of the "I think" as the new foundation of knowledge in the modern/colonial world. The *ego extermino* is the socio-historical structural condition that makes possible the link of the *ego conquiro* with the *ego cogito*.

Grosfoguel goes on to further argue that,

The forced expulsion of Muslims and Jews from their land (genocide) led to the repopulation of the territory with Christian populations from the North of the Iberian Peninsula (Caro, Barojas 1991; Carrasco, 2009). This is what in the literature is called today "settler colonialism." (2013: 77)

There are subsequently two things that can be said as a matter of challenging the notion of epistemicide. The first is to acknowledge similarities in the consequence of forced removals of the locals from territories that were to be occupied by the colonial settlers, however, the cultural genocide that is identified by Grosfoguel (2013) did not occur on a similar scale. This is substantiated by Kumalo (2018b), wherein he details how the contemporary Black/Indigenous being still has access to the modes of life of her/his ancestors. This claim does not take away from the validity of Mamdani's (2005) claims when he argues that political identity in the African context is still ensnared in the trappings of categories established by the colonial matrices of power; a point that brings us to the second observation. Acknowledging the imposition of colonial political systems, as indicated by Falola and Heaton (2008) who argue that the cultures of Nigeria were transformed and transfigured by interactions between native subjectivity and British colonial incursion, one cannot resultantly dismiss all forms of African life as an invention of colonial imposition. Simply put, while Mamdani's (2005) argument stands true, that the (post)-colonial state is still trapped in the categories developed by the colonial state apparatus, this does not dismiss the realities of Africans; realities that are still

defined by African languages; languages that allow Africans to access their modes of being outside of the political economy instituted by colonial imposition. To demonstrate the veracity of this point in relation to the one outlined by Falola and Heaton (2008) as well as Mamdani (2005), uMqhayi (1917) is useful when he writes about uMpande.

> *Apo ke ngoku u Mpande aze kungena kona ke yena kusemveni kweloduli. Ute ngokupateka kakubi kumkuluwa wake u Dingana wade wacinga ukuba makamkwelele, aye kuzicelela indawo ezintshabeni paya, kuba hleze abulawe ngomhla otile omnye. Ute kuba u Mpande uza nomkhosi ongqindilili wempi engakolwayo sisipato sika Dingana, avuya kakulu ama Bhulu esithso nokuti yimpendulo yemitandazo yawo.*[xviii]
> ([1917] /2001: 453)

It is clear to note the transfigurations of Black/Indigenous modes of being that were instituted by colonial incursion, however, this does not take away from the validity of Kumalo's (2018b) assertions, who maintains that the Black Archive allows us access into knowledge that pre-existed colonial incursion and that continues to exist even in (post)-colonial[7] African reality. While there might have been changes instituted in Black/Indigenous modes of life owing to colonial incursion, one cannot dismiss the reality that these incursions were in no way tantamount to those documented by Grosfoguel (2013). Simply, while I acknowledge – as demonstrated through the work of uMqhayi, the changes that were instituted against African subjectivities in cases such as who would rule *isizwe sika Zulu*, I cannot accept that these changes were solely the responsibility of white colonial incursion in our context[8]. This would be tantamount to devaluing the role of agential power exercised by the likes of uMpande no

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[7] To write the term as (post)-colonial – in parenthesis with a dash between the post and colonial – is done deliberately. To frame the concept in this way follows in the decolonial tradition that contends that the current world continues to be defined by modernity which is synonymous with coloniality as argued by Mignolo (2009), Tlostanova and Mignolo (2009) and Grosfoguel (2013).

[8] I wish to put forward a contentious claim here, that the transformation and transmutations that we witness in history are as a result of the collusions between Indigeneity and coloniality (a point aptly detailed by the scholarship of Mda 2000; as well as uMqhayi [1917]/2001).

Cetshwayo in fashioning their realities as aided and abetted by the Boers as detailed by uMqhayi ([1917]/2001). This caveat suggests that while this argument may be in agreement with the scholarship of Falola and Heaton (2008), one cannot speak of the Nigerian context in the same ways as one does of the South African context, whose history is documented by the likes of uMqhayi. This reality subsequently necessitates the consideration of the assertion that the claim of epistemicide is fallacious in South Africa. However, it is useful to acknowledge the role played by colonial imposition on the African continent as indicated by uMqhayi ([1933]/2001: 451), "*lomfo [ingu Mpande] ngyunyana ka Senzangakhona, – u Tshaka no Dingana ngabakuluwa kuye; yena wayengowezindlwana ezisemva kanye, engacingeki ukuba anagze ade ongamele ubukumkani bakwa Zulu bakwa Malandela.*"[xix] While cognisant of colonial incursion, this history is not only documented it is further the basis from which Black/Indigenous beings make claims about epistemic injustice/harms. If, on the other hand this history did not exist and there was no access to the Black Archive, we could subsequently entertain the notion of epistemicide.

With regards to 'borrowings and appropriations' as dealt with by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015: 493), it is no surprise that the history as told by the victors of the battle between amaZulu and the Boers elides the role played by uMpande; a role that is detailed systematically by uMqhayi (1917). Subsequently, the reader sees the uses of revealing the entirety of history and the role played by those erased from said history. U-Mqhayi ([1917]/2001: 455) corroborates this when he claims,

> *Kude kwati kupi u Cetshwayo watenjiswa ngabamhlope nama Zulu ukuba ekufeni kuka yise iyoba nguye inkosi yakwaZulu; zaqala ke izinto zangati ziyazola, kuba lomfo wayesel' eyilonto ukuzingela umfo ozakutata lendawo kayise; ukuze ambulale. Ngomnyaka we 1872 wab'ub'a u Mpande. Wafa umfo ewuhlanganisile umzi ka Zulu*

ekubeni zintsali zemfazwe ngemfazwe, – kodwa eyifumene londawo ngokusinikela isizwe sakowabo.[xx]

The role of each actor on the colonial divide is revealed here by uMqhayi, who stresses that, "*kodwa eyifumene londawo ngokusinikela isizwe sakowabo*" ([1917]/2001: 455), demonstrating the complexity that came with colonial imposition and rule among the Black/Indigenous subjects. In claiming epistemicide, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) and all those who would follow in this trajectory flatten the complexities that inhere in a systematic engagement with the Black Archive. In detailing this history and surfacing the role of the Black Archive in our context, which continues to be silenced and erased owing to the preponderance of colonial imposition – we witness one of the coalescing forces that results in the Perfect Storm; this being the force of interaction. In claiming that this knowledge does not belong to the archives of Philosophy of history, as it exists outside western modernity, a fundamental epistemic harm is committed against those whose history is erased. Epistemic injustice in this regard takes the form of hermeneutic injustices, which are a constitutive part of the structural and agential power that inflicts epistemic harms. It is on the basis of this analysis that this chapter now considers the shortfalls with Fricker's (2007) model.

4.3 Fricker's Model of Epistemic Justice

Fricker's theory of *Epistemic Injustice*, while useful, does not sufficiently address the South African context. The theory is premised on a communally "shared ethical intuition", an underlying assumption that presupposes consensus about epistemic engagements while downplaying the reality of divergence/difference. This framework takes us into the terrain of ethicists, requiring a distinction between the thinking of virtue ethicists and duty ethicists; a distinction elucidated by Van Hooft (2006). This distinction highlights the disagreements between Afrocentric and Euro-North American conceptions of ethics. I, however, do not deal

with these differences as I am – here – interested in a virtue epistemological conception of epistemic justice and not the distinctions of the Afrocentric and Euro-North American traditions[9]. The proposition of a shared ethical intuition, comes from the presupposition that there is a community of epistemic agents that ought to act in an ethical way towards each agent that constitutes this community. This is framed as; "any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity essential to human value; and the particular way in which a testimonial injustice does this is that a hearer wrongs a speaker in his capacity as a giver of knowledge, as an informant" (Fricker, 2007: 5). A shared ethical intuition, here, presupposes no divergences in the epistemic traditions that constitute a given community; a presupposition whose challenges are detailed in footnote 9 below.

To illustrate this point, it is useful to reconsider the preceding section, which highlights that decoloniality as tradition lacks a shared ethical intuition witnessed in the claim of epistemicide. Briefly, Ndlovu-Gathseni (2015: 494) argues, "[decolonising] the mind speaks to the urgency of dealing with epistemicides and linguicides. Moving the centre addresses the problem of Euro-North American centrism. Re-membering is about uniting a dismembered and fragmented continent." Ndlovu-Gatsheni is partly right in his suggestion of moving the centre so as to address epistemic injustices and harms. This is seen in the suggestion that "re-membering is about uniting a dismembered and fragmented continent" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 494). This contention addresses one of Fricker's presuppositions – a homogenous

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[9] The debates relating to the differences between conceptual understandings of ethics from an Afrocentric versus a Euro-North American viewpoint has been championed by scholars working in the tradition of Afro-communitarian conceptions of personhood – (see Chemhuru, 2018; Matolino, 2014; Masaka, 2016; Molefe, 2016). This debate is largely influential, albeit implicitly, in venturing the critique against Fricker's (2007) theory in our context. To qualify, there are two levels at which this challenge can be staked. First, surfacing the differences between the epistemic traditions of Afrocentric modes of thought, which differ from Euro-western thinking. This highlights the contradiction in Fricker's (2007) "shared ethical intuition" that rests on a communitarian tradition, while her theoretical proposition of virtue epistemology undermines this thinking. This is as virtue ethics are premised on an individualistic cultivation of virtues. Second, within a community, i.e. decolonial philosophers, whom we would assume work from a position predicated on a shared ethical intuition – this community itself lacks this characteristic of a shared ethical intuition as a result of the claim of epistemicide.

community of epistemic agents, for Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2015) argument showcases that there are divergent modes of knowing in the academe. Heterogeneity within the epistemic community highlights the first critique against Fricker as suggested in footnote 9 above. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's formulation, in the second part, joins the tradition of Africana philosophers, epitomised by Outlaw's (2018) critique of European philosophers and their disqualification of the humanity of African subjects, through their claiming superiority in their knowledge forms. Addressing epistemic injustice here means acknowledging the heterogeneity that today constitutes the academe; heterogeneity, is denied by the claim of Euro-western and north American claims of universality in Philosophy as discipline.

Chapter two deals with an elided complicity. An elided complicity elucidates the aversion of the political, conceptualised as power, by the 'pure' philosopher who avoids their complicity, as well as that of Philosophy as discipline. The previous chapter details this position using Graneß's (2018) argument which maintains that those departments that continue to privilege European and American philosophical traditions ought to be called, departments of European and American Philosophy.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, in the first aspect of his formulation seems to flatten the geography of reason when he suggests that "decolonising the mind speaks to the urgency of dealing with *epistemicides* and *linguicides*" (2015: 494 emphasis added) wrought by colonial imposition. While this claim may be true for locales such as the South Americas, linguicides in the context of the South African geo-political loci of knowledge, is hyperbolic. The existence of the Black Archive is indicative of a wealth of knowledge that deals with the *Fact* of Blackness regardless of the reality that Blackness/Indigeneity was excluded from institutions of knowledge production. This close reading of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) highlights the challenges that arise from addressing epistemic injustice using Fricker's (2007) theory. This claim rests on the role

of language and a heterogeneous community that nullifies the notion of a shared ethical intuition. I contend therefore that the lack of a shared ethical intuition speaks to a broader problem that transcends the colour line, and showcases the incapacity of decolonial thinkers to recognise the role and usefulness of the Black Archive. This reality addresses the second challenge with Fricker's theory.

A communally shared ethical intuition illuminates how we make sense of "[a]ny claim of injustice [which] must rely on [said intuition]" (Fricker, 2007: 5), which does not exist in the case of the South African philosophical community. To state that the claim of epistemic injustice ought to be understood within the framework of a shared ethical intuition rests on the use of virtue epistemology as argued by Fricker (2007: 86-98). What informs Fricker's theory is conceptualised in this study as *the sociality of epistemic practice*. *The sociality of epistemic practice* best traces the political in the knowledge project, through surfacing how "epistemic practices as they are, of necessity, […] socially situated" and highlights the relations of social subjects (Fricker, 2007: vii). These epistemic practices, for Fricker (2007), are rooted in what I have suggested does not exist, in the South African context; a "shared ethical intuition." To clarify, this proposition is applicable among philosophers in general – whose disciplinary existence is defined by an historical divide between politics and Philosophy framed as the *arché*. Another critique can be levelled against the sufficiency of Fricker's (2007) theory, on the basis of her use of virtue epistemology. Credibly staking this challenge requires a sufficient detailing of the tradition. Critique here reveals the limitations of this theoretical proposition, facilitating a way of developing a conception of epistemic justice that is locally responsive.

4.3.1 Detailing Virtue Epistemology as Tradition

Fricker's model is framed as the virtue of testimonial justice (Fricker, 2007: 86), and is premised on virtue ethics i.e. an ethics of duty. Van Hooft distinguishes between an ethics of

duty and virtue ethics (2006: 7), with the latter category extending beyond moral values, such as the avoidance of wrongful acts such as "… cheating, lying […] and murder" (Van Hooft, 2006: 9). Virtue ethics speak of personal characteristics that fall outside of the moral values economy and are typified by characteristics such as courageousness, punctuality and courteousness (Van Hooft, 2006: 9). Van Hooft argues that these personal traits are not moral qualities in themselves, rather qualities that we admire, however society doesn't condemn someone who lacks them (2006: 9). This framework extends social understanding of morally sanctioned permissible behaviour as it is indicative of behaviour that is either obligatory, forbidden or permitted (Van Hooft, 2006: 9). Van Hooft (2006) indicates how virtue ethics combine the moral economy and virtuous characteristics to formulate virtue ethics principles. However, there is a difference between morality and duty ethics.

Duty ethics focuses on our obligations towards others (Van Hooft, 2006: 9). Van Hooft maintains that duty ethicists view morality as existing to order our relationship with others (2006: 9). Duty ethicists assume a prudential inclination towards morals, "whereas morality is the normative structure that we give to our altruism" (Van Hooft, 2006: 10). This inclination prioritises positions such as, it is wrong to lie and or steal owing to the harms caused to others, and it is obligatory to adhere to justice principles due to the benefits that we and others derive from said adherence (Van Hooft, 2006: 10). Contrasting duty ethics, virtue ethics emphasises the agent/individual (Van Hooft, 2006: 10). Van Hooft's distinction enlightens the reader, showcasing how Fricker uses both a duty conception of ethics while combining it with morally right actions. Fricker's theory leans on duty ethics, couched in the language of virtue. In light of my critique, inquiry into the tradition of virtue epistemology is useful.

Virtue epistemology is ascribed to the scholarship of Sosa (1980) whose paper *The Raft and the Pyramid* addresses epistemological issues. Jonathan Kvanvig maintains that "Sosa's initial idea was to use virtue notions to provide a unified account of knowledge, and this goal

constrains what Sosa counts as an intellectual virtue" (2011: 199). The link between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology was foregrounded by Zagzebski (1996) who argued that a truly Aristotelian understanding of the intellectual virtues focuses more on character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. The tradition of virtue epistemology then, is characterised by two strands, namely reliabilism and responsibilism. Smit (2018: 123) argues that these two traditions are defined by the distinction between the work of Sosa (1980) and Code (1987) with Sosa presenting a reliabilist view and Code developing a responsiblist position. Reliabilism suggests that "rather than constructing our beliefs as the coherentists or foundationalists would, […] we should construct our beliefs through the use of 'stable dispositions' that we come to have through 'stable virtues'" (Smit, 2018: 123). Put differently, "the central component in such approaches to virtue epistemology is that of a reliable cognitive faculty, and epistemologists who have followed Sosa's lead here focus on faculties such as vision, reasoning powers, introspection, and memory as primary examples of intellectual virtues" (Kvanvig, 2011: 199). Kvanvig maintains that, "in the theory of justification, challenges to the necessity of virtues conceived in terms of acquired character traits arise first by noticing that individuals themselves can have justified beliefs even if they have acquired few to no virtues" (2011: 202). This observation highlights the shortfall with a reliabilist view of epistemology. Another challenge with the reliabilist perspective is highlighted by Kvanvig,

> Inhabitants of evil demon worlds have no faculties or powers that are typically successful in getting them to the truth, but it is less plausible to hold that they have no justified beliefs. They don't have knowledge, since that requires the truth of what they believe, but the fallibilist position that justified false beliefs are possible is just the sort of theoretical underpinning needed to insist that their beliefs are justified even though nearly always mistaken. (2011: 204)

Alternatively, the responsibilist perspective (Code, 1987), suggests orienting epistemology in terms of the concept of epistemic responsibility and focuses on the role of agency in inquiry and on the moral and social dimensions of social life. Kvanvig argues that Greco (2002) "identifies epistemically responsible belief with subjective justification, and that […] the same account of the virtues is capable of giving an account of both subjective justification and knowledge" (2011: 200). Zagzebski (1996) maintains therefore, that virtue epistemology can be best understood as a consideration of what a virtuous person might believe, when faced with similar circumstances. Code's (1987) argument contextualises Fricker's (2007: 3) analysis when she argues,

> Suspicion of the category of reason *per se* and the tendency to reduce it to an operation of power actually pre-empts the very questions one needs to ask about how power is affecting our functioning as rational subjects; for it eradicates, or at least obscures, the distinction between what we have a reason to think and what mere relations of power are doing to our thinking.

Fricker comes to this position as she thinks through "the overarching aim [which brings] to light certain ethical aspects of two of our most basic everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and making sense of our own social experiences" (2007: 1). This aim aligns Fricker's work with the tradition of virtue epistemologists, while going further. As Kvanvig states it, virtue epistemology "has focused primarily on those approaches that have attempted to address the issues of traditional epistemology rather than on attempts to expand epistemological inquiry in a way that finds a central place for the virtues" (2011: 202). Fricker's work presses the question of "what sort of critical awareness is needed for the hearer to be able to correct for identity prejudice in a given credibility judgement" (2007: 90). Fricker raises this question owing to her contention that "when one is undermined or otherwise

wronged in a capacity as essential to human value, one suffers an intrinsic injustice" (2007: 44). The claim that Fricker advances virtue epistemology stems from Code's (1987) framing of virtue epistemology. Code argues, "the virtue of being epistemically responsible is the chief cognitive virtue […] with the methods and approaches of traditional epistemology unlikely to provide an adequate conception of the intellectual life and the role of the virtues in it" (Kvanvig, 2011: 201). However, what are the shortfalls of the virtue model in Fricker's theory?

4.3.2 Critiquing Fricker's Model

Fricker's theory, while taking into account identity prejudice, does little to address the concerns that arise out of the colonial matrices of power that define contexts such as ours. This observation is in agreement with Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2018: 24) position that "rethinking thinking is fundamentally a decolonial move that requires the cultivation of a decolonial attitude in knowledge production." This is to suggest that our contexts require thinking that responds to the social realities, as they – of necessity affect our epistemic inclinations. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's suggestion advances the democratisation of the knowledge project, while instituting new modes of thinking. This is aligned with post-colonial critiques raised by scholars such as Hountondji (2002) and Nyoka (2013) who suggest the importance of generating our own concepts, while challenging our over reliance on theories generated in the northern hemisphere. However, the reader will recall the questions in the introduction to this chapter, i.e. that if epistemicide indeed defines our experience, how then do we undertake a decolonial agenda. Generating new ways of thinking and re-thinking thinking, necessitates the resurrection of the Black Archive. As indicated in the first section of this chapter, an over reliance on imported theory results in self-erasure(s) rooted in the internalisation of Eurocentric ideas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni corroborates this position when he contends that, "the concept of 'intimate' enemy captured accurately the reality of colonialism's 'colonisation of the minds in addition to bodies

and it releases forces within the colonised societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all' resulting in internalisation of Eurocentrism" (2018: 17).

Analysing our epistemic frameworks using Fricker (2007), while useful in capacitating our thinking about the structure of our knowledge economies in the global South, reinstitutes the prevailing political paradigms of thought by reinforcing the hegemonic preponderance of these importations. Fricker's work is limited to individual accounts of epistemic injustice and not epistemic injustice as it affects a group systematically. The reader will recall the examples developed from uMqhayi's 9[1917]/2001) scholarship, which highlighted the collusions between Blackness/Indigeneity and the drivers of colonial incursion in our context. While my analysis is rooted in the claim of a systematic attempted erasure, against the claim of epistemicide, I am cautious about the uncritical application of theories that were not intended for the theorisation of nuances and complexities that define our existence. Responding to social injustices that are maintained by epistemic injustices, which are hermeneutic in nature – if we accept Fricker's definition of hermeneutic injustices – requires more considered thought.

Fricker's model, which is derived from virtue ethics, occludes a broader social obligation that takes account of historical injustices. To clarify, the critique here takes issue with a virtue epistemology account as a response to epistemic injustices. Virtue epistemology, as used by Fricker, rests on the cultivation of virtuous traits developed by the hearer in order to guard against epistemic harms against a speaker. However, in contexts such as ours, these injustices are not only confined to a speaker and a hearer, but are more systematic and systemic. To this end Cudd (2006: 4) defines oppression as follows; "the term 'oppression' plays a rich and complex role in defining a fundamental social wrong. Its complexity will lead us to ask questions about the origin and maintenance of that wrong, as well as how it might be overcome." This definition recentres uMqhayi's question about the future possibilities of Xhosa cosmology "*ukuba iya kuthi, yakutshonela iphele le ntetho nale mikhwa inesidima*

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yakowawo, [kotshonela] nto ni na emveni koko?"[xxi] (1914: v). U-Mqhayi's question invites two considerations. The first concerns Cudd's (2006) inquiry about how to overcome the social wrong instituted by oppression. The second speaks to the requisite obligation to foster epistemic justice, as the failure to do so maintains and perpetuates the dysfunctions wrought by colonialism *as* coloniality. Reading Fricker's theory in tandem with Cudd's analysis of oppression, highlights the importance of my critique. This comes as Fricker's theory addresses the speaker and the hearer, and downplays a more systematic/systemic analysis that addresses the social organisation of power. Fricker (2007) attempted to deal with uMqhayi's (1914) concerns through an individualistic and relational epistemic paradigm that does not undermine the ontological legitimacy of Indigeneity. However, the theory falls short as it is located in virtue epistemology that rests on virtue ethics, which as described by Van Hooft (2006: 10) centres an agential/individualistic outlook. U-Mqhayi's observations about epistemic erasures owing to colonial incursion, highlights epistemic injustices premised on epistemic practices rooted in colonial violence(s). This observation in turn, demonstrates the politics of knowledge/knowing. This schema substantiates the claim that an intellectual sociality, as detailed in chapter two, can act both as a way of perpetrating and or mitigating epistemic harm(s).

These examples *(impi kaNqgika noNdlambe, ukubekwa kukaMpande ebukhosini bakwaZulu* and the systematic erasure of Xhosa cosmology) demonstrate testimonial and hermeneutic injustices and are useful in surfacing the constituent elements of epistemic injustice (erasure, theft, the creation of a zero-point position) and can be understood as systematic/systemic institutionalised testimonial injustice premised on a shared ethical intuition that precluded Indigeneity. Thus, signalling the first component that contests the notion of a shared ethical intuition in South Africa. The preclusion of Indigeneity and its consequences culminated in the call for the dissolution of the PSSA. This call was rooted in the historicity of the examples cited

above; a point that is addressed in the following chapter. I now consider how these components epitomise the Perfect Storm model.

4.4 The Black Archive as Alternative

Having showcased the limitations with Fricker's (2007) underlying assumption that presupposes a shared ethical intuition, what follows, lays the foundations for the project of epistemic restitution. Using the Black Archive, my analysis begins to re-imagine our contemporary higher education landscape – through a praxis that is locally responsive and globally relevant. This move will demonstrate what is meant by resurrecting the Black Archive as a form of epistemic restitution. My analysis in this section begins by explicating Antony's (2012) argument, which reveals implicit modes of erasure that are unintentional.

Louise Antony (2012) suggests a move away from the Different Voices Model, developed by Buckwalter and Stitch, to a Perfect Storm model, which she contends does more to analyse the problem of Philosophy as discipline. The Different Voices model, Antony (2012) suggests, is unsubstantiated as it will always rely on fallacious reasoning that shores-up the differences between the sexes. This critique can be extended to an analysis concerning Blackness/Indigeneity in the context of South Africa. The reader will recall Outlaw's critique of European philosophers who dismissed and disqualified entire peoples from human history on the basis of European thought being the only epistemic framework that espouses rationality. This disqualification is the basis from which we can speak of epistemic harms that have dehumanised peoples of the periphery, a move that is contemporarily contested by the decolonial philosopher.

Antony (2012) argues that the Different Voices model, continues to institute and inscribe differences within the disciplinary community when in fact what we ought to be looking at are the factors that influence how the University mirrors the social problems of its location. She

(Antony, 2012: 234) suggests that the Perfect Storm is constituted by "convergence, interaction, and intensification" with these three components viewed as the coalescing forces that lead to the attrition of womxn from the discipline. In detailing the interaction of forces, Antony uses Crenshaw (1991) to argue that, "if all the black people hired have been men, and all the womxn hired or promoted have been white, it is at least plausible that racism and sexism have converged in a unique way to systematically disadvantage black [womxn]" (2012: 233). This is indicative of the factors at play in the disciplinary arrangements that can be conceived as *the sociality of epistemic practice*. Antony substantiates this point, claiming that "race and sex – together with any other socially significant parameter of human variation – can be thought of as axes defining a multidimensional space" (2012: 233). Antony (2012) extends Fricker's argument that our epistemic practices are defined by the social conditions wherein our epistemic practices play out. This line of thinking takes seriously the role of social factors as they shape the knowledge project, not only in Philosophy as discipline, but more broadly in the University.

Adhering to or challenging the socio-political norms of society, specifically in a context such as South Africa – where the racial economies instituted by colonial imposition and the presupposed superiority of whiteness continue to exist unabated – the raciality of our institutions manifests to discipline the Black/Indigenous body. A comparison can be made between the gendered realities of womxn who are socially sanctioned for exhibiting behaviour that is acceptable of men and the realities experienced by Black/Indigenous people in HWIs. To demonstrate, consider when Kumalo writes,

> This chastising response [to playing by the rules as established in the institution] is witnessed at Maritzburg College when the Prefect involved in the 'Kaffir'-incident earlier in the year retaliated by branding his shirt 'EFF our last hope of getting our Land Back' at the end of the year. While the school responded with visceral disciplinary

action that sought to remind Blackness/Indigeneity of its place in white institutions, the response given by the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education highlighted how HWIs continue to see Blackness/Indigeneity as expendable and thus abject beings (2018a: 6).

In light of this reality, it becomes imperative to consider the role of the Black Archive in fostering epistemic justice and restitution. Antony's (2012) gender-based analysis draws our attention and parallels the realities that continue to define the *Fact* of Blackness/Indigeneity in Philosophy as discipline. This assertion rests on the analysis presented in the first section of this chapter, which considered an internalised eurocentrism that continues to undermine the epistemic contributions of Blackness/Indigeneity in the academe and seen in the claim of epistemicide propounded by Black/Indigenous scholars. To this end, I suggest that epistemic justice in the South African context may be realised if we unlock the possibilities that lie in the Black Archive.

While I am in agreement with Antony (2012, 251) when she cautions against uncritical changes to Philosophy as discipline – as she argues that "the anti-feminist line says that if [womxn] can't (or won't) do philosophy, so much the worse for womxn. The feminist line says that if philosophy is not informed by [womxn's] minds, so much the worse for philosophy", I am also in agreement with Graneß (2018) in that Philosophy departments that refuse to diversify their curricula ought to be called what they really are, departments of European and American Philosophy. This is to acknowledge the shortfalls that come with arbitrary changes in the discipline, however, Dotson's (2011) argument should inform our reasoning when she maintains that privileging one epistemic tradition institutes ignorance, as that tradition is blind to its own limitations. It is on the basis of this contention that I offer the Black Archive as a facilitating tool towards epistemic justice. The use of the Black Archive signals the introduction of thinking that exists outside colonial imposition and incursion. Consider the work of uMqhayi when he writes *Ityala Lamawele*. In the introduction to the text uMqhayi suggests that he is

concerned with working through Xhosa jurisprudence to highlight its significance and contribution to the thinking of contemporary societies. He asserts "*nangani ndingengcali kwathi ni yamthetho, ndinawo noko amanakani okuba umthetho wasemaXhoseni awahluke nakancinane kowezizwe ezikhanyiselweyo.*"[xxii] The reader should consider teaching *Ityala Lamawele* as a mode of conducting comparative jurisprudential analyses in a course on political Philosophy or comparative jurisprudence.

There are two things to be said in this regard. First, uMqhayi's work does not lean on imposed borrowings derived from colonial incursion, which subsequently facilitates the use of alternative epistemic frameworks in pedagogy. U-Mqhayi is concerned with the impact of colonial incursion on Xhosa jurisprudential processes, substantiating the proposition that the notion of epistemicide and linguicide in our context is a misnomer. In this instance, i.e. the use of uMqhayi's work, the University is presented with a genuine task aimed at decolonial thinking that is innovative, responsive and does not speak only to our context but is globally relevant. Global relevance comes from a teaching praxis that establishes dialogical conceptions of jurisprudence, not by way of an additive approach, but rather as a substantive comparative exercise. Second, this facilitates inter-epistemic dialogue using the Black Archive and decolonising from a predisposition directed by Black/Indigenous epistemic traditions. In this regard, decoloniality democratises the knowledge project and is driven by those genuinely invested in its success and not merely in advancing their careers by stealing from the knowledge of Blackness/Indigeneity. This concern comes from the realities highlighted by Tuck and Yang (2012) who challenge approaches to decoloniality that do not engage the epistemic traditions of those whose knowledge is used as the premise of decolonisation. As a way of further foregrounding Antony's (2012) cautionary remark, about how we implement changes to the teaching and learning praxes of Philosophy as discipline, the reader is invited to consider scholars who work in traditions such as decoloniality without any knowledge of the Black

Archive. This perpetuates erasure through advancing the claim that there exists no scholarship, knowledge or work done by African thinkers in addressing the seminal, political and philosophical questions that continue to define curricula.

Consider another example of decolonial praxis, using artworks such as *Song of the Pick* by Gerard Sekoto (1947). Prior to the formal institutionalisation of apartheid in South Africa, Sekoto made a poignant observation about the migrant labour systems in South Africa. The painting speaks volumes of the deracination of Black family life. Taught as part of analyses of personhood and the state, this painting addresses the seminal philosophical question 'Who is [Wo]Man as a political being'. Commenting on the power relations marked by raciality in South Africa, Sekoto surfaces the seminal questions asked by Socrates of 'Athenian Democracy' (Irwin 1989). Furthermore, Sekoto's work considers the Hobbesian question of political authority and its legitimation, by critiquing a political economy premised on the exploitation of Black/Indigenous labour.

With these two examples, and countless others unmentioned, I suggest that my analysis annuls objections that may be levelled against such a project, i.e. the question of 'how is this philosophical?' The real question would be an inquiry into how does the Black Archive lend itself to thinking about second order questions that preoccupy the philosopher[10]. If Philosophy is earnestly invested in decolonising the knowledge project, the interfusion between Art and Philosophy, Music and Philosophy, Literature and Philosophy becomes the starting point in decolonising curricula. This suggestion comes from Kumalo (2019a) who argues that resurrecting the Black Archive concerns thinking about/through and theorising the *Fact* of Blackness/Indigeneity, which continued to think through the Black Archive even as Blackness/Indigeneity was denied access in institutions of higher learning.

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[10] Given the scope and space I would problematize even this notion of second order questions, however, this question is left for another project.

4.5 Conclusion

The reader might inquire as to how the Black Archive allows Philosophy as discipline to make good on the promise of epistemic justice. There are three things to be said by way of answering this question and concluding my analysis. First, the Black Archive redefines Philosophy as discipline by teaching from a position that is aligned with the decolonial tradition. By this I mean, the Black Archive aids us in developing curricula that is locally responsive and globally relevant. While centring the perspectives of historically marginalised groups, the Black Archive does not appeal to a fundamentalist pedagogy. To frame the Black Archive in this way is rooted in the first section which highlighted the criticality assumed when dealing with historical materials that constitute this Archive. Second, the Black Archive anticipates the three coalescing forces; convergence, interaction and intensification. In the first instance, curricula coded/developed using the Black Archive are diversified to include the realities, narratives and rationality predispositions of those who experience these forces as pressing down on their being. The Black Archive instantiates critical reflexivity in demanding that we always be conscious of the historical machinations that constitute contemporary realities. Simply put, curricula begin to reflect the ontologies and the variance that is constitutive of the demographics that make up Philosophy departments in the contemporary University in South Africa. Finally, the Black Archive takes seriously the demand of the decolonial philosopher by revealing the politics of both the knower and knowledge. The Black Archive diversifies loci of enunciations.

Premising my argument on the Black Archive, I have showcased that the claim of epistemicide in the South African context is inaccurate and obscures analyses that seek to unearth the political components of the knowledge project. My analysis, in this chapter highlighted that the notion of epistemicide and linguicide, when applied uncritically in theorising our reality, suggests epistemic justice/restitution as a cultural inventive project that reproduces erasures.

To frame decoloniality thusly was rooted in the reality of decolonial scholars who themselves claim epistemicide and linguicide in our context. If we are to truly re-imagine the project of teaching and learning from a position predicated on decoloniality, I suggest the resurrection of the Black Archive.

Chapter 5

Detailing the Political through the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa

5.1 Introduction

Based on the preceding chapters that develop the conceptual schema for understanding epistemic injustice in South Africa, this chapter considers the breakup of the PSSA and the founding of the Azanian Philosophical Society. The argument advanced here maintains that it was precisely the absence of a 'shared ethical intuition' that gave rise to the rupturing of the philosophical community. To substantiate this claim, an analysis of *The Demographic Diversity of Philosophy and the Possibilities for Transforming Philosophy in South Africa* – a report published as a result of the 2016 PSSA meeting at Chintsa, Eastern Cape – is conducted. To remind the reader, this meeting culminated in the demand that the PSSA be dissolved, therefore surfacing the deep divides that constitute the philosophical community in the country. The call for the dissolution of the PSSA revolved around the reality that in the 21st century, white philosophers, through epistemic arrogance, continued to deem themselves the only experts on/of the lived realities of all in the country and in the University. This claim should not be misunderstood as an attempt at delegitimising the work of philosophers and scholars, specifically white scholars, who make substantive contributions in the academe[1]. Rather it points to the reality of the 'metaphorisation' (Tuck and Yang, 2012) of decolonisation with white scholars who work in areas of research such as decolonisation delegitimating the contributions of Black/Indigenous intellectuals. The demand to dissolve the PSSA substantiated the existence of intellectual divides that were, in large part, ignored by scholars

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[1] See Russell Kaschula (1995; 2001) and Jeff Opland (1975; 2001; and 2019), whose work showcases an intimate understanding of the knowledge systems of Blackness/Indigeneity. Furthermore, this scholarship works towards the substantive engagement of Black/Indigenous epistemes subsequently actioning epistemic justice.

who claim that knowledge is apolitical. To demonstrate both the historicity and political nature of these divides, Sartre (1948) is useful. Sartre (1948: 13) writes,

> When you removed the gag that was keeping these Black mouths shut, what were you hoping for? Did you think that when they raised themselves up again, you would read adoration in the eyes of these heads that our fathers had forced to bend down to the very ground? Here are black men standing, looking at us, and I hope that you – like me – will feel the shock of being seen.

Sartre facilitates a consideration of the deep-seated nature of the racial categories that define the socio-political reality witnessed in the South African context through the philosophical community[2]. Sartre (1948) substantiates the claim that the divide witnessed in the PSSA as the rupturing of the organisation, is historically situated even as it was ignored in the broader philosophical community. The first section of this chapter, then, details the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. This analysis substantiates the argument presented in chapter three, which details the constitutive parts of epistemic injustice.

If the objective of the preceding four chapters was to develop a conceptual language that situates both the background and nature of the PSSA debacle, the aim of this chapter is to position this challenge in its broader framework i.e. the University. Highlighting how the discipline is reflective of the University will be useful in better situating the claim of the political nature of knowledge. To this end, Paphitis and Villet maintain that 'at a global level the discipline of philosophy remains largely demographically unrepresentative' (2017: 2); a position which is substantiated using the work of Lebakeng et al (2006) in chapter three. The

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[2] While the analysis of this study deals with Philosophy as discipline, ample evidence suggests that the PSSA debacle is symptomatic of the wider problem that defines the South African higher education landscape. This is envisaged through the scholarship of Welsh and Savage (1977) when they write about 'The University in Divided Societies'. This claim is also substantiated by the scholarship of contemporary thinkers who have theorised the experiences of Black/Indigenous academics in the *transformed* higher education sector in the country. See Khunou, Phaswana, Khoza-Shangase and Canham (2019).

curriculum taught in the discipline which comprises 'predominantly male and white' thinkers (Dotson, 2011) demonstrates this point further. The staff demographic of universities in South Africa substantiates the contention that the discipline has failed to confront the politics that constitute it as social practice. These factors all point to *the sociality of epistemic practice* at an institutional level. With this said, it is of high import to interrogate how scholars, institutional administrators and intellectuals can work towards changing this reality, in line with decolonial objectives. To answer the previous question, the analysis presented in this chapter, is a judicious consideration of methods that ameliorate these social and epistemic injustices as reported by Paphitis and Villet (2017). This will constitute the second section of this chapter. Interrogating the inferred integrative and additive approaches, highlights the Black Archive as a rich epistemic tool that avoids the shortcomings of the report. Using the Black Archive in curating a decolonial socio-political condition facilitates the realisation of a truly postcolonial[3] reality. Using the Black Archive to think through the decolonial mission, presents the possibility of speaking from and to local epistemic positions.

5.2 The Raciality of the Sociality of Epistemic Practice

As indicated in the previous chapter, Fricker (2007) defines epistemic injustice as actions that are ethically culpable. Humean (1748) thought[4], which informs several philosophers working in western philosophical tradition(s), evinces ethical culpability in the perspectives expressed. Owing to this ethical culpability, in the call to dissolve the PSSA was the question of the political as consensus. Put differently, with the full knowledge of the historical realities that

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[3] The reader will note the difference in how postcolonial is written here. This formulation differs from that given in chapter four, wherein postcolonial is written as '(post)-colonial'. This formulation suggests a socio-political condition that substantively de-links from colonial legacies and categories of thought. Furthermore, it invites consideration into the debate on the (post)-colony in the South African context. This is inspired by Mbembe (2001: 3) when he notes that "there [is] hardly ever any discourse about Africa for itself. In the very principle of its constitution, in its language, and in its finalities, narrative about Africa is always pretext for a comment about something else, some other place, some other people."

[4] It is useful to remind the reader of the argument developed in the third chapter using the work of Lebakeng et al (2006). The argument developed here is a rejoinder to that developed in chapter three.

govern the South African academe, the community was tasked with curating conditions that allow for difference to co-exist. The political as consensus was inspired by the reality that the social conditions in which Philosophy as discipline exists, maintain the foundations established by scholars such as Hume (1748). Furthermore, with the task of framing and establishing a new political order, the political as consensus, the community was confronted with the historicity of the knowledge project; a point that will become clearer to the reader when this analysis begins to engage JM Coetzee's (1988) work. In light of the political as consensus, there are two things to be said. The first deals with colonial imposition on Blackness/Indigeneity. Colonial imposition(s) makes obvious the implications of the argument presented in chapter two, which thinks through *The Cultural University as a Bastion of Coloniality* using Readings' (1996) analysis.

U-Mqhayi's exposition of the effects of coloniality in the country gives weight to the first point addressed, i.e. the implications of Humean thinking for the Black/Indigenous subject in Philosophy as discipline and in the University. This first consideration is therefore, interrelated and gives birth to the second. The second relates to this impositions' role in fashioning and developing the structure of knowledge in the westernised university, which finds itself located on the African continent. On the first count, this position is detailed by uMqhayi ([1917]/2001: 125) when he writes,

> *Imfundo yombuso u-Maqoma uyifunde ngokutana nca noyise u-Ngqika, waye uyise lowo wayetatyatelwa pezulu kakulu ngamapakati, esenza ukumhluta kuyisekazi u-Ndlambe, kuba ayefuna ukumfundisa ngeyawo indlela. Zite kanjalo i-Ruluneli ezimhlope zakufika, nabafundisi ngokunjalo, zamtabata uNgqika njengoyena Kumkani wasema Xoseni, yaza lonto yenza ukuba u-Ngqika acunubeke kwezinye inkosi zakowabo. U-Maqoma waba nokulubona, kwasebuncinaneni bake ke ngoko lonke unyhwalazo, nobuqetseba bezizwe ezimhlope.*[xxiii]

U-Mqhayi ([1917]/2001) details the transformations and transfigurations of the socio-political reality of Blackness/Indigeneity owing to colonial imposition, while highlighting and substantiating the claim that contemporary reality is fashioned by historical machinations that define South Africa. This position is substantiated by Welsh and Savage (1977) when they maintain that the University in South Africa, specifically the HWU, mirrored rather than ameliorated the social conditions at the height of apartheid[5]. U-Mqhayi elaborates on the argument advanced in the previous chapter, which details the constitutive parts of epistemic injustice, with his analysis rooted in the broader social reality that defines the country. Further to this, the socio-political reality of the country, directly impacted the role and view of the Black/Indigenous subject as unable to think and reason. Jonathan Jansen (2017: 104) writing about the university sector in the country stresses this point poignantly when he notes,

> Only one historically black university in South Africa has defied the apartheid odds. Black institutions of higher learning were originally created as sites of inferior education. They were located in isolated, mostly rural areas – hence the adopted name 'bush colleges' for the collective of ethnic universities birthed by the apartheid state through the ironically named Extension of University Education Act of 1959.

Jansen's (2017) remarks facilitate our ability to trace how the logic of coloniality and colonialism impacted Black/Indigenous subjectivity, with the political agenda having a substantive bearing on the knowledge enterprise as it relates to how Black/Indigenous subjects were educated. Inferior education was developed for the Black/Indigenous subject on the premise that they cannot think and reason. This is to say Blackness/Indigeneity were useful in the eyes of whiteness and the beneficiaries of coloniality only insofar as Blackness/Indigeneity

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[5] At this point it might be useful to consider whether or not this condition has at all changed in the country. With much of the scholarship pointing to the requirements for change and transformation in the sector, one would suggest that while universities have attempted to transform, transformation and institutional decolonisation have been slow and politically unmotivated.

was to be the servant of coloniality. With regards to the impacts of coloniality on the Black/Indigenous subject and how they were to be educated, Jansen's (2017) observation about Black institutions as sites of inferior learning is important. This point is addressed by a number of scholars in the decolonial tradition, culminating in the claim of epistemicide for some such as Lebakeng et al. (2006). Inferior education works in tandem with the claim that the Black/Indigenous subject must function with the intended purposes of serving whiteness and its objectives. This points to the construction of Blackness/Indigeneity as unable to reason, a proposition rooted in the thinking of Hume and Hegel. The historicity of this logic is detailed by Coetzee in his *White Writing: The Culture of Letters in South Africa* (1988). Detailing the narratives of idleness as they relate to the pastrol, Coetzee (1988: 5) notes,

> Pastrol in South Africa therefore has a double tribute to pay. To satisfy the critics of rural retreat, it must portray labour; to satisfy the critics of colonialism, it must portray white labour. What inevitably follows is the occlusion of black labour from the scene: the black man becomes a shadowy presence flitting across the stage now and then to hold a horse or serve a meal.

Coetzee showcases the rationalisation behind the notion of inferior education for the native, or as Coetzee (1988: 33) frames it, the kaffir and the Hottentot. The Black/Indigenous subject is framed in this way owing to the desire to occlude and negate their humanity; with this dehumanising discourse dating as far back as the 17th century[6]. Footnote 6 highlights how these narratives began at the time of colonisation and early contact with colonial incursion. Furthermore, it would be remiss to overlook how these narratives continued to infuse the thinking of apartheid South Africa culminating in the observation made by Jansen (2017) with

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[6] The historicity of these discourses emerge when Coetzee details the historical underpinnings of this narrative. Coetzee (1988: 16) notes from Fryke (a text written in 1685) the following: "the Hottentots sleep by day (idle Hottentot character) in a hut (Hottentot dwelling), lying all over one another (Hottentot sexual mores) like hogs (place of Hottentots on the scale of creation)."

regards to the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. In more radical quarters this claim would be used to suggest that this thinking has not changed even with the dawn of democracy. From this line of thinking it might make sense why some scholars have made the claim of epistemicide in our context. This brief historical overview suggests that one cannot understand the rationalities that led to the exclusion of Blackness/Indigeneity from spaces of knowledge production, without an appreciation of the political as power and its implications on the knowledge project.

To claim that Philosophy as discipline and the University continue to espouse Humean thought is based on an interpretive reading of Readings' (1996) analysis, which traces the history of the contemporary University that was preceded by the Kantian university of reason, the Humboltdian university of culture, that was subsequently replaced by the contemporary university of excellence. It is important to note Popkewitz and Brennan's (1997; 1998) argument, as used by Kumalo (2020: 3) when he suggests that the power dynamics of pedagogy operate with a taken-for-granted status that shields them from critique.

Grosfoguel (2013) defines the contemporary University as westernised. This critique drives the principle of democratising knowledge production in the form of creating a pluriversity. Briefly, it is of some use to complicate and critique even Grosfoguel's (2013) conception of the University. Kumalo (2018c: 12) does this by showcasing the uses of knowledge developed in the northern hemisphere when he writes,

> A critique that can be levelled against Grosfoguel (2013) when he wrote about the structure of knowledge in westernised universities rests on how his contribution here does little to complicate the decolonial debate. Nuancing the decolonising project entails an awareness of how these knowledges, while provincial in their nature, are useful in the project of refashioning and reconceptualising subaltern knowledges which

were, in part, erased by the colonial project. What I aim to stress through a nuanced understanding of the decolonial project is how we can begin to create ecologies of knowledges that transcend and meaningfully decolonise the canon.

Still keeping with the critique offered by Grosfoguel (2013), which is echoed by Nyoka (2013) who contends that the South African University has not been able to define itself outside of European conceptions of the University. This has resulted in a number of scholars attempting to conceptualise an African University in our context. Owing to this desire, higher education theoreticians and decolonial scholars alike, are pre-occupied with the question of what does an African University look like. Decolonial thinkers in the country have attempted to answer this question with Kumalo (2018b: 216) writing that,

> Indigenous narratives, representative of experiential knowledge, do not feature in the structure of knowledge in westernised universities (Grosfoguel, 2013), even as they continue to inflect our lived realities. Without the tools to read Indigenous epistemes and the histories which constitute these epistemic positions, the academy continues to deny the humanity of Indigeneity and its existence.

Kumalo's (2018b) argument teases out the ethical culpability noted by Fricker (2007) when she details the harms of epistemic injustice. One can speculate from Kumalo's (2018b) argument that an African University attempts to correct these historical injustices, while teaching from a place that takes seriously the epistemic contributions of Blackness/Indigeneity. This ethical culpability, then, was challenged in the South African context with the call to dissolve the PSSA, as many believe(d) that it continues to be an enclave of whiteness. This enclave has been framed as protecting the interests of white settler colonial descendant futures, while erasing Blackness/Indigeneity from the discipline. It was forcefully brought to our attention that the South African philosophical community lacks a shared ethical intuition in the

contention that the PSSA be dissolved. This claim is informed by Fricker's (2007) assumption – which is a precondition for dialogue on epistemic injustice. How, then, does this reveal the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*?

Aversion of the political, either as power or as consensus, creates 'the perfect storm' detailed in the previous chapter using Paphitis and Villet (2017), Thompson et al (2016) and Antony (2012). Antony (2012) contends that sex and race discrimination operating in broader society play out and converge in Philosophy as discipline demonstrating how the amalgamated factors function to create a skewed disciplinary make-up. These amalgamated factors include the nature of Philosophy as a discipline, the presence of implicit and explicit forms of harm, characterised in chapter three as *the sociality of epistemic practice*. These factors point to *the sociality of epistemic practice* in the discipline which fails to politicise and confront the political nature of Philosophy as discipline. The raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice* is addressed by Almeida (2015: 81) when she writes, "Puwar (2004) states that colonialism is the foundation of the fully human, individual white male subject, the irrational woman, and the wild, uncivilized non-white figure." These racialized categories established by European colonial imposition on the continent, showcase the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. This is to say that the categories that were established by colonial modes of thinking continue to infuse the social practices of the discipline. With this in mind, one ought to consider the implications of the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*.

In this regard, there are three things that require our attention. The first reveals the reality that little has changed in Philosophy as discipline as the categories of thought inherited from the colonial legacies of domination and apartheid continue to define the discipline. The second, is derived from the first, which is the ideological tension that characterises Philosophy as discipline in the country. The last highlights how these two previous realities that define the discipline culminated in the demand that the PSSA be dissolved. In what follows, I deal with

each of these in seriatim so as to analyse the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice* in Philosophy as discipline.

5.2.1 An Archaic Institutional Vanguard

As Ramose (2002a: 6) notes it, "to deny the existence of African philosophy for the sake of maintaining existing standards in education is to undermine the very nature of education and science. It is at the same time to make the questionable claim that the curriculum is free from ideological tension." Ramose (2002a) begins to think through the raciality of the discipline through the observation that even as the field of African Philosophy has been developed in Philosophy as discipline, it remains dominated by philosophers who claim expert knowledge in areas that continue to allude said philosophers. To demonstrate this reality, this analysis considers language in Philosophy. Consider how some of the leading theoreticians in the field of ubuntu are scholars who cannot speak an Indigenous language; the very languages that give birth to ubuntu. I am in no way advocating for a parochial mind-set that confines disciplinary domains to specific groups on the basis of their race, language, sex or orientation, as this would undermine the academic project as a scientific endeavour in the most legitimate sense. This concern, however, is raised owing to the reality that a scholar working on Husserlian Phenomenology, specifically in the German context, and has no knowledge of Husserlian Phenomenology in German would not be framed as a leading thinker of Phenomenology. To frame the point better, consider the reality that a scholar working in the tradition of feminism, cannot claim to be a feminist scholar without having engaged the forerunners of feminist thought, i.e. Simone De Beauvoir, Kimberle Crenshaw, bell hooks, and/or Linda Alcoff for instance. To claim expert knowledge in these fields, be it in Phenomenology or in feminist thought, without having engaged the canon would amount to a form of intellectual fraud. And yet, some of the leading scholars of ubuntu in South Africa, can neither speak the languages of ubuntu nor have they engaged with the scholarship of thinkers such as B.W. Vilakazi, Mazisi

Kunene, Sibusiso Nyembezi and WW Gqoba; thinkers whose work substantively deals with the concepts of ubuntu; as these concepts are understood by the progenitor groups of the Philosophy of ubuntu. To substantiate this move, I invite the reader to consider the work of Praeg (2014: 78) who is quoted at length here

> We can thus distinguish between ubuntu as 'ethnic morality' (Prozesky, 2009: 5) and Ubuntu as abstract ethic. As ethnic morality, ubuntu is a function of the absence of a distinction between morality and religion; it refers to what Martin Prozesky (2009: 4) describes as 'the moral traditions embedded in the many and various cultures of sub-Saharan Africa, the moral traditions of Black African cultures' and which in the words of Saule […] represents the kind of human behaviour 'inculcated in the individual by society through established traditional institutions over a period of time' (in Mnyaka 2003: 144). This difference perhaps explains why Neville Richardson comments that 'to set out to discover and understand African ethics via abstract moral principles is to embark on a journey of frustration. Instead one has to observe and reflect upon the social life of the people – their rituals, customs, practices, events and relationships' (2009: 131).

This formulation can be critiqued extensively for divorcing the concept or Philosophy of ubuntu from its progenitor languages. However, this analysis pays attention only to two aspects. The first speaks to Praeg's (2014) move in flattening the geography of thought when it comes to African being, seen in the claim that "[instead] one has to observe and reflect upon the social life of the people –their rituals, customs, practices, events and relationships." The reader might inquire as to whether understanding African modes of being is still premised on an Anthropological gaze as detailed in the first chapter using Mudimbe's (1996: 6) observations when he suggests that "[the] need of the modern state for more exact knowledge on which to base its decision had led to the emergence of new categories of knowledge already in the

eighteenth century, but these categories still had uncertain definitions and frontiers." The exact knowledge used by the state, to base its decisions, comes from disciplines such as Anthropology which was used as a tool to conquer the subjugated/colonised natives. In the claim of understanding "their rituals, customs, practices, events and relationships", this formulation is reminiscent of the white Anthropologist reading his subjects who are classed as primitive, sub-human and are the objects of study for the purposes of understanding how best the state can make its decisions of colonising and subjugating these people. In a more generous reading, there arises the question of how best to understand these social institutions, if one cannot even understand the languages that constitute them. This question is buttressed by the work of Richardson (2009: 131) used in Praeg (2014) wherein Richardson claims that "to set out to discover and understand African ethics via abstract moral principles is to embark on a journey of frustration." Richardson's formulation is problematic as he is concerned with discovering African ethics, as if African ethics did not exist prior to their discovery by white intellectuals in our context. This formulation is reminiscent of the colonial explorers who *discovered* the peoples of the colonised territories. However, this is not my concern, I am rather interested in the notion of discovery being fraught with frustrations. The frustration comes from the unwillingness to learn the languages of African peoples, an attitude rooted in the colonial modes of thinking established in the 17th century, for as Coetzee (1988: 7) notes it

> This landscape remains alien, impenetrable, until a language is found in which to win it, speak it, represent it. It is no oversimplification to say that landscape art and landscape writing in South Africa from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth revolve around the question of finding a language that will be authentically African. Of course there exist plenty of authentically African languages, languages indigenous to the subcontinent. But their authenticity is not necessarily the right authenticity. The quest for an authentic language is pursued within a framework

in which language, consciousness, and landscape are interrelated. *For the European to learn an African language 'from the outside' will therefore not be enough: he must know the language 'from the inside' as well, that is, know it 'like a native,' sharing the mode of consciousness of the people born to it, and to that extent giving up his European identity.* (emphasis added)

Coetzee (1988) substantiates the point of an unwillingness on the part of those who would claim expert knowledge in areas of scholarship that are still treated as abject inasmuch as they are developed by the progenitor groups. This is to say that the aversion to learn Indigenous languages maintains the claim of African thought as backward, retarded and intellectually meritorious only insofar as it is developed by colonial settler descendants. This claim is premised on the framing of African modes of being as a project of discovery by Richardson (2009) as used by Praeg (2014). Coetzee (1988: 7-8) goes on to argue that,

> So, quite aside from the question of whether it is practical for a European to enter African culture in sufficient depth, quite aside from European doubts about whether the black man anyhow 'appreciates' the landscape into which he was born any better than an animal does, the question has to be rephrased: *Is there a language in which people of European identity, or if not European identity then of a highly problematical South African – colonial identity, can speak to Africa and be spoken to by Africa?* (emphasis added)

The refusal to learn Indigenous languages has culminated in what can be termed an extrapolation that misreads and decontextualises the Philosophy from its progenitor groups. Ramose's (2002a) observations subsequently reveal that as African philosophies have been developed in Philosophy as discipline, this happens under the continued erasure of Blackness/Indigeneity. This erasure is premised, as Mudimbe (1988) notes it, on the reality that

the Black/Indigenous African subject has always been framed as lacking, backward, and retarded; a claim that has its genesis in the thinking of scholars such as Hume, Hegel and Kant. This component demonstrates the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice* in South Africa. Simply put, one can argue that the presuppositions highlighted by Ramose's (2002a) work, showcase that African Philosophy is useful only insofar as it is developed by white scholars. This analysis showcases how philosophers can come together to consider the state of Philosophy in South Africa without a single Black/Indigenous subject on the panel. This is what led to the call that the PSSA be dissolved as it continues to be an enclave of whiteness along with its attendant superiorist thinking in the discipline. Erasure in this form, substantiates the claim advanced in chapter two, which details epistemic slighting visited on Blackness/Indigeneity. This epistemic slighting gives rise to the consideration of an archaic vanguard, by this I mean a group of intellectuals who are concerned with African thought only insofar as these ideas advance their continued preponderance and career trajectories.

The rise of African Philosophy as continuously dominated by philosophers who decontextualise the philosophies that they claim expert knowledge on, displays the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice* in Philosophy as discipline. It is useful therefore, to consider the implications of the ideological tensions in the discipline.

5.2.2 An Ideological Tension and its Implications

With the aims of this study framed as a concern with the politics of knowledge, it is useful to elucidate the ideological tension that defines both the discipline in the broader University structures in South Africa. Ramose (2002a) contends that the curriculum is framed by an ideological tension. This tension is derived from the realities of colonial imposition and is sustained by what Lange (2014: 3) frames as an erosion of the "intellectual, political and moral elements that seem to have shaped the conceptualisation of transformation in the early 1990s

[which] were reduced and oversimplified." Lange (2014) reveals a poignant aspect detailed by Ramose in *I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign* (2002b). Ramose (2002b: 463) contends, "[the] purpose [of his analysis] is to show that what people hold to be natural or fundamental justice does not always coincide with justice according to law. Legal justice will remain a contested area as long as it does not coincide with the ordinary perceptions of natural or fundamental justice." Lange (2014) surfaces this component when she speaks of the erosion of the moral elements that were driving transformation in the country. She frames these impediments as follows, "[put] differently, the sector-specific notion of transformation has delayed (or postponed indefinitely) political analysis of the obstacles that exist in the South African economic model and political settlement that impede transformation in different areas of the social and economic life of the country and how the interdependence between these operates" (Lange, 2014: 3-4). The moral component is demonstrated by the interdependence between the areas of social and economic life. This observation is inspired by Soudien (2010: 352) when he writes, "Black people still overwhelmingly provide the working class with its character and its numbers, but a significant proportion—two million out of 22 million adults, according to an article in the *Cape Argus* ("Wealth Survey Finds," 2006)—have ascended into the ranks of the middle class."

This reality therefore, highlights the moral question of transformation in the country, with a number of scholars highlighting that the disjuncture between the law and the natural or fundamental conception of justice instantiates the displeasure of the majority with slow-paced change in the country. This is evinced in Modiri's argument when he writes "Nkosi associates the period that is temporally described as 'post'-apartheid or symbolically as 'the Mandela republic' with 'the failure of South Africa to function as a unitary nation'" (2018: 2). This failure rests on the reality that a vast majority of Black/Indigenous subjects still live in abject poverty. Modiri, (2018: 2) subsequently suggests that "the very idea of a 'South Africa' has

operated under the sign of a division so profound that only a complete overhaul of the social infrastructure could clear the ground for the emergence of a truly national literature." Modiri is inspired by Nkosi (2016) when he writes, "[the] coupling of 'nation' with 'narration' in postcolonial studies led Nkosi, in the early 1990s, to question the very idea of a 'South African national literature'" (Modiri, 2018: 2). These sentiments inspire considerations that investigate how transformation has been divorced from its political, moral and intellectual underpinnings as detailed by Lange (2014).

Modiri's (2018: 2) proposition of "a division so profound that only a complete overhaul of the social infrastructure could clear the ground for the emergence of a truly national literature" requires some consideration. This position can be contested from a constitutionalist perspective. This hyperbolic claim i.e. the need for a complete overhaul of social reality, so as to clear the ground for the emergence of a new socio-political reality, cannot go unchallenged. Considering a constitutional framework, a republican(ist) socio-political condition will result in tensions. By this I mean, a socio-political reality that is constituted by a multiplicity of identities will be fraught with contestations. However, this does not give credence to a recklessness that would see the country overturned. I acknowledge that this position can itself be contested using Ramose's (2002b: 463) scholarship when he suggests that "legal justice will remain a contested area for as long as it does not coincide with the ordinary perceptions of natural or fundamental justice." This is to say that the critique of Modiri's (2018) proposition is itself predicated on a legalistic/minimalist conception of justice, however, it requires mentioning. I further wish to acknowledge that this position may be read as shoring up the very problematics critiqued below.

The implications of decoupling transformation from its moral, political and intellectual drivers saw this debate being high-jacked by careerists in the country's university sector. The transformation debate that was embraced by all and sundry, resulting in what I term an Archaic

Vanguard, preceded calls for the reinstitution of Indigenous Knowledge Systems. This is to say that the historical roots of decolonisation can be traced back to the transformation discourse of the early 1990s, which articulated the desire for the inclusion, and substantive engagement with IKS. This historical move begins as the transformation discourse, becomes the IKS debate and later the demand for decolonisation. The ideological tension emerges when one interrogates how this literature has aided the objectives of social redress in the country in general. This is to say that transformation, owing to its deracination, was contested by the student body, through movements such as #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall, which were spurred by the scholarship that had observed the viciousness of this category, i.e. transformation.

This analysis brings to bear two questions. First, owing to the raciality that defines the South African academe, was anything to be expected from an apoliticised mode of thinking such as transformation? In the second chapter, the answer to this question is tentatively proffered by Arendt (1994) who suggests that Philosophy as discipline only becomes interested with the political in times least propitious for philosophising. The second question deals with the political as it relates to the broader academe in the country. With Philosophy as a synecdoche of the broader South African University, was the public truly expecting an academe dominated by whiteness, and white interests, to deal with the raciality of this space. Put differently, was the South African public truly expecting the academe to confront the politics of knowledge production in a systematic and meaningful way? This second question illustrates the ideological tension that Ramose (2002a; 2002b) speaks to, in that the contemporary scholar ought to inquire about reconciling natural/fundamental conceptions of justice with a legalistic/minimalist definition.

This heralds the long standing debates in political theory on the notion of substantive freedom as detailed by Amartya Sen (1999). Kumalo (2020) attempts to reconcile this tension when he writes about *Justice through Higher Education: Revisiting White Paper 3 of 1997*. With higher

education framed as a social institution that would address the gaps instituted by colonial domination and were based on a racial conception of society, Kumalo suggests a shift in how we conceptualise the University so as to deliver on substantive justice. Kumalo (2020) subsequently proposes a horizontal conception of public accountability, suggesting that universities ought to be accountable to their communities as opposed to a vertical accountability that only sees the institution accounting to the Minister through the Vice-Chancellor and Principal.

This move while laudable, does not sufficiently address the problems encountered in the higher education landscape of the country. These challenges are inherently entrenched, resulting in a system premised on the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice*. Put differently, the analysis of the ideological tension, which is inspired by Ramose's (2002a; 2002b) scholarship, is contradictory when one considers Ramose's (2002b) suggestion that legal justice will remain a contested area, so long as prevailing notions of justice have not been reconciled with common perceptions of justice. The role of the contemporary legal scholar, the philosopher and the political theorist therefore is in developing scholarship that attempts to reconcile these divergent conceptions for the purposes of conceptualising a world that takes seriously the divergent epistemic traditions that exist in a republicanist context such as South Africa.

As a way out of this quagmire Paphitis and Villet (2017: 21) infer two approaches; adding materials which are relevant to the lived experiences of students and underrepresented groups or integrating knowledge(s) of underrepresented groups. These suggestions pose two challenges. First, the additive approach may be construed as superficial transformation. Second, integration can fall prey to the objection that it reproduces epistemic injustices.

5.3 The Black Archive as Alternative Approach

The Demographic Diversity of Philosophy and Possibilities for Transforming Philosophy in South Africa, infers two options out of the quagmire detailed in the previous section, these are the integrative and additive approaches. This inference can be gleaned from the following, "[seeing] few members of staff, particularly occupying higher ranking positions, seeing few Postgraduate students, and engaging with few tutors within one's department from one's own racial group is likely to create a schema clash between the schema for one's racial group and the schema for that discipline" (Paphitis and Villet, 2017: 10). Paphitis and Villet come to this observation owing to their framing of Philosophy as "the study of some of the most basic questions pertaining to our existences. If it ignores large chunks of human experiences and excludes those whose experiences have not previously influenced the mainstream, a crucial opportunity to take the discipline forward would be lost" (2017: 3). This would lead one to conclude that Philosophy as discipline should look to diversifying its content so as to avoid high attrition levels from Black/Indigenous subjects. The report highlights two options in addressing the schema clashes as detailed by Paphitis and Villet (2017), these being the additive and integrationist approach. These two approaches are also derived from Graneß' (2018) argument when she details the need to diversify Philosophy as discipline, so as to shift the power dynamics of western philosophical traditions. In what follows, the analysis considers the limitations with these approaches, so as to substantiate the use of the Black Archive as a solution to this challenge.

5.3.1 The Shortfall with an Integrative Approach

The integrative approach falls prey to the vacuousness that defines transformation in the country as noted by Lange (2014). Consider Thompson et al (2012), and Antony's (2012) argument along with other scholars who have attempted to think through this problem. An

integrative approach also inspires further consideration, with regards to the political as power. Simply, in an integrative framework, where one knowledge system is brought in to co-exist with another that has enjoyed hegemonic preponderance, how are knowledge practitioners to negotiate the power dynamics at play? This question highlights the requisite demand to deal with these power dynamics and how they play out in the knowledge project; this is to say that the knowledge project is inherently defined by the colonial categories of thought that have been discussed throughout this study[7]. Highlighting the power dynamics that exist between knowledge traditions, is indicative of the shortfalls of an integrative approach in dealing with the politics of knowledge production. When thinking about knowledge while bearing in mind its political status, the question, 'how do we curate a system wherein knowledge(s) co-exists coevally', resurfaces with more verve. This comes from the reality that knowledge production has been and continues to be defined by the political as power.

The capacity to have knowledge systems coevally exist in the knowledge project, is addressed by Kumalo and Praeg (2019) who consider the possibilities that are available to knowledge practitioners concerned with the decolonial agenda. They maintain that MacIntyre's (1988) notion of translation may be framed as a solution. In detailing this problem, Kumalo and Praeg (2019: 2) argue, "[in] light of the reality that different colonial systems had varying impacts on the peoples of the global South, it is worth considering the divergences that exist between traditions." This consideration contextualises the socio-political nature of knowledge, when attempting to correct the problem of domination of one knowledge system by other

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[7] At this point, an observation is necessary. In South Africa, where social relations and the political economy, have been premised on the raciality that infuses how we think about knowledge – as highlighted through Coetzee's (1988) argument, we cannot cower behind the notion of 'knowledge for knowledge's sake'. This proposition misses the point raised by the scholarship of Ramose (2002a) and frames the knowledge project as ahistorical and apolitical, a point contested by Boughey and McKenna (2016) substantially. The politics of knowledge has further been detailed by decolonial scholars who have demanded that the knowledge project reveal the politics that inform the loci of enunciation from which the knowledge practitioner/theoretician speaks. This move showcases how each epistemic paradigm is itself provincial as argued by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018). In surfacing this provinciality, the aim is not to dismiss knowledge frameworks, but rather to dismantle the hegemonic preponderance that underpins one system of thinking, which ultimately delegitimates other modes of thinking.

knowledge(s); a move rooted at the heart of the decolonial tradition. This is to say that when thinking about responses to epistemic injustices, we cannot assume that one solution will be useful in all contexts. To frame the debate in this way is premised on the reality that there exist "divergences […] between traditions" (Kumalo and Praeg, 2019: 2) as a result of coloniality having impacted different locales in different ways. However, what of the notion of the pitfalls of the integrative approach?

This approach, integrating one mode of knowing with the dominant system of knowing, is challenging in light of the power dynamics detailed above. This observation is made in light of the reality that knowledge systems exist in a political context, defined by political actors. This is to say that the political outcomes function to serve the continued beneficiation of the political actor. Put differently, and echoing a question that was raised earlier, one needs to consider in more detail whether South Africa expected a group of people, whose political preponderance seemed threatened by the inauguration of the democratic dispensation, to serve societal transformation in its most authentic form. An investigation of this nature, however, does little to answer the question, 'how do we curate a socio-political condition, wherein two divergent epistemic traditions can co-exist coevally?'

This analysis showcases some of the shortcomings with an integrative approach to the problem of epistemic injustice. An integrative approach, as indicated above, has been suggested by a number of scholars who are thinking critically about correcting the problem of epistemic injustice, with their task translating into social justice as per the argument developed by Kumalo (2020). An integrative approach, therefore, while laudable does little to correct the problem of epistemic injustice, and institutes further challenges that require our attention.

5.3.2 Critiquing the Additive Approach

As showcased above, the integrative approach requires a mediation of the power dynamics that exist as a result of colonial categories of thought. This section is dedicated to a critique of the additive approach. The simplest objection against this approach, is that it is superficial in nature. Todd (2016) substantiates this position when she writes about *An Indigenous Feminist's Take On The Ontological Turn*. Todd (2016) takes issue with systems of decolonisation that perpetuate colonial epistemic injustices. She contends, "[it] is easier for Euro-Western people to tangle with a symbolic polar bear on a Greenpeace website or in a tweet than it is to acknowledge arctic Indigenous peoples and their knowledge systems and legal-political realities" (Todd, 2016: 6). Todd uncovers and deals with the problems that are encountered when Indigenous modes of knowing are added into the mainstream debates. This is to say that these debates shore-up the notion that European thought continues to lead world thought in addressing contemporary social reality. This position is substantiated, using Outlaw's (2017) treatise when he details how European modernity frames itself as *sui generis* the source of philosophical thinking. The difficulty with an additive approach, is that Indigenous modes of knowing are subsumed under colonial logics; itself an instantiation of colonial epistemic injustices. In the third chapter, I detail this very problem in South Africa using SEK Mqhayi's scholarship. The obstacle(s) as detailed in the third chapter, arise from knowledge(s) that originate(s) in other areas of the world being subsumed as the invention of European modernity. This is contested by Todd (2016: 7) when she further argues, "I was left wondering, when will I hear someone reference Indigenous thinkers in a direct, contemporary and meaningful way in European lecture halls?"

Todd's (2016) question highlights the limitations with the first approach, the integrative approach, which has been critiqued for this very reason; its continuation of the power imbalances in knowledge. It is clear to note then from this brief analysis how the additive

approach, is itself imbricated in the first; the integrative approach. Both approaches highlight the setbacks instituted by seemingly progressive thinking. The propositions that exist in the literature therefore, do little to work through this issue of unequal power dynamics and correct the problem of epistemic injustice. An alternative remedy is found in Fricker's (2007) theory when she proposes virtue epistemology that counteracts the epistemic harms committed against the speaker. However, this approach is itself contested to showcase that it does little to deal with the challenge that we encounter in South Africa. Alternatively, epistemic justice scholars could model the proposition developed by Fricker (2007) on an institutional scale. The shortfall with Fricker's theory, however, is that it is premised on an individualistic framework that is only concerned with epistemic harms and justice as it relates to individuals. To detail this problem more effectively, Kumalo's (2017) treatise on the development discourse is useful.

There is something to be said about colonial logics and how they function in the contemporary academe. Kumalo (2017: 18) argues that the difficulty with adding Indigenous knowledge(s) into the mainstream is highlighted by the superimposition of western categories of thought. In simpler terms, historically, Black/Indigenous subjects have conceptualised western thinking as enlightened. This is seen in the reality that it was western modernity that birthed the current global environmental crisis through technological advancements. With the Truman doctrine of 1949 that instituted categories of the developed and the underdeveloped world, Africa played into the catch up game (Kumalo, 2017: 18). This meant the degradation of the environs of African peoples as they were in the race to attain the development that characterises the western world. This example showcases the implications of attempting to add Indigenous ways of knowing to existing epistemic frameworks that were established by epistemic injustices. By this I mean, an additive approach – which has mistakenly been aligned with the decolonial movement – does little to contest existing categories that define the structure of knowledge in westernised universities.

This example further highlights how Black/Indigenous ways of knowing are now being appealed to, as a mode of solving the problem instituted by the Truman doctrine. This is to say that the knowledge(s) of Black/Indigenous subjects is/are now being added into considerations of strategies in addressing a problem that was birthed by ideologies that sought to undermine Indigenous ways of life. In sum, we can comfortably conclude that an additive approach can be critiqued for its lack of substantive engagement with the epistemic predispositions of Black/Indigenous knowledge as highlighted by Kumalo and Praeg when they maintain, "[these] performances of 'decoloniality', which often take the form of elaborately ritualised and expensive decolonial lectures delivered by international scholars, amount to a form of '*box-ticking*' that lacks substantive engagement with locally situated struggles, debates and dialogues" (2019: 1).

5.3.3 An Alternative

I conclude by speculating on options that could potentially bypass the objections of an additive and an integrationist approach. This being the resurrection of the Black Archive. The Black Archive is constitutive, in part, of Black intellectuals and scholars i.e. Plaatje (1916), Soga (1910) and Mqhayi (1912; 1914; 1928 and 1933) who were instrumental in championing a struggle against the epistemic erasures of colonialism on the continent since the nineteenth century[8]. The Black Archive, historically and contextually locates the demand put by Black/Indigenous philosophers in our context that the PSSA be dissolved while revealing the ethical culpability of dominant European epistemic paradigms. Ethical culpability of this kind, as termed epistemicide[9] by scholars working in African philosophy and the decolonial tradition, undermines the status of Africans or people of African descent as knowers. This culpability

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[8] It must further be noted that there has been work developed by other scholars that dates back as far as the 18th century in South Africa. Thus the reason why this approach is framed as a resurrection of the Black Archive.
[9] In the previous chapter this claim is contested and it is useful to remind the reader of this fact here.

creates what is conceptualised as the *Native of Nowhere* (Kumalo, 2018a). The Black Archive, however, does not portend a nationalist project, rather it acknowledges the historicity of epistemic injustice in the South African academe. It constantly reveals the origins of knowledge and substantively engages Black/Indigenous epistemic frameworks. In this regard, the Black Archive suggests a constantly revisionist approach to canon formation – something akin to Bill Readings' (2006) idea of a republicanism in canon formation.

How, then, does the Black Archive ameliorate epistemic injustice in our context? There are three things that can be said by way of answering this question. The first lies in the conception of the Black Archive. This collection of work does not merely speak to thinkers, intellectuals, artists and knowledge practitioners that are Black in the sense of Indigeneity. The Black Archive is constitutive of practitioners that were fighting against coloniality in the Southern African region since the decolonial moment, the moment of contact. The second remark speaks to the outlook of the Black Archive, which continues to grow as knowledge practitioners continue to deposit alternative modes of thinking into this repository. This approach to knowledge generation substantiates the revisionist agenda advocated by Readings (1996). The final consideration, is derived from the second, and speaks to its responsiveness to the local conditions, while also remaining globally relevant. Global relevance is derived from the use of the Black Archive as a teaching tool that is in conversation with other modes of thinking. This is to suggest a decolonial teaching praxis that is aligned with the argument advanced by Dussel (2013) when he calls for inter-epistemic dialogue. Inter-epistemic dialogue, in the Dussellian sense, differs from an additive or integrationist approach in that this thinking substantively engages alternative epistemic frameworks while locating these in dialogue with dominant traditions. The Black Archive therefore, shifts the geography of reason, and facilitates alternative modes of knowledge production in the South African context.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter mapped the raciality of *the sociality of epistemic practice* in Philosophy as discipline, while broadly extending this debate to consider its implications in the University. The argument presented in this chapter hinges on the broader argument of this study, which analyses the politics of knowledge as they manifested in Philosophy as discipline; culminating in the demand that the PSSA be dissolved. Furthermore, it is useful to note the conditions under which this call was made by the Azanian Philosophical Society. On the basis of sustained epistemic injustices, the call to dissolve the PSSA was rooted in the historical socio-political and socio-economic conditions of South Africa more generally. Put differently, the argument presented in this chapter crystallised the argument advanced in the second chapter, that the state and the University are closely imbricated, and that in order to understand the politics of knowledge production, as they play out in the University as well as in Philosophy as discipline, one needs to understand the raciality that informed coloniality. This argument cannot be read as an exception to the South African context. This comes from the reality that South Africa can be viewed as a synecdoche of the global politics of the knowledge project.

The chapter subsequently considered the suggestions that are offered as a way out of this quagmire, i.e. the politics of the knowledge project. These two alternatives were framed as the integrative and additive approaches, suggested in the scholarship of intellectuals working in higher education transformation and decolonisation. This move was, however, critiqued in that it did little to correct the problem of epistemic injustice. An alternative perspective to these suggestions would be to look to the scholarship of Miranda Fricker (2007) who suggests the development of a virtue epistemology to counteract the harms committed against a speaker. This move itself was critiqued in the previous chapter, showcasing that it is concerned with epistemic harms and justice only insofar as this pertains to individuals.

As a way out of this challenge, the analysis presented in this chapter went on to consider the Black Archive as a response. In this regard, the Black Archive was framed as a more conducive way of negotiating the contradictions that exist in Philosophy as discipline, but more importantly in the broader framework of institutional decolonisation and transformation. This is as the Black Archive takes seriously the role of inter-epistemic dialogue as developed by Dussel (2009) while also revealing the dissent in the discipline; a notion that can be applied to other areas within the broader institution, i.e. the University.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

This study analysed knowledge as political. By a political enterprise is meant that we cannot understand knowledge claims outside of the historical and political contexts in which it is situated. The motivation behind unearthing the political status of knowledge was inspired by Fricker (2007) when she contends that we have to understand epistemic agents not in abstraction, but rather as they relate to each other in socially situated reality. While this framework – analysing knowledge as a political enterprise – may be resisted by some scholars, specifically those working in second order disciplines i.e. Art, Music, Philosophy and Literature; the ideal of knowledge for its own sake was challenged in the fourth chapter. As a way of concluding then, it might be useful to interrogate what this analysis gives us as a way of thinking about the contemporary knowledge enterprise in South Africa.

While the analysis was rooted in a systematic consideration of Philosophy as discipline, as indicated in the study, the discipline might be a synecdoche for the broader South African University. The challenges that plague the discipline, are challenges that define the academe, resultantly inspiring students and scholars alike to demand the decolonisation of the South African University. As a way of answering the question of what the analysis gives us as a way of thinking about the knowledge project in our context, it might be useful to interrogate some of the limitations that presently define the decolonial tradition in our context.

A principle challenge that I would like to draw the reader's attention to, speaks to the reality that decoloniality is presently elusive. By elusive is meant the reality that decolonisation as a liberatory tool has been underutilised in the academe owing to a slack engagement with the Black Archive. With the second chapter tracing the historical interconnections between the University and the European nation state, the analysis showcased that the contemporary African state is first, a product of the residual hang-ups of colonial categories of state

organisation and secondly has been unable to redefine the University into an institution that works towards the attainment of social goals, i.e. redress and equity. Redress and equity in this regard is premised on the factual reality of Blackness/Indigeneity suffering epistemic harms and political dispossession all across the African continent. The subsequent question would be, 'has decoloniality as a theoretical tool failed to live up to its promise – the liberation of African subjectivities from European conceptions'? The answer to this question lies in a more systematic engagement with the Black Archive, which has been neglected by decolonialists in our context.

The neglect of the Black Archive is indicative of two realities. The first speaks to a question of whether this knowledge is being intentionally side-lined so as to prop-up the notion of decolonisation as a cultural inventive project. In some respects, there is a need to inquire as to whether intellectuals and scholars in the academe are feigning intellectual laziness so as to establish the narrative that their scholarship is addressing new and novel questions, or is there a genuine sense of laziness that is contemporarily arresting the academe? The second consideration speaks to the possibility that this knowledge has been neglected owing to the reality that scholars working in the decolonial tradition are incapable of reading the Black Archive and unlocking the potentialities that it presents to us in this time of institutional transformation. An inability to read the Black Archive might be rooted in the matter addressed in chapter five, wherein the analysis looked at how some of the leading theorists of ubuntu in our context cannot even speak the languages of ubuntu. In these two considerations, the focal point of this study is once again brought to the forefront, the reality that knowledge is a political and historical enterprise that is underpinned by the motivations of political actors who drive it.

A thorough engagement of the Black Archive is useful insofar as it highlights the historicity of the geography of dissent. As indicated in the first chapter, this geography is constitutive of thinkers and knowledge practitioners who have always been invested in resisting colonial

imposition in our context. With a focus on uMqhayi's work in this study, the analysis has showcased how the constitutive members of this Archive have always been invested in resisting colonial imposition and the erasure of Black/Indigenous modes of knowing. The Black Archive therefore, highlights the reality that the South African University has always been defined by a contestation of rationalities, with Blackness and whiteness competing to entrench their modes of knowing. In the knowledge that the ethics of knowing in South Africa have always been fraught, what can the Black Archive tell us about the future possibilities of the knowledge project, as it relates to South Africa?

There are two things that can be said as a mode of answering this question. The first speaks to how we conceptualise the political in the South African context. In the analysis conducted in this dissertation, there were two conceptions of the political that were proffered. The first speaks to the political as power, in the sense of the distribution of resources and the implications that are derived from said distribution. This notion of the political, specifically as it relates to knowledge, was derived from Mignolo (2009) and Gordon (2008; 2014). The political as power in the South African context, has always seen Blackness/Indigeneity as benefiting minimally from the political conditions of possibility. This point was evinced in the argument developed in chapter five, wherein I detail how African categories of thought, in and of themselves, are only taken seriously insofar as they are developed and drive by white scholars in our context. The political as consensus, a concept derived from the scholarship of Maclure and Taylor (2011), in our context yields no better result either. This is to suggest that the political as consensus is itself defined by power imbalances seen in the previous chapter as a critique of the two approaches that are advanced in the literature, when it comes to attempting to develop solutions that get us to a position of epistemic justice. *Knowledge as Political* then in this sense invites the consideration that the knowledge enterprise will always be fraught with contestations and minimal efforts at institutional transformation and decolonisation. This

observation is rooted in the reality that so long as whiteness remains at the helm of higher education institutions in the country, the possibilities for substantive change are minimal. The Black Archive, however, may possess alternative perspectives when engaged systematically and substantively. This is to say that prior to rushing to propose political solutions to the problem of *Knowledge as Political*, there might be some benefit derived from an engagement of the works of intellectuals who witnessed colonisation unfolding and were documenting the death/suppression/demise of African modes of thought and the rise of European conceptions of the world in our context.

The Black Archive facilitates our capacity to begin developing theory that is responsive to the social realities that define our context. This is to say that the Black Archive is rooted in and concerned with the biting pains that define African reality as discussed using Chimakonam (2018). A concern with the biting pains of Africa denotes a form of epistemic humility that recognises that the contemporary questions, with which we are confronted have been addressed and considered historically by the likes of Gqoba (1888) and Mqhayi (1914) to mention a couple. With knowledge defined as politically and historically situated – according to the analysis developed here, it might be useful to inquire as to the uses of a University in any society. Put differently, contemporarily – what is the South African University driven by? What motivates or informs the knowledge project in our context?

Answering this subsidiary question goes a long way in revealing the implicit assumptions that we carry about the knowledge project and whether it will at all be able to address the challenges that afflict the contemporary South African state. This question therefore can be answered in two forms; the University is a site of cultural production (in the sense of Readings' 1996 argument) or the University is a social institution dedicated to addressing socio-political and socio-economic realities of any given state. In light of the analysis presented in this study it is not easy to decisively take one position and claim that it trumps the other. The complexity that

is highlighted by this question showcases the very political nature of the knowledge project as the decision, as to which inclination one takes, itself highlights what is intended in the contention of the knowledge project as a political and historical enterprise. Owing to the scope of this project, these subsidiary questions that are highlighted at the end of the analysis cannot be fully addressed. It is, however, hoped that further research may be conducted to answer these questions.

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Endnotes

[i]Where are your daughters? What is your word?
They have traversed this land searching for marriage
Renting rooms/cottages; covered in dust
Ruled by their own laws, in lands removed from their homes.

Their mothers' wailing until their eyes are red from sobbing
Abandoned by their children; leaving as they watch
Advising while wailing without hope of being heard
Sons and daughters of education!

The jails exploded and the offices ransacked
By these mischievous characters of education.
Certificates of the Seminarians
Are a joke to the magistrates

All the bandits are in school
All the thieves are in school
All the witches are in school
You are to be forsaken, I swear it on my life

[ii] This work was a draft of a chapter to be included in *The South African Epistemic Decolonial Turn: A Global Perspective that did not make it into the volume.*

[iii] In this short tale, I explore the customs and systematicity of the Xhosa people as they think through legal arbitration and how it relates to social life. This comes as they attempt to locate legal arbitration systems in the historical traditions and customs of the Xhosa people. I also showcase that the King is not the sole adjudicator when it comes to jurisprudential matters, as the nation exists in relational ties to one another. My aim in showcasing these facets of Xhosa cosmology is rooted in the concern that the epistemic practices and processes of the Xhosa people are being erased owing to the impositions of the peoples of the West.

[iv] At the battle of Amalinde in 1818 between Ngqika and Ndlambe, Ngqika's armies were commanded by Maqoma, who had recently emerged from initiation school. The Ngqika fought valiantly but were utterly destroyed, destroyed by the overwhelming numbers of the Ndlambe, who had joined forces with all the Xhosa nations; Maqoma narrowly escaped, bleeding from battle wounds. And so Ngqika's heroes fell, Jotelo the father of Soga, Ntyi the father of Tyala, and Ntlukwana the father of Neku. And so Ngqika secretly appealed to the white man for support, and so the man excised a large section of land for himself as a reward, and established Ngqakayi, claiming it for Ngqika's protection.

[v] This case [Ityalal Lamawele] was adjudicated in Butterworth, at the palace of the King, where there now stands the Wesley Church of African Peoples.

[vi] The arrival of the westerners and the cultural interplay between the two traditions saw modes of appropriation as, they (British colonial settlers) found our treatment of the law to be judicious and systematic to the extent that they too borrowed from our systems of arbitration and adjudication.

[vii] Nations that know Maqoma, white and black, were agreed that Maqoma was not only brave and a hero in battle but was also an extremely eloquent speaker, an expert at investigating the truth, and finding it under a hue garbage heap of deceit, lies and distortion. [...] A case at Maqoma's court consumed much time: a thorough investigation was set aside, resumed on another day, and set aside again, until the truth was revealed, with testimony repeated over and over, through questions and answers. All this was done so that the accused was judged on his words or the words of his witnesses.

[viii] See endnote 3.

[ix] See endnote 1.

[x] See endnote 3.

[xi] See endnote 1.

[xii] See endnote 4.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] It becomes the burden of the contemporary scholar, who is conversant with the mores, cultures and values of amaXhosa, to probe the question of what else will be erased once they (the colonial settler with their imposition of their customs and ways of knowing) have erased our languages and customs.

[xv] See endnote 4.

[xvi] See endnote 1.

xvii He whose house was christened with the blood of his enemies.

xviii Only now, after this battle, did Mpande enter the picture. Because of his ill treatment at the hands of his elder brother Dingana, he had decided to leave and seek a place of refuge from his enemies for fear of being murdered one day. Because Mpande brought with him a massed army of soldiers dissatisfied with Dingana's rule, the Boers greatly rejoiced at this answer to their prayers.

xix This fellow was the son of Senzangakhona – Shaka and Dingaan are his older brothers; as he comes from a minor house of less significance, it was inconceivable that he could rule the kingdom of Zulu and Malandela.

xx After some time the whites promised Cetshwayo and the Zulu that after his father's death he would succeed as King KwaZulu; things began to calm down then because this fellow had been hunting the fellow who was to succeed his father. In 1872 Mpande died. He died with the Zulu nation united after the disruption of war after war – but he had achieved this dispensation by handing over his own nation.

xxi See endnote 12.

xxii Even as I am not an expert of comparative jurisprudence, I do hold the view that the laws that govern Xhosa society are not that different from the laws that govern enlightened societies.

xxiii Maqoma learnt about matters of state from close association with his father Ngqika, who as very highly regarded by his councillors, who worked at taking him from his uncle Ndlambe because they wanted to teach him in their own way. When white governors and missionaries arrived, they treated Ngqika as paramount chief of the Xhosa, and the other chiefs of his nation then grew hostile to Ngqika. Maqoma at this young age witnessed all the hypocrisy and deceit of the white nations.