



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

**An Analysis of South Africa's Bilateral Relations with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States:
The Cases of Indonesia and Singapore**

By

Xitsundzuxo Kenny Dlamini

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SUPERVISOR: Prof Siphamandla Zondi

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Declaration

I declare that this research paper: *'An Analysis of South Africa's Bilateral Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States: The Cases of Indonesia and Singapore'* is my work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources that I have used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged.

Signature:

Date:

Abstract

Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been successful in establishing strategic relations with Asian countries to strengthen and promote its political, social and economic interests, through bilateral relations and multilateral engagements. This is a foreign policy study seeking to analyse the fundamental principles and approach of South Africa foreign policy in the Global South, by focusing on South Africa's relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. It builds on the historical and ideological linkages between Asia-Africa relations with reference to the 1955 Asia-Africa conference in Bandung, Indonesia, where the principles and values of South-South Cooperation were firstly underlined. The study will be grounded on a conceptual framework using, the concept of Global South and Ubuntu Diplomacy in South African foreign policy.

The purpose is to analyse the basis of South Africa's relations with the ASEAN member states in terms of political, economic or ideological linkages. The approach and method of the research will be qualitative relying mostly on desktop research to gather primary and secondary data sources. The structure of the paper will begin with a background study on South Africa's foreign policy in the Global South, followed by the challenges of South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries: Indonesia and Singapore, and conclusion with recommendations on strengthening South Africa's bilateral relations with ASEAN member states.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction of the study

1.1. Identification of the Research Theme

This is a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) study analysing South Africa's relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to the literature in International Relations, FPA is distinctively defined to understand the conduct of states in international affairs. This study draws on a definition of FPA by Alden and Aran (2017), as “ the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system, where diplomacy, intelligence, trade negotiations and cultural exchanges all form part of the substance of foreign policy between international actors (Alden and Aran 2017).

The research seeks to analyse the drivers of South Africa's foreign policy towards the Global South with special reference to relations with countries in the South-East Asia region, using Indonesia and Singapore as cases in point. The question is why this is an important research theme and focus. Below I explain the theme and outline the research problem.

The study also recognises that there is no holistic approach to the definition of foreign policy analysis. There are different perspectives on what constitutes foreign policy analysis in international relations. However, this study selectively uses Alden and Aran (2017) definition of FPA as a point of reference to understand South Africa's foreign policy conduct in the Global South. The analysis is done based on South Africa's relations with the ASEAN member states, how South Africa defines its approach towards the Southeast Asia region and why it is important for South Africa to strengthen these relations

Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy expresses a view that the country's prosperity is inextricably linked to the African continent and the Global South (Hengari 2014). According to the former minister of South Africa's International Relations & Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, one of the fundamental purposes of South Africa's South-South focus is “to demystify the notion that South Africa is being fashionable in pursuing relations with its

partners of the South, by reminding South Africans that the seeds of South-South cooperation were laid at the 1955 Bandung Conference. South Africa is also aware that history has marched on, and the age of globalisation requires South Africa to elevate these partnerships to a different level, building on the wells of goodwill and solidarity, and generate mutually beneficial economic relations” (Nkoana-Mashabane 2012). This statement suggests that South Africa seeks to build its foreign policy paths that will complement the ideas and values of goodwill, solidarity and mutual benefit in the Global South. Building upon the historical and ideological linkages between Asia-Africa relations and principles of South-South Cooperation of the 1955 Bandung conference, one of South Africa’s priorities in the Global South is to revitalise the New Africa Asia Strategic Partnership as a vehicle for South-South social-economic cooperation (DIRCO strategic plan 2010-2013). According to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation strategic plan 2015-2018, ‘Partnerships with countries of the South are critical to advancing not only South Africa’s own development needs, but also the African Agenda and to create political, economic and social convergence for the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and the marginalisation of the South” (DIRCO strategic plan 2015-2018). Therefore South Africa will sought to champion a strong and mutual beneficial South-South cooperation

From 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been successful in establishing strategic relations with Asian countries to strengthen and promote its political, social and economic interests, through bilateral relations and multilateral engagements (Dlamini, 2014). South Africa-Asia focus is mostly defined in terms of relations with China, Japan and India. This vested interest in the big countries has generally overshadowed South Africa's diplomatic engagement with other (Southeast) Asia nations. As a result there is an insufficient analysis of South African relations with other Asian countries, in this case with Southeast Asian nations such as the content of trade, bilateral mechanisms and drivers of these relations. This is besides the historical linkages and the fact that South Africa shares bilateral relations with all ASEAN member states. In principle, South Africa’s diplomatic relationships with the region highlights its significant longstanding relations with the ASEAN community. This was also reflected during the 8th ASEAN summit address by President Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as a Chairperson of the African Union, stressing the need to deepen cooperation between Africa and ASEAN.

1.2. Research problem

The research problem of this study is based on the lack of knowledge and interest in both academia and non-academic space on South Africa relations with Southeast Asia. This may be linked to the shortage of research studies and interest when it comes to South Africa's relations with developing states in Asia. Generally, studies on South Africa and Asia focuses on specific countries like China (Cornelissen 2015; Sithole 2015; Alden & Wu 2014), Japan (Carim 1994; Cornelissen 2015) and perhaps South Korea (Sheldon 2009, 2014); very little research published on South Africa's relations in the Southeast Asia region. What exists are a few publications such as (Dlamini 2013, 2014; Krisetya 2015, Haron 2007) in providing a broad overview of relations in the ASEAN region. There are yet studies that provides a systematic analysis and evaluation of South Africa's relations with ASEAN member states, besides the fact that these relations are now more than 20 years old.

Thus, this study will focus on bilateral relations with Indonesia and Singapore in the hope that this will lead to analysis of other ASEAN countries and that the findings of this study could be extrapolated for the analysis of the entire region in future. The selection of these two countries is influenced by South Africa's historical relations with Indonesia in advancing Africa-Asia relations and the level of trade and economic activities with Singapore in the Southeast Asia region. But also the reason that little analysis has gone into understanding these relations. However, the study concedes that these two countries do not necessarily reflect South Africa's overall relations with entire ASEAN.

1.3. Research Question

This study will be guided by the following question: What are the drivers of South Africa's diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asia region with special reference to Indonesia and Singapore, and how are these important for South Africa's south-south cooperation agenda?

1.4. Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this study is to conduct an analysis of the drivers of South Africa's relations with South-East Asian countries; Indonesia and Singapore

Study objectives are:

- To describe the evolution or historical background of South Africa's relations with ASEAN member states
- To evaluate bilateral relations between South Africa and the two ASEAN member states: Indonesia and Singapore
- To analyse the implications of these relations in South Africa's socio-economic diplomacy towards the South-South agenda.

1.5. Literature Study

The importance of literature review is to provide a thorough summary and critical analysis of the relevant available research and non-research literature on the topic being studied (Hart, 1998). There are different types of literature reviews, however this research will use a narrative literature review also known as traditional literature review. A primary value of the traditional literature review is to quickly offer the newcomer or “visitor” to a subject area with a reasonably thorough overview of the state of relevant knowledge in that area (Rozas & Klein, 2010). This type of literature review give the author and reader a comprehensive overview of the topic and to highlight significant areas of research (Griffith University), this will assist to effectively evaluate the available published and unpublished documents in relation to the research topic and also to justify the research problem.

To provide a comprehensive literature review for this study, I will consult the following books as key sources; South African foreign policy review volume 1 (2012), South African foreign policy review volume 2 (2015) published by the Africa Institute of South Africa. The third book will be *In Full Flight: South African foreign policy after apartheid* published by the Institute for Global dialogue in 2006. While I will not be limited to these books, I considered them to be extremely useful in providing an in-depth analysis of South African foreign policy in a post-apartheid era. I will also use as a point of reference *'A Foreign Policy Handbook; an overview of South African Foreign policy in Context'* by the Institute for Global Dialogue (2014) to unpack South Africa's foreign policy agenda and implementation from Mandela 1994-1999, Mbeki 1999-2008 and Zuma 2009-2014. The handbook provides a concise literature in understanding the shift of South African foreign policy in the first 20 years.

1.5.1. SA Foreign Policy towards Asia/Southeast Asia

South Africa's ties with Asia has both expanded and deepened as South Africa maintains a differentiated approach to the Asia continent reflected by stronger diplomatic relations nurtured with only a small number of states (Cornelissen, 2015). However, a study on South Africa's relations with ASEAN is yet to be fully explored. The constant shifting priorities in the South have led to older relations declining out of neglect, while new ones are being consolidated (Twenty Year Review South Africa 1994-2014). For example, South Africa allowed its focus on the Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa (BRICS) forum to overshadow its attention to other South-South platforms, a mistake that could have been avoided by the development of a strategy on south-south cooperation broadly (Twenty Year Review South Africa 1994-2014).

One of the scholars who wrote on South Africa's relations in ASEAN, Haron (2007) argues that there is an existing gap in the literature available of scholarly research publication studying South Africa's relations in the Southeast Asia region. In his PhD thesis '*South Africa and Malaysia: Identity and History in South-South Relations*', Haron echoes the sentiment that South Africa's relations with Asia "a sizable amount of literature has been produced that gave attention to South Africa's relations with countries such as China, Japan and the Koreans, very little covered its relationship with Asean" (Haron 2007).

Haron further explained that "the absence of skilled human resources and the lack of research on far east, southwest and southeast Asia basically signify that the opportunity to explore the relationship and partnerships which exist between South Africa and other nation-states in Asia, is essentially an open terrain" (Haron 2007). More than ten years later after Haron's paper, there is still a lack of literature focusing on South Africa relations in the Southeast Asia.

Indonesia

Background on Indonesia's foreign policy shows that "Indonesia's perception of the world and itself is as much influenced by the cold war environment where it sought to strike an independent path from the two opposing blocs; the Soviet-led communist bloc and the American-led capitalist bloc" (Anwar 1994). This according to Anwar, led to the adoption of free and active foreign policy doctrine in 1948. To this date, Indonesia's foreign policy is still premised in the free and active doctrine, an obligation stipulated in Indonesia's constitution. To achieve the free and active foreign policy doctrine, and also to deal with the injustice of the

past caused by the colonisation period under the control of Netherlands which ended after the World War II in 1945, Indonesia focused on cooperation with other countries where it played a key role in the formation of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) during the cold war; an active role in the regional politics, also a founding member of ASEAN in 1967; and the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia in a quest for regional order.

In the 1990s, Indonesia embarked on adopting a higher diplomatic profile in the Southeast Asia region and beyond (Vatikiotis, 1993). According to Vatikiotis, the changes to the external and internal dynamics of foreign policy appear to have coincided and combined to set Indonesia on a more outward-looking course (Vatikiotis, 1993). This period also strengthened the legacy of the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia foreign policy in the multipolar world.

The available literature between South Africa and Indonesia shows that the bond between Indonesia and (South) Africa is forged by the shared historic solidarity against colonialism (Marsudi, 2017). Africa is a major non-traditional market for Indonesia (Marsudi, 2017), and the most current dominating relations are between Indonesia and West Africa, mostly defined through economic diplomacy.

Other scholars like Chipanda (2015) explains that Indonesia is an attractive potential market for South African products due to its population size, growing middle class, GDP growth rate, trade complementarity and its regional trade associations. Halim (2017) further argue that these two countries had a strong foundation of bilateral friendship as Indonesia had played a key role in supporting the South Africans' struggle for freedom in the past.

In an essay by Beltsazar Krisetya '*Towards Indonesia –South Africa advanced cooperation*', the author describes the commonalities that defines the relations of the two countries. Both countries found 'solidarity in history and common background of democracy and economy, both plays an important role in their regional organisations, and are seen as a voice for their region in global politics' (Krisetya 2015).

Singapore

Regarding South Africa and Singapore relations, the available literature shows that economic relations between the two countries are growing and that South Africa considers Singapore as an important and valued partner in the Southeast Asia (SAnews 2015).

As a small state with economic power in the Southeast Asia region, Singapore boasts of a strong and active foreign policy that rely on soft power to define and safeguard its national interest in the continuous changing world. Theoretically, majority of mainstream literature have simplistically categorized Singapore's foreign policy declarations and behaviour in a realist outlook (Chong 2006).

This categorization is rooted in the fundamental principles of Singapore's foreign policy where the first two principles states that "as a small state, Singapore has no illusions about the state of its region and the world" (MFA site) and also the "need to maintain a credible and deterrent military defence to underpin its foreign policy (MFA site). Acharya (2007) in his book 'Singapore's foreign policy: the search for regional order' also argues that Singapore's foreign policy makers have articulated an essential realist conception of international politics which resembles a Hobbesian state of nature. In this context, this scholar echoes the former foreign minister of Singapore S. Dhanabalan where he argued that in international politics, 'order' is prerogative to the survival of states (Acharya 2007). This is described in one of the Singapore's fundamental principles of foreign policy, "working to maintain a secure and peaceful environment in and around Southeast Asia and in the Asia Pacific region" (MFA site)

However some scholars believe that Singapore's foreign policy go beyond realism theory. According to Ting (2010) it is important to understand Singapore's foreign policy through the lens of realist perspective, but it is also important to focus on Singapore's foreign policy actions which do not necessary conform to the realist rhetoric, revolving around the anarchical and unstable nature of international relations (Ting 2010). As a small state, Singapore's longstanding narrative of vulnerability, a narrative that has galvanized its strategic policies for the last four decades in areas from education to defence to foreign relations is evolving into one that is more about sustaining its success (Jack, Huang & Collin 2013).

Not different from South Africa's foreign policy, Singapore's foreign policy is principled, focusing on building ties with partners, seeking to foster common interest among friendly nations, and to uphold a stable, secure region and global order that abides by the rule of law (Zi Liang 2016). Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1992 and since then Singapore assisted South Africa with developmental experience, relations are also growing in other spheres- political, economic, military and social. (SAnews 2015).

Singapore's foreign relations success is also evident in the South African trade statistics; it is South Africa's second largest trading partners in ASEAN region and in 2005 South Africa and

Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding on bilateral cooperation that made provision for regular consultations on issues of mutual interest between the two ministries of foreign affairs.

While the available literature provides a glimpse of the bases of South Africa's relations with Indonesia and Singapore, there is a need to study what drives these relations, as this is not fully covered in the literature, a study to go beyond the historical background to provide a more analysis on the current perspectives of these relations.

1.6. Research methodology

Research methodology is defined as a body of knowledge which attempts to explain or understand how research is done, this includes various steps followed by researchers in undertaking research (Walwyn 2017). This research will be grounded on a qualitative research approach. A Qualitative approach rely on human interpretation and evaluation, and cannot be dispassionately measured in a standard way, thus checks on the reliability and completeness of qualitative data can be made by consulting a variety of sources of data relating to the research topic (Williman 2011). The research approach used is an evaluative analysis, while there are competing definitions of evaluative analysis, it is used for this research as a tool to look and study available literature to improve forward direction (Lundberg 2006)

1.6.1. Data collection and analysis

The study used desktop research method for data collection, collecting from secondary sources available for public consumption. These include books, academic journals, internet sources, speeches and official government documents of bilateral relations available to public between South Africa and the two ASEAN member states.

Furthermore, the study use content analysis for data analysis. In this case, Hsieh & Shannon (2005) consider a qualitative content analysis as one of numerous research methods used to analyse text data, other methods include ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, and historical research. Patton (2002) describe qualitative content analysis as any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to

identify core consistencies and meanings. This consist of purposively selected texts which can inform the research questions being investigated (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2005)

The content data analysis was suitable for the study to analyse books, academic journals, internet sources, speeches and official government documents of bilateral relations available to public on what are the drivers of South Africa's relations with ASEAN.

1.6.2. Ethics

The research was guided by the code of ethics for research set out by the University of Pretoria. In this case the research did not use any confidential information that is not available for public consumption without permission granted by the relevant parties. All information used from secondary data sources has been acknowledged.

1.6.3. Limitations

The limitations of this research were:

- The lack of primary data on South Africa's relations with ASEAN due to distance between SA and ASEAN region means that the study will depend more on secondary data and also non-researched publications.
- Time will not permit this researcher to conduct interviews with South African government officials at the Department of International Relations & Cooperation and diplomats from ASEAN member states based in South Africa.

1.7. The structure of the research

The research consist of five chapters. Chapter one is an introduction laying out the focus and framework of the study. It introduces and problematizes the topic, stating what the study intends to do and the research method to be followed. Chapter two contextualises South Africa's Global South focus within the context of Global South and Ubuntu Diplomacy, discussing the fundamental principles and approach of South African foreign policy. Chapter three outlines the pillars of South African foreign policy under the democratic South Africa and how these pillars played out in the government of President Nelson Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki and President Jacob Zuma. Chapter four analyses South Africa's engagement with ASEAN member states by focusing on South Africa's bilateral relations with Indonesia and Singapore. This chapter incorporates the information gathered from the research to

evaluate and understand the drivers and interest of South Africa in the Southeast Asia region. Finally, chapter five is summary and recommendations. Based on the research gathered, the chapter provides recommendations on how South Africa can strengthen its bilateral relations with ASEAN member states in order to increase its footprint in the Southeast Asia region.

CHAPTER TWO

South Africa's foreign policy and the global south in context

2.1. Introduction

In 1994, the newly South African democratic government in the post-apartheid had a duty and a challenge to construct a South African foreign policy that would seek to rebrand the image and future aspirations of the democratic South Africa both nationally and internationally. There were high expectations from the international community, anticipating how the African National Congress (ANC) government would usher the new South Africa to become a responsible global citizen. The expectations resulted from the manner in which the transition from apartheid to a democratic state was achieved through peaceful transition, and from the objectives and principles of the ANC's foreign policy ambitions outlined before it came to power.

The issues of human rights, equality, non-racialism and non-sexism became dominant aspects in the road to democracy. These were some of the ideals of the freedom charter adopted in 1955 at the Congress of the People, to be the guiding principles for the free and fair South Africa. These principles would later become the cornerstone for the fight against apartheid and cherished by the democratic government.

Other dominating factor in the new South African foreign policy was the focus on strengthening relations with Africa and the South. The ideals of Pan-Africanism and the Global South narrative dominated South Africa's foreign policy spaces because of the historical link between the ANC with African states and the countries from the South, in supporting the ANC struggle against apartheid and the fight against colonialism in the Global South.

Since 1994 South African foreign policy continues to prioritize Africa and Global South focus, this came to be cherished under the notion of Ubuntu diplomacy introduced under President Zuma's administration in 2009. The concept of Ubuntu diplomacy was not officially included in South Africa's foreign policy until in the 2011 draft White Paper on foreign policy. Thus, this chapter seeks define and contextualize Ubuntu Diplomacy in South Africa's foreign policy, how this concept influences South African foreign policy in the Global South.

The chapter begins by defining the concept of Global South and the second section defines the concept of 'Ubuntu diplomacy', in relation to how they are understood in the South African foreign policy. The aim here is to outline South Africa's South-South cooperation and analyse how South Africa has conducted its relations with the countries of the South. The values of Ubuntu are enshrined in the South African foreign policy White Paper and it is of importance to explain and understand how this concept continues to be a reference point in defining South Africa's foreign policy. Secondly, Ubuntu values are also intertwined with the principles of South-South cooperation of the 1955 Bandung conference, which is also the basis of South Africa's foreign policy towards the South.

2.2. The Notion of Global South

The term Global South is widely used in politics and academia referring but not limited to the notion of South-South Cooperation, also used as an alternative to the term 'Third World' or 'Developing World'. It is considered to carry more weight in resisting hegemonic forces, in theory; it appears to be less hierarchical or an evolutionary term than the two former terms 'Third World or Developing World'. However according to Jardim (2015) there is no consensus on what the term Global South means in international relations as praxis and as discipline. Mahler (2017) argues that Global South may be productively considered a direct response to the category of postcoloniality, capturing both political subjectivity and ideological formulation that arises from lateral solidarities among the world multiple 'South'.

Generally, Global South refers broadly to the region of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania; it marks a shift from central focus on development or cultural differences towards an emphasis on geopolitical relations of power (Dados & Conell 2012).

According to Alden, Morphet and Viera (2010) the concept of Global South is not only defined based on a group of developing countries, these countries share common identities with similar challenges and social aspects, suffering from negative impacts of international world order, not being able to include their own needs and interest easily at a global stage. This common identity, according to Jardim (2015) is constituted by material, historical and institutional similar elements and it is cemented through the seeking of strengthening international norms related to development and social issues becoming enablers of cooperation.

Other perspectives consider Global South to represent a positive element of quick growth and rising capacity of influencing the global agenda (Stuenkel 2014), also a central element to understand the international order (Jardim 2015). For the purpose of this paper, the term Global South will be used to refer to the less developed and developing countries, who are geographically located in the South, those that are calling for the reformation of international structure and institutions, for a more equitable economic and political international landscape (Kotze 2014). The paper acknowledges that the term ‘Global South’ is not a static concept but its definition will always be driven by the persuasion of South-South cooperation, guided by the principles of respect national sovereignty, national ownership, independence, equality, non-interference on domestic affairs and mutual benefit. These are some of the tenets that guides South African foreign policy agenda, based on the practice of Ubuntu diplomacy.

The notion of Ubuntu diplomacy formed the basis of the South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, however it was officially included in the White Paper document in 2011. According to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the concept of Ubuntu diplomacy is used to explain South Africa’s foreign policy approach of collaboration, cooperation and partnership rather than of conflict and the use of force. The following section discusses context of Ubuntu diplomacy analysing how the principle of Ubuntu diplomacy is embedded in the South African foreign policy practice especially in the Global South

2.3. The concept of Ubuntu Diplomacy

The concept of Ubuntu is integral in South African foreign policy. According to the draft White Paper on South African Foreign Policy ‘Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’, the philosophy of Ubuntu “means humanity and it is reflected in the idea that we (South Africa) affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others (Draft White Paper, 2011). This philosophy was paramount in creating South African national consciousness in the process of its democratic transformation and nation building (Draft White Paper, 2011). As a result South African foreign policy strives to guide and shape its approach to international relations through the lens and expression of Ubuntu diplomacy that respects all nations, people and cultures. The expression of Ubuntu means that South Africa recognises the importance of achieving its common good through the promotion of the greater good of others. According to the White Paper, through diplomacy of Ubuntu South Africa accords central importance to immediate African neighbourhood and continent; working with countries of the South to address shared

challenges of underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice; and working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world (Draft White Paper, 2011).

While there are differing interpretation of the Ubuntu philosophy, for South African foreign policy Ubuntu diplomacy means the recognizing South Africa's interconnectedness and interdependency to its African neighbourhood and the world, to promote and support not only its national interest but the development of others. This means that the destiny of South Africa as a nation is inked intrinsically with the destiny of the Africa continent, and its foreign policy actions are informed by the interest of the continent (Ubuntu Magazine 2013)

Since the release of the draft White Paper in 2011, few South African scholars have embarked on studying the notion of 'Ubuntu diplomacy' in South Africa's foreign policy. Scholars such as Siphamandla Zondi explains how 'Ubuntu' can be understood in the context of South African foreign policy values and principles. He suggests that the concept of Ubuntu diplomacy in the 2011 White Paper is "not fully understood by government, this new rhetoric has deep meaning for the struggle for the birth of a new, fairer, just and humane world order marked by prosperity for all (Zondi, 2014: 104). Since 1994 the identity, principles and values of South Africa's foreign policy has been embedded to this philosophy of Ubuntu (although not officially stated until 2011), rooted in the objectives of the ANC International Relations policy. Zondi further explain that 'Ubuntu belongs to the set of ethics and values designed to decolonise humanity and the world (Zondi 2014:104).

The concept of Ubuntu is the root of African philosophy, where the African tree of knowledge stems from and it is connected indivisibly (Ramose 2003). This means that the African concept of 'being' is based on the philosophy of Ubuntu, an expression of one's self or being by recognising the importance of the other being. While the origins of this concept is not conclusively, there is enough consensus in the literature that ubuntu as a philosophy and a way of life is associated with many African societies – and certainly in Southern Africa (Nkondo 2007). According to Krog (2008) quoted in Smith (2011) while Ubuntu is associated with the South Africa, "it is not an isolated phenomenon, but is manifested in a variety of forms across the African continent and could thus be generalised to giving us some insight into an African take on international relations.

Furthermore Turaki (2009) explains that the philosophy of Ubuntu is based on the communal character of African culture where "People are not individuals, living in a state of

independence, but part of a community, living in relationships and interdependence”. However, the ethics of Ubuntu philosophy does not ask persons to sacrifice their own good in order to promote the good of others, but instead to recognise that they can attain their own true good only by promoting the good of others (Lutz, 2014).

According to Teffo (1998) Ubuntu is a “social ethic and unifying vision, in this regard African societies placed a high value on human worth, where humanism found expression in a communal context rather than the individualism that often characterises the West. In this sense the logic of Ubuntu means that in the African culture communalism always comes first, as an ‘individual’ is born out of and into the African community and will always be part of the community (Venter 2004).

Another scholar Gabriele Mohale in ‘What does Ubuntu solve? Thoughts on the rhetoric used in the making of the Heritage Transformation Charter’ argues that the Ubuntu rhetoric provides for an interesting dimension in the postcolonial, post-apartheid narrative, which Ochieng’-Odhiambo describes as the African belief in communalism (Mohale 2013:486). For the new South Africa this narrative was foretold by the former ANC president Oliver Tambo during the First Congress of the Angolan party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Luanda 1977. Tambo gave a clear directive that the ANC see to live in peace with its neighbours and the people of the world in conditions of equality, mutual respect and equal advantage (The Presidency 2015). This was reiterated by Nelson Mandela in an article South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy published in 1993 before the ANC came to power. Mandela expressed that:

“South Africa’s future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations”. (Mandela 1993).

According to Qobo and Nyathi (2016) writing on ‘Ubuntu, public policy ethics and tensions in South Africa’s foreign policy’, Ubuntu is approached as those frames of knowledge that are primarily grounded in African realities, perspectives and cultural practices, but resonate with humanism in its universal sense. It is evident that an Ubuntu paradigm in international relations is needed more than ever before (Qobo and Nyathi 2016).

Accordingly, the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy advocates pursuing an active engagement in world affairs while building African unity and contributing to the economic, political and social renewal of the continent (Struwig, Roberts and Gordon 2014). Based on the

White Paper, South Africa is expected to play a leading role in championing the values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment (White Paper 2011:4). For South Africa, the philosophy of Ubuntu is worth pursuing and it is a value that can best be secured through multilateralist processes that are less anchored on hierarchies of power and more on recognition of multi-polarity and the imperative of interdependence (Qobo and Nyathi 2016). Furthermore, Ubuntu should be responsive to the socio-economic plight of the majority of South Africans, while at the same time offer inspiration for South Africa's varied multilateral engagements in the domains of trade, development, security and finance (Qobo and Nyathi 2016).

However, the Diplomacy of Ubuntu has its challenges and flaws as a guiding document for South African foreign policy. With the failure of the Green paper on foreign policy, there are questions about the need for the White paper on foreign policy, a consultation done in 2011 cautioned against the idea of having foreign policy documented (Tralac 2014). According to le Pere (2017), it is important to acknowledge that the White Paper establishes a basis for South Africa's definition of who it is as a country and a society, and how it ought to relate to other countries and societies under the philosophical and normative remits of Ubuntu and Batho Pele (People First). However, the values and virtues of Ubuntu and Batho Pele have been poorly served and executed in South Africa's foreign policy (le Pere 2017). Le Pere further argues that the White Paper fails as a political praxis of diplomacy in providing a strategic path for the realisation of the humanist spirit and ideal (le Pere 2017).

Consequently, while the concept of Ubuntu provides an identity principle in the South African foreign policy, it still needs to be articulated properly as the international relations environment is rapidly changing and there is a great need to balance the values of South Africa and its national interest. The following chapter discusses the themes and pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. The aim is to provide an overview on what guides South African foreign policy and how it has been conducted by the first three democratic presidents of South Africa; from Mandela to Mbeki and Zuma's foreign policy. The objective here is to analyse whether there has been a change or continuity in the practice of South Africa's foreign policy, especially towards the Global South

CHAPTER THREE

Pillars of South African foreign policy

This chapter outlines the pillars of South African foreign policy under the democratic South Africa. It looks at how these pillars played out in the government of President Nelson Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki and President Jacob Zuma. In 1993 Mandela wrote an article on the future of foreign policy in the new South African government, pointing out six principles to guide the path of South African foreign policy. The principles stated that:

Issues of human rights were central to international relations and extended beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental spheres; that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind could only be achieved by promoting democracy worldwide; considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations; all nations should strive towards peace and where this broke down, employ internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms including effective arms control regimes; that South Africa's foreign policy choices should reflect the concerns and interests of the African continent; and that economic development depended on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world (Mandela 1993, quoted in Carlsnaes and Nel 2006)

From 1994, South African foreign policy continues to be guided by these principles prioritizing the African continent. This include working with the South to address shared challenges of under development; working with the North to develop true and effective partnerships for a better world; transforming and strengthening the multilateral system to better reflect global diversity & its centrality in global governance (Draft White Paper, 2011).

3.1 South Africa's Africa Agenda

South Africa continues to follow Mandela's promise that "the post-apartheid government would place the concerns and interests of the African continent at the heart of its foreign policy (Carlsnaes and Nel 2006). Explaining the African agenda, Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) outline that South Africa's Africa agenda "is about charting a new strategic path in order to affect a turn-around in the continent's economy, governance and development orientation with South Africa as a critical player in shaping the development of the continent" (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007)

According to South Africa's Department of International Relations & Cooperation (DIRCO), formerly known as Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the struggle for a better life in South

Africa is intertwined with South Africa's pursuit of a better Africa in a better world, and destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region (Draft White Paper, 2011). Since re-joining the international community, South Africa has made unequivocal statements about prioritizing the stability and development of Africa in its international relations (Ngwenya 2012, 153). This includes issues of democracy, peace, security, stability, justice and prosperity of the continent.

According to Zondi (2015) the African agenda in the South African foreign policy did not begin with the adoption of post-1994 foreign policy by the new government, it can be traced back to the evolution of African nationalism in South Africa against the colonial system before the formation of the South African National Native Congress (SANNC), the precursor to the ANC (Zondi 2015, 98). Today South Africa's position on the African continent is widely seen to be one of dominance and leadership through its visionary campaign built around the notion of an 'African Renaissance' to restructure continental institutions in line with its interests (Alden and Schoeman 2015).

The aspect of the African agenda in South African foreign policy included a need for strong continental integration and in this case, South Africa was instrumental in the establishment of the African Union (AU), also in building a strong Regional Economic Communities as building blocks and agents of the AU (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). Thus, achieving regional economic development and building SADC, is one of the key pillars of South Africa's 'African agenda'. Moreover, South Africa was also instrumental in the crafting a socio-economic development plan for Africa together with Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal at the forefront in the development of the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007)

3.2. South Africa's South-South Cooperation

South Africa's Global South relations are based on the principles and values of the 1955 Africa-Asia conference in Bandung which resulted in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with the need to change the world to reflect the needs and interest of developing countries (Draft White Paper, 2011). In advancing its interest, South Africa became a member of key movements and multilateral organisations of the Global South, such as the Group of 77 (G77), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum, and later joining Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) to form BRICS. This includes strengthening relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in efforts to reach

out to the global African diaspora and to coordinate their participation in the African Renaissance as a sixth region of the African Union (Moore 2015, 173).

3.3. South Africa and the Global North

After 1994 South Africa's relations with the global North underwent a fundamental redefinition and reorientation which saw a foreign policy shift from the global North to the global South (Olivier 2012, 173). South Africa aimed to improve the North-South relations by focusing on reforming the global economy and global governance, enhancing market access for developing countries and instituting more favourable terms for trade, debt relief and new forms of partnership for development (Simpson 2014). In the first decade of democracy, South Africa was largely successful in engaging the G8 and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to strengthen its economic relations with key countries and the European Union (EU) (Simpson 2014). According to Firsing and Masters (2015) while there has been some progress towards achieving cooperation with countries of the West in the first two decades of post-apartheid South African foreign policy, there has also been a change in South Africa's approach towards relations with industrialised countries.

3.4. The foreign policy of Mandela government

Foreign policy under Nelson Mandela was mostly defined with the pursuit of human rights broadly interpreted to cover economic, social and environmental as well as political rights (Barber 2005). Envisaging the new democratic South Africa, in his 1993 article on 'South Africa's future foreign policy', Mandela made it clear that the government of the African National Congress (ANC) believed that the charting of a new foreign policy for South Africa is a key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country (Mandela 1993). The pillars to guide the new foreign policy were based on the beliefs that; human rights are central to international relations; the promotion of democracy worldwide; consideration of justice and respect for international law; that all nations should strive for peace; and the interest of Africa to be reflected in South Africa's foreign policy choices (Mandela 1993).

This was a period, which saw the pursuit of an 'independent' approach to international affairs and re-establishing the role of South Africa as a 'responsible global citizen' (IGD 2014). According to Mandela, this meant that South Africa's future foreign relations will be based on

a belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and that South Africa is ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world South Africa share with the community of nations". (Mandela 1993).

The aforementioned pillars became the cornerstone of the legacy of Mandela's foreign policy despite the immense challenges the Mandela government had to deal with such as creating a new foreign policy from scratch, linking with dozens of countries that had boycotted the apartheid regime, joining dozens of international organisations that had banned the country, and redefining relations with countries that had been complicit with South Africa's rogue policies (Marthoz 2012). This saw the new government gaining further prominence by hosting and chairing a range of international bodies including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth of Nations, while in Africa it became a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the OAU (Barber 2005) .

While the Mandela's foreign policy brought hopes of the possibility for South Africa to become a beacon of change for the post-cold war world, with opportunities to promote the interest of the African continent and the Global South (Braga 2017), the new democratic government had difficulties in reconciling both domestic and foreign policy interest. The Mandela government had the responsibility to improve relations with the rest of the world, to attract investments to the country, and at the same time to enhance its international prestige (Smith, 2012: 72).

In this administration, the focus on South Africa's relations with the Global South received much attention, inspired by the practice of Ubuntu, to build cooperation and partnerships rather than conflict and competition. Thus, in terms of values and principles, the broad focus of South Africa's foreign policy since 1994 continued to be Africa, to be followed by Asia, then Latin America. In Asia, Mandela's foreign policy orientation evolved over two phases, first as a deputy president of the ANC, when the departing apartheid administration and the incoming ANC administration visited Asian countries to secure support for the imminent post-apartheid government, this included Mandela's visit to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and Japan in the late 1990 (Cornelissen 2015).

Consequently, from Mandela's government onwards relations in southeast and east Asia continues to focus on China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, while South Asian relations primarily focus on Bangladesh and Pakistan and relations with countries in Euro-Asia developed a strong trade element (DPME 2014:153-154)

3.5. Continuity and change: the foreign policy of Mbeki to Zuma government

South African foreign policy under President Thabo Mbeki continued to be rooted in the Africa agenda and the Global South. To understand this continuity and change it is imperative to recognize from Mandela to Zuma, the message conveyed through foreign policy is that, the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbours in Southern Africa.

During the apartheid era, South Africa identified with the West, and after 1994, the ANC government rebranded South Africa as an African state, and as a result ‘Africa had to be elevated to a position of prominence in the South African foreign policy’ (Moore, 2014). During his tenure as President, Mbeki became known as one of the most foreign policy-oriented leaders in Africa. He had been at the helm of the South African government since 1994 – at first, acting as de facto prime minister to Nelson Mandela, and thereafter serving two consecutive terms as South African President (Spies 2009). His foreign policy objectives advocated for African Renaissance, prioritizing the interests of Africa first, and how these interests are voiced out in the international community. According to Alden & le Pere (2006), Mbeki recognized that South Africa had to engage more closely with multilateral partners in Africa and the South.

As a result, Mbeki’s foreign policy moved away from Mandela’s human rights-orientated approach and focused more on promoting the ‘African agenda’ (Polity 2011), and championing South Africa as developmental state. His government reinforced four mutual themes to represent South Africa's key foreign-policy objectives; South Africa's domestic interests; the objectives of the African renaissance; promoting an agenda for the South, and developing an equitable global system (Alden and le Pere, 2003). He advocated for domestic and foreign policy goals that would narrow the gap between the industrialised and developing world, in “eradicating poverty; reducing unemployment and creating jobs; fighting crime; building the capacity of state; bringing about better Africa; and bringing about better world” (Polity 2011). Furthermore, under President Mbeki, South Africa established itself as an important interlocutor for Africa in global fora, a strong advocate of South-South solidarity and reform of the outdated global governance architecture, and a leader in the reconstruction of Africa’s institutional architecture (Sidiropoulos 2008).

Mbeki was at the centre of defining South African foreign policy particularly in the “the pursuit of African agenda through the Africa Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)” (Master, 2012). Some of his notable foreign policy goals and practice included South Africa’s peacebuilding process in the continent through the use of soft power; playing a leading role in popularizing the African agenda in the international community; and South Africa using its chair of the UN Security Council to prioritize African conflicts and their solution.

Under the Mbeki’s presidency, South Africa’s multilateral agenda was driven by a collective search of global redistributive justice, widening and deepening the range of South African engagement initiated during the Mandela era (Alden & le Pere 2006). This led to South Africa giving attention to the call for South-South cooperation through the promotion of special trading arrangements with Brazil to the west, India and China to the east, and Africa to the north (Alden & le Pere 2006). This saw the formation of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) dialogue forum, a trilateral partnership committed to inclusive sustainable development in pursuit of the well-being for the people of the three countries and those of the developing world.

From 2009, President Zuma took over the reins and South Africa’s foreign policy continued to be dedicated to a ‘better Africa and a better world’, with commitments to promote the African Agenda in world affairs; promote human rights and democracy; respect justice and international law; and spur economic development through regional and international cooperation (Allison, 2015). During his first state of the nation address, Zuma reiterated the continuity to prioritize the Africa continent would be the priority, by strengthening the Africa Union and its structures. This was later reflected in the 2011 draft White Paper entitled “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu” which seeks to promote the use of diplomacy to rekindle the hope of peace, growth and rejuvenation of the African continent.

Although, Zuma conceded that South Africa’s foreign policy engagements on the continent would also be constrained by global economic crisis, meaning that the country will be more selective in its engagements by bringing a greater focus on those countries with whom it seeks to build strategic relationships both politically and economically (Mangcu 2009). In principle, Zuma’s foreign policy strived to elevate the role and influence of South Africa in the international stage especially in the Global South. Unlike his predecessor, Zuma’s presidency gave a greater leeway to the renamed Department of International Relations and Cooperation

(DIRCO), formerly called Department of Foreign Affairs, to pursue South-South solidarity and continue its broad prioritisation of Africa (Cilliers 2017).

The greatest heights for Zuma's foreign policy was when South Africa joined the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) membership, which later became a dominant factor in Zuma's foreign policy. This was complemented by the increasing attention in strengthening bilateral relations with China and Russia; however, this also gained much criticism about South Africa's capacity to join the collective, whether it was just a mere member or it had the potential to play an influential role in the group.

In the Africa Union, the deployment of the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to become the chairperson of the African Union Commission was also the highlight of Zuma's foreign policy, which led to the launch of the Agenda 2063, a vision of the continent's future. Furthermore, from a regional perspective, South Africa under Zuma evolved from being a strategic and intellectual founder of key influential institutions on the continent to a multilateral actor with vested interest in aligning with emerging powers through multilateral platforms like the G20, BRICS and FOAC (Mpungose 2018).

Between President Mbeki and President Zuma there was not much difference than continuity. Mbeki's foreign policy was defined by his African Renaissance, with the focus on South Africa's position in the international system, emphasizing on the role of Africa within South Africa's foreign policy. With Zuma, Africa remained central with greater emphasis on partnerships in South Africa's international conduct and strengthening relations with the geopolitical South.

3.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, South Africa's foreign policy has been influenced by the values and principles of Ubuntu diplomacy and the prioritisation of strengthening South Africa's relations with the Global South since post-1994. While South Africa's bilateral relations in the Global South have expanded, fewer attention is given on relations with countries from the Southeast Asia and this creates a gap to accurately understanding South Africa's Global South focus. The next chapter seeks to analyse South Africa's engagement with ASEAN member states focusing on bilateral relations with Indonesia and Singapore.

CHAPTER FOUR

Analyzing South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries: a case of Indonesia and Singapore

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on South Africa's engagement with ASEAN as a region and also at the bilateral level with two ASEAN countries; Indonesia and Singapore. The first section will provide a background on (South) Africa- Asia relations, this is to highlight the context and dynamics of Africa-Asia relations with the purpose of narrowing down these relations into South Africa and ASEAN. The second section looks more into South Africa – ASEAN relations and how South Africa's bilateral relations with ASEAN countries is defined, on the other hand how ASEAN as a region navigate their relations with South Africa. This section uses two ASEAN countries as examples; Indonesia and Singapore, evaluating political and economic bilateral relations. The last sections analysis the possibility for South Africa through its bilateral relations with ASEAN member states to promote relations ate the regional level between ASEAN and SADC.

4.2. (South) Africa-Asia relations

South Africa's engagement with Asia is ideologically defined by the principles of South-South Cooperation (SSC), established in the 1955 Bandung conference after 29 government representatives from Asian and African nations met to discuss 'peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development and decolonization'(Bandung Conference, 1955). The core principles of concern at the Bandung conference were political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality (Bandung Conference, 1955). This became the guiding principles for cooperation in the countries of the South.

According to Phillips (2016) 'Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its legacies for international order', the Asian and Africa leaders in the Bandung conference

“aimed to win greater foreign policy independence for newly independent states, and to fortify South–South economic and cultural cooperation”.

Several meetings took place after the 1955 Bandung conference such as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity conference in Cairo 1957, famously known as the Cairo Conference, and the Belgrade conference in 1961, which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Syafputri, 2015). The Cairo Conference adopted a “Declaration reaffirming the ten principles of cooperation amongst nations that were first endorsed at the Bandung Conference (Homer 1958). The 1961 Belgrade Conference was the first official NAM summit where leaders concretised “the commitment to work for peace, security and disarmament on the one hand, and independence, development and cooperation among nations on the other” (Suryanarayanan 2002). These meetings gave rise to what is called South-South Cooperation in the Global South.

The current dynamics show that South Africa’s bilateral relations with countries in the Asia Pacific, Central Asian and Latin American regions expanded significantly over the past two decade (Ntsaluba 2004). This is echoed in the White Paper, stipulating the increasing importance of the Asian continent to South Africa and Africa. Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has been successful in establishing strategic relations with a number of Asian countries to strengthen and promote its political, social and economic interests, through bilateral relations and multilateral engagements. Most of these Asian countries are leading role players in the Global South and share common membership with South Africa in international organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G77+China and the Commonwealth of Nations (South African Year Book 2006/07). In these multilateral groupings, South Africa and key Asian countries continue to agree on issues such as, the reform of Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations (UN); international disarmament and proliferation of weapons; and protection of the environment.

Moreover there are already existing Africa-Asia co-operation fora where South Africa plays a key role, namely the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). These forums are being synchronised with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to serve as implementing institutions. TICAD is an initiative for African development, launched in 1993 through the joint efforts of the Japanese Government, the UN and the Global Coalition for Africa (South African Year

Book 2006/07). FOCAC is a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation.

However, to some extent South Africa's relationship with the Southeast Asian region is yet to be systemically defined. This is not only a South African issue; it applies to most if not all African countries in general. Basically, formal governmental or state relations between Africa and Southeast Asia have been both patchy and scanty.

4.3. (South) Africa's relations with ASEAN

Founded in 1967 by five Southeast Asian nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), ASEAN is a political and economic organization aimed primarily at promoting economic growth and regional stability among its members (Breene 2017). The membership of the regional bloc grew to 10 member states to include Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. ASEAN is regarded as the only regional economic community of its kind outside Europe and North America. It aims to promote collaboration and cooperation among member states, as well as to advance the interests of the region as a whole, including economic and trade growth (Breene 2017).

The Political objectives of ASEAN is to promote regional peace and stability, respect for justice and the rule of law, and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter (ASEAN.org). These included developing norms of behaviour and principles for political cooperation called 'The ASEAN way', to promote respect for sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference in domestic affairs of other members (Snitwongse 1998).

The economic significance of ASEAN lies in a large market with a combined GDP over US\$ 2.4 trillion, collectively put the region as the 6th largest economy in the world and it is the world's 3rd most populous market, behind only China and India with a total population of almost 630 million people (AEC 2017). ASEAN's economy is defined by its economic blueprint of 2007, with aspirations to "transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital" (ASEAN.org). This became a master plan for economic development that led to the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) formally established in 2015 during the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. With the establishment of the AEC, the ASEAN leaders adopted a

new blueprint to guide the next phase of the economic integration from 2016 to 2025, aiming to become a highly integrated and cohesive economy; to create a competitive, innovative and dynamic ASEAN; to enhance the region's connectivity and sectoral cooperation; to promote a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people centred ASEAN; and lastly to promote a global ASEAN (AEC 2017).

Identifying opportunities in the African continent, emerging economies of the ASEAN such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia are expanding their presence on the continent in search for strategic partnerships with African nations, markets for their products and opportunities for investments. From the turn of the century onwards, Africa has been placed in the centre of the debate over emerging economies in the South and it has also been going through a period of economic growth starting from the beginning of the 21st century (Rubiolo, 2016). ASEAN's quest for economic relations in Africa is based on the need to close the gap that exists in advancing relations between ASEAN and African states. Secondly, it seeks to complement the historical linkage of Asia-Africa relations cemented in the 1955 Bandung conference. By then both continents were marked by similarities of the troubled colonial past, unbalanced economic development, and to some extent they both uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs (Diaz, 2017).

However, Diaz (2017) also identifies that the opportunities for cooperation between Southeast Asians and Africans are copious, and this can only be maximized if the knowledge bridge between their regions is built with strong resolve. According to Vinayak et al (2014), ASEAN is a major global hub of manufacturing and trade, as well as one of the fastest-growing consumer markets in the world. The authors continued to argue that while ASEAN seeks to deepen its ties and capture an even greater share of global trade, its economic profile is rising. (Vinayak and et al 2014).

South Africa shares full diplomatic bilateral relations with all ASEAN member states. According to DIRCO, five of these relations have been in existence before South Africa became a democratic state in 1994 with Singapore in 1992; Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam in 1993. Full diplomatic relations with the rest of the ASEAN states were established from 1994 onwards with Indonesia and Laos in 1994, Cambodia and Myanmar in 1995, and Brunei Darussalam in 1996.

In principle, these diplomatic relationships highlight the significance and values of South Africa's relations with the Southeast Asia region. In a speech by the former and first South

African democratic president Nelson Mandela during his second visit to the Southeast Asia in 1997, he proclaimed that “Southeast Asia is a shining economic example and inspiration for what South Africa have set out to achieve and the South African region” (Mandela, 1997).

From an ASEAN perspective, relations with South Africa are one step ahead in laying the bricks for a formal partnership. ASEAN has created a formal platform and strategic approach to facilitate ASEAN activities and relations with South Africa. This formal platform includes a committee that was established in 2008 by ASEAN known as the ASEAN Pretoria Committee (APC). This is a community of diplomats representing the interest of ASEAN member states in South Africa and it consist of the seven ASEAN mission based in Pretoria; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam. The committee is one of the ASEAN Committees in Third Countries and it represents the interest of ASEAN member states in South Africa.

In 2014, the APC pledged to search for ways of increasing cooperation in investments, trade and tourism and to discuss ways of strengthening multifaceted cooperation between ASEAN and South Africa (VOVworld 2014). Basically, the APC seeks to broaden cooperation between ASEAN countries and South Africa. On a positive note, high level official visits between South Africa and ASEAN member states are growing with a purpose to promote trade, investment and to boost other forms of cooperation. For example, in 2013 high level visits from ASEAN were made by Vietnam and Thailand to South Africa and the former South African President Jacob Zuma visited Malaysia in the same year. Again in 2013, the then South African Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr. Ebrahim Ebrahim undertook a Working Visit to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Accompanied by a business delegation, the focus of the visit was to embark on a quest to create ways to increase the level of trade and investment, marking South Africa's first business venture into Myanmar after the country normalized its domestic situation.

In 2014, the South African Department of Trade and Industry undertook an outward selling mission to Indonesia and Singapore to assist South African producers and exporters in the field of Agro-processing, cosmetics, Automotive parts and Yachts to introduce their products into foreign markets. The outward trade mission was part of the DTI's objective to create market access for South African value-added products and services in new high-growth markets, and highlight South Africa as an investment destination of choice.

This type of mission is what South Africa needs to encourage relations with the Southeast Asian region as a whole. By encouraging these kinds of missions, it will open ways to explore potential areas for future investment and developmental cooperation, and also to promote people to people interaction. Consequently, the DTI's 'outward selling mission' in concert with the recent increase of visits by a South African delegation to the region to promote trade, investment and to boost other forms of cooperation, is necessary and essential for South Africa to increase its footprint in the Southeast Asia region.

4.3.1. South Africa and Indonesia relations

During the apartheid era there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, Indonesia played a key role in supporting the South Africans' struggle for freedom (Halim 2017). For example in 1963 Indonesia took a step to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with South Africa, this included the closure of Indonesian port to South African vessels (Kalley et al 1999).

Bilateral relations between the two countries were resuscitated when South Africa became a democratic state in 1994. According to Krisetya (2015) after 1994 the relationship between South Africa and Indonesia became driven by South Africa's determination to gain recognition from international society after being in isolation and Indonesia's newfound aspiration to build strategic partnerships for economic improvement purposes. Moving forward, the two countries are dedicated to strengthen their bilateral relations and fostering Afro-Asian relations. This section looks at South Africa and Indonesia relations in promoting the 1955 Bandung Spirit and how this relation has evolved since 1994.

I. Promoting the 1955 Bandung Spirit

Indonesia has been a leading actor in the developing world since the 1955 Bandung conference and had made its voice heard in the issues of the Global South (Tarrosy 2014). It is also significant to note that whilst Indonesia hosted the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference of 1955, South Africa was also represented by the ANC in the event (DIRCO 2005). South Africa and Indonesia are both championing the formalisation of the New Asian-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP).

While the 1955 Bandung Conference is significant in the building and strengthening of Afro-Asian relations, the interest of both African states and the Southeast Asian nations in Afro-African meetings declined. After this period, Indonesia was the only country that became influential in pushing for the Afro-Asian cooperation during Surkano's regime, the first Indonesian President from 1945 to 1967. However, in the post Surkano government, Indonesia's interest in the Afro-Asian cooperation also declined under the administration of his successor, President Suharto.

For South Africa, the significance of South-South Cooperation was signified by former President Nelson Mandela's first Asian visit to Indonesia in 1997, to the historic site of the 1955 Bandung conference, where he said the conference was an important and inspiring event for many oppressed peoples (Palatino, 2013). This was to be a reflection on how South Africa would consider its future relations with Indonesia and the countries of the global south based on the principles of the 1955 Bandung Conference.

In the same year of 1997, the President of Indonesia Suharto visited South Africa four months after Mandela's visit to Indonesia. This was also a historic visit and Mandela reiterated that Indonesia has set an inspiring economic example of turning a legacy of underdevelopment into sustained growth and development (Mandela 1997). Since that period, bilateral relations between the two countries grew and the countries continued to play leading roles in developing and enhancing South-South Cooperation.

Under the administration of President Mbeki, the relations continued to build momentum on strengthening South Africa-Indonesia bilateral relations and also the Africa – Asia cooperation. In 2003 the first Asian-African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference (AASROC) took place in Bandung co-hosted by Indonesia and South Africa, considered to be the first step in reviving the spirit of the Bandung Asian-African Conference of 1955. AASROC considered “issues of common interest and concern as well as to strengthen cooperation between the two continents, through a number of discussions, the conference considered ways and means by which the people of the two continents could achieve full economic, cultural, social, and political cooperation and address global challenges facing both continents (ASEAN 2003). This is where the idea for the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) was endorsed to preserve the Bandung spirit and to promote peace, prosperity and progress of Asia and Africa. The second AASROC meeting was hosted in 2004 Durban, still under the co-chairmanship of South Africa and Indonesia, in preparation for the 50th anniversary of Asia Africa summit in

2005, Jakarta. During the 2005 summit, a pledge was made to launch NAASP under the auspices of Indonesia and South Africa as co-chairs, to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the two continents (Syafputri, 2015).

When it comes to economic relations, trade between South Africa and Indonesia is improving. Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and also one of the emerging global market economies (Poetranto 2018). According to the South African embassy in Indonesia, in 2006 a Joint Trade Committee (JTC) was established between the two countries to promote and expand trade and investment relationship. Through the JTC bilateral trade between South Africa and Indonesia amounts to US\$2, 14 billion. In a policy brief by the Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies in South Africa done in 2015, it is argued that in terms of total merchandised trade and export values, South Africa is Indonesia's second trading partner in Africa after Nigeria (Chipanda 2015).

However, excluding the petroleum oils trade, South Africa is Indonesia's main African trading partner in both imports and exports (Chipanda 2015). South Africa's major exports to Indonesia include chemical wood pulp, ferrous waste, iron ore, aluminium, fruit and mechanical appliances. In Africa, South Africa became the only country to be Indonesia's strategic partner, as Indonesia sees South Africa as one of important trade partner in Africa (Krisetya 2015). From 1997 to 2017, eleven bilateral agreements in a form of MoUs were signed between the two countries, and five more MoUs are still under consideration.

Furthermore, amongst other things, South Africa and Indonesia are also founding members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) which is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of 21 coastal members with the aim to strengthen regional cooperation and sustainable development within the Indian Ocean region. In the administration of President Zuma, South Africa-Indonesia relations focused more on strengthening cooperation in business, trade and investment. In 2017 the two countries agreed on a Plan of Action to act as a guiding document. The Plan of Action agreement included the initiative for a free-visa agreement for service and diplomatic passport holders, an agreement on diplomatic training and other engagements in the marine and fisheries sector (Salim 2017). On a multilateral level the focus was more on renewing commitment on IORA, Through IORA, South Africa believes that the organisation can be used to enhance interaction between SADC and ASEAN to advance greater South-South cooperation as was envisaged during the Bandung Conference in 1955 (SAnews 2017).

4.3.2. South Africa and Singapore relations

Formal bilateral relations between South Africa and Singapore were established in the year 1992 and in the same year embassies were opened in both countries. However, according to South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), when South Africa re-entered the Commonwealth of Nations in 1994 the embassies were converted into High Commission. Since the establishment of these relations Singapore has been influential in assisting South Africa with developmental experience, this relation continued to grow in other spheres- political, economic, military and social (SAnews 2015).

Since 1994 these relations are marked by high level exchange and visits from ministerial level to official state visits. One of the memorable visit is the 1997 visit by President Nelson Mandela to Singapore. During this visit Mandela emphasized South Africa's deep desire to rekindle old relationships not only with Singapore but the Southeast Asia and to forge strong multilateral ties under the new and more favourable conditions for freedom, technological advance and peace (Mandela 1997). Post Mandela administration South Africa still regard Singapore as an important partner to jointly advance the developmental agenda of the global South (Mhaule 2018). On the other hand Singapore continues to promote itself as the ideal platform for in-bound ASEAN business interests and attempts to set the rhythm for ASEAN South-South cooperation globally (MacPherson 2016).

I. Advancing developmental relations

Singapore is ranked amongst the top in terms of global competitiveness and development, with a government and public sector that are regarded as one of the most efficient and cleanest in the world, with world class infrastructure facilities (ISE 2011). To achieve its developmental goals, Singapore relied mostly on trade and investment within and outside the region. This was possible because Singapore realised that as a small state cannot afford to make enemies (Parameswaren 2015). One of Singapore's founding fathers, S. Rajaratnam, once stated that Singapore want to live in peace with all her neighbours because Singapore have a great deal to lose by being at war with them, therefore Rajaratnam asked for Singapore to be left alone to reshape and build the country the way Singapore people want it (Parameswaren 2015). In short

Singapore chose to preserve peace and prosperity. So how did it manage to preserve peace and prosperity.

After gaining its independence in 1965, Singapore was in total gloom and doom, underdeveloped with no natural resources and high unemployment rate that led to crime, ethnic violence and with extreme poor housing, often overcrowded and lacking sanitation (ISE 2011). To transform the situation Singapore had to place a series of measures that led to success of Singapore's development initiatives, these included focusing on security, accountability, human capacity, housing, citizenship, and nation- building (ISE 2011).

For South Africa, Singapore became an example to follow in pursuing its developmental goals. This was also emphasised by President Mandela that the contribution of Singapore and other investors will be critical in South Africa's massive mega-projects in mineral processing, petrochemical industries, telecommunications, car manufacturing, tourism and other infrastructure (Mandela 1997). In 2005, during President Mbeki's state visit to Singapore, the governments of the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning bilateral cooperation with the objective to encourage and promote the development of political, economic and technical co-operation. This included a framework within which detailed proposals for programmes of co-operation could be identified, such as trade and investment, tourism, maritime Affairs, academic cooperation, human resources development and crime and terrorism (MoU 2005).

Following the 2005 MoU, there are other significant MoU's between South Africa and Singapore that are yet to be finalised; 1) the draft Memorandum of Understanding between Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) and Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE); 2) draft Action Plan for the implementation of Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic South Africa and the Republic of Singapore concerning Bilateral Tourism Cooperation; 3) the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic South Africa and the Republic of Singapore concerning Higher Education and Training Cooperation.

These MoU's are aimed to complement the existing trade and investment gap between South Africa and Singapore. In a research conducted by Brand South Africa to assess challenges and opportunities for South Africa in the Singapore market and the rest of ASEAN, it was found that Singapore has low levels of familiarity of South Africa as both a business and investment

destinations (Brand South Africa 2017). This is mostly linked to the geographical and language barriers.

One of the significant aspect of South Africa and Singapore relations is the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP). The SCP is a series of human resource development programmes administered by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was formally established in 1992 to bring together under one framework the various technical assistance programmes offered by Singapore to other developing countries (UNICEF). In Africa, South Africa is one of the beneficial countries with the highest number of participants in the SCP, with more than 900 government officials who benefited in “SCP training programmes in the fields of economic development, trade, tourism promotion, public administration, governance and law, information and communications technology, environment, urban development, land transport, port management, civil aviation and education” (Enterprise Singapore).

II. The quest for trade and investment

ASEAN-Africa trade has been growing at a phenomenal rate of since 1989, the value of trade grew from \$2.8bn in 1990 to \$42.5bn in 2012 (Omarjee 2016). As the broader Southeast Asia –Africa corridor gains momentum, MacPherson (2017) argue that Singapore stands to benefit from its increasing trade and investment with African partners. Singapore’s private sector are undertaking considerable efforts to understand and familiarise itself with potential areas of future possibility (MacPherson 2017). This is done with the support of Singapore’s government in monitoring, researching and scouting for the right opportunities and local partners (MacPherson 2017).

There is also the Singapore’s International Enterprise (IE), which is part of Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry that fosters relationships between Singaporean and African companies. In 2013 the IE opened two centres in Africa, one in Johannesburg, South Africa to facilitate business links between Singapore and the South Africa through the Africa Singapore Business Forum (ASBF) (Sullivan and Akanbi 2016). The ASBF is a biennial event opened to business and government leaders seeking to improve relations between the two regions (Sullivan and Akanbi 2016). According to the IE, South Africa is considered to be a giant economy in the southern Africa with opportunities for Singapore companies in power generation and the hospitality industry, and also in sectors such as education services (Brand South Africa 2017).

The amount of daily trade taking place between South Africa and Asia is a positive movement towards the growing and cementing of mutually beneficial economic trade relations (APO Group 2018). South Africa – Singapore trade relations has been improving, in 2016 Singapore was South Africa’s second largest trading partner in ASEAN. This was based on the 2014 bilateral trade which amounted to R28, 9-billion as compared to R23, 5bn recorded in 2015. Exports in 2015 amounted to R6, 8bn while imports totalled R16, 6bn. However this is not the case for South Africa to Singapore. According to International Enterprise Singapore, in 2015 South Africa was ranked to be number 33rd trading partner of Singapore with bilateral trading reaching S\$2.236bn (Brand South Africa 2017). This trading relations gap shows that South Africa is yet to full penetrate Singapore’s market.

4.4. Conclusion: Promoting relations at the regional level

In conclusion, cooperation between ASEAN and South Africa has a great potential to grow in the field of trade, infrastructure development, technology transfer, education and tourism. South Africa needs to continue to generate and expand its level of engagement and its strategic interest to increase trade and investment in the abovementioned sectors. This can be achieved if South Africa develops strategic ways to engage with the APC on a regular basis. The APC made a commitment to work with South African leaders to advise them on alternative ways to accelerate trade and investment exchanges. This is a promising initiative that could attract the interest of businesses on both sides and thus boost economic relations. In future, this will provide South Africa with an opportunity to improve its relations with ASEAN nations.

Furthermore, while navigating bilateral relations with individual states in the Southeast Asia, it is also significant for South Africa to establish a strategic approach and a formal agenda on how to conduct relations with ASEAN at a regional level in order to benefit not only South Africa’s interest, but also the SADC region. So far ASEAN does not have formal external relations with African countries or regional organizations, and this place South Africa in a strategic position to initiate dialogue between SADC and ASEAN in terms of building formal inter-regional relations.

Interaction between these two regional organizations dates back to 1996, when the first ASEAN Economic Ministers – Southern African Development Community (AEM-SADC) consultation took place during the WTO Ministers Conference in Singapore. A second informal consultation followed in October 1997 in Malaysia to note the progress of the first AEM-SADC

Ministers consultations. Here the importance of establishing a linkage towards strengthening trade and investment ties between the two regions was reiterated (AEM-SADC, 1997). The most recent activity between the two regions was in 2013 in a working visit by the delegation of the SADC Secretariat to the ASEAN Secretariat. Like the 1996 and 1997 meetings, the focus of the (2013) visit was to exchange information on and experiences in regional integration and to explore the possibility of forging closer relations between ASEAN and SADC (ASEAN Secretariat News, 2013).

There are a number of reasons why South Africa should put its weight in building bridges with the ASEAN. South Africa stands a better chance to push for formal partnerships with the ASEAN community to improve its economic diplomacy and cultural diplomacy; and also to champion the relationship between ASEAN and SADC. Therefore building South Africa-ASEAN relations can be advantageous. First to promote opportunities for cooperation between SADC and ASEAN, as currently these two regions do not have formal cooperation. Secondly, the SADC –ASEAN cooperation can be used to push for the strengthening and formalising the NAASP initiative.

To conclude the research, the following chapter provides a summary and recommendations on how South Africa can improve its relations with ASEAN member states based on three foreign policy drivers; historical linkages, improving economic bilateral relations and strengthening South Africa's development initiatives.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary and Recommendations

5.1. Summary

The aim of this research paper was to conduct an analysis of the drivers of South Africa's relations with Southeast Asian countries. This concluding chapter provides insights, firstly on what are the drivers of South Africa's foreign policy in the Southeast Asia region based on the research gathered in the previous chapters. The second section of the chapter provides recommendations on how South Africa can strengthen its bilateral relations with ASEAN member states in order to increase its footprint in the Southeast Asia region. The recommendations are also an expansion from a policy brief I wrote in 2014 "The prospects of South Africa's engagement with ASEAN countries". The suggestions provided in the policy brief are also relevant in this research to analyse how South Africa can potentially grow relations with ASEAN in the field of trade as well as infrastructure development, technology transfer, education and tourism (Dlamini 2014).

It is significant to note that the information provided in this research paper is based on limited literature and studies available on South Africa's relations with the countries from the Southeast Asia region. As a result this paper also argued that in the academic environment there is still a great need for research and studies on South Africa's foreign policy in the global south in terms of South Africa's bilateral relations with ASEAN member states. This will provide more literature for future studies on how to understand and analyse South Africa's bilateral relations in the Southeast Asia region and the rest of the Global South. The example of Indonesia and Singapore as countries of focus in this research study could only provide a minimal perspective on what drives South Africa's relations with ASEAN.

5.2. Drivers of South African foreign policy in the Global South

These drivers may not be exactly what is defined by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation documents and South African Foreign Policy on relations with Southeast Asian nations. However for the purpose of this research, these drivers are influential to understand the background and the conduct of South Africa's bilateral relations with ASEAN.

The First driver: South Africa's relations with ASEAN are driven by historical linkages between the ANC and the Global South countries. These relations were cemented in the 1955 Bandung conference and became a "significant platform for launching solidarity and international support for the people of South Africa" (Saragih 2015) in the struggle against the apartheid regime. Furthermore the aspirations and the principles of Ubuntu diplomacy in South African foreign policy are in other ways shaped by the spirit and principles of the 1955 Bandung conference, in promoting solidarity of the global south countries and also in South Africa's quest for building a better Africa and a better world. This is considered to be a political driver.

While not all ASEAN countries were at the forefront in supporting the ANC struggle against apartheid like other global south countries such as China, Cuba and the likes, the democratic South Africa continues to make reference and acknowledge the support from ASEAN and how it is important to strengthen relations at the political level to promote the south-south cooperation. This is also on the basis of Afro-Asia solidarity, where Indonesia played a significant role in the anticolonial struggle (Santikajaya and Abdurrohman 2015) not only in South Africa but Africa as a whole, and still continue to prioritize the institutionalisation of cooperation between Asia and Africa through NAASP despite the lack of political will from other Asian and Africa countries.

The second driver is to improve economic bilateral relations and this has been the dominating driver as South Africa seeks to increase its footprint in the Southeast Asia region through bilateral trade, direct investment and business initiatives. This is also influenced by the fact that ASEAN considers South Africa to be a gateway to the African market as the region seeks to step up its effort to boost bilateral trade and investment ties with South Africa, SADC and the rest of Africa. Furthermore, one of ASEAN's objectives in strengthening relations with (South) Africa is to broaden investment opportunities for Southeast Asian companies and to find new markets for their products. The importance of this driver was also emphasised in 2008 meeting between seven ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Myanmar) and South African National Assembly Committee on International Relations discussing ASEAN bilateral & trade relations with South Africa. By then trade

between South Africa and ASEAN countries was between \$4 and \$5 billion (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008).

On the other hand South Africa considers ASEAN economic bloc to be one of the priority markets for the country's exports (MyPressportal 2017). South Africa Department of Trade and Industry believes that strategic relations with ASEAN community will enable synergies in relations to inward direct investment and export promotion where African value added products are concerned, this includes creating more formal institutional links, technical co-operation, the protection of regional stability and trade relations on the basis of reciprocity (MyPressportal 2017).

The third driver is the need to strengthen South Africa's development initiatives which is in line with the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 and also the African Agenda 2063. In a speech by President Mbeki as the chair of the African Union during the 8th ASEAN summit, he expressed the "need to achieve the common objectives of the eradication of poverty, the building of developed societies and the occupation of our rightful place in a world that continues to be characterised by unequal relations between a developed North and a developing South" (Mbeki 2002).

According to chapter seven of the NDP "for South Africa to achieve its national goals of eradicating poverty, lowering inequality and creating jobs, foreign relations must be driven by the country's domestic economic, political and social demands" (National Development Plan 2030). Some of the objectives of the NDP is to build a capable and a developmental state by focusing on infrastructure, social security, strong institutions and partnerships both within the country and with key international partners (National Development Plan 2030).

While there is less mentioning of South Africa's reliance in the countries of Southeast Asia region for its developmental goals, some of the ASEAN member states have been supportive in providing development assistance after the end of apartheid in 1994. To achieve this common objective of building a developmental society, there is a need for increasing investments in infrastructure sectors and services such as energy, transport, communication system, sanitation and housing. This is where Southeast Asian investors play a significant role in the (South) African economic development with Singapore leading Southeast Asian investment in development projects (Rubiolo 2016).

5.3. Recommendations

The research paper recommends that South Africa needs to expand its level of engagement and with ASEAN countries. This involves defining its strategic interest in the Southeast Asia region to increase trade and investment including infrastructure development, technology transfer, education and tourism (Dlamini 2014). South Africa should construct a clear policy framework on how to build a stronger economic partnership with ASEAN. Working closely with the ASEAN Pretoria committee can be useful for South Africa to create a meaningful relation with ASEAN individual states.

Furthermore, there should be a united and a strategic approach from the South African government departments on what constitutes South African interest in the Southeast Asia region. What is also needed is for South Africa to ensure that there are more formal institutional links, technical co-operation and trade relations on the basis of reciprocity in its relations with the ASEAN community. This can be done through engagements and dialogues with research institutions and organizations that are conducting researches in the Southeast Asia region. South Africa needs to examine ways for cooperation with the APC; this will provide South Africa with an opportunity to realize where it needs to improve its relations with the ASEAN community (Dlamini 2014)

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