UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
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YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM: SOUTHERN AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS AND SADC, 1989 TO 2016

By

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the

Department of Political Sciences at the
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

SUPERVISOR
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MARCH 2019

I dedicate this thesis to all engaged epistemic communities, survivors of elitist governance systems in Africa and around the World

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although I put a great deal of effort into completing this study, it would not have been possible without the kind support and guidance of many individuals and institutions. Therefore, I hereby extend my sincere thanks and express my deepest appreciation to all those who gave me the opportunity to complete this research project.

On that note, I am very grateful to Almighty God, source of my life and divine inspiration, for granting me strength and ability to surmount many challenges encountered in this academic journey. I am highly indebted to my supervisor, Dr Christopher C Nshimbi, for the remarkable contributions through his pertinent comments, guidance, remarks and encouragement for the successful completion of this study. To my former supervisor, Prof Lorenzo Fioramonti, for giving me this golden opportunity to pursue my doctorate studies by obtaining a scholarship for me, I say thank you so much and salute you.

More than that, I am forever grateful to my precious wife, Jolie Tshimpaka, and my beautiful children, Faith, Elbo, Chady, Leon and Candice, for their love, patience, sacrifice, endless prayers and encouragement as an impetus to the completion of this study. To my late parents, Mwamba and Kanku, for your legacy in my life. To my brother, Jeannot Wabantu, for your moral support and advice. Thanks to all family members and friends, especially Ms Madalena Chingondundo, who supported me in various ways throughout this academic journey.

Special thanks go to my research assistant, Mr Francis Ng'ambi, for his remarkable contributions during my field work. To all my amazing colleagues at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), thank you for your constructive advice and guidance. To the head of my department, Prof Siphamadla Zondi, and other academic mentors, I say many thanks. I owe many thanks to Prof Dr Tobias Lenz, Dr Frank Mattheis and Dr Muauz Gidey Alemu for their availability to comment on some sections of my writings despite their respective busy schedules. Furthermore, I would also like to acknowledge with much appreciation the Andrew Mellon Foundation and GIGA for their respective financial support from which I was privileged to benefit in order to undertake my doctoral studies.

And last, but not least, many thanks go to all my respondents and discussants from different backgrounds, who gave their full support in availing themselves for the interviews and focus group discussions.

DECLARATION

I, **Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka**, declare that this thesis on "People-centred Approaches to Regionalism: Southern African Civil Society Networks and SADC, 1989 to 2016" is a result of my own single-handed endeavours and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. The thesis is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. It has not previously been submitted for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka

Pretoria, March 2019

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, political projects to form a region, i.e. regionalisms, have become an important object of research in political science. The study of regionalism deals with projects and imaginations that claim a political, social and economic space between the nation state and the global governance system. Though regionalisms are a priori not constrained to one specific institutional form, they are predominantly studied as formal intergovernmental organisations. Academic research predominantly reverts to state-centric approaches and has struggled to systematically incorporate actors other than states in both conceptual and empirical terms.

The objective of this study was to address this gap in research on regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis towards non-state actors. This endeavour departed from a critique of the main schools of thought with respect to how they deal with informal and self-organised forms of regionalism. Based on this critique, revised working concepts of regional civil society and regional networks were elaborated and applied to Southern Africa for the period 1989 to 2016. Southern Africa has been selected due to its established paradoxical regional governance system that provides a joint space for a formal regionalism, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and civil society networks.

Relying on semi-structured face-to-face personal interviews and other primary resources, this study developed a typology of the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society groups while interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. A differentiating comparative approach revealed that regional civil society networks that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism exhibit different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation in opposition to formal regionalism.

Following the empirical findings, this study proposed a conceptual expansion of regionalism that does not only understand non-state actors as dependent units of formal regional organisations but considers them actors in their own rights.

***Keywords**: Regionalism, SADC, Southern African civil society networks, SAPSN, SADC-CNGO, New Institutionalism, strategies, norms and rules, Southern Africa*

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AACC	All Africa Conference of Churches
ABAC	ASEAN Business Advisory Council
ACSC	ASEAN Civil Society Conference
AF	Asian Foundation
AFRODAD	African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
AFSRAG	African Strategic and Peace Research Group
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIDC	Alternative Information and Development Centre
AL	Arab League
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
ALOP	Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo
ANND	Arab NGO Network for Development
ANSA	Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa
APF	Anti-Privatisation Forum
APF	ASEAN People's Forum
ASCCI	Associations of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ASDR	African Security Dialogue and Research
ASEAN	South-East Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies
ASETUC	ASEAN Services Employees Trade Unions Council
ASSN	African Security Sectors Network
AU	African Union
BOCONGO	Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBTA	Cross-Border Traders Association
CCL	Caribbean Congress of Labour
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development
CDRAV	Caribbean Coalition for Development and the Reduction of Armed Violence
CEDE	Centre for Democratic Empowerment
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRNSA	Child Rights Network of Southern Africa
CSF	Civil Society Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DIE	German Development Institute
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EABC	East African Business Council
EAC	East African Community
EACSOF	East African Civil Society Forum
EALS	East Africa Law Society

EASWN	East African Sustainability Watch Network
EATUC	East Africa Trade Union Council
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECCJ	ECOWAS Community Court of Justice
ECOSOCC	Economic Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EISA	Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa
EJN	Economic Justice Network
ELS	Employment and Labour Sector
ESP	European Social Forum
EU	European Union
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FANRPAN	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FCES	Foro Consultivo Económico-Social
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FOCCISA	Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa
FODA	Foundation for Security in Africa
FORUM-ASIA	Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development
FTA	Free Trade Area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of America
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GO-NGO	Government-Organised NGO
HAS	Hemispheric Social Alliance
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICBT	Informal Cross-Border Trade
ICIC	Iniciativa Civil para la Integration Centroamericana
IMS	Instituto Social Mercosur
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
MARWOPNET	Mano River Women's Peace Network
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFWA	Media Foundation of West Africa
MISA	Media Institute for Southern Africa
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MWENGO	Mweleko wa Non-Governmental Organisation
NAF	Northern American Forum
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPSAR	Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNHRI	Network of National Human Rights Institutions in West Africa
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid

NRA	New Regionalism Approach
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
POSCAO	Plateforme des Organisations dela Societé Civile De l'Afrique de l'Ouest sur l'Accord de Cotonou
RCAHR	Regional Consultations on ASEAN and Human Rights
RCSN	Regional Civil Society Networks
REC	Regional Economic Community
RID	Red Inter-Americana para la Democracia
RIGO	Regional Inter-Governmental Organisation
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RO	Regional Organisation
RPO	Regional Poverty Observatory
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACAU	Southern African Confederation of Agriculture Unions
SAGPA	Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance
SACBTA	Southern African Cross Border Traders Association
SACCAR	Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural
SACSN	Southern African Civil Society Networks
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-CNGO	SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
SADC-PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SADRC	Southern African Research and Development Centre
SAFAIDS	Southern African AIDS Service Organisation
SAFOD	Southern Africa Federation of the Disabled
SALA	SADC Lawyers Association
SAMA	Southern Africa Mineworks Association
SANASO	Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisation
SAPA	Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy
SAPSN	Southern African People's Solidarity Network
SASCO	Southeast Asian Civil Society Organisations
SAT	South African Trust
SATUCC	Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council
SAYM	Southern African Youth Movement
SEACA	Southeast Asian Committee for Advocacy
SEATINI	Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute
SEG	SADC Employers Group
SICA	Central American System of Integration
SNC	SADC National Committee
SNCP	SADC National Contact Point
SOA	Summit of America
TRALAC	Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa

TUCA	Trade Union Confederation of Americas
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNAC	União Nacional de Camponeses
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAN	Union of South American Nations
WACSOF	West African Civil Society Forum
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WILSA	Women in Law in Southern Africa
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZIMCODD	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

For the past few decades, regionalism has been conventionally analyzed through a hierarchical lens, predominantly putting more emphasis on the role of state actors, politicians and technocrats, and to a lesser extent ordinary citizens and business associations (Fioramonti 2015). By contrast, civil society has demonstrated how capably it can exert a growing influence on decision-making processes in line with region formation, not only through state-established formal institutions of interaction with government elites, but also by the desire of ordinary citizens to make their voice heard in an arena of engagement outside of the mainstream for an alternative (Scholte 2015). There is a need to expand the focus of analysis to include non-state actors in the study of contemporary regionalism. Investigating Southern Africa between 1989 and 2016, this study seeks to develop a typology of how civil society groups interact within both civil society organizations among themselves, also known as horizontal networks, outside of the mainstream and with formal regional bodies like SADC. In that regard, this study engages a highly relevant research question that speaks to a gap in the existing literature on the topic regarding the lack of engagement with alternative strategies, norms and rules to form regions that do not centre around state actors when epistemic communities, referred to as the ordinary citizenry, experience exclusion. The choice of Southern Africa as the region of focus in this study was guided by its established paradoxical regional governance system that provides a joint space for a formal regionalism, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and regional civil society networks. This study focuses on understanding the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society actors as they interact in two distinct institutional settings: self-organized cooperation among themselves, and cooperation with state actors in the context of SADC in order to build alternative regionalisms, referred to as forms of regionalism. The present study argues that regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. What strategies, norms and rules are developed by non-state actors in order to build alternative regionalisms? This introductory chapter provides an overview of the thesis by outlining its scope and focus

through the problem background, research aims and objectives, justification, relevance and delimitations, and the research methodology used and layout of thesis chapters.

1.2 Overview of the Study

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This research project was motivated by dissatisfaction with the way contemporary regionalism was conceptualised and analysed in most academic and research fields, which focuses more on state actors without expanding to include non-state actors. This study on people-centred approaches to regionalism began in 2016, as over the past few decades an increasing interest in the phenomenon of trans-boundary activities that seek transnational responses was already at the centre of global discourse from the boardrooms of politicians, the think tanks of technocrats and the public arena of ordinary citizens. Despite their efforts, national governments have demonstrated that they lack the capability to handle cross-border issues like migration, terrorism, infectious diseases, civil wars, climate change, and financial crises, to name a few (Edwards 2009, Fioramonti 2015). The above issues are no longer confined to one territorial space but transcend national borders, making a state-centred governance model ill-suited to respond to these regional dynamics effectively. Regionalism has gained appeal as the cornerstone and most innovative mode of governance of recent times, commissioned to respond to cross-border phenomena (Fioramonti 2012). Regrouped within different regional blocks, states are committed to solving transnational issues that are not confined to their borders. Consequently, political decisions to form regions have shifted to the centre of national government elites' endeavour in order to adjust to regional dynamics. This implies that regions become desirable for solving a variety of collective dilemmas. However, if not well conceptualised, regionalism can sometimes be exploitative, reinforce asymmetric power relations or lead to a range of detrimental outcomes (Fioramonti 2012, Söderbaum 2015). For example, Malamud and Gardini (2012) criticise the Latin American regionalism for not delivering, as it has been dominated by a regional political agenda and fundamentally hegemonised by incumbent Heads of State to achieve their diverse political ambitions at the expense of epistemic communities' voices at the top of the regional organisation. At the same time, an expansion of international agreements and organisations among governments has been accompanied by a corresponding proliferation of transnational civil society associations of all types, resulting in a myriad of informal and self-organised regionalisms (Edwards 2009, Edwards and Gaventa 2014). On this note, regionalism has become, at the same time, a

potential mode of governance and a frame for the expression of citizenship for alternative demands (Hettne 1997, Mittleman 2000). Regionalism serves as an arena of representation, able to support citizenship demands. In this context, regions are understood as sites of transnational collective action by citizenship networks based on identity and interest (Grugel 2004).

Nevertheless, regionalism has been traditionally analysed through a top-down lens, with emphasis on the role of government elites, including their associates, technocrats or markets, but to the expense of the general citizenry (Fioramonti 2015). By contrast, civil society has received limited attention by scholars of regionalism despite the critical role it can play in strengthening the legitimacy of regional governance (Fioramonti 2012, Scholte 2015). Apart from influencing policy in formal settings, "transnational civil society may undertake self-sustenance socio-economic activities, intellectual endeavours, and so forth, as patterns of informal participation in regionalism" (Rhodes-Kubiak 2015: 50). Cross-border interactions among non-state actors have led scholars of transnational relations to call for an expansion of the traditional, state-bounded notions of civil society to account for a transnational public sphere (Guidry et al. 2000).

In this regard, this study follows the growing debate in the contemporary regionalism discourse on whether civil society has been, more often than not, intentionally side-lined in region-building processes (Fioramonti 2015). From Europe, to Africa, Asia and Latin America, civil society has largely been on the receiving end of region-building processes (Fioramonti 2013). Civil society has been occasionally invited through once-off forms of participation in state-established avenues where the scope is limited and defined in advance by elites, instead of through day-to-day coexistence and continual negotiation (Gaventa and Mayo 2009, Gaventa 2010). Despite rhetorical references to the importance of civic participation, regionalism has largely developed without the citizens. These practices have not allowed ordinary citizens to fully participate in region-building decisions and have subsequently forced them to claim participation from the regional institution. At the same time, these citizens develop their own institutions of interaction outside of the mainstream, which is traditionally dominated by technocrats and lobbyists, for alternative regionalisms like what is happening with the Southern African civil society networks. Nevertheless, despite the proliferation of transboundary civil society organisations and their interaction within formal and informal regionalisms, there

seems to be lack of clarity around the way non-state actors go about conducting their business and achieve their goals or how they interact with organisations that are formal or self-organised networks.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aimed to develop a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting within both horizontal networks outside of the mainstream and with the formal regional bodies like SADC, in order to understand their differences.

The specific research objectives ensuing from this broad aim are to:

i) Identify the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that are developed by Southern African civil society groups when they interact within horizontal networks and with the SADC;

ii) Examine the differences between institutional arrangements in terms of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African regional civil society networks during their interaction within formal and self-organised regionalisms;

iii) Develop a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalisms in relationship to the respective kinds of strategies, norms and rules they employ;

iv) Contribute to the existing literature on regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors.

1.4 Justification and Relevance of the Study

This study contributes to the existing literature on the contemporary regionalism debate by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. Despite the explosion of new regionalism throughout the world, the role of civil society remains neglected by political elites, academics and policymakers. The study of regionalism in Africa, and more specifically in Southern Africa, as well as globally, has been dominated by rationalist schools of thought praising the mainstream state-led and market-driven approach as the sole mode of regional cooperation. Such research on regionalism has focused on Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region, with Europe remaining an intellectual laboratory (Engel et al. 2017). In

this regard, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their capability to promote alternative regionalism have been minimised. Firstly, this research has been inspired by the academic writings of Della Porta et al. (2006), Fioramonti (2012, 2015), Söderbaum (2004, 2007, 2017), Godsäter (2014), Grugel (2003, 2005) and Gerard (2014, 2014b) on the importance of civil society engagement within different political projects to form regions across the globe. This information guides the aim of this study, seeking to move beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism, to the bottom-up model and, above all, understanding regionalisms as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena.

Apart from influencing policy in formal settings, it has been seen that transnational civil society may undertake self-help socio-economic activities, intellectual endeavours and so forth as patterns of informal participation in regionalism (Rhodes-Kubiak 2015). Focusing on the increase of civil society influence in global governance, recent scholars agree that the latter fill a democratic deficit that has long plagued international institutions (Fogarty 2013, Jönsson and Tallberg 2010, Scholte 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013, Godsäter 2015). Some empirical studies have also demonstrated that civil society is not only likely to build regionalism from below but can lead to meaningful contestations of existing regionalism paradigms and contribute to reshaping regions in line with alternative agendas (Fioramonti 2013, Godsäter 2014). While some forms of civil society engagement can strengthen the regional status quo and only produce marginal adjustments in terms of participation and openness, other forms of action exhibit a fundamental counterhegemonic character to the prevailing forms of state-led regionalism. On the other hand, outside-led and top-down regionalism has become debatable as citizens have been the second best of integration (Söderbaum 2007). For example, transnational activists such as Amnesty International have played a significant role in spreading and advancing the norms of human rights, not to mention various environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, that are campaigning to change norms in order to end the nuclear arms race and climate distortion (Keck and Sikkink 1998). According to Botto (2015), civil society actors in Latin America have built transnational networks, the Southern Cone Coordination of Union Federations (CCSCS), through innovative practices of involvement. These civic engagements were aimed at challenging the Free Trade Area Agreement (FTAA) and advance alternatives to the dominant models of regional integration within Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), among others, and creating an identity that goes beyond their particularity sectorial interests (Botto 2015). However, in the Caribbean region, the CARICOM regional civil society still has a long way to go to be recognised as a third actor alongside the state and private sector in regional policymaking (Anyanwu 2015). Focused on formal engagement between regional civil society and governmental elites in the Caribbean region, Anyanwu concludes that apart from the Caribbean Coalition for Development and the Reduction of Armed Violence (CDRAV) with a few groups which successfully influenced regional policy in CARICOM, most civil society groupings have seen their effectiveness being constrained by structural problems, lack of funding and manipulation of skilled representatives, including donors (Anyanwu 2015).

Secondly, a few studies have been conducted in the field of civil society regionalism in Southern Africa that have served as points of reference for this research. Among them, there are studies conducted by Söderbaum (2004, 2007, 2015), Landsberg (2006, 2012), Godsäter and Söderbaum (2011, 2017), Collins (2008, 2013), Zajontz (2013), Godsäter (2014), Odhiambo et al. (2015), and Zajontz and Leysens (2015). These studies were conducted in the Southern African region and demonstrated in various ways how regional civil society networks have the potential transformative power to either influence or shape political decisions of SADC through transnational advocacy strategies. In Southern Africa, most models and practices of regionalism have tended to exclude the diversity of voices and roles in society that compete with states' agendas (Söderbaum 2007). These practices have been criticised by many to often serve the specific interests of some Southern African ruling elites, the ambitions of hegemonic actors or the agendas of industrial and financial powers (Fioramonti 2013). The state-led regional governance has been criticised by many for not helping citizens to fully participate in the regional decision-making processes to form regions (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014). The quest for alternative regionalisms reaches paramount importance through creation of new collaborative avenues where interaction between and among stakeholders in regionalism becomes ultimate.

More than that, SADC's underdevelopment and non-operationalised joint mode of regional governance have both engendered an excess of local and regional popular self-help and grouping initiatives in the form of civil society networks (Florini 2000, Warkentin and Mingst 2000, Wapner 2002, Edwards 2009) to counteract the predominant state-centred regionalism

with a people-centred regionalism model (Söderbaum 2007). These civil society networks function in the form of regional associations, regional networks, regional programmes, regional centres and regional non-profit service providers (Söderbaum 2004: 120). Since the 1990s, the Southern African region has seen the founding of groupings of its citizens within different networks such as the Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN), SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), and Mweleko wa Non-Governmental Organisation (MWENGO) to name a few (Zajontz 2013, CIVICUS 2015, Söderbaum 2016). These regional civil groupings participate either within state-invited or self-created spaces, in order to reclaim SADC resources for SADC's people through alternative regionalisms. Illustratively, SADC-CNGO interacts in SADC through formal avenues as key civil society partners, while SAPSN interacts in informal and self-organised settings outside of the mainstream. In their interaction either in SADC or outside SADC settings, these regional civil society networks seem to develop strategies, norms and rules that interest the current study. Such strategies, norms and rules also seem to be either different or similar, depending on civil society network or organisation with which they interact, as this study seeks to establish. State-established spaces of participation, in the case of Southern Africa, have not fully alleviated regional underdevelopment despite engagement between some selected civil society networks and SADC in decision-making (Söderbaum 2007). At the same time, other civil society groupings have created popular spaces of interaction outside of the mainstream in the form of self-organised and informal regionalisms where strategies, norms and rules are developed which this study seeks to investigate.

With reference to the above studies, there are a few attempts to compare differences of institutional arrangements – strategies, norms and rules – developed by Southern African regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal and self-organised regionalisms for alternatives. Although these previous studies have tended to focus on civil society engagement in region-building processes in the Americas, Asia, Africa and specifically the Southern Region, rather less attention has been paid to, in a comparative manner, what kind of strategies, norms and rules are developed by Southern African civil society networks in their engagement either in formal regionalism with the SADC or self-organised interactions. This research seeks to bridge this gap, and offer an original contribution to the literature, by providing such an inquiry as well as comparing, first, strategies, norms and rules developed by

regional civil society networks when they interact within both formal regionalism with SADC and self-organised regionalisms among themselves outside of the mainstream.

The current study is relevant to a range of disciplines such as global studies, transnational advocacy networks, informal institutions, new regionalism approaches, and development studies, among others. The outcome is valuable for area specialists in Africa and Southern Africa, policymakers, states, civil society organisations, grassroots communities, scholars, international development agencies and donors. The original contribution this thesis makes is bridging the gap in the literature and in practice between state-centric and people-centred approaches to regionalisms by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors in order to build alternative regionalisms in Southern Africa and the world at large. It is this understanding of region formation that led this study to explore how regional civil society networks interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. A focus on Southern African civil society networks enabled the researcher to (i) identify the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that non-state actor groupings developed when they interact within both formal regionalism like SADC and self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream (ii) compare these two sets of institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society networks in two distinct settings of interaction in order to gauge the differences among them (iii) develop a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting within formal and with self-organised regionalisms. Through this inquiry, the research sought to explore and understand people-centred approaches to regionalism drawing from Southern Africa and positioning the voice of Southern African epistemic communities within the larger context of contemporary regionalism from below.

1.5 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

This study is situated in the contemporary regionalism debate, which expands the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. It argues that regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon, which can also be promoted by non-state actors like Southern African civil society networks in the SADC region. If well-governed, regional civil society networks, as self-organised regionalisms, can function just like formal regionalisms driven by state actors and technocrats. Against this backdrop, the overarching research question is: *what kinds of strategies, norms and rules are developed by civil society networks in Southern Africa in order to build alternative regionalisms?*

This question entails addressing the following research sub-questions:

1. *What kinds of strategies, norms and rules are developed by regional civil society networks when they interact in formal regionalism processes like SADC?*

2. *What kinds of strategies, norms and rules are developed by regional civil society networks when they interact in self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream?*

This study was delimited into three dimensions, notably conceptual, temporal, and geographical, in order to guide its focus and scope. With regard to conceptual delimitation, a new institutionalist lens was adopted to develop an understanding of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks when they interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms as institutional arrangements in people-centred approaches to regionalism, drawing from the work of new institutionalists like Johan Olsen and James March (1984), Elinor Ostrom (1986), Douglass North (1990), Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991), Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996), Guy Peters (1999), and Andre Lecours (2005), among others. The framework provided by these new institutionalist scholars allowed for an exploration of the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by non-state actors within SADC-CNGO and SAPSN in horizontal networks and with SADC, and the understanding of the most suitable standpoint to look at regionalism as an unconventional sociopolitical phenomenon that can be promoted also by non-state actors like Southern African civil society networks. In the same vein, the study is also conceptually limited to regional civil society networks encompassing structured and unstructured civil society organisations such as social movements, NGOs, faith-based organisations, research institutions and trade unions actively involved in democracy and socio-economic development at the regional level. The study does not include any terrorist movements or any other social organisations that threaten human life, wildlife and nature in their daily activities (Scholte 2014, Edwards 2009, 2014). Thus, there are a few studies conducted in the field of civil society regionalism in Southern Africa that have served as points of reference for this research. As indicated in section 1.4, these include studies by Söderbaum (2004, 2007, 2015, 2017), Landsberg (2006, 2012), Godsäter and Söderbaum (2011, 2017), Zajontz (2013), Godsäter (2014), and Zajontz and Leysens (2015). More than that, the SADC Report, Southern African civil society networks reports, peer-reviewed academic journals and credible media sources were used to augment the literature that covers Southern African civil society regionalism.

The study focused on the institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society networks in regionalisms covering the period between 1989 and 2016. This period marks, on the one hand, the end of the Cold War in 1989, which triggered a drastic change in global order from bipolar to multipolar, from a clearly structured by bloc confrontation to a new complexity, and from an imagined hierarchy of spatial configurations around the nation-state to a multiplicity of competing and overlapping regimes of territorialisation (Engel and Middell 2005). Subsequently, world politics witnessed a multiplicity of actors such as Southern African civil society actors' groupings alongside state actors within regional intergovernmental organisations like SADC, collaborating and competing at the same time for the formation of regions through their respective involvement in regional political decisions (SADC 1992, Söderbaum 2007). On the other hand, this period coincides with the democratisation of political spaces including declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their end in 2016, which inaugurated the emergence of regional civil society networks activism and establishment of a regional governance system that provides a joint space for a formal regionalism (SADC), and regional civil society networks. During this time, the Southern African region has registered a myriad of regional civil society groupings lobbying for an inclusive regional institution through formal and self-organised interactions in order to build alternative regionalisms.

Geographically, the study is limited to the strategies, norms and rules that are developed by civil society networks operating within the boundaries of countries that form SADC, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kingdom of Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Kingdom of Swaziland (now Eswatini), Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC 2016). The choice made to focus on the Southern Africa region is empirically justified on the one hand due to its adopted mode of regional governance by the Regional Intergovernmental Organisation (RIGO) that allows a joint space of collaboration between regional actors like SADC and civil society networks in decision-making processes (SADC 1992). However, despite its established joint space of a regional governance system, SADC has been criticised by many for being one of the major African regional economic communities (RECs) least open to civil society (Odhiambo et al. 2016) due to its established state-driven regional integration model. Steered by its top-down system of regional governance, SADC has failed to deliver on its promises with regard to fully engaging in constant dialogue with civil society in decision-making processes as stipulated in

article 23 of its treaty (SADC 1992, Söderbaum 2007, SADC-CNGO 2012). In response to the state-driven mode of regional integration and cooperation, Southern African citizens mobilised within networks claim a political, social and economic space between the nation-state and the regional governance system through various institutional arrangements within formal and self-organised interactions. The emergence of these new spaces and opportunities of citizen engagement in regional integration and cooperation processes has motivated the researcher to develop a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society groups when interacting within both horizontal networks and with SADC, in order to build alternative regionalisms. In that regard, the Southern African region has become both a "paradox" case, for lack of operationalisation of its approved joint mode of governance, and, at same time, an "atypical" case compared to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC), both situated on the same continent, for the interaction of cross-border civil society associations within formal institutions. As far as theory is concerned, there is a lack of studies, compared to other regions in the world, on the typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society associations during their interaction within two institutional settings. In this context, regional civil society networks such as the Southern African People Solidarity Network (SAPSN) and SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) are scrutinised as embedded sub-case studies, though limited. These regional civil society networks represent respectively the reformist groups interacting in formal settings and counterforce groups interacting within self-organised settings outside of the mainstream. SAPSN and SADC-CNGO are actively advocating for democracy and socio-economic development at the macro (regional) and meso (national) levels, which corroborate the purpose of this study (Söderbaum 2004, SADC-CNGO 2012).

1.6 Definition of key concepts

This section provides the working definitions of key concepts used in this study, which constitute the conceptual framework as expanded in chapter 2. It focuses on the contextualised meaning of concepts such as regionalism, civil society and people-centred approach to regionalism, and the way they have been applied and interlinked in the research.

1.6.1 Regionalism

There is a general understanding that regionalism is an ideal that represents state initiatives to cooperate (Agnew 1999, Fawn 2009). Some scholars view regionalism as a political project to form regions but not necessarily driven by states as sole actors, on the contrary competing and coexisting with other regional visions from other regional actors (Söderbaum 2009, Zajontz 2013, Oloruntoba 2016).

In order to grasp what regionalism entails, one needs to borrow from a notion of region as an embedded concept in the study of regional civil society networks. Given regionalism as a key concept of this study, region is still a contested concept as subjectively defined according to different contexts, factors and circumstances (Mansfield and Milner 1999). Based on geographical proximity, a region is referred to as a social construction including more than two countries (Agnew 2015, Borzel and Risse 2016) like the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), SADC, and so forth. It can be understood at a macro level as a unit within the national or global arena and as micro-regions between national and local or sub-national levels (Godsäter 2014). Beyond territorial localisation, regions are more than space-bound entities and defined by homogenous factors such as language, culture, ideology or religion (Schoeman 2013, Lang 2013, Fioramonti 2015) as can be seen in the case of the Arab world, to name a few. In addition, regions are becoming a normative contiguity: organisational frameworks for civic activism and for the construction of new expressions of post-sovereign citizenship (Hettne 1997, Mittleman 2000) which is the case in this study. Regions are social constructions and understood as sites of transnational collective action by citizenship networks based on identity and interest (Fawn 2009, Grugel 2004).

Against this backdrop, regionalism is understood, in this study, as a set of ideas, values, identities and ideologies or policies that aim at creating a region or regional project for socio-economic development (Söderbaum 2009, Zajontz 2013). Falk (1995) sees regionalism as part of a trend towards the containment of neoliberal globalisation and demands for greater democracy, human rights and social justice. It is a political project to form a region or a type of world order where states are deemed to be sole actors. Regionalism is referred to as the urge for a regionalist order that suggests a policy of cooperation and coordination among actors within a given region (Agnew 1999, Fawn 2009), implies wide-ranging activities of transnational co-operation and cross-border flow and carries a serious political and

institutionalist bias (Schoeman 2013, Mittleman 1999, Acharya 2009). Not to be confused with regionalism, regionalisation refers to the process of cooperation, integration and cohesion that creates a regional space (Söderbaum 2015). It is an outcome of regionalism (Taylor 2010, Söderbaum 2015). Regionalisation, in the most basic sense, may mean no more than a deepening or widening of activity, trade, peoples, ideas, or conflict at the regional level (Fawcett 2005a). In this regard, the study is interested in, as indicated in preceding sections, civil society's interaction within processes of region formation and more precisely the kind of strategies, norms and rules that are developed. Thus, it is paramount to understand what precisely civil society entails.

1.6.2 Civil society

This thesis recognises that civil society remains a highly contested concept among many scholars. It does indeed mean different things to different people at different times, depending on the school of thought (Armstrong and Gilson 2010; Edwards 2004; Weiss 2008). The concept of civil society reflects its normative associations, as emphasised by Hedman, who argues that "civil society is typically viewed as a strangely apolitical and horizontal sphere of voluntarism and spontaneity" (Hedman 2005: 140). This thesis concurs with comments of Edwards (2011), Fioramonti (2015) and Scholte (2002) that civil society is an arena of participation outside the state and the market where individuals and groups are voluntarily associated to interact in the pursuance of their objectives animated by a variety of values and interests. This definition of civil society is found to be balanced in this study not only because it allows one to look at civil society comprehensively and exclusively, but also helps one to understand how voluntary groupings of citizens are participating within an arena outside the state and market in order to influence or shape political institutions that they deem to be of collective value and interest during interaction.

In this study, the emphasis is on the views of German philosopher Habermas and political scientist Larry Diamond, who respectively viewed civil society as a democratising agent and public sphere of discourse and interaction crucial for the development and strengthening of democracy (Diamond 1999, Kellner 2000). They describe civil society as a breeding ground where new issues and demands are formed, received and re-elaborated by the public sphere, and finally translated into policies and law-making norms, or in other terms into rights. It is about the involvement of people in attempts by actors outside of state spheres to step in where the state is perceived to be failing to fulfil its duties and obligations to citizens.

At the same time, there are different kinds of civil society outside the traditional NGOs, according to their assigned mandate and undertaken works or activities. These encompass think tanks, community-based organisations (CBOs), grassroots organisations, labour movements, faith-based organisations (FBOs), environmental organisations, social movements, women's movements, youth movements, informal trader networks, advocacy groups, research organisations, and so forth (Parekh 2004, Söderbaum 2007, Scholte 2015). There are other types of civil society like terrorist movements and extremist Islamic movements pursuing anti-democratic goals, employing anti-democratic means, and producing anti-democratic consequences. These risks are by no means grounds to exclude civil society, but they give reason to treat it with care (Scholte 2001). However, in this study, civil society encompasses the above, but excludes organisations that threaten human life and cause harm to animals and the environment in their routine activities.

In term of their scope of operationalisation, there are civil society operating at the grassroots level and have nothing to do with the entire nation or region as the scope of their activities. At the same time, there are also some civil society organisations respectively operating at the national level, like SANGOCO which is a national umbrella of local NGOs in South Africa (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014), and other national civil society with regional mandate, like the Economic Justice Network of South Africa (EJN) and a few research institutions (Scholte 2015). More than that, there are some regional civil society networks constituted with national chapters of civil society within a region and form a network in line with their working area. In this regard, SADC-CNGO, Gender Links, and SAPSN, among others, constitute examples of regional civil society networks. Others operate in the form of cross-border non-state actors associations within a given region, like the informal cross-border traders (ICBTs) (SADC-CNGO 2012, Gender Links 2016, SAPSN 2012, Söderbaum 2004, Godsäter 2015, Zajontz and Leysens 2015).

This thesis focuses on civil society networks operating at the regional level, comprising both grassroots and national civil society organisations as part of a regional network. On that note, regional civil society networks (RCSNs) refer to self-organised advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest (Florini 2000, Edwards 2009). They constitute important new avenues that promote collaboration and collective action around common agendas for the interest of non-state actors across state borders.

Thus, the concept of civil society is treated as the public sphere instead of a force for good. Just like RCSNs, global civil society refers to a kind of social counter-force to state control, in which citizens organise themselves and their interests across national boundaries (Edwards 2011). The World Social Forum (WSF) or the World Women's Forum are both examples of global civil society, which is actively influencing international dynamics (Neubert 2014, Walk and Boehme 2002). For example, the WSF creates avenues of mobilisation for global citizenry awareness to contest the decisions of seven (states which are) leaders of the World Economic Forum (WEF). The WSF gathers alongside a group (the WEF) that decides on the fate of the global economy (Della Porta et al. 2006).

Given its cross-border interaction within regionalisms, civil society becomes not simply identified as the voice of the voiceless or the point of origin of communicative power, but as a new form of transformative power that is developed and exercised within the overall national or regional governance framework. In this context, civil society creates associations beyond national borders, which prompt them to establish a people-centred approach to regionalism. Thus, it is paramount to conceptualise a people-centred approach to regionalism in order to illuminate the understanding of the reader.

1.6.3 People-centred approach to regionalism

The term *people-centred approaches to regionalism* is used here to refer to regionalist projects driven by active frontline communities, including ordinary citizens, women, indigenous people, small-scale farmers, migrants, socio-economically disadvantaged groups and other most affected grassroots actors. These are at the centre of political region-building projects in opposition to state-centred approaches driven by nation-state members of regional groups as sole actors. This implies that civil society within nation-states is an antithesis to regionalism. It is a result of the failure or inadequacy of groups of nation-states to meet expectations at the regional level. Cross-border epistemic communities' aspirations become the centre of regional interaction within both self-organised networks and state-led forums. These people-centred approaches to regionalism put the aspirations of the regional citizenry at the centre of political ideologies to form regions. It is a relocation of the centre of regional political decision-making, where non-state actors play an active role not only as participants on the side of their counterpart stakeholders but also as active agents and actors in their own right. It requires the legitimacy of institutions and their respective actors, and active participation of epistemic communities at different stages of political decision-making to form regions. A people-centred

approach to regionalism, where the public is a central element and resource in regional integration and cooperation processes, represents a paradigmatic shift from the top-down, traditional models of regionalism, to the bottom-up (Della Porta et al. 2006). People-centred approaches to regionalism include cross-border civil society associations in two institutional settings. These encompass, on the one hand, the horizontal networks among ordinary citizens themselves coined as informal or self-organised regionalism (SAPSN 2012, Godsäter 2014, Söderbaum 2017). On the other hand, there is vertical interaction with SADC elites in formal forums, coined as formal regionalism (SADC-CNGO 2012, Söderbaum 2017). This distinction will be explained in detail in the next chapter, which is the conceptual chapter. For this study, reference is made to the Southern African civil society networks and, specifically, the Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) and SADC's coalition of non-governmental organisations (SADC-CNGO) operating within the SADC region (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014). These regional civil society networks create new avenues that promote and allow collaboration between people inside and outside of the SADC through a call for the Civil Society Forum (CSF) and SADC People's Summit, with the aim of enabling ordinary citizens to engage in the formation of regions (SADC-CNGO 2012, SAPSN 2012, Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014, Zajontz and Leysens 2015). This study seeks to understand the strategies, norms and activities that guide the behaviour of actors in such networks during their interactions in formal and self-organised regionalisms, and in their quest for alternative regionalism.

1.6.3.1 Strategies

The concept *strategies* has various meanings in different sections of society, such as the military, sports, business, among others. It generally describes the behaviour of a player in a game. In terms of definition, this thesis draws from Elinor Ostrom's definition of strategies as operating procedures and practices that describe the behaviour of civil society networks in their interactions (Ostrom 2005: 156, Schluter and Theesfeld 2010). Strategies facilitate the coordination of activities shared by everybody within a network and help to predict and regulate human behaviour (Bromley 1989, Schluter and Theesfeld 2010). In the current context, strategies constitute a set of operating procedures developed by Southern African civil society networks when they interact within both self-organised networks of civil society organisations among themselves and with the SADC. This definition is suitable for this study

as it helps the researcher explain the coordination of the interactions among Southern African civil society organisations in the quest for alternative regionalism.

1.6.3.2 Norms

The study defines *norms* as collective representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of specific group conduct (Jackson 1965). They are routines and linked actions of groups which are bound by a common purpose to achieve outcomes (Ostrom 2005). Further, norms are standards of behaviour shared by members of a social group. This definition helps the researcher to identify the collective behaviour shared by cross-border non-state actors in their interaction in the Southern African region.

1.6.3.3 Rules

Rules refer to a set of instructions for creating an action in a particular environment (Black 1962, Allen 2005). They relate to a shared understanding in civil society networks about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, prohibited, or permitted (Ostrom 1980). Rules take various forms. For example, they may be codified and prescribed, as are constitutions, which constitute the law on paper and are not necessarily applied every time. There are also rules-in-use in the action arena, which are not necessarily on paper but are applied as operating rules that are commonly used by most participants (Ostrom 2005). This thesis seeks to identify the rules-in-use that dictate the behaviour of Southern African civil society networks during their interactions in which they claim inclusion in regional decision-making process as provided by article 23 of the SADC Treaty (SADC-CNGO 2012, Söderbaum 2007).

1.6.4 New Institutionalism

New Institutionalism forms the core theoretical frame for the examination of strategies, norms and rules employed by actors in civil society networks in this thesis. It enabled the researcher to focus on the strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interactions in both SADC-led and self-organised processes of regionalism. The approach is explained and engaged with in detail below and chapter 3.

Before concluding this section, a word on *typology* or an explanation thereof is necessary because it constitutes a key contribution of this research to the body of knowledge, as chapter 6 of this thesis will show. This study borrowed Babbie's definition of typology as a classification

of observations in terms of their attributes on two or more variables (2005). It is an organised system of types or a summary of an intersection of two or more variables (LaPorte 2014). As for types, they constitute a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories that are used to measure an overarching concept and to classify cases (Babbie 2005). In this case, typology helps to conceptualise and classify the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society in two distinct institutional settings, namely formal and self-organised outside of the SADC. Although criticised for being old-fashioned and unsophisticated, typology is praised by Collier, LaPorte and Seawright (2012) being a useful tool in forming concepts, refining measurement, exploring dimensionality, and organising explanatory claims. Descriptive typology was used in this study, where the combination of values on the dimensions describes the named analytic types contained in the cells.

1.7 Research Design and Methodology

1.7.1 Philosophy and theory of the study

In order to attain its objectives, this study recognises the importance of the lived experience of people on the ground. It, therefore, does not apply universalist theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed from a different lived reality. This approach also fits in well with the new institutionalist lens, which underscores the need for recognising the people-centred approach to regionalism. Unlike positivist and rationalist paradigms that claim that it is possible to separate facts from value, that research is value-free and that the researcher is independent, taking the role of an objective analyst (Blumberg et al. 2005), post-positivism rejects the value-free position and claims that objective theories can be crafted in order to understand and explain reality or events.

This study uses New Institutionalism as a core theoretical frame and lens through which to examine the people-centred approach to and engagements between civil society networks in Southern Africa and formal regionalism. It is the main prism through which the research was conducted. This is because New Institutionalism focuses on the strategies, norms and rules that civil society networks develop in order to build alternative regionalisms. New Institutionalism helped the researcher to understand how civil society groups adopt strategies in light of the norms they hold and within the rules of formal or self-organised settings within which they are interacting. Through a new institutionalist lens, this study undertakes a cross-sectional comparison of institutional arrangements in collective-choice situations to gauge differences in the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society groupings in two institutional settings. In this context,

strategies are operationalised as practices and operating procedures that describe the behaviour of civil society networks in their interactions (Ostrom 2005); norms are routines or collective representations of acceptable group conduct bound by some common purpose to achieve outcomes (Jackson 1965); rules are set instructions for creating an action situation in a particular environment (Allen 2005, Black 1962) or shared understanding by civil society networks about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, prohibited or permitted (Ostrom 1980). New Institutionalism provides a suitable theoretical perspective for the comprehensive study of institutions, the way they interact, and the effects they have on society (March and Olsen 1984). It provides an understanding of how institutions evolve in very different ways and how they shape the behaviour of agents or individual members and produce change through rules, norms, and other frameworks (Lecours 2005). In this context, institutions are sets of norms, rules and procedures that enable and constrain actor behaviour with some predictability over time and may also constitute their identities and preferences (March and Olsen 1984; Charles Plott in Ostrom 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions are not only material and formal structures – bureaucracies – as seen by old institutionalism, but ideational/normative and informal structures as cognitive scripts, norms and values (Hall and Taylor 1996).

Moreover, this study borrows elements from the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) in order to illustrate the strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border non-state actors from an unconventional point of view. This is because NRA allowed the researcher to look at regionalism as an unconventional social and political phenomenon, which can be promoted also by non-state actors (Hettne and Inotai 1994; Palmer 1991). NRA enabled the researcher to link the promotion of regionalism by non-state actors through bottom-up initiatives in Southern Africa. NRA conceptualises regionalism as a multidimensional process occurring in many sectors and on different levels simultaneously, and driven by a variety of regionalising actors, broadly grouped in terms of states, markets and civil society (Söderbaum 2007). One basic assumption is that not only economic, but also social, cultural and environmental regional networks and projects are anticipated to develop more quickly than formal state-driven regionalist projects (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

1.7.2 Research design

Babbie and Mouton (2001: 74) define research design as a plan ahead of research. In order to answer the above research questions, this study applied a qualitative comparative study research design that observed two cases that were selected on a most-similar cases basis (Tilly 1984). The

comparative approach has been praised by a number of political scientists, especially in the study of institutions, for making the study of politics more structured and devising more precise conclusions. This design was useful in the current study on institutions as it denotes the practice of comparing political institutions such as strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks within both formal and self-organised settings. Bearing in mind that a comparative design requires at least two facts or events, like two texts, two theories, two historical figures, two scientific processes, and so on (Tilly 1984, Ragin 1987, Walk 1998, Pickvance 2005), this comparison was focused on two sets of strategies, norms and rules developed within the region. In this regard, the study focused on the kinds of institutional arrangements developed within both horizontal networks and vis-à-vis SADC as two institutional settings by two categories of regional civil society networks, such as SAPSN and SADC-CNGO in the same region, SADC. Although the comparative approach in political science is regarded as advantageous in linking theory to evidence, enhancing it as a scientific discipline, there are several constraints on its possibilities and which can impair its usefulness (Caramani 2014). These, including the presence of too many variables and too few cases in politics, have engendered some limitations in terms of the ability to draw causal inferences from the factors that may affect the outcome of interest. The research may not be objective, and the researcher may be tempted, especially when working within a defined research programme, to use a negative case study to justify his or her position. More than that, sometimes comparative politics tends to present a normative evaluation of the world in favour of defining the political world and clarifying why it is the way it is (Babbie and Mouton 2001, Caramari 2014). In this case, the researcher remained objective and used similar cases with minor differences for comparison to countermeasure any bias that may affect the outcomes.

1.7.3 Methods and approach

Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used to conduct this study, as explained below. Relying on original semi-structured interviews and primary resources, this study developed a typology to identify and examine the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society groups while interacting in two institutional settings, such as horizontal networks and with SADC. Through a comparative approach, the researcher first separately identified the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that are developed by civil society networks when they interact in formal regionalism processes with formal institutions like the SADC and identified those that are developed by civil society networks when they interact in informal and self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream. Second, the researcher then compared the kinds of strategies, norms and rules as institutional arrangements that were developed within formal regionalism and self-

organised regionalisms outside the mainstream in order to work out the differences between them. Lastly, following the identification of differences in strategies, norms and rules, the researcher developed a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks interacting in two distinct institutional settings or environments, as indicated above.

1.7.4 Study population and sample

A population is defined as the total of the entire individuals having characteristics that are of the interest to the researcher (Babbie 2005, Salkind 2012). The target population of this study was the regional civil society networks active in the field of democracy and socio-economic development at the macro (regional) and meso (national) levels. The units of analysis were the regional civil society networks in Southern Africa, including the states as drivers of formal regionalism and the overall environment in which the study was conducted and against which people-centred approaches were contrasted. A desktop search revealed that the Southern African region is a bastion of networks of cross-border civil society actors undertaking citizenship that fulfils functions such as transnational advocacy, service provision, knowledge production, and mobilisation, to name a few, in different fronts of social, political, ecological, economic and environmental sectors (Söderbaum 2004, Moyo et al. 2009, Godsäter 2014, 2015). Among the foremost RCSNs, there is the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD); Child Rights Network of Southern Africa (CRNSA); Economic Justice Network (EJN); Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA); Southern African Research and Development Centre (SADRC); Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN); Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA); SADC Lawyers Association (SALA); Southern Africa Federation of the Disabled (SAFOD); Southern African AIDS Service Organisation (SAFAIDS); Southern African Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA); Southern African Confederation of Agriculture Unions (SACAU); Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance (SAGPA); Southern African People's Solidarity Networks (SAPSN); Southern African Youth Movement (SAYM); Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI); Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC); Women in Law in Southern Africa (WILSA); Gender Links; SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGO); Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA); Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), among others (SADC-CNGO 2012; Söderbaum 2007; Godsäter 2015; Odhiambo, Chitiga, & Ebobrah 2016). This study focuses on SASPN and SADC-CNGO for civil society as elaborated in chapter 1. That is, bearing in mind the risk of depending on one or

two actors as a source of data collection, this research used the SAPSN and SADC-CNGO, as they encompass interlinked and affiliated civil society organisations and social movements from national levels within Southern African region. These civil society networks devise different kinds of strategies, norms and rules during their interactions within both horizontal networks and vertically with the state in the quest for an alternative regionalism that is centred and driven by ordinary people themselves in civil society and SADC.

A combination of snowball and cluster sampling techniques were used to select research participants from the population. As mentioned by Silverman (2016), snowballing is a useful technique when conducting a study in which the target respondents are not easily accessible. Convenors and referrals were also used because of conditions in the field, such as the case of political tension in the DRC. These sampling techniques were adopted because the study explored a highly politicised and debated topic in the SADC region around institutions which claimed to be legitimate in representing citizens in decision-making processes. Given the sensitivity of the research topic, the researcher made use of snowballing because it would have been challenging to get through to respondents without referrals. Participants were divided into three clusters representing members of regional state actors, regional civil society and regional donors/partners all involved, in one way or the other, in the regional integration of Southern Africa. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) indicate that qualitative research investigates the why and how of decision-making, not just what, where, when. In this case, according to the authors, smaller but focused samples are more often needed, rather than large samples. Since the present study is qualitative and non-probability, a total number of 40 people participated in this research as explained in sections below. These included 28 respondents who participated in face-to-face semi-structured interviews, as per the attached list of interviewees in Appendix I.3 of this thesis, and 12 discussants in two separate focus group discussions. The separation of these two categories of participants was done for triangulating the data. The number of 28 semi-structured interviews was achieved through the following specific criteria: eight state actors from the SADC Secretariat, the SADC Parliament Forum and the SADC National Committees from Botswana, DRC, Mozambique and South Africa, as research sites. Each of these was purposively chosen by the researcher. Regional civil society constituted the second category of 14 respondents from organisations affiliated with SAPSN, SATUCC, Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA), Gender Links and SADC-CNGO, including ordinary citizens in the region. The third category comprised six respondents from major partners/donors or external regional actors in the region such as the EU Delegation to SADC, the Open Society Foundation, the German Development Cooperation, the

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Norwegian People's Aid. Respondents were demographically represented by gender, youth, people with disabilities, and all of which were between 18 and 60 years old.

1.7.5 Data Sources

Data was gathered through primary and secondary sources.

1.7.5.1 Secondary data sources

Secondary data collection is the most common research method employed in research today, to the extent that it involves processing data that have already been collected by another party (Babbie 2005). In this study, secondary data was retrieved from relevant published and unpublished books, articles, newspapers and other relevant documents and digital materials on SADC and Southern African civil society networks sources. The researcher reviewed data from various relevant sources on the SADC and civil society in the Southern African region. These included annual reports, constitutions, summit declarations, newspaper articles, the SADC Treaty and Protocols, periodicals, reports, audio-visual materials, and online scientific materials as well as electronic sources, conferences and workshops, among others.

The secondary data enabled the researcher to cross-check the literature in order to validate the primary data collected during fieldwork.

1.7.5.2 Primary sources

Primary data was collected in SADC member states as research sites including, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique and South Africa – where non-state actors within civil society organisations connected to SAPSN and SADC-CNGO are actively involved in self-mobilisation at the same time as they are engaged with state actors. These countries were purposely selected by the researcher because the SADC region comprises heterogeneity in political regimes, ranging from autocracies to consolidating democracies through defecting democracy as indicated in table 4.2 of chapter 4. These political regimes were viewed by many to be determinants of civic interaction in each country.

1.7.5.2.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Through semi-structured interviews, respondents were able to express themselves openly and freely and could define the world from their perspectives and not solely from the perspective of the researcher (Dawson and Ry Algozzine 2011). Semi-structured interviews were well-suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and also enabled probing for more information and clarification of answers (Louise-Barriball and While 1994). In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 28 respondents, who were clustered into three categories based on country as indicated above. Responses from the regional state actors' category enabled the researcher to answer the first sub-research question about the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks in formal settings of interaction with the SADC. The regional civil society actor category of respondents enabled the researcher to answer the second sub-research question, about the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when interacting in formal or self-organised regionalisms. The third category of regional donors enabled the researcher to get balanced responses about the status of the interaction of Southern African civil society networks in the region. Some semi-structured interviews were concomitantly conducted by the researcher and a team of researchers from the German Development Institute (DIE) led by Dr Merran Husle under the research theme: "The influence of civil society networks on regional governance: the case of SADC" as part of the MoU between the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation at the University of Pretoria and DIE (see Appendix X).

1.7.5.2.2 Focus Group Discussions

Two focus group discussions were held and comprised six discussants each (Dilsha and Latif 2013), chosen through simple random sampling. The discussions took place in Gaborone, Botswana in March 2018 and were necessitated by the availability of discussants in that country which hosts the SADC Secretariat. Focus group 1 comprised civil society grouping affiliated to SADC-CNGO. Focus group 2 comprised discussants from civil society groups which interact within self-organised networks, for example SAPSN. Discussants included male, female, young people and people with disabilities, for a satisfactory demographic representation. All of these were snowballed based on their association to a regional civil society network and experience in interacting either in formal or self-organised regionalism. Discussions in group 1 enabled the researcher to understand the kind of strategies, norms and rules that are developed respectively within SADC-led forums. Those in

group 2 helped the researcher to grasp the kind of strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. By providing insight on the perceptions, beliefs and opinions of a group of people in relation to the research questions, focus group discussions helped the researcher to triangulate the data collected from semi-structured interviews, observations and literature review (Silverman 2016).

1.7.5.2.3 Participant Observation

For triangulation, the abovementioned techniques of data collection were augmented by observational notes through participant observation (Johnson et al. 2006) of the researcher on strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during their interaction within the 13th Civil Society Forum held from 14th to 16th August 2017 prior to the 37th Head of States Summit from 19 to 20 August 2017 at the OR Tambo Building in Pretoria, South Africa (SADC 2017). More than that, the researcher has observed the interaction between civil society networks and SADC elites during the Gender Links Summit and Awards held in Gaborone, Botswana on 6 and 7 March 2018. The technique enabled the researcher to grasp the way self-organised forums were held through strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during their interaction with the SADC elites and among themselves outside of the formal forums, which were also mentioned during the semi-structured interviews, like informal bargaining behind the scene, mutual respect among participants, among others (see chapter 5) even though from different sectors.

1.7.6 Data analysis and tools of analysis

Data analysis was done through qualitative thematic content analysis, which is a tool for analysis that provides a descriptive presentation of qualitative data sets. Thematic content analysis has been used to develop the recurring themes from the narratives of the lived experiences of the research participants (Braun and Clarke 2006, Yin 2016). These qualitative data sets are analysed by identifying the recurring patterns within data and grouping them into themes (Braun and Clarke 2006). These themes are patterns of thought that capture the perceptions of research participants on various phenomena in relation to the research questions (Babbie 2005). In a nutshell, these include the transcribing of all recorded interviews and observation notes taken during the data collection process, the coding of data collected, creation of key themes and categories, and discussion of findings (Creswell 2013). For the sake of anonymity, the study assigned pseudonyms to the participants in the data presentation and analysis process to protect their identity and ensure

consistency. The study categorised them under regional state actors for representatives from the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SNC, and SNCP. Regional civil society actors constituted a category of respondents representing civil society groupings affiliated to SADC-CNGO, SAPSN, SATUCC, FOCCISA, BOCONGO, Gender Links, and SAT, to name a few, as well as the regional citizenry. Finally, the regional donors' category included respondents from the donors/partners like GIZ, FES, OSISA, EU Delegation to SADC, German Cooperation, and so forth. All participants were allocated and identified as respondents with a number from 1 to 8 for the regional state actors' category; 9 to 22 for regional civil society actors and 23 to 28 for the regional donors' category. As for the two focus group discussions, participants were identified as discussants allocated numbers from 1 to 6 for discussants representing civil society representatives who interact in formal settings of regionalism and 7 to 12 for civil society actors interacting in self-organised regionalism outside of the SADC

The study used qualitative differentiating comparative analysis as a modelling approach in order to gauge differences in the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society groupings in two institutional settings of interaction (Tilly 1984, Pickvance 2005). Based on the findings, the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks within two distinct institutional settings were compared by the researcher in order to gauge whether their differences were useful for typology building. The trustworthiness of data collected was measured by means of credibility through triangulation (Babbie and Mouton 2001) and prolonged engagement; building relationship trust with key informants, learning the culture and checking for misinformation and distortion (Polit and Beck 2004), and dependability and confirmability (Babbie and Mouton 2001).

1.7.7 Ethical Considerations and challenges

Anonymity, confidentiality and neutrality in both data collection and research presentation were the key ethical factors on which this study relied (Babbie and Mouton 2001, Babbie 2005). Anonymity and confidentiality entail the protection of the interests, right to privacy and identities of the respondents and participants through techniques of data collection because of the political sensitivity attached to issues of participation of grassroots communities in regionalism. Before data collection, all key respondents and discussants were given consent forms by the researcher, informing them about the importance of confidentiality and anonymity. Informants were briefed by the researcher not to disclose their identity during interviews or focus group discussions. In line

with the anonymity and confidentiality, some respondents were reluctant and refused to be taped for fear of any further prosecutions from the authority within the region. Consequently, some interviews were not taped, and the researcher was obliged to use the hand writing technique to capture the data from these respondents.

1.7.8 Study limitations encountered

The obstacles and limitations to this study included the unavailability of some key informants from both sides, regional state actors and regional civil society groups, due to various reasons. The SADC committee members were especially reluctant to offer recorded interviews. More so, there were language barriers with respondents from civil society. Also, limited access to information due to political regime patterns and unrest in countries chosen as research sites, like in the DRC. To counteract potential obstacles, the researcher made use of interpreters for Portuguese and local vernaculars. Sometimes, the researcher was forced to conduct interviews at a lodge, restaurant or café in an informal setting outside of respondent's office by the request of the respondents for fear of being overheard or recorded by law enforcement. The researcher could not visit more SADC countries due to financial constraints. More than that, the researcher conducted some online interviews and undertook internet searches on think tanks working on alternative regionalism initiatives around the world. Besides, the researcher made use of all sorts of libraries, SADC Reports, the SADC Treaty, SADC Protocols, policy briefs, Civil Society Annual Reports and Declarations, periodicals and columns to which the researcher had access. Conveners and referrals were used in case of the DRC due to political unrest.

1.8 Structure of the Study

Including the introductory chapter, this thesis comprises seven chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

This chapter introduces the research in order to explain the scope and focus through the problem background, research objectives and importance, delimitation, description of the research design and methodology used, and the thesis chapter layout.

Chapter 2 Conceptual Perspectives of Conventional and People-Centred Approaches to Regionalisms

Chapter 2 focuses on a review of both conventional and unconventional approaches to regionalism from pertinent existing literature and discusses how people-centred approaches to regionalism have become an alternative to the conventional approaches in this study. This process entails reviewing citizen engagement discourse in the formation of regions from different schools of thought in contemporary regionalism.

Chapter 3: Understanding People-centred Approaches to Regionalism: Lessons from Theory

Chapter 3 theorises the people-centred approaches to regionalism using New Institutionalism as the core theoretical framework of this study. The chapter sheds light on the understanding of the study focusing on the emergence and importance of informal institutions at the regional level, which are structuring politics of regions formation in new ways across the world. By doing so, the researcher justifies firstly the use of New Institutionalism by the fact that it helped him to look at the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting within both horizontal networks and vis-à-vis the SADC. Secondly, some elements of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) were borrowed by the researcher in order to look at regionalism as an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-states actors.

Chapter 4 The Formal Context of Southern African Civil Society Networks' Interaction in Regionalisms

The chapter unpacks the formal, legal and socio-political contexts in which the Southern African civil society networks interact within the region. It does so through a thorough examination of what constitutes the mode of governance and especially the institutional permeability and legitimacy of SADC. The extent to which Southern African civil society networks have access to decision-making processes in relation to region-building is analysed from different points of view.

Chapter 5 Institutional Arrangements for Formal and Self-Organised Regionalisms in Southern Africa

Drawing from the case of Southern Africa, this chapter aims to present key findings from fieldwork on institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks during their

interaction in the region in order to both answer the research questions and achieve the study objectives. In that regard, the chapter is essentially focused on identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks interacting within formal settings like the Council of Ministers, the Heads of State Summit, and those interacting within self-organised initiatives like SAPSN through the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People's Summit.

Chapter 6 Typology of Institutional Arrangements of Southern African Civil Society Networks in Two Distinct Institutional Settings

In line with the previous chapter, which focused on the presentation of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society in two distinct regional institutional environments, this chapter discusses the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society groupings in formal and informal regionalism respectively. Relying on differentiating comparative analysis, this chapter compares the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed before building a typology of how Southern African civil society networks interact in distinct institutional settings of regionalisms in order to build alternatives.

Chapter 7 Conclusion: Towards A People-Centred Approach to Regionalism: Some Theoretical Reflections

The objective of this chapter is to provide a general summary of the thesis and put forth an imperative for further studies based on the findings of the research. Because the thesis dealt with the interactions of Southern African civil society networks in regionalisms in order to build an alternative, the general idea was to develop a typology of how civil society interacts in regionalisms through a comparison of their developed institutional arrangements. Hence, the focus was on understanding the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks like the SADC-CNGO (apex bodies)[1] and SAPSN when they are interacting respectively within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. Recommendations were given to SADC state members, regional civil society networks, donors and policymakers in order to foster an inclusive and people-centred regionalism.

[1] Apex Bodies is a regional body of three regional civil society networks, namely SADC-CNGO, FOCCISA and SATUCC (SADC-CNGO 2012)

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to introduce the overall study to the people-centred approaches to regionalism by drawing from the case of Southern African civil society networks. The overall argument of the thesis is that regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. It is time to move beyond the state-centric, and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism and above all, understand regionalism as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena. The chapter focused mainly on the introduction of the thesis in order to provide its clear scope and focus throughout its problem background, argument, research objectives and rationality, definition of the key concepts, delimitation, and includes a description of the research design and methodology used, and the thesis chapter layout.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES OF CONVENTIONAL AND PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO REGIONALISMS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to review conventional and unconventional approaches to regionalism from existing literature. It discusses how people-centred approaches to regionalism have become an alternative to the conventional approach. This entails reviewing the citizen engagement discourse in the formation of regions from different schools of thought in contemporary regionalism. The chapter explores the debates on contemporary regionalism, state-led and people-led approaches to regionalism, regional organisations and regional networks, the interaction of regional civil society networks in regionalisms, as well as contextualisation of regionalism from the Southern African experience. Unlike previous studies, which have tended to focus on state-centred institutions developed in regionalism, this chapter argues that attempts have been made by new institutionalist scholars to understand how non-state institutions are working and are of paramount importance for an inclusive regionalism that allows civil society actors to be not only important, but also independent, active agents in the formation of regions. The chapter suggests moving beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism and, above all, understanding regionalism as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena.

2.2 Conceptual Framework of the study

Table 2.1 Regionalism, civil society and people-centred approaches to regionalism in the SADC region



Source: the Author

Table 2.1 summarises the conceptual framework of the study by depicting the linkages between the key concepts under investigation. From left to right, the table demonstrates how regionalism in Box 1 as an ideal to form regions for states to cooperate has been driven by government elites and their allies. Emphasis is put on states as sole actors in the decision-making processes and to a lesser extent ordinary citizens who are hardly invited, except on consultation basis. The box in the middle includes not only civil society organisations that interact with the states but also those which are at the contestation front. At this point, there is a shrinking of formal space for civil society to interact as symbolised by the dotted arrow (**Fi**) between regionalism (Box 1) and civil society (Box 2) where the regional agenda is set a priori by state actors. As a result of their exclusion, civil society at the contestation front with the state (depicted in Box 2) come in attempts by cross-border networks of epistemic communities outside of state spheres to step in where the state is perceived to be failing to fulfil its duties and obligations to include people in the decision-making processes to build regions. Subsequently, these cross-border self-organised networks (**Si**) of civil society within SAPSN, SADC-CNGO (depicted in Box 3 in Table 2.1) develop, through strong links, people-centred approaches to regionalism as an alternative paradigm to regionalism. Regionalism is considered a failure or inadequacy

of a group of states within the regional organisation, like SADC, to meet expectations at the regional level. The central aim was to find out the strategies, norms and rules (**SNR**) developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal space (**Fi**) and self-organised networks outside of the state or mainstream (**Si**) in order to build alternative regionalisms, as indicated in Table 2.1. In order to understand and identify the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks, the researcher used New Institutionalism as the core theoretical framework, which is elaborated upon in chapter 3.

There is a need to review the literature on the discourse of contemporary regionalism and how it speaks to strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when they interact within both formal and informal regionalisms.

2.3 Contemporary Regionalism Debates

In this globalised world, there is an increase in interest in the phenomenon of trans-boundary activities that seek transnational responses. States have shown their inability to handle cross-border issues like financial crises, terror attacks, diseases pandemic, migration, civil wars, and climate change, among others. Regrouped within different regional blocks, states are committed to solving transnational issues that are not confined to their borders.

Historically, scholars such as Panikkar (1948), Hurrell (1995), Mittelman (1996), Jönsson et al. (2000), Hettne (2000), Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003), Hettne (1999), Söderbaum (2004), Fawcett (2005), Scholte (2009), Fioramonti (2012, 2013), Godsäter (2014), Boito (2015), and Kim and Fiori (2015) have made incisive contributions to the evolution of regionalism. Without delving too much into the historical trajectories of regionalism – early, old, new and comparative – and their comparison, there is considerable confusion in the study of regionalism about what is ‘old’ and what is ‘new’, which has been misunderstood and misused (Söderbaum 2016). However, this study acknowledges the existence of the early premodern exchange systems between communities and cooperation in centuries past, especially during the Ancient Greek cooperation era (Jönsson et al. 2000). In this context, the old regionalism first emerged in the 1950s and stagnated in the 1970s (Söderbaum 2004) due to the slowdown of Western European integration and free trade areas (FTA) in developing countries (Hettne 2000), and the multitude of interrelated structural transformations of the global system. In the beginning, old regionalism was modelled on Europe as the intellectual laboratory of regional integration (Hettne 2000). It established and justified

closed and protectionist trading blocs as a way of managing economic policy and providing for development within the bloc (Jönsson et al. 2000, Varynen 2003).

After the end of the old regionalism in which the world was bipolar divided between the East and the West, a renewed and worldwide trend of regionalism was needed, coined as new regionalism, that was not confined merely to formal inter-state regional organisations and institutions (Mittleman 2000). New regionalism emerged in the mid-1980s and has been described as an open, multidimensional societal process that takes shape in a multipolar world order in which a variety of non-state players are also operating at several levels of the global system (Hettne 2000, Söderbaum 2004). To be distinguished from old regionalism, new regionalism reflects the need for states to make a response to the global trend away from protectionism (Varynen 2003). Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, political projects to form a region, i.e. regionalisms, have become an essential object of research in world politics. The world has witnessed a radical change of global order, from bipolar to multipolar, from clearly structured by bloc confrontation to a new complexity, and from an imagined hierarchy of spatial configurations around the nation-state to a multiplicity of competing and overlapping regimes of territorialisation (Engel and Middell 2005, Engel et al. 2017). New regionalism inaugurates a new era of interaction between multidimensional actors at the multipolar centres of political decisions about the formation of regions. World politics has witnessed the collaboration between states and civil society as regional players. New regionalism refers to the processes by which actors, public or private, engage in activities across state boundaries or state actors develop conscious policies of integration with other states (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999). In the current context, new regionalism is a crucial space within which civil society actors connect, exchange information and debate, and contest and contribute to the norms that govern politics and policy-making within states and across the region, like SADC (Grugel 2004).

The study of regionalism deals with projects and imaginations that claim a political, social and economic space between the nation-state and the global governance system. New regionalism is an essential space within which civil society actors connect, exchange information and debate, contest and contribute to the norms that govern politics and policymaking within states and across regions (Grugel 2004). Mittleman (2000) talks of the emergence of regionalism from below, conceptualised as an outcome of the agency of grassroots movements and NGOs as well as more traditional subaltern social actors such as trade unions, as groups connect and

work together across state boundaries. New regionalism is seen as a regional system of governance, a regional trade regulator among member states and an avenue where citizens across the regions exercise their citizenship (Grugel 2004).

Building on Grugel's insights, this thesis views regionalism not only as an arena where formal regional governance is exercised but also as an arena of citizenship for alternative regionalisms (Grugel 2004). This entails that alternative regionalism is associated with the move from the old or first wave of regionalism to the new or second wave of regionalism, where regionalism now takes place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character and involves multidimensional processes (Hettne et al. 1999, Hettne and Söderbaum 2000, Hettne 2005). Alternative regionalisms are regarded as an attempt to specify non-traditional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures involved in the making and re-making of regions across the globe **(**Icaza 2009). As for an alternative, it is a reformist or transformative effort to improve the existing system and institutions, in otherwords, the values, norms, institutions and system that exist outside the traditional, established or mainstream system and institutions (Chandra 2009). Alternative regionalisms seek to highlight that different paradigms inform physical-geographical, political-economic or ideational regional constructs and in so doing they expose the key limitations of state-centric and capital-centric explanations of regionalisms that could be addressed and contested. In this study, to build alternative regionalisms in the Southern African region implies the improvement and/or expansion of SADC's existing integration initiatives to build regions that can also be driven by civil society. Though regionalisms are a priori not constrained to one specific institutional form, they are predominantly studied as formal intergovernmental organisations (Hettne 2000). Academic research predominantly reverts to state-centric approaches and has struggled to systematically incorporate actors other than states in both conceptual and empirical terms.

In the African context, the post-colonial era in the continent has informed the debates about regionalism, despite being influenced by both European integration theory and practice as well as by intellectual debates in Latin America. Importantly, nationalism and pan-Africanism were both general ideological foundations of African regionalism which first and foremost informed the visions and series of treaties developed within what was then the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) (Asante 1997, Taylor 2005). The core aim of these

nationalist ideologies was to guard the continent against external interference in respect of the ideas of the founding fathers of the OAU in 1963 (Nanjira 2010, Schoeman 2013) in the post-colonial era. Identified as post-colonial states, African countries within the AU and other sub-regional organisations were bound together to form social cohesion in order to safeguard their borders against any other potential forms of imperialist interference in their respective domestic affairs and to liberate the remaining states under colonial and apartheid rules. On that note, African regionalism became similar to that of East Asia, but different from the European model, which is based on breaking off nationalist thinking in favour of global or regional thinking, despite being a source of inspiration to the former and latter regional integration models.

Historically, the African continent has experienced two waves of regionalism with significant mutual differences (Boaz 2001). The first one emerged in the 1960s through to the 1980s and was associated with decolonisation and Pan Africanism, manifested by the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Boaz 2001, Söderbaum 2016). In this period, a range of regional schemes was established in order to combat the ongoing exploitation of the continent's resources and achieve political unity. Since most of them concerned economic cooperation, they were often referred to as regional economic communities (RECs). During this period, African regionalism was driven by strategies centred around state-led industrialisation, import substitution and collective self-reliance (Söderbaum 2016). The East African Community (EAC) formed in 1967 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975 are said to be the earliest RECs in this regard (Ajulu 2005, Godsäter 2013). Another significant attribute of the first wave was the strong focus on state actors (Grant and Söderbaum 2003). The second wave of African regionalism started in the early 1990s, partly as a counterforce to the uncertainties of economic globalisation (Boaz 2001). One crucial concrete incentive was the Abuja Treaty, adopted at the 27th summit of the OAU in 1991, which called for a strengthening of existing RECs and the establishment of new ones on the continent (Ajulu 2005). The security of African regional organisations came to the fore of regional negotiation against threats of globalisation dominance.

The state-led approach and Eurocentrism, which refers to modelling on Europe, have both characterised the two waves of African regionalisms (Jenkins and Thomas 2001, Söderbaum 2016). Hence, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992

and the EAC was revived in 1999 after lying dormant for more than two decades. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the predecessor of today's SADC, was created in 1980 in order to work against apartheid and external dependence (Schoeman 2013). The SADCC approach was loosely influenced by the Latin American tradition and on paper, it favoured a dirigist strategy of import-substitution industrialization coupled with a fair distribution of costs and benefits. In practice, however, SADCC was limited to being a structure for project coordination and implementation, funded mainly by donors from Europe and the Nordics in particular (Godsäter 2013). One of the fundamental problems with the radical and structuralist approaches was that they became politically irrelevant due to the increasing importance of structural adjustment and neoliberalism throughout the 1980s. In line with new regionalism in African countries, one crucial novelty is that the institutional agendas and strategies assigned to sub-regional institutions have broadened to include social, politico-strategic and other concerns besides traditional economic integration (Bach 2005). In the case of Southern Africa, there was an emergence of interaction between African front-line states and regional civil society networks in the form of trade unions (SATUCC) and faith-based organisations (FOCCISA) during the liberation struggle to actively fight against the colonial and apartheid regimes.

2.4 Conventional vs people-centred approaches to regionalisms

It is of paramount importance to elaborate on state-centred approaches to regionalism in order to understand the necessity to shift toward a people-centred approach to regionalism as an alternative which aims for inclusive and people-driven regional integration and cooperation.

2.4.1 State-centred approaches as conventional approaches to regionalism

In International Relations and International Political Economy (IR/IPE), the study of regionalism remains highly dominated by rationalist, materialist or structuralist theories focusing predominantly on states and technocrats as regionalising's most important actors as well as on formal inter-state frameworks and market-led processes of regional integration (Mansfield and Milner 1997, Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). This state-centred approach to regionalism engenders a formal type of regionalism centred around formal institutional arrangements driven by state members and their allies (Söderbaum 2016). In other words, the realist approach to nonstate actors in general, and civil society networks in particular, has been

to dismiss them as marginal in world politics. Perceived by many as the conventional mode of building regions, state-centred approaches to regionalism have partly formed the basis for governing political projects aimed at the formation of regions. State members typically deployed these approaches explicitly established by government elites, seconded by allied technocrats and lobbyists as sole actors, and discharged through a state-centred and hierarchical model of governance. The state-centred approach views the state as the dominant organisational structure attempting to control a problematic international and domestic environment, thereby restructuring the society over which it claims to rule (Skocpol 1985; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). These corroborate with the old institutionalist perspective that puts more emphasis on the role of the state as the key player in structuring society. Skocpol (1985) rejects society-centred theories, which she criticises as converting the state into a captive instrument of voters, interest groups or classes, rather than a dominant organisation with a mandate to maintain control and order. The state-centred model of decision-making is driven by state-led and top-down decisions which are deemed to be led by the few and imposed on the many (Fioramonti 2015). Taking the centrality of the state as a premise, realist thinkers have argued that transnational organizations matter only at the fringes of world politics (Mearsheimer 1994/1995).

According to neorealists and neoliberalists, the international system is marked by anarchy, and the most important actors are rational egoists and unitary states whose outward behaviour is dependent on their pre-defined interests (Smith 2002, Ruggie 1998). Neorealists and inter-governmentalists privilege the importance of states and emphasise sovereignty and power. In this case, non-state actors may pressurise their governments, but power is performed within the framework of formal regional institutions driven by state actors. This being said, neorealists believe that any effort to build a community beyond the nation-state will be challenging and may even intensify the differences and conflicts between states (Cini 2003, Söderbaum 2017). State-led decisions have sidelined many citizens who are supposed to drive and own political decisions that affect their lives daily. In Gilpin's reading, groupings of non-state actors were acknowledged by neorealists provided they helped hegemonic states to further their goals. However, "the state continues to be the principal actor in both economic and political affairs" (Gilpin 2004:238). Citizens are treated as beneficiaries, and not as active agents and owners of political projects to form regions. In most cases, these state-driven regional groupings are centred around state will in promoting regional growth through free trade, and building peace

and security among state members. This implies that regional agendas are purely an expression of economic and political aspirations of states. Regrouped within different regional blocks, states become more concerned about consolidating their mutual political power and economic ties in respect of their sovereignty. In the name of sovereignty, states are dictating regional policies and overseeing other organs of the regional body, like the case of SADC which dictates its agenda to its General Secretariat, which lacks enforcement mechanisms (SADC 1992). These state-centred approaches to regionalism are operationalized through formal state-established and driven regional organisations or intergovernmental organisations, like the UN, EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, AU, SADC, among others, perceived to be purely groupings of states who willingly share their common agenda, deemed to be a priority for their respective countries.

2.4.2 People-centred approaches to regionalism as an alternative to regionalism

Many have criticised these state-centred approaches to be an embodiment of state hegemony that reinforces a top-down form of regionalism driven by state-led institutions in decision-making processes. More than that, the great powers and state-centric utilitarianism have been challenged to the extent that these power politics tend to reproduce themselves and reinforce the existing self-help structure as well the dominance of great powers. Wendt (1992) argues that social construction within the realism approach has been problematized and designed for someone and for some purpose (Cox 1996). Given the impressive research output of these schools of regionalisms, there are, in general, very few studies on the importance of non-state actors in the formation of regions. There is a need, in this study, for a reflectivist approach to regionalism that focuses on how inter-subjective practices between actors, rather than the state only, affect how interests, ideas and identities are developed in the process of social interaction, rather than rationalist approaches which are based on rational choice and take the interests, ideas and identities of actors as given (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003).

More than that, the last three decades have witnessed a paradigm shift in contemporary regionalism through the rethinking of the state-led approach to regionalism to be substituted by the most appropriate people-centred approaches as an alternative that include non-state actors in decision-making processes. These people-centred approaches to regionalism put the improvement of people's livelihood at the centre of political ideologies to form regions. It is a

relocation of the centre of regional political decision-making where non-state actors play an active role not only as participants on the side of their counterpart stakeholders but also as active agents and actors in their own right. A people-centred approach to regionalism, where ordinary citizens are at the centre of regional integration and cooperation processes, represents a paradigmatic shift from the top-down, traditional models of regionalism, to the bottom-up (Della Porta et al. 2006), described above in the introductory section of this study. This shift has manifested over the last three decades in response to increasing calls from regional civil society groupings, international organisations and more recently from academia in contemporary regionalism (Hettne 1998, Söderbaum 2017). These people-centred approaches to regionalism are operationalised through the creation of regional civil society networks in the form of transnational advocacy groups, regional social movements and organisations, and research institutions with a regional mandate described by scholars of new regionalism as informal regionalism (Söderbaum 2016). The countless illustrations of transnational civil society networks include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-NGOs coalition in the ASEAN, the North American Forum (NAF), the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the Asia Foundation, the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), the World Social Forum (WSF), the European Social Forum (ESF), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPSAR), SADC-CNGO, West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), and so forth (Fioramonti 2015; Scholte 2015; Godsäter 2014; Söderbaum 2007). These people-centred transnational groupings are, to an extent, contributing to influencing or reshaping formal institutions with people participation at the centre of region-building processes (Scholte 2015; Kim and Fiori 2015 in Fioramonti 2015).

2.4.2.1 Integrating principles of a people-centred approach to regionalism

Borrowing from Samuel's readings on people-centred advocacy (Samuel 2002), this study focuses on participation, legitimacy and communication as integrating principles of a people-centred approach to regionalism. However, more emphasis was put on participation and legitimacy as the two social realities were considered to embed communication and representation, which the author did not overlook as part of the integrating principles of a people-centred approach to regionalism. Participation of non-state actors in regionalisms constitutes a key avenue through which the development of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules occurred. As for legitimacy, it links to the credibility and rights acquired from ordinary

citizens by those who devise collective or consensual strategies, norms and rules during the interaction and claiming to represent them.

(i) Participation as an integrating principle of a people-centred approach to regionalism

People-centeredness is meaningless without some degree of citizen participation in the decision-making that affects their lives. Unlike state-centred approaches, people-centred approaches to regionalism cannot develop without citizens' direct involvement for their interests. Gaventa and McGee (2013) underscore that citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as the construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states, and inclusive and cohesive societies. The concept of participation is related to rights of citizenship and democratic governance (Dahl 1998; Pateman 1970; Samuel 2002). Linking citizen participation to the state at both regional and grassroots levels raises fundamental and normative questions about the nature of democracy and about the skills and strategies for achieving it (Gaventa 2004). In this context, participation is possibly less about choice than voice. It is about developing mechanisms and approaches that encourage voices to be sounded and ensure that those voices will be heard and receive a response in region-building processes (Cornwall and Coelho 2004, Gaventa 2006).

Participation builds on a deep respect for plurality, tolerance, and dissent, and it also involves an ability to understand and appreciate differences (Samuel 2002). The people-centred approach disapproves of passive participation that encourages feeble involvement and misrepresentation in decision-making processes planned or driven by outsiders. Instead, it focuses on active participation and representation, which are based on an inclusive moral choice: self-reliance and ownership by epistemic communities (De Beer 2012). Inclusion that entails no voice of ordinary people is suffocated or left behind in the decision-making processes while self-reliance is associated with autonomous and independently undertaken survival strategies aimed at improving their livelihoods followed by ownership of development goals that concern their lives (Korten 1983, Gaventa 2004, Ackerman 2004, Innes and Booher 2004). At the same time, this study includes both formal and informal participation whereby it puts epistemic communities at the centre of decision-making and allows them to be active agents of their own social change by voicing their aspirations and articulating their demands in the form of either casting their vote, protesting, signing petitions, lobbying and direct actions, or

interfacing with state actors within a participatory sphere (Deth 2001, Gaventa 2004, Warren 2009, De Beer 2012). From a regionalism point of view, participation is a process that needs to involve civil society in a wide range of organisations involved in policy formulation and implementation at both national and regional levels. Civil society participation includes the popular initiatives undertaken by ordinary people in civil society, which help to develop a community or influence norms that govern them. More than that, these actions may not necessarily originate from state government or technocrats as formal development activities, but from ordinary people whose actions aim at serving their own needs and solving their problems collectively at local and regional levels through self-reliance. This study argues for people-centred approaches to regionalism which would facilitate Southern African citizens' active participation in the making of the political decisions to form regions that set the basic pattern of their collective life and shared goals for solidarity building at the regional level.

(ii) Legitimacy as an integrating principle of a people-centred approach to regionalism

In social settings, what is legitimate is deemed to be lawful, proper, and regular. Legitimacy is a social status that can adhere to an actor or an action: it involves being recognised as good, proper, or commendable by a group of others (Coleman 2007). Political theorists have long struggled with the question of legitimate authority, in other words which rulers, regimes, or laws should be obeyed. The enquiry into the forms and foundation of legitimacy has also spread beyond political theory, but the focus on legitimacy as concerning the right to rule has mostly been maintained. Building on Max Weber (1978) and his successors, Williams (1998) and Coicaud (2002, 2004) suggest that legitimacy determines the basis on which the right to rule rests. Meaning, if the right to rule rests on coercion and that coercion goes unchallenged, even through fear, then the rule is legitimate. Undoubtfully, legitimacy is used to denote desirability in moral and ethical terms, often with a degree of legal formalisation, of an action or an actor, whether it be a state, an individual, an international organisation or a multi-national corporation. To Heiskanen (2001), it about the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people prevails over that of the sovereignty of the state through legitimacy. The exercise of state power should reflect the will of the people. In this context, associations of cross-border civil society need to be exercise regional citizenship that meets the expectations of the regional citizenry they claim to represent. These strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks should reflect the aspirations of the ordinary citizens in the region. It is about

enlightening, or civilising, the people by enhancing their ability to form, express, and justify their political views in a rational public debate; and to establish administrative state machinery that has no independent political goals of its own, other than the loyal implementation of popularly enacted laws.

However, legitimacy is not merely about legality; it is both about ethics and politics. Most contemporary writing about international legitimacy remains focused on the legitimacy of entities and actors. These lead to negligence of the legitimacy of actions and behaviour in favour of that of actors and institutions portrayed as a key dimension of international legitimacy. On that note, Suchman (1995) views legitimacy as a subjective concept and generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. According to Suchman, leaders are perceived as legitimate when their actions are seen as such by different actors, including their followers, government, political parties, NGOs and other institutions (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy for social movements and civil society organisations means that "an organisation is lawful, admissible and justified in its chosen course of action and therefore has the right to be and do something in society" {Edwards (2010: 11), cited in Lis 2011}. Samuel (2002) argues that legitimacy is not something one assumes, but something one acquires. It offers a solution to a fundamental political problem, which consists in justifying simultaneously political power and obedience, but provided it fulfils at least three intertwined and indissociable conditions, namely consent, law, and norms (Coicaud 2004). In effect, consent plays a decisive role in the mechanisms of reciprocity that exist among individuals within a given society. Legitimate institutions consider norms by reaching an understanding of what the activity of governing is to be. This implies that those who command (governors) and those who obey (governed) have to agree with one another about those values politics makes it its objective to promote within the framework of a de jure relationship (Coicaud 2004). The appointment of those who command is therefore subordinate to the law, which defines their powers and determines those conditions within which their will can command obligation. Legitimate institutions represent the voices, interests and values of countries and their citizens. The lack of the latter always leads to loss of legitimacy or a legitimacy deficit. This implies that truthful representation forms an essential aspect of the constitution of legitimacy. Connected to the perception of power, legitimacy is derived over a period through a series of

actions. It is the sense of deep commitment, accountability, communicability, and action that help to foster legitimacy. It is both relative and dynamic and fosters credibility (Samuel 2002).

The question of the legitimacy of institutions, be it formal or informal institutions, is not solely confined to domestic politics, but also to international politics. In this context, legitimacy relates to the ways and means of organizing the relationship between the state or government on the one hand and the people or civil society on the other. It is about the credibility and rights acquired from ordinary citizens to the institutions that claim to represent them within national and international institutions, like the case of regional intergovernmental organisations and regional civil society networks. According to Lis (2011), regional intergovernmental organisations have been criticised by many ordinary citizens to lose legitimacy as they work on the interests of political elites and their allies ignoring social contracts with people. At the same time, civil society organisations that claim to represent people have allegedly been criticised for not only having a mandate for but also not being in constant touch with the epistemic communities that they claim to represent (Söderbaum 2007). Elected officials argue that "most of the civil society organisations are directed by self-appointed leaders who are not subject – as politicians are – to the scrutiny of formal mechanisms of legal and political accountability" (Peruzzotti 2006: 43). The literature on global governance and international organisations differentiate between 'input' and 'output' legitimacy (Lis 2011, Steffek 2014)[2]. This study is interested in the legitimacy of institutions that truly reflect the aspirations or will of epistemic communities at the regional level in order to build an alternative regionalism, where legitimacy from vote casting alone is not enough.

2.5 Regional organisations and regional networks as institutions of regional interactions

2.5.1 Regional organisations

The state-centred approaches to regionalism are operationalised through formal state-established and -driven regional organisations or intergovernmental organisations, like the UN, EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, AU, and SADC, among others, perceived to be purely groupings

[2] Output legitimacy refers to the efficient delivery of results that are in the public interest of the respective community. Input legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to institutional arrangements that allow citizens to communicate their interests, values, and preferences to political decision-makers; or, as in the case of direct democracy, to take decisions themselves (Steffek 2014).

of state who willingly share their common agenda deemed to be a priority for their respective countries. States co-exist based on associations often defined by their shared common interests converted into social, political, or economic interrelationships and driven by mutual forbearance and respect and a willingness of all parties to abide by the basic rules of the game (Robertson 1969, Mayall in Fawcett and Hurell 1995; Abass 2004). These state groupings are formed either on global, regional or sub-regional scale. Historically, before the existence of the UN in 1945 (Russell 1958, UN 2015), regional associations like the Congress of Vienna and the Rhine Commission, both formed in 1815 (Robertson 1961; Harrison 1971), and the International Telegraph Union of 1865 and Universal Postal Union of 1875 are all deemed to be the oldest examples of regional organisations (Peterson 1945; Wallace and Singer 1970, O'Brien 2000; Abass 2004). Regional organisations[3] encompass (i) specified aims; functions; and activities; (ii) a membership and (iii) its own formal, permanent structure to order its responsibilities and carry out its functions, like a constitution, treaty, or administrative structure (Archer 1992, Söderbaum 2016). In this understanding, formal and permanent bureaucratic structures, including a minimum degree of autonomy from its members constitute key elements that differentiate regional organisations from regional networks, which are more loosely structured and less hierarchical. Regional organisations are more formalised, with a clearly defined administrative and hierarchical organisation. They have the advantage of being effective and rational concerning the implementation of strategies and policies, especially in a stable environment and where the problem to be addressed is clearly defined.

Regional organisations are categorised based on their organisational scope which might be task-specific or general purpose (Lenz et al. 2014). Firstly, task-specific or specialised regional organisations are functional and sectorial regional organisations operating in a specific field of activities like security, education, health, transport, communications, among others. Single-purpose regional organisations include the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the United Nations Regional Economic Commissions within the UN, to name a few. Secondly, multi-purpose regional organisations are considered to be an exciting form of regional cooperation as they have multiple purposes and undertake activities across many sectors in combination with a centralised and comprehensive organisational

[3] Regional organizations in this thesis is regarded as the manner in which states form unions for varying purposes (Nye 1965; Barrera and Haas 1969; Haas 1958, 1970, 1971; Wallace and Singer 1970).

structure (Söderbaum 2016). This being said, multisectoral regional organisations in new regionalism dispensations provide state members with opportunities to navigate between various sectors under the same regional mainstream, like the case of the EU, SADC, ASEAN, and ECOWAS, among others. Without overlooking the task-specific regional organisations, this study was interested in multi-purpose regional organisations like SADC.

2.5.2 Regional networks

Sociologists have argued forcefully that modern technologies have broken down territorial boundaries of communication and greatly facilitated social exchanges over long distances and across borders (Castells in Kaiser et al. 2010). Regional networks[4] encompass the importance of social relationships and ways of forming and maintaining communication, cooperation, and trust across borders. They are conceived as relationship structures in all sectors of regions that activate and coordinate the different partners and partner groups in order to spark impulses or to tackle shared common problems whereby the people affected become participants (Sprenger 2001). Building on Manuel Castells' insights, rapidly changing communicative spaces and practices have resulted in the formation of what he terms "a network society". Apart from being more loosely structured and less hierarchical, regional networks are less formalised than regional organisations. They come in many varieties, with different structures, functions, objectives and types of participants which may be physical and tangible, institutional and organisational, or socio-cultural (Castells 1996). Even though some networks are not concerned with policy formulation and project implementation, they are focused on increasing communication and interaction or getting cooperation started (Johnson et al. 2000). They weaken the control by state institutions over expert knowledge and other policy-relevant information. They also strengthen non-state actors who can pool resources, form coalitions and influence media reporting and public communication more efficiently within and beyond nation-states (Kaiser et al. 2010). Compared to organisations, networks are more decentralised and horizontally structured. Their flexibility in structure may be more adaptable in a turbulent, rapidly changing environment, in situations where progress depends on accommodative, flexible cooperation and more informal and inclusive relationships and communication. Some network-based social structures usually lack clear-cut internal divisions, and often people are

[4] Regional networks are defined as cooperation between businesses, government agencies, educational and research institutions, intermediary institutions and other social groups (Sprenger 2001).

allowed to join or exit with relative ease. According to Söderbaum (2016), these networks are open, extroverted, and inclusive, capable of expanding without formal limitations and interacting with new nodes and other networks as long as the members can communicate among themselves, like in the case of regional civil society networks. In that case, networks and organisations may interact and merge like the case of hybrid network organisations. Networks facilitate overlapping and multiple patterns of actor identity, and changing patterns of social communication, and information exchange also facilitate cooperation between different sets of state and non-state actors in politics and policymaking (Castells 1996).

Like regional organisations, in Söderbaum's reading (2016), regional networks are categorised into single-purpose and multi-purpose regional networks. First of all, single-purpose regional networks have a specific task or undertake a single activity as their focal point. Specific purpose regional networks can be in the form of research, for example, the Southern African Research Institute; or training, like Gender Links, African Sex Workers Alliance; business, like Southern African Chambers of Commerce; or civil society, like Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations (SANASO), among others. Secondly, multipurpose regional networks concomitantly undertake different activities covering various sectors that affect social life and nature. In line with this study, emphasis was put on regional civil society networks like the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (SADC-CNGO), and Southern African People's Solidarity Networks (SAPSN), to name a few, as multipurpose regional networks mainstreaming in all life sectors of Southern African citizens (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014, Zajontz and Leysens 2015, SADC-CNGO 2015).

2.6 Situating Regional Civil Society Networks in the Regionalism Discourse

From local to global levels, reforms in governance have generated a profusion of new spaces for citizen engagement due to the changing forms of power and new realms of authority driven by global phenomena such as terrorism, global warming, migration, and the Ebola pandemic, among others. Globalisation has meant that national civil society groupings increasingly build links across borders in order to create transnational networks. This increased transnational advocacy has contributed to higher demands for input legitimacy on the part of international organisations, and they have responded by widening the scope for civil society engagement in region-building processes. Regional civil society networks can also play a valuable role in

affecting change at a national level (Keck and Sikkink, 1999; van der Vleuten, 2005). Transnational civil society is, to an extent, contributing to influencing or reshaping formal institutions and transforming human livelihoods (Scholte 2015; Kim and Fiori 2015 in Fioramonti 2015). For example, transnational activists such as Amnesty International have played a significant role in spreading and advancing the norms of human rights, not to mention various environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, that are campaigning to change norms in order to end the nuclear arms race and address climate change (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In that regard, civil society has emerged as an alternative and collaborative avenue of citizen mobilisation around shared goals in order to participate in the public affairs that concern their lives.

2.6.1 Civil society

The study of civil society networks owes a lot to the pioneers in the field, including Cohen and Arato (1992), Barber (1998), Putnam (1993), Hettne (2000), Florini (2000), Scholte (2000, 2009, 2014), Salamon, Sokolowski, and List (2004), Edwards (2009, 2011 and 2014), Fioramonti (2014), Söderbaum (2015), Godsäter (2014), Castell (2009, 2015), Gaventa (2009), Steffek, Kissling and Nanz (2008), and Armstrong, Bello, Gilson and Spini (2011). As indicated in section 1.6.2 of chapter 1, this study acknowledges that the concept of civil society remains highly contested among opposing scholars. There are different meanings attached to the concept of civil society depending on people from different schools of thought at different epochs (Armstrong and Gilson 2010; Edwards 2004; Weiss 2008).

The literature on civil society is vast, and little agreement exists on its exact meaning. Some people label civil society as a great good, their last best hope and the key to good governance and poverty-reducing growth, whereas to others it presents a threat (Edwards 2011, Scholte 2002, Fioramonti 2015). While some view civil society as a specific product of the nation-state and capitalism, others see it as a universal expression of the collective life of individuals, at work in all countries and stages of development but expressed in different ways according to history and context (Edwards 2011). For example, in Michael Edwards' reading, the Cato Institute equates civil society to fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and individual liberty; civil society is the single most viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market, as seen by the World Social Forum. The New Labour views civil society as the missing link in the success of social democracy

(Edwards 2009). Yet, there is no universal consensus on the interpretation of civil society. In classical Greece, the term civil society entailed the "good society", implying set forms of participation that characterised the democratic city state against other forms of government. Aristotle viewed civil society as a *"public ethical community of free and equal citizens, under a legally defined system of rule"*. According to Aristotle, civil society and the state are intertwined and difficult to separate, an argument which was contended by liberalist thinkers such as Adam Ferguson and Thomas Paine, who underlined that civil society plays a vital role in aggregating private interest and concomitantly attenuating state authority, therefore they cannot be intertwined (Odeh 2012, Fioramonti 2015). Alexis de Tocqueville joins the contention by emphasising the importance of civil associations for the creation and strengthening of democratic practices (Putman 2000, Imade 2007, Godsäter 2014). However, Tocqueville did not specify what kinds of civil society were able to foster democracy as some of those civil organisations could be simply wheeler-dealers at the service of the state. From a liberalist viewpoint, civil society is viewed as a bulwark against the absolute monarchy that promotes the expression of the modern proprietary class, which carved spaces of autonomy and self-determination out of the absolutist state (Edwards 2009, Fioramonti 2015). Tocqueville equated civil society to micro-level self-organisation, a breeding ground for democratic values and social capital composed of associations based on voluntary participation against the top-down control (Ehrenberg 2011).

Contrary to liberalist thinkers, Hegel critically viewed civil society as a source of conflict that can be spread to the larger society, which could even undermine the success of democracy (Imade 2007). To Hegel, civil society is a cohort of all those groups and functions as a vehicle of cultural permeation that strengthens rather than challenges the order imposed by the state (Fioramonti 2015). As for Antonio Gramsci, he understood civil society as the realm of hegemony and consent, as opposed to the realm of force that pertains to the domination exerted by the state (Bobbio 1988). This implies civil society cannot be separated from the state, as the dominant groups may exercise their power either actively or passively throughout society (Tar 2009). It is an interplay of power relations (Mamdani 1999). Nevertheless, Gramsci further recognises the revolution capability of civil society against any capitalist and authoritarian structures of power (Bobbio 1988; Fioramonti 2015). In Fioramonti (2015), Jurgen Habermas views civil society as a public sphere which lies between the state and the private sector and in which ideas and values sustain a form of dialogic society. For Habermas, civil society is a

sphere of public debates and information exchange, including where groups and individual express their interests. These public discourses and interactions may encourage democratic values in society that are crucial for the development and strengthening of democracy. Foucault commented that the public sphere is dominated by internal power structures encompassing conflicts of ideas and goals (Edwards 2011). This thesis shares the perception of civil society as the public sphere.

In modern political science research, civil society has been equated with structured non-profit organisations based on voluntary membership (Salamon and Anheier 1998) and scholars have mistakenly taken no notice of unstructured social movements like ad hoc activism and online mobilisation which may constitute other avenues of participation that do not necessarily require a proper bureaucracy in order to stand. In Fioramonti's reading, Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier pioneered the idea of civil society as structured organisations distinctive from the state, autonomous and with free, voluntary membership (Fioramonti 2015). Nowadays, civil society should be considered the interaction of different forms of civic participation, structured or unstructured groupings and violent or nonviolent arenas. As for Gold (1990), civil society is a whole range of social groups that seek to operate independently of the state, such as private business enterprises, trade unions, professional associations, religious bodies, student organisations and so forth. Mutfang (2003) complements Gold when he says that civil society is a wide range of associations and other organised collectives, capable of articulating the interests of their members and pushing their demands, moulding and constraining state power. Political scientist Larry Diamond views civil society as democracy's watchdog, encompassing a realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, independent from the state and bound by a legal order that performs democratic advocacy functions such as dissemination of information and monitoring of state policies (Diamond 1999, Odeh 2012).

Conversely, this democratising function of civil society championed by Diamond was challenged by development practitioner Carothers, who observes that civil society organisations are not benign, democratic, independent from the state, or accountable to the citizens (Carothers 2000, Fioramonti 2015). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) views civil society as the third sector, existing alongside and interacting with state and market. They consist of Non-Profit Organisations and special interest groups, either formal or

informal, working to improve the lives of the epistemic community (UNDP 2012). In a nutshell, civil society is firstly viewed as the good society, meaning the kind of society these associations are supposed to generate; secondly, in the world of associational life which is the most common view, and thirdly civil society as the public sphere, the arenas in which citizens talk to each other about the great issues of the day and arrive at some political consensus (Edwards 2014).

Without overlooking different perspectives on civil society, this thesis adopts the liberal views in order to deconstruct the role of civil society in mobilising to enhance active citizen participation in the decision-making revolving around their daily life. This thesis concurs with comments of Edwards (2011), Fioramonti (2015) and Scholte (2002) that civil society is an arena of participation outside the state and the market where individuals and groups voluntarily associate to interact in the pursuance of their objectives animated by a variety of values and interests. This definition of civil society is found to be balanced in this case, not only because it allows one to look at civil society comprehensively and exclusively, but also helps one to understand how voluntary groupings of citizens are participating within an arena outside the state and market in order to influence or shape political institutions that they deem to be of collective value and interest during interaction.

In this thesis, the emphasis is on the views of German philosopher Habermas and political scientist Larry Diamond, who respectively viewed civil society as a democratising agent and public sphere of discourse and interaction crucial for the development and strengthening of democracy (Diamond 1999, Kellner 2000). They describe civil society as the breeding ground where new issues and demands are formed, received and re-elaborated by the public sphere, and finally translated into policies and law-making norms, or in other terms into rights. At the same time, there are different kinds of civil society outside the traditional NGOs, according to their assigned mandate and undertaken works or activities. In addition to different types of civil society entities as indicated in chapter 1, there exists civil society networks which work on various sectors of society such as poverty reduction, environmental, consolidation of democracy, social justice and human rights, research and youth, human security, gender and women rights, labour and employment, anti-corruption and good governance, development and HIV/AIDs, to name a few (Söderbaum 2007, Scholte 2015, Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

With a focus on Southern Africa, this study takes an interest in regional civil society networks working in the field of regional social justice and democratic governance at national and regional levels linked within regional networks, like SADC-CNGO, SAPSN, among others (SADC-CNGO 2012, SAPSN 2012, Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2015). This working sector helped the researcher to understand how non-state actors within those networks strive for participation in order to fill a democratic deficit that has characterised the decision-making processes to form regions by developing different strategies, norms, rules in the quest for alternative regionalisms (Jönsson & Tallberg 2010, Tallberg et al., 2013, Godsäter 2015). From local or regional levels, civil society groupings fulfil diverse functions which describe them. However, in this context, the emphasis was put on functions related to strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during interaction within both formal and self-organised networks outside of state spaces.

2.6.2 Regional civil society networks categories according to their functional types

The kinds of functions that civil society groupings exercise, either at national or regional level, at the same time constitute key drivers that determine the institutional setting within which they are entitled to engage either in formal or self-organised regionalisms and determine the type of organisations there are. This includes civil society as partner, legitimator/reformist, manipulator, and transformer/counterforce (Fioramonti 2015, Godsäter 2014, Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011, Söderbaum 2016). Bearing in mind that the list of functions of civil society is not exhaustive, the researcher has clustered them into five main functions, namely watchdog, service delivery, mobilisation, knowledge production, and issue framing coupled with agenda setting (Edwards 2009, Paffenholz and Spurk 2010, Scholte 2012, Godsäter 2014). Civil society is a check, a monitor, but also a vital partner in the quest for a positive relationship between the democratic state and its citizens.

2.6.2.1 Watchdog civil society as transformist or counterforce

By fulfilling a watchdog function, civil society checks, monitors, evaluates and restrains the power of government elites and their allies through accountability and transparency demands (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010, Edwards 2012). During the exercise of its watchdog function, civil society raises public awareness by reporting to the general public findings on the status of day-to-day governance of public affairs and implemented policies (Godsäter 2014). Civil society has been viewed by many as being misrepresentative and without legitimacy and

transparent internal governance for the people it claims to represent (Scholte 2004, Edwards 2009). Watchdog civil society groupings are deemed to be transformers and counterforce organisations as they come into competition with states and sometimes challenge the existing status quo for radical change at both local and regional levels of society (Fioramonti 2015, Söderbaum 2016). States view the latter with scepticism and are excluded from the decision-making processes. In this regional context, these transformist civil societies contest the existing deficiencies of state-led regional policy and lobby in favour of transparent and people-driven political decisions (Millstein 2015). There are a plethora of pro-democracy forces, women's movements and environmentalists that fulfil this transformative and counterforce function (Söderbaum 2016). The Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) is one of the striking examples of counterforce regional civil grouping criticising SADC to be a state-driven organisation using neoliberal dogmas. The Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) is another illustration of its kind contesting privatisation of water, electricity, education and housing in the SADC region.

2.6.2.2 Service delivery civil society as partner and legitimator

Civil society has always been considered as service delivery agents or a helpful hand where states have failed to deliver. Under a service delivery function, civil society fills the gap in services that was intentionally or negligently left by the state or state members (Edwards 2009, Godsäter 2013). Civil society is often contracted by other actors at national or international level to fill the gap in services either on their behalf or on behalf of donors for the improvement of lives or the environment as they legitimise the actions of national or international institutions. Illustratively, the United Nations, international development agencies and philanthropist organisations have all been, to some extent, targeting and tasking civil society especially from developing countries with implementing existing regional policies in line with their respective agendas. In this context, civil society is at the same time partner and legitimator as it accepts the existing status quo by engaging in state-invented spaces of participation (Fioramonti 2015, Söderbaum 2016).

2.6.2.3 Civil mobilisation civil society as partner, manipulator and counterforce

As an avenue of participation and mobilisation of social forces, civil society creates new terrains to ordinary citizens for a more comprehensive, ampler democratic debate of public policies aimed at improving their living and environmental conditions. In this case, civil society

takes on a mobilisation function for public deliberation on common pressing shared issues in order to either solve them or seek alternatives. Civil society acts through social capital, the capacity of people to act together willingly in their common long-term interest, and there is social cohesion among the citizens who share collective identities and goals (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Civil society networks may facilitate collaboration, solidarity and sometimes the movement of members across countries, and in some cases work actively against rising intolerance (Millstein 2015). Through its mobilisation function, civil society may be a transformist/counterforce institution when it undertakes activities that enhance awareness and self-consciousness of the discontented epistemic communities and ultimately trigger citizenship in many forms such as boycotts, protests, self-help initiatives, and so forth (Godsäter 2013, Söderbaum 2016). In this context, civil society become an agitator on behalf of aggrieved citizens. Unstructured and informal civil societies, like grassroots movements, are striking examples of this mobilisation function. There is another scenario where civil society mobilises ordinary citizens for awareness in favour of state-led local or regional policies deemed to enhance health conditions or security alerts on a particular threat like the case of terrorist attacks or pandemic disease. In this case, civil society becomes the legitimator while mobilising for state interest. It can be a case of mobilising citizens to approve a state-initiated reform that civil society considers to be useful for the betterment of the population at the local and regional level. More than that, civil society can also mobilise to manipulate people in favour of the state, not because the cause is good but just because it is a state-made organisation (GONGO) itself or a briefcase organisation hunting for funds as a survival strategy (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

2.6.2.4 Knowledge production civil society as reformist

Apart from the mobilisation function, civil society may carry out activities that aim at knowledge production for both states and non-state actors at local and international level. Through its knowledge production function, civil society undertakes empirical studies, investigations, capacity building, and dissemination of edited and filtered information. This arena of participation provides essential empirical local knowledge that is vital to the policy process, and that gives voice to the opinions and experiences of the ordinary citizens. For example, research institutions may provide background research to state members, including the general public (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011, Godsäter 2013). The knowledge production function enables civil society actors to be seen as performing the role of organic

intellectuals and understood as critical agents that serve to clarify the political thinking of social groups, leading the members of these groups to understand their existing situation in society (Fioramonti 2015). In that case, civil society becomes reformist, striving for reform of the status quo. Regional networks of civil society may strengthen civil society organisations in their role of holding national and local governments accountable and democratic (Millstein 2015).

2.6.2.5 Issue framer and agenda-setting civil society as transformist and counterforce

Civil society, in this context of transnational actors, plays a key function in issue framing and agenda setting. Civil society organisations participate in the processes of persuasion that ideally culminate in agenda setting at the regional intergovernmental organisations. They seek to maximise their influence or leverage in order to achieve their objectives (Godsäter 2014, Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). To achieve this, regional civil society networks engage in framing activities that aim at rendering issues meaningful to targeted policymakers by providing meanings and collective action for issues at stake. Network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates and serve as sources of information and testimony. They also promote the implementation of norms, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In order to successfully enter the agenda of policymakers, issues need to be framed in a way that resonates with RIGO's previous norms, or identifies a problem of relevance or topicality (Fioramonti 2015). In this regard, regional civil society networks contribute to shaping political and policy debates about inclusive regional integration as they are simultaneously principled and strategic actors that frame issues (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001). The potential transformative capabilities of these regional civil society networks arise from their capacity to use their assets to advantage in the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and accountability. In Keck and Sikkink's readings, transnational advocacy networks affect state behaviour by acting simultaneously as principled and strategic actors that frame issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to fit with favourable institutional venues (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In doing so they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behaviour (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001, Söderbaum 2017). The five main functions fulfilled by regional civil society have generated different attributes of regional civil

society networks as part of their interaction typology in regionalisms. Figure 2.1 summarises the category of regional civil society networks based on their functions.

Figure 2.1: Category of RCSNs based on their functions



Source: Author adapted from Godsäter (2013), Fioramonti (2015) Söderbaum (2016)

2.7 Mapping the interactions of regional civil society networks in regionalisms

In the era of new regionalism, an expansion of international agreements and organisations among governments has been accompanied by a corresponding proliferation of transnational civil society associations of all types (Edwards 2009, Fioramonti 2015). Cross-border interactions among non-state actors have led transnational relations scholars to call for an expansion of our traditional, state-bounded notions of civil society to account for a transnational public sphere (Guidry et al. 2000). Apart from influencing policy in formal settings, transnational civil society may undertake self-organised activities, intellectual endeavours and so forth as patterns of informal participation in regionalism (Rhodes Kubiak 2015). Empirical studies on citizen engagement have demonstrated how marginalised and disenfranchised citizens at all levels of society, through formal and informal spaces of participation, mobilise to claim their rights, including their inclusion in decision-making processes, protect their resources, and gain

recognition for their identities, usually against global odds. Thus, it is of paramount importance to map out how transnational civil society interacts within regionalisms.

2.7.1 Institutional settings or environment of civil society's interaction

Institutional settings or environment constitute an overall environment within which interaction of institutions are taking place and strategies, norms and rules are developed. The current study is interested in horizontal and vertical interactions by Young et al. (1999, 2005) and Oberthür and Gehring (2006c) as institutional settings or environments of regional civil society networks. Vertical interaction is perceived to be hierarchical and a top-down pattern of interaction driven by state elites in a state-designed regional environment where, for example, ordinary citizens through regional civil society networks are invited to participate. By contrast, horizontal interaction occurs among institutions at the same level of social organisation or the same point on the administrative scale. Interaction among ordinary citizens at the national or cross-border level within Southern African region constitute a consummative example of horizontal interaction as institutional setting. At the international level, this kind of interaction originates from the high degree of fragmentation of the international system in which actors frequently choose to pursue their common interests by setting up new institutions rather than expanding existing ones (Berkes 2002; Cash et al. 2006; Gehring and Oberthür 2008).

Table 2.2 below shows the settings of institutional interaction whereby horizontal interaction under political linkage represents an intentional interaction among institutions at the same level of social organisation for individual or collective goals. Quadrant A1B1 shows Southern African civil society like SAPSN, SADC-CNGO, among others, interact among themselves within horizontal interaction. Unlike, within the horizontal interaction, vertical interaction under political linkage in quadrant A1B2 of Table 2.2 represents an intentional interaction across institutions at different levels of social organisation for individual or collective goals. Formal interaction between SADC elites and Civil society representatives is a striking illustration of this type of institutional setting or environment. Table 2.2 below summarises the above.

Table 2.2: Types of Institutional Interplay

	A1 **Political linkage**	**A2** **Functional linkage**
B1 **Horizontal Interaction**	Intentional or deliberate interaction among institutions at the same level of social organisation for individual or collective goals	Unintentional interaction among institutions at the same level of social organisation for collective goals
B2 **Vertical Interaction**	Intentional or deliberate interaction across institutions at different levels of social organisation for individual or collective goals	Unintentional interaction across institutions at different levels of social organisation

Source: Adapted from Young (2002)

In addition, the proposed institutional interactions between formal and informal institutions by Helmke and Levitsky (2002) have led the researcher to be interested in understanding how institutions within Southern Africa interact horizontally and vertically. Southern African civil society networks interact within two distinct institutional environments, namely formal and self-organised regionalisms. There is a mutual influence between formal and informal institutions, as institutional arrangements during their interaction are steered by the institutional environment/setting within which it takes place. There are implications for each of these institutional settings or environments for actor strategies, interactions, and patterns of cooperation. More than that, different settings create positive or negative conditions for the emergence of interaction, which feeds different groupings of actors to either adjust or at the same time pursue their goals collectively (Scharpf 1997, Room 2011) in the form of networks (Thompson et al. 1991) or clans (Ouchi 1980) in the name of organic solidarity (Durkheim 1964). As for Williamson (1998), an institutional environment consists of a broader socio-economic framework within which different sets of rules or agreements governing the activities of a specific group of people pursuing a certain objective take place. An example of this relates to market transactions or organisations, as seen in the case of regional civil society or regional organisations. These institutional environments can be formal, in the form of constitutions, laws, structures of state decisions and regulations enforced by law enforcement, and at the same time informal institutions such as norms of conduct, historical traditions or religious precepts enforced by custom and habit (Keefer and Shirley 2000, Williamson 2002). In this thesis, vertical interaction and formal regionalism are used interchangeably, just as are horizontal interaction and self-organised regionalisms.

The existing literature and empirical data collected during fieldwork on how institutions interact in distinct institutional environments have nurtured the understanding of the researcher

on how to develop a typology on how regional civil society networks interact in formal and self-organised regionalism in the Southern African region. The way institutions interact horizontally and vertically by Young (2002) and the four-fold typology proposed by Helmke and Levitsky (2002) on the interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions have both served as a guideline in that regard. Building on Lauth, and Helmke and Levitsky's works, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of formal institutions may cause informal institutions to interact in two dimensions, namely compatible/open and conflicting/shrinking, which subsequently may generate either complementary and accommodating informal institutions or substitutive and competing informal institutions.

Table 2.3 below demonstrates how types of institutional setting B1 and B2 determine the kind of institutional arrangements A1 and A2, as indicated in quadrants A1B1 and A2B2. For example, quadrant A1B1 displays how self-organised institutions develop complementary institutional arrangements to formal institutions while interacting in open/compatible space. While in conflicting space, they develop competing institutional arrangements, as presented in quadrant A2B2. In line with the objectives of this study on alternative regionalisms, the researcher was interested in accommodating and competing institutional arrangements developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction in two forms of regionalism.

Table 2. 3 Typology of self-organised institutions in interaction with formal institutions

	A1 **Formal Institutions**	**A2** **Self-organised Institutions**
B1 **Open/compatible space**	Complementary	Substitutive
B2 **Shrinking/conflicting space**	Accommodating	Competing/Counter-forcing

Source: Adapted from Helmke and Levitsky (2002)

Against this backdrop, the works of Young (2002) on vertical and horizontal institutional interplay and that of Helmke and Levitsky (2002) on the four-fold typology on interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions have both served to locate the principal

concern about developing, by the researcher, a typology on kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction in regionalisms within the SADC region. In line with this thesis, more emphasis was put on institutional arrangements that were developed by regional civil society networks within both vertical and horizontal interactions. This implies that accommodating and substitutive informal institutions were both considered to be key factors that corroborate with the thesis' purpose to compare the institutional arrangements developed by a typology of civil society networks, notably the reformists, the SATUCC and SADC-CNGO, and transformists like SAPSN and FOCCISA, interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms for an alternative (SADC-CNGO 2015). Informal institutions, which interest the current study of people-centred approaches to regionalism, are, for example, norms of conduct, historical traditional, rules and procedures that manifest themselves in shared beliefs and common knowledge among groups of actors as well as in behavioural practices (North 1990, Bozel and Risse 2016).

2.7.2 Regional civil society networks' interaction in formal regionalism

Normatively, interaction of regional civil society networks within state-centric spaces of engagement in the RIGOs is anchored by regional mechanisms such as treaties, protocols and other constitutive documents. These state-led provisions of participation determine the modalities of engagement and status of civil society during their engagement, like the case of the SADC treaty and established institutions or spaces of interaction (SADC 1992). The state-developed strategies, norms and rules of engagement in this formal setting of interaction are mostly detailed in these regional treaties and at the same time devised by state members themselves without the full involvement of ordinary citizens. Often, civil society networks are invited by states to the table of regional negotiations on either an observation or consultation basis in selective sectors only, provided they are not acting as transformists, but conformists to the status quo (Söderbaum 2007, Fioramonti 2015). At the same time, civil society networks are expected to provide united and organised citizen voices for this manner of participation. This is an aspect of direct or participatory democracy in which citizens aggregate in communities of interest (Odhiambo 2010). Interaction of civil society networks within the formal setting is orchestrated by state members to legitimise the existing status quo of the RIGOs and satisfy donors demands in the case of developing countries (Söderbaum 2007). The conventional ways of anchoring such civil participation are through granting of observer status,

and through a consultative framework which could take the form of consultation sessions, in the case of SADC, and other related structures (SATUCC 2015). Consultation of civil society within RIGOs is in line with the emphasis of the New Institutionalism on the behaviour shaped through the interaction of actors involved in collective action. In this regard, the emphasis on civil society consultation within RIGOs stems from the realisation that states, in this globalised world, cannot solely undertake important developmental responsibilities (Odhiambo 2010). Therefore, the participation of civil society is seen as crucial in augmenting the roles of states. Many IGOs now create room for civil society participation from the time they are formed.

Interaction between regional civil society networks and regional inter-governmental organisations in formal regionalist political decisions is not a new phenomenon. In the Americas, for example, building on the notion of invited and invented spaces, scholars in contemporary regionalism, such as Grugel (2004, 2006), Smith and Korzeniewicz (2002), Tarrow (2001), and Carolina Hernandez (2006), have all demonstrated how RIGOs have entered into interaction with transnational civil society. They argue that a range of civil society movements is actively engaged with and participates in new forms of regionalism (Smith and Korzeniewicz 2002, Grugel 2004). In seeking to shape regionalist politics and debates, civil society movements enter into formal regionalisms and are beginning to construct self-organised avenues of interaction. Smith and Korzeniewicz (2002) point out that the governments of countries such as Canada, Chile, Costa Rica and the United States have emphasised during their official debates the promotion of civil society participation in hemispheric negotiations including considerable political clout. At the same time, civil society participation in formal initiatives such as the Summits of the Americas (SOA) was resisted by other diplomats and trade negotiators who did not want to face public scrutiny and demands for transparency and participation because of the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Civil society was considered a threat to state members' sovereignty. Consequently, participation of civil society in Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations resulted in frustration and alienation between state members and civil society (Tarrow 2001). Grugel and scholars such as Smith and Korzeniewicz distinguish two categories of civil society interacting in the region-building processes in the Americas, notably the insider groups and the outsided groups (Smith and Korzeniewicz 2002, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003). According to the two scholars, the insider civil society groups seek to use the invited or formal spaces, such as the SOAs, to lobby inside the state-led avenues of interaction for inclusiveness and commitment to participatory

democracy within the hemisphere. More than that, these insider civil society groupings attempted to establish a dialogue that links non-state actors' demands with the FTAA agenda and to claim participation within the FTAA. Despite the establishment of a committee of government representatives on the participation of civil society in the FTAA in 1998, Pages (2000) laments that participation of a few civil societies in three FTAAs was still insignificant. Among the insider groupings were FOCAL (Canada), the Esquel Foundation (US), the Inter-American Foundation (US) and Corporacién Participa (Chile), which formed part of an officially-sanctioned Civil Society Task Force created in 1993.

Like the Americas, Mercosur established formal avenues of interaction for civil society participation in region-building processes. The Foro Consultivo Económico-Social (FCES), for example, attempted to influence labour policy within formal interaction in Mercosur (Ermida 2000). Modelled on the European Economic and Social Council as invited spaces for civil society, the FCES was made up of representatives of the main business groups, national trade union federations, consumer protection organisations and some other third sector groups who are less confrontational aimed to push for social agenda in Mercosur (Grugel 2005). Additionally, the Instituto Social Mercosur (IMS), established in 1999 and devoted to the study of social policy in Mercosur, had worked closely with the Department of Integration and Regional Programmes in the region (Luna, 2002). Civil society groupings within the FCES lobby within member states and the Joint Parliamentary Committee, conferences, publications and network with the state and across the professional associations (Gonzalez Bombal and Villar 2003). In the Greater Carribean, regional integration bodies like the Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo (ALOP), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), the Central American System of Integration (SICA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Red Interamericana para la Democracia (RID) have all entered into formal interaction with civil society networks in state-led initiatives. This invited space of interaction in regionalism created by the Organisation of American States (OAS) was aimed at providing a platform and a space for cooperation between ideologically moderate civil society movements concerned with democracy and governance within Latin states (Grugel 2005). In the same vein, the ASEAN Services Employees Trade Unions Council (ASETUC), AsiaDHRRA, Southeast Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA) and Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) (Ramirez 2008) were among the major civil society networks in the ASEAN region invited in formal regionalism on a consultation basis to

interact with the ASEAN Secretariat in line with the promotion of non-state actors. For example, ASETUC has sought to respond to the liberalisation of the service sector in ASEAN states that has taken place as part of the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community. As for the AsiaDHRRA, it interacted with the ASEAN Secretariat on a partnership basis and contributed to drafting the five-year work plan for ASEAN's Framework Action Plan on Rural Development (Gerard 2014). Engagement with civil society within formal settings in ASEAN has contributed to policy making such as drafting of the ASEAN Charter. More than that, the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA) submissions recommended incorporating environmental sustainability, human rights and human security into the ASEAN Charter, among other proposals regarding streamlining ASEAN processes and reforming some institutional practices, specifically consensus decision-making and the non-intervention norm (Gerard 2014). Established in 2005, the ASEAN Civil Society Conference and ASEAN Peoples' Forum (ACSC/APF) became the main forum for civil society engagement with the ASEAN. In addition to that, ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC), the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) and other similar regional think tanks were also part of the key pillars of ASEAN's informal policy-making body, ASEAN-ISIS (Carolina Hernandez 2006: 20). Not all of these improvements were state-led initiatives, and some were implemented as a result of constant push and lobbying from various elements of civil society. However, many civil society organisations were excluded from interaction with ASEAN state members even though they do have the potential to support the purposes of ASEAN and wish to engage ASEAN and contribute to the building of the ASEAN Community (Chalermpalanupap 2008). Despite the engagement of ASEAN civil society networks within the region, lack of popular participation in ASEAN decision-making is still the primary concern. Most of the interactions between civil society and ASEAN states are consultative on selective matters where civil society is deemed to be a service provider (Gerard 2014). The shrinking of ASEAN spaces of engagement has pushed civil society to interact within self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream. These new spaces of civil participation lobby for people-to-people interactions rather than state-to-state relations or purely market-oriented interactions in the ASEAN (Tadem 2017).

The European Union architecture has been a prototype of the regional institutional structure of many RIGOs, mostly on the African continent, that include the SADC. Besides being modelled on the EU, many African RIGOs are still struggling to incorporate civil society in their regional

policymaking and political decision processes that form regions. Conversely, the EU commission has focused on reducing the democratic deficit through the development of a more engaged and vibrant European civil society that promotes active and participatory citizenship bringing citizens closer to the European Union and its institutions (Maloney and van Deth 2010). The commission was reportedly increasingly relying on civil networks in order to promote good governance in terms of democracy, accountability and efficiency (CEC 2001a, Maloney and van Deth 2010). In that line, the EU views civil society not only as implementers of development assistance but also as key development policy actors (EU Report 2017). The European Parliament and the European Commission are the key points of contact for civil society in the EU. Engagement with CSOs, such as the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, began in the 1990s. The engagement was formalised with the EU White Paper on Governance in 2001 (Gerard 2014). State players became aware of concerns among civil society regarding the impacts of creating a single market. Civil society engagement accelerated in the mid-1990s in response to concerns regarding the EU's democratic legitimacy. In this regard, civil society attend meetings, provide information and comment on policy, even though participation is ad hoc. The EU Citizens' Initiative enables CSOs to raise petitions to place items on the Commission's agenda (Gerard 2014).

Africa is not an exception with regard to interaction between RIGOs and civil society. The partnership between African states and civil society during the liberation struggle has demonstrated how non-state actors have been interacting either among themselves or with government elites in order to influence political institutions. Civil society engagement in African formal regionalism began in 2001 with the first Civil Society Conference. It was formalised at the official inauguration of the AU in 2002 (Gerard 2014). The AU's founders considered civil society participation significant in achieving the AU's goals and avoiding the problems that plagued its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In that regard, according to the General Assembly of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), civil society representatives were directly elected to an advisory body in order to engage with the AU organ (ECOSOCC 2005). Normatively, African intergovernmental organisations have put in place state-led avenues that allow joint governance with civil society to engage in selective political projects to form regions. Thus, provisions and modalities for involving civil society groupings in region-building project processes were put in place through different founding protocols and treaties of the main RIGOS and RECs, namely the East

African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), SADC and to some extent the Middle East in order to include citizens in regional development processes. This implies article 127 of the EAC treaty of 1999 (EAC 1999), article 23 of the SADC treaty of 1992 (SADC 1992), article 81 of the ECOWAS amended treaty of 2001 and articles 7 and 10 of amended ECCAS of 2002, to name a few (Moyo et al. 2007). Despite the established joint space of regional governance between RIGOs and civil society, the majority of ordinary Africans are not fully involved in political projects to form regions where civil society groups interact as observers (Söderbaum 2015). These interactions of civil society in formal regionalisms in the African continent occur through the Heads of State Summit, Council of Ministers and respective government members with a weak civil representation. Power is still mainly vested in the states and state-driven regional institutions.

Additionally, civil society regional networks have developed strategic partnerships with regional institutions through regional dialogue platforms. In West Africa for example, the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding are classic interface models that other regions ought to study and adopt (Iheduru 2013). Co-founded in 2003 by ECOWAS, the WACSOF is formed and constituted by more than 100 civil society organisations in the region, mainstreaming diverse issues and engaging within formal settings with government elites (Iheduru 2015). The West African Civil Society Forum in West Africa, the East African Civil Society Forum (EACSOF) in East Africa and the SADC-CNGO, Gender Links, SATUCC, Southern Africa Trust (SAT), to name a few in Southern Africa, are all in interaction with respective RIGOs in formal regionalism processes (Moyo et al. 2007). Iheduru (2015) points out that WACSOF was initiated with the assistance of ECOWAS after the latter recognised it needed something better and institutionalised dialogue with CSOs in the region around many priority and thematic areas. Similar reasoning lay behind the establishment of SADC-CNGO in 1998 (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014). In East Africa, EACSOF was granted observer status in the East African Community (EAC) in 2001 (Moyo et al. 2007). The EAC has established the EAC CSO-PSO Dialogue Framework which is a tripartite constituted by the regional body, civil society organisations and private sector organisations. The Sectoral Council for Ministers of East African Community Affairs and Planning (SCMEACP) meeting directed more time for national consultations (EAC 2015). Regional civil society actors are also working closely with regional institutions on particular issues. For instance, the West

Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is a key partner of ECOWAS in peacebuilding efforts in the West African region. It has strategically built regional cooperation with ECOWAS while at the same time developing strong national networks in the 15 member states, involving some 500 local organisations. Iheduru (in Fioramonti 2015) underlines that civil society networks in the ECOWAS region have managed to achieve numbers of regional reform through a combined set of strategies including partnership, legitimisation and counter-hegemony.

The East Africa Law Society (EALS) went on fact-finding missions to Zanzibar and Uganda and discovered that observers based in the region can grasp the dynamics and assist in preventing irregularities and possibly also violence (Millstein 2015). According to Moyo et al. (2007), COMESA works with civil society groupings, however in more selective ways. Because of the nature of its work, COMESA is bound to be limited to groups that work with regional integration issues and frankly, there are very few in the region. In Southern Africa for instance, the Southern Africa Trust (SAT) helped the mineworkers' unions in their efforts to strengthen the rights of migrant workers. This also led to the establishment of a Southern Africa Mineworkers Association (SAMA) that can transcend the previously fragmented efforts by various national unions to support ex-mineworkers (Millstein 2015).

2.7.3 Regional civil society networks' interactions in self-organised regionalisms

Self-organisation in regionalism refers to the degree to which cross-border collective actors through regional civil society networks are capable of independently organising, that is mobilising their resources and forming their own choices, in other words, self-determination. This is a critical question since engaging the states always carries risks of oligarchization, goal displacement and even outright co-optation. Civil society organisations may be said to be either dependent, when they do not have the capacity for self-organisation and self-determination without external support, or autonomous when they have the capacity for self-organising and self-determination (Baiocchi, Heller, Silva 2008). In the quest for RIGOs reaching out to citizens and various associations, regional civil society groups have also gone beyond invitations to creating their own spaces and modalities for collaboration (Godsäter 2014, Söderbaum 2007). In this regard, fully-fledged cross-border civil society networks, whose dominant form of collective action goes beyond information exchange to mount joint mobilisation across national boundaries, attract ordinary citizen activists committed to more

comprehensive goals of counter-forcing the prevailing social order (McAdam 1996; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). These regional civil society groupings constitute a parallel arrangement of political interaction focused on the self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action by decentralised local actors that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there (Lipschutz 1992, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001). Thus, these invented or created spaces of interactions by citizens themselves outside of the mainstream for alternative regionalism are referred to, in this thesis, as self-organised regionalisms. Building transnational civil society networks is not an easy process due to the complexity and diversity of identities, cultural background, interests and needs of epistemic communities across the borders. Even where transnational social movement actors consciously work to incorporate more diverse peoples and issues, actually doing so can require exceptional costs and risks, and localised organizing is cheaper and more manageable in many ways (Liebowitz 2000; Tarrow 2001a 2001b, 2005; Smith 2001, 2002). Voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of exchange and communication are the main characteristics of these regional civil society networks representing organisational forms that are more distinct from either bureaucratic hierarchies and markets (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

At a global level, the World Social Forum is one of the illustrative arenas of transnational horizontal networks of civil society outside of the formal World Economic Forum, gathering political leaders from the G7 countries (Della Porta et al. 2006). The WSF organises protests, demonstrations and sit-ins beyond the walls of the G7 conference in order to get an issue on the international agenda, to get international actors to change their discursive positions and institutional procedures, and to influence policy change and actor behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Additionally, the call to demonstrate against the Millennium Round during the WTO conference in Seattle in November 1999 by more than fifty thousand demonstrators from 1,387 civil society groups constituted another emblematic case for interaction within self-organised regionalisms (della Porta et al. 2006). These WTO negotiations were accused of restricting individual states' power to intervene in social and environmental issues in the name of free trade. As for the Americas, the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) has been a striking illustration of a self-organised civil society group interacting outside of the mainstream for alternative regionalism (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2004, Grugel 2005). As an outsider and network of over fifty organisations from across the hemisphere, the HSA was opposed to neoliberalism and corporate power and exercised pressure outside of the summit processes and

the FTAA, which remains central to their strategies of action (Grugel 2005). The Alianza Chilena por un Comercio Justo y Responsable (ACJR); the Réseau Québécois sur l'Intégration Continentale; the Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos; the Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo, an international peasant movement; and the Iniciativa Civil para la Integración Centroamericana (ICIC), are all affiliated with the HSA (Grugel 2005, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2004). Legler (2000) argues that this HSA has been central in the decision to organise parallel events alongside the official Summit processes, illustratively the Quebec Summit of 2001 and the Quito Summit of 2002, building on its considerable support and links with labour federations. Among their strategies, civil society groupings within the HSA build an independent network for non-state actors discussion, debate and solidarity and for the exchange of information. But they also seek to influence the official agenda during the Summit period. HSA succeeded in blocking the FTAA and continued to push for alternative models of integration based on democracy, social justice, support for human rights and well-being. Despite their capability to disrupt formal negotiations, civil society networks affiliated to HSA were denied access to the table of negotiation. No influence could, therefore, be exercised over the direction of formal processes of integration for their inclusion. In Latin America, civil society movements have been on the forefront of struggles for representation, citizenship, human rights, and holding governments to account (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2004). More than that, the Red Interamericana para la Democracia (RID) was created by the Organization of American States (OAS) to provide a platform and a space for cooperation between ideologically moderate civil society movements concerned with democracy and governance within Latin states. At the same time, the HSA adopted an oppositional posture toward the official negotiating process, try to challenge perceived limits to participation by mobilising against the official process, and seek to develop alternative networks and alliances outside the structures promoting hemispheric integration (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2004, Gerard 2014).

The shrinking space of participation in the ASEAN region has pushed civil society to interact within self-organised regionalisms that Gerard (2014) calls "created spaces". Many official activities of ASEAN were duplicated into parallel activities by the Southeast Asian civil society organisations. These include workshops, forums, and the drafting of an agreement such as the ASEAN People's Charter against the ASEAN Charter (Lopa 2009). More than that, Regional Consultations on ASEAN and Human Rights (RCAHR) was another parallel event to the

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) which was shut out to the Southeast Asian civil society organisations (Chongkittavorn 2012, Ponnudurai 2012). In addition to parallel activities, protests have been among the strategies of the Southeast Asian civil society organisations (SACSOs), but most of the time, brutally reprimanded by authoritarian regimes driving the ASEAN countries. One example among many was a protest held on 18 November 2011 alongside the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Approximately 1000 protestors staged the event outside both the Japanese and US Consulate General buildings. Protestors raised a range of issues. Regional concerns included the neglect of welfare and environmental problems at ASEAN summits and the negative distributional impacts of free trade agreements, while national issues included the exploitation of Bali for tourist developments and the environmental damage from Indonesia's mismanagement of its natural resources (Suriyani 2011a, 2011b). Within self-organised regionalism in ASEAN, SACSOs produce and disseminate critical knowledge. Apart from their in-house activities to inform the advocacy work, the SACSOs have undertaken the work which focuses on the Global South, published reports, articles and occasional papers on ASEAN and other multilateral bodies' economic policies (Gerard 2014). From the ASEAN People Assembly (APA), Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA), ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) to the ASEAN People's Forum (APF), non-state actors in the ASEAN region demonstrate how actively they are engaged with and participate in altering and adjusting the community-building project for alternative regionalisms (Grugel 2004; Chandra 2009; Collins 2008, 2013). Through these different spaces of involvement, civil society groupings in the ASEAN region have been challenged to both interact with state actors and counteract the existing regional status quo for a newly reformed people-oriented ASEAN (Gerard 2014). APA became a general meeting of civil society organisations, nongovernment organisations, and civic organisations from the 10 member states of ASEAN. The APF aims to serve as a vessel for articulating and conveying the people's views and interests outside of the formal political channels (Hernandez 2003). The ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) was initiated by the Malaysian government as a parallel event to the 11th ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 (Lopa 2016). Yet, identifying and explaining the modes of participation for CSOs in ASEAN, Gerard (2014) argues that ASEAN's post-crisis engagement with civil society is directed toward boosting its legitimacy and furthering its narrow reform agenda, rather than creating opportunities for CSOs to contest its political project. Despite ASEAN's rhetoric of creating a people-oriented organization, the mode in which ASEAN actually interacts with CSOs constrains them to either

accommodate ASEAN's political project in order to interact with officials, or they are excluded from such interaction via the withdrawal of official participation, ignorance or even sabotage (Gerard 2014).

In the West African region, the interaction of civil society within self-organised settings in the ECOWAS region was evidenced by the activism of counterforce civil society organisations that emerged in 1990 and 2001, challenging state actors to go against the neoliberalism dogmas for the quest for alternative regionalism. These civil organisations used the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) as a site to exercise their counter-hegemonic struggles (Iheduru 2015). There are the West African region-wide organisations, the Network of National Human Rights Institutions in West Africa (NNHRI), the Media Foundation of West Africa (MFWA), POSCAO (La Platforme des Organisations de la Societé Civile de l'Afrique de l'Ouest sur l'Accord de Cotonou) (Iheduru 2011), including the nation-based organisations like the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) in Sierra Leone, the Centre for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE), Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and Foundation for International Integrity (FIND) in Liberia, the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FODA), African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Ghana; the African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG), the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and CLEEN Foundation in Nigeria; RADHO in Senegal; the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET) in Guinea (Conakry), Liberia and Sierra Leone; and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) aimed at increasing citizens participation in the quest for solutions pertaining to security threats fuelled by violent conflicts and civil wars within the region (Iheduru 2015).

In the Eastern African region, the EACSOF is formed by more than 61 civil societies with 59 of the members being umbrella organisations with a network membership of over 500 CSOs. These include the Eastern African Business Community (EABC), EALGA, East Africa Law Society (EALS), EANNASO, EASSI, EATUC, Kituo Cha Katiba (the Eastern Africa Centre for Constitutional Development, KcK), to name a few (EAC 2015). EACSOF has played a remarkable role in mobilising for citizen participation in region-building processes. However, the EACSOF presence at grassroots sub-regional levels has been viewed as minimal. This being said, although the EAC has already adopted a framework for the private sector, civil society and other interest groups, participation and the ability to influence policy by non-state

actors, especially by civil society groups, remains low. At the regional level, CSOs across the region are mainly represented by the East African Civil Society Forum (EACSOF), while the East Africa Business Council (EABC) represents the private sector. While the EABC, which represents the interests of minority-established business entities across the region, has well-defined status as an observer, including participation at the secretariat and heads of states summit levels the EACSOF, has a lesser role despite its wider constituency across the region at both national and sub-national levels (Odhiambo 2010, EAC 2015). This, in essence, denies majority stakeholders who are ordinary EAC citizens inclusion and participation in the EAC initiatives at the policy formulation and implementation stages. This is likely to lead to disenchantment on the part of ordinary citizens with EAC policies and projects, as well as undermine the integration process as key stakeholders are excluded from the process. Additionally, the East African Sustainability Watch Network (EASWN) is involved in a watchdog project for sustainable development in the Lake Victoria basin (Godsäter 2013). EASWN is another slackly organised coalition of national networks in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, with objectives to increase citizen participation in reforming policies related to sustainable development and improving networking and information-sharing about sustainable development. One of the remarkable contributions of EASWN has been to lobby state actors within the EAC for substantial changes in the set-up of the commission and to ensure more space for citizen participation in the management of the lake's resources (Godsäter 2013). The Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) has been a striking example of self-organisation within the Maghreb and Arab regions (Fioramonti 2015). As for the Southern African civil society networks, they interact within both formal regionalisms set by SADC and self-organised settings outside of the mainstream in the form of horizontal networks. Chapter 4 has expanded on mapping the interaction of regional civil society networks in the Southern African region.

In order to develop a typology of how civil society interacts within two distinct settings of regionalism, namely formal and self-organised/informal regionalisms in line with the assigned objective of this thesis, there is a need to scrutinise the institutional arrangements that are developed by regional civil society networks during these interactions, which scholars in contemporary regionalism have been struggling to map out. This means that a systematic comparison is needed of the operating procedures, practices, shared standards, routines, observed rules and conduct of civil society networks on whether they are interacting in formal

regionalisms or self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream in order to gauge their differences. Unlike the abovementioned literature on the interaction of civil society within both vertical and horizontal regionalisms, the authors did not empirically identify the institutional arrangements developed by civil society actors during their interactions, which constitute the gap that this study aims to fill as its main objective.

2.8 Existing research on civil society regionalisms from a Southern African context

Rationalist schools of thought praising the mainstream state-centred approach to regionalism has dominated the literature on the study of regionalism globally and more specifically, in Southern Africa. Consequently, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their ability to promote alternative regionalisms have been minimised. Many conducted studies are extensively focused on Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, there are a few studies conducted in the field of civil society regionalism in Southern Africa that have served as points of reference for this research. Among them, there are studies conducted by Söderbaum (2004, 2007, 2015), Landsberg (2006, 2012), Godsäter and Söderbaum (2011), Godsäter (2014), Odhiambo et al. (2015), Zajontz and Leysens (2015), Godsäter and Söderbaum (2016). Söderbaum (2004) underscores that Southern Africa is a heterogeneous and multidimensional region and its civil society actors have a reasonably well-articulated regional vision. However, many civil society actors are concerned with their own agendas and do not try to influence the shaping of the formal region. Some civil society actors are contributing to the formalisation of the region through institution building and others prefer to relate to formal regional arrangements. Söderbaum (2007) demonstrates again how regional civil society within SADC countries contains internal paradoxes and is subject to patrimonial power that impedes its performance. Lack of shared vision, fund hunting, and donor dependency are among the most cited constraints of civil society.

Drawing from an empirical study on how transnational civil society within SATUCC, SAPSN and SADC-CNGO networks have developed great capacity on trade and HIV/AIDS-related issues, Godsäter (2014) demonstrates how civil society networks are highly active in constructing regionalisation through framing issues and, to a lesser extent, by building regional identities. Zajontz and Leysens (2015) assess the potential of civil society in the Southern African region to act as a catalyst for transformation towards broader inclusivity and a people-centred approach to regional integration and socio-economic development. Scholars have found that civil society organisations encounter major constraints (Söderbaum 2007), including lack of financial

autonomy, dependency on donor funding, shortage of human resources, limited representativeness and legitimacy followed by a lack of effective common ideology and coordination between them. However, there is a gap in this literature as the above studies did not respectively expand, in a comparative manner, on the typology of how civil society interacts within both horizontal networks and with SADC in order to gauge the differences of strategies, norms and rules developed in these two distinct institutional settings.

2.9 Conclusion

The aim of chapter 2 was to review the literature on the key concepts, regionalism, civil society and people-centred approaches to regionalism, which form a conceptual framework of the study. Conceptualisation was centred around different perspectives on regionalism, civil society and people-approaches to regionalism, and the way they link to each other. The chapter expanded on the discourse of contemporary regionalism and civil society, and how they speak to strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when they interact within both formal and informal regionalisms. Table 2.1 above in section 2.2 summarised the conceptual framework detailed throughout the chapter. The latter attempted to show the shrinking of regional civic space driven by states as sole actors has triggered civil society interactions within both formal or vertical interactions with SADC and self-organised or horizontal networks in which they develop different kinds of strategies, norms and rules in order to build alternative regionalisms, as this study attempts to show. The researcher proposed New Institutionalism as a core theoretical framework to examine the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. At the same time, illustrations, evidence and examples, etc. are drawn from the new regionalism approach to show how regionalism as an unconventional social and political phenomenon can also be promoted by non-state actors, meaning, building regions from the bottom up. The next chapter focuses on the theoretical framework of the study.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM: LESSONS FROM THEORY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to theorise the people-centred approaches to regionalism using New Institutionalism as a core theoretical framework of this study. This chapter sheds more light on the understanding of a study of this nature that focuses on the emergence and importance of informal institutions at the regional level, which are structuring politics of regions formation in new ways across the world. This chapter firstly explores the use of New Intuitionalism as an appropriate core lens through which the researcher examined the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. Secondly, the chapter expands on how the study borrows some elements from the New Regionalism Approach in order to understand the formation of regions from below and how it allowed the researcher to view regionalism as an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. This chapter argues that institutionalism helps us understand that informal institutions are as important as formal institutions in regionalism, and how these institutions can serve as bottom-up and unconventional phenomena at the same time. This theoretical approach which informs the debate on the conceptualisation of regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors in the formation of regions, states and technocrats alike, helped the researcher to understand how regions can also be formed from below through unconventional institutional mechanisms.

3.2 Strategies, norms and rules for building regions from below

In globalised world politics, political decisions to form regions are no longer dictated by single groups of lone players like government elites, allies, and technocrats at the expense of excluded epistemic communities who are relegated to merely be beneficiaries of state-driven decisions. More than that, prescriptions devised by states in formal settings are no longer considered by new institutionalists scholars (Peters 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Lowndes 2001, Ostrom 2005) to be sole determinants of the nature of political institutions. There are also other types

of institutions which are informal as developed outside of formal institutional contexts such as clientelism, corruption, uncodified traditional customs, and civil society practices, which are all capable of shaping behaviours and influence political outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). In this context, the researcher used the New Institutionalism as a core theoretical framework in order to look at how a region can also be constructed through informal institutions developed by non-state actors within unconventional settings. Additionally, the research borrowed some elements of the New Regionalism Approach as evidence to view how a region can be constructed also by non-state actors from the bottom up as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon.

Expansion of New Institutionalism was triggered by dissatisfaction with theoretical and conceptual understanding of informal institutions within international institutions, by old institutionalism emphasizing more on states, but to a less extent on their interactions with other institutions, like civil society in the context of IR/IPE (Peters 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Lowndes 2001, Ostrom 2005). The reason being was that the study of regionalism in IR/IPE remains highly dominated by rationalist, materialist or structuralist theories focusing predominantly on states and technocrats as regionalising most important actors as well as on formal inter-state frameworks and market-led processes of regional integration (Mansfield and Milner 1997, Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). This implies the realist approach to non-state actors in general, and civil society networks in particular has been to dismiss them as marginal in world politics. Taking the centrality of the state as a premise, realist thinkers have argued that transnational organisations matter only at the fringes of world politics (Mearsheimer 1994/1995).

According to neorealists and neoliberalists, the international system is marked by anarchy and the most important actors are rational egoists and unitary states whose outward behaviour is dependent on their pre-defined interests (Smith 2002, Ruggie 1998). Neorealists and inter-governementalists privilege the importance of states and emphasise sovereignty and power. In this case, non-state actors may pressurise their governments, but power is exercised within the framework of regional institutions driven by state actors. This being said, neorealists believe that any effort to build a community beyond the nation-state will be challenging and may even intensify the differences and conflicts between states (Cini 2003, Söderbaum 2017). As indicated in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2, these state-centred approaches to regionalism were

critiqued by many to be an epitome of state hegemony that underpins a top-down regionalism driven by state and technocrats as sole actors in decision-making processes. In Gilpin's reading, non-state actors' groupings are acknowledged by neorealists provided they help hegemonic states to further goals. However, the state continues to be the principal actor in both economic and political affairs (Gilpin 2004).

Given the impressive research output of these schools of regionalism, there are, in general very few studies on the importance of non-state actors in the formation of regions. There was a need, in this study, for a reflectivist approach to regionalism that focuses on how inter-subjective practices between actors, rather than state only, result in how interests, ideas and identities are developed in the process of social interaction, rather than rationalist approaches which are based on rational choice and take the interests, ideas and identities of actors as given (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). Reflectivist approaches to regionalism challenges core rationalist assumptions, such as the separation of subject and object, fact and value, the state-centred ontology of most rationalist approaches as well as the role of norms and identities in the formation of informal and formal regions (Söderbaum 2016). Some rationalist scholars focus on pre-given regional delimitations and regional organisations. Unlike the rationalists, reflectivists and constructivists are concerned more with how regions are constituted and constructed (Murphy 1991, Neumann 1994, Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). This implies that the constructivist perspective could be needed if the purpose of the analysis of this thesis was to gain a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary processes of regionalisation and regioness, which is very important for the study of regionalism, but not as an objective for the current study (Söderbaum 2004). As for the constructivist theorists, they tone down the importance of materialist incentives and instrumental strategies associated with many of the IR/IPE theoretical perspectives. They instead point to the importance of subjective aspects of identity, interests, learning, communication, shared knowledge, ideational forces as well as how cooperation and communities emerge (Söderbaum 2017 and Godsäter 2015). Referring to proponent of constructivism Karl Deutsch (in Hettne and Söderbaum 1998), cultural interaction and communication can become so intense that a region can become a security community, which is defined as a shared sense of belonging to a community, a sense of We-ness, including the development of diplomatic-political-military practices and behaviour, that ensure the expectation of only peaceful relations among the population for a long time.

In order to reveal the shortcomings and normative tenets of conventional theories and institutions, and to account for the complexity and multidimensionality of political projects to form regions, the New Institutionalism is considered to be a core suitable theoretical approach for this study to look at the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by non-state actors. And so, NRA, as a complementary approach in this study, was borrowed by the researcher to have unconventional views on the formation of the regions by non-state actors in the quest for alternative regionalisms. The NRA became a cogent approach that enabled scholars in contemporary regionalism in order to understand how different interactions are taking place in multipolar settings, where non-state actors interact both within state-led formal setting as co-actors in the formation of regions and also in self-organised settings outside of the mainstream, where they are actors on their own in order to build alternative regionalisms. This being said, NRA is quite influential, claiming that there are no natural regions, but that regions are made, remade and unmade in the process of global transformation, by collective human action and identity formation through interactions and mutual understanding (Söderbaum 2004). In this case, regionalism in a new post-cold war era become characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003).

Building on the work of Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) and other new regionalist scholars (Hettne and Inotai 1994, Hurrell 1995, Bach 1999, Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999-2001, Hettne 2000, Mittelman 2000, Söderbaum and Shaw 2003, and Söderbaum 2004), researcher borrows evidence from NRA to help pinpoint the realities that the thesis attempts to explain. It is about structured behaviour in the form of strategies, norms and rule based on neo-institutionalism in the establishment of alternative or people-centred approaches to regionalism. Firstly, regionalism takes place in a multipolar world order, which justifies a proliferation of regional groupings around the world. For example, in Southern Africa, political decisions to form regions is no longer confined to one centre of decision, like SADC. There is an emergence of cross-border non-state associations which interact with the states and at the same time among themselves within self-organised networks committed to advocating for a common agenda which is not state-driven. To second the above, there is the World Social Forum, Regional Trade Unions Council (SATUCC), and Southern African Civil Society

Solidarity Networks (SAPSN), among others. These civil groupings operate alongside regional formal institutions. Secondly, regionalism emerges as a spontaneous process, like ad hoc social movements, which do not necessarily need to be a properly structured or sophisticated system of organisation, like intergovernmental organisations, to emerge. For example, in the name of regional solidarity, citizen groupings within the Arab world during the Arab Spring have demonstrated how spontaneous processes can ignite a regional social movement, advancing a cause that is deemed to be a regional concern. In this case, the SADC People's Summit is one of the striking examples that evidences a spontaneous mobilisation through SAPSN that leads to regional collective actions challenging SADC regional status quo through jump to help initiatives.

Thirdly, regionalism become open and outward in character, and is founded on a pyramid of regionalizing actors, broadly grouped in terms of states, markets and civil society interaction (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Regionalism in the Southern African region like other part of the world, become considered as a joint regional governance which is open to non-state actors. The latter are engaging within multiplicity of relationships with states and among themselves (Godsäter 2016, Söderbaum 2016, Zajontz and Leysens 2015b). Lastly, regionalism evolved around multidimensional processes as it is not limited to one sector, like trade or regional security, but are involved in all sectors such as the economic, social, political, environmental, and cultural sectors, to name a few, which contribute to the well-being of the people of SADC. Regionalism is no longer based in favour of the Western or European context, but is rather more culturally, socially and politically sensitive. It transcends state-centric and Eurocentric perspectives on regionalism that emphasise political unification and sovereignty transfer within state-led regional organisations (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011, Söderbaum 2016).

3.3 Understanding civil society regionalisms through New Institutionalism

This section is mainly devoted to unpacking New Institutionalism, which forms the core theoretical approach of the study. It does so by defining institutions from a new institutionalist perspective. It emphasises the typology of institutions and their interactions and goes on to revisit New Institutionalism as a study of institutions and elaborate associated analytical approaches before justifying a hybrid form of a New Institutionalism used in this study.

3.3.1 Defining institutions from a new institutionalist perspective

Building on definitions of institutions by Kaspar and Streit (1998), Scott (2001), and Vatn (2005), the concept was also defined by Elinor Ostrom (2005b) as the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales. This implies these institutional arrangements are deliberately crafted, sometimes circumvented, by individuals and groups in order to make the interaction more predictable by removing uncertainty and reducing risk. In this vein, institutions are sets of norms, rules and procedures that enable and constrain actor behaviour with some predictability over time, and may also constitute their identities and preferences (March and Olsen 1984; Charles Plott in Ostrom 1986; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996). To March and Olsen (1989), conceptualisation is that institutions tend to have a 'logic of appropriateness' that influences behaviour more than a 'logic of consequentiality' that also might shape individual action. They illustrate the above with firemen who willingly enter blazing buildings because that is the role they have accepted as a function of their occupational choice and their training in the fire service. Institutions are mechanisms for adjusting behaviour in a situation that requires coordination among two or more individuals or groups of individuals (Hurwicz 1994). Hall and Taylor (1996) define institutions, from a historical institutionalist point of view, as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity.

In practice, however, historical institutionalists tend to narrow institutions down to organisations and rules and customs proclaimed by formal organisations. March and Olsen (1989) contend that institutions should rather be understood as a collection of norms, rules and understandings, and perhaps most importantly, routines. At the same time, political institutions, in New Institutionalism, should not be equated with political organisations; rather they are the sets of rules that guide and constrain actors' behaviour (Peters 1999, Lowndes 2001). Institutions are not only material and formal structures – bureaucracies – as seen by old institutionalism, but ideational/normative and informal structures as cognitive scripts, norms and values (Hall and Taylor 1996). On that note, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define institutions as both formal and informal rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling the behaviour of actors. For example, there are treaties, protocols and other codified constitutional documents that regulate cooperation between states within

regional organisations, like SADC, and networks. Collective mutual trust among civil society groupings during the SADC's People Summit constitutes another example of uncodified institutions (SAPSN 2012). Sometimes, uncodified norms like Ubuntu spirit guides African states informal dialogues during the UA meetings. Some social movements, like Arab Spring, Burkina-Faso Uprising, among others, did not need codified rules, like treaty or MoU, to coordinate their protests (Pinfari in Fioramonti 2015). In this vein, Crawford and Ostrom (1995) define an institution as a widely understood rule, norm, or strategy that creates incentives for behaviour in repetitive situations (see also Ostrom 2005).

In sum of the above definitions, this thesis conceptualises institutions as both formal and informal or codified and non-codified collections of rules, norms, or strategies that structure social interaction and creates incentives for actors' behaviour in repetitive situations, like the World Social Forum, the National Democratic Institute, the Open Society Foundation, to name a few. This definition fits well with the research questions and objectives of this study, which mainly focuses on informal institutions developed during interactions. Firstly, it enables the researcher to explain how the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society during their interaction in regionalisms may not be necessarily codified in a bureaucratic way, but they still form part of institutions without overlooking the formal institutions they are interacting with. Secondly, this study is mostly interested in the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society in line with their interactions within both formal and self-organised regionalism settings. Finally, this definition enables the researcher to situate civil society networks' behaviours in an institutional context that triggered the development of institutional arrangements during interactions in regionalisms. Concerning the reviewed definitions of institutions from the above new institutionalist scholars, it is of paramount importance to illuminate the shadow around formal and informal institutions in the New Institutionalism discourse.

Regarding the features of an institution, firstly a structural feature of the society and polity is the most important element of the characteristic of an institution. According to Peters (1999), that structure may be formal – a legal framework, legislature, or an agency in the public bureaucracy – or it may be informal – a network of interacting organizations, like civil society groupings, or a set of shared norms. It is about transcending individuals in order to involve associations of people within designed interactions sanctioned by specified relationships among them. Stability constitutes the second feature of an institution. However, there is a

debate over this second feature whereby some versions of institutionalism argue that some features of institutions are extremely stable and then predict behaviour on that basis, while others make institutions more mutable, but all require some degree of stability (Peters 1999). The third feature of an institution is it must affect individual behaviour. This implies that an institution should in some way constrain the behaviour of its members, like the case of civil society associations prior, during and after the exercise of their citizenship. More than that, these constraints can be either formal or informal, but provided there must be an institution in place and some sense of shared values and meaning among the members of the institution. This constraint feature is shared by a few versions of institutionalism such as normative, sociological and international (March and Oslen 1989, Peters 1999).

Institutions provide the rule of the game, while organisations and individuals are players within that game (Goodin 2001). They shape how political actors define their interests and structure their relations of power to other groups (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Having said this, institutions delimit the capacity for social change. These institutions are important precisely because they are intentional constructions that structure information and create incentives to act or not to act in a particular situation. Thus, they impose constraints on the range of possible behaviour and feasible reforms. The key role of institutions lies in the need to create the preconditions for the establishment of a stable structure of human interaction by reducing the level of uncertainty in society (Lekovic 2011). In sum, institutions shape actors' behaviours, and subsequently political outcomes.

3.3.2 Typology of Institutions and their Interactions

3.3.2.1 Typology of Institutions

In comparative politics, institutions are clustered into two distinct forms, namely formal and informal institutions, with descriptions such as codified and uncodified, or to some extent conventional and unconventional. Without delving too much into contradictory conceptualisations of informal institutions equated to traditional culture, personal networks, clientelism, corruption, clan and mafia organisations, civil society, and a myriad of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms (Borocz 2000), Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727) define informal institutions as 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'. They include a variety

of social and moral norms that influence people's behaviour, allowing for coordination of expectations in social and economic interactions (Lekovic 2011). However, despite their non-codification, it is possible to identify and describe informal institutions on an analytical level as they possess distinct functional logic and identities as well as mechanisms of incentives and sanctions. Still problematic to some extent, the difference between formal and informal institutions, in line with this thesis, can be distinguished through three approaches, according to Helmke and Levitsky (2002).

First of all, formal institutions are state institutions or rules enforced by the state, while informal institutions are established by society. Secondly, most of the time formal rules are enforced by the state as the third party, while informal institutions have self-enforcing mechanisms. Lastly, formal rules are written and codified, while informal rules are unwritten (Helmke and Levitsky (2002, Lekovic 2011). Generally speaking, the clear demarcation between formal and informal is essential for analytical purposes, but in practice, it is quite ambiguous (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). For instance, formal rules can be interpreted and applied in different ways by administrative units so that they transform into differing informal rules. While in the political system, formal institutions are codified by constitutions and laws, informal institutions are not fixed in formal documents but gain their relevance through the actual impact on structures and functions of the political process. These entail that not all social interactions are informal institutions. They have to serve the basic elements of the definition of an institution, which means they have to possess a certain minimal legitimacy and continuity and be distinguishable as structures (Lauth and Liebert 1999; Lauth 2000; Merkel and Croissant 2001; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). It is important to note that the line of demarcation between the two sets of institutions is not the basis of tradition and modern realities. In our days, some traditional institutions can be written and at the same time codified in law. The same applies to modern rules, like the funding criteria of development agencies, clientelism or corruption, that can get the status of informal institutions.

3.3.2.2 Understanding institutional interaction and settings

Institutional interaction highlights that the social practices emerging in the implementation of one institution may also be shaped by other institutions (Gehring and Oberthür 2008). In Young et al. (2005), institutional interaction is of paramount importance due to the fact that the effectiveness of specific institutions often depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions with other institutions. It is part of the broader consequences of international institutions occurring beyond their own domains (Underdal and Young 2004). The study of such interaction supplements the traditional inquiry into the establishment, development**,** and effectiveness of individual international institutions (Gehring and Oberthür 2008). In this respect, the development of international institutions has drawn the attention of the researcher. These institutional developments corroborate with the research focus centred on the understanding of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African cross-border civil society associations during their interaction with both SADC elites and self-organised networks outside of the mainstream.

However, institutional interaction also creates new institutional structures that are difficult to design rationally, because they evolve gradually from, and are continuously shaped and reshaped by, numerous decentralised interaction occurrences. Additionally, there are horizontal and vertical interactions within institutions, as indicated in the preceding chapter 2, which speak to the objectives of this study (Young et al. 1999, 2005). Vertical interaction addresses the influence of institutions across different levels of social organisation or administration (Oberthur and Gehring 2006c). For example, the institutional design of domestic political systems shapes state interests and thus exerts influence on the design of international and European institutional arrangements (Héritier 1999). This type of horizontal interaction enabled the researcher to understand how ordinary citizens within regional civil society networks interact within self-organised regionalisms and the kinds of alternative institutions they develop while sharing common experiences through collective action at the regional level. This thesis did not want to expand on causal mechanisms of institutional interaction nor delve too much into the types of classification of institutional interactions like political linkages, whether intentional or deliberate, and functional linkages, which are a fact of life (Young 1996, 2002). Such causal mechanisms and classifications are all important, but not useful in this case.

In a similar vein, recent studies in comparative politics have demonstrated how an exclusive focus on formal institutions risks missing many of the real incentives and constraints that underlie political behaviour. Referring to the two schools of thought on the role of informal institutions, in order to analyse their interaction, Helmke and Levitsky (2002) distinguish the work firstly by Edna Ullman-Magalit, Robert Axelrod, and Donald Matthiews, which treat informal institutions as playing a functional or problem-solving role. These schools of thought cast norms as solutions to problems of social interaction and coordination, and informal rules are seen to enhance the efficiency or performance of complex institutions (Ullman-Magalit 1978, Axelrod 1986, Matthiews 1959). Secondly, informal institutions are cast as primarily dysfunctional or problem-creating. These trends of studies put more emphasis on phenomena such as clientelism, corruption, patrimonialism, and clan politics, which undermine the performance of markets, states, democratic regimes, and other institutions (O'Donnell 1996, Borocz 2000, Lauth 2000, Collins 2002).

More than that, recent studies put more emphasis on how informal institutions at times reinforce or substitute for the formal institutions they appear to undermine (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). During their interaction within a formal or vertical setting, as indicated in the preceding section, civil society may develop complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive institutions considered as informal institutions. Complementary informal institutions emerge when the rules in form become enforced and the gaps left by formal institutions are filled accordingly by these complementary informal institutions without any violation of established formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2002). For example, conformist civil society networks may develop complementary norms, routines, and operating procedures that allow regional bureaucracies and other complex organisations within the regional decision-making framework to function effectively (Godsäter 2014). Accommodating informal institutions are viewed as second-best institutions developed by actors that can change the outcomes of formal rules which they were discontented with through modification of the effects by violating the spirit but not the letter of the formal rules (Lekovic 2011). These institutions are equated to those developed by reformist civil society networks, for example, who lobby inside the formal institutions by accepting the status quo (Godsäter 2014, Söderbaum 2017). Competing informal institutions emerge in the case of weak formal institutions and antagonistic objectives. These institutions shape actors' incentives to be incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule actors must violate another (Lekovic 2011). In this thesis, for example,

transformist civil society networks resolve to allow even uneducated epistemic communities to share experiences and join discussions during their regional forum within self-organised initiatives alongside the formal summits (SAPSN 2015). Substitutive informal institutions are devised by actors seeking to achieve outcomes that formal institutions were expected, but failed, to generate. For example, the Southern African civil society networks develop their own strategies, norms and rules in civic spaces created to strengthen citizenry and promote democratic culture. This is done by engaging ordinary citizens on different issues which SADC has failed to address (SADC-CNGO 2012). This correlates with the central argument of New Institutionalism that, institutions shape action (Lecours 2005) and that as formal institutions weaken, vibrant informal networks grow and expand (MacLean 2010). Building on MacLean's comments, the used in this research approach helps to understand how other institutional mechanisms are able to construct new forms of regions which are people-centred, with non-state actors as new players. These alternative institutional arrangements developed by non-state actors are aimed at either reforming or transforming ongoing formal institutions, like SADC.

3.3.3 Revisiting New Institutionalism as a study of institutions

For many decades, studies on political institutions focused merely on formal rules. Yet contemporary studies suggest that an exclusive focus on formal rules is often insufficient, and that informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, often have a profound and systematic effect on political outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The researcher used New Institutionalism theory to explain how to move informal institutions from the margins to the mainstream of comparative politics studies. At the same time, NRA complements the New Institutionalism approach with empirical evidence in order to enable the researcher to understand the development of informal institutions developed by civil society networks as new institutions during their interactions in a formal and informal institutional environment in order to build alternative regionalisms. The researcher used the New Institutionalism in order to focus specifically on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks capable of constructing regions rather than just formal institutions.

This thesis does not intend to provide a comprehensive outline of the history of New Institutionalism. Such accounts are available elsewhere (Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 2001; Ostrom 2005). Instead, the purpose of this section is to draw out the major

currents of this vast body of literature on political institutions in order to develop a line of thinking that facilitates the identification of the kind of new institutions developed by regional civil society networks during their interaction in regionalisms. Before understanding why, the new version of institutionalism was useful for the current study, rather than its older version, it is important to explain what constituted old institutionalism, which reflects some features and characteristics of the newer approach in understanding politics. Political life and further research of political institutions were inspired by variations of old institutionalism as the foundation (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). The focal point of old institutionalists, like John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Selznick, Gouldner and Dalton (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) was to analyse the nature of institutions of governance capable of structuring the behaviour of individuals for better outcomes and collective purposes (Peters 1999). Old institutionalism considers political science as the study of the state and an exercise in formal-legal analysis and inspired many political science scholars of the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries to be a basis of their research (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Peters 1999). This being said, old institutionalism was viewed as normative, structuralist, historicist, legalist and holistic (Peters 1998:11), characteristics which fuelled more criticisms from behaviouralists and rational choice theorists (Storing 1962, Bates 1998). Without delving too much into those criticisms, old institutionalism was focused upon formal rules and organizations rather than informal conventions, and upon official structures of government rather than broader institutional constraints on governance in public, private and civil spheres (Peters 2005). It has been criticised for its descriptive method and disdain for theory. In that regard, the old institutionalism lens could not be useful in the current study, which uses an understanding of informal institutions as a focal point.

Thus, New Institutionalism has been effective in generating understanding about how institutions affect organisations (Ohanyan 2012). In order to understand the new institutionalists, one needs to understand not only the old institutionalists but also the schools of thought that emerged between them, at which point the two flourished. There are behaviouralist and rational choice theory as preceding approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996, Lowndes 2001). Both of these approaches assume that individuals act autonomously as individuals, based on either socio-psychological characteristics or on rational calculation of their personal utility. In either theory, individuals were not constrained by either formal or informal institutions but would make their own choices; in both views, preferences are

exogenous to the political process (Peters 1998). The latter challenge to the formalism of the old institutionalism proved that politics evolved around more than just formal arrangements for representation, decision-making and policy implementation, but also informalism, which draws the attention of this thesis.

Although they criticised old institutionalism and at the same time influenced the development of New Institutionalism, the behaviouralists and rational choice theorists did not influence the theoretical background of this current study for the following few reasons. First of all, the behavioural revolution of the late 1950s challenged the old institutionalism by questioning what lay beneath the formalisms of politics and using empirical investigation to find out who really governs in different contexts (Sanders 2010, Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In the meantime, behaviouralists underline that social collectives such as political parties, interest groups and legislatures do not make decisions but people within those collectives do. Goodin contends that what matters is not what people are supposed to do, but what they actually do (Goodin 1996). This implies behaviouralists' denial of the importance of formal institutions in determining the outputs of government, which position does not corroborate with the current study, which also acknowledges formal institutions.

This study agrees with Peters (1999) that the same people would make different choices depending upon the nature of the institution within which they are operating at the time. In order to build a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalisms, in this context, the researcher will need to understand, through a comparative approach, the nature and context of institutional arrangements in which regional civil society networks interact before identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they develop during those distinct interactions. Both formal and informal institutions are crucial for shedding light on the current study of the typology of civil society networks interaction in the Southern African region. Secondly, rational choice theorists explain politics in terms of the interaction of self-interests of individuals (Hindmoor 2010). They do not admit that institutions do possess some influence over participants because institutional rules establish the parameters for individual behaviour (Buchanan and Tullock, in Peters 1999), but still deny their significance in shaping the preferences of participants (Peters 1999).

In this case, rational choice theorists do not help the researcher to answer the research questions, as collective behaviour has been reduced to the individuals, which is contrary to the

focal point of this study on collective behaviour of regional civil society networks in interaction within horizontal networks and with the SADC. Nevertheless, behavioural and rational choice analyses were criticized by institutionalists to be contextualist, reductionist, utilitarian, functionalist, and instrumentalist (March and Olsen 1984). In the later 1980s, due to the internal limitations of these paradigms, New Institutionalism emerged again with some features of old institutionalism and was named by James March and Johan Olsen (March and Olsen 1984). During this era, institutionalism was viewed as an area where political institutions remained important but changed due to the de-institutionalisation of politics and government with the break-up of large-scale bureaucracies and the growth of soft processes like networking, collaboration or steering (Rhodes 1997; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002).

In the 1990s, New Institutionalism emerged as a response to the under-socialised character of dominant approaches in the discipline, in which institutions were, at best, seen as no more than the simple aggregation of individual preferences (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). New Institutionalism has attracted many political scientists from cutting-edge disciplines. According to new institutionalist scholars like Johan Olsen, James March, Elinor Ostrom, Andre Lecours, Paul DiMaggio, Walter Powell, Douglas North, Guy Peters, Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, New Institutionalism is referred to as a prominent social theory that focuses on developing a comprehensive study of institutions, both formal and informal, the way they interact, and the effects of institutions on individuals and society at large (Peters 1999, Lecours 2005). Additionally, Lowndes (2001) adds that the new institutionalists concern themselves with informal conventions as well as formal rules and structures. They pay attention to the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships, and they study not just the impact of institutions upon behaviour, but the interaction between individuals and institutions. In other words, New Institutionalism provides a way of viewing how institutions shape the behaviour of individual members and produce change (Vielba 2006). In Lowndes and Roberts' (2013) readings, there is an increasing role of markets and networks alongside hierarchy and bureaucracy. It is an era of hybridity where the existing and emerging institutions overlap and recombine in context-dependent ways. At the same time, informal conventions can be as binding as formal constitutions, and hard to change (Lowndes and Roberts 2013).

Thirdly, there is a double life of institutions sanctioned by mutual influence between institutions and actors (Grafstein 1988). The difference between old and New Institutionalism is sanctioned by analytical shifts. These include shifts from a focus on organizations to a focus

on rules; from a formal to an informal conception of institutions; from a static to a dynamic conception of institutions; from submerged values to a value-critical stance; from a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions; and from independence to embeddedness (Lowndes 2001).

The New Institutionalism is a suitable theory for the current research because it provides a comprehensive study of new institutions, the way they develop and interact, and the effects they have on society. New Institutionalism helps the researcher to explain the development of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules used by the Southern African civil society networks during their interactions within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. At the same time, the New Institutionalism lens helps to look at the context as the institutional environment in which these competing new institutions were developed outside formal institutions like SADC's rules, norms and standard operating procedures. This corroborates with Lecours' view of New Institutionalism which sets out an understanding of how institutions evolve in very different ways and how they shape the behaviour of agents or individual members and produce change through rules, norms, and other frameworks (Lecours 2005).

3.3.4 Analytical approaches of New Institutionalism

The three main traditional analytical approaches of New Institutionalism include historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. They put more emphasis on external rule-following structures that serve primarily as constraints on actors, whether as rationalist incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames (Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 1998). Strictly speaking, New Institutionalism does not constitute a unified body of thought. Peters (2001) distinguishes six schools of New Institutionalism in political science. All of them stress the importance of institutions for social, economic and political outcomes. They mainly differ in their definition of institutions, their assessment of the relationship between institutions and actors/behaviour, and their explanation of the genesis and change of institutions, which is not the purpose of this study. However, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. Instead, Hall and Taylor (1996) and March and Oslen (2008) identify three main analytical approaches, all respectively called New Institutionalism. The three complementary approaches of New Institutionalism have interested the researcher as they make one hybrid approach for this study.

3.3.4.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism in political science is closest to new institutional economics, from which it has adopted the concept of the *Homo economicus* (Peters 1999). In this view, institutions exist because they reduce insecurities, enhance the possibility to anticipate the behaviour of other actors, and hence allow for strategic interaction. Institutions play a role by providing a framework that directs expectations, limits the range of choices an actor can make and offers sanctions and incentives. For this approach, institutions constitute systems of rules and inducements to behaviour in which individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities (Weingast 1996, Peters 1999). The orientation to institutional norms is the result of an individual rational cost-benefit equation as it is perceived as cost-reducing (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999). While this approach is useful to grasp strategic behaviour, it was criticised for neglecting the social construction of preferences and cannot explain the persistence of dysfunctional institutions (March and Oslen 2008).

3.3.4.2 Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism argues that it is not possible to explain the existence and persistence of institutions with effectiveness or rationality, and rejects models of rational actors and behaviouralism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Peters 1999). Rather, it seeks to understand how institutions influence orientations, preferences and perceptions, anticipations, interests, and objectives of actors and therefore, the ways solutions to problems are sought before concrete incentives become effective. Sociological institutionalism became especially powerful in organisational theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). While sociological institutionalism aims at bringing society back in (Friedland and Alford 1991), the objective of historical institutionalism is bringing the state back in (Evans et al. 1985). As its primary concern is the interaction of political institutions and politics in order to explain policy as outcomes, it is often used in policy analysis. In this case, the state is conceptualized as a complex set of institutions that interacts with other societal and political institutions such as regional civil society networks.

3.3.4.3 Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism expanded the conventional understanding of institutional effects on behaviour by including informal institutions and clarifying which institutions matter and how (Ma 2007). This approach generated a structuralist understanding of political behaviour as it showed how institutional systems structure individual and collective action (Peters 1998). Historical institutionalism is based on the assumption that development is path-dependent, meaning that institutional designs, once established, are in effect for a long time as they constrain the possibilities and options for change (Ma 2007). Hence, even specific efforts to shape institutions are limited by these path dependencies. Political ambitions to change institutions are often not feasible as it is impossible to change the path. In this manner, powerful actors that benefit from certain institutions and hence have an interest in their persistence or change also play a role (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 2002). Historical institutionalism combines actor-specific and institutional factors. While actors are not as much constrained by institutions as in the sociological variant, their strategies, objectives, and norms still are shaped by the institutional setting. Institutions are only one set of factors influencing policy outcomes beside others like economic development or the spreading of political ideas. Although these three schools refer to distinct meta-theoretical approaches and their distinction is important, they also share basic assumptions and can be regarded as supplementary rather than exclusionary. Therefore, they can be all combined in this study. In addition to the three traditional approaches of New Institutionalism, there is discursive institutionalism, coined to be a fourth, newest approach (Schmidt 2010).

3.3.4.4 Discursive institutionalism

Discursive institutionalism is concerned with both the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in an institutional context. A few scholars deem discursive institutionalism to have the greatest potential for providing insight into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors (Schmidt 2010). Yet, for the three New Institutionalisms, institutions are structures external to agents that constitute rules about acting in the world that serve mainly as constraints – whether by way of rationalist incentives that structure action, historical paths that shape action, or cultural norms that frame action (Peters 1998, Hall and Taylor 1996). Unlike the

three approaches to New Institutionalism, to discursive institutionalism institutions are internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures of thinking and acting that constrain action and as constructs of thinking and acting created and changed by those actors (Schmidt 2010). Despite their distinct analysis of world politics, these three traditional approaches developed in reaction to the behavioural perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s and seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). The three traditional complementary approaches of New Institutionalism have interested the researcher, as explained below.

3. 3.5 Justification of a hybrid form of New Institutionalism used in this study

In this study, more emphasis is put on combined elements of historical and sociological institutionalism in the basic understanding of institutions and institutional change without totally rejecting rational choice assumptions. The latter are partly integrated into historical institutionalism, also including power (and hence strategic behaviour) as a factor in institutional change. Thus, elements of rational choice institutionalism are used in order to understand and explain the strategic and power-seeking behaviour of actors, albeit with their preferences not being fixed but shaped by the institutional context. At the same time, sociological institutionalism is the second variant of the New Institutionalism that enables researchers to capture the linking practices that characterise regional civil society networks engagement in world politics, especially in SADC. Concerning the focal point of this study, which is an understanding of the kind of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society when they interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, this thesis combines the three intertwined and complemented New Institutionalisms, therefore they engender a hybrid form of New Institutionalism. The reason is that the researcher could not look at these informal institutions without digging into the historical paths that shaped the newly-emerged informal institutions, strategies, norms and rules, developed by regional self-organised networks of non-state actors in the label of regional civil society networks. Equally, rationalist incentives structuring the collective action of the Southern African civil society networks constituted factual elements that should not be neglected, even though not in line with the objective of this study focused on comparative political institutions, meaning what kinds of institutional arrangements are developed in different institutional environments. More than that, cultural norms that frame collective action of civil society networks in the Southern African region are

of paramount importance in order to shed more light on the understanding of the kinds of institutional arrangements they developed during social interactions, whether within formal or informal regionalisms. Yet the researcher is aware of the limitations of New Institutionalism theory that was criticised for not being seen to represent a coherent and unified school, but rather a cumulative result of three distinct intellectual traditions embodying different methodological and epistemological positions, as well as separate ontologies and interpretations of political processes (Vielba 2006).

In line with the research question of this thesis, the three approaches of New Institutionalism, notably rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms, were combined to transcend their respective limitations in order to engender a clear hybrid form of New Institutionalism that is useful to enable the researcher to focus on the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by non-state actors within horizontal networks among themselves and with SADC. The researcher joins the new institutionalists by arguing that theorizing in political science should take into account that action does not occur in an institutional vacuum (North 1990, Lecours 2005). The actions of civil society networks as unplanned and unforeseen institutions by state actors need to be considered, not ignored, by political elites in the process of region-building projects with reference to the Southern African region. Drawing from the New Institutionalism, this thesis puts forward the idea that institutions represent an autonomous force in politics, and that their weight is felt in action and outcomes, contrary to an instrumentalist reading and societal reflection perspectives that ignore the possibility that institutions themselves can have effects on political outcomes.

3.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter focused on New Institutionalism as the core theoretical framework for the study of people-centred approaches to regionalism. It was about the construction of strategies, norms and rules devised by the ordinary regional citizenry in the quest for alternative regionalisms. The idea was to explain through the New Institutionalism how self-organised institutions are proficient in forming regions. The chapter theoretically argued that if well-governed, there are other institutional mechanisms that work or function rather than only state actors. The chapter started by debating different approaches in order to understand how strategies, norms and rules in the formation of regions can be constructed from below. In the same vein of theoretical debate, the researcher established how useful elements borrowed from

the New Regionalism Approach were, in order to complement the core theoretical framework, the New Institutionalism. The borrowed elements from NRA constituted evidence to enable the researcher to have an unconventional view of regionalism which takes place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character, and involves multidimensional processes and driven by actors outside state mainstream. That being said, the chapter elaborated on institutions followed by explanation regarding the usage of hybrid form of New Institutionalism approach as a lens in the study. This theoretical approach helped the researcher to, firstly, understand the way rational incentives structured the actions of civil society; secondly, what were historical paths that shaped their strategies, norms and rules, and thirdly, which cultural norms framed their collective action. In a nutshell, New Institutionalism helped the researcher to look specifically on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interaction within both SADC-led forums and self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. The following chapter is focused on the formal context of these interactions of regional civil society networks in the SADC region.

CHAPTER 4

THE FORMAL CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS' INTERACTION IN REGIONALISMS

4.1 Introduction

The adopted mode of regional cooperation and integration by a given regional economic community establishes distinct spaces of interaction that may either include or exclude non-state actors in decisions to form regions. In this, the Southern African region is not an exception. This chapter aims to unpack the formal, legal and political contexts in which the Southern African civil society networks interact within the region. It does so through a thorough examination of what constitutes the mode of SADC governance and especially its permeability and legitimacy in relation to civil society engagement in the formation of regions. This chapter argues that the exclusive features of the state-centred mainstream mode of SADC governance have triggered two settings of engagement within which civil society interact for alternative regionalisms. The chapter reveals that despite the existence of the article 23 of the SADC treaty, which establishes the joint governance system between government elites and non-state actors in the decision-making processes, still lacks full operationalisation in important sectors of regional integration and cooperation. At the same time, regional civil society actors are consulted on a service delivery basis by SADC elites. State actors accuse civil society of lack of capacity and technical expertise in pressing issues at both national and regional levels; therefore, there is a sense of mistrust between states and civil society actors. This chapter concludes that normatively SADC has a strong framework of involvement of civil society, but operationalisation is still problematic for several reasons among stakeholders. SADC should institute measures to operationalise article 23 of the SADC treaty and develop a policy on how it engages civil society in pursuance of the treaty provision in order to allow non-state actors to own the processes of region formation in Southern Africa.

4.2 Historical perspective on the interaction between SADC and Southern African civil society networks

This section does not intend to delve too much into the genesis of the Southern African regionalism, all the way from the pre-colonial era to the colonial incursion into the African continent, about which many scholars (Söderbaum 2004b, Fage and Oliver 2002; Thompson 2009b, Zajontz 2013) have already written. Instead, it focuses on a brief historical perspective on the interaction between state actors and non-state actors in region-building projects in Southern Africa. As Boas et al. (2003: 199) underline, that regionalised world "is not a novelty, but an integrated part of human history". Historically established as a Conference from 1980-1992 under the name SADCC, which changed to SADC in 1992, the Southern African regional organisation was born out of the Frontline States, an alliance of a few Southern African countries that came together and whose objective was the political liberation of Southern Africa (Söderbaum 1996, Schoeman 2013, Odhiambo, Ebobrah and Chitiga, 2016).

The history of Southern Africa has been marred by conflict, including wars of expansion and dispossession, the violence of colonialism, liberation wars and post-colonial civil wars in some countries (Thompson 2009b; Zajontz 2013). To liberate Southern Africa became a catalytic objective in the quest for regional cooperation, brotherhood and Pan-Africanism (Asante 1997, Odhiambo, Ebobrah and Chitiga, 2016). The liberation struggle against colonialism and the apartheid regime, as mentioned in section 3.2 of chapter 3, was a result of a joint effort between Southern African frontline states and regional civil society networks like trade unions, the SATUCC, and faith-based organisations, like FOCCISA (Asante 1997, Thompson 2009b). Instigated by the end of apartheid and the democratic transition in South Africa, a desire to move on from solidarity politics towards economic development emerged among the SADC founding members. These revealed SADC to be a state-led regional institution. However, after political liberation of the region, the role played by civil society organisations on the periphery of frontline states has been ignored by political elites. In the early 1980s, civic space started shrinking despite a provision, like the former NGO Liaison Desk, made by state members for civil society participation in the formation of the region (Moyo et al. 2007). The NGO Liaison Desk was a state-established avenue to interface with civil society, but which was not a success story. Another former quasi non-existent state-led space was the former state-created Sector Coordination Unit on Employment and Labour considered as a platform for policy dialogues between state members and other stakeholders like trade unions, business and civil society

(SADC-CNGO 2006, Moyo et al. 2007). The two abovementioned state-created spaces sketched the genesis of SADC's political willingness to interact, in principle, with non-state actors in the formation of regions. The Founding Treaty that formally established SADC in its current form was signed in 1992 and amended in 2001 and 2009 respectively. Being a strictly intergovernmental organisation with the preservation of state sovereignty at its heart (Godsäter, 2015), SADC allows for limited opportunities for engagement of non-state actors and only via certain mechanisms, as the pages below demonstrate. Like other top-down and controlled processes, SADC has tended to sideline its citizens in the crafting and implementation of its policies and developmental projects (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2013). There is also increasingly a growing disdain and suspicion for civil society among SADC member states, which has triggered the creation of self-organised avenues of participation as an alternative for the inclusion of non-state actors (Moyo et al. 2007). All in all, SADC has a long history of involving civil society. In this regard, an understanding of state-established legal frameworks and civic spaces of interaction in Southern Africa is of paramount importance in order to understand the context of regional civil society networks interactions.

4.3 Description of the SADC legal and regulatory framework for interaction of regional civil society networks

This section presents the findings in relation to SADC-led provisions for the established joint mode of governance with regional civil society networks. This theme presents the description of the current state-provided legal instruments and state-created civic spaces for the involvement of civil society in the formation of the SADC region. These include article 23 of SADC Treaty and Protocols, SADC Secretariat, Heads of State Summit, Council of Ministers and the Troika, SADC National Committees and National Contact Points, and the SADC Parliament Forum, among others.

4.3.1 The SADC Treaty and Protocols

The joint mode of regional governance between state actors and non-state actors in the Southern African region was legally sanctioned by the SADC Treaty of 1992 in Windhoek, establishing the SADC and its protocols. The SADC Treaty aims at achieving common approaches and policies through protocols in areas of cooperation (SADC Treaty 1992, OSISA 2015). Starting from its preamble, the SADC Treaty states that Heads of State and Government should be mindful of the need to involve the people of the region centrally in the process of

development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law. Article 23 of the treaty stipulates that:

> *"In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organizations in the process of regional integration. SADC shall co-operate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and nongovernmental organizations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the region" (SADC Treaty 1992:17).*

More than that, Article 5.1 and Article 5.2.(b) of the same treaty clearly assert that "SADC will encourage the people of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC" (SADC Treaty 1992: 5-6). However, this legal effect given to SADC and civil society collaboration is not mandatory, as there are no sanctions attached to this joint mode of governance, as pointed out by respondents 5, 16 and 25, respectively, during fieldwork. Member states are not forced to include civil society in all decision-making processes to form the region.

The treaty seeks to coordinate and harmonise policies through protocols in areas of cooperation. Core elements of the treaty are the sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and rule of law; as well as balance and mutual benefit. Significantly, Article 6.5 of the treaty requires member states to domesticate the treaty by "taking all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of national law" (SADC, 1992: 7). Subsidiary documents such as protocols, charters and declarations complement the legal and political provisions outlined in the SADC Treaty.

Furthermore, SADC (2015) has developed 26 protocols that provide the legal framework for cooperation and collaboration among member states in several areas such as defence, development, illicit drug trade, free trade, gender, the facilitation and movement of persons and legal affairs. Yet only 10 protocols highlight SADC's willingness to interact with civil society. Article 4(i) on the preventative measures of the Protocol Against Corruption (2003: 6) states that: "Mechanisms to encourage participation by the media, civil society and non-governmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption…"; article 7(b) and (c) on Drug Demand Reduction of the Protocol Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking (1999: 7) stipulates that "member states shall (b) Establish mechanisms to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the demand reduction

efforts of government and non-governmental organisations" (c) Call upon the public, private, business and NGO sectors to give higher priority in their programmes to combating drug abuse and the demand for drugs"; Article 16.5 on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights and 18 on information policies (1) and (4) all of the Protocol on Culture, Information and Sports (2006: 11-13) respectively say that: "State Parties shall encourage and facilitate the formation of copyright societies or associations in the interest of involving non-governmental stakeholders in matters pertaining to the protection of copyright and intellectual property"; "State Parties shall formulate and harmonise information policies after thorough consultations involving appropriate stakeholders and civil society"; State Parties shall create political and economic environment conducive to the growth of ethical, diverse and pluralistic media"; article 4.12 on Guiding Principles of the Protocol on Forestry (2006: 8) says: "State Parties shall be encouraged to operate in partnership with non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and other entities and institutions".

Article 10 section (1) and (2) on Co-operation with Non-state Parties and International Organisations of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation of 2004 and amended in 2009 respectively state that "In recognition of the fact that political, defence and security matters transcend national and regional boundaries, cooperation agreement on these matters between State Parties, and other organisations other than SADC shall be accepted provided that such agreements shall not: (a) be inconsistent with the objectives and other provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol, (b) impose obligations upon a State Party that is not a party to such cooperation agreement, and (c) impede a State Party from fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and this Protocol; (2) Any agreement between the organ and a non-State Party, or between the organ and an international organisation, shall be subject to approval by the Summit (2009: 10).

Article 10 on NGOs in the Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation (2008: 10) asserts that "for the purpose of implementing this Protocol, Member States shall promote the participation of non-governmental organisations and the private sector, in accordance with article 23 of the Treaty; article 12 on cooperation with other organisations in the Protocol on Mining (2000: 10) underscores that "In accordance with article 23 of the SADC Treaty, the Mining Coordinating Unit shall co-operate with other organisations provided that the objectives and activities are not at variance with the objectives of the Protocol. The Mining Coordinating Unit shall establish working relationships with such organisations and entities

and make such arrangements as may be necessary to ensure effective cooperation"; article 13 on the composition and functions of the technical committees of the Protocol on Education and Training (1997: 23-24) says that: (1) the Technical Committees established by article 11 shall be comprised of the following: (a) non-governmental organisations with a key stake in basic education, (b) private sector; article 3 on principles (2) (a) and article 5 on Institutional Arrangements (8) –(d) and (e) of the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (2004: 4-7) says respectively that: State Parties shall ensure co-operation at the national level among government authorities, non-governmental organisations and the private sector; the Wildlife Sector Technical Coordinating Unit shall (d) support the efforts of Member States and non-governmental organizations to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife and the involvement of local communities in such efforts; (e) Promote such cooperation between the national wildlife law enforcement authorities, communities and by non-governmental organisations on all issues related to enforcement.

Article 4 on institutional mechanisms (1) (c) (v) and (6) (f), including article 8 on NGOs and article 9 on Research Development and Training (5) of the 1998 Protocol on Energy, stipulate respectively that "the commission shall have the following functions: (c) (v) liaise, with other SADC sectors and with national, regional and international organisations; "Relevant stakeholders may include government departments, parastatals, private sector organisations, institutes, communities, etc. Those who are unable to adequately represent themselves e.g. rural communities should be consulted and assisted and may be represented by government bodies, NGOs etc."; (8) "In accordance with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as the business and industrial communities provided that their objectives and activities are not at variance with the objectives of the Protocol. The commission shall establish working relationships with such NGOs and communities and make such arrangements as may be necessary to ensure effective co-operation"; (9) "Member States shall cooperate with and involve relevant NGOs in the Region in energy related scientific research and development."(1998: 9-20).

In addition to the protocols detailed above, interaction between civil society and SADC is also encouraged by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP 2001) in its chapters from 1 to 4 and 6, including the objectives and strategies for sustainability of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO).

Table 4.1 below summarises the SADC legal documents that make provisions for civil society interaction with the regional organisation within the Southern African region.

Table 4.1 Legal Provision of Civil Society Engagement in SADC

No	Legal Provision	Tabled for Signature	Entry into force	Civil Provision
1	SADC Treaty	17th August 1992	30th September 1993	Article (23)
2	SADC Protocol on Transport, Communication and Energy	24th August, 1996	1st July, 1998	Art. (4) (8) and (9)
3	SADC Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs	24th August, 1996	20th March, 1999	Article (7)
4	SADC Protocol of Education and Training	8th September, 1997	8th September, 1997	Article (11) and (13)
5	SADC Protocol on Mining	8Th September, 1997	10th February, 2000	Article (6) and (5)
6	SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement	18th August, 1999	30th November, 2004	Article (3) and (5)
7	SADC Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation	14th August, 2001	2nd March, 2004	Article (10)
8	SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sports	14th August 2001	7th January 2006	Article (16) and (18)
9	SADC Protocol Against Corruption	14th August 2001	6th August 2003	Article (4)
10	SADC Protocol on Forestry	August 2002	1st September 2006	Article (4)
11	SADC Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation	17th August 2010	-	Article (10)
12	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) II	SIPO (II) 5th August 2010	-	Political Sector Objective (1) (2) and (3)
13	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)	1st March 2001	-	Chapter1(1.5.2); Chapter 2 (2.4.3); Chapter3 (3.4.2); Chapter 4 (4.8); Chapter 6 (6.4.3)

Source: Adapted from SADC-CNGO (2015) and the GIZ-SADC Peace and Security and Good Governance Programme

4.3.2 SADC Secretariat

With more than 150 staff members, the SADC Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC and is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes (SADC 2016). It is headed by the Executive Secretariat appointed by the Summit and charged with the task of implementing decisions made by the Summit and the Council of Ministers. Situated at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, the Secretariat organises and manages SADC

meetings and is responsible for the financial and general administration of the Community. It undertakes diplomatic representation and promotion of SADC. Notwithstanding its six Directorates, SADC does not implement SADC decisions nor have an enforcement mechanism to force the member states to ratify and domestically execute the signed protocols, as mentioned respectively by two representatives from regional civil society and regional donors:

> *"SADC Secretariat is just a coordinating body at the service of member states' will".*
>
> *"This Secretariat does not have decision-making powers to dictate to the member states." (respondents 18 and 25, 2018)*

Additionally, Tjonneland observes that the SADC Secretariat, the organisation's central executive institution, is primarily an administrative body with no formal political power (2005: 170). Members states have been reluctant since 1980 to establish a supra-national power organisation (Buzdugan 2007). In line with regional spaces of engagement, the regional civil society networks see the SADC Secretariat as a key entry point. The Secretariat and its various departments are important places as focal points and gatekeepers for activities of regional civil society networks. The SADC Secretariat is particularly important for such issues as information on priorities for SADC, the calendar of events, invitations and accreditation to participate in specific processes, among others. It plays a key role in influencing the framing of discourses and decisions as a better place to recommend regional civil society networks to participate in specific spaces controlled by Member States (SADC-CNGO 2015). Illustratively, the Directorate on Policy Planning and Resource Mobilisation has a focal point person that helps regional civil society networks understand the operations of SADC. Regional civil society networks have interests in linking with the SADC Secretariat for their engagement in formal avenues of interaction.

According to respondents (3, 4, 2018), there are several ways regional civil society networks can engage the SADC Secretariat. These include offering to provide expert guidance and input on specific topics; offering to write short briefing papers; presenting research and policy papers and publicising these at regional and member state level; request a seat at the table as is the case with the Regional Poverty Observatory; offer alternative policy positions; partner with the Secretariat in conducting specific activities; volunteer to draft reports of meetings; seek an invitation to be part of the SADC delegation to continental and other relevant meetings; engage

in social accountability initiatives such as the Protocol Tracker to hold SADC member states accountable, and so forth (SADC-CNGO 2015, SADC 2016).

4.3.3 The Heads of State and Government Summit

SADC is a very political intergovernmental organisation driven by the powers of heads of state and government of its member states, which limits direct non-state actors' engagement (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter, 2015). Thus, the Summit is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC, gathering the heads of state and government of all member states at least once a year around August/September in a member state at which a new chairperson and deputy are elected. It is responsible for regional policy direction and control of functions of the organisation (Godsäter 2013, SADC 2015). The Summit of heads of state and governments is the ultimate decision-making institution that oversees the overall political direction of SADC. The collective decisions of the Summit, which may include amendments to the SADC Treaty or respective protocols, are taken by consensus and are binding for all member states (SADC Treaty 2009). Civil society interaction within this space is very limited as only a few representatives of RSCNs like SADC-CNGO and SATUCC that have formal relationships with the SADC Secretariat through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of which one benefit is the invitation to attend the SADC Summit as observers or partners in which they are sometimes allowed to read their collective communiqués or declarations after submission to the Secretariat (the reading of these communiqués or declarations before the heads of state constitute the mechanism of interaction of regional civil society networks within this supreme elitist policy decision-making space, the SADC Summit).

4.3.4 Council of Ministers and the Troika

The Council of Ministers, which consists of mainly of Foreign or External Affairs Ministers from each member state, advises the Summit on questions of general policy and any other matters related to the smooth functioning and future development of SADC (SADC Treaty 2009). Further bodies, including the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees (SAMCOST) as well as the SADC Secretariat, have coordinating and implementing functions. The Troika consists of the current chair, the outgoing and the incoming chair of SADC institutions. Since

its establishment in Maputo in 1999, the Troika enables SADC to execute tasks and implement decisions expeditiously as well as provide direction to SADC institutions in periods between regular SADC meetings (SADC 2016). It applies to institutions such as the Summit, the Organ, Council, the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees, and the Standing Committee of Officials. These are sites that are normally utilised by RCSNs and yet these play significant roles in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring. For instance, the Council is the organ that prepares discussions for the Summit. More than that, the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation is of paramount importance in that regard (SADC 2015). Again, here RCSNs have pitched minimal engagement efforts due to restrictions encountered. And yet issues of peace and security, including development, are at the heart of why citizens within RCSNs must engage with SADC in general and the Organ in particular.

4.3.5 SADC National Committees and National Contact Points

Established by the amended SADC Treaty of 2001, SADC National Committees (SNC) constitute a national key state-led entry point of civil society involvement in the decision-making processes aimed at the formation of regions on a domestic level. Semi-structured interviews revealed that, prior to influencing policy at a regional level, civil society was expected to be part of the whole cycle of regional policy formulation at the domestic level by engaging state through SNC and the integrated Committees of Ministries in their respective countries, as observed by representatives from the SADC Secretariat and SNC Mozambique (Respondents 2 and 6). According to the amended SADC Treaty (2001), SNC should be comprised of government, private sector and civil society as stakeholders in each member state for the establishment of the committee. In a thorough manner, the SNCs are constituted of government, the private sector, civil society, NGOs, workers and employers' organisations (Oosthuizen 2006, Moyo et al. 2007). These ensure that all stakeholders, including state actors, market and non-state actors, effectively participate in the decision-making processes of SADC affairs to derive maximum benefits from the process of regional integration and cooperation. Literature confirms that the SNCs serve as the vehicle through which stakeholders, including civil society, should participate in the formulation and implementation of regional policies and strategies (SADC Treaty 1992, 2009; SADC-CNGO 2015). More than that, SNC fulfils the following functions: (i) promotes and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in member states; (ii) facilitates information flow and communication between member states and

the SADC Secretariat; (iii) provides input at the national level in the formulation of regional policies, strategies, programmes and projects; (iv) coordinates and oversees the implementation of regional policies, strategies, programmes and projects at the national level; (v) coordinates the provision of input at the national level for the development and review of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programmes (RISDP) and monitors its implementation at the national level through relevant sub-committees; and lastly (vi) serves as a forum for consultations among key stakeholders in member states on SADC matters (SADC Treaty 2001). The committees are ideally also responsible for the initiation of SADC projects and issue papers as an input into the preparation of the regional strategies. There are also SADC National Contact Points (SNCP) in each member state and they are responsible to chair the SNCs at country level. Member states are expected to establish sub-committees and technical committees that deal with issues in line with the approved core areas of regional integration and cooperation such as infrastructure and services, trade, industry, finance and investment, social and human development, and food, agriculture and natural resources (FANR), including special programmes. Furthermore, these SNCPs are located in the ministry responsible for SADC matters at country level. They are responsible for initiating constant engagement and briefings of relevant government institutions, civil society, the private sector (stakeholders) and the media on matters pertaining to the SADC mandate.

As spaces of civil interaction, the Integrated Committees of Ministers, including the SADC National Committees, enable national wings of regional civil society networks to influence policies at an early stage. For instance, SADC-CNGO and SATUCC both have observer status in the Integrated Committee of Ministers and occasionally attend other SADC senior officials' meetings on an invitation basis (Respondent 2, 2018). If functioning well, SNCs are formal national settings that enable civil society at country level to voice their aspirations, which can be incorporated into regional policies. Although SNCs are supposed to serve as the entry points for civil society at country level in SADC's programmes, several challenges exist as most of them are not functioning optimally. In some member states SNCs are almost non-existent, except in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, where they seem to function due to many factors to be unveiled in a future comparative study. Botswana, which is also the seat of the SADC secretariat, has a functional national committee, which, according to the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), serves as an information-sharing forum on the implementation of SADC policies (Respondent 16, 2018). According to

respondent 2, the effectiveness of the SNCs depends on the interests of each member state fund in creating and funding a national secretariat to facilitate its operationalisation (Respondent 2, 2018). There is an ambiguity in the function and reporting line of the SNCs. Oosthuizen (2006) laments that, while SNCs are supposed to be located in National Contact Points (NCPs), 'it is less clear whether SNC national secretariats are meant to report directly to the SADC Secretariat, or via NCPs'. Moreover, the functions of NCPs in the overhauled SADC, and the exact relationship between them and the SNC structures, are also unclear, as pointed out by respondents 19 and 27, 2018.

4.3.6 SADC Parliamentary Forum

Established in 1996, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) aims to bring together national parliaments and parliamentarians, to support regional integration processes in Southern Africa. However, it is an inter-parliamentary institution with only deliberative and consultative powers, rather than a fully functioning regional parliament (SADC-PF 2015). The SADC-PF provides a formal avenue for civil society to participate in region-building projects. Mandated to serve the Southern African communities, the SADC-PF seeks to enable the interaction of citizens of SADC within the integration processes through elected representatives from the national parliaments of member states (SADC-PF 2015). The SADC-PF complements the aims and objectives of those of SADC, ranging from political to socio-economic, for which it informs and familiarises the people of SADC and informs people of the region on the aims and objectives of SADC, which range from political to socio-economic (Moyo et al. 2007, SADC-PF 2015). More than that, SADC-PF promotes the participation of civil society, businesses, and intellectual communities in the activities of SADC. Participation through the democratic electoral processes in respective member states is considered to be a focal entry point of civil society engagement in the SADC-PF from which representatives are elected.

The SADC-PF has the potential to provide useful entry points for policy engagements on priority programme areas and could be a means of injecting a more active role for civil society into regional integration processes. There are formal provisions on civil society engaging the SADC-PF. These include firstly seeking invitations to interact in the Bi-annual Plenary Assemblies of the Forum, which is its policymaking and deliberative body constituted of Speakers and four representatives elected by each National Parliament (SADC 2001). The Plenary Assembly meets twice a year in the member states on a rotational basis and

representatives serve for a five year period. The Plenary Assembly advises the SADC Summit on matters of regional policy issues and promotes the objectives and programmes of SADC (SADC-CNGO 2015). Secondly, RCSNs may seek invitations to interact in meetings of Standing Committees which include (i) Legal Committees, (ii) Regional Integration and Development, (iii) Women's Parliamentary Caucus, (iv) HIV/AIDs, and (v) Democratization, Governance and Gender Equality. Thirdly, interaction may occur through supporting parliamentary outreaches or hearings. Civil society can jointly convene these with specific Standing Committees. Fourthly, RCSNs may invite parliamentarians to participate in their self-organised events and engage with them at the national level (SADC-PF 2015).

4.4 Problematising SADC Institutional Permeability

A few themes emerged from semi-structured interviews pertaining to the institutional permeability of the SADC, which features the regional context shaping the pattern of interaction of regional civil society networks in regionalisms. These included themes such as SADC as a shrinking space for civic interaction; national political regime types shapes interaction at a regional level; only non-political sectors are tolerated for civil engagement by SADC; and there is a rivalry between members from SADC and RCSNs in the region.

Most of the governments in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere have used the war on terror as an excuse to restrict civic spaces and shrink their permeability (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). In the African context, the notion of sovereignty, nationalism and pan-Africanist ideologies have all triggered the inaccessibility of non-state actors into state-led regional decision-making processes to form regions (Scholte 2004). Yet, SADC and its embedded institutions are considered by regional civil society networks (RCSNs) as a key focal point, but not as sole player, among other stakeholders in regional development, responsible for the well-being of the livelihood of Southern African people, and therefore an important advocacy target to access (Godsäter 2015). Access by non-state actors to regional decision-making spaces depends on how permeable the regional intergovernmental institution is in the first place. Clark (2000) and other scholars view permeability as "the degree to which elements from other domains may enter (Jacobides and Billinger 2006, Beach, 1989; Hall and Richter, 1988; Piotrkowski, 1978). As for Bolsover et al. (2004), it is the ability to move spontaneously across a barrier.

In this context, there are three dimensions defining the institutional permeability of a regional organisation or network, namely range of access, level of access and transparency (Hawkins 2008). At the same time, Odhiambo et al. (2016) posit that there is a variation in institutional permeability between different regional organisations. Firstly, the range of access determines the spectrum of civil society that can produce needed knowledge for the regional organisation through both formal and informal settings of consultations. Secondly, the level of access entails the level of decision-making at which access is granted to RCSNs. This implies, at the lower end of the spectrum, RCSNs may be granted permission to access some of the early stages of decision-making but are excluded from the highest-level decision-making settings. For instance, a national wing civil society can be granted access to the SADC National Committee at the country level, which is not a decision-making platform but sees its regional umbrella excluded from the high-level forums. At the higher end of the spectrum, third parties or external actors are allowed to contribute with information or arguments at the most important decision-making settings, like in the case of the Heads of State Summit and ministerial meetings. Lastly, transparency entails how transparent the information disseminated to RCSNs is. At the lower end of the spectrum, regional organisations may provide little access to the reasoning behind a decision, nor an explanation of how a particular decision was reached, based on the spectrum, after access to the information they hold, and allow RCSNs to observe government positions during negotiation processes.

In the case of SADC, access to different levels of SADC-led spaces of interaction by RCSNs has been facing myriads of challenges due to the shrinking status of these spaces. Unfortunately, civil groupings within impermeable regional organisations, like the SADC, are less likely to play a substantial role in regionalism. However, there is likely to be some variation across different policy sectors, even among regional organisations with a generally low level of permeability. In particular, informal permeability may vary a great deal depending on the outlook of individual actors within regional secretariats, like the SADC Secretariat, and the extent to which they are aware of and participate in transnational advocacy networks.

4.4.1 SADC as a shrinking space for civic interaction

It is important to note that the SADC Treaty provides full involvement of the people of the region among various other players to participate in the region-building process, yet civil society groupings still find it very difficult to engage, especially with government elites as

stakeholders with equal participative rights (Mukumba and Musiwa 2016). During semi-structured interviews and focus groups discussions, 80 percent of the 28 respondents as well as 12 discussants in focus group discussions believed that SADC is a shrinking space when it comes to civic interaction compared to 20 percent of the 28 respondents from the regional state actors who contend that SADC is an open institution to all regional stakeholders including regional civil society networks, provided they contribute constructively with sectorial expertise in line with the regional agenda. "SADC is strictly a club of authoritarian elites who waste their time to discuss how to conserve political powers" complained one of respondents from regional civil society (Respondent 20, 2018). The SADC Council of Ministers meeting in Luanda in 2011 declared that key stakeholders should participate in the SADC integration agenda through the SADC National Committees. This appears to block off direct participation at regional level, apart from existing arrangements with organisations such as memoranda of understanding (MoUs) (Odhiambo et al. 2016). However, most of the SADC National Committees at the country level within the region are almost non-existent and not functioning, which consequently leads to non-participation of national wings of regional civil society to participate in the decision-making processes to form regions. The shrinking of civic space at the SNC has severely impeded the participation of civil society at the highest formal forums at the regional level, the Summit. Consequently, the Heads of State Summit, which is the supreme platform of decision-making, is open only to SADC Heads of State, member of governments and their allies to the exclusion of the majority of regional civil society networks. More than that, there is no adequate transparency when it come to the access to information given to civil society groupings to the reasoning behind decisions, nor an explanation of how a particular decision was reached by the heads of state, laments one participant to the focus group discussion (Discussant 2, 2018).

The above situation confirms that the range of access, level of access and transparency of the institutional permeability of SADC are severely shrinking for civic interaction in formal decision-making processes, which consequently opens the way for self-organised avenues of civic interaction. Sanders (2011) seconds the above statement that solidarity among the former liberation movements in the region reinforces the perception of SADC as an "old boys club", in which governments are in charge of affairs without sufficiently considering the views of non-state actors. Just like Cilliers and Sturman (2004), who reiterate that some commentators have rather erroneously characterised the African Union (AU) as a "trade union of Presidents",

perceptions abound or persist in civil society circles that SADC is also a "highly elite-driven club" since the inception of the old SADCC in 1978 (Landsberg and Mackay, 2004:18). Consequently, this has abstracted the fight of civil society to advocate for a state-civil society nexus in the formation of regions (Ditlhake 2006). One representative from regional donors/partners laments that: "SADC is indeed a closed space of civic engagement. Engagement of CSO with SADC for the moment is limited to few organisations that manage to have a personal connection with people in power in SADC (either at the Secretariat or member states) and thus have access. Without personal access, CSOs are not invited to participate, to share opinions or to contribute" (Respondent 23, 2018).

However, one representative from the regional state category contends that "SADC doors are closed to regional civil society networks who do not have an MoU with the Secretariat. Even those who have access are confronted by a lack of capacity to contribute constructively to the formation of regions with concrete and evidence-based needed expertise; instead, they just make empty noise" (Respondent 1, 2018). Chitiga (2015) confirms that the opportunities for interaction of civil society groupings within SADC policymaking are very limited compared to other regional organisations around the world. This corroborates with what another regional donor representative argues: "The reluctance to give up sovereignty is definitely an issue […]. These governments like to keep as much power as possible, and there is very little opposition to that" (Respondent 22, 2018). The shutting down of the SADC Tribunal in 2012 illustrated the state-centric and sovereignty-preserving concerns of SADC (Godsäter 2015). Accordingly, the policy process in SADC is hierarchical and top-down, and the ultimate decision-making power lies in the hands of the Summit. Fieldwork, participant observation and reviewed literature revealed that despite the existence of article 23 of the SADC treaty, which establishes the joint governance system between government elites and non-state actors in decision-making processes, it is still not fully operational in essential sectors of regional integration and cooperation.

4.4.2 Influence of national political regime type on interaction at regional level

With a few exceptions, most of the African countries and those in the Southern African region are characterised by centralised governments led by cohesive state institutions exercising their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision making. African states have been criticised by many to be driven by authoritarianism, which makes them far from being a bastion

of democracy (Nwabueze 2003, Godsäter 2013). Southern Africa is not an exception, as many states have fostered a regional political culture of authoritarian rule and the dominance of personal rulers is strong (Peters 2011). According to data provided in Table 4.2, despite the political transition away from authoritarian regimes to participatory democratic systems, political regimes within SADC members state still range from autocracies like in Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe, to consolidating democracies in Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, and defect democracy in Malawi, Tanzania, to name a few (Matlosa 2007, BTI 2016, IIAG 2016). Instead, one regional donor representative quotes article 4 of the SADC Treaty, which requires: "SADC and its Member States to follow principles of (a) sovereign equality; (b) solidarity, peace and security; human rights, rule of law and democracy; (d) equity, balance and mutual benefit; (e) peaceful disputes settlement" (SADC Treaty 1992: 4-5, Respondent 28, 2018). According to Söderbaum and Taylor (2008), this authoritarian mode of governance has created rent-seeking political elites at all levels of society, dominating and monopolising formal politics. The latter have distorted the true sense of pluralist democracy by using it as an instrument to confiscate or gaining power for self-enrichment (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008 Thomson 2010, Godsäter 2013). Subsequently, neopatrimonialism has invaded African political regimes whereby political power is manipulated and tailored to cater for the personal enrichment of heads of state and their allies at the expense of suppressed epistemic communities (Thomson 2010). Through this concentration of power, neo-patrimonial leaders benefit the superior position vis-à-vis civil society by manipulating and co-opting them in order to serve the agenda of the political elites.

For example, the briefcase and manipulator civil society groupings, as mentioned in chapter 2, are all the offspring of neo-patrimonial strategies to dictate the will of the authoritarian leaders on both national and regional governance systems. These statist and state-centric types of domestic political regimes have shaped and influenced the neoliberal regional order and consequently the interaction between regional state actors and regional non-state actors, to the detriment of regional civil society networks (Godsäter 2015, Respondents 10 and 27, 2018). In most cases, several SADC member states do not welcome collaboration with CSOs as a result of SADC's features also being influenced by the character and personality of the head of state who chairs the institution (Respondent 25, 2018, Ndumbaro and Kiondo 2007; Sachikonye 2007). Political leaders use regional governance to strengthen the sovereignty of the state (Söderbaum 2004).

In addition, Youngs (2015) seconds that the shrinking of civic space interaction in some member states of the region has tightened restrictions on the registration processes of civil society organisations at both local and regional levels, like the case of SADC-CNGO, which face denial from the government of Botswana to register as a regional NGO in Gaborone without a recommendation of the SADC Secretariat (Respondent 14, 2018). Representatives from both regional civil society and regional donors/partners confirm that civic participation and variation seems to be strong in consolidated democratic regimes; at the same time, it faces serious restrictions in defective democratic regimes and of course grave shelving in autocratic regimes (Respondents 13 and 26, 2018). The four members states visited as research sites constituted showcases of how domestic political regime type influences the regional context of interaction, as displayed in Table 4.2. The civil society-enabling environment in South Africa is quite open as per respondents' views due to the consolidation of democracy in the country, as confirmed by data in Table 4.2. Despite being a consolidating democracy like South Africa, Botswana is a slight shrinking space for effectiveness of civic interaction whereby executive board members of the Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO) have been reported to be allegedly on the state payroll, which restricts the independence of their activities for alternative opinions (Respondents 17 and 26, 2018). In that vein, the break-ins and intimidation tactics have both impeded, over recent years, civil society participation in the decision-making processes in Mozambique despite how well established the SNC is in the country (Respondent 15, 2018). Two civil society representatives in the DRC lament that autocratic elites are accusing civil society of "being the puppets of imperialism in the quest to destabilise legitimate institutions through regime change in order to plunder mineral resources" (Respondents 9 and 20, 2018). It is argued that the exclusive features of the state-centric mainstream mode of SADC governance have triggered two settings of engagement within which civil society interacts for alternative regionalisms. Table 4.2 confirms how SADC is driven within a mosaic of political regimes ranging from autocracy to democracies undergoing consolidation. This has implications for the nature of civic space at both local and regional levels. Table 4.2 below summarises the type of domestic political regimes in some SADC member states.

Table 4.2: Bertelsmann Transformations Index and Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Country	BTI Regime Classification 2016	IIAG 2016
Angola	Autocracy	26,3 /100
Democratic Rep. of Congo	Autocracy	25,3 /100
Zimbabwe	Autocracy	31,7 /100
Lesotho	Defect Democracy	67,0 /100
Madagascar	Defect Democracy	81,0 /100
Malawi	Defect Democracy	64,8 /100
Mozambique	Defect Democracy	53,8 /100
Tanzania	Defect Democracy	57,4 /100
Zambia	Defect Democracy	58,8 /100
Botswana	Consolidating Democracy	83,3 /100
Mauritius	Consolidating Democracy	88,1 /100
Namibia	Consolidating Democracy	83,3 /100
South Africa	Consolidating Democracy	80,1 /100

Source: Author compiled from BTI (2016) and Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016)

Figure 4.1: **Civil Society Participation Trends in Southern Africa, 2006-2016**



Source: Adapted from the DIE (2018) and the Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance 2017

Figure 4.1 complements Table 4.2 by classifying SADC member states as per features of enabling civic space from increasing improvement to increasing deterioration as a result of the type of their political regimes. The red section of Figure 4.1 presents state members with an increasing deterioration of civil society participation, which is evident in Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. In Table 4.2, the latter countries range between autocratic and defecting democracy. The dark green section of Figure 4.1 shows that civil society participation in Madagascar, Seychelles and South Africa, Seychelles and Zimbabwe experience an increasing improvement of participation as a result of defecting and consolidating democracy. Despite its autocratic regime, as indicated in Table 4.2, Zimbabwe experienced an increase of civic participation in Figure 4.1. This was fuelled by the

deterioration of socio-economic conditions and a discontented population which resolved to protest and demonstration for better living. Botswana and Namibia fall within the yellow section of Figure 4.1, bouncing back due to annual average decline over the decade, but improvement in the last five years as a result of a consolidating democratic regime, as presented in Table 4.2.

4.4.3 Sectors tolerated by SADC for civic engagement in Southern Africa

Normatively, the SADC Secretariat has sought to engage non-state actors in various ways, allowing them to interact with other SADC institutions on several issues related to regional policy development, formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Moreover, SADC is driven mainly by power politics and logically does not voluntarily give up that power to the benefit of CSOs (Godsäter 2015). It is widely recognized by civil society actors, regional partners and some scholars, including SADC officials, that civil society is generally deliberately marginalized in SADC-led regionalism and that consultation with CSOs in most sectors is very minimal (Söderbaum and Godsäter 2011, Zajontz 2013), the reason being, as argued respectively by one discussant and one respondent from regional donors, government elites tolerate interacting only with regional civil society networks that are actively operating in the non-political realm and approach with consternation those that fight for a new regional order (Discussant 11, 2018 and Respondent 28, 2018). These encompass regional civil society fulfilling the functions of service provision, mobilisation on behalf of SADC, and knowledge production in the case of providing background research to member states. RCSNs are tolerated to interact in formal regionalism provided they conform to the existing status quo as partners or problem solvers.

Conformist and manipulator civil society organisations (Söderbaum 2004, Godsäter 2013) are the most welcomed at the state-led table of interaction. In the words of one respondent from regional donors: “For example, I perceive gender issues to not be a big threat to the power politics of the member states of SADC. […] that is why Gender Links has been granted opportunities to interact with SADC through its Gender Unit discussions and Gender Summit. Consequently, Gender Links managed to influence the SADC Gender Protocol even though its ratification and domestication by all members state still debatable” (Respondent 16, 2018). However, SADC member states criticise some regional civil society networks for being illegitimate and ironically concerned about regional order that they do not understand much

due to lack of capacity for needed practical expertise to advance region-building projects. According to one respondent from the regional state actors: "SADC has no time to waste with people who make noise without contributing with constructive expertise to shape its regional agenda. […] we are not discriminating against anyone" (Respondent 1, 2018). In a nutshell, SADC is criticised for using discriminatory mechanisms of selection for which civil society to engage with, and this has consequently led to the formation of horizontal networks of interaction by side-lined civil groupings outside of the SADC.

4.4.4 Rivalry between Member States and RCSNs in the SADC region

Fieldwork demonstrates that there is a rivalry between SADC elites and RCSNs that are supposed to work jointly in the formation of regions. Discussants from both focus groups alluded to the fact that SADC officials and regional civil actors approach each other with consternation fuelled by their respective motives. On the one hand, civil engagement with regional decision-making is not a priority for SADC member states, especially for those from authoritarian and defected democracy regimes. They criticise civil society for lack of capacity to contribute constructively with the needed expertise to policy formulation at the country level within SADC's National Committees. To most SADC heads of state, civil society organisations are puppets of Western donors working for the regime change in the Southern African region by pushing for Westernised policy and culture. They do not master how SADC functions and its protocols (Respondent 5, 2018). SADC representatives reproach RCSNs for not being representatives of cross-border grassroots communities they claim to represent (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2013). More than that, RCSNs lack a clear and common vision about the development of the region, apart from the empty slogan of "The SADC we want", laments one regional state actor representative (Respondent 2, 2018).

On the other hand, RCSNs criticise SADC for not having the intention of constant engagement with epistemic communities, but approaches them with consternation to satisfy donors' demands, requesting their insertion into region-building projects. As external actors, donors are playing a role of rapprochement to unite two relatives who seem unable to tolerate each other in order to make a cake called regional integration (Respondent 25, 2018). More than that, RCSNs criticise Southern African heads of state as being autocratic, obstructing the operationalisation of article 23 of the SADC Treaty. As one respondent from the regional civil society argues: "These autocratic presidents are afraid of a boomerang of regional engagement

of civil society in their respective countries. They do not like us as we have been demonised to be threats to their national political regimes which take hostage their own citizens, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo" (Respondent 18, 2018). It is clear that the joint space of engagement in the Southern African region seems to be hampered by finger-pointing that has erupted between the stakeholders, state and civil society, who are supposed to work jointly on the formation of the region. Because of this rivalry, some civil society organisations decided to seek an alternative space of engagement outside of the mainstream, the SADC.

4.5 Interrogating SADC Institutional Legitimacy

From a general point of view, a legitimate institution has means and ends that conform to social norms, values, and expectations (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 in Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: 17). It is socially acceptable by its members and should provide normative quality, efficiency and performance to its constituency (Epstein and Votaw 1978). In reference to its conceptual chapter, this thesis is interested in the legitimacy of regional institutions that truly reflect the aspirations and will of ordinary cross-border citizens in order to build alternative regionalisms, where the acquisition of legitimacy transcends vote casting. Legitimacy is no longer confined only to the credibility and rights acquired through reciprocity mechanisms from voters or ordinary citizens to the institutions that claim to represent them. It is mainly the combination of the efficient delivery of results that are in the public interest of the regional community and institutional arrangements allowing citizens to exercise their citizenship to political decision-makers or to initiate self-organised activities in the collective interests, values and preferences (Steffek 2014). These corroborate what Heiskanen (2001) alludes to when he says that people's sovereignty should prevail on that of the state. As for Samuel (2002), legitimacy derives from a deep commitment, accountability, communicability, and action. The absence of the latter always leads to a loss of legitimacy.

In the case of Southern Africa, field findings reveal that people have lost confidence in their political leaders, reproaching them for working for their political interests and those of their allies, marginalising many ordinary citizens. SADC is a cohort of 16 Heads of State and Government, some of whom were controversially elected, making political decisions to form a region on behalf of the people of the region (SADC 1992, SADC-CNGO 2015, SATUCC 2016). There is always an issue surrounding the institutional legitimacy of SADC regarding translating into regional politics the aspirations of the people it claims to help, laments a

regional donor representative (Respondent 24, 2018). This entails that heads of state affiliated to the organisation were repeatedly criticised for not representing the aspirations and interests of the Southern African citizens who put them in power. The established consensual mode of decision-making attributes equally one vote to each member state, a system which was allegedly criticised for not necessarily representing the aspirations of the citizens of each member country despite how they differ in terms of the size of their economy and the number of their populations (SAPSN 2015). For example, the vote of a country like Lesotho, with a population of 1.2 million people, carries the same weight as that of the Democratic Republic of Congo with a population of more than 80 million, comments one participant in the second focus group (Discussant 9, 2018).

More than that, the Namibian-based SADC Parliamentary Forum, which comprises elected parliamentarians from member states, has been criticised for not playing a meaningful role in regional integration, mainly because they are devoid of any legislative or oversight powers (Karuuombe 2008, SADC-PF 2015). This implies that there are no regional check and balance mechanisms that will enhance accountability and transparency within the SADC structures of decision-making, due to the inexistence of SADC-PF as a fully-fledged regional legislature and suspended SADC Tribunal. Consequently, SADC is portrayed, by many citizens of the region, as a club of government elites and their allies with a mandate to protect themselves in order to conserve their political power rather than serving their voters in the region (Respondent 20, 2018). Given that legitimate institutions represent the voices, interests and values of countries and their citizens, the lack of the latter always leads to loss of legitimacy or legitimacy deficit. Therefore, this deficit of SADC legitimacy has triggered a quest for alternative avenues of interaction through established self-organised regionalisms for inclusive participation outside of the SADC.

4.6 Opportunities for the emergence of Southern African Regional Civil Society Networks

In addition to the impermeable status of SADC, various opportunities have led to the emergence of regional civil society networks in the Southern African region. To begin with, the political liberation struggle in the Southern African region has paved the way for the formation of cross-border social movements such as the regional trade union, the SATUCC. Since its formation in 1983, SATUCC has respectively succeeded in playing a role in the

political liberation of Namibia and Zambia from colonialism, followed by South Africa's liberation from apartheid in the 1990s alongside with frontline states at that time (SATUCC 2015). In the 1990s during the era of democratization and after a political front, a myriad of cross-border civil society coalitions emerged to fight on the socio-economic front, challenging the neoliberal order established in the region by post-independence states (Söderbaum 2004, Godsäter 2013), the reason being that this neoliberal order has plunged the people of the Southern African region into abject poverty and drastic inequalities, exacerbating the existing vulnerable living conditions (Kanyenze et al. 2006). In their own words, the African heads of state, including those from the SADC, reiterated that:

> "*We also wish in this regard to put on record our disapproval of all economic programmes, such as orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which undermine the human condition and disregard the political role of popular participation in self-sustaining development*" (African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, Arusha 1990: 4-5).

Therefore, the empowerment of the people to determine the direction and content of development came to the fore. Consequently, these socio-economic crises have triggered the emergence of survival strategies and citizenship through the creation of citizen cross-border links to tackle common problems threatening their livelihood. Apart from the Union of Cross-border Miners, for example, there are other trade unions coalitions, like SATUCC, which emerged to fight for the rights of workers against any arbitrary retrenchment and established unfair labour practices in favour of multinational companies (SATUCC 2015). It was an era of both new regionalism and post-colonialism, where the long-held central position of nation-states in the international order was challenged by new non-state players.

SADC legal provisions, like Article 23 and SADC protocols dealing with joint space for regional governance between state and non-state actors, has encouraged a burgeoning of civil group coalitions beyond national borders opening out to encompass more and more voices from epistemic communities. In this vein, the democratic transition in most of the SADC member states has motivated the formation of civil society coalitions beyond borders to fight for the implementation of democratic principles and human rights such as good governance, free and fair elections, gender equality, and women's rights, among others. SADC-CNGO and SAPSN constitute striking examples formed respectively in 1998 and 1999 to influence regional affairs

in that regard. The declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 inaugurated another emergence of various anti-poverty transnational advocacy movements which widened their scopes of operation in line with the MDGs (MDG 2015). Poverty eradication, social and environmental justice become the most exploited popular sectors by Southern African civil society networks. Since this era, the SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, and SAPSN, among others, have aligned themselves as pro-poor self-organised networks operating at different layers and fields for the well-being of the ordinary citizens in the region.

Lastly, the epistemic communities see the opportunity of creating cross-border links when channels between local groups and national government elites are hampered to the extent that they are ineffective for resolving pressing societal issues. This implies the organisational culture of the SADC is dominated by types of national political regimes which do not condone direct access to formal institutions, as elaborated above in section 4.4.2. They decide to advocate regionally in order to create a boomerang effect at the national level through regional solidarity and social cohesion within a multi-cultural society characterized by complexity and diversity of identities, culture background, interests and needs of ordinary citizens within the borders of the Southern African region (Keck and Sikkink: 1999, Liebowitz 2000; Tarrow 2001a; 2001b). Inspiration from other global and regional civil society networks such as the World Social Forum, Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA), and the ASEAN Coalition of Civil Society, among others, has been another opportunity for the formation of regional civil society networks in Southern African (Grugel 2005, Della Porta et al. 2006). The regional context within which Southern African civil society interacts demonstrates how the general citizenry can be excluded materially even though included symbolically in regional decision-making processes to form regions.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter presented the overall regional context within which Southern African civil society networks interact in the quest for alternative regionalisms. The chapter elaborated on the historical interaction between state and civil society during the Southern African liberation struggle in order to shed light on the current state of affairs of non-state actors' inclusion in the contemporary regionalism debate in the region. A few themes evidenced how the institutional permeability of SADC is a shrinking space featured by its state-centred mode of regional governance and the influence of national political regimes on patterns of interaction at regional

level, including a game where only non-political sectors are tolerated for civil engagement and rivalry between SADC elites and regional civil society networks during interaction. More than that, field findings demonstrate that despite its legal provision and regulatory framework for civil interaction in region-building projects, SADC has difficulty allowing regional civil society to openly interact in the political decisions to form regions. Instead, SADC elites embarked on a blame game to justify the non-inclusionary features of the SADC mode of governance. Consequently, regional civil society has lost confidence in SADC elites, which has led to the institutional legitimacy deficit of the SADC. Other factors leading to the formation of regional civil society networks in the SADC region were identified. These include the political liberation struggle, the democratic transition in the post-independence era, the neoliberal order deepening poverty and inequalities, the 2015 Millennium Development Goals followed by the boomerang hypothesis and inspiration from other regional networks around the world. This chapter concludes that normatively SADC has a strong framework for the involvement of civil society, but operationalisation among stakeholders is still problematic for several reasons. SADC should institute measures to operationalise article 23 of the SADC Treaty and develop a policy on how it engages civil society in pursuance of the treaty provisions in order to allow non-state actors to own the formation of regions processes in Southern African region.

CHAPTER 5

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR FORMAL AND SELF-ORGANISED REGIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

5.1 Introduction

Many studies in contemporary regionalism do not expand their focus of analysis to include non-state actors. More recently, a few scholars have attempted to discuss the way non-state actors influence state-led institutions within formal settings of interaction, like SADC. Very few studies, however, explore informal institutions such as strategies, norms and rules that non-state actors develop when they interact within both formal regionalism and self-organised regionalisms. Drawing on Southern Africa, this chapter aims to present key findings from fieldwork on institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks during their interaction in the region in order to both answer the research questions and achieve the study objectives. In that regard, the chapter is mainly focused on identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks interacting within formal settings like the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit, and those interacting within self-organised initiatives like Civil Society Forum, and the SADC People's Summit, among others. The chapter argues that, despite being informal, the strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regionalism gatherings are also as important as state-led formal institutions and are capable of influencing and forming regions outside of the mainstream or formal. It was revealed that through the People's Summit, SAPSN exhibits the following strategies, norms and rules. These include (i) confronting SADC elites with transnational citizenship and submission of a collective communiqué; (ii) building solidarity and coalitions by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among the regional citizenry; (iii) use of capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance popular critical consciousness; (iv) contestation of the existing SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit; (v) calling for full operationalization of article 23 of the SADC Treaty; (vi) selection of participants to the People's Summit through national contact points; (vii) and sharing commitments using uncodified rules and culture.

At the same time, SADC-CNGO interacts within a SADC-provided space of engagement on a consultative and partnership basis as stipulated in the MoU between stakeholders. During interaction, SADC-CNGO developed the following institutional arrangements: collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement; quiet diplomacy through informal bargaining behind the scenes; and submission of a collection of declarations for the SADC Heads of State Summits; conformation to SADC's existing status quo through respect of the precedence; concomitantly reinforcing formal norms and invoking alternative norms; developing norms which are influential but not enforcing; submitting to the SADC-provided legal framework of engagement, and prevention of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions. This chapter concludes that civil society has also developed strategies, norms and rules that can be useful to build alternative regionalisms.

5.2 Civil Society Networks in Southern Africa

Before talking about the kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society when engaging in or with both formal and self-organised regionalisms, it is vital to elaborate on key regional civil society networks in the region in line with this study. Mentioned below are two cases of Southern African civil society networks, SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, that speak to the aim and objectives of this study, as indicated in chapter 1.

5.2.1 The SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO)

Formed in 1998, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO) is the lead apex NGO and regional umbrella body of NGOs operating in all 15 member states[5] of the SADC (SADC-CNGO 2016, Odhiambo, Chitiga, & Ebobrah 2016). However, it took the organisation until 2007 to gain sufficient financial resources and staff and to become fully operational and opening their own secretariat in Gaborone (Respondent 21, 2008). According to Article 3.1.1 of its founding constitution, SADC-CNGO's core objective is to "contribute towards the creation and sustenance of an enabling environment for NGOs at national and regional levels" (SADC-CNGO 1998: 3). The purpose of SADC-CNGO is to facilitate effective and meaningful engagement between national umbrella bodies of NGOs in the region and SADC institutions as mentioned in section 4.3 of this thesis (SADC-CNGO 1998, SADC-

[5] During the period under consideration SADC had 15 member states. Comoros officially joined the SADC in August 2018.

CNGO 2016). SADC-CNGO has the vision to see "An integrated regional community living in peace with itself and neighbours; characterised by a meaningful people's participation in all aspects of development; committed to ending poverty, hunger, conflict; and ensure peace, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights in a constitutionally protected environment" (SADC-CNGO 2016:-). In December 2003, SADC-CNGO entered into an MoU with the SADC Secretariat that defines the need for and framework of cooperation between NGOs and SADC in the process of regional integration and development. The spirit of the above MoU aligned with the assigned objective of the SADC-CNGO to collaborate with the state through SADC-led forum as stipulated by the Article 3.1.4 of its Constitution:

> *The objects of the SADC-CNGO shall be to collaborate with governments through the forum of SADC in identifying issues and development challenges which should be addressed by NGOs with the necessary support of government (SADC-CNGO 1998:3).*

According to Matlosa and Lotshwao (2010: 40-41), the MoU foresees close collaboration between the inter-state body and civil society, officially among other things in order to "contribute to the improvement of the standard of living for the peoples of the region through eradication of poverty and creation of employment opportunities".

The organisation is based and registered in Botswana for continuous engagement with the SADC Secretariat headquarters in Gaborone. In relation to its space for civic interaction in region-building processes, SADC-CNGO coordinates the Southern African Civil Society Forum, held alongside of the SADC Heads of State Summit to capture civil society perspectives on issues of concern. Chapter 5 has elaborated thoroughly on the Civil Society Forum as one of the strategies in self-organised regionalisms driven by non-state actors. More than that, SADC-CNGO constitutes clusters and sectors, based on themes which also mirror the directorates of SADC. Then, NGOs are facilitated in each cluster to conduct a joint analysis of issues, develop common positions and ultimately engage with SADC and its structures. All in all, SADC-CNGO seeks to be a space and platform that any NGO in the region can use in order to understand and feed into SADC processes (SADC-CNGO 2012). The strategic development objective of the SADC-CNGO is to promote and support sustainable human-centred regional development characterised by good governance, democratic processes and institutions, and meaningful people's participation in all aspects of development that affect their lives and destiny (SADC-CNGO 2016).

These arguments tally with that of Godsäter (2013, 2015), who confirms that SADC-CNGO seeks to influence development policies in the SADC. These include accelerating their implementation and advancing NGO interests and perspectives, and more specifically creating conditions that favour people-centred regional economic integration. In order to reach its strategic objectives, SADC-CNGO has four focus areas, namely Governance, Peace and Security (GPS) Programme; Poverty and Development (Pand D) Programme; The Regional Economic Integration (REI) Programme; and Civil Society Mobilisation and Strengthening (CSMS) Programme (SADC-CNGO 2012).

SADC-CNGO is encompassing civil society national umbrella from the member states of SADC who are full members and eligible for election to the Regional Executive Committee (SADC-CNGO 2012). These include the Forum of Angolan NGOs (FONGA); Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO), Conseil National des ONG de Développement de la RDC (CNONGD); Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN); National Platform of Civil Society Organisations in Madagascar (PFNOSCM); TEIA in Mozambique; Namibian Non-Governmental Forum Trust (NANGOF Trust); Liaison Unit of Non-Governmental Organisations Seychelles (LUNGOS); Council of NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA); Mauritius Council for Social Services (MACOSS); South Africa National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO); Coordinating Assembly of NGOs in Swaziland (CANGO); Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO); Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD); National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2013, SADC-CNGO 2016). Additionally, three representatives from the regional civil society actors underscore respectively that SADC-CNGO in 2010 signed the alliance pact of regional apex organisations with other regional civil society networks, SATUCC and FOCCISA, in order to institute a united voice framework to influence SADC institutions (Respondents 9, 17 and 20, 2018).

According to Article 6 of the SADC-CNGO constitution (SADC-CNGO 1998), the governance structure of SADC-CNGO comprises the Regional Assembly, Regional Council and Executive Committee. Coined as the General Assembly, the Regional Assembly is the supreme decision-making body of SADC-CNGO, which is composed of all members of the Regional Council, three representatives from each SADC-CNGO member countries. It meets every two years and elects the Executive Committee (EXCO). The Regional Council is the second highest decision-making organ after the Regional Assembly. It meets once a year and decides on general SADC-CNGO policies and strategic direction. As for the Executive Committee, it is the executive

organ of the SADC-CNGO. The EXCO is composed of 7 members –the President, 1st Vice President, 2nd Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary and two committee members. The coordination and facilitation of the activities of the Council are done through a Secretariat, headed by the Executive Director, and is based in Gaborone, Botswana. In terms of membership, the above-mentioned full members are entitled to vote at the General Assembly provided they are fully paid-up members. In addition to full members, there are associate members: Gender Links, the Southern African Youth Movement (SAYM), the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), including apex organisations of other civil societies, regional thematic organisations and specialised networks who add value to the activities of the Council (Respondent 14, 2018). Associate members cannot be voted into the Regional Executive Committee (SADC-CNGO 2012).

5.2.2 The Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN)

Formed in 1999 by a number of Southern African civil society organisations working on issues such as debt, poverty, trade, structural adjustment and globalisation, the Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) is involved in trade, social justice for labour and the fight for an alternative development and regional integration agenda (SAPSN 2003, Godsäter 2013, SAPSN 2015, Odhiambo, Chitiga, & Ebobrah 2016). It envisions economic, environmental, social and political equity and justice in order to mobilise regional solidarity, build members' capacities and support people-based regional co-operation, integration and unity in the fight against the debt crisis, global trade injustices and neo-liberal policies in Southern Africa (Söderbaum 2004, Godsäter 2015, SAPSN 2015). SAPSN has created space for the epistemic communities, such as rural activists, mining activists, women's movements and small-scale farmers within the region, but is not affiliated to SADC-CNGO or SATUCC, in order to add their collective voice on the SADC agenda and ensure that their issues are heard by the heads of state. This creates a stronger, more united force in advocating for peace, democracy, gender equality and human rights for all. Through its members at the national level, ordinary people are mobilised to air their views at the regional level. SAPSN perceives itself as a regional low grassroots-oriented social movement with a slightly different approach compared to other regional civil society networks like apex organisations, SAT, Gender Links, and among others, deemed by many to be white collar organisations eating from the same

neoliberal dish with government elites, as described by respondents (Respondents 18 and 22, 2018). Its membership is at the same time diverse and open to individuals, local and regional NGOs that subscribe to the objectives of the network and are highly sceptical of neoliberal globalisation dogmas and market-driven regionalism (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

SAPSN comprises a network of civil society organisations and social movements which are autonomous and not bound by any formal constitution but a common understanding and guiding principles (SAPSN 2003). According to SAPSN guiding principles (SAPSN 2003), the governance structure is composed as follows: Regional Coordinating Committee, General Assembly and Secretariat. Inspired by the SADC Troika, the Regional Coordinating Committee is constituted by the former, current and incoming General Secretary Generals of SAPSN. It has a mission to, once a year, give the political direction of SASPN work and give administrative support to the secretariat. As for the General Assembly, it is the supreme decision-making body of SAPSN and meets once in five years. The General Assembly is tasked to plan SAPSN annual activities and endorses them; adopts Annual General meeting minutes and selects the organisation's Secretariat when required. The annual general meeting is attended by all SAPSN members. The SAPSN Secretariat was housed by the South African-based Alternative Information Development Centre (AIDC) between 2000 and 2003 on a rotational basis. Since then, the SAPSN Secretariat was hosted by ZIMCODD in Zimbabwe until 2011 when it moved to Malawi to be hosted by the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN). It is currently hosted in Lesotho (SAPSN 2016). The General Secretary is the overall head of the network at the same time responsible for effective profiling in relation to the activities, campaign and lobbying activities. It deals with program implementation, assisting in fund-raising, organising workshops, information dissemination to member organisations including clearing house for networks activities (SAPSN 2003).

Annually, since 2006, SAPSN has held what is known as the People's Summit, which is an open space for citizens of SADC to meet and discuss issues that affect the people of SADC. The Peoples' Summit Project has also sought to consolidate and deepen the cooperation and solidarity that the people of the Southern African region had developed during the fight for the liberation of the region (SAPSN 2016, Odhiambo, Chitiga, & Ebobrah 2016). It was ordinary peoples' support, sacrifices and solidarity that furthered the political independence of the region, culminating of the fall of the apartheid state in South Africa (Respondents 19 and 21, 2018).

Much as the root that led to the creation of regional CSO forums is the same, which is to fight for space in SADC development discussions, and as much as one would expect that CSOs would have been one SADC CSO Network, the AIDC-led group felt that the SADC-CNGO was more focused on democracy, human rights and gender equality. They also felt that the strategies taken by the SADC CNGO Network were more of cooperation and collaboration with SADC structures to reach the heads of state and governments (Respondent 17, 2018). SAPSN's concern is that there is no room for civil society participation in SADC structures. This exclusion leads the organisation to take a confrontational approach against the SADC-implemented neoliberal regional order, which pushes for regional economic integration driven by the selfish interests of a network of state elites and multinational institutions, to the detriment of ordinary citizens of the region whose voices needed to be heard (Respondent 21, 2018). In pursuance of this goal, SAPSN considers itself a new avenue of sharing evidence-based experiences and information, creating awareness and a mass movement through social mobilisation (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

The biggest and longest lasting campaign has been "Reclaiming SADC for the Citizens". The same notion in the SADC CNGO Civil Society Forum is branded as the "The SADC We Want" campaign (SADC-CNGO 2015). In other words, both CSF and SAPSN have been fighting for a new type of regionalism, a people-centred regionalism that is different from the formal and much more structural state-led regionalism that SADC is espousing (Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2013; SASPN 2016, Respondent 18, 2018). Since then, SAPSN has quickly become one of the nodes for civil society resistance in Southern Africa (Söderbaum, 2002). The network is extremely critical of the 'establishment' and sees itself as being part of the worldwide anti-globalisation movement. SAPSN has today built a SADC grassroots movement across the fifteen SADC member states for women activists, small-scale farmers, informal cross-border traders, labour movements, university students and many other social movements (Respondents 17, 21, 2018). In other words, SAPSN has become the alternative connection for citizens within SADC around issues and challenges that come with the implementation or non-implementation of SADC protocols. It is an informal voice and vehicle for sharing information, empowerment and regional connectivity. The ideology of SAPSN is informed by the founding organisations, like AIDC among others, which has had and still has a leftist approach to engagement, especially fighting neo-liberalism and the perceived unfair trade agreements that SADC member states were entering into with multinational companies.

5.3 Institutional Settings of Southern African Civil Society Networks Interaction in Regionalisms

Interaction by cross-border non-state actors within formal or self-organised institutional settings is tailored by ideology distinction driving regional civil society networks (Grugel, 2004). In the case of the Southern African region, empirical findings reveal that there are civil society groupings, like SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, FOCCISA, Gender Links, to name a few, which accept liberal conceptions of citizenship in which SADC is the legal source of rights of civil engagement in the region-building projects through state-established avenues of participation. At the same time, other civil links, like SAPSN with its communist background and anti-neoliberal inclination, seek to construct alternatives of citizenship through self-organised mechanisms which do not depend upon state-centred engagement (Godsäter 2013, Respondents 11, 17, 28, 2018).

5.3.1 Southern African civil society networks in formal regionalism within SADC

Transnational formal spaces of interaction are anchored by regional mechanisms such as treaties, protocols and other constitutive documents. In this case, Article 23 of the SADC Treaty and Protocols constitutes the SADC-led provision tailoring formal engagement between state actors and non-state actors in a joint space of regional governance (SADC Treaty 1992, Söderbaum 2004, Godsäter 2013). Often, this joint space of governance has been criticised for legitimising the existing status quo and responding to donors' demands to incorporate civil society in different projects of development (Söderbaum 2007). Empirical findings show that some civil society groupings such as the SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, Gender Links, and Southern African Trust (SAT), to name a few, to some extent have respectively entered into interaction with government elites from the SADC institutions above indicated in section 4.3. Among them are the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit where a few representatives of RCSN are respectively invited as observers and sometimes allowed to read a communiqué or declaration from their forums.

Some selected regional civil society networks have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the SADC Secretariat, as mentioned in chapter 4 of this thesis (SADC-CNGO 2012). They can provide evidence-based information, including arguments, to SADC and can

also engage in governance by, for example, participating in the elaboration of protocols. At the same time, few SADC officials attend side events, like the Civil Society Forum, held by SADC-CNGO before SADC summits. Nevertheless, power politics and sovereignty concerns play an important role within SADC, and power is rarely given up for the sake of RCSN engagement in regional governance (Godsäter 2015). For example, by SADC invitation, SATUCC, being part of the apex with SADC-CNGO, participates as an observer on a few SADC Ministerial Committees, especially on labour-related matters. SATUCC has a seat at the ELS meeting as a member of the SADC Tripartite Meeting in the Employment and Labour Sector. This ELS meeting gathers relevant SADC Ministers, social partners and SATUCC within employment and labour areas for policy formulation discussions (Osei-Hwedie 2009, SATUCC 2011, Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2013, Respondent 17, 2018). During these yearly ELS meetings, SATUCC has influenced the design of various labour codes, labour standards, declarations and charters (Respondent 17, 2018). Hence, SATUCC has contributed to a reform of labour protocols about the rights of workers in the SADC region; the SADC Declaration on Productivity and Social Security; the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons; and the Protocol on Gender and Development, among others (Godsäter 2013, SATUCC 2016).

To second that interaction with non-state actors, SADC has granted diplomatic status to the members of the Secretariat General of SATUCC, as confirmed by Respondents 2, 17, 27 (2018). Due to this diplomatic status, SATUCC was accused by 8 discussants out of the 12 during focus group discussions, to be an extension of the club of presidents claiming to fight for the rights of workers in the region. This view was shared by 80 percent of the 28 respondents interviewed in face-to-face interviews. Consequently, this suggests that the effectiveness of civic participation in these high-profile meetings still raises many doubts. "It is one thing to participate, but more importantly, it is another thing to influence and be heard," laments one representative of SADC-CNGO (Respondent 17, 2018). Gender Links sets another positive example of civil society interaction within formal regionalism with SADC by contributing to the Protocol on Gender in the region after working side by side with the Gender Unit of the SADC (Godsäter 2015; Gender Links 2016; SADC 2016). Thus, many regional civil society networks are seemingly sidelined by SADC, and yet, those that are interacting in formal settings have been criticised for not having a significant and influential voice. This exclusion has led civil society to foray into horizontal networks among themselves, outside of the mainstream.

5.3.2 Southern African civil society networks within self-organised regionalism outside of SADC

As mentioned in chapter 1, cross-border collective actions characterise the self-organisation of actors in region-building projects. Cross-border civil society groupings become capable of independent organisation and self-determination through a collective transnational coalition (Baiocchi, Heller, Silva 2008). In the quest for an alternative, regional civil society networks have transcended the established regional order and created new parallel avenues of collaboration shaped by new rules, norms and strategies in order to establish a new regional order (McAdam 1996; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014).

In the case of the Southern African region, the shrinking features of SADC-led space have isolated the majority of ordinary citizens across the region by preventing them from participating in political projects to form regions. This politically manifested exclusion has consequently triggered scepticism across the border of the region within the epistemic communities toward the established autocratic and neoliberal approaches driving the SADC regional order. Consequently, citizens across the Southern African region became involved with self-organised regionalism in the form of new collaborative avenues of participation to build solidarity among themselves through collective actions in order to build alternatives centred on people's aspirations. The Southern African People's Solidarity Networks (SAPSN) and SADC-CNGO, among other regional civil groupings mentioned above in section 4.6.2, constitute a myriad of striking examples of the desire of ordinary citizens to make their voice heard in an arena of engagement outside of the SADC for an alternative. Self-organised activities parallel to the existing regional order include the SADC's People Summit, the Alternative Mining Indaba, the Civil Society Forum, and so forth (Respondent 19, 2018; Söderbaum 2004; Godsäter 2015). For example, the Alternative Mining Indaba is a yearly self-organised parallel forum to the SADC Mining Indaba organised by the Economic Justice Forum, gathering cross-border epistemic community associations living within the SADC areas where mining is extracted, and many human rights abuses have been perpetrated by multinationals (Respondent 19, 2018). The following sections elaborate, in a thorough manner, on the Civil Society Forum and SADC People's Summit as self-organised parallel avenues for citizens' self-interaction within region-building projects outside of the SADC mainstream.

5.3.2.1 The Civil Society Forum

The Civil Society Forum (CSF) is an annual event that brings together various civil society stakeholders, mostly NGOs with similar interests, to discuss and lobby SADC on matters concerning regional integration focusing on socio-economic, political and environmental reforms (SADC-CNGO 2012, Respondent 18, 2018). It creates a bridge between the official and governmental regional leadership and civil society. Since 2005, SADC-CNGO, the regional umbrella body for NGOs in SADC, has spearheaded the forum. The CSF is held as a joint venture by the apex alliance partners consisting of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA), Southern Africa Trade Unions Coordinating Council (SATUCC) and SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (Söderbaum 2004, SADC-CNGO 2015).

Observation notes reveal that the annual forums have been held under different themes based on emerging pressing regional issues but also resonating with the official annual themes of the SADC Heads of State and Council of Ministers. The forum creates an opportunity for civil society organizations from the region to (i) analyze, reflect and dialogue on the critical issues facing the region; (ii) contribute to and create synergy with the agenda of SADC; (iii) impact on the Summit of Heads of State and Governments; and (iv) plan and develop independent actions and priorities for regional civil society for the coming year, including identifying key campaigns, movement building and areas of collaboration (SADC-CNGO 2015, Respondent 18, 2018).

1) Organizing the Civil Society Forum

Table: 5. 1 Civil Society Forum Organizational Structure



Source: by the author

Table 5.1 above details the organisational structure of the Civil Society Forum, which is presented in five stages from the top-down. Stage 1 describes networks of civil society which are involved in organising the forum, SADC-CNGO board, FOCCISA Steering Committee and SATUCC board. Stage 2 displays how the above self-organised institutions forms one Apex Bodies Steering Committee in order to call for the CSF indicated in stage 3 of Table 5.1. Stage 4 shows how CSF is clustered into five components notably commissions in Box 1, thematic group meeting in Box 2, side events in Box 3, plenary sessions in Box 4 and network in Box 5. Stage 6 describes in a thorough manner the above five components of the CSF. See appendix IV for a sample of the CSF programme.

The Civil Society Forum is one of the self-organised spaces of interaction created by SADC-CNGO in order to participate in the region-building projects outside of SADC spaces in the quest for alternative regionalisms. However, its processes and procedures are formalised and guided by rules of operation. Even though it seems to be an informal space, the Civil Society

Forum is still viewed as a recognised space by SADC, as emphasised by a representative from SADC-CNGO (Respondent 14, 2018). More than that, affiliated members from SAPSN have been criticizing the Civil Society Forum for being a semi-formal platform which to some extent cajoles SADC elites into inviting apex body representatives to engage within its formal spaces. Sometimes, SADC elites are invited to speak to the Civil Society Forum on a particular matter in line with the annual regional agenda (Respondent 14, 2018).

Also, findings revealed that the Civil Society Forum Meetings are meticulously structured following the SADC-CNGO constitution and structure for the Civil Society Forum. A clear programme with an agenda is developed and sent to all participating members in advance for comments and suggestions for improvement. The programme, with defined content, is controlled and timed. Often the meetings are opened by the Chairpersons of the three apex bodies, followed by speeches from the three Executive Directors of SATUCC, SADC CNGO and FOCCISA/EJN. In some meetings, delegates have complained about the protocol and the number of speeches, saying that the forum has become a copycat of the official SADC Heads of State Summits (Respondent 21, 2018). An example of the CSF programme has been attached in the Appendix IV.

2) Preparation and Logistics for hosting the Civil Society Forum

According to respondents in the SADC-CNGO, preparations to hold the Civil Society Forum (CSF) begins around May/June of each year. The preparation of the forum is conducted the same way as the SADC Summit is prepared, from the identification of the venue, to setting the agenda, as commented upon by civil society representatives. This implies the venue of the next forum has been identified as being in the same country as the deputising chair of the SADC. A series of preparatory meetings by the apex bodies are held. The purpose of these meetings is to plan for logistics, a common agenda and also financing of the forum. One of the meetings is held in Gaborone, Botswana, where the three organisations interface with the Executive Secretary of SADC or any other designated official from the Secretariat. The aim for this meeting is to get a feel for the issues that might be discussed in that year's SADC Head of States Summit, although the official SADC Summit Agenda will not be ready for circulation to the public at this stage. The meeting is also an occasion at which the regional civil society networks air anything that they deem important to the Secretariat (Respondents 11, 14, 2018).

This is often done in two ways; first, there are logistics that are taken care of by the respective apex bodies, for example deciding on how many participants they must invite to the forum depending on finances from the Economic Justice Network, a wing of FOCCISA. Secondly, the matter of who attends the forum is governed by the respective organisational procedures. Often, attendees are the chairpersons of NGOs, executive directors of NGOs or general secretaries, in the case of FOCCISA and SATUCC, and some important key officers identified by the apex bodies. The apex bodies pay for the travel and sometimes accommodation costs and per diems for their people. However, the bulk of the logistics are handled by SADC-CNGO (Respondents 11, 14, 2018).

SADC-CNGO creates a team to prepare and plan in order to make sure that all logistics are met accordingly. The team often meets weekly and sometimes as often as it is required, especially as the time of the meeting draws closer. These meetings continue daily in the evenings to make sure that all is progressing according to plan and that if there is any need for amendments, these are done correctly. There are also times when the apex bodies' team leaders meet formally or informally on various matters related to the forum in order to assist in guiding the proceedings of the forum, as confirmed by Respondents 11 and 14 (2018).

3) Steps toward the holding of the Civil Society Forum

Table 5.2 Stages of Civil Society Forum



Source: the author

Based on discussions in focus group 1, the researcher discovered that there are close to 12 steps leading up to holding the Civil Society Forum (CSF). Table 5.2, although not exhaustive and sometimes not true to the logical progression, illustrates the 12 stages toward the holding of the CSF. These stages are identified in Table 5.2 through ascending numerical order from 1 to 12 allocated to the letter A. Thus, the first stage A1 shows how a call is made by the Apex bodies Steering Committee from SADC-CNGO, FOCCISA and SATUCC for the holding of the CSF by giving tentative dates and venue. The call is followed by the Apex Bodies' preparatory meeting with potential donors as indicated in second stage A2 of Table 5.2. After that, this preparatory meeting develops a concept note and programme of the CSF to be circulated to affiliated members for comments as shown in A3. Looking at Table 5.2, there is an indication that the preparatory process of the CSF goes through interconnected stages till the holding of the CSF three days prior the Head of States Summit reproduced in stage A9 before the sharing of a collective declaration as an eleventh stage A11 in Table 5.2. Dissemination of a collective declaration is followed by the CSF postmortem, which is the last stage A12 of the process as indicated in Table 5.2. This CSF postmortem is a review meeting between representatives of Apex bodies to CSF and some selected CSOs for further orientations and improvement.

Discussants during the first focus group revealed that the CSF is organized by the three apex bodies: SADC-CNGO, SATUCC and FOCCISA. It is sanctioned by the governing bodies of the three bodies, which together design and devise a common engagement mechanism with SADC structures. However, the three bodies individually may also engage SADC structures on individual issues relating to their fields, namely faith issues (FOCCISA), unionism and labour (SATUCC) and civil society work (SADC-CNGO). The three bodies created a steering committee whose main function is to plan, review and evaluate the activities of the CSF.

There was a general view among respondents from the regional civil society category that hosting the annual CSF is the main activity of the apex bodies. Although the CSF is led by the three apex organizations, SADC-CNGO is often prominent mostly because it is the founder of the CSF and secondly because of its proximity to SADC Secretariat since it is based in Gaborone, Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat is situated. Often, SADC-CNGO foots most of the bills at the CSF. There have been cases where SADC-CNGO solely financed the forum, especially when the other two apex organizations encountered difficulties in financing their participants to attend the forum (Respondent 13, 2018). While the venue of the CSF

corresponds to where the SADC Summit takes place, it is also a procedure that the National NGO umbrella organization of the country where the official SADC Summit is being hosted becomes de facto the host organization for the CSF forum. The umbrella body then works closely with the apex bodies, more especially SADC-CNGO, to ensure that visas, accommodation and local travel arrangements are taken care of. If there is a need to identify speakers from the hosting government to speak at the CSF, the hosting NGO is asked to make such arrangements (Respondent 15, 2018). In return, SADC-CNGO provides subvention to cushion the extra work the national umbrella body would be required to do.

The CSF itself is divided into five sections, namely (i) Commissions, which are guided meetings with designated key speakers; (ii) Plenary sessions, which are the main gatherings for all participants, delegates or observers (iii) Network meetings, which are meetings for regional organizations that are not part of the apex bodies but share in the philosophy of the CSF; (iv) Thematic meetings, which are meetings organized at the forum for regional bodies that are closely affiliated to the CSF – these are for example SAFOD, SACBTA; (v) Side Events, which are meetings or sessions organized by interest groups such as Gender Links and others (Respondents 11, 13, 2018). Participants in this civil forum are classified as delegates, participants or observers. Delegates are those that come from within the local NGO sector, and were selected and identified to attend by the national umbrella NGOs. Often, these are the chairperson of the umbrella bodies or their representative, including the Executive Directors of the organizations. These have voting powers and all their expenses in line with the forum are covered by the apex body members. Participants are people that have been paid by the apex bodies to participate in the forum but do not have any voting powers. These could also be people that have been brought to the forum by interest groups to attend parallel sessions during the summit. Expenses for such people are met by the interest groups. As for observers, they are often members of the donor community, or any other persons. These two have no voting powers and are not obliged to stay for the entire period. They are free to attend any session of their interest, explains one representative of SADC-CNGO (Respondent 17, 2018).

4) Programme of the Civil Society Forum

The proceedings of the rest of the programme include presentations on specific agreed-upon topics by carefully selected speakers known for their particular expertise on SADC processes. After that, groups break away into commissions in which members discuss topics that could converge into collecting points to be used in the development of a final collective declaration.

Side events are also held soon after the opening ceremony. There are also thematic group meetings for visitors to the CSF that are not in the apex bodies. These are organized for regional networks such as the Southern African Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) and the Southern Africa Forum for Disability (SAFOD), among others. There are also network meetings in parallel sessions organised and paid for by interest groups who bring their own people to the forum (Respondents 13, 17, 2018). The following steps detail the programme according to responses from the apex bodies representatives:

(i) Pre-Forum events: These events take place one or two days prior to the Civil Society Forum (CSF). These are special meetings arranged and paid for by SADC-CNGO or other affiliated CSOs. They are often capacity-building events evolving around specially selected topics related to the governance of SADC and the social development of the region. These events may also include sectoral meetings and sometimes it ends in a launch of a relevant research report or a book.

(ii) Day 1: Opening ceremony attended by all delegates, participants and observers. Chairpersons from the three apex bodies all give speeches. A government official from the hosting SADC member state is also invited to give a speech. There are also cultural events just like at the SADC Summit at the opening ceremony. The opening session is followed by the plenary session where designated speakers deliver their keynote addresses in order to set the tone of the discussions of the Civil Society Forum. The SADC Secretariat Executive Secretary or any representative is also among the guests to speak on a specified topic in line with the forum agenda. There are also several presentations on selected topics from affiliated civil society organisation members of the SADC-CNGO on the SADC political projects to form regions in different sectors. There are reports made by thematic networks such as on children, disability, elderly, gender and development, media, youth, the informal sector, and others. Day 1 is also characterised by side events which often take place from six o'clock in the evening and are self-organised by interest groups. People are often provided with meals or snacks to encourage them to come and remain interested in the meetings.

(iii) Day 2: The CSF is clustered into commissions, which are guided sessions aimed at discussing key issues of great concern for the region and formulating a concrete plan of action for implementation. There are often four to five commissions and these act as discussion arena for SADC Protocols. For example, in 2016 the commission topics

were (a) Democratizing our Democracies (b) Inclusive and sustainable development (c) Human security and Development in SADC (d) Civil Society Engagement Mechanism (e) Strategies and tactics for social mobilisation. The main issues are noted from each commission. After discussions within the commissions, participants are gathered again to interact within commissions for the plenary session. This is a guided session in which a consolidated report from the commissions is presented to the plenary for comments, validation and approval. This forms the basis for the collective declaration. There are other side events that are self-organised sessions by respective regional or international civil society organisations on selected topics of concern stemming from work they do in the region with their membership.

(iv) Day 3: Participants engage through plenary sessions in which presentation and final adoption of a plan of action take place. This outlines strategies, tactics, mobilisation and campaigns to be run in the SADC member states. For example, the "The SADC We Want" campaign, which is a highly acclaimed SADC-CNGO brand has been adopted by the SADC elites during their summits. As one respondent laments, "SADC has stolen our brand, The SADC We Want, without acknowledging our collective efforts" (Respondents 19, 2018). Day 3 is marked by the presentation of the collective declaration during the plenary session by the drafting team leader who is the consolidator of the declaration based on the outcomes from abovementioned commissions. The presentation of the declaration is sanctioned by the closure of the forum through the culmination of the forum deliberations. A plan of action is presented and adopted collectively followed by vote of thanks given by the three apex bodies. The chairperson of the hosting SADC-CNGO national umbrella gives concluding remarks. Afterwards, participant members are free to return to their respective countries.

(v) Post-CSF attendance at official SADC Summit: A selected team of representatives of the Civil Society Forum from the apex bodies attend the official opening ceremony of SADC Heads of State and Government Summit by invitation to submit and present the collective declaration coming from the civil forum.

The other parallel event of Southern African civil society networks is the SADC People's Summit.

5.3.2.2 The SADC People's Summit

The SADC People's Summit constitutes another horizontal network of Southern African civil society that meets parallel to the annual SADC Heads of State and Government Summit (Söderbaum 2009, Zajontz 2013, SAPSN 2012, Godsäter 2015). It is a key annual open activity of SAPSN that brings together ordinary SADC citizenry who use the summit to voice their concerns on pressing issues that affect their daily lives under the current neoliberal order to reclaim SADC for the people of the region (Respondent 19, 2018). As a network of mainly grassroots movements, SAPSN has a structure from the bottom up which facilitates the participation of SADC citizenry in a self-organised regional agenda with great potential to influence the policy shift at the SADC level. Like the CSF, the SADC People's Summit is held on a rotational basis in each of the member states where the Heads of State Summit is held. The idea was engendered in 2000 when SAPSN organised a workshop parallel to the Heads of State Summit held in Windhoek in Namibia, seeking to build alternatives through the people's voice, and this was followed by 2006 and 2007 Summits in Maseru and Lusaka respectively (SAPSN 2012). The 2008 People's Summit was held in South Africa, while DR Congo, Namibia and Angola respectively hosted in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Mozambique has joined the queue by hosting the 2012 Summit, joining by Malawi in 2013, Zimbabwe in 2014, and Botswana in 2015, and Swaziland in 2016 in Manzini (AIDC 2016).

Findings revealed that the SADC People's Summit has a General Assembly made up of 13 representatives from SADC member States which are supposed to meet at least once a year to give strategic policy and direction for citizen engagement in the region. Unfortunately, due to financial constraints, SAPSN's AGM meets erratically. The second layer is the SAPSN Regional Steering Committee which comprises national SAPSN contact/focal points in the 13 member states except for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar and Seychelles where SAPSN is yet to have representation (Respondent 21, 2018).

1) ***Structure and thematic groups of the SADC People's Summit***

Table 5.3 SAPSN Structure and thematic groups of the SADC People's Summit



Source: Compiled by the author

Table 5.3 above highlights in five layers labelled in order of A1, B1, B2, C3, and D4 representing the structure of the SAPSN and SADC People's Summit. Thus, the first layer, A1, presents the SAPSN General Assembly which is the supreme decision-making body and tasked to plan SAPSN annual activities and endorses them in accordance with SAPSN guiding principles (SAPSN 2003). It is seconded by the Regional Steering Committee which is comprised by National Contact Points as presented in second layer B1 and B2 in order to call for the SADC People's Summit displayed in D4 of Table 5.3. The above two organs work hand in hand with the SAPSN Regional Secretariat, as indicated in the third layer, C3. The fourth layer D4 shows how the SADC People's Summit is clustered in non-exhaustive 11 different thematics, from Landless People in D4.1 to People's Tribunal in D4.11, displayed as sublayers in Table 5.3.

2) ***Organising the SADC People's Summit***

The SAPSN Steering Committee (SSC) appoints, on a rotational basis, a host country where the secretariat is to be hosted. The secretariat drives the implementation of the activities of SAPSN and is responsible for fundraising, reporting to donors and most importantly, holding the SADC People's Summit. AIDC was the first to host the secretariat, in Cape Town, South Africa; it then moved to the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) in Harare, Zimbabwe, then to the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) in Malawi until 2015. The Foundation for Social Economic Justice (FSEJ) of Swaziland took over the hosting until 2017, when Lesotho, with Development for Peace Education (DPE), took over (SAPSN 2012, AIDC 2016).

During the SADC People's Summit, regional epistemic communities are clustered according to available thematic groups in line with to different lived experiences they want to share among themselves. These include landless people, the cross-border informal sector, the Unemployed People's Assembly, the Rural Women's Assembly, small-scale farmers, youth and unemployment, tax justice and extractives, the Climate Justice Alliance, Trade Justice Campaign, Permanent People's Tribunal, and the Migrant People's Assembly (SAPSN 2012, Respondent 21, 2018). These thematic groups create fora where different aspects of political projects to form regions are discussed. It is from these thematic group meetings that points are generated for the collective communiqué.

3) ***Steps toward the holding of the SADC People's Summit***

Table 5.4 Steps toward the holding of the CSF



Source: the author

Discussants from focus group 2 confirm that there are close to twelve steps leading up to holding the SADC People's Summit. Table 5.4 above, although not exhaustive and sometimes not true to the logical progression, illustrates the 12 steps toward the holding of the SADC People's Summit. These steps are identified in Table 5.4 through ascending numerical order from 1 to 12 allocated to the letter A. The first step, A1, presents a call for People's Summit made by SAPSN Steering Committee. The call is followed by a planning meeting between SAPSN Steering Committee and potential funders where a budget is agreed upon as indicated in the second step, A2. Following the planning meeting, the third step A3 shows that a summit programme is drawn up and sent out for comments and improvement by participants from social movements and organisations. The setting of the programme is followed by identification of all participants as indicated in the fourth step A4 till the holding day of the People's Summit concurrently with the CSF in step A10 without neglecting other steps presented in Table 5.4. Reading the Table 5.4, this is to show that holding of the People's Summit is meticulously planned through interlinked steps till to the last step, A12, whereby the SSC held back to review proceedings of that year's People Summit and make recommendations for further improvement.

4) SADC People's Summit Programme

An observation made during fieldwork was that SAPSN's programme is drawn up before the holding of the SADC People's Summit. This is done in a consultative way among the member state representatives and also drawing from the SADC agenda of the year disclosed to the civil society organizations prior to the summit. The SAPSN steering committee requests programmes of the CSF as well as the official SADC Summit programme. However, it is important to indicate that the SADC People's Summit programme remains flexible, semi-structured and almost unstructured in order to accommodate in-depth engagement of the regional citizenry through shared lived experiences (Respondents 19, 21, 2018). The following steps shed light on the People's Summit's programme as per responses from SAPSN representatives:

(i) **Pre-Summit activities**: These include member state briefings to keep participants abreast of events at the Summit. Information materials are disseminated and displayed at the summit. The media is briefed at country level for publicity. The regional programme is finalised and circulated in advance, confirms Respondent 19 (2018).

(ii) **Day 1**: There are three activities on the programme, namely registration of participants and opening ceremony, keynote address and solidarity messages. The opening of the SADC People's Summit is conducted by the Chair of the Steering Committee, and the host country of the SAPSN member welcomes the participants to the Summit. This is punctuated by dancing and chanting of solidarity songs. Sometimes, a representative of a government official of the host country can be invited to speak as a guest of honour, which the discussants reported in the focus groups, but the latter does not show up in most of the cases. Opening remarks are also made by the SAPSN Secretariat. As for the keynote address, it is given to meticulously selected speakers who are known for mobilising the general citizenry for action in order to set the tone. Solidarity messages are given by participating SAPSN member chairpersons. They share the outlook of pressing issues challenging citizens in their respective countries in order to raise a regional solidarity awareness among the participants.

(iii) Day 2: It is characterised by self-organised events, starting with a plenary session, then clustered into people's assemblies and parallel workshops and seminars, followed by a common dinner and cultural exhibition events. Respondents reveal that the plenary session begins with input on topics aimed at guiding the self-organised events of the day. Sometimes this could be a documentary or an educational visit. People's Assemblies are self-organised events grouping participants at the Summit clustered into different thematic groups. For example, these include the Rural Women's Assembly, the Permanent People's Tribunal, the Migrant People's Assembly, and the Unemployed People's Assembly, among others. Parallel workshops and seminars include topical workshops such as tertiary debates on SADC and the Youth; Women building Power around SADC Gender and Development Protocol; the Role of TNC's and IFI such as BRICS and others; Tax Justice; combating illicit financial flow from SADC and building a sustainable solidarity movement in the SADC region. There are always scribers who are tasked to take notes of critical emerging issues from discussions within these parallel sessions. At the end of the day, these notes are collected and collated to inform collective communiqué development. After taking part in the plenary session, people's assemblies and parallel workshops and seminar, participants have dinner together and entertain each other by cultural dance performances. Sharing arts informs capacity building on the diversity of culture in the region for solidarity building among regional citizenry.

(iv) Day 3: Participants gather again in order to march and close the Summit. Beforehand**,** all participants interact within the plenary session with the drafting team which presents the collective communiqué for comments and validation. Once the collective communiqué has been approved and validated by the plenary, the latter is printed for dissemination to members and a copy to be taken to the official SADC Summit venue. The validation of the People's communiqué is followed by marching and handover of the collective communiqué. A team comprising the outgoing chairperson, incoming chairperson and People's Summit host country chair is tasked to hand over the communiqué to the SADC Secretariat. Depending on the distance between the two venues hosting the People's Summit and the SADC Summit, often participants accompany the selected team to the SADC venue and a march is organised accordingly. The feasibility of this march depends on the type of political regime of the host country. Law enforcement agencies in the host country are mobilized for mob control and to deal with any breach of national security and public order. After the march, participants return to the venue and collectively draw up a 12 months' common agenda and action plan leading to the next SADC People's Summit. This is meant to drive National SAPSN activities over the 12 months. The closing ceremony of the People's Summit is often done by the SAPSN Secretariat and the hosting country SAPSN member. A solidarity message on a particular issue is read out to the plenary. In the evening there is often a get-together dinner depending on availability of funds. The following day participants leave for their respective countries.

(v) SAPSN Forum Review Meeting: This is held around December of each year depending on availability of funds. The Steering Committee members meet to evaluate the proceedings of the SADC People's Summit for improvement in subsequent People's Summits. Sometimes donors take part in these meetings. This serves as a planning meeting for the next people's forum.

5.4. Strategies, Norms and Rules developed by Regional Civil Society Networks when interacting in formal regionalism

Southern African reformist civil society networks have sought to influence SADC's reform agenda by interacting within formal forums that have been established by SADC. This section presents a few themes that have emerged from the semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation notes conducted during fieldwork with respondents

from the regional state actors, regional civil society and regional donors/partners as indicated in chapter 1. These themes emanate from recurring answers to the question related to the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by reformist civil society actors affiliated to SADC-CNGO when they interact within state-led regional sites of interaction, like the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC Regional Policy Dialogues, engagement with other regional institutions, Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO), and the Heads of State Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012).

5.4.1 Strategies

This study views strategies as part of institutional arrangements alongside norms and rules developed by non-state actors during interaction within formal settings. Primary data reveals that participation in the state-created regional sites of engagement indicated above with civil society networks is undertaken by invitation from SADC or governed by an MoU or through recognition, especially at the programme implementation level (Respondent 2, 2018). As such, SADC-CNGO is expected to conduct itself in a way that SADC would approve of so that they are invited again to SADC meetings. Below are some strategies developed by SADC-CNGO representatives when they interact within the above SADC-created spaces of interaction:

5.4.1.1 Collaboration with SADC elites through a cooperative engagement

Ninety percent of 20 respondents from both regional civil society and regional donor categories confirm that some Southern African civil society networks, especially those that have entered into an MoU with the SADC Secretariat, like SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, among others, employ cooperative engagement while interacting within SADC-created spaces. In this regard, RCSNs openly collaborate with SADC elites during the Council of Ministers, where they may be requested to give their collective view or contribution on the development of protocols, like the case of SATUCC on SADC Trade and Labour Protocols (Respondent 19, 25, 2018). Cooperative engagement is translated through tolerance and adaptation of civil society to a SADC-led framework. SADC-CNGO interacts within the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, and SADC regional policy dialogues on a consultative and partnership basis as stipulated in the MoU between stakeholders. In high-level meetings, the apex bodies are invited as observers, not as delegates, unless stipulated otherwise. Often Civil Society Forum officials attending SADC

meetings are the chairpersons of the apex bodies and their executive directors. Besides cooperating with SADC, SADC-CNGO would also collaborate with member states or with SADC institutions at large. There is a close affinity among officials, a complementary relationship and partnership. The collaboration is a strategy that allows SADC to build mutual trust, albeit feeble, among members of the Southern African civil society network. At the same time, civil society representatives use cooperative engagement to gain trust from SADC delegates for informal bargaining behind the scenes. "If we do not cooperate with them, it will be difficult to gain their trust and convince them to dance to our tune within behind the scenes interaction. During the breaks between sessions, we always remind them how we are all brothers and sisters of the African continent at the service of our people," comments one of the representatives from SADC-CNGO (Respondent 19, 2018). In contrast, another discussant during focus group reacts that most of the civil society groupings collaborating with SADC end up losing their autonomy by being, most of the time, driven by a pre-set agenda (Discussant 10, 2018). There is also the risk of these Southern African civil society groupings in cooperative engagement compromising their reformist agenda and becoming co-opted into the SADC mainstream.

5.4.1.2 Quiet diplomacy through informal bargaining behind the scenes

Cooperative engagement engenders a quiet diplomacy featuring informal bargaining during formal negotiations. This entails that Southern African civil society networks, be it SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, SAT, or Gender Links, among others, cannot just raise dissenting views in the official meetings, but they would rather diplomatically express their opinion to influence the decision-making processes without causing prejudice to SADC-established precedence (Respondents 4, 18, 21, 2018). It is up to the official meeting to accept the views or not. In this case, informal lobbying in the form of informal bargaining during formal meetings becomes a key master strategy to influence the decision-making processes. Here, at certain junctures, Southern African civil society networks make larger gains by engaging SADC agencies quietly and behind the scenes. This is linked to the above strategy on cooperative engagement. However, here, civil society representatives would raise important issues during informal times such as tea/health breaks or after working hours, that were not raised during the formal meetings due to several reasons stipulated in the MoU, like respect for precedence (Respondents 4, 18, 21, 2018). For instance, civil society representatives in formal settings may

target representatives from a member state with, a consolidating democratic regime, like South Africa, and regional influence, like Angola, to informally lobby for the impact of some of the SADC-proposed decisions that need to be amended in favor of the epistemic communities of the entire region. "To some, we invite them for a proper dinner after working hours. With others, we drink together after hours during the night just for us to bargain for what was discussed during the official meetings. It is not corruption, but elite's alliance seeking," confirms one representative from the regional civil society category (Respondent 14, 2018). These sympathisers would then take up the matter into the official meetings to influence outcomes. Sometimes, this is accompanied by researched position papers on SADC protocols by members of SADC-CNGO, which illustrate the impact gathered from research on a position proposed by SADC. SADC-CNGO has in fact over the years produced numerous position papers and research documents on SADC protocol implementation and how people in the region have been affected (SADC-CNGO 2016, Respondent 17, 2018,). This quiet diplomacy is followed by submission of collective declarations.

5.4.1.3 Submission of a collective declaration for the SADC Heads of State Summits

Findings showed that submission of a collective declaration as a representation of shared aspirations of the Southern African epistemic communities constitutes another key strategy developed by SADC-CNGO within vertical settings of interaction with SADC. Since 2005, when the first Civil Society Forum was held, the apex bodies have been submitting declarations to every subsequent Heads of State and Government Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012). The declaration is a condensation of issues emerging from the two-day Civil Society Forum, but also aligned to the theme and agenda of the Heads of State and Government Summit held each year. The purpose of submission of these collective declarations is to remotely make known the shared views of Southern African civil society networks on both regional and national matters that require the attention of the whole region and then possibly influence the outcomes of the formal meetings. However, this collective declaration has been criticised by some SADC elites for lacking constructive substance and evidence-based solutions useful for the development of the region. "It does not incarnate any innovation from its template to its content. We know how that declaration has always been written and influenced by few individuals who claim to advocate for people of the region without their mandate," critiques one SADC representative (Respondent 5, 2018). As for respondents from the regional donors'

category, they were not convinced that SADC elites consider the impact of these collective declarations from the Civil Society Forum (Respondents 23, 28). Submission of the declaration is a tool for making demands of RCSNs.

5.4.2 Norms

In their responses, most of the respondents from all three categories confirmed that Southern African civil society networks (RCSNs) interacting within SADC-established frameworks have developed certain kinds of norms that facilitate their debatable collaboration with SADC elites through a cooperative engagement strategy. These include conforming to the existing status quo through respect of the precedence, concomitantly reinforcing existing formal norms and invoking alternative norms and the fact that norms developed by civil society are only influential, not enforceable.

5.4.2.1 Conforming to the existing SADC status quo through respect of the precedence

Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO, are expected to align themselves, within formal interaction with SADC elites, to the elitist-set agenda of the meeting, the mode of conducting the business of the day in accordance with SADC legal framework as indicated above in section 4.3 of chapter 4. By interacting within SADC-driven forums of negotiation to achieve progressive reforms, representatives of Southern African civil society networks find themselves unintentionally legitimising state-centric SADC institutions. The insider influence strategy obligates Southern African civil groupings to conform to established SADC state-led norms (Respondent 4, 2018). Often, at the end of the second day of the CSF, the chairpersons of the apex bodies are all selected to submit collective declarations during the Heads of State Summit. When the selected delegates go into the official meetings, they are expected to conform to the established status quo at the meeting by complying, for example speaking only when the occasion is given by elites, wear formal dress if the dress code at the Summit requires it and register with the SADC Secretariat for security vetting. During Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, statutory meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, and sometimes the Heads of State Summit official SADC meetings, invited civil society association representatives respect the precedence by abiding to the differentiation of clearly defined status: delegates, participants and observers, and so forth. It is a gathering of high profiles and people with high university degrees, as disparaged by one

respondent from SAPSN (Respondent 12, 2018). They only intervene if a chance is given to them to comment on a particular matter, like while attending SADC-PF. Most of the time they are quiet and observe the protocol, lamented one civil society representative (Respondent 13, 2018).

5.4.2.2 Concomitantly reinforcing formal norms and invoking alternative norms

When an opportunity is given to voice their aspirations during the official summits, Southern African civil society networks do not just reinforce existing SADC collective representations that promote desired regional integration and cooperation, but they invoke alternative norms to create new transformative policy opportunities. For example, SADC-CNGO and other regional networks proposed the inclusion of more civil society networks in the region-building projects through the insertion of a formal mechanism of civil society engagement in the SADC to second article 23 of the SADC Treaty. Southern African Trust was tasked by the SADC Secretariat to consult all stakeholders for the formulation of that formal mechanism, as respectively commented on by two representatives from SAT and GIZ (Respondent 17, 25, 2018).

5.4.2.3 Influential but unenforceable civil society norms

Most of the discussants during focus groups underlined that the collective declarations from the Civil Society Forum presented to the Council of Ministers and the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit were only influential and not binding since the Civil Society Forum was not a SADC-binding entity. It is for that reason that civil society representatives at the formal Summit are always keen to identify, behind the scenes, sympathisers among SADC elites for informal bargaining in order to act as entry points of influence in regional decision-making processes (Discussant 9, 2018).

5.4.3 Rules

Field findings demonstrated that Southern African civil society networks interacting within SADC-established spaces developed a respect for the SADC legal framework of engagement and prevention of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions.

5.4.3.1 Submitting to the SADC-provided legal framework of engagement

Submitting to the SADC-led legal framework, indicated in section 4.3 of chapter 4, constitutes a golden rule for Southern African civil society networks interacting within the SADC mainstream. Even though article 23 is lacking its full operationalisation, stakeholders in interaction are still referring to it as a legal framework of civic involvement in political projects to form regions in the SADC region. The MoU signed with the SADC Secretariat constitutes a key tool granting legal entry to the SADC-CNGO representatives into cooperative engagement with SADC elites at the table of decision-making processes. "MoU is a discriminatory mechanism that SADC has instituted to grant access to, in a selective manner, only its allies claiming to be civil society organisations by excluding those who are really fighting for the right cause in the region," laments SAPSN representatives (Discussant 9, 11, 2018). In this regard, deployed civil society representatives speak the same language to that of member state and technocrats. In order to gain access to the table of negotiation, invited civil society coalitions are forcibly obliged to abide to the SADC-provided legal instruments for civil engagement. Otherwise, entry can be denied if they behave against the MoU and code of conduct during the summits (Respondent 4, 2018). It is about respect for established chains of command delineating responsibilities within the formal interaction where debates are driven by states and technocrats.

5.4.3.2 Prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions

Southern African civil society networks have developed friendly and cooperative attitudes toward their counterpart state stakeholders during formal sessions. By respecting the MoU and code of conduct, cross-border civil society coalitions set themselves rules of tolerance by avoiding using radical and aggressive language during formal meetings. "We work with those who have an MoU with us because it helps us to avoid unforeseen chaos to be perpetrated by antagonistic attitudes from other uninvited people who always use violence and unfriendly behaviour as means to express their grievances," laments one SADC representative (Respondent 3, 2018). Although they are not happy about the official position adopted by member state, their contestation mechanisms are not necessarily ruthless and fierce, but instead tolerant, with room for negotiation behind the scenes. "Our contestation is always done in a friendly and moderate manner as we usually use our informal bargaining strategy to convince

influential member state representatives," confirms one representative from civil society (Respondent 19, 2018). However, this rule on the attitude to adopt within formal interaction has been criticised by SAPSN representatives, in the focus group, as inducive tactics compromising transformational strivings in order to win favour with and obtain regular access to SADC-created spaces (Discussants 7, 10, 2018).

5.5 Strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting in self-organised regionalisms

In response to the shrinking of civic space at both national and regional levels, SACSN have increasingly developed self-organised spaces in order to pursue a political activity that bypasses regional and state actors. Within these horizontal networks, SACSN also developed various kinds of institutional statements aimed at building alternative regionalisms. Based on responses from respondents during fieldwork, this section presents the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, when they interact within horizontal networks, most importantly their main parallel activities such as the Civil Society Forum and the People's Summit outside of the SADC in the quest for alternatives. The SADC People's Summit is clustered into the Permanent People's Tribunal, a major global campaign to fight the exploitation of our lands, our ecosystems, our labour and our bodies by big corporates acting together with powerful states; the Migrant People's Assembly fighting against xenophobia and for the free movement of peoples in the region and the Assembly of the Unemployed, to name a few (AIDC 2017, Respondent 14, 2018). Through thematic analysis, a few themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews and focus groups, which constitute the institutional arrangements developed by cross-border citizen groupings in self-organised regionalisms.

5.5.1 Strategies

5.5.1.1 Confronting SADC elites with transnational citizenship and submission of a collective communiqué

Unlike interaction within vertical networks, SACSNs confront and contest SADC elites in self-organised interaction settings. Empirical findings demonstrate that the confrontation strategy employed by Southern African civil society networks intends to make SADC elites aware of their perspective in relation to SADC-provided interaction settings, in the hope that this

strategy may influence region-building projects (Respondent 17, 2018). Confrontation with SADC elites constitutes a main key strategy of the Southern African People's Solidarity Network, as a counterforce and transformist civil society network, to confront SADC-established structural power and reinvent the regional order in Southern Africa. It is about a process in which this horizontal network, in this case, engages in critical reflection on its counter-hegemonic stance and actions in relation to the wider SADC and its structures of power. This confrontation is, firstly, characterised by parallel activities in the margin with SADC forums. Among them, there are the SADC People's Summit, the Civil Society Forum, as indicated above in sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2, respectively, and various workshops. For example, in 2012 the SADC People's Summit was held in the Maracuene District of Maputo, in parallel with the Heads of State Summit, under the theme: "Reclaiming SADC for People's Development – A People's SADC: Myth or Reality?" which gathered more than a thousand delegates with the aim to improve participation of the general citizenry in the policymaking processes of the SADC by ensuring that the people's voices are registered at regional level (SAPSN 2012). Although these self-organised forums are confrontational to SADC, they are still modelled after the latter. Calling for people-centred mining against land grabbing and corporate social irresponsibility through the Alternative Mining Indaba alongside the formal Mining Indaba every year within the SADC region constitutes another confrontational strategy of Southern African civil society network, like FOCCISA (Respondent 20, 2018). Secondly, protests and marches accompanied by revolutionary songs always hit the streets during these parallel activities. Flyers and other communication materials reflecting civil society's counterforce stance against the regional order have always been part of civic contestation (Discussants 1, 12, 2018). After these parallel activities, the hosting country of SAPSN and the incoming host country and some members of the steering group remain behind to polish the communiqué and then submit it to the official meeting, as confirmed by one civil society representative (Respondent 18, 2018). Representatives of the SAPSN have seldom attended the Heads of State Summit, for apparent reasons.

5.5.1.2 Building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among the regional citizenry

In this study, solidarity and coalition-building among regional citizenry sought to be part of the main strategies developed by Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, during their interaction within horizontal networks. SAPSN is building solidarity by allowing

epistemic communities from SADC member states to share their day-to-day lived experiences in their respective member states in order to enact regional cohesion and mutual trust around collective identity among themselves. Participants in the SADC People's Summit, for example, come to showcase the impact of lack of or weak implementation of the SADC Protocols (Respondent 17, 2018). In that way they strengthen each other's stance on these cross-country experiences. These participants, who might not be literate or informed, have been trained on how to speak out in their respective countries; they are taken to the forum to share their lived experiences with others and become learning points to other members. During the Permanent People's Tribunal Tribunal, for example, victims of corporate abuses and injustice were expected to openly testify during the People's Summit sessions against the land grabbing, forced relocations or socio-economic injustices perpetrated by multinational companies operating in their communities. Then, regional citizenry within SAPSN organized marches and protests in solidarity with their counterparts, comments one civil society representative (Respondent 9, 2018). More than that, SAPSN entered into coalition building with national grassroots social movements from the SADC member states and beyond Southern African borders, like SATUCC, EJN, FOCCISA, EACSOF, EASWN, WACSOF, and the World Social Forum, among others (Respondent 19, 2018). This coalition-building allowed SAPSN to strategize on how to create a united front of sidelined people in the fight against poverty and global injustices, and, at the same time, to contest at the SADC level against the neo-liberal dogmas by forcibly creating alternative avenues of citizen participation in the region-building projects (Discussants 2, 11, 2018). The solidarity building comes in more in terms of working shoulder to shoulder across the region on similar issues. For example, groups like the Eastern and Southern Africa Farmers' Forum, La Via Campesina, and the Rural Women's Assembly share experiences and strategies on how to strengthen campaigns on food security and agriculture. They also agree on how to engage their respective governments once they return to base (Respondents 16, 21, 2018). Solidarity building is undertaken horizontally between people country to country and beyond, across sectors and inter-sectoral. Participants in the forum are carefully selected to include affected or infected people.

5.5.1.3 Use of capacity building training and media platforms to enhance popular critical consciousness

Popular conscientization is one of the golden norms of counterforce cross-border citizen links, like SAPSN. But these would not be possible without building the capacity of the epistemic

communities involved in self-organised interaction. During capacity building workshops, the Paulo Freire Model of capacity building was used to enable civil society critical consciousness for collective actions in order to end the culture of silence in which the socially dispossessed internalize the negative images of themselves created and propagated by the SADC state, centred in situations of extreme poverty (Mustakova-Possardt 2003). The motives of critical consciousness were to unleash the ability in grassroots communities to intervene in the SADC-established order in order to change it. Borrowing from Freire's insights, the idea is to get people to achieve an in-depth understanding of the Southern African region, allow for the perception and exposure of social and political contradictions, and be able to take action against the oppressive elements in their lives that are illuminated by that understanding (Freire 2005). In these meetings, carefully selected and planned topics are presented with the aim of awakening participants on the fundamental or root causes of challenges being faced in the region. To SAPSN, this capacity building training helps to liberate epistemic communities from the elitist SADC elitist system of governance and encourage a mutual support among them, especially when they become aware of regional challenges and how these affect fellow citizens in the region, as pointed out by discussants during the focus group 1 in Gaborone (Discussants 4, 12, 2018).

Observation notes reveal that the People's Summit is not just an annual event but is instead seen as the culmination of a year's programme of regional campaigning. When participants gather at the forum, before departure an action plan is drawn up for implementation across the participating member states. SAPSN always has a media desk which liaises with conventional media houses and social media to convey the daily outcomes of the deliberations. These messages are disseminated far and wide with the hope that they would also be distributed by the mainstream media and reach SADC structures. Additionally, there is the use of petitions which constitute brief messages with a human face to it. They are often produced to be circulated for people to link impact and human beings. These are also shared with SADC technocrats in order to influence their thinking on particularly pressing issues. These are the products of action research at the member state level and then condensed to briefs for circulation.

5.5.2 Norms

Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, have developed a number of internalized norms such as common understanding, shared beliefs, and mutual trust that all challenge SADC status quo that obstructs desired regional integration.

5.5.2.1 Internalising norms in contestation with existing SADC status quo

In advancing an agenda for change , civil society interacting within self-organised settings have developed norms in a form of a common understanding around shared lived experiences by the regional citizenry. These norms are collectively triggered by many human insecurities , which lead to contestation thereafter. The latter have awakened ordinary citizens to exercise their citizenship through collective actions. Consequently, people of the region share the same beliefs built on mutual trust by organising themselves and at the same time continuing to put more pressure on SADC elites to abandon their elitist mode of regional governance. "We always have a common understanding around the strategies to employ during our citizenship and expected outcomes of the People's Summit," as mentioned by a member of SAPSN (Respondent 17, 2018). More than that, public-spiritedness and moral duty together have all become part of internalising norms' processes for all members of SAPSN to express their contestation against the SADC status quo publicly. This is done through public marches and protests by following the shared code of conduct enabling them to voice out their aspirations in the manner that can be heard by SADC officials. For example, protesters are aware of how to exercise their citizenship outside of the venue where the formal Heads of State and Government Summit is held. Exercise of citizenship is monitored by law enforcement of the host country in respect of the designated place and itinerary to avert any intruders. In this regard, educated and non-educated members are all welcome to exercise their citizenship during the SADC People's Summit without any hindrances.

5.5.2.2 Participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit

Regional self-organised spaces of civil interaction, like the SADC People's Summit and the Civil Society Forum, among others, are always self-regulated and clustered into different sessions. For example, during the People's Summit, there are the Permanent People's Tribunal dealing with regional injustice and abuses caused by irresponsible corporates under the blessing

of the authoritarian elites. Victims of socio-economic injustice by multinational companies are encouraged to testify publicly to their counterparts within this self-organised legal forum. At the same time, there is the Migrant People's Assembly where issues related to bad migration governance, restricting the free movement of people and a blind eye that is turned to xenophobic attacks, are brought to the fore by regional citizens. As for the Assembly of the Unemployed, it is a gathering of unemployed youth from the whole region expressing their grievances against the SADC labour protocol which is not materialised in their respective countries (Respondents 12, 20, 2018).

5.5.2.3 Calling for full operationalisation of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty

Setting in motion the operationalization of article 23 of the SADC Treaty has all along been part of the norms of the Southern African civil society networks while interacting in self-organised spaces like the People's Summit, the Civil Society Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty gives impetus to civil society groupings within the region to interact outside of the mainstream using different avenues, despite the shrinking of the civic space of SADC. To them, this SADC legal framework of interaction is not yet practically materialised by the elites. "How do you expect us to engage with leaders who are not prepared to abide by the rules and norms that they have created themselves?" one regional civil society representative complains (Respondent 21, 2018). In this regard, calling for the operationalisation of article 23 becomes a moral norm driving cross-border citizenship of regional citizenry in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

5.5.3 Rules

5.5.3.1 Identification of participants to the People's Summit through national contact points

In each SADC member state, there is a contact point for SAPSN. The contact point is an NGO/CSO group that is officially affiliated to the SAPSN Secretariat as that country's SAPSN focal point. A few months prior to holding the summit, an open call is made by the SAPSN steering committee through the SAPSN Secretariat. The call comprises of a concept note and registration form as shown in Appendixes VI and VII. The country focal point has the legitimacy to identify participants to go to the summit. When the open call is made, the country focal point, in turn, circulates that call to country SAPSN members, known as Chapter

Members, as well as to new interested members. Names of participants are then collated at the country level, and a national SAPSN meeting is called at which the participants are briefed about SAPSN and the People's Summit. A final list is then drawn up, logistics are arranged for travel and accommodation, and then the participants travel to the venue where the conference is held. As indicated earlier on, national SAPSN chapters get funding from the SAPSN Solidarity Budget; this is supplemented by any local funding that might come from the participants. Selection of participants is also guided by the thematic groups at the People's Summit.

After holding the Summit, the National SAPSN chapters return to their respective countries where they also hold feedback SAPSN meetings with the rest of the country. Other members of SAPSN who did not attend and the rest of the citizens in the country are informed through sharing of the collective communiqué using local media, social media as well as dissemination of the hard copies of the declaration. They also collectively discuss the regional programme developed for the next 12 months and how they could localise the planned activities.

5.5.3.2 Collective commitment to abide by uncodified rules and culture of belonging

SAPSN has no written rules, but participants are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical manner resonating with balanced African customs. There is an unwritten culture that is shared through a community of practice. When participants gather for the Peoples' Summit, on the first day of the summit, people are briefed as to what is expected of them by the organising Steering Committees. Participants are verbally briefed on the rules of interaction. For instance, to have a frank and open debate that allows open-minded participation, only one person at a time can speak, an arrangement which is driven by mutual respect and a common understanding, especially during testimony time at the People's Tribunal. Participants are requested to conduct themselves decently during the breakaway sessions and report to their respective representatives in case of any needs. They are also free to express themselves through chanting and singing solidarity songs (Respondent 19, 2018). Participants were told to share their lived experience during the People's Summit with others who did not attend in order to encourage more attendance. This then informs new participants about what to expect when they go to the summit in the following year. Travel to the meetings is often by road and people are expected to support one another and share resources in the spirit of solidarity. There is a Solidarity Budget which is supported by donors, especially Norwegian Church Aid (NCA),

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Southern African Trust (SAT), and OSISA, among others, from which the respective SAPSN participating countries get funded. Accommodation and food are modest, with people often sharing rooms and offering space to those who do not have accommodation. Often, the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People's Summit are not white-collar meetings; people are expected to put on attire that is expressive of what they are in solidarity with. Hence participants wear attire that expresses their life experiences. Participants are expected to actively participate in all meetings, including breakaway sessions. In this regard, despite being informal, the strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regionalism constellations are also important as state-led formal institutions capable not only of influencing but also of forming regions outside of the formal mainstream.

5.6. Conclusion

The empirical findings resonate with the assertion that region formation cannot be attained only through formal structures where there is the exclusion of the regional citizenry in favour of state officials and markets. The chapter presented, on the one hand, how Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, interact within SADC-established spaces and their exhibited institutional arrangements. These include collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement, quiet diplomacy through informal bargaining behind the scenes, and submission of a collective declaration for the SADC Heads of State Summits, conforming to the existing SADC status quo through respect of the precedence; concomitantly reinforcing formal norms and invoking alternative norms. More than that, norms developed by civil society are influential, but not enforceable; submitting to the SADC-provided legal framework of engagement and prevention of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions. As presented, it is evident that SADC and its institutions of interaction have been struggling over the years to fully deliver on its promises to include epistemic communities in the regional political projects to form regions. Moreover, the self-organised institutional setting of interaction, SAPSN, attempts to single out many citizens informally through the creation of horizontal networks in which the general citizenry across the region come to participate and share both opportunities and pressing issues affecting them on the ground. If well-managed, institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society in self-organised

networks can function just like formal institutions and be able to build alternative regionalisms in the region.

On the other hand, the chapter presents the institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society in the self-organised setting. These include confronting SADC elites with transnational citizenship and submission of a collective communiqué; building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among the regional citizenry; using capacity building training and media platforms to enhance popular critical consciousness; contestation of the existing SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit; calling for the full operationalisation of article 23 of the SADC Treaty; selection of participants to the People's Summit through national contact points, and sharing commitments using uncodified rules and culture. In these self-organising fora, Southern African citizens have culturally and economically been integrated, sharing lived experiences and developed partnerships for trade and other socio-economic endeavours. There is a need to consider other self-directed initiatives and structures which are not necessarily formal in the formation of regions. The following chapter compares the above two sets of institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks when interacting within both formal and self-organized regionalisms.

CHAPTER 6

TYPOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS IN TWO DISTINCT INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

6.1 Introduction

In line with the previous chapter, which focused on the presentation of the strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society in two distinct settings of regionalism, this chapter discusses the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society groupings in formal and informal regionalism respectively. It compares the two sets of institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks presented in chapter 5 in order to gauge their differences. The chapter argues that, while interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, Southern African civil society networks devise distinct institutional arrangements that inform a typology of their interaction in the region. The horizontal networks of civil society organisations exhibit distinct strategies, norms and rules compared to those involved in formal interaction with SADC. The strategies include competing with the existing status quo instead of complementing it for fear of being excluded; developing a common agenda instead of a state-led agenda; ownership of debates by civil society instead of state-orientated debate; a collective attitude rather than state-driven; inclusive and flexible debates in place of selective and more bureaucratic debates; building regional solidarity and networks through shared lived experiences instead of friendship-building with SADC elites behind the scenes; collective action sanctioned by a shared communiqué instead of a collective people's declaration. Southern African civil society networks interact within both formal regionalisms, where it legitimises the existing status quo through cooperation, and with self-organised regionalisms, where it challenges the status quo through self-organised initiatives for radical change. Thus, these informal institutions are considered, by many, to constitute alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions. More than that, they build community, increase participation, promote diversity, and strengthen civic engagement. In this regard, regionalism has become an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors.

6.2 Comparative analysis of strategies, norms and rules of Southern African civil society networks within interactions

Table 6.1 Comparison of SACSNs' devised institutional arrangements during interactions

Institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs	Institutional settings (Frame of Reference)		Remarks
	SADC-led setting	**Self-organised setting**	
Strategies	- Cooperation/collaboration with SADC elites - Quiet diplomacy - Submission of collective communiqué - Informal bargaining behind the scenes - Building elitist alliance - Desktop search	- Confrontation/competition - Building solidarity and coalitions - Popular conscientization - Submission of a collective declaration - Sharing opportunities and lived experiences - Parallel activities	On the one hand, SACSNs lobby for change inside SADC framework through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. On the other hand, SACSNs build solidarity and coalition in self-organised settings outside the mainstream of the SADC
Norms	- Conforming to existing status quo - Respect of precedence - Reinforcing formal norms while invoking alternative norms - Compliance to SADC-driven debates by SADC elites or technocrats - Civil norms are not enforceable, but influential.	- Contestation of SADC status quo through internalised norms - Participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit - Claiming rights to be included in regional decision-making processes - Popular and collective debates	SACSNs in vertical interaction respect SADC-created norms through conforming to the status quo. In contrast, SACSNs in horizontal interaction oppose and contest the status quo through shared beliefs, common understanding and collective actions
Rules	- Respect of chain of command delineating responsibilities within SADC - Prohibition of radical and aggressive attitude during the formal sessions - Moderation and tolerance - Formal dress code and only qualified elite class participate - Respect of MoU with SADC Secretariat	- Identification of participants to the People's Summit through national contact points - Collective commitment to abide by uncodified rules and culture of belonging - T-shirt or cultural dress code expressing lived experiences - Both illiterate and literate participate	In formal settings SACSNs comply with SADC-provided legal framework in form of Treaty, Protocol, MoU delineating responsibilities. While in self-organised interaction, SACSNs develop fair and block uncodified rules in line with grassroots circumstances.

Source: the author

Table 6.1 highlights the comparative analysis of devised institutional arrangements of the two sets of SACSNs during their interactions. By doing so, Table 6.1 presents institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs (down) and Institutional settings (across). Thus, the first quadrant lists Strategies against SADC-led setting. These include cooperation/collaboration with SADC elites; quiet diplomacy; submission of collective communiqué; informal bargaining behind the scenes; building elitist alliance and desktop search. As for the fourth quadrant, it shows the norms defining the operational procedures of SACSNs during their interaction within a self-organised setting. For instance, contestation of SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit; claiming rights to be included in regional decision-making processes; to name a few, constitute the norms devised by SACSNs within the self-organised setting. In the vein, quadrant five shows which rules guide SACSNs while interacting within a formal setting. Respect of chain of command delineating responsibilities within SADC; prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes during the formal sessions; moderation and tolerance; respect of MoU with SADC Secretariat, are rules driving interaction of SACSNs within formal settings. The last column in the table includes remarks that emerge from the settings in the previous two columns as well as their interaction with the institutional arrangements listed in the first column highlights. For example, one remark that emerges from the devised strategies by SACSNs within and outside of SADC-led setting is that, reformist SACSNs lobby for change inside SADC framework through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. However, transformist SACSNs build solidarity and coalition in self-organised settings outside the mainstream of the SADC as indicated in quadrant remarks/strategies in Table 6.1.

In political projects to form regions, Southern African civil society networks like SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, among others, find it difficult to be included by the SADC member states in decision-making processes with the same rights as states and markets. They view SADC as a shrinking space for civil participation and subsequently employ various kinds of strategies, norms and rules in order to build an alternative regional order that allows for the inclusion and participation of Southern African epistemic communities. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the two sets of institutional arrangements devised by the above regional networks is of paramount importance to respond to the research questions and objectives of this study. In this study, the comparative analysis is based on the differentiating analysis which is used to explain differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African

civil society in two distinct institutional settings as a frame of reference for this comparison. Although both SADC-CNGO and SAPSN advocate for the inclusion and participation of the regional citizenry in the regional political projects to form regions, the strategies they respectively employ and their respective norms and rules differ significantly. Even though SADC-CNGO can be sceptical of SADC's state-centric mode of governance, it still ensures cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with SADC elites in order to lobby for reform within SADC formal spaces. SAPSN allows the regional citizenry to contest the SADC status quo and confront SADC elites outside of the mainstream in self-organised spaces through solidarity and coalition-building among themselves.

When comparing the two sets of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks (SACSNs) within both formal and self-organised regionalisms, as presented in Table 6.1, it is clear that there is a variation between them, and this is useful in the construction of a typology. Firstly, in line with developed strategies, on the one hand, some SACSNs, like SADC-CNGO, collaborate with SADC elites and employ quiet diplomacy behind the scenes in order to lobby for regional reform during interaction inside SADC-established spaces, as showed in first quadrant of Table 6.1. On the other hand, other SACSNs – like SAPSN – enter into competition and contestation with SADC elites for an alternative regional order through solidarity and coalition-building in self-organised and parallel activities outside of the SADC mainstream, as displayed in the second quadrant of Table 6.1. Given the above argument, SATUCC is a striking example of using cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes to lobby for reform inside a SADC-provided interactive framework by engaging with SADC elites cooperatively through respect of precedence during development and adoption of several protocols. These include the SADC Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of People, the SADC Employment Protocol, the SADC Social Security Code, and the SADC Code on HIV/AIDs and Employment, among others (Respondent 17, 2018; SATUCC 2013).

Nevertheless, the implementation of the above regional instruments by SADC member states is still an illusion and mired in many challenges (Respondent 23, 2018). In relation to the collaboration strategy and as indicated in chapter 4 and 5, in 2004 SADC-CNGO entered into a partnership with SADC through an MoU aimed at promoting their cooperation and collaboration in order to implement the SADC-CNGO programmes on poverty eradication and sustainable development (SADC-CNGO 2012, Godsäter 2013). More than that, Gender Links,

through the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance, collaborated and cooperated with the SADC Gender Unit within the SADC Secretariat in 2016 for the development of the MER framework for the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (Gender Links 2016). However, although devised as strategies by some SACSNs in order to seek reform inside SADC-provided spaces of interaction, cooperative engagement and collaboration were criticised by many to exhibit the traits of affiliate organizations to SADC, like the case of SEG, SATUCC, ASCCI, among others (Respondent 17, 2018; Ncube 2009, Godsäter 2013). These civil organizations have been accused by other regional civil groupings of building elitist alliances with SADC officials in order to capture their attention, translated into invitations to various high-profile SADC meetings (Respondents 9, 23, 2018). As emphasised by Godsäter (2013), SEG, for example, has been present in the SADC Employment and Labour Task Force. Similarly, apart from the MoU with SADC on promoting business in Southern Africa, ASCCI arranges meetings between government and SADC officials and business representatives with regional trade on the agenda (Godsäter 2013). Despite the interaction within SADC institutions, SACSNs have not succeeded in pushing for inclusive and transparent debates among stakeholders in the formation of the Southern African region. The above argument is empirically evidenced by the unending SADC-centred regional order driven by the will of the member states rather than the aspirations of the people. In that regard, new strategies were developed by the regional citizenry in contestation of the SADC-established order within self-organised settings outside of the SADC mainstream and claim their rights of inclusion in regional decision-making processes as stipulated by article 23 of the SADC Treaty. The emergence of self-organised arenas of civil participation alongside SADC institutions fills the gaps left by cooperative engagement, quiet diplomacy, elitist alliance-building behind the scenes and collaboration with SADC elites as strategies developed by SACSNs in formal settings of interaction.

Findings reveal again that strategies developed by SACSNs within self-organised settings of interaction outside of the SADC framework are not moderate to SADC elites and intolerant of a state-centric mode of governance but enhances person-to-person integration. In 2016, for example, from 17 to 19 August more than 450 cross-border civil society representatives drawn from grassroots organisations, youth and student movements, economic justice and human rights networks, labour movements, community-based organisations, women and gender-based movements, and faith-based organisations, among others, were all gathered at the SADC People's Summit in Manzini, Swaziland as a parallel activity alongside the SADC Heads of

State Summit (Action Support 2016). There was a general belief among respondents that solidarity building strategies employed among side-lined epistemic communities during the SADC People's Summit in Manzini enabled the 450 delegates to speak a collective language in line with contestation against SADC elites. They collectively put more pressure on the latter outside of the SADC mainstream to call for radical change through expression of their discontent against established undemocratic practices and human rights abuses. These include, according to Action Support (2016), shrinking space for public participation in key national and regional decision-making spaces; exceptional rising levels of corruption; land grabbing and farmer-related challenges; lack of adjusting to climate change; and condoning corporate abuses, among other issues affecting people's livelihood daily. As indicated in chapter 5, the SADC People's Tribunal strategically allows citizens across the region to share their lived experiences and opportunities in a quest for regional solidarity-building.

Consequently, networks are built upon shared values and common identities as drivers of cross-border interaction within horizontal networks. However, although predominant among grassroots citizens in self-organised settings, coalition-building is not an exclusive strategy to them, but is also happening among those interacting within SADC spaces, even though this interaction is between elites rather than ordinary citizens. For example, SADC-CNGO recognises the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance as a key strategic partner and considers Gender Links its expert or reference organisation on gender architecture (Ditlake in Gender Links 2016: 22). Sometimes, SADC-CNGO and its allies invite SADC officials as guest speakers during their Civil Society Forums. In other words, SACSNs have entered into coalitions among themselves even though operating differently as insiders and outsiders. "We are not in contradiction to each other as civil society in the region but still we are using different approaches to enfeeble the SADC-established neoliberal order", says one respondent from civil society (Respondent 11, 2018). Occasionally, SATUCC and SAPSN, for example, join forces together in order to put more pressure on SADC-elites during the marches organised by the SADC People's Summit.

Secondly, as presented in third and fourth quadrants in Table 6.1, the comparative differentiating analysis between norms developed in two distinct institutional settings reveals that Southern African civil society networks interacting within SADC institutions complement and conform themselves to the existing status quo through respect of the precedence, compared to those interacting within self-organised settings that challenge and contest the status quo

through shared beliefs and a common understanding shaping their common identities and at the same time driving their collective actions. This implies that once invited to participate as observers to SADC's official meetings, SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, and Gender Links, among others, have an obligation to not challenge but respect the SADC-established formal agenda set by an outsider and their collective declaration is expected to conform to the SADC regional integration mandate to avoid exclusion from subsequent forums.

In contrast, in self-organised settings, the agenda is not set by outside players but is instead set collectively by ordinary insider citizens through their respective representatives after circulation for comments and approval before the SADC People's Summit. Self-organisation is about the willingness of the regional citizenry to overcome collective problems through collective action without imposition by outside players. For instance, Godsäter (2013) criticises SADC-CNGO for conforming to SADC's neoliberal view of regional integration by reiterating its support for the aims and ideals of the SADC Treaty in relation to regional cooperation and development in their statement during the 5th SADC Civil Society Forum in Kinshasa, DR Congo in September 2009. Unlike in the formal setting, in the collective declaration during the SADC People's Summit in September 2009 in Kinshasa, the regional citizenry contested the SADC status quo and opposed member states by accusing them of implementing neo-colonial and capitalist policies that plunged the region into abject poverty and drastic unemployment instead of enabling citizens to own resources useful for security and justice (SAPSN 2009, Congo Forum 2009). Interestingly, the abovementioned have influenced another difference between collection declarations from both the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People's Summit in terms of their content and manifested attitude that may respectively complement and oppose SADC's agenda. As indicated in chapter 5, participants in the SADC People's Summit have often taken to the streets of the Summit's host country, in the form of a peaceful march, to contest the established regional order by calling on the member states to respect their commitment to open up civic spaces to allow civil participation at both national and regional levels.

Lastly, regarding the rules developed by SACSN when interacting with SADC-elites and among themselves in self-organised settings, as mentioned in fifth and sixth quadrants of Table 6.1, a differentiating analysis demonstrates that within formal settings SACSNs comply with the top-down perspective or SADC-established rules-in-form like treaties, protocols, and MoUs which delineate responsibilities among regional stakeholders. Here, tolerance and open-

mindedness are required during a formal interface which are translated into the prohibition of radical and aggressive attitudes from invited regional civil society participants. Compared to self-organised interaction, SACSNs create bottom-up fair and joint uncodified rules in line with local circumstances as rules-in-use. In this case, civil society within self-organised platforms becomes hostile to the attitude of SADC elites, accusing them of dragging their feet to operationalise article 23 of the SADC Treaty.

Consequently, rules-in-use are applied in the form of uncodified collective commitments to abide by the culture of belonging whereby ordinary citizens discuss the optimal joint strategies and norms to extract promises from one another through frank debates. Internalised rules within these self-organised interactions enable civil society to be tolerant of one another and conscious of the plurality and diversity of culture among them.

Differentiating analysis proves there is a difference between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks when they interact within both SADC-established spaces and/or among themselves in self-organised settings outside of the SADC. Yet, interacting within the two distinct institutional settings do not necessarily indicate a dichotomy among Southern African civil society networks but a way of building alternative regionalisms from different fronts by devising different kinds of strategies, norms and rules. As Scholte (2015: 25) points out, civil society links may make larger gains by quietly engaging official institutions outside of the mainstream, while on other occasions noisy public demonstrations can more effectively promote the alternative. However, institutional arrangements developed within SADC-created spaces were viewed by many respondents as an impediment to the construction of alternative regionalisms which are supposed to be spontaneously driven by the aspirations of the epistemic communities themselves at multiple levels. This being said, these strategies, norms and rules developed by SACSNs within SADC-created spaces contribute, to some extent, to the persistence of the state-centric status quo which undermines full inclusion of the epistemic communities in decision-making processes to form Southern African regions.

This state-centric status quo puts more emphasis on member states and their technocrats as sole players in regional political decisions, to the detriment of epistemic communities who are deemed to be only beneficiaries. There was a general view among respondents that these strategies, norms and rules devised by SACSNs in formal settings of interaction constitute an

impediment to people-centred regionalism as they spark the legitimisation of the existent SADC status quo, which continues to exclude the majority of the regional citizenry in the formal formation of regions. Yet, according to Samuel (2002), legitimacy, communication, participation and representativeness of ordinary citizens constitute the integrating principles of people-centred regionalism. As emphasised in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2, an alternative to state-centred regionalism has no meaning without some degree of direct involvement of the general citizenry in the decision-making that affects their daily lives. Respondents from SADC-CNGO and SATUCC all believe that conforming to the SADC-established order, coupled with quiet diplomacy and bargaining behind the scenes between breakaway sessions, have helped SACSNs to influence reform of the SADC protocols in favour of the regional citizenry in different sectors of their lives, for example, the case of Gender Links, SATUCC, and SAT, among others, that manage to influence SADC protocols in their respective fields through bargaining for reform within SADC-created spaces (Söderbaum and Godsäter 2011, Godsäter 2013, 2015, SATUCC 2013, Gender Links 2016). At the same time, they alert the sleeping or obstinate SADC member states to the drawbacks or shortcomings of some implemented protocols and political projects to form a region. In a nutshell, these strategies, norms and rules employed by SACSNs within SADC-provided spaces can be an impediment to people-centred regionalisms in case they are meant to only legitimise state-centred mode of SADC governance as indicated in chapter 4.

In contrast, public conscientization, contestation of the SADC status quo within parallel activities, claiming rights to be included in the formal spaces by protesting and demonstrating, and sharing lived experiences through collective commitment to uncodified rules and culture of belonging developed by SACSNs within self-organised settings of interaction outside of SADC mainstream, are all viewed by many respondents to be the basis of alternative regionalisms that are not only conventional phenomena, but also unconventional phenomena centred around non-state actors and driven by themselves. The majority of respondents from the regional civil society category believe that these strategies, norms and rules employed within the SADC People's Summit and Civil Society Forums allow regional citizenry engagement whereby ordinary cross-border citizens participate freely and in a collective manner in the formation of regions in multidimensional forms. Collective decisions are made through free expression of self-reliant non-state actors, including the marginalised, through open and frank debates driven by self-consciousness, of the desire to be active agents in the

formation of regions translated into collective communiqués seeking alternatives. For example, within the SADC People's Tribunal, survivors of corporate abuse are allowed to share their lived experiences and testimonies before their peer participants or other survivors for collective action against any malpractice by multinationals. These resonate with what Gaventa and McGee (2013) highlight, namely that citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states, and inclusive and cohesive societies. In other words, these strategies, norms and rules of civil society networks devised within self-organised interaction corroborate with the integrating principles of people-centred approaches such as legitimacy, communication and participation as backed by Samuel (2002) in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2 of this thesis.

However, the legitimacy and representativeness of some SACSNs like SATUCC and SADC-CNGO have been criticised by several SADC elites and regional donors/partners as indicated respectively in sections 4.4.4. and 4.5 of chapter 4. To some, SATUCC leadership has been elected by a few affiliated members who contributed their membership fee in order to vote. This financial prerequisite of affiliation has sidelined many national trade union umbrellas who were unable to vote for the SATUCC leadership. Consequently, the inclusion and legitimacy of SATUCC become debatable, observes one regional donor representative (Respondent 27, 2018). Some reproached these SACSNs for being driven by the will of a club of elites excluding ordinary citizens they claim to represent and help (Respondents 2, 24, 2018). Consequently, their institutional arrangements may be portrayed to be inclusive but are still far from building true alternative regionalisms genuinely centred around ordinary citizens in the SADC region, laments one donor representative (Respondent 23, 2018).

The above claims have been dismissed by regional civil society respondents by indicating the way they build regional solidarity through public conscientization on human rights abuses and regional political regime discrepancies which are stripping Southern African citizens' dignity. They allow the voices of ordinary citizens to be listened to, through self-organised platforms or sometimes through their national representatives, and after that merged into a collective communiqué. Although conforming to SADC's state-centric status quo, it also needs to be emphasised that some strategies, norms and rules developed in SADC-created spaces may be useful in the construction of alternative regionalisms. For instance, cooperative engagement is a good entry point into a shrinking civic space like SADC. It is useful once it is joined with quiet diplomacy in the form of informal bargaining behind the scenes between breakaway

sessions, like in the case of SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, to convince obstinate SADC elites to opt for reform and abandon their radical attitudes against full inclusion of ordinary citizens in regional decision-making processes.

It is therefore possible for this cooperative engagement of civil society networks associated with informal bargaining to complement the other strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised interaction outside of SADC for an alternative. In vertical interaction, the latter strategies help to influence the conscience of the SADC elites and intangibly weaken the SADC-established order thanks to the MoU allowing their interaction with SADC elites. For instance, the desktop search conducted on the SADC region by SADC-CNGO, SAT, SATUCC, and Gender Links, among others, can be made available to citizen associations within SAPSN for public conscientization and capacity building during the SADC People's Summit (SADC-CNGO 2012, Respondent 21, 2018). Based on the above comparison, it is of paramount importance to argue that, despite a few shortcomings, strategies, norms and rules developed by SACSNs within self-organised interaction are likely to facilitate the formation of people-centred regionalisms. At the same time, a few of the institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs within SADC-created spaces can complement those employed within self-organised spaces in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

6.3 Differentiating civil society's institutional arrangements within formal and self-organised interaction

The following section provides a detailed account of the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks (SACSNs) when they interact within both SADC-created spaces and among themselves in horizontal networks outside of the SADC mainstream.

Table 6.2: Difference between strategies, norms and rules developed in and outside SADC

SACSNs within	**A1** **Formal Interaction**	**A2** **Self-Organised Interaction**
B1 **Strategies**	Complementing status quo Compliance agenda	Contesting the status quo Ownership of agenda
B2 **Norms**	Constrictive/Moderate	Expansive/Confrontational
B3 **Rules**	White-collar bureaucracy	Authentic grassroots approach

	(Codified)	(partly codified)

Source: the author

Table 6.2 above displays the difference between strategies, norms and rules developed by SACSNs in and outside SADC. To start with, Table 6.2 is comprised of institutional arrangements A1 and A2 (across) and institutional settings B1, B2 and B3 (down). Quadrant A1B1 reveals different kinds of strategies devised by SACNS during their interaction within a formal setting compared to quadrant A2B1, which shows other kinds of strategies devised in self-organised. For example, complementing status quo and compliance agenda constitute devised strategies in formal setting compared to contesting status quo and ownership of agenda in a self-organised setting. These difference in institutional arrangements developed within two distinct institutional setting is visible throughout Table 6.2 in relation to norms and rules as presented in quadrant A1B2 compared to quadrant A2B2, and quadrant A1B3 vs A2B3.

A differentiating comparative analysis reveals that SACSNs that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism exhibit different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation in challenging formal regionalism. The differences between the two kinds of institutional arrangements include competing vs complementing status quo; ownership vs imposition of agenda; capacious vs constrictive; and grassroots solidarity vs elitist alliance.

6.3.1 **Contesting vs Complementing State-Centric Order**

Information gleaned from discussions with semi-structured interview respondents showed that the difference between the overall strategies, norms and rules developed by SACSNs within horizontal networks and those exhibited in vertical interaction with SADC elites lies in the fact that they are, on the one hand, confrontational and on the other complementing to the SADC status quo. A differentiating comparative approach reveals, first of all, confronting SADC elites through parallel summits, solidarity building among ordinary regional citizens, and sharing lived experiences outside of the SADC mainstream all endorse the competition in which self-organised interaction goes up against the SADC status quo. Secondly, conforming in a cooperative engagement and respect for the precedence during meetings guided by an MoU with SADC Secretariat demonstrates how SACSNs complement the SADC status quo while interacting within SADC institutions.

Based on the findings presented in chapter 5, the difference is that civil society groupings interacting within horizontal networks are competing with the existing SADC status quo rather than complementing it, for not being invited to interact within SADC-established spaces. In fact, SAPSN and other transformist civil organisations all compete, on various fronts, with SADC institutions through parallel activities, like the SADC People's Summit and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, with the aim to enhance person-to-person integration followed by their inclusion in decision-making processes to build alternative regionalisms, compared to SADC-CNGO, for example, that complements SADC's state-centred mode of governance, while abiding by the MoU within SADC-created spaces of interaction. Although lobbying either within formal or self-organised settings of interaction, Southern African civil society networks should not abandon their assigned goals, which constitute fighting for the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the decision-making processes to form regions.

6.3.2 **Ownership vs Compliance to Agenda**

The repeated theme appearing in the responses of discussants during focus groups was that there was difference between the way civil society networks were engaging in debates within the formal SADC forums and self-organised forums like the SADC People's Summit (Discussant 4, 6, 2018). As presented in chapter 5, participants at clustered thematic sessions like those on landless people, the cross-border informal sector, the Unemployed People's Assembly, the Rural Women's Assembly, small-scale Farmers, youth and unemployment, tax justice and extractives, the Climate Justice Alliance, the Trade Justice Campaign, the Permanent People's Tribunal, and the Migrant People's Assembly (Respondents 10, 17, 2018), have all given opportunities to freely debate according to lived experiences. In this case, apart from the SADC agenda that was circulated prior to the convening regional citizenry within the People's Summit, debates are driven by shared lived experiences and opportunities from the participants without being necessarily steered by an outside agenda. The collective agenda is constructed during popular interaction. Instead, within SADC-established spaces, as indicated in chapter 5, the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC Regional Policy Dialogues, and the Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit invite regional civil society participants to a debate of which the agenda has been set by SADC elites.

For the sake of respect for precedence, civil society representatives, in this formal setting, become obligated to argue in line with the member states agenda by sharing their views. Against this backdrop, there is strong ownership of debates driven by collective attitudes of epistemic communities within self-organised settings compared to state-oriented debates driven by the political attitudes of SADC elites.

6.3.3 **Expansive vs Constricting Norms**

It is evident from the findings presented in chapter 5 that civil society self-organised avenues of interaction, like the SADC People's Summit, have developed participatory norms that abide by the principles of a people-centred approach. Those inclusive and flexible norms allow numerous people from different levels of society, including gender and age groups, to freely participate in the debates, advancing a range of economic, environmental, political and social causes. For instance, before the SADC People's Summit, participants are mobilised at national level among grassroots communities and survivors of any forms of abuse who are willing to share their lived experiences or testimonies within different thematic groups. Once identified, no one is left behind among those who were interested in participating (Respondents 17, 21, 2018), compared to formal interaction, where civil representatives reinforce the established selective and bureaucratic norms of participation cautioned by invitations and MoUs with SADC institutions. In this case, only invited civil society representatives can participate as observers in the SADC official forums. For example, SATUCC representatives cannot participate in the Council of the Ministers on regional labour-related matters without a formal invitation from the SADC Secretariat. At the same time, other trade unions not affiliated to SATUCC, for the reasons indicated above, might find themselves denied access to SADC forums on labour issues even though the matter might concern regional workers (Respondent 17, 2018). In this regard, there is a wide scope for participation within self-organised settings that are driven by inclusive and flexible norms, as opposed to the constrictive character and greater bureaucracy of the official SADC forums.

6.3.4 **Grassroots Solidarity vs Elitist Alliance**

Respondents alleged that many civil society organisations are operating within the Southern African region, like SADC-CNGO, FOCCISA, SATUCC, Gender Links, ICBT, SAPSN, to name a few, claimed to build solidarity and coalitions among the general citizenry across the region and to be at the centre of their formation. Yet, some of these acclaimed regional representations had fallen short of inclusion, complained one respondent from the general public (Respondent 21, 2018). As indicated in section 5.5.1.2 of chapter 5, discussants said that the SAPSN has successfully enhanced solidarity and coalitions among grassroots and vulnerable people across the region through its strategy of sharing lived experiences during the SADC People's Summit. These have helped the people of SADC to have a common understanding of what their challenges are and to identify themselves through a collective agenda in order to think collectively on how to solve their problems through collective actions (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2015).

Unlike the SAPSN, the apex bodies of civil society (SADC-CNGO, SATUCC and FOCCISA) are much more interested in affiliated members who pay their membership fees. Similarly, discussants from focus group 1 disclosed that these apex bodies are interested in building an elitist alliance with SADC elites to gain greater entry into SADC formal forums. For instance, SAT was criticised by most discussants for having privileged access to the SADC Secretariat because of its link to its former member currently working within the SADC Secretariat. An elitist alliance with the apex bodies is allegedly for personal profit between the parties in alliance and overlooks enhancing solidarity among the cross-border epistemic communities they claim to mobilise and unite to reclaim SADC for people (Discussant 11, 2018).

6.3.5 **Authentic Grassroots Approach vs White-Collar Bureaucracy**

Responses from respondents during semi-structured interviews revealed that during self-organised interaction, civil society associations use an authentic grassroots approach to express themselves. These include wearing t-shirts conveying their aspirations and at the same time carrying placards disseminating the message concerning their lived experiences and expectations from SADC elites during the People's Summit, compared to SADC forums where invited participants are obliged to be in formal attire and abide by formalised state-led proceedings. More than that, there is attire worn during performances, dance exhibitions of

each representative groups demonstrating cultural diversity and slogans and chanting of liberation struggle songs during the People's Summit. Discussants from focus group 2 said one can tell by the setting at the venue how vertical interaction is highly hierarchical and militarised during the SADC forums, compared to the horizontal networks' venue, where people in solidarity have developed mutual trust enabling them to guard themselves during the SADC People's Summit. The collective declaration derived from collective resolutions of civil society actors during the SADC People's Summit comprises diverse aspirations and grievances of all participants.

In contrast, during their interaction within SADC forums as observers, representatives of civil society associations endorse some of the official SADC resolutions and read their collective communiqué from their Civil Society Forum which, often, shares the views of SADC officials.

6.4 Civil strategies, norms and rules within and outside of SADC through a people-centeredness lens

This section discusses the findings presented above on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks within and outside SADC according to principles of participation and legitimacy as integrating principles of a people-centred approach to regionalism. The goal is to find out how differently these two sets of institutional arrangements developed by ordinary citizens in two distinct interaction settings speak to the integrating principles of a people-centred approach.

6.4.1 **Participation**

As argued in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2, people-centeredness requires full and continuous involvement of the general public in the decision-making that affects their lives daily. In this case, participation has not only become part of the rights of citizenship but also one of the principles of democratic governance (Dahl 1998; Pateman 1970; Samuel 2002). As indicated in chapter 1 by Gaventa and McGee (2013), citizen engagement produces positive outcomes such as construction of citizenship, increased capacities for collective action, responsive and accountable states, and inclusive and cohesive societies. The examination revolved around how different the two sets of developed procedural mechanisms by civil society networks focused on active participation and representation based on inclusive moral choice, self-reliance and ownership by epistemic communities (De Beer 2012).

Firstly, findings revealed that the majority of respondents and participants believed in developed strategies, norms and rules within self-organised spaces of interaction to encourage in-depth involvement of cross-border epistemic communities in political decisions to form regions. However, strategies, norms and rules developed within formal interaction encourage weak involvement of ordinary citizens. For example, building solidarity and coalitions, and sharing lived experiences through open debates as strategies within clustered thematic groups, encourage marginalised citizens within the region to be fully involved in the formation of region processes. However, collaboration with SADC elites through a cooperative engagement as a result of an MoU encourages passive participation translated into a weak civil involvement, as only a few invited civil society representatives took part in the SADC formal forums. This implies there is a difference in terms of the number of participants within the two distinct spaces of interaction, which impacts the level of representation featuring an absolute participatory mechanism (Respondents 17, 22, 2018).

Secondly, discussants argued that parallel activities, popular conscientization and mutual trust, among other procedural mechanisms developed within horizontal networks, enabled epistemic communities across the SADC region to become self-reliant vis-à-vis the member states. The regional citizenry become capable of exercising their citizenship in order to intervene collectively in pressing issues affecting their lives. In contrast, respect of a MoU with SADC, an elitist alliance with SADC elites and quiet diplomacy as developed by insider civil society networks were all criticised by most respondents and participants for yielding dependent citizens acting as beneficiaries but not as active agents in decision-making processes. Lastly, findings demonstrated that open debates through lived experiences and sharing opportunities within clustered thematic groups during the SADC People's Summit encourage ownership of both the summit agenda and decisions incorporated into a collective declaration. Citizens get involved with their voices being heard within civil horizontal networks. Compared to conforming to the SADC status quo, respect of the precedence, compliance to SADC-driven debates developed by reformist civil society networks within SADC-created spaces, most discussants from focus group 2 lamented that these institutions did not encourage ownership either of the agenda or the formal Summit (Discussants 11, 12, 2018).

There is weak involvement with barely a voice within formal interaction. Against this backdrop, it has been found that strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African

civil society networks within self-organised settings outside of SADC promote in-depth participation of epistemic communities across the region.

6.4.2 Legitimacy

The discussion inquiry showed dichotomies and tensions in the way respondents perceive and experience the legitimacy of collective actions of Southern African civil society networks in interaction within and outside the SADC sphere. Although legitimacy is the right to govern and defines the basis on which the right to rule rests, it is not merely about legality; it is both about ethics and politics (Williams 1998, Coicaud 2002, 2004, Edwards, 2010 in Lis 2011). More than that, Steffek (2014) classifies output legitimacy and input legitimacy within global studies. According to Steffek, output legitimacy, as indicated in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2, implies the efficient delivery of results that are in the public interest of the particular community. As for input legitimacy, it constitutes institutional arrangements that allow citizens to communicate their interests, values, and preferences to political decision-makers or to take decisions by themselves in the case of direct democracy (Steffek 2014).

As mentioned in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2, this study considered institutions as legitimate that truly reflect the aspirations of the ordinary citizens across the region in the quest for alternative regionalism, in which voter legitimacy itself is not enough. In this regard, legitimacy is about the credibility and rights acquired from the general public to the national and international institutions that claim to represent them, like the case of SACSNs (Steffek 2014). Against this backdrop, findings revealed that Southern African civil society networks are composed of a regional body affiliated with national chapters. The aspirations of grassroots communities seem to be channelled into the regional forums through the existing representative networks in the name of public interests Apart from their associational life, there was a general view among respondents that the strategies, norms and rules of cross-border civil society associations within the SADC People's Summit, the Civil Society Forum, Gender Links Forums and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, represent the collective aspirations of most epistemic communities (Respondents 16, 20, 2018).

Most of the respondents from civil society claimed that the collective actions undertaken became legitimate because they were conducted in the public interest and their resolutions during clustered thematic groups were consolidated into a collective declaration. Yet, referring

to rights acquired from votes of ordinary citizens, some regional donors and SADC elites criticised SACSNs for being illegitimate, as they did not receive any mandate from the people they claim to represent. Regional representation of citizens within both formal and self-organised forums was criticised by other stakeholders to be very selective by a club of elites claiming to be leaders (Respondents 3, 26, 2018). In this regard, parallel activities, coalition and solidarity-building embody the legitimacy of regional epistemic communities as they are undertaken to advance the public interests in the region.

6.5 **Institutional Typologies according to Institutional Settings of Civil Society Groups**

This study employed a cross-tabulation of two dimensions forming multi-dimensional categorical variables. This implies each cell within a cross-tabulate constituted categories that describe the kinds of strategies, norms and rules as dependent variables, developed by civil society under a particular dimension, either SADC-created spaces or self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. The construction of typologies in this study is based on the model of institutional interaction according to Young (2002) and typology of institutions of Helmke and Levitsky (2002) as alluded to in chapter 2.

6.5.1 Typology of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society networks in and outside SADC

Against the above backdrop, a typology was constructed of the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed within two distinct institutional settings of interaction, as below displayed by Table 6.3. This typology categorises strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society according to their respective institutional settings in which interactions took place, namely SADC-created spaces and self-organised horizontal networks as indicated in columns B1 and B2 of Table 6.3. For example, on the one hand, quadrant A1B1 shows that the strategies most devised by civil society associations, which conform to the existing SADC status quo, within SADC-created spaces of interaction, are labelled *Elitist-collaboration/Informal bargaining strategies.* Because within SADC-created spaces, representatives of civil associations are most likely to cooperate with SADC elites during their interaction through cooperative engagement, closeness to officials, quiet diplomacy, informal bargaining behind the scenes and seeking an alliance with elites.

The overall norms guiding the interaction of civil society networks within SADC-led forums, which legitimise the existing SADC status quo, are labelled *Compliant Norms*, as shown in quadrant A2B1 of Table 6.3. The findings presented above stress that Southern African civil society networks interacting within formal SADC forums conform themselves to the established mode of regional governance by SADC. They abide by the spirit and letter of the elitist SADC communiqué despite their involvement in the dialogue as observers or partners. Conforming to the SADC status quo is, sometimes, visible in the SACSNs' collective declaration during their Civil Society Forums.

Moreover, the rules most often developed by insider Southern African civil society networks, that reinforce and abide by the existing SADC-provided legal framework through respect of precedence, are labelled *Dependent Rules* as disclosed by quadrant A3B1 in Table 6.3. Here, reformist civil society networks, like SATUCC and SADC-CNGO, respect the SADC-established chain of command defining tasks during SADC forums. At the same time, they respect the precedence established by the SADC legal framework of civil interaction. This category of reformist civil society networks in the Southern African region makes sure any developed institutional arrangements do not infringe on the SADC-established order for fear of being excluded from the official forums. On the other hand, quadrant A1B2 of Table 6.3 presents the strategies most devised by transformist civil society networks in the Southern African region, like SAPSN, which enter into competition with SADC-elites outside of the SADC mainstream through solidarity and coalition-building within parallel activities like the SADC People's Summit, the Civil Society Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba are labelled *Confrontational and Grassroots Solidarity Building Strategies.*

Within parallel activities outside of SADC institutions, civil society associations seek to build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through sharing lived experiences and popular conscientization. As presented above, cross-border civil society associations share lived experiences and opportunities in self-organised platforms, like the SADC People's Summit. As displayed in quadrant A2B2 of Table 6.3, the customary norms guiding procedural mechanisms of transformist civil society groupings within horizontal networks, that enter into contestation with SADC status quo, are described as *Contesting and Mobilising Norms.* Because the regional citizenry in SADC exercises citizenship and claims their rights to be included in the SADC discussion forums through demonstrations, protests, popular debates in the quest for

alternative regionalisms. They are guided by common beliefs, identity and mutual trust among themselves.

Finally, the rules most developed within civil horizontal networks by transformist civil groupings, which regulate a collective commitment, a common understanding and mutual trust are labelled *Grassroots Emancipatory Rules* as shown in quadrant A3B2 of Table 6.3. During interaction in clustered popular debates, participants across the region abide by both partly codified and uncodified rules that consider the culture diversity and level of literacy of all participants. In this regard, this typology is constructed based on the examination of these two dimensions, SADC-provided spaces and self-organised civic spaces, combined with dependent variables, strategies, norms and rules. Table 6.3 summarizes this typology.

Table 6.3 Typology of kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by SARCSNs in and outside SADC

Developed Civil Institutional Arrangements

Regional Interaction settings	SACSNs within	**A1 Strategies**	**A2 Norms**	**A3 Rules**
	B1 SADC-provided spaces (Reformists)	Elitist-Collaboration /informal bargaining	Compliant Norms	Dependent Rules
	B2 Self-organised civic spaces (Transformists)	Confrontational/Grassroots solidarity building	Contesting/mobilising Norms	Emancipatory Grassroots Rules

Source: the Author

The discussion above demonstrates that these strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised spaces outside of the mainstream are considered, by many, to constitute alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions that are centred around and driven by aspirations of cross-border epistemic communities. More than that, findings demonstrate how these self-devised institutional arrangements build community, increase participation, promote diversity and strengthen the legitimacy and civic engagement, which are of paramount importance for people-centred regionalisms. In this

regard, regionalism has become an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors.

6.5.2 **Typology of Southern African civil society interaction within regionalisms**

Information gleaned from the literature, discussions with respondents and the findings presented in the previous chapters reveal the way developed strategies, norms and rules by civil society networks during their interaction have informed a typology of how associations of cross-border non-state actors interact within regionalisms in the Southern African region. Based on the above discussion with empirical findings, it has been found that Southern African civil society networks interact within three spaces in the quest for alternative regionalisms.

Table 6.4 Typology of SACSNs interaction in regionalisms based on their strategies, norms and rules.

Developed Civil Institutional Arrangements

Regional Interaction settings	SACSNs within	**A1 Strategies**	**A2 Norms**	**A3 Rules**
	B1 SADC-provided spaces (SADC Institutions)	Elitist-Collaboration /informal bargaining	Compliant Norms	Dependent Rules
	B2 Intermediate Spaces (Reformist spaces)	Cooperative/rivalry strategies	Mobilising/Compliant Norms	Internalised/ Dependent rules
	B3 Self-organised spaces (Transformist spaces)	Confrontational/Grassroots solidarity building	Contesting/mobilising Norms	Emancipatory Grassroots Rules

Source: Compiled by the Author

In addition to what is presented above in Table 6.3, Table 6.4 brings in the emergence of a new intermediate space of interaction created by reformist civil society, like SADC-CNGO. Table 6.4 presents a typology of SACSNs interaction in three settings of regionalism based on their strategies, norms and rules. It is constituted of both developed civil institutional arrangements,

strategies, norms and rules, as shown in A1, A2 and A3 across the row, and regional interaction settings, SADC-provided spaces, intermediate spaces and self-organised spaces as listed down by columns B1, B2 and B3 respectively. Table 6.4 demonstrates that based on their different developed strategies, norms and rules, SACSNs interact within three institutional settings instead of two as above displayed in Table 6.3. The column B2 of Table 6.4 presents the intermediate or reformist spaces of interaction. This intermediate space is worth being emphasised as not being SADC space but created by reformist SACSNs as an additional space to existing formal and self-organised spaces. Interestingly, quadrants A1B2, A2B2 and A3B2 demonstrate how SACSNs in intermediate spaces devised hybrid strategies, norms and rules. These are a combination of institutional arrangements devised in both formal setting and self-organised setting. For example, quadrant A1B2 presents hybrid strategies such as cooperative and rivalry strategies which are reproduced respectively in quadrants A1B1and A1B3.

Firstly, findings demonstrated that Southern African civil society networks collaborate with SADC elites through a cooperative engagement within SADC-created spaces called formal forums. Within this interaction setting, cross-border ordinary citizens associations exhibit *elitist-collaboration, informal bargaining and compliant norms, including dependent rules,* all as procedural mechanisms of their interaction within SADC institutions as indicated in quadrants A1B1, A2B1 and A3B1 in Table 6.4.

Secondly, the literature on the typology of Southern African civil society's interaction within regionalisms remains silent on the *intermediate spaces of interaction* created by reformist Southern African civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO as mentioned in chapter 4 and 5. These *intermediate spaces* of interaction exist between the two regional spaces of interaction, notably one SADC-created called formal and another by civil society networks themselves labelled informal or self-organised spaces. These *intermediate spaces* allow cross-border civil society associations that were granted limited access to formal settings of interaction, like SADC-created spaces, to express themselves freely within their own created spaces. However, still without civil society offending SADC elites, who become special guest speakers as indicated in section 5.3.2.1 of chapter 5, neither infringing on the regulations provided by the MoU.

In other words, these *intermediate spaces* still unite the two partners of formal forums whose talks seem to be relegated to a different institutional environment, like the Civil Society Forum

and Gender Links Forum, among others. The guests who were once invited to formal forums set the agenda and become organisers in the intermediate spaces. SADC elites are invited to speak in a collaborative manner in order to be acquainted with the aspirations of the regional citizenry and strengthen their working alliance with regional civil society organisations, like SADC-CNGO, for a cooperative engagement in SADC-created spaces. The Civil Society Forum is a good example of intermediate space between SADC-created and transformist spaces, like SAPSN. Southern African civil society networks, within these intermediate spaces of interaction, adopted a dual approach to procedural mechanisms. This entails cross-border civil associations exhibiting hybrid institutional arrangements guiding their interaction. These include *cooperative with rivalry strategies; combined mobilising and compliant norms; and internalised coupled with dependent rules* in order to maintain their partnership feelings as indicated in quadrants A1B2, A2B2 and A3B2 in Table 6.4. There was a general view among respondents, including the researcher, that Southern African civil society networks cooperate with SADC elites, but with rivalry within both formal and intermediate spaces as they are striving to maintain their alliance and at the same time lobbying for reforms by voicing their aspirations through decentring the negotiation spaces.

Lastly, findings reveal that transformist Southern African civil society networks emerge out of contestation, challenging formal regionalism for inclusion within *self-organised spaces outside of SADC*. Within these transformist spaces, cross-border civil society agglomerations in the Southern region mobilise themselves to contest the SADC-established state-centric mode of governance and at the same time build coalitions among themselves to combine forces in order to build alternative regionalisms outside the SADC mainstream. Within these self-organised spaces, civil society networks exhibit distinct institutional arrangements compared to formal and intermediate spaces. These include combined *confrontational and grassroots solidarity building strategies; contesting and mobilising norms; and emancipatory grassroots rules* as indicated in quadrants A1B3, A2B3 and A3B3 of the above Table 6.4.

This chapter borrows from the literature on the categories of civil society based on their respective functions and roles as indicated in chapter 2. These include legitimator, transformist/counterforce and manipulator (Söderbaum 2007, Godsäter 2014). But here, based on the empirical findings, this typology is constructed using the three dimensions of interaction settings labelled as SADC-provided spaces, intermediates spaces and self-organised spaces combined with different kinds of strategies, norms and rules as parameters of differentiating

between various types of Southern African civil society interactions within the Southern African region in the quest for alternative regionalisms. Table 6.4 above summarises the typology on how Southern African civil society interacts in regionalism in order to build alternative regionalisms.

6.6 Prospects for Alternative Regionalism in the Southern African region

As indicated in chapter 1, alternative regionalism is associated with regionalism taking place in a multipolar world order, emerging as a spontaneous process, open and outward in character and involving multidimensional processes (Hettne et al. 1999, Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). Through the study of this people-centred approach to regionalism, it has been found that beyond state-centred or conventional arrangements of building regions, there is another possibility of building regions through unconventional arrangements devised and promoted my non-state actors themselves, bearing in mind that alternative regionalism is an endeavour to specify unconventional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures involved in the making and re-making of regions across the globe (Icaza 2009). Therefore, thinking of the state-centric approach as a one-size-fits-all approach to regionalism is inadequate.

Findings gleaned from analysis proved that if well-structured, strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised settings of interaction by non-state actors themselves can function just as well as the formal institutional arrangements in the quest for the formation of the South African region. This corroborates with what Chandra (2009) points out, namely that alternative regionalism refers to institutional arrangements and systems that exist outside the traditional, established or mainstream system and institutions.

First of all, as indicated in chapter 4 and 5, interaction within self-organised settings enables epistemic communities across the Southern African region to fully participate in the political decision-making processes to form regions, from the setting of the agenda to the drafting of a collective declaration. In this regard, ordinary citizens own the meetings' agenda, guided by open and honest debates that are far from being manipulated or driven by the few and imposed on the many by outsiders, as is the case in the formal setting of interaction. Forms of discrimination seemed to be minimised in these self-organised spaces to the extent that all voices from diverse cultural, gender and educational backgrounds are represented, like during

the SADC People's Summit. As indicated in section 2.4.2.1 of chapter 2, participation builds on a deep respect for plurality, tolerance, and dissent, and it also involves an ability to understand and appreciate differences (Samuel 2002).

During clustered thematic groups, for example, ordinary citizens are encouraged to freely collaborate with their fellows by sharing lived experiences and opportunities that embody their respective countries, which are useful for collective decisions shaping their aspirations for the region's integration. Mutual communication among ordinary citizens becomes enhanced within these new collaborative avenues. As Cornwall and Coelho (2004) point out in chapter 1, participation is about developing mechanisms and approaches that encourage voices to be sounded and ensure that those voices will be heard and receive a response in region-building processes. To decentre the space of political decisions is seconded by what Della Porta et al. (2006) label, as mentioned in chapter 1, a paradigmatic shift from the top-down to the bottom-up where there is a relocation of the centre of political decisions to form regions. There was a general view among respondents that self-organised meetings enhance person-to-person integration through deployed solidarity and coalition-building strategies, as indicated in chapter 5 and section 6.2 of this chapter. Active frontline regional citizenry become self-reliant and active agents in the formation processes of their regions rather than beneficiaries of political decisions made by the member states and technocrats.

Secondly, findings showed how strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised networks embody substantial popular legitimacy, of course, bearing in mind that legitimate institutions represent the voices, interests and values of countries and their citizens, as indicated in chapter 1. Failing to cater to the needs of ordinary citizens across the region, SADC institutions have been described by SACSNs as having lost their legitimacy. Self-organised networks are deemed to gain more popular legitimacy as they are militating for the aspirations of the epistemic communities composing the networks. However, SADC-elites claim to receive legitimacy from the votes of the people and criticise SACSNs for being illegitimate, as mentioned in chapter 4. Deployed efforts by cross-border non-state actors to build alternative regionalisms through their own self-organised spaces of interaction cannot be overlooked, but need more attention by other peer stakeholders involved in the formation of regions, including scholars and policymakers in the field of contemporary regionalism. Regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-

state actors. Against this backdrop, there is the possibility of having an alternative regionalism in the Southern African region.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks when they interact within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. The chapter compared the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by SACSNs within two distinct interaction settings before building a descriptive typology. The chapter argued that while interacting within SADC-created spaces, reformist cross-border civil associations exhibit different strategies, norms and rules compared to those interacting within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream.

Firstly, findings revealed that SACSNs interacting within the SADC framework lobby for change through cooperative engagement with SADC elites, while SACSNs within self-organised settings build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through parallel activities in contestation with SADC elites for an alternative. Secondly, it has been found that SACSNs in vertical interaction respect SADC-created norms through conforming to the status quo, compared to those in horizontal networks that stand in contestation to the SADC-established status quo through shared beliefs, common understanding and collective actions. Lastly, differentiating comparative analysis showed that in formal settings, SACSNs comply with SADC-provided legal frameworks in the form of treaties, protocols and MoUs delineating responsibilities.

While in self-organised interaction, SACSNs draw up fair and uncodified rules in line with grassroots circumstances. Succinctly, the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules included detracting from instead of complementing the state-centric order; ownership instead of compliance to an agenda; expansive instead of constrictive norms; grassroots solidarity instead of elitist alliance; and authentic grassroots approach against white-collar bureaucracy. A descriptive typology of these kinds of institutional arrangements revealed that within SADC-created spaces SACSNs exhibit elitist-collaboration and informal bargaining strategies and compliant norms and dependent rules, while within self-organised civic spaces

SACSNs devise combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms, and emancipatory grassroots rules.

The discussion around the preceding section of this chapter indicated that institutional arrangements developed by both transformist and reformist civil society networks in the Southern African region has informed the construction of a descriptive typology of their interaction. Based on the differences between the strategies, norms and rules they developed, the chapter built a descriptive typology demonstrating how SACSNs interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These include SADC-created spaces, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society networks, followed by self-organised spaces created by transformist civil groupings. It was observed in this chapter that these strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised spaces outside of the mainstream are considered by many to establish alternative avenues of collaboration for citizen mobilisation to fully participate in the formation of regions that are driven by the people themselves across the Southern African region.

In a nutshell, regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-economic phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. More than that, findings proved that if well-structured, informal institutions can function just like formal institutions in the formation of regions. This implies that there is another possibility to build regions through unconventional mechanisms developed outside of the mainstream.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH TO REGIONALISM: SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis and lays forth the imperative for further study into some of its findings. Before making some recommendations for further study, the chapter offers a synopsis of the main arguments presented throughout the thesis. At the same time, it reflects on the main conclusions of the study that speak to the research questions. More than that, this chapter points out the empirical and theoretical contributions of the study to the body of knowledge on people-centred approaches to regionalism. This thesis has dealt with the strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interactions in regionalisms in order to build an alternative. The general idea was to develop a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalisms based on a comparison of the institutional arrangements they have developed. Hence, the focus was on understanding the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks like the SADC-CNGO (Apex) and SAPSN when they are interacting respectively within both formal and self-organised regionalisms. The overall argument of this study was that regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. What kinds of strategies, norms and rules are developed by regional civil society networks in their quest for alternative regionalisms? This has been done through reviewing and building on the existing literature on civil society regionalisms, followed by the collection of empirical data through semi-structured interviews, participant observation and focus group discussions in selected countries in the Southern African region. A differentiating comparative approach revealed that regional civil society networks that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism exhibit different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation in opposition to formal regionalism. Following the empirical findings, this study proposed a conceptual expansion of regionalism that does not only understand non-state actors as dependent units of formal regional organisations but considers them actors in their own right.

Further study is needed, firstly, to find out why other cross-border civil society groupings prefer to interact outside of the mainstream rather than joining the state-created spaces. Secondly, we need a comparative study on the functions of SADC National Committees within the SADC member states in order to establish their influence on the civil society-enabling environment at SADC level. Lastly, how regional donors promote civic engagement in SADC institutions needs to be analysed. This chapter reviews the entire thesis through four phases.

7.2 Synopsis of Preceding Chapters

This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters, including its conclusion. Chapter 1 aimed to introduce the overall idea of the study in the people-centred approaches to regionalism by drawing from the case of the Southern African civil society networks between 1989 and 2016. The overall argument of the thesis is that regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional social and political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. It is time to move beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism and above all understanding regionalism as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena. Chapter 1 focused mainly on the introduction of the thesis in order to provide its clear scope and focus throughout its problem background, argument, research objectives and rationale, the definition of the key concepts and delimitation, and includes a description of the research design and methodology and the organization of the thesis through the chapter layout. The chapter was backed by chapter 2 in order to explain the theoretical and conceptual perspectives of the study.

A review of conventional and unconventional approaches to regionalism was needed in order to unpack pertinent existent literature in this thesis. Chapter 2 also discussed how people-centred approaches to regionalism have become an alternative to the conventional mode of building regions in this study. This entailed that the researcher reviewed citizen engagement discourse in political projects to form regions from different schools of thoughts in contemporary regionalism. The chapter explored the debates around contemporary regionalism, state-centred and people-centred approaches to regionalism, regional organisations and regional networks, and regional civil society networks' interaction in regionalisms. This included contextualisation of regionalism from a Southern African experience. Unlike previous studies, which tended to focus merely on state-centred institutions

developed in regionalism, chapter 2 argued that attempts were made by new institutionalist scholars to understand how non-state institutions work and are paramount for an inclusive regionalism that allows civil society actors to be not only important, but also independent active agents in their own right in the formation of regions. On that note, chapter 2 summarised the conceptual framework in graphic form in Table 2.1 by demonstrating the link between key concepts, regionalism, civil society and people-centred approach to regionalism. It showed how informal institutions, if well-structured, can function equally well as formal institutions in the quest for alternative regionalism. Table 2.1 displayed how the shrinking of regional civic space triggered civil society interactions within two institutional settings, notably vertical interaction with SADC and horizontal networks in a self-organised setting, in which they developed different kinds of strategies, norms and rules in order to build alternative regionalism as the focus of the study. Chapter 2 suggested moving beyond the state-centric and top-down perspectives dominating the research field of regionalism and above all understanding regionalism as processes that are much more than state- or market-driven and formal phenomena.

As for the third chapter, it was focused on the learning theory around New Institutionalism as a core theoretical framework around the debates in the study of people-centred approaches to regionalism. It was about the participation of cross-border epistemic communities in regional political project processes to form regions. Through literature review, this third chapter started by explaining through the lens of New Institutionalism how people in self-organised institutions were proficient in forming regions. The overall idea was to demonstrate how informal institutions, strategies, norms and rules employed by the regional citizenry, could contribute to the construction of an alternative regionalism promoted by the people themselves. Chapter 3 theoretically argued that if well-designed, there are other institutional mechanisms devised outside the state by non-state actors that may equally work or function like those established by state actors only. Against that backdrop, chapter 3 started by explaining, through review of other different approaches, how regions can also be built from below through the construction of strategies, norms and rules by non-state actors. This being said, chapter 3 demonstrated how the researcher borrowed some elements of new regionalism approach as evidence in order to have an unconventional view of the formation of regions. These elements of NRA were associated with the move from the state-led and bipolar old regionalism to a new form of regionalism taking place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous

process, is open and outward in character and involves multidimensional processes. More than that, chapter 3 unpacked how the use of hybrid forms of the new institutionalist lens helped the researcher to focus on the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society associations in SADC region while interacting within both SADC institutions and self-organised horizontal networks outside of the mainstream.

In chapter 4, the researcher presented the overall regional context within which Southern African civil society networks interact in the quest for alternative regionalisms. Chapter 4 elaborated on the historical interaction between state and civil society during the Southern African liberation struggle in order to shed light on the current state of affairs of non-state actors' inclusion in the contemporary regionalism debate in the region. Themes were drawn that showed how SADC was an impermeable and shrinking civic space characterised by its state-centric model of regional governance; the influence of national political regimes on patterns of interaction at a regional level; the fact that only non-political sectors were tolerated for civic engagement; and rivalry between SADC elites and regional civil society networks during interaction. More than that, field findings demonstrated that despite its legal provision and regulatory framework for civil interaction in region-building projects, SADC has difficulty allowing regional citizenry through their respective organizations to openly interact in the political decisions to form regions. Instead, SADC elites embarked on a blame game to justify the non-inclusion feature of the SADC mode of governance. Consequently, regional civil society in the region lost confidence in SADC elites, which led to the institutional legitimacy deficit of the SADC. Additionally, chapter 4 identified other opportunities leading to the formation of regional civil society networks in the SADC region. These included the political liberation struggle, democratic transition in the post-independence era, the neoliberal order deepening poverty and inequalities, and the 2015 Millennium Development Goals followed by the boomerang hypothesis and inspiration from other regional networks around the world. Chapter 4 concluded that normatively SADC has a strong framework encouraging the involvement of civil society, but operationalization is still problematic for a number of reasons among stakeholders. The researcher recommended to SADC to formally institute measures to operationalize article 23 of the SADC Treaty and develop a policy on how to engage civil society in pursuance of the Treaty provisions in order to allow non-state actors to own the formation of regions in Southern African region. Chapter 4 was complemented by chapter 5, on the major findings of the study.

Chapter 5 was devoted to the presentation of key findings from fieldwork on the institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks during their interaction within the region in order to both answer the research questions and achieve the study objectives. In that regard, chapter 5 was essentially focused on identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks (SACSNs) interacting within, first of all, formal settings like the Regional Thematic Meetings of Senior Officials or Ministers, Statutory Meetings, the SADC Secretariat, SADC-PF, SADC regional policy dialogues, Council of the Ministers and the Heads of State Summit. Secondly, chapter 5 was devoted to strategies, norms and rules developed within self-organised interactions, like the Civil Society Forum, and the SADC People's Summit, among others. Chapter 5 argued that, despite being informal, strategies, norms and rules devised by civil society networks during interaction within regionalism constellations are also as crucial as state-led formal institutions, capable not only of influencing but forming regions outside of the formal mainstream. Chapter 5 revealed the two sets of strategies, norms and rules exhibited by Southern African civil society networks in two distinct institutional settings of interaction. These institutional arrangements constituted the main findings of the thesis and at the same time constituted the empirical and theoretical contributions of this thesis to the contemporary debates on regionalism. These findings are thoroughly discussed below in section 7.3 pertaining to research questions of the thesis.

As for chapter 6, it widened the empirical discussions above by comparing the two kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society networks in two distinct institutional settings of interaction. Through a differentiating comparative analysis, chapter 6 compared the two kinds of institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks within two distinct interaction settings before building a descriptive typology. Chapter 6 argued that, while interacting within SADC-created spaces, reformist cross-border civil associations exhibit different strategies, norms and rules compared to those interacting within self-organised networks outside of the mainstream. Firstly, chapter 6 established that SACSNs interacting within the SADC framework lobby for change through cooperative engagement with SADC elites. SACSNs within self-organised settings build coalitions and solidarity among themselves through parallel activities in opposition with SADC elites for an alternative. Secondly, it was revealed in chapter 6 that SACSNs in vertical interaction respect SADC-created norms through conforming to the status quo, compared to

those in horizontal networks that stand in opposition and contestation to the SADC-established status quo through shared beliefs, a common understanding and collective actions. Lastly, through the differentiating comparative analysis, chapter 6 revealed that in formal settings SACSNs comply with SADC-provided legal framework in the form of the SADC Treaty, Protocols and the MoU delineating responsibilities. While in self-organised interaction, SACSNs draw up fair and uncodified rules in line with grassroots circumstances. In a succinct manner, the differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules included detracting from instead of complementing state-centric order, ownership instead of compliance to agenda, expansive instead of constrictive norms, grassroots solidarity instead of an elitist alliance; and authentic grassroots approach against white-collar bureaucracy. Based on the remarkable differences between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they developed, the chapter built a descriptive typology demonstrating how SACSNs interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These include SADC-created spaces, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society networks, followed by self-organised spaces created by transformist civil groupings. Having presented the main arguments of the thesis through a recapitulation of the chapters, the following section aims to elaborate on the two core questions of the study.

7.3 Institutional Arrangements developed by Regional Civil Society Networks in Regionalisms

The following two sections demonstrate how the thesis has answered the two core research questions asked in section 1.5 of the introductory chapter. It delineates the conclusions based on the two guiding research sub-questions.

7.3.1 On the nature of the strategies, norms and rules of regional civil society networks in formal regionalism

One of the two research sub-questions is "What kinds of strategies, norms and rules are developed by regional civil society networks when they interact in formal regionalism processes like SADC?" As indicated in the preceding sections of this chapter, regional civil society networks interacting within formal regionalism exhibit complementing strategies, norms and rules which are assimilative to the state-established status quo and do not infringe on the spirit and letter of the MoU. These institutional arrangements developed by civil society

networks within state-created spaces are centred around building elitist alliances in order to deter their exclusion from attending formal forums.

Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, as indicated in section 4.3.1 of chapter 4, allows full involvement of ordinary citizens of the region to participate in the decision-making processes advancing regional integration. Yet this legal framework of a joint space of governance has not been fully operationalised despite the established SADC institutions of interaction, like the SADC Secretariat, the SADC National Committees, the SADC Parliamentarian Forum, the SADC regional policy dialogues, and the Council of the Ministers and Heads of State Summit as mentioned in chapter 4. In order to answer to the regional donor demands to include civil society within its activity, SADC, being a highly donor-dependent institution, had no choice but to include a few regional civil society networks, like SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, Gender Links, and FOCCISA. It has signed an MoU with some of these, steering their mutual working relationship and partnership at the early stage of regional decision-making processes. On that note, these recognised regional civil society networks within SADC-established spaces of interaction have become more concerned about how to lobby as insiders without contesting the spirit and letter of the MoU for fear of being excluded within what Young (2002) coined, in chapter 2, vertical interaction. On that note, some Southern African civil society like the SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, among others, develop strategies, norms and rules that will maintain the status quo while interacting within SADC-provided spaces on a consultative and partnership basis as stipulated in the MoU between stakeholders. Findings revealed that Southern African civil society networks (SACSNs) developed the following institutional arrangements: collaboration with SADC elites through cooperative engagement, quiet diplomacy through informal bargaining behind the scenes, and submission of a collective declaration to the SADC Heads of State Summits, conforming to the existing SADC status quo through respect of the precedence, concomitantly reinforcing formal norms and invoking alternative norms, norms developed by civil society are influential but not enforceable, submitting to the SADC-provided legal framework of engagement, and prevention of a radical and aggressive attitude during the formal sessions. The thesis has exemplified that SADC-CNGO and SATUCC constitute striking examples of using cooperation and quiet diplomacy behind the scenes to lobby for reform inside the SADC-provided interactive framework by engaging with SADC elites cooperatively through respect of precedence during the development and adoption of several protocols. These include the SADC Protocol on

Facilitation of Movement of People, the SADC Employment Protocol, the SADC Social Security Code, and the SADC Code on HIV/AIDs and Employment, among others. More than that, Gender Links, through the SADC Gender Protocol Alliance, collaborated and cooperated with the SADC Gender Unit within the SADC Secretariat in 2016 for the development of the MER framework for the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SATUCC 2015). For example, despite being excluded from many SADC policy-making forums, in 2008 SADC-CNGO managed to influence the launch of the SADC Free Trade Area by exhorting SADC member states to improve the implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol (Pressend 2010, Godsäter 2015).

However, these strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society associations within a formal institutional setting were criticised by many respondents for not encouraging active participation of regional epistemic communities in regional policy-making processes. It has been found through that participation is possibly less about choice than voice. As indicated in chapter 3 by Cornwall and Coelho (2004), it is about developing mechanisms and approaches that encourage voices to be sounded and ensure that those voices are heard and received a response in region-building processes. It has been argued by some discussants during focus groups and respondents during semi-structured interviews that SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, among others, interacting within formal SADC forums were viewed as rubber stamps or regional GO-NGOs legitimising the SADC state-centric model of governance to the detriment of ordinary citizens. To other discussants, these strategies, norms and rules that were devised to some extent plunge reformist Southern African civil society networks into begging mode, rather than bargaining within SADC forums in order to convince SADC elites to align their decisions with the pressing issues threatening the well-being of the regional citizenry. Thus, the elitist alliance-seeking becomes one of the strategies within formal interaction in order to gain the elites' trust for informal bargaining behind the scenes. It has been found that these simulative strategies, norms and rules developed within formal institutional settings were different compared to those exhibited in self-organized networks, which are confrontational toward SADC-institutions. As indicated in chapter 5, few respondents believed that these institutional arrangements developed by Southern African civil society networks within two institutional settings are not in contestation with each other but serve one common purpose, which is fighting from different fronts for the inclusion of ordinary citizens into regional decision-making processes. In fact, empirical findings showed that Southern African civil

society networks, like SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, and Gender Links, interacting within SADC-provided spaces, developed complementing strategies, constrictive norms and codified bureaucratic rules in order to conform to the existing SADC status quo through cooperative engagement in line with Helmke and Levitsky's (2002) typology of institutions as indicated in chapter 2.

7.3.2 On the nature of strategies, norms and rules of regional civil society networks in self-organised regionalism

This section addressed the second research sub-question related to identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks while interacting within self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream. Findings proved that cross-border civil society associations interacting within self-organised networks devise contesting strategies, norms and rules outside of the mainstream which are in opposition to the state-established status quo, and at the same time mobilise themselves through solidarity and coalition-building around a common identity and agenda.

Given the lack of operationalisation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols aimed at including regional citizenry in the decision-making processes to form regions, discontented civil society networks have decided to group themselves through self-organised initiatives. Building on Young's typology of institutional interaction, these self-organised civil society groupings were viewed as horizontal interactions. As mentioned in chapter 2, these horizontal networks entail deliberate interactions among institutions at the same level of social organisation, like ordinary citizens, for collective goals (Young 2002). This thesis was interested in identifying the kinds of strategies, norms and rules that they developed during their interaction within self-organised avenues of participation outside of SADC in order to build an alternative. It has been argued throughout the thesis that excluded cross-border epistemic communities in the region have undertaken parallel activities outside of SADC, like the Civil Society Forum and the SADC People's Summit, among others, in order to voice their aspirations and at the same time demand inclusivity of the SADC-created civic spaces. Fieldwork revealed that, through the People's Summit, SAPSN exhibits the following: confronting SADC elites with transnational citizenship and submission of a collective communiqué; building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among the regional citizenry; using capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance the popular critical consciousness; contestation of the

existing SADC status quo through internalised norms; participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the People's Summit; calling for full operationalization of article 23 of the SADC Treaty; selection of participants to the People's Summit through national contact points; and sharing commitments using uncodified rules and culture. Based on the typology of institutions built by Helmke and Levitsky (2002) as indicated in chapter 2, competing informal institutions emerge in the case of weak formal institutions and antagonistic objectives. As stated in chapter 2, Helmke and Levitsky (2002) allude to the fact that these institutions shape incentives of actors to be incompatible with the formal rules under the principle that to follow one rule, actors must violate another (Lekovic 2011). Focus groups, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and secondary data all revealed that Southern African civil society networks within self-organised settings exercise citizenship through parallel activities on the margins of the SADC Heads of State Summit in order to contest the state-centred mode of governance criticised for being neoliberalist and exclusive.

There was a general view among respondents that the institutional arrangements developed within these self-organised settings foster, to some extent, active participation of ordinary cross-border citizens in political projects to form the Southern African region. For example, as signified in chapter 5 and 6, the clustered thematic groups of the SADC People's Tribunal, among others, during the SADC People's Summit allows survivors of human rights abuses and the recklessness of multinationals to testify in front of their fellow participants who team up for the search of social justice. More than that, regional epistemic communities express themselves freely on common pressing issues and opportunities characterising the SADC region considered as drivers of coalitions and solidarity building. There was an observation during fieldwork that Southern African citizens have culturally and economically been integrated, sharing lived experiences and developed partnerships for trade and other socio-economic endeavours within self-organised networks. However, a few respondents from the SADC and donors respectively criticised these cross-border civil society associations for being at the same time fund hunters and donor-driven, exclusive and led by a small team of elites claiming to represent the aspirations of the entire regional citizenry. In a nutshell, findings demonstrated that transformist Southern African civil society networks, like SAPSN, interacting within self-organised networks, devise contesting strategies, confrontational norms and authentic grassroots approaches in order to build an alternative regionalism that is more inclusive and driven by epistemic communities themselves. The above findings have

demonstrated that if well-structured, self-organised regionalisms can function as well as formal regionalisms with equal standing.

7.4 Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Alternative Regionalism

Scholarly analysis of regionalism leaves many gaps where more emphasis has been put on states and markets as the sole main actors. The literature has demonstrated how rationalist schools of thoughts proclaim the alliance between the mainstream state-led and market-driven approaches as one mode of building regions. Such research on political projects to form regions have focused on Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region, with Europe remaining as an intellectual laboratory (Fioramonti 2015, Engel et al. 2017). Consequently, the importance of non-state actors in region-building projects and their capability to promote alternative regionalism have been minimised. However, with the emerging of new players and a shift from bipolar to multipolar centres of regional decisions as the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the expansion of the focus of analysis in new regionalism came to the fore with the inclusion of non-state actors (Hettne et al. 1999, Hettne and Söderbaum 2000, Zajontz 2013, Scholte 2014). New regionalism became conceptualised as an impetus to governance through civil society associations, strengthened by a dependence on non-state actors to deliver and drive policy, compared to state-led development strategies (Grugel 2004). Consequently, civil society networks become crucial and active agents in the development processes in the EU, ASEAN, Mercosur, AU, ECOWAS, EAC, and in SADC (Söderbaum 2007, Tussie and Botto 2002). As mentioned in chapter 1, despite the explosion of new regionalism throughout the world, the role of civil society and how they interact within various institutional settings remain ignored by scholars and mainly by government elites and policymakers. More than that, those few scholars from the new regionalism paradigm who attempted to include non-state actors in their conceptual analysis did not extensively expand on how non-state actors cannot just be actors among other partners in the processes of region formation, but they can also stand in their own right without necessarily being accompanied by state and market as stakeholders with equal standing. As implied in chapter 1, alongside influencing policy in state-led settings, it has been evidenced that cross-border citizen associations may exercise citizenship and intellectual endeavours, to name a few, as patterns of informal participation in political projects to form regions (Rhodes-Kubiak 2015).

Against this backdrop, the thesis, firstly, contributes to the existing literature on contemporary regionalism debates by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. In this thesis, the SADC People's Summit, the Civil Society Forum, Gender Links Forum and the Alternative Mining Indaba, among others, have been consummate examples of how epistemic communities across the Southern African region are also important active actors capable of mobilising themselves through both citizenship exercises and intellectual endeavours in order to influence and/or shape the regional order for an alternative. Scholars focusing on the intensification of civil society influence in global governance agree that non-state actors become capable of filling a democratic deficit that has long plagued international institutions (Fogarty 2014, Jönsson and Tallberg 2010, Scholte 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013, Godsäter 2015). This study established how Southern African civil society networks like SADC-CNGO, SAPSN, SATUCC, to name a few, have chosen to fight, at different fronts of advocacy, against the democratic deficit manifested throughout the exclusion and restriction of civic spaces featuring the state-centric mode of SADC governance.

Secondly, this study on people-centred approaches to regionalism does not only theoretically contribute to the study of contemporary regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors but also attempts to demonstrate empirically how regions can be constructed by non-state actors themselves outside the state-centric paradigm. Non-state actors across the Southern African region prefer to network among themselves within self-organised platforms where they are allowed to build coalitions and express themselves freely by sharing opportunities and lived experiences useful for their well-being. The contribution of this thesis to the contemporary regionalism debate is to provide an important understanding of different kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by civil society associations within two distinct institutional settings of interaction. The thesis proves that Southern African civil society networks through their parallel activities, namely building solidarity and coalition by sharing lived experiences and aspirations among regional citizenry, use of capacity-building training and media platforms to enhance the popular critical consciousness; to name a few, have managed to build the SADC region from below in a way that is centred around and driven by cross-border ordinary citizens themselves. At the same time, these civil society links across the region contest in a meaningful manner the existing SADC state-centred status quo through contestation and internalised norms, participation in self-regulated cluster meetings during the SADC People's Summit, and calling for full operationalization of article 23 of the SADC

Treaty for alternative agendas as mentioned in chapters 1, 5 and 6 (Fioramonti 2013, Godsäter 2014). The thesis shows how the procedural mechanisms developed by non-state actor associations are capable of building regions beyond the state-centric paradigm in their own right. In other words, this thesis contributes to the debates around contemporary regionalism by demonstrating how regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. This thesis proves that there is another possibility for building regions through unconventional mechanisms developed outside of the mainstream.

Lastly, the thesis empirically contributes to the literature of alternative regionalisms with institutional typologies of different kinds of institutional arrangements developed by civil society networks and how they have shaped their interactions in regionalisms. These typologies can be useful as a point of reference to other similar studies in relation to unconventional institutions developed by non-state actors for the construction of alternatives at both national and regional levels of society. This study shows that regional civil society networks interacting in SADC-created spaces exhibit different institutional arrangements compared to those in self-organised networks. These differences between kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by SADC-CNGO and SAPSN, as indicated in chapter 6, respectively included cooperative vs contesting engagement strategies, complementing instead of detracting from the state-centric order, compliance to instead of ownership of the agenda, constrictive instead of expansive norms, elitist alliance instead of grassroots solidarity, and white-collar bureaucracy versus an authentic grassroots approach. More than that, a descriptive typology revealed that within SADC-created spaces, reformist civil society networks exhibit elitist collaboration and informal bargaining strategies, compliant norms and dependent rules, while within self-organised civic spaces transformist civil society networks devise combined confrontational and grassroots solidarity-building strategies, contesting and mobilising norms and emancipatory grassroots rules. Given the remarkable difference between the kinds of strategies, norms and rules they have devised, this study contributes with a descriptive typology demonstrating how regional civil society networks interact within three spaces in order to build alternative regionalisms. These include SADC-created spaces, intermediate spaces created by reformist civil society groupings and self-organised spaces created by transformist civil society networks. These institutional typologies of the institutional arrangements of civil society

networks demonstrate that if well-structured, informal institutions can function just like formal institutions and achieve the same objectives as formal institutions at all levels of society.

Nevertheless, this thesis acknowledges the challenges encountered by Southern African civil society networks during their interaction within both SADC-led institutions and self-organised networks among themselves. These include a lack of funds to conduct proper mobilisation within the region and undertake the activities deemed important to achieve their assigned goals. This lack of self-funded mechanisms has been a great impediment to the credibility of the Southern African civil society networks, causing SADC elites to accuse them of being donor-driven and agents of the West for political regime change in the region, as indicated in chapter 3 and 4 (Söderbaum 2007, Zajontz 2013, Godsäter 2013, 2015). Secondly, cross-border civil society associations have been criticized by SADC elites for not being equipped with the needed expertise and skills in technical matters to transform the region instead of claiming more political participation. Lastly, regional donors have allegedly criticised Southern African civil society networks for not being inclusive themselves even though giving lessons in inclusivity to SADC elites (Söderbaum 2007, Zajontz 2013, Godsäter 2013, 2015). It has been found that if properly self-funded or funded without conditionalities, Southern African civil society networks could be important new collaborative avenues for epistemic communities' participation in the political decisions to form regions.

7.5. Recommendations

As indicated throughout the thesis, the aim was to build a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks within the above two distinct settings of interaction. The study has paved the way for further research in the field of contemporary regionalism in order to establish how regions can be built alternatively from below, outside of the formal mainstream, using self-organised institutions in a spontaneous manner, and in multidimensional processes covering various aspects of human life, not only in the Southern African region but worldwide. Nevertheless, there are still many gaps in the study of people-centred approaches to regionalism that were not all covered by this thesis but still need to be addressed in further studies. It is of paramount importance to reflect on what potential avenues of new research need to be developed in this area of alternative regionalisms.

Further studies need, firstly, to find out what could be an ideological driver behind the reasons why other cross-border civil society groupings prefer to interact outside of the mainstream rather than joining state-created spaces. This study did not cover in a thorough manner, the justification for the two distinct interaction contexts in which regional civil society may like to interact in order to unpack an ideological driver of the institutional behaviour in the quest for alternative regionalisms. Apart from the national political regime, as indicated in chapter 4, the thesis dealt with some opportunities leading to the creation of regional civil society networks. Among them were the political liberation struggle, the democratic transition in the post-independence era, the neoliberal order deepening poverty and inequalities and the 2015 Millennium Development Goals followed by the boomerang hypothesis and inspiration from other regional networks around the world. Further studies are needed to find out what are the factors determining the creation of self-organising networks outside of the mainstream. The potential researcher will be tempted to answer an additional question as to why regional civil society networks may choose or not to join the state-created spaces.

Secondly, a comparative study is needed on the functions of SADC National Committees within the SADC member states in order to establish their influence on the status of civic spaces at SADC level. As alluded to in chapter 4, SADC National Committees (SNC) play an essential role as an entry point of civil society into SADC decision-making processes at the national level before the incorporation of people's aspirations into regional policy documents. However, few studies have demonstrated how these key institutions of civic engagement at the national level fail the citizens of the region, which this study did not cover either in a thorough manner. In this regard, it is important for future studies to interrogate the efficacy of these SNCs in each member state and their respective impact on shaping regional civic spaces in a comparative manner. It will be also interesting to research what civil society at the domestic level is doing in order to make these SNCs function, because during the interviews the SADC elites' responses to the issue of inclusion of civil society always referred to a fight for participation by ordinary citizens to be included in the decision-making processes at the national level through SNC, but not at regional level.

Thirdly, a comparative study is needed on the institutional legitimacy of regional actors. The study did not delve too much into an issue related to institutional legitimacy at the SADC level, which is a key element in democratic governance. In their responses, both SADC elites and civil society representatives questioned each other's legitimacy for either not receiving a

mandate from the people they claim to represent or for not delivering on the promises made to their citizens. The issue of institutional legitimacy needs to be conceptualised and analysed from an African perspective in order to show in whose interest regional institutions are working or lobbying. A comparative analysis is needed to understand when and how these distinct regional actors such as regional civil society networks and regional organisations may lose or gain legitimacy in a Southern African context. These can be done, for example, using a legitimacy assessment framework based on input and output legitimacy indicators.

Lastly, how regional donors promote civic engagement in SADC institutions needs to be analysed. This thesis did not cover the role of regional donors as external actors in the SADC region as drivers of the interaction between SADC elites and civil society. Being donor-dependent, SADC and civil society are forced to respond to donors' demands by coexisting despite rivalry among them. It would be ambitious to find out who owns the narrative of regionalism for whose interests. Further research is needed to find out what could be the formal and informal strategies employed by regional donors to convince SADC elites to allow civil participation in SADC decision-making processes, knowing that SADC is a shrinking civic space. In this vein, there is a need to research how to decolonise civil society citizenship in Africa.

The study established that there is a possibility of building alternative regionalisms driven by non-state actors and centred on their full inclusion in decision-making processes. The thesis has demonstrated how regional civil society networks are capable of building regions in their own right using unconventional self-devised strategies, norms and rules outside of the mainstream. However, there is still a long way to go as Southern African civil society networks are still mired in a myriad of challenges before they can fully function in their own right as formal regions. Based on the findings and discussion throughout the thesis, the researcher offers the following recommendations to scholars and policymakers, SADC elites, regional donors, and civil society actors in order to have alternative regionalisms centred and driven by people themselves in Southern African and elsewhere in the world:

(i) In the contemporary regionalism debate, there is a need for scholars and policymakers to expand the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. Political decisions to form regions should consider any informal institutions developed by non-state actors that are useful in influencing or shaping world regions. Regionalism should be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon

that can also be promoted by non-state actors within self-organised institutional settings with the same rights as formal institutions;

(ii) SADC needs to fully establish democratic principles and operationalise article 23 of its treaty to avoid any ambiguity in its initiated joint mode of governance. SADC should consider non-state actors, not only service delivery or monitoring and evaluating agents, but important evidence-based knowledge brokers and stakeholders with equal rights, by allowing them access at all stages of the decision-making processes in the formation of the region. SADC should accelerate the adoption of the proposed SADC Mechanisms for Engagement with Non-State Actors for equal treatment among stakeholders. SADC should ensure that shared norms are truly implemented on the ground by accelerating, for example, the adoption of the proposed SADC Mechanisms for Engagement with Non-State Actors to advance fair inclusion and equal treatment among stakeholders;

(iii) Regional donors should play a fair game in terms of collaboration and information exchange with civil society associations across the region by considering them important key players in regionalisms with equal standing with states and markets. Donors should take advantage of SADC being donor-dependent to encourage SADC to fully open its civic spaces and allow civil society access at the table of decision-making as technocrats. Donors should continue to push for the adoption of the Proposal on SADC Mechanisms for Engagement with Non-State Actors, where civil society should be on the same page as business or technocrats. Donors should avoid political manipulation, if any, of regional institutions but pay attention to their diversity and heterogeneity;

(iv) Regional civil society networks should strive for inclusivity by discouraging any discriminatory attempts in order to preach by example rather than trying to teach other lessons. Civil society networks should invest more in evidence-based activities in order to be attractive to the SADC elites, rather than claiming political participation without offering any expertise other than technical expertise. More than that, civil society should build more coalitions with other non-state organisations around the world for more global awareness and visibility. Lastly, financial independence is needed for credible and independent regional civil society networks across the Southern African region and the world at large.

7.6 Conclusion

This study contributed to the literature, approaches and theoretical debates on contemporary regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors. It did so by understanding the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society when interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms outside of the mainstream. The study demonstrated the possibility of building alternative regionalisms driven and centred around ordinary citizens. People-centred approaches to regionalism are regarded as an alternative possible way to build regions using unconventional institutions outside of the mainstream. Alternative regionalisms remain an attempt to specify non-traditional, and thus less visible, mechanisms, processes, agents and structures involved in the making and re-making of regions across the world from below, outside of the state-centric paradigm. Given that alternative regionalisms seek to highlight that different paradigms inform physical-geographical, political economic and/or ideational regional constructs, in so doing they also expose key limitations of state-centric and capital-centric explanations of regionalisms that could be addressed and contested. More than that, alternative regionalism is associated with the move from the old regionalism to the new regionalism, where regionalism now takes place in a multipolar world order, emerges as a spontaneous process, is open and outward in character and involves multidimensional processes.

Findings showed that building alternative regionalisms in the Southern African region encompasses transcending the existing state-led SADC model of governance by building regions with institutional mechanisms driven by civil society themselves. The study established that different kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by cross-border civil society associations within both formal and self-organised networks are as important as formal institutions in the formation of regions. Civil society networks within self-organised regionalisms are capable of fostering inclusion and full participation with voices of epistemic communities in the decision-making processes to build regions from below, outside of the mainstream. In this regard, regionalism can be viewed as an unconventional socio-political phenomenon that can also be promoted by non-state actors. If well-governed, regional civil society networks, as self-organised regionalisms, can also function equally well as formal regionalisms that are driven by state actors and technocrats.

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APPENDIX I. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP GUIDES

I.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS GUIDE FOR REGIONAL STATE ACTORS, REGIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY & REGIONAL DONORS REPRESENTATIVES

This study aims to develop a typology of the kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by regional civil society networks when interacting within both horizontal networks outside of the mainstream and vis-à-vis the formal regional body like SADC in order to gauge their differences.

The specific research objectives ensuing from this broad aim are to:

i) Identify the kind of strategies, norms and rules that are developed by Southern African civil society groups when they interact both within horizontal networks and vis-à-vis SADC;

ii) Examine the differences between institutional arrangements in terms of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African regional civil society networks during their interaction within both formal and self-organised regionalism;

iii) Develop a typology of how civil society networks interact in regionalisms in relationship to their respective employed kinds of strategies, norms and rules;

iv) Contribute to the existing literature on regionalism by expanding the focus of analysis to include non-state actors.

Respondents are organised in three categories namely: regional state actors, regional civil society, regional donors/partners. Regional state actors' category is comprised by SADC members; Regional civil society category is represented by affiliated civil society to SAPSN and APEX (SATUCC, FOCCISA & SADC-CNGOs and general public); Regional donors' category is comprised by donors namely GIZ, EU-Delegation, GIC, FES, and Open Society Foundation, representatives, working at regional level.

I.1.1 QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL STATE ACTORS

- **Q1**: What are the formal avenues for civil society engagement with SADC decision-makers? And how inclusive are they?
- **Q2**: Being a RIGO formed by states, why is it important to have a framework for civil society engagement in SADC?
- **Q3**: What are formal eligibility requirements for civil society to seat at the table of negotiation created by SADC?
- **Q4**: At which level of decision-making process civil society is allowed to engage the SADC?
- **Q5**: In which sectors civil society is welcomed to interact within formal regionalism?
- Q6: On which capacity civil society engage the SADC: Consultant, observer, equal partner, or service provider?
- Q7: What are the rules regulating or guiding civil society in the engagement process with SADC as either observer? Partner? Service provider?
- Q8: How do civil society lobby SADC in the formal setting of engagement? And what kind of operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding are they using?
- Q9: Is the SADC state-centred or people-centred? How has this been translated into your various activities of the community and its organs?
- Q10: Regional civil society involved in region-building processes have criticised the SADC to be a close space of engagement and those who are invited to engage have hands tight and limited action at certain area. Is this an accurate assessment? Please elaborate on your answer.
- **Q11**: Are you aware of civil society self-organised avenues of engagement outside of the SADC? And what could motivate their set-up?
- **Q12**: How legitimate and transparent are these regional civil society networks to ensure representativeness of the vulnerable people they claim to represent at the regional level?

- **Q13**: To what extent do operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding, developed by civil society in self-organised setting could foster regional integration driven by people themselves?
- **Q14**: How do your activities and those of civil society networks be funded at regional level?
- **Q15:** What are the factors that are likely to promote or undermine civil society engagement in the SADC as currently constituted?

I.1.2 QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY

I.1.2.1 Civil Society Organisations Actors

- Q1: Could you give us a short presentation of your organisation? Including its main activities?
- Q2: What are the formal SADC-created spaces of engagement with civil society networks? And how inclusive are they?
- **Q3**: Why is it important to have a framework for civil society engagement with SADC despite being an intergovernmental organisation?
- **Q4**: What are formal eligibility requirements for civil society to seat at the table of negotiation created by SADC?
- **Q5**: At which level of decision-making process civil society is allowed to engage the SADC?
- **Q6**: In which sectors civil society is welcome to interact within formal regionalism?
- Q7: On which capacity civil society engage the SADC: Consultant, observer, equal partner, or service provider?
- Q8: How do civil society lobby SADC in the formal setting of engagement? And what kind of operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding are they using?
- **Q9**: How legitimate and transparent are these regional civil society networks to ensure representativeness of the vulnerable people they claim to represent at the regional level?
- **Q10**: To what extent do operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding, developed by civil society in self-organised setting could foster regional integration driven by people themselves?
- **Q11**: How do activities of SADC and those of civil society networks be funded at regional level?
- **Q12:** What are the factors that are likely to promote or undermine civil society engagement in the SADC as currently constituted?

I.1.2.2 General Public

- Q13: Are you aware of the existence of SADC? And how familiar are you with its mandate in the region?
- Q14: Through which regional civil society networks you identify yourself as a member? And how inclusive the organisation is?
- Q15: What are the operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding guiding your interaction within the self-organised spaces of engagement in decision making procedures?

I.1.3 QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL DONORS

- Q1: Could you give us a short presentation of your organisation? Including its main activities?
- **Q2**: How do you interact with both SADC and regional civil society networks as a partner in the Southern African region?
- **Q3**: What are the formal SADC-created spaces of engagement with civil society networks? And how inclusive are they?
- **Q3**: Why is it important to have a framework for civil society engagement in SADC?
- Q4: Regional civil society involved in region-building processes have criticised the SADC to be a closed space of engagement and those who are invited to engage have hands tight and limited action at certain area. Is this an accurate assessment? Please elaborate on your answer.
- **Q5**: Are you aware of civil society self-organised avenues of engagement outside of the SADC? And what could motivate their set-up?
- **Q6**: How legitimate and transparent are these regional civil society networks to ensure representation of the vulnerable people they claim to represent at the regional level?

- **Q7**: To what extent do operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding developed by civil society in self-organised setting could foster regional integration driven by people themselves?
- **Q8**: Which activities of both SADC and civil society networks are funded by your organizations at regional level?
- **Q9:** What are the factors that are likely to promote or undermine civil society engagement in the SADC as currently constituted?
- **Q10:** What are you doing as partners to ensure civil involvement in regional decision-making processes?

I.2 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSION GUIDE FOR REGIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS IN FORMAL AND SELF- ORGANISED REGIONALISM

The following questions will be asked to prompt research participants for two focus groups discussions which will be conducted within 6o minutes timeframe each. The following questions will guide the discussions:

- **Q1**: What are the formal SADC-created spaces of engagement with civil society networks? And how inclusive are they?
- **Q2:** How do civil society lobby SADC in the formal setting of engagement? And what kind of operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding are they using?
- **Q3**: To what extent do operation procedures, accepted conduct/routines and shared understanding developed by civil society in self-organised setting could foster alternative regionalisms driven by people themselves?
- **Q4**: Between practices and arrangements developed distinctively in formal and self-organised interactions, which one of them are representative and legitimate fostering inclusion and full participation of ordinary citizens of the Southern African region?

I.3 LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Category 1	**No**	**Category 2**	**No**	**Category 3**	**No**
Regional State Actors	8	Regional Civil Society Actors	14	Regional Donors/Partners	6
SADC Secretariat	1	SAPSN	1	GIZ	1
SADC-PF	1	SADC-CNGO	1	FES	1
SADC National Contacts: SA, Mozambique, DRC, Botswana	4	BOCONGO, SANGOCO, SAT, Gender Links, TEIA, CNONGD, AIDC	7	German Development Cooperation to SADC	1
SADC Gender Unit	1	FOCCISA	1	OSISA	1
SADC Governance Unit	1	SATUCC	1	EU-Delegation to SADC	1
		General Public	3	Norwegian People's Aid	1

APPENDIX II. SAMPLE OF RESEARCH CONSENT FORM FOR RESPONDENTS

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA
Dept. of Political Sciences
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8 March 2018

RESEARCH PROJECT: People-Centred Approaches to Regionalism: The case of the Southern African Civil Society Networks

My name is Tshimpaka Mwamba, I am a PhD student (no. **16141718**) in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria and I am conducting field research on the above topic in Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and South Africa. Permission to conduct the field research has been granted by the University of Pretoria. My research findings will eventually appear in my dissertation and in journal articles.

Will you please participate in my research project by joining in the discussions and interviews?
I will do my utmost to ensure your confidentiality in all my written reports by using either code names or pseudonyms or your names/organization names if you prefer. I do not expect you to divulge any information that might compromise you or your organization in any way. All information will be treated as confidential and you may withdraw from discussions or interviews at any time without any consequence. All the information gathered will be stored safely at the University of Pretoria, Department of Political Sciences for a minimum of 15 years.

The aims and objectives of the research:
The specific aim of the research is to develop a typology of kinds of strategies, norms and rules developed by Southern African civil society network when they are interacting within both formal and self-organised regionalisms for alternative. A comparative approach reveals that regional civil society networks that form part of a dominant formal process of regionalism exhibit different strategies, norms and rules than those that emerge out of contestation in opposition to formal regionalism. The overarching research question is: *what kind of strategies, norms and rules are developed by civil society networks in order to build alternative regionalisms?*

Thus, the following sub-questions will be explored in the course of this research:

1. *What kind of strategies, norms and rules are developed by civil society networks when they interact in formal regionalism processes like SADC?*

2. *What kind of strategies, norms and rules are developed by civil society networks when they interact in informal and self-organized regionalisms outside of the mainstream?*

You may also contact me at the following telephone number: 0840332521 or contact my supervisor, Prof. Lorenzo (+2712 420 2696) or e-mail lorenzo.fioramonti@gmail.com

I, the undersigned, have read the above and I understand the nature and objectives of the research project as well as my potential role in it and I understand that the research findings will eventually be placed in the public domain. I voluntarily consent to participate in all discussions, to give my expert opinion and to provide details about my life history, keeping in mind that I have the right to withdraw from the project at any stage. I also grant the researcher the right to use my contribution to the research project in completing this project as well as other projects that may emerge from it in future.

Full name of participant	Respondent's Signature	Researcher's Signature	Date

APPENDIX III. MAP OF SADC COMMUNITY AS A RESEARCH SITE

APPENDIX: IV. SAMPLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM CALL

Fellowship **o**f **C**hristian
Councils **i**n **S**outhern **A**frica

FINAL CONCEPT NOTE

11th Southern Africa Civil Society Forum

THEME: ***TOGETHER MAKING SADC BETTER: ACHIEVING JUSTICE, PEACE &EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR ALL***

A RE IKAGENG SESHA! LET US RENEW OURSELVES!

Introduction

The Southern Africa Civil Society Forum (CSF) will be hosted for the 11th consecutive year in Gaborone, Botswana. The CSF is a platform for civil society to dialogue and reflect on issues affecting the regional community, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the constituencies, organizations and movements of civil society at regional and national level.

The CSF has been held since 2005 under different themes relevant to the emerging issues and key perspectives, which are identified by stakeholders to be of particular importance for civil society.

The Forum has been convened by the Regional Apex Alliance, i.e. Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA); Southern Africa Trade Unions Coordinating Council (SATUCC) and SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO). As co-conveners of the CSF, the Regional Apex Alliance works with relevant networks and organizations at the regional level to receive input and contributions as the key themes and issues for deliberation.

The 11th CSF follows in the tradition and practice of the previous forums which have defined themselves as creative, reflective and action-orientated spaces for the broad spectrum of civil society formations in the region, including faith-based organizations, trade unions, campaigns, special interest groups, progressive academics and local people's formations and people's movements in Southern Africa. This tradition, which participants are rightly proud of, has over the years developed distinct value-adding dimensions that are unique, including that:

- The CSF builds consensus and unity on the burning issues facing CSO in the region and addresses itself in particular to the challenges and opportunities facing regional integration.
- The CSF contributes towards a common and shared plan of action on agreed priorities for CSO in Southern Africa.
- The CSF benchmarks best practice for CSO and fosters the highest standards of efficiency, sustainability and ethical conduct amongst participating organizations.
- The CSF fosters solidarity and unity amongst the diverse communities of interest and facilitates cross-sectoral unity and understanding amongst CSO.
- The CSF holds the organizations of civil society in Southern Africa accountable for the mutual and agreed actions and inculcates a culture of transparency in the affairs of CSO in Southern Africa.
-

At the same time it is a space for civil society to:

- Analyze, reflect and dialogue on the critical issues facing the region;
- Contribute to and create synergy with the agenda of SADC;
- Impact on the Summit of Heads of State and Governments;

- Plan and develop independent actions and priorities for regional civil society for the coming year, including identifying key campaigns, movement building and areas of collaboration.

The 11th CSF will be a turning point in the history of civil society in the region for a number of reasons. Firstly, the co-conveners recognize that the incoming Chairperson of SADC, the government of the Republic of Botswana, was a leading member of the Frontline State, the precursor to SADC and has played host to the SADC Secretariat since its inception. In many ways, this Summit marks a return for SADC to its institutional and political birthplace. A critical reflection of the SADC as a Regional Economic Community is necessary as Member States prepare to locate their role in the AU Agenda 2063 as well as the SADC Vision 2050.

In short, the implication of these developments, are that both the short-term trajectory of SADC, as contained and reflected in the reprioritized RISDP, as well as the long-term vision of SADC are currently being defined. Civil society's contribution to these processes is essential for its success.

In confronting its many and varied challenges SADC is also addressing key programmatic and institutional reforms. These include:

- The industrialization roadmap currently being developed;
- The regional agricultural policy, implementation framework and agricultural development fund;
- The prioritization of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2015 -2020);
- The review of the Gender and Development Protocol;
- The role out of the Regional Poverty Observatory and the development of the SADC definition of poverty, multi-dimensional poverty indicators and the SADC Poverty Status Report;
- The engagement with and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals;
- The development of regional responses to Climate Change and common positions on the UNFCCC COP21;
- The review of the SADC Guidelines on Elections; and
- The guidelines and agreed modalities for engagement with non-state actors.

These reflect the ongoing challenges confronted by SADC as an intergovernmental body as well as the critical hurdles faced by the regions citizens. Industrialization, agricultural and agrarian reform, climate change, gender justice and poverty reduction are inter-linked challenges which necessitate coherent and well considered responses from national governments and the regional community. The nexus between governance reform and democratization as meaningful participation by people within a legally guaranteed framework with recourse to the courts and institutions of justice is well established as a critical precondition for sustainable socio-economic development.

Rationale of the 11th CSF

How SADC responds to these challenges is in many ways dependent on the influence and impact non-state actors can have on SADC as independent actors. Critical to exercising influence and exerting pressure, which results in positive outcomes, requires a greater awareness and capacity on the part of non-state actors, particularly civil society formations.

In preparing for the 11th CSF the Regional and National Steering Committees believe a deeper and more critical reflection of the role of non-state actors in the workings of SADC, the efficacy of the Civil Society Forum and the mechanisms and modalities for effective engagement must constitute a central plank of its work. Having hosted the CSF for 11 consecutive years, and having resolved at the 10th CSF to establish clear accountability and monitoring mechanism for the decisions and declarations of the CSF, this year will review our collective impact and make critical determinations as to the ongoing role of the Civil Society Forum itself.

While recognizing that the CSF, which is held alongside the SADC Heads of State & Government Summit (HOSG), is a vital space to foster and enhance civil society capacity to influence the official SADC processes by creating a bridge between the official and governmental regional leadership and civil society, its overall impact must be improved by simplifying the amount issues dealt with and unifying civil society in time-bound actions for more defined outcomes. For this reason, the 11th CSF will also work very close and share common spaces with the Peoples Summit, Peoples Dialogue and Gender Summit – all related movement operating at the national and regional level seeking positive change and improvement in SADC and its Member States.

The 11th CSF is critical for mobilization of civil society in the region to confront and overcome the real challenges facing the citizens and people of the region. The region, though largely peaceful, experience a range of development and governance obstacles which prevent the full realization of the SADC Treaty and hamper people's efforts at achieving economic and human security for themselves and their children. Some of these issues, which the CSF will address, include:

- Xenophobia/Afro-phobia;
- Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, job creation and economic activity;
- Free movement of people;
- Access to water;
- Rights of Migrant Workers;
- Corruption;
- Rights of LGBTI community;
- Land grabs and agrarian reform;
- Social protection and security;
- Access to quality public services.

The CSF will attempt to focus on these key identified issues, without excluding any sector or constituency in its deliberations. Many and varied vulnerabilities are experienced by communities and all these concerns and points of action must also be integrated in the 11th CSF.

Objectives of the 11th Civil Society Forum

It is a necessary condition of peace; justice and sustainable development that people are active change agents and role-players. The seeming disconnects between citizens and states, let alone people and SADC as a multi-lateral inter-governmental institution must be understood and appropriately addressed. SADC, while it is a product of governments, is an institution of all citizens, stakeholders and actors in the region. As citizens and civil society organizations we are therefore also going to carefully review and assess our own role, our own accountability levels and mechanisms for achieving people-centred development.

It is against this that the 11th CSF aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. To amplify the voice of a unified civil society towards the realization of the SADC agenda on regional integration;
2. To build consensus on issues affecting the region and develop concrete strategies for moving forward;
3. To foster the spirit of solidarity among the people of the region and provide an information sharing platform for civil society working in different areas of regional development;
4. To nurture the interface between civil society, SADC institutions and political leadership in the SADC region in order to foster common appreciation of our challenges as a region and continent;

The 11th CSF will deal with the following core issue in plenary session:

a) Review the impact of non-state actors and define the role of Civil Society in Revisioning SADC-CNGO – including the role of the CSF itself, the proposed engagement mechanism with SADC and linkages between the local, national and regional level
b) Address the root causes – governance, socio-economic, cultural, etc – contributing to xenophobia in Southern Africa and determine a common plan of action
c) Develop a common and rights based approach towards the LGBTI community

The key thematic sessions for the 11th CSF are:

i) Governance & Accountability

- Anti-corruption;
- Promoting accountable quality service delivery
- Promoting effective and transparent governance of the private sector

ii) Inclusive & Sustainable Development

- Social protection meeting people's needs;
- Promoting effective & sustainable livelihoods;
- Promoting migration and free movement of persons

i) Rights & Justice for All

- Gender justice & equity
- Tax Justice
- Climate, food & land Justice

A series of side-events and parallel sessions have thus far been proposed by organizations:

1) Children's Rights
2) The Rights of Elderly Persons
3) Indigenous Persons
4) NGO Sustainability
5) Climate Justice – Women's Justice
6) Extractive Industries
7) Regional Anti-Corruption Team of Experts side event
8) Media & Digital Freedom

The 11th CSF will be coordinated in tandem to key events which will also be hosted by civil society during the time of the Summit, namely:

- The Peoples Summit
- The Gender Summit

The attached co-ordination mechanism has also been agreed and improved to enhance the efficacy of implementation towards and beyond the 11th CSF.

The Road map to the 11th Civil Society Forum

The 11th CSF will be held between 10 – 17th August 2015 in Gaborone, Botswana. Exact dates will be determined in consultation with partners and the Government of Botswana as host of the official HOSG.

Participation

In order to facilitate the engagement with partners and networks, in addition to the current Regional and National Steering Committee, the following networks will be invited to participate:

1. SADC Business Community (ASCCI)
2. Traditional Leaders (Contralesa)
3. Disability Sector (SAFOD)
4. Indigenous Persons (WIMSA)
5. Cross boarder Traders (SACBTA)
6. The elderly (Help Age)
7. Children's Rights sector (CRNSA)
8. LGBTI sector
9. Political parties
10. The Government of Botswana
11. SADC Secretariat
12. The SADC Parliamentary Forum
13. The SADC Electoral Support Network
14. Southern African Research & Documentation Centre
15. The African Union & related institutions
16. The Southern African Gender & Development Protocol Alliance (Gender Alliance)
17. Small Scale Farmers & Pastoralists, particularly women farmers (ESAFF/Rural Women's Assembly)
18. Land, food & climate justice sector (Southern African Food & Climate Justice Coalition)

1. The Southern African Social Protection Network
2. The Southern African Peoples Summit
3. In addition, we will invite other regions of the African union, such as East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, including continental Labour and Faith-based to amplify and consolidate coordinated engagement at regional and continental levels.

Process Leading to the Forum

Several processes will culminate in the civil society forum:

1. **Steering Committee Meeting**: A Steering Committee to prepare for the forum and lay a concrete foundation for collaboration among apex organizations and some regional thematic organizations especially in the content of the forum.
2. **National Steering Committee established in Botswana** as a host country to ensure local logistical and strategic planning and execution of key strategic priority plans. These include on consultative (national preparatory) meeting to develop key local civil society positions as their contribution towards the Civil society Forum.
3. **Pre-forum strategy and programme** Engagement with a variety of SADC Member States and Secretariat, including host government Botswana, SADC Parliamentary Forum, Political parties, SADC business forum to consult and discuss appropriate strategies and approaches towards the forum, including push towards institutionalizing and recognizing the strategic role of civil society participation and involvement in SADC processes.
4. **Hold Civil Society Forum**: The Forum will be held in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2015. The consensus from civil society will be fed into SADC ministerial and technical processes by a select advocacy team of civil society delegates
5. **Organized and coordinated advocacy during the Summit,** where a delegation from the Forum will be tasked to engage effectively with the Summit processes.
6. **Post Forum review meeting:** A post forum meeting will be held in September to evaluate the forum and its processes. This evaluation will inform future action for civil society regarding implementation of the resolutions from the forum.

Conclusion

The 11th CSF will provide a dynamic and active space for civil society in Botswana and from the entire SADC region to collectively reflect and plan for coming year. The 11th CSF will also provide an engagement platform for learning and knowledge sharing across the various sectors of civil society.

The main objective of the 11th CSF will be to build awareness and common action on a burning issue in the region, namely xenophobia. It will also address the key opportunities and challenges in respect of justice for the LGBTI community, women and small-scale producers, enabling movement building and promoting awareness of the rights of these communities.

Finally, the 11th CSF will enable more dynamic engagement with SADC and its institutions, building on the experiences of the past and innovating civil society practice post-2015 and beyond. The future mechanism, spaces and forms of engagement with SADC will be shaped through the deliberations and decisions of the 11th CSF, making conscious and deliberate decisions on the collective way forward for 2015 and beyond.

APPENDIX: V. SAMPLE OF A COMMUNIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM



Fellowship **o**f **C**hristian
Councils **i**n **S**outhern **A**frica

Communique of the 10th Civil Society Forum
Held on 30th July 2014, Harare, Zimbabwe
To the 34th Ordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State & Government

We, the assembled representatives of Civil Society in Southern Africa, having gathered in Harare, Zimbabwe and deliberated on the progress and challenges facing the Southern African Development Community on the occasion of the 10th Civil Society Forum, hereby express the following for your consideration at the forthcoming 34th Summit of the Heads of State and Government;

Hereby call on SADC Heads of State & Government to:

Enhancing Democracy & Justice:

- Elevate the SADC Principles and Guidelines governing Democratic Elections to the legal status of a Protocol and strengthen the provisions for national adherence and compliance, and;
- Revoke the suspension of the SADC Tribunal and reinstate it to its original mandate as provided for in the Tribunal Protocol (2005).

Promoting Sustainable Economies and Human Security:

- Facilitate the development and implementation of regional regulations, guidelines and institutions to manage intra-regional trade and investment, the exploitation of national and natural resources in a transparent, accountable and inclusive manner where local communities benefit directly and equitably;
- Dedicate adequate resources from the Regional Agricultural Fund to support small scale farmers, particularly women and youth, to ensure food security, sovereignty and sustainable livelihoods in rural and urban areas in line with the Maputo Declaration (2004);
- Adopt, ratify, domesticate and implement a SADC Employment & Labour Protocol by 2015;
- Approve and adopt the multi-deprivation definition of poverty, multi-deprivation poverty indicators and allocate adequate resources for the establishment and functioning of National Poverty Observatories within the Regional Poverty Observatory;
- Implement the African Mining Vision in an inclusive, integrated and participatory manner;
- Formulate, adopt and implement a SADC Basic Income Grant, and;
- Harmonize regional socio-economic and political policy frameworks to constitute a comprehensive human security framework for SADC.

Strengthening Civil Society Engagement in SADC Processes:

- Formulate and adopt guidelines for institutionalized participation of SADC civil society organizations in policy processes (e.g. RISDP & SIPO) and program implementation in consultation with Non-State Actors;
- Expedite the establishment of SADC National Committees and ensure their proper functioning in all Member States in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and;
- Include civil society at all levels of the Regional Development Fund.

Ensuring Gender Equality and the Rights of Vulnerable Groups:

- Ensure the full ratification, domestication and implementation of the SADC Gender & Development Protocol by 2015;
- Develop, adopt and domesticate a SADC Protocol on Children and Youth by 2015 in consultation and negotiation with affected constituencies and interest groups of civil society;
- Develop, adopt and domesticate a SADC Protocol on Disability 2016 in consultation and negotiation with affected constituencies and interest groups of civil society negotiation with affected constituencies and interest groups of civil society;
- Develop, adopt and domesticate a SADC Protocol on the Elderly by 2016 in in negotiation with affected constituencies and interest groups of civil society negotiation with affected constituencies and interest groups of civil society;
- Approve and implement the SADC Labour Migration Policy Framework by 2015 in consultation and negotiation with trade unions and interest groups of civil society; and
- Engage in a process of consultation and negotiation on the issues affecting the Indigenous People of the SADC region in order to facilitate the implementation of international legal instruments to protect their rights, traditions, cultures and environment.

Protection of Human Rights and Access to Information

- Align the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport with Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the African Platform on Access to Information.

On International Solidarity

- We call upon the SADC Summit to initiate impartial investigation on the Kingdom of Swaziland into the credible claims of the repression of trade unions, political parties and civic organization, the abuse of the judiciary and the persecution of members of the opposition;
- For SADC to put the political situation in Eritrea on the African Union as a standing agenda item and immediately start with the facilitation of an all-inclusive political dialogue in Eritrea, and;
- For SADC to support the people and State of Palestine in their efforts to achieve humanitarian aid and assistance; and immediately expel all Israeli diplomatic missions and business interests.

Signature:  Date: 13 August 2014

Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa

Signature:  Date: 13 August 2014

SADC Council of NGOs

Signature:  Date: 13 August 2014

Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council

APPENDIX: VI. SAMPLE OF SAPSN OPEN CALL TO SADC PEOPLE'S SUMMIT

Southern African People's Solidarity Network

Announcing……

The SADC People's Summit 2010

As the SADC Heads of State will be meeting in Windhoek, Namibia in August 2010, the ordinary peoples of Southern Africa will also converge at the Catholic Cathedral Hall in Windhoek on the 15th – 16th of August 2010 under the auspices of the Southern Africa Peoples' Solidarity Network (SAPSN).

Theme

This year's Summit is expected to bring together participants from community-based groups, social movements and civil society organizations from all corners of the region under the theme **"Reclaiming and Reuniting SADC for People's Social and Economic Rights"**

Agenda

The broad thematic issues on the agenda for the 2010 Peoples' Summit are as follows:

- Democracy and Human Rights
- Youth and Unemployment
- Gender and Women's Rights
- EPAs and Regional Integration
- Social and Economic Safety Nets
- HIV/AIDS/Health Issues
- Free Movement of Persons
- Debt and Trade Justice

The Peoples' Summit is a people's platform to share experiences, map out strategies and build solidarity around common challenges. A key output from the Summit deliberations will be the SADC **Peoples' Declaration** to be submitted to the SADC Heads of State and disseminated throughout the region.

Your Participation and Contribution

SAPSN is pleased to invite you to participate in this landmark event. **Participation is open to all ordinary citizens of the region.** Groups**,** organizations and individuals that are interested in participating are requested to complete the attached form by 25 July 2010. Organizations are encouraged to support their representatives to the summit.

Dates and Venue

The 2010 Summit will be held at the Catholic Cathedral Hall (91 Werner List Street, Windhoek) on the 15th – 16th of August 2010.

APPENDIX: VII. SAMPLE OF REGISTRATION FORM

Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN)

"Reclaiming and Reuniting SADC for People's Social and Economic Rights"

SADC People's Summit Registration Form
Windhoek, Namibia
15- 16 August 2010

To be filled in and sent back by email/ Fax
sapsn@zimcodd.co.zw/zimcodd@zimcodd.co.zw +2634776830/31

Before 25th of July 2010

Personal Details

1. **Full Name:** ----------

2. Organization: ----------

3. Address: (Bus) ----------

4. Country----------

5. Tel: ----------

6. E-mail 1: ----------

7. Participation Details

What activities do you intend to participate in during the Southern African People's Summit (Please complete the table below).

	Sub Themes	**Specify your choices by ticking**
1	Gender and Women's Rights	
2	EPAs and Regional Integration	
3	Democracy and Human Rights	
4	Free Movement of Persons.	
5	Social and Economic Safety Nets	
6	HIV/AIDS/Health Issues	
7	Youth and Unemployment	
8	Debt and Trade Justice	

APPENDIX: VIII. A SAMPLE OF SAPSN COLLECTIVE COMMUNIQUE

Southern African People's Solidarity Network

SADC Peoples' Summit Declaration
5-6 September 2009 in Kinshasa

We the more than 250 representatives of Social Movements, Non-Governmental Organisations, Trade Unions, Religious Organisations, Economic Justice and Human Rights Networks, Youth and Women's Organisations, met in Kinshasa, DRC, to bring the SADC Community's attention to challenges that affect our daily lives. The SADC Peoples' Summit is annually convened parallel to the Heads of State Summit under the auspices of the Southern Africa Peoples' Solidarity Network, SAPSN. Our theme for this year is, 'Reclaiming SADC for People's Solidarity and Development Cooperation: Taking Ownership of our Resources for People's Security and Justice". From our deliberations at the Summit, we call on the SADC governments and all stakeholders to pay particular attention to the following:

1. Privatisation of basic Public Services: This is worsening the poverty of the SADC peoples as African leaders apply neo-capitalist and western policies without profound analysis of regional and African issues. Privatisation violates the right to life as it infringes on the rights to education, health care, accommodation, safe drinking water, protection of persons and services and also the right to electricity. The Peoples of SADC demand that:

* The DRC and the other states in the region involved in the exportation of electricity from Inga Dam ensure that there is complete electrification of DRC before exportation.
* The organised Civil Society representing specific social interests should be actively involved in the negotiations related to the granting of contracts on public services in order to guarantee the social economic rights of workers and the social responsibility of new shareholders in community development projects.
* There should be a STOP to privatisation of essential services.

2. The impact of external forces in the DRC armed conflict is of major concern. The role of foreign states in the stabilisation of the DRC must be of concern to the SADC Heads of State. The people of SADC are demanding that:

* The SADC states move and cooperate following the SADC charter on the security of DRC in order to allow effective peoples integration;
* The SADC states must themselves avoid taking advantage of the weakness of the Congolese government to occupy it as in the case of Kayemba and Bas Congo by Angola and other forms of imposition.
* The SADC Leaders ensure that the resources of the Congo are used for the benefit of the people of the Congo.
* The rampant violence against women and children in the DRC must be stopped forthwith.

3. Democracy and human rights is a solid base to support sustainable development and guarantee the participation of SADC people in the project of regional integration. We demand that:

* All the governments throughout the region respect promote and protect fundamental human democratic rights. On this subject, we would like to draw the attention of the Heads of State on the Limited freedom of speech and association particularly for the political organisations in the Democratic

Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Angola and Zimbabwe is an impediment to the people's participation in the project of collective development.

* The power sharing agreement concluded on 15th September 2008 in Zimbabwe between the political protagonists must be implemented in the realisation of promises on human rights related reforms.

* The strengthening of mechanisms of execution of the SADC Tribunal decisions. The courts and national tribunals should be without racial, sex and social class discrimination.

4. External debts, international aid and Trade Injustices are ropes that tie down the African people to poverty. The majority of the population who pay the price are ignorant of this issue. It is therefore necessary that the civil society gets involved in the popularisation of debt problems, and make petitions demanding external debt cancellation to the SADC Head of State. The people are calling for:

*An audit of external debt in order to separate legitimate debt from illegitimate debt particularly when the political leaders enjoy being supported by donors and Western states. ·

*Organise a meeting of the SADC civil society on external debt and submit the resolution to SADC Heads of State. ·

*Our national governments to stop opening up our markets to international competition that negatively affect small-scale producers and traders particularly women. ·

*Our governments to revisit and review the Economic Partnership Agreements they have signed whilst those that have not yet signed should desist from signing the agreements.

5. Global Financial Crisis. The global financial crisis is widely generalised and yet it was created by the financial institutions from economically powerful nations. The State must involve itself more in the regulation of the financial sector to avoid fraud, money laundering and their harmful social consequences on the people. To achieve this, we demand that:

* The Heads of State must favour the creation of a common market of exchange in the region to allow financial cooperation and integration and regional customs.

* The SADC states must adopt a policy of granting micro credit to the population particular rural and peasant to prompt either production of local goods. 6. Climatic Change and Energy Crisis has become a major problem in the 21st century affecting all the countries. However, the most industrialised nations which find themselves out of our region and of the continent are the biggest polluters. The African people, particularly women and children who are already poor and they pay the most.

* The SADC people reject the principle and application of Carbon Trade which is a false solution predicated on inventing a perverse right to pollute. They propose reforestation of forests devastated by western companies and put in place measures protecting water and fishing.

* The SADC people must participate and contribute positively as civil Society in order to find national solutions to the problem of Global Warming. The DRC civil society seeks that the Heads of State and SADC Nongovernmental organisations support the preservation of the Central basin whose greater part is found in the Congo.

7. Poverty and Unemployment are a plague in our region principally caused by neo-colonial and capitalist policies implemented by our governments. SADC countries pledged to allocate 10% of their national budgets to agriculture (Maputo Summit 2003) but food crisis continues and not all countries have honoured their agreements on agriculture. We have 249 million people in the region, 70% of them depend on agriculture for food, income and employment. The poor spend 60- 100 % of their income on food. WE therefore demand:

* The establishment of an economic and social agency to promote creation of decent employment in each SADC country;

* A huge budgetary allocation to the key sectors particularly education, employment creation, and the fight against poverty.

* On Agriculture the government must provide with: Infrastructure (roads, railways and access to markets), Mechanisation, Inputs (seeds etc),' Research and extension services and capacity building for farmers' organisations,

* Mitigation approaches must be put in place in areas where climate change is having an impact for example providing irrigation where farmers depend on rainfall (due to evidence of drought they are becoming vulnerable).

APPENDIX: IX RESEARCH ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

Faculty of Humanities
Research Ethics Committee

27 November 2017

Dear Mr Mwamba

Project:	**People-centred approaches to regionalism: The case of the Southern African civil society networks**
Researcher:	**T Mwamba**
Supervisors:	**Prof L Fioramonti and Dr C Nshimbi**
Department:	**Political Science**
Reference number:	**16141718 (GW20171025HS)**

Thank you for your response to the Committee's correspondence of 13 November 2017.

I have pleasure in informing you that the Research Ethics Committee formally **approved** the above study at an *ad hoc* meeting held on 27 November 2017. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should your actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely

Prof Maxi Schoeman
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate and Research Ethics
Faculty of Humanities
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
e-mail: tracey.andrew@up.ac.za

cc: Prof L Fioramonti (Supervisor)
Dr CC Nshimbi (Co-Supervisor)

APPENDIX: X RESEARCH PERMIT

TELEGRAMS: PULA
TELEPHONE: 3950800
TELEX: 2655 BD

REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

MINSTRY OF PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS,
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
PRIVATE BAG 001
GABORONE

REF: OP 5/59/8 XII (23)

04 December, 2017

Dr Merran Hulse
Researcher "Governance, Statehood and Security"
Merran. Hulse@die-gid.de
Germany

Dear Sir/Madam

APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH PERMIT

Reference is made to above subject matter.

You are herewith granted permission for research permit to conduct a study titled: **"The Influence of Civil Society Networks on Regional Governance: The case of SADC."** The permit is valid for 1 month, from 1st – 31st March, 2018.

1. Copies of any report/papers written as a result of the study are directly deposited with the Office of the President.

2. The permit does not give authority to enter any premises, private establishment or protected area. Permission for such entry should be negotiated with those concerned.

3. You conduct the project according to the particulars furnished in the approved application taking into account the above conditions.

4. Failure to comply with any of the above stipulated conditions will result in the immediate cancellation of the permit.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,

Russ Molosiwa
For/PERMANENT SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

Copied to: Director, Botswana National Library Services
Director, National Archives and Records Services

d·i·e

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik

German Development Institute

The Permanent Secretary to the President

P/Bag 001

Gaborone

Botswana

Dr Merran Hulse
Researcher "Governance, Statehood and Security"
Merran.Hulse@die-gdi.de
Tel + 49 (0)228 94927-212

Bonn, November 21st, 2017

Application for a Research Permit to conduct research on civil society in the SADC region

Tulpenfeld 6
D-53113 Bonn

Telefon +49 (0)228 94927-0
Telefax +49 (0)228 94927-130

www.die-gdi.de
www.facebook.com/DIE.Bonn
www.youtube.com/DIEnewsflash

To Whom it concerns

The Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute (DIE) is planning to conduct a research project on the role of civil society networks in regional governance in the southern African region. Therefore, we would like to apply for a permit to conduct research in Botswana in March of 2018.

The DIE is a leading European think tank for global development cooperation and aims to produce research of the highest academic quality while simultaneously informing evidence-based development policy. We provide policy advice to both German and international development practitioners. We also run a post-graduate training programme for future development professionals. A core component of this training programme is to conduct a research project on a theme relevant to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. This academic year, one of our projects focusses on how cross-border civil society networks participate in regional governance.

Our starting point is the observation is that non-state actors increasingly build connections across borders, and in some cases partner with regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in order to develop, implement and monitor regional policies in different policy sectors, such as gender equality, trade, HIV/AIDS etc. We believe that the engagement of civil society has potential to contribute to peaceful and inclusive societies (SDG Goal 16) and strengthening partnerships for sustainable development (SDG Goal 17).

As Botswana is home to the SADC headquarters and several important umbrella civil society organizations for the southern African region, we would like to visit Botswana

Kuratoriumsvorsitzende:
Dr. Friedrich Kitschelt, Staatssekretär
Geschäftsführung:
Prof. Dr. Dirk Messner
Dr. Imme Scholz (stellv.)
Postbank Berlin:
BLZ 100 100 10, Konto 184490-104,
BIC PBNKDEFF,
IBAN DE 10 10010010 0184 4901 04
Sitz der gGmbH:
Bonn
Registergericht:
Amtsgericht Bonn
eingetragen unter HRB 8741
USt-IdNr. DE210856958

for a four-week period, approx. from 4th March – 30th March. Our research team consists of myself, Dr. Merran Hulse, five German postgraduate researchers, and a PhD researcher from the Centre for Governance Innovation at the University of Pretoria. See attached pages for more info on members of the research team.

While we are in Botswana we would like to interview various stakeholders involved in regional governance and civil society matters. This would include civil society actors, academics, representatives of the Botswana government, SADC representatives, local experts, and members of the donor community.

We will also conduct research in neighboring southern African states. Our findings will be used to produce a final report, which will be disseminated via the DIE publication series, and policy recommendations on how civil society and regional institutions can work together for the achievement of the SDGs. We also aim to hold a seminar in the southern African region on the initial findings of our project. The project is funded entirely by the DIE.

The project will follow the highest ethical standards and practices as set out by the Rules of Good Scientific Practice presented by the German Research Foundation / Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), as well as any ethical guidelines issued by the Government of Botswana

Please find attached CVs and passport copies of the research team.

Sincerely,

Dr Meran Hulse

REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

Research Permit Application Form

Two copies of this form should be completed and signed by the applicant who wishes to obtain a permit for conducting research in the Republic of Botswana, and sent to the Permanent Secretary of the relevant Ministry (see guidelines for addresses). These forms should not be submitted unless the **Guidelines for the Application for a Research Permit** has been carefully studied. A copy of any project proposal submitted to funding agencies must accompany this application. Please refer to Annexure I attached to this application form.

Description of the Proposal

1. (a) Title of Research:

The Influence of Civil Society Networks on Regional Governance: The case of SADC

(b) Discipline involved:

Political Science / International Relations

2. Name and Address of Applicant(s):

Dr. Merran Hulse (team lead)
Ms. Lisa Guerth
Ms. Helena Kavsek
Ms. Verena Stauber
Mr. Mwamba Tshimpaka
Mr. Daniel Wegner
Mr. Jan Weinreich

Telephone: +49(0)228 94927-212 (Merran Hulse)

Fax: +49(0) 228 94927-130 E-mail: Merran.Hulse@die-gdi.de

3. Name and address of home institutions (if any) to which you are affiliated:

Deutsches Institut fuer Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute (DIE)
Tulpenfeld 6
53223 Bonn
Germany