A Critical Analysis of South Africa's Pursuit of an African Agenda at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - 2007/2008 and 2011/2012

By

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DECLARATION

I declare that *A Critical Analysis of South Africa's Pursuit of an African Agenda at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-2007/2008 and 2011/2012* is my own work, that it has not been submitted previously for any degree or examination at this or any other university, and that all the sources that I have used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

South Africa participated in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2007–2008 and again in 2011–2012 as a non-permanent member within the context of a multipolar global power configuration. It was a global environment in which Africa as a continent remained economically and politically marginalized as a result of colonialism and forms of neo-colonialism. The assumption of the seat in the UNSC followed the country's transition from a pariah state to a democratic one since the dawn of democracy in 1994.South Africa has sought to play an integral role on the world stage as an economic leader in Southern Africa, a diplomatic representative of the African Agenda on the global stage and a good global citizen. Both administrations of President Thabo Mbeki and President Jacob Zuma adopted foreign policy strategies that sought to advance the African Agenda during the country's tenures in the UNSC. This study seeks to address the question of how South Africa pursued the African Agenda during both tenures. The study uses desk top research by looking at the primary and secondary material on the role of South Africa during both tenures. In addition, elite interviews using semi-structured questionnaires were conducted with officials from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. The theoretical framework adopted in this study is the decolonial thought which as analytical framework illustrated how the country was able to reimagine its being, power and knowledge in advancing the African Agenda in order to bring tangible changes within the UNSC.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my late father, Lebogang Frederick Sefolo, and late Uncle Modikwe Carl Sefolo who ignited my love for politics and education. Both your deaths have fueled in me a fire to become a better scholar and to advance my academic career.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
AUHIP	African Union High Implementation Level Panel
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IR	International Relations
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
P2	Two Non-Western Permanent Members (China and Russia)
P3	Three Western Permanent Members (France, UK and US)
P5	Five Permanent Members (China, France, Russia, UK and US)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US/USA	United States/United States of America

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1   INTRODUCTION

This project interrogates multilateralism, in this instance the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as an effective and strategic mechanism which addresses the challenges of the current world-order and geo-political issues affecting nations. This chapter contextualizes the problem by locating it in historical perspective. Having identified the research problem, the objectives are spelt out leading to the methods and techniques of data collection and analysis.

The section further provides an overview of the Literature related to the two core areas under examination in this study namely South Africa and the African Agenda and a suitable theoretical framework, the Decolonial thought, to contextualize the study and to identify the gap this research seeks to fill.

1.2   BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM

Prior to the transition to a democratic dispensation, South Africa was internationally isolated and could not participate in sub-regional, regional and global multilateral institutions because of its racial engineering policies of colonial-apartheid. South Africa's relations with the international community began to deteriorate by the end of World War II. In particular, during the period 1948 until 1994 the country was subjected to an international campaign of diplomatic isolation against the policy of the National Party known as apartheid. As a result, South Africa had global attention but limited diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with other states. Consequently, South Africa became one of the international pariah states (Zubane, 2017:7)

Following South Africa's transition into democracy, the country was re-admitted into sub-regional, regional and global institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) in 1994. South Africa has since 1994 used multilateralism as one of its instruments to advance its foreign policy objectives and to increase its influence on a global scale. In this regard, South Africa has taken on a number of leadership responsibilities in

multilateral organisations on a sub-regional, regional and global level. The new democratic government embraced the opportunity to engage within the international community (Mandela, 1993). With its newfound moral status in the eyes of the world, South Africa served as an elected member of the UNSC for two tenures, during the administration of President Thabo Mbeki from 2007-2008 and then during the administration of President Jacob Zuma from 2011-2012.

The UNSC is a preeminent global institution mandated with the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945: 7). Almost three quarters (70%) of the UNSC's agenda is concerned with security and conflict issues in African countries (Fransman, 2012). Africa thus dominates the UNSC agenda by virtue of its designation as 'conflict ridden'. However, the continent continues to be marginal in determining or driving the solutions to resolve these problems. For instance, no African country has a permanent seat on the UNSC, which continues to be dominated by the five permanent members (known as the P5), namely, the United States of America, Britain, France, China and Russia. The other ten members completing the 15 countries representing all five regions of the world are elected (popularly known as the E10) and rotate tenures every two years. South Africa has thus been elected for a non-permanent seat twice in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012.

South Africa's role on the continent and its performance in the UNSC are linked and it was therefore important for South Africa to take the opportunity and ensure that its term yielded positive developments that would benefit the continent at large (Ajulu, 2009: 51). By ignoring the rest of Africa or failing to step up to the plate, South Africa risked damaging its longer-term foreign policy goals of firstly reforming the UN with continental backing, and secondly benefitting directly from this reform in the position of Africa's elected representative on an enlarged UNSC (Du Plessis, 2013: 58).

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2007: 62), for the elected members of the UNSC there is generally little room for maneuver as the reality is that the P5 members set the agenda. Despite formal and explicit colonization ending with the decolonisation, its successors, namely Western Imperialism and globalization perpetuated inequalities within the global system. In this regard, this study seeks to critically analyse South Africa's conduct and pursuit of its foreign policy of the African Agenda at the UNSC within the context of Africa's place in global affairs. The study considers the marginality

of the continent and the extent to which South Africa's pursuit of an African agenda was and could possibly have been achieved. This study also assesses South Africa's two tenures, with a view to understanding better the complexities and possibilities of using a non-permanent seat at the UNSC to influence the global system through an African Agenda.

1.3   JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The assumption of the non-permanent seat of the UNSC by South Africa ignited a great deal of interest from scholars, academics and think tanks during both tenures. Scholars have studied and analysed either the first or second tenure of South Africa's membership of the UNSC as a non-permanent member (see Bischoff, 2009; Serrao, 2011 and Mbete, 2018). However, a systematic and scholarly comparative study of both tenures focusing on the promotion of the African Agenda has not been conducted. Much of the writings on South Africa's performance in the UNSC have also focused on its human rights agenda (Spies, 2008; Inglis, 2009; Manku, 2017) with less emphasis on its pursuit of an African Agenda. Through a study of the two terms at the UNSC, and specifically a critical analysis of South Africa's pursuit of an African Agenda, this study addresses an important gap in the literature. Moreover, the study has pragmatic and policy significance as South Africa aspires for a permanent seat in the future expanded UNSC.

1.4   RESEARCH QUESTION

The study addresses the following research question:

How did South Africa – itself a relatively marginal, middle power in global affairs – advance the African Agenda during its two tenures at the UNSC?

1.5   RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The study seeks to consider the possibilities and pragmatics of pursuing an African Agenda on a global stage, through a case study of South Africa's two tenures at the UNSC.

 Therefore, the study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- To critically analyse how South Africa as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 pursued an African Agenda;
- To examine how the African Agenda was understood and advanced by South Africa and how this was received on the continent;
- To compare and contrast the consistency and continuities across the tenures;
- To analyse discourses and narratives around South Africa's "successes" and "challenges" in advancing the African Agenda during the two tenures; and
- To use the insights gained through the empirical case of South Africa's two tenures at the UNSC in order to reflect on the place of Africa in the global system using decolonial lenses.

1.6   REASEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

The study is a critical analysis of South Africa's foreign policy behavior at the UNSC, using both its first and second term as case studies. According to Yin, a case study is "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin 2009: 14). The case under study is South Africa's two tenures at the UNSC with the unit of analyses being how it promoted the African Agenda through decisions it made during its participation in the UNSC.

A qualitative research approach has been employed to collect and analyse data. According to Have (2004: 5) most qualitative research tends to be based on an 'interpretative' approach, in the sense that the meanings of events, actions and expressions is not taken as 'given' or 'self-evident', but as requiring some kind of contextual interpretation. It is against this background that we employ qualitative research in order to study things in their natural settings, allowing the researcher to interpret and analyse information and bring meaning to the study.

The study used primary and secondary material obtained through desktop research. The primary sources came from government policies, speeches from key foreign policy role players within the South African government and UNSC statements, interventions, voting records and reports. The secondary material was collected from scholarly articles on the subject of South Africa's participation in the UNSC during both tenures.

Elite interviews were conducted with officials from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and those who represented the country at the UNSC during either one or both tenures. The interviews were semi-structured. According to Moyser (2006: 5), elite interviews have three broad needs that can be fulfilled. First, through interviewing, elites may provide first-hand information about their personal backgrounds, outlooks and motivations. Second, interviews might also be undertaken where the elites serve as experts. It is often the case that such individuals have unique experiences as 'insiders', enabling them to comment upon events or evidence, provide interpretations and suggest fruitful lines of further inquiry. Third, elites may serve as gatekeepers who, formally or informally, control access to needed data sources.

The data from both primary and secondary sources was analysed by employing the decolonial theory's three elements of coloniality, which are coloniality of being; coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge as an analytical framework. Elite interviews were conducted in order to substantiate or refute observations made to interpret the primary and secondary sources regarding certain decisions taken or lack thereof in order to provide a more detailed explanation of events that took place during either or both tenure(s).

1.7   ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

The researcher ensured that informed consent is obtained from the interviewees before conducting any interview and that participants are allowed to retain anonymity if they so wished. Permission to record (audio or scribing) the interviews was also requested by the researcher thus enabling the researcher to refer back to the interviews during data analysis.

1.8   SCOPE AND LIMITATION(S) OF THE STUDY

The focus of this paper is South Africa's two tenures at the UNSC in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012, specifically its advancement of the African Agenda. South Africa's advancement of other foreign policy priorities during the two tenures in the UNSC, and any decisions it made in other UN organs or multilateral institutions during this time will be excluded as other scholars have extensively studied them.

Having noted above in section 1.6 that elite interviews would be conducted, the study faced several limitations which to some extent impacted on the research. Given the seniority of the interviewees in the above-mentioned government department, the availability and accessibility of the officials affected the progress and outcome of the study in that several of the individuals had limited time (1 hour) to engage on the issues under discussion. Secondly given the nature of their work, interviewees were unwilling to extensively engage on classified information but rather provided a simplistic explanation without divulging too much thus 'gatekeeping' information. Furthermore, the issue of the protection of the officials (interviewee) identity resulted in their refusal for audio recording and opted for the interviewer to scribe responses during interviews.

1.9   LITERATURE SURVEY AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.9.1 South Africa, multilateralism and the African Agenda

South Africa has since 1994 used multilateralism as a key strategy to advance its foreign policy objectives to increase its influence on a global scale. In this regard, South Africa has taken on a number of leadership responsibilities in multilateral organisations at a sub-regional, regional and global level. According to Nel et al (2001: 12), South Africa's high-level activism in multilateralism institutions ensures that it becomes a voice for the more vulnerable states in world affairs, especially as an advocate for the African agenda. Multilateralism, as noted by Black (2001: 77) "offers states like South Africa a means to enhance their leverage and multiply their influence while minimizing their exposure and risk on sensitive foreign policy issues". By playing a central role in multilateral organisations, South Africa positioned itself as a critical player in shaping the development agenda of the continent.

South Africa's first democratically elected President, Nelson Mandela wrote as he outlined the country's new foreign policy in 1993, "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not develop our energies to serve this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its parts" (Mandela, 1993: 87). This brought with it the idea that South Africa would become a champion of the African Agenda and its commitments to Africa and Southern Africa in particular would become the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy.

According to Landsberg, the African Agenda is based on the "understanding that socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability" (Landsberg, 2009: 1). South Africa's African Agenda goals include:

- Strengthening the African Union and its structure
- Contributing towards Southern African Development Community (SADC) Common Agenda
- Strengthening the governance and technical decision-making capacities of SADC
- Contributing to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)
- Contribute towards Peace, Security and Stability in Africa

Landsberg further goes on to explain that South Africa's African Agenda is an impressive and ambitious plan as it involves a wide range of measures to make democratic political systems, peace and security and accelerated economic growth the cornerstones of development in Africa.

Today the African Agenda is one of the "four pillars" of South Africa's foreign policy (Zuma, 2011). South Africa, through the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), emphasized that it had no intentions to be an exploitative hegemon, stating that "[the country] should resist all pressure to become the regional power at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent; instead, it should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence" (African National Congress, 1994: 5).

The concept of the African Agenda, introduced during President Mandela's administration in 1993, has remained an important goal of South Africa's foreign policy despite four changes in leadership of the country. The concept was brought to the fore and articulated more fully during the Presidency of Thabo Mbeki under the flagship of the African Renaissance and remained a key priority under President Jacob Zuma (Rapoo, 2007: 1). According to Landsberg and Kondlo (2007: 1) the African Renaissance, with its "Pan-Africanist pedigree" informs the African Agenda and South Africa's ambitious vision for the continent. A primary goal of the African Agenda is to integrate the continent into the global economy on the basis of "mutual responsibility"

and "mutual accountability" (Landsberg, 2007). Mbeki and his allies namely Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) therefore sought to persuade a majority of African governments to support their agenda by engaging in "trade-off diplomacy" with the West (Landsberg, 2007).

Despite the ANC's professed commitment to the contrary in the early 1990s, Hengari (2014: 1) argues that there are concerns throughout the continent about South Africa's "giantism". He further argues that there is fear and resentment that South Africa is behaving like, and harbouring ambitions of a domineering hegemony. Alden and Soko (2005: 368) supported this notion by arguing that South Africa's promotion of the African Agenda is aimed at advancing its own "hegemonic aspirations" in the sense of seeking out a position of structural power on the continent. Landsberg and Korgnegay (2007: 2) have also raised questions about South Africa's advancement of the African Agenda and the African Renaissance, asking: "Is the renaissance a Pax-Pretoriana thinly disguised as Pax-Africana? Or is it genuine Pax-Africana?" This raises concern around whether the African Agenda as advocated by South Africa is indeed a view held by all (or even a majority of) African states and if it honestly advances the notion of African solutions to African problems or if it is an attempt by the country to pursue its own interest on the continent and the world at large at the expense of the rest of Africa.

The advancement of the African Agenda was meant to be a pursuit that pushed the continent beyond the strictures of colonial domination and ensured its assumption of independence and autonomy in the global system. This would have represented a pushback against forms of neo-colonialism and would have constituted practical realization of decolonial theory. Ndinga-Muvumba and Mottiar (2007: 188) highlight the idea that the concept of the African Agenda promotes values such as self-respect and autonomy which are central to stimulating Africa's identity, constructing African institutions and formulating African solutions to African problems.

South Africa's participation within the UNSC during both tenures and its objective of advancing the African Agenda can best be explored and understood by analysing these policy objectives through the insight lenses provided by decolonial theory.

1.9.2 Decolonial/Africanist theory

Although formal and explicit colonization ended with the decolonisation of the Americas and the global south in the late twentieth century, its successors, namely Western Imperialism and globalization perpetuated inequalities within the global system. Decoloniality was introduced during the sixteenth century when the colonial matrix of power was put into place, with the aim of confronting and delinking from Eurocentrism, which maintained that the history of human civilization departed from nature and culminated in Europe and also that the differences between Europe and non-Europe were due to biological differences and not histories of power (Quijano, 2009: 542).

Walter D. Mignolo (2005: 33) argued that "coloniality names the experiences and views of the world and history of those whom Fanon (1963) called *les damnes de la terre"* ('the wretched of the earth'), those who have been, and continue to be, subjected to the standards of European modernity, built on exploitation and expropriation. The theory is divided into three constitutive elements of global coloniality, namely the coloniality of power, the coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge. These three concepts enable a deeper understanding of the construction of the modern world that is today besieged by a plethora of crises.

The "Coloniality of Power" is an expression coined by Anibal Quijano to describe the modern global structures of power, control, and hegemony that have emerged during the era of colonialism and are still present today. Coloniality of power exists as an entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies and hetararchies of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic, aesthetic, and racial forms of domination and exploitation (Grosfoguel, 2007: 217). It helps to investigate how the current 'global political' was constructed and constituted into the asymmetrical and modern power structure.

Nelson Maldonado-Torres transforms the idea of the coloniality of power to the coloniality of being which aims to respond to the need to thematize the question of the effects of coloniality in lived experience and not only in the mind (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:242). The being of the colonised became that of the racialised self, open to all sorts of abuses from the colonisers. What is at issue here is the pertinent question of

how whiteness gained ontological density far above blackness as well as how the notions of 'I think, therefore I am' mutated into 'I conquer, therefore, I am' and its production of 'coloniser and colonised' articulation of subjectivity and being (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 12).

"Coloniality of Knowledge" refers to how Euro-American techno-scientific knowledge managed to displace, discipline and destroy alternative knowledge it found outside the Euro-American zones. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2001: 55) schools, churches and universities contributed towards the invention of the "other" as they operated as epistemic sites as well as technologies of subjectivities that naturalized Euro-American epistemology as universal. The most important form of colonial invasion and repression is that which targeted modes of knowing, of producing knowledge and of producing perspectives (Quijano, 2007: 169).

Global coloniality remains one of the most important modern power structures that constrains and limits the African agenda. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 21) has been a prominent theorist in support of this notion and has applied the decolonial analysis to the African context. Decoloniality is born out of a realisation that the world is asymmetrically ordered and is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans who are socialised into hating the Africa that produced them, and liking the Europe and America that rejects them (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 21).

Mafeje states that Africans should speak for themselves and about themselves, "the world will hear the authentic voice, and will be forced to come to terms with it in the long-run. If we are adequately Afrocentric, the international implications will not be lost on others" (Mafeje, 2000: 66). It could be argued that this is precisely what was attempted by Mbeki when he spoke of an African Renaissance and when South Africa insists within global institutions such as the UNSC, that it will promote and pursue an 'African Agenda'. Yet, the question remains: to what extent has this been possible and plausible within an unequal global power structure? It is evident that Africa dominates the UNSC's agenda, rather than the 'African Agenda' dominating the UNSC. Capturing the ontological state of blackness within the social order, Du Bois (1903:1) asks the question: "How does it feel to be a problem?" Within the current global order African states appear high on the agenda but principally/ primarily as a problem. Within

institutions of global order such as the UNSC, the agenda is dominated by African security issues; Africa then is dominant within the UNSC as a place of deep and intractable insecurity, that is, as a problem. It is with this construction and context that the idea of an "African Agenda", of a different place for Africa in the global order, must necessarily contend.

Maldonado-Torres (2011: 2) states that decoloniality means to dismantle power relations and "conceptions of knowledge that encourage the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonised world". Decoloniality is about contesting the construction of the other and the emancipation of the human regardless of race, culture, religion or locality. Ralph Austen (1987: 271) clearly understood that the major problem facing African people is that of asymmetrical relationship between the "role of the continent in the world and the degree to which that world […] has penetrated Africa". According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 22), decoloniality is a political and epistemological project seeking to liberate "(ex-) colonised peoples from global coloniality".

The study will employ decolonial theory, instead of the dominant Euro-American centric theories such as neo-liberalism or neo-institutionalism to shift the paradigm by which International relations, especially foreign policy analysis is framed. Zondi (2017: 179) observes that "South Africa's social sciences research has become nothing more than mimicry of the Euro-American centric intellectual communities, seeing itself as a subordinate extension of the latter". This is supported by Wallerstein (1991) who proposes that scholars within the social sciences need to move away from employing Euro-north American centric theories as they are nothing short of imperialism as they are used to see and understand the world by sustaining rather than challenging Eurocentric assumptions about how the world is constructed thus misleading and constraining to the phenomenon of a renewed global south and Africa in particular. We take motivation from both Zondi (2017) and Wallerstein's (1991) remarks that African scholars must therefore be encouraged to employ an Africanistic view and approach to promote and spearhead the domestic and foreign policy issues on the continent. This will direct us to move away from a neo-colonial mind-set and rather employ the decolonisation of power, of being and most importantly, of knowledge.

As such, decolonial theory will form the theoretical basis of this study and will be used to analyze South Africa's participation at the UNSC, in order to understand the possibilities and pragmatics of its commitment to an African Agenda. By using Decolonial theory to analyse South Africa's advancement of the African Agenda in the UNSC, this study will illustrate how African countries and regional organisations have continued to seek ways to increase their leverage on the UNSC in order to allow the continent to have a more influential role on the body and thereby to promote the interests of the continent.

By employing decolonial theory the study will consider and assess how institutions of global order and security, in this case the UNSC, continue to steer and direct the meanings of conflict and security in the global order, and how the place of Africa is determined in and through these constructed meanings. It is for this reason that South Africa's participation in the UNSC during both tenures will be analysed using decolonial theory as a lens to interrogate the possibilities and pragmatics of advancing an 'African Agenda' within a significant and influential global UN organ such as the UNSC. By advancing the African Agenda, South Africa seized on the concept of self-determination to advance their claim for "African solutions to African problems", which is a position that decolonial theorists believe should be projected by the former colonised states in order to change their role and influence in international organisations. Decolonial theory will be used to interrogate the possibilities and pragmatics of promoting a coherent 'African Agenda', as well as to interrogate the very possibility of a singular, commonly held 'African Agenda'.

1.10   CHAPTER OUTLINE

The structure of this dissertation seeks to allow a flow of information gathered, ideas constructed and the analysis of such data. The first chapter discusses considerations that motivated the study, which speaks to the key research question and objectives of the research, the theoretical framework and the methodology undergirding the study.

Chapter two discusses the different theoretical approaches to defining decolonial thought underpinned by its three forms of analysis namely coloniality of being, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of power.

Chapter three traces South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy on advancing the African agenda by examining the country's evolutionary participation in various international multilateral organisations after 1994.

Chapter four discusses South Africa articulation of the African Agenda during the first tenure of the UNSC in 2007-2008.

Chapter five discusses South Africa articulation of the African Agenda during the second tenure of the UNSC in 2011-2012.

Chapter six is concerned with data analysis, findings and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

DECOLONIALITY AS AN EFFORT TO DELINK FROM COLONIALITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the different theoretical approaches to defining decolonial thought underpinned by its three forms of analysis namely coloniality of being, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of power. This chapter is organized into three sections; the first section presents the empirical literature on colonialism versus coloniality and its impact on Africa. The second section will assess the divergence and convergence of decoloniality and post-colonial theory. The last section will give a critical reflection on the African Agenda as a representative sample of decoloniality.

2.2 COLONIALISM VS COLONIALITY

2.2.1 Colonialism

The emergence of decoloniality as a combative ontology by African theorists to critically analyse Africa's behaviour is because of coloniality having negated the politics and the development of the African continent. It is impossible to assess decoloniality without having to address the issue of colonialism.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 13) describes colonialism as "a historical process that culminated in the invasion, conquest and direct administration of Africa by states like Spain, Portugal, Britain, Belgium and France for purposes of enhancing their prestige as empires, for exploitation of natural and human resources and export of excess population, for the benefit of the empire". Relatedly, Comaroff and Comaroff (1997: 16) argue that colonisation was a multifaceted phenomenon from the beginning of its inception in that it was as much a cultural ideology as it was a political one as it aimed to bring about new divisions of wealth, new notions of politics and a new sense of identity.

A better description of colonialism was made by Fanon (1963: 210) in which he stated that "colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By making of perverted logic, it turns to the

past of oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it" (Fanon, 1963: 210). It is clear, based on these definitions that colonialism was a process or movement and even a system, rather than a singular event. Colonialism was not just a phase of 'divide and rule' of Africans by Europeans however it was a phenomenon that continued to have long-term alienating effects on the colonised, in this case Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 23).

Mazrui (1986:12) identified six long-term consequences of colonialism. Firstly, "colonialism and capitalism dragged African labour into the emerging international capitalist system". Secondly "Africa, which was physically partitioned after the Berlin Conference of 1884/5, was later incorporated into the post-1945 United Nations sovereign state system". Thirdly "Africa was incorporated into a Euro-American centric world culture and European languages". Fourthly "Africa was incorporated into a heavily Euro-American centric world of international law". Fifth, "Africa was incorporated into the modern technological age, including being swallowed by the global systems of dissemination of information". Lastly, "Africa was dragged into a Euro-North American-centric moral order, dominated by Christian thought" (Mazrui, 1986: 12).

Based on Mazrui's observation, it is evident that colonialism took away Africa's power, being and knowledge with the aim of dehumanising the continent. Based on the aforementioned, Euro-American centric powers, played a huge and long-lasting role in impacting the outlook of the continent today, which is, a 'weak and fragmented' state that it is seen to be. The effects of colonialism meant that Africa continued to remain on the margins of a five-centuries-old world system that was characterised by domination, subordination and violence. Colonialism has thus forced Africa to grapple with challenges that it would have to contend with, within this world order and to confront its position of being both inside yet outside as a global citizen (Masters et al, 2015: 2).

Colonialism has thus forced Africa's identity and role within the global world order as one which has to reform the global system that has become characterised by power rather than one that remains rules-focused and aligned to a just and equitable world order. Colonialism cannot be understood as just an event or an episode, however it

should be understood, as Mignolo (2000: 60) termed it, as "a global design" that became entangled with "local histories".

2.2.2 Coloniality

From the late 1950's African colonies started fighting against white exploitative and oppressive colonialism to gain their independence and begin the process of decolonization. Decolonisation was seen by African colonies as a process to dismantle the colonial rule and administration however, decolonisation was in fact a terrain of illusions for liberation and myths of freedom (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 66).

As such, although many African countries continue to celebrate their 'Independence Day', the process of decolonisation did not end domination and exploitation. Colonialism continued to resurface beyond its institutionalised colonial era. Therefore, decolonisation as was hoped for by many colonised states did not advance a 'post-colonial world', instead global coloniality succeeded. Maldonado-Torres notes that "after colonialism had been dethroned and exhausted, coloniality achieved, economically, politically and epistemically all the purposes and ends that colonialism imbedded in the beginning" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243).

Quinjano further goes on to elaborate on the meaning of coloniality as follows: "coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged because of colonialism but that define culture, labour, inter-subjective relations and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations" (Quinjano, 2000: 540). Mignolo describes coloniality as a name for the "negative side/underside of modernity that needs to be unmasked" (Mignolo, 2005: 6). Thus, coloniality survives colonialism, it is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects "we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 243).

Therefore, coloniality makes post-colonialism, decolonisation and democratization a myth. Ndlovu-Gatsheni described how 'myths of decolonization' caused a false euphoria and celebration in Africa as what "emerged from the decolonization process was not a new world dominated by new humanist values of freedom, equality, social

justice and ethical coexistence. African people found themselves engulfed by a 'postcolonial neo-colonized world" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 3). Coloniality therefore enhances and reproduces slavery, colonialism and apartheid through an "'invisible form of power without any formal financially and morally expensive presence of juridical and administrative structures" of the coloniser (Mpofu, 2018: 85).

Coloniality however, could not take place on its own without any mechanism, it is upheld through four key devices which Quinjano lists as follows: The first is control of the economy, which entailed that the colonisers ensured total control of resources. The second is control of authority whereby the Kings or African who were chosen to serve as agents of foreign colonial rule were 'puppets' as their power was to make decisions limited to what the colonisers needed. The third is "control of gender and sexuality" which described and outlined the socio-economic roles of men and women and the fourth is "control of knowledge and subjectivity" where African knowledge was discarded and Western Knowledge upheld as the only true form of knowledge (Quinjano, 2007: 169).

This new coloniality has been achieved through Euro-American-centric ideas of 'modernisation', 'globalisation' and the 'new imperial order' of the world (Mpofu, 2018: 86) which has received praises from the euro-north American world as a "system of worldwide innovation that shall bring great advances to humanity" in that it will allow such states to control not only the land but the being of Africans (Bulhan, 2015: 244).This new imperial order of the world entails advancing Eurocentrism which privileges Europe and or America as the ultimate form of power and is organising and globalising the world into systems that promote a hegemonic Euro-North American economic and political world order (Mpofu, 2018: 90).

According to Escobar, "modernisation or modernity is essentially about displacing, conquering territories, uprooting people from places and restructuring places" (Escobar, 2004: 15). Such modernity exists as "an embedded logic that enforces control, domination, exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, modernisation and being good for everyone" (Mignolo, 2005: 8). Such modernity that emerged from Europe emerged through the period of the enlightenment during which Africa and the global South were being pillaged and conquered in violent ways. European modernity, through theories such as modernization theory, promised

development pathways for Africa. However, such development was entrenched in the prescripts of slavery and colonialism which entailed domineering global designs which are embedded in the economic, political and social realities within the global South (Mignolo, 2000: 5).

According to Rodney (1972: 1) "Europe has underdeveloped Africa" and this was achieved by introducing modernity in violent ways to the African continent; in fact, the modernization and development of Europe depended on the underdevelopment of Africa and other countries in the global South (through extraction of resources, and the exploitation of cheap labour).This argument is supported by the dependency theory which states that "a relationship of 'unequal exchange' in which the rich nations of the world, referred to as the 'core societies' enforced trade relationships with the poor 'peripheral societies', in which the former extracted surpluses from the latter" (Wallerstein, 1976: 223).

This was a deliberate and systematic way to exploit Africa in order to foster the development of European colonizers. Modernity was seen, to the ex-colonised, as an emancipatory process. However, it was in fact a process of imposing itself on the peripheral societies by the core societies and was entangled with the very ideas of colonialism. Modernity was thus constructed to make the situation for Eurocentric nations better at the expense of African and other nations. In other words modernity was never something that happened in Europe and then was brought to Africa; it was a process that created both the developed Europe and the underdeveloped Africa simultaneously.

European modernity produced a world order that is sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 10) and this has resulted in a plethora of problems for the new world order. Such global problems/crisis emanates from the realities of European modernity which have resulted in "modern problems for which there are no modern solutions" (Escobar, 2004: 207). These modern world problems include ecological destructions, climate change, global migration which is resulting in new forms of racism; xenophobia and civil war across the globe including on the African continent.

Thus, modernity brought, especially for those countries who were enslaved or colonised, nothing short of more problems than solutions to the consequences of colonialism and this is what became known as 'the marginalisation of Africa' (Baah, 2003: 4). It is through this very form of modernisation that colonialism is reproduced to under develop and dominate Africa and the South in general. Through all processes of modernization which affected and forced change in Africa, the continent was excluded and did not influence any of the changes. On the basis of its explanatory strength, it is only through the employment of a decolonial turn as a combative intervention into the historical, political and social negations of Africa that we can try to solve the problems imposed on the current world order and bring solutions that will best serve the African continent at large.

2.3 DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE OF DECOLONIALITY AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY

2.3.1 Post-colonialism

Young defines post-colonialism as a "theory that has been created from the political insights and experience that were developed during colonial resistance to western rule and cultural dominance, primarily during the course of the anti-colonial struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Young, 2001: 14).

Post-colonial and decolonial studies are often used interchangeably as they both offer a critique of and opposition to Euro-American centric theories, though they are different in the way in which they independently refer to colonialism. Post-colonialism was first employed in the 1960s to explain the different aspects of society in the global South. Post-colonialism focuses on the effects of colonialism on culture and leaves out any reference to the political and economic injustices (Loomba, 1998: 40). According to Young, "post-colonialism has come to name a certain kind of interdisciplinary political, theoretical and historical academic work that sets out to serve as a transnational forum of studies grounded in the historical context of colonialism, as well as in the political context of contemporary problems of globalization" (Young, 1998: 4).

Post-colonialism does not refer to after colonialism. Rather, it examines the full responses of experiences of colonial contact. Maldonado-Torres posits that "post-

colonialism has left one of the stronger expressions of modernity/coloniality untouched" (Maldonado-Torres, 2008:382); that is post-colonialism failed to substantially 'move the centre' or to effectively 're-member' Africa after years of 'dismemberment' but instead African leaders continued to manage and maintain a global system that still represented Euro-American centrism, after having replaced direct colonial rule (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 29).

Post-colonialism illustrates the imperial underpinnings of modernity and how such modernity impacts, through European hegemony, on culture and being of the colonised. This is supported by Mignolo who states that "modernity is a European narrative that hides its darker side, coloniality" (Mignolo, 2011: 39), Post-colonialism failed to understand the extent to which modernity has continued to allow colonialism to infiltrate the forms of expression of power in the modern world. According to Mignolo, modernity has resulted in 'global modernities' which in retrospect mean 'global colonialities' that is, the colonial matrices of power's dispute that "if there cannot be modernity without coloniality similarly there cannot be global modernities without global colonialities (Mignolo, 2011: 40).

2.3.2 Decoloniality

Decolonial thought was first introduced in the twentieth century by scholars such as Mignolo and Wallerstein as a critical theory that emanated from the need to challenge colonial, racial and dehumanising practices and behaviours by Euro-American centric actors and interpret history from the perspective of the colonised. Decolonial thought is used to reimagine and reconstruct the future of the colonised.

Decoloniality is an alternative school of thought that seeks to identify a renewed way of thinking to account for what is happening in the world, where it is coming from and the direction that should be taken in order to pursue the liberation of humanity, especially of Africans (Mpofu: 2018: 91). It should be noted that decoloniality is not a singular theoretical school of thought but rather a combination of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as the fundamental problem in the modern world order (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 13). Decoloniality operates on pluri-versality and truth and not on uni-versality and truth. In other words, the decolonial turn cannot subscribe to one rigid view point as it will be too universal and thus limit the re-imagined being,

knowledge and power within the world order (Mignolo, 2017:39). It subscribes to the delinking from Western modernity, at all levels and within different spheres, in order to establish the re-existence of the colonised within the prescripts of their own thoughts and ideas which will serve their interests and not the interests of the coloniser.

Decoloniality pays attention to the historical and political injustices encountered by Africa through slavery, colonialism and a continuing situation of coloniality. Du Bois, widely regarded as a decolonial thinker, coined the concept of decolonial turn as a revolt against what he referred to as a concept of "colour line", a reference of racial segregation (Du Bois, 1903). Mpofu (2018: 84) posits that the decolonial parading offers "a liberatory and a repair operation at the level of power, knowledge and being of Africans, this time as subjects rather than objects of history". The events that led to its solidification include the collapse of the European Age in the two World Wars, and the second wave of decolonization in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and other territories across the globe, including the Bandung Conference.

Decoloniality can thus be understood as seeking "the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern world (Maldonado-Torres, 2011: 1). This definition lays the ground of how the global South and Africa in particular should move to bring an end to the injustices imposed upon it through colonialism. A decolonial approach requires that Africans be cognisant of the trap that modernisation and globalisation is placing in normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world. Such direction by Africans, to unmask and destroy the negations of colonialism would entail, according to WaThiongo, the 're-membering' of Africa not only as objects but as subjects of their own power, being and knowledge (WaThiongo, 2009: 1).

Decoloniality is born out of a realisation that the current world order is asymmetrical whereby the Euro-north American centric powers dominate the international arena and this is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to alienate Africans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 11). The aim of decoloniality is to move away from the reasoning of imperial versions of history, especially in the context of Africa, from which the world is designed

towards African reasoning and explanation of how and why the modern world order is constructed.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that "decoloniality is a continuing search for a new world order after slavery and colonialism impoverished Africa and coloniality continues to extract rent from Africa" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 25). Decoloniality is about deconstructing what coloniality had constructed through modernity in the African state and African institutions. According to decolonial theorists, the only way that the future of the colonised can be reimagined or reconstructed is through challenging the west at a civilization level.

The 'decolonial turn' is about making visible the invisible and about analysing the mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility in light of a large stock of ideas that must necessarily include the critical reflections of the 'invisible' people themselves (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 262).It is premised on three concepts of analysis namely the coloniality of power, knowledge and being. These three concepts of analysis allow us to have a better understanding of how coloniality brought about dilemmas for the global South and in Africa in particular, be it political, economic, social or ideological dilemmas.

2.3.2.1   Coloniality of power

The first concept which looks at coloniality of power investigates how the current 'global political' is constructed and configured into an asymmetrically Euro-American-centric modern colonial power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 11). The concept looks at the constitutive elements of how the West dominates and exploits the non-western world in order to achieve continued control over their economies, knowledge, subjectivity, gender and sexuality. The concept further articulates how Western psychologies and world-views are still embedded in the post-colonial era through the economic, political and social hierarchical relationships of exploitation and domination between the Euro-North-centric world and the global south (Grosfoguel, 2007: 210).

Maldonado Torres (2007: 242) builds on the coloniality of power as a manner in which to investigate the interrelations between modern forms of exploitation and domination of the coloniser over the colonised. Coloniality of power is divided into the 'Zone of

being' and the 'Zone of non-being' (Fanon, 1963: 8). The zone of being refers to those who are seen as subjects which are the Euro-North American regions. On the other hand, the zone of non-being refers to the ex-colonies who are seen as objects. The subjects of the world are those who act while the objects are acted on, thus creating a particular power relation between the two. It further helps in understanding how the world was bifurcated into the 'have's', which is the world of those who hold power in global structures and benefit from modernity, and the 'have not's', that is the world of those who are victims of slavery, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. This separation of zones is maintained by invisible 'abyssal lines' (Santos, 2007: 45). These abyssal lines refer to the bifurcation of the world into 'this side', which is a world identified with the upholding of legality, truth and humanity and 'that side', which is a world that entails lawlessness, falsehood and sub humanity. Coloniality of power is used to explain how power configurations within the global world has come to be and how the modern world uses this power to achieve the separation of what is presumed to be First, Second and Third world countries.

According to the decolonial thought, coloniality of power is entrenched in interlinked systems of hierarchies as listed below (Grosfoguel, 2007: 216-217):

a. "a particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labour are going to co-exist and be organised by capital as a source of production of surplus value

b. an international division of labour of core and periphery where capital organised labour around coerced and authoritarian forms

c. an inter-state system of politico-military organisation controlled by European males and institutionalised in colonial administrations

d. a global ethnic/racial hierarchy that privileges European people over non-European people"

Coloniality of power addresses the problem of how the modern matrices of power continue to trap and entangle Africa within this modern global coloniality. This colonial matrix of power is a combination of the rhetoric of modernity that is the progress, development and growth promised and the realities of coloniality that include poverty, misery and inequality that has inextricably characterised Africa and the global south (Mignolo, 2007: 158).

This division of power in the global order thus has implications for how we understand global institutions of power and diplomacy such as the United Nations and its various bodies including the UNSC. The global order within which Africa exists, and African security issues become significant, and within which the pursuit of an African Agenda at the international level occurs, require an understanding of how such a global order is created through the coloniality of power.

2.3.2.2 Coloniality of knowledge

The second concept is that of coloniality of knowledge which aims to outline epistemological issues, the politics of knowledge production as well as who generates such knowledge and for what purpose. This concept allows us to investigate how indigenous knowledge has become lost within history in order to allow Euro-American centric knowledge, through colonialism, to remain relevant and dictate to the global South.

Coloniality of knowledge acknowledges the fact that knowledge should be determined based on a 'locus of enunciation' that is to think from where you are located (Grosfoguel, 2008: 2). Santos (2007:48) explains how Western codes of meaning and understanding were imposed through the advancement of colonialism and imperialism while destroying all other world views and practices. This he referred to as 'epistemicide'; Western forms of knowledge depicted as essential for progress which would treat the social and political knowledge of the colonised as useless. Coloniality of knowledge seeks to address how colonial powers, through modernity, appropriated African ways of knowing, social meanings and knowledge production and replaced it with its Eurocentric "truthful, universal and scientific knowledge" (Escobar, 2007: 180).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni explains how the West used Christianity to spread their knowledge across the world, as the only truthful and scientific form of knowledge thus displacing other forms of knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 8). Decoloniality criticises the present-day order where knowledge is still being dictated by the Euro-North academy. Ndlovu-Gatsheni opines that a typical African child begins a journey of alienation from their African context the very moment they step into the school, church and university door (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:10). Coloniality of knowledge focuses on "teasing out

epistemological issues, politics of knowledge generation, as well as questions of who generates which knowledge, and for what purpose" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11).

The promotion of such Euro-American centric knowledge has saddled Africa with irrelevant knowledge that disempowers rather than empowers, alienates rather than remembers the African community (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015: 33). The construction of knowledge has been used to promote the colonial power configuration within the asymmetrical modern world. It is important for decolonial scholars to decolonise knowledge in order for Africa and the global south to free itself from continued colonialism.

2.3.2.3   Coloniality of being

The third concept of analysis is the coloniality of being which seeks to understand the realities of the dehumanisation and depersonalisation of the colonised into the *dames* which refers to the condemned people and the wretched of the earth (Fanon, 1963; Maldonado-Torres, 2007). The concept refers to the lived experiences of Africans through colonization and its impact on the social and racialized classification of their humanity. What prevails from this is how whiteness gained ontological density far above blackness thus producing the notion of coloniser and colonised or conqueror and conquered (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 12).

Maldonado-Torres (2007:244) states that this concept illustrates the relationship between the subjects as vertical rather than horizontal in that some identities enjoy superiority over the others. Under colonialism, the colonised experienced a 'hellish life' which was entrenched through racial and social hierarchies of power thus preventing equal and humane relations between the coloniser and the colonised. This is best articulated by Descartes motto of 'Cogito ergo sum' which translates to 'I think, therefore, I am' which brought about the ontological scepticism that the Western being was superior in that their reasoning was based on their ability to 'think' whereas the colonised would not be able to 'think'. Furthermore, the 'I am' translated into the colonisers superiority over the colonised who are considered inferior to them (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 252).

Coloniality of being allows decolonial thinkers to investigate how "African humanity was questioned and the processes that contributed to the 'objectification', 'thingification' and 'commodification' of Africans" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 12). Such dehumanising and objectification through the coloniality of knowledge has been used within the global power systems as politicised states of existence. Decolonial thought, through the coloniality of being, challenges the objectification of Africa and in resistance promotes the African personality/identity, African Unity and the common destiny of Africa. Coloniality of being speaks of how African subjects were rearticulated according to racialised stereotypes of otherness and how they are constructed as inferior.

All these three concepts enable a deeper understanding of how the current world order is constructed. Decoloniality prevails from the context in which the humanity of black people (the coloniality of being) is doubted and emerges as one way of telling the story of (coloniality of knowledge) the modern world (coloniality of power) from the experiences of slavery, colonialism and apartheid. It is evident that these three concepts of analysis are inter-related and one cannot look at one without making reference to the others.

2.4 CONCLUSION

Decoloniality has a strong activist and practical liberatory thrust which calls for Africans and the global South to free themselves from the chains of coloniality that is prevalent in the domains of modernity through power, knowledge and being. The decolonial call is for Africa to 'de-westernise' itself and for Africans to become active participants in creating their own futures freely without any subscriptions to western demands. In a quest to outlive the conditions of such colonial legacy, decolonial thought plays a role in intensifying an alternative world system. It is through these multilateral organisations wherein Africans yearn for self-determination and the attainment of Africa's sovereignty over its power, being and knowledge. Furthermore, the decolonial turn unveils epistemic silences which are hidden within Euro-American centric forms of coloniality that modernity has maintained in present day.

The chapter revealed that there has been a drastic change in South Africa's foreign policy in the democratic dispensation which is markedly different from the one pursued

during the apartheid era. It further examined South Africa's efforts to implement its vision of Africa and the developing countries within the global arena emerging from its legacy after 1994. From the analysis, it can be highlighted that South Africa's foreign policy shows strong enthusiasm for Africa and multilateral forums as a means for building alliances in defence of the interests of the developing world.

Through these multilateral organisations, South Africa has been seen to pursue a global development agenda to contribute to the reduction of insecurity in Africa and inequality within global governance through its pursuit of the African Agenda. However, one can deduce that Africa has not fully benefitted from regionalism and or multilateral relations to the utmost potential. The promotion and participation of South Africa in these multilateral organisations and the advancement of the African agenda to some extent, ensured political and economic development rather than the ideological incompatibility created by colonial boundary demarcation and delineation.

CHAPTER 3

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AFRICAN ANGEND POST-1994

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter applies decolonial thought to South Africa's foreign policy on the African Agenda in various multilateral organisations since its democratisation in 1994. This is a necessary background that will assist in understanding the role that South Africa, through its foreign policy, set out to achieve post-1994 and the prospects and pragmatics of achieving the African Agenda as a foreign policy objective. This chapter will look at how South Africa has participated in selected multilateral organisations post-1994. It will also determine how South Africa as a middle power has used its foreign policy to pursue the African Agenda within such organisations.

3.2 THE AFRICAN AGENDA AS SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY POST-1994

South Africa's African policy prior to 1994 was an example of the 'realist' paradigm in international relations, which asserts that states are essentially atomistic actors within international politics, pursuing their self-interest, defined as survival and the enhancement of their power in a context of mutual competition and even hostility (Gelb, 2001: 12). South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy has instead seen the pursuit of multilateralism, which has allowed South Africa to influence the priorities and policies of fellow African states, attempt to forge consensus amongst them and enhance cooperation, all without dominating or dictating policies.

At the dawn of the new democratic South Africa, it was pertinent that the country looked back at the continent for its contribution in bringing apartheid to an end. It was to this end that the ANC, as the ruling party, in its Foreign Policy Perspective in a democratic South Africa acknowledged its special relationship with the people of Southern Africa, recognising that apartheid and its destabilisation policies had devastating effects on South Africa's neighbours (ANC, 1994: 4). It was thus imperative to recognize and acknowledge that South Africa could not develop without

Africa and, as a country with newfound moral and diplomatic authority on the global stage. It was the country's main objective to take on for itself the role of shaping Africa's development agenda.

The regeneration of Africa became a key pillar of South Africa's foreign policy objectives. Mandela as the first democratic President of South Africa highlighted this notion that "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny" (Mandela, 1994: 87). It was therefore imperative that the commitment of South Africa to the African continent would become important and this was illustrated when it became identified as one of the four pillars of South Africa's foreign policy, these pillars being (South Africa.info, 2011):

- a commitment to multilateralism
- deepening South-South cooperation
- commitment to the African Continent
- deepening North-South cooperation

It was through this commitment to the African continent that the concept of the African Agenda emerged. The concept has taken on different shapes since its introduction by Mandela in 1993, its expansion during the Thabo Mbeki administration as the 'African Renaissance' and remained a key priority under the Jacob Zuma administration. The purpose of the African Agenda was to solidify South Africa's African identity post-democracy, as under the apartheid government, it had been isolated from the rest of the continent. To achieve this, Sidiropoulos (2007: 2) states that South Africa's advancement of the African Agenda affirms to the rest of the continent that it is part and parcel of the continent and willing to work together to provide African Solutions to African problems.

According to Landsberg (2007) South Africa's attempts to help craft the African "progressive" public policy landscape were closely identified with the "African Agenda", or African renaissance which he coins as the progressive Africanist policies of President Thabo Mbeki and his continental allies. He further states that the primary goal of this "African Agenda" is to integrate the continent into the global economy on the basis of "mutual responsibility" and "mutual accountability". It is for this reason that South Africa has strengthened its Africanist foreign policy objective by enhancing

multilateral mechanisms and within Africa to ensure democratic political systems, peace and security and accelerated economic growth and development in Africa.

Post 1994, South Africa demonstrated a strong commitment to promoting the interests of Africa, and in being the "voice" of the continent internationally. This was done through the country placing itself and its own history within the broader context of the continent's struggles. It also meant South Africa placing itself as a forerunner in Africa's developmental objectives. South Africa saw its 'good neighbourliness' and 'non-hegemonic' relations with African states as 'strategic partners' in order to promote peace, stability and development within the continent (Landsberg and Kondlo, 2007: 2). South Africa based its African Agenda strategy on a view and an understanding of Africa's position within the geopolitics of the 21st Century, which entailed a world system which is described by the decolonial contention of "the West and the rest of us" (Chinweizu, 1975).

The African Agenda is defined by DIRCO as being based on the "understanding that socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability" and are seen as prerequisites for socio-economic development (DFA, 2005: 72). Landsberg and Kondlo (2007: 2) define the African Agenda as a series of objectives that aim to chart a new strategic path in order to effect a turn-around in the continent's economy, politics, governance and development orientation. To achieve this, DIRCO outlined the goals of the African Agenda as follows (Landsberg, 2009: 1):
- Strengthening the African Union and its structures
- Facilitating South Africa's participation in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
- Promoting the implementation of New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
- Promoting peaceful resolution of conflict and encouraging post-conflict reconstruction and development
- Successfully implementing ongoing peace processes
- Enhancing and strengthening democracy regionally and continentally
- Strengthening bilateral relations
- Promoting South-South cooperation and Asia-Africa cooperation
- Promoting North-South cooperation in support of the African Agenda

After 1994, South Africa faced the task of repositioning itself in the region, on the continent and in the world, with a shared interest in peace, stability and prosperity. South Africa had to ensure that it positioned itself as a regional leader and global player, and its repositioning included advancing an African Agenda. This could only be achieved through South Africa ensuring that it had reliable and strategic allies to help support and advance this agenda, within the region and the continent at large. The African Agenda was seen as an impressive and ambitious plan for the continent because it aimed to develop mechanisms that would ensure democratic political systems for the peaceful resolution of conflict, ensuring sustainable peace and security and ensuring accelerated economic growth (Rapoo, 2007: 2). Under the banner of 'the African agenda', South Africa sought to be a progressive agent for change by rooting its foreign policy firmly in Africa with the aim of championing Africa's interests.

Mbeki, seen as the 'father of South Africa's African foreign policy', took on a more complex and pragmatic approach than Mandela by moving away from Western-orientated approach and focused on an African Agenda which was often referred to as the 'African Renaissance' (Pillay, 2011: 2). Mbeki expanded on his articulation of South Africa's position towards Africa in his inaugural speech in 1999 where he stated that "it is no longer possible to falsely define South Africa as a European outpost in Africa" (Mbeki, 1999: 1) supporting the notion that the country had now taken on its position as a partner and active participant in the development of the continent through a commitment to reforming Euro-American centric regional and global institutions, similarly to what the coloniality of being advocates. With his idea of an 'African Renaissance', Mbeki sought to establish an Afrocentric South Africa which would give substance to the African agenda (Masters, 2012: 22).

The African Agenda sought to change the 'coloniality of being' of the continent by enhancing regional integration and promoting African unity and integration amongst member states. According to Landsberg and Kondlo (2007:3) the African Agenda favours the strengthening of regional bodies to promote the objectives of regional integration, democratisation, peace and security and accelerated economic growth.

3.2.1 African Union (AU)

South Africa has since 1999 been a prominent actor in the African Union (AU) and has played a central role in its transitions from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 2002 as a result of a Sirte Declaration, which was a declaration called by heads of state and government of the OAU to establish an African Union (AU, 1999: 2).The OAU was formed by 32 countries in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963. The transition of the organisation was as a result of the rapidly changing global political environment and resulted in the formulation of more comprehensive objectives in the AU thus enabling it to address the continent's multi-layered social, economic and political problems (White Paper South African Foreign Policy, 2011:7).

The AU was constituted as the government body of the entire continent whose role it is to defend and protect each individual member-state. The AU is responsible for the promotion of peace and the cooperation of member states proving a compatible and conducive environment for each and every member state to grow both economically and politically while maintaining a stable, united and peaceful community (Africa Union, 2002), something which colonialism had deprived the ex-colonial states and in particular Africa. The AU makes provision for the establishment of some 10 new organs entrusted with maintaining order in African politics. These key institutions include executive organs, accountability structures and representative institutions. With South Africa's influence, the AU moved to place an emphasis on the need to strengthen capacities and actions in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and governance (Landsberg, 2009: 5). The former Minister of DIRCO, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that "the strengthening of the African Union and its structures is a priority in deepening continental integration" (DIRCO, 2015: 2)

President Thabo Mbeki strongly influenced the new AU's orientation and aims, and has been a strong supporter of continental cooperation through his philosophy of the African Renaissance. South Africa has since the inception of the AU taken several leadership roles in the organisation. In 2002 South Africa became the first African state to chair the organisation and has sought to promote and enhance African unity and integration amongst member states, which is one of the objectives of the African Agenda. As the Chair, South Africa played an integral part in the formation of the AU's institutions, policies and procedures, including the creation of the Pan African

Parliament and the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which encompasses the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System and the Peace Fund (African Union, 2005). His successor, President Zuma followed the mandate by seeking to strengthen the mechanisms. In 2013, President Zuma proposed that the AU should create a military rapid reaction force known as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) which was accepted by the AU Summit, in relation to the advancement of "African solutions to African problems" (Nathan, 2013: 48).

South Africa has not only served as one of the top financial donors to the AU but it has also served two terms on the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2004 and 2016 respectively. A former South African Home Affairs Minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was appointed as the AU Commission's chairperson in July 2012, becoming the first woman to occupy the high office and also the first from Southern Africa since the establishment of both the OAU and the AU (Mail & Guardian, 2012). Key priorities for her term included greater internal efficiency and effectiveness within the AU Commission as an executing agency of the AU collective (The Presidency, 2014:149). However, her emergence as the AU Chairperson brought about questions around her loyalty and whether her term in office would serve the interest of the continent or just the southern region of Africa and her home country (Mail & Guardian, 2012).

The AU is faced with a major challenge to convince its member states of the need to pool some of their sovereignty under the umbrella of the organisation and its organs and to move in one direction as the Continent. This has been evident through the debate over the 'United States of Africa' as proposed by the former Libyan president Moammar Gadaffi but contested by Thabo Mbeki (Landsberg, 2007: 3). South Africa has thus enhanced African Unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the African Union. South Africa has promoted development and curbed conflict within the continent through its active role in introducing and promoting institutions within the African Union, thereby promoting and fostering its African Agenda.

3.2.2 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The African agenda provided a crucial role for South Africa to support and promote, as an issue of great importance, a socio-economic development plan for the continent which would pull African countries out of the depths of poverty. In 1999, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria introduced the Millennium Development Recovery Programme (MAP) in order to integrate the region and develop its social and economic priorities. With the inclusion of Senegal, this was later developed into the New African Initiatives (NAI) (Landsberg, nd: 13).

In 2001, these countries revised NAI and formulated the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which was founded on the values of democratic principles, governance and economic and corporate governance (NEPAD, 2015). NEPAD was formed as a means of establishing a new trading regime with the North and it was an opportunity for African countries to come together to follow suit with the prescriptions of globalisation. NEPAD is a socio-economic development programme which is a strategic framework for Africa's renewal which South Africa was determined to see succeed. The main objectives of NEPAD is the eradication of poverty in Africa, to end the continued marginalisation of Africa in the global political economy and the placement of African countries and the continent at large on the path for sustainable development (NEPAD, 2015).

According to Peters (2010: 90) NEPAD has conceptual roots both in Pan-Africanism and the concept of "African Renaissance" as developed by Thabo Mbeki. The programme emphasises collective self-reliance and acknowledges regional integration as part of the strategy for an African economic renaissance. NEPAD hopes to promote Africa's development after decades of failures as a result of the legacies of colonialism, the Cold War, bad governance, unsound economic policies and management and destructive conflict (Bekoe & Landsberg, 2002). NEPAD is based upon three prerequisites for the regeneration of socio-economic development which is a key feature of the African Agenda namely (peace and security, democracy and political governance), priority sectors (investment in infrastructure, new information technology, health, education, human resource development, agriculture and market access) and the mobilisation of resources (foreign direct investment and foreign aid) (NEPAD, 2015).

South Africa made tremendous progress in helping the continent to articulate NEPAD as the continent's blue print, in fact, its expectations of NEPAD were so great that it sought to include the concept of NEPAD into its macro-economic policy of Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Landsberg, 2007: 10). Mbeki has been seen as a driving force behind NEPAD, which stresses political, social and cultural factors as prerequisites for development. Through NEPAD, South Africa and its continental partners introduced the notion of "mutual accountability and mutual responsibility" between the continent and its overseas development interlocutors. (Landsberg, 2007: 11).

South Africa is host to the NEPAD Secretariat and commits significant resources to its programmes and the operations of the Secretariat. One of the main focus areas of South Africa's involvement in NEPAD has been on improving cross-border infrastructure. During the 23rd Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee meeting in 2010, President Jacob Zuma introduced the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), which South Africa is chairing. The AU/UN PICI was introduced to accelerate regional infrastructure development enabled through the political championing of projects (NEPAD, 2012).

South Africa assumed a leadership role in the promotion of NEPAD on the continent and internationally as Africa's socio-economic development plan. In 2002, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution accepting NEPAD as the official development plan for Africa. South Africa also promoted it amongst MERCOSUR (an economic and political bloc comprising of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), the Gulf Co-operation Council States (GCC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Japanese development initiative for Africa (TICAD), the China-Africa Co-operation Forum (C-ACF) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Landsberg and Kondlo, 2007: 5).

Although the creation of NEPAD has widely been celebrated as an outstanding African initiative towards the establishment of new partnerships and links with the rest of the industrialised world (Melber, 2002:2), others have criticised it as a "neo-liberal initiative" tailored to South Africa's assets and interests, with the risk of increasing regional social disparities (Marthoz, 2013). South Africa is thus faced with the challenge of promoting NEPAD amidst scepticism about the feasibility of its success,

and South Africa's narrow interests in promoting it. The successful promotion of an African Agenda, particularly on the continent, would require dispelling the idea that initiatives such as NEPAD constitute a narrow promotion exclusively of South Africa's interests. It can be argued that through NEPAD, there has been a positive integration of African economies into the world economy, however with its limitations. According to Amusan, "since the inauguration of NEPAD, there has been no substantial trade development to its advantage or to equal advantage for the North and the South" (Amusan, 2017: 701).

The concerns of the continent of South Africa's "giantism" and aspirations to become a regional hegemony are some of the challenges faced by NEPAD. Landsberg (2007: 5) stated that the creation of NEPAD, through South Africa's influence, "caused irritation among other African governments" based on the fact that "South Africa was so determined to see NEPAD succeed that it was seeking to transform NEPAD into its own domestic socio-economic plan, leading to a perception throughout the continent that South Africa would allow NEPAD to rival the AU". Weltz (2013: 130) supports this notion by stating that NEPAD was regarded as a parallel structure to the AU and was disapproved by African countries at the beginning as they were also not pleased with the manner in which Mbeki tried to assert it onto the continent.

According to Akokpari (Akokpari, et al, 2008: 91) it is evident that this model borrows from the developed world and their financial institutions as an 'external guarantor's model'. This notion is supported by Amusan (2017: 702) who states that NEPAD is a misguided regime only satisfying the North's trading regime. Bond further argues in support of the above notion that participation by African states in regionalised organisation such as NEPAD "may not be in the best interests of Africa, but may lead to further exploitation of the continent as a dumping ground for manufactured goods and a source of industrial inputs for other members of the organisation"(Bond, 2011).

The African Agenda looks at creating a continent that transcribes to the dictates of the Euro-American-centric prescripts of what development and modernity entails for modern states through economic mechanisms such as NEPAD that may be derived from colonial frameworks. For African economies to be self-sufficient it is important for African countries to reclaim the power in order to articulate solutions for its economic development problems by stopping to borrow from Western economic mechanisms,

which continue to marginalise it, but rather to address the realities of Africa's political economy internally and externally.

3.2.3 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

In 2003, South Africa along with its NEPAD allies, namely Nigeria; Algeria and Senegal introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) based on its commitment to the democratisation of the continent as part of its African Agenda (Landsberg and Kondlo, 2007: 6). The APRM is a voluntary programme which member states sign up to, to comply with the principles, priorities and objectives of the AU Constitutive Act and all other decisions of the AU and NEPAD (NEPAD, 2012).

The APRM was designed to monitor and promote democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development. It was credited as the brain-child of President Mbeki. The APRM aims to investigate the standards of government within the continent through periodic reviews of progress towards mutually agreed goals (The Presidency, 2014:150).According to Landsberg & Kondlo (2007: 6), South Africa is firm in the view that the APRM should make a link between governance, democracy, peace and security and development. South Africa has ideally believed that all member states of the AU should sign up to the APRM and member states should fully comply with the mechanism provisions.

In 2005, President Mbeki's administration officially launched South Africa's year-long Peer Review Process. There were great expectations from this process from fellow member states and the rest of the continent, given that South Africa had played such a pivotal role in the development of the mechanism. South Africa's government commissioned three base study documents on political governance, economic governance and socio-economic governance and encouraged public participation amongst its citizens so as to engage with the process (Landsberg, 2007: 3). South Africa was praised for a number of best practises such as the use of provincial executive councils, the financial management system and the tax collection system (The Presidency, 2014: 151).

On the other hand, the South African government faced criticism from its own citizens as they saw government's intervention in the review process as rather domineering. This is supported by Herbert & Gruzd (2008: 7) "the process in South Africa was significantly flawed and its programme of action was particularly weak, but the final report did identify and discuss the country's key problems in a robust manner". The consultation process in South Africa focused on mass-based organisations rather than expert sources as government rejected the use of independent research institutes as 'inappropriate' and said the APRM was not a research task (Herbert & Gruzd, 2007: 24). This could be based on the fact that the government was threatened by the fact that the report would portray the country in a negative way. South Africa implicitly argued that such evidence of its problems should be excluded because 'the risk is that general perceptions, often essentially racist, about the hopelessness of the African situation are all too easily confirmed by statistical constructs that have a very tangential relationship to the actual universe' (Herbert & Grudz; 2007: 23). Furthermore, there is a traditional lack of trust between the government and stakeholders and finally allowing stakeholder's resources and access to information would be detrimental to government's image.

The APRM system has shown significant weaknesses and limitations as indicated in the case of South Africa's review report. According to Herbert & Gruzd "the South African case is worthy of special attention given the country's position in Africa-the continent's wealthiest and most developed state, the moral authority it has derived from the demise of apartheid and the establishment of a relatively stable democracy, as well as the country's position as one of the initiators of NEPAD" (Herbet & Grudz, 2008: 22).

The APRM system faces formidable challenges which continue to impede its success. Firstly, the process should maintain its independence from governments influence. Secondly the voluntary nature of the APRM has resulted in rules and regulations governing the process that are loose therefore impeding its ability to enforce policy. Lastly the weak civil society in most African states influence against meaningful participation in and contribution to the process of peer review

3.2.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC)

In 1992, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) finally became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which South Africa joined in 1994. The SADCC was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on the 1st of April 1980 with the aim to eliminate the element of African states having to depend on countries outside Africa and develop African cooperation and integration thus enabling African growth (African Union, 2015). The transition from the SADCC to SADC was meant to move the organisation from one that was politically motivated to one that would be economically motivated and aimed at improving the lives of its people within the region (Gwala, 2015: 87).

South Africa prioritized strengthening this body as a key pillar of its foreign policy as illustrated in the country's adoption of the "Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa" in 1996 which promoted collaboration and economic integration with the region (Soko, 2007:10). By joining the regional organisation, South Africa has improved SADC's position within the continent and also within the broader international community as South Africa holds a pivotal role within the global space and is portrayed not only as a good global citizen but also as a leader on the continent. It has been argued by Gelb (2001:14) that South Africa joined SADC primarily so that it would adopt a position of mutual partnership rather than that of a 'selfish' hegemon especially in its economic relations with other African countries, and to ensure that an equal share of benefits was evident amongst the states within the region rather than accruing benefits only to itself.

South Africa's vision for SADC is "one of the highest possible degree of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning of regional development initiatives, leading to integration consistent with socio-economic environmental and political realities" (DIRCO, 2004). South Africa supported the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme which is one of the elements of the restructuring of SADC. The aim of this was to provide member states with a coherent and comprehensive development agenda on social and economic policies that had clear targets and time frames (DIRCO, 2004).

South Africa has committed to all spheres of SADC's agenda including political, economic and social well-being of the region. In support of the above mentioned, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Rob Davies explains that SADC's original vision was not merely confined to trade: "what is needed in the southern African region is not a programme of trade integration alone but one combining trade integration, sectoral cooperation and policy coordination in ways that address the major challenges of developing production structures and infrastructure as well as promoting mutually beneficial trade" (Davis, 2015).

South Africa has taken a lead role in the region to address issues of closer collaboration and integration. The country negotiated on the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement which was concluded in 2008, which critics' state has been tailored to suit the perceived interest of its business community instead of the region as a whole. South Africa has sought to nurture regional integration at three levels namely SADC, the Southern Customs Union (SACU) and the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) between the Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Eastern African Community (EAC) and SADC (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007:3).

According to Habib (2009: 151), under President Zuma, efforts to promote strong regional integration have resulted in the re-emphasis on the importance of political cohesion and good governance capacity within SADC. South Africa's regional strategies placed a huge emphasis on strengthening governance and capacity in SADC, and commitments to ensure the integration agenda which would ensure that South Africa meets the SADC's timeframes (DFA, 2005: 6).South Africa has since 2000 placed much effort into restructuring SADC and has advocated that all other sub-regional bodies should restructure themselves in collaboration with the priorities of the AU (Landsberg, 2012: 16). It further pushed for the articulation of protocols on free trade, politics and security cooperation and stressed the implementation and operationalization of such protocols. Furthermore, the country pushed for advancing international confidence and attracting Foreign Direct Investment for SADC on various occasions.

3.2.5 United Nations

The relationship between South Africa and the UN is very old as South Africa was a signatory to the "Covenant" of the League of Nations in 1919 the forerunner of the United Nations. In 1945, South Africa became one of the original 51 founding member states of the UN, however, this relationship became negatively impacted after the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) suspended South Africa from participating in its work on 12 November 1974 due to increasing international opposition to the country's policy of apartheid (DFA, 2004).

The idea of a "United Nations" was coined by United States President Franklin Roosevelt during the Second World War. The UN was founded on the basis that states within the international community can and should cooperate to resolve conflicts peacefully and change people's lives for the better (UN Charter, 1945: 5). The UN's core functions are outlined in the Charter as follows:

- To maintain peace and security and to manage the prevailing international order.
- To maintain the norms of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- To prevent a resurgence of causes of social upheaval and conflict by the development and rehabilitation work of the specialized agencies.

The UN Charter establishes six principal organs of the United Nations which make up the core of the organisation, namely, UNGA, UNSC, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Secretariat, International Court of Justice (IJC) and the Trusteeship Council each with specific mandates. The UN is an embodiment of multilateralism and as an organisation it has manifested itself as the central overarching authority (UN Charter, 1945: 49).

The democratic elections in South Africa in April 1994 paved the way for the complete normalisation of South Africa's relations with the UN. It was in that year that United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros-Boutros Ghali welcomed the country back into the international community as it strived to become a good global citizen and an advocate for Africa (Inglis, 2009: 48). The democratically elected government has pursued a foreign policy based on the centrality of the UN in the multilateral system. South Africa recognized the need for social and economic development and thus its

membership to the UN is to advance the global development agenda by addressing underdevelopment and the eradication of poverty. The democratic South Africa and the UN have shown to be on similar grounds and share similar interests when it comes to the consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights (The Presidency, 2011). It is against this background and the fact that the organisation played a pivotal role in bringing an end to apartheid that the new democratic South Africa pursued a foreign policy based on the centrality of the UN and its core principles.

According to Landsberg, South Africa has used its membership in the UN to advance three strategies that are in line with the Charter. First, South Africa has focussed on establishing and operationalising the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) as an agency with resources and authority to advance the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and to promote women's rights. Second, South Africa sought to elevate issues of development and poverty and move away from emphasis on "peace and security" as defined by the West. Third, South Africa identified the UN as a platform to challenge the dominance of the West in international relations and address inequalities in the global political economy. These issues are a reflection of how South Africa has used its power and influence to advance its foreign policy, which is guided by the African Agenda, within the UN (Landsberg, 2015: 46).

The importance placed on South Africa and the nature of their relationship is reflected by the number of UN agencies that are hosted in the country. The UN has seventeen agencies in South Africa that work closely with the government and also serve other member states within the Southern African region. These agencies include the Resident Coordinator system which is the face of the UN in a member state, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), to name a few (DFA, 2004).

South Africa has taken several leading roles within the UN and its agencies. In 1996 South Africa held the presidency of the UN Conference on Trade and Development serving a four-year term. The country also served as the vice-presidency of the UNGA as well as becoming the chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term (1997-1999). South Africa was also elected as vice-chairperson of the UNGA's Economic and Financial Committee in 2003. Most recently South Africa

became elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2007-2008, 2011-2012 and is currently serving its third term 2019-2020.

However, it seemed as though South Africa had become comfortable with the Euro-centric mechanisms of these institutions, especially within the United Nations. According to Zondi "the South African government seemed to limit itself to governance systems and the composition of the leadership within this organisation instead of deeper questions of inherent unfairness and injustice in their very constitutions" (Zondi, 2017: 186). The ANC, as the ruling party has on a more radical stance called for the South African government to take decolonial position by urging it to "work towards fundamental reform of the United Nations but more importantly the UNSC and other structures of global governance, because they remain dominated by developed countries" (ANC, 2007).

3.2.6 Brazil, Russia, India and China and South Africa (BRICS)

Democratic South Africa has always valued partnership with countries of the global south, regarding them as important for the development of the country and the continent and for creating solidarity in the global struggle against poverty, underdevelopment and the marginalisation of emerging economies.

The concept of strengthening South-South cooperation is not new to the post-apartheid foreign policy of South Africa. In actual fact the ANC outlined this in its 'Foreign Policy Perspective of a Democratic South Africa' in which it states that "a democratic South Africa will play an active and leading role in the development and strengthening of multilateral fora which empower the nations of the South" (ANC, 1994: 9). This was later strengthened in the ANC's discussion paper titled 'Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy' which cautioned that "unless the South (developing countries) acts together in both multilateral forums and in economic relations, there is little chance for properly challenging the unjust world order" (ANC, 1997: 4). These two documents indicate that South Africa, from the dawn of democracy, defined itself firmly as a country of the South that is committed to building multilateral fora for addressing issues facing the South.

The formation of the BRIC forum in 2009, which included Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), signalled a continuation of the shift in global power to the advantage of

developing countries. It is for this reason that South Africa identified with the BRIC agenda of global reform and cooperation within the developing world and joined the forum in 2010 to form a new acronym of BRICS. The BRICS countries have been seen as influential countries in the international arena, based on the fact that these countries are regional leaders in their respective regions and are said to be the fastest growing economies in the 21st century (Piper, 2015).

South Africa joined BRICS in line with the country's foreign policy to strengthen South-South relations (The Presidency, 2014: 153). Former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad, expressed the view that the "cornerstone of our foreign policy will be to achieve a new world order that is more equitable and people centred and to create conditions for sustainable development" (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003). This supports the aim of BRICS, which is to challenge the imbalance of power that characterises global governance.

South Africa joined BRICS with three objectives (DIRCO, 2016: 8)
- Advancing its national interest
- Promoting its regional integration programme and related continental infrastructure programmes
- Partnering with key players of the South on issues related to global governance and its reform

The invitation by BRIC for South Africa to join the forum was recognition of the country's contribution in shaping the socio-economic regeneration of Africa, as well as our active involvement in peace and reconstruction efforts on the continent and the responsible role that South Africa has been playing in the international community. By joining the BRICS formation, South Africa aspires, although with challenges, to ensure that Africa's developmental needs and aspirations are fully incorporated into the BRICS agenda. To support this notion, the country invited African regional leaders to an inclusive first time BRICS-Africa Leadership dialogue on infrastructure development in 2013, held in Durban (The Presidency, 2014:153).

The country has worked to consolidate its position as a BRICS member and used its position to identify opportunities to further its developmental goals and the African Agenda. Given that South Africa had the largest economy in Africa, at the time of

joining the bloc, its inclusion into BRICS boosted its geo-political significance. South Africa remains committed to the consolidation of the African Agenda and to the use of its BRICS membership to increase its strategic cooperation among emerging market economies of the South in support of this agenda (Onyekwena et al., 2014: 6). South Africa used its opportunity of Hosting the 10th BRICS Summit under the theme BRICS in Africa to include an "African outreach" component which allowed African leaders and heads of African regional organisations to discuss issues of mutual importance to the continent and BRICS. (Fabricius, 2018). Secondly the development of the BRICS Development Bank has become a major source of financial assistance in developing and advancing African infrastructure, trade and economic development (Fabricius, 2018; Magama, 2013)

Habib (2009) in his work states that due to South Africa's economic, diplomatic and military status, in relation to other African nations it has managed to afford itself the status of being an African hegemon. Secondly, to secure a place in BRICS, President Zuma presented South Africa as a country that would serve as a gateway to the African continent. This meant that South Africa would be a bridge between the continent's resources and BRICS investment (Zubane, 2017: 84). As a BRICS member, South Africa has advocated the prioritising of emerging economies which it has strengthened in the international developmental agenda. The country's membership has enhanced its reputation as one of the leading campaigners for the reform of multilateral institutions, especially the UNSC with South Africa, India and Brazil bidding for permanent membership within the UNSC. However given the fact that both China and Russia, both veto-wielding members of the UNSC, have supported the BRICS unanimous statement that the UNSC "must increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges" (The BRICS Post, 2017), the two countries have remained obsolete on the issue of extending veto power beyond the P5. South Africa's involvement with BRICS indicates how the country has been regarded as a significant emerging power, worthy of attention in global decision making.

3.2.7 India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA)

The India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) trilateral dialogue forum was established in 2003 by the Brazilia Declaration, with the purpose of bringing together the three

countries to strengthen their position as developing nations and to enable them to act as part of the global community (Graham, 2010: 3). South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki said after the formation of IBSA "it is a necessary response to the current state of play in the global economy and its purpose and objectives are even more relevant in the context of the collapsed Doha Development Round of talks" (Mbeki, 2006)

The need for close collaboration amongst these three countries was brought about by their status as middle powers, their need to address social inequalities and the consolidation of their industries through closer collaboration (Alden & Vieira, 2005: 4). With its open and flexible structure, that doesn't entail headquarters or a permanent secretariat, IBSA members work together at three levels namely as heads of states; government to government and people to people cooperation. IBSA is underpinned by three pillars namely political consultation and coordination, multi-sectoral and trilateral cooperation and concrete projects of cooperation and partnership with less developed countries through the IBSA Facility for Hunger and Poverty alleviation (IBSA Trust Fund) (The Presidency, 2014: 153).

It is clear that South Africa has used multilateral bodies to show the benefits of its leadership within the region and amongst other African states in order to cement and solidify its claim of regional representation by forming alliances of this nature with broadly 'like-minded' developing countries. One can deduce that it is perhaps more important to South Africa than it is to India or Brazil, to maintain relations with these countries, given that South Africa remains a relatively small middle-income economy compared to her counterparts. This notion is supported by Mokoena (2007: 127) who states that "South Africa's commitment to IBSA, at the diplomatic level at least, therefore must be considered genuine and does not appear to be in conflict with the country's overall foreign policy agenda".

Although IBSA had not focused exclusively on Africa as a problem to be solved, it was in 2005 that specific attention was given to NEPAD and the need to support Africa, through South Africa's advocacy of the African Agenda in its foreign policy (IBSA, 2005). Under the IBSA Fund, projects have been approved for African countries that are politically unstable, for example the fund committed resources to an agriculture project in Guinea-Bissau among others (Mokoena, 2007: 127). However such funds have been allocated under the United Nations Development Programme, relinquishing

control from the funded government over receipt of funds but stipulating clearly the type of projects to be funded (Zondi & Moore, 2015: 494). Although this is done with good intentions, to help ameliorate problems within the African countries, which appears potentially most difficult to manage in Africa, deepens further the perception of the rest of Africa towards South Africa and its IBSA partners as mere donor countries and not counterparts.

The abovementioned statement concurs with Mokoena (2007:127) who states that "South Africa's involvement in IBSA has caused it some problems, principally in the form of suspicion and criticism from several African countries, which are, by definition, excluded". South Africa has found it difficult to fully ensure that the African Agenda takes central stage within IBSA as has been its usual posture within international politics. Vieira & Alden state that "the governments of these three states have sought to describe IBSA as an instrument to promote the interests of all developing countries, rather than embedded their privileged partnership in a regionally defined source of legitimate action" (Vieira & Alden 2011: 514). Zondi and Moore (2015: 494) further explain that each member state of IBSA inhabits a fractious regional position, in which its own leadership is contested and this is what "paradoxically keeps IBSA neutrally focused on all three continents represented within the grouping and no one region is permitted to dominate". Critics say South Africa's commitment to African solidarity is eroded by its attraction to 'clubs' of this nature.

Many critics, especially from the north have surfaced, by South Africa emphasising its role in enhancing the agency of the South through multilateral fora's such as BRICS and IBSA. Such relations that South Africa has established with the rest of the undeveloped countries through its South-South relations have seen a lot of criticism and one can deduct from a decolonial perspective that this emanates from the fact that the South-South cooperation is not a Eurocentric idea and position, therefore increasing the West's fear of the new direction that South Africa and Africa at large is taking. Zondi elaborated more on this notion by stating that "the decision to balance the focus on South-South cooperation and North-South relations leads to criticism that South Africa is dis-engaging from relations with the North" (Zondi, 2017: 192).

3.3 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to contextualise the background of South Africa's participation in numerous multilateral organisations at regional and international level, pre and post-1994. South Africa has taken on a leadership role in all of these multilateral organizations on a regional and international stage. Through South Africa's positioning, within the international community, the country has created possible opportunities for the pursuit of an African Agenda and of African interests at the highest stage of international relations.

The chapter revealed that there has been a drastic change in the country's foreign policy since the new dispensation as opposed to that of the apartheid era. It further examined South Africa's efforts to implement its vision of Africa and the developing countries within the global arena emerging from its legacy after 1994. From the analysis, it can be highlighted that South Africa's foreign policy shows strong enthusiasm for Africa and multilateral forums as a means for building alliances in defence of the interests of the developing world. Both Mbeki and Zuma's administration saw multilateral organisations as a mechanism to achieve the promotion of the African agenda and the AU, SADC, NEPAD and APRM were considered the 'entry points' for achieving South Africa's goals (DFA, 2005: 9). By playing a central role in the development of these regional organisations, South Africa positioned itself as a critical player in shaping the African Agenda of the continent.

The African Agenda is seen not only as an identification problem for South Africa. Rather, more as a political solution to the problems within the continent as the decolonial thought would contest; it aims to redeem the African people from the subjectivity of being and power. Thus for Africa to be self-sufficient it is important for it to reclaim the power in order to articulate solutions for its economic development problems by stopping to borrow from Western economic mechanisms, which continue to marginalise it, but rather to address the realities of Africa's political, social and economic standings internally and externally.

The chapter revealed that South Africa regained its position as a respected member of the international community and has enjoyed successes in furthering its own interests, as well as those of the African continent and the SADC region, although with

several challenges along the way. Having discussed and explored South Africa's commitment to multilateralism and its participation of the highest level in multilateral relations at different levels and organisations, the researcher will go on to analyse South Africa's two terms in the UNSC as one empirical case through which to concretely explore the country's pursuit of an African agenda.

CHAPTER 4

SOUTH AFRICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
2007-2008

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter will examine South Africa's behaviour during its first term by focusing on how the country engaged on issues on the UNSC's agenda, namely those that promoted the African Agenda through its attempt to influence thematic and country-specific issues. Focus will be on significant strategic themes which became apparent in South Africa's conduct of its external relations by looking at reform of the UN and the promotion of equitable global governance, the advancement of African interests and the consolidation of the relationship between the UN and regional organisations (AU) and lastly the votes on issues related to South Africa's African Agenda. The decolonial analytical framework will be used to interpret South Africa's behaviour and how it sought the promotion of the African agenda.

4.2 BACKGROUND

On 16 October 2006, for the first time since 1945, South Africa was elected by UNGA member states to serve on the UNSC as a non-permanent member for a two-year term. South Africa obtained 186 out of 192 votes cast by UNGA member states. South Africa ran on a clean slate as the only African country running for the African candidature to the UNSC and was also endorsed by the African Union (Inglis, 2009: 69).

Other non-permanent membership in 2007 was held by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Indonesia, Belgium, Italy and the Slovak Republic. Ghana had previously served two terms on the UNSC in 1962-1963 and 1986-1987 and was serving its third term from 2006 to 2007. The Congo had served on the UNSC in 1986-1987 and again in 2006-2007. In 2008, South Africa served with Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama and Vietnam as non-permanent members. The other members were the five permanent members, namely, the United States, China, United Kingdom, Russia and France. Burkina Faso had served on the UNSC in 1984-1985 and was now was

serving from2008-2009 and Libya served in 1976-1977 and was now serving from 2008 to 2009 (Graham, 2015: 71).

The membership of South Africa to the UNSC in its first term as non-permanent member of the UNSC was an opportunity for the country to promote the African agenda within the international community and to deepen the country's role in global governance. Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma supported this election as she accepted the country's election to the council by emphasising the country's continued ties to the continent and global South: "We humbly accept the mandate thrust upon us by the people of Africa, South Africa and the world in general in electing us to this position of responsibility" (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007). According to Van Nieuwkerk (2007: 61), this position presented South Africa with a golden opportunity in terms of furthering a progressive and Africanist foreign policy orientation. South Africa believed that its seat in the UNSC would ultimately secure her and Africa a place in an evolving multi-polar world where other 'regions or civilisations' would form an inclusive part of global governance and promote her chances of democratising global governance in order to create a more equitable and just world order (Mbete, 2018: 115).

Table 1: South Africa's participation in UNSC, 2007-2008

	2007	2008	Total
Formal meetings	202	243	445
Resolutions	56	65	121
Presidential Statements	50	48	98
SA Yes votes	56	64	120
SA No votes	1	1	2
SA Abstentions	0	1	1

Source: Mbete, 2018: 116

The monthly presidency of the UNSC rotates among members, following the alphabetical order of the Member States' names in English. Consequently, South Africa held the presidency in March 2007 and April 2008 (Inglis, 2009: 69). The UNSC held 445 formal meetings in 2007, and 2008 and South Africa made statements in 119 public meetings during its first term. The UNSC adopted 121 resolutions in which103 resolutions were adopted on country-specific situations, and 68 of those were

concerned with African situations. This highlights that 66% of issues adopted by the UNSC during this time were related to African country specific issues thus indicating, as previously mentioned that Africa dominates the agenda of the UNSC. South Africa voted in favour of 120 and abstained once. South Africa voted against two draft resolutions, on Myanmar and Zimbabwe, which were not adopted because of vetoes by China and Russia (Graham, 2015: 72).

South Africa's participation was focused on thematic and country-specific issues which would enable the UNSC to explore issues of peace and security in greater depth, to monitor and facilitate implementation of some of its decisions and to oversee their implementation. South Africa was however on the one hand realistic in recognising the "challenges that will certainly arise from its membership on the UNSC as an instrument of our collective peace and security" (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007). Despite the challenges and expectations, South Africa focused on impacting positively to the realisation of governance of global political system to achieve a stable, peaceful and secure coexistence between and amongst world nations.

4.3 COLONIALITY OF BEING

4.3.1 Reform of the UN and the promotion of equitable global governance

Since the inception of the UNSC, the role of the P-5, who are the victors of World War II, continues to reflect the world of 1945 such that the operations and decisions of the UNSC are bipartisan, thus, undemocratic and exclusionary. The UNSC's continued lack of representativeness and its inability to accommodate developing countries is progressively undermining its own mandate which is based on the norm of "equality amongst nations" as prescribed in the UN Charter (UN Charter, 1945: 3).

In 1997, the ANC urged the South African government to work towards the reform of the UN Security Council through the "democratisation and expansion of membership of the UNSC; the strengthening of its development agenda and the democratisation of the operations of the institution" as it believed the UNSC remained dominated by developed countries and did not embrace the current geopolitical global order (DFA, 2008: 6). Mandela repeated these sentiments during his last address to the General Assembly: "This very organisation, including its important Security Council, must itself

go through its own process of reformation so that it serves the interests of the people of the world, in keeping with the purpose for which it was established" (Mandela, 1998).

It is evident from above that that the reform of the UN and in particular the UNSC has thus been central to South Africa's multilateral diplomacy as a commitment to democratising the institution of global governance (Landsberg, 2015:49; Mbete, 2018: 107). It should be noted that the UNSC has only been reformed once since its inception after the Second World War, in 1965 when it enlarged its members from eleven (11) to fifteen (15). However, the P5 members veto power remains unchanged. South Africa has thus used its non-permanent tenure to advocate for the enlargement of the UNSC in order to make it more representative of the interest of the global South member states.

South Africa's approach to the implementation of the African Agenda acknowledged that the post-cold war global world order had entrenched the marginalisation of the global South, in particular Africa. The country believed that the best way for African states to attain their goals and to deal with continental and global problems is through multilateral efforts. South Africa pursued its call for UN reform through its active involvement in the discussion by then Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005 (A/59/2005) which highlighted the expansion of the UNSC to include permanent seats for Africa and Latin America who remain excluded from the P5 representation. The proposal for reform of the UNSC includes increasing the size, restraining the power of the veto and alterations to the UNSC's working methods (Spies, 2008: 102).

South Africa publicly pronounced on its aspirations of wanting a "permanent presence at the global high table where major rules of world politics are made" (Geldenhuys, 2006: 102). South Africa's Permanent Representative to the UN, Dumisani Kumalo made an assessment that "Africa in particular, remains an outsider in this political game; therefore, it is left to the discretion of foreign powers, [referring to the P5] to decide if, when and how the council should intervene in African Affairs" (Kumalo, 2007: 37). Ultimately, this raises the critical problem: African issues dominate the agenda of the UNSC, and yet Africa is marginal in resolving these issues and marginal to the actual decision-making power around these issues. This means that decisions about African peace and security are made outside of Africa by the P5. This statement by Kumalo acknowledges what decoloniality encapsulates; that is shifting the geography

of reason from the West as the main point of departure from which the world, especially Africa is described and constructed.

The mere fact that over 66 percent of issues on the UNSC Agenda are on African conflict raises a few questions firstly could African conflict, whether unnecessarily prolonged or not, be the main reason the council remained relevant through its influence and interference in Africa? This is based on the fact that all African conflict-related issues are placed on the agenda of Council while other regions in the world, especially Latin America and Asia, significantly avoid the UNSC intervention. The only other region on the UNSC Agenda is the Middle East and this is because of its oil and the United States of America (US) political and economic interest in it and also because of its history, similarly to that of Africa, as a battleground for colonial power battles between the United Kingdom (UK) and France (Mbete, 2018: 318).

Secondly, is Africa such a problematic region that the UNSC, dominated by the P5 have to take critical decisions on behalf of Africa and on African issues as if Africa has no capacity and capabilities to contribute to these decisions? Does Africa, in fact, become framed, through the fact of its dominance on the UNSC agenda, as a problem? This position is further advanced by decolonial scholar Du Bois who states that "the false position in which Negro problems place them…is based on proscription and prejudice, these same Negroes are classed with and treated like the lowest of their people, simple because they are Negroes and only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world" (Du Bois, 1903:130-131).Mpofu further supports this position as he states that "In the world, Africa is that presence which is also an absence. When world power is exercised, Africa appears only as an object and not an important subject" (Mpofu, 2018: 87).

South Africa believed that it had to be at the forefront of efforts to champion African positions on peace and security issues in order to change the image of Africa, as perceived by the international community as a 'problem' and conflict-ridden continent (Mashabane, 2018: 397).However, the current configuration of the UNSC makes it difficult for the ten non-permanent members to have a significant impact on decision making during their two-year term. This brings into question the leadership of the UNSC, how it is inherited, and the extent to which it is representative of the international community (and indeed, what representation means in global politics).

Adebajo (2006: 153) argues that the reality of the UNSC structure is that the P-5 has a more significant advantage over the rotating members not merely by virtue of the veto power but also because of institutional advantages such as familiarity with secretariat staff and institutional memory. This thus puts the non-permanent members at a disadvantage to make an impact within the UNSC in a two-year period. This highlights the constraints in which African states, especially non-permanent members within the UNSC, face in their attempts to re-order the neo-colonial structure of power in the UNSC.

South Africa initially pursued its call for UN Reform with alliance to its IBSA tri-alliance as well as the G4 nations (Germany Japan, Brazil and India) who were canvassing for the reform to allow a stronger role for developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America making the UNSC more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive (Kagwanja, 2008: 43). Such an alliance by South Africa to the G4 became problematic for the country as other African countries were pushing for a unified African position on Reform which was adopted in the Ezulwini Consensus by the Executive Council of the African Union, after drawing on the 1997 Harare Declaration in which the OAU called for an enlarged UNSC with two permanent and three non-permanent African seats (Spies, 2008: 103).

South Africa could not continue sharing the G4's candidacies due to its regional obligation as the country failed to convince both the AU and the G4 to agree on a common position in order to ensure their proposal achieved the two-thirds majority vote at the General Assembly in September 2005 which both groups could not achieve (Landsberg, 20015: 50).In order to act in accordance with the African agenda, South Africa needed to use the opportunity to define its foreign policy actively while recognising the role of the UNSC and being mindful of the obligations associated with its non-permanent election to the body. If South Africa ignored the rest of the African continent and failed to take forward the African agenda or the African Union's mandate, the country risked damaging its longer-term foreign policy goals of reforming the UN with continental backing.

It was thus imperative that during South Africa's tenure, President Mbeki pronounced on the issue of the UNSC's reform to be central to the African Agenda as a foreign policy position. According to Mbete (2018: 108), the call for the reform of the UNSC is

relevant for the current issues dominating its agenda in order to deal with the continuation of colonial relations between major European powers and the continent. The call by South Africa for reform is aimed at making the UNSC balanced by ensuring a greater diversity of members. Attempts by South Africa to weigh in on cases outside of its sphere of influence were "likely to be perceived as delusions of grandeur- and rebuffed" (Adebajo, 2006), and this is reflected in South Africa calling for but unable to successfully push for a resolution to reform the UNSC.

4.4 COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

4.4.1 The relationship between the UN and Regional Organisations

South Africa assumed Presidency of the UNSC in March 2007 and April 2008. During its first term, South Africa's was instrumental in revitalising "the relationship between the UN and regional organisations and in particular the African Union in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter" (DIRCO, 2009: 2). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of 1945 makes provision for regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security in line with the principles and purposes of the UN. Article 53 allows enforcement action to be taken by regional arrangements with authorisation by the Security Council (UN Charter, 1945: 11).

South Africa served as a member of the UNSC and African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the continent's main decision-making body for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, simultaneously, which gave it access to both institutions to pursue its goals (DFA 2007: 11).The country used this opportunity to foster issues on the UNSC Agenda that would benefit the continent as per its African Agenda objective. According to Theophillus (2011: 156), non-permanent members can use their Presidency on the UNSC to exert some influence, although limited, in order to present themes that are not officially on the Council agenda or to retain focus on issues that would otherwise be neglected on the agenda. With its new position as a non-permanent UNSC member, South Africa used its tenure in the UNSC to focus on resolving the root causes of African conflicts, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as preventing new conflicts from emerging and this would be achieved if South Africa was able to advance the interests of the AU by enhancing the relationship between the UNSC and regional organisations, in particular, the AUPSC (DIRCO, 2009:10-15).

It was imperative for South Africa to forge cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC and in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in terms of how the UN and regional organisations responded to peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Having previously noted that a vast majority of issues on the UNSC are on conflict in Africa, South Africa, along with the rest of the continent expected the UNSC to include the AUPSC in its decision-making, provide logistical and material support for peace missions and allow Africans to take leadership on African peace and security issues.

On 28 March 2007, Minister Dlamini-Zuma chaired an open ministerial debate in the UNSC to launch the initiative with the quest for 'burden-sharing' with regards to deployment in peacekeeping missions on the African continent by identifying the need to strengthen relations between the UN and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), in particular the AU (DIRCO, 2008). This was based on the comparative advantages of each regional organisation. For instance, unlike the UN, the AU does not necessarily have the necessary financial or logistical capabilities to single-handedly provide an adequate response while the UNSC does. Secondly, regional organisations had an advantage over the UN in conflict situations such as proximity and a greater understanding of conflict situations; more flexible processes; and the ability to intervene as soon as conflict erupted (S/2007/148). Dlamini-Zuma stated that South Africa aimed that "during our tenure in the Security Council, we can contribute to better articulation and clarification" of the relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC as mandated by AU leaders at the organisations summit in January 2007 (S/PV.5649 2007). To a certain extent, such cooperation between the UN and the AU would ensure that African states and their regional organisations would be able to bring African solutions to African problems as advanced by decolonial theory instead of being entirely dependent on Western intervention and this would further prevent contestation over mandates and authority.

On 16 April 2008, during the summit of Heads of State and Government, South Africa seemed successful in convincing the UNSC to authorise and implement the Secretary General's report (S/PV.5868 2008), which would outline options for sharing the responsibility associated with peacekeeping between the UN and regional organisations, and in particular the AU (Alden, 2015: 2). President Thabo Mbeki also produced a milestone on this issue when he hosted the UN member states and

presented the issue of the report which resulted in Resolution 1809 (2008), which institutionalised for the first time in its history, the relationship between the UN and the AU on the maintenance of international peace and security (S/RES/1809).

Resolution 1809 entailed the endorsement of the report and the establishment of the AU-UN panel of distinguished persons by the UN Secretary-General which would be responsible for assessing how AU peacekeeping missions mandated by the UN could be supported to make financing of regional organisations more predictable, sustainable, and flexible. The resolution further endorsed closer cooperation between the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission to work together on developing the AU's military, technical, logistical and administrative capabilities. The resolution also recognised that there would be challenges and the AU could assist as the organisation has had a greater understanding of the continental conflicts and the need for its member states to achieve peaceful resolutions within their respective countries (S/RES/2008).

Although such an achievement by South Africa supports the decolonial thought objective which calls for change of the Western tradition of knowledge to the promotion of indigenous (African) knowledge, this brings into mind that the basic tenets of Western knowledge should not be seen as all good or all bad, but we should recognise that they are historically situated, and potentially restrictive if universalised through our projects, as they prevent the imagination of other possibilities (Chiumbu, 2017: 2). In that the support provided to AU peacekeeping missions, mandated by the UN, raises the concern of whether Africa, through the AU, would be truly determining for itself what is important and which interventions need support or is this a mere façade by the UNSC to be seen as re-ordering global power relations within its structures.

Furthermore, South Africa was able to host a meeting between the UNSC and the AUPSC during its presidency as well as a meeting between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission. South Africa invited twenty-one other African countries to participate in the meeting to share their experiences of UN peacekeeping operations. The panel began this work in the very same year it was established (Dlamini-Zuma, 2007). This allowed for opportunities for the AU to gain capacity building and operational support significantly but most importantly to advance and influence issues of concern to Africa especially conflict resolution issues in African contexts which

dominated the agenda of the UNSC. Additionally, Resolution 1809 formalised the introduction of annual visits between the UNSC and AUPSC, with meetings rotating between Addis Ababa and New York (Alden, 2015: 5). South Africa had achieved one of the crucial goals it had set itself as a member of the UNSC. According to Nieuwkerk (2007: 68), it was expected from South Africa in its quest as an emerging middle power to stabilise Africa by firming up the relationship between the UN and AU.

South Africa's success of formalising the relationship between the AU and UNSC allowed it to consolidate the African peace and security architecture and being recognised as an essential role of being a 'policy entrepreneur' introducing new norms of peacekeeping and providing the intellectual leadership to improve global governance and security especially in Africa (Mbete, 2018: 182). South Africa was praised by its peers and fellow African non-permanent members. Ghana's representative stated his country "remains deeply committed to President Thabo Mbeki's vision of an African renaissance that would enable our continent to assume its rightful place of honour and dignity in the twenty-first century" (S/PV.5649. 2007: 10). The Chairperson of the Commission of the AU, Alpha Konaré, thanked South Africa for its "leadership on all African issues"; for dedicating its presidencies on the Council to Africa, and "for listening to African peoples and African leaders" (S/PV.5868, 2008: 34).

4.4.2 Visiting Missions to Africa

Visiting Missions by the UNSC have been used since 1964 when the UNSC first travelled to Cambodia and Vietnam for a number of reasons namely to engage in preventing diplomacy, first-hand information gathering, supporting peace processes and mediation. Visiting mission has become a more frequent working method of the UNSC which between 1990 and 2015undertook 51 visiting missions to pursue a wide range of goals and purposes (SCR, 2019). There is little guidance regarding UNSC travelling missions in the UN Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. Missions have been deployed under the broad powers granted by Article 29 of the UN Charter, according to which the Security Council "may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions" (UN Charter, 1945: 7).

South Africa challenged conventions around structural power within the UNSC, in particular, and global politics, in general. South Africa's motivation for advancing the African Agenda at the UNSC was partly to counter the neo-colonial practice of the P5 (that includes two former colonial powers) in setting the Agenda of African problems and providing mechanisms to 'solve such problems' without Africa's involvement and influence. South Africa looked for a pragmatic and cooperative approach in which the UNSC, through its processes and structures, would allow for a consolidated approach to problem-solving with regards to African issues. One elitist interviewee supported this notion as follows

> During South Africa's first term, it insisted that instead of having neo-colonial leaders head Visiting Missions to their respective colonies, for example France leading visits to Francophone and the UK leading visits to Anglophone countries on the agenda of the UNSC there should be co-leadership with African countries (OID4)[1].

In 2007, South Africa lobbied to join the UK in becoming a co-leader of a visiting mission to Addis Ababa and Khartoum. The visiting mission entailed exchange of views on more extensive African situations of interest to both the UNSC and the AUPSC, welcoming enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union (S/2007/347, 2007: 2). In 2008, South Africa co-led another visiting mission to Djibouti in connection with the situation in Somalia and Sudan. South Africa succeeded and joined the UK in leading the mission, and as a result, most missions since then have seen a co-leadership of a permanent and elected member leading the UNSC Visiting Missions to Africa. One elite responded stated that South Africa's success in advocating for co-leadership of African missions:

> "is that we managed to change the continuation of 'business as usual' within the Council, particularly on African issues, where the former colonial masters were the authority on the former territories, specifically the UK

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[1] Each official interviewed for this project is given a unique code e.g. (IOD1) in order to maintain their anonymity

and France. Due to our involvement in a number of conflict situations in Africa spanning from French to English speaking countries, we have managed to play a significant role in these areas" (OID1). Another official interviewed shared similar sentiments stating that "we know that Algeria is not French, Angola is not Portuguese nor is Kenya English, but they are all African countries in Africa, now why do we need to side-line African countries in dealing with resolving conflicts in those countries?" (OID3).

The P5 continue to execute their UNSC mandate and obligations on partisan ways and west versus east bipolar nexus, through the veto power. Thus, their economic interests are the foremost determinants for action and or lack of. The decolonial turn calls upon the global south, especially Africa to challenge colonial practices that continue to instil coloniality in the global world order. One could assess that it was thus imperative for the South Africa to challenge post-colonial conventional structural powers within the UNSC and this is supported by Wines (2007: A1) who states that "South Africa is playing the role of bad boy on the Security Council to underscore its demand that the Council be overhauled to reflect new global realities".

4.5 COLONIALITY OF POWER

4.5.1 Votes on issues related to South Africa's African Agenda

Coloniality of power is at the core of the present global power structure where Africa is presented as a continent that is lacking in history, civilisation, and democracy, human rights and development (Grosfoguel, 2007: 213).

The colonial powers have not left Africa as they did not leave the continent willingly and it is against this backdrop that we look at how they continue, through interference in the governance of many African countries, to advance their own colonial interests. This is especially when it comes to peacekeeping matters that were brought to UNSC. This has informed how South Africa responded to African conflict resolutions on the agenda of the UNSC, specifically in relation to draft resolution S/RES/447 (2008) on Zimbabwe and draft resolution S/RES/1828 (2008) on Sudan. These two cases have been selected due to their relevance to the African Agenda as they are African state

conflicts in which the principle of prioritising 'African solutions to African problems' was explicitly and strongly brought to the fore in discussions and debates.

4.5.1.1 Sudan

Sudan featured prominently on the Council's agenda and drew considerable international attention due to its deteriorating humanitarian situation fuelled by years of underdevelopment and conflict. When South Africa joined the UNSC in 2007, it had been actively involved in the conflict situation in Sudan for three years in its capacity as the AUPSC Chair and troop contributor to the African Mission in Sudan (AMISON), an AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur (DIRCO, 2009: 10).

In 2007, a draft resolution on Sudan which proposed a joint AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to be established for 12 months and authorised UNAMID "to seize and collect arms whose presence violated peace agreements" was brought before the UNSC (S/2007/468, 2007). The AU-UN mission was a recommendation by the AU to the UNSC in order to address concerns about the Western involvement and to assist with Africa's intervention in Darfur. Furthermore, the resolution included extending sanctions against Khartoum if it did not comply with the mission (S/2007/468, 2007). South Africa cautioned against sanctions because Al-Bashir accepted the establishment of a UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur, this was further supported by China, Russia and Congo amongst others. This position by South Africa and its allies indicated the concern over the wellbeing of the people of Darfur and the progress that had already been made by the government to soften its position. The intentions of the UNSC western countries, mainly the UK and the US, who were concerned with bureaucratic processes of intervening in Darfur raised questions about their interests and interpretations of events in Sudan (Mbete, 2018: 191).

Although South Africa was central in the drafting of the resolution, the country was along with its African non-permanent counterpart and other UNSC member states such as China, Russia and Indonesia against the insertion of sanctions and challenged the inclusion of this issue as a condition of the resolution. As such, these countries indicated that imposing further sanctions on Darfur would compromise the progress already made by the country as it had shown its willingness to cooperate with UNAMID. Furthermore, these members pointed out that, "the proposed mandate for

the Panel of Experts, the use of Chapter VIII and the authorisation of all necessary means and the inclusion of language not present in the AU-UN recommendations, in particular, the authorisation to cease or collect arms"(S/2007/468) was of concern.

The other concern was raised that too much emphasis was placed on the Sudanese government's failure to comply instead of also reprimanding the rebel groups for failure to honour their commitments and adhere to the peace process (S/2007/421). However, the UK and the US were not convinced about Khartoum's acceptance of the operation. This highlights the decolonial thought, in that the Euro-North American centric states continue to have a sense of entitlement over Africa and this is reflected in their continued insistence to instruct Africa on what to do. This view was also supported by elite respondent who stated that:

> "The west does not want to see Africa stabilize in order to
> continue with the neocolonial project which requires Africa's
> continued control by the Euro-American centric states through
> interference, however Africa will not stand and watch this happen
> again. We cannot fail Africa again" (OID4).

On 31 July 2007, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1769 which was sponsored by Belgium, Congo, France, Italy, Peru, Slovakia and the UK. The draft resolution authorised the deployment of a 26 000-strong AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) as effort to end the conflict in Darfur (S/RES/1769, 2007). Furthermore the resolution accommodated South Africa's concerns and as part of a compromise the resolutions preamble paragraph stressed that the hybrid operation should reinstate the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by ensuring that the hybrid operation would have a predominantly African character with troops sourced from African countries and the need to mobilise the financial and logistical resources to assist AMIS whilst establishing UNAMID.

Although this can, to some extent, be seen as a positive thing, from a decolonial point of view, the resolution raises various questions about the intentions of the West in pursuing this resolution. Firstly, is this not merely shifting the financial/ logistical/ people burden onto African countries? Does this mean that African countries are determining how long this troop intervention is/ what kind of intervention it is/ the

content of the intervention? Or are they following the directives of the US/UK on these questions? According to Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, coloniality "makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish" (Wa Thiong'o, 1986: 3)

South Africa, along with its other non-permanent African countries requested that the resolution to renew UNAMID also include the call on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to defer for 12 months any consideration of the ICC's request to prosecute Sudan's President al-Bashir. All members of the UNSC did not accept this request. However, an agreement to include language which would take note of the AU's request would be considered by the UNSC at a later stage (Hauben, 2008: 1). South Africa was supported by the AU and Arab League's decisions that the possible indictment of the Sudanese President be deferred as it could hinder the political process in Sudan. In doing so, South Africa's intention was not to block the referral but instead to defer it in line with Article 16 of the Rome Statute (DIRCO, 2009: 21).

The UNSC member states took these concerns into consideration and a new draft resolution S/2007/468, sponsored by Belgium, Congo, France, Italy, Peru, Slovakia and the UK, which incorporated issues raised by the group was unanimously adopted. The revised draft encompassed the AU-UN report recommendations on UNAMID's mandate and removed the issue of sanctions against Sudan but instead kept the language on mandate of command and control, referring to the political and operational control of UN peacekeeping forces by the Military Staff Committee of the UNSC, according to UN Chapter VII (UN Chapter VII, Article 47). The hybrid operation was authorised under Chapter VII to prevent the disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to monitor the presence of any arms in Darfur and most importantly to protect civilians under threat of violence. In 2008 a revised draft resolution S/RES/447 (2008) on Sudan was unanimously adopted.

South Africa ensured that it voted in consensus with the AU on all the 68 resolutions on the peace and security of the African continent. This was done to promote 'African solutions to African problems.' South Africa, through its voting patterns, consistently took its policy direction from the mandate of the AU. According to McGurk (2013: 38), South Africa conducted itself in this manner to fulfil its "desire to be seen as a voice

piece of the African continent and the Global South which trumped the desire to be a 'good global citizen' or bastion of human rights and promotion of democracy". However, on the other hand South Africa also advanced its own foreign objectives through its voting behaviour. According to Nathan (2008: 1-17) South Africa's use of diplomacy especially regarding the situation in Sudan was influenced by the countries business interest in Sudan referring to the economic and trade agreements which were signed in 2007. Secondly Mbeki's desire to bring stability to Africa, through the championing of Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the UNAMID.

4.5.1.2   Zimbabwe

South Africa's second vote on the council was on draft resolution S/2008/447 on Zimbabwe, which sought to impose sanctions on the country as a result of deteriorating political situation following the Presidential run-off election on 27 June 2008. The draft resolution invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter as it reasoned that the situation in Zimbabwe was a threat to international peace and security in the region (S/2008/2008: 2). The resolution proposed that sanctions be imposed on the country and that a travel ban and financial freeze be imposed against President Robert Mugabe and 13 senior government and security officials considered responsible for creating the 'violent crisis' in the country. The draft resolution requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative on the situation in Zimbabwe in order to support negotiations between the political parties, which would report back to the UNSC on the political, security and human rights situation (DIRCO, 2008: 1).

South Africa, along with Libya and Vietnam opposed the vote with the view that this would undermine the ongoing peace process. The draft was sponsored by the United States and nine other countries, namely Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, the United Kingdom and the United States of America who voted in favour of the resolution. The resolution was however defeated by China and Russia's vetoes, which critics say South Africa was influential in securing (Kornegay, 2012: 9). This point is confirmed by one respondent who said that:

> "The process involved a serious shuttle diplomacy, especially
> going to China   and then Russia to secure assurances that they

would use their veto power because the numbers were against South Africa" (OID3).

South Africa believed that the best approach to the situation in Zimbabwe was through engagement and dialogue instead of condemnation and sanctions. President Mbeki responded to those calling for a harsher response against Zimbabwe by saying "they seem to believe that if we issued some instructions to the political leaders of Zimbabwe, as determined by themselves, this leadership would meekly obey what the 'baas' across the Limpopo would have told them. We remain convinced that the people of Zimbabwe must decide their future" (Mbeki, 2008: 1). The very fact that Mbeki uses the word 'baas', Afrikaans for the boss, suggests the unspoken racial impetus that was implied in what was going on, and who should be willing to take directives from who. However it should be noted that the resolution was brought to the UNSC by the region's former colonial power, the UK, and that South Africa standing against the UK and in support of Zimbabwe's sovereignty could be read as an instance of assertion of a 'decolonial' stance which advocates on the resistance to the objectification and dehumanisation of African leaders, in this instance Mugabe, on a world scale.

South Africa's commitment to the AU throughout its term in the Council was also evident in this resolution as Ambassador Kumalo, in his explanation of the country's vote against the draft, during a media briefing made reference to the regional consensus necessary to find a solution to the political problems of Zimbabwe and further explained that South Africa was compelled by its membership to these organisations to follow the decisions made by them and vote against the resolution (DIRCO, 2008). Kumalo indicated that South Africa had been tasked by the SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation to facilitate talks between Zimbabwean political parties. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, according to Kumalo, also "appealed to States and all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate for dialogue" (DIRCO, 2008).

South Africa was faced with the challenge of managing the tensions between promoting its African Agenda foreign policy position versus its expected commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights (McGurk, 2013: 12; Ndayi, 2011: 1). This was criticised by domestic opposition political parties and Western allies of South

Africa such as the UK, France and the US. South Africa was accused by the UN Human Rights Watch (2007b) of having the worst voting record in the UN in respect of human rights especially with regard to situations in specific countries, because of its voting record in the UNSC. However, South Africa's Chief Director of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in DIRCO, Pitso Montwedi defended South Africa's time on the UNSC by stating that the country had adopted a "distinct approach to human rights issues" (Corrigan, 2009: 18). This was supported by a statement made by one of the officials interviewed for this project:

> "The reality is that South Africa's participation reflected the country's priorities and national interests. As such, the country did not make human rights the only light guiding its foreign policy. The decisions and voting patterns have been premised on and pursued under a guiding thread that was more than just human rights hence could not solely be guided by a moral compass. Other components of the priorities included respect for multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism, advancing the African agenda, strengthening the South and nurturing dialogue between the South and the North" (OID2).

Draft resolution S/2008/447 on Zimbabwe created a great divide between African states. South Africa alongside Libya opposed the vote and Burkina Faso, voted in favour of the draft resolution. South Africa insisted "that Zimbabweans parties' commitment to dialogue was encouraging, moreover, it chose to stand behind the position of the continent and regional multilateral organisations, namely the AU and SADC which both 'appealed to states and all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate for dialogue" (AU, 2008). Libya's reasons for voting against the resolution was that it would entail a violation of Zimbabwe's sovereignty and the sanctions would be interference in Africa's efforts to resolve the crisis as they would possibly create a climate for tensions (S/PV.5933.2008: 5).

Burkina Faso, on the other hand, stated that 'history, in particular, Africa's history, has accustomed us to situations in which a small spark has led to a great conflagration.

Therefore, the situation in Zimbabwe should be seen as a threat to peace and security" (S/PV.5933.2008: 6). Burkina Faso's explanation reflects what decolonial turn argues about Africa, that the West instilled and continues to instil in Africa, primarily through their leaders that 'what Africa knows about itself, what different parts of Africa know about each other, is that Africa is problematic and undemocratic and this is influenced by the West' (Mazrui, 1987:13)

The difference in consensus on voting between South Africa and other non-permanent African states has raised questions about the degree to which South Africa's voting patterns are autonomous decisions and the degree to which emerging powers could influence them, in this instance China and Russia (Anthony, Tembe & Gull, 2015: 8). However, one official interviewed made a striking point that:

> "We need to remember that every country is independent and their behaviour within any multilateral organisation, especially the UNSC, would be directed by its own foreign policy first and foremost and if a common African position is not in favour of that then rest assured it will not vote in favour" (OID2).

South Africa's diplomacy towards Zimbabwe raised a view that the Mbeki's administration has had to ignore the quality of democracy and human rights records of possible allies in order gain enough support of its African Agenda within the African continent, especially amongst its neighbours in order to have a greater political voice globally (Serrao & Bischoff, 2009: 363).

4.6 CONCLUSION

As South African foreign policymakers began re-creating the country's image after 1994, both as an African state and a member of the global South, they soon decided that the UN, especially the UNSC be one of the most critical multilateral platforms for raising the profile of these regions through the advancement of the African Agenda.

South Africa's chosen multilateral path in "service of the global south" has proven to be slightly bumpy (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 298). The accountability of the three African non-permanent members on the UNSC to the common African position,

as stipulated by the AU, on issues affecting the continent was weak, and the recommendations of the AU were often not respected by individual African member countries thus making a consensus for Africa very minimal (Paterson & Virk, 2013: 2). It was important for South Africa to encourage this coordination with other non-permanent African countries as the continent would be in common agreement, but more importantly, the UNSC would respond and consult regional concerns of the continent.

It is evident from the preceding that South Africa's foreign policy position on advancing the African Agenda in the international community through the UNSC is undeniably linked to its interests in achieving equal and democratic representation for African states in political and economic decision-making structures within the current global world system through its push to reform the UNSC. Although discussions to reform the UNSC had been on-going for years, South Africa used its term to voice out its concern, along with the rest of the global south, and revived the discussion to reform the Council. Although South Africa could not succeed in bringing about the reform of the UNSC, the country contended with the structural framework of the Council in which elected members are disadvantaged compared to the permanent members. Indeed, this confirm the limited and modest gains SA was able to make in terms of reformation of the way the UNSC functions

South Africa membership in the Council played an important role to leave a legacy of the African Agenda especially with regard to its promotion of cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC. The importance of such cooperation is invaluable in that besides the AU being one of few regional organisations with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, the AU also deals with all the African issues on the agenda of the Council, making it logical for the two organisations to cooperate and collaborate (Mashabane, 2018: 397). The formalisation of cooperation of the UNSC and regional organisations, especially the AU, allowed the country an opportunity to engage on issues of African interest and ensured bringing about tangible change within the councils working methods by bringing about mission visits and strengthening the UNSC and AUPSC relation. Through strengthening the relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC, it is evident that at the top of South Africa's African agenda is the need to ensure that the African continent economically develops and politically

matures into international systems of governance. This was also provided by the fact that the UNSC agenda has traditionally been dominated by African issues.

South Africa's tenure in the UNSC was faced by intense criticism especially over the Zimbabwe vote, where the international community, especially Western countries, believed South Africa had disregarded its human rights foreign policy position. It should be noted that South Africa followed certain principles in order to advance its foreign policy objectives and defend its national interests. It is therefore clear that South Africa did not follow fixed alliances but each situation and development was considered to its merit and necessary approach.

CHAPTER 5

SOUTH AFRICA AT THE UNSC 2011-2012

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide an analysis on South Africa's second tenure in the UNSC to determine if there was any continuity or departure in the country's position in pursuit of the African Agenda within the UNSC, keeping in mind that the country had also experienced domestic change in leadership from Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, as well as the changes in the global power brought about by the 2008/2009 recession (Mbete, 2018: 217).

5.2 BACKGROUND

Soon after South Africa completed its first term on the UNSC, in late 2010, the country attained two highly sought-after foreign policy objectives. South Africa was included into the BRIC (now BRICS) grouping of states which included Brazil, Russia, India and China. Secondly, the UNGA elected the country, in October 2010, for a second term for two years from 2011 to 2012 (Serrao, 2011: 2). South Africa received 182 out of 191 votes of member states who voted. The candidacy was endorsed by SADC as well as the AU which had endorsed its candidacy at its 14th ordinary session in January 2010 and it was the only African contender to replace Uganda. South Africa joined other non-permanent members which were Brazil, Bosnia, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, Herzegovina, India Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal to serve in the Security Council until the end of 2011. In 2012 South Africa served with Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, and Togo as non-permanent members (Kornegay & Nganje, 2012: 5).

South Africa's re-election within two years of leaving the Security Council was a strong affirmation of the international community's confidence in the country. South Africa sought to use its second term on the Council to continue to focus on resolving African conflicts and on reforming the working methods of the Security Council (Mashabane, 2018: 397). South Africa wanted to take a non-confrontational and non-controversial approach to these issues in the second term to differentiate the Zuma presidency from

that of Mbeki and to recover some of the moral authority lost in decisions in the previous term (Mbete, 2018: 215).

President Zuma in his State of the Nation Address of February 2011 said on South Africa's second occupation of the seat in the UNSC: "We have taken up our non-permanent seat in the UNSC, which we will use to promote the African Agenda as well as peace and security in Africa and the world. We have come a long way and we have achieved a lot, but challenges still remain" (Zuma, 2011: 14). Zuma's focus was on the African Agenda and peace and security in Africa first and then in the broader international sphere. However, upon taking up the seat for the second term, the then DIRCO Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, outlined South Africa's objectives on the UNSC was follows: "South Africa in the conduct of its international relations is committed to garner support for our democracy and human rights, uphold justice and international law in relations between nations, seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts and promote economic development through regional and international cooperation in an inter-dependent world" (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2011).What the Minister highlights here is that the orientation shifts somewhat away from a distinct approach with the continent as the main priority, as highlighted above by President Zuma's quote, towards a more generalized pursuit of 'good governance' goals of a country acting as a 'good global citizen'.

Table: South Africa's participation in UNSC, 2011-2012

	2011	**2012**	**Total**
Formal meetings	235	199	434
Resolutions	66	53	119
Presidential Statements	22	29	51
SA Yes votes	65	52	117
SA No votes	0	0	0
SA Abstain	1	1	2

Source: Mbete, 2018: 217

South Africa's second term on the UNSC was characterized by a busy UNSC agenda. The UNSC adopted 119 resolutions, considered 51 presidential statements and participated in 434 formal meetings to deliberate on various issues on its agenda.

According Masters South Africa brought two elements to the UNSC "the first is a commitment to enhancing the integrity of the UN and its organs, as a custodian of global governance by ensuring no mandate creep; the second is to put Africa and the global South at the centre of the UN agenda" (Masters, 2011: 13). South Africa co-sponsored 10 resolutions in 2011 which were co-sponsored by Nigeria and Gabon. This was a clear indication that the African member countries were willing to work together to advance a common African position and advancing African issues on the Council collectively (Bowland, 2012: 3). This was a great improvement from the previous term during which South Africa served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC where only six resolutions were co-sponsored by non-permanent African member states.

For South Africa to be able to influence the agenda of the UNSC to include more items that are concerned with Africa, despite the difficulty that non-permanent members find themselves in, in influencing the UNSC agenda, this was a great reflection on South Africa's commitment to the African agenda and finding solutions to African peace and security. It should also be noted that a successful South-South cooperation was being fostered by the fact that most of these resolutions were co-sponsored with India and Lebanon. Furthermore, a majority of these resolutions were co-sponsored with the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Germany and the United States which indicated a strong North-South cooperation (Bowland, 2012: 5).

South Africa's second term was very interesting as the country was joined by a number of its strategic allies. Two African countries were also members of the council at the time namely Nigeria (another key power on the continent) and Gabon, and, together with SA, were seen to be a collective voice for Africa. Fellow emerging power allies of South Africa namely from the IBSA and BRICS were also present on the UNSC. According to Kornegay (2012: 12), this second term could "be viewed as a veritable microcosm of global geopolitical conflicts and accommodations shaping the strategic landscape perhaps well beyond 2011-2012". Some of these members aspired for a permanent seat on the Council. The inclusion of South Africa on the UNSC so soon after its first tenure was part of a wider initiative to involve all the major Southern powers on the body to assess how an informal redistribution of power at the UNSC might be operationalised and the extent to which the countries would work together on particular issues, especially those that affect the continent (Kornegay, 2012: 11). The

second term thus became a real test for the possibility and pragmatics of a different kind of global order, one in which Africa and the global south would not be marginal.

5.3 COLONIALITY OF BEING

5.3.1 Reform of the UN and the promotion of equitable global governance

In 2009, Nkoana-Mashabane's statement provided the most accurate summary of South Africa's developing foreign policy position on UN reform in which she said that:

"The transformation of the global multilateral system will be to the benefit of all. Hence we continue to call for the transformation of the international system for a better world and Africa – such transformation will be about making organisations such as the UN more effective and efficient in discharging their roles and responsibilities. As countries of the South, we are advocating against the North wanting to limit the UN reform programmes to administrative matters pertaining to the Secretariat. Our stance is for a reform programme that will ensure relevance, equity and the democratisation of the institution" (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009).

Such a statement by the minister was a reflection of South Africa's position in reference to the continued colonial power dynamics within the council and build on the decolonial school of thought that Africa needs to challenge colonial matrixes of power which are reinforced by modernity.

During its second term, South Africa continued to focus on advancing the issue of reform within the UNSC through its working methods. Pretorius states that South Africa has consistently called for a transparent and equitably represented UNSC as well as "reform of an unfair world order", whichever comes first (Pretorius, 2007). This is precisely what decolonial thought calls for; the only way that the future of the colonised can be reimagined or reconstructed is through challenging the West at a civilization level.

The presence of countries, who shared similar sentiments to those of South Africa such as India and Brazil during South Africa's second term, challenged the Council's current obsolete configuration as unsustainable (Mashabane, 2018: 398). The

common African position on reform of the UNSC was strategic for Africa. However, developments from its previous term required that tactics to pursue this position become more uniform rather than reliance on one country pursuing unilateral action. South Africa's position on the reform of the UNSC aimed at making the organ more democratic in its conduct and inclusive in its decision-making structures by enhancing equity, transparency and efficiency (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013: 23). South Africa's advancing of the reform was reflected in its progress made by implementing changes to the working methods of the Council. One of the officials interviewed highlighted this by stating that:

> "as chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict prevention, South Africa managed to involve the broader UN membership and non-state actors in discussion of the working group in order to make it more accountable, responsive, transparent and effective" (IOD4).

President Zuma highlighted the importance of reforming the UNSC when he addressed the 66th UNGA General Debate at which he stated that "recent international developments have made more urgent our efforts to intensify the reform agenda of the UN, particularly the UNSC. No reform can be complete without the substantive reform of the UNSC, whose membership must be consistent with the principle of equitable geographical representation. In this regard, we reiterate our call for Africa to be represented in the permanent category of the UN Security Council" (Zuma, 2012). However according to Zondi (2017: 186) South Africa's government seemed to limit itself to governance systems and the composition of leadership in the council instead of deeper questioning the inherent unfairness and injustices in the founding UN Charter which enshrined the enormous power vested on permanent members in the UNSC, which gave the P5 members the sole right to determine the course and approach in any conflict, including the veto power. This is seen by Zondi as a toning down of radicalism of the government's previous position on UNSC reform. This is also not a reflection of what decolonial thought calls upon which is that the current colonial matrixes of power should be challenged in order to re-structure processes within the global imperial design away from the dominance of the global North and the perpetual 'subalternity' of the global South (Mignolo 2007, 155-167).

Masters highlights, though, that the short-term occupancy of non-permanent membership on the Council makes it difficult for countries to achieve certain expectations, such as the reform of the UNSC. "This is a situation that confronts numerous challenges: an essentially rigged multilateral framework in terms of agenda-setting and geopolitical realities, the resort to unilateralism by larger powers, an historically dated framework reflecting a bygone era, and a limited timeframe enabling the P3 (and for that matter the entire P5) to wait out the non-permanent members' tenure" (Masters, 2011: 5). This was supported by one of the officials interviewed for this project:

> "There is no way that a non-permanent member, in this case South Africa, can achieve such a huge objective as the P5 experience is a constraint on the actions of emerging powers to bring about meaningful change, especially one which goes against their own existence" (IOD3).

Furthermore, Serrao highlighted two reasons that affected South Africa negatively in achieving its objective of reforming the UNSC. Firstly, it was not possible for South Africa to reform the Council without the support and concurrence of the common AU position, as enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus of 2005, the common African Union position on the proposed reform of the United Nations (AU, 2005: 1) ever being seriously considered. South Africa cannot break ranks with the AU position of UNSC reform without it losing its status as representative for Africa, the very rationale for its campaign to win a permanent seat on the Council. Secondly there was no likelihood of any meaningful change in the composition and structure of the Council going against the interests of the P5 (Serrao, 2011: 4).

As Alden (2015: 5) argues, while the long-term impact of South Africa's initiatives may be significant for global governance and for Africa's peace and security arrangement within the global system, the role of Africa, through South Africa's participation, is limited in providing permanent influence and reform of the UNSC. South Africa cannot exert any single influence in shaping the agenda of the UNSC and determining decisions. This is also because non-permanent members are seen as "mere puppets" within the UNSC as they do not hold any power as the continent is not represented in the permanent category of the council.

5.4 COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Decoloniality calls upon the interrogation of modernity's deep deposition of Euro-American knowledge and global imperial designs that continue to colonise the global south. During South Africa's second term, the country used its position to critique and advocate for change to the neo-liberal behaviour of the P5 in the UNSC that continue to pose as sources of salvation for Africa through its implementation of advancing the African Agenda.

5.4.1 Relationship between the UN & Regional Organisations

The second term on the UNSC offered South Africa another opportunity to promote the expansion of the UN's cooperation with regional organisations, in line with its African Agenda. Marius Fransman, the then Deputy Minister of DIRCO, speaking at the University of Pretoria, argued that since it was apparent that the UNSC often acted on African issues in a way that does not favour the continent, it was therefore a necessity for South Africa to be a "countervailing force in the Council in defence of Africa's aspirations" (Fransman, 2011).

South Africa ensured that work on the UN-AU cooperation, from the previous tenure, would be developed further by formalizing and expanding its mandate in its second term as it had been successful in implementing change during its first term. (Alden, 2015: 4). In 2012, South Africa served as President of the Council and as a means to advance its African Agenda during its Presidency, South Africa organised another open debate on cooperation between the AUPSC and the UNSC. The country's strategy during this period was to move the attention of the Council from emergency response towards establishing a structural framework which would deal with conflicts in a manner that would be addressing their underlying causes (Nganje, 2012: 2).   In the High-Level debate of 12 January 2012, which South Africa convened, President Zuma addressed the Council and made recommendations regarding how the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, especially the AU, in maintenance of international peace and security could be fostered and advanced. This resolution was adopted against the background of the Libyan situation whereby the Council accepted a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led intervention, ignoring the efforts of the AU roadmap for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Based on its previous advancement of cooperation and coordination between the UNSC and AUPSC, South Africa sought to improve further on this. Firstly, President Zuma advised that to curb the imbalance created by Africa's inability to gain permanent representation on the council, cooperation of the UNSC with the AU's Peace and Security Council should be fostered to ensure aligned policies, strategies and mechanisms for addressing conflict in Africa. He advised that this was important to "ensure strategic political coherence" between the two organisations. Secondly South Africa recommended that the UNSC "should consider the possibility of developing and defining modalities for cooperation and decision making between the institutions in order to have clarity on how the UNSC should respond and implement the requests and suggestions of the AUPSC''. Zuma advised that, there should be a clear division of responsibilities between the UNSC and the AUPSC, considering their respective competencies and advantages. Last, South Africa recommended that solutions for "capacity building and sustainable resource allocation" should be found in order to allow the AU to respond adequately to conflicts (S/PV.6702, 2012: 3)

As a result, Resolution 2033 of 2012, which focuses on achieving strategic and political coherence between the UNSC and the AUPSC in dealing with conflicts in Africa, was unanimously adopted at the High-Level debate (S/RES/2033). This resolution built upon its predecessor Resolution 1809 of 2008 which advocated for closer collaboration between the AUPSC and the UNSC on African Issues (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013: 23). South Africa stressed the importance of the UNSC taking into account the views of the AU when dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security issues in Africa. The resolution also addressed the funding and logistical challenges of African peacekeeping operations. Resolution 2033 further called on the UNSC to take into account African perspectives and to exchange views on conflicts on the continent (S/RES/2033).

The resolution sought to strengthen the relation between the two organisations through effective annual consultative meetings, collaborative and the holding of timely consultations field missions of the two Councils to formulate cohesive positions and strategies. The success of Resolution 2033 was evident in practice when the UNSC in May 2012 adopted Resolution 2046, on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan and in December 2012 when the UNSC similarly adopted Resolution 2085, on the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). In both resolutions, the

UNSC endorsed the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC, 2012). South Africa's success in achieving such cooperation would allow for better coordination of intervention strategies in dealing with African conflicts and ensuring peace and security within the continent. (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013: 23).

It should be noted that South Africa's views and position were extensively respected and sought after by the Council and this is evident from the achievements that the country had made. The success of strengthening the AUPSC and the UNSC further strengthened the country's stature and credibility as an advocate of the Africa Agenda. South Africa along with the UNSC gained valuable knowledge on how best to deal with African conflict situations, keeping in mind that such may differ from one conflict to another.

5.5 COLONIALITY OF POWER

This section will focus on the two resolutions that South Africa voted on based on the argument made by Holloway that voting in the UN is significant because it is the official method of recording which resolutions are passed or fail to be passed and more importantly it can be used as an indicator of a state's foreign policy behaviour (Holloway, 1990: 279).

5.5.1 Votes on issues related to South Africa's African Agenda.

South Africa continued to advocate for the promotion of peace and security on the continent through democratic channels which is the main objective of the African agenda during its term in the Security Council. However, South Africa continued to face more contradictions and contentious moments during its second term particularly in relation to the vote on Resolution 1973 regarding Libya and Resolution 1967 on Cote d'Ivoire.

During this time, the South Sudan referendum was a major topic on the agenda. However, this was later overshadowed by the electoral crisis in Cote d'Ivoire and later by the Arab Spring uprisings (Kornegay & Nganje, 2012: 6). This section assesses South Africa's role with regards to African conflict resolution on the Agenda, especially in relation to the situations in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya.

5.5.1.1   Cote d'Ivoire

On 28 November 2010, Cote d'Ivoire held long awaited presidential elections which it was believed would bring an end to the long political crisis that was taking place in the country between troops loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo, who had been elected as president in 2000, and rebel forces supporting Alassane Ouattara, who had been excluded from the poll in 2000 on the grounds that one of his parents had been born outside of Côte d'Ivoire (Paterson & Saunder, 2011: 19). Ouattara was declared the winner of the elections by the country's electoral commission. However, Gbagbo disputed the constitutionality of this outcome and this resulted in both candidates claiming executive authority over state institutions which precipitated a crisis in the country that saw hundreds of civilians killed and many human rights violations within the country (Paterson & Saunder, 2011: 19).

In March 2011, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) requested the UNSC to review the mandate of the United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which had been deployed since 2004, by allowing it "to use all necessary means to protect life and property and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power" to Alassane Ouattara (Reuters, 2011). The UNSC condemned president Gbagbo's refusal to step down as president as had been requested by the AU High-Level Panel and urged him to "immediately step down". South Africa, Russia, and China welcomed the AU's creation of a high-level panel to find a negotiated political solution to the electoral stalemate and expressed reservations about endorsing Nigeria and Gabon's support for a proposed ECOWAS-led military intervention in the country (Paterson & Saunder, 2011: 20). It is evident that the common African position could not be achieved in this instance. One of the officials interviewed made a striking statement in clarification of South Africa's view of its African partners at the UNSC declaring that:

> "It's no good organizing Africans on an African issue. You're not going to get anywhere (just getting support from) people who agree with you in word [referring to closed meetings] but disagree with you in action" (IOD2).

The UNSC responded to the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire by voting on Resolution 1975 (2011) on 30 March 2011. The resolution recognised Ouattara as president and mandated the UN mission to use "all necessary means" to protect civilians. The resolution received unanimous votes from all 15 member states (S/RES/1975). The resolution authorized the additional deployment of 2000 troops for UNOCI and reaffirmed the mandate of the UNOCI mission to protect civilians including preventing the use of heavy weaponry against civilians. Sanctions targeted against President Gbagbo and his close allies were imposed for "obstructing the peace process and reconciliation in the country, obstructing the work of UNOCI, and committing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" (S/RES/1975).

The international community and most African governments recognised Alassane Ouattara as the new president. South Africa's behaviour was again at odds with this shared African stance. Firstly, South Africa initially refused to recognize the electoral victory of Alassane Ouattara, over the then incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, who had launched a series of attacks against civilians in December 2010, which was a position held also by fellow SADC member, Angola (Landsberg, 2012: 13). Then the country backtracked on its previous position and pushed to advance the AU's position. It was not unusual for South Africa to want to align its position to that of the AU. However, the AU's position was also not clear and consistent. Finally, the AU called for a negotiated position between the belligerents which would form a government of unity to resolve the stalemate.

This position went against fellow non-permanent African members on the Council, Nigeria who to some extent was accused of being influenced by colonial powers, referring to France. Such power dynamics, which were interpreted by critics as a power rivalry between the two countries, South Africa and Nigeria, to exert its leadership on the African continent as a way to influence their respective bid to a possible permanent seat on the Council, resulted in a missed opportunity for an African led solution, which was called for by the AU entailing a negotiated position between the two parties (Lynch, 2011). This was emphasised by one elite interviewee who stated that:

> "What was missed by many is that Nigeria had taken a position
> with other West African countries that had nothing to do with the

results of the election but had everything to do with their national interests. After all, they feared that Gbagbo would expel all foreigners which meant millions of their citizens. That is why they found common ground with France" (IOD3).

South Africa's refusal to succumb to western influence is supported by decolonial theory which advocates for change and critiques the balance of power dynamics asserting that former colonised countries exert their influence more strongly, especially in support of their own development and to ensure that Africa's being is not characterised in terms of 'negation' and 'lack'. ECOWAS believed that South Africa intended to hinder efforts and press for a power-sharing agreement that would preserve a role for Gbagbo in Ivory Coast's government (Lynch, 2011). The AU position, along with that of South Africa, later shifted recognising Alassane Ouattara as president in March 2011 after endorsing the UNSC's call for Gbagbo to step down (Paterson & Virk, 2013: 24). One elitist interviewed stated that:

> "South Africa was swimming against the tide as the AU's position was also not consistent. It is clear that South Africa's advancement of the African Agenda was at times its Achilles heel" (IOD1).

South Africa's shifting position was directed by the AUs position on the Cote d'Ivoire crisis. The AU did not have a united stand on the crisis, which made South Africa's decisions more difficult (Bowland, 2013: 4). South Africa voted in favour of Resolution 1975 (2011) as the resolution is fully in line with the roadmap outlined by the AU, as it calls for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and for the parties to implement the political solution endorsed by the African Union" (DIRCO, 2011: 1)

The situation in Cote d'Ivoire seemed crucial for South Africa's foreign policy as it needed to protect its own reputation and also to ensure a peaceful solution especially because in the very same year, 2011, many African countries were faced with crucial elections. Although South Africa was criticised for not taking on a stronger leadership role, the country acted in accordance with its principle of promoting the African Agenda and abiding by the AU consensus. However, South Africa's behaviour with regards to the Cote d'Ivoire situation raises an important question: whether South Africa, in

pursuit of its African agenda, is willing to risk its own global reputation by following an African consensus position no matter how controversial such positions may sometimes be?

5.5.1.2 Libya

In February 2011 Libya witnessed a deteriorating political situation which was inspired by revolts from neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia which came to be known as the Arab Spring of 2011. On 15 February 2011 demonstrations against Muammar Al Gaddafi's government began and the government launched brutal attacks and cracked down on the protesters which saw thousands of civilians killed and ambushed. The escalating clashes between security forces and anti-Gaddafi rebels resulted in unrest that would see the 42-year rule of Gaddafi collapsing (BBC, 2013).

The UNSC, in response to the situation in Libya, drafted a sanctions resolution which officially placed the Libyan situation on the agenda of the UNSC. On 26 February 2011, this draft was adopted as resolution 1970, which demanded the immediate end of violence and human rights violations by the government. The draft further imposed targeted sanctions on Gaddafi and key members of his government and referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (S/RES/1970). However, the situation in Libya deteriorated significantly and thus threatened to descend into a full scale civil war. On 17 March 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 which was called for by the Arab League and sponsored by Lebanon. The resolution entailed "imposing a no-fly zone over Libya's military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (S/RES/1973: 2). The resolution further authorised all member states to "take all necessary measures" to achieve the protection of all civilians. However, the resolution effectively introduced a strategy for regime change in Libya.

South Africa, along with the other African members of the Council, Nigeria and Gabon, voted in favour of Resolution 1973. South Africa also made it clear that it "supported the resolution with the necessary caveats to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya" (DIRCO, 2011). The three non-permanent African countries vote was faced with a contradiction on two aspects. Firstly, the vote isolated the AU's call

for a resolution rejecting "...any foreign military intervention, whatever its form" (AUPSC, 2011: 1). Secondly the call by the Arab League for a no-fly zone was supported by Chapter VIII of the UN which supports cooperation between regional organisations and the UNSC. Therefore, if South Africa had voted against the resolution it would have contradicted its own position to advance the African Agenda which advanced the strengthening of UNSC cooperation with regional organisations which it pioneered (Mbete, 2018: 230).

This situation illustrated South Africa's difficulty to manage the African Agenda in that, as a member of both the AU and BRICS, there are constraints shaping its position. Furthermore, this highlighted challenges between South Africa and the AU's communication as according to Mckaiser there was a lack of clarity on the AU's view on a no-fly zone (Mckaiser 2011: 5) which indicates that there was little to no consultation between African Council members about resolution 1973.

All BRICS countries abstained from the resolution along with Germany. According to Graham, the abstention by BRICS countries indicated concerns over Chapter VII of the UN Charter which questions the authorisation of far reaching measures (Graham, 2016: 85). It is evident that the BRICS countries had taken note of concerns regarding the lack of information on the interpretation of the 'no-fly zone' and that the P3 (France, UK and US) had ulterior motives with implementing the resolution. This is supported by De Waal who argues that the P3's disavowal of the regime change was an exercise in dissimulation (De Waal, 2013: 368). Decolonial thought asserts that Africa needs to "unveil the epistemic silences hidden within Euro-American epistemology as well as deceit and hypocrisy that conceal epistemicide" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 5) which are often used to include the maintenance of military superiority and monopolization of the means of violence.

According to Kornegay & Nganje (2012: 13), South Africa's vote on this resolution "was allegedly to redeem itself from the inglorious performance during its first UNSC term as non-permanent member". South Africa's vote led to speculations about whether the country was amending its previous mistakes in the UNSC during its first term with regards to the Zimbabwe vote, by prioritizing human rights especially as fellow BRICS member states decided to abstain from this vote (Serrao, 2011: 4). This was further supported by an official of the South African Mission in New York,

Nomfanelo Kota who stated that "We can't bear responsibility for what is happening now. We knew people had different ideas and ulterior motives, but we had to vote in favour, otherwise we would have been accused once again of neglecting human rights considerations and it would be said that we are siding with Gaddafi" (Rossouw, 2011: 1).

South Africa wanted to take a non-controversial approach and to recover its moral authority which was lost in decisions made during its first term. However, this vote illustrated South Africa's inconsistent voting behaviour. This comes after South Africa criticised the very resolution it had voted for as it became apparent that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was using the resolutions for 'regime change' purposes and to bring about a resource war in that country (Landsberg, 2012: 12). Speaking at the UNSC heads of state meeting in January 2012, President Zuma warned against those who used "Africa as a playground for furthering the interests of other regions". Zuma further advised that "the UN must not allow itself to be used by any country regardless of its history or size. All citizens of the world should feel confident and secure, in the knowledge that the UN is above all interests and only serves those of the global citizenry" (Zuma, 2012)

Many critics believed South Africa should have rather abstained from the vote as her BRICS counterparts had done (Bowland, 2012: 5). This negative response was also prevalent internally in the country whereby the South African government came under fire from the ANC Youth League, who believed that the government, through its vote, put power in the hands of non-African forces and that the Libyan conflict should have been addressed by the African Union. This was based on the fact that the AU had put together a panel of African nations including South Africa to deal with the Libyan crisis. However, its efforts were hampered by the imposition of a no-fly zone, which meant that the panel could not enter Libya on a fact-finding mission (Rossouw, 2011: 1).

South Africa's Deputy Minister of DIRCO, Ebrahim Ebrahim, condemned NATO's military intervention and openly criticised the way in which the AU and its efforts to find a sustainable solution were completely side-lined by the West (Ebrahim, 2012). This was further supported by South Africa's former President Mbeki, suggesting that NATO's military intervention "mark the moment of the asphyxiation of the dream of an African Renaissance (Mbeki, 2011: 9)

South Africa's position on the Libyan vote brought about confusion and disparities. Although South Africa's intention was in good faith to protect Libya's sovereignty, the country received international backlash for ignoring the human rights issues that were prevalent from the Libyan situation. Secondly the behaviour of South Africa contributes to the debate around the possibilities and pragmatics of voting on the basis of principle versus following the dictates of realpolitik and whether the two are mutually exclusive. This is an issue that is not confined to the UNSC but rather an issue that continuously places demands on countries' foreign policies.

5.6 CONCLUSION

Post 2010, the tumultuous developments across the globe and in particular in Africa and the Middle East, required dynamism and focus on South Africa in dealing with these challenges that have a direct influence on its pursuit of the African Agenda. In pursuing its second tenure, South Africa had to build on the achievements and lessons learnt during the previous term (2007-2008) in order to consolidate the gains and furthermore to create flexibility to improve on the work and respond effectively to emerging global issues and challenges. It is on the one hand evident that there were also attempts by the new administration to dissociate from some of the controversial actions of its predecessor administration.

South Africa's efforts to contribute to peace, security and stability on the continent, as an objective of the African Agenda, saw the country 'push above its weight' by voting on Resolution 2033 (2012), which faced reluctance from the P3, which sought to establish a more effective relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC. This resolution presented by South Africa was a strong statement which attested to the country's commitment to the African Agenda and further afforded the country an opportunity to leave a positive legacy of its second term in the Council. It is evident that South Africa's second term viewed its mandate on behalf of the AU thus projecting its mandate more broadly and, in most cases, did not reflect its own national agenda and interests narrowly

With regards to the voting behaviour of South Africa in advancing the African Agenda, it is evident from the discussion on Resolution 1975 (2012) on Cote d'Iviore and Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya that the country's voting showed confusion as the

country would often 'back-track' on its position. It is noteworthy that in some cases, especially with regards to Libya, South Africa seemed not to be sure about positions it should take. This could be attributed to the fact that the position of the continental body, the AU, was fully communicated and adhered to by the country even though the body itself was uncertain of decisions to take. The Libyan vote has further indicated the developed world's abuse of power and the structural inequalities within the global systems which continues to marginalise and undermine the global south, especially Africa. It is evident from above that there were lessons learnt from term one, and these lessons included the need to maintain a reputation as good global citizen in pursuit of human rights and dignity rather than as first and foremost an advocate of African state sovereignty.

South Africa's second term serving on the Council was seen as different from its previous term in that there were dynamics of the presence of other emerging powers and South Africa's alliances (IBSA, BRICS and Nigeria) serving on the council and this further created another bar to assess the country's behaviour. The presence of South Africa and other countries within the global South (BRICS) and those from the continent, especially Nigeria, raised expectation that there would be a possible commitment to collectively advance the African position within the Council. However as previously stated, this was not to be seen as both countries often held different positions either to push their weight as regional leader or to advance their respective countries' foreign policy position in isolation to that of the continent as often requested by the AU. South Africa tried to cooperate and work together with the two other African countries on the council, in order to push African solutions to African problems.

What is evident in this chapter is that, South Africa maintained its independence in international affairs, which meant the country did not take positions under pressure from other countries, especially the West but rather considered the AU's recommendations, especially on issues regarding Africa. This was so even when undue pressure was applied such as in the case of Libya and Cote d'Ivoire. It is evident that South Africa's primary commitment was to Africa through its mandate from the AU.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarises the findings of the study and demonstrates that to a large extent, South Africa was able to advance its African Agenda during its two terms in the UNSC. Having applied the decolonial framework to analyse South Africa's behaviour during the two tenures, by analysing how the African Agenda was advanced through South Africa's decisions and actions in a selection of country-specific and thematic issues on the UNSC, the study showed how the country was able to reimagine its being, power and knowledge in order to bring tangible changes.

The chapter reviews the theoretical framework of the study against the background of South Africa's behaviour by answering the question raised in chapter one that is central to this study. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the study's contribution to knowledge and the major unresolved questions remaining before presenting a summary of the findings. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of future prospects for research, arising from this study's findings.

6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

The African agenda as a foreign policy position allowed a great understanding of how the democratic South Africa thinks about itself and the rest of the continent and the role it aimed to play within the international arenas in advancing its power, being and knowledge in order to re-imagine itself in a world that is characterised by colonial matrixes. The African agenda, as pursued by South Africa, challenged the complex interfaces between its own image, as a country and as a continent, and what the rest of the world sees it to be, a wretched of the earth.

From a decolonial point as outlined in Chapter 2, the African Agenda contributed to its three point of analysis namely coloniality of being, power and knowledge. First the African Agenda calls on the continent to take pride in their African identity, coloniality of being, despite the damage of colonialism and the challenge of coloniality, Secondly the African Agenda calls upon Africa to be united, coloniality of power, to challenge

the colonial matrixes of power and not allow for modernisation to further implement continued coloniality at the expense of its sovereignty. Thirdly, the African agenda encouraged the continent to use its knowledge of civilisation to contribute to the shaping of a new world which would see the continent becoming an equal role player in international affairs.

Although the outlined objective of the African agenda was to address deep seated and long standing developmental and governance challenges within the continent, Landsberg & Kondlo (2007: 2) acknowledges that the key goal of the African Agenda was that South Africa can position itself as a leader of the continent. It is for this reason that the African Agenda may not have received total acceptance and advancement from other African states as they see South Africa as pushing itself as a hegemonic power. The advancement of the African Agenda during both terms was a rebellion against Western political and cultural hegemony in Africa which marginalise the continent and perpetuates underdevelopment. This following what decolonial thought advocates for the global South and Africa in particular. It further examined South Africa's efforts to implement its vision of Africa and the developing countries within the global arena emerging from its legacy after 1994.

The challenge for South Africa was to try and find a balance between how it sees itself as an actor within the international system, how the continent sees it, how it wants the continent and the world to see it and the how its foreign policy identity is interpreted, especially in its interaction between the global North, global South and Africa in general. It can be concluded from South Africa's behaviour during both terms that the country's foreign policy identity, of pursuing the African Agenda, remained constrained by its supposed role as a bridge builder for Africa and pursuing its interest based on its own foreign policy interests.

6.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

6.3.1 Reform of the UN and the promotion of equitable global governance (Coloniality of Being)

Although South Africa did not, during both terms in the UNSC (2007-2008 and 2011-2012), achieve to ensure the reform of the UNSC, it should be noted that these plans may have failed, but what did surface was the acknowledgement that "most reform

proposals have hidden political agendas and policy goals reflecting competing national interest" (Karns & Mingst, 2009: 132).Moreover, a reform is a process not an event and therefore this cannot be achieved during one or two tenures. The key lies in conscientising the entire membership of UNGA on the issue.

It should be noted that in terms of providing a platform for international engagement on an equal basis, the UNSC falls short. For the matrix of power to be equal within a modern global order, Africa, and the global south, should be allowed to become equal power players and this can only be achieved if the UNSC is reformed and the P5 is on a rotational basis. If the UNSC agrees to reform and the two permanent seats are granted to Africa, this might encourage the continents record and commitment to the maintenance of peace and security. This would thus support decoloniality thought which calls for the global south to break away from the constraints of modern coloniality and find its own footing within the global power configuration.

Based on the evidence provided in Chapter 4 and 5, South Africa, like other elected members, was sometimes powerless to help address the most serious challenges to the Security Council's credibility brought about by the double standards of its permanent members in responding, or failing to respond, to crises in different parts of the world. These experiences, which are not unique to South Africa, suggest that the Security Council is an institution in urgent need of comprehensive reform that addresses both Council expansion and reform of its working methods. For South Africa to be successful in achieving the reform of the Council and securing equitable representation, the country needs to build consensus amongst its fellow African states, especially through the African Union and also garner support from some of the P5 members, especially those in BRICS, and leverage on their relationship. However, for this to be possible, given the fact that the P5 have no interest in acceding to such change, South Africa needs to convince the African Union to re-look the Ezulwini Consensus and find a more workable solution for Africa to reform the council. By unlocking the Ezulwini Consensus rigidity, there can be progress on reforming the Council and moving the process forward so that the UNSC can more realistically reflect the current diverse global power structures and allow it to be a more credible force in resolving insecurity in major crises.

It is therefore clear that it is difficult for non-permanent countries to dislodge the hegemonic tendencies amongst the P5 in the Council thus making it difficult to envisage the reform of the UNSC. It can be concluded that the reform of the UNSC especially by an African country might be farfetched as the West continues to enjoy its colonial privileges that marginalise the underdeveloped countries, more so the African continent. The P5 members control the Council's agenda, which is in line with their individual's countries foreign policy and as seen in Chapter 4 and 5, national interests often, if not at all, trumps collective good.

6.3.2 Relationship between the UN & Regional Organisations (Coloniality of Knowledge)

The success that South Africa was able to achieve in ensuring that Africa gets to be an active role player in addressing and solving conflict within the continent and bringing about peace and security was evident in its fostering of strengthening the relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC. The aim of strengthening this relationship was to ensure that Africa does not marginalised in the affairs of the continent and just become an observer while the West takes over decisions that affect the continent.

It should be noted that although South Africa didn't not achieve to ensure structural reform of the UNSC, as stated above, the country was successful in pushing for normative reform of the Councils processes through changing the working methods of the Council by advancing a working relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC which is still in practise, few years after South Africa has left the council. Furthermore, South Africa has used its two terms to gain a considerable voice as a 'mouth piece of the continent' by challenging the inequality and unrepresentative nature of the UNSC by drawing attention to the democratic deficit that exist which continue to marginalise the global South. The continued success of the Mission visits which are co-headed by an African country and one P5, as discussed in chapter 4 is evidence of that.

South Africa's achievement of ensuring sustainable cooperation between the UNSC and AUPSC is a long-term impact which is significant for Africa's peace and security within the Council but also for the global governance system. It is through this knowledge sharing and cooperation between the two Councils that it can be deduced

that South Africa's advancement of the African agenda advance fully the notion of decolonial thought to change coloniality of knowledge in order to promote Africa's knowledge as equally important especially within the global arena.

However, it should be noted that such an achievement has been met with a few shortcomings and resistance by some of Council's P5 members, as seen in the Libyan case where the AUPSC plan was ignored and marginalised by the West, in order to secure their own national interests. Furthermore what this relationship as done is to give Western countries an opportunity to neglect their global responsibility, under the false pretence of implementing this achievement, through shifting or reducing the financial, logistical and personal mandates of peacekeeping within the continent to African states at this has been evident recently with countries such as the United States threatening to withdraw troops from UN peacekeeping missions.

From a decolonial point of view, the African Agenda may have some shortcomings of its own. Firstly, South Africa has enhanced African Unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the African Union. South Africa has promoted development and curbed conflict within the continent through its active role in introducing and promoting working methods within the UNSC and the AU, thereby promoting and fostering its African Agenda. The AU is faced with a major challenge to convince its member states of the need to pool some of their sovereignty under the umbrella of the organisation and its organs and to move in one direction as the continent. This has been evident through the debate over the 'United States of Africa' as proposed by the former Libyan President Gadaffi but contested by Thabo Mbeki (Landsberg, 2007: 3).

Secondly, South Africa has been seen to pursue a global development agenda to contribute to the reduction of insecurity in Africa and inequality within global governance through its pursuit of the African Agenda. However, one can deduce that Africa has not fully benefitted from regionalism and or multilateral relations to the utmost potential. It is suggested that there is a need to advance this option vigorously through a decolonial lens in order to ensure political and economic development rather than the ideological incompatibility created by colonial boundary demarcation and delineation.

6.3.3 Votes on issues related to South Africa's African Agenda (Coloniality of Power)

When looking at both tenures at the UNSC, especially in regards to the voting behaviour of the country, it is evident that the power dynamics of the permanent five played a huge role on what actions would be taken in relation to solving African problems that relate to peace and security. It should be noted that South Africa acted independently without bowing down to the pressures and dictates of the great powers on the Council but however chose to implement a common African position, especially on issues relating to Africa.

Another aspect which is illustrated by South Africa's voting behaviour is the key tensions and dilemmas that exist within the country's foreign policy. Firstly, South Africa's position of advancing the African Agenda might not be relevant to resolving all conflicts within the continent. Although as has been evident in chapter 4 and 5, that South Africa's advancement of a common African position through its voting behaviour has not been successful, in that it is often seen as a 'hegemon' by the rest of the continent and who's intentions are often not trusted because of the notion that each country is advancing its own national interests which might not necessary be for the collective good. This therefore illustrates the challenge to establish or maintain unity amongst developing countries that were members of the Security Council. South Africa sometimes found itself alone in advancing African common positions adopted at Summit level by the AU. Solidarity within the Non-Aligned Movement on issues of key importance to the developing world also did not always translate into a common platform for action in the Security Council.This brings into question whether indeed is the African agenda a view of Africa as a whole and what possibilities are there that there can be one African Agenda advanced by all African states within the council? Or was this too an ambition for South Africa to advance the African Agenda without an African consensus, especially amongst the non-permanent African countries?

Secondly the tensions between advancing the African agenda vies-a-vis human rights were also evident. It should be noted that these two foreign policy positions should not be assessed against each other as this becomes an unfair assessment of the country's voting behaviour and more importantly its foreign policy. For South Africa always looking to promote the African Agenda, especially in support of the common position of the African Union as seen in the case of Zimbabwe and Libya, the country was seen

to oppose human rights protection. Furthermore, this comparison over South Africa's foreign policy position brought into question the countries reputation within the international community bringing into the open the unequal and biases that exist within the international world order.

Thirdly the advancement of African Solutions to African problems when western strategic national interests are involved highlights limitations in the success of the South Africa's foreign policy position. South Africa's voting behaviour has to some extent highlighted the double standards at which the international community, especially the West, treats Africa vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The advancement of the African Agenda vis-a-vis its commitment to human rights (not to say that the country neglected this foreign policy position) was seen by western countries as a means for South Africa to prevent the agenda of the Council, especially the P5. It is evident that Western countries use the UNSC, especially through the votes, to advance neo-imperialism. This is why the African continent, through the AU, is often side-lined on decisions affecting the continent in order to factor western countries national and corporate interests and not necessarily for Africa's development and peace.

Although South Africa's voting behaviour witnessed a lot of criticism from the international arena, especially in reference to the votes discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 a question arises: why has the bar for South Africa's performance, never the less its young democracy and the fact that it had only served on the Council for two tenures, been set so high for how it voted and behaved on the Council, while other African countries such as Nigeria, who served on the council longer the South Africa, were not necessarily criticised to a great length? This may be a possible avenue for other academics to research on.

6.4   CONCLUSION

In answering the question raised in Chapter 1, it can be deduced, based on the analysis done through Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 that while the personalities of different presidents played a role in foreign policy, with Mbeki's administration supporting a pro-African and Zuma's administration leaning towards a western approach, the principles of the country's foreign policy have remained the same, with very minor changes. Zuma's engagement in Africa's challenges was not a strict Pan-Africanist course,

similar to that of Mbeki as he roots his foreign policy in domestic interests and is less ideological. However, it should be noted that Zuma did not compromise South Africa and Africa's historic relations against the backdrop of Western powers. During both tenures that South Africa served on the Security Council, the country established credentials and proved its ability to advance and defend Africa's interests and those of the developing world

This therefore entails that there was indeed no precise change from Mbeki to Zuma, although with minor deviations here and there, but rather continuation of how both administrations advanced the African Agenda at the UNSC during the country's two tenures as non-permanent member. It can ultimately be concluded that the pursuit of the African Agenda and its understanding of social, economic and political well-being of Africa is at the pinnacle of South Africa's foreign policy which the country strived to pursue throughout its participation in the UNSC as a non-permanent member

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

In Chapter 4 and 5 we identified the role that ex-colonisers played in influencing the voting behaviour of their ex-colonies for either monetary or resource benefits. This perspective illustrates the power that colonialism continues to influence international politics and how the independence of decision making by developing countries is characterised by a struggle against colonialism which highlights the disparities that colonial matrices of power evident in the current world order. An investigation into the role played by western countries to exert their power in influencing their ex-colonies voting behaviour would contribute to global efforts in understanding how coloniality continues to influence international relations in the modern world. Furthermore, further research should be conducted on how African countries behaviour is influenced by structural powers within the changing world order.

The changed geo-political realities since the establishment of the Security Council have highlighted the need for a comprehensive reform of the body. An international consensus emerged, strengthened by the 2005 World Summit outcome, that there is an urgent need to redress imbalances in power and representation in the Security Council and to improve its working methods.South Africa has to date supported the Ezulwini Consensus, which is the formal standing position of the continent on the reform of the

UNSC which has not yet been revised to realign to the changing political environment in Africa and the rest of the international community. The study recommends that intergovernmental negotiations need to take place where South Africa may have to review its adherence to the Common African Position or for the continent to review its position on the Ezulwini Consensus.

During the process of this project, South Africa was elected by UNGA on 08 June 2018 to serve as a non-permanent member for a third term at the United Nations Security from 01 January 2019 until December 2020. The countries candidature was announced by DIRCO in early 2018 and endorsed by the African Union at its 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. South Africa's third term provides an opportunity for scholars to conduct research solely on the term and to also conduct a comparative analysis on the country's three terms as a non-permanent member and how it, if at all, advance the African agenda.

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