EXPLORING THE CHALLENGES OF STRUCTURAL PEACEBUILDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CIVIL WAR SOMALIA 2013 TO 2018

By

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DECLARATION

I, **Igba Samuel Ajogwu**, declare that this mini dissertation is my own unaided work, both in conception and execution. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Diplomatic Studies in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

Igba Samuel Ajogwu

Pretoria, September 2019

ETHICS STATEMENT

I, Igba Samuel Ajogwu, has obtained, for this research, the applicable research ethics approval and declare that I have observed the ethical standards required in terms of the University of Pretoria's Code of Ethics for researchers and the Policy Guidelines for responsible research.

ABSTRACT

There is a growing consensus in the discipline of International Relations that the sovereign nation state, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, is a myth because of the several nations that can be found within one sovereign entity, made so by the Berlin conference of 1885 that partitioned Africa. Regardless of this consensus, international peacebuilding theory and practice is biased towards maintaining these sovereign arrangements that were created during the colonial periods by European colonizers. This bias is caused by several epistemic colonialities nested within a wider colonial matrix of power. Peacebuilding in Somalia presents an example of how these biases affect peace in a multiethnic, multiclan, and diverse society.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

IUC Islamic Union of Courts

SFG Somalia Federal Government

SNA Somalia National Army

SRRC Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TNG Transitional National Government

UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNSOM United Nations Assistant Mission in Somalia

LIST OF FIGURES

CONTENTS

1. CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Introduction

The official end of the Cold War brought about a questioning of the meaning of sovereignty by the various schools of thought within International Relations (Jeng, 2012:3; Jørgenson, 2004:99). It also brought about the emergence of new ways of thinking in the disciplines such as that of decoloniality. The decolonial school of thinking argues that knowledge was colonized through epistemecides and appropriation of other ways of knowing which included the assumption that the only valid knowledge comes from Europe and North America. Power was colonized by usurping, and theft of world history and its rearticulating through the prism of hellenocentrism, eurocentrism and westernization (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38). This is the colonial matrix of power that decolonial scholars such as Grofoguel (2011), Mignolo (2007), and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) refer to.

With sovereign states in Sub-Saharan Africa in mind, increasingly more International Relations thinkers, including decoloniality thinkers, agree that the idea of the sovereign nation state on the African continent is mythical. This is because the concept of a sovereign nation state does not consider the several nations clustered together by the Berlin Conference of 1885 which led to the colonization of Africa after the imperial scramble for Africa. This is an epistemological shortcoming that arguably influences the success of peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Englebert, 2007:62-63: Jackson, 1986; Jeng, 2012:3; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zondi, 2017).

In many Sub-Saharan Africa states, peacebuilding is marred with a recurrence of conflicts, largely due to the disregard for this epistemological shortcoming (definition of a sovereign nation state) by International Relations scholars, peacebuilders, and the international community in general. Approaches to peacebuilding usually centre on liberal peacebuilding processes that are aimed at holding democratic elections and building liberal democratic states. Decolonial scholars, on the other hand, suggest other approaches such as capitalizing on values shared by parties in conflict, finding common grounds, transforming colonial legacies, and other approaches (Africa Union, n.d; Autesserre, 2011; Banim, 2017; Jeng, 2012:283; Nakaiza, n.d).

This research considers the case of Somalia to better understand the implications of the epistemological shortcoming that contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War, particularly, it explores the effects of the epistemic coloniality embedded in the concept of the sovereign nation state and its effects on Africa societies such as Somalia. Somalia is considered an ethnically homogenous society compared to other African countries. Despite this fact, conflicts between the various clans, marginalization and inequalities that followed independence in the 1960s as well as the merging of two former colonies of British Somalia (present day Somaliland) and Italian Somalia (present-day South-Central Somalia) culminated in the events that led to the outbreak of the Somalia Civil War that last for 22 year, between 1990 and 2013. (Elmi and Barise, 2006:33). It can be observed that despite these effects, todays peacebuilding by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and other members of the international community, and peacebuilders in Somalia is focused on re-establishing Somalia as one sovereign entity.

1.2. Nature of Research Problem

This research proposes that in Somalia, liberal peacebuilding has dominated the peacebuilding process because of the epistemic coloniality of knowledge regarding the definition of the sovereign nation state. The sovereign nation state in this study refers to the diverse ethnic and cultural groups within the continent who were superimposed on each other into a legal and internationally recognized entity by the Berlin conference that partitioned Africa (Englebert, 2007:245; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Coloniality of knowledge is the believe that knowledge was colonized through epistemecides, and appropriation of other ways of knowing by assuming that the only valid knowledge comes from Europe and North America (Jeng, 2012:3; Jørgenson, 2004:99). This research assumes that this results in a limitation of ways of thinking, and doing peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, including in the case of Somalia.

The trend is for conflicts to end with little or no "milestone" changes in agreements, rather, governments are restructured within the same sovereign confinements, and liberal democracies are put in place to replace military dictatorships. This pattern is referred to as the liberal peacebuilding in this research. Somalia represents an example of this, as several clans and sub-clans have been left out of agreements and a federal government was put in place in 2013 to end the country's Civil War. The result is an opposition from clans which have now reconstituted as terrorist organizations, stagnating the peacebuilding progress of the country. It is uncertain whether the

Somalia Federal Government (SFG) can retain its authority if the AU mission, which provides it with security, should withdraw from the country. (Canci and Magudu, 2016).

Opposition to liberal peace by decolonial thinkers is based on arguments on the need for a decolonial peace that emphasizes unity, finding common ground, capitalizing on shared values, and transforming the sovereign state from its colonial legacy. But it can be argued that even these propositions perpetrate the liberal peace objectives, as they are all geared towards keeping respective sovereign nation states of Sub-Saharan Africa together (Banim, 2017; Autesserre, 2011), as opposed to addressing the "myth" of the sovereign nation state all together. The myth of the sovereign nation state here refers to the belief that sovereign states in Africa are not sovereign nation states because, even though there are territorial borders and internationally recognized legitimate governments, the absence of a common language, ancestral decent, and common history makes them sovereign states and not sovereign nation states. (Seton-Watson, 1977:339).

1.2.1. Problem Statement

This research suggests that there is an incommensurate link between the wide criticism of the sovereign nation state in International Relations and approaches adopted for peacebuilding which has consequences on lasting peace in sovereign Sub-Saharan Africa nation states. Sub-Saharan Africa is a choice location as a way of narrowing the argument, as there are contestable variations between states north of the Sahara and those south of it (Bentahar, 2011).

1.2.2. Research Question/s Aims and Objectives

Bearing in mind the wide consensus amongst International Relations scholars about the myth of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the assumption that liberal peacebuilding approaches represents a manifestation of epistemic coloniality of knowledge that do not address root causes of conflicts, this research is aimed at answering the following questions;

- Why does the wide consensus on the myth of the of sovereign nation states in Sub-Saharan Africa not lead to peacebuilding solutions outside sovereign arrangements?
- How does the myth of the sovereign nation state undermine peacebuilding in Somalia?
- What alternatives to liberal peace exist, outside sovereign arrangements?

The paper therefore seeks, as objectives, to explore;

- Why the wide consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign nation state in Africa does not lead to new ways of thinking and solutions to peacebuilding outside existing sovereign arrangements.
- How assumptions about the mythical nature of sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa undermine peacebuilding in Somalia
- Alternatives to liberal peacebuilding that transcend sovereign arrangements.

1.3. Literature Overview

The literature review, which will be discussed in detail in chapter two, focuses on a purposively selected literature sample of literature discussing decolonial perspectives as a base theory, decolonial perspectives on peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, liberal peacebuilding, and links these have to the notion of the sovereign nation state in Somalia. The research will consult authors that speak to the coloniality of knowledge such as Mingolo (2007), who discusses the ontological and epistemological assumptions of decoloniality in detail, stating that knowledge needs to be decolonized. Zondi (2018), who agrees with Mingolo, with an African perspective on the matter, and Mohamud (2015), who brings in a Somali perspective of the coloniality of knowledge about Somalia.

For perspectives on the sovereign nation state, Englebart (2007), will be consulted as he discusses the consequences of the notion of sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. He discusses why, despite the nature of Africa sovereign states, (the diversity and "failure" since the decolonization period), there seem to be a shortage of secession around the continent. Zondi (2017), will also be consulted in this regard, with a peacebuilding dimension on the matter, he argues that AU's records show that interventions have been successful in ending violent conflicts, and restoring the authority of sovereign states, but have been unable to transform societies for lasting peace due to the neglect for transforming colonial legacies. Zondi (2017) is however not clear on the meaning of 'transformed colonial legacies' and whether this entails dissolving African sovereign nation states or redefining structures within existing states. In similar arguments, Autesserre (2011) agrees with Zondi (2017), noting that liberal peacebuilding that focuses on ending conflicts and installing democratic governments are top down, and do not lead to long term peace. Autesserre's (2011) argument focuses on indigenous solutions within colonial legacies. This list of authors suggests

that decolonial scholars agree on the myth of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa, but do not offer solutions that transcend this myth. It is therefore intended in this study, to explore why despite the acknowledgment of coloniality, peacebuilding solutions in theory and practice are led by solutions within sovereign arrangements.

The liberal peacebuilding is the basis for most peacebuilding operations in Somalia today. For perspective on this, Richmond (2006), will be consulted. Case analysis literature will be drawn from the work of organizations such as the Africa Union (n.d), ALNALP (n.d), and Interpeace (2017), Releifweb (n.d), contained in reports and publications on peacebuilding approaches in Somalia and available in the public domain. These literatures speak to the nature of current peacebuilding efforts in Somalia which is dominated by liberal peace approaches.

1.4. Theoretical Framework

This research will be conducted through a decolonial lens with a particular focus on the coloniality of Knowledge or epistemic coloniality described by Ramon Grosfoguel (2011). S Decolonial thinkers believe that 'being' was colonized through racial profiling, classification, and hierarchization of the human population. They also assert that knowledge was colonized through epistemecides, and appropriation of other ways of knowing, whilst assuming that the only valid knowledge comes from Europe and North America. Power was colonized by usurping, and the theft of world history and its rearticulating through the prism of Hellenocentrism, Eurocentrism and westernization. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38). Moreover, with the arrival of Europe to the global south in precolonial times, colonialism came with several hierarchies that Grosfoguel (2011:18) has termed the coloniality of power and describes as heterarchical structures. These will be further discussed in chapter three and five.

As mentioned in the introduction, in relation to sovereignty, Africa decolonial scholars such as Jeng, (2012), Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako (2016), Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2016), and Zondi, (2017) agree that the idea of the sovereign nation state on the African continent is mythical. The Berlin Conference of 1885 led to diverse nations being clustered together as single entities. In this research, it is assumed that the inability of the concept of the sovereign nation state to account for these diverse nations within sovereign nation states in Sub-Saharan Africa is an epistemological shortcoming that influences the success of peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa (Englebert,

2007:62-63: Jackson, 1986; Jeng, 2012:3; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zondi, 2017). Zondi (2017), assumes this to be behind the failure of liberal peacebuilding, therefore, decolonial peacebuilding needs to involve a transformation of colonial legacies, as will be unpacked further in chapter three.

In Somalia, since 2013, peacebuilding initiatives led by the African Union, United Nations, and various NGO's have been focused on liberal peacebuilding initiatives (Africa Union, n.d: ALNALP, n.d; Interpeace, 2017; Releifweb, n.d). The inability of these organizations to adopt other approaches to peacebuilding, as well as initiatives to satisfy splinter groups, such as the Al-Shabaab (Canci and Magudu, 2016), that developed from clans neglected in peace agreements Ingiriis (2018:525) underscores not only the existence of coloniality, but also the failure of liberal peacebuilding.

1.5. Research Methodology

1.5.1. Research Approach

This proposed study will adopt a qualitative approach. Research approaches are plans and procedures for research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. They can be either qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods (Cresswell, 2008). The objective of this is to explore reasons why an identified problem does not correspond with the solutions being offered by existing literature. Regarding this study, it explores why the wide consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign nation state in Africa does not lead to new ways of thinking and solutions outside existing sovereign arrangements. Whenever study objectives are to understand, explore or describe behavior, themes, attitudes, trends or relationships, then a qualitative approach is suitable (Du Plooy-Cilliers, 2014). Denzin and Lincoln (2005:3), define qualitative research as an "interpretive naturalistic approach to the world", noting that researchers in this category study things in their natural settings, attempting to understand, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.

The objective of this research is to explore the relationship between the definition of sovereignty and the effects it has on peacebuilding. This is will be done through a decoloniality lens that critiques existing knowledge, and in this case, the concept of the sovereign nation state in terms of meanings International Relations scholars bring to them. As a result, the study lends itself to a qualitative approach.

Qualitative research is also adopted by some constructivist theorists, who believe that ontologically, reality is relative, multiple, socially constructed and ungoverned by natural laws, while knowledge is constructed between inquirer and participant through the inquiry process itself, (Costantino, 2012:5). In this study, it is assumed that peacebuilding approaches are influenced by socially constructed conceptions of a sovereign nation state, through a liberal perspective whose ontology is governed by natural laws. With this in mind, an objective of this research is to make subjective inquiries about knowledge regarding sovereignty and peacebuilding, by taking into consideration subjective perspectives from literature.

1.5.2. Research Design

This research is a literature-based study. The central objective is to explore the reasons as to why the wide consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign nations states in Sub-Saharan Africa does not lead to new ways of thinking and solutions in peacebuilding outside of sovereign arrangements. The study is intended to serve as basis for future study and therefore adopts a stand-alone literature review described by Efron and Ravid (2018:2-3) as a literature review done to provide the bases for future research. The research will provide a review of purposively selected literature on current knowledge about sovereignty and peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Somalia as a case analysis, describing theories and research outcomes relating to the topic.

The study will adopt a critical review of the literature as described by Jesson, Lacey and Matheson, (2011:14). Byrne (2017) notes that in Social Science, a literature review should include a sense of the issues being contested, not only in terms of what we know, but how we know it. Furthermore, the review should not only summarize the literature but be able to identify methodology and point out research gaps (Pautaso, 2013). One way to do this effectively is through a critical review. The critical review will be used because of the decolonial lens through which this research will be carried out.

Decolonial thinking, is in its nature, critical (Mingolo, 2008:451), and therefore, the critical approach will be used to assess purposively selected, conceptual contributions of existing knowledge and literature with regards to the sovereign nation state and peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, including literature that describes, critiques, and discusses the sovereign nation state, peacebuilding, and liberal peacebuilding through a decolonial lens, literature that describe

7

decolonial thoughts, and literature that discuss the nature of peacebuilding in Somalia between 2013 and 2018.

1.5.3. Analysis of the Data

The study will adopt a critical analysis following the adoption of a qualitative method, and a traditional style critical literature review. This approach involves identifying an argument and determining whether it is justified by its position, claim, or reason (Hanscomb, 2017:5). According to Holland and Novak (2017:2), critical analysis assumes that language creates reality, and that our reality is premised on "social hierarchy, privilege and the unequal distribution of material resources and political power". There is a belief in the tradition of critical approaches that no one has the monopoly on what is to count as knowledge (Wallace and Poulson 2011:4). This is also in line with decolonial ontological and epistemological assumptions (Mingolo, 2008:451). In this study, it is assumed that the concept of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa has created the reality of conflict in Somalia and continues to play a part in approaches that are adopted for peacebuilding.

Critical approaches are also used to assess theories and are subjective rather than objective (Jesson, Lacey, and Matheson 2011:14). This makes it appropriate for this qualitative study to critically engage with the current approaches to peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa to determine how, why and to what effect knowledge claims regarding peacebuilding have been produced. According to Holland and Novak (2017:3), acknowledging subjectivity in a critical approach challenges the possibility of "value-free" observation and that value-free research is necessary for discovering knowledge. It is a well-established position within the decolonial school that objectivity is not the only means to knowledge production. Critical analysis provides a platform for the researcher to express critical judgements of the literature reviewed, while acknowledging his/her own study limitations, according to Macallef (2015:118). Moreover, acknowledging that approaches and meanings are subject to the positionality of the authors (Rowe, 2014:2), this research critiques the current liberal peacebuilding approaches in order to identify biases that result in its failure.

1.6. Ethical Considerations

Because the study is composed of desktop and literature review of secondary literature samples of materials available in the public domain, there are no ethical consideration, apart from plagiarism (Hine, 2011:3). All materials consulted in this study will be duly referenced in this regard.

1.7. Proposed Chapter Outline

Chapter one introduces the topic, theoretical framework, research approach and literature review while chapter two will discuss major assumptions about decolonial thought, and how it guides the study. Chapter three is a detailed critical review of the literature samples, while chapter four will be a critical case analysis of the sovereign state and peacebuilding in Somalia. In chapter five, a concluding analysis and conclusion will be provided.

Conclusion

This research will explore structural peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan African, particularly Somalia, through the lens of a decolonial school of thinking which argues that knowledge needs to be decolonized. The study will focus on the concept of a sovereign nation state as a concept that represents epistemic coloniality, evident in that increasingly more International Relations thinkers, including decoloniality thinkers, agree that the idea of the sovereign nation state on the African continent is mythical. This is assumed to have consequences on peacebuilding in Africa as it leads to peacebuilding solutions within sovereign arrangements which tends to replicate liberal peacebuilding. Despite the wide consensus on the mythical nature of the sovereign nation state and its consequences, peacebuilding solutions remain confined to what is possible within sovereign arrangements. Bearing in mind the wide consensus in International Relations about the myth of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa, and assumptions about the dominant liberal peacebuilding approaches, the research is aimed at exploring why the wide consensus on the myth of the of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa does not lead to new ways of thinking and doing peacebuilding outside sovereign arrangements, how does the myth of the sovereign nation state undermine peacebuilding in Somalia, and what alternatives to liberal peace exist, outside sovereign arrangements. The next chapter is a detailed literature review which critically discusses the chosen sample of existing literature on the subject.

2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.Introduction

This research discusses structural peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, using Somalia as a case analysis. It focuses on answering questions as to why the wide consensus on the myth of the of the sovereign nation states in Sub-Saharan Africa does not lead to peacebuilding solutions outside sovereign arrangements, how the myth of the sovereign nation state undermine peacebuilding in Somalia, and what alternatives to liberal peace exist, outside sovereign arrangements.

This literature review focuses on a purposively selected literature sample discussing decolonial perspectives as a base theory, decolonial perspectives on peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, and liberal peacebuilding. It discusses the links these perspectives have with the notion of the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research also discusses the link between the meaning given to the sovereign nation state and peacebuilding approaches and outcomes. Observing that peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan African often leads to silencing the guns (Zondi, 2017:109), but failing to achieve long lasting peace because due attention is not given to structural issues such as ethnicity, marginalization, and exclusivity, the research gives an imperative for more research into structural peacebuilding.

Structural peacebuilding described here refers to that which is aimed at transforming society and underlying causes of conflict through dismantling, constructing and reconstructing concepts and structures. 'Structure' in this research is used following Martin and Lee, (2015:713) and Haslanger's, (2015:2) description of the term as "abstract organizations of reciprocally defined social categories that are seen as part of some social whole" and as "theoretical entities, postulated to do work in a social theory". Structures are also used in this study to identify and critique structural injustice nested in the colonial matrix of power that forms a central part of decolonial thinking (Mignolo, 2007). It is also used to provide the context for human agency; and more importantly, it is used following Galtung's (1969) definition of structural violence as relating to the inegalitarian distribution of power and resources.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, over the past few decades, several approaches have been used and proposed as the best ways to undertake structural peacebuilding. The liberal peacebuilding is currently the dominant approach and focuses on installing democratic governments through elections, with a focus on maintaining sovereign entities. This approach is largely a top-down approach. On the

other hand, much has been written about more bottom up approaches, which resonate with decolonial thinking. Focusing on transforming relationships, addressing root causes, and acknowledging indigenous conflict transformation concepts form part of this. Because one of the objectives of this research is to explore alternatives to peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa besides liberal peace approaches, the literature review discusses the major assumptions of liberal peacebuilding and analyzes the implications of these approaches in Somalia.

2.2. On Sovereignty and Sub-Saharan Africa Nation States

This study explores why peacebuilding initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly, in Somalia, are constrained by a bias by academics and practitioners towards maintaining sovereign arrangements. The research is focused on exploring why this bias exists despite a consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign Sub-Saharan Africa nation states.

Sub-Saharan African nation states are referred to as mythical in this study because they are made up of several nations merged together without consideration for diversity of ethnic groups and cultures. The concept of sovereignty produced by the treaty of Westphalia (Osiander, 2001:252; Hassan, 2006:65) and the subsequent imperial conquest, scramble for, and colonization of Africa is one major cause of this because; along with colonialism and colonial administration, an epistemic coloniality nested within a colonial matrix of power followed and remains in Africa today (Grosfoguel, 2011:38). These will be discussed in depth in chapters three and five of this study. The above point is made to guide the inquiry as to why practitioners, and peacebuilders, have been unable to identify peacebuilding solutions beyond the current definition of sovereignty and the sovereign nation state.

Epistemic coloniality refers to the coloniality of knowledge, the assumption that knowledge was colonized through epistemicides and appropriation of ways of knowing which, during the course of history, invalidated other ways of knowing that are not based on Euro-America knowledge acquisition methods (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38), methods that seek to hide cultural biases, according to Zondi (2018:19). Decolonial scholars agree that the coloniality of knowledge, is inextricably linked to the coloniality of power. As mentioned previously, power was colonized by usurping, and theft of world history and its rearticulating through the prism of Hellenocentrism, Eurocentrism and westernization. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38). The consequences of this is manifest in international relations and peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan

Africa by the definitions and meanings ascribed to concepts such as the sovereign nation state. The meaning of this concept has vast effects on entities in the Sub-Saharan African region.

Englebart (2007), discusses the consequences of the notion of sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. He discusses why despite the nature of Africa sovereign states, (the diversity and "failure" since the decolonization period), there seem to be a shortage of secession around the continent. To him, sovereignty in African states is given legal command by international recognition, therefore, because Africa state sovereignty is juridical, Africa state power is *de iure*. i.e. the state is defined by its legality rather than its effectiveness (Englebert, 2007:62-63). Englebert (2007:62-63) notes that legal command endures in African states, and this has been the reason for African states existence today despite the many issues encountered with regards to conflicts, economic and social development. Legal command affords these states the capacity to control, dominate, extract, or dictate through the law.

Englebert (2007) suggests three solutions he assumes are utopian. The first is to remove the sovereignty of African states completely by derecognizing problematic sovereign states, but this idea is likely to result in chaos. A case in point is the Israel/Palestine conflict, in which the international community refused to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state leading to age long conflict between Israel and Palestine. A second recommendation suggests liberalizing the supply of sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. This entails the international community giving support to states that perform well as sovereign states. Thirdly, Engelbert (2007:257) suggests diluting sovereignty. This refers to providing the various nations within current sovereign arrangements autonomy and reducing the powers of central governments. This is a promising, but problematic approach in terms of operationalization, as peacebuilding in countries like Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo has failed to properly implement federalism and devolution of power, even though their constitutions suggests it. Moreover, this solution also fails to address the myth of the sovereign nation state which is the focus of this research.

Engelbert's (2007) suggestions can be faulted for still containing some biases towards sovereign nation states. He focuses on international legitimacy as the supplier of sovereignty, and therefore his suggestions are limited to international recognition and derecognition. This research, on a practical basis, is intended to transcend these constraints of sovereign arrangements, to develop ideas on how African indigenous nations can flourish without relying on sovereign arrangements

for peace and development. This will be done by identifying how the meaning attributed to sovereign nation states practically affects the various warring clans in the case analysis of Somalia. This is in a bid to change the direction of peacebuilding initiatives regarding the sovereign bias.

2.3. On Liberal Peacebuilding

The most common and dominant approach to peacebuilding is the liberal peacebuilding. The liberal peacebuilding is the basis for most peacebuilding operations today and centre on processes that are aimed at holding democratic elections and building liberal democratic states (Autesserre, 2011). It is composed of the several key components including democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets, and neo-liberal development (Richmond, 2006:292). Richmond discusses the liberal peacebuilding, identifying its key components, and conflicts between these components as relates with peacebuilding. He notes that critiques have focused on problematic areas of the liberal peacebuilding such as; the ownership of development projects, impositions of the neoliberal agenda; the possible incompatibility of post-conflict justice with the stabilization of society and human rights; the problem of crime and corruption in economic and political reform; and the establishment of the rule of law.

According to Richmond (2006:292), an area of liberal peacebuilding that should be critiqued more is its idea of what peace is, as the liberal peacebuilding theoretical perspective does not take into consideration conceptual issues associated with negative peace, defined as the absence of war (Galtung, 1969). Richmond (2006:292) argues that peacebuilding is first determined by a definition of peace. To him, history of engagement with the construction of peace indicates that it has been generally thought of as an ontologically stable concept. Richmond (2006:300) suggests that, as a result of epistemology regarding peace within liberal peacebuilding, three models in liberal peacebuilding contradict each other. These models include the conservative model, the orthodox model, and the emancipatory model. The conservative model is "associated with top down approaches to peacebuilding and development, tending towards the coercive and often seen as an alien expression of hegemony and domination, sometimes using force, or through conditionality and dependency creation". An example of this is the AU approach to peace in Somalia which focuses on installing a central authority (Zondi, 2017).

The second model is the orthodox model which is concerned with including local needs and cultures in peacebuilding initiatives. This model is still dominated by a focus on transferring

methodologies, objectives and norms of western liberal peacebuilders. The third model is emancipatory and is "concerned with a much closer relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership. It tends to be very critical of the coerciveness conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate through". An example is the activities of various NGOs focused on peacebuilding such as ANALP. In their report, ANALP (n.d) suggests that "the overall strategy for Somalia should have focused on establishing a solid basis for peace by "civilianizing" the clan leaderships and demobilizing the clan militias, keeping in mind the unintended economic and social impacts that an international presence might have on the peace process" all in a bid to unite all clans in Somalia.

Following his above critique of epistemological issues that plague liberal peacebuilding, Richmond (2006:307) clearly describes a liberal peace understanding of peace as a peace that is "stable and consensual, but within a cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of the individual, the state and the global". This complex position on peace needs to be clearly elucidated before we can begin to decide whether it has the potential to become ontologically stable and a positive epistemology.

Richmond's (2006) description of peace falls short of a decolonial definition of the concept in that, although it accounts for diversity by recognizing that a cosmopolitan framework of governance is needed, practical operationalization of accepting diversity boils down to democratic elections and majority rule and thereby making it exclusionary to minority groups (Leon, 2010:8). This partly leads to the epistemic bias of liberal peace approaches. It also presents an imperative to redefine the concept of peace in the context of current and historical realities of Sub-Saharan African states such as Somalia. For this reason, Zondi (2017:122) emphasizes the need for a 'decolonial peace, a peace that "deals with the colonial continuities in the nature of the inherited state, with its underlying paradigm of war and violence, its colonizer model of the world and its colonial political economy". He discusses the need for a decolonial peace that transcends colonial legacies and the inherited sovereign nation state, arguing that the AU's records show that interventions have been successful in ending violent conflicts, and restoring the authority of sovereign states, but have been unable to transform societies for lasting peace due to the neglect for transforming colonial legacies.

2.4. On Decolonial Peace

Zondi (2017) is particularly concerned with the Africa Union's approach to peacebuilding and its constraints regarding achieving decolonial peace. According to Zondi (2017:125-126), although the AU has shown efforts towards a decolonial peace, it is constrained by a number of factors including the over reliance on external actors for funding and an obsession with saving the inherited sovereign nation state. These make the current AU approach to peacebuilding a liberal peace approach and subject to interests and biases of member states. For this reason, Zondi (2017) suggests that the AU has failed to transform colonial legacies, noting that this would require a willing and able set of leaders, motivated by the common good (Zondi, 2017:112).

Zondi's (2017) approach can be faulted on a few grounds. Firstly, he suggests that a decolonial peace will entail building national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration. These objectives bare striking resemblance to Richmond's (2006) description of peace within the context of liberal peacebuilding as a 'peace that is stable and consensual, but within a cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of the individual, the state and the global'. This approach is still derived from a western Eurocentric assumption of universality and hegemony. Moreover, operationalizing this approach becomes problematic when consideration is given to building national unity within a diverse society. As attempts at this often led to the weaker nations within sovereign arrangements being marginalized due to ethnicity (clan rivalry in the case of Somalia), tribalism, greed, and corruption.

In similar arguments, Autesserre (2011) discusses conflict transformation in Sub-Saharan African states where identity breeds division. Autesserre (2011) presents a unique critique of the rational actor approach which she assumes is the dominant approach to peace interventions, noting that liberal peacebuilding falls under this approach and "fails to inquire into the process through which vested interests and material constraints have been constructed". Moreover, it looks at intervention failures as a "problem for which technical solutions could be worked out," such as additional resources or more robust involvement. She advocates for a more constructivist approach to peace interventions. Autesserre (2011) however identified a gap in the constructivist literature, noting that it fails to build on Anthropological research on peace interventions due to the rigid nature of the discipline of International Relations. To her, International Relations as a discipline tends to focus on the 'top down', while Anthropology tends to focus on the 'bottom up'. This makes it

necessary for International Relations to build on Anthropological research on culture and develop collective understanding that can help identify what leads to the success or failure of peace interventions and help boost their effectiveness.

Autesserre (2010:1) notes that international peacebuilders have their own world, "with its own rituals, its own customs, its own beliefs, its own roles, its own stars, its own villains, its own rules, its own taboos, its own meeting places, in brief, its own culture". This study assumes this to be an epistemic coloniality in peacebuilding and Autessere (2010:1) argues that this is a major cause of peace intervention failure. This is because it fails to capture micro-level antagonisms that continues to fuel the insurgencies that destabilized communities during implementation of peace agreements (Autesserre, 2010:8). Micro level antagonisms here refer to local agendas at the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the municipality, the community, the district, or the ethnic group that partly drive the continuation of violence during peace agreement implementation. She suggests emphasis should be placed on identifying bottom up approaches that capitalizes on shared values and can bring about unity between communities, citing examples of success in communities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). An example of such bottom up is the residents on the island of Idjwi who used a "peace from bellow" approach to avoid violence despite surrounding conflicts claiming millions of lives. Citing examples of countries in which this has been the reality, Autessere (2010:6) mentions Somalia, where clan tensions are seen as the main source of violence and have contributed to the failure of the numerous peace agreements negotiated since 1991. Examples of clan tensions include that between the Digil-Mirifle clan in Bay and Bakool regions and the Marehan which was resolved in the Bardhere peace conference that was initiated by elders of both clans in a bid to end fighting over pasture and water resources (Amber, 2010:53).

Autesserre's (2010; 2011) argument reinforces the position of this research, that peacebuilding theory is marred by an epistemic coloniality of knowledge, because of the use of top down peacebuilding initiatives that do not consider micro level antagonisms. This research argues that Autessere's (2010:8) suggestion of a focus on micro level antagonisms falls within a decolonial approach that embraces a multiple ontological perspective. Autessere (2010) however suggests that a solution to these micro level antagonisms such as disputes between communities, or individuals from two different communities, would be to identify shared values between

communities that can bring about collective understanding and long-term peace. This proposal can be faulted on the grounds that this kind of approach, like that recommended by Richmond, does not address the challenge of epistemic colonialities either. It simply attempts to ignore them and reinforces the universalizing agender of liberal peacebuilding approaches to merge cultures and societies that are different in a bid to save the inherited colonial sovereign states. The implication of this is manifold and will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this study.

2.5. On Epistemic Coloniality and Peacebuilding in Somalia

Hussein Mohamud in an article titled "#CadaanStudies contra Somali Studies: An Encounter with Colonial Epistemology", argues that the coloniality of knowledge about Somalia has been dominated by European scholars who suppress and ignore Somali voices. Mohamud (2015), notes that, #CadaanStudies translates to white studies and emerged after a Somali student studying at Harvard University noticed that a journal, the "Somaliland Journal of African Studies (SJAS)" was launched by a group of predominantly European academics in March 2015. Not a single Somali was represented in the editorial board of this journal. According to German Anthropologist Markus Hoehne, SJAS board member, this was not deliberate, as according to him, they were unable to find young Somalis who were educated enough or qualified scholars. Mohamud (2015) notes that Hoehne, despite that he was addressing young Somali scholars, believed that this was an undeniable truth. Mohamud (2015) notes that this represents a manifestation of epistemic coloniality, that one's cultural way of knowing is superior to another's.

Mohamud's (2015) study is neither a peacebuilding study, nor a study on sovereign nations states. It is however cited in this research to underscore the argument that an epistemic colonial knowledge of Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa exists, and its effects can be seen in peacebuilding within Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly, Somalia. Since the beginning of the Somalia Civil War in 1991, efforts at peacebuilding have been focused on establishing a strong central government, one major objective of liberal peacebuilding. This liberal peacebuilding approach is informed by a conviction of liberal peacebuilders in universalism and transferring cultures despite socio-cultural differences in societies as noted by Richmond (2006:300). This approach was adopted by the UN, and the African Union in Somalia and highlights the sovereign bias of peacebuilding focused on the establishment of a central government, regardless of exclusion of some of the parties to the conflict in peace agreements. On a practical basis, the approach also

leads to international aid, and support to, or through the central government and thus making it the more attractive for various warring parties to seize power and gain recognition as the central authority, leading to a plethora of chain reactions and manifestation of structural violence that drives greed, corruption, and promotes inequalities (Leon, 2010). All this is nested in a colonial matrix of power that will be discussed in chapters three and five of this study.

Moreover, knowledge about Somalia in academic literature according to Cassanelli (n.d:5), was intellectually partitioned during the colonial period. This is because Somalia was colonized by three different colonizers, the French in Djibouti, the Italians in Southern Somalia, and the British in Somaliland. As a result of this intellectual partitioning, separate colonial identities were created for these three Somalia geographical locations and the knowledge generated during this period forms the bases for the Western secular tradition of Somali Studies. "As a result, the Somali population became both "subjects" of different colonial states and "objects" of study by different colonial researchers" (Cassanelli n.d:4). The consequence of this is that even today, knowledge about Somalia is still narrated, considering its history based on this European account by foreign scholars, as well as Somali scholars using European methods. Over time, these scholars came up with the generalization that painted Somalis as a single people or ethnicity, albeit divided into different clans or "tribes". Hence the Epistemic coloniality that drives peacebuilding in Somalia towards maintaining a sovereign nation state.

2.6. Conclusion

The above is not exhaustive of all literature on the subject under study but paints a picture of the epistemic coloniality of knowledge within liberal peacebuilding approaches in theory, and consequently, in practice. From the definition of peace adopted by the liberal peace, it can be observed that it falls short of an all-inclusive peace, or a peace free of structural violence. Liberal peace's conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory models which form its epistemological bases are all focused on transferring liberal cultures to societies where liberal peace approaches are used to build peace, and this leads to exclusion and structural violence. This presents an imperative for a new definition of peace, in order to develop approaches to peacebuilding that work. Decolonial peace, coined by Zondi (2017) is a concept that has been adopted in this research to address the issue of diversity. This refers to a peace that is able to consider historical and current realities of

coloniality in Africa in order to build long term peace. This research is conducted considering the scholarly suggestion for a decolonial peace, and what approaches it leads to.

This literature review has importantly demonstrated, however, that even in the work of Zondi (2017), as well as that of Richmond (2006), and Autesserre (2010, 2011), some of the key critics of the liberal peacebuilding approach, the bias of the idea of the sovereign nation state is still perpetuated. Chapter five of this study will discuss a proposed approach that can bring about a transformed colonial legacy from an epistemic basis.

It is also observed in this literature review that there is a coloniality of knowledge about Somalia from colonial times and till this day, as Cassanelli (n.d) and Mohamud (2015) have argued, and this literature is included to underscore the argument in this study, even though this is not directly related to peacebuilding. It does relate to the epistemic problem underlying peacebuilding interventions. The coloniality of knowledge and the colonial matrix of power will be further elaborated in chapter three and five in order to provide a lens through which structural peacebuilding in Somalia in relation to the sovereign nation state in Sub-Saharan Africa can be explored.

3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

The official end of the Cold War brought about a drastic change in international relations and the focus of International Relations discipline, as conflicts changed from interstate to intrastate (Blin 2011:293-294, Yelmiz, 2007:11;). The emergence of intrastate conflict became common predominantly in Africa and other parts of the global south. These conflicts also attracted interests and concerns from the international community, as peace interventions in Africa became part of the global agenda. Europe, which was faced with such wars in the past, including the 30 Years' War that led to the Westphalia Treaty (Hassan, 2006:65), was swept clean of intrastate conflict, partly through establishment of liberal democratic states.

But the same liberal peace that has been able to stabilize societies in Europe and North America has not been very successful when applied to the African context. It is the argument in this chapter, that this can be tied, ontologically, to the fact that African, and specifically, Sub-Saharan African states such as Somalia, have different ontologies compared with European states. The ontological realities in western states and the global south differs and as a result, application of epistemologies that work in the western states fail to produce the same results in the global south. One common ground on this matter between various thinkers in International Relations is that the concept of a sovereign nation state fails to consider the diversity of cultures that exists within sovereign entities in Sub-Saharan Africa, and this accounts partly, for the failure of the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding. (Englebert, 2007:62-63: Jackson, 1986; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). The liberal peace approach to peacebuilding is referred to as liberal peacebuilding in this research.

This research is aimed at exploring why the growing consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign nation states in Sub-Saharan Africa does not lead to peacebuilding solutions outside sovereign arrangements. It focuses on finding out how the assumption of the sovereign nation state undermines peacebuilding in Somalia. This chapter discusses theoretical assumptions that underpin the dominant theories that guide peacebuilding today. A decolonial lens is adopted in this section to offer an alternative perspective to the dominant liberal peacebuilding that fails to account for historical realities and epistemic biases.

3.2. Theorizing Peacebuilding

Compared to other branches of International Relations, peacebuilding theory has only recently emerged (Aryal, et al., 2012:2). Peacebuilding researchers observe various conflicts around the world in attempts to construct theories that explain them. The result has been the various theories of change which focus more on explaining the process of change, in a bid to "design, monitor, and evaluate peacebuilding activities" (Aryal et al., 2012:3; Lambourne and Herro, 2008).

A popular theory of peacebuilding which is dominant in peacebuilding practice around the world today is the liberal peacebuilding, perhaps this is partly because liberalism dominates international relations today. According to Meiser (2017:23) "we currently live in an international system structured by the liberal world order built after the Second World War (1939–1945)". This conclusion is reached as a result of the fact that "international institutions, organizations and norms (expected behaviors) of this world order are built on the same foundations as domestic liberal institutions and norms (of specific state); the desire to restrain the violent power of states".

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the liberal peacebuilding theory represents the theory adopted by both the UN and the AU in their approaches to peacebuilding in Somalia since the outbreak of the Civil War. It is also the dominant theory consequently adopted by NGOs in peacebuilding (AU, n.d; Interpeace, 2017; Releifweb, n.d). In order to identify the reasons why the growing consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign nation states on the African continent does not lead to peacebuilding initiatives outside sovereign arrangements, it is important to scrutinize the dominant theory in peacebuilding today and identify why it neglects this epistemological shortcoming.

3.3. Liberalism as a Theoretical Base of the Liberal Peacebuilding

Fundamentally, liberal peacebuilding developed out of the various forms of liberalism, neo liberalism and liberal institutionalism theories of International Relations. According to Meiser (2017:22), "Liberalism is a defining feature of modern democracy, illustrated by the prevalence of the term 'liberal democracy' as a way to describe countries with free and fair elections, rule of law and protected civil liberties". Based on a moral argument to protect rights of citizens, and focused on building institutions that can achieve this, liberalism frowns against monarchies and dictatorships for this reason. These remain issues of domestic politics, but Meiser (2017:22) notes

that a state's activity abroad can affect liberty of its people at home, and for this reason, liberals take international relations very seriously.

A key aspect of liberalism is its position on the importance of the sovereign state in international relations, although new strands of liberalism such as neoliberalism are beginning to recognize other important actors in international relations (Meiser, 2017:22; Slaughter, n.d:14) To them, several actors exist, but the most important actor remains the state. "The core problem is how to develop a political system that can allow states to protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual liberty of its citizenry". This statement by Meiser, (2017) demonstrates the central role of the state in liberal ontological perspective.

According to Slaughter (n.d:14), the democratic peace is the strongest contribution made by the liberal school in International Relations theory today. It is the assertion that democratic states will not go to war with one another because, firstly, democratic states are characterized by internal restraints on power. Secondly, democracies tend to see each other as legitimate and unthreatening and this makes them more likely to want to cooperate with each other than they would with non-democracies. These ontological assumptions are derived from the different epistemological approaches adopted in liberalism.

3.3.1. Liberal Peace Epistemology

Broad spectrums of International Relations theories rely on empirical evidence to support their arguments (Smit and Snidal 2013:10). Several assumptions within the liberal school that act as basis for the liberal peacebuilding emerged from positivist approaches to research. Examples of this include the liberal institutionalism and economic theories that advocates for free economies and their relationship with peace and social justice, the empirically justifiable democratic peace assumption that liberal democratic states do not go to war with each other (Slaughter n.d:14). These positivist approaches lead to a neglect of, or disregard for normative factors in analysis (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2013:13).

For example, Slaughter (n.d:12), argues that "Statistical analysis and historical case studies provide strong support for democratic peace theory, but several issues continue to be debated". Firstly, democracy is recent in the history of human societies, as a result, there are few cases where democracies have had to fight each other. Secondly, it is uncertain whether it is actual democracy

that leads to peace, or other factors contribute to peace. Factors such as power, culture, and economics can also be contributors to peace. Thirdly, democracies might be unlikely to go to war with each other, but this does not suggest that they might not be aggressive to non-democracies. This would explain the United State (US) antagonism of non-democracies (Iraq, Libya). This explains why UN approaches and international organizations are focused on establishing democracies worldwide.

Reus-Smit and Snidal (2013:13) argue that "positivism gives unreflective primacy to falsification or treats theory only as a hook upon which to hang empirical results, it misses the fact that theory can be important even when it cannot be empirically validated or falsified". This is true of the liberal peacebuilding approach, as holding democratic elections and liberalizing economies has not been able to bring about lasting peace in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa as it had in Europe and North America. Liberals are aware of empirical bias that neglects normative factors, but their analytic tools are not as powerful for addressing other values, and are therefore slighted (Slaughter, n.d:12: Smit and Snidal, 2013:10)

Another example of the failure of positivist approaches to consider normative factors is Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) study of what factors contribute to successful peacebuilding. After statistical and empirical analysis of ethnic factors in peacebuilding, they concluded that ethnicity does not affect peacebuilding. Further investigation of normative factors will prove otherwise. This study argues that, for the above-mentioned reasons, amongst other reasons, liberal peacebuilding approaches tend to pay little attention to ethnic dimensions of state building in their bid to establish a central government. For example, warlords in the Somalia Civil War have often faulted peace conferences for not being inclusive enough, and not containing the right number of clans. This has led to little implementation of these agreements in the past. Even though the last agreement form 2002 was implemented and led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Government and subsequently a Federal Government, several clans and sub clans who feel marginalized have become members of Al-Shabaab (Adan, 2015:1; Gundel, 2009:7; Ingiriis, 2018:518).

This study does not, however, disregard empiricism as a tool for inquiry, it does however suggest that subjective knowledge and analysis of social issues is needed because not all variables can be quantified. The fact that some variables are unquantifiable does not make them any less significant.

Normative factors including, for example Sub-Saharan African realities, are ignored by peacebuilding as a result of the dominance of liberal schools. An example of this is ethnicity, and in the case of Somalia, the 'clan system'' and clan rivalry is regarded as a major cause of conflict.

3.3.2. Liberal Peacebuilding

The liberal peacebuilding is a peacebuilding process that focuses on processes that are aimed at holding democratic elections and building liberal democratic states (Autesserre, 2011). According to Richmond (2006:292), most critiques of liberal peacebuilding are based on operational issues such as democracy, capitalist economies and their practicability in developing countries, but simpler concept within the theory results in its conceptual elements contradicting each other when it comes to implementation, a critique of the concepts that make up the liberal peace is due. According to Richmond (2006:293), liberal peacebuilding is based on four conceptual stands including; 'victor's peace', the 'institutional peace', the 'constitutional peace', and the 'civil peace'. The victor's peace is derived from the argument that if peace rests on military victory, and leads to domination by a hegemony or victor, then peace will last. This understanding of peace produces a model of peacebuilding that focuses on top down approaches and installing central authorities in post conflict states. The institutional peace is a more idealist and liberal-institutionalist conception of peace which assumes that states co-operation on how to behave brings about lasting peace. This is still a top down approach that focuses on state level peacebuilding and neglects the grassroot level.

A third conception of peace within liberal peacebuilding is anchored on the constitutional peace which developed from the liberal Kantian democracy, free trade, and a set of cosmopolitan values that are built from an assertion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. This conception of peace leads to a model of peace that attempts to focus on local level peacebuilding but still tries to transfer foreign values to the societies where peace is being built. Lastly, liberal peacebuilding is built on the civil peace, "the civil peace is derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilization, from the attainment or defense of basic human rights and values, spanning the ending of the slave trade to the inclusion of civil society in International Relations today" (Richmond, 2006:293).

As building blocks of liberal peacebuilding, these concepts are problematic and contradict each other, according to Richmond (2006). Firstly, the victor's peace leads to territorial and strategic

over extension, greed, and an inability to control unruly subjects. The civil peace is overshadowed by the weight of official discourses, even though it claims to be aimed at enhancing human security and social justice. Thirdly, because the institutional peace requires a broad range of actors to consent, it results in a struggle to receive consensus or to communicate with those societies of interest-based actors. Lastly, the constitutional peace is a challenge to those who do not want to share power in domestic politics (Fernando, 2014:214; Richmond, 2006:294;). Moreover, it can be observed that these liberal peace assumptions are state centric, top down understandings of peace which tend to universalize and impose values, methods and ideas assumed universal on societies they encounter. Developing peacebuilding using this approach presents a problem of exclusion, marginalization, and inequalities because they are based on exclusionary epistemologies and methods of knowledge generation. This results in a recurrence of violent conflict as is the case with most post conflict societies and states in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Somalia.

This research argues that for peacebuilding theory to be successful, there is the need for an approach that considers normative factors and acknowledges multiple ontologies. Perhaps this begins to answer the second research question epistemologically, namely, that liberal peacebuilding's inability to explain the role of ethnicity and clannism, is a major factor in why it neglects certain voices in formulating peace agreements and is biased towards maintaining colonial legacies of sovereign arrangements. It also starts to answer the first research question on why peacebuilders, despite a consensus on the mythical nature of sovereign states in Sub-Saharan Africa, fail to develop peacebuilding solutions that transcend sovereign arrangements. Epistemologically, this can be linked to generalizing, and othering, and the belief that all African societies are the same. The failure to recognize differences in culture and ethnic diversity as a major factor, leads to peacebuilding failure in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed, Somalia.

3.4.Conclusion

In conclusion, theories are lenses through which reality can be explained (Babbie, 2011). Peacebuilding approaches are formulated through various theoretical lenses, the most dominant of them in today's world being the liberal peace theory that has nested within it, the liberal peacebuilding. The theory has failed to accept ontological realities of geographical locations where

it attempts to build peace. As a result of epistemological assumptions derived from its own ontology, it attempts to generalize, universalize and force cultures and methods on societies different from its own. This accounts for the failure of peacebuilding in most Sub-Saharan African states, including Somalia.

This study adopts a different theoretical lens from the dominant liberal peacebuilding approach. The decolonial lens is focused on accepting multiple ontologies in a bid to create a positive peace, defined by Galtung (1969) as the absence of structural violence. In an African context, this peace considers the several nations clustered together by the partitioning of Africa during colonial periods. It also goes beyond suggestions for further decolonizing colonial administrations and focuses on unmasking and charting out a course for exiting the colonial matrix of power. The next chapter presents Somalia's current realities with regards to peacebuilding and how these theoretical assumptions have interacted in protracting conflict in the country.

4. CHAPTER 4: SOVEREIGN NATION STATE AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA

4.1. Introduction

Since the start of the Somalia Civil War, knowledge about Somalia has been presented to the rest of the world through a European lens by certain European scholars and media (Mohamud, 2015), and to a certain degree by some Somali scholars through a European lens (Cassanelli, n.d:4). In peacebuilding, this has led to a plethora of studies that suggests the best solution to the conflict, given the anarchic state of the country depends on the creation of a central authority to govern Somalia (Ligawa et al., 2017:3). Be this as it may, since the breakdown of the Somalia society and the outbreak of the Somalia Civil War in 1991, several transitional governments had been established to guide the restoration of a central authority in Somalia with the help of the international community. According to Hanson and Kaplan (2008), there was a total of fourteen attempts at creating a functioning transitional government. These transitional governments came under criticism for not being inclusive enough amongst other reasons that will be discussed in section on peace agreements in this chapter. Ainte (2012:60) and Atta-Asamoah (2013:1) note that it was not until 2004, after the establishment of a Transitional Federal Charter that a functioning and internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in neighboring Kenya. The TFG was established to lay the foundations for a transition to a permanent Somalia Federal Government. This was achieved in 2013.

Since the successful transition from a Transitional Federal Government to a Federal Government in 2013 however, the SFG has faced critical challenges from different militia including a certain organization known as Al-Shabaab (Ingiriis, 2018:513). Al-Shabaab has been classified as a terrorist organization by most European governments, noting that its fundamental objectives are aligned with the global terrorist group Al-Qaida (Bryden 2013:12; British Home Office 2017). Al-Shabaab members are composed of descendants from the various clans around Somalia who are disgruntled with political, social and economic injustices and inequalities that existed before and during the Somalia Civil War. Ingiriis (2018:518). Moreover, the Somalia Civil War broke out as a result of these injustices that were exacerbated by Mohammed Siad Barre's authoritarian and military regime which lasted from October 1969 – January 1991 (Elmi and Barise, 2006:34; Fitzgerald, 2002).

Peacebuilding in Somalia since 2013 has taken the form of a military operation supported by a political one. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) is the military operation that has been given the mandate to keep the peace in Somalia. It has been present since 2007 after the defeat of the Islamic Union of Courts (IUC) and the subsequent departure of Ethiopian military forces. The AMISON operation in Somalia is supported by the United Nation Assistant Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) which provides political support for the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) as well. Unilateral acting states such as the United State, and European Union countries also participate indirectly through financial assistance to peacebuilding NGOs in Somalia, and recently through the financial aid to the SFG as well. Locally, several traditional peacebuilding initiatives can be identified and have proven successful in some regions of Somalia including Puntland administration, and self-declared independent state Somaliland. Such peacebuilding has been described by some scholars as even more successful in building durable peace than the more publicized and financed international peacebuilding activities (Amber, 2010).

This chapter discusses peacebuilding in Somalia today, taking into consideration its background and historical underpinnings. It also discusses the focus of international peacebuilding actors and the bias towards maintaining the inherited sovereign nation state regardless of indigenous cultural differences and its effects on nation building.

4.1.1. Background to the Somalia Civil War

Following the discussion so far in this research that Somali voices are excluded from analysis of Somalia issues (Mohamud, 2015), this section offers a critical narrative of the background to the Somalia Civil War that incorporates Somali and African voices.

Somalian society is made up of kinship formations based on a lineage type known as a clan. In the clan system, identities of individuals are defined by genealogies. This means that an individual is identified based on the ancestor they can be traced to (Gundel, 2009:7). According to Gundel (2009:7), the clan can act as a corporate political unit and have territorial exclusiveness. A unique feature of Somali society is that clan members are identified by their common agnatic descent as opposed to identification by territorial locations. There are few religious or ethnic crises in Somalia, but clan clashes have resulted in some of the worse crises in the country (Adan 2015:1). Somali society has experienced conflicts based on clan and sub-clan rivalry that lead to the

marginalization of some clans even before the outbreak of the Somalia Civil War (Belachew, 2009).

The Somalia Civil War broke out as a result of the authoritarian rule of former president Muhamed Siad Barre inter alia. Ingiriis (n.d), notes that Barre ruled with an iron fist between 1969 and 1991, in a regime based on a monolithic totalitarian structure. "The divide-and-rule tactics of the Barre regime pitted clans against each other and led to a competition for resources in an already resource-scarce environment" (Paul et al., 2014:154). Elmi and Barise (2006:33) note that literature and collective memory of Somalis suggest that clans have always clashed over resources such as water, livestock, and grazing long before Somalia became a sovereign state. These conflicts were resolved using a Somali traditional legal system known as *Haar*, where traditional leaders where responsible for settling disputes.

The emergence of the sovereign nation state, however, brought a different reality when large populations migrated to urban centers and the type of resources changed from livestock and water to other government resources including foreign aid (Elmi and Barise, 2006:33). This gave the political elites the incentive to control the state as a means to controlling the nations resources leading to widespread corruption in the civil service, police, and other government institutions. Elmi and Barise (2006:34) describe the nepotism in the Somalia public service at the time:

> "More than 70 per cent (51 out of 71) of police-station chiefs were members of the same clan as the then police chief". Moreover, the police chief was just one example of how government officials were misusing their power. Besides the political patronage appointments that characterized the civil service, corruption affected all levels and departments of the government". (Elmi and Barise, 2006:34).

General Siad Barre's regime further exacerbated the issue, as he was, according to Elmi and Barise (2006:35), fixated on controlling and consolidating his power to the benefit of members of his clan. This became clear to all Somalis; opposition groups were outlawed, and no one could criticize the military leaders. As a result, several military officers, predominantly from the Majerteen clan, attempted a coup against Barre. These events led to the beginning of the Somalia Civil War as

other clans such as the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle also started opposition groups in order to seize power.

The Somalia Civil War is an armed conflict that lasted 22 years, from 1991 to 2013. At the wake of the Civil War, the Somali Army and all other military forces disbanded, and personnel from these institutions reconstituted as clan militia and regional forces all battling to protect their respective interests (Belachew, 2009; Fitzgerald, 2002:4-6). During the same period, north eastern Somalia was not left out of the fighting, the entire country was divided, though Mogadishu was the main battlefield, farmlands were destroyed, and this resulted in starvation of Somalis. Somalia had remained in this state which has been described by Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) (2018:3) as the most protracted case of statelessness in the world.

Militias which have been categorized as terrorist organizations were also formed along clan lines during the Civil War, amongst them include Al-Shabaab, Hizbul, Raas Kaambooni Anoole/al-Furqaan. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004, in neighboring Kenya, and entered Somalia in 2005. The TFG received heavy opposition from the Islamic Union of Courts (IUC). The IUC first appeared in north Mogadishu in 1994. Founded by Islamic clerics of the Abgal sub-clan of Hawiye, a clan described by Barnes and Hassan (2007:152) as the largest and currently most powerful clan in Somalia. It was created to bring order to Somalia as a result of the absence of a central authority and the consequent anarchy that resulted from the outbreak of the Somalia Civil War. The IUC consisted of several courts governed by Sharia laws, and according to Barnes and Hassan (2007:157), the violence that followed the arrival of the TFG to Mogadishu "dramatically underlines the benefits of the brief period of 'Islamist' authority in southern Somalia which already seems like a 'Golden Age" within the period between 1994 and 2006 when it was defeated by the TFG. Regional actors attempted to unite the TFG and its opposition the IUC but talks led to a deadlock. With the assistance of Ethiopia, which believed that the IUC clamored for Jihad (Holy War), and the international community, the TFG defeated the IUC. The IUC's defeat in 2007 eventually led to the creation of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab remains the strongest opposition to the SFG today.

Peacebuilding in Somalia since the outbreak of the Civil War has been focused on uniting the country through establishing a central authority. BTI (2018:3) notes that the first Federal Government of Somalia was meant to carry on the state building project initiated by the international community, which was focused on steering the country towards democratization. This required a constitutional review, the preparation of a constitutional referendum and the holding of general election scheduled for October 2016. According to BTI (2018:3) implementation of this transition lacked the political will from the ruling elites who seemed more interested in personal economic and political benefits than they were in establishing 'effective, transparent and accountable government institutions or initiating a wider reconciliation process. This view is however a typical analysis from most western scholars of politics in, not just Somalia, but several African countries. As it tends to shift the blame from other problematic issues that accompanies the nature of the sovereign nation state on the African continent.

For example, Sanei (2014:4) argues that the fact that there is no unified national vision amongst the political leaders of Somalia makes it very difficult for state building to occur. In his observation, there are observable patterns of political clashes between the different governments that came into power since 2002. The IUC and the TFG leadership disagreed even though there were many IUC members who were nationalists. Turmoil between Abdullahi Yusuf and his second Prime Minister Nuur Hassan Hussein led to the demise of President Yusuf's TFG in 2008. Similarly, during President Sharif Sh. Ahmed's tenure from 2009-2012, the Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) was forced to resign after the Kampala Accord was signed in June 2011, his resignation was met with angry protests across the Somali capital Mogadishu (Mohamud, 2011). Moreover, between 2013 and 2017, fights between the executive and legislative continued and by 2015, the SFG admitted that universal elections were not possible, instead, there would be an indirect electoral process. The process would involve 14, 000 delegates selected by clan elders, who would elect 275 members of the Lower House of Parliament, and regional assemblies would nominate the Upper House.

In the security sector, although financial and logistical support has been made available to the SFG by the international community, it has also been faced with overwhelming challenges with regards to progress on improving accountability and effectiveness of the national security service (BTI

2018:7; Office of the Prime Minister Federal Republic of Somalia, 2017:1). According to Abukar and Camacho (2017:7) this is because the SFG inherited an army that is clan divided. As a result, if the SNA is to be reformed effectively, "the most important parameter is the requirement of integration, that is to say; if the vast majority of soldiers do not develop a national identity and national allegiance above that of clan, region, and warlord - then it is a failed effort and prospects for a unified Somalia are endangered" (Abukar and, Camacho 2017:7). Abukar and Camacho's (2017:7), as well as Sanei's (2014:4) views reiterates the argument in this research, that a peacebuilding solution outside sovereign arrangements needs to be established for a long-lasting peace in Somalia.

Map of Somalia showing regions controlled by various entities (British Broadcast Commission, 2016)

Figure 4.1

4.1.2. Al-Shabaab

According to Bryden (2013:12), the stabilization of Somalia, including the defeat of Al-Shabaab is primarily a political problem. This is because Al-Shabaab's strength lies in its ability to exploit its enemies' weaknesses. Between 2007 and 2009, Al-Shabaab exploited widespread outrage, and nationalist rejection of Ethiopia's occupation of southern Somalia. This boosted its membership

and support from the Somali diaspora. According to Mohamed Ali (2011), Ethiopia and the former Democratic Republic of Somalia had been in conflict over the disputed Ethiopian region of Ogaden during the Cold War period in the Ogaden War offensive that occurred between July 1977 and March 1978. Ogaden region in Ethiopia is composed of a sizable Islamic and Somali ethnic group. Barnes and Hassan (2007:155) note that Ethiopia feared an Islamic authority in Somalia could radicalize its sizeable Muslim population. This warranted Ethiopia's involvement in the Somalia Civil War, and its resultant invasion of southern Somalia in support of the TFG which was able to defeat the IUC in 2006. After Ethiopia withdrew in 2009, Al-Shabaab lost its appeal, but was able to continue raising funds from its control of the southern economy. The organization raised hundreds of millions of dollars between 2009 and 2012 (Bryden 2013:12).

It can be observed that the United States, Ethiopia, and other unilaterally acting European and neighboring state's fear of Somalia becoming a Jihadist state and breeding ground for terrorists, as well as the consequent creation of Al-Shabaab from the defeated IUC, was informed by negative perceptions formed about Islam. Samatar (2007) argues that Ethiopia's invasion was too early because even though the IUC had managed to increase the levels of peace within its six months of ruling southern Somalia, its introduction of harsh Islamic laws was bound to reduce its popularity in the eyes of many Somalis. This is because the very nature of Somalia's society makes it improbable that the country would become united as a Jihadist nation. As Samatar (2007) notes:

> "Simply put, the patterns of Somali social organization—or more appropriately disorganization—precludes the possibility of the growth of a large-scale, grassroots Jihadist movement in Somalia" (Samatar, 2007).

There are varying views concerning Al-Shabaab, however, and while typically western views describe the organization as strictly a terrorist organization, a variety of sources provide a more complex dimension to the group. A typically western orientation asserts that Al-Shabaab seeks a strict interpretation of Islamic law for Somalia and fights against western influence on Africa. For example, the British Home Office (2017:12) notes that the organization seeks 'the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia but has publicly pledged its allegiance to Usama Bin Laden. It has announced an intention to combine its campaign in the Horn of Africa with Al-

Qaida's aims of global Jihad.' The organization has also been focused on achieving this goal through discrediting the efforts of the Somalia Federal Government. According to the British Home Office (2017:5), the military capacity of Al-Shabaab has been considerably reduced following efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the SFG forces, as well as internal crises within the group. This represents the bulk of most western international actors, and scholars' views and understanding of Al-Shabaab. Actors such as the United Nations, the African Union, the United States and the European Union all confirm these perceptions about Al-Shabaab (United States State Department, 2018)

As will be discussed in chapter five, the fear of Islam developed as part of the colonial matrix of power described by Grosfoguel (2011) which created a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christians and is operationalized, according to Cardinal (2016:6), through a "*power to narrate*" that exists in the structure of the international sphere which gives hegemonic superiority to the European, modern, and liberal. As a result, the 'Other' as well as the 'Other's' fate is defined through the epistemic and historical narrative from the West (Cardinal, 2016:6; Grosfoguel, 2011:11).

This view that Al-Shabaab is purely driven by Jihadist motives can be faulted on the grounds that it is one sided and informs major aspects of the international communities' activities regarding peacebuilding in Somalia. Viewed as largely uninformed about the deep-rooted causes and dynamics of the conflict in Somalia (Brüne, 2015:1; Einashe and Fangen, 2018), peace operations follow negative stereotypes and misinformation, and are largely guided by parochial interests, as opposed to harnessing information on how intrastate actors in Somalia act, their motives, interests as well as context. Einashe and Fangen (2018) argue that Somali lives in Europe are often already framed through a problematizing lens based on the narrative from the media, and to the disadvantage of Somalis. Even though terror attacks by Somali Jihadists have been relatively few, the Jihad community from Somalia is reported as a high-profile Jihad. As a result, the broad perception in the west remains that Somalia is a Jihad country. This stereotype is backed up by the fact that Somalia has one of the largest Jihad organization in Africa (Al-Shabaab). This view is prevalent and as a result, the main purpose for the formation, and predominance of the organization remains disregarded by majority of European scholars, states, and peacebuilders engaged in

Somalia. This view also informs peace operations and why the focus has been on eliminating Al-Shabaab and creating a central government with the monopoly on the use of force powerful enough to silence Al-Shabaab, thereby neglecting a political solution outside the notion of a sovereign nation state (Brüne, 2015:1; Graveline, 2016; Ligawa et al., 2017). This research argues that this is part of a colonial matrix of power, as will be discussed in chapter five.

Other views about Al-Shabaab see the organization differently, as Ingiriis (2018), Hussein (2014), and Harding (2016) explain, offering a more complex dimension. Harding (2016:167) notes that like the Taliban, Al-Shabaab was focused on bringing order to a war-torn and anarchic society through Islamic laws. The feeling in war-torn southern Somalia is that "insecurity under Al-Shabaab is far better than security under the SFG because of the organization's ability to create security, even in the areas controlled by the SFG (Ingiriis, 2018:513). According to Hussein (2014:352), Al-Shabaab uses the idea of Islamic nationalism to unite Somali clans by referring to the SFGas *daba dhilif* (meaning a government set up for a foreign purpose). This perspective has gained some degree of traction among Somalis as Ingiriis (2018:525) argues; the government authorities struggle on daily basis and are unable to shield themselves and civilians under their territories from Al-Shabaab's suicidal and ambush attacks. The Somali President, like his predecessors, cannot freely leave the villa without heavy protection from foreign security forces. This has been argued to demonstrate to the Somali local population that the government derives its authority from external powers and not from the Somali public (Brüne, 2015:1; Ingiriis, 2018:525).

Al-Shabaab is constituted of three main categories of members (Ingiriis, 2018:518). The first category is the smallest, and is the ideological group made up of few fighters. Regardless of its size, this group is powerful enough to run the organization, exercise power, and act as the real leadership of the organization. The second category is a disjointed and fragmented group of militants that share the same '*Takfiri ideology'* with the first group mentioned. This group is however focused more on personal gains and is constituted by mostly uneducated youth who hail from impoverished families and as a result are motivated by regular pay and other material rewards. The third group is the most numerous. It is made up of members who are motivated by

grievances against the Federal Government and its state power sharing formula which brought political marginalization and economic exclusion to Somalia.

1.1.A Decolonial Lens

It is observed in this research that ethnicity is overlooked by peacebuilders as part of a strong 'hetararchy', fundamentally, in sovereign nation state settings. It is entangled with the global heterarchical system, understood by Grosfoguel (2011:9) as Eurocentric, cultural, peripheral/core capitalist accumulation. Heterarchical thinking is aimed at conceptualizing social structures with a new language different form the liberal paradigm of nineteenth century social science. The legacy of the nineteenth-century liberalism, Grosfoguel (2011:18) notes, "implies the division of the economic, political, cultural and social as autonomous arenas". This is what Quijano (1991; 1998; 2000), addresses in his discussion of the 'coloniality of power' that "there is no overarching capitalist accumulation logic that can instrumentalize ethnic/racial divisions and that precedes the formation of a global colonial, Eurocentric culture". This also refers simultaneously to the coloniality of being and of knowledge. Decoloniality asserts that 'being' was colonized through racial profiling, classification, and hierarchization of the human population. They also believe that knowledge was colonized through epistemeides, and appropriation of other ways of knowing while pretending that the only valid knowledge comes from Europe and North America. Power was colonized by usurping, and theft of world history and its rearticulating through the prism of Hellenocentrism, Eurocentrism and westernization (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38).

Decoloniality represents a line of thinking which argues that the history of the world has privileged western/European culture, knowledge and epistemology that is built on 'inferiorizing' these elements from other parts of the world (Grosfoguel, 2011:25; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38). This means that the world is built on the assumption that all other cultures, knowledge, and ways of generating knowledge are inferior to that of Europeans. This has consequences on ontologies, as it has resulted in the construction of today's realities. This research argues that it has led to the application of non-compatible epistemologies to the multiple ontological perspectives that exists, by making other knowledge claims inferior and consequently excluding them.

1.1.1. Decolonial Epistemology, Ontological and Perspectives on Peace and the Nation States

Zondi (2018:19) argues for a decolonial epistemology for Political Science, International Relations, and Diplomacy, three broad disciplines under which international peacebuilding is located, an epistemology different from the monoculture of Eurocentric scientific knowledge that tends to generalize and declare other epistemologies inferior. This would ultimately result in what he refers to as 'epistemic disobedience'. Zondi (2018:19) suggests a decolonial '*meditation*' different from that of traditional International Relations methods, which are aimed at ending "fixation with conventions that hide more than reveal, that complicate rather than simplify, deceive rather than explain, and that create formulae rather than ways of liberating our ability to understand phenomena deeply and broadly".

> "There is no major problem with Europe telling its history and celebrating its story, but the problem arises because the Western canon claims universal nature and application. It is not that it is Western that is a problem, but that it is Eurocentric in the sense Jack Goody means by the theft of history. It is that it claims to be universal that generates epistemicides and other forms of displacement of other voices and ways of knowing. The universalist claims lead to epistemicides in that in order for it to thrive as 'the knowledge' other epistemologies have to die" (Zondi, 2018:21).

Grofoguel (2011), Mingolo (2007), Zondi (2018) and other decolonial scholars call for epistemologies developed by the subaltern and indigenous people from the global south, from the perspectives of the indigenous. Decolonial thinkers advocate that what should be considered legitimate knowledge does not have to be scrutinized through the eye of a tiny Eurocentric needle of scientific social enquiry to be accepted as true knowledge in International Relations. From this premise, the entire project of liberal peace is faulted for its reliance on scientific and positivistic approaches to peacebuilding, for the ways it does not account for subjectivity, and for its generalization and imposition of foreign and European cultures and knowledge on the world.

Decolonial scholars advocate for a world of multiple ontologies that gives voice to multiple suppressed including lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgendered, women, different ethnic and racial

others. According to Grosfoguel (2011:16-18), this does not give an imperative for fundamentalism or economic reductionism, but offers an opportunity to transform beyond the colonial matrix of power, understood as "an entanglement or, intersectionality of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies ("heterarchies") of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures", arguing that positions such as nationalism is fundamentally reductionist and therefore suggesting that decoloniality goes beyond decolonizing colonial administrations.

> "The old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nation-state are not sufficient, because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power". (Grosfoguel, 20011:14)

Sub-Saharan African decolonial thinkers pay attention to the nation state in their search for a 'decolonial peace', bearing in mind the historical and current realities of Sub-Saharan Africa and diversity of ethnic groups that have been forced together by the Berlin conference of 1885 (Englebert, 2007:62-63: Jackson, 1986; Jeng, 2012:3; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zondi, 2017). These scholars agree to the mythical nature of the sovereign nation state on the African continent. They therefore propose a peace that is focused on transforming conflicts through deconceptualizing and reconceptualizing colonial legacies such as the sovereign nation state as an approach to peacebuilding (Zondi, 2017). According to Cassanelli (n.d:4) colonialism in Somalia was accompanied by a partitioning of knowledge about Somalia that has been carried on by researchers undertaking research about Somalia today. Knowledge creation about Somalia is generated using a European historical account that regards Somalia as one ethnic group with different clans, but Cassanelli (n.d:4) argues that Somalia is a multinational society traditionally, and prior to the arrival of colonialism. This has implications on theory, as application of theories that do not consider this ontological perspective of the area leads to structurally weak peacebuilding initiatives that fail to produce lasting peace.

This considers epistemic decommissioning of the concept of the sovereign nation state, in order to create ideas for more durable peace in Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa. It focuses on the sovereign

nation state concept as a global phenomenon that must be decolonized on the global level in order for African nations to flourish (Grosfoguel, 2011, Ndlovu, 2016). Colonialities in knowledge such as that of the concept of the sovereign nation state ontologically results in the continued existence of colonial legacies in arrangements where there is domination by an ethnic majority, it is facilitated by the failure to transform colonial legacies that are embedded in transferred colonial administrations. For example, according to Leon, (2010:9), ethnicity or racism can easily be disguised as democracy when one ethnic group enjoys a majority because such an ethnic group can easily make laws that are favorable to its members but excludes minorities. In employment, through nepotism, direct, or systemic discrimination, majority ethnic groups are likely to be more represented in government and private organizations than minority groups (Tacoli, Gordon and, Satterthwaite, 2014:13, Leon, 2010:9;). "Direct discrimination involves intentional behavior. Individuals are treated in a negative manner based on stereotypes about the group to which such persons belong" while systemic discrimination "occurs through the operation of established employment procedures that discriminate against one or more groups" (Weiner 1995: 79-81).

1.1.2. Peace Agreements

There have been a variety of peace agreements and reconciliation conferences in Somalia aimed at bringing lasting peace. These peace agreements and conferences, according to Saalax and Ibrahim (n.d:32), have failed for not being inclusive enough as a result of being seen as avenues to further personal interests of politicians. Since the outbreak of the Civil War, reconciliation conferences have also become a goal in itself because prominent leaders develop out of these conferences and are seen primarily as representative of their clans. Others have used the conferences to create factions simply to generate support and increase the number of participants in peace conferences, thereby prolonging them. Saalax and Ibrahim (n.d:32) note that some have simply participated as spoilers focused on blocking the ambitions of their rivals.

In 1991, there were two international reconciliation meetings aimed at reestablishing Somalia's government. The conferences which took place in Djibouti in June and July saw six organizations participate. These organization were all representatives of clan or sub-clan constituencies. However, Saalax and Ibrahim (n.d:32) note that clans served as instruments to further individual ambitions. As the leaders of these clans had once held similar positions and were competing for similar ranks in a possible administration.

Between 1994 and 2004, when the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia was formed, there were several agreements and reconciliation conferences which failed to be implemented. In October 2002, a reconciliation conference held in Eldoret, Kenya produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders. The agreement stipulated the need to create a federal structure, reversing unitary structures established in previous agreements. The signatories included representatives of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), powerful warlords, and various faction leaders present in previous meetings. In all, three hundred delegates were present during this process that eventually led to the agreement which brought on a Transitional Federal Charter and the selection of 275 members of parliament who in turn elected Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the TFG in October 2004. (Saalax and Ibrahim, n.d:33).

After the Somalia Transitional Federal Government was created, the international community, through the United Nations, the African Union, and unilateral acting member states provided the needed support in order to ensure that the transition took place and a Federal Government was installed. The SFG was installed in 2013 and peacebuilding since this period has been mainly focused on the establishment of a solid central government through regaining the monopoly on the use of force (Brüne, 2015:1)

1.2. Local and International Approaches to Peacebuilding in Somalia

1.2.1. Successful Local Peacebuilding

According to Johnson and Raghe (2010:46), since 1991, and in the absence of a central government, many successful reconciliation agreements have taken place at local and regional levels within Somalia. These agreements have proven more sustainable than the better resourced and publicized national reconciliation conferences sponsored by the international community. From micro-level traditional peacebuilding and reconciliation between clans, and within small interclan communities in south-central Somalia, to remarkable peacebuilding in the Puntland administration and the seceded Somaliland region, traditional mechanisms have proven effective and credible in the eyes of many Somalis.

Although Southern Somalia has remained relatively unstable compared to northern parts like Puntland and Somaliland, there has been some considerable successes with regards to local peace processes which have proven effective in managing security in some parts of south-central Somalia (Amber, 2010). However, hard-won local peace accords reached through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in this region were always vulnerable to being undermined by armed factions, business leaders and other powerful local actors.

For example, earlier in the Somali Civil War, a 1993 Bardhere peace conference was initiated by elders of the Digil-Mirifle clan in Bay and Bakool regions, and the elders of the Marehan clan, in a bid to end fighting over pasture and water resources. According to Amber (2010:53), these communities have continued to co-exist harmoniously and the Bardhere agreement has been referred to whenever conflicting matters arise between the communities. Another example of successful micro level peacebuilding is that brought about by the conflict of territory in the 1990s over the village of Kulan Jareer, near Baidoa, and its surrounding grazing land. Amber (2010:54), notes that the land was traditionally shared by the Jiron and Hadame sub-clans of the Digil-Mirifle clan. The clash between both groups ended in 1994, after traditional and religious leaders came together to support a reconciliation process to restore harmony. Between February 2006 to February 2007, a peace agreement between Sa'ad and Saleman sub-clans ended the protracted violent conflict between the two groups in Galgudud and South Mudug (Amber, 2010:54).

Peacebuilding in the Puntland Administration

According to Interpeace and the Puntland Development Research Center PDRC (2008:22), Puntland State was formed in 1998 and claims a wider territory than the historical "Northeast Regions". It incorporates parts of Sool, Sanaag and Togdheer to the west, but its claims to these western territories are contested by Somaliland. The Harti clans also inhabit areas of southern Somalia, notably in the Lower Juba region and Kismayo, the regional capital, where they migrated in the 19th century, as well as the adjacent area of Wardheer in eastern Ethiopia. According to the Puntland's Five-Year Development Plan (2007), "Puntland's vision is a strong and secure Puntland State within the Somali Federal System, preserving its Islamic and cultural heritage, developing human resources, preserving the environment, and exploiting natural resources equitably and sustainably" (PFYDP 2007). Unlike Somaliland, as will be discussed subsequently, Puntland does not seek separation from greater Somalia.

According to Interpeace and the PDRC (2008:23), a number of factors aided stabilization in the northeast region of Somalia known as Puntland, these factors include; the reversal of the brain drain to the south over the previous two decades since the start of the Civil War. Many people who had fled to the northeast brought professional experiences with them, they were known as "Dowlad Ku Noo" meaning government dependents, because they were formally technocrats and military personal of the former Somali administration. Their experiences in governance help in the evolution of local government structures in Puntland. Secondly, despite the conflicting factions, clan politics, and the booming unregulated economy, Puntland remained relatively calm, and Interpeace and the Puntland.

Somaliland and Indigenous Peacebuilding

In all this, northern Somalia has developed differently. BTI (2018:4), noted that in the northwest, the Republic of Somaliland declared independence in May 1991 and has gradually rebuilt basic state structures. This region has developed a modest capacity to govern and strive to reach democratization, but it has not been given international recognition (Mesfin 2009:). Somaliland was the former British colonized part of Somalia which merged voluntarily with Italian colonized Somalia to form the Democratic Republic of Somalia in a union that led to Somaliland being excluded from governance (Ahmed, 1999:116). According to Mesfin (2009:4) one reason for the breakdown of Somalia's society is that the civilian democracy of greater Somalia was poorly adapted to the clan-based nature of Somali politics and as a result, southern Somalia still remains comparatively unstable, and this provided the incentive for Somaliland to seek its independence. In 1991, Somaliland emerged as an autonomous entity after unilaterally declaring its independence from the rest of Somalia. According to Mesfin (2009:1), over the years since its independence, Somaliland has managed to display a measure of peace and stability achieved through successive clan conferences that have been able to established relatively viable institutions which paved the path for reconstruction of an entity mainly employing local resources. In all this local peacebuilding success, there has been little help from the international community in terms of financial assistance. Ahmed (1999:124) notes that "with the exception of some very limited logistical support for the Borama conference, the UN and other agencies did not provide support for (in fact opposed) many successful local level initiatives.".

Some of the notable locally developed institutions that were significant for Somaliland's relatively peaceful transition include the participation of clan elders in politics through the council of elders called the *Guurti*, the Guurti participated in a political system established in 1993 known as the *Beel*, meaning clan or community. This was regarded as a fusion of traditional and western governance structures into a hybrid structure. According to Ahmed (1999:123), Somaliland clan elders where chosen based on several qualities besides age;

> "Unlike the tribal chiefs in many African societies, elders in Somaliland are `chosen by virtue of their personal attributes such as age, expertise in the political arts of compromise and persuasion, powers of oratory, skill as a poet, religious knowledge, piety, wealth, generosity, courage and reputations for fairness". (Ahmed, 1999:123)

There was also the entrenchment of the use of *Xeer*, a traditional and unwritten law of social conduct among the clans of Somaliland in accordance with their traditions and Islamic principles as the basis for law and order.

Despite this relatively successful indigenous peacebuilding, the international community has failed to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. Shin (2002:6) and Fadal (2013:43), argue that the Africa union fears recognizing Somaliland because recognition might result in the opening of a pandora's box of secessionist movements across the continent. According to Fadal (2013:43) the "established premise for the international recognition of secessionist states is that they must first be recognized by regional bodies", and the African Union is the regional body that Somaliland considers. The Africa Union's fear of a backlash of secessionist across the continent can be linked to what Zondi (2017:109) described as a lack of imagination, courage, and revolutionary consciousness by Africa political elites to transcend the concept of the sovereign nation state as will be discussed in Chapter five.

1.2.2. International Peacebuilding

BTI (2018:39) note that the Somali state depends largely on foreign aid and foreign protection and is supported by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), United Nation Assistant Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While UNPOS worked with the Transitional Federal Government to establish political stability by facilitating mediation processes and supporting them until a federal government was established, its mandate expired in 2013, because its goal was achieved. The establishment of a SFG led to the

creation of UNSOM in 2013. UNSOM was created to continue supporting and providing political and peacebuilding advice to the Somalia Federal Government. AMISOM acts as a peace support operation mission. The goal of these organizations is to establish a central authority for Somalia that has adequate monopoly of the use of force.

Apart from UNSOM and the African Union, there are other peacebuilding actors including neighboring states such as Kenya and Ethiopia, European states with interests in counter terrorism such as the United Kingdom (U.K), the United States (U.S) and the European Union (EU) who provide the bulk of the financial support for AMISOM and finance NGO peacebuilding. These groups are also engaged in other support mechanism aimed at achieving stability, promoting state-building and economic development, as well as providing humanitarian aid to Somalia (BTI 2018:39). The U.S has since 2007 provided over $1.4 billion in security-related support to AMISOM, the Somalian National Army (SNA) and regional forces fighting Al-Shabaab. BTI (2018:39) notes that the U.S has built counter-terrorism capacities in Somalia and neighboring countries, trained special reaction forces in Somalia, and carried out military strikes with the aim to kill or capture Al-Shabaab leaders. Increasing its operations since 2016, the U.S deployed an additional 100 military personnel to Somalia (BTI, 2018:39). Ultimately, peacebuilding in Somalia is characterized by a militaristic approach supported by a political approach on the background.

It can be observed that these peacebuilding operations by these organizations and unilaterally acting states are fundamentally militaristic, with political approaches nested within them. The roles played by the AU and UN are further elaborated in the following section because the African Union Mission in Somalia is one of the major interveners involved in peacekeeping in Somalia, and the United Nations provides the bulk of political support to the SFG.

The African Union's Approach

The African Union Mission in Somalia takes the form of a peace support operation that was first deployed in March of 2007 with a total of 1,600 Ugandan soldiers (Graveline, 2016) it was first created in a peacekeeping mission to protect key sites in Mogadishu and has faced varying degrees of challenges since its creation and deployment. Graveline (2016) notes that AMISOM was only a secondary actor in Somalia, until 2008 when Ethiopian forces withdrew and AMISOM was

expanded with Ugandan and Burundi troops making up the contingents that became the primary deterrent against Al-Shabaab. AMISOM's ability to hold Mogadishu in September 2010 was a critical success that forced Al-Shabaab to adopt new ways of assaults including suicide bombings and assassinations to attack weak point in AMISOM (Graveline, 2016).

According to Ligawa et al. (2017:2), peace support operations (PSO) are a very important approach that the international community adopts for intervention in conflict zones. The primary aims of PSOs are to create political change by reducing the levels of physical violence and addressing the root causes of the conflicts in the areas. Somalia's security challenges are currently a threat to the stability of the entire region of East Africa because over the years it has presented good platform for training terrorist. This leaves an imperative to transform local social and political orders. Ligawa et al., (2017:3) argues that both local and Somali scholars have examined the peace and conflict in Somalia and the dominant position is that because Somalia had become a failed state, the best solution should involve facilitating democratization and building a developmental state. Moreover, this makes it important for the military to be at the center of peace strategies in Somalia even beyond the stage of pacification because of the idea that the armed forces are the only organization capable of carrying out such peacebuilding missions in volatile areas that require monopoly on the use of force. The unintended consequence of this is that the military is the central actor tasked with implementing most of the goals of the PSOs and this leads to continued centrality of military ways of thinking and operations.

According to Graveline (2016), AMISOM's current challenges also reflect broader political issues. The main issue is the Somali government's inability to implement effective political reforms that address the grievances driving Al-Shabaab. AMISOM was established to address a political reform which has remained largely ineffectual. Corruption scandals, delayed elections, uncertain status of the Somalia's federated regional governments, and failed service delivery of the state have generated support for Al-Shabaab's position that it can provide more effective governance in Somalia. AMISOM does not have the tools for a political solution because it is a military mission aimed at returning the monopoly of the use of force to a SFG. Bryden (2013:9) notes that until political reform occurs, conflict will continue in Somalia. In this research, Bryden's (2013:9) position is limited because it, and the entire state-building endeavor that peacebuilding in Somalia is based on, is situated in the problematic myth of the state (Ahmed, 1999:125; Doornbos and

Markakis, 1994:87; Englebert, 2007:62-63; Hesse, 2010:248). Therefore, resolving the Somalia conflict requires the imagination of a solution that transcends the mythical sovereign state (Zondi, 2017).

United Nations Assistant Mission in Somalia

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established in June 2013 to support the Federal Government of Somalia. Its mandate has been renewed in subsequent years, including as recently as 2019. UNSOM's mandate includes the provision of policy advice to Somalia's Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on issues relating to peacebuilding and state-building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law, development of a federal system of government, constitutional reviews, democratization and coordination of international donor support. UNSOM also provides support for the SFG on issues relating to human rights protection.

UNSOM is based in Mogadishu and has branches in emerging capitals of existing federal states in Somalia, including Puntland, the Interim Jubba Administration, Interim South-West Administration, and the Interim HirShabelle Administration. Planning is underway to establish a UNSOM presence in the Galmudug Interim Administration during 2018.

As contained in United Nations in Somalia (2014:30) report, there has been incremental successes recorded with regards to peacebuilding within regions in Somalia including assisting in developing the parliaments in Puntland and Somaliland, as well as successfully assisting in leading elections in Puntland in 2014. Between 1996 and 2010, UNICEF was able to provide basic education for Somali children even without the presence of a central government. By engaging flexibly with sub-national governing entities including nascent zonal governments to support educational provisions, education suitable for both public and Qu'ranic schools was made available in different regions of Somalia (Williams and Cummings. 2015:425).

Regardless of traditional, as well as UN led micro level peacebuilding successes, and its potential for long lasting peace, the establishment of a central authority, regardless of representativeness or legitimacy in the eyes of the many Somalis, remains of paramount importance to the international community, and consequently, the United Nations. A pattern of liberal peace democracy that is similar to that used in other post conflict areas has been adopted in Somalia in this regard. As

contained in the United Nations in Somalia (2014:21) report, the UN role in Somalia is to support the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia on peacebuilding and state building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law, the development of a federal system and coordination of international donor support as spelt out in the New Deal. This is a classic UN peacebuilding model, and is tantamount to replicating "liberal democracies", the same models that exists in other Sub-Saharan African countries that have failed to bring about lasting peace (Leon, 2010:5). Moreover, it is also modeled on the same problematic federal system of government that is replicated in most African states which have also failed to create less structurally violent societies.

Unilaterally Acting Members of the International Community

Several unilaterally acting states have funded peacebuilding initiatives through Aid agencies which have made reasonable impacts in local communities. An example is the Finn Church Aid (FCA), which is the largest Finnish organization in international aid. FCA operates in 14 countries across four continents and has over 70 years of experience. In Somalia, the Finn Church Aid manages funds such as the Somalia Stability Fund donated to Somalia by countries including Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The Finn Church Aid, since 2013, has used the funds to develop peacebuilding initiatives such as the Somali Peoples Peace Initiative which supports traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that have proven effective in addressing regional level conflict in Somalia. (Fin Aid Church, 2019)

1.3. Conclusion

Peacebuilding in Somalia today is focused on restoring a central authority to a federal sovereign state of Somalia through creating a monopoly of the use of force (BTI, 2018). In order for this to be successful, the SFG would need to first gain the trust of the various clans in Somalia and build a Somalia National Army and other law enforcement agencies that would be loyal to it. It also requires a strong national identity that supersedes that of the clan identity that defines Somali politics (Abukar and Camacho, 2017:7; Sanei, 2014:4). The SFG however faces difficult challenges in this regard, as the legitimacy of the government is in doubt by Somali citizens (Ingiriis, 2018:513; Hussein, 2014:352). This is apparent in the fact that AMISON is the major

security force standing in the way of militia forces from taking over Mogadishu (Graveline, 2016). The unrepresentative nature of peace agreements is one probable reason for this (Saalax and Ibrahim, n.d:32), as it has led to the establishment of the Somalia Federal Government, which many Somalis, including the Islamic militia group Al-Shabaab believe is a government installed by foreigners with a foreign agenda.

The above can be epistemologically linked to a bias of peacebuilders towards maintaining sovereign arrangements. It can be observed in this chapter that the epistemic bias towards maintaining sovereign arrangements by peacebuilders manifests practically in several ways; firstly, through stereotypes held about Somalia, fixation on establishing a central authority, the dominance of the 'victors' peace', Africa Unions lack of imagination to identify solutions outside sovereign arrangements and Somalia nationalist approach for a united Somalia which is based on the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. These manifestations will be discussed and linked to epistemic coloniality in more detail in the next chapter.

2. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

2.1. Introduction

Grosfoguel (2011), describes the coloniality of power as follows:

> "coloniality of power is an entanglement or, intersectionality of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies ("heterarchies") of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures".

The previous chapter has provided a critical ontological narrative of manifestations that reveal the existence of an epistemic coloniality which makes peacebuilders biased towards maintaining sovereign arrangements in Somalia despite the complex structural challenges that accompanies it in the Somali society. This chapter is focused on connecting the dots to show how epistemic colonialities are nested within the colonial matrix of power and affects epistemology which shapes the current ontology of peacebuilding in Somalia today. The study argues that the colonial matrix of power, described by Grosfoguel (2011:11) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016:38) among others, is a major cause of peacebuilding bias and it manifests and exists in several hierarchies including epistemic coloniality. Following this discussion, the study concludes that this leads to the failure of peacebuilding initiatives to produce long term peace. It is therefore made explicit in this study that a construction of a new term to describe what Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly, what Somalia is, is due in order to build a long-lasting peace.

2.2. Epistemic Coloniality and the Sovereign Nation State Bias in Peacebuilding

It is the position in this research that epistemologically, coloniality of knowledge and knowledge production led to the definition of "sovereignty" and subsequently that of the "sovereign nation state" following Europe's 30 years' war and the subsequent imperial conquest of the world and theft of world history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016:38. The historical implications of these are manifold, as it led to formations of heterarchical structures described as the colonial matrix of power. In Sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically Somalia, several manifestations of epistemic colonialities on peacebuilding can be observed. In this section this will be explained further in relations to the colonial matrix of power.

Grosfoguel (2011:10) argued that, colonialization did not start or end with colonial administration, it brought several heterarchical structures with it. Grosfoguel (2011:11) referred to these structures as the colonial matrix of power. He described them as *heterachies* because according to him;

"Heterarchies move us beyond closed hierarchies into a language of complexity, open systems, entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous hierarchies, structural levels, and structuring logics". Grosfoguel (2011:11)

Grosfoguel (2011:10) described fifteen different hierarchies, but for the sake of this study, those relevant and affecting peacebuilding in Somalia include, inter alia; epistemic hierarchies that privilege western knowledge over nonwestern knowledge, a global media hierarchy that privileges western media over others, and spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christians. All heartaches, including the ones not mentioned in this research interact and form the colonial matrix of power. It is assumed in this research that both the global media, and spiritual hierarchies influence the epistemic hierarchy and vice versa. These hierarchies are operationalized, according to Cardinal (2016:6), through a "*power to narrate*" that exists in the structure of the international sphere which gives hegemonic superiority to the European, modern, and liberal. These can be identified within some of the manifestations of the coloniality of power and epistemic colonialities as outlined in the conclusion of the previous chapter; stereotypes about Somalia, fixation on installing a central authority in Somalia, implementation of the liberal peace concept of the victors peace, the African Union's lack of imagination to transform the inherited sovereign state, and Somali nationalist fixation on a united Somalia based on Westphalia model of sovereign nation state concept.

- **Stereotypes about Somalia as manifestation of epistemic coloniality;** As observed in chapter four of this research, in peacebuilding, epistemic colonialities manifest through stereotypes about Somalia presented to the world by predominantly western organizations, media and scholars (Einashe and Fangen, 2018; Mohamud, 2015). Many Somalis have argued about how the Somalia Federal Government, the Somali National Development Plan, and most peace agreements have been based on foreign agendas and unrepresentative of Somali interests (Saalax and Ibrahim, n.d:32;). This argument can be linked to what Grosfuguel (2011:10) described as "epistemic hierarchies that privilege western knowledge over nonwestern knowledge" as well as "media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the

means of global media production and information technology while the non-West do not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media networks". With regards to this, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:14), suggests that Africa, not just Somalia, is a victim of externally generated knowledges which are not informed by geo and biographical contextual understanding of the Africa condition.

- **Fixation on installing a central authority in Somalia;** It can also be observed from the critical narrative in chapter four that there is a fixation by the international community to install a generic liberal peace democracy because of the fear that Somalia would become an Islamic nation. This is despite the successes of the IUC, and other traditional peacebuilding mechanism which could have otherwise been built upon to create more durable peace (Barnes and Hassan, 2007:157; Samatar, 2007). Within the heterarchical structures described by Grosfoguel (2011:10), this point represents a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christians. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:12), notes that culturally, modernity has worked to banish religious thinking and spiritualism, replacing it with rational and expert knowledges capable of rationalizing ontology with a view to overcoming all cultural obstacles to human trajectories.

- **Implementation of the liberal peace concept of the victor's peace;** The victor is the TFG and is supported by the international community. In this regard, ideally, the looser in the conflict, and in this case the militarily defeated IUC and its supporters, which mutated into Al-Shabaab is to be forced to conform to the rules set by the victors which are the TFG, and western, Eurocentric interveners (Samatar, 2007). The implications of this has been the continued Al-Shabaab insurgencies and a possible structurally violent sovereign nation state.

- **African Union's lack of imagination to transform the inherited sovereign state**; A fourth manifestation of the colonial matrix of power brought about by epistemic sovereignty is shown in the AU's lack of imagination to develop peacebuilding solutions outside sovereign arrangements. This has resulted in their reluctance to recognize Somaliland as an independent state irrespective of Somaliland's indigenous peacebuilding success (Ahmed, 1999:124). Both this point and the next point can be linked to what Grosfoguel (2011:28) terms, the geopolitics of knowledge, where colonialities are also perpetuated by subaltern people. A phenomenon brought about by the colonial recalibration of the geographical location of thoughts which Grosfoguel (2011:28) refers to as the geopolitics of knowledge "The fact that one is socially

located in the oppressed side of power relations does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location".

- **Somali nationalist fixation on a united Somalia based on Westphalia model of sovereign nation state concept**; The fifth epistemic coloniality observed in this chapter is fixation, by Somali nationalist towards creating a national identity and unified Somalia defined by Westphalian notion of a sovereign nation state. According to Doornbos and Markakis (1994:87) "the fact that Somalia did for some time constitute a state cannot be considered a sufficiently convincing reason to go back to it again, unless one finds that there were elements in it that are still worth retaining or building upon". While pan Somali nationalism can assumed to be noble aspirations, it can be critiqued for not considering the aspirations of Somali regions that want to be independent such as Somaliland. Moreover, observing Somalia through history shows that Somali nationalism is strongest when there are external threats, but weak when internal administrative challenges as a sovereign entity arises (Samatar, 2007). This calls for a more adaptable form of social organization than the "sovereign nation state".

What this research has argued so far and laid out in the above discussion is that peacebuilding in Somalia is marred by a fixation on re-establishing a united Somalia by the international community, peacebuilders, and Somali nationalists and this is brought about by a colonial power matrix created by the epistemic coloniality concept of the Sovereign nation state.

2.3. Implications of the Sovereign State Bias of Peacebuilding Interventions

Because of the colonial matrix of power, which privileges everything European, there is a neglect for indigenous methods and ideas to conflict resolution in Somalia. Neglecting indigenous methods and ideas for peacebuilding leaves a void, therefore giving room for a focus on modeling the liberal democratic system and replicating the central authority that exist in liberal democratic states. This is regardless of the ontological realities that are present in Sub-Saharan Africa, and specific to this research, Somalia. The kind of liberal democracy that is intended to be created is likely to lead to several side effects, as a result of its exclusionary methodology of objectivity and majority rule (Leon (2010). Although liberal democracy is meant to be racially and ethnically inclusive, it works best in political units that are homogenous (Muller, 2008:18). Leon (2010:9), argues that liberal democracies in Africa are problematic because loyalties to ethnic groups (clans in Somalia's case), "have inhibited democratic consolidation and political accommodation of minorities, as a result,

politics of identity ends up trumping politics of interests"; interests becomes collective interests of one ethnic group against the other. This makes it easy for political parties who enjoy overwhelming majority to change constitutional edifices that are meant to counter overconcentration of power and marginalization. The breakdown of Somalia in the first place came about because the Somalia clan-based politics could not adapt to democratization (Mesfin, 2009:4). Long after the break down of Somalia's society in 1991, politics remains marred by a lack of unified national vision between Somali politicians and leaders observable in the clashes between the different governments that came into power since 2002 (Sanei, 2014:4). There is also a large population of Somalis that are disgruntled, and more confident in Al-Shabaab and militia groups than they are in the SFG (Ingiriis, 2018:).

In addition to challenges that accompanies liberal democracies, the heterarchical structure created by the colonial matrix of power leads to several implications for international aid and support. It results in artificially created central authorities that become attractive for individual material benefits and not for the good of society. As noted in Chapter four, the emergence of the sovereign nation state of Somalia brought a different reality when large populations migrated to urban centers as resources changed from livestock and water, to natural resources and foreign aid. (Elmi and Barise, 2006:34). Foreign aid and concentration of political powers in the center gives political elites the incentive to control the state and this leads to corruption and mismanagement of funds. (Elmi and Barise, 2006:34; Leon, 2010:11)

On the other hand, without international intervention, aid or assistance, Somaliland, different from South Central Somalia has been able to chart a path towards long term peace (Mesfin, 2009:1; BTI, 2018:4). Even though it has not been given recognition by the international community, through indigenous administrative formations and contributions of local businessmen who have *arguably* minimum other interests besides developing their state, Somaliland has been described as relatively stable compared with South Central Somalia and other parts of Somalia as a whole. Puntland has also been able to develop local administrative structures that have proven effective. Somaliland and Puntland's successful peacebuilding leaves an imperative for further probing and research into the impact of international aid and interventions in conflicts because these two entities have achieved peacebuilding success with minimum international support, whereas, most

of southern Somalia with all the international intervention and support has remained in a volatile state. (BTI, 2018:4; Bryden, 2013).

2.4. Alternatives to Liberal Peacebuilding

As discussed in chapter two and three, decolonial scholars suggest a decolonial peace that takes into account the colonial legacy and challenges the fixation on maintaining sovereign arrangements created by a history of colonialism and coloniality (Zondi, 2017). These scholars suggest a transformation of colonial legacies but fail to go further than suggesting this transformed colonial legacy. The third and final research question of this study seeks to identify alternatives to liberal peace that will transcend sovereign arrangements. In order to answer this question, there is need for further probing on what transforming colonial legacies entail. Fundamentally, scholars in public administration, constitution law and peacebuilding practitioners would advocate for recalibrating colonial administrations and developing all sorts of power sharing agreements and practices of federalism. This research advocates for a different approach as a starting point, as these listed approaches lead to nationalism and fundamentalist clamors which according to Grosfoguel (2011: 2011:21) are legitimate claims in themselves but remain a tiny aspect of a global phenomenon of coloniality. What is required in terms of transforming colonial legacies is a construction of a term different from the 'sovereign nation state' that can best describe what Sub-Saharan Africa's current realities are. Because coloniality is a global problem, and a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is also in line with Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2013:13) argument that decolonization became a historical process that was enabled by the emergence of the United Nations sovereignty and its global constitutionalism that embraced postcolonial states. In other words, decolonization came from global epistemological decoloniality of the concept of sovereignty. The United Nations decolonization is however limited by its focus on liberal democracy, and consequently disregarding minority groups, their cultures, and perspectives. This makes it imperative for further decoloniality of the concept to come from the international community, and particularly, the African Union.

Bearing in mind the diversity of Sub-Saharan Africa, and that sovereignty is given legality by the international community, a term that best describes current realities is a starting point to developing a decolonial system that transcends colonial legacies. According to Grosfoguel (2011:29), decolonization of knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic

perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. An approach like this has the potential to diversify peacebuilding approaches of international interveners from the status quo of establishing central authorities that are not representative irrespective of them being 'democratic'. Therefore, this research suggests a bottom up epistemic construction of a term to describe African societies as a starting point to decolonial peace in Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa at large.

2.5. Conclusion

This research has painted a picture of the epistemic coloniality of knowledge within liberal peacebuilding approaches in theory, and consequently, in practice. Epistemic coloniality causes a bias of peacebuilding approaches towards a sovereign nation state, and when this state deteriorates to an extent that it becomes a "failed state", efforts are directed at reestablishing a central authority, as has been observed with the case of Somalia. These epistemic colonialities of knowledge concerning sovereignty and sovereign nation states in Sub-Saharan African state are deeply entrenched to the extent that it becomes difficult and utopian for scholars and practitioners to imagine a decolonial society.

The liberal peace, like other traditional International Relations theories, assumes that there is a universal ontology and as a result attempts to replicate approaches that led to peace in some societies. This leads to a disregard or oppression of societies with variations in identity whether cultural, religious, or ethnic. In contrast, the decolonial approach is more accommodating of a multiverse of ontologies, as such it holds promise for identification of key principles that can guide peacebuilders in managing conflicts like that of Somalia. The purpose of this research is not to identify a generalizing theory that will be replicated within all the sovereign states of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is aimed at identifying within case assumptions that can explain how the assumption of the sovereign nation state undermine peacebuilding in Somalia, as well as why the assumptions about the mythical nature of sovereignty do not lead to solutions outside sovereign arrangements. Identifying the reasons for these gaps is a starting point to identifying propositions for lasting peace in Somalia.

From the narrative in chapter four, the rhetoric from the major peacebuilders (UN, AU and unilateral international actors) all point to the re-establishment of a central authority in Somalia

which must be achieved by establishing a Somali National Government that has monopoly over the use of force. Al-Shabaab is viewed as the major obstacle that hinders the achievement of this goal and is consequently treated as the major problem instead of as a symptom of the anarchy that followed the outbreak of Civil War in Somalia.

Meanwhile, Somaliland has been relatively peaceful and stable in its state building, employing an indigenous peacebuilding approach. Regardless, the international community refuses to recognize Somaliland as a state, even though it has developed internal legitimacy. The above narrative reinforces the bias of international peacebuilders towards maintaining sovereign legacies. It can also be observed that there is a misconception about the nature of complexities within Somalia's society that is driven by a Eurocentric view of Somalia by peacebuilding practitioners and scholars. It is observed in chapter four of this research, that several hierarchies exist that are being ignored by international peacebuilders. This led to peace conferences that where simply aimed at bringing in as many factions in Somalia as possible with an ultimate goal of re-establishment of the colonial sovereign nation state.

It is the position of this research that there a bias in peacebuilding theory and practice because of the colonial matrix of power that constitutes several heterarchical structures. From epistemic coloniality, other colonialities follow and can be identified in several hierarchies that Grosfoguel (2011) has termed heterarchical structures. Some of these structures have been identified in this study but include many more not mentioned. The effects of these on the mythical sovereign nation state are many and ultimately leads to a dysfunctional society where exclusivity leads to inequalities. Therefore, there is need to properly define African societies as what they are in order to chart out a course for lasting peace. This requires a construction of an indigenous concepts that considers the diversity of Sub-Saharan Africa and transcends the inherited and mythical sovereign nation state.

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