

**South Africa's Style of Leadership in the Southern African Development  
Community is Widely Criticised: *Is this justified?***

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## **Abstract**

The main aim of this study is to provide an exploration on criticisms and justifications of South Africa's Leadership Style within the SADC region with hope of filling some of the literature gaps in the subject under enquiry.

The identified research problem is due to the agreements and disagreements in the existing literature on whether South Africa is a hegemon, pivot or self-appointed leader in Southern Africa and Africa at large. The literature does not appear to take into consideration the constraints presented by the principle of sovereign equality of states provided for in the 1992 SADC Treaty when criticising South Africa for not acting decisively on countries that violate the human rights. The other problem is due to the quandary that SA finds itself in on whether to apply its perceived hegemonic authority in providing decisive leadership to the SADC region or to maintain the stand of being the first amongst equals.

The judgemental or purposeful sampling of literature was applied because the primary and secondary sources provided the reliable information to achieve the objectives of the study. Data collection techniques that the researcher relied on included the South African National Development Plan, 1992 SADC Treaty, document and desktop analysis. Data was analysed to determine if the criticism of South Africa's style of leadership in the Southern African development Community is justified.

South Africa was, until August 2019, a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Troika of the Summit and its joint leadership role is critical for political stability, regional economic integration and investments in SADC. The study explored how South Africa's leadership style would be compromised if it is not in the SADC Double Troika, hence the need to lobby to become a permanent member of SADC Double Troika. If successful, this would close the existing gap in the country's leadership agenda. The country applies quiet diplomacy in its engagement with SADC member states. However, there is a gap because it has not been firm enough when engaging the region on matters of good governance. South Africa's ability to act decisively on human rights violations in the region is constrained by the principle of sovereignty equality of states, which is enshrined in the SADC Protocol of 1992.

The economic strength of South Africa in Southern Africa is indisputable. Regional, continental and global interests lie at the heart of South Africa's foreign policy. This

research investigated South Africa's prospects as the most qualified State to lead the regional integration processes in Southern Africa. It was established that South Africa has the most diversified economy in the region and therefore critical to drive SADC's developmental regionalism. This is primarily due to its soft power, advanced infrastructural development, superior economic strength and mediation/facilitation capabilities.

It is prudent for South Africa to find some ways of becoming a permanent member of the SADC Double Troika of the Organ (either in the SADC Troika or SADC Organ Troika) so that it could exercise its leadership collectively with other Troika members.

## Acronyms

ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance
ANC	African National Congress
AfDB	African Development Bank
ASF	African Stand-by Force
AU	African Union
AU/OAU	African Union/ Organisation of African Unity
BELN	Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho and Namibia
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa bloc of countries
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Co-operation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Area
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBSA	India Brazil and South Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITAC	International Trade Administration Commission
JBCC	Joint Bilateral Commission for Co-operation
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MMA	Multilateral Monetary Agreement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NDP	National Development Plan
NIE	New Industrial Economies
Organ	SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIDMP	Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan

RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RSWIDP	Regional Strategic Water Infrastructure Development Programme
RTRN	Road Truck Route Network
SA	South Africa
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Development Community Brigade
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPMIL	Southern Africa Preventive Mission in Lesotho
SAPP	Southern Africa Power Pool
SIPO	Strategic Development Plan of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
TDCA	Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
UN	United Nations



## Chapter 1

### 1. General Introduction

#### 1.1 Introduction

The research is in response to the criticism levelled at South Africa's style of leadership in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The demise of apartheid in South Africa (SA) in 1994 brought with it the dawn of democracy and high expectations, both in Africa and in the international community, that she should assume leadership of SADC. This is due to the country's dominance of the region, most notably in the economic and military spheres. South Africa has the most diversified economy in the region and therefore critical to drive SADC's developmental regionalism. South Africa had to rekindle its relations with all member states of the Southern African Development Community. It also had to develop a post-apartheid foreign policy, which is underpinned by the philosophy of Ubuntu. The country's foreign policy places Africa at the centre of its priorities, for example, the priority on enhancing the African Agenda and Sustainable Development revolves around promoting democracy, good governance, human rights, peace and security, and sustainable development on the African continent. Furthermore, the country makes human and financial resources available to the AU and SADC as a way of strengthening of mechanisms and structures of these organisations. Other additional priorities include, relations with the Global South, the Global North and Global Multilateralism. It is through the priority on Political and Economic Integration of SADC that South Africa contributes to SADC processes, in order to create an enabling environment that is supportive of political and economic integration, including the effective functioning of the regional organisation.

The priority on Strengthen South-South Cooperation implores South Africa to engage identified organisations and formations of the South in order to contribute to and advance common positions of the South.

Despite being expected to lead the region since 1994, the succeeding years witnessed varying degrees of criticism being levelled at South Africa for not having assumed the expected leadership role. This study had established that leadership based on the context of the theory of realism is not an option for South Africa. There is a perception that despite being an economic powerhouse

in the region, SA is not demonstrating strong and decisive leadership. The assessment centred around SADC Declaration and Treaty of 1992 and the precepts of its foreign policy. Although SA is doing more to support regional stability based on mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and solidarity; and sustainable development, the legacy and impact of colonialism and dependency on foreign aid by some SADC countries are hindering South Africa's efforts to use her influence and assume expected leadership role.

## **1.2 Justification of the study**

The research established the truth that South Africa is playing her leadership role in the region in accordance with the SADC Declaration and Treaty of 1992. The 1992 Treaty stipulates that SADC acts in accordance with principles of sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes. The West perceives South Africa, which is more concerned about regional stability, integration and socio-economic development, as a threat to their interests in the region.

The study contributes to knowledge because it has identified the gap in that the existing literature criticises South Africa without taking into consideration that acts within the parameters of the 1992 SADC Treaty. The principle of sovereign equality of states constrains South Africa from dealing decisively with the countries that are violating human rights. The metaphysics of Ubuntu guides South Africa in her pursuit of her foreign policy priorities.

South Africa is at times viewed as a benevolent hegemon with the most diversified economy, which is critical to SADC's drive towards developmental regionalism. South Africa has demonstrated commitment to SADC's regional economic integration by stating that even if it would not be in the SADC Troika, it would continue to make resources available for regional integration. Regional industrialisation could only be realised if driven by a regional power house, which is not a sphere of influence of former colonial powers

The foreign policy of SA is committed to promoting the interests of the region through quiet diplomacy. In this process, the country is sensitive about

hegemonic perceptions whilst at the same time it cannot sit on the sidelines when good governance is being undermined.

Despite being a dominant power, SA is not a permanent member of the leadership structures of SADC, i.e. either SADC Troika of the Summit or Troika of the Organ. The absence of South Africa in the SADC Troika leaves a leadership vacuum and this explains why the rotational chairship of SADC is not good enough for regional integration.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

There appears to be agreements and disagreements in the existing literature on whether South Africa is a hegemon, pivot or self-appointed leader in Southern Africa and Africa at large. This reality then necessitates further explorations on criticisms and justifications of South Africa's Leadership Style in the SADC region in order to reveal some of the underlying factors.

The literature does not take into consideration the constraints presented by the principle of sovereign equality of states provided for in the 1992 SADC Treaty.

The problem that South Africa faces is the quandary that it finds itself in on whether to apply its perceived hegemon authority in providing leadership in the SADC region or to maintain the stand of being the first amongst equals.

### **1.4 Research questions**

The study is premised in the following manner:

What are criticisms towards South Africa's leadership style in the Southern African Development Community region and what are the justifications?

### **1.5 Research aim and objectives**

The main aim of this study is to provide an exploration on criticisms and justifications of South Africa's Leadership Style within the SADC region with hope of filling some of the literature gaps in the subject under enquiry.

The specific objectives are to:

- Explore criticisms towards South Africa's Leadership Style in the Southern African Development Community Region.
- Explore justification towards South Africa's Leadership Style in the Southern African Development Community Region.

### **1.6 Research methodology and structure**

This study followed qualitative approach as opposed to the quantitative approach to evaluate and assess the role played by South Africa in the exercise of power and leadership in SADC region. It moved from account of South Africa's foreign policy making and its actual implementation in answering the

question of whether the country's style of leadership in the Southern African Development Community is suitable to assist the region attain its long-term development aspirations. Creswell (2014: 4) described qualitative research methodology as "an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or group ascribe to a social or human problem. Qualitative researchers strive to get a thorough understanding of human behaviour and the rationale behind it. This approach was relevant to this study because it sought to understand the variation of South Africa's behaviour with regard to foreign policy making options.

The researcher used qualitative method mainly on what the researcher had read on the roles and functions of leadership in regional economic communities. The study also used literature reviews to gather in-depth understanding of state behaviour, including those that South Africa is working with in other organs of SADC. The researcher analysed and interpreted the meaning of the data with the aim of gaining a thorough understanding of the reasons that governed such behaviour and the relationship between South Africa and other Southern African States. Welman *et al* (2005: 8) supported this argument when they stated that the "aim of qualitative research method is to establish the socially constructed nature of reality, to stress the relationship between the researcher and the object of study".

Qualitative method allowed the researcher more flexibility in obtaining and analysing data. Neil J Salkind (2010:1162) stated that virtually every aspect of the qualitative analysis process relies heavily on the interpretative and analysis procedures carried out by the researcher. Of the two main and different methodological approaches to designing research, the researcher utilised the inductive approach as opposed to the deductive approach. The inductive research approach illuminated the researcher in understanding the underlying issues that contribute to South Africa's leadership challenges and opportunities in the region. In her attempt to assist the region to attain its aspiration, South Africa had taken an ethical decision that the Revenue Sharing Formula of Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) be reviewed to make provision for the development of a financing mechanism for cross-border industrial and infrastructure development projects. South Africa needed assurance that some

of SACU's financial resources would be used for developmental purposes. This consequential approach towards financing cross-border industrial and infrastructure projects would assist the region to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into the region. According to Pumela Msweli (2011:59), with the inductive approach the researcher could use the core question to generate data that provide well-grounded, rich description and explanations of processes in identifiable contexts.

As a leader who is concerned about attaining long-term aspirations of sustainable peace and stability, South Africa has become involved in resolution of conflicts and the promotion of peace and stability in the region. In this regard, South Africa's footprints are found in countries like Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe.

The researcher relied exclusively on literature. In this regards, qualitative data provided a deeper understanding of the topic as it took into account things like context, quality and meaning. Methods of gathering information included analysis of documents, materials and external literature reviews, which are all in public domain. According to Ranjit Kumar (2011:162), in qualitative research the researcher usually extracts descriptive (historical and current) and narrative information.

The researcher applied the judgemental or purposeful sampling of literature because the primary and secondary sources provided the appropriate information to achieve the objectives of the study. Salkind (2010:1161) indicates that the data or empirical evidence collection used in the qualitative enquiry is non-numeric and is collected in one or more of three basic forms: through interviews and /or conversations, through observations (either unobtrusive or as participant) and through documents. Larry B Christensen *et al* (2015:69) stated that one of the components of qualitative research is that it is multimethod, which means that variety of methods are used to collect data. In this regard, the data collection techniques that the researcher used are document analysis, desktop analysis, material and external literature reviews. These methods enabled me to get the best understanding and description of

South Africa's style of leadership in Southern Africa, namely, that of joint partnership.

The research was tilted towards comparative methodology, which is widely preferred in contemporary political science. Over and above making a comparison to illustrate an argument, the researcher applied comparative methods to systematically test the proposition. The researcher compared styles of leadership in other regional economic communities in order to clarify and understand South Africa's situation and draw lessons from the former for the latter.

The researcher used Harvard referencing method. The research took a period of fourteen months.

This research is comprised of six chapters.

Chapter One – General Introduction

Chapter Two - Conceptual and Legal Frameworks

Chapter Three - Good Governance and security

Chapter Four - Regional economic integration in SADC

Chapter Five - Finance and Investments in SADC

Chapter Six - Conclusion

## **1.7 Ethical consideration**

Most of the documents that I had used are in public domain and as such not confidential.

## Chapter 2

### 2. Conceptual and Legal Frameworks

This is a policy paper, which explores the criticism and justifications towards South Africa's Style of Leadership in Southern Africa Development Community. It sets out to examine concepts of regional leadership, good governance, security, industrialisation, economic growth and regional integration.

Africa and the international community expected South Africa to assume leadership position of SADC when it became a democracy in 1994 because of its moral high ground and benevolent hegemonic status. Some pillars of good governance in a democracy include respect and protection of human rights, freedom of speech, press and assembly. These pillars were explored to determine how South Africa is advancing them in Southern Africa.

South Africa puts Africa and notably Southern Africa at the centre of its foreign policy imperatives. To this end, one of its foreign policy priorities is the sustainable growth and development of the Southern African (SADC) region. South Africa is regarded as the conduit for economic growth and development of the region because of its economic strength, which is unparalleled in the SADC. It accounts for 60% of SADC's total trade and about 70% of the region's GDP. It is also the country in Southern Africa with the most diversified economy and therefore critical to SADC's drive towards developmental regionalism. The role that South Africa and its companies have played has benefited the region in many ways and these include job creation and human resources development.

Given the strength of South Africa's economy, the country plays a critical role in the industrialization of the region. The SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (2015-2063), was approved by the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe in April 2015 under the chairship of former President R G Mugabe. During her chairship of SADC in 2018, South Africa proposed and SADC Summit endorsed that industrialisation be an overarching priority for the region as per SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (2015-2063).

South Africa has actively participated in the SADC institutional reforms which took place between 2001 and 2004. The main element of these reforms was the



consolidation of the SADC policy agenda, namely, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO). SADC through the Organ on Political, Defence and Security Cooperation focuses on the promotion of peace, security and stability, conflict prevention and management, and consolidation of democracy in the region. Regarding security in the region, South Africa's foreign policy imperatives make provision for commitment to working for a stable African continent that enables peace and development. The country has been involved in mediation and facilitation efforts in countries such as the DRC, Madagascar and recently in Lesotho. Overall, the region remains politically stable with some semblances of political and security challenges in Comoros, the DRC and Lesotho. In line with the objectives of SIPO, South Africa has consistently participated in SADC Elections Observer Missions in various SADC member states.

This policy paper explored specific legal frameworks, which guided South Africa's leadership of the Southern Africa region.

South Africa provides leadership of the region within the framework of the 1992 SADC Treaty. The Treaty provides for SADC member states to act in accordance with the principles of (a) sovereign equality of all member states; (b) solidarity, peace and security; (c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; (d) equity, balance and mutual benefit and (e) peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles explain why South Africa has not been able to forcefully intervene in the domestic affairs of countries that are violating human rights. However, it engages them through the policy of quiet diplomacy. The objectives of the Treaty are to (a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; (b) evolve common political values, systems and institutions; and (c) promote and defend peace and security, amongst others.

South Africa is a signatory to the SADC Protocol on Trade. SADC Protocol on Trade envisaged the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) in SADC region. It seeks to further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services, contribute towards cross-border and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into the region and regional value chain.



South Africa has ratified the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, which would integrate three Regional Economic Community into one Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) market of 700 million people. The TFTA is based on the development integration agenda that combines market integration with industrial and infrastructure development. In the TFTA negotiations, South Africa is the coordinator of the negotiations on behalf of SACU, which negotiates as a block. SADC is not able to negotiate as a bloc owing to the challenges of dual memberships.

South Africa has been active in the negotiations of African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which was adopted by the AU. South Africa has already ratified the AfCFTA, which seeks to create a single continental market for goods and services and expand intra-Africa trade.

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the country has prioritised SADC in its foreign policy and has played a crucial role in the formulation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is a comprehensive development and implementation framework guiding the Regional Integration Agenda of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) over a period of fifteen years (2005-2020). It provides strategic direction with respect to SADC programmes, projects and activities in line with strategic priorities provided for in the SADC Treaty of 1992. South Africa as the most diversified country in the region has moral obligation to spearhead the regional integration Agenda and is guided by the RISDP in this process. The ultimate objective of the RISDP is to deepen integration in the region with a view to accelerate poverty eradication and the attainment of other economic and non-economic development goals.

South Africa has played an active role in the formulation of the SADC Industrialization Strategy. The Strategy is geared towards long-term modernisation and economic transformation of SADC region in line with Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU). The Regional Strategy is driven by National Development Plans, the SADC Treaty, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), and specifically by the Industrial Development Policy Framework (IDPF). It is also informed by African Union's Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa and Agenda 2063. The SADC

Industrialization Strategy and Roadmap seeks to engender a major economic and technological transformation at the national and regional levels within the context of deeper regional integration. It also aims at accelerating the growth momentum and enhancing the comparative and competitive advantage of the economies of the region.

## **2.1 Literature review**

### **2.1.1 Introduction**

The themes that have been reviewed include good governance, regional economic integration, finance and investment. Under goods governance, the researcher considered the role played by South Africa in championing the region's compliance with the principles of good governance. The researcher explored factors constituting good governance and their applicability to SADC. It was established that the literature does not address the challenges brought by the principle of respect for sovereignty, which constrains South Africa from dealing decisively with human rights violations in some SADC member states. South Africa is criticised for being selective when dealing with human rights issues. The country's foreign policy clearly states a commitment to advancing the principles of good governance and democracy, however, this has not been the case when engaging eSwatini.

These factors include respect for human rights, be they political, economic and social rights; periodic elections and freedom of speech, assembly, press and movement. Establishment of functional institutions that would safeguard democracy and fundamental human rights are critical.

South Africa's commitment to collaborative efforts geared at addressing poverty, underdevelopment and promoting human rights, peace and security in SADC region were explored. The literature recognises South Africa as a leader on the continent and for having played a leading role in negotiating a new strategic partnership between Africa and the outside world.

The theme on regional economic integration explored stages of economic integration in Southern Africa, namely SADC Free Trade Area, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). Furthermore, the researcher explored SADC as an investment destination. In this regard, the role of South Africa as a leading investor in SADC was examined. The literature criticises South Africa for prolonging the integration of SACU into SADC. A

comparative analysis of regional economic integration in other parts of the world was deliberated upon.

### **2.1.2 South Africa in Continental and Regional Community Politics**

During the era of white minority rule in SA, the apartheid regime used her technological superiority to coerce her neighbours into signing some non-aggression pacts as well as to violate their sovereignty. Ali Mazrui (1990:6) states that the white minority government in South Africa had access to advance technologies not because they were on the southern tip of Africa but because they were culturally related to those in Europe.

Chris Landsberg *et al.*, (2012:2) indicate that the foreign policy of democratic South Africa has shifted fundamentally from the foreign policy pursued by white minority governments of the pre-democracy era. Post 1994, South Africa has adopted foreign policy strategies and goals of domestic, sub-regional, continental, global South, industrialised North and global governance dimensions. International and domestic policies have been pursued with the aim of effecting the shape and direction of the country's domestic order and overcoming the legacies of the apartheid era, including poverty, inequality and social dislocation. Democratic South Africa has shown determination to demonstrate that she is a good world citizen in contrast to the rogue behaviour of the apartheid regimes.

South Africa favoured a "cautious and step-by-step" approach towards regional development in Southern Africa. Given the destructive role and violations of sovereignty of countries in the region by South Africa during the apartheid years, the country's post-1994 foreign policy has become sensitive to regional anxieties. This explains the reason why SA's current policy is based on the principle of equity and mutual benefit and the belief that an emphasis on partnership would be more effective in realising foreign policy goals. According to Landsberg (2018:14), South Africa played a leading role in negotiating a new strategic partnership between Africa and the outside world.

Mbeki's government made Africa the centrepiece of South Africa's foreign relations. Landsberg points out that Mbeki's government had to replace South Africa's European identity with African identity. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), took umbrage at Europe's deliberate minimalistic role in the struggle against apartheid.

South Africa's membership of BRICS emboldened it in her drift from the North. Landsberg (2012: 178) indicates that SA argued that without changes to the rules of North-South interaction and the former's benevolence, Africa would remain marginalised bilaterally and multilaterally.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996 states that the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation has a mandate to formulate, promote and execute the foreign policy of the country. South Africa's foreign policy places Africa at the centre of its priorities. Additional priorities on Relations with the Global South, the Global North and Global Multilateralism compliment the former priority. According to Zondi *et al.*, (2014:9) the priority of enhancing the African Agenda and Sustainable Development revolves around promoting democracy, good governance, human rights, peace and security, and sustainable development on the African continent. South Africa deploys personnel and makes annual financial contribution to the African Union and SADC as a way of strengthening of mechanisms and structures of these intergovernmental organisations. It is through the priority on Political and Economic Integration of SADC that South Africa contributes to SADC processes, in order to create an enabling environment that is supportive of political and economic integration, including the effective functioning of the regional organisation.

The priority on Strengthen South-South Cooperation implores South Africa to engage identified organisations and formations of the South in order to contribute to and advance common positions of the South. South Africa's foreign policy priorities are reflected in these engagements with the global South.

Having just emerged from apartheid isolation, SA assumed leadership role in Africa. Olusola Ogunnubi *et al.*, (2016:11) state that since the dawn of democracy in the country, SA expanded its socio-economic, political and ideational influence. It also increased diplomatic ties in the continent and beyond. The country's commitment towards collaborative efforts such as addressing poverty, underdevelopment and promoting human rights became its priority.

The process of integrating South Africa's foreign policy institutions into government was not easy. However, the country's stature as a formidable regional and global

leader was reinstated with the demise of the apartheid system when its leadership was recognised by international organisations. It is noted that pre-1994 SA was barred from participating in the activities of international organisations such as the UN and the then OAU, among others. According to Chris Alden *et al.*, (2015:7), this was an indication of the country's recognition as an African leader. Former President Mbeki of South Africa engaged the like-minded countries on the continent, especially Nigeria and the Western countries in his efforts to negotiate better developmental aid and favourable investment terms, which would benefit Africa. This engagement resulted in the adoption of NEPAD whose aim is to improve good governance on the continent.

Alden *et al.*, (2015:10) show that SA played a central role in the transformation of the OAU into AU. Clauses outlawing the unconstitutional change of government and prevention of genocide and violations of human rights, which are provided for in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 are credited to South Africa. South Africa was willingly involved in peace efforts in Burundi, The Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s and 2000s. Despite her unselfish efforts, some African countries still view SA with some measure of suspicion. According to Makwena Maleka *et al.*, (2016: 199), while South Africa is praised by the West for its human rights commitment, it is not the same on the African continent. South Africa is often attacked from the within the continent for not "toeing the line". It is this kind of criticism that coerced South Africa to realise that in order for it to secure legitimacy as the voice of Africa, it would have to adjust the tone and texture of its engagements on sensitive issues pertaining to Africa. Furthermore, Victoria Graham (2006, 121) indicates that when the then President Mbeki's letter to the then President Robert Mugabe was leaked to the media, the former South African President was accused of being "manipulative" and of "furthering the agenda of a domestic and imperialist lobby". The letter was urging former President Mugabe to return to reconciliation talks with the Zimbabwean official opposition party.

Valerie Ferim (2008:182) argues that lack of will power by South Africa to accept the burden of hegemon as well as the crime situation in the country, HIV/AIDS and xenophobia impede South Africa from becoming a hegemon in the region. There is an acknowledgement that foreign policy of quiet diplomacy has replaced the country's foreign policy of coercive diplomacy, which was the characteristic of the apartheid government. When former President Mbeki was responding to a Parliamentary debate

on the State of Nation address in Cape Town on 18 February 2003, he said that the government seeks to “assure our neighbours that the government we lead has no power pretensions. We claim no right to impose our will on any independent country. We would not force anything on anybody”. Ferim claims that SA faltered in its leadership obligations by being reluctant to castigate the internal crisis that had plagued Zimbabwe.

Lack of good governance and leadership in some countries had forced illegal immigrants to come to South Africa and this subsequently resulted in unfortunate incidences of xenophobic attacks. In an article that was published on the website of [www.lusakatimes.com](http://www.lusakatimes.com), Sishuwa Sishuwa (2019) states that South Africa is paying for the failures of leadership and policies of other African countries. He goes further to ask why would citizens of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria or indeed any other African country leave their countries for the slums of KwaZulu-Natal or Gauteng, where they risk being beaten or killed instead of staying in home capitals? According to Sishuwa, it is because they feel that they have reached a dead end in their countries, that their national political leaders have failed them. Sishuwa admits that South Africa was being made scapegoat for the failures of other leaders in the SADC region.

South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe did not produce the desired results and was widely criticised domestically. Victoria Graham (2006:115) shows that NEPAD placed emphasis on compliance with a set of principles relating to democracy and good governance. However, South Africa applied double standards when it dealt with issues relating to political governance in Zimbabwe. She laments that when talking about the concept of the African Renaissance and good governance, former President Mbeki spoke with passion and commitment. Graham was critical of former President Thabo Mbeki who pursued quiet diplomacy in his engagements with the then Zimbabwean President Mugabe.

Makwena Maleka *et al.*, (2016:194) corroborate the above when they point out that the democratic rule in South Africa ushered in a new commitment to promoting the principles of good governance and democracy. However, the country has failed to engage the Kingdom of eSwatini (formerly Swaziland) on these principles. This hypocritical approach has resulted in divisions within the tripartite alliance made up of

the African National Congress, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

South Africa has too many domestic problems to lead the SADC region. Mzukisi Qobo (2018) argues that under former President Zuma's leadership, South Africa's stature as a global player of note diminished significantly. Domestic priorities, values and institutional and leadership qualities were damaged under former President Zuma's administration. Qobo basis his argument on the fact that foreign policies are an expression of countries' domestic priorities, values and institutional and leadership quality. Qobo argues that the driving force of Zuma's presidency, and by extension his foreign policy thrust, was transactional leadership - a preoccupation with using public office to maximize personal gains. It is indicated that during Zuma's administration, relations with countries such as Angola, the DRC and Central African Republic were always enmeshed with commercial deals that had nothing to do with South Africa's interests. During this period of Zuma's leadership, South Africa's stature on the global stage diminished significantly. Qobo is corroborated by Peter Lewis (1998:32) when he laments that where corruption is widely practiced, evidence of the weakness of public institutions is portrayed.

South Africa has demonstrated its commitment to SADC since joining the regional organisation on 29 August 1994. The country has always had a vision for the SADC, which is "peaceful, prosperous and characterised by partnerships". It has shown commitment to contribute to the best of its ability to the improvement of all SADC and its people. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2003: 83) corroborate this by stating that the country is also committed to intra-regional relations based on peace and oriented towards sustainable development and economic growth. The emphasis is on the effective distribution and management of existing resources. Therefore, South Africa's vision for the Southern African region is one of economic co-operation, mutually beneficial and joint preparation and planning of cross-border development projects. Other stakeholders like non-governmental organisations, civic organisations, parastatals, development agencies and private sector and trade unions should together shape the future of southern Africa.

Peace and security in southern Africa are a prerequisite for economic growth and development to thrive. To achieve lasting peace and security, SA should promote her



foreign policy principles in the region and should encourage SADC member states to promote human rights and democracy. Alden *et al.*, (2003:87) indicate that without democracy, freedom and respect for human rights, the pillars of South Africa's approach to international relations, durable peace and stability cannot be realised.

Since 1994, SA has played a leading role in the establishment of security architecture in Southern Africa and on the continent. When SADC was formed, security of the region was one of the areas on which countries agreed to collaborate. Thomas Mandrup (2009:2) states that since South Africa joined SADC, the regional security co-operation in Southern Africa has strengthened because necessary institutional frameworks were set up. He indicates that despite the crisis that engulfed Zimbabwe, the DRC and Lesotho in 1998, South Africa demonstrated leadership by indicating that SADC would form a regional stand-by brigade, which would be used by the AU.

South Africa defended SADC's decision to admit Comoros because it believes SADC could assist the Indian Ocean Archipelago state to solve its problems. Peter Fabricius (2018:2) claims that SADC inherited a world of trouble when it accepted the Democratic Republic of Congo as a member in 1997. It has also accepted another problematic "existing condition" by accepting Comoros as its 16<sup>th</sup> member in August 2018.

SADC placed the Prime Minister of Lesotho under pressure to ensure that political reconciliation succeeds and that security sectors reform to move ahead. The main obstacle point has been the continued exile in South Africa of the leader of the opposition, Mothetjoa Metsing. Liesl Louw-Vaudran (2018:2) states that former Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke of South Africa has managed to convince Lesotho to withdraw its request to have Mothetjoa Metsing extradited to stand trial for corruption.

South Africa has a long history of involvement in peacekeeping missions in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Madagascar. Lucy Dunderdale (2013:2) acknowledges that since 1994, promoting peace in the region has been a priority in South Africa's foreign policy. However, Dunderdale (2013:5) criticises South Africa for being a player in the continued conflict and of putting South African troops and Congolese civilians at risk.



### 2.1.3 South Africa as international player of note

South Africa has historically placed emphasis on its peace and security approaches to enhance its global presence and influence. The country has always emphasised that peace and security are critical to ensuring long-term development and stability in Africa. Gustavo de Carvalho (2018:4) indicates that this is evident in the country's engagement in several peace processes in the continent, including the DRC and Burundi. In both countries, South Africa provided direct bilateral support to the peace processes and contributed military personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations. However, the consistency of the country's foreign policy under Zuma's administration was criticised. Criticism was also evident in the country's engagements in the Central African Republic, the controversial decision not to arrest the Sudanese President al-Bashir and the decision to withdraw from the International Criminal court (ICC).

During his UN General Assembly speech in September 2018, President Ramaphosa called on the UN to become a more effective instrument for mediation, peacekeeping and post conflict resolution. Gustavo de Carvalho (2018:4) shows that SA has been active in appointing mediators to The Sudan, Burundi and Madagascar. Furthermore, thousands of SA troops were deployed in the UN peacekeeping operation, including the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

Since the dawn of democracy in the last 25 years, South Africa has managed to carve out a place for itself in global affairs. The country has persistently established itself as the leading African voice in the Global South. South Africa has become more involved in the multilateral fora like the United Nations, G20, BRICS and IBSA. It has forged close partnerships with the emerging powers, including China and India. In addition, South Africa will assume the chairship of the African Union in 2020. In the article published in the website <https://saiia.org.za>, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2016) states that promoting global peace and security has been one of the principles of South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa worked towards finding African solutions for African problems. The country has contributed towards building the security architecture on the continent and has keenly taken on the role of a mediator and facilitator in countries such as South Sudan and Lesotho.

Under President Zuma's administration, the country's foreign policy focussed on its engagement with the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group.

While originally created with a strong focus on economic integration measures, BRICS became increasingly involved in peace and security discussions, including the decision in 2018 to establish a working group to discuss peacekeeping.

South Africa's campaign for the Security Council seat (entitled 'Continuing the legacy: Working for a just and peaceful world') highlighted the critical importance of renewing its leadership in regional and global forums. The campaign focussed on the following key areas:

- Negotiated settlements as a key area for the UNSC,
- Increasing cooperation between the UN and the AU, particularly towards achieving the AU's Africa Agenda 2063 and its goals to silence the guns by 2020,
- The African Agenda, including the continent's priorities in peace and security and
- Working in partnership to reform the UN.

South Africa was endorsed by the AU in 2018 to serve for the third time as a non-permanent member of the UNSC and was eventually elected into the UNSC on 8 June 2018. The country is already playing a visible role, taking some risks, blocking some actions and intervening in key discussions. In one instance, during the tense debate on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) earlier in 2019, South Africa blocked the UNSC from releasing a statement that it deemed premature. South Africa sided with China and Russia on the DRC's contested election results, and supported Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro. In an article published in the website [dailymaverick.co.za](http://dailymaverick.co.za), Gustavo de Carvalho acknowledges that consensus among the three African members of the UNSC (the A3) has historically been weak and difficult to achieve. However, South Africa had managed to bring the A3 countries, which includes Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, together in a strong, unified position on Sudan. Together the three states advocated that the UNSC follow the AU Peace and Security Council decisions on Sudan.

#### **2.1.4 South Africa and SADC's regional economic integration.**

South Africa is the only country in the SADC region that has the economic capability and levels of diversification that are required for the realisation of the economic integration process, which is mutually beneficial. Richard Lee (2011:2) states that the country dominates the Southern Africa region economically by virtue of accounting for

60 percent of SADC's total trade. It also accounts for approximately 70 percent of SADC's GDP. The role that South Africa and its companies have played has benefited the region in many ways and these include job creation and human resources development.

Fritz Nganje (2014:3) corroborates Lee's assertion by indicating that South Africa's dominance in the region is indisputable. He also points out that South Africa accounts for 60 percent of SADC's total trade and about 70 percent of the region's GDP. The diversified South African economy is critical to drive SADC towards developmental regionalism.

SA is the most suitable to lead regional integration in the SADC region due to its first world infrastructure, greater economic strength and conflict mediation and facilitation capabilities in the region. Adebajo (2014) supports this assertion when he states that although the role of South Africa as a hegemon in Southern Africa has been contested, South Africa's investments in individual SADC countries are prevalent.

South Africa should carry the responsibility of expediting the process of regional integration in SADC in a manner that is more equitable. This would ensure that representatives of the state, civil society and non-governmental organisations of other countries in the SADC should no longer maintain that the objectives of the Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) of reducing their dependence on South Africa no longer remain to be achieved. Sehlare Makgetlaneng (2011: 81) elucidates that since 1994, SADC member states have been expecting South Africa to play a leading role in the regional economic integration. Accordingly, the expectation of Zimbabwe's state and non-state actors was for South Africa, as a regional power, to assume leadership in mobilising and distributing resources for the good of the region.

Siphamandla Zondi *et al.*, (2010: 35) indicate that when SADC was established in 1993, it sought to overcome the weaknesses of its predecessor, i.e. the (SADCC), which placed more emphasis on political and security considerations over economic and developmental imperatives. Indeed, SADC has adopted numerous protocols and programmes to address the problems of uneven development, low intra-regional trade and poverty. It prioritises poverty eradication through social and economic development and good management of human security outcomes. The authors further

indicate that the adopted RISDP sees high levels of intra-regional trade as a major contributor to regional integration and poverty alleviation.

SA has assumed a leadership role in the region by fostering closer collaboration and economic integration. Amos Saurombe (2010:124) indicates that the country commands economic and political strength in SADC region and the primary focus of its foreign policy is Southern Africa. However, it has a delicate relationship with SADC because it has to satisfy her continental and global role without compromising her leadership responsibilities in Southern Africa. The views of the Zimbabwean State, capital and civil society is that South Africa should forge and sustain better and more equitable relations with the rest of Southern Africa to create and sustain a more meaningful mutual dependence.

It is critical that South Africa should strive for the integration of SACU into SADC. It is through its contribution to regional integration that it contributes effectively to African continental integration. Makgetlaneng (2013:42) argues that SA does not need SACU but SADC to advance, achieve and defend its long-term strategic interests in the region and the entire continent.

The simmering tension between SA and BELN countries indicates that the integration of SACU into SADC would eventually become a reality. Makgetlaneng (2013:317) reveals that tension already exists between SA and other SACU member states over the review of the revenue sharing formula. He indicates that South Africa should strengthen its relations with BRICS member states in its efforts to advance its regional and continental agenda.

SADC Summit has taken a decision to establish a customs union (CU) as part of its integration agenda. If SADC CU were to succeed, then SACU would either cease to exist or be integrated into the former because no country can hold membership of two CUs. Peter Draper *et al.*, (2007:21) corroborate Makgetlaneng's (2013) view when they state "many SADC protocols and other legal instruments have pushed the region to deeper economic integration indirectly, in ways that SACU" does not mirror.

The realisation of economic independence, desires and political security needs for SADC member states are guiding the developmental approach to regional integration. Within Southern Africa, the argument for regionalism is based on other issues than

trade, with structural weaknesses being regarded as impediment towards regional trade integration. The implementation of SADC Trade Protocol heralds a new era of market integration. Meanwhile COMESA's integration programmes are centered on trade, for example, the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. However, Dani Venter *et al.*, (2007: 251) argue that COMESA has not been able to address structural constraints that are necessary for the implementation of an integration agenda.

Tralac (2018:2) states that the AU/OAU is committed to the Agenda of integrating the continent through its eight Regional Economic Communities. A number of RECs are progressing towards meeting the timelines of the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The Abuja Treaty calls for "the co-ordination and harmonisation of policies among economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the African Economic Community". The East African Community (EAC) has made the most of the progress and is now aiming at establishing a political federation. The journal places SADC in the fourth position in terms of advancement in Africa. The COMESA- EAC- SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) was launched in 2015 during the Third Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, which was held in Egypt. The purpose of the TFTA is to harmonise the trade arrangements among the three RECs, with a view to establishing a single Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing all of the member states.

The commitment by three RECs to establish a TFTA consisting of 26 countries is an important milestone. Trudi Hartzenberg (2011:6) stresses that it would address the problem of overlapping membership in the regional integration arrangements.

### **2.1.5 SADC as an investment destination.**

South Africa has prioritised Africa in her international engagements and has diplomatic Missions in 46 African countries. The country is committed to the reconstruction and development of Southern Africa. Sibusisiwe Gwala (2015:94) points out that SA is the leading investor in the region and its rapid economic growth throughout the African continent has been remarkable. South Africa's relationship with Mozambique, for example, illustrates that the country has been deepening economic growth in the region. Mozambique has emerged as South Africa's leading investment destination and the Mozambican Investment Promotion Centre reports that, there were more than 262 investment projects belonging to South Africa that have been

registered since 1985, which by the end of 2003 had accrued US\$1,330 billion worth of investment value. South Africa accounts for 60% of SADC's overall trade. South Africa also makes about 70% of the region's GDP. When dealing with matters related to SADC FTA, South Africa has reacted thoughtfully to accommodate regional concerns. For instance, the SADC Trade Protocol of 1996, which came into force in 2000 and calls for the establishment of a regional FTA by 2008, provides for an asymmetrical reduction of industrial tariffs, mainly in the clothing and textile sectors, with South Africa acting swiftly to make deepest cuts to offset regional trade imbalances.

In his examination of factors that determine the inflow of FDI to the SADC region, Kupukile Mlambo (2005:558) elucidates that FDI is key for introducing widespread technological change and critical to improving competitiveness of industrial firms as well as providing access to skills and global markets. Mlambo indicates that FDI to the SADC region has improved significantly since the end of apartheid in South Africa. South Africa is an important growth pole for attracting FDI to the region. However, it is indicated that regional infrastructure bottlenecks constitute a major constraint to intra-regional trade and investment in Southern Africa.

Since the dawn of democratic rule in South Africa, the country has registered rapid economic growth across the African continent. South Africa has become a significant investor on the continent to the extent of challenging the dominance of multinationals from the US and Western Europe. A number of factors explains the emergence of South Africa as a leading trade partner and investor in Africa post 1994. The country's readmission into the global community represented a turning point in its economic relations in that it reinstated her trade rights in the global trade system after a long period of isolation prompted by the oppressive rule of apartheid. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2005:369) assert that this readmission triggered a surge of its investment capital into the African market. South Africa's investment into Africa has been encouraged by the country's championing of NEPAD. It is through NEPAD that African leadership undertook to deal decisively with challenges of good governance, eliminate corruption, manage and resolve conflicts. These efforts would in turn attract developmental aid and Foreign Direct Investments into the continent.

There has been a significant increase in the flow of FDI into the SADC region as compared to other regions on the continent. Paul J Dunne *et al.*, (2017:403) state that the intra-regional investments have been dominated by SA, which accounted for around 80% of the FDI stock within the region. In 2010, the country had collective investments amounting to \$980 million in Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zambia.

In a show of leadership, South Africa criticized international gas companies for depriving African countries of much of the benefits of their own gas discoveries. South Africa wanted a greater cut for Southern African countries from their huge gas resources. Peter Fabricius (2017:3) indicates that former President Zuma urged the African Development Bank to work with the SADC Ministers of Finance to work out a gas exploitation regime that would benefit the SADC member states.

Governments in Southern Africa must tackle the important issue of policy head-on if the region is to attract FDI and maximize their developmental impact that opening to the world market forces may impose. It is indicated that FDI is the engine of economic growth and development. Andre Goldstein (2004:7) laments that Sub-Saharan Africa remained on the margins of global FDI flows during the boom years of the 1990s and he attributes this to perceptions of poor investment climate, small market size, inadequate infrastructure and insufficient knowledge of investment opportunities.

Samson Muradzikwa (2002:7) shows that the countries have realized the need to liberalise, deregulate and privatise their economies. The relaxation of South Africa's exchange controls has formed part of the liberalisation policies that SADC have gravitated towards. In the case of South Africa, this has resulted in many South African companies investing in SADC countries. However, Muradzikwa indicates that the SADC region has major obstacles to attracting greater investment levels due to the location of the region and size of the SADC market, which is by far smaller by international standards. Some of the major constraints in attracting FDI into SADC are infrastructure weaknesses and questionable corporate governance.

South Africa's decision to relax exchange control has contributed to economic growth in the FDI recipient countries. In 2012, South Africa was the biggest investor on the African continent in new FDI projects to the extent of superseding the traditional



investors from the developed world. An article by Thalia Holmes (2013:1) indicates that South Africa has created almost 46 000 cumulative jobs through Foreign Direct Investments in Africa. Despite the 2012's grim global numbers showing the second biggest decline in FDI since the start of the recession and the number of South African FDI projects increased by 23%.

Africa lost almost \$1.3 trillion through capital flight between 1970 and 2010. According to Tendai Gwatidzo (2017:4), \$254 billion was from the SADC region and most of this came from the resource rich countries, namely Angola, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

### **2.1.6 Regional Economic Integration in other parts of the world**

Kevin Cai's work (2010:121) indicates that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 with the aim of promoting peace, stability, political and economic co-operation. The founding member states are Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN became increasingly united and active when Vietnam occupied Cambodia in the mid-70s. ASEAN sought solution to the Cambodian conflict in co-operation with the US and China. A security framework was institutionalised in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. ARF is regarded as a genuine Forum for security dialogue that involves ASEAN and 17 other countries as well as all major regional and global powers. According to Kevin Cai (2010:121), the Forum provides opportunity for member states to discuss regional political and security issues and to develop co-operative measures to regional stability and peace in East Asia.

In Latin America, the early aim of MERCOSUR was to cement the return to democracy since all its founding member states had emerged from dictatorship in the 1980s. It was formed in part to cement a rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil where their relationship had suffered earlier from a competition, regional dominance and diplomatic agendas. Claire Felter *et al.*, (2017:1) indicate that MERCOSUR is a political and economic bloc comprising of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela. The member states agreed to eliminate customs duties, implement a common external tariff (CET) of 35% on certain imports from outside the bloc. Felter *et al.*, (2017:1) state that the Treaty calls for "free movement of goods, services and



factors of production between countries”. They also agreed to adopt a common trade policy towards outside countries and blocs.

Meanwhile when the Gulf Co-ordination Council (GCC) was established on 25 May 1981, its Charter called for co-ordination and integration in all fields. The GCC has impressive development in communication and infrastructure networks and is better integrated than many networks in Middle Eastern countries. Humayon A Dar *et al.*, (2001:1162) note that in 1981, the GCC adopted the United Economic Agreement (UEA), which makes provision for free trade in all agricultural products, animals and industrial products, which originated within the member states. The UEA also provides for Common External Tariffs (CET). Rules of Origin stipulate that a local product is one which has at least generated 40% of value added within the GCC.

BRICS political bloc was institutionalised on 16 June 2009 in Russia and it has already launched a number of initiatives aimed at providing additional and different capabilities to global, political and economic governance structures. Sanusha Naidu (2018:1) indicates that BRICS has created the New Development Bank (NDB), which had initiated funding to the value of US\$3.4 billion at the end of 2017 to member countries. SA initiated the BRICS Outreach Partnership, which is a channel including key partners across the African continent.

The proliferation of regional integration initiatives and geopolitical forums are changing the economic and political landscape. SA is a member of many fora including the BRICS, IBSA, G77 and is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Hany Besada *et al.*, (2013:9) show that South Africa’s membership of BRICS would allow it to positively contribute to key global governance and democracy issues and to demonstrate its leadership on issues such as conflict resolution, security, reconstruction and development.

### **2.1.7 Sub-conclusion.**

Since becoming a democratic country, South Africa has regarded Southern Africa as one of the most important priorities of its foreign relations. This is demonstrated by its commitment to all spheres of the SADC agenda, including political, social and

economic integration of the region. The country's foreign policy desires the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region.

South Africa remains a major source of FDI for the other SADC countries in the region. This is credited to the relaxation of exchange control by Pretoria, which resulted in cumulative jobs in the region. Infrastructure bottlenecks in the region prompted South Africa's decision that some of the SACU revenue should be used for infrastructure in the region.

The literature review has shown that SA is playing a leadership role as demonstrated by her role in economic regional integration. The country is also a leader in investing in the region. The philosophical view of Ubuntu continues to guide the country's foreign policy in resolving the challenges faced by the region. It has been found that SA has been consistently involved in facilitation and mediation processes in the region. Some priorities of the country's foreign policy include enhancing the African Agenda and sustainable development, strengthen political and economic integration of SADC, strengthen South-South Cooperation, strengthening relations with strategic formations of the North, participation in the global system of governance and strengthen political and economic relations. This research sought to provide an answer to the question of whether SA was not demonstrating decisive leadership in Southern Africa.

## Chapter 3

### 3. Good Governance and security

#### 3.1 Introduction

In line with the 1992 SADC Treaty, South Africa is committed to good governance and rule of law. Some of the principles of Treaty state that member states shall act in accordance with human rights, democracy and rule of law. South Africa, as a regional power, would compromise her credibility if it continues to ignore calls for respect of human rights and freedom of association with some countries in the region.

The African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG), which was adopted on 30 January 2007 in Ethiopia provides for the minimum requirements for the adherence to democratic principles. In complementing the South African Constitution, the SADC Treaty provides for consolidation, defense and maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability.

South Africa has played a key role in conflict mediation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho and Madagascar. The government has also allocated a significant amount of time and resources to peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and development. SA is furthermore a member of the SADC Troika on Politics and Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (Organ) where it continues to contribute to good governance, mediation and security in the region and on the continent. This illustrates that SA is not standing on the fence while it comes to matters of conflict resolution in Southern Africa.

#### 3.2 Research findings

Some pillars of good governance in a democracy are freedom of speech, press and assembly, which enable ordinary citizens in a given country to participate in a pre-leadership function of signalling the problem situations that encroach upon citizens' purpose in the society. It is only when people enjoy their rights to free speech and assembly, the right to strike and so on, that they would bring their concern to the authorities and seek that the authorities address them where reasonably possible. These rights are provided for in the Constitution of South Africa and many of the SADC countries. It is unfortunate that these basic rights are trampled upon in some of the

countries in Southern Africa. Robert Tucker (1981:68) supports this statement when he states that freedom of press and publishing and freedom of research without impediments are important requisites of democratic leadership.

When governments disregard pillars and institutions of good governance, citizens' concerns would naturally raise due to lack of participation, violations of their civil rights and legitimacy of the government of the day. Conflict arises when people or a group feel marginalised by those in power. At the onset, colonial powers did not willingly hand over political power to independent states in Africa and were never interested in good leaders of the people. When they handed over power, they made sure that they handed it over to associates whose duty was to protect the interests of the former colonial masters and not to promote good governance for the benefit of their own nationals. This created tension between liberation leaders and partners/cronies of the colonial powers and resulted in political repression and non-respect of human rights. Good governance was never on the agenda of the colonial rulers. The colonisers used state power and violence to intimidate the Africans into submission. Unfortunately, the independence leaders continued with this culture of using violence against their own people and this remain evident to this day. Fonkem Achankeng (2013:6) corroborates this argument when he rightly points out that African states have remained under the influence of former colonial rulers, who have never been interested in changing the colonial situation in their former colonies. Regrettably, some African leaders who are in power continue to perpetuate this culture of violence and in some cases refuse to cede power despite the appeals from their nationals to do so. Uganda, The Sudan, Chad, Cameroon and until recently Zimbabwe, are good examples of leaders who have overstayed their welcome. It is this lack of good governance that requires regional powers like South Africa, working in partnership with intergovernmental organisations like the AU, to provide democratic leadership in the form of capacity building.

The African Union (AU), through NEPAD activities and processes is committed to the improvement of democracy and good governance. To accomplish the objectives and the outcomes of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), African leaders have adopted the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) through which their countries would be peer reviewed. The APRM, to which South Africa played a key role in its formative years, reviews areas such as democracy and political

governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development. On 30 January 2007, the AU Summit adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG) in Ethiopia, which provides for the minimum requirements for the adherence to democratic principles. Its ratification and implementation are imperative to the attainment of peace and security, protection of human rights and effective democratic governance in Africa. It complements the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, which recognises the principles of non-discrimination, civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights, which are fundamental to good governance. Whilst the political will to uphold democratic principles at the AU level prevails; there remains the challenges of institutional capacity and domestication of the ACDEG in the member states. Elements of good governance in a democracy are government institutions, accountability, transparency and financial accountability, which are lacking in most of the African countries. In supporting this argument, Kedibone Phago (2013:107) indicates that AU member states face challenges of creating and maintaining the institutions of democracy, which are meant to facilitate and uphold citizens' rights such as the universal access to justice, freedom of expression and media freedom.

In 2003, the SA Government set out objectives to promote international respect for human rights and democracy; promote peace, security and stability in Africa. In order to attain these noble objectives, South Africa's post-settlement foreign policy shifted in fundamental ways from the external strategies pursued by white minority governments of the pre-1994 age. SA became keen to show that she is a good world citizen in contrast to the rogue behaviour of the apartheid regimes. South Africa flexed its new muscles by committing to promoting the interests of Southern Africa, the African continent and even those of countries of the South. Just as the policies of the previous regime had been detrimental to relations with the outside world, so those of the new democratic SA should be beneficial, particularly if geared to the republic's progress and stability in the economic sphere. Chris Landsberg *et al.*, (2012:2) corroborate the above when they indicate democratic South Africa is determined to show that they are good world citizens in contrast to the rogue international behaviour of the apartheid regimes. It should be noted that some SADC countries suffered deadly human rights violations at the hands of the apartheid regime of pre-1994 SA. The country was mindful that 'a leadership role had been imposed on it and was sensitive

about hegemonic perceptions about itself. It wished to shun the 'Big Brother or Big Sister syndrome' while it realised that it could not afford to 'sit on the sidelines'.

South Africa has stayed on course in implementing its foreign policy imperatives. Zondi *et al.*, (2014: 10) indicates that the main pillars of South Africa's national and foreign policy interests include the following:

- prioritising the sustainable growth and development of the South African economy;
- prioritize the sustainable growth and development of the Southern African (SADC) region;
- commitment to working for a stable African continent that enables peace and development to take root; and
- to work towards the creation of a just and equitable world order.

South Africa has been an active participant in the SADC institutional reforms which took place between 2001 and 2004. A need to turn the SADC into a fighting machine against poverty inspired these reforms. The main element of these reforms was the consolidation of the SADC policy agenda into two holistic plans, namely, the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO). The SADC Summit, which was formally held in Namibia in 2001, adopted the Protocol on the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The Summit formalised the Organ's structures including a troika of current chairperson, out-going chairperson and in-coming chairperson as a team to lead the Organ's work throughout the year. There is also a Ministerial Committee, which is divided into two committees, namely the Committee for Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy, which is comprised of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Inter-State Committee that consists of Ministers of Defence/Security. The SIPO priorities are to control the proliferation of small arms and elections management. Siphamandla Zondi *et al.*, (2010:42) corroborate this by indicating that elections management has become a major area of intervention by SADC to prevent electoral conflict because it tends to disrupt the consolidation of democracy.

South Africa was right in pursuing quiet diplomacy in her engagements with Zimbabwe during the Presidency of Robert Mugabe. This served to assure the region that Pretoria is not a hegemon but a good neighbour who is willing to support regional

countries to resolve their internal problems through dialogue. SA had expressed concern that the Zimbabwean Government suppressed the rights of people to protest peacefully. Despite criticism by Victoria Graham (2006:115) that quiet diplomacy would not yield any positive results in Zimbabwe, South Africa asserted that it is interested in a Zimbabwe that is democratic and politically stable. Stability in Zimbabwe would in turn lead to prosperity. SA's engagements finally paid off because it resulted in the formation of a Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe, which saw Morgan Tsvangirai, then leader of the official opposition, becoming the Prime Minister.

Since the dawn of democratic rule in South Africa, the country's foreign policy clearly stated a commitment to promoting the principles of good governance and democracy. However, SA adopted a hypocritical approach when dealing with eSwatini. South Africa remained silent when called upon to support calls for radical transformation in eSwatini. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country is just a delaying tactic towards tolerating the eSwatini monarchy despite human rights violations in that country. In supporting the above finding, Maleka Makwena *et al.*, (2016:195) decry the fact that the Presidency of former President Nelson Mandela and succeeding administrations focused on promoting human rights and firmly stamped its moral authority on the world. Paradoxically, they tolerated eSwatini despite human rights violations in the Kingdom.

The Constitutions of SADC member states make provision for respect and promotion of human rights. However, their implementation seemed to be deliberately ignored. A case in point is Zimbabwe where lethal force is used to disperse demonstrators. Although South Africa has been engaging the authorities in Harare through the policy of quiet diplomacy, it is not able to act decisively because of the constraints placed by the 1992 SADC Treaty. The Treaty is paradoxical in a sense that it provides for respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law; and simultaneously make a provision for the principle of sovereign equality of states constrains. Furthermore, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states needs to be revisited because it constraints leading countries like South Africa from taking decisive action when the SADC Treaty is being violated, of course with a clear mandate from SADC.

Until such time that South Africa has successfully lobbied to be permanent in the SADC Double Troika, it would continue to attract criticism for not doing enough in



dealing with human rights violators. As Liesl Louw-Vaudran (2019) stated, consideration should be given to turning SADC Double Troika into a more permanent structure made up of the six lead states in the region.

The current rotational system of leadership in SADC is not effective enough. As recent as August 2019, the 39<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, that was held in Tanzania elected Zimbabwe to chair the SADC Organ Troika. It is the researcher's considered view that Zimbabwe should not have been allowed to chair the SADC Troika of the Organ due to domestic political crisis confronting it. As Chair of SADC Troika, one can be assured that Zimbabwe would not want issues of state repression as they apply in Harare to appear on the agenda of the SADC Double Troika, let alone the SADC Troika of the Organ. When violation continue in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the region, anger and criticism would be directed at South Africa – the regional powerhouse for not acting decisively.

South Africa's stature as a global player of note diminished significantly under former President Zuma's administration, which tended to focus more on economic diplomacy and avoided to be involved in areas where it would not yield any economic benefits. During that era, SA aggressively pursued its own economic interest instead of mediating in conflict situations in Africa and this compromised the base of its soft power. The involvement in the Central African Republic is a case in point where SA deviated from its regional approach. Mzukisi Qobo (2018) supports this when he points out that under Zuma's presidency, the foreign policy took a transactional direction wherein he was pre-occupied with using the public office to maximise his personal gain. He further lamented that relations with countries such as Angola, the DRC and the Central African Republic were always entangled with commercial contracts that had nothing to do with South Africa's interests.

There is a perception that South Africa would like to dominate the continent through its leadership on the continent. Leadership requires not only ideas but also more tangible resources and SA lived up to this. The democratic SA led a campaign for Africa's renewal, namely the African Renaissance, to structure continental institutions in line with its interests. South African corporations, which wanted to penetrate the markets that were previously not accessible, complemented the campaign. In her effort to bring about political stability in Africa, SA has been an active participant in



peace and security initiatives. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2015:1) indicate that since the 1990s, SA has contributed 2020 troops to peace missions led by the UN and AU in 14 peace missions. This contribution made SA one of the major troops contributing countries from Africa.

South Africa is committed to good governance, democracy, peace and security in the region. South Africa as a member of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (Organ) continues to play a role in the unfolding political process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which had democratic elections in December 2018. South Africa has been playing a leading role in Lesotho where President Cyril Ramaphosa is the SADC Facilitator. President Ramaphosa has now appointed a Facilitation Team, led by retired Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke to support him in the facilitation process. The country has members of the South Africa Police Services in Lesotho serving as instructors and has two judges in Lesotho making judgements on cases brought to their attention. South Africa has also appointed a Special Envoy for Madagascar who has been engaging the role players in the country to ensure that elections would take place under stable and peaceful conditions. The first round of Presidential elections in Madagascar took place on 7 November 2018 and the second round took place on 19 December 2019. The former President of South Africa, Kgalema Motlanthe, was appointed to chair the Commission of Inquiry into post-election conflict in Zimbabwe. All these efforts point to the fact that SA is concerned about peace and stability in the SADC region. Liesl Louw-Vaudran (2019: 9) who stated that the objectives of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of SADC are to enhance regional peacebuilding; conflict prevention, resolution and management and collective defence supports the above.

South Africa's global recognition since 1994 is a result of its commitment to democracy and good governance. During the apartheid era in South Africa, the army used to destabilise neighbouring countries with such brutality that has now left an intense suspicion of the country's military interventionism. This explains why SA did not deploy any forces to be part of Southern Africa Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL) but opted to contribute through a SADC facilitation process instead. Lesotho is now experiencing relative peace with all stakeholders engaged in a dialogue and SA is not imposing her position on them. In the area of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, SA has applied quiet diplomacy to facilitate dialogue between warring political parties and

to resolve their issues in an amicable manner. It has skilfully done this in a regional approach and this has helped to quell the myth of dominance.

This is supported by Olusola Ogunnubi *et al.* (2016:310) when they indicate that SA finds comfort acting as a third-party mediator under the auspices of institutions like the SADC, the AU or the UN.

SA has played a pivotal role in the formation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF), which should be able to provide the AU with rapid reaction capability consisting of five regionally based brigades. The responsibility of creating Peace Support Operations and the ASF structures have been placed upon the regionally dominant states, for instance SA in Southern Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. On 17 August 2007, SADC declared its stand-by force operational. SA is able to provide the equipment that other states in the region do not possess. SADC member states have pledged their contribution to SADCBRIG and SA would deliver the capabilities that the other members lack. Thomas Mandrup (2009:19) indicates that SA has pledged a parachute battalion, engineering capability, sanitation, a field hospital, harbour patrol boats and a host of other capabilities to fill the gaps of the other member states.

Promoting peace in the region has been a priority in South Africa's foreign policy since 1994. SA has a long history of involvement in peacekeeping missions in such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar and Sudan. However, Lucy Dunderdale (2013:5) criticises South Africa of being a player in the continued conflict and of putting her troops and Congolese civilians at risk. This criticism is misplaced because conflict is an integral part of our lives and requires continuous management. SA, as part of the international community and a regional power cannot stand by while there is ongoing conflict in the region. It has a duty to assist the conflicting parties to find a peaceful solution. Throughout the DRC crisis, South Africa has always been at the center providing a mediation process and had rightly deployed peacekeepers in line with the UN Security Council's resolution 2098. Dunderdale fails to recognise the achieved progress, which culminated in the recent elections of December 2018.

### 3.3 Analysis

It is important to note that when the African National Congress (ANC) was elected to form a government, there was already an epistemic view that the democratic government of South Africa would be hegemonic in the region. This is supported by Chris Landsberg *et al.*, (2012:7) when they point out that while the new government was mindful that ‘a leadership role was imposed on SA’, Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of SA, was sensitive about hegemonic perceptions about SA and wished to shun the ‘Big Brother or Big Sister syndrome’ while it realised that it could not afford to ‘sit on the sidelines’.

There is no way in which the former colonisers were to leave the region peacefully without causing some form of tension amongst the countries in the region. The Western powers are aware of the mineral wealth of the region, which are of strategic importance for their economic growth in Europe. The former colonisers of the region managed to control the regional countries by providing them with financial aid, except for South Africa, which has an effective tax collection mechanism to finance its own projects. This view is supported by Achankeng (2013:6) who points out that African states continue to be influenced by former colonial powers, which have never been interested in changing the colonial situation in their former colonies. South Africa advocated the idea of beneficiation of our raw materials before they could be exported and this puts it at loggerheads with the former colonial powers. It seeks to address the paradox of “rich Africa, poor Africans”. The best way for the Western powers to dislodge SA is to label it a hegemon and instil distrust of SA among SADC member states. South Africa is not a “hegemon” state but working jointly with other countries in the region to find a solution to the existing problems. This is demonstrated by the mediation process it is leading in Lesotho, which resulted in all political parties participating in the National Leaders Forum, which took place on 23-24 August 2018.

On the other hand, one could understand the distrust that some of the SADC countries have of SA. South Africa needs to work very hard to convince the regional countries that it would not use any hard power against them. The manner in which the apartheid government violated the sovereignty of countries such as Angola, eSwatini Lesotho, and Mozambique is making it difficult for democratic South Africa to exert its influence on the region. Ogunnubi *et al.*, (2016:10) corroborate this when they say that the

apartheid's terror campaign, which destabilised Southern Africa has left an intense distrust of military intervention by SA and that remains strong to this day. However, one has to acknowledge that democratic SA has since 1994 adopted a diplomatic approach to solve political problems in the region. Over the recent years, SA has adopted the style to act within the regional structures in dealing with conflict situations.

The principle of good governance includes a multiparty democratic political system, and respect for rights of political parties, right to peaceful assembly and respect for workers' rights, amongst others. These rights are enshrined in the National Constitutions of SA, eSwatini and Zimbabwe; and have to be respected. Tucker (1981:68), states that without freedom of speech, press and assembly, ordinary citizens in a given country would not be in a position of participating in a pre-leadership function of signalling the problem situations, which encroach upon citizens' purpose in the society. This assertion of citizens' rights and press freedom brings us to the 1992 Treaty of SADC, which talks to promotion of common political values and defence of democracy. The above-mentioned rights are also enshrined in the South African Constitution of 1996, Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 and the Constitution of eSwatini of 2005, amongst others.

In order for South Africa to avoid criticism of not paying attention to gross human rights violations in eSwatini, it might have to introduce the latter country's human rights situation on the agenda of the Organ. However, Maleka *et al.*, (2016:195) argue that this commitment has not been the case when engaging eSwatini. In fact, there are persistent human right violations and political parties are still banned through the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the Industrial Relations Act of 2008 in eSwatini. eSwatini is clearly taking advantage of its historical ties with the ANC by virtue of having accommodated the latter's cadres during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Now that the ANC is the ruling party in SA, it feels indebted to eSwatini for South Africa's freedom. Maleka *et al.*, (2016:197) corroborate this by indicating that in May 2013 the ANC called for the democratisation of eSwatini, the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles and free political activity. However, this dismayed the eSwatini government who never hesitate to remind the ANC of the role played by eSwatini in the liberation struggle in SA. It would appear that the SA government lacks the courage to refer the matter to SADC for intervention.

Indeed, South Africa needs to be consistent in the way it deals with matters of good governance. The fact that it remained silent on human rights violations in eSwatini under the guise of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries raises some eyebrows. In fact, it should find a way of becoming a permanent member of the Organ.

South Africa expresses her domestic priorities, values and leadership capabilities through her foreign policy, which is underpinned by the philosophy of Ubuntu. It would gain more mileage if it were to pursue and promote its priorities and values in the SADC region. Having adopted a regional approach to problem situations and as a member of the SADC Organ, the country can use its soft power to influence positive change in the region.

Those criticising SA choose to ignore the fundamental fact that its foreign policy is guided by the principle of Ubuntu, which is characterised by the concepts of morality, dignity and good relations. Some priorities of the country's foreign policy include enhancing the African Agenda and Sustainable Development, strengthen political and economic integration of SADC, strengthen South-South Cooperation, strengthen relations with strategic formations of the North, participation in the global system of governance and strengthen political and economic relations. South African Foreign Policy remains focused on the strengthening of regional integration with particular emphasis on improving the political and economic integration of SADC. Furthermore, it believes that the regional integration process should be guided by developmental requirements to improve the multitude of challenges facing the continent, primarily the scourges of poverty, underdevelopment and Africa's marginalisation. Zondi *et al.*, (2010:39) supported this view when they stated that SADC reforms between 2001 and 2004 were partly informed by a need to turn SADC into an efficient vehicle for leading a concerted war against poverty.

In 1998, when the political crisis started in Lesotho, South Africa was the first to deploy and arguably without the mandate of SADC. This resulted in concerns being raised when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) invaded Lesotho to reverse a military coup in 1998. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2015:8) corroborate this when they indicate that concerns about SA foreign policy activism was put under the spotlight in 1998 when South Africa sent troops to Lesotho to squash the military coup. One would

therefore understand the decision by South Africa to accept the responsibility of facilitation as opposed to deploying troops under the banner of SAPMIL.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country would not make it possible for SA to attempt to bring about political change in any country unilaterally. The “rule” that SA only plays a specific role in states when authorised to do so by a regional or international organisation such as the SADC, AU or UN is not convincing. It is recollected that in 2013, SA intervened in the Central African Republic’s crisis, which did not pose a direct threat to it as compared to eSwatini, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

The Theory of Realism, which does not recognise the relevance of ethical conduct in international relations, does not apply in South Africa’s engagement with the SADC countries. Realism is an antithesis of the philosophy of Ubuntu. One has to understand that SA’s relations with the SADC countries were negatively affected by the apartheid regime of pre-1994. It was during this period of apartheid that white-ruled South Africa had aligned herself with European countries with whom it shared cultural identity. Ali Mazrui (1990:8) referred to the then white-ruled South Africa as “the fragments of Europe lodged in Africa”. White-ruled South Africa did a lot of damage in its relationships with the SADC countries. It would more often invade targeted countries in the pursuit of her interest, which included violating the sovereignty of countries such as eSwatini, Lesotho and Mozambique to destroy targeted areas.

### **3.4 Sub-conclusion**

If South Africa acts decisively in the pursuit of its foreign policy, it risks losing the support of the continent. It has now adopted the regional approach of working in partnership with the countries in the region to advance its foreign policy agenda. However, it would be important for SA to find some creative ways of continuously remaining in SADC Organ if its regional approach is to become effective.

South Africa has been instrumental in getting a clause such as suspension of government that comes into power unconstitutionally and intervention to prevent forms of genocide and gross violations of human rights included in the AU governance architecture.

South Africa should demonstrate leadership by invoking Article 33 of the SADC Treaty, which calls for sanctioning any member state who persistently fails to fulfil obligations provided for under the Treaty. South Africa and eSwatini have a Joint Bilateral Commission for Co-operation (JBCC), which was signed in 2004 and the former could use this framework to entrench democracy and respect for human rights in the latter, if it is wary of raising these violations in a SADC multilateral forum.

If South Africa is to continue to play an effective leadership role in the region, it should find a way of continuously being a member of the SADC Troika in the same way that Nigeria has managed to remain a permanent part of the security architecture within ECOWAS. Countries with questionable track-records on human rights should be barred from serving in the Organ, e.g. Comoros and eSwatini. The barred countries should be encouraged to put their houses in order to avoid being conflicted.

SA has demonstrated commitment to contributing to peace building in SADC and on the continent; this is verified by its pledge to contribute a host of capabilities to SADC BRIG. Mandrup (2009:19) corroborates this when he indicates that SA has pledged a parachute battalion and engineering capability, amongst other things.

South Africa remains committed in assisting the Kingdom of Lesotho to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution through the SADC supported reform process. In his capacity as SADC Facilitator to Lesotho, President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed a Facilitation Team to support him on a continuous basis.

South Africa demonstrated its commitment to the promotion of democracy and good governance by participating in the observation of elections in the region such as the Republics of Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the DRC. Despite the good work it has been doing, South Africa needs to pronounce itself on the situation of human rights in eSwatini where fundamental human rights like freedom of expression and association are still suppressed. It should be pointed out that on the occasion to commemorate the 242<sup>nd</sup> US Independence Day, Ambassador Lisa Peterson of the US remarked that “Protecting citizens’ freedom to form associations, to assemble in a public square and to express opinions – even if they are currently unpopular – lays the foundation for greater innovation and diversity of thought, which is what eSwatini will need to achieve its national development goals”.



## Chapter 4

### 4. Regional economic integration in SADC

#### 4.1 Introduction

South Africa is expected to play a leading role in Southern Africa's regional integration, which is a critical component of securing sustainable economic and political stability in the region. It is not in the interest of South Africa or the region for Pretoria to continue sitting on the fence for fear of being labelled a hegemon in the process of regional integration. Since 1994, the region has been expecting South Africa to lead the regional economic integration. South Africa has adopted the regional approach of working in partnership with the countries in the region to advance its foreign policy agenda.

South Africa should consider integrating SACU into SADC if it is to effectively lead the regional integration agenda of SADC, which depends on it for its success. SACU is proving to be an obstacle towards the realisation of the SADC Customs Union because one country cannot belong to two Customs Unions. The country's long-term strategic interests in the region and the continent lie with SADC and not with SACU.

Regional integration has taken place in various parts of the global regions, something that has led to economic growth and interdependency in the concerned regions.

#### 4.2 Research findings

It has been established that the SADC geographical area is one of the richest regions on the African continent and the participation of South Africa lays the foundation for successful economic co-operation in the region. South Africa is one of the most important economic powers on the continent. Venter *et al.*, (2007: 129) support this when they indicate that the participation of SA as a member of SADC lays the foundation for successful economic cooperation in the region. SA stands to benefit from SADC FTA because there is likely to be slower inward cross-border migration to the SA market place because of the growth effects expected in other SADC countries.



South Africa favours a carefully calibrated and balanced approach when dealing with regional development issues in Southern Africa. SA prefers joint partnership and quiet diplomacy in dealing with regional developmental issues. Chris Landsberg supports this in his paper, when he states that given the destructive role South Africa used to play in the region during the apartheid era, the post-1994 policy has become sensitive to regional anxieties. Today's policy of SA is based on the principle of equity and mutual benefit, a denunciation of domineering and bossy postures towards the region. Over the years, SA has put more efforts into restructuring SADC and pushed for articulation, implementation and operationalisation of legal instruments with special emphasis on those dealing with free trade, politics and security.

SA has the most developed and diversified economy within the region as well as in Africa. Acknowledging this, it rests on the fact that regional integration in Africa needs to be taken seriously and South Africa's active participation is crucial because it could potentially make or break regional integration. It is also crucial that commercial relationships with countries in the region and the continent be mutually beneficial. Since the advent of democratic rule in South Africa, the government has prioritised the region in its foreign policy. To give an example, South Africa adopted a "Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa" as its first foreign policy document in 1996. Sehlare Makgetlaneng (2011:81) supports this statement when he indicates that since 1994, the SADC member states have been expecting South Africa to play a leading role in the regional economic integration. Accordingly, the expectation of Zimbabweans was to see increased integration in terms of mobilisation, generation and distribution of resources, including wealth, with South Africa as a regional power playing a leading role. Makgetlaneng (2011:95) reveals that the central view of the Zimbabwean State and non-state actors is that SA should see to it that the integration process is faster and more equitable so that role players in the SADC region should no longer maintain the objective of SADCC of reducing dependence of their countries on it.

SADC is regarded as the fourth most advanced REC in Africa. Intra-SADC trade substantially increased from \$20 billion in 2004 to \$72 billion in 2014 following the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. The SADC Free Trade Area (FTA)

was launched in 2008 when 85 per cent of intra-regional trade amongst the participating states attained zero duty. SADC is experiencing a challenge to establish a Customs Union because some of its member state already are members of well-established Customs Unions like SACU. Some members have dual membership with other RECs. The future of the SADC Custom Union depends on SA taking a decision to integrate SACU into SADC. One cannot expect the Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho and Namibia (BELN) countries to take such a decision because they benefit from revenue sharing arrangements at the expense of SADC Customs Union. This is corroborated by Peter Draper *et al.*, (2007:20) when they state that “since all SACU members are members of SADC, and since one cannot be a member of two CUs, it is obvious that should SADC succeed, then SACU would fall away in favour of the SADC Customs Union”.

It follows that the principal hurdle facing regional integration in SADC and SACU in particular, arises from inequalities between South Africa and other SACU member states, BELN. The level of development of BELN countries are different and the countries vary in size of population and economic strength. Progress has been made by creating the SADC FTA, which increased the size of the market in the region. However, SA could do better by ensuring that SACU becomes integrated into SADC. The intra-SACU trade is characterised by the dominant position of South Africa within the BELN grouping. South Africa enjoys over 75% of the market in each country. This imbalance of trade leaves South Africa with a multi-billion-dollar regional surplus. It is recognised that South Africa is more developed in financial services, transport infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and technological research. These dynamics place South Africa in a much more dominant position in SACU political economy. Chris Saunders *et al.*, (152: 2012) argue that the inequality among SACU member states is deep rooted, consistent and persistent. They argue that with South Africa’s integration into Southern Africa following the demise of apartheid and the dawn of democracy in 1994, the issue of inequality has become more pronounced and South Africa’s economic dominance has become more entrenched.

Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which was established in 1910 by the then colonial British Empire, is proving to be an obstacle towards achieving regional integration in Southern Africa. South Africa holds the key to resolving the challenges posed by SACU towards the realisation of a SADC Customs Union. The governance

of SACU and related achievements are attributed to SA. The country's International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) performs the tasks of SACU's Tariffs Board. Accordingly, the institutional and legal framework and technical expertise of South Africa are the driving force behind the effective functioning of SACU. SACU cannot survive without SA.

The 2002 SACU agreement makes provision for BELN countries to exercise their right to set tariffs. However, the challenge is that these countries have no capacity to establish tariff boards that would enable them to decide on the setting of tariffs. They depend on South Africa to carry out this mandate. SA has since demanded that the 2002 SACU agreement be reviewed because Pretoria considers the tariff setting as its policy space. Tariff setting is industry-based and it is SA, which would be negatively affected if BELN countries with very few industries were to be allowed to set tariffs. In supporting the above, Makgetlaneng (2014:301) states that the problem posed by SACU towards regional integration could have been resolved in 1994 by South Africa acting in partnership with SADC partners but that did not happen. This has been the failure of SA and other SADC member states regarding the integration agenda. He points out that if "SA is to contribute to the achievement of regional integration, it should carry the primary responsibility of bringing SACU to an end". As a matter of fact, the AU has granted SADC the mandate to integrate Southern Africa and not SACU. The AU depends on RECs to realise the objective of integrating the entire continent. In fact, the objective of integrating Southern Africa is not provided in all SACU Agreements of 1910, 1969 and 2002 respectively.

Furthermore, one country cannot belong to two Customs Unions. This explains the reason why there has not been any substantial move to have the decision to establish the SADC Customs Union implemented. One anticipates that the review of the SACU Agreement would eventually lead to the integration of this olden customs union into the SADC because it would be difficult for SADC to have a Customs Union as long as SACU exists. South Africa is already feeling the pinch as a result of the demands by BELN countries to play a role in the SA policy space of tariff setting and this has created tension within SACU. It is not conceivable that SACU would be extended to include other SADC member states. This is supported by Peter Draper *et al.*, (2007:19) when they indicate that some non-SACU states in SADC are wary of South Africa's perceived dominance of the region and are not in favour of joining SACU. Their fear

is that joining SACU might end up creating a financial dependency on SA through the revenue-sharing arrangement.

Goods manufactured in the SACU area could be exempted from any duty and quantitative restrictions. However, goods imported from outside the SACU area are subjected to duties and this is a bone of contention because subjecting goods from non-SACU member states to duties does not contribute to regional integration in SADC. With the advent of democracy in South Africa, the BELN countries and South Africa agreed that the 1969 SACU Agreement needed to be renegotiated in order to address the needs of the SACU members effectively in terms of revenue sharing and the decision-making process. The 1969 SACU Agreement was criticised by all SACU member states from their own respective perspective and this led to the renegotiations of the Agreement. Dani Venter *et al.*, (2007: 162) state that the aims of SACU are to maintain and promote free interchange of goods between the member countries. South Africa is the custodian of all customs and excise income collected by virtue of the said income being paid into its national revenue fund. The collected income eventually is shared among member states according to a prescribed formula.

The SACU Agreement of 1969 stipulates that member states should apply the customs, excise and safeguard rules to goods imported from countries, which are not members of SACU. However, SACU members were allowed to join other trade agreements provided such agreements are not contradicting the 1969 SACU agreement.

When SACU was established in 1910 by the British Colonial Empire, the intention was not to achieve regional economic integration that would benefit the region but South Africa's neighbouring countries were integrated in the regional process as reserves of cheap labour. The British colonial power used violence to get the proletariat from the neighbouring countries to supply labour on a vast scale. According to Makgetlaneng (2011:80), it was based on the capital accumulation in the gold mining sector of the South African economy by British colonial power. The regional integration led to the establishment of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), Common Monetary Area and the Central African Federation, which consisted of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe which existed until 1964. The demise of the federation resulted in Zimbabwe entering into a preferential agreement with South Africa in 1964.

Regional integration offers the region with a platform to overcome their detriments of being minor by merging their small states with those that are relatively developed such as South Africa and Namibia. It is spearheaded by factors such as political will, dedication, political stability and regional peace as success drivers and these elements often involve massive compromises from the member states. Some factors from a political and development point of view such as social, economic, infrastructure and unstable political systems have played a part in contributing to the challenges of regional integration in the SADC region. In Southern Africa, South Africa is the most developed nation and it represents about 61% of the total SADC GDP. Being a regional leader means the country needs to shoulder some of the financial responsibility to realise set objectives. That is why Daniel N Mlambo (2018:3) is arguing that SA is expected to utilise its vast resources (technology, military, economy and infrastructure) to the benefit of Southern Africa.

In line with the above, development corridors, which are focal points for regional development initiatives in Southern Africa, are some of the SADC's priority areas that could contribute to regional integration and poverty eradication. They were conceptualised by the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), with a goal to promote regional co-operation through mobilising development assistance, joint development projects and decreasing economic reliance of member states on apartheid SA. Regional cross-border infrastructure, especially transport, energy and water are some potential ways to contribute to regional integration and poverty alleviation in the region. In order to strengthen this approach, the SADC has adopted a Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan with the key component that includes the Road Truck Route Network (RTRN), the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) and the Regional Strategic Water Infrastructure Development Programme (RSWIDP). Zondi *et al.*, (2010:44) state that the most significant aspect of development corridors is the introduction of the idea of Private Public Partnerships, which brought the increased participation of the corporations in developing regional infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, a role previously played by the state. Some of the notable projects include the North-South Corridor, which links SA to countries to its north and is by far the busiest regional transit link in southern Africa.

Since 1994, South Africa has regarded Southern Africa as the most important priority of its foreign policy. This is demonstrated by its commitment to all spheres of the SADC agenda including political, social and economic well-being of the region. It is noted that the focus of the 1992 SADC Treaty is on deepening economic integration. South Africa acceded to this Treaty on 29 April 1994 at the Heads of State Summit in Gaborone, Botswana, and was given a sector responsibility for finance, investment and health as a result of its capacity in the relevant sectors. The country has already seconded an expert to SADC Secretariat to support the integration agenda. Amos Saurombe (2010:125) backs the strategic role of SA when he argues that “the success of the SADC regional integration agenda undoubtedly depends on South Africa’s willingness to support it”. SADC founded the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) as a guide for deeper integration. The key milestones of the RISDP were to attain Free Trade Area in 2008, Customs Union in 2010, Common Market in 2015, Monetary Union in 2016 and regional currency in 2018. Saurombe (2010:125) points out that the successful implementation of RISDP can hardly be achieved without the active participation of the biggest economy in the region, namely South Africa.

A successful integration agenda is important to South Africa because it has significant interests in the region and SADC has an export market for its internationally uncompetitive products, as is the case in SACU. South Africa’s industrial and agricultural sectors depend on water resources from countries in the region. Accordingly, SA has played a leading role to address issues related to closer co-operation and regional economic integration. This was demonstrated by its role in the establishment of a Free Trade Area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure and human resources as well as facilitation for peace, democracy and good governance in the region. While negotiating in the SADC FTA, South Africa led the negotiations on behalf of SACU. Saurombe (2010:127) claims that the “SADC FTA agreement was mainly tailored to suite the perceived interests of the SA business community”.

South Africa, like any other sovereign state, has the right to pursue its national interests in the context of international relations. It has signed the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union (EU). The Agreement covers a wide range of areas of cooperation, which include development cooperation, cooperation in economic and trade-related areas. Its ultimate objective is to create a



free-trade area between South Africa and the EU over a 12-year period, effectively by 2012. Saurombe (2010:129) laments that the Agreement would have a devastating impact on other SACU member states and SADC. The journal goes further to indicate that the TDCA was reached without consultations with SACU member states (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini (formerly Swaziland)). SA is criticised for disregarding the SACU Treaty, which states that such agreements should be approved by members. Saurombe (2010:129) states that these independent actions by South Africa put the issue of trust on the line and made other SACU members realise that SA is a hegemon and does not take them seriously. South Africa stands accused of maximising its interests whilst other BELN countries are being disadvantaged. SADC also fears that the EU goods would flood the SADC market as a result of the TDCA. This SADC anxiety has been realised because it has become difficult to control the movement of EU goods from entering the SACU and SADC markets. It is further stated that other SADC countries expressed their displeasure that SA signed the SADC FTA after its negotiations with the EU had been completed. South Africa appears to have divided attention by virtue of rather focusing on its trade with the EU than on the SADC.

Africa needs a dominant economic power like South Africa to address the developmental challenges facing the continent. South Africa has the first world financial system as compared to other countries on the continent and according to the World Fact book of 2008, has a fully effective military, which operates on a budget about twice that of all SADC states combined. All these factors qualify South Africa to be a hegemon in the SADC region and on the entire African continent. This is supported by Valery Ferim (2008:181) who is unequivocal in that SA is a hegemon in the region. However, Ferim points out that South Africa lacks the political will to accept the responsibility of hegemony in the region. In my view, SA is not a hegemon state because it works in partnership with other countries in the region. Ferim needs to understand that the country's policy of coercive diplomacy, which existed prior to 1994, has been replaced by one of quiet diplomacy. Based on the principle of Ubuntu, South Africa does not have any "great power pretensions" in the region but has a duty to act decisively and persuasively on matters of regional integration without suppressing other countries.

South Africa is criticised as a hegemon without leadership. Nganje (2014:3) acknowledges that South Africa's dominance of the region is indisputable, particularly

in the economic sphere where it accounts for 60% of SADC total trade and approximately 70% of the region's GDP. However, Nganje is quick to point out that this economic dominance does not necessarily translate into the capacity to lead. Nganje argues that leadership "requires intellectual capacity, a well-articulated development vision and strategy as well as political will and diplomatic influence". According to him, South Africa has not capitalised on opportunities to develop these attributes.

South Africa has played an active role in SADC in the late 1990s and early 2000s and was crucial in efforts to revamp the organisation's institutional framework with a view to aligning it to a more rationalised agenda. However, the country has subsequently become reluctant to assume a more prominent political leadership role in SADC; a posture that has been blamed on an enduring sensitivity to regional fears of domination. SA does not need to nurse the feelings of some SADC leaders in pursuing leadership at the expense of the desired regional economic integration. It is worth mentioning that Pretoria's unwillingness to lead SADC does not in any way detract from South Africa's economic hegemony in the region. Fritz Nganje (2014:4) points out that South Africa's companies continue to penetrate and dominate Southern African markets and in some instances their operations have worked to undermine the developmental objectives of SADC's integration agenda. South Africa's non-assertiveness in the wake of an integration process inadvertently reproduces the very perception of domination and exploitation it seeks to avoid. SA should avoid behaving as the first among equals and lead the region. The pronouncement it made to continue making resources available for regional integration is a noble one.

### **4.3 Economic integration in other regions**

It has been established that major economies in East Asia successfully achieved growth when they became New Industrial Economies (NIE). Their economies became more integrated through trade liberalisation and FDI flows. SADC could therefore take a leaf from East Asia and become more economically interdependent. This is corroborated by Kevin Cai (2010:92) when he states that China, a dominant economy in East Asia, shunned its policy of relying on its own resources and participated in the integration of East Asia. This opened up the effective regional co-operation in East Asia and vastly expanded the region's market, natural resources and industrial potential. Since the mid-1980s, East Asia witnessed an increased economic



integration and this led to rapid economic growth in the region. East Asia became an important market for East Asian countries because of regional integration, which saw increased levels of intra-regional trade and FDI. Integration deepened economic interdependence among regional countries and this was concurrently accompanied by declining importance of the US, as a market or source of investment for East Asia economies. Cai (2010:93) supports this when he indicates that the values of exports in intra-regional trade in 1985 was \$67.6 billion, in 1995 was \$343.1 billion and in 2003 was \$576.3 billion. Whereas the value of trade with the US in 1985 was \$103.9 billion, in 1995 it was 235.2 billion.

In Africa, the African Union (AU) remains committed to the implementation of the integration Agenda through its eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which include SADC but not SACU. It should be noted that in terms of SACU Treaties, Southern Africa regional integration is not part of SACU's mandate. Most of the RECs are on schedule with the overall timeline of the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The Abuja Treaty calls for the coordination and harmonisation of programmes and policies among the RECs for the purpose of establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). In supporting this statement, Tralac (2018:2) indicates that the AU has to implement the integration Agenda in harmony with its development framework, namely Agenda 2063, which provides for the implementation of flagship projects like AfCFTA, the Integrated High-Speed Train Network, the Commodities Strategy, the Grand Inga Dam Project and the African passport and free movement of people. The EAC has made most of the progress in terms of economic integration and has made significant improvements in Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB). It has also reduced turnaround time in the movement of cargo from Mombasa in Kenya to Uganda from 18 days to 4 days respectively. Similarly, the turnaround time from Kigali has decreased from 21 days to 6 days. The EAC launched the Customs Union in 2005 and adopted the Protocol establishing the Common Market in 2009.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was declared a Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2000, is regarded as the second most advanced of the RECs on the continent. It is followed by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) whose regional trade was \$3.1 billion in 2000 prior to launching the FTA. However, the regional trade significantly increased to \$22.3 billion in 2014 when the

FTA was launched. SADC is the fourth most advanced REC on the continent. However, its integration has been challenged by overlapping membership.

This challenge of overlapping memberships in sub-Saharan Africa would soon be a thing of the past with the establishment of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), which was launched in Egypt on 10 June 2015. As an example, eSwatini, which is a member of SADC, is also a member of COMESA; Tanzania has dual membership in SADC and EAC and this phenomenon applies to other countries as well. The TFTA would combine three RECs, twenty-six countries and approximately 632 million people; and about \$1.3 trillion in combined GDP. Between 1994 and 2014, trade has increased from \$ 2.3 billion to \$36 billion in these RECs. On 13 December 2018, SA's Department of Trade and Industry issued a media release confirming that the country has ratified the Agreement establishing the TFTA. It is expected that other countries in the SADC region would follow suit because most of them have signed a Declaration of Intent to become members of the TFTA. The AU has also launched the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2017 at its 25<sup>th</sup> Summit of the AU Heads of States and Government, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Sbusisiwe Gwala (2015:99) supports this argument when she points out that South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) states that the emerging Tripartite Free Trade Area must be one of the top priorities in South African foreign policies as it is an important phase towards integration in the continent and the TFTA would lay to rest the challenge of overlapping memberships in RECs. The ratification of the TFTA Agreement by SA is in line with chapter 7 of NDP 2030 (2012:235) which states that SA should "expand its collaboration and co-operation on the African continent through deeper integration and increased trade with its regional trade partners in Africa" and the global south in general.

South Africa is not only representing her national interests but those of other African countries in multilateral institutions it belongs to. It has already called upon SADC countries to make use of New Development Bank (NDB) funds for their developmental agenda. Equally, BRICS has committed itself to help the African continent to promote employment, infrastructure development and industrialisation, including connectivity and other developmental projects. SA, together with Brazil, Russia, India and China are members of BRICS political bloc, which has already launched a number of initiatives aimed at providing additional and different capabilities to global, political,

and economic governance structures. BRICS has created the (NDB), which had initiated funding to the value of US\$3.4 billion at the end of 2017 to member countries. Sanusha Naidu (2018:2) states that the BRICS bloc would want to assert its authority on the back of the growing uncertainties in the global political affairs. South Africa initiated the BRICS Outreach Partnership, a channel of inclusion for key partners across the African continent.

Regional integration is not a new phenomenon and countries in South America have also taken advantage of it. Latin American states established MERCOSUR in 1991 when Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion. Venezuela joined MERCOSUR in 2012 but was suspended in late 2016. The member states agreed to eliminate customs duties and implement a common external tariff (CET) of 35% on certain imports from outside the bloc. Once again, SADC would find it difficult to implement a CET as long as SACU exists. Claire Felter *et al.*, (2017:1) state that the Treaty calls for “free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries”. They also agreed to adopt a common trade policy towards outside countries and blocs. MERCOSUR countries have a combined GDP of \$2.9 trillion, making it one of the largest economic blocs globally.

#### **4.4 Challenges posed by xenophobia**

Xenophobic attacks, which took place in SA in 2008, 2009 and 2015, are not helping SA’s efforts towards integration, especially in the area of free movement of business people. There is a view that South Africans are not positively receptive to foreign nationals. Alden (2009) indicates that South Africans seem not to accept people who are not from South Africa, specifically nationals from other African states. The eruption of the xenophobic attacks across South Africa in 2008 and 2009 saw poor Africans particularly those living in townships and informal settlements viciously assaulted, leaving dozens of people dead. This behaviour undermines South Africa’s leadership role in the region and causes a rift with other African countries thus hindering forging sincere partnerships and integration.

#### **4.5 Analysis**

South African Foreign Policy remains focused on the strengthening of regional integration with particular emphasis on improving the economic integration of SADC.

It needs to be bold in spearheading the integration process. However, this has to be done within a cooperative partnership with SADC member states. This is supported by Fritz Nganje (2014:4) when he states that it would neither assist SA nor SADC region for Pretoria to sit on the sidelines in the face of challenges pertaining to regional integration. At a meeting of the SADC Ministerial Task Force on Economic Integration, which I attended in Pretoria in July 2018, South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, indicated that even if it is no longer the Chair of SADC, it would continue to make resources available for the SADC integration agenda. As a testimony of South Africa's commitment to the regional economic integration agenda, the country has already seconded an expert to the SADC Secretariat to assist with the integration programmes. This is the kind of leadership role that SA is expected to play in SADC and on the continent; and clearly, SA has demonstrated its commitment so far.

SADC views equitable integration as a fundamental requirement for sustainable development and to alleviate the scourges of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment in the region. It is not logical for SA, which is the biggest economy in the region to leave the integration process in the hands of smaller economies. In order to have a successful regional integration, one needs the stronger economies to spearhead the process and in the case of SADC, that country is South Africa. As a continued commitment to regional integration, South Africa hosted the 37<sup>th</sup> SADC Summit in Tshwane in August 2017. A considerable milestone achieved was to have the Summit endorse a theme presented by South Africa as current chair "Partnering with the Private Sector in Developing Industry and Regional Value Chains". As Outgoing Chair of SADC, South Africa continues to serve in a collective leadership role of SADC and works closely with the SADC Double Troika members in supporting regional industrialisation programmes, integration agenda, regional peace and security initiatives. The theme of the 37<sup>th</sup> SADC Summit is corroborated by Makgetlaneng (2013:55) when he indicates that SA should endeavour to encourage closer collaboration between its state and non-state actors, their counterparts in the region and the entire continent. This collaboration would go a long way in addressing the under-development of SADC region and the continent. Furthermore, an article by Peter Fabricius (2017:11) added that South Africa indicated that BRICS' New Development Bank (NDB) would fund African countries to prepare bankable infrastructure projects. South Africa has a critical role to play in ensuring that the

financing mechanism of NDB would mutually benefit the region and not only the BRICS countries. If it does, SA would have earned the trust of the region, which is somehow still overshadowed by the atrocities and economic exploitation committed by the then apartheid government.

One appreciates the expectations that SA should lead the regional economic integration, which is true with any economic power within a particular Regional Economic Community. Before criticising SA for not doing enough in regional integration, one needs to understand that SA is pursuing the route of quiet diplomacy, which is underpinned by the principle of Ubuntu and guided by the country's foreign policy priorities. It is through this principle that SA continues to build trust amongst SADC member states, particularly those whose sovereignty was violated with impunity during the apartheid era. Landsberg corroborates this view when he states that SA is aware of her pre-1994 historical past of cross-border violations and related anxieties, which are so prevalent and as such has made it clear that the policies of a democratic South Africa are underpinned by the principles of equity and mutual benefit.

South Africa believes that the regional integration process should be guided by developmental requirements outlined in the African Union's Agenda 2063, which is to improve the multitude of challenges facing the continent. Regional development and economic integration are key ingredients towards the achievement of shared objectives of prosperity, peace and development as spelled out in the region's strategic blueprints namely the Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP 2015-2020), Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ and the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP).

South Africa utilised its position as Chair to ensure seamless implementation of the SADC Industrialisation Action Plan. The chosen theme was connected to the strategic objectives of SADC aimed at addressing unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment in the region. South Africa is one of the thirteen (13) Member States that contributed to the consolidation of the SADC Free Trade Area by ratifying the Protocol on Trade and Services. The country continues to advocate for a stronger

focus on intra-regional infrastructure development, which would eventually link SADC with COMESA and the EAC in a trilateral integration process.

Dissonance and tension currently exist within SACU wherein the BELN countries are opposed to using some SACU revenue for cross-border infrastructure projects as proposed by SA. Makgetlaneng (2014:311) indicates that SA had proposed the establishment of a SACU Development Fund, wherein customs and excise revenue would be ring-fenced for intra-SACU development projects; this was rejected by the BELN countries. Should the BELN countries continue to demand that the revenue be transferred to them unconditionally, then SA should consider dissolution of SACU in favour of the SADC Customs Union. This view is supported by Makgetlaneng (2014:301) when he states that a SACU is not relevant anymore particularly that regional integration is not one of its objectives. SA needs to work towards the integration of SACU into SADC so that the SADC Customs Union could be realised.

South Africa would be applauded for integrating SACU in SADC because SACU is an obstacle to SADC regional economic integration. Makgetlaneng (2013:42) supported this view when he said Southern African countries contribute towards the achievement of regional integration through SADC not SACU.

South Africa needs to defend and promote the interest of southern Africa in BRICS and mitigate projects that could undermine the integration process within the region. If it does, her credibility would be strengthened.

#### **4.6 Sub-conclusion.**

South Africa's foreign policy approach is grounded on collaboration, mutual sustainable development, co-operation and partnership rather than conflict and coercion. The country has played a key role in the negotiations of the SADC FTA Agreement and nothing could prevent it from taking a bold decision of ending SACU and concentrate on the creation of a SADC Customs Union and regional integration. Saurombe (2010: 125) argues that the success of regional integration agenda undoubtedly depends on South Africa's willingness to support it. He further argues that while negotiating in the SADC FTA, South Africa negotiated on behalf of SACU and this was done without any discussions with other SACU member states. This was due to capacity reasons for the SACU member states. Other RECs on the continent have already established regional Customs Unions and SADC cannot afford to be left

behind. South Africa, with its wealth of experience in the field of customs union, holds the key to establishing a successful SADC Customs Union.

South Africa needs to be firm but cautious in dealing with her neighbours given the violations that were committed during apartheid. It needs to earn trust amongst SADC members. The pre-1994 foreign policy of South Africa was guided by the theory of Realism in its conduct of international relations whereas the theory of democracy is underpinned by the metaphysics of Ubuntu, which calls for mutual respect of one another.



## Chapter 5

### 5. Finance and Investments in SADC

#### 5.1 Introduction

South Africa, as an economic powerhouse in Southern Africa and Africa, is a leading African investor in the SADC region and on the African continent. It has demonstrated leadership in this regard to the extent that those who started the now defunct Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are finding it difficult to think of reviving it. The purpose of SADCC was to lessen Southern Africa's dependence on the undemocratic government of South Africa that existed prior to 1994.

SADC has an Investment Policy Framework (IPF) to which South Africa and six other voluntary countries have contributed to its development process. The IPF calls for the harmonisation of laws and regulations related to investment in the region, this is aligned to the Agenda 2063 of the African Union.

The proposal was made by South Africa to ring-fence some of the SACU revenue pool for cross-border infrastructure projects in the region worthy of a regional leader that would contribute to regional integration in Southern Africa.

Truly speaking, South Africa can hardly afford to maintain the stand of being the first amongst equals in the region. It has already called upon the president of the African Development Bank to work closely with the SADC's Ministers of Finance in developing the gas exploitation regime whose terms and conditions would favour the SADC region. As a member of BRICS, SA stands to play a key role in facilitating funding from BRICS's New Development Bank for infrastructure projects in the region.

#### 5.2 Research findings

Diplomatic relations that SA has established with other African countries post 1994 has opened more opportunities for South Africa's private sector to expand beyond its borders than ever before. This has resulted in the country's mining, construction, telecommunication companies and state-owned enterprises seeking investment opportunities and markets in other African countries. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2014) support this view when they point out that South Africa's corporate sector opened branch



offices on the African continent and that there was a spread of South African consumer goods on the continent.

Although South Africa has lost its spot as the largest economy in Africa, it remains the main player as far as intra-FDI in Southern Africa and the rest of the continent are concerned. Amos Saurombe (2017:345), who indicates that South Africa has successfully embarked on various outward reforms in an effort to position itself as a base on investment in the Southern Africa region, supports this view. It is through the signed Protection of Investments Bill that the country's reforms focus amongst other things, on the relaxation and promotion of services related to the free flow of cross-border financial regulations. The reforms have eased tax requirements on companies that are operating in other countries. They have also made it easier for financial institutions like banks in SA to invest and operate in other countries. The reforms have furthermore created a more supportive and conducive environment for the country's companies seeking to expand into other parts of Africa and offshore to do so. (<https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-d1f112a4f>).

The South African private sector is penetrating the African market in an unprecedented manner and has created multiple jobs through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Africa in the process. The country's decision to relax exchange control has contributed to economic growth in the FDI recipient countries. Accordingly, SA invested in more new FDI projects in Africa than any other country in the world in the year 2012. An article by Thalia Holmes (2013:1) indicates that approximately 46 000 accumulative jobs were created by SA through FDI on the continent. In spite of the economic challenges of 2012, South Africa's FDI projects showed an increase of 23%. During the same year, South Africa accounted for 75 projects, which is 12% of the total FDI in Africa. The capital committed for these projects was approximately \$1.4 billion. However, if measured strictly by capital invested, India, the US, The UK, Canada and China had committed more capital than SA.

The Southern African region has witnessed an interesting development in the 1990s with an unprecedented growth in intra-regional investment. Most of these investments were attributed to SA. Since 1995, Sub-Saharan Africa received investments averaging \$1.4 billion per year in various sectors ranging from financial services to

mining. South Africa's investments to Sub-Saharan Africa averaged \$1.4 billion per year in such sectors as financial services, information and communication technology, retail and mining.

SADC countries source a considerable amount of their FDI from South Africa. In 2000, 85% of FDI that flowed into SADC countries originated from SA. This is corroborated by Samson Muradzikwa (2002:6) when he points out that South African companies, which were restricted by exchange controls from investing beyond the country's borders have expanded into Southern Africa. Accordingly, South African Trans-National Corporations are investing in telecommunication and retail, among others.

Since 1994, South Africa has invested heavily in Southern Africa and the continent at large. By 2013, investments by South African corporations were prevalent on the continent despite being eclipsed by those from China and India. Ghana, which is geographically remote from South Africa's sphere of influence, is a typical example of the latter's aggressive investment in the African region. Ghana was a host to over 80 South African companies by 2012. South Africa's communications company, MTN, is well entrenched in Uganda and Nigeria. South Africa's retail stores like Woolworths and Clicks are some of the companies that made their presence to be felt in Ghana and the Standard Bank of SA has branches in 18 African countries. As a matter of fact, South Africa has consistently, since the dawn of democracy in 1994, contributed 70 percent of SADC's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60 percent of the SADC's total trade.

It has been established that South Africa is an essential investment gateway into Southern Africa and this is demonstrated by the significant increase of FDI flows into the region. This investor attractiveness stems from the sophisticated infrastructure and sound investor policies as well as internationally competitive banking system. SADC is an investment destination of choice in Africa partly because of the progressive integration process in the region and the fact that countries trade more among themselves than any other sub-region on the continent. Kupukile Mlambo (2005:558) indicates that between 1985 and 1995, FDI inflows in SADC averaged \$660 million. However, this was increased to approximately \$5784 million during the period leading to 2004. It is further stated that the flows of FDI are mainly concentrated

in countries that have huge deposits of natural resources such as gold, diamond and oil amongst others.

South Africa, together with Mauritius, Kenya and Nigeria have been active in intra-Africa FDI that has been increasing at an encouraging rate. However, SA continues to play a dominant investment role on the African continent.

Within Africa, SADC has been the recipient of a sizeable amount of FDI, with SA dominating intra-regional investment. It accounted for approximately 80 percent of the FDI stock in Southern Africa. Paul Dunne *et al.*, (2017:403) corroborate this by indicating that in 2010 the country had combined investments of approximately \$980 million in four SADC countries, namely Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zambia. The FDI provides opportunities for technology transfers and concomitant job opportunities in the SADC region.

SADC countries, save South Africa, need to invest more on infrastructure development projects if it is to attract more investment into the region. The challenge is that they still continue to sign the Bilateral Investment Agreements that favour foreign investors. SA needs to intervene and collaborate with other SADC countries to address this challenge and ensure that no country is left behind in this journey towards sustainable and inclusive development in the region. This is corroborated by Saurombe (2017: 353) who stated that most of the SADC countries have faced the challenge of shrinking industrial base because of liberalised trade and insufficient inward investments. The other challenge affecting FDI flows in SADC region relates to infrastructure weaknesses. Apart from South Africa, the whole of Southern Africa shows a poor state of road, rail and aviation network that is also poorly regulated.

South Africa has made a proposal that part of the SACU revenue should be ring-fenced for investment into the infrastructure projects in the member states. In this regard, South Africa is demonstrating a decisive and constructive leadership by not giving into the demands of BELN countries of maintaining the status quo on revenue sharing. SACU is a revenue sharing and trade facilitation organisation, which was founded in 2010 by the colonial British Empire. In support of this proposal, Sehlare Makgetlaneng (2013:45) is emphatic that SACU is a burden to SA and is not adding any value to its regional interest.

In his paper, Makgetlaneng points out that relations between SA and BELN countries are strained over the revenue sharing formula. It has been established that SA registered her dissatisfaction that SACU revenue is not being used for socio-economic development of the region. It proposed that the revenue sharing formula be reviewed and BELN countries agreed. As expected, the BELN countries, namely Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho and Namibia) rejected the outcomes of the review when it did not provide them with additional compensation for South Africa's dominance of the market. [http://46895\\_sacus\\_place\\_within\\_southern\\_african\\_regional\\_integration.pdf](http://46895_sacus_place_within_southern_african_regional_integration.pdf).

Furthermore, Chris Alden *et al.*, 2014 support Makgetlaneng in that SA wants a certain amount to be ring-fenced for cross-border infrastructure development in SACU member states. This surely points to South Africa's more assertive approach to the BELN countries. In fact, SA contributes 98 percent of the pool of customs and excise duties; however, it has no say over the usage of the revenue.

Lack of funding to develop bankable projects remains an obstacle for the public and private sector to implement infrastructure projects. South Africa as a leading economy in the region has a moral obligation to contribute to the sustainable development of Southern Africa. It needs to invest more in water security and renewable energy sources in Africa for its needs and that of other African countries. Without access to sufficient electricity, the region's industrialisation initiatives would not be materialised. In supporting this view, Makgetlaneng (2013:48) illuminates that this would be the best way to advance its long-term strategic interests on the continent. South Africa is already using Eskom as a vehicle for expansion into the SADC region. The purpose of this expansion is to integrate a power network in the region and ensure sustainable energy security in Southern Africa. In this regard, South Africa is collaborating with its counterparts in Angola, Botswana, the DRC and Namibia. At the SADC Summit, hosted by South Africa in August 2017, South Africa proclaimed that it would do its best to advance SADC's Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (2015–2063) as a long-term modernisation and transformation mechanism. It is indicated in the SADC Investment Policy Framework (IPF) that SA is member of the Drafting Committee, tasked with the responsibility for guiding and overseeing the contents of the Framework. One of the key action areas of the IPF is the promotion of a coherent and transparent investment environment, which encompasses the harmonisation of

regulatory procedures, which would help investors to identify, assess and comply with regulations.

In his article, Peter Fabricius (2017:3) supports the energy security initiative by indicating that the former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, had urged the president of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi Adesina, to work with the SADC Finance Ministers to develop a gas exploitation regime that would favour SADC countries. At the time, Jacob Zuma, cautioned against SADC countries exporting raw materials and for SADC to stand firm on beneficiation of these raw materials in the region. South Africa, as a member of BRICS and a host of the African Regional Center of BRICS' New Development Center (NDB), would facilitate funding for the latter to fund African countries to prepare bankable infrastructure projects.

Africa tends to experience capital flight, including ill-gotten funds every time election dates are announced. By implication, the fund managers do these transfers out of fear of unjust appropriation of wealth after elections. This implies that there is a direct link between political stability and investments. Fear associated with elections needs to be addressed so that capital flight could be averted. SA with its competitive financial sector could support the region on how to curb this outflow of funds out of the region. According to Tendai Gwatidzo (2017:4), Africa lost almost \$1.3 trillion through capital flight during the period 1970 – 2010. Of this amount 20% (\$254 billion USD) was from the SADC region and most of the capital flight originated from resource rich countries, namely Angola, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The serious challenge of illicit financial flows in Africa is further alluded in a journal by Tralac (2016:15) where it points out that Africa is illicitly deprived of more than \$50 billion annually and this amount increases by approximately 20% every year.

As a regional leader, South Africa needs to avoid taking unilateral decisions in dealing with issues of trade and investment in Southern Africa particularly that it has made a pronouncement that it is committed to joint partnership in driving the integration process. The annulment of the SA- Zimbabwe bilateral agreement in 1996 by SA without consent of Zimbabwe resulted in resentment by Zimbabweans. South Africa, like any other country has a right to pursue her national interest, however, unilateralism has the potential of having unintended results. In support of this view, Chris Alden *et al.*, (2014) states that the unilateral annulment of the 1996 trade agreement with

Zimbabwe destroyed the Zimbabwean textile industry while South African producers benefited. South Africa cannot afford to promote her interest and accrue benefits at the expense of other countries in the region. Any unilateralism would fuel the perception of a hegemonic state that would destroy the national economies of the region.

### 5.3 Analysis

In much the same way that the US has recently terminated the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) whose members comprised of Canada, Mexico and the US, it would favour the Southern Africa region if SACU were to cease to exist so that it could give way to SADC Customs Union. South Africa needs to take a decisive step towards leadership and bring SACU to an end or at least integrate it into SADC. This move would be applauded by other SADC member states and would enable South Africa to invest the SACU revenue pool towards cross-border infrastructure projects in the region which would amount to constructive leadership. Ending SACU would allow the BELN countries to tighten up their tax collection systems to augment their national budgets. This is supported by Makgetlaneng (2013:45) when he elucidates that South Africa does not need SACU but SADC “in the advancement of its long-term strategic interests in the region” and continentally. SACU is possibly a liability to SA as it is opposed to the transformation process proposed by Pretoria to serve the region better. As a matter of fact, there is a serious deadlock over lack of agreement by SACU member states on the SACU Architecture for Tariff Setting whereby BELN countries want to determine the trade policy, which largely impacts on South Africa.

Under the 1910 and 1969 SACU Agreement, South Africa has been responsible for setting the SACU external tariff, which is dependent on industrial policy. As it stands, the BELN countries have very few industries and have no existing capacity to undertake tariff investigations, which inform the decision to either increase or reduce tariffs. As such, South Africa’s industrial policy is effectively the default premise for SACU tariff setting; this is however done with the participation of BELN industries. The current tariff setting mechanism provided for in the 2002 SACU Agreement is, particularly in respect of tariff setting and dispute settlement, in conflict with South African legislation and the Constitution. South Africa has brought this to the attention of SACU and an in principle agreement was reached at the level of Heads of State



and Government that some aspects of the 2002 SACU Agreement (including tariff setting) need to be reviewed. The BELN countries are now reneging on this in principle agreement and insisting that the 2002 Agreement should be implemented in its current form, irrespective of the concerns, which have been raised by South Africa.

The BELN countries are adamant that since South Africa has ratified the SACU Agreement, it has an obligation to implement it and that failure to do so may result in the BELN taking South Africa to the International Board of Arbitration.

Furthermore, during the 36<sup>th</sup> SACU Council of Ministers meeting which took place on 20 September 2018 in Windhoek, Namibia; Botswana informed the meeting that it had already established a national body equivalent to the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) to carry out trade investigations since it and other SACU member states were excluded from participation in ITAC. Further to this, Botswana has also threatened to withdraw the mandate given to South Africa, through ITAC, to act as an interim tariff-setting institution for SACU. It should be noted that the implication of SACU member states withdrawing the mandate of ITAC and replacing it with separate national bodies that have the autonomy to set tariffs individually would mean the end of a common external tariff and the basis for revenue sharing.

Another tariff challenge is the difficulty for SACU to come up with different tariff arrangements due to its commitments in the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) arrangements. Makgetlaneng (2013:42) indicates that the former President of Botswana, Ian Khama, once made a pronouncement at the SACU centenary celebration in April 2010 in Windhoek that “as we implement the ideals of SACU we must also take into account our membership to and objectives of SADC as we move forward in our regional integration initiatives”. Any insistence on tariff arrangements that are separate from those provided for in the SADC FTA would bring into question the purpose of regional integration. In view of this and other SACU challenges, South Africa should seriously consider integrating SACU into a SADC FTA arrangement.

South Africa needs to show her assertiveness by insisting that funds in the SACU revenue pool should be used for infrastructure development in the member states. It should be made clear that although it respects the sovereignty of SACU member states, funds in the revenue pool should be ring-fenced for investment flows into the

region. Many countries in the region have ill-maintained transport networks (roads and railways) and poor infrastructure.

The SADC region has gravitated towards South Africa's liberalisation policies of relaxing exchange controls regulations. The decision to remove exchange controls regulations in South Africa resulted in an increase in the country's investment into the rest of the Southern Africa region and the African continent. In turn, these investments have resulted in cumulative job opportunities in Southern Africa. This is supported by Muradzikwa (2002:6) when he argues that countries that have followed the path towards privatising their state-owned enterprises have attracted investments that have increased their respective economic growth rates. Mozambique and Zambia are some of the countries that have followed this path.

South Africa, as a dominant regional leader, has the potential of increasing its investments in SADC to satisfy the maxim that "charity begins at home". It is not entirely logical to have more FDI stock outside the continent than in the SADC region where natural resources are in abundance. The country needs to show confidence in the regional economies by investing more in Southern Africa than outside the continent. In this way it would make a compelling case to outside investors that their investments are safe in the region. South Africa's investments in the region are drops in the ocean compared to its FDI stock outside the continent and this is not good for the region. This is supported by Kupukile Mlambo (2005:560) when he points out that South Africa's "outward FDI stock in Africa amounted to \$14.23 billion in 2002" of which 90 percent of the FDI stock was held in the SADC region. However, he went further to point out that South Africa's FDI overseas was R202.8 billion in 2002 compared to R12.9 billion in Southern Africa.

Whilst one appreciates that the exchange control liberalisation measures pronounced by South Africa in the 2004 Budget speech allow local companies to use SA funds to finance new approved Foreign Direct Investment up to R2 billion per project for investment in Africa and R1 billion for projects elsewhere, it would be more proper for Pretoria to be explicit by stating that more funds should be used for projects in Southern Africa.



Whilst investing in Southern Africa, South Africa needs to make compromises in pursuance of her national interest. The fact that it collapsed Zimbabwe's textile industry bears the hallmarks of a hegemon state, which does not seem to care about the plight of other countries. This explains why Zimbabweans tend to resent South Africa at some times. Leadership comes with responsibility, which at times requires one to spend a huge amount of money in pursuit of certain regional objectives. South Africa needs to recognise this fact and act accordingly. During the administration of former President Mbeki, spending for a good regional cause was not much of a problem and the successive administrations need to follow suit if they are to restore the respect that has since been slowly eroded.

Meanwhile, it is of great importance for South Africa, as a more developed regional state to be at the fore of a fight against capital flight in the region. When SA joined SADC in 1994, it was allocated the responsibility of the organisation's financial sector by virtue of its sophisticated financial sector. The financial resources outflow undermine development in the region and reduce the amount of resources available for development. This is a serious problem because capital flight reduces the resources required to solve challenges of poverty, unemployment and poor infrastructure. South Africa could collaborate with the African Union Commission, which had appointed former President Thabo Mbeki to investigate the impact of illicit financial outflows in Africa. The amount that Africa loses in illicit financial outflows exceeds what the continent receives in the form of foreign aid.

Export of raw materials by African countries would only help to perpetuate the paradox of rich Africa, poor Africans and is not in line with the Agenda 2063 of the African Union.

#### **5.4 Sub-conclusion**

The relaxation of exchange controls by South Africa has resulted into an upsurge of investment by the South African private sector into the rest of Southern Africa.

South Africa contributes 98 percent of the pool of customs and excise duties shared between SACU members but it has little say in the way in which the revenue is spent. This is frustrating to Pretoria and therefore the country is justified in demanding that a portion of this revenue be used for trans-national infrastructure development.

## Chapter 6

### 6. Conclusion

South Africa is the outgoing member of the SADC Troika of the Summit and its joint leadership role is critical for political stability, regional economic integration and investments in SADC. It is being criticised for not acting decisively on human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and eSwatini. The criticism does not take into consideration the principle of sovereignty, which is enshrined in the 1992 SADC Protocol. Without being in the Troika of the SADC Summit or SADC Organ Troika, it would be difficult for South Africa to address violations of human rights in other SADC member states, for example in Zimbabwe. It is prudent for South Africa to find some ways of becoming a permanent member of the SADC Double Troika of the Organ (either in the SADC Summit Troika or SADC Organ Troika) so that it could exercise its leadership collectively with other Troika members. Should this be the case, it would be able to place issues relating to lack of good governance and security on the agenda of the Troika and deal with them effectively. In this way, no one could blame South Africa of being a hegemon in the region because it would be acting within the mandate of SADC. In line with the research statement, SA cannot afford to be the first amongst equals in the region whilst principles of good governance are not being observed and implemented by other SADC countries. SA has played a critical role in the development of Agenda 2063 of the AU and the onus is on it to ensure that the aspiration of “an Africa of good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; and a peaceful and secure Africa” is attained.

South Africa applies quiet diplomacy in her engagements with the international community. However, there is a gap because it has not been firm enough when engaging the region on matters of good governance. The other gap that is critical for South Africa’s leadership is that it is not a permanent member of double SADC Troika. As a member of the UN Security Council, incoming Chair of the AU and an outgoing member of the SADC Troika, SA has the standing to speak with authority in dealing effectively with good governance and security issues in the region, particularly in Comoros, eSwatini, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. Chris Alden *et al.*, (2014) state that SA was criticised for its failure to influence “other African regimes”, which purposefully act against its core interests, for example in the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Swaziland (now eSwatini) where it had substantive economic leverage at its

disposal. Nganje Fritz (2014:4) who critically argued that South Africa is unwilling to accept a political leadership role in SADC because of fears of regional domination supports this view.

The region expects South Africa to assume a leadership role in Southern Africa. The fact that SA is member of the UNSC and recently elected to chair the African Union in 2020 is a show of confidence on the country's capabilities to lead. It is noted that SA did not voluntarily decide to become a candidate for the AU 2020 Chairship. It was approached by eSwatini, a country that was to chair in 2020, to take over and Pretoria agreed. In taking a decisive decision on good governance, South Africa would be backed by the 1992 SADC Treaty, to which all SADC member states are signatories. The SADC Treaty makes provision for member states to execute their responsibilities in line with the principle of human rights, democracy and rule of law.

Despite the violent crackdown on protestors following the election in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean government is prepared to resolve the crisis through inclusive political dialogue. A Commission of Enquiry, led by former President Motlanthe of South Africa was established to investigate the causes of the violent crackdown. The report of the Commission recommended that the government should have a dialogue with the opposition parties to solve the multitude of problems confronting the country. The President of Zimbabwe has made a commitment to engage the opposition party. SADC Troika needs to take the momentum emanating from this commitment to push for further institutional and practical reforms. South Africa would need to lobby to become a permanent member of the SADC leadership structures (i.e. SADC Summit Troika or Troika of the Organ) if its leadership is to be more effective in dealing with issues of good governance and security, regional economic integration and investments. Leaving countries with questionable human rights records and weak economies to occupy leadership positions would not help the region.

SADC region is making strides towards greater democratisation. In 2018, the region witnessed a sizeable number of countries going through elections. These are the DRC, eSwatini, Madagascar and Zimbabwe where South Africa was integrally involved in ensuring that there were peaceful elections. Since the SADC Facilitation Team under Retired Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke of SA commenced with the facilitation process in July 2018, the reform process in the Kingdom of Lesotho has been progressing

smoothly. The reform process is aimed at addressing constitutional reform, the security sector, legislative and public sector.

The mediation and facilitation process undertaken by SADC, to which SA is playing a critical role as a member of the SADC Troika, and the realisation of stability in the region would allow the region to focus more on issues of regional economic integration.

The fact that one of the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy is to prioritise the sustainable growth and development of the Southern African region, demonstrates the country's determination to addressing the socio-economic challenges that are confronting the region. Some scholars have observed that South Africa is bearing the brunt of failed and incompetent leaders in the SADC region and this had resulted in incidences of xenophobia. It is noted that South Africa cannot be expected to meet the aspirations and failed dreams of a sub-region or an entire continent. Instead of making South Africa a scapegoat, leaders should find a more sustainable solution, one that tackles the glaring levels of inequality and would significantly reduce poverty and unemployment.

The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA represents an integrated market of 29 countries with a combined population of 700 million people which is fifty-seven percent of Africa's population; and with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD\$ 1.4 Trillion (2018) that contributes fifty-eight percent of Africa's GDP. The country has been active in the negotiations of the SADC FTA, COMESA-EAC-SADC TFTA and AfCFTA and has already deposited instruments at all these regional arrangements in pursuit of regional economic integration. A total of 14 SADC member states have signed the TFTA.

SADC Customs Union would not be realised unless SA takes a firm decision to integrate SACU into SADC. Accordingly, no country can belong to two customs unions. South Africa is being criticised for its prolonged stay within SACU despite facing opposition from BELN countries on the review of the SACU Agreement of 2002. South Africa is criticised for bullying its regional partners by attempting to wield its economic power when negotiating with partners in both SACU and SADC. The

literature points out that even if the new SACU agreement replaced the old agreement in 2002, SACU remains an apartheid-created relic, designed to ensure that South Africa would have a captive market for its agricultural and non-international competitive manufactured products. This economic dependency of the SACU states on South Africa was part of a strategy to ensure South Africa's economic hegemony

The South African position that the Revenue Sharing Agreement be reviewed to make a percentage of the annual revenue share allocation available for infrastructure development and industrialisation is a noble and decisive gesture. If implemented, it would make certain leaders unhappy but it would be good for economic integration and development in the region. South Africa is responsible for ninety percent of the SACU region's GDP and tariff setting (currently tariff setting is done by South Africa's International Trade Administration (ITAC) in line with the WTO guidelines), is an integral part of its industrial development policy. As such, South Africa cannot allow the BELN countries to set its domestic tariffs. Should this happen, the rationale for the current SACU revenue share arrangement falls away. The Revenue Sharing Arrangement (RSA) in its current form is not sustainable and a component of the fund needs to be diverted for a cross-border industrial and infrastructure development and regional value chain.

Despite being the biggest investor in Southern Africa, South Africa needs to guard and protect the investment space in the region so that countries of the region do not end up signing agreements that would disadvantage them. The aspiration of a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, which is so well articulated in the Agenda 2063 of the AU, would be undermined if Southern Africa is not going to develop harmonised investment policies. This aspiration seeks to address the paradox of rich Africa, poor Africans. It is clear that other countries from outside the region, e.g. China, France *et al.*, would occupy the space if Pretoria does not act fast enough. It is encouraging that South Africa has already called upon the president of the AfDB to work closely with the SADC's Ministers of Finance in developing the gas exploitation regime whose terms and conditions would favour the SADC region. SA needs to go further than that by ensuring that the right of first refusal is built in all the bilateral agreements it enters into with the countries of the region. This would

ensure that SA is consulted first on strategic investment opportunities in the region. As a member of BRICS, SA would play a key role in facilitating funding from the New Development Bank of BRICS for infrastructure projects in the region. Already SA has urged SADC member states to utilise the NDB whose regional office is based in the country.

South Africa has been playing a pivotal leadership role in Southern Africa by applying quiet diplomacy, however, it needs to be firm with those who do not comply with the provision of good governance that are enshrined in the SADC Treaty. It can play this role effectively if it becomes a member of the SADC Troika. SA has demonstrated leadership by its secondment of an expert to SADC Secretariat to support the integration process. On finance and investments, the country has taken a critical decision by relaxing the exchange control regulations, something which resulted in more SA companies investing in SADC region and elsewhere on the continent.

Given its military and economic strengths, it is self-evident that South Africa is the dominant force in the SADC region. However, there is a debate as to whether South Africa should lead regional integration within SADC. Those justifying South Africa as a leader of regional integration in SADC argue that South Africa has become an important role player in peace keeping and peace building on the African continent, has contributed to the growth of the African Union (AU) and African Peace and Security Architecture, is the biggest investor in the SADC countries and is also the biggest financial contributor to the region. 82% of the net GDP of SADC comes from South Africa. The country is also leading SACU member states in the regions' negotiations in the TFTA, which is expected to be launched in 2020, provided the required threshold of 14 ratifications would have been met.

South Africa is also a member of BRICS, which makes it a potential bridge builder between developing and developed nations. South Africa is also among the biggest African contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations through the African Union and the United Nations. South Africa has had expansive efforts in regional peace building over the past 20 years in Burundi, the DRC, Sudan and Madagascar. The country is currently involved in peace facilitation process in Lesotho. From this vantage point, South Africa holds a commanding position in the region and the African continent as a whole, despite some challenges.

South Africa's dominance in southern Africa, most prolific in the economic sphere, remains uncontested. South Africa accounts for about 60% of SADC's total trade and about 70% of the regions GDP. The country is also within the region, the most diversified economy and thus critical to SADC's drive towards developmental regionalism. Nevertheless, it is also true that a relationship of interdependence binds South Africa to the region. Moreover, in varying degrees, the economies of other SADC member states also benefit from employment opportunities, skills transfer, tax revenues and global linkages as a result of the business activities of South Africa firms.

South Africa is often viewed with a sense of distrust both in Africa and in the SADC region. Prevalent xenophobic attacks such as those of 2008 and 2015 are also given as reasons why South Africa cannot lead regional integration in SADC. It is argued that South Africa needs to transform and strengthen itself first to ensure that its structural weaknesses are not replicated in the continent.



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