

Collaborative Diplomacy: A Study of the BRICS New Development Bank

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	5
ABSTRACT	7
1. INTRODUCTION	8
1.1 The Aim of the Study	8
1.2 Descriptive Literature Study	10
1.3 Formulation and Demarcation of the Research Problem	12
1.4 Research Methodology	14
1.5 The Structure of the Research	15
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	16
2.1 Introduction	16
2.2 International Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century	17
2.3 International Decision-Making	19
2.3.1 Nineteenth Century Decision-Making in International Organisations	19
2.3.2 Twentieth and Twenty-first Century Decision-Making in International Organisations	20
2.4 What is Diplomacy?	22
2.4.1 Three Categories of Diplomatic Practices and Theories	23
2.5 Multilateral Diplomacy	27
2.6 Understanding Polyilateral Diplomacy	29
2.7 Understanding Collaborative Diplomacy	30
2.8 Collaborative Diplomacy versus Polyilateral Diplomacy	36
2.9 Conclusion	38
3. COLLABORATIVE DIPLOMACY: BRICS AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTBANK (NDB)	40
3.1 Introduction	40
3.2 The Importance of BRICS in the Global Economic Arena	41
3.3 The BRICS NDB	42

3.4	International Cooperation and the BRICS NDB	46
3.5	Collaborative Diplomacy and the BRICS NDB	48
3.6	The Decision-Making Process in BRICS	52
3.7	The Decision-Making Process in the BRICS NDB	56
	3.7.1 Twentieth Century Decision-Making	57
	3.7.2 The Phenomenon of Modern Summitry	58
3.8	Conclusion	59
4.	CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY IN THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (NDB)	61
4.1	Introduction	61
4.2	The Future of the NDB	61
4.3	The Future of Diplomacy in the NDB	62
4.4	BRICS Summit Diplomacy	62
4.5	The Importance of Modern Diplomacy in the Global Arena	63
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	64

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFSEC	- African Standardisation Electrotechnical Commission
AU	- African Union
BRICS	- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BRC	- BRICS Research Centre
BWIs	- Bretton Woods Institutions
CCCWS	- China Centre for Contemporary World Studies
CRA	- Contingent Reserve Arrangement
EU	- European Union
G5	- Group of Five
G7	- Group of Seven
G20	- Group of Twenty
G77	- Group of Seventy Seven
GSO	- Gulf Standards Organisation
HSRC	- Human Sciences Research Council
IEC	- International Electrotechnical Commission
IFIs	- International Financial Institutions
IMF	- International Monetary Fund
IR	- International Relations
ISO	- International Standardisation Organisation
ITU	- International Telecommunication Union
MAP	- Mutual Assessment Process
MNCs	- Multinational Corporations
NC	- National Committee
NDB	- New Development Bank
NGO	- Non-government Organisation
NSA	- Non-State Actors
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORF	- Observer Research Foundation
SABS	- South African Bureau of Standards
SADCStan	- SADC Standardisation Organisation
SMMEs	- Small, Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises

UN - United Nations
UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
WB - World Bank

ABSTRACT

Relative to mainstream diplomacy, collaborative diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that does not yet have a fixed definition. Scholars have over the years distinguished different approaches to this concept. The concept is constantly changing as it adapts to new challenges in the diplomatic arena of the twenty-first century. The evolutionary changes in the practice of diplomacy will be investigated with a case study focussed on collaborative diplomacy in BRICS and in particular, on the diplomatic practices which enabled the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). As a multilateral partnership of developing countries, BRICS has had to establish an identity that is, to an extent, different from that of the West. Therefore, the NDB was established in 2014 during the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza and became operational in 2016. This was a way for BRICS to demonstrate its ability to contribute to global economic governance and to prioritise the provision of resources for development projects in emerging and developing countries.

Through collaborative diplomacy, BRICS members succeeded to create a new empirical reality and to challenge the dominance of the Global North in the global system. The countries of BRICS have been working together to establish the group's development bank. One of the challenges of collaborative diplomacy is that it has not been given sufficient attention. Through a case study design of the BRICS NDB, the purpose of this study is to investigate collaborative diplomacy as a phenomenon and determine how it has contributed to the existence of the BRICS New Development Bank when employed by the individual member-states in the partnership with shared interests.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Aim of the Study

Western perspectives have dominated mainstream diplomacy at least since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but the late twentieth century introduced many changes in the theory and practice of diplomacy. As a sub-field of International Relations (IR), diplomacy is constantly changing in how it is developed and practiced. Therefore, it is safe to argue that as diplomacy develops, the forms it takes change in accordance with the needs of the global community. This study focuses on collaborative diplomacy and aims to determine how it contributed to the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). BRIC, a group of four emerging countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, emerged in 2006 as a new actor in the global arena, the developing countries' answer to the crisis of functionality in the global arena. The inability of international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cope with financial instability and the humanitarian crisis resulting from the global financial crises of 1997/98 and 2007/8, highlighted the limitations of these institutions and the need for the emerging powers to become self-reliant (Christensen and Xing 2016:6). By 2011 BRIC transformed into BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa, thus ensuring that Africa is represented in this significant grouping of emerging powers. BRICS mainly aims to find internal consensus on the issues they share as emerging markets in the global arena. Thus, for the first time since the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions, a new group exists to give a strong political voice to the Global South and "to deepen and consolidate their partnership in the economic-financial area" (BRICS Ministry of External Relations n.d). Moreover, to be able to finance development projects in the developing world, they established the NDB. The focus of this study is to investigate how collaborative diplomacy contributed to the establishment of the BRICS NDB.

Collaborative diplomacy initially formed a subfield of public diplomacy which is described by Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 10) as requiring that actors, state and private, communicate with the people of other states "by moving from monologue to dialogue". Before collaborative diplomacy developed as a concept on its own, the concept was a third layer of public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 12). This implies that collaboration was simply one third of the elements that constitute public diplomacy and was not considered a form of diplomacy on its own. However, collaborative diplomacy has evolved into a new form of diplomacy with its own significance in terms of theory and practice for the discipline of IR. It is on this basis that significant attention is now paid to the pursuit of collaborative diplomacy (Albro, 2013).

Two aspects position this study in the broad theoretical framework of the IR discipline. The first is provided by Robert Cox's well-known distinction between problem-solving and critical theories. He posits that problem-solving theories support and accept the *status-quo* and aim to find solutions to problems to ensure stable relationships and the continuous functioning of the system and the components thereof (Cox, 1981). Cox (1981: 128) argues that problem-solving theory acknowledges the existing global arena, in terms of the way it is structured by dominant power relations, as a given. Anthony Leysens (2008: 40) also explains that in practice, problem-solving theories guide 'tactical action' to maintain the *status quo*. Thus, applied to the global economic arena, problem-solving theories accept the liberal international order and the Bretton Woods institutions and attempt to solve the issues underlying governance in this system. It also entails that if institutions fail to function according to new norms and demands, problem-solving theories will focus on how to reform these institutions to improve their legitimacy and to maintain the *status-quo*.

Cox (1981: 129) notes that critical theory criticises the origin and nature of the existing world order and seeks for alternatives. Critical theorists focus on change and not improving the existing order with all its limitations, as the problem-solving theorists do. Thus, critical theorists do not accept the *status quo* and functions as guides to ensure 'strategic action' to radically change what they determine to be unacceptable (Leysens 2008: 40). Doty (1997: 382) notes that the agency-structure debate has resulted in approaches that are more critical, in which the *a priori* rejection of predetermined and unchanging agents and structures have permitted a broader array of questions. Steans et al. (2010: 109) also note that critical theorists acknowledge that human intervention will not necessarily result in drastic changes due to historical constraints. The parallel can easily be drawn to the dominant practices and structures of the neoliberal world and particularly to the establishment of the Bretton Woods system which dates to the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, critical theorists are often optimistic about the possibilities of change and argue that Non-State Actors (NSAs) can also be agents of change because states are not the only significant actors in the emerging world order (Steans et al. 2010: 109). The distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory is employed in this study as it explains the nature of the emerging world order and the functioning of emerging powers in this new order from different theoretical perspectives, each with its own aims and outcomes.

The second aspect influencing this study is the re-introduction of norms in the study of IR, and more particularly constructivism, as explained in the writings of constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Christian Reus-Smit, and Martha Finnemore. These scholars explain the international arena as a social construct and highlight the importance of ideas, norms and interests, the non-material world, in the construction of the international arena. They focus on how intersubjective meaning defines and

characterises agents (actors) and structures in international relations. Nugroho (2008: 88) also highlights the interaction between intersubjective knowledge and the material world. Thus, different focus areas guide this study, the first being the nature of diplomatic theory and practice in the twenty-first which can be either problem-solving or critical (or both). The second focus area is the type of actors involved in diplomatic endeavours and in particular involves the inclusion of Non-State Actors (NSAs). The dominance of norms, values, identities, and interests as determinants of the behaviour of actors is the third focus area, while the way collaborative diplomacy enabled the establishment of the BRICS NDB is considered the fourth focus area.

Collaborative diplomacy is described as a nonlinear, iterated, open-ended and decentralised process. This description is consistent with the main tenets of collaborative diplomacy. It is based on trust-building, cooperation, mutual objectives, shared values, “team work”, and projecting the partners’ image abroad. These tenets not only contribute to operationalising collaborative diplomacy, but also provide important guidelines for the analysis of the establishment of the BRICS NDB.

1.2 Descriptive Literature Study

International cooperation in the twenty-first century takes the form of continuous, decentralised and open-ended processes that impact on both actors and the functioning of the international system. O’Neill, Balsiger, and Van Deveer (2003: 151) identify three themes in international cooperation, which will form a key point of departure in this study. These themes identify the key elements in the structural transformation of the international system. They are the involvement of NSAs as agents of change; the importance of norms and ideas as opposed to the previous focus on material aspects; and the importance of identity formation for more effective international cooperation processes¹.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to contextualise the study in the realm of diplomacy, which is described as a set of structures and processes that relate to negotiation, communication, and sharing of information (Hocking et al., 2012: 9). In the context of a potential or actual multilateral dispute or conflict, diplomacy tends to be concerned with reducing tension, providing clarification and finding acceptable formulae through personal contact, ‘oiling the wheels’ of multilateral relations (Barston, 2013: 4). Therefore, to some extent,

¹ For the purposes of this study, ‘actors’ refer to states and NSAs; ‘states’ referring to the individual member-states of BRICS, ‘non-state actors’ referring to BRICS as a collective and the experts from the individual member-states who contributed to the establishment of the Bank.

collaborative diplomacy has characteristics that go beyond the traditional ‘ways’ of diplomatic practice. The difference between the two descriptions is one of the reasons why collaborative diplomacy will be studied and why an attempt is made to better understand it in practice.

Berridge (2002: 105, 146) explains that traditionally, relationships have either been bilateral, a partnership formed between two states, or multilateral, a partnership between three or more states. Examples of multilateral relationships include international organisations such as the UN and the EU, and a grouping such as BRICS. However, multilateral relationships have become increasingly complex and important (Hocking, 2008: 65) in terms of the types of actors involved and the outcomes of multilateral diplomacy. Events, such as the global financial crises, have re-awakened concerns that were related to commercial diplomacy and have thus increased relations between diplomats (as representatives of states) and the business community (Hocking et al., 2012: 11). This study will highlight the modern form of multilateral relationships where governments are not the only actors involved, but where, as in the case of BRICS, financial experts, market researchers, academics and other actors also participate.

Two themes guide the literature study of this mini-dissertation. The first theme is collaborative diplomacy and the second theme is the BRICS NDB. In terms of the first theme, basic sources on the theory and practice of diplomacy serve to provide information for what diplomacy is, how it has transformed from traditional to modern diplomacy and how collaborative diplomacy can be explained. Sources, such as the work of Shaun Riordan, Geoffrey Cowan, Amelia Arsenault, Robert Albro, Brian Hocking and others who have contributed to the development of the concept collaborative diplomacy were consulted. In terms of the second theme, a variety of publications on BRICS have been used. Publications that can be found in the South African BRICS Research Centre (BRC), a unit of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and in the National Committee for BRICS Research in Moscow, Russia, also provided valuable information.

For the purposes of this study, the description of collaborative diplomacy to be considered is that of Albro (2016). Albro (2016: 4) describes collaborative diplomacy as the tendency, to emphasize trust-building through cooperation on mutual objectives and around shared values, often via the “team work” of partnerships in projecting the partners or actors image abroad. The reasons for this include firstly, the description highlights indicators that will assist in operationalising this phenomenon; trust-building, cooperation, mutual objectives, shared values, “team work” and projecting the partners image abroad. Secondly, these indicators will also assist with investigating the phenomenon in a real life context, allowing a case study to be conducted. Thirdly, by operationalising the concept in this way, it will assist with

investigating what collaborative diplomacy aims to achieve in this case study and with analysing if collaborative diplomacy was employed in the decision-making process which informed the creation of the NDB.

Furthermore, what seems to make collaborative diplomacy different can also be described as initiatives or a set of common goals that can be achieved in other circumstances. In addition, more permanent and long-term diplomatic structures and processes underlie diplomacy as it emphasises negotiation, communication, and sharing of information in both the bilateral and multilateral partnerships. This study will focus on an example of joint ventures in BRICS which took the form of short-term or temporary relationships formed for the specific purpose to establish the BRICS NDB.

The basic tenets of collaborative diplomacy link up with O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer's (2004: 150) three key elements underpinning international cooperation in the twentieth century and are also supported by Henrikson (2005) arguments about the role of dialogue for effective international cooperation built on partnerships resulting from dialogue and not manipulation or branding. Dialogue also allows NSAs to have a voice in the conversation that eventually leads to cooperation. Dialogue also determines the introduction and acceptance of particular norms during international cooperation as well as the way in which these norms form the normative framework for cooperation. For the purposes of this study, all these aspects will be applicable with emphasis on the introduction of NSAs and the effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation. These two recent developments of international cooperation can account for how and why collaborative diplomacy is employed by state actors and NSAs, and decision making in collaborative diplomacy. Effective international cooperation would be close to impossible if it is not based on the building of trust, cooperation, mutual objectives, shared values, and "team work".

Based on these developments, it is relevant to link decision-making to international cooperation. As a developing block of nation-states, BRICS falls under this twentieth century view of the decision-making process. In addition, as a NSA (the collective block), international cooperation is applicable in understanding the decision making process of BRICS because of its tenets and/or features.

1.3 Formulation and Demarcation of the Research Problem

One of the challenges of collaborative diplomacy is that it has not been given sufficient attention, as mainstream diplomacy has not made room for collaborative diplomacy and its characteristics. Traditional

diplomacy seems to place emphasis on states as the main or even only actors in diplomacy and this illustrates that traditional diplomacy, largely, does not adhere to the features of collaborative diplomacy. Not only does collaborative diplomacy seem to challenge the Western dominated mould of mainstream diplomacy but it also contributes to the new forms of modern diplomacy. Therefore, it could be argued that collaborative diplomacy does not completely move away from traditional diplomacy or only forms part of modern diplomacy but rather seems to be building a bridge between traditional and modern diplomacy as it consists of elements from both. However, the concept may not have been recognised for what it aims to achieve and that forms part of the purpose of this study, which is to investigate collaborative diplomacy as a phenomenon.

In addition, the extent to which collaborative diplomacy was applied during the establishment of the BRICS NDB potentially implies that this form of diplomacy is more applicable and that it presents less limitations than mainstream diplomacy. Furthermore, as noted above, mainstream diplomacy tends to focus on states as the actors whereas collaborative diplomacy regards both states and NSAs as actors with agency, adhering to the inclusion of elements in both traditional and modern diplomacy. Therefore, the application of collaborative diplomacy may differ as well. Furthermore, as Hocking (2008: 63) posits, traditional diplomacy presents a hierarchical image because it is based on a predominantly intergovernmental process while most of its theoretical debates are still found in state-centred models. In case of the network image², diplomacy is mainly conducted through complex networks with publics being regarded as partners in the diplomatic processes (Hocking, 2008: 64). In this case diplomacy's focus is no longer state-centric, as with the hierarchical image.

Based on the above, the research question of this study is what is collaborative diplomacy and how was collaborative diplomacy employed in the process of establishing the NDB? Subsequent questions ask whether all the features of collaborative diplomacy manifested during the establishment of the NDB, or are some more applicable than others? Are there features of collaborative diplomacy that may be discovered through research during this study?

The existence of the NDB illustrates, to some extent, that most of the features of this concept; trust-building, cooperation, mutual objectives, shared values, "team work", and projecting the partners' image abroad, were employed throughout the process of establishing the bank. For any international or regional partnership to be accepted and/or acknowledged by the rest of the world, the partnership should project a positive image.

² Also referred to as the 'multi-stakeholder' image by Hocking et al (2012: 11) who also posit that the impact of 'multi-stakeholder' diplomacy on the traditional diplomatic service needs further clarification.

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are emerging economies with mutual objectives and shared values who have built a trusting partnership and based on this, have been cooperating with each other and through “team work” to achieve initiatives such as the NDB.

The objectives of this study are:

- To distinguish collaborative diplomacy from mainstream diplomacy.
- To investigate the development, aims and significance of collaborative diplomacy.
- To investigate the contribution of collaborative diplomacy to the establishment of the NDB, based on the indicators of collaborative diplomacy indicators and the role of decision-making in this process.
- To assess the establishment of the NDB from a problem-solving and a critical perspective.

The process that resulted in the establishment of the NDB provides the information necessary to determine whether all or only some of the qualities inherent in collaborative diplomacy were applied to achieve this.

1.4 Research Methodology

The qualitative research approach was chosen as the research design of this study because it depends on the systematic collection and interpretation of selected texts. In addition, the researcher chose a descriptive case study because it provides the opportunity to examine information obtained from a specific context and to answer a ‘how’ question. Furthermore, the data collected for this study focusses on the period of establishment and the decision-making process that led to the BRICS Bank to adhere to the case studies characteristic of qualitative research. The announcement of the idea of a development bank was made at the fourth BRICS Summit in India. The BRICS NDB eventually started operations in China, and therefore, the period of establishment is from 2012 to 2015.

As the unit of analysis for this study the processes of decision-making and establishment of the NDB assist with the understanding of collaborative diplomacy as a phenomenon. Collaborative diplomacy provides the theoretical framework for the study while the establishment of the NDB serves as a unit of analysis and a real-life example of the importance of collaborative diplomacy in the international economic system and more specifically, the process of how the NDB came about as the unit of analysis (Yin 2009: 2). Collaborative diplomacy requires an approach that is dialogue-based (Melissen 2005: 23) rather than an approach that is more violent or other rigorous forms. This dialogue-based approach seems to adhere to the indicators of collaborative diplomacy noted above and since this phenomenon requires to such an approach it confirms

that the qualitative research approach is better suited for this study rather than quantitative, as the qualitative approach largely does not require statistics or graphs to carry out the study.

1.5 Structure of the Research

Chapter one introduces this study and explains the rationale of the study, the problem statement, the research objectives, and the relevance of the literature, the research design and methodology, the analysis of the data, and the structure and overview of the mini-dissertation. As the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study, chapter two comprises a conceptual framework, followed by an analysis of international cooperation and a framework for its application to collaborative diplomacy. The purpose of chapter three is to explain how collaborative diplomacy contributed to the establishment and development of the NDB while chapter four concludes the study and asks whether the case study represented all the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy and indicates potential future research.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Introduction

As indicated in chapter one, this study investigates collaborative diplomacy and the way it enabled the establishment of the BRICS NDB. Thus, the transformation from traditional to more modern diplomatic practices and the emergence and significant role of collaborative diplomacy in the global arena are main themes in this chapter.

As is the case with the discipline of International Relations, the Global North, and particularly Western nations and their scholars have dominated traditional diplomacy at the expense of the Global South. Therefore, the actors, practices, procedures, and other features of diplomacy have been Western oriented. However, new developments in the international arena after the collapse of the Soviet Union created an international arena where President Robert Kennedy's ideal of "a transatlantic community of equals" made way for a world characterised by a "multipolar configuration of power" and the gradual emergence of new powers from the Global South (Serfaty 2012: 38). Similarly, as will be shown in this chapter, these developments also affect the transformation process in diplomacy that has started in the previous century. Thus, scholars in diplomacy are not only able to distinguish various stages in the evolution of diplomacy from traditional to new diplomacy, but can also identify the unique characteristics of modern diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

As argued, the end of the Cold War created a more complex, multipolar world with more challenges and opportunities for cooperation. In addition, new actors become involved in diplomatic practices, a direct consequence of globalisation eroding the status and relevance of states and national borders. As Spies (2010: 10) explains, the reality of twenty-first century politics is the erosion of the 'one-size-fits-all' model of Westphalia in terms of state sovereignty.

In this chapter a brief discussion of the international decision-making process will provide the framework for the assessment of the way the decision-making process can influence the decisions made in financial institutions. Nineteenth, twentieth, and to some extent, twenty-first century decision-making will be discussed briefly as the characteristics, or some characteristics, of both periods seem to be applicable to the purpose of this study. Problem-solving theory and critical theory form the broad theoretical context of this study and will therefore also be discussed in this chapter.

Traditional diplomacy tends to be state-centric because for centuries states were the only sovereign, and therefore legitimate, actors in the global arena (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011: 528). Moreover, professional diplomats fulfilled the functions of representation, negotiation, and communication on behalf of states while issues with ‘high politics’ labels were prioritised in diplomatic relations. However, diplomacy has gradually evolved in the way it is practiced due to the rapid expansion of the number and types of actors involved. More emphasis has been placed on the role of NSAs, such as experts, market researchers, academics, etc. employed by states. Cooper, Heine and Thakur (2013: 6) acknowledge the substantial changes which are still taking place “In the levels at which diplomatic engagement and activity take place, from the local through the domestic-national to the bilateral, regional, and global” and also in the “modes, types, and techniques of diplomacy”. Changes also occur in who is represented and how, who should be involved in negotiations and what are communicated during and after diplomatic negotiations have been conducted.

Various observations can be made, the first being that multilateral relationships are formed between three or more state-actors and NSAs. Secondly, with this being the case, multilateral diplomacy, in some scenarios, is no longer sufficient on its own. These scenarios require a combination of, for instance, multilateral diplomacy and public diplomacy and for the purposes of this study, this combination is applicable through collaborative diplomacy. BRICS is a multilateral group comprising five states and as it will be shown below, entering a relationship of such a nature comes with its own victories and battles.

2.2 International Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century

O’Neill, Balsiger, and Van Deveer (2004: 150) note three key elements that characterise international cooperation in the twenty-first century. The first element is the extensive involvement of NSAs, such as independent experts. A focus on transnational norms and ideas is the second element. The third element is the increased examination of the effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation.

a. *The inclusion of NSAs:* Not only is the number of NSAs involved in diplomatic events important, but these actors represent civil societies and their involvement changes the character of cooperation, and diplomacy for that matter. International cooperation is increasingly non-hierarchical and inclusive, less state driven, because transnational actors have become so much more important. International cooperation is more personalised or individualised than ever before. It now has a democratic character, far removed from the elitist endeavour it had been for many centuries. This element could be applicable to both a problem-solving

theory and a critical theory. In the former, it could remedy cooperation between states and non-states in existing powerful institutions and in the latter, because it questions the hierarchical nature of diplomatic relations and also the institutions such as the Bretton Woods Institutions (O'Neill, Balsiger, and Van Deveer 2004: 150).

b. *The study of norms and ideas*: Having shared transnational norms and ideas is important to generate lasting cooperation, which can be transmitted to domestic politics. Researchers focus more on a constructivist understanding of how norms determine the behaviour of actors and how they learn from each other (O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer 2004: 150). The focus on ideas and norms as the basis for international cooperation underpins the social constructivist's view that the international system is a social construct, an "intersubjective social context", according to Hopf (1998: 173). The identities, interests, and behaviour of the actors are constructed by intersubjectivity, which can be described as the sharing of ideas, which result in agreements between humans. Thus, these ideas and identities determine the nature of the international system and the behaviour of the actors involved in this system. Underlying all of this is the ability of international actors to build consensus and to reach informal as well as formal agreements with the aim to strengthen existing relationships or to change it either moderately or radically. Norm entrepreneurs ensure the acceptance or the development of new norms, interests, and behaviour. These entrepreneurs play a crucial role during negotiations aimed at reaching formal agreements that demand "political buy-in", according to Emily O'Brien and Richard Gowan (2012: 6-7). Evidently, NSAs and networks of transnational civil society influence opinions, but they are also increasingly important as central actors in the diplomatic scene.

c. *The effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation*: The effects of cooperation is an increasing concern. Questions in this study field include how well states tend to comply with agreements entered into, measures taken to implement these agreements and the extent that they resolve the problems the agreements were intended to address (O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer 2004: 150)

How applicable is the above for this study? Firstly, the role of NSAs is applicable to this study which is focused on the role played by NSAs in the establishment of the BRICS NDB. As will be discussed in chapter three, these NSAs were employed by the member-states to reach this goal. Secondly, the study of norms and ideas are also applicable because the member-states of BRICS have found shared, norms and ideas, which are important in the process of establishing the Bank (a lasting cooperation). Thirdly, the effectiveness of international cooperation is applicable as it highlights the impact the BRICS Bank has on each of the member-states; to be discussed briefly in chapter three.

International cooperation is explained by Paulo (2014: 3) as the interactions of actors to achieve common objectives, which can be explained common when the preferences of these actors are neither irreconcilable (conflict) nor identical (harmony). These interactions can take place between different types of actors, such as state-actors and NSAs, as well as at bilateral, multilateral, regional and global levels (Paulo 2014: 3). The interactions can either result in ad-hoc cooperation or longer, more permanent formal relationships. Examples of such interactions can be seen in the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the United States, the multilateral relations between members of the African Union (AU), in regional organisations such as the Gulf Standards Organisation (GSO) and perhaps, in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) at a global level.

According to O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer (2004: 150) cooperation is conventionally defined as, 'the deliberate and coordinated adjustment of policies by states attempting to solve a mutual problem or achieve mutual gains'. However, an adaption of this definition is required especially considering the more recent changes in international environmental regimes (O'Neill, Balsiger, and Van Deveer 2004: 150). Therefore, based on this, the adapted definition of cooperation includes the, '...iterated processes, which continue beyond initial agreements and result in complex and enduring governance orders and potential social change' (O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer 2004: 150). These definitions are useful as they assist with conceptualising cooperation and how it is used in this theory, which in turn assists with what international cooperation contributes in this study.

2.3 International Decision-Making

This study broadly distinguishes between the main features of decision-making in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

2.3.1 Nineteenth Century Decision-Making in International Organisations

Reinalda (2001: 3) identifies four elements underlying decision-making in the nineteenth century. First, the tendency to grant professionals and experts a certain amount of power enabling them to speak on behalf of the state (Reinalda 2001: 3). Secondly, the participation of private actors which at times included nongovernmental organisations. In the 1850s, NSAs discovered their own ability to influence governments (Reinalda 2001: 3). Charnovitz (1997: 184) confirms the unique role of NSAs in international governance by the end of the nineteenth century but also adds, "...the involvement of NSAs seems to rise when governments

need them and to fall when governments and international bureaucracies gain self-confidence, suggesting a cyclical pattern” (Charnovitz 1997: 190).

Thirdly, the experimental nature of the conferences. Murphy (1994: 61) argues that in the nineteenth century governments’ participation in international conferences was motivated by a desire to see if these conferences could identify or reveal common interests in new regimes covering more aspects, which was never previously considered to be subjects of multilateral agreements. Lastly, the process of institutionalisation and the process of institution building. By 1910, conferences gathered by public international unions started to outnumber those gathered by governments and/or monarchs (Reinalda 2001: 3-4). Scholars, such as Murphy (1994: 111-112) have regarded this to be the most important innovation in institutionalism by public international unions at the time.

2.3.2 Twentieth and Twenty-first Century Decision-Making in International Organisations

Reinalda (2001: 4) notes that particular developments in the twentieth century contributed more definitively to international decision-making. The first development is continued institutionalisation and the creation of international governance structures, the latter starting in 1919 with the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty which brought an end to the First World War (Reinalda 2001: 4). In terms of security, the League of Nations aimed to achieve international peace and recognised the importance of international law in the regulation of the relations among nations. In this regard, the League’s main organs; the Assembly, the Council, and the Permanent Secretariat, were assisted by an International Court and the International Labour Organisation. These organs gave the League permanence and a functional organisational structure. However, the Council only had general responsibilities and functions, a limitation which has been rectified after the Second World War when the decision was made to give the Security Council of the United Nations specialised functions (Goodrich 1947: 12). Both the League and the UN were voluntary organisations dominated by their members, but they also became excellent examples of multilateral decision-making in the twentieth century (Goodrich (1947: 21).

Regarding economics, Evans and Newnham (1992: 79) note that if free trade did not lead to international cooperation then perhaps international cooperation could establish free trade. Gabriella (2013: 314) cautions that the creation of an institutional architecture should accommodate the values in the social system underpinning international decision-making. Decision-making in institutions such as the IMF is linked to a quota system. Each member-state of the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative position in the world economy as the quotas for member-states determine their maximum financial commitment to the IMF.

The quotas also determine a member's voting power and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing (International Monetary Fund 2017c). Therefore, institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF must change their voting systems and decision-making rules to accommodate the values of the Global South.

Gabriella (2013: 314) refers to the impact of interdependence on decision-making when she posits that "interdependence has not only led to increasing political challenges, but also in delivering effective international cooperation". This does not seem to speak to the first development but explains the second development in the increasing importance of multilateral over bilateral diplomacy or the primacy thereof. During the period of post-war diplomats, their roles as well as the nature of diplomacy changed in different respects, with the most important change being the primacy of multilateral over bilateral diplomacy (Reinalda 2001: 6).

This second development is applicable to this study for several reasons, the first being that BRICS members, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, gained more from its membership of this multilateral group than from being in bilateral relationships with one another. However, the considerable inequalities between members of the group and the dominance of China put question marks behind the notion of multilateral decision-making. Still, BRICS plays an important role as a multilateral grouping in the promotion of development assistance to low income countries and the likelihood that South Africa and India cooperate bilaterally to establish a development bank would not have been as strong and even if they did establish it, the time it would have taken them to create such a bank would have been longer than the time taken as part of the BRICS group.

The third development, the phenomenon of modern (global) summitry is defined by Alexandroff and Brean (2015: 2) in terms of two essential elements. The first element answers the question; what? and refers to the global structure, which they describe as "the architecture, institutions and, most critically, the political and policy behaviour of the actors engaged in the influence of outcomes of common concern in the international system". The second element answers to the question; who? and refers to the process of interaction, "the collaborative interaction that underlies global summitry, which involves those actors that have an influence on the agenda, the organization and the execution of global politics and policy". Summitry is not new and was prescribed in 1950 by Winston Churchill in an effort to create international peace through "parley at the summit" (Alexandroff and Brean 2015: 3). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the term modern in this context refers mostly to the late twentieth-century. An example of modern summitry in this context can be seen in summits of the Group of Seven (G7) which started as a meeting of finance ministers from different

states including the UK, the US, Germany and France in the White House Library (Reinalda 2001: 7). When the finance minister of Japan joined, the group became known as the Group of Five (G5) (Smith 2011: 4). During the mid-1970s, the group became seven when Canada joined, which was considered as the counterbalance of North America to Italy as included by France (Smith 2011: 4). As the most industrialised countries in the world, the heads of state of the G7 had their first meeting in France at what is known as the “Rambouillet Summit” (Mourlon-Druol 2012: 681). Perhaps the most important reason why this forum can be classified under the modern summitry umbrella, as discussed in the context of the late twentieth century, is that it became intertwined with other international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the IMF (Reinalda 2001: 7).

Lastly, the relevance of regional groupings of nation-states. Regional groupings have become more and more important (Reinalda 2001: 8). At the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, the increased interest in regionalism took place against the background of a more global economy (Reinalda 2001: 8). States tend to cooperate in regional organisations to create zones where trade is free and a common market can be established (Reinalda 2001: 8). On the face of it, it may seem that this development is not applicable to this study with BRICS not being a regional group as it is not as Mansfield and Milner (1997: 3) puts it, ‘a group of states in close geographic proximity’. What is extremely applicable to this study is the diplomatic practices underlying international decision-making.

2.4 What is Diplomacy?

Diplomacy is often described as both an art and a science, but it is also a crucial part of the history of humanity. According to Paul Sharp (1999: 51) diplomacy “expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years”. Nevertheless, diplomacy has become a system of communication, “a way of doing business” in the interactions between political entities since time immemorial. Over time diplomatic practices have been institutionalised and “codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations” (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 2). Thus, diplomacy has since the 1961 achieved the status of a profession with the status and privileges of diplomats being acknowledged and protected.

What is the nature and essence of diplomacy and how is it practiced in the international arena? Paul Sharp (2009: 1) provides a traditional, state-centric description of diplomacy, which he describes as communication

and negotiation between countries. Thus, this ability of countries to negotiate strengthens their ability to reach their foreign policy goals. In contrast, Noguera's (2012: 2) broader definition explains diplomacy as the interactions, negotiations and maintenance of contact and communication between states and other international actors. This seems to adhere to non-traditional diplomacy because it includes both state actors and NSAs. Leguey-Feilleux (2009: 1, 5) also defines diplomacy as "representation and communication across international boundaries, but he also acknowledges the broadening of diplomacy to include new actors" and "new modes of interaction". Still, most studies in diplomacy focus on how it is done and less on what it is.

Nevertheless, diplomacy does have the ability to respond to changes in the national and international arenas, according to Hocking (1997/1998: 170). Thus, it is crucial to find clarity on what modern diplomacy is and how it is practiced and studied. Stuart Murray's (2013: 17) three schools of diplomatic thought, the traditional, nascent and innovative schools, provides a useful way of explaining the evolution of diplomacy.

2.4.1 Three categories of diplomatic practices and theories

The nature of diplomacy and the circumstances around it have changed (Albro 2013). In a traditional view, diplomacy is depicted as a game in which the responsibilities and roles of actors are clearly delineated (Melissen 2005: 5). However, since circumstances have changed, this clear delineated picture no longer resembles the world that has become much fuzzier in which, as Melissen (2005: 5) puts it, most actors, particularly state-actors, are not in control as much as they would like to be. Based on this view, if one should classify collaborative diplomacy, it can be described as a type of diplomacy that falls under a more modern diplomacy. For example, the presence of Brazil in the African continent has increased more and more through government bodies, businesses or public-private partnerships (BRICS Policy Centre 2014: 9). The interaction in this example is not between states but rather between state-actors and NSAs or between NSAs, such as businesses and public-private partnerships.

Countries can reach their foreign policy goals through different forms of diplomacy; the more traditional form of diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy as well as more non-traditional forms, such as polyilateral and, more applicable in this case, collaborative diplomacy. Therefore, to understand the evolution of diplomatic practices and theories, this section focuses on the types of actors involved, the different modes of diplomacy, and the basic theoretical assumptions of scholars in diplomatic studies. Klavins (2011: 7) posits that "the transformation of diplomacy happens at high-speed" and it does not exist in a vacuum and Hocking (1997/1998: 170) observes that diplomacy changes as it responds to "change in the character of both state and society". Furthermore, the aim of this section is to explain the changing nature of diplomacy and focuses

on three main pillars or categories of diplomatic theories in the IR discipline, including traditional, nascent, and innovative diplomacy.

a. Traditional diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that can be referred to as ‘state-qua-state diplomacy’ (Murray 2006: 21), in other words, diplomacy between states. Two modes of diplomacy that has been regarded as traditional diplomacy include bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and as Murray (2006: 22) notes, for a large part of the seventeenth century, the system of emerging states required a method that would mitigate the conflict that dominated Europe and this method was traditional diplomacy. Based on this, traditional diplomacy showed a softer side as it contributed to peacekeeping during the European conflict of the seventeenth century. This coincides with Sharp’s view when he notes, “diplomacy ... allows the barbarians to enter the town without burning it or killing everybody” (Sharp 2009: 5). However, Murray (2013: 6) provides a harder side of traditional diplomatic practices when he posits “from the outset [diplomacy] was Machiavellian, driven by the hunger for power, territory and resources; it was strategic and chess-like, a shrewd, tactful, cunning and at times deceptive game of practical manoeuvre, of poise, thrust and counterpoise”. This view implies that diplomacy provided a method to ensure survival during times of extreme power politics, but also that it served as an instrument to ensure dominance and victory.

Klavins (2011: 3) posits that diplomacy has been used directly as a foreign policy tool in the period between the fifteenth century and the end of the Cold War when changing international agendas forced diplomatic practices to adapt to new challenges. The main assumptions underlying traditional diplomacy are that it is the exclusive instrument of sovereign states to ensure their security in the anarchical international system and that it is the exclusive domain of professional diplomats who are mainly involved in high politics matters (Murray 2006: 31-33). Murray (2006: 42) concludes, “...traditionalist contributions illustrate a preference for continuity and gradual evolution of diplomatic theory over change and revolution”. Traditional diplomacy scholars include Geoff Berridge, Harold Nicholson, Ernest Satow, and Henry Kissinger, the latter also a practitioner during the Cold War. Their elitist, narrow focus on diplomacy was unequivocally clear in the first sentence of the introduction to *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, “Diplomacy is the term given to the official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of states” (Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte 2001: 1).

In *The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution* (2010), John Robert Kelley suggests that diplomacy has undergone a revolution that led to a “new diplomacy” and asks: “Is diplomacy solely the domain of the state?”

(Kelley (2010: 286) He describes states as political activity hubs and argues that diplomacy provides the spokes for the political interests of one state to interface with those of another state without resorting to force of a military nature (Kelley 2010: 286). Thus, in modern times, diplomacy has a ‘softer’ and peaceful approach and the question could be asked, if the United States had applied traditional diplomacy instead of a military offensive against Iraq, would a conflict have occurred?

b. Nascent diplomacy

Nascent diplomacy is non-state diplomacy or new diplomacy and scholars who advocate nascent diplomacy reject traditional diplomacy, which they view as obsolete, irrelevant, and determinant to international cooperation. After serving as a career diplomat in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Carne Ross, who became an influential critic of traditional diplomacy, wrote a book entitled *Independent diplomat, Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite*, in which he criticised the diplomatic service for being irrelevant, unaccountable, and veiled in secrecy. He founded an NGO, Independent Diplomat, to provide diplomatic services “for those who needs it most” (Wood 2007). Murray (2013: 220) explains that the nascent school highlights the “multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment” and the dominant role of “unconventional actors” in the diplomatic arena. Even though it may have existed in one way or another in previous centuries, nascent or new diplomacy only found recognition in the diplomatic arena during the early twentieth century when its impact on international relations became more noticeable (Murray 2006: 89). There are different opinions on the origins of nascent or new diplomacy but scholars, such as Ivor Roberts, support Murray’s main phases in the development of new diplomacy.

- Phase 1: The First World War and the Versailles Peace Conference, 1919

This period includes the end of the military alliances that created a multipolar balance of power between dominant European nations in the 19th century. World War I brought traditional (secret and mostly bilateral) diplomacy in disrepute because it could not prevent the outbreak of the war. Nevertheless, the establishment of the League of Nations also failed to prevent a second world war, but the League remains one of the first of its kind: a multilateral international organisation (Roberts 2009: 3). This phase continued until the end of the Second World War.

- Phase 2: The post-Second World War

During the Second World War the creation of the United Nations, signified new beginnings and the coexistence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ diplomacy until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s (Roberts 2009: 4-5). During this time of Cold War diplomacy state security and the interests of superpowers dominated the agendas and main organs of the UN while summit diplomacy gave

the leaders the opportunity to determine the main issues, to have personal meetings with their peers and they have their private conversations on the side (Melissen 2006: 3). Thus, practitioners such as Henry Kissinger extensively used “back-channel diplomacy” and secret diplomacy during his time as US National Security Adviser. Summits later took the form of series and became institutionalised in the case of the European Council, G7/G8 and the meetings of the Group of 20 (G20). In addition, public diplomacy became the sure way to “win the hearts and minds” of influential individuals and groups in other countries.

- *Phase 3: After the Cold War*

Roberts (2009: 10) notes that by the end of the Cold War, professional diplomats no longer controlled diplomatic tasks where these tasks are only carried out by ministers, prime ministers, and presidents when having direct contact with the leaders of a state, which the diplomat is accredited. This is referred to as track one diplomacy as it includes professional diplomats and the traditional work they do (Roberts 2009: 10). With this being the case, paradiplomacy and track two diplomacy is often used by NSAs, such as non-governmental organizations, academics, humanitarian organizations (*Médecins sans Frontières*), religious institutions (the *Sant’ Egidio* community), former government officials (such as the Carter Centre) and think tanks, among others (Roberts 2009: 10).

Andrew Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur describe the key features of new or alternative diplomacy in terms of “its form (with a heavy emphasis on coalition building), scope (its extension from the economic and the social into the security domain), and its intensity” (Murray 2006: 122). Murray (2006: 137) notes that scholars of nascent diplomacy tend to cite three economic reasons why the state is no longer as relevant in this century. The impact of globalisation is the first reason, while the growing importance of MNCs, provides a second reason and the diminished ability of states to generate wealth through territory can be cited as the third reason (Murray 2006: 137).

c. Innovative diplomacy

The focus on the gap between traditional diplomacy (the main actor is the state) and nascent diplomacy (main actors are non-state entities) seems to have occupied opposite poles in studying the field of diplomacy. However, a middle ground between the two strands has benefited both and therefore, a third strand, innovative diplomacy, emerged because of this split, and occupied the middle ground (Murray 2006: 157-158). Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, and Paul Sharp privilege the involvement of both state and NSAs in diplomacy, criticise the polarisation of diplomatic theory and reject demands for the exclusivity of official diplomacy in traditional diplomatic studies. However, they also condemn the orthodox approach of nascent

diplomatic scholars (Murray 2006: 164). Their focus is on reconciling the two opposite views. For example, Hocking (1999: 21-22) claims that the “sterile discussion” between “newness and decline” marginalises the importance of new developments, in particular “the evolution of the state and its relationship with society, and the character of the international system itself” which impacts directly on the nature of diplomacy. Innovators praise the involvement of NSAs in diplomatic practices because their diplomatic involvement as representatives of “low politics” enforce the acknowledgement that “low politics” is as important for the diplomatic arena as “high politics” (Murray 2006: 190). As Manojlovic and Thorheim (2007: 10) explain, diplomacy still fulfils the function of “the articulation of states’ international policy goals” but it “also represent components of the evolving network of global governance”. Hocking (1999: 21, 32) refers to the “symbiotic relationship between governments and NSAs and “the growing capacity of groups, particularly NSAs, to operate alongside governments in the international arena”.

Giandomenico Picco (2005: 32) views the involvement of NSAs, which he describes as “—a group of unelected, self-appointed individuals” in diplomacy as far reaching. He applauds the new, influential role of NSAs who now dictate the international agenda, and posits that “diplomacy, one of the last monopolies of a government, is now accessible to and performed by NSAs as well as individuals who have one main characteristic: credibility”. Klavins (2011: 3) posits, “...modern diplomacy has become a transnational process of social relationship realized by an enlarged diplomatic community” and as Murray (2013: 4) argues: “plurality is both necessary and positive”. Based on this, collaborative diplomacy seems to fall into this strand rather than the two previous strands as it includes both states and non-states as the actors.

2.5 Multilateral Diplomacy

The previous section provided clarity of what diplomacy means in the context of this paper and a basis for this section. Since BRICS is a multilateral group, this section explains multilateral diplomacy. Traditionally, multilateral relationships have been formed mostly between states as the actors in these types of relationships, or in some cases, conventions. Examples of such relationships or conventions include the UN and its structures as well as the European Union (EU) and its structures as international organisations. However, this type of relationship has become increasingly complex and important in terms of the actors already involved, but also in terms of the inclusion of NSAs, which has become crucial for dealing with global issues at the end of the twentieth century.

In addition to this, Hocking's view of distinct types of multilateral diplomacy, such as conference diplomacy where states aim to accomplish common objectives, permitting an agreement in a multilateral setting (Sharp 1998: 110) and associative diplomacy, a form of diplomacy most often used by regional organisations, such as the EU and the AU. The operational styles of the EU, capacity building, action plans, strategic partnerships, etc. have been incorporated into the procedures of the AU because of contact through initiatives of the EU associative diplomacy (Barston 2013: 78).

This is the case even with the argument that multilateral relationships are regarded as a traditional form of diplomacy. Events, such as the global financial crisis have re-awakened concerns that were long-standing with commercial diplomacy and therefore, the relations between diplomats (as representatives of states) and the business community (Hocking et al. 2012: 11) are increasing. If one can identify the features of collaborative diplomacy through further research, the diplomacy in this scenario can be approached through different types. For the purposes of this study, even if the establishment of a multilateral relationship is classified as a traditional mode of diplomacy, this type of relationship will be applied in the traditional approach (the five states of BRICS) and a more modern approach (the NSAs who played a role in the establishment of the BRICS NDB). These approaches to multilateral relationships will be discussed further in chapter three and this will assist in the investigation of how collaborative diplomacy was employed in the establishment of the BRICS NDB.

Moreover, a more modern approach of diplomacy requires the involvement of experts who are particularly familiar with the science and art of negotiations and who can proof their ability to work in a new multicultural environment with different types of actors (Kurbalija 1998: 2). A practical example of multilateral relationships is to be found in South Africa at a media briefing held in 2009 by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, where she summarised South African diplomacy, the country's positive attitude, and its position in multilateral affairs:

We are strategic partners and we co-operate in a whole range of areas – the economic level in terms of promoting trade and investments between our two countries; people-to-people and cultural exchanges; science and technology; and a whole range of other areas. We ... co-operate in the multilateral arena – China has been supportive of our engagement in Africa in peace and security areas besides Africa-China co-operation so we value and think our relations are very important ...

(Alden and Wu 2014: 12)

2.6 Understanding Polyilateral Diplomacy

According to Geoffrey Wiseman (1999: 41), the term, *polyilateralism*, can be defined as:

... the conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organisation) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities.

This definition notes certain features and characteristics of polyilateralism, such as *relations between official entities and at least one unofficial non-state entity, reasonable expectation of systematic relationships*, where some form of *reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation* is involved, but *not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities*. Some of these features and characteristics will be compared with the features of collaborative diplomacy below, as this will assist with the distinction between polyilateral and collaborative diplomacy.

Wiseman (2011) explains that the concept, *polyilateral* indicates that the participants in this interaction tend to think and act diplomatically as they communicate, represent, negotiate with, report on and promote relations between entities with a certain standing in world politics (Wiseman 2011). Polyilateral diplomacy has gained such momentum that Wiseman (2011) notes that if the twentieth century included formally accepting multilateral diplomacy as complementary to bilateral diplomacy, the start of the twenty-first century saw the advent of polyilateral diplomacy. There are certain differences and similarities between bilateral, multilateral and polyilateral diplomacy that can be noted. Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy are forms of both traditional and modern diplomacy. Traditionally, bilateral diplomacy is the concept used to describe the relations between two states. For example, China having a presence in South Africa through its embassy. Traditionally, a multilateral relationship is formed when three or more states are present (Berridge 2002: 146), for example, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) with an official membership of eighty-three. In terms of modern diplomacy, bilateral diplomacy can also involve a relationship between a state and an international organisation. An example of this includes Switzerland concluding a series of bilateral agreements with the EU (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2008). Multilateral diplomacy with a modern approach manifests in the BRICS where NSAs contributed to the establishment of the BRICS Bank.

However, polyilateral diplomacy does not seem to have a traditional approach but rather a modern approach. As noted above, traditional diplomacy considers states to be the only actors in diplomacy. Polyilateral diplomacy is, according to Wiseman (1999: 41), "... the conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organisation) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity...". Another difference in polyilateral diplomacy being different from bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is that in bilateral diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy the number of actors seem to be the focus whereas with polyilateral diplomacy, the focus seems to be on the involvement of at least one NSA and, "... a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships" (Wiseman 1999: 41). One of the similarities between bilateral, multilateral and polyilateral diplomacy is that each of these forms of diplomacy can be classified as modern, or even an innovative, forms of diplomacy as they could include atleast one NSA.

Another similarity is that these forms of diplomacy each involve some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation. In addition, there are several similarities between polyilateral diplomacy and collaborative diplomacy. One of which include the observation that both forms are modern or innovative forms of diplomacy. This is the case, as both tend to include state and NSAs; this will be illustrated below. Another similarity of both forms seems to include some form of communication, representation, negotiating with, reporting on and the promotion of relations. However, there are several differences between them as well which will be discussed below. This discussion will add to the illustration of why collaborative diplomacy is applicable to this study and not polyilateral diplomacy.

2.7 Understanding Collaborative Diplomacy

There is a difference between the terms collaboration and cooperation, yet both are used in this study. Paulo (2014: 3) notes that cooperation takes place when actors adjust their own behaviour in such a way that it suits the anticipated and/or actual preferences of others. In addition, Ashkenas (2015) argues that cooperation includes the willingness of actors to work together and share information. Ashkenas (2015) also posits that collaboration involves the ability and flexibility of actors to align their resources and goals with those of others while at the same time getting all the actors involved on the same page.

Based on this, both cooperation and collaboration are applicable in this study as chapter three will illustrate, all actors in the establishment of the BRICS NDB have to some extent demonstrated their willingness to work together but at the same time, align their resources and goals with their counterparts. There are also reasons

to highlight why parties collaborate in the global arena. Kurbalija's view on collaboration in terms of resource insufficiencies Kurbalija (1998: 100) seem to adhere to Ashkenas' description of collaboration since resources may be insufficient for actors separately, when actors align their resources through collaboration, these resources could perhaps be sufficient to reach common goals. However, this collaboration can fail and may weaken which in turn, may weaken any potential future cooperation and/or consensus (Kurbalija 1998: 100).

Another reason for collaborating internationally is that states are no longer able to remain an island and survive without some form of collaboration. For instance, when it comes to international trade, for countries to overcome trade barriers they need to collaborate regionally and internationally through their standards bodies. In the case of South Africa, the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) is collaborating regionally through its membership of SADC Standardisation Organisation (SADCStan), international through its membership of the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) as well as on a continental level as a member of the African Standardisation Electrotechnical Commission (AFSEC).

Having insufficient resources creates somewhat of a catch twenty-two and the trick is to find the correct balance between finding the most relevant partners and not going it alone, as Albro (2013) puts it to address resource insufficiency and identifying the most relevant partners to collaborate with. The following description by Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 11) of collaboration could assist with this balance:

...initiatives in which people work together on a joint venture or project providing an equally critical and, in certain cases, more effective approach to engaging with foreign publics

There are different types of joint ventures, such as actors who enter agreements with others to reach a short-term goal for instance, hosting a conference. Once the conference is concluded, the agreement is dissolved as well. An example of this can be seen with the possible agreement to be entered into between AFSEC and the National Committee (NC) in Rwanda for the upcoming Africa Smart Grid Forum to be held in Rwanda 2018. In the context of this study, joint ventures include the establishment of the BRICS NDB.

What adds to the importance of collaboration is typical interconnected and crosscutting challenges that partners may encounter and therefore, are required to collaborate so that these challenges are addressed (Albro 2013). For example, in the context of BRICS, China may encounter challenges that are similar to challenges encountered by Russia and collaborating on a platform such as BRICS could assist these partners with finding solutions to these challenges. In addition, this group of countries typically would face similar

challenges because they are classified as emerging economies; they would therefore have mutual objectives and shared values, as Albro (2013) puts it. For instance, such as the development of small, medium and micro-sized enterprises (SMMEs) in the cases of South Africa and Brazil and the importance of trade between the partners of the group.

Furthermore, nothing creates a sense of mutual respect and trust (adhering to the trust-building tenet of collaborative diplomacy) as fully as meaningful collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11). Trust-building is a premise of diplomacy as well and it tends to emphasise initiatives that feature an effort by citizens of different countries to achieve a common goal (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 12). On the other hand, diplomacy refers to a set of structures and processes that relates to negotiation, communication, and sharing of information (Hocking et al. 2012: 17). In the context of a potential or actual multilateral dispute or conflict, diplomacy tends to be concerned with reducing tension, clarification, seeking formulae that are acceptable, through personal contact, possibly forming the basis of relations such as that of a multilateral nature (Barston 2013: 4).

Therefore, in this context, and drawing from Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 12), Hocking et al. (2012: 17) and Barston (2013: 4), collaborative diplomacy can also be described as a joint venture, initiatives or set of common goals that can be achieved by state and NSAs through diplomatic structures and processes, relating to negotiation, communication, and sharing of information, in both the bilateral and multilateral partnerships. To have a clearer understanding of collaborative diplomacy, further discussion is required.

According to Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 11), there are three 'layers' of public diplomacy (as described in chapter one): monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. Each of these is an essential requirement at certain times and in certain situations; for instance, in terms of monologue, not many things match the memorability of a speech or proclamation that has been beautifully drafted (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11). It should be noted that monologue on its own may not be a part of diplomacy; however, diplomacy and its relations include the move from a monologue to a dialogue. This view seems to be adhered to by Former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who notes that diplomacy includes a conversation (dialogue), not just a monologue (Snow 2009: 243) and in the instance of dialogue, a thoughtful dialogue assists with building mutual understanding (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11).

As for collaboration, when it comes to a meaningful collaboration a sense of trust and mutual respect needs to be created (Cowan and Arsenault 2008: 11). Therefore, before the development of collaboration in


diplomacy, it was a third layer of public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008: 12). Within this context, this implies that collaboration was simply one third of the elements that makes up public diplomacy and not a form of diplomacy on its own. However, as Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 21-22) show, collaboration has come a long way from just being one of the components of public diplomacy; the others being monologue and dialogue. Such cooperation that is multi-levelled and open requires the active pursuit of relations that is more collaborative diplomatic in nature with different types of actors (Melissen 2005: 5). The inclusion of different types of actors in collaborative diplomatic relations already indicates a main difference between traditional and a more modern diplomacy.

For the purpose of this study, the description given by Albro will be applied as it highlights tenets that can be used as part of the foundation for what the study aims to achieve. Albro (2016: 4) notes that collaborative diplomacy,

... tends to emphasize *trust-building* through *cooperation* on *mutual objectives* and around *shared values*, often via the “*team work*” of partnerships in *projecting the partners or actors image abroad*.

The tenets highlighted in this description adhere to Smith’s (1998: 94) argument as Smith notes that diplomacy has become about the achievement of agreements between actors who are mutually advantaged through collaborative effort (Smith 1998: 94). Additionally, what diplomacy has become adheres to some of the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy. For example, *mutual objectives* (as a characteristic of collaborative diplomacy) need to be identified in combination with the application of *collaborative effort* (in achieving agreements) for all parties or actors to be *mutually advantaged*. A turn to collaborative diplomacy tends to echo collaboration-talk across a range of activities that could be related, including activities such as innovation, to the arts, to science (Albro 2013).

The characteristics noted above are important for this study, but they are not the only characteristics that should be noted. Other features include representation, legitimacy, networking and non-hierarchical, equality, and short-term interaction. These tenets will also assist with testing collaborative diplomacy and for the purposes of chapter three, how it played a role in the establishing the BRICS NDB. Firstly, in the context of this study, representation involves the inclusion of states that would otherwise have been excluded. An example of this can be seen in the IEC. The Commission has three categories of memberships, including, full members, associate members, and the affiliated programme. Through their National Committees (NCs), states (developed and developing) form part of one of these categories. The Commission notes that:



(International Electrotechnical Commission 2017)

The membership categories have been presented in this way because the members are not able to progress from one level to the next without adhering to the requirements each category has. As a characteristic of collaborative diplomacy, representation seems to be adhered to because both developed and developing countries are represented particularly in the full and associate membership categories, as these categories do not favour developed countries over developing or vice versa. One of the requirements of the full membership and associate membership categories is the annual membership fees they are required to pay. Therefore, irrespective of the countries' classification (developed or developing), as long as they are able to pay the fee attached to the full and associate memberships, both developed and developing countries are able to form part of and be represented in these categories.

Secondly, legitimacy plays a role when collaborative diplomacy is employed as it assists with justification. For example, in the case of launching the affiliate program of the IEC in 2001 (International Electrotechnical Commission 2017). This program has been set up for various reasons. The group of developing states who fall under this category have experienced challenges in setting up NCs and therefore, the first reason for launching this program is to assist this group of developing countries with establishing their own NCs, which in turn contributes to them moving up to the associate membership category at a later stage. The second reason includes these countries being allowed to have access to the IEC and not excluded from the Commission. The third reason is to assist these countries financially as they do not have to pay the same membership fees as the countries in the full and associate membership categories. This program also adheres

to the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy as it assists with the justification of why the program was launched and in turn, adhering to its legitimacy.

Thirdly, for networking, as noted above, the focus is shifted here to a diverse group of actors including government agencies and non-governmental stakeholders (Hocking 2008: 64). Therefore, the way diplomacy is conducted has evolved from being an exclusionary hierarchical, state-centric traditional activity and process to placing more emphasis on an inclusive network of diverse actors where collaboration is required to assist the practice of diplomacy. For this feature, it is worth mentioning the fourth industrial revolution. The fourth industrial revolution or part 0.4 as it is referred to at times, is empowering those who have been excluded economically from the world by providing them with access to networks that have become more digital (Thornhill 2016).

Fourthly, equality has largely been a challenge globally. An example of this can perhaps be seen in the United Nations and some of its agencies with developed countries such as the United States who have used its power to influence decision-making in one way or another. This elitist approach seems not to have been seen in the BRICS group. Equality is one of the characteristics that the group has been promoting and still promotes. When the very first summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, (2009) the event resulted in what is now known as the First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders. In this statement, the heads of states agreed to:

...underline...support for a democratic and just world order based ... equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision-making of all states...

(First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRICS Countries Leaders 2009: 2)

Lastly, short-term interaction between the actors involved to reach a set goal. As mentioned above, Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 11) note that collaboration involves "...initiatives where people work together on a joint venture...". The purpose of a joint venture is for two or more parties to enter a short-term agreement to reach a goal. Once this goal is reached, the agreement usually is dissolved. An example of such an interaction can be seen in construction. A property developer may enter into a short-term agreement with engineering consultants and other experts to construct the property. Once this goal is reached and the development is completed, the joint venture agreement is dissolved.

2.8 Collaborative Diplomacy versus Polyilateral Diplomacy

For the purposes of chapter three, NSAs include the firms, businesses, market researchers, etc. that played a role in establishing the NDB. Muller (1998: 66) explains that modern diplomacy is by nature continuously evolving as it responds to what is required by the times and is shaped by those participating in it. This evolution may have resulted in nascent and innovative diplomacy. As noted above, there are several differences between collaborative diplomacy and polyilateral diplomacy. The discussion on these differences in this section will assist with illustrating why polyilateral diplomacy is not used in this study but rather collaborative diplomacy.

Firstly, in terms of interaction, as noted above, it would seem that collaborative diplomacy includes short-term interaction rather than mid or long term. It seems to be project or initiative-based resulting in reaching a specific goal set when the agreement entered into. For instance, this could be seen in the case of the UN setting up ad hoc committees, such as the Ad Hoc Committee on the Administration of Justice established in 2008 and dissolved in 2009 (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 2017). This example is important as it illustrates an initiative that is project based (short term) for the sole purpose of reaching specific goals set by the UN. The ad hoc committee was opened to all member-states of the UN as well as members of the UN specialised agencies, adhering to the state and NSAs in collaborative diplomacy as a modern form of diplomacy. The lifespan of this ad hoc committee adheres to the short-term interaction that seems to be a characteristic of collaborative diplomacy. Different to collaborative diplomacy, the interaction in polyilateral diplomacy seems to be more mid to long term. The Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization set up in 1975 and still being active, can be regarded as an example of this more mid to long term interaction (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 2017).

Wiseman (2011: 2-3) notes that NSAs include what is referred to as a transnational civil society which comprise individuals and groups that operate for the support and promotion of legitimate causes that are socio-political in nature across international borders. The difference between collaborative diplomacy and polyilateral diplomacy here is that transnational NSAs tend to act as being more superior and/or taking the lead to the state, they are interacting with. For example, the presence of the UN and its agencies in Afghanistan since 2001 due to the country's array of challenges, which in turn have led to the UN providing guidance to certain volatile situations. The longstanding presence of the UN in Afghanistan has resulted in what is referred to as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) along with other UN entities working in the country (Tanin 2011: 55).

This relationship, and similar relationships, illustrate that these interactions tend to last longer than just a few months or years. However, the goals set for socio-political causes tend to be mid to long term as in most cases a ‘quick fix’ does not help but tend to result in more damage. For instance, after civil unrest, countries tend to form relations with international organisations related to human rights, environmental affairs, health, etc. to assist with stabilisation. However, these interactions tend to take longer than a short-term interaction as stabilisation tends to be a long process. An example of this can be seen in this relationship between the UN and Afghanistan as the responsibilities of UNAMA include assisting the country with its political, security, economic and humanitarian affairs (Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN 2011) even after the country’s transition period.

Secondly, for the purposes of this study, the type of NSAs seems to differ as well. With collaborative diplomacy, NSAs in collaborative diplomacy seem to be territorial or institutional bound. For instance, the experts who serve on the BRICS Academic Forum who participate in the topic of discussion by contributing through their expertise, i.e. the papers written, presentations made, etc. from their own country’s point of view. The academic experts who, based on research done, recommended that the BRICS NDB be established, are largely territorial bound as they come from, or are located in, the BRICS member-states and institutional bound as most of them are linked to an educational or research institution in some of the member-states. However, for polyilateral diplomacy, Wiseman (2011: 2) notes that transnational civil society can refer to interactions that are not confined to states in terms of institutional and territorial spaces. An example of this can be seen when organisations like Amnesty International form relations with a country or a group of countries. Thirdly, in the case of collaborative diplomacy, it is more inclusive of both developing and developed countries. This could be illustrated in the way the BRICS group has approached their willingness to work with small, middle-sized, and great powers or developing and developed countries.

Lastly, in collaborative diplomacy having a sense of mutual objectives and mutual recognition in the interaction seems to be important. This adheres to the equality characteristic of collaborative diplomacy and no party is more superior to another. All parties seem to be mutually recognised and are viewed as equal. An example of mutual objectives can be identified in the G20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). At the G20 Pittsburgh Summit held in 2009, members of the G20 conceived an approach to policy collaboration, the MAP, with the aim that this collective policy will benefit all (International Monetary Fund 2017a). Leaders of the group pledged to work together and through the G20 MAP identify shared (mutual) objectives, and progress toward these objectives (International Monetary Fund 2017a).

However, mutual objectives and recognition does not seem to be important in polyilateral diplomacy. According to the description of polyilateralism provided by Wiseman (1999: 41), this form of diplomacy includes relations between official entities (one or more state actors) and at least one unofficial (NSA) that does not involve mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities. This seems to imply that, depending on the relations formed, at least one of the actors are more superior to the other (or others) and therefore, all actors involved in the interaction do not seem to be equal or mutually recognised.

2.9 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to lay a foundation for the chapters to follow by explaining the dominant concepts in this study and to provide a theoretical framework used as a guidance throughout the study. It was found that even though diplomacy has evolved gradually, traditional diplomacy still plays a dominant role in the modern era, but that the way in which diplomacy is practiced in the current global arena demands emphasis on the inclusion of NSAs and on new forms and methods. Collaborative diplomacy is based on the inclusion of private or independent actors and they play a much more important role than ever before. By doing so these private institutions enhance their business model and goals and at the same time contribute to the growth of the country's economy.

Chapter three investigates collaborative diplomacy as the phenomenon and apply this phenomenon in the establishment of the BRICS NDB along with what the role of the BRICS decision-making process is. As the theoretical framework of this study, the description of Robert Cox's differentiation between problem-solving theory (in trying to solve the challenges within existing institutions) and critical theory (with challenging the existence of established institutions) is used. This framework is important, as it does not just accept the institutions in the global arena, as they are but rather challenges them in one way or another. As noted above, Western perspectives have heavily influenced traditional (or mainstream) diplomacy.

Therefore, it has been argued that the involvement of actors and issues, such as processes and procedures have also been influenced by these perspectives. Traditional diplomacy focusses on states as actors and believes that processes and procedures where state actors are perhaps the only representation in diplomacy, as well as the way negotiations and communication are conducted. However, diplomacy has evolved in the way it is practiced from this traditional approach to a more modern approach. The section on the recent developments in international cooperation is significant. It adds to this evolution as the role of NSAs have become much more important, the focus on norms and ideas have become increasingly important with

globalisation and the increased effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation have been necessary as no state is able to operate as an island.

The discussion on international decision-making has illustrated that how decisions are made (the processes set in place by institutions) and by who they are made (states and/or non-states) have an impact on the outcome of the decision made and therefore, it is an important aspect of this chapter. As illustrated above, diplomacy has evolved from traditional diplomacy during the period of World War I and the Versailles Peace Conference to nascent (or new) diplomacy during the post-Second World War period and innovative diplomacy after the Cold War, in the 1990s and beyond. Diplomacy still serves to solve conflicts and to make the global arena a more peaceful place, but its functions have changed due to changes in the arena in which it operates. Therefore, the global arena does not suddenly require a dedication to modern forms of diplomacy such as polyilateral diplomacy and more importantly for this study, collaborative diplomacy.

Furthermore, Hocking (2008: 63-64) refers to the traditional way of diplomacy as the hierarchical image and the more modern way of diplomacy as the network image. Therefore, the way diplomacy is conducted has changed from an exclusionary hierarchical, state-centric traditional activity and process to a more inclusive network of diverse actors where collaboration is required to adhere to the way diplomacy is practiced. Based on this, this chapter provides a conceptualisation of diplomacy, which assists with the context of this study. Nascent and innovative forms of diplomacy such as collaborative diplomacy and its characteristics have become increasingly important in the global arena. Firstly, it seems to adhere to recent developments in international cooperation and secondly, international decision-making in relation to having an equal say through voting and not based on the state's position in the world economy.

CHAPTER 3: COLLABORATIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRICS NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK

3.1 Introduction

The question asked in this chapter, is to what extent collaborative diplomacy played a role in the establishment of the BRICS NDB. This chapter is primarily structured by collaborative diplomacy as identified by Albro (2016) as “trust-building through cooperation on mutual objectives and around shared values, often via the “team work” of partnerships in projecting the partners or actors image abroad”. Therefore, the two main questions to be answered in this chapter are: Firstly, how collaborative diplomacy contributed to the establishment of the BRICS NDB? Secondly, are all the tenets of collaborative diplomacy applicable to the establishment of the development bank of BRICS or are some more significant than others? Thus, chapter three investigates the way collaborative diplomacy contributed to the establishment of the BRICS NDB. In addition, this chapter investigates how international decision-making played a role in establishing the BRICS Bank.

As explained in chapter two, traditional diplomacy emphasizes states as the main actors in diplomatic practices. However, as also indicated, diplomacy is constantly transforming to adapt to new challenges and collaborative diplomacy is not only an important feature of the twenty-first century, but also serve as an instrument of the Global South to challenge Western dominance and to create alternative global structures. The hierarchical structure and exclusive nature of traditional diplomacy still characterises the involvement of professional diplomats in most of the bilateral and multilateral interactions between states, but a more inclusive network of diverse, NSAs is increasing. This duality also characterises BRICS where the members are states who employ a network of experts to provide the basis for collaboration.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that even though the way diplomacy is practiced has been evolving, the traditional perspective of diplomacy should not be excluded and/or ignored completely as it still plays a significant role. For instance, even though multilateralism has been regarded as a traditional form of diplomacy as it is described as the interaction between three or more states, it has also evolved in terms of how it is practiced. However, as this chapter will show that in its more modern approach, these interactions are formed between three or more actors including states and non-states. Therefore, based on this, multilateral diplomacy, for the purposes of this study, is no longer sufficient in its traditional form, as some scenarios require a combination of multilateral diplomacy and collaborative diplomacy as is applicable in this study.

This argument will be illustrated in this chapter by discussing the relevance of both the member-states of BRICS (state-actors) and the experts (NSAs) employed by the members who played an important role and contributed to what is now known as the BRICS NDB.

Therefore, section one of this chapter serves as a background as it discusses why the BRICS group decided to establish a development bank, in other words, what were the factors and/or events that contributed to the initial ideas of such a bank. The second section will link international cooperation and its features with the BRICS NDB particularly in the process of how it was established. Sections three and four will investigate why collaborative diplomacy is more significant for the purposes of this study rather than polyilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, sections five and six will briefly focus on the international decision-making process and how its characteristics in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with some evolving in the twenty-first century, will assist with investigating the decisions made the BRICS group and entities, such as the BRICS NDB as a financial institution. As noted in chapter two, some of these elements and characteristics may not be applicable to this study and these will be included in the investigation.

3.2 The Importance of BRICS in the Global Economic Arena

The existence of the BRICS group has created many debates about its relevance and role in the global economic arena. Experts on one side of the debate argue that the group is not strong enough to last, those on the other side of the debate have argued that the BRICS group will last as it, among other things, gives the Global South a voice. Grincheva and Lu (2016: 26) argue that the grouping emerged in 2008 as a new cooperative project of developing countries with the purpose of overcoming the economic downturn of the world and add to the facilitation of healthy economic development within and beyond their countries' borders in the future. Furthermore, O'Neill (2014) notes that the "BRICS name is certainly here to stay, and in terms of global governance, their influence is likely to rise as a group because of this development". Initiatives, such as the BRICS NDB have been portrayed as alternative mechanisms in the global arena which contributes to the existing economic order without attempting to restructure it completely (Grincheva and Lu 2016: 39).

The BRICS summit diplomacy has contributed to the group's significance in the global arena. For instance, in the case of Russia, BRICS summit diplomacy has assisted Moscow in reconstructing a stronger image of the country "in the eyes of foreign publics" (Grincheva and Lu 2016: 30). Another example includes China; the BRICS summit diplomacy provides a platform to communicate a national image that is softer to the global audiences (Grincheva and Lu 2016: 30).

3.3 The BRICS NDB

On 26 August 2015 Leslie Maasdorp, Vice-President of the NDB referred to “a radical shift in the world economy towards developing countries, and Asia in particular” which subsequently also created “a major shift in the overall development finance architecture” (Maasdorp 2015). As evidence he indicated, “...the BRICS bloc constitutes 43% of the world’s population and generates roughly 22% of global GDP”. He also posited that the NDB would prioritise the development of infrastructure, a main concern of emerging markets. In addition, “emerging markets have accumulated large long-term foreign exchange reserves over this period, creating the right enabling conditions for a bank like the NDB to come to life”. The Ufa Declaration of July 9, 2015 (number 13: 6) supports this view by stating: “Sound macroeconomic policies, efficiently regulated financial markets and robust levels of reserves have allowed the BRICS economies to better deal with the risks and spill-over effects presented by the challenging global economic conditions in the last few years”.

Hence, the justification for the establishment of the NDB can be found in the challenges presented by the nature of the global financial system, the particular development needs of BRICS members and the practical realities of funding gaps for economic development in the Global South. However, it is important to avoid the misconception that the NDB is a rival to the existing global financial institutions, as Undapur Vaman Kamath, NDB President, declared, “...our objective is not to challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the system in our own way” (Thussu 2015). The fourth BRICS Summit that took place in New Delhi, India in 2012 provides an important starting point in the analysis of the establishment of the NDB. Two decisions dominated during this summit, firstly, the approval of South Africa as a new member and secondly, the initial idea of the NDB was launched (Baumann 2017: 26). To start answering the question posed in the title of this section, it is worth noting the timeline that led to the establishment of the NDB. In 2013, the newest member of the BRICS family hosted the fifth BRICS Summit in Durban, South Africa and at this Summit, the group decided to follow up on the negotiations to establish the BRICS NDB (Baumann 2017: 27).

The Sixth Summit, held in 2014, in Fortaleza resulted in the signing of treaties for the establishment of the group’s Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and more importantly for the purposes of this study, the NDB (Damico 2017: 63). By signing the first treaty, the member states agreed to the CRA with a total of US\$ 100 billion in commitments (Baumann 2017: 27). In addition, by signing the second treaty, the NDB Constitutive Agreement became more achievable with each member state having an initial registered capital of US\$ 50 billion along with an initial authorized capital of US\$ 100 billion (Damico 2017: 66).

However, as with the establishment of any institution, there are certain key matters to be considered. Dr Jeffrey Mabelebe, Former Chief Executive Officer of Higher Education South Africa, notes some of these considerations. Firstly, considering the trade activities and the growth thereof between the BRICS members, he notes that the need for a bank was bound to lead to the establishment of such an institution (Mabelebe 2014: 34). What adds to this need are the members of the group having experienced some frustrations with certain existing institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Mabelebe 2014: 34). An example of these frustrations include the member states, and other countries, applying for development finance but not being successful in receiving this funding due to the systems and/or procedures of the IMF and World Bank.

Duggan (2015: 19) adds to this when he argues that the BRICS NDB was designed to reduce the frustrations, bureaucratically, that developing countries have been facing in terms of having access to funds from the Bretton Woods Institutions (Duggan 2015: 19). With trade activities increasing, it shows that the member-states of BRICS have built a foundation of trust among themselves. When states only consider their own agenda, by either looking after only their national interests or other reasons, building trust can become challenging, as the counterparts are not certain as to what the endgame is, which in turn presents a risk in trading with some states to start with.

The second key consideration is either the creation of new institutions or the reinforcement of key arrangements that are minilateral or regional in nature (Abdenur, Esteves and Gama 2014: 57). As the BRICS group launch new entities and/or institutions, which are moulded on BRICS as an existing group but tends to address areas that have been neglected by the powers that are more established, it can be argued that the group follows paths that are more ambitious (Abdenur, Esteves and Gama 2014: 57). This argument seems to touch on two significant reasons of why the BRICS NDB was established, the first reason being that the institution would be moulded by BRICS, and therefore, influenced by the group's ideas and perspectives and not with the ideas and perspectives of the West, as is the case with the Bretton Woods Institutions. The second significant reason includes that the BRICS group will be able to address the issues, which have not been high on the agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions, i.e. the IMF and the World Bank such as the infrastructural development of developing states.

To some extent, these two reasons contribute to the very justification to the question of why the BRICS group established a bank. As an area that has been neglected by the existing powers, the financing of heavy infrastructure and industrial policy as a gap is a matter that the NDB intends to address (Abdenur, Esteves and Gama 2014: 57). What makes these paths more ambitious is that the existing powers have been applying

a financing approach that may have led to including some states and excluding others. If this were not the case, why would there be gap in terms of developed developing development financing in the first place? What could possibly be included in the answer that explains this is that financial institutions tend to lend to those who are able to pay back the amount borrowed or commit to other measures in one way or another. For instance, in the case of the IMF, when a member-state requests resource from the IMF, these resources are made available under what is known as a lending arrangement, which specifies the economic policies and measures that the state agrees to implement so that its balance of payments challenge can be solved (International Monetary Fund 2017b).

However, if the financing model of the financial institution does not allow for a range of applicants to be successful due to being Western dominated, the gap becomes even wider. Duggan (2015: 11) seems to agree with this when he notes that many of the organisations and bodies that assisted with the creation of global governance were established and/or developed in the period between 1945 to 1980 and have been dominated by actors from the West with a Western agenda. Therefore, the BRICS NDB aims to address this and other areas of neglect, which has added to a financing gap, the bank aims to assist some of those who have been excluded from being financed by the existing institutions in terms of heavy infrastructure and industrial policy.

It could be argued that this is why the NDB has not only been regarded by the BRICS group as necessary but also much needed in closing a gap in the financial market. Since it is not the responsibility, task or mandate of the current established multilateral banks to support heavy infrastructure development, some of these current established multilateral financial institutions have failed in satisfying the financing needs of the BRICS group in many infrastructural and regional development projects (Lixing 2014: 61). Examples of these current established multilateral banks include, firstly, the largest development bank in the world, the World Bank, who has made a shift in its work agenda that focusses on programmes surrounding poverty alleviation especially in areas located in Africa and Latin America that are poverty-stricken (Lixing 2014). Secondly, the Asian Development Bank contributes 8% of the total investment in the member-states of the BRICS group and therefore, the bank has a very limited number of projects being BRICS specific (Lixing 2014).

Furthermore, Ramamurti and Singh (2009) note that the efforts to establish a bank are complementary rather than substitutionary of the more established institutions and in the creation of such parallel organizations the group has allocated considerable resources such as financial, institutional, and to some extent, political

resources. The lengths that the BRICS has gone to establish and maintain the NDB long-term, illustrates its importance in the group's vision. However, this also presents two sides of the BRICS NDB coin. On the one side, there is the matter of adhering to the growth and development of developing countries, and perhaps, how they are perceived internationally. On the other side, there is the matter of the bank not being a substitute for the more established institutions but rather being complementary to them as it speaks to the NDB's institutional design. As Abdenur, Esteves and Gama (2014: 57) note, the bank's institutional design may require an ironing out of issues such as its structure of governance and perhaps the bank can learn from the mistakes of the existing institutions to avoid making the same mistakes. Furthermore, Abdenur (2014: 88) notes that the bank is meant to address capital deficits for financing in the long-term for projects, such as industrial and infrastructure in developing countries, including, the group's members themselves, should it deem necessary.

In addition, if the wish of the BRICS group is to offer an alternative and at the same time, complement existing institutions, the initiatives of the NDB has to be built on an innovative basis rather than just mimicking the approach of the existing bodies and institutions (Abdenur, Esteves and Gama 2014: 57). This is argued because mimicking these institutions would mean that not only would their successes be copied but also their failures. However, the reality is that since these existing institutions are as developed as they are, the BRICS NDB may mimic some successes.

The aim of establishing the BRICS NDB does not include a duplication of any current established regional development bank (Lixing 2014); adhering to the above-mentioned need for a more innovative approach. Lixing (2014) further notes that the bank is rather committed to the construction and design of a new international financial system; based on: firstly, lessons drawn from the recent global financial crisis, secondly, striving towards becoming a featured financial institution in development, and thirdly, to maximise total benefits, form partnerships that are complementary with other international financial institutions.

To achieve and maintain the innovative approach that ties in with a new international financial system, the BRICS decision-making process has to be geared and constructed in such a way that it adheres to and eventually, resulted in what became the BRICS NDB. In responding to the frustrations experienced by existing development financial institutions, Viswanathan (2015: 25) argues that the BRICS group had four options; including,

- firstly, conforming; going along with the structures that are equitable,
- secondly, to reform; the efforts of the group in bringing changes to the Bretton Woods Institutions,

- thirdly, to bypass; ignore those norms that are loaded heavily against the developing world so long as this does not amount to violation of recognised international laws, and
- lastly, to create new institutions; the NDB falls into this category.

By establishing the NDB, BRICS took a position that allowed its members and other emerging economies (and developing states) to have a voice and to be heard in a way that may have been barely audible with institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, to include emerging economies and developing states in the interest of the Bretton Woods Institutions, these institutions need to reinvent themselves, however, as Ncwadi and Ruzive (2015) argue they do not seem to possess the capacity to do so. Therefore, the establishment of a financial institution that would serve the needs of the group's members and other emerging markets seemed to have been the next step, a drastic step but to fulfil these development financial needs, a much-needed step.

3.4 International Cooperation and the BRICS NDB

Based on Cox's critical theory and problem-solving distinction, the argument could be that since critical theory questions why the more powerful institutions were set up in the first place, to some extent, this illustrates that BRICS took the critical step in establishing the bank. Additionally, since the aim of problem-solving theory is to solve the challenges within existing institutions, the establishment of the NDB seems to be contrary to this theory, as the Bank did not just attempt to solve the problems in the existing institutions but rather created an institution that would address matters neglected by these existing institutions.

As noted in chapter two, O'Neill, Balsiger and Van Deveer (2004) distinguish three recent developments in international cooperation which are important to this study; these include: firstly, the introduction of NSAs, secondly, the study of norms and ideas, and lastly, increased examination of the effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation. Each of these developments can be linked, in one way or another, to the process of establishing the BRICS NDB. The purpose of this section is to investigate where in this process each of these developments can be identified.

NSAs – This development could be applicable to both problem-solving theory (as it remedies cooperation between states and non-states in existing powerful institutions) and critical theory (as it questions institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in why and how they were established as well as their tendency to be state-centric). Since the very nature of the NDB is to operate under a more commercial mode (Lixing 2014),

this may suggest the presence of NSAs. In addition, institutions of development finance do not exist within a vacuum; these institutions are interconnected with a global network (Abdenur and Folly 2017: 97) and this global network does not just include states actors but also NSAs. The BRICS NDB is not any different to this.

Furthermore, as part of the discussions that took place leading up to the formal announcement of the NDB, the group identified five institutions that have been participating and contributing to the general discussions (Abdenur and Folly 2017: 97). These institutions include multilateral institutions and bilateral providers as well as, and more importantly here, a wide array of NSAs deeply interconnected at multiple levels (Abdenur and Folly 2017: 98), allowing both state actors and NSAs alike to be identified in the process of establishing the BRICS NDB.

The study of norms and ideas – The BRICS group has questioned certain existing norms in terms of global governance (Viswanathan 2015: 25). This argument can be taken a step further by noting that not only has the group questioned certain existing norms but also by creating a development financial institution, the group has started to reform these norms. Furthermore, this adheres to how the group responded to their frustrations and what Viswanathan (2015: 25) regards as the four options BRICS had, as mentioned above.

For the purpose of this section, by choosing the last option of Viswanathan (2015: 25), the BRICS group directly adhered to option three by bypassing and ignoring “...those norms that are loaded heavily against the developing world so long as this does not amount to violation of recognised international laws” (Viswanathan 2015: 25). All the members of the group were keen on establishing the NDB, showing that members experienced frustrations, the questioning of norms and eventually attempting to reform the transnational issues. In addition, the argument of Viswanathan (2015: 25) of the group questioning certain existing norms in terms of global governance seems to adhere to Cox’s critical theory rather than problem-solving theory. The BRICS group did not choose the option of solving the problem within the existing institution by, for instance, attempting to amend the agenda or list of priorities of the existing institutions. However, as Abdenur, Esteves and Gama (2014: 53) ask, “how can you change a system whose legitimacy you question – and yet, whose existence you support (i.e., because you depend upon the existence of that system in order to expand your own influence)?”.

The effectiveness, or impact, of international cooperation – When countries or other international parties enter into agreements, they tend to have a very enthusiastic approach in the beginning, but this enthusiasm

tends to meltdown and leads to cooperation becoming a challenge. The way in which the cooperation in the BRICS NDB has been coordinated and structured allows cooperation to be sustainable. Each member of the group has given some form of responsibility placing pressure on each of them to cooperate and therefore, contributing to a sustainable cooperation. The creation of the NDB places emphasis on South-South cooperation among developing countries (Lixing 2014). This also illustrates the importance of international cooperation.

3.5 Collaborative Diplomacy and the BRICS NDB

In chapter two it was noted that the description provided by Albro (2016) would be employed in this study because it highlights characteristics that can be used as part of the foundation for what the study aims to achieve. Albro (2016: 4) notes that collaborative diplomacy is diplomacy that,

... tends to emphasize *trust-building* through *cooperation* on *mutual objectives* and around *shared values*, often via the “*team work*” of partnerships in *projecting the partners or actors image abroad*.

Trust building – In the creation of the BRICS NDB, it can be argued that the way the members of the BRICS group has built trust amongst each other was the monetary contribution each of them had to make; the US\$10 billion contributed by each member of the US\$50 billion for the initial subscription capital. Therefore, by each member making their contribution, it takes away the spotlight and pressure from one member and shifts the spotlight to all the members.

Cooperation and Teamwork – The role each member plays now that the NDB is established illustrates both cooperation and teamwork. Each member has agreed to accept certain high-level responsibilities, which include members making their resources available to make the NDB work. For instance, South Africa has agreed to host the regional office in Johannesburg and therefore, making resources available to set up this regional office. If the other members of the group did not trust South Africa, they would have found it difficult to agree to this. This characteristic can also be seen in the relationship between India and China. Cozendey (2017: 129) argues that one of the concerns India had was to balance the decision-making of the group in terms of the NDB in that the headquarters would be in China and opted to host the headquarters in India instead. However, through the collective decision-making of the group, India had to trust the members of the group and agree to the headquarters being in China.

Mutual objectives – It is important to note the role played by each member in the establishment of the NDB. In the process of establishing the NDB, working groups and technical groups were set up to investigate different aspects in this process such as the viability of a bank. In March 2012, the New Delhi Declaration stated that BRICS directed their Ministers of Finance to examine the viability and feasibility of this BRICS initiative, establish joint working group for further research and report back to the following Summit (in 2013) (Bertelsmann-Scott et al. 2016). The joint working group is no longer active, as it had served its purpose by the 2013 Summit. To work together in this way, the parties had to establish the mutual objectives of each member and a trust amongst each other that formed the foundation for this working relationship as it would be challenging to establish a bank if the objectives were not mutual.

There are also two main BRICS structures that are vitally important in terms of the group's mutual objectives. Firstly, the BRICS Think-Tank Council. In 2012, Ambassador Jerry Matjila (and the Former Director General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation), met with stakeholders (independent and governmental) to form discussions on how South Africa can create its own BRICS Think-Tank as the other members of the group already had their own think tanks dedicated to BRICS (Bracht and Sadykova 2013). The think tank from each member of the group would later establish the BRICS Think-Tank Council. The members of BRICS are represented on the Council as follows: The Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) – Brazil; the National Committee for BRICS Research (NRC/BRICS) – Russia; the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) - India; the China Centre for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) – China and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) – South Africa (Fifth BRICS Academic Forum 2014). One of the main objectives of the BRICS Think Tanks Council would be to act as the knowledge hub in terms of sharing and developing research work, publications, and data on BRICS (Fifth BRICS Academic Forum 2014). Furthermore, the Council creates a platform for academia, researchers, and think tanks from each member of BRICS (Fifth BRICS Academic Forum 2014).

One of the items that were high on the Council's agenda was the research required to establish the NDB as illustrated through the BRICS Think-Tank Forum held in China September 2012 where forty experts from all BRICS members gathered under the theme: Adjustment, Innovation, and Cooperation (Bracht and Sadykova 2013: 7). It was during this meeting that the consensus was reached to move forward with the decision to create a BRICS development bank as it was found that the creation of a bank was practical and necessary, according to Bracht and Sadykova (2013: 7) who also note that no official report was released on this consensus but that it would formulate the discussion for the following BRICS Think-Tank Forum held

before the 2013 BRICS Summit in South Africa. The Council is still active and it continues to create a platform for think tanks, researchers, and academia to interact under the BRICS umbrella.

Secondly, the BRICS Academic Forum which serves as a platform for researchers and academics to forge closer cooperation and exchange knowledge for the generation of knowledge BRICS-wide (Zondi 2014a). By the Durban Summit, the forum had evolved a broad framework of discussion that gives it significant integrity, intellectually to the forum (Zondi 2014b). It was at this Summit where BRICS Academics highlighted member-states sharing common interests in pushing for reform, comprehensively, of multilateral institutions in global governance, to make them more legitimate, effective and responsive to the needs of both Africa and the developing world (Fifth BRICS Academic Forum 2014).

One of the main ways of BRICS responding to these needs includes the NDB. Furthermore, the Forum collectively offers timely and viable recommendations and advice to BRICS state leaders to support the adoption of best practices, policy-making, assisting with implementing existing and/or new programmes and schemes as well as the exploration of new frameworks (Nkoana-Mashabane 2013). The NDB is one of the major projects that the Forum has assisted with as it advised the group's state leaders on its establishment. Lixing (2014) agrees to this by noting that the proposal on the establishment of the BRICS NDB is a major recommendation of the Academic Forum. Under the Forum, experts from all the member-states conducted in-depth studies on the feasibility and necessity of establishing a development bank (Lixing 2014). The Forum was involved in the establishment of the NDB since its initial ideas and, similar to the BRICS Think-Tank Council, remains active.

Projecting the partners or actors image abroad – If the BRICS group only focused on developing states, it would be taking the same approach as the institutions who tend to place more emphasis on developed states. In turn, such an approach may have projected a view of exclusivity of the group and therefore, in the eyes of the global arena may not have a positive perception of the group abroad.

The other characteristics of collaborative diplomacy may assist with testing collaborative diplomacy and its role in the establishment of the BRICS NDB:

Representation – In the context of this study, representation involves the inclusion of different types of states rather than a specific group and excluding another. For example, one of the reasons why the NDB was established was to create a platform where the countries of the Global South are represented in matters related to development financing such as heavy infrastructure. The NDB is not just beneficial to the members of

BRICS but as Dingding Chen (2014) puts it, other developing countries are also in desperate need of infrastructure financing.

Legitimacy - Secondly, legitimacy plays a role when collaborative diplomacy is employed as it assists with justification. For example, in the case of establishing the BRICS NDB, the legitimacy of the Bank can be justified in a number of reasons. Chen (2014) notes that the first criticism or scepticism is that the establishment of the BRICS NDB seems to demonstrate the dynamics and viability of the BRICS group despite the criticism and scepticism in recent years. Some of these criticisms and scepticisms include certain member-states experiencing slower growth in recent years and criticisms on the BRICS NDB point to the different views that the member-states had among each other (Chen 2014). An example of these different views includes India initially disagreeing to the NDB Headquarters being in China.

However, what these critics seem to be missing is that there will always be views and opinions that are different among the member-states of BRICS as it is no different to the differences in views and opinions among the members of the G7 (Chen 2014). Despite the differences among these members, development seems to be the answer to them sharing a major common goal, which in turn unites them (Chen 2014). The second challenge, the BRICS NDB presents a direct challenge to the West led global order and therefore, the Bank is significant, according to Chen (2014) who also argues that the BRICS NDB should attempt to push the Bretton Woods Institutions, i.e. the IMF and World Bank, to be more transparent and open. This allows for a strong relationship that is complementary between the BRICS NDB and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Chen 2014). Therefore, the BRICS NDB should not be seen as a threat to the dominance of the IMF, the World Bank and the rest of the West (Chen 2014) but rather as an institution that complements them.

Networking and non-hierarchical – As noted earlier in this chapter, it could be argued that diplomacy has evolved from exclusionary hierarchical, state-centric traditional interactions to a more inclusive network of diverse actors where collaboration is required when adhering to the way diplomacy is practiced. In the case of the BRICS NDB, the BRICS Think-Tank Forum, discussed above, has assisted in the establishment of the NDB. As mentioned above, the Forum held a meeting in China in September 2012 where forty experts from all the BRICS member-states gathered. These experts can be regarded as the BRICS network of experts as they included academia, researchers, and the think tanks of the BRICS member-states.

Equality/Non-elitist – For the BRICS group, equality in decision-making is one of the characteristics that the group has been promoting and still promotes since the very first Summit held in Yekaterinburg, Russia 2009,

when the event resulted in what is known as the *First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders*.

The heads of states agreed in this statement that:

...underline...support for a democratic and just world order based ... equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision-making of all states...

(First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders 2009: 159)

Short-term interaction - For collaborative diplomacy, short-term interaction between the actors involved to reach a set goal seems to be significant. As mentioned above, Cowan and Arsenault (2008: 11) note that interaction involves "...initiatives where people work together on a joint venture...". The purpose of a joint venture is for two or more parties to enter a short-term agreement to reach a goal. Once this goal is reached, the agreement is usually dissolved. For the purposes of this study, it would seem that one of the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy is short-term interaction as this is illustrated during the establishment of the BRICS NDB. An example of this is each BRICS member-state setting up the joint working group, mentioned above, that assisted with the establishment a bank and more particularly, if it would be viable and legitimate. Furthermore, to some extent, the experts from the BRICS Academic Forum that provided expertise in the establishment of the BRICS NDB could be another example of the role of the experts in terms of their research to establish a bank largely became less significant after the NDB was established and now that it is operating. However, the NDB might wish to employ experts again should it require such expertise for its projects and initiatives.

3.6 The Decision-Making Process in BRICS

As noted in chapter two of this study, the focus on decision-making has been on two main streams; nineteenth century and twentieth century decision-making. The former places emphasis on the role of experts, the role of private actors, the experimental nature of conferences and the process of institutionalisation (Reinalda 2001: 3). The latter tends to focus on a continued institutionalisation and creation of international governance structures, a primacy of multilateral over bilateral diplomacy, the phenomenon of modern summitry and the relevance of regional groupings of nation-states (Reinalda 2001: 4) with some of these characteristics spilling over into the twenty-first century.

With this in mind, on the surface it would seem that the decision-making process of BRICS coincides with twentieth century decision-making more than it does nineteenth century decision-making. The purpose of this section is to firstly, investigate which stream would be more applicable, keeping in mind that a

combination of the two may also be applicable and secondly, if the decision-making in BRICS can be related to one of these streams. The decision-making process adopted by the BRICS countries is an interesting process that converges into two main directions (Scaffardi 2014: 141). The first main direction involves “coordination” between heads of state within the BRICS Summits themselves and the second direction operates at a level that is inter-ministerial (Scaffardi 2014: 141). Since some multilateral institutions do not completely represent the current distribution of wealth and power, their mechanisms in terms of decision-making have proven to be unresponsive to changes regarded as significant over time (Scaffardi 2014). Even with this being the case, it would seem that groups such as BRICS have started the process of paving their own way to be more responsive to changes no matter how small those responses may currently be.

The process of how the BRICS NDB came about assists with understanding whether the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy were applied to achieve this goal. Since the very first official documents of BRIC(S) were drafted, the group has declared their commitment to the decision-making process they employ in its vision. In the context of this argument, the use of BRIC(S) indicates the membership of the group before South Africa joined the group; BRIC, and after the country became a member (S) in BRIC(S). As noted above, in 2009, when the very first Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, the event resulted in what is now known as the *First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders*. In this document, the heads of state agreed to:

...underline...support for a democratic and just world order based ... equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision-making of all states...

(First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRICS Countries Leaders 2009: 2)

The term ‘collective’ in this statement suggests that no one member will have more decision-making powers than the other members; when a decision needs to be made, all members will have equal powers and each voice will be heard equally. Similarly, in the second Summit held in Brazil, under the heading, *Common Vision and Global Governance*, the leaders committed to:

...underline [their] support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on ... equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision-making of all States...

(Second Summit: Joint Statement 2010: 1)

However, during the third Summit, the statement on decision-making became more robust when the heads of state acknowledged that:

... While facing the evolving global environment and a multitude of global threats and challenges, the international community should join hands to strengthen cooperation for common development. Based on universally recognized norms of international law and in a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision-making, global economic governance should be strengthened, democracy in international relations should be promoted, and the voice of emerging and developing countries in international affairs should be enhanced.

(Third Summit: Sanya Declaration and Action Plan 2011: 2)

Not only does this statement in the declaration continue the trend of declaring ‘collective decision-making’ but it also adheres to the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy through the use of terms such as *cooperation* and *mutual respect*.

In 2012, the group’s decision-making was taken a step further during the fourth Summit held in India. The leaders agreed that they:

...stand ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, based on universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision-making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today...

(Fourth Summit: New Delhi Declaration and Action Plan, 2012: 1)

An observation worth making here is that the decision-making of the group started to be more inclusive of both developing and developed states. If the group only focused on developing states, it would be taking the same approach as the other international institutions who tend to place more emphasis on developed states. In turn, such an approach may have attached an exclusionary view to the group and therefore, in the eyes of the international arena may not have a positive perception of the group abroad. Furthermore, another observation to make here is that the decision-making has been geared in such a way that it is able, or at least attempts, to deal with both challenges and opportunities the global arena faces.

In 2013, the newest addition to the BRIC(S) group; South Africa, hosted the fifth Summit when BRIC became BRICS. During this Summit, the decision-making in BRICS was significant due to the two major proposals that would later become BRICS initiatives in the financial area (Damico 2017: 63). One of these proposals resulted in the decision made on the viability of the BRICS NDB, followed by the respective ministers of finance and the presidents of central banks being instructed to negotiate their agreements of constituent

(Damico 2017: 63). This decision made at the Summit hosted by South Africa is also significant as it somewhat coincides with South Africa becoming a member of the group.

The nature of BRICS decision-making at the sixth Summit seems to be similar to that of the fifth Summit. The first to the fourth Summits, the group seems to have laid a foundation for the type of decision-making they employ. However, the nature of the decision-making seems to become more practical with the fifth and sixth Summits as they implemented some of the decisions made previously. In 2014, at the sixth Summit, held in Brazil, the group decided to announce, formally, the launch of the new international financial institution, the NDB (Abdenur and Folly 2017: 90).

Furthermore, as BRICS matured the group's decision-making changed as shares of decision-making functions have been increasing and the deliberation function has been declining (Bohler-Muller 2015). The table below illustrates this change:

Documents dominated and Year	Deliberation	Direction-setting	Decision-making
2008	46% of the discourse functions	Almost 49% of the discourse	Amounted to only 5%
2009	Substantially decreased	Rose considerably; 57%	Rose considerably; 18%
2010	High proportion of development in global governance reflects the efforts of BRIC to facilitate the reform of certain Bretton Woods Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, governance to ensure a shift of voting power to emerging economies and developing countries. Furthermore, the dialogue on concrete steps towards establishing regional currency arrangements between the BRIC countries launched.		
2011	Deliberation and direction setting seemed to have declined and the decision-making function continued to grow reaching 38.6%.		
2012	However, in 2012, deliberations and direction setting seemed to have dominated and decision-making dropped to 21%. Possibly, due to different factors that came into play such as deliberating and setting direction on the BRICS NDB.		
2013	Similarly, in 2013, the share of decision-making constituted 25% showing a rise in this function but the dominant functions were still deliberations and direction setting.		

2014	Declined; 18%	Declined; 20%	Increased drastically; 61.3 %
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(Bohler-Muller 2015: 106)

The change in deliberation and decision-making functions seem to correlate with BRICS initiatives. During the years when deliberation was higher than decision-making, the group seems to have received more criticism and sceptism on the different issues including its longevity. However, even though the criticism and sceptism did not end, as soon as the share on decision-making became higher, it resulted in initiatives such as the NDB. Furthermore, taking the above into account, decision-making has played a significant role in BRICS and what the group aims to achieve. The following section explores how the decision-making in BRICS has contributed to establishing the BRICS NDB.

3.7 The Decision-Making Process in the BRICS NDB

In 2013, former South African Minister of Higher Education, Dr Blade Nzimande, delivered a speech at the Fifth BRICS Academic Forum. He noted that all countries present at the fifth Academic Forum, other countries and more particularly, the BRICS members are faced with crucial challenges such as unemployment, overcoming poverty, and inequality (Nzimande 2013: 29). Therefore, to address these challenges, it is important to develop policies and strategies that achieve development and sustainable economic growth (Nzimande 2013: 29). These goals are not unique to the members of BRICS and shared by other developing states (Nzimande 2013: 29). Based on this argument, former Minister Nzimande notes that:

These nations will follow the ... deliberations closely and will be keenly interested in the decisions that [the Academic Forum takes], particularly decisions involving the establishment of new development institutions such as the ... BRICS Bank ...

(Nzimande 2013: 29)

The countries interested, and keenly so, in the decisions made by the Academic Forum adhere to the role NSAs played in the establishment of the BRICS NDB. The recommendations made by the experts of the Forum are not just considered by the BRICS executive but, as former Minister Nzimande puts it, are keenly interested in these recommendations.

The decision of BRICS that resulted in the establishment of the BRICS NDB adheres to twentieth century decision-making as it speaks to the development of a continued institutionalisation and creation of

international governance structures and perhaps the development that notes the phenomenon of modern summitry (Reinalda 2001: 4). The latter development is highlighted here because the collective decision-making of BRICS to establish the BRICS NDB was a decision made in a BRICS Summit; hence, modern summitry. The decision-making and voting powers of all members are equal and can be seen in the contributions each made to the NDB; the initial subscription capital was US\$50 billion with each member contributing US\$10 billion giving each equal voting powers (Otero-Iglesias 2014). This individual contribution of each member and the overall process of establishing the BRICS NDB brought some implications for each member in terms of their national interests.

In establishing the NDB, nineteenth century decision-making was adhered to as it includes two elements of this stream; the role of experts and the role of private actors (Reinalda 2001: 3). Through experts, such as those in the Think-Tank Forum, participating in the deliberation and decision-making, the BRICS group agreed that the establishment of a development bank is feasible and viable for the mobilisation of resources for sustainable development and infrastructure in BRICS projects as well as projects from other emerging economies and developing countries (Fifth BRICS Academic Forum 2014). These NSAs and experts, employed by the respective member-states to provide the necessary skills to conduct the research and/or studies making them important in establishing the NDB.

3.7.1 Twentieth Century Decision-Making

As the first development of this stream, continued institutionalisation and the creation of international governance structures are applicable to this chapter through its second aspect; economics. The first aspect; security, does not seem to be as significant. However, economics would be applicable considering that BRICS created the NDB after doing the appropriate studies required that eventually led to its establishment. In addition, the possibility of international cooperation leading to free trade, as argued by Evans and Newnham (1992) in chapter two, adheres to economics and this study for two reasons. Firstly, international cooperation adheres to the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy. Secondly, the cooperation between the BRICS member-states have led to increased activity between these five states and, more importantly here, the establishment of the BRICS NDB.

The primacy of multilateral over bilateral diplomacy is applicable to this study for different reasons. The first reason, some of BRICS' members gained more from its membership of a multilateral group than from being in a bilateral relationship with one of the other members. For instance, the likelihood of South Africa and India establishing a development bank would not have been as strong and even if they did establish it, the

resources such a process requires may have presented challenges to one country if not both. Secondly, groups being 'like-minded' and sharing a common purpose adhere to the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy. To build trust in a partnership, there is a level of 'like-mindedness' required. In addition, for any actor to form part of a group and be able to identify mutual objectives, the members have to share a common purpose of why they are part of the group to begin with and why they want to participate in certain joint ventures as part of the group such as the NDB.

Another development of twentieth century decision-making is the relevance of regional groupings of nation-states. This is applicable to some extent because even though BRICS may not be a regional grouping geographically speaking, it cannot be disputed that BRICS and its NDB have elements of a regional group. Such a group, through cooperation, as Reinalda (2001: 8) argues, hopes to strengthen its common economic position in the global market, while at the same time wanting to optimise and secure the national interests of the member-states. Since each of the member-states has to secure their national interests, none of the members would have agreed to establishing the BRICS NDB if it had harmed their national interest in the process.

3.7.2 The Phenomenon of Modern Summitry

Even though the phenomenon of modern summitry is a development of twentieth century decision-making, it is an important aspect of this study. Based on the discussion above, modern summitry seemed to have been a phenomenon in the late twentieth century but has evolved in the early twenty-first century. According to Melissen (2006: 14), it is safe to assume that summitry will continue to undergo transformation in the twenty-first century as it has in the last few decades between summits such as Yalta in 1945 and Johannesburg in 2002 (on sustainability). Further to this transformation of summitry, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol notes that summit diplomacy is a recent expression (Mourlon-Druol 2016: 1). Even though the expression was coined in the 1950s and further developed in the mid-1970s with the emergence of the G7 summits, the 1990s and 2000s saw further developments in the practice of regular summits when the G20 emerged, at first, the ministerial meetings in 1999 and later, the heads of government in 2008 (Mourlon-Druol 2016: 1-2).

In addition, both the G20 and the Group of 77 (G77) serve as excellent examples of summit diplomacy. Delgado and Soares (2005: 41) argue that the developing countries of the G20 reached a point of prestige at the Cancun Conference, which could turn the group into a counterweight that would be significant to the WTO consisting of developed countries and their overwhelming domination of the interests. Therefore, summit diplomacy could have provided, and still could provide, a unifying front for developing countries.

This approach of summit diplomacy as a unifying front seems to be applicable to BRICS as well. The member-states of BRICS have used the group as a platform not only to present a unifying front but also to counter the dominating interests of developed countries in the global arena.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the question whether, and to what extent, collaborative diplomacy played a role in establishing the BRICS NDB. The importance of BRICS in the global arena has also been noted in this chapter. The group and its initiatives have received criticism and scepticism but it has grown and lasts longer than some critics thought it would. As with any other group or international organisation, the group has experienced setbacks, one of which is some member-states experiencing their own national challenges. Nevertheless, as noted by Chen, this is no different to other states who are members of other groups and international organisations. In chapter two, the concept of collaborative diplomacy was analysed and therefore, this conceptualisation, which included the characteristics of Albrow (2016) and characteristics discovered through investigation, guided this chapter.

Furthermore, as a modern form of diplomacy, collaborative diplomacy seems to be more applicable to this study than other modern forms. The modern nature of collaborative diplomacy has been illustrated through different aspects including the types of actors and that it can be used simultaneously with other modes of diplomacy such as multilateral diplomacy, which has been regarded as traditional mode of diplomacy. To build on chapter two, chapter three investigated collaborative diplomacy as the phenomenon and applied it in a more practical way by investigating it through its role in establishing the BRICS NDB. In addition, this chapter has also briefly discussed how international decision-making played a role of the establishment of the NDB along with the link between international decision-making and the BRICS decision-making process that resulted in the Bank.

This chapter has illustrated that not only was collaborative diplomacy used in the establishment of the BRICS NDB but it also played a significant role in this process. Its characteristics as noted by Albrow (2016) and those discovered through research have illustrated this point. Furthermore, it would seem that even though most of the characteristics noted by Albrow (2016) can be linked to the process of establishing the NDB, the last characteristic; projecting the partners or actors image abroad, does not seem to be as clear as the others. The image that the member-states of BRICS project in relation to the business of the NDB could create a debate as a main purpose of the Bank is to assist developing countries with heavy infrastructure development and

the group has stated that it is willing to work with developed countries. However, it does not seem to be clear that BRICS through its Bank is willing to assist developed countries with their projects. This point could create a debate in whether the group is project a positive or negative image. Furthermore, through its decision-making process, the group has established initiatives such as the CRA and more importantly, the NDB. This matter warrants further investigation and/or research.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY IN THE NDB

4.1 Introduction

Chapter one noted that Western perspectives have dominated mainstream diplomacy at least since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. However, the twentieth-century introduced many changes in the theory and practice of diplomacy. Chapter two has shown that diplomacy is constantly changing in its theory and practice and chapter three assessed the role of collaborative diplomacy in the establishment of the BRICS NDB. This chapter will consider the future of the NDB, the future of diplomacy in the NDB, BRICS summit diplomacy and the importance of modern diplomacy in the global arena.

4.2 The Future of the NDB

This study has illustrated that unlike the decision-making process of Western dominated institutions such as the IMF, the collective decision-making process of BRICS seems to be working for the group. This approach to decision-making has not only provided all member-states the opportunity to have a voice within the BRICS structures but it would also seem that BRICS has given certain other emerging economies (and perhaps, other developing countries) hope that their projects concerning heavy infrastructure may be considered in terms of funding. On this basis, it seems that the future of the NDB is bright. It should be acknowledged that just like any other financial institution, the Bank might make mistakes.

However, two aspects could assist in contributing to the NDB growing stronger. Firstly, the member-states having equal powers in voting and decision-making, and no member being more superior to another, may assist in solving and/or overcoming possible future problems and challenges. Secondly, international cooperation. Evans and Newnham (1992: 79) note that, "If free trade did not lead to international cooperation then perhaps international cooperation could establish free trade". Based on this, it can be argued that should international cooperation establish free trade, it would then directly assist the member-states with overcoming barriers, technical and otherwise, which prevents cooperation from taking place. Similarly, international cooperation assists the group with development finance in the context of the NDB. Therefore, international cooperation could be a key aspect in the members of BRICS overcoming the barriers between them and assist with establishing a set of norms and ideas (as discussed in chapters two and three) which have been moulded by BRICS and not by the West that emerging economies (and developing countries) just have to comply with.

4.3 The Future of Diplomacy in the NDB

The focus of this study has been on collaborative diplomacy and how it may have contributed to establishing the BRICS NDB. Collaborative diplomacy has developed into a non-traditional mode of diplomacy with its own significance in terms of theory and practice in the IR discipline and the theories and practices underlying diplomacy in the twenty-first century. The concept has only started receiving attention recently and therefore, its application seems to be limited in comparison to other modes of diplomacy. Based on this, significant attention is now paid to the pursuit of collaborative diplomacy (Albro 2013).

As this study has shown, collaborative diplomacy can now be tested in a practical way by applying it to real-life scenarios such as the establishment of the BRICS NDB. On this basis, there is an observation to make. When applying diplomacy to the NDB it can be argued that the members of BRICS have made the correct decision in establishing the Bank. This also means that the processes the group has put in place since the first Summit in Russia (2009), seems to yield results.

Therefore, should BRICS continue to use modes of diplomacy, such as collaborative diplomacy, who knows what other initiatives and projects the group will establish and/or undertake. This study has also indicated that all the characteristics of collaborative diplomacy may not always be applicable to all possible case studies and therefore, may have certain limitations. In the case of the BRICS NDB, the application of collaborative diplomacy in establishing the NDB have indicated that the last characteristic of collaborative diplomacy; projecting the partners or actors image abroad, may create a debate within the Bank. Furthermore, through further research and investigation, it is worth applying collaborative diplomacy to other possible case studies to determine if all the characteristics can be applied to a single study.

4.4 BRICS Summit Diplomacy

As illustrated in chapter three, modern summitry has evolved as a phenomenon and therefore, it is no longer in the same state it was in the twentieth-century. This argument can be taken a step further by noting that summitry can be applied either through its traditional or modern approach; illustrated through the use of summitry by groups such as the G7 and the G20 (in the late twentieth-century) and others such as BRICS (in the twenty-first century).

Groups such as BRICS have used summitry as a form of diplomacy adhering to the argument by Mourlon-Druol (2016) on summit diplomacy in that the practice has increased in the late twentieth-century spilling over into the twenty-first century. BRICS summit diplomacy has played an important role in how members portray themselves in the global arena such as Russia and China. Summit diplomacy also seems to be significant in the agreements the group has reached. For instance, the agreements related to the CRA and the NDB were reached and agreed on during BRICS Summits held annually.

4.5 The Importance of Modern Diplomacy in the Global Arena

The modes that diplomacy has adopted have evolved in accordance with the needs of the global arena. Even though certain modes of diplomacy, such as polyilateral diplomacy and more importantly for this study, collaborative diplomacy, can be classified as modes of modern diplomacy (nascent or innovative) and they have certain close similarities, chapter two has illustrated the differences between these modes through their characteristics and features. The similarities and differences could mean that modes of modern diplomacy have become increasingly linked and even possibly intertwined, as the global arena has become more interconnected making modern diplomacy important in the global arena.

Further to the importance of modern diplomacy in the global arena, collaborative diplomacy seems to have created a possible bridge between traditional diplomacy (tends to focus on states) and nascent (or new) diplomacy (does not completely disregard states but tends to focus on non-state). Therefore, it could be argued that collaborative diplomacy is a form of innovative diplomacy as it places emphasis on both types of actors (state and non-state) and thus, can be seen as a bridge between traditional and nascent (or new) diplomacy. This type of diplomacy is necessary in the global arena, as it requires both states and non-states.

Additionally, because modes such as collaborative diplomacy seem to have been developed fairly recently, in comparison to others, the research and literature done on it does not seem to be as much as other modes of diplomacy such as multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. This has allowed for contribution to the literature on this mode as collaborative diplomacy can be studied even further by applying it to other case studies. Collaborative diplomacy has played a more significant role than it has been given credit. Through further investigation, not only can collaborative diplomacy receive more attention but it will also allow for greater relevance in diplomacy as a sub-field of IR and therefore, in the IR discipline.

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