UNDERSTANDING PEACEFUL AND VIOLENT NATION-BUILDING THROUGH LEADERSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN

By

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For my family

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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS

Peace-building has reached a cross-roads. The high instance of conflict relapse in "post-conflict" societies has stimulated an examination of dominant peace-building thinking and practice. This research contributes to this thinking by examining nation-building in societies plagued by identity-related conflicts, specifically in South Sudan. It does so using the leadership process approach. The question driving this enquiry is to discover whether the leadership process approach can shed light on why South Sudan failed to build a nation that sustains peace. By using the leadership process approach, this study contributes to a better understanding of nation-building and how it contributes to both conflict and peace processes, allowing for a greater understanding of the relationship between nation-building and peace-building and why dominant state-building approaches to peace-building are incomplete.

Using existing literature, the thesis provides a cohesive conceptual framework of the nation combining five elements: a national identity, link to a territory, a claim to political organisation and self-government, collective will and collective responsibility. This provides the key themes and indicators which are examined using the leadership process approach. The leadership process approach, which conceptualises leadership as a relationship between leaders, followers and situations, provides the analytical tools that are used to explain the emergence of the five elements of the conceptual framework of the nation. These tools include an examination of the leader-follower relationship based on mutuality and the exchange of influence, situational leadership and the sources of power. This framework is used to understand South Sudan. A case study approach is used to ensure a full examination of the relationship between nation-building and peace-building using the leadership process. Multiple forms of data collection were used including documentary analysis, a literature review and interviews. This data is analysed using the process tracing approach.

The analysis includes South Sudan's early history through to the signing of the most recent peace agreement in 2015. South Sudan's early history of conquest and colonisation, the first Sudanese civil war, the second Sudanese civil war and the current South Sudanese civil war are all explored in depth. The study finds that the leadership process approach allows for a more nuanced and holistic understanding of the South Sudanese conflict specifically and nation-building in general. It shows that peace-building failed in South Sudan because of the conflict-reinforcing nature of the nation-building and leadership processes that have been replicated at national, regional and local levels. It concludes with several lessons learned for both nation-building and peace-building.

Keywords: Leadership, nation-building, peace-building, South Sudan

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
AUCISS	African Union Commission of Inquiry in South Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRA	Compensation and Reparation Authority
CTRH	Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing
GoNU	Government of National Unity
HCSS	Hybrid Court for South Sudan
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JIU	Joint Integrated Units
NCP	National Congress Party
NCRC	National Constitutional Review Commission
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIF	National Islamic Front
NLC	National Liberation Council
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
NUP	National Unionist Party
PMHC	Political-Military High Command
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement - In Opposition
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSIM/A	South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SSNPS	South Sudan National Police Service
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Context and rationale for the study

The thinking and practice of peace-building has stagnated and is facing a crisis. In the past two decades, the model of peace-building used by the United Nations (UN) and the international community has slowly evolved, but the widely criticised liberal peace-building model remains dominant. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines peace-building as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Peace-building's primary goal, then, is to prevent conflict relapse (Berdal 2009: 17; Cousens 2001: 4; Paris 2004: 2; Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008: 2). Yet, the various peace-building interventions that have stemmed from the liberal peace-building paradigm have produced a mixed record, especially with regards to achieving lasting peace in the fullest sense of the term[1] (Paris 2010: 337, 340-343, 347). As a result, the report produced by the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peace-building Architecture indicated that a rethinking of peace-building is necessary (UN 2015).

Despite the extensive critique of peace-building in the UN report and elsewhere (see 1.2.3) efforts to re-frame peace-building have been constrained by certain conceptual and theoretical assumptions and disciplinary limits. These are covered in detail in the literature review below. In short, it includes an emphasis on state- and institution-building, which stems in part from an under-conceptualisation of leadership in the Political Sciences (see 1.2.1; 1.2.3). In the peace-building literature, nation-building, peace-building and state-building (or similar concepts) are often used interchangeably (Call 2008: 3, 5; Dobbins 2015; von Bogdandy *et al.* 2005: 580, 593). This also occurs in the policy sphere. For example, the United States has often used the term nation-building for its post-conflict reconstruction and state-building efforts (Dobbins 2015). These are inherently different terms, however, and should be understood through the different meanings of statehood and nationhood.

The "state" can be defined as an entity that encompasses "(a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states" (League of Nations 1936: 25). It is also generally expected to have "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" (Weber 1946: 6). The state, then, is a more legal and institutional entity. The "nation", on the other hand, is a more dynamic entity that "refers to a community whose members see themselves as distinct from other communities" based on some key identity markers (see 1.2.2; 2.2.1.3)

[1] By this the author refers to Galtung's conceptualisation of peace as the absence of not just direct violence but of structural violence as well, resulting in positive peace (Galtung 1969).

(Holsti 1995: 58). Nationhood, as it is understood here, includes an element of statehood, but the two are still distinct (see 1.2.2; 2.3.1). As a result, state-building, more often associated with peace-building, refers to the construction of state institutions (a functioning fiscal system, effective military and police force, administrative institutions and more), while nation-building is a more abstract and complex process of building a sense of nationhood and belonging amongst members of a society along with functioning government institutions (Hippler 2005: 9; Mullenbach 2006: 55). The emphasis placed on state institutions in peace-building has contributed to a conflation of state and nation in peace-building, leading to an assumption that successful state-building will lead to peaceful nations. It also prevents more robust study on why and how institutions function or fail in conflict societies due to other processes such as leadership.

Another key assumption constraining peace-building thinking is the view that successful peace-building should address the root causes of a conflict (UN 2015: 4). However, conflict processes are dynamic and alter a society's structures. The need to address this has been raised with regards to the economic changes in a war-torn society (Ballentine & Sherman 2003: 1-2), but less so with regards to societal relationships, particularly in identity-related conflicts. Those that have attempted to address such societal rifts have focused on issues of reconciliation and transitional justice, which is too limited (see 2.2.2.3). In addition, the study of identity-related conflicts has produced overly dichotomous debates on the cause of such conflicts and the nature of identity. For example, the study of identity and conflict has tended to centre on whether and how "ethnic hatred" or nationalism leads to conflict (Horowitz 2001; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 49-50; Williams 2016: 174-175). Identity-related conflicts are often emotionally charged and associated with extreme violence and mass atrocities, complicating peace-building (Bennet 2016: 2; Eley & Suny 1996: 11-12; Mann 2001). However, there is little empirical evidence to support a claim that a diversity of identities in itself increases the risk of violent conflict (Gilley 2004: 1155; Laitin 2007: 10-11).

As a result, the debate on identity-related conflicts is often too narrowly focused on finding or disproving a causal relationship between identity division and conflict. While addressing root causes is widely held to be essential in peace-building (UN 2015: 4), in identity-related conflicts at least, it is not only about root causes (Kaufmann 1996: 137). Peace-builders must confront the multiple relationships that have evolved and broken down in such a conflict. For example, once an identity-related conflict reaches its formal end, previous enemies, who have become accustomed to identifying each other based on certain identity markers (Cohen 1999: 9; Hroch 1996: 68; Kaufmann 1996: 138; Weilenmann 2010: 41), must often find a way to live with each other and co-operate. This requires a re-framing of societal perceptions of identity, belonging and "the other". In each conflict,

the factors and relationships that have contributed to a heightening of such identity divisions is unique. Consequently, externally imposed recipes for peace-building are likely to be ineffective. Rather, a framework for understanding and analysing individual conflicts is needed as opposed to grand theories on the causes of conflicts and the road to peace.

The leadership process approach (see 1.2.1), which lends itself to the study of relationships, may provide such a framework. By untangling the concepts of state-building and nation-building, it becomes clear that an institutional/state-building approach is insufficient for peace-building. An approach that allows an analysis of agency, relationships and context is essential. The leadership process approach looks beyond individual leaders and allows for an analysis of followers and context as well. This is a useful frame to understand the multi-dimensional nature of the nation, which includes but is not limited to statehood. The process of forming the nation — nation-building — can promote either peace-building or conflict. The factors that influence the direction nation-building will take are determined by how the key elements of the nation are formed (see 2.3), and the contradictions and consistencies between these elements (see Figure 1). The interactions between these elements often determine whether a nation is conflict-producing or peace-promoting. State-building is therefore viewed as one element of an overall nation-building process, along with identity construction and the formation of collective will and responsibility. All three elements, therefore, are important in peace-building. Understanding the formation of and the relationship between the various elements of the nation is the key point of inquiry for this research, and is done using the leadership process approach.

At this stage, it must be noted that no normative value is placed on either leadership or nation-building. Leadership can be both constructive or destructive, and lead to either peace or conflict. Leadership is therefore viewed not as a specific goal or ideal but rather a process that leads to various outcomes. Similarly, nation-building can be peaceful or violent (see 2.3.2) and this research does not promote a specific type or form of nationhood for peace-building. Rather, it seeks to understand how nation-building can turn violent or peaceful by understanding the leadership process present in a society.

FIGURE 1: Nation-building, peace and conflict



The purpose of this research is three-fold. First, it proposes a conceptual framework of nationhood and a theoretical framework of leadership that can be used together to understand identity-related conflicts in a holistic and context-specific manner. This provides an original contribution to knowledge by exploring the intersection between leadership, nation-building and peace-building, which leads to a new framework for analysis. Second, it broadens the understanding of leadership traditionally found in the Political Sciences. More specifically, this study explores how the leadership process approach can shed light on some of the lesser understood aspects of nation-building and nationalism. The use of leadership to understand the relationships in society that contribute to the building or dividing of nations, and therefore peace or conflict has not been studied before. In addition, leadership is under-conceptualised in the Political Sciences, which has neglected a robust enquiry into leadership as an important societal process that impacts public life (Peele 2005: 187-188). Finally, by providing an understanding of conflict that incorporates the multiple, relational and complex dynamics and processes of conflict and peace, this study contributes to the efforts to move beyond a state-centric and institution-focused understanding of peace-building.

The proposed conceptual and theoretical frameworks are used in an analysis of South Sudan to understand why the country has been unable to build a nation that sustains peace. South Sudan is chosen for several reasons. First, the conflicts and history between northern and southern Sudan have

resulted in extensive "othering" processes that have embedded certain racial, religious, ethnic and class differences (Johnson 2011a; Deng 1995; Thomas 2015). The resurgence of conflict so quickly after secession illustrates that political agreements and subsequent efforts to build the new South Sudanese state, which followed the traditional state-building and liberal peace model (Larson et al. 2013), was not sufficient to address the divisions that had become rooted in South Sudanese society. With little binding the society together other than its opposition to the north (Martin 2002: 122; Young 2003: 423), it is clear nation-building has taken a violent and divisive turn, making the return to conflict swift. Secondly, as the newest country to enter the international sphere, South Sudan provides an interesting test case for nation-building. This will be further discussed in section 1.2.4 below. Considering South Sudan's history, it is important at this stage to note the terminology used in this thesis. "Sudan" is used to refer to the Sudanese state as configured by its post-1956 borders. "southern Sudan" refers to the southern region of Sudan prior to secession, formed of the Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile provinces. "South Sudan" is used to refer to the independent state created from this region in 2011.

1.2 The study of leadership, nation-building and peace-building to date

The challenges presented by the many countries experiencing and emerging from conflict since the early 1990s has inspired a wealth of literature on peace-building. This literature is in itself multi-disciplinary and significantly informed by the growth of the literature on the security-development nexus (see 2.2.2.1)[2]. At the same time, however, there are some fields of study that may contribute to a more holistic and dynamic understanding of peace-building that have not been explored. More specifically, while the peace-building literature often engages with the very important and technical aspects of peace-building that require inter-disciplinary input (such as Law, Strategic Studies, policy analysis and Economics), it shies away from the more intangible, but no less important, elements of peace that fields such as Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology may provide insight into. In other words, as knowledge on peace-building is often driven by a policy agenda, the literature that follows often serves to (a) provide an analysis of the more practical elements of peace-building and (b) provide an analysis of peace-building processes driven by the key actors (i.e. the international community). While such thinking and knowledge is useful, it is also important to explore those elements of peace-building that appear intangible and elusive (i.e. nation-building and the mending of societal rifts), as they can have a very real impact on the possibility of conflict relapse.

[2] Key examples of this literature include: Alao (2007), Collier and Hoeffler (2000); Ballentine & Sherman (2003); Berdal & Malone (2000); Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand (2003); Stewart (2008).

As a result, this research provides a more theoretical and intellectual exploration of peace-building to provide such an analysis. In addition, it seeks to bring into the peace-building literature a field of study that has not yet been sufficiently explored in relation to peace and conflict studies — that of Leadership Studies. Therefore, while inter-disciplinary in nature, it uses three key sets of literature for its theoretical and conceptual frameworks — Leadership Studies, nation-building and nationalism, and peace-building. The following sections provide an overview of these three fields, highlighting the key issues of relevance to this study. It will do so by first exploring the field of leadership, arguing that it is understudied in Political Sciences but that contributions from Leadership Studies may be useful in better understanding nation-building processes and challenges. From there, a brief overview of the nationalism literature is provided to set the stage for a more detailed analysis and the conceptual framework provided in Chapter Two. The third key field of peace-building is then covered, which serves to summarise the progress made in the field thus far and highlight the key challenges that remain. Finally, this section will conclude with a brief overview of the literature available on the case study used here — South Sudan.

1.2.1 Leadership and the leadership process approach

This research uses leadership as the entry point to understanding peace-building. The peace-building literature has not delved into conceptualizing and studying leadership in a concerted, systematic way. The literature on leadership can be found in the fields of Management Sciences, Psychology and Sociology instead, with some works found in Political Science and International Relations literature, primarily outside the context of peace-building (Bass & Riggio 2008; Burns 2012; Rotberg 2012; Weber 1978: 215; Young 1991). However, the way in which leadership is dealt with in the field of Political Sciences is limited. It is founded largely on early works by philosophers and writers such as Plato and Machiavelli (Peele 2005: 189). Weber's essay on the types of legitimate rule is likely the most influential (Peele 2005: 189; Weber 1978: 215). He creates a typology of rule that includes legal/rational authority (i.e. legally appointed officials), traditional authority (i.e. founded on traditions such as inherited rule) and charismatic authority (i.e. legitimacy based on a leader's personal character and values) (Weber 1978: 215). This has become a staple when discussing leadership in Political Sciences.

However, when one compares this with the work on leadership that is done elsewhere, it is clear that this conceptualisation of leadership is insufficient. Grint (2010) identifies four approaches to the study of leadership: leadership as person, leadership as position, leadership as result and leadership as process. The first approach refers to the study of leaders with a focus on their traits (Grint 2010: 3-7). The second refers to leadership that is derived from occupying a certain office (Grint

2010: 3-7). These two approaches have been the primary focus of leadership where it has been studied in Political Sciences theory. For example, Weber's notion of charismatic leadership largely looks at the individual traits of leaders while that of legal authority can be linked to the leadership as position field. These are, then, largely leader-centric understandings of leadership. In fact, much of the literature on leadership in general has been criticised for being leader-centric without taking into account the role of followership (Cooper 1991: 393; Pierce & Newstrom 2011: 238). Bennis' (1994: 75-86) work on the four competencies of leadership is an example. While this conceptualisation is useful, particularly with regards to a leader's ability to manage attention and meaning, thereby creating and communicating vision (Bennis 1994: 78-82), it is also too limited for the purposes of this research. Similarly, Rotberg's (2012) recent book *Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World*, illustrates the importance of leadership in societies with fledgling or non-existent institutions. However, this work also focusses primarily on the individual leader.

Grint's third approach, leadership as result, indicates that leadership occurs when certain outcomes are achieved (Bass 2008: 18; Grint 2010: 3, 8-9). The last approach, leadership as process, views leadership as an exchange relationship between leaders and followers that occurs in response to a certain situation (Bass 2008: 21; Pierce & Newstrom 2011: 4-6). Northouse (2016: 6) similarly defines leadership as "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal." This is the approach taken in this research. Within this perspective on leadership there are various elements that are of use to this study. First, it is relational (Grint 2010: 12). It therefore accepts and understands that leaders do not act in a vacuum, which is important when seeking to understand complex societies that are facing complex challenges. As a result, it also highlights the importance of mutuality (the need for leaders and the led to share common challenges, interests and purpose) (Northouse 2016: 6). This resonates with much of the literature on nation-building which argues that a key element of a nation is a sense of common interests, common history and common destiny that supports collective action (Miller 2000: 28-29; Smith 1999: 60-61; Weilenmann 2010: 38-49).

The leadership process approach also conceptualises the relationship between the follower and leader as an exchange relationship, which includes, among other things, the leader framing experiences and focussing attention, which is interpreted by followers and potentially seen as a basis for action (Smirich & Morgan 2011: 22; Pierce & Newstrom 2011: 25). Such a relationship is important in peace-building since it determines how leaders choose to frame the "new" post-conflict society and who belongs in said society, whether this vision is accepted by the population and how

this vision drives collective action either for peace or violence. A national identity also needs to be accepted and embedded enough to create norms, and thereby predictability, within a society (Hopf 1998: 174), which requires a widely accepted perception of national identity founded in an exchange relationship between leaders and followers. Similarly, if the dominant vision for the nation is being driven by international actors (who usually pursue a vision of a liberal democratic state), but no exchange relationship exists between the international community (leadership) and the national population (followers), state-building and nation-building is likely to be more difficult as collective action is founded on different perceptions of reality. This is because the vision cannot be communicated to and accepted by the population.

Viewing leadership as a process also bridges the elite/people dichotomy that is found in much of the Political Sciences and particularly the nation-building literature. The contention on how a nation is constructed (see 2.2.1.2) arises from a disagreement about whether a nation is primarily constructed from below (the people and their inherent national characteristics) or above (by elites, intellectuals, "ethnic entrepreneurs" and institutions of the state) (Laitin 2007: 41; Hearn 2006: 38-39; 47-49; Hroch 1996: 61; Smith 1998: 180, 190). Leadership as process provides an opportunity to confront this false dichotomy by acknowledging the relational character between such leaders and society. This intersection between leadership and nation-building is further explained in section 2.4.2.

In addition, the leadership process approach is context-dependent (Northouse 2016: 8). It does not presume to identify universal characteristics of leadership, but rather provides a framework to understand how leadership occurs in different contexts, facing various situations (Grint 2010: 11-12). It allows for the conceptualisation of situational leadership, which argues that leadership must be suited to, and is influenced by, a specific context (Hollander & Julian 2011: 15). This is important in a field that has been criticised for using a cookie-cutter approach to peace-building without adequately understanding the local context (Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008: 13-14, 25). Also, a transition from conflict to peace signals a transition in situation. It requires a transition in the leadership process and dominant patterns of leadership. This is particularly true when leadership has been used to ignite societal divisions during a conflict, as will be discussed throughout this study.

Also, in developing societies leadership does not only, and often not at all, reside in the formal position of leader. The benefit of the process approach is that it is adaptable to various contexts and does not assume that the leaders that actually practice leadership are always those holding office (Northouse 2016: 6). In post-colonial societies where political office is often far removed from the people and society, such an approach is particularly useful. Similarly, in a society emerging from or

embroiled in conflict, leadership often does not reside in a leader's position alone, especially if that society is fragmented. The liberal peace-building model, however, is based on the assumption of a traditional nation-state as found in Western Europe. But this is not the case in Africa, where state borders are largely artificial, and many state institutions were imposed by colonial powers for the purpose of protecting colonial interest (Beissinger & Young 2002: 25; Mbaku 1997: 112). Similarly, the dominant literature on nationalism and nation-building has largely emerged and used empirical evidence from the Western and European context, while sidelining much of the African experience (Blaut 1987: 8).[3] As discussed below, this literature closely links the nation with the state, which poses several problems when applied to the African context.

Finally, using the framework of the leadership process approach allows us to move beyond the language of the state and government to deal with the reality of societies on the African continent. The relationship between state and society, and government and people, that is found in most traditional states may be found elsewhere in African societies. For example, the exchange of influence may occur between traditional leaders and community members, or even international actors and local society. This has been seen in cases like South Sudan where NGOs are the main service providers (Ajak 2015: 3-4; Kisiangani 2015: 3; Maxwell et al. 2014: 18). Similarly, many communities in the country rely on traditional structures for governance and even militias or other non-state actors for security (AUCISS 2014: 47-48; Reeve 2012: 41-42). The conceptualisation of a leadership process allows one to investigate such relationships as it is not restricted to the state-society framework. It allows the researcher to understand how a collective governs and organises itself through the use of specific agents. In this way, the leadership process framework allows the researcher to challenge the liberal peace-building model by seeking to understand how a society organises itself, and what role this can play in nation-building. In this way, this research also provides an original contribution by broadening the understanding of leadership in the Political Sciences, thereby re-thinking governance and the state.

1.2.2 Nationalism and nation-building

The peace-building literature primarily engages with the issue of nation-building in two ways. First, much of the work aligns with the liberal peace model by focussing on constitutional and democratic design, usually within the context of international assistance (Guelke 2012; Horowitz 2008; Simonsen 2005). For example, Horowitz (2008) provides a discussion on institutional design and its abil-

[3] A few key examples include: Gellner 1983; Hroch 1996; Smith 2009

ity to reconcile fragmented societies. Similarly, Simonsen (2005) highlights the dangers of poor institutional design and its ability to aggravate post-conflict ethnic divisions through a form of "ethnic-census" voting. He argues for more flexible constitutional design. These are all valuable contributions to the peace-building and nation-building literature but remain narrow in their focus on institutional design (this is discussed further in section 2.2.2.3). Secondly, the peace-building literature looks primarily at reconciliation, through evaluating various forms of truth and reconciliation commissions and analysing issues of justice (Lederach 1997; Mani 2002). Reconciliation, however, does not necessarily lead to a sense of community or nationhood. In order to utilise the peace-sustaining elements of the nation (see 2.3.2) and counter the conflict-fuelling elements of identity construction, more than reconciliation is needed. While some of the nationalism literature may allude to this (see 2.2.2.3), it has been poorly studied in the peace-building field.

Thus, while state-building has taken the fore, very little peace-building literature discusses the need and mechanisms for successful and peaceful nation-building. Where this is done, it usually suffers from two failings: (1) the emphasis placed on institutional design with little understanding of how such institutions gain legitimacy within the psyche of a society and (2) the actor within such studies is usually the international community with little exploration into the relationship between the national and international levels. Regarding the first, institutions have often failed and crumbled following a conflict. The proposal here is that institutions are less likely to fail if they reflect the collective will and collective identity of the people, which will promote a sense of collective responsibility.[4] On the second point, a co-option of the state-building processes by the international community can interrupt the social contract between people and state. Nation-building is then key in ensuring a lasting sense of collective will and collective responsibility. The key gap in both these issues is that of leadership, as it is through the process of leadership that a common vision can be developed, bridging the gap between people and institutions and the international and local.

The nation-building literature, discussed in section 2.2, illustrates that building a nation is much more than the building of institutions and striving for reconciliation. It is through the conceptualisation of "the nation" that we see why an institution-building focus is not a sufficient pathway to building a nation. The concept has been defined in multiple ways. Often this includes some link to the state (Breuilly 1993; Laitin 2007: 40). Yet, conceptualisations range from a focus on a pre-existing shared identity, history and culture (Hearn 2006: 20; Smith 1998: 193) to more constructivist definitions which highlight choice and some form of coordination by members in building this

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[4] These are three key elements of the nation further discussed in section 2.3.1

shared identity (Breuilly 1993: 6; Laitin 2007: 30, 40; Renan 1992; Ting 2008: 453). While its link to the state may make the nation appear an institutional endeavour, its shared identity is not. Nation-building, also suffering from contested definitions, can therefore be seen as efforts to create this "sense of common nationhood" (Call 2008: 5) or to "make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide" (Mylonas 2012: xx). This second view in itself does not guarantee peace, as the example of South Sudan will illustrate. Therefore, more needs to be understood regarding the processes involved in building peaceful nations as opposed to violent ones.

Most theorists disagree on the definition of such a fluid concept as the nation (Anderson 2006: 3, 5; Gellner 1983: 5-7; Hearn 2006: 3; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 4), and thus different schools of thought place emphasis on different elements of the nation. Key debates centre around whether nations are an ancient or more recent phenomenon, whether they are natural or constructed, and whether they are driven by the masses or elites (Guibernau 2007: 14). Miller (2000: 31-33) acknowledges that many of the myths that define nations are not based on historical fact, but he argues that this debate surrounding the origins of nationality is not as relevant as it is made out to be. He argues instead that what is important is that the "felt" sense of nationality is real, which serves to bind people within large states in order to "share a political loyalty" (Miller 2000: 32). His book *Citizenship and National Identity* (2000) largely defends the importance of nationality. Similarly, when one compares conceptualisations of the nation from various theorists (see 2.3.1), it can be seen that while there are key differences in focus and emphasis, there are many common elements across these theories. Regarding the debate surrounding the importance of elites and the masses in building cultural and national identity, some acknowledge the role of elites in the "selection, reconstruction and reinterpretation" of nationalist myths, but do not go further to understand the processes by which this is done (Ozkirimli 2003: 347). This is another area where a study in leadership can shed light on such issues.

Additionally, Smith (1998: 75-76) critiques the state-based conceptualisations of the nation, arguing that the nation also includes "a distinctive culture community, a 'people' in their 'homeland', a historic society and a moral community". Comparing this to the central role of the state in the modernist paradigm (see 2.2.1), there is then a tension between the notion of the state and the nation and the role that one plays in the other. With this being the case in literature that has analysed the European nation-state, this ambiguity is likely to be even more evident in post-colonial states. As Holsti (1995: 54-55) explains, most European states were built on pre-existing groups with nationalist sentiments, whereas post-colonial states achieved statehood at the international level before developing

an internal sense of nationalism. The nation-building and state-building trajectory of modern Europe and colonial states is drastically different, providing a certain set of nation-building challenges to post-colonial states made up of largely artificial borders and state institutions that are, at least to some degree, externally constituted.

Finally, the links between nation-building, nationalism and violent conflict are equally complex. Nationalism is often associated with violence (Hearn 2006: 5). The ways in which nationalism leads to violence is widely studied.[5] Similarly, academics and practitioners have grappled with the mechanisms through which one can build peace after nationalist inspired conflicts, focussing primarily on state and constitutional design as well as transitional justice and reconciliation, as discussed above (see 2.2.2.3). Yet, when one compares this literature with the complex nature of nations just discussed, it is evident that nations are highly abstract and fluid entities that require more than these types of interventions, which are often externally driven, if they are to be fully formed.

However, it is also important to note here that it is not argued that a homogenous society is necessary for sustainable peace. In fact, there is little data to support such a claim (Laitin 2007: 2, 15). In addition, identity is layered, meaning that building a nation does not require the eradication of other identities, which can lead to dangerous notions of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Most individuals hold more than one identity at a time (Vignoles *et al.* 2011: 4). In relation to national identity, Miller (2000: 125-131) creates a typology of social division. He identifies nations that can have within them ethnic cleavages but still hold an over-arching national identity; states that contain incompatible national identities or rival nationalities; and finally "nested nationalities", where "two or more territorially-based communities exist within the framework of a single nation, so that members of each community typically have a split identity" (Miller 2000: 129).

Rather, the assumption that is made here is not that nations must be homogenous to be peaceful, but that a society's nation-building processes play an important role in their peace-building or conflict-sustaining trajectory, and therefore must be understood and confronted in peace-building efforts. If a society's nation-building challenges are confronted to promote the peace-sustaining elements of nationhood (see 2.3.2), societal challenges may be dealt with in more peaceful ways as nation-building can create a sense of loyalty to the nation and the established institutions and norms of that nation. It is also a way of confronting established notions of who is seen to "belong" in a community, by re-imagining who is considered the "in-group" and "out-group". Such divisions are created

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[5] Key examples include: Dandeker (1998); Horowitz (2001); Mann (2001); Laitin (2007). This will be discussed further in sections 2.2.2.

through a process of identity construction that is reinforced by conflict and can easily re-emerge in violent ways when a conflict of interest arises, that could be dealt with more peacefully in other circumstances (see 2.2.2). In short, the way a nation is built, rather than the type of nation that is built, is argued to play in important role in whether a society is likely to build sustainable peace.

1.2.3 Peace-building

Various definitions of peace-building exist, though one element that remains consistent is the aim of preventing a recurrence of violent conflict (i.e. achieving lasting peace) (Berdal 2009: 17; Cousens 2001: 4; Paris 2004: 2; Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008: 2). In order to achieve this the root causes of conflict must be addressed (Paris 2004: 3; UN 2015: 4). However, as Cousens (2001: 9) points out, the international community has struggled to organise its policies and institutions to understand, analyse and act according to the individual contexts of various conflicts, and therefore its root causes. Rather, the international community has tended towards a more "deductive" peace-building approach, whereby peace-building activities are determined more by the capabilities of international actors than the needs of the country (Cousens 2001: 5-8). This has resulted in a blueprint or "cookie-cutter" approach, the recipe usually being that of "liberal peace" (Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008: 13-14). This leads to the dominant liberal peace-building model, which seeks to construct post-conflict states into liberal democracies with a liberal market economy, due to the thesis that liberal democracies are generally more peaceful (Duffield 2001: 10-11; Paris 2004: 5). In order to move beyond this use of templates, this study provides a framework for understanding conflicts' individual contexts.

In response to the prevailing policy of "liberal peace" in the 1990s, Paris (2004: 7-8) posited a different model, that of "institutionalisation before liberalisation", in order to counteract the destabilising effects of democratisation and liberalisation. This has evolved into what is often termed the state-building approach. Proponents of this approach argue for peace-building efforts to be focussed on rebuilding functioning state institutions. This coincided with a shift at policy level in the late 1990s and 2000s on building legitimate government institutions, instead of relying on rapid democratisation and quick fixes (Paris and Sisk 2009: 2). Yet, Paris' advocation for a state-building approach cannot be seen as a drastic divergence from the liberal model for peace. Rather, the difference can be found in questions of sequencing rather than substance. In other words, Paris argues for state institutions to be built before consolidating democracy, but the end game (a liberal democratic state) remains the same.

There are various critics of these peace-building models. One such group of scholars emerges from the critical school of thought. Indeed, one critique of theirs is the ontological foundations of the state-building approach, arguing that this restricts peace-building's ability to account for various interests, actors and processes by viewing the state as a single unit (Pugh, Cooper & Turner 2008: 2). Others argue that peace-building should be understood within the context of global governance and the inequalities and power relations this entails. This leads to an argument that peace-building is an international political project to create "normalised", stable and cooperative states, usually in the form of liberal democracies (a project they argue has been largely ineffective) (Chandler 1999; Duffield 2001:11; Goetze & Guzina 2008: 333-338; Zanotti 2006). These critiques of peace-building, however, have come under fire for unjustifiably calling for an abandonment of liberal peace-building without providing a viable alternative (Paris 2010: 347-354, 362). This research provides the basis for seeking alternatives.

While the aim of this research is not to reject the liberal peace-building model out of hand, it does argue that there is a missing piece to the puzzle, that of nation-building. Hippler (2005: 8) argues that state-building is one of three elements of nation-building. The other two elements are (1) that of a "unifying, persuasive ideology" and (2) the physical infrastructure needed to integrate a society (Hippler 2005: 7-8). Thus, state-building can be seen as part of a broader project. International attention, however, has come to see it as an end in itself. This is perhaps because there is an implicit assumption that liberalism will provide sufficient ideological unification to provide a sense of community. Alternatively, it may be because the ideological aspect of nation-building is difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the international community to take responsibility for. In the end, peace-building must be seen as a collaborative endeavour between the international community and local actors, in which the international community can provide support in the form of technical expertise, peacekeeping, and material support in order to facilitate a national process of nation-building that results in the formation of a nation and state suited to the national context. Thus, if nation-building is taken as the end goal, state-building can be seen as a key element of this process that requires international assistance. However, it must complement the other nation-building processes occurring within that society.

From this overview, it becomes clear that a gap exists in the peace-building literature in which the importance of nation-building, especially following an identity-related conflict, is neglected. This is necessary to move beyond a strictly institutional and state-centric approach to peace-building. Nation-building, however, is a complex process. Creating a sense of unity requires a change of atti-

tudes and behaviour. Established practices of institution-building have seemed unsuccessful in doing this. Thus, to achieve lasting peace, this research questions whether a better understanding of nation-building and its interactions with peace and conflict processes will not illuminate new ways of understanding peace-building in identity-related conflicts. The leadership process approach provides a useful theoretical framework to understand how nations are built and constructed and may provide insight into the mechanisms and processes that lead to peaceful rather than conflictual nations.

1.2.4 South Sudan

Since independence in 1956 Sudan has faced a nation-building challenge. One of the ways this has manifested is in the conflict that arose between southern Sudan and the capital, Khartoum, which culminated in two civil wars (the first lasting from 1955-1972 and the second from 1983-2005). The causes of these two conflicts are diverse and emerge from inequality, political exclusion, the "resource curse" and historical enmities (Ayers 2010; Martin 2002; Thomas 2015). During the second conflict, predominantly between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Khartoum government, the conflict was often narrowly framed as an Arab-African or Muslim-Christian conflict between North and South, despite a more complex identity landscape (Ayers 2010: 156-157; Zink 2014: 443). As a result, a unified Sudan became almost impossible, despite SPLM/A leader John Garang's preference for this solution, leading to southern Sudan's secession in 2011 (Panozzo 2011: 23; Young 2003: 424; Zink 2014: 443). South Sudan's independence from Sudan followed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which prioritised a unified Sudan, but provided for a referendum to secede (Thomas 2015: Introduction).

While the moment of secession gave the impression of unity, southern Sudan has been fragmented and divided on economic and ethnic grounds before and after independence. Thus, the conflict that erupted in December 2013 suggests that the nation-building process has proven more difficult than expected. Racial framing is being replaced by ethnic framing in the power battles between current president Salva Kiir and his rivals (Zink 2014: 444). These ethnic tensions are not new, however, and were often dramatised during earlier conflicts as well, especially as some ethnic groups were utilised by Khartoum to engage in proxy wars (Hutchinson 2001: 307; Martin 2002: 117; Thomas 2015: Introduction). During the conflict and since the eruption of violence once again in 2013, many international actors and bodies have been involved in peace-building in the country (Ajak & Hirsch 2015; Gatimu 2014; Kisiangani 2015). Yet, despite the significant amount of resources allo-

cated to peace-building initiatives in the country, which have centred around state-building, sustainable peace remains elusive (Larson et al. 2013). The conceptual and theoretical framework proposed in this study is used to explain why this peace-building approach has failed.

The conflict in South Sudan is well-studied and many works are available that provide an important foundation to understanding the conflict. While different authors argue for an emphasis on different aspects of the conflict and crisis in Sudan, ranging from identity politics to development challenges, taken together they provide a holistic understanding of the complexities of the conflict. These varying works highlight some of the key challenges of nation-building and state-building in the post-colonial era. Francis Deng, a South Sudanese author and politician, is a key authority on the conflict. In *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan,* he provides an in-depth analysis of the identity crisis in Sudan during the conflict, including a historical perspective (Deng 1995). Amir Idris (2005) similarly provides a historical analysis to the politics of identity in Sudan, linking it with processes of colonialism and state formation. Copnall (2014: 9-40) also provides some insight into the identity landscape of Sudan. While many of these works focus on the division between Arab and African identities (Deng 1995, Idris 2005; Sharkey 2008) some works do discuss the ethnic differences within southern Sudan as well, both before and after secession (Frahm 2015; Hutchinson 2001; Jok & Hutchinson 1999).

What many of these works reveal is the constructed nature of identity in Sudan and South Sudan. Deng (1995) in particular points out, through historical analysis, how the line between Arab and African in Sudan is far more blurred than believed by the population. In addition, it has also been argued that much of the South Sudanese and African identity was built in response to policies of Arabisation and other forms of oppression and exclusion from the north (Deng 1995: 3-6, 9-14, 69-97, 135-140; Frahm 2015: 253; Sharkey 2008: 21). This has led to some assertions that there is little uniting the citizens of South Sudan apart from their collective opposition to the North (Martin 2002: 122; Young 2003: 423). Similarly, various commentators have pointed out the lack of social cohesion and unity in South Sudan (Frahm 2015: 253-254; Gerenge 2015), but few have engaged in depth by what processes a sense of unity could be built, or even systemically reviewed which processes resulted in the failure to build a sense of community.

Douglas Johnson has similarly written extensively on the conflict. His work, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* (2011a), provides a holistic and detailed analysis of the conflict. Johnson (2011a: 1-58) challenges dominant narratives regarding the cause of the conflict be-

tween northern and southern Sudan, especially an over-emphasis on identity, and prefers to highlight issues of socio-economic development and state formation. Thomas (2015) also chooses to focus on issues of socio-economic development in trying to understand South Sudan's road to independence and the subsequent challenges. He argues that Sudan's unequal development and societal divisions stem from its historical engagement with the international economic system, resulting in a core-periphery structure with a more developed core in Khartoum and more underdeveloped peripheries such as South Sudan (Thomas 2015). Ayers (2010) also highlights the importance of understanding international political and economic dynamics in the Sudanese conflicts.

These works are important in mitigating an oversimplified identity narrative and reductionist understanding of Sudan's wars. They highlight the complex ways in which access to power and access to resources resulted in widespread grievances, overlapping with dramatised identity divisions, providing the fuel for conflict. This analysis has been carried over to the current conflict by other academics and commentators who point to the socio-economic sources of conflict (AUCISS 2014: 28; Rolandsen 2015: 165-166). Several recent works have also cautioned against using identity as a framework to understand the current conflict (Kisiangani 2015: 7; Rolandsen 2015: 163-164). While this is a valid and necessary critique, it is also important not to disregard the prevalence of ethnic and racial tensions in a society. The efficacy of ethnic mobilisation in the 2013 conflict indicates that there are rifts in the society that must also be addressed alongside political and economic solutions. In the end, understanding ethnic tensions in their economic context provides us with a better understanding of how and why ethnicity can be mobilised for violent ends, and is thus more likely to lead to a holistic understanding of the mechanisms for peace and conflict in a society.

Other key works provide insight into the various peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan. The peace building trajectory adopted by South Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was that of liberal peace-building and state-building (AUCISS 2014: 37-38; Gerenge 2015: 87). The 2013 relapse into conflict indicates that these peace-building efforts failed. Young (2012) strongly critiques the CPA and subsequent peace processes. He characterises the process as that of "liberal peacemaking" and provides an extensive critique of its shortcomings and failures in South Sudan. For example, he argues that the priority placed on holding elections after the signing of the CPA sacrificed true democratic transformation (Young 2012: 9-10; 134-176). The counter-argument to this is that ending the violence was more important at the time than seeking "fundamental political change" (Rolandsen 2011: 555), illustrating the complex debates and trade-offs that need to be considered in peace-building.

There are also extensive policy briefs and reports that have sought to evaluate the various peace processes in South Sudan. Several documents highlight various shortcomings, though key issues raised are a need for justice, a better plan for post-secession South Sudan, a failure to confront corruption and patronage and the lack of an inclusive peace process (Ajak 2015: 8; Akol 2014; AUCISS 2014; Deng et al. 2015; HRW 2014; Kisiangani 2015: 1-5). In seeking to understand why the country relapsed into another war so shortly after independence, a few commentators have also pointed to the issue of leadership (Ajak 2015: 8; Kisiangani 2015: 1-4). However, this is often done in passing or in conclusion with little effort to fully conceptualise leadership or the role it has or should play in peace and conflict. As a result, the term is used loosely to condemn the actions of elites without providing a complete analysis of the leadership process that has resulted in the continued cycles of conflict in South Sudan.

South Sudan serves as an instrumental case for this research for several reasons. As a country that seceded from Sudan for reasons of self-determination, it provides an important test case to better understand the dilemmas of nationality and self-determination. In particular, it poses important questions about what makes a nation — does a nation need a common enemy to be cohesive? How does one maintain that sense of community when the common enemy is no longer a present threat? Does secession open the door to further fragmentation? How are the internal and external boundaries of the state determined? If multiple identities can be held by individuals, how does one build an over-arching identity that is compatible with the smaller ethnic and "national" groupings in a state? And what does one do when such identities prove incompatible?

Secondly, South Sudan exemplifies current trends in international peace-building. The primary focus on state and institution-building, the dominance of international actors, and the elite-centred peace process are key characteristics of peace-building in South Sudan that have done little to build the nation. This research will seek to understand the link between state-building and nation-building, and how an exclusive focus on institution-building may not lead to the more fluid/elusive characteristics of a peaceful nation — community bonds and a sense of loyalty to the state. Similarly, the high presence of international actors begs the question of how a social contract is to be built between state and society in order to foster a sense of nationhood. Finally, the focus on elite interests during the peace process and by peace-makers raises issues surrounding the development of a common vision for the nation as a whole.

1.3 The research problem: Understanding peaceful and violent nation-building through leadership

Conflict relapse is a persistent problem in the world. Every civil war that broke out between 2003 and 2010 was a result of conflict relapse (Walter 2010: 1). Cases of conflict-relapse fill approximately half of the conflict related issues on the UN Security Council Agenda (UN 2015: 21). The recent conflict in South Sudan, a state that was created in 2011 after over fifty years of conflict with northern Sudan, represents an example of conflict relapse. This, despite separating the South from its opponent in the North, investing billions of dollars into humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-building and developmental initiatives, and attempting to form a democratic government (Ajak 2015: 2-3; UNMISS 2016, Young 2012: 134-177). It would seem that secession was an over-simplified solution that stemmed from a reductionist understanding of the Sudanese conflict. Programmes to fund and build the new South Sudanese state failed to deliver (Ajak 2015), and the democracy that was installed in Sudan and South Sudan was superficial at best (Young 2012: 9-10; 134-176). All of this, combined with the persistent structural challenges of the previous conflicts, contributed to conflict relapse in 2013.

Why is conflict relapse such a prevalent problem and how can it be mitigated? The dominant model of liberal peace-building, which was used in South Sudan (AUCISS 2014: 37-38; Young 2012: 1, 4, 7, 9-10), appears to have failed. South Sudan's experience indicates that state-building on its own, and the associated efforts to build institutions, is insufficient when building peace in a conflict-ridden society, particularly when such a conflict is identity-related. It is necessary then to look at building peaceful nations as well, through not only the formation of institutions but an understanding and restructuring of key relationships in society. In addition, it is important to understand how institutions reflect and interact with these relationships and society as a whole. Relationships are also not just between different identity groups, but between leaders and followers and the situations that confront them. In other words, thinking needs to shift from building states to building nations, through shifting from a narrow focus on the institutions of said states to the leadership of nation-building. However, the processes involved in building a nation are complex and insufficiently understood. This study proposes the leadership process approach as a framework which better understands such nation-building processes and how their nature and interaction can contribute to either peace-building or conflict relapse.

The research question guiding this thesis is as follows: To what extent does the leadership process approach shed light on why South Sudan failed to build a nation that sustains peace? The question will be answered using a conceptualisation of the nation based on five elements (collective identity,

political organisation/statehood, territory, collective will and collective responsibility) (see 2.3.1). The sub-questions below are based on this conceptualisation, combining statehood and territory and collective will and responsibility. The sub-questions will be answered by asking the following: How does the leadership process approach explain the formation and development of the following elements of nationhood?

1. How is identity constructed and what is the relationship between identity construction and peace and conflict?
2. How does the relationship between the nation and the state build and sustain peace or conflict?
3. How does collective will and collective responsibility form to promote either peace or conflict?

There are four main objectives to this research:

1. To develop a conceptual framework of nationhood and a theoretical framework of leadership that can be used to understand identity-related conflicts and the nation-building challenges and opportunities associated with such conflicts.
2. To use this theoretical and conceptual framework to understand the conflict dynamics and nation-building processes in South Sudan.
3. To use the analysis provided by this framework to explain the relationship between nation-building and peace and conflict in South Sudan; and identify patterns that may be relevant to other identity-related conflicts.
4. To assess the utility of the proposed framework in understanding identity-related conflicts with the purpose of better understanding peace-building challenges in such conflicts.

As indicated in section 1.1, the primary purpose of this research is to propose a new framework to study and understand identity-related conflicts for peace-building purposes. It moulds a conceptual framework for nationhood using existing literature. This provides the researcher with the key indicators to identify nationhood in South Sudan (reflected in the sub-questions above). These indicators and the processes by which they emerge and break down are each analysed using the leadership process approach. This is done in set historical periods from South Sudan's early history. The result is a comprehensive understanding of South Sudan's nation-building challenge that avoids reductionist explanations of violence in the country. In addition, the research uses this analysis to provide some lessons for future peace-building analysis.

1.4 Methodology

This research adheres to a qualitative research approach as it seeks to understand the complex processes within societies that lead to the construction of social reality, in this case a sense of "nationhood". A quantitative approach would not serve the purpose or suit the epistemological foundations of this research. For example, surveys may be useful in gathering quantitative data on how people identify themselves. However, due to its constructivist foundations, this study is less interested in what people identify themselves as, but rather why such perceptions of belonging or nationhood exist and how this sense of belonging changes over time. Such information could not be gathered through the survey method. This is also a multi-disciplinary project (including concepts and studies from International Relations, Political Sciences, Leadership Studies, Sociology and Anthropology) that will develop an analytical framework developed from the three key fields discussed above (see 1.2).

The research strategy employed in this thesis is that of a case study. A case study is chosen for several reasons. First, Yin (2009: 18) indicates that this strategy is useful where "the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." In any study of nations or identity, the boundaries of the nation are difficult to determine. The beginning and end of conflicts are similarly difficult to isolate. In addition, the case study strategy allows one to employ multiple methods and data collection techniques. Using multiple sources is useful when studying nation-building because nation-building and identity construction occur at multiple levels, in multiple forms and through multiple factors. Similarly, this will allow the researcher to provide an in-depth understanding and analysis of the case and the various processes involved; and to examine the interrelationships between the many processes of nation-building. Therefore, thick description is necessary to gain a holistic picture of a society's nation-building and identity construction processes. Finally, the theory used, that of the leadership process approach, lends itself to the use of case studies because it is context-specific and situation-dependent. A case study approach does, however, provide certain limitations on the theory-building capability of this research. While analytical generalisations are made from South Sudan's experience, further research is required with additional case studies to confirm the findings of this study. This, however, is not feasible in the available scope of this study.

South Sudan is used as an explanatory case study because it seeks to explain the phenomenon of nation-building. More specifically, this study aims to understand and explain the relationship between nation-building and peace and conflict processes, through the use of the leadership process approach. However, this study is not one of theory testing. Rather, the approach used is that of abduction. While a theoretical framework is used to guide the analysis of the data, the study also seeks to

build a new theoretical approach that can be used to understand the phenomena of nation-building and peace-building. The purpose of the study is also instrumental. In other words, the case of South Sudan is used to understand broader theoretical and conceptual questions. Therefore, a critical case is chosen because it allows for "logical generalisation" (Creswell 2013: 158).

This research is a single case study that takes place in the geographical context of southern Sudan/South Sudan, with the southern/South Sudanese conflict as the case. While there have been three conflicts in this region/state's post-colonial history (1955-1972, 1983-2005, 2013-present), these conflicts are so interrelated that it is not possible to separate them, and they are therefore studied as a whole. The case of southern/South Sudan's conflict(s) is purposefully selected as a critical case. It is a critical case because the conflict represents a clear example of an identity-related conflict. In addition, the fact that South Sudan seceded from Sudan provides a rare opportunity to study the processes of nation-building in a new state. South Sudan also represents a classical example of the challenges in peace-building (specifically conflict relapse). Finally, South Sudan is chosen because of the clear failure to build a cohesive and peaceful nation. The absence of an inclusive nation-building process can provide insights into why some forms of identity construction can lead to a unified and peaceful nation, while others lead to a divided and conflictual society.

This will also be an embedded case study with multiple units of analysis. While the key unit of analysis is that of the process of nation-building, key processes, actors and events will be studied within this. This includes the leader-follower relationship as a process, which involves the study of key leaders, movements and political organisations; and the broader populace with its various identity groups. Another key unit of analysis is made up of key events and policies that influenced the nation-building course of South Sudan. Regarding the parameters of the case, it is bounded by its geographical setting (southern/South Sudan), but includes a *longue durée* analysis of the conflict and nation-building processes so is not bound temporally, with the exception of ending the current study at the signing of the 2015 peace agreement.

The study is based on multiple forms of data collection, including a review of existing literature on South Sudan; analysis of documents including policy documents, peace agreements, newsletters, news articles and transcript of speeches; and semi-structured interviews with experts, practitioners and members of South Sudanese civil society. Interviews took place in South Sudan and Kenya in June 2017 and were selected using a snowballing method and pre-existing contacts. Those interviewed primarily included local members of South Sudanese civil society, including those working

for South Sudanese non-governmental organisations and research organisations. Several interviewees also included foreign experts working for a multilateral organisation in Juba. A limited number of Sudanese and South Sudanese politicians or former members of government were interviewed where access was feasible. In order to protect interviewees, they were permitted to choose how they would be cited, so some are cited by name and others are cited anonymously on this basis. Archival evidence was retrieved from the Sudan Open Archive compiled by the Rift Valley Institute. Various broad analytical strategies are used to analyse this data. The key approach is that of process tracing. The processes of identity construction, attempts at nation-building and the conflict trajectory are described and analysed in a diachronic manner. In this way, key events and situations that altered or influenced South Sudan's nation-building trajectory are identified and analysed using a theoretical and conceptual framework developed from a detailed literature review. A diachronic and process tracing approach is used because the process of identity construction is deeply rooted in history but also changes over time. Therefore, an understanding of current nation-building challenges requires the researcher to take a historical view of South Sudanese society. In addition, this study employs the techniques of description and thematic analysis.

This methodology does, however, provide some limitations. The first is in reference to the limitations of a case study discussed above. Despite the limited ability to generalise from a case study, which would be useful considering the theoretical aims of this research, ensuring an in depth understanding of the case was deemed more important to prevent a reductionist understanding of nation-building, peace and conflict. The second limitation regards the study of leadership. While this study seeks to understand leadership using a process approach in order to also highlight the role of followership, the nature of the data and data collection techniques made garnering follower perspectives more difficult. Policy documents and scholarly work are by their very nature authored by elites. Considering the context of South Sudan, it is important to keep in mind that such works do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the majority of followers. Due to issues of ethics and access, extensive interviews with South Sudanese individuals were not feasible. In addition, as a result of the ongoing conflict, many leaders and politicians (particularly of the opposition) were in exile or hiding, limiting the researcher's ability to access alternative views. Also, for safety reasons, travel beyond the capital of Juba was not recommended, preventing an extensive collection of data from the perspective of the rural population. In order to counter-act this elite bias, the researcher validated much of the data from documentary sources through additional literature, secondary sources that contained interviews with South Sudanese citizens, interviews with civil society members who had access to the perspectives and areas excluded by this approach and general observations during a field trip to South Sudan.

Finally, there are some limitations that emerge from the scope of this study. First, as this is a historical study, the data used to study Sudan's earlier history was prone to certain biases and omissions. For example, much of the written work dating from Sudan's colonial history are written by Western or colonial social scientists. The researcher therefore read such works from a critical perspective and used a wide range of primary and secondary data to ensure various perspectives are acknowledged. On the other end of the spectrum, the conflict in South Sudan is ongoing, which makes much of the contemporary data used highly dynamic. Some of these ongoing challenges are acknowledged in the thesis, but the scope of the study only extends to the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan on 26 August 2015.

1.5 Structure

Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Chapter Two continues the literature review found in section 1.2 by providing a more detailed analysis of the existing knowledge of nation-building, nationalism and identity-related conflicts. It therefore provides the academic and global context in which this study situates itself. It concludes with a conceptual framework of the nation, which identifies the key indicators and themes used in the research, and a theoretical framework of leadership that guides the analysis.

Chapter Three: The origins of conflict and the nation-building crisis in Sudan (c. 1821-1983)

This chapter serves two purposes. It provides the contextual background of the case study and begins the leadership analysis of Sudan and southern Sudan's nation-building process. The chapter covers the historical period from Sudan's pre-colonial era to 1983. Using this, it is argued that identities were constructed in early Sudan through a leadership process that responded to specific situations, lacked mutuality and would lay the foundations for future nation-building challenges. The key events discussed in this chapter include the various conquests and early states of Sudan, the independence process and the civil war that followed shortly after. It concludes with an analysis of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 and the period of uneasy peace that followed, which serves to both illustrate the continued leadership challenges and set the stage for Chapter Four.

Chapter Four: Sudan's Second Civil War and the road to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (1983-2005)

In this chapter, the Second Civil War between northern and southern Sudan is analysed, along with the peace processes that led to its formal conclusion in 2005. The conflict's early years are analysed

to highlight the consistencies with and diversions from earlier nation-building and conflict processes. This is followed by a discussion of the turbulent years when internal conflict erupted within the South in the 1990s, which is used to further explain how the leadership process leads to specific nation-building challenges. The chapter concludes with a leadership analysis of the peace process, which presents some of the leadership challenges that come to the fore in Chapter Five. From the data and analysis in this chapter, it is put forward that many of the nation-building challenges in South Sudan can be found in the multi-level patterns of the leader-follower relationship that is characterised by limited and identity-based mutuality and thin channels of influence exchange.

Chapter Five: The road to secession and the descent into civil war

Chapter Five concludes the analysis of the case study with a discussion of the post-CPA peace process, South Sudan's immediate post-secession experience and the 2013 civil war. In this chapter, the nation-building challenge and its link to leadership in South Sudan becomes most evident. The leader-follower relationship identified in Chapters Three and Four is brought to the fore to illustrate how nation-building faltered as leader and follower interests began to diverge with the reduction of a common threat. This analysis finds that a leadership-follower relationship that lacks mutuality results in failures to exchange influence to achieve a collective will and a dependence on unsustainable forms of power, which results in a continued fragmentation of society.

Chapter Six: Lessons learned for nation-building and peace-building

To conclude this thesis, the final chapter provides an overview of the findings regarding South Sudan's nation-building failure, followed by a discussion of the lessons this provides for our understanding of both nation-building and peace-building. Recommendations for further research are also made.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In January and February of 2011, the world watched as South Sudan became the newest country to join the community of states. It seemed to signal the end of a drawn-out peace process that followed an even longer civil war. It was a defining moment and triumph for southern Sudanese nationalism. With over 98 per cent of southern Sudanese voting for independence (Gerenge 2015: 100), an illusion of a new unified nation was created. This illusion, however, was quickly shattered with the outbreak of conflict in December 2013. Why did peace-building fail so miserably in this context? While there are many inter-locking factors that contributed to conflict relapse, this research argues that one of the key factors was a fundamental misunderstanding of the conflict, driven by an insufficient understanding of the relationship between identity construction and peace and conflict. In Sudan, this occurred in several layered ways. First, the conflict as a whole was over-simplified as a racial and religious conflict between Arab and African citizens. This led to the misconception that merely separating these two identity groups should lead to peace, while structural and systemic causes and other societal rifts were largely ignored. Secondly, the relationship between identity and conflict was seen as linear and straightforward, while it is in truth highly complex and fluid. As a result, a failure to understand the relationship between identity construction and conflict led to an over-simplified solution (secession) to a complex problem. This was followed by the deployment of the oft-used liberal peace-building model, which proved insufficient to confront and navigate these processes.

The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it provides an extension of the literature review that was started in Chapter One. Second, it provides the disciplinary and global context in which this thesis places itself. Finally, the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that will guide this inquiry are provided in the form of a conceptualisation of the nation and a discussion of the leadership process approach. Throughout this analysis, questions will be raised that provide the foundation for this inquiry. In short, this chapter will provide a discussion on the complexities of the relationship between identity construction, nation-building and conflict. This discussion will illustrate that while there have been important contributions to understanding these relationships, many of the processes that determine how identity construction leads to either conflict or peace remain unexplained. The leadership process approach is then discussed and proposed as an analytical framework that will help us better understand these issues.

2.2 The construction of identity and identity-related conflicts

The debates surrounding the relationship between identity and conflict centre around whether identity difference (usually ethnic or religious) causes conflict (see 2.2.2, 2.2.2.1). It is, however, no longer sufficient to argue that the mere presence of ethnic difference causes conflict, despite the media and popular discourse often reducing conflicts to such reductionist explanations. However, one cannot reject the existence of any relationship between identity and conflict, even if it is not a causal one. The relationship between identity and conflict is far from linear and about more than causal linkages, but this does not mean a relationship does not exist. In order to better understand this relationship, it is important to start with an understanding of identity construction. There are several key debates and issues in the literature regarding the construction of identity (including nationality and ethnicity). First, there is a debate regarding the origins of ethnic or national identity. Along with this, questions are raised on how malleable identity is. Secondly, there is an overly dichotomous debate on the role of the elites and the masses *vis-a-vis* nation-building. Thirdly, the objectivity of attributes used to identify nations is debated. This, then, directly relates to the identification of "the other". All these issues are widely discussed in the literature and cannot be covered in full here. Therefore, a brief overview will be given in order to serve as a basis for this researcher's understanding of identity construction, how it contributes to conflict and peace, and how it relates to the leadership process.

With this understanding of identity construction, this section will also explore the relationship between identity construction and conflict. It starts with the premise that the relationship between identity construction and conflict is about more than whether the former causes the latter. The complex relationship between the two before, during and after conflict is illustrated. It will also provide a snapshot of some of the key identity-related conflicts and how they have been confronted in the past. Because this relationship is clearly complex, this research has chosen to use the term identity-related conflict as Bennet (2016: 2) does. This serves two purposes. First, it avoids the impression that an assumption has been made regarding the causal nature of identity difference and conflict. Secondly, using identity, as opposed to nationality or ethnicity, acknowledges the fluidity of such terms. This chapter may appear to be conflating the two concepts, but creating the impression of a stark differentiation between the two has been deliberately avoided and therefore they have been handled together for several reasons (see 2.3).

2.2.1 The construction of identity

The study of identity embodies several fields that cannot all be covered here. In addition, the notion of identity is very broad, ranging from individual identities to group identities, both of which can

include multiple characteristics (e.g. career, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality etc.) (Vignoles *et al.* 2011: 2-4). It is neither possible nor useful to cover all these forms of identities in this research. While these various forms of identity are acknowledged, this thesis is primarily interested in social identity (i.e. identity groups at a higher level than that of the family and constituted through historical, cultural and/or physical attributes). In particular, the focus of this research is national identity. Therefore, when "identity" is used here it primarily refers to national identity, which may at times overlap with ethnic or territorial identities. National identity refers to the identity element of nationhood (see 2.3.1) and can include any form of social identity that claims or aspires to nationhood. Also, while this section will discuss the construction of identity based on literature from nationalism and ethnicity studies, ethnicity and nationality are not necessarily interchangeable, though they can be related (see 2.3). For the moment, this section is concerned with how certain group identifications come into being. This is an intensely debated topic in multiple fields. It is also more complex than a dichotomous debate between those academics who view identity as natural and those who view it as constructed.

Most works in the nationalism literature (focussing on how nations come into being) will divide the field into three key approaches: Primordialist, Modernist and Ethno-symbolist (Dandeker 1998: 2-3; Hearn 2006: 20-113, 172-182). The primordial concept of the nation views the nation as a natural phenomenon arising from more organic and historical categories such as ethnicity, blood and kinship ties, and language (Guibernau 2007: 15; Hearn 2006: 20). Renan (1992) was one of the first to challenge this notion by defining the nation as a "daily plebiscite",[6] thereby highlighting the element of choice in defining the members of the nation (Laitin 2007: 29-30). Thus, a key criterion for nationhood is that most of the community's "members believe and feel them to be nations" (Norman 2006: 5).

This feeds into the group of theorists (generally referred to as Modernists) who view nations as social and mental constructs (Anderson 2006: 4-6; Gellner 1983: 5-7, Hearn 2006: 67-92; Ting 2008). Anderson characterises this idea of the nation as "*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 2006: 6). Yet it is important to note that he does not equate this to "fabrication" and "falsity", as he accuses others of doing

[6] Renan's lecture "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" (What is a Nation?), originally delivered in 1882, provides one of the earliest and most quoted definitions of the nation. It rejected pre-existing notions of the nation as natural and challenged the more dominant nationalist and romantic perspectives emerging from German scholars at the time, such as those espoused by Heinrich von Treitschke (Laitin 2007: 29; Smith 1998: 9-10; Smith 2009: 3-4).

(Anderson 2006: 6). The nation is thus seen to be built through complex social and historical processes (Ting 2008: 453). These different processes in nationalism and nation-building have been extensively studied by different scholars. For example, Deutsch (1953) studied the role of social communication, while Gellner (1983) linked the nationalism process with that of industrialisation and modernisation. Mann studied the role of the various institutions that contributed to greater national consciousness through increased literacy, highlighting the role of the militarised state and commercial capitalism (Hearn 2006: 82-83). Similarly, many thinkers have linked the notion of the nation and nationalism closely with that of the state, or some form of political autonomy (Breuilly 1993: 1-2; Laitin 2007: 41; Ting 2008: 483). This claim to political autonomy, as well as territory, is what Miller (2000: 127) uses to distinguish a nation from an ethnic group.

In response to many of these theories, some writers have tried to re-assert the importance of culture and identity in determining the nation. Anthony Smith is a key author in this regard. His work on Ethno-symbolism, presented as a critique of Modernism, tries to find a middle-ground between the Primordialist and Modernist schools of thought, particularly regarding the historical depth and antiquity of nations (Guibernau 2007: 14; Ozkirimli 2003: 341; Smith 1998: 145). Smith (1999: 57-62) makes an argument that national identity and national movements require some sense of common history (which can be based on myth) to provide direction, build solidarity and lay claim to territory, which is something that the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity and identity does not fully explain. Hroch (1996: 61) similarly indicated that nations were not built out of nothing, stating that "certain objective preconditions for the formation of a national identity [had to] already exist". The case of South Sudan will illustrate these tensions between viewing nations as historical or modern entities. Modern perceptions of identity in Sudan and South Sudan have been informed by historical experiences of conquest and conflict (see 3.2), which fuels perceptions of ancient identities. At the same time, perceptions of identity have shifted and changed over time in response to modern developments, illustrating the constructed nature of Sudanese identities.

There are also alternative approaches such as the Marxist and post-modern views. Marxists, with their focus on the supremacy of class identity, are largely skeptical of nationalism and view it instrumentally — as a tool used by the "bourgeois" elite to distract the "proletariate" from class revolution (Blaut 1987: 9; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One & Two; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 47-48). They also largely reject ethnic identity in favour of class identity (Cohen 1999: 5). In the post-modern view, some advocate for a complete rethinking of the nation and group identity in scholarly analysis, arguing that it furthers violent nationalist discourse in public life (Brubaker 2004: 7-63; Norman 2006: 6). At face value, such an argument is appealing. However, the realities of human

relationships have not yet been able to transcend the imperatives for national or group belonging, and the myriad of demands that come with it (e.g. loyalty to one's group and group members in times of crisis and conflict).

2.2.1.1 Nations: Old or new? Born or created?

Regarding the antiquity of nations, this debate relates to the continuity or dynamism of group identity. Guibernau (2007: 10) identifies "continuity over time" as one of two key indicators of identity and, subsequently, national identity (the other being "differentiation from others"). He further explains:

> Continuity springs from the inception of the nation as a historically rooted entity that projects into the future. Individuals perceive this continuity through a set of experiences that spread out across time and are united by a common meaning, something that only "insiders" can grasp. (Guibernau 2007: 10)

This sense of a shared history (and less so a shared future) is a recurring idea in the conceptualisation of nations (Eley & Suny 1996: 8; Guibernau 2007: 14; Smith 1998: 196; Weber 1994: 22). Yet, to what degree does this shared memory reflect an accurate understanding of history? Does this matter? Is there a process of myth-building involved in creating this shared memory and, if so, can this shared sense of history be altered? This is one of the key divisions between Modernists, Primordialists and Ethno-symbolists. While Modernists view the nation as a fairly recent phenomenon, driven by industrialisation and its associated processes; Primordialists would view nations as ancient, historical entities founded in kinship (Guibernau 2007: 14; Hearn 2006: 20, 67). Primordialists often highlight the importance of common descent, but despite this discourse often being prevalent in national consciousness "it is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite to found a nation" (Weber 1994: 22). Therefore, Primordialist theories have largely been rejected by scholars (Gilley 2004: 1158), despite their views often reflecting the views of group members. On the other hand, the arguments for the nation as a modern entity are compelling. Then there are Ethno-symbolists who recognise that *nations* may be modern but that they are also rooted in ethnicity (or as Smith [1999: 127] terms them: *Ethnies*) (Guibernau 2007: 14).

Perhaps it is not so much the actual origins of the nation that matter, but the perception of their antiquity instead. Thus, even if collective memory is removed from reality, it is not the reality that matters but the degree to which it is felt as real (Guibernau 2007: 12). The formation of the Arab identity in Sudan is a good example of this (see 3.2). The veracity of historical claims to nationhood

is not what drives people to collective action (conflictual or peaceful), but rather whether the members of the nation accept this version of the “truth”. However, it is important to note that if the antiquity of nations is therefore not guaranteed, the nation is not set in stone. As a result, it can change. Perhaps it is best to view the building or formation of nations as an ongoing process. This allows one to capture the dynamism of identity. For example, members can feel they are part of a nation for an extended period of time but “the elements upon which such a feeling is based may vary” (Guibernau 2007: 11). Similarly, the sense of belonging may be latent and only re-emerge in response to a threat of some kind (Guibernau 2007: 12). This is evidenced in the way that the collective consciousness of a South Sudanese identity has waxed and waned in response to threats from northern Sudan (see 3.3, 3.4, 4.3, 5.3, 5.4). In fact, groups previously not viewed as a nation may gain the title of nation in a relatively short period of time through changing their behaviour, as seen in the Chinese nation, which was previously only viewed as a race (Weber 1994: 23).

Thus, as Hroch (1996: 61) states, the nation is not “an eternal category”. In fact, nations can be seen as highly fluid “categories of practice” or “happenings” rather than “substantial, enduring collectivities” (Brubaker 1996: 21). The construction of nations is also highly context dependent. Hroch (1996: 65-68) identifies four “antecedents” to nation-building (briefly: a “crisis of legitimacy”; “vertical social mobility” of the “non-dominant ethnic group”; “a fairly high level of social communication”; and “nationally relevant conflicts of interest”). Therefore, while ethnicity and nationality cannot be constructed from nothing, it remains constructed. Yet, how are they constructed and from what? “How” refers to the question of actors and the roles they play in this process, discussed in the next section. This is where the leadership process approach provides some tools to better understand identity construction (see 2.4). “What” refers to the attributes used to divide identity groups from each other (see 2.2.1.3).

2.2.1.2 Identity: Elite or mass phenomenon?

It is hard to dispute that national and ethnic identity holds a certain degree of emotive power that is not easily explained through rationalist thinking. In fact, despite its constructed nature, the nation is largely viewed as an essential part of human existence and “the idea of a man without a nation seems to impose a far greater strain on the modern imagination” (Gellner 1983: 6). The cultural and psychological nature of group identity results in its internalisation by individuals, “charging it emotionally”, and driving individuals to action based on a higher goal (Guibernau 2007: 12). Horowitz (2001: Chapter One-Three) regularly critiques other approaches for failing to explain the emotive power identity holds and why people respond to elite calls to action, especially in conflict. This emotional and psychological element of identity rests at the heart of the question of whether identity

construction is driven by the masses or the elites. After all, if nations are mere illusions created by elite puppet-masters, why do national and cultural symbols evoke such respect and why are people willing to make the ultimate sacrifice (their life) in pursuit of the nation's enduring existence?

On the other hand, national movements do not spontaneously rise from the masses either. They usually require someone to provide direction and vision, frame social reality, and build the narrative that drives the collective will. Elites are known to utilise the emotional power of national identity for mobilisation (Guibernau 2007: 12). This is often portrayed as an instrumentalist approach, where the goals of elites are perceived as self-interested, especially by Marxists (Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 47-48; Stewart 2008: 8). Yet, the role of elites is not just in the instrumental use of identity for political ends, but also in the construction of national identity as well. Referred to by various terms, the *intelligentsias/intellectuals/ethnic entrepreneurs/activists* play a key role in building consciousness of their national identity within groups (Eley & Suny 1996: 4, 14; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One; Hroch 1996: 63; Laitin 2007: 41). These actors usually refer to some elite group that has been able to achieve a degree of upward social mobility and begin to champion the cause of their ethnic or national grouping (Eley & Suny 1996: 14-16; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One). They have also been identified as those who possess certain attributes or achievements that are considered cultural values and as a result become the leaders of said "culture community" (Weber 1994: 25).

Hroch (1996: 63), using evidence primarily from Europe, identified three key phases of nation-building and the first two centred on the role of elites (or as he terms them, "activists"). The first set of activists were intellectuals who studied and disseminated an awareness of group attributes, without laying any claims of statehood or self-determination (Hroch 1996: 63). The second phase involved a different group of activists who would pursue these goals and begin to mobilise group members, leading to the final stage where a mass movement would emerge (Hroch 1996: 63). Simply put, while different approaches seek to highlight the roles of either the masses or the elites in identity construction and collective action, there is clearly a complex relationship between the two at play that has not been sufficiently explored. The leadership process approach, with its relational view of followers and leaders, nuances and deepens the understanding of how elites use and influence identity formation without excluding the role of the masses (see 2.4).

2.2.1.3 Group Boundaries and Attributes: Subjective or Objective? Rational or Non-rational?

If identity groups are constructed, if both elites and the masses play a role in their construction, how do they choose the attributes that define "insiders" and "outsiders"? The word "choose" is used very

deliberately here. A key aspect of this debate is the notion of choice, first brought into nationalism literature by Renan's notion of the "everyday plebiscite" (Laitin 2007: 30; Renan 1994: 17). Other nationalism authors hint at this notion by highlighting the importance of members *believing* they belong to the same nation as others (Guibernau 2007: 11; Laitin 2007: 40; Miller 2000: 28). Therefore, whether consciously or unconsciously, people collectively choose how to define themselves (Laitin 2007: 30; Miller 2000: 127; Weilenmann 2010: 34-37). However, identity groups are also not chosen at random. There are often some attributes or commonalities that act as "raw materials" for such groups to develop (Eley & Suny 1996: 9). Generally, there must be some degree of shared attributes to be considered part of a nation (Guibernau 2007: 11).

But which attributes contribute towards the building of a national identity? Are these subjective or objective attributes? And are some attributes more powerful than others (e.g. race or religion)? For example, there are a multitude of identity attributes present in Sudan (racial, ethnic, sub-ethnic, language, religion, territorial origins etc.), many of which are subjective and some which have gained more prominence in collective consciousness than others at different times. How and why does this occur? Primordialists would argue that the attributes of a nation are largely objective and "given", while others point to the changing and transformative nature of culture (Eley & Suny 1996: 6-8; Guibernau 2007: 15; Laitin 2007: 29-37). The leadership process approach is used throughout this study to understand this tension between the objective and subjective by understanding the events, processes and relationships in a society that give rise to certain perceptions.

Unfortunately, there is no particular attribute or set of attributes that help us readily identify nations, or indeed other forms of group identity (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One & Two; Norman 2006: 5). In other words, if we were to divide the world up into language groups, this would not mirror the nations of the world. The same would apply if we used race, culture, religion, territorial origin or ethnicity. The attributes used to define a group are contextual. In certain cases, the attribute that builds solidarity may be language, while in others it may be religion, or ethnicity, or history (Weber 1994: 22). As a result, ensuring territorial and state boundaries reflect perceived and changing nations is exceptionally difficult. Interestingly, shortly after the colonial period in Africa, religion was not seen as a key source of political tension and threat to national unity, while ethnic sub-nationalism was (Mazrui & Tidy 1984: 186-187). This can certainly not be said today, in light of recent radicalised Islamist groups such as Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, and the conflicts in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire (which included a Christian-Muslim element). Why did these groups begin to divide themselves more strongly along religious lines? The answer likely lies in changing political and social contexts.

In addition, groups can expand to include broader attributes. When micro-ethnicities are aggregated into macro-ethnicities (e.g. German, Serb, European), this may be done according to language, race or religion, depending on the context and the purpose for building group consciousness (e.g. "white" was used to identify those of European descent during imperial conquest to distinguish the conquerers from the conquered) (Mann 2001: 208). Therefore, the selection of attributes can change, making the strong emotional allegiance that one feels towards a group at a certain period of time largely non-rational (Guibernau 2007: 12). In addition, Horowitz (2001: Chapter One) argues that the strength of attachment felt to one's group identity is not based on the specific attribute used to identify that group (e.g. race does not necessarily instil a greater sense of nationalism than religion). Contextual factors are likely to determine this instead, as the case study of South Sudan will illustrate. The leadership process approach allows for such contextual analysis (see 2.4).

Regarding objectivity and subjectivity, some of these attributes may seem objective because members are born into them and therefore make identifying members fairly easy (e.g. race). Others, however, are subjective and allow for more fluidity and movement between identity groups (e.g. religion) (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One & Two). Most attributes, however, may seem objective but can hold an element of subjectivity to them (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One). For example, most people are born into their language groups, but new languages can be learned and, over time, the language landscape of a state and nation can change (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One; Laitin 2007: 18, 31-40). The Arab-African racial divide in Sudan is also not as objective as it is perceived to be (see 3.2.1). This subjectivity makes patriotism and nationalism seem even more non-rational. But even if these attributes are subjective, that does not mean that they do not have consequences (Guibernau 2007: 12). In fact, while scholars or other observers may view loyalty to one's ethnic or national grouping as non-rational, this does not diminish the power and real-life consequences of such sentiments (Cohen 1999: 9), as the conflictual history of South Sudan covered in this thesis will illustrate.

Hroch (1996: 61) perhaps captures this relationship between the subjective and objective best in his definition of the nation as:

> […] a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of *objective relationships* (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their *subjective reflection* in collective consciousness." (Emphasis added)

There are several key points made in this definition. First, that a nation is not defined by a single attribute. Secondly, he refers to relationships as opposed to attributes. This is essential in illustrating that cultural or national attributes are relational and interact with each other to create a broader identity. This perhaps sheds light on why in certain contexts, religion may be the defining attribute while in others it may be geography, race or language, depending on how they interact with each other and their context. Finally, he points to the importance of "subjective reflection", indicating that what appear to be objective categories are framed as such to create a sense of group identity by both those within and without the group.

Finally, identity is also relational and the attributes chosen to identify the nation often stem from this. Therefore, a key aspect of identity is distinction from others (Eley & Suny 1996: 32; Guibernau 2007: 10). This difference can be real or perceived. As Weber (1994: 21-22) points out, the definition of a nation does not lie in any objective attributes but rather in the ability to create solidarity amongst group members in opposition to other groups. In fact, Horowitz (2001: Chapter Two) shows how even relatively homogenous groups can create divisions and stereotypes. The identification of "the other" can be considered a decision, whether real or perceived (Deutsch 2010: 11), in the same way that belonging to a nation is a choice. Also, distinction between groups is strengthened when there is conflict with another group (Mann 2001: 208). This is why the attributes used to unite a group often vary based on the context, which often includes the perceived enemy.

In addition, who a group identifies as its common enemy can vary depending on context, situation and needs (Deutsch 2010: 11). In South Sudan, the common enemy, which played a central role in group identification, often shifted between racial, ethnic, sub-ethnic and territorial groups, depending on the context (discussed in the following chapters). To put it more succinctly, "Culture is more often not what people share, but what they choose to fight over" (Eley & Suny 1996: 9). This is why in certain cases identity-related conflicts appear to be between two vastly different groups (e.g. apartheid South Africa) and in other cases between groups that appear relatively similar (e.g. Somalia), and why it is difficult to use identity as a causal explanation for conflict (Eley & Suny 1996: 9; Horowitz 2001: Chapter Two & Six). This is discussed further in the next section. For now, it is important to note that a common enemy and a clear perception of "the other" is often a central feature in group identification (Deutsch 2010: 11; Guibernau 2007: 10).

The above discussion has shown that identity construction and nation-building are not clear-cut processes with pre-determined steps (Deutsch 2010: 7-8). It is a "complex, uneven and unpredictable process" (Eley & Suny 1996: 8). It can also stall, reverse, or be interrupted (Hroch 1996: 61). For

the purposes of this research, it is argued that group identity is constructed through multiple and complex processes, but also that it requires some foundation in social reality and perception. The leadership process approach provides a framework in which this relationship between actors (elites and followers) and context (history, conflict, demography) can be better understood. The manner in which these processes of identity construction then interact with violent conflict are equally complex and is the topic of the next section. It will be shown that, just as the debates surrounding identity construction are far more complex than they first appear, the questions usually raised regarding the relationship between identity and conflict often lead to reductionist claims and avoid confronting the complexities of social reality.

2.2.2 Identity-related conflicts

Many conflicts in recent history have been portrayed as ethnic or nationalist conflicts. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the increased number of intra-state conflicts have often contained rifts along identity lines. Perhaps the two that hold the most responsibility for raising interest in identity-related conflict, both in the media and in the literature, are Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Pischedda 2008: 103). The genocide in Rwanda is estimated to have led to the deaths of 800 000 people in approximately three months (Clark & Kaufman 2009: 1). The wars related to Yugoslavia's disintegration are responsible for approximately 140 000 lost lives (International Center for Transitional Justice 2009: 1). Both Rwanda and Yugoslavia are notorious for their human rights violations. These events reinvigorated interest in what was often termed "ethnic conflict", both in the public and academic spheres. However, some would argue that such an interest is unjustified and that the idea of "ethnic conflict" is both conceptually weak and undeserving of such attention because such conflicts are relatively rare (Gilley 2004: 1155). The salience of ethnic conflicts in the world is debated, with some claiming that these conflicts are ubiquitous and on the rise since the end of the Cold War (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 424; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One; Mann 2001: 207). Others argue that this is exaggerated, especially when one considers how many ethnic groups live in states of co-existence and cooperation across the world (Gilley 2004: 1155; Laitin 2007: 10-11).

However, it is not the number of identity-related conflicts that drive this inquiry, but rather their nature and the peace-building challenges they pose when they do occur. Similarly, as Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 424) eloquently state: "Ethnic violence warrants our attention because it is appalling, not because it is ubiquitous." Using identity as a tool in conflict has resulted in some of the worst atrocities in human history. Its most extreme form, that of genocide and ethnic cleansing, is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of 60 to 120 million people in the 20th century (Mann 2001:

207), aside from the other atrocities that often accompany such events (e.g. rape and torture). This pattern of atrocities in identity-related conflicts has been continued in South Sudan. How to “undo” the psychological and sociological rifts furthered by such conflicts remains a challenge. As discussed above, to avoid conceptual confusion between ethnicity, nationality and other forms of identification that have often contributed to conflict (such as religion), this thesis will use the term identity-related conflict. This is not meant to imply that identity divisions cause conflict, only that they interact with various conflict processes, including but not limited to the causes of conflict. As a result, identity needs to be taken into account in the resolution of such conflicts in the same way economic factors do.

2.2.2.1 Before Conflict: How identity contributes to the outbreak of violence

The power of identity in violent conflict has been demonstrated quite clearly, but how does identity, the way it is constructed, and conflict interact prior to the outbreak of war? Do societal tensions between identity groups lead to or contribute to conflict? First, it is important to look at some macro-explanations of identity-related conflict in the world. Part of the “rise” of identity-related conflicts can be attributed to several ideals that have emerged in the last century (e.g. self-determination) and the formation of an international system that is theoretically (if not in reality) comprised of nation-states (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One). As the world was divided up into nation-states, the power of national consciousness was such that “national self-realisation was a legitimate and positive goal of political struggles, even wars” (Eley & Suny 1996: 4). Thus, a key aspect of identity-related conflict is the state and its link with ethnicity and nationality. The nation especially is often closely linked with the state (see 2.2.1, 2.3.1) and what is termed ethnic violence and nationalism is regularly linked to some claim to the state, resulting in secessionist or irredentist movements, or some other claim to political autonomy, as seen in South Sudan (Breuilly 1993: 1-2; Eriksen 1991: 265-266; Hearn 2006: 27; Smith 1998: 72). In fact, it can be argued that the rise of the modern nation-state and the discourse of self-determination gave impetus to increasing waves of ethnic cleansing, by overlaying larger aggregations of ethnic groups or nation-states over smaller ethnic groups (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One; Mann 2001: 209, 235-237).

The increased trend of identity-related conflict (real or perceived) has been attributed to many other factors as well. First, some have pointed to the decline of the Weberian state or rather, the increase of what today is called “weak states” that are incapable of controlling such conflicts when they do arise (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 424). Also, the decreased relevance of the left-right ideological political discourse in the 1990s that had dominated conflict during the Cold War was expected to result in a rise of identity politics and conflict (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 424-425). Such explanations

are reminiscent of Huntington's widely criticised "clash of civilisations" argument, which claimed that the post-Cold War world would see a decrease in ideological and economic conflicts and an increase in cultural rifts (Huntington 1993). Though this may have been exaggerated, an element of truth in this argument can be seen in the ways in which politicians in the developing world, and increasingly in the developed world, have relied on ethnic, racial or religious identification during elections. Cote d'Ivoire is an example where such "ethnic-census" voting had disastrous consequences. Following its transition to multi-party democracy and the death of its long-time leader Houphouet-Boigny, a pattern of identity politics and exclusion led to an ethnicised political system that, in tandem with various economic and political crises, led to a civil war in 2002, and extensive post-electoral violence in 2011 (Bah 2010; Bassett 2011). In both cases, conflict lines were drawn on territorial, ethnic and religious grounds (Bah 2010; Bassett 2011). Similarly, the electoral violence of 2007-2008 in Kenya also held an ethnic element (Kagwanja 2009). These types of examples perhaps support a thesis put forth by Snyder (2000) suggesting that early democratisation processes often lead to identity-related violence and conflict.

At a more micro-level, how an academic views the relationship between identity and conflict is often linked to his/her perception of how identity is constructed. In other words, if the primordial view is espoused, they are likely to hold to the "ancient hatreds" view; but a more instrumentalist view would lead the academic to argue that identity-related conflict is the fault of elites who drum up ethnic and nationalist hatred for their own personal gain (Williams 2016: 174). The constructivist argument holds that such violence stems from group myths, which have been built and changed over time, that "justify hostility, fears of group extinction and chauvinist mobilisation" (Williams 2016: 174). For example, in Sudan and South Sudan, a primordial scholar would argue that Arabs and Africans (in Sudan), and the Dinka and the Nuer (in South Sudan), are formed from inherent identities, based on descent, that conflict with one another due to historical animosities and hatred. An instrumentalist would argue that the Sudanese and South Sudanese wars are the fault of elites who manipulated the masses by using racial and ethnic narratives in their pursuit of political power. A constructivist would point to the histories that have been used in South Sudanese identity formation, such as the slave trade (see 3.2.1), and how this fuelled fears of domination in future generations.

Both the instrumentalist view and the constructivist view hold value and will be utilised in this study's theoretical framework. Horowitz (2001) in his seminal work *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, takes a different approach to identity-related conflict. He argues that conflict and violence between ethnic groups is driven by self-comparison between groups, which can create insecurity. All of

these perspectives on identity construction are limited in their ability to explain agency, particularly group agency. With the exception of the instrumentalist approach, which gives agency primarily to group leaders, these perspectives imply that members of a group are impassive in the formation of their own identities, which is the product of external events and processes. The leadership process approach allows for an analysis of the agency of both followers and leaders in identity construction.

There are many examples, globally and historically of conflicts that were framed, in one way or another, as a clash of identities. Some contained atrocities so immense that they hold special attention in human history, such as the Holocaust and the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides. However, identity-related conflict has manifested in multiple forms and degrees. Examples include the electoral violence in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire; inter-communal pogroms between Hindus and Muslims in India; the struggle for equality in apartheid South Africa; the conflicts between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi, Arab and African in Sudan, Israeli and Arab in the Middle East and Shi'a and Sunni in Iraq. Of course, while many of these conflicts carry a narrative of ethnic, religious or racial difference, none can be reduced to only this. For example, the actual role of ethnicity in Rwanda has been widely debated, and other contributing factors such as land have also been put forward (Homer-Dixon & Percival 1999: 270-271). Some of these examples may best be termed the "ethnicisation of political violence", whereby political violence holds elements of ethnic and nationalist violence, rather than "ethnic violence" (Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 424).

As discussed earlier, Marxism is similarly critical of nationalism and by extension, ethnic or nationalist explanations for conflict (Anderson 2006: 3; Blaut 1987: 10; Dandeker 1998: 3; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One & Two). With the supremacy and immutability placed on class identity over ethnic and national identity, Marxists view identity-related conflicts as an "artificial" endeavour whose purpose is to distract the proletariat from their class interests and utilise the masses for bourgeois interests and legitimacy (Dandeker 1998: 3; Horowitz 2001: Chapter One & Two; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 49-50). This literature has not gone unchallenged. It has been criticised for its "ambivalent" dismissal of national liberation struggles in the developing world as "bourgeois" (Blaut 1987: 10). In addition, Marxists are accused of paying insufficient attention to (or even suppressing) the human need to belong to an identity group (Fine 1999: 155). Similarly, Horowitz (2001: Chapter One-Three) points out several gaps in the reasoning of such Marxist theories of conflict. He does the same for other economic and development theories of conflict. While his arguments are extensive and detailed, a key point of importance to this study is that economic theories of identity-related conflict cannot account for the level of support that identity's emotional and psychological power can raise during a conflict, compared to class identity.

In certain circumstances, it is easier for politicians and elites to frame a conflict as driven by identity difference and a clash of interests between two national groups, rather than use a more nuanced, evidence-based and political discourse to raise support (Hroch 1996: 68). However, even if elites use nationality (or other forms of identity) to mobilise and provide a "sense of solidarity" in response to a grievance, this does not make the cause of the conflict ethnic (Gilley 2004: 1159). Rather, the cause remains the central grievance, be it economic, political or social (Gilley 2004: 1159). It is perhaps best to view identity's role in conflict as relational. In other words, the impact identity will have on conflict is dependent on its interaction with many other contextual and situational factors. These factors can include *inter alia* the political system, a specific political or economic crisis, the territorial and ethnic layout of a state and the leadership available at the time, which is why context-specific analysis of conflict is needed. The leadership process approach provides for an understanding of how identity is formed through this interaction between elites, people and context (see 2.4). In addition, as ethnicity and other forms of identity are constructed, this makes them fluid and therefore, some would argue, incapable of explaining political conflict (Gilley 2004: 1158). This is perhaps taking it too far, simply because if identity is constructed it does not mean it is not felt as real. However, it is a valuable insight to note that identity is dynamic and can even be so during a conflict. Therefore, the linkages between identity and conflict are likely to evolve as circumstances change.

Also, in what may be seen as a push-back against the growing narrative of "ethnic violence" in the developing world, particularly Africa, literature re-directing attention to the economic factors of conflict began to re-emerge in the form of the security-development nexus. This literature promoted an understanding of the relationship between development and security through debating the role of poverty, inequality, and war economies in creating and prolonging conflict.[7] As a result of this criticism and the growing literature on the security-development nexus (favouring economic explanations for conflict), the study of identity-related conflicts seems to have waned in the early 2000s. This thesis does not seek to negate the valuable contributions made by economic and political explanations for conflict and therefore will not engage at length with this debate. However, what is argued is that whatever the cause(s) of a specific conflict, its framing as an identity-related conflict by elites and politicians does hold consequences for the unfolding of the conflict and the subsequent peace processes. As the security-development discourse has proved unable to present a sustainable

[7] Key examples of this literature include: Alao (2007), Collier and Hoeffler (2000); Ballentine & Sherman (2003); Berdal & Malone (2000); Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand (2003); Stewart (2008).

approach to building peace, perhaps it is time to revisit theories of identity-related conflict and see what they can contribute to the now changed discourse of peace-building.

2.2.2.2 During conflict: a mutually reinforcing relationship between identity construction and conflict

Some would argue that identity holds a specific emotive power during conflict (Bennet 2016: 2; Horowitz 2001: Chapter Two & Three). This emotional aspect of identity has already been discussed. However, another source of this power is the refuge that identity provides during times of transformation, crisis and conflict. This is because, despite identity's dynamic nature, it is perceived as "stable and predictable" by its members who fear the different and the unknown, and therefore it provides a sense of security (Eley & Suny 1996: 31-32). This makes cross-ethnic interaction and dialogue exceptionally difficult during conflict as trust is built within one's group while distrust of "the other" grows. Such instinctive and psychological processes contribute to the continued construction of identity during conflict. The dynamic nature of identity has already been alluded to. One of the key factors in this dynamism is conflict and crisis. Indeed, conflict is a key basis for the formation of nations when a conflict of interests overlaps with identity lines (Hroch 1996: 68). Threats and dangers tend to be more powerful in building a sense of community than peace and prosperity, which is when community consciousness tends to decrease (Weilenmann 2010: 41). This is clearly evident in the decreased unity found in post-secession South Sudan (see 5.3, 5.4). Conflict with other groups strengthens one's own group identity (Mann 2001: 208). On the other side of the coin, group identity holds special power in crisis situations. As Cohen (1999: 9) says:

> Sensing attack, you seek a bond with your friends and a clearer definition of your enemies. This bonding is sometimes so powerful that some people think it is sacred. The ethnic group, sometimes even the whole nation, becomes an object of worship, a civil religion for which you are prepared to die.

Two key points are raised here, first, that the distinction of identity groups provides a means of identifying one's enemies during conflict. Even though this identification may be flawed and subjective, it can become very real in the minds of group members. Secondly, in such circumstances, loyalty to one's identity group becomes imperative, despite any rational pleas to the subjectivity of the societal division or alternative explanations for the conflict. In contrast to wars over ideology, individuals have less freedom of choice in their loyalties when a conflict is identity-related (Kaufmann 1996: 138). In certain cases, the polarisation that occurs during conflict is so intense that peo-

ple are forced into a nationalist mindset. Drakulic (quoted in Kressel 1996: 32) described Croat nationalism during the Serbia-Croatia war as being "pinned to the wall of nationhood". She further compared it to being forced to wear an "ill-fitting shirt" because "there is nothing else to wear", since other forms of identification (i.e. class, gender etc.) have been taken away (Drakulic quoted in Kressel 1996: 32).

In addition, the discourse used in identity-related conflicts and the atrocities that often accompany it cement identity differences (Kaufmann 1996: 137). In Bosnia, for example, the war altered and complicated Bosnia's societal rifts significantly in its almost four-year duration. This provided additional challenges that had to be addressed in addition to those that caused the conflict in the first place (Bennet 2016: 8). It is perhaps paradoxical that nationalist movements, often framed as a fight for a certain group's rights (e.g. self-determination), often proceed to violate the rights of other groupings in such ways (Eley & Suny 1996: 11-12). While there are likely many explanations for this, one may be found in the earlier discussion on the antiquity of nations. The myth of the nation, often linked with its history, also contains an element of prestige entailing some divine destiny or mission (Ting 2008: 458; Weber 1994: 24, 25). In South Sudan, for example, Biblical passages describing what some believe to be ancestors of South Sudanese and a foretelling of independence were used in national myth-building (Copnall 2014: 31). National myths often elicit a sense of responsibility on the members of the nation to uphold the glory of the past and ensure the success of the nation for future generations (Hroch 1996: 61; Weilenmann 2010: 40). Unfortunately, this sense of prestige or destiny can also entail a sense of superiority and uniqueness (Weber 1994: 24-25), leading to the atrocities mentioned above (Eley & Suny 1996: 11-12; Nairn 1975: 17-18).

Therefore, conflict and identity are mutually reinforcing during conflict. Conflict leads to a heightened sense of group identity due to the functional qualities of ethnicity and nationality (providing stability, refuge and informal networks that ensure survival [Horowitz 2001: Chapter Two]) and the identification of a common enemy. In turn, the emotional, psychological and social nature of identity increases the stakes of what may be a mere conflict of interests, often leading to increased conflict and conflict-related atrocities. And, coming full circle, these atrocities further entrench identity differences. In this way, a cycle of violence is created. The breaking of this cycle is the challenge confronting peace-builders after such conflicts.

2.2.2.3 After conflict: Institutional change, reconciliation and the "de-construction" of identity

Conflict relapse is an endemic problem of identity-related conflicts. As identity-related conflicts tend to hold a higher degree of emotional investment amongst the people, because they challenge or

champion people's very sense of who they are, they are immensely difficult to solve and manage (Bennet 2016: 2). The generally accepted view of peace-building is that one must tackle the root causes of conflict to build lasting peace. If this is true, knowing the nature of the relationship between conflict and identity, as discussed above, is critical. However, Kaufmann (1996: 137) boldly states that the "solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes". He goes on to highlight the ways in which ethnic hatred and intolerance are cemented during conflict and argues for separation and partition as a solution to identity-related conflict (Kaufmann 1996: 136-137). The outbreak of violence in South Sudan less than three years after secession indicates that this may be an over-simplistic view of identity-related conflict. Perhaps Kaufmann's statement is too extreme but it is important to note that when dealing with an identity-related conflict, one must address not just how identity contributed to the start of the conflict, but how conflict and identity processes have interacted to create a new, potentially untenable, situation. By extension, this also illustrates that while identity may not be the "root cause" of conflict, it cannot be ignored in the peace-building process.

The broader trends of peace-building thinking and practice have been discussed in Chapter One. In brief, the conclusions reached were that, while there have been significant strides in peace-building, they still fall short of the mark in building lasting peace. This is especially true in identity-related conflicts. In Bosnia, one can see the hallmark of liberal peace. The international community brokered a peace agreement (the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995) that, while ceasing hostilities, did not satisfy the protagonists of the conflict, was vague on Bosnia's future, and contained "unrealistic deadlines" that served to provide the international community with an exit strategy (Bennet 2016: 8). While the country has not returned to open warfare it has also not achieved democratic transformation and remains highly unstable (Bennett 2016: 2). A decade later, despite significant strides in peace-building practice, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Sudan (2005) and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of Cote d'Ivoire (2007) would make similar mistakes. More specifically, the agreements sought speedy elections, failed to address the deep-seated grievances of both sides of the conflict and failed to provide a framework for what each country would look like as a nation.

In Bosnia, the elections that were held just nine months after the signing of the accord "entrenched ethno-national divisions" (Bennet 2016: 12). In Sudan, elections entrenched the two warring parties in power despite significant evidence of electoral fraud (Young 2012: 134-135), both of whose governance of the country would contribute to continued instability. In Côte d'Ivoire, elections would, after significant delays, lead to a conflict that resulted in the deaths of over 3000 people (Mitchell 2012: 277-278). Peace-building, of course, entails more than the initial peace agreements. It in-

cludes a plethora of activities aimed towards preventing a return to conflict. These cannot all be discussed in the space available, but an overview of the various peace-building activities of specific interest to identity-related conflicts is necessary. The activities involved in resolving identity-related conflict can be divided into three broad categories. The first is constitutional and institutional design, the second is justice and reconcilation and the third is intellectual.

There are various constitutional and institutional designs that theorists and practitioners have experimented with in search of the most peace-sustaining and conflict-reducing model. Nationalist movements and their demands have often been settled by certain political concessions that exclude secession, particularly through some form of federalism (Eley & Suny 1996: 10). Territorial solutions to such conflicts can include confederations, federations, federacy arrangements, devolution and decentralisation (ranging from the more concrete political divisions to those less so) (Wolff 2012: 29). Confederal arrangements provide identity groups with some form of control and self-administration in their own regions (Mann 2001: 211). A more extreme version of this is partition, which allows a region self-government through regional autonomy at the least and formal independence at the most (Pischedda 2008: 43). This, of course, is usually only possible if identity divisions are relatively regionally distinct. For example, a similar solution was proposed in the early days of the Bosnian conflict in an effort to halt the march to war, but this failed miserably because communities quickly realised the proposed borders would make some of them minorities under the rule of "the other" (Bennet 2016: 7). However, partition has been proposed as a solution to some intractable identity-related conflicts like Iraq (Pischedda 2008: 43) and was thought to be the solution to violent conflict in southern Sudan. This relatively extreme solution to identity-related conflicts stems from the belief that some conflicts become so extreme that they cannot be de-escalated until groups are separated (Kauffman 1996: 137).

Another option is to take a more consociational approach, which assures that minorities will hold some degree of power at the centre (Mann 2001: 211). This is often associated with power-sharing (Wolff 2012: 23), which is regularly advocated for (Kauffman 1996: 136). Wolff (2012: 23) also associates this with territorial solutions of self-governance mentioned above, though he acknowledges that the literature sometimes separates them, as has been done here for the purpose of clarity. However, it should be noted as Wolff (2012: 23) does that these two solutions often go together. Consociationalism aims to ensure that all segments of society, including minorities, are represented in government (Wolff 2012: 24). It usually involves primarily some form of power-sharing through coalition governments; and secondarily a minority veto and proportionality in electoral systems and civil service employment (Wolff 2012: 24).

In general, the international community prefers power-sharing agreements to some of the more drastic solutions described above, such as partition (Kauffman 1996: 136; Pischedda 2008: 104). This has almost become a trend in peace settlements of late. For example, power-sharing was used in South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya (Bah 2010: 613; Lemarchand 2006; Spears 2002: 126; Stewart 2010: 134) and is the central principle of the 2015 peace agreement in South Sudan (IGAD 2015a). However, as seen in Côte d'Ivoire, power-sharing does little to address the root causes of conflict and the deep divisions that arise from it. Often, it is a superficial solution that usually only addresses the needs of elites and therefore only holds until the next crisis emerges or elite interests are no longer served by it. The dangers of power-sharing are aptly summed up by Roeder (2012: 71):

> [The] demand for power sharing by the parties themselves should attune us to the very danger contained in power sharing and why those concerned for the longer-term survival of peace within a country should be most resistant to power sharing at exactly the moment it appears to be the only option: power sharing is a quick fix to end one round of conflict, but raises the risk of later recurrence of conflict at still greater intensity.

These types of institutional efforts (excluding partition) seek to ensure that all identity groups are bound to the state in some form (Mann 2001: 211). Another approach to constitutional and institutional design — centripetalism — is more focused on integrating divided societies by promoting "cross-ethnic behaviour" through "institutional incentives" (Reilly 2012: 57). They do this by designing systems that, for example, encourage and require elites and parties to look to other identity groups for votes (Reilly 2012: 57; Horowitz 2008: 1217). This approach therefore looks for longer term change and confronts the fears that consociational designs may entrench identity-politics (Simonsen 2005: 310-311). In addition, advocates of centripetalism also argue that consociationalism is elite-focused (Reilly 2012: 57). Considering the importance of both elites and masses in nation-building, such elite-centred solutions are insufficient.

The second broad category concerning peace-building in identity-related conflicts is that of justice and reconciliation. Justice is an important, but not un-contested, aspect of peace-building, especially considering the atrocities that often accompany identity-related conflicts. Identity-related conflicts are often associated with past injustices, through the historical construction of identity, and may stem from or incite future conflicts based on a pursuit of "collective revenge" (Cairns & Doe 2003: 4-5). However, it must be noted that there is a broader debate on the importance of justice in all

post-conflict settings (not just identity-related conflicts). This relates to the inevitable trade-offs involved in pursuing peace or justice. In brief, those who advocate for justice argue that the prosecution of war crimes is essential for moral reasons, to prevent a return to conflict based on past atrocities and to act as a deterrent for future potential war criminals (Colson 2000: 53-55). Those who employ the logic of peace prioritise a cessation of hostilities, which may require appeasement and amnesty; argue that justice mechanisms may prevent protagonists from signing agreements for fear of prosecution; and challenge the legality of international justice and the potential hypocrisy and imperialism it may embody (Colson 2000: 55-56). This is not a debate that will be settled here, but the issues raised in this debate present the same challenges in identity-related conflicts that they do in all conflicts and is an on-going challenge in South Sudan (see 5.3.4, 5.4.4).

Mani (2002: 5-6) identifies three dimensions of justice that are important in post-conflict societies — legal justice (i.e. establishing the rule of law), rectificatory justice (i.e. addressing the crimes and human rights abuses that occur during conflict) and distributive justice (i.e. addressing the "structural and systemic injustices"). All three are important, but the second two are of greatest concern to this section, as the first is associated with re-building the security institutions of the state (i.e. state-building). Also, the first (legal justice) and the second (rectificatory justice) have received greater attention, particularly from the international community than the third (distributive justice). Rectificatory justice has also been broadly termed as "transitional justice" and is the primary means through which reconciliation was sought following the surge in intra-state conflict in the 1990s and early 2000s (Mani 2005: 511, 514-520). Transitional justice refers to "a set of measures and processes adopted to deal with the consequences of mass human rights violations in the aftermath of regime changes, violent conflicts, wars, and other historical injustices that were derivatives of undemocratic regimes, colonisation, occupation, and so on" (David 2017: 151). The ways in which transitional/rectificatory justice have been sought varies, including tribunals, community justice mechanisms, truth commissions, apologies, vetting and reparations (David 2017: 151).

These mechanisms for transitional justice range from more reconciliatory approaches such as apologies and truth commissions (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC] in post-apartheid South Africa is perhaps the hallmark of this approach) to more punitive/retributive approaches such as international tribunals (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTYR] and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] being key examples) (David 2017: 154; Mani 2005: 511, 514-520). They also include revelatory approaches (such as the truth commissions first instituted in Latin America) and reparatory approaches (e.g. paying financial reparations to vic-

tims and addressing structural inequities) (David 2017: 154-155, 167). The examples provided indicate different ideas of what is needed for reconciliation. The TRC in South Africa, which controversially offered amnesty for truth, illustrated a view that punishment would hinder a peaceful transition (Dragovic-SoSo 2011: 186). On the other hand, the ICTR in Rwanda, whose mandate centred on the prosecution of offenders, saw punishment as not just a moral imperative but also a necessary element of reconciliation (Clark 2009: 191-192). There are challenges in the punitive approach too, particularly regarding who to prosecute. By their nature, tribunals and courts prosecute individuals, but this "individualised guilt may contribute to a myth of collective innocence", by not punishing the complicity of bystanders or supporters (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002: 579-580). Also, evidence suggests that people tend to view their own identity group as victims and use tribunals to reaffirm this rather than acknowledge the crimes of their own group members (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002: 580-581).

In this way, transitional justice is not without its challenges and is limited in its nation-building capacity. In addition, there is the notion of "victor's justice", where the prosecutions tend to be directed towards the "losers" in the conflict. Both Côte d'Ivoire and Rwanda have been accused of this (HRW 2013; Peskin 2011: 173-183). Such "victor's justice," in line with what has been discussed regarding collective memory and identity construction, may lay the foundations for future conflicts. More importantly, however, transitional justice has fallen short of "delivering reconciliation or helping to rebuild inclusive societies," and may even contribute to a further fragmentation of society (Mani 2005: 511). Therefore, transitional justice alone does not lead to the transformation of societies and the divisive relationships there-in (Haider 2011: 175), even when they initially appear successful. As has been shown above, different groups are capable of living relatively peaceful parallel lives only to have this crumble when a conflict of interest arises. This is why some argue for distributive justice, which can also be termed transformative justice, to address the structural challenges within a divided society.

Gready and Robins (2014: 339-340) advocate for a greater focus on transformative justice, rather than rectificatory/transitional justice (which they associate with liberal peace-building and state-building). This is because transformative justice promotes a "shift in focus from the legal to the social and political, and from the state and institutions to communities and everyday concerns" (Gready & Robins 2014: 340). Such processes require broader initiatives than usually found in liberal peace-building and demands more than institution-building. Similarly, others have promoted a more complex and inclusive transitional and transformative justice approach that includes transferring the focus from "victims" (truth-based approaches) and "perpetrators" (punitive approaches) to

"survivors" (i.e. both victims and perpetrators); making the process more inclusive of all groups in society (i.e. not just the main protagonists); and addressing systemic and structural discrimination (Mani 2005: 521-524). Transitional justice and reconciliation remains an ongoing challenge that has and will continue to be deployed in different ways depending on context and lessons learned from past cases. However, while it has made a significant contribution to the resolution of identity-related conflicts there remains a final approach to addressing these conflicts that is far more elusive.

This is related to the final broad category and entails a deconstruction and reconstruction of the nation (not just the state) after a conflict. A plea can be made to intellectuals to "remind us all of the imaginary quality" of nations (and other identity groups), in light of the many atrocities that have been committed in the name of these constructed, imagined and sometimes mythical entities (Eley & Suny 1996: 11-12). Similarly, if identity is constructed the question is raised whether identity can be re-framed or re-constructed for peaceful ends rather than violent ends. Horowitz (2001: Chapter Two) proposes this and others have argued that efforts should be made to reconstruct a more civic identity, to promote a more civic nationalism (Kaufmann 1996: 136). Civic nationalism is generally seen to be less destructive than ethnic nationalism (Geertz 1994: 31-32).

Also, many large identity groups of today are aggregations of previously diverse groups that came to be through processes of institutionalisation of cultural practices and social construction (Mann 2001: 208). If this has been done in the past, can it be done in the future? More specifically, can former warring groups be brought together to identify themselves as belonging to a common nation with common goals and common interests. Unfortunately, while this has been proposed in theory, there are not enough studies done on how this can be achieved and much less attention has been paid to this than the above two approaches. Perhaps it is because this is far harder to translate into policy than constitutional design and reconciliation are. Peace-building is often conducted by international actors which require clearer goals and targets than this approach allows. This is why, without negating the importance of the two approaches above, this last form of addressing identity-related conflicts is the primary focus of this thesis. By using the leadership process approach to understand how identity is formed, it moves towards a better understanding of how to confront divisive identity construction processes in the future.

2.3 Peace and nation-building

The premise of this thesis is to discover how peaceful and violent nation-building occurs and whether a re-framing of the "nation" is necessary after an identity-related conflict. In order to do this, a conceptualisation of the "nation" is necessary to (a) provide the conceptual framework for

analysis and (b) identify the peace-supporting elements of the nation. This section serves this purpose. First, however, a brief note on definitions is important. A key challenge in discussing identity-related conflicts and nation-building is navigating the use of the terms ethnicity and nationality. The definitions of both these concepts are fluid and contested, making differentiating the two difficult and highly dependent on how each is defined. Some scholars draw a clear distinction (Eriksen 1991: 264-265; Gellner 1983: 49; Miller 2000: 29; Smith 1998: 196; Weber 1994: 22-23), while others point to some implicit link between ethnicity and national identity (Calhoun 1993: 214; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 4; Norman 2006: 4-5; Smith 1998: 196). Nations may stem from ethnicities (Smith 1998: 193), or *vice versa*. For example, what are considered "ethnic sub-nationalism[s]" today on the African continent have been labelled as "pre-colonial cultural nations" (Mazrui & Tidy 1984: 186). In the end, while scholars generally agree that ethnicity and nationality are not the same, in certain situations there are similarities between the two (Norman 2006: 4-5). It is not possible, nor necessary to solve this debate here. Perhaps it is better to view the distinction between ethnicity and nationality as a continuum susceptible to change based on context.

2.3.1 Nation and nation-building

Defining the nation is no easy task. However, through a careful reading of some of the key definitions of the nation found in the literature (see below) a conceptual framework has been developed and is proposed here. It highlights five key elements of the nation that can be found in many, if not all definitions of the nation. These are:

a) A nation requires a national identity that can be determined by a range of attributes.
b) A nation requires a territorial link of some sort, whether a perceived homeland or state borders;
c) A nation lays claim to some form of political organisation and self-government;
d) A nation holds some form of collective will;
e) A nation's members hold a collective responsibility that lays certain rights and responsibilities on its members and ensures mutual trust;

First, a nation requires a *collective identity.* This can be variously described as a common identity, common culture etc. No matter how it is termed, what is important is the purpose it serves, which is to create a sense of community. As mentioned in section 1.2.2, Smith's work on Ethno-symbolism was key in re-asserting culture and identity in the nationalism literature. He argued that nations also contain a "distinctive culture community" and a "historic society" (Smith 1998: 76). The way in which identity is constructed has been discussed at length. What is important to note here is that in

conceptualising the nation there must be a "coordinated set of beliefs" about what the group's cultural identity is and what qualifies someone as belonging to that group (Laitin 2007: 40). In addition, collective identity makes the nation "cohesive" (one of five elements Deutsch uses to define the nation) by ensuring better communication and cooperation within the group than without (Deutsch 2010: 11-12). A crucial part of this common identity is the history associated with the nation. Most nations have an element of shared memory, history and origins (Smith 1998: 196). This can also be termed as "memories of a common political destiny" (Weber 1994: 22). This history is used to confer legitimacy on nations (Guibernau 2007: 14). It can also be subjective and manipulated through a process of myth-building in order to legitimise the nation and its claim to self-determination (Eley & Suny 1996: 8).

The emotive power of identity has already been discussed. As a final note, however, Deutsch's (2010: 12) explanation of his final element of the nation ("internal legitima[cy]) is illustrative. He explicitly links identity with building the ethical community of a nation and the social contract that allows its respective political organisation to govern:

> [The nation's] habits of compliance with and support of the government, or, at least, toward mutual political cooperation and membership in the nation, are connected with broader beliefs about the universe and about their own nature, personalities, and culture so that their support for the nation, even in times of adversity, is likely and thus ensures its endurance. (This internal legitimacy, anchored in the beliefs of its own population, may be largely independent of the opinions of other populations or of foreign governments.) (Deutsch 2010: 12)

On *territory,* there are two general views on the link between territory and the nation. The first view, usually held by Modernists, links the nation with the state and therefore the territory it occupies. For example, Giddens (quoted in Smith 1998: 71) argues that a nation must exist within a "clearly demarcated territory which is subject to unitary administration". This is closely linked to the legal definition of statehood that demands a "defined territory" (League of Nations 1936: 25), overlapping with the next element of political organisation. The second view focusses on the emotional connection that the nation holds with a "homeland" (this view is usually held by Primordialists or Ethno-symbolists) (Hearn 2006: 31; Miller 2000: 127; Norman 2006: 5; Ting 2008: 457). Smith (1998: 75-76), in response to the focus on the state points out several other elements of the nation including the importance of a "homeland". Both are useful in distinguishing the nation from other forms of identity that are not usually as closely associated with territory (e.g. religion and language) (Weilenmann 2010: 33). While this is an important aspect of the nation and can be a key

source of dispute in conflict and peace-building, the intricacies of territorial demarcation are not the focus of this thesis and it is therefore discussed as part of statehood in future chapters.

Regarding *political organisation* and *self-government*, there is little consensus on the link between the nation and the state. Some have argued that national movements require distinct, culturally homogenous states for each nationality (Eley & Suny 1996: 10). Such an argument closely aligns with those scholars, usually Modernists, who assert that the nation must be politically sovereign (Anderson 2006: 6-7; Breuilly 1993: 1). In a five-part definition of the nation, Deutsch (2010: 11-12) summarises Carl Friedrich's conceptualisation of the nation. The first element he provides is that the nation must be "independent" (i.e. sovereign). His third, but related, point is that the nation must be "politically organised" (i.e. an effective government) (Deutsch 2010: 11-12). However, it is important to note that he avoids using the term state, which therefore begs the question whether such elements can be achieved in another form of political organisation. In addition, oftentimes, the nation need only be a group of people who *claim* political sovereignty (in the form of statehood or regional autonomy), such as the Jewish people before the creation of modern Israel and the Igbo in the Biafra region in Nigeria (Laitin 2007: 40-41).

While nationality is often associated with the state, national identity can also exist at the sub-state level, especially when there is a collective memory of "independe[nce]" or "endured oppression" (Guibernau 2007: 11). Therefore, while some see the nation and state as inextricably linked, it is important to note that history reveals both have existed without the other (Gellner 1983: 6). Thus, the link between the nation and state is not solely that the nation has to coincide with the state. Rather, the relationship can be one of such correlation, or one where the nation is in conflict with the state (Smith 1998: 83). In addition, nationhood is often seen to emerge from the mechanisms of the state. This broadly encapsulates the arguments of many Modernists (see 1.2.2). Eley & Suny (1996: 9) summarise the role of the state in the following way:

> But a fully developed national consciousness—one in which national identifications are strong enough to override regional, religious, and even class loyalties for most of the population most of the time, at least in certain kinds of situations—tends to require systematic propaganda or political education, normally but not invariably by a centralising state and its agencies.

The fourth element of the nation is that of *collective will.* As has been already determined, nations are not natural, pre-existing entities. They come into being through various complex processes. The

mere existence of social groupings does not guarantee the emergence of a nation, indicating that a key requirement for a nation to come into being, to unify disparate groups, is some form of "political action" (Eley & Suny 1996: 7). Similarly, nations must, at the very least, ensure mutual political cooperation (Deutsch 2010: 12). This more elusive aspect of the nation has been dealt with in various ways by various authors. For the purposes of this research, it is termed as "collective will" and refers broadly to the ability of the group to pursue common goals and common actions. Some may argue that this is the key differentiation between a nation and other group identities (Weilenmann 2010: 43). While holding similar attributes, living in the same environment, having the same needs and interests and believing you hold the same identity provides an illusion of nationality, the true test of a nation is its ability to "arriv[e] at unified political decisions and act [collectively]" (Weilenmann 2010: 43).

Finally, a nation requires some element of *collective responsibility and loyalty.* In other words, nations have also been identified as moral or ethical communities (Miller 2000: 27; Smith 1998: 76). This means that members of a nation hold certain responsibilities and duties to fellow members that they do not hold to those outside the nation (Miller 2000: 27), which includes legal rights and responsibilities, distinguishing the nation from other forms of identity (Smith 1998: 196). This is associated with the fourth element of Deutsch's (2010: 11-12) definition — what he terms "autonom[y]". A nation is autonomous when "acclaim, consent, compliance, and support" are given to the government to ensure its ability to govern. Similarly, John Stuart Mill (quoted in Mazrui & Tidy 1984: 186) identified greater cooperation amongst group members in relation to outsiders, as a key aspect of nationality (the others being sharing common sympathies and a wish to be self-governed). This highlights the view that loyalty to the nation should supersede loyalty to other identity groups (Breuilly 1993: 2). These loyalties and solidarities may be "artefacts" but remain an element of the nation (Gellner 1983: 7). In situations where certain groups feel little or no loyalty to the state and fellow members various situations may ensue. Depending on the context, groups may deny the state and employ violence against fellow citizens through war; they may passively accept the state until a time of crisis where they will seek secession; or they may accept their inclusion in the state enough to avoid resistance but would also not support the nation-state when it is in need (Deutsch 2010: 6). In layman's terms, this is the aspect of the nation that ensures loyalty to fellow group members, the state and the nation as a whole.

The various elements of the nation are also closely linked and interact with one another. In this thesis element (a) is discussed individually as identity, but elements (b) and (c) are addressed together as statehood and (d) and (e) as collective will and responsibility. Of these various elements of the

nation some are easier to achieve than others. For example, fostering loyalty and trust amongst group members and between group members and the government is far more difficult than formalising the state, its borders and its institutions. Ensuring collective will and building a sense of belonging through identity are similarly much more difficult than establishing a *de jure* state. Even harder still is to get all five elements to complement, rather than contradict, one another.

2.3.2 Peace and nation-building

By now it should be clear that the link between identity and conflict, and by extension identity and peace, is not a straight-forward one. Therefore, just as it would be too dangerous to say that identity difference causes conflict, it would be erroneous to assume that homogeneity would lead to peace. In fact, this is a dangerous line of argument that could be used to justify the more violent nation-building acts such as ethnic cleansing. This is also not the claim made in this thesis. Rather, this thesis is an exploration into how nation-building, under certain conditions, can move a society to stability through the creation of a common destiny and a re-framing of divisive identity lines. And, just as the linkages between identity and conflict are complex, the linkages between the nation and peace are equally complex. So how can nation-building contribute to peace? Weilenmann's (2010: 41) description of nation-building provides some indication. He argues that disruptive external forces and disintegrative internal forces can only be overcome when the common needs and interests of people, and their relationship to the environment, are viewed as essential to life, which creates a sense of community (Weilenmann 2010: 41). In other words, when a society's members face mutual struggles and strive for mutual goals, they are less likely to fall prey to divisive forces. In this way, as much as a sense of nationhood can contribute to conflictual relations, it can also contribute to peace.

Another way nation-building can build peace is by providing non-violent forms of conflict resolution and ensuring predictability. This occurs through the first and fifth element of the nation discussed above (collective identity and collective responsibility). For example, a sense of common identity is said to have a significant impact on creating predictable patterns of behaviour (Hopf 1998: 174). Also, if all members are believed to be equal and hold certain rights (in truth, not just in law) human rights violations are less likely to occur (though this will of course not eliminate all forms of inter-personal discrimination and conflict). Both collective responsibility and collective identity should also increase trust amongst group members, which is often broken in conflict. Collective will is also essential in peace-building to counter-act problems of poor coordination, a lack of buy-in to the process and the exclusion of certain voices from the peace-building process. In short, collective will ensures the collective action that is necessary when rebuilding a society. While

the focus here has been on the last three elements of the nation, this by no means negates the value of the first two. Indeed, the reflection of the political organisation and nature of the state in the collective will and identity of the people is paramount. However, the importance of the state and governance has been covered more than sufficiently in the peace-building literature to warrant an in-depth discussion here.[8]

Tom Nairn famously referred to the nation and nationalism as "Janus-faced" (Nairn 1975: 17-18). By this he meant that it can be a driving force in either violence or peace (Dandeker 1998: 3-4; Nairn 1975: 17-18). The former, however, has garnered far more attention in the literature than the latter. Thus, while nationalism can be an exceptionally destructive force, it can also be a source of "acceptance, even celebration, of difference" (Eley & Suny 1996: 32). In the quotation provided in the section above, Eley and Suny (1998: 9) refer to the way in which nationality should override other loyalties, at least in certain situations. This seems to be a normatively poor argument and toes the line with racism and ethno-centrism. However, in a world where the ideals of universalism seem to be failing and identity politics prevails, perhaps bringing disparate groups under the banner of one nation can be a step towards building broader, more universal identities while also facing the current reality.

2.4 Nation-building and leadership

To summarise, it has been determined that identity is a fluid and constructed entity that can contribute to conflict in complex ways. When narratives of identity do become enmeshed with conflict processes, the identity construction process continues. This often leads to an entrenchment of societal divisions, creating deeply divided societies after the formal ending of a conflict. In turn, this poses a threat of conflict relapse. While many efforts have been made to confront this challenge they have fallen short of success. One reason for this is that these efforts have tended to only address two elements of the nation (the territory and the state) through constitutional and institutional design. Reconciliation efforts have tried to address the other three elements (collective identity, collective responsibility and collective will), but are incomplete. The correlation of all elements, however, are central to ensuring peace. Therefore, a re-framing and re-defining of the nation is necessary to assist in building a nation that holds all five elements. How does this occur? This section provides the theoretical framework, that of the leadership process approach, that will be used to better understand the processes that contribute to a more unified or more fragmented nation. It does so

[8] For further discussion on this see Call 2008, Paris 2004 and Paris & Sisk 2009.

by first providing an overview of the leadership process approach and then by identifying some of the intersections between this approach and nation-building.

2.4.1 Leadership as Process

As discussed in section 1.2.1, leadership is under-conceptualised in the Political Sciences. Also, despite the extensive discussion of elites in the nationalism literature, the field suffers from the same poverty of conceptualisation. Leadership in both fields is highly leader-centric. How this is so in the Political Science literature has already been addressed (see 1.2.1). In the nationalism literature, as seen from the above discussion, discussions on elites focus on the ability that leaders have to, at the least, use existing sentiments to drive action and, at the most, act as puppet-masters of the masses. However, the definition of "leader" is assumed and leadership is hardly discussed. As a result, the nationalism literature has not sufficiently engaged the relationship between followers and leaders that leads to this kind of collective action. In addition, while there is much discussion of the dynamism of identity, which is often implicitly linked to context and situation, this is not associated with the issue of elites and leaders. Therefore, the leadership process approach provides an interesting opportunity to consolidate some of these issues because of its linkage of leaders, followers and situation.

First, an expanded explanation of the leadership process approach provided in section 1.2.1 is needed. As mentioned in section 1.2.1, the leadership process approach is focussed on studying the relationship between three key elements — leaders, followers and the situation or context (Pierce & Newstrom 2011: 5-6). As such, in this thesis, a distinction is made between "leadership" (the whole process and the relationships therein) and "leader" (a specific actor within the process). The role of the leader can vary depending on situation and society, making it a difficult actor to define. As a working definition, the leader is viewed as the "foci of group processes", which may require the leader to be the centre for decision-making and implementation processes, the primary actor framing issues, problems and solutions and/or a central player in determining group organisation and structure (Bass 2008: 16). Leaders can include *inter alia* elites within a society, political actors, members of civil society and international actors. Due to the visibility and prominence of political leaders and elites in the literature, media and social discourse, analysis will often lean towards these types of leaders, as occurs in this thesis. Also, as one of the justifications for this research is to provide a more systematic understanding of the responsibility of political elites and leaders in South Sudan's nation-building and peace-building challenge (see 1.2.4), the primary focus of this thesis is on this category of leaders. However, this does not negate the role of other leaders, which are addressed where relevant in this research. A leader also need not be an individual but can refer to an

organisation as well. For example, In Chapters 4 and 5, both John Garang and the SPLM/A are analysed and understood as leaders.

The leadership process approach has resulted in the rise of several theories and concepts that describe the relationships between leader, follower and situation, and how they contribute to effective leadership. The study of followers and the relationship between the follower and leader was slow in coming after the immense attention that had been paid to the leader in the literature (Graen & Uhl-Bien 1995: 222). Yet, the growth of the process-based approach and various studies into followership has begun to close this gap. The study of the leader-follower relationship involves examining the type of influence between leaders and followers, the characteristics of their relationships and what types of relationships are most effective (Graen & Uhl-Bien 1995: 223). What is of greatest concern to this research is the idea of the exchange of influence. Relationship-based approaches to leadership argue that there must be a two-way influence between leaders and followers based on "trust, respect and mutual obligation" (Graen & Uhl-Bien 1995: 223-224). Thus, it is not only leaders that influence others, but followers that influence leaders as well (Oc & Bashshur 2013: 919-920). The exchange of influence is also dependent on another key concept of importance to this study — mutuality. Mutuality exists between leaders and followers when they face a mutual situation and hold a common goal or purpose (Bass 2008: 21; Burns 2012: 4; Northouse 2016: 6). As shown throughout this discussion and in the conceptualisation of the nation this notion of commonality (in experience, interests, history etc.) is a ubiquitous theme in nation-building and identity construction and is further discussed below.

Additionally, while it is often studied on its own, power is important in the leader-follower relationship. French and Raven (1959) identified five sources of power (some of which are reminiscent of Weber's typology of leadership). These are referent power (followers follow because they identify with the leader or admire him/her); expert power (followers follow because the leader is competent in the field or situation at hand); legitimate power (followers follow because of "internalised values" that legitimise a leader's right to rule); reward power (followers are enticed to comply and follow through a system of rewards); and coercive power (leaders use force and sanctions to gain followers compliance and loyalty). The type of power used and the degree to which it holds sway on the targeted followers will impact the degree to which the leader can influence said follower (Oc & Bashshur 2013: 921). Another key aspect of this relationship between followers and leaders is the degree to which followers see themselves in their leader. Followers will often choose their leader based on whether s/he represents the prototype of the society (Bass 2008: 397). This is closely associated with identity and will shed some light on the ethnicisation of politics.

Similarly, Burns (2012: 3-4) identifies three types of leadership — transactional, transforming and moral. "Transactional leadership" represents an exchange relationship (i.e. follower support is exchanged for goods and rewards of some sort). This is clearly a case of the use of reward power (and potentially coercive). The stronger relationship of "transforming leadership" occurs when the leader "recognises and exploits an existing need or demand of a potential follower" and even preempts the potential motives and needs of the follower by engaging them more deeply and fully (Burns 2012: 3-4). This is perhaps very similar to Weber and other writers' notion of the charismatic leader. However, this type of charisma does not mean that there is mutuality between the leader and follower, which may be why charismatic leaders often lose support when situations change (as seen in the many dictators that once held popular support but are toppled through later popular revolt). Burns' (2012: 4) final concept of moral leadership is revealing:

> By this term I mean, first, that leaders and led have a relationship not only of power but of mutual needs, aspirations and values; second, that in responding to leaders, followers have adequate knowledge of alternative leaders and programs and the capacity to choose among those alternatives; and third, that leaders take responsibility for their commitments […] Moral leadership emerges from, and always returns to, the fundamental wants and needs, aspirations, and values of the followers.

This type of leadership clearly includes the ideas of mutuality and therefore, while it may include cases of referent, expert and legitimate power, allows for influence to be exchanged between follower and leader based on this mutuality.

An important contribution of leader-follower studies is the notion of the "in-group" and "out-group". Simply put, this indicates that leaders can have different relationships with their different followers in the same organisation, creating an "in-group" and "out-group" (Bass 2008: 63). These "differentiated relationships" are developed and described differently from each other (Graen & Uhl-Bien 1995: 227, 229). In addition, this results in different degrees of influence that certain followers will have over their leaders (Oc & Bashshur 2013: 921). This conceptualisation is of particular use in understanding divided and fragmented societies because it allows for a study of the masses without assuming they are a homogenous entity. It also helps clarify the use of concepts in this study. For the purposes of this study, both the terms of "leader" and "follower" can have multiple meanings. A "leader" does not refer solely to political leaders but may also be used to refer to

parties that act as leaders (e.g. the SPLM/A). Similarly, the term "follower" is used primarily to refer to the populace as a whole but may also refer to smaller groups of followers (e.g. a leader's specific identity group). This largely depends on the context in which leaders and followers are being discussed. Similarly, Kelley (2008: 7-8) identifies five types of followers — the sheep, the yes-people, the alienated, the pragmatics and the star followers. The importance of studies such as this are two-fold. First, they explore and study the role of followers as active participants in the leadership process, which can influence leaders and the situation. Secondly, they indicate that, just as leaders can vary, followers also vary and should not be studied as (a) the same phenomenon in every situation or (b) a homogenous entity made up of people who all think and act the same.

2.4.2 The leadership process and nation-building: Some points of intersection

Most peace-building efforts have been directed at the statehood element of the nation (territorial and political administration), through state-building and where necessary, using federalism, partition or secession as a solution to identity-related conflict. Yet, it has generally fallen short of creating collective will, collective responsibility and a collective identity. These are the more intangible, but no less important, aspects of a nation. They are also perhaps the most determinant on whether a society is likely to turn to peace or conflict during a crisis. Finally, it is in these elements that Leadership Studies may be able to provide a contribution. For example, much of the debate regarding the construction of identity, and their power in conflict, rests on its constructed or natural and subjective or objective nature. Those who argue that it is constructed and subjective, are often also those who identify elites as the key actors in the national project and in identity-related conflict. Critics, as discussed earlier, question what drives the masses to follow if this is the case. The leadership process approach provides some insight into this. For example, the notion of mutuality has often been reflected in nationalism literature without using the leadership literature. Hroch (1996: 68) states that a mass movement will develop more quickly:

> […] If the national slogans and goals used by agitators to articulate social tensions do in fact *correspond to the immediate daily experience*, to the level of schooling, and the system of symbols and stereotypes current in the majority of the non-dominant ethnic group. (Emphasis added)

Another aspect where the concept of mutuality dovetails with the nationalism literature is the notion of what is referred to in various nationalism texts as common sympathies, common interests, common destiny and the like (Guibernau 2007: 11; Mazrui & Tidy 1984: 186; Miller 2000: 38; Smith 1998: 183, 188; Weilenmann 2010: 38-43). This is seen as a central element of nation-building. In

explaining the unifying and disintegrative factors in nation-building, Weilenmann (2010: 38-43) points to common needs, common interests and common environment. This, he argues, leads to a "desire to maintain the common good" and by extension a "consciousness of belonging together" (Weilenmann 2010: 41). Applying the concept of mutuality will provide us with greater insight into how identity is constructed and how it is used in politics, through violent conflict but perhaps also in building peace. Mutuality is a key concept that is used to explain the fluctuating levels of national consciousness in South Sudan in the following chapters.

Similarly, the leadership process may provide some insight into one of the key questions in the nationalism literature: what makes a person willing to die (and kill) for their identity group (Horowitz 2001: Chapter Three; Ting 2008: 455-456)? This has also been phrased in other words, such as "what specific joint action" a group is willing to engage in (i.e. war)? (Weber 1994: 24) It also does not relate solely to a soldier's willingness to die for his country but also to the element of the nation that ensures collective will. Nationalism's "power to mobilise political activity is unsurpassed" (Kellas 1998: 1). But what is it about national identity that holds this mobilisation power? This is where the leadership literature may be useful. What drives collective action is an important component of the leadership process. For example, it is addressed in concepts such as the management of meaning, where the way the leader frames an experience drives followers to a certain course of action (Bennis 1994: 78-82; Smirich & Morgan 2011: 21-22). It is also related to the leader-follower relationship. The type of relationship that exists (e.g. transactional, transforming or moral) often characterises the nature of collective action. Can transactional leadership, which relies on an exchange of goods, build nations that act collectively in the same way that moral leadership can? As the case study of South Sudan will show, transactional leadership appears less effective in building a sustainable sense of nationality (see 3.2.4, 3.3.3, 4.3.4, 6.3.1, 6.3.3).

Therefore, a recurring question in the nationalism literature is why people choose to follow elites, often to catastrophic consequences, when it appears it is the elites' purposes being served (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 846; Horowitz 2001: Chapter Three). South Sudan serves as an important example of this that needs further investigating because, as the following chapters will show, elite interests are often served to the detriment of societal needs. The aspects of the leader-follower relationship discussed above can provide various insights into this. For example, the way in which leaders breathe life into the meaning of the nation, its goals, its history and its destiny, if accepted by the population, can drive them to the action required by that vision. This is often some struggle for secession or revolution, though can also be important in driving action for cooperation, peace and develop-

ment, which is far less studied in the nationalism literature. In addition, Kelley's (2008: 7-8) typology of followers can be useful in this analysis. It indicates that the degree to which elites or the masses are influential in the building of a nation is not an absolute but may in fact depend on the type of followers found in the nation. In other words, the questions being asked by nationalist scholars (whether elites or masses are more important in determining the nation?) is the wrong question. Rather, they should be asking under which circumstances leaders or followers are more influential in the building of the nation and what kind of leader-follower relationship leads to a more peaceful nation?

In addition, Leadership Studies can also provide some insight into the power dynamics of nation-building processes and their impact on conflict and peace. Nation-building exercises can be violent; they can use force; and they can be coercive. However, the consequences of such nation-building exercises are often disastrous (Mylonas 2012: xx-xxi). Similarly, collective will can come either through voluntary means, or it can be "imposed upon men through persuasion, deception, law, or naked force" (Weilenmann 2010: 45). In leadership terms, this can be associated with the sources of power. The different sources of power — expert, referent, coercive, legitimate and reward — denote different approaches to leadership. They also suggest a different approach to nation-building. Coercive power may entice a leader to build a nation by force. But coercive power has certain pitfalls, just as building nations through coercion does. Reward power may be used to convince "the other" to assimilate into the nation. The success of this depends on the sustainability of the rewards.

Legitimate power may lead one to use laws or institutions to try and build the nation. However, this can be highly controversial and lead instead to greater resistance, especially in an international system that values multiculturalism. The case of the veil ban in France is a good example. Referent power may use charisma and persuasion to ignite the emotions of people. This can lead to peaceful nation-building (e.g. Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu and the "rainbow nation") or extremely violent nation-building (e.g. Hitler and Nazi Germany). However, the sustainability of the nation after the departure of the leader becomes a key question in such situations. Expert power may fall to intellectuals who recover histories or build new ideas that can provide unity for divided societies. Does the study of power in leadership therefore provide some answers on a more peaceful but successful way to build nations? More specifically, does the form of power used play a role in building compliance to the nation and its respective members and political organisation? Many of these types of power are analysed in South Sudan to answer these questions. For example, Khartoum's efforts to impose an Arabisation and Islamisation programme, John Garang's use of referent and charismatic power and Salva Kiir's use of reward power are discussed (see 3.3.1, 4.3.4, 5.3.4).

Another point of resonance between the leadership process approach and the nationalism literature is the continued reference to context or situations. As has been discussed, identity is highly susceptible to context. For example, the three key people groups of Bosnia (Bosnians, Croats and Serbs) ranged from states of co-existence with little inter-group contact, to genuine integration under the central ideology of communism, to a conflict so intense it gave birth to the term "ethnic cleansing" (Bennet 2016: 2-3). These shifts coincided with shifts in rule and state structures, driven at times by global or regional events (Bennet 2016: 3-4). Thus, many of these changes in identity relations were as a result of changes in context — international, regional and national. The leadership process approach places particular importance on situation and context and how leadership responses to situations result in new/changed outcomes and situations (Pierce & Newstrom 2011: 5). To give an example, the *intelligentsias/intellectuals/activists/elites* identified by the nationalism literature as being crucial in national movements and nation-building are unlikely to be successful if their interpretation of the nation and its goals do not respond to the situation confronted by the ordinary group members. Also, when there is a crisis, identity can be used to differentiate oneself from the perceived enemy responsible for the crisis, leading to conflict. A question of pertinence to this study is once the situation and context changes, can identity lines change as they did prior to the conflict, and can the leadership process shed light on how this can occur? These are but a few ways in which the leadership process approach may heighten our understanding of nation-building processes.

2.5 Conclusion

It is evident from the analysis in this chapter that the processes involved in the construction of identity are dynamic, complex and have been a matter of debate in scholarly literature for years. These debates centre around *when* nations are formed (whether they are historical or modern entities), *who* forms them (whether they are driven by the elites or the masses) and *what* forms them (which identity attributes form nations and how objective they are). There is no formula that can be used to determine or predict which identity groups are likely to emerge or endure as nations. The origins of national identity are complex, unclear and often determined by contextual factors. The actors involved in nation-building also do not act in isolation of each other. Nation-building occurs through a process of interactions and relationships between elites and masses. Such processes are embedded in history but also respond to current and modern situations, resulting in dynamic nations that are both modern and historical.

These complex nation-building and identity construction processes then interact with the equally complex and context-specific processes of war and conflict. The construction of identity can influence the emergence and trajectory of a conflict, while conflict also reinforces and influences the process of identity construction. This cyclical process occurs before, during and after a conflict and can result in an intricate web of nation-building challenges. Identity differences and inter-group dynamics can interact with political and economic grievances and conflicts of interest to generate identity-related conflicts. These identity-related conflicts often embed and reinforce group differences and therefore intra-group unity. Such inter-group differences then present significant peace-building challenges in societies emerging from identity-related conflicts. These processes can be addressed through legal and institutional means as well as through reconciliation efforts. However, such efforts have proven insufficient to build sustainable peace as it does not address the broader nation-building challenges in such societies.

To address such nation-building challenges it is important to understand what constitutes a nation and how nationhood can enhance peace or contribute to conflict. The conceptual framework posed in this chapter presents five elements of nationhood: national identity, territory, political organisation, collective will and collective responsibility. These are applied to the case study of South Sudan in the following chapters by analysing Sudan and South Sudan's identity construction processes, state formation and state-building processes, and degrees of collective will and collective responsibility. Each is analysed in turn throughout the country's history using the leadership process approach as a theoretical framework. Using the concepts of mutuality, influence exchange, and power the relationship between actors and institutions involved in nation-building and how this relationship determines nation-building's violent or peaceful outcomes is explored. Using the situational dimension of the leadership process approach, the dynamic and context-specific nature of nation-building is also analysed. The next chapter begins this analysis by starting with South Sudan's early history, colonial history and immediate post-independence history.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND THE NATION-BUILDING CRISIS IN SUDAN (c. 1821-1983)

3.1 Introduction

Sudan's transition into modernity was rife with many nation-building challenges. Some of these are typical of the post-colonial state (e.g. the incompatibility of state borders and pre-existing identity formations), while others emerged from the society's specific historical experiences of conquest and colonisation. This chapter's purpose is two-fold. First, it seeks to give an overview of Sudan's early history to provide contextual and background information that will be important to the subsequent analysis. This overview is presented chronologically throughout this chapter, first discussing Sudan's early history up until and including its rule under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, then its independence process and the subsequent turbulent post-independence years up until the end of the First Civil War in 1972. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the interim period between the First and Second Civil War (1972-1983), which sets the stage for the next chapter. The second purpose of this chapter is to begin an analysis of the early nation-building process using the leadership process approach. In each of these historical phases, the key sub-questions of this thesis are addressed by discussing the processes of identity construction in Sudan, the country's early phases of state formation and the waxing and waning of collective will and collective responsibility in Sudan. While Sudan here is treated as a whole, attention is given to those aspects that influenced southern Sudan specifically.

It is argued that many of these nation-building processes were influenced by the leadership process at hand, particularly leaders' response to contextual factors and the degree of mutuality between leaders and their followers. This analysis will illustrate that early choices made regarding Sudan would influence and limit future opportunities to alter the nation-building trajectory. At the same time, fluctuations in perceptions of identity and loyalty to these identities are revealed, as well as the constructed nature of the divisive identities used to foment conflict. Using the leadership process approach, it is argued that this construction of identity is the product of leaders' response to contextual and situational factors, and follower acceptance of that response. It is also argued that the foundations for mutuality between leaders and followers were limited due to the economic, educational and geographical distance between leaders and followers. As a result, leaders built support and followers chose leaders on the existence of common but narrow identity attributes. This, however, did not foster a leader-follower relationship built on common needs and interests, and therefore did not engender a vision of the Sudanese nation that crossed different identity groups.

3.2 Conquest and colonisation in early Sudan

Sudan's identity story is one of conquest and colonisation. The degree to which Sudan's conflicts can be attributed to its colonial past is a matter of debate. However, the purpose of this analysis is not to discover the cause of the conflict. Rather, this section seeks to trace the various historical processes that have defined Sudan's nation-building challenge. In doing so, it uses a leadership framework to understand how identity was constructed through a dynamic and non-linear process of "othering" based on certain political and economic conditions. The events discussed here would form a part of modern Sudan's historical myths that have been used to construct certain identities through a subjective process of myth-building. As Iyob and Khadiagala (2006: 37) note, "Truth has been a casualty in the studies of history, with the different sides highlighting only those elements that would justify their current demands." Therefore, the shifting lines of identity, as revealed in this early history, were highly context dependent. Secondly, the early processes of state formation are discussed to illustrate how statehood and nationhood are intertwined concepts that can either support or contradict each other. In Sudan's early history, the state was often a tool of coercive power used by leaders rather than a mechanism for nation-building. Similarly, the state was often externally constituted rather than an entity formed out of a nation's collective will. As a result, it was often rejected by the population, leading to an inability on the state's part to influence the society at large for an extended period of time. Finally, a brief discussion of collective will and collective responsibility illustrates how loyalty to state or nation in this early history was a shifting phenomenon, again based on specific contexts and on the nature of the followers in Sudan.

3.2.1 Identity construction: the birth of "the other"

Sudan has variously been portrayed as a bridge or a frontier between the Arab and African world (Copnall 2014: 10-11; Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 59; Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005: 8). To what degree is this a truthful representation of the Sudanese identity landscape? If identity is constructed, as was determined in Chapter Two, how did this perception of what was actually a highly complex society come into being. The attributes used to distinguish these groups are unclear and adhere to the usual problems of subjectivity and irrationality. Many of the perceptions that supported conflict between northern and southern Sudan were driven by the prevailing myths about the shared history and origins of the Arab and African peoples of Sudan. Therefore, an interrogation of identity and its contribution to conflict in Sudan must start here. Predictably, many of the held "truths" about Arab and African identity do not stand the test of factual inquiry. However, as will be shown here, while elites played a role in the construction of these identities, they also stemmed from followers' perceptions of their own social experience. In other words, they stem from certain interpretations of Sudanese history held by the people of Sudan.

The interaction between "Arab" and "African" in Sudan has been traced back centuries and the contact between so-called "Northerners" and "Southerners" includes centuries of contestation (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 70). As discussed in section 2.2.1.3, a key aspect of identity construction is distinction from "the other." The civil wars in Sudan can be seen as the culmination of a long process of "othering" that identified, crystallised and divided these two groups over centuries of complex and varied relations. The division between Arab and African, however, is not an objective and rational one, which becomes clear from an analysis of early exchanges between the two groups. Early interactions between Arabs and Africans were largely that of trade, but inter-marriage between the dominant indigenous groups of what is now northern Sudan and Arab traders has been traced back to the seventh century (Deng 1995: 10; Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 22). This inter-marriage and migration resulted in a constructed Arab and Muslim culture that was not reflected in the actual number of "true Arab[s]" (Sawant 1998: 345). Similarly, Ambassador Hassan (Interview 2017) highlights the early migration of peoples from North to South and the inter-marriage between such groups. Richard Gray (1963: 1) therefore argues that the differences between Northerners and Southerners was less about distinctive physical attributes and more about cultural and political orientation, towards either the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, the attribute of Arab was not a genetic or racial one so much as a socially constructed one.

The constructed nature of Arab identity can be seen in various ways. First, with the gradual introduction of Islam into state practice in the fourteenth century, Arab genealogies also emerged. These were used to trace the Islamic and Arabic heritage of rulers to the first century and even that of Sudanese holy men to the Prophet Muhammad himself (Deng 1995: 15, 40; Idris 2005: 26-27; Johnson 2013: 38). These lineages were traced with "many jumps or lacunae" (Deng 1995: 40), but they nevertheless were used to incur "political or spiritual legitimacy" (Johnson 2013: 38). Here we can already see an early process of myth-building taking place that would eventually lead to a constructed, but strongly felt, division between Arabs and Africans in Sudan. Secondly, modern racial attitudes in Sudan formed a complex hierarchy where those who bear more African traits were seen as inferior (for reasons discussed below), despite many Arabs holding the same or descending from people with similar traits (Copnall 2014: 20; Deng 1995: 64). Much of this division would stem from a need for those of a certain identity group to maintain social, political and economic power (Deng 1995: 35-68). As the situation and context would change throughout the twentieth century, however, these myths and narratives were not altered by leaders to confront the changing situation, leading to incredibly violent contestations of Sudanese identity.

The use of genealogies is just one way in which historical myths were used to construct Arabic and Islamic identity. The Mahdist revolution, discussed in the next section, provides one of these shared myths of history. Leading a revolution against external rule by the Ottoman empire, Muhammad Ahmad sought to implement an Islamist state (Dekmejian & Wyszomirski 1972: 204-206). He would in future be remembered as "'The Father of Independence', a nationalist leader who united the tribes of the Sudan by an Islamic ideology, drove out the alien rulers, and laid the foundations of a nation-state" (Holt & Daly 2000: 77). Although the Mahdist state was short-lived, its significance in the memory of a certain Sudanese political class would lead to a continued effort to transform Sudan into an Islamic nation. In an interview with the author, Ambassador Hassan (2017) referred to the Mahdist revolution to support the shared history of a unified Sudan. The Mahdist revolution, however, came at a certain point in history in response to certain challenges. Its ideology was not representative of Sudan as a whole and it was remembered differently by different citizens of Sudan (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 9; Deng 1995: 73; Holt & Daly 2000: 77). Therefore, its use as a basis for future nation-building efforts proved highly contentious simply because it did not represent the common goals and values of a broad cross-section of Sudanese people.

On the other side of the coin, an important part of shared history that has contributed to the building of a collective consciousness amongst Southerners is that of slavery. The memory of the slave trade played a significant role in identity construction in the future. This institution and practice would have significant impact on future definitions and perceptions of identity in Sudan. William Deng and Joseph Oduho, leaders of the liberation movement Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) published a book outlining the southern case against northern Sudan. In the brief historical overview of Sudan, the slave trade under Turkish and Mahdist rule is given prominent attention (Oduho & Deng 1963: 11). Oduho and Deng (1963: 11) state that:

> It is unfortunate that half a century of Anglo-Egyptian rule did not succeed in dissipating the impressions left by the slave trade on Northern and Southern Sudanese alike; the former tend to regard themselves as born masters, and the latter surround themselves in a stockade of suspicion which has proved to be well founded.

In fact, Idris (2005: 27) argues that Muslim Arabs began to view their culture as superior to others early on due to the extensive practice of slavery, and its associated connotations with labour and economic status. The stigmas associated with those of African identity (who were often referred to

as “abeed”[9] by Arabs up until late in the 20th century) (Copnall 2014: 19-20); and the perception of the “Arab” as enemy, stems from this history (Deng 1995: 73-74). In this way, the slave trade is one of the primary experiences that shaped notions of “the other” in the North and the South. To the Arab North, “the other” Africans were seen as inferior while to the South, “the other” Arabs were seen as oppressors. These perceptions undoubtedly played a role in future engagements with each other and the nation-building trajectory of the country.

Yet, the story is far more complex than one of Muslim Arabs in the north raiding the South for African slaves. The tradition of slavery was started in Sudan by its smaller Christian and Pagan kingdoms and sultanates which raided regions of northern Sudan and limited parts of southern Sudan (Johnson 2011a: 2-3). This tradition was then continued when Islamic states came to rule in Sudan and instituted the use of slave soldiers (Johnson 2011a: 3-4). Similarly, Muslims were also enslaved (Idris 2005: 27-28). However, slavery eventually became divided along religious lines, with Muslims usually raiding non-Muslim lands (Johnson 2013: 42). In addition, slavery seemed to increase following its abolition in the Western World (Idris 2005: 24), which is one of the reasons why slavery is associated with Arab rule rather than British colonialism (Natsios 2012: 35, 41). The continuation of slavery was also justified using *Shari'a* law (Idris 2005: 24), which distinguished “between ‘enslavable’ infidels and those who belong to the *umma*” (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 25). This not only provided a clear, institutionalised boundary between those who belonged to the group and those who did not, it also created a sense of superiority for the in-group on the one hand and a sense of shared oppression for the outsiders on the other. A shared sense of oppression can be a building block for future nations (Guibernau 2007: 11). In addition, this provided a further source of tension and difference between Northerners and Southerners through religious distinction, furthering the establishment of “the other”.

Ironically, many Southerners are in fact those who escaped the fate of slavery and Northerners are more likely to have descended from former slaves who were then assimilated into Northern culture (Deng 1995: 5-6). This once more highlights the subjectivity of identity construction. Idris (2005: 28) also demonstrates this subjectivity in his discussion of race and religion during the slave-raiding years in Sudan. He points out that the key attribute used to identify difference and social status was that of Arabic descent, rather than religion or race (many who claimed Arabic descent did not bear the physical attributes often associated with this race). Therefore, identity construction held the

[9] The arabic word for slave (Copnall 2014: 19)

usual elements of subjectivity. Yet, the importance of slavery and the perceptions surrounding it would carry on into modern Sudan. As Iyob and Khadiagala summarise (2006: 25):

> […] the legacy of [slavery] was to become the wedge separating the Sudanese multinational polity into two groups—those who were stigmatised and disenfranchised by a servile past and those whose privileged position was threatened by the demands for equality of the disenfranchised.

Slavery, however, did not only influence identity construction by building collective memory and framing perceptions of "the other." It also directly altered the social identity of those involved. Slaves were often assimilated into Northern Sudanese culture through conversion to Islam and the learning of Arabic (Sikainga 2000: 35). As a result, former slaves held a complex and ambivalent identity that shared with other non-Arab groups a history of oppression and discrimination, but also provided them with greater opportunities than other non-Arab groups (D'Agoot Interview 2017; Sikainga 2000: 35). Therefore, former slaves, even though they may have been born in the South, were perceived by other Southerners to have "lost their identity." (Sikainga 2000: 34).

The same challenges of subjectivity that exist between North and South exist between different identity groups in the South. The various identity groups in southern Sudan are diverse in political, social and economic structure. The Nilotic peoples, who were deemed to be largely pastoral with strong warrior traditions, ranged from being tightly knit with a clear political structure (such as the Shilluk) to more decentralised and less cohesive (such as the Dinka) (Collins 1962: 4-5). These groups, the largest and most prominent being the Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer, primarily lived in the northern parts of southern Sudan, and therefore were at the centre of North-South engagement and conflict (Collins 1962: 3-7, 23, 29-31, 77-78, 110-112, 133-134, 137-138, 178-181). The southern regions of Equatoria were inhabited by smaller, sedentary groups and the Azande (Collins 1962: 4-7; Johnson 2011a: 12). While the first group tend to dominate narratives of southern Sudan's history, particularly its history of conflict, the second group also forms part of the region's history. In the colonial era, sedentary groups were often singled out for educational purposes and administrative posts (Johnson 2011a: 12-15, 17-18). The separation of southern Sudanese society based on ethnic interpretations, as seen here and in military recruitment (discussed below), served to prevent cross-cultural exchange and the development of a broader identity.

In reality, however, the distinctions between various ethnic groups are not as clear cut as colonial administrators perceived. For example, while ethnic groups are often distinguished by their economic activities (e.g. Dinka, Nuer and Murle as pastoralists and others as agrarian), there are those within the traditionally pastoralist groupings that also engage in agricultural practices (Thomas 2015: Chapter One). Another distinction is that of geography or language. Certain groups were largely associated with certain territories or regions (and remain so) (Johnson 2013: 54; Interview B 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter One). However, even these lines are not clear cut. An early manuscript of Dinka culture, written by a Dinka reverend, notes how elements of Dinka heritage can be found in other regions and amongst other groupings of people (Deng 1974). The ways in which group belonging has been built amongst these groups is also dependent on "histories of migration, language, communication and exchange that brings some groups together and pushes others apart" (Thomas 2015: Chapter One). Furthermore, the word "tribe" itself (used to identify these various ethnic groups) has no clear translation in the languages of South Sudan (Thomas 2015: Chapter One). Similarly, Deng (1974: 108), in the manuscript discussed above writes how the very word "Dinka" is "a name foreign to our language". This is a further indication that these communities were externally constructed. This construction is often attributed to British administrative policy — discussed below.

From this it becomes clear that there is an element of shared history amongst the peoples of southern Sudan. Shared history is an important element in building a collective identity, but not the only one. More specifically, it could be argued that the only similarity amongst Southern Sudanese peoples is the shared history of oppression and exploitation (both before and after Sudan's independence) (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 3). Yet, one must question why this is the narrative chosen to represent the history of Southern Sudanese people specifically while it applied to most of Sudan's peripheries. The history of Sudan is more complex than Northern oppression to the South. Other regions of Sudan experienced similar oppression and/or neglect (Copnall 2014: 111; Johnson 2011a: 2-3). There have also been moments in history where cooperation, and perhaps even unity, existed between Northern and Southern peoples (see 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 4.2.2). However, the dominant narrative of slavery and oppression has come to define the shared memory and history of southern Sudan, which would go on to play a central role in constructing the Southern identity.

3.2.2 Statehood in early Sudan

As discussed in the previous chapter, the nation and state (or other associated political organisation) are closely related entities. Sudan is no exception, and perhaps an extreme example of this. Idris (2005: 23) argues that:

> […] it is the racialised state that transformed cultural identities into political identities through the practice of slavery in the precolonial period, indirect rule during the colonial period, and state exclusive policy of citizenship in the postcolonial period.

A fundamental challenge for future nation-building in Sudan would be finding an aspect of Sudanese society which would act as the centre of gravity for political thought, consciousness and action. This is where agency is very important. In a complex society such as Sudan, leaders, as the managers of meaning, can influence the narrative that drives a society in one direction or the other. However, they are also restricted by changing situations and existing sentiments amongst the population. The trajectory of state formation in Sudan will illustrate that leaders often centred their ideologies for the future Sudanese state on narrow political interests rather than broader societal goals. This stemmed from an inherent lack of mutuality between a very small *intelligentsia* and a large, diverse populace.

A key example of this is the use of religion in Sudan. Khalid (2003: 40) states that:

> Whereas in other African countries the tribe provided the nucleus around which political consciousness was consolidated, in Sudan the Sufi orders had served the same function, and to a large measure, in a pan-tribal manner.

This, of course, did not apply to the less Islamised South (Khalid 2003: 40). A similar cross-ethnic religious identity was also less feasible in the South because of Christianity's divisions and its elitist nature (Khalid 2003: 40). The accuracy of this statement would also be tested in later years where fractures emerged amongst different Islamic groupings (see 3.3.2, 3.4, 4.3.2). Centring the state on such a narrow and exclusive identity attribute would prove disastrous in future as Sudan emerged from colonialism, indicating both a failure to respond to changing situations and build mutuality with a suddenly much broader constituency. This is further discussed below.

For now, a brief overview of early state formation processes is illuminating. Sudan's early history of statehood entails the presence of several smaller kingdoms and states. Many of these states began to convert to Islam in the fourteenth century as a result of contact with Islamic merchants and "wandering holy men" (Johnson 2013: 38). This led to the introduction of the Arabic language, which expanded literacy, and the adoption of Islamic legal principles (Johnson 2013: 38). The Funj kingdom in particular (located in Central Sudan) was one of the first to institutionalise Islam as part of

the state, also beginning a long tradition of identity-based politics (Idris 2005: 26). With this process came one of distinction between states and their peripheries, which were not placed under the same legal framework (and rights) as those in the states (Johnson 2013: 38-39). Therefore, one's relationship with the state, determined by territorial origins, played a central role in one's social status, more so than religion at this time when religious boundaries were still rather fluid (Johnson 2013: 40). This divided followers clearly between an "in-group" and "out-group" and, while effective for maintaining security at the time and pursuing the state's economic goals, was unsustainable in the twentieth century.

Southern Sudan, however, remained outside the reach of any state for much of its history, in large part due to the resistance provided by the Shilluk and Dinka (Johnson 2013: 41). It was only with the conquests of the nineteenth and twentieth century that this began to change. Prior to becoming an independent state, the conquest and centralisation of state control in Sudan took the form of three key phases. The first was the Turco-Egyptian conquest that lasted from 1821 to 1885, when it was replaced by the Mahdist government of 1885 to 1898. Both governments had very little presence in what is South Sudan today (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 9). Yet, the Turco-Egyptian regime reached further into southern Sudan than any of the previous Sudanic states, upsetting the geopolitical balance that had existed for centuries and increasing the slave trade practice in the region (Johnson 2013: 41). This state therefore opened up southern Sudan to economic exploitation at an unprecedented scale (Johnson 2013: 41). Johnson (2013: 41) identifies this moment as the "beginning of a North-South divide in the Sudan." This divide developed largely due to the expansion of slave-raiding (including a new taxation scheme demanding tribute in slaves) and the encroachment onto southern lands by Northerners due to the economic hardships imposed by the new state (Johnson 2013: 41-42).

Slavery was also used as an instrument of state control through the use of slave soldiers (Idris 2005: 28; Johnson 2013: 39). The use of slave soldiers to act as the tool of coercion in an oppressive state (Sikainga 2000: 24), presents an interesting case of state and nation-building. The increase in military conscription in Europe played a significant part in the growth of nationalist discourse and sentiment (Mann 1994: 3, 4-5, 8). Naturally, the use of slave soldiers would not result in the creation of patriots. For one, these soldiers remained in the military as regimes changed in Sudan, and therefore (understandably) showed little loyalty to one or another state (Sikainga 2000: 24). At the same time, being part of the military influenced their social identification processes. Sikainga (2000: 24) asserts that these slave soldiers were socialised by the military to "identify themselves with the government," and were also distinct from the society they would enter upon leaving the military.

In response to the “exploitation and economic turmoil” under Turco-Egyptian rule, a Muslim uprising led by Muhammed Ahmed Ibn Abdalla overthrew the regime in 1885 and installed a short-lived “theocratic Mahdist state” (Poggo 2009: 22). Interestingly, several groupings in the South joined the Mahdist rebellion against the Turco-Egyptian government despite its claiming an Islamic ideology. These groups, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, rallied behind the Mahdi in order to challenge “an oppressive and unpopular Government” (Collins 1962: 23, 29). This alliance, unusual in the broader context of Sudanese history, is summarised as follows by Collins (1962: 29-30):

> Consequently any revolt on the part of the Dinka was probably divorced from Mahdist influence and arose almost solely from grievances against the Danãqla merchants and officials and the constant desire to eliminate the burdens of government from their domain. Later, it is true, the Dinka appeared to have allied themselves with the Mahdists against the Government, but such an alliance was only of the most temporary and opportunistic nature and clashes between the two were not infrequent.

What this event and other, albeit rare, instances of cooperation between Northerners and Southerners illustrates is the flexibility of identity and its relative animosities. Much of the animosities that would follow between Northerners and Southerners were instigated by certain situations and exacerbated by leaders that saw these situations as opportunities to further political interests. However, in situations like this, where mutual interests were present amongst diverse followers, collective action was possible. It is also important, however, to note that most instances of mutual cooperation across perceived identity divisions was in opposition to the state. This indicates that Sudan has always struggled to find a system of political organization (statehood) suited to the society.

The brief life of the Mahdist state was followed by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Poggo 2009: 22). Much of the post-colonial challenges of Sudan and the current problems in South Sudan have been traced to this period. The administrative policies of the British are said to have contributed to the divisions not only between North and South but also amongst Southerners themselves (Idris 2005: 23). The first is often attributed to the Southern Closed Districts Ordinances Act, which prohibited contact, cultural exchange and trading between North and South (Nasong’o & Murunga 2005: 59). The original purpose was to unite southern Sudan with British East Africa, but this did not happen at independence (Nasong’o & Murunga 2005: 59). Some identify this moment as the start of the rift between northern and southern Sudan and an orientation away from Islam and Arabic culture in the South (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017). In other words, British colonialism can be

perceived as an interruption of an Islamisation and Arabisation process that was already occurring organically in the South. Similarly, development initiatives (both political and economic) were targeted to the North's riverian core, leaving the South highly underdeveloped (Copnall 2014: 2; Interview C 2017; Young 2012: 3). Yet, some have cautioned against over-stating the role of the British attempts at state engineering in Sudan's identity crisis (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 2-3, 8-9). In this argument, the narrative of an imposition of a single state over two clearly separate entities is exaggerated and neglects the long history of contact between northern and southern Sudan (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 2, 8-9). Similarly, it has been argued that the closed districts act was never fully implemented (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 8-9).

The second division, amongst Southerners themselves, is seen to be a result of British indirect rule, which utilised (and often selected) traditional leaders to act as a mediating authority between the colonisers and colonised (Zambakari 2015: 73-74). British administrators had "little knowledge of local laws and customs, and in most cases had limited experience dealing with diverse ethnic issues" (Poggo 2009: 22). This warranted a new system (implemented from 1910 to 1930) of indirect rule which relied on local chiefs (Poggo 2009: 22-23). These ethnic groups and administrative structures were based on colonial interpretations of southern Sudan's ethnic landscape (Zambakari 2015: 73-74). While Southern ethnic identities existed before colonialism, their fluid and flexible character was cemented through their transformation from primarily cultural to primarily political entities (Idris 2005: 23). In some cases, the policy of Native Administration significantly expanded the power of chiefs in what were previously very decentralised communities (Poggo 2009: 23). Different ethnic groups in southern Sudan had held different traditions of political and social organisation, ranging from more centralised structures to more consensus-oriented systems (Thomas 2015: Chapter One). Early Dinka structures, for example, were largely disorganised, with leaders being elected to handle only issues of war, while members of the group were largely permitted to go about their business (Deng 1974: 110).

A similar ethnicisation occurred in the Southern armed forces. Both the Turco-Egyptian Regime and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium used ethnic stereotypes in their recruitment of soldiers from the Sudanese population, leading to an unbalanced military formed of those groups (often non-Arab) perceived to be good warriors (Sikainga 2000: 26-27). As time passed, however, the colonial government began to fear that the military, as it is wont to do, was re-socialising its members to lose their ethnic identity and creating a foundation for Egyptian nationalism (Sikainga 2000: 27). The government response was to deploy a policy similar to that of indirect rule by creating "territorial units" in which its members would be recruited from and stationed in their own communities in

the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan (Sikainga 2000: 27). The Equatorial Corps was the result of this effort to establish security in the South with the use of an army composed of Southerners (Poggo 2009: 30). The military is often seen and used as a key institution to build solidarity within a nation-state (Mann 1994: 3, 4-5, 8). However, in this case the companies and units of the Equatorial Corps, and the military in general, were largely divided according to ethnic groupings (Poggo 2009: 31; Sikainga 2000: 30), preventing such integration and unity.

The educational policies of the colonial regime also provide an illustrative example of how such policies served to enhance societal divisions both between North and South and within the South. Education in the South was administered separately from the North and was provided primarily by missionaries (Sharkey 2008: 33). In contrast to the North, this system received little attention, was less rigorous and held a strong focus on the Christian religion (Deng & Daly 1989: 169-170; Young 2012: 3). Also, the language of instruction was a combination of local languages and English in the South but Arab in North (Deng 1995: 19; Sharkey 2008: 33). In addition, the purpose of this education was to spread Christianity and to ensure a small educated class would be available to act as clerics for the British administration (Deng & Daly 1989: 167). A concerted effort to educate Southerners also began very late in the colonial era when it became clear Sudan was moving towards independence (Johnson 2011a: 14-15). Therefore, this education provided little in the way of nation-building as it (1) did not target the broader population but only a select few and (2) did not aim to promote a collective ideology through, for example, educating Southerners on a shared history or developing a national language.

A small community of Southern leaders with a Southern consciousness did emerge in this space, however, and would go on to represent the South at the national levels (Howell 1973: 168-169). This, however, created a gap between the future leaders and followers in South Sudan. A quote by Andrew Wieu, referring to a dispute between the students of his school and its Headmaster regarding regulations compelling students to wear their traditional dress, is illuminating:

> The students argued that "we should not be halfway between our people and civilisation. Either we are recognised as mixed or left to be like our people, but we should not be kept halfway, neither with civilisation nor completely with the traditional way of life." (Deng & Daly 1989: 170)

What is of interest here is that the students at a very young age began to identify themselves as different and apart from their fellow Southerners, albeit not completely separate.

The purpose of the above overview is to illustrate two key points. The first is a theoretical observation — state action and structure can influence the ways in which identity is constructed. Sudan's history illustrates the enduring effects of identity divisions, however false, that are constructed by processes of state formation. However, the story of South Sudan also illustrates how imposed state structures can be rejected by its citizens. The imposition of a state therefore does not equate the building of a nation and, if the leaders of said state hold little influence over the populace and are required to use coercion to do so, it is likely that the narrative under-pinning said state will be unsustainable. Future sections and chapters in this thesis will illustrate this.

This leads to the second observation regarding southern Sudan specifically. Southern peoples have, since early history, resisted not only external rule (Gray 1971: 1), but also any form of state control. In line with this key defining feature, the South was resistant to British administration as well. The British was only able to gain full control of the South by 1930 (e.g. the Nuer rebelled up until 1929) (Poggo 2009: 25). In fact, a defining feature of the Southern peoples is that they "have long been locally defined" and are "from a region that was a hinterland, an area so remote that they remained outside the control of any metropol or centre for centuries and have defied assimilation" (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 3). It appears as though southern Sudan holds a history of resistance to the state. This resistance would continue through Sudan's independence and may shed light on some of the state-building challenges post-secession South Sudan has faced. In other words, Southern Sudanese have tended to unite in opposition to the encroachment of the state on their daily lives. If this is the case, what is a state that is now meant to represent the South Sudanese people supposed to look like?

Similarly, as the state tended to be external to southern Sudan, perceptions of other groups and the state became conflated in the minds of many Southerners. In an interview conducted by Francis Deng, Gordon Muortat Mayen speaks about his early encounters with the British government, which largely entailed witnessing acts of oppression. He states:

> "*Tueny* could be a white man, an Egyptian, or a Northern Sudanese; he could be any person who wore clothes and carried a gun or had government authority over others. […] It made me bitter against whoever was in charge of what you call the government, whether white men or other men. I didn't have any idea in my mind as to the racial identity of the government at that time. But later on, I learned that the government was British." (Deng & Daly 1989: 165-166)

This quote sheds light on the perception of foreigners and the state in colonial southern Sudan — namely that they were synonymous. In this instance, distrust of "the other" was first developed due to lived experiences, after which racial identities were superimposed on the oppressors. In other words, southern Sudan has faced oppression under the state by various regimes of different social and group identities. However, as the conflict would progress historical and contemporary perception of the enemy would be framed as the Arab North, reducing several complex processes of oppressive state formation and exploitative economic practices to an over-simplified and constructed identity division.

3.2.3 Challenges for collective will and collective responsibility in early Sudan

Chapter Two discussed the importance, and elusiveness, of collective will and collective responsibility in nation-building. Determining the level of support for political actions taken a century ago, and the degree to which group members felt loyalty to one another, is difficult. However, some tentative assertions can be made by an analysis of known events. First, the people of southern Sudan were largely isolated geographically, economically and politically until the Ottoman Empire began to reach into Sudan (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 8; Poggo 2009: 21). Such a context and situation required little collective will or action amongst Southerners as a whole. It is possible that since the situation did not demand a unified response, no sense of unity emerged and no leader either to build such unity. This would change as the situation changed. Even then, collective action did not come easily. When foreign powers began to infiltrate what is South Sudan today, some communities would often collude with these powers to invade other communities whom they perceived as the "traditional enemy" (D'Agoot Interview 2017). In addition, these imperial conquests were not "felt across the country at the same time." (D'Agoot Interview 2017). In other words, the context was not favourable for the emergence of a leader that would drive collective will.

As seen above, the notion of Arab in Sudan is more a historical than racial distinction (Sawant 1998: 345). In this case then, one of the key attributes that would be used to distinguish between Northerners and Southerners is largely subjective. It could therefore be argued that the immense loyalty given to these groups, and the distaste of "the other", is largely non-rational. Yet, as will be shown in the following chapters, the distinction between Arab and African was engrained through a leadership process in which leaders often responded to situations out of an interest in their own political needs or that of a select group of followers rather than a mutuality with their followers or the society as a whole. As discussed, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims during this early period were not inherently conflictual and were even cooperative at times. For example, during the

rise of the early Sudanic states, Muslim pastoralists averse to state control would seek refuge with non-Muslims beyond the reach of the state, including the Dinka (Johnson 2013: 39). In addition, Northerners and Southerners banded together to overthrow the Turco-Egyptian presence in Sudan (Deng 1995: 10-11). Thus, cooperation and collective action was often dependent on context and the situation to which people were responding.

An important point that has not been discussed is that of followership, which is central in creating collective action. Without supporters, nationalists' views would rarely leave the halls of academic institutions. The followership in southern Sudan, however, faced certain challenges arising from this period. In contrast to northern Sudan, the British Administration was primarily concerned with security rather than development (Copnall 2014: 2; Young 2012: 2-3). Administrators, despite being obliged to learn the customs and languages of the communities they governed, were both scarce (no more than thirty over the colonial period) and often on leave (being given three months of leave a year) (Poggo 2009: 23). The North and South were also exposed to different educational policies, with the Northern education policy being more extensive and Arabic in nature, while the South was more limited and driven by Christian missionary education (Deng 1995: 19; Sharkey 2008: 33-34; Young 2012: 3, 18-19).

This, of course, would have an impact on the type of leaders and followers present in the society. First, it would limit the emergence of leaders in the South that would be able to provide vision and leadership towards collective action. Little to no effort was made to build up a Southern Sudanese elite class. Chiefs were not educated in government issues and Southern Sudanese were not educated or recruited to assist in bureaucratic matters (Poggo 2009: 24). It was only late into the colonial period that a limited number of Southern Sudanese were educated in such matters in order to ensure representivity in the Legislative Assembly after the 1949 elections (Poggo 2009: 24). Secondly, the people in the South were not exposed to a single, coherent education that would build a sense of collective consciousness. The followers in the South would therefore be much harder to unite post-independence.

3.2.4 Conquest and colonisation in early Sudan: A leadership analysis

Therefore, it is clear that early processes of identity construction existed prior to the state in Sudan. These identities were highly dynamic and fluid, shifting with situational and contextual change. Such situational fluctuations in identity can be viewed from a leadership perspective. The example of cross-group cooperation during the Mahdi era reflects a leader's ability to respond to a situation

of oppression by rallying multiple followers to a revolutionary goal. However, this wider cooperation was not fostered to construct a wider identity after external rule was overthrown and the situation had changed (no longer requiring the Mahdi to raise support amongst Southerners). This is reminiscent of the same problem faced by South Sudan after secession and indicates a failure to understand and change dominant leadership trends in the society.

Also, Sudan's case illustrates one of constant tension between the nation and the state. As will be shown throughout this chapter, leaders' response to this situation was to either try and alter the state or alter the nation. One or the other, however, would often be rejected by either all or a significant group of followers. In each case, the seed for future contestation of the state or the nation was laid in these responses. Usually, Northern leaders tried to alter the nation through Arabisation while Southern leaders sought to alter the state borders or structure. As will be shown in the following sections of this chapter and in future chapters, this resulted in an untenable situation as "othering" practices became the norm in discussions surrounding the state. In Sudan's early years discussed above, the rejection of the state by smaller identity groups was the norm, particularly in the South. This was largely due to the external nature of the state, however, resulting in a situation where state and nation were incompatible.

Local leaders and followers then, were often in agreement when challenging the state. However, external rulers (particularly the colonial government) were able to leverage local leaders by bringing them into the fold of the state, creating a mutuality gap between leaders and followers. These leaders then developed their own interests and have been perceived as colonial "puppets" (D'Agoot Interview 2017). This is illustrated most clearly in the independence process discussed in the next section. In addition, the external state often had to rely on coercive power to ensure compliance. The use of military oppression, legal restrictions and heavy taxation were institutional tools that ensured short-term adherence to the state but not long-term loyalty based on a sense of collective destiny, identity and responsibility. In other words, the leadership of the colonial regimes was often transactional, with the brief exception of the Mahdist regime. Transactional leadership, however, is not based on a shared understanding of the nation and the state by leaders and followers and therefore does not contribute to building a sense of nationhood.

The ability to compel people to act as a collective (collective will) and to create loyalty beyond narrow identity groups, was often situation dependent. The Mahdist revolution and the independence movement show contradictory examples of being able to this, or not needing to due to the situation, respectively. What is most illuminating in this case, from a leadership perspective, is the depth of

collective will and responsibility shown once situations changed. For example, the cross-group collective will raised by Mahdi was unsustainable once the Turco-Egyptian state was no longer a threat. This is a theme carried throughout Sudan and South Sudan's history, as will be shown in the next sections regarding the transition to independence, the period following the Addis Ababa Agreement and in Chapter Five when discussing South Sudan's secession.

An aspect of leadership is the ability of followers to be conscious of and able to choose alternate leaders (Burns 2012: 4). Naturally, this did not exist in the colonial regimes and the brief Mahdist interlude suggests followers exerting their choice in leadership as a response to this. As a result, it is not possible to suggest that actions taken by the Sudanese state during this time can be perceived as an example of collective will. Rather, collective will was often found in the actions of rebellion, such as the Mahdist revolution and the resistance to Anglo-Egyptian rule by Southern Sudanese groups. However, due to the circumstances and the coercive power used by the colonial regimes, there was little room for these examples to develop into a national collective will across multiple identity groups. The move towards independence provided a brief opportunity to develop such collective will, but leaders failed to respond to this situation or the needs of their followers as a whole.

3.3 Independence and the First Civil War in Sudan

Sudan's independence and post-independence years provide some key insights into the nation-building process. Building a collective Sudanese identity proved a significant challenge for several reasons. Collective values, beliefs and identities had been formed in a divisive way already, and leaders proved both incapable and unwilling to search for a broader and inclusive identity to unite Sudanese society. In addition, the leaders driving the identity narratives proved far removed from the ordinary Sudanese person. As a result, elites in Khartoum tried to unify Sudan under a divisive identity of Islamic Arabism. This illustrated a lack of understanding of context and history, stemmed from a failure to connect with all citizens of Sudan and understand their needs and consequently demanded a reliance on coercive power, which proved unsustainable. The modern Sudanese state, therefore, was neither able to structure itself to suit the needs of all its citizens nor to use its structures to build a cohesive nation. The state-building efforts of Khartoum, therefore, ran counter to (and even spurred on) the fledgling nation-building processes in southern Sudan. Yet, the nation-building process in southern Sudan also struggled with its ability to unite Southerners to a collective political action. Southern leaders faced similar challenges of mutuality that would hamper their ability to relate to and unify the Southern people. Nevertheless, a Southern consciousness emerged in response to a situation of oppression and repression. Later chapters, however, will interrogate the sustainability of such leadership tactics when situations change.

3.3.1 Identity construction and contestation in modern Sudan

Regarding Sudan's independence, there are two key historical trends of relevance to this discussion. The first is that nationalist thinking is often driven by an elite, educated class. Sudan is no exception in this pattern. However, where Sudan shows some variance is the narrowness of this *intelligentsia* in terms of its representativity (i.e. being largely Arab and Muslim) (Sharkey 2008: 30). For example, due to their education, key players in the growth of nationalist organisations were former soldiers, many of whom were non-Arab (as discussed above), but they failed to steer the ideology of these organisations as they were overshadowed by the dominant Arab speaking blocs (Sikainga 2000: 31). Upon discharge from the military, soldiers would often return to rural areas while officers remained and congregated together in urban areas, upholding the identity instilled in them by the military (Sikainga 2000: 31). This distinction, along with the preferential treatment given to officers with regards to education and job access (Sikainga 2000: 31), is an example of the gap between leaders and followers that existed and would persist in the Sudanese context.

Sudanese nationalism began to emerge amongst the intellectuals of Northern Sudan with the first World War (Khalid 2003: 41). This group slowly began to build a political consciousness in Khartoum. The Graduates' Congress, formed of high school graduates from northern Sudan, sought to jump-start Sudanese nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s by creating a sense of national consciousness. They strongly encouraged people to identify themselves as Sudanese and set aside other identities (Khalid 2003: 46). However, this movement was elitist and viewed "the socially less-developed ethnic groups of Sudan [as] backward tribes who do not qualify for being treated as nationalities." (Khalid 2003: 47) These intellectuals then, lacked mutuality with their followers on several counts. First, being educated set them apart from most Sudanese at the time (Gray 1963: 1; Howell 1973: 165). It is therefore not too far-fetched to say that they did not confront the same challenges and daily needs of their targeted followers. Secondly, their brand of nationalism was too narrow and exclusive, reflecting their own identities rather than that of wider Sudanese society (Khalid 2003: 46). This reiterates the idea that identity cannot be constructed at will by intellectuals and politicians. It must resonate in the attributes and values of the followers. The narrative of supremacy is also highly problematic. While it is not unusual in nationalist discourse, and is normatively dubious in all cases, in the Sudanese situation it showed a remarkable failure amongst leaders to understand their followers. The perceived supremacy of Arab nationalism is highlighted in a quote from *Al Fajr:*[10]

[10] A journal produced by a Sudanese "intellectual study group" (Khalid 2003: 48)

> Belonging to the country, rewriting Sudan's history so as to cleanse it from flawed notions, upholding the pillars of religion, shunning tribalism and parochialism and attending to Arab language with a view to ensuring the supremacy over all other languages (Quoted in Khalid 2003: 48)

The second global trend is the role of independence struggles in nation-building. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, crisis and conflict have a unique ability to construct a sense of community. However, the Sudanese struggle for independence was unique in its distinct lack of struggle. Much of the reason for Sudan's independence was geopolitical rather than the product of a nationalist independence movement (Johnson 2013: 69-70). The *intelligentsia* of Northern Sudan did not rely on, or benefit from, "national consolidation around a common cause, shared common national symbols and a common nationalist outlook." (Khalid 2003: 42) Therefore, the context of Sudan's independence movement did not demand leadership and did not produce a shared identity. Regarding the first, elites had little cause to engage with the populace (i.e. followers) to achieve their goals. There was therefore a lack of mutuality in this case. As a result, no common narrative emerged to face a common challenge. As identity is often constructed from such trials and challenges, the liberation movement of Sudan did not build or rely on a shared Sudanese identity.

After independence, this narrow view of Sudanese identity would continue. Abboud's military regime sought to ensure unity in Sudan through a process of Arabisation and Islamisation in the South, using educational and religious institutions (Beshir 1968: 81). For example, Islamic education was introduced and the language of instruction was changed to Arabic (Natsios 2012: 43). In other words, the government sought to speed up the process of identity construction by imposing a broader identity. They used oppressive tactics, including arresting Catholic leaders, expelling missionaries (only from the South, not the North), and driving Southern intellectuals out of the country (Beshir 1968: 81-82). Despite the overthrow of the military regime, the successive governments of 1965-1969 continued the Arabisation and Islamisation policies (Natsios 2012: 46).

The assimilation of smaller groupings into a larger identity group is not unheard of. However, it did not work in this case. The use of coercive power, specifically targeted towards the South, in this nation-building initiative would instead foster resistance. An interesting example of this is the *increased* number of conversions to Christianity after these policies (Natsios 2012: 43). Sharkey (2008: 35-36) points this out when questioning why the Anya-nya leadership preferred to implement education reminiscent of the colonial system when both Colonial and Arab education employed similar practices of assimilation:

> The major difference after 1956 was that the national government was no longer officially colonial, and educated Southerners aspired to a share in national power. Moreover, what Northern politicians regarded as policies of national unity, many southern intellectuals regarded as cultural colonialism, precisely because they had no choice or voice in the matter. (Sharkey 2008: 36)

Similarly, by choosing two attributes (race and religion) that were a key source of division to try and unify the state was ill-conceived from the start. It is representative of the lack of mutuality between leaders and followers. The Arab and Islamic identity did not provide a source of common history or values between elites and followers but rather highlighted their lack of a shared history.

As discussed above, the distinction between Northerner and Southerner is far from clear cut and emerged from a dramatisation of certain attributes above others. In this case, the choice to identify on geographical location stemmed from "[…] a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is conferred by birth" (Gray 1963: 1-2). The distinction between North and South was constructed from a history of political and economic processes that placed a primacy on one's regional origins, which often determined one's social, economic and political prospects. This has been discussed above but key examples of such contributing processes include the separate administration of North and South, the economic and political divide between urban centres and the vast rural areas, and slavery. However, it is important to stress again that as much as one's geographic origins determined one's primary identity, this was not a genetic distinction. For example, just prior to independence, Southern leaders, being suspicious of former slaves from the South, excluded those whose homes were not in the South from their Southern Social and Political Club on account of them not being "genuine Southerners" (Sikainga 2000: 34). In this way, a Northern and Southern identity, based on geographical association, had begun to crystallise by independence. Gray (1963: 1) states that, "[…] despite these cultural affinities which cross the line, a Northerner, however poor or well-educated, identifies himself with the North, while a Southerner, even if a Muslim or a graduate of Khartoum, remains committed to his group."

As a result, by this time, the north was already viewed as the common enemy of the South, which would form the foundation of southern identity. Joseph Lagu (quoted in Natsios 2012: 41), the leader of the armed rebellion against the North, wrote of Sudanese independence: "It was not a true independence for the South, but the start of another colonialism by the North, *their traditional en-*

emy." (Emphasis added) Furthermore, Abboud's policies and oppressive tactics fostered further resentment in the South (Howell 1973: 172). It can be argued that the civil war between the North and South stemmed from a disagreement over how the South would be governed, rather than a difference in identity (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017). Yet, Southern leaders also perpetuated the notion that the challenge was one of identity difference in their framing of the crisis. In response to claims by some Northerners that the differences between Northerners and Southerners were "imaginary" and constructed by British colonial policies, Oduho and Deng (1963: 17) stated simply, "The differences are so apparent as to require no proof."

An analysis of Oduho and Deng's (1963) language also illustrates a construction of Northern identity from the Southern perspective as primarily Arab. Notably, they often use North(ern) and Arab interchangeably. For example, at one point they claim the army in the South as being "overwhelmingly Northern", while a few paragraphs later they instead refer to it being "overwhelmingly Arab" (Oduho & Deng 1963: 18-19). At the same time, it is important to note that some Southern leaders were hesitant to frame the conflict as religious. This is seen in a statement by SANU which agreed with the Commission of Enquiry's findings that the 1955 disturbances were caused by political rather than religious reasons, highlighted the inclusion of southern Muslims in the rebellion, and criticised Khartoum for blaming missionaries for the crisis (SANU, No Date). At the same time, the statement does make extensive and unquestioned use of the labels of Arab and African. So, at this time, where identity was used to frame the conflict, it tended to lean towards a racial and territorial framing rather than a religious one.

The Anya-Nya (the armed wing of the Southern rebellion against the North) capitalised on the fear of an Arab colonialist regime to build support for the rebellion. A background paper published by the Anya-Nya highlights the dangers posed by the North. Importantly, the paper identifies the enemy repeatedly as Arab, an identity that does not encompass the entire Northern Sudan, rather than the North or the Khartoum government (South Sudan Resistance Movement, No Date). This further framed the conflict as an identity-based conflict. Key excerpts include:

> The Army […] if left unchallenged […] would have turned the South into an Arab colony. Arabs were settled in strategic areas of the South, and all culture save Arab culture was suppressed.
> […] Towards the end of 1960, a government plan to move 1.5 million Arabs to the Southern Sudan, to be preceded by the mass arrest of all Southern former parliamentarians, was revealed to Southern leaders by an Arab informant.

> […] a tribal people ravaged and torn for over a hundred years by Arab slave-traders and political and military oppression.
> […] Until all Southern Sudanese are free, energies had best be devoted to fighting the common enemy.
> […] the Anya-Nya, armed with traditional weapons […] were able to drive out the Arabs from their posts […] and to send Arab settlers fleeing back to their country — thus removing the threat of Arab colonisation of the South.
> […] The Southern Sudanese people face an enemy bent on exterminating them unless they accept virtual serf status in an Arab country. (South Sudan Resistance Movement, No Date)

The paper goes on to claim significant atrocities committed by Arab troops both under Abboud and Nimeri's regimes. In addition to this, the Anya-Nya showed an understanding of the role of conflict in nation-building. In the same publication they state:

> Armed struggle is a revolutionary means of accelerating national unity. The blood and tears of Dinka, Anuak, Bari and Azande which have washed the soil of southern Sudan are producing a new generation, undivided by earlier tribal and political differences. […] Armed struggle is making southern Sudan more united and cohesive then many veteran African countries. (South Sudan Resistance Movement, No Date)

There is some evidence to support this claim at this time. Contrary to the future ethnicisation of politics in South Sudan (see Chapter Four and Five), politics at this time and shortly after 1972 was driven more by party politics than ethnic politics, as seen in the presence of leaders from both dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups (Akol Interview 2017). This view would later prove premature but, in this way, conflict predictably created further divisions between Northern Arabs and Southerners and a sense of commonality amongst Southerners, which fostered further conflict. In response to several alleged massacres in 1965, a southern leader of the Azania Liberation League stated that, "The moderates have now joined the extremists. Those of us who believed in a federation […] no longer think this is possible. The only policy now is to make the Southern Sudan into the independent State of Azania." (*The Observer* 1965).

Similarly, in December 1964, shortly after Abboud's military regime was overthrown, riots between northern and southern Sudanese broke out in Khartoum. In response to false rumours that southern leader Clement Mboro had been assassinated, the crowd that had gathered to welcome him back to

Khartoum began to attack members of the Arab community (Natsios 2012: 45). This sparked extensive rioting and violence between Northerners and Southerners that left approximately one hundred dead while four thousand Southerners sought refuge in a football stadium, hoping to be given safe passage to the South (Natsios 2012: 45; Tayar 1964). Such inter-group violence indicates that the perceived boundaries between North and South had crystallised and were likely further cemented by these events. It was also clear that Southerners viewed themselves as a separate social and political entity who could only be represented by a leader from the South and could only find safety and belonging in the Southern region. At this stage, and indeed for many years to come, it seemed as though mutuality between leader and follower was dependent on mutual identity, defined along North-South boundaries. Had a leader emerged from the North that was responsive to the situation in the South and addressed their needs and interests, would this have been the case?

However, southern Sudan needed more than a conflict with the North to build a collective identity. Leaders appeared conscious of this, if incapable of actualising a vision for a national identity in southern Sudan. For example, in May of 1969, the Anya-Nya leaders declared Southern Sudan as the Nile Republic and Gordon M. Mayen as its president (Voice of Southern Sudan 1969: 1). This period illustrates a short but interesting phase in the nationalism of southern Sudan. The deliberation over the name of an independent southern Sudan was in itself an exercise in identifying the characteristics of the Southern Sudanese nation (D'Agoot Interview 2017). After rejecting "Southern Sudan" due its origins in colonial history and rejecting Azania due to a "more legitimate claim" for this name being found in East Africa, the leaders settled on the Nile Republic (Voice of Southern Sudan 1969: 1). This showed a superficial, and largely unsuccessful attempt, at creating a sense of nationhood through the use of symbols. In addition, the Southern Sudanese leaders attempted to minimise internal identity differences. They critiqued those who highlighted inter-ethnic differences in southern Sudan, including the Khartoum government and the press in neighbouring countries (Voice of the Nile Republic 1969: 1, 3-4).

It is interesting to note, however, that despite the constructed nature of Northern and Southern identities, leaders tended to adhere to this reading of Sudanese society rather than explore alternate visions of a unified Sudan. Where this did occur, it was rarely successful. For example, a fledgling vision of a unified Sudan began to emerge in the early 1970s within the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). In a critique of Nimeiri, an official statement by the organisation "call[ed] upon all patriotic Sudanese from North, West, East-Central and South Sudan to work together to bring down the dictatorial regime of Nimeiri and to restore to the Sudan the independence and democracy which have been betrayed by this gang of human butchers" (Grass Curtain 1971). This

statement, along with earlier ones made in the same publication, is a rare example of the narrative extending beyond the North-South dichotomy which was more commonly used in such publications.

3.3.2 The opposing forces of state-building and nation-building in modern Sudan

Sudan formally gained independence on 1 January 1956. However, by this time power had already been transferred to the Sudanese after the winners of the 1953 elections took office on 9 January 1954 (Holt & Daly 2000: 145). Considering the close relationship between the state and the nation, one almost expects that once a society gains independence from external rule, it signals a significant change in that society's ability to determine its future. This includes the society's ability to determine its own government and organise itself politically. However, Holt and Daly's statement below indicates that this was not the case in Sudan.

> The curious sense of anti-climax that attended the formal independence of the Sudan was a reflection of the continuity not only of the system of government, but also of the tenor of politics. (Holt & Daly 2000: 145)

The structure of the new Sudanese state was a matter of intense debate prior to independence. In the North, the primary issue was whether Sudan would unify with Egypt, while in the South the primary concern was the self-government of the region (Sidahmed & Sidahmed 2005: 29-30; Howell 1973: 166-167). In the end, the Liberal Party (seen to represent the Southern people) was excluded from the negotiations held in Cairo in 1953 that would determine the future of Sudan's independence (Poggo 2009: 33). In October 1954, Southern leaders gathered at the Juba Conference to discuss the future of Sudan and southern Sudan. The conclusion reached was that Sudan should not be unified with Egypt and that southern Sudan should be given self-determination, either through federation or independence (Natsios 2012: 40). Therefore, Southern politicians sought some form of self-government for the South (either within a unified or separated Sudan), but were largely ignored by Northern politicians in Khartoum (Poggo 2009: 32). This domination of the independence process by the North was perceived by Southerners as another form of colonisation (Poggo 2009: 36).

The South was similarly excluded in the Sudanisation process (the plans to transfer administrative and bureaucratic control from the British to the Sudanese), with only four out of eight hundred posts being granted to Southerners (Poggo 2009: 35-36). This applied even in the South. British administrators were replaced with Northern ones (usually Arab) (Natsios 2012: 41). As a result, Sudan's independence process was felt amongst Southerners as more of a "change of masters." (Report of

the Commission of Enquiry 1956: 117). Due to the long history of "othering" that had occurred between North and South, this resulted in a distinct leadership crisis. The gap between elites and followers created by this separation of Arab and African in the consciousness of the people meant there was no exchange of influence or mutuality. Therefore, the state could not and did not act as the usual agent of nationalism that it had in the development of the European nation-state.

The first parliamentary elections in Sudan, just prior to independence, only provided twenty-two out of ninety-seven seats to southern Sudan, resulting in a failure to represent southern interests in Khartoum as well (Poggo 2009: 34). In addition, Southern leaders themselves lacked mutuality with the Southern people. The Southern leaders of the Sudanese Legislative Assembly (the predecessor to the 1954 Parliament), failed to garner widespread support from the Southern people, "beyond a small measure of support in their own communities" (Howell 1973: 164). Despite eventually building a sense of "Southerness" amongst the leaders, they were also physically and intellectually isolated from the people in the South, which lacked a significant political consciousness (Howell 1973: 165). This lack of mutuality was problematic because it illustrated the failure of the Sudanese state and its structures to represent its citizens. This is a consequence of the state not representing the nation but would also prevent the state from building a sense of nationhood in turn.

State institutions have often been the tools used for building the nation, as studied by Modernists (see 2.2.1). The first Prime Minister of Sudan, El-Azhari, however, used state institutions as a means of coercive power. In a statement to counter growing discontent in the South he said, "The Government must use all its force and strength … the Government shall not be lenient … it has army, its police and all its might." (Quoted in Poggo 2009: 39). This may shed some light on why the state is not always able to build a nation, despite holding the tools for nation-building (e.g. education, bureaucracy and the military). The form of power through which the Sudanese leaders used these institutions were coercive rather than legitimate or referent. Khalid (2003: 47) argues that, due to the chosen nature of the nation, "For unity to be viable, it has to be predicated on free will and choice." Therefore, leaders must rely on mutuality and an exchange of influence not based on coercive power but rather on expert, legitimate and referent power that persuades people of their common destiny, is founded on common norms, and inspires people through a common vision.

In the end, the British left Sudan under a cloud of uncertainty. The transitional constitution had not answered the fundamental questions of "federalism and the role of Islam" (Natsios 2012: 42). In other words, there had been insufficient consideration of how to ensure the structure of the state would protect all those housed within it and concurrently ensure a sense of belonging to the state.

As a result, the structure of the Sudanese state became a unitary, Arab, primarily Muslim one (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 3). This was chosen by a small elite that lacked a sense of common history, values and goals with the Sudanese people as a whole. Southern identity therefore stemmed primarily from a resistance to being forced into such a state (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 3).

Due to a deteriorating political and economic situation in the country, a *coup d'etat* took place on 17 November 1958, installing Major-General Ibrahim Abboud as the new prime minister (Holt & Daly 2000: 145, 148). It has been argued that the aim of the coup was to suppress the growing discontent (and vocalisation of this discontent) of those outside government (Beshir 1968: 80). Natsios (2012: xxii, 42) notes that the officers leading this coup were primarily from what he terms "the Three Tribes" (the leading Arab tribes of the riverain core that dominated the political, economic and military sphere). He argues that this form of "tribal-military power" would continue until present day. This shows the failure of a key state institution, often central to nation-building, to fulfil this function as an integrating force. From a leadership perspective, such a lack of mutuality between military leaders and followers, and between the military and the people, would likely require coercive power to ensure influence. This leads to loyalty based on fear rather than a sense of common purpose and identity. Abboud's attempt to impose a nation-building project from above, and the resistance this caused, has already been discussed in the above section. Politically, SACDNU (later the Sudan African National Union [SANU]) declared in 1963 the intention to seek independence for southern Sudan (Beshir 1968: 83). The Sudanese state, then, seemed unable to build a cohesive nation, compelling Southerners to seek their own state.

In its early years, the second military regime, under Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri, held some promise for the South. Due to Nimeiri's modest upbringing, he was less beholden to the Islamist slant of Sudanese elite, and rather adopted a "secular, socialist, pan-Arab ideology" (Natsios 2012: 47). Aside from its Arabic nature, such an ideology may have appealed to the broader Sudan as a whole, particularly considering the state's history of neglecting peripheral communities. Nevertheless, Nimeiri's initial approach to the South was to seek a solution through negotiation rather than force (Natsios 2012: 45-47). He also sought to allow "decentralized self-government" in the South (Natsios 2012: 47). However, Nimeiri was distracted from these plans by threats to his own rule from the conservative and communist parties (Natsios 2012: 47-49). In general, Nimeiri's push for peace in the South has been characterised as an effort to regain his lost political support (Akol Interview 2017). Eventually, Nimeiri sought a negotiated settlement with the South through his minister of Southern Affairs, Abel Alier (a Southerner) (Natsios 2012: 49-50). Alier held several

contacts with church leaders who facilitated negotiations and these leaders revealed that Southerners were willing to negotiate remaining in Sudan, leading to the peace talks in Addis Ababa of 1972 (Natsios 2012: 49-50). Contrary to future peace processes, this agreement was negotiated quickly, with official talks lasting only a week (Akol Interview 2017).

The Addis Ababa Agreement promised southern Sudan what it had sought at independence — regional autonomy (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 66). This system also ensured the withdrawal of Islamisation and Arabisation policies, returning English as the language of instruction and government (Natsios 2012: 50). However, there was little agreement on the meaning of regional autonomy — while Southerners assumed this meant a federal state, it was in fact less than this in practice (Johnson 2013: 101-102). For example, the South was not given the budgeting authority necessary for true autonomy (Akol Interview 2017). Nimeiri, being a secularist, did not insist upon Islamic law in the South (Natsios 2012: 50). He therefore appears to have been more responsive to the situation than his predecessors. However, deeper analysis reveals that this may have been superficial. Nimeiri's goals in seeking peace were largely self-interested. Bringing peace to the South was a strategy to build support and counter challenges to his rule (Akol Interview 2017; Natsios 2012: 47-51). It was not founded on any deep mutuality with the Southern people.

The demand for secession was also not forgotten amongst Southerners who viewed Alier as an "accommodationist" and Lagu an opportunist who had traded southern independence for a high-level position in the Sudanese army (Natsios 2012: 51). By this time, the "bitterness" created during Abboud's rule meant that "the federalist cause was coming to be seen as a compromise, if not a betrayal" (Howell 1973: 172). This reveals the power of the idea of the nation-state in the twentieth century, where self-determination was a global ideal (see 2.2.2.1). While Southerners have historically resisted the state, and later demanded a federal arrangement when statehood was imminent, once the idea of a southern independent state entered southern consciousness, it could not easily be rejected. This was true even if their leaders may have seen potential benefits in remaining in Sudan. Both the nation and the state evoke powerful images in people's imaginations, be they viable or not. Leaders therefore, hold the responsibility of managing these images responsibly. In the case of Lagu, promising independence and then backing down from his stance led to his losing some of his influence. The drive for an independent Southern state may also have precluded any development of a united Sudanese nation. Therefore, Southern leaders, through their factionalism and own opportunism (perceived or real) failed to build a narrative in southern Sudan that was durable and flexible enough to confront the complex identity landscape of Sudan and the political realities of the international scene (which was averse to any separatist movements). However, their ability to manufacture

mutuality with Southerners based on a shared sense of oppression, planted the seed for a long journey to statehood.

3.3.3 The emergence of collective will and responsibility and its continued challenges

Much of the above discussion has already alluded to issues of collective will. The drive for independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule is already a representation of collective action. Yet, as has been pointed out, the independence movement in Sudan was largely driven by the educated, Northern elite (Johnson 2011a: 22-23; Sharkey 2008: 30-33). They used the means of political engagement through the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma party (Poggo 2009: 31). The Northern elites, however, did not represent the needs and interests of the South (Poggo 2009: 31). Therefore, in the late-1940s and early 1950s, the small southern intellectual elite also began to organise itself politically through various parties and groupings, including the Black Bloc in the North and the Liberal Party (Poggo 2009: 32). Southern politicians, however, formed a small part of the Legislative Assembly and were faced with significant opposition from Northern politicians, preventing their ability to form collective action (Poggo 2009: 32). As a result, the independence process produced a feeling of being "cheated" in the South (Poggo 2009: 36). Also, despite being unified on the issue of federalism, Southern leaders were divided in other ways. This was revealed in 1958 when the Liberal Party's MPs' votes were divided between the ruling coalition government and the NUP opposition (Holt & Daly 2000: 148).

The experience of the Black Bloc provides an example of some of these challenges. The organisation emerged from the Black Co-operative Society, which aimed to support former soldiers and slaves in the urban North (Sikainga 2000: 32). As a political organisation, the group found itself allied with the Umma Party due to their collective stance opposing unification with Egypt (Sikainga 2000: 32). This, however, complicated building support at the local level, with the most militant opposition emerging from a group called the Black Liberals. (Sikainga 2000: 33). Nevertheless, the Black Bloc managed to garner significant popular support, either through their inherent attractiveness to the people, or at times through the use of monetary rewards where their support was challenged by the Black Liberals (Sikainga 2000: 33). Therefore, the Black Bloc used both rewards power and referent power, resulting in a mixture of transactional and transformational leadership. The Black Bloc eventually failed due to poor organisation, internal fragmentation and suppressive tactics used by the colonial government and other political parties (Sikainga 2000: 34).

Eventually, the desire for a federation was expanded to include the support of the Southern people. The Liberal Party courted the support of Southerners in this endeavor and traditional leaders and

their followers rallied behind this demand in fear of Arab oppression (Poggo 2009: 37). El-Azhari tried to garner the loyalty of Southerners but failed. During his tour of the South in 1954 he was met with ridicule and a mass walkout of one of his speeches by the Juba population, led by Southern leader Daniel Jumi Tongun (Poggo 2009: 38). Tongun's decision to lead the walk-out was driven by El-Azhari's promotion of a unified Egypt and Sudan, which was against southern wishes (Poggo 2009: 38). After this response from Southerners, El-Azhari reportedly first tried to gain southern support by offering higher salaries and, when this failed, resorted to repressive tactics (Oduho & Deng 1963: 26). This southern discontent resulted in El-Azhari and his circle viewing the South and Tongun as "agitators" hostile to the North, resulting in his aggressive stance towards the South (Poggo 2009: 38). This is a case of using first reward power, followed by coercive power, neither of which build mutuality. They rather represent a form of transactional leadership. El-Azhari made no effort to understand and confront the beliefs and needs of Southerners, nor to build or communicate a vision of Sudan that included those needs.

The South, on the other hand, felt their fears confirmed regarding the North's lack of concern for their interests (Poggo 2009: 38). This illustrates a clear challenge in building collective will and responsibility. It requires a sense of mutuality amongst group members and with those who are meant to represent them. In this instance, El-Azhari lacked an understanding of Southern needs and therefore was unable to build a mutuality with them, resulting in a lack of influence exchange. Due to this lack of influence, the Prime Minister was unable to build collective will with the Southerners to garner their loyalty in pursuing his vision for a united Nile Valley. Tongun, on the other hand, understood the current situation and needs facing the Southerners (the fear of another colonisation) and was therefore able to motivate collective political action.

The post-independence leaders of Sudan also failed to face and plan a solution for the "Southern Problem" (as it was described by the North) (Beshir 1968: 80; Natsios 2012: 45). This illustrates a clear failure to recognise and address the situation at hand, a necessity of leadership. The discussion above has shown how important it is for leaders (be they intellectuals or politicians) to be sensitive to the broader context in which they seek to build a nation and a state. Unfortunately, Sudanese nationalists failed to recognise the importance of including southern ideas in their conceptualisation of the Sudanese nation and Northern politicians were remarkably indifferent to the needs of Southerners. Had these leaders been more attune to the context in which they were operating, the results may have been significantly different.

Little else indicates the presence of collective will and loyalty than the willingness to go to war for one's nation. It is, however, also a weak measure since crisis elicits loyalty and unity easier than peace does (Weilenmann 2010: 41). The true test of collective will and responsibility comes in peace. This is further engaged in Chapter Five where post-secession South Sudan is discussed. For now, the first conflict will be analysed and the degree to which this can be seen as an indication of collective will is questioned. The first signs of violent resistance were seen in 1955, when Southern discontent with the independence process led to rioting and a mutiny in Torit by the Equatorial Corps (Natsios 2012: 41). These were unorganised expressions of discontent, however (Natsios 2012: 41), and did not yet represent a collective will amongst Southerners. Small and isolated incidents of resistance continued to crop up in the southern countryside but remained disparate and unorganised (Beshir 1968: 84). In short, it took several years and the continued oppression of the South "as a collective" to generate national appeal for the rebellion (D'Agoot Interview 2017). At this point, the South lacked the leadership necessary to channel and frame the discontent of Southerners into collective political action.

The Anya-Nya leaders tried to instil a sense of collective responsibility and collective will in its followers. One example of this is its critique of Southern Sudanese youth who had fled to neighbouring countries, arguing that it was their "duty […] to free their own country from Arab occupation" (Voice of the Nile Republic 1969: 3). Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly how widespread the support for rebellion was amongst ordinary Southerners. However, it is suspected that the majority of troops in the Anya-Nya rebellion originated from Equatoria (the southernmost region of Southern Sudan) (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 1). This raises two possible questions. First, while the rebellion claimed to be speaking for all the peoples of southern Sudan, to what degree did the movement and its leaders command the loyalty and attention of all Southerners? Secondly, if those willing to fight were largely from a single region, does this indicate a lack of collective will amongst southerners as a whole? When combined with the arguments that the South lacked unity from the start, it seems creating a collective will indicative of a nation was an early problem in the South.

Many leaders were also exiled and formed their resistance movement from outside southern Sudan (Poggo 2009: 66-68, 115-116). This came about as many of the Southern *intelligentsia* and political class fled the military regime's oppressive tactics, forming political organisations from outside, supported by the Church (Beshir 1968: 83). In the 1960s, these exiled political organisations largely sought change through diplomacy, raising awareness and petitioning inter-governmental organisa-

tions (Beshir 1968: 83). This type of political action has the ability to contribute to the type of collective will and action required of a nation, if it corresponds to the will of the people who remain behind. The first armed and organised resistance in the South only emerged in 1963 with the Anya-Nya rebellion (Beshir 1968: 84). This rebellion rose out of a dissatisfaction and impatience with SANU's peaceful tactics, while SANU condemned the rebellion's use of force (Beshir 1968: 85).

As such, there is a question to be raised here regarding mutuality. First, leaders tended to emerge from a small, educated elite — those educated in missionary schools. While their schools provided them with the space to grow their political consciousness, they also created a gulf between the educated and the less-educated that made it more difficult to communicate and transfer their views to the majority of Southerners (Howell 1973: 168). Gray (1963: 1) notes this in an overview of Sudan's identity landscape by stating, "The educated élite of [the North and South] have, in many ways, far more in common with each other than with their illiterate fellows; there are Marxists, democrats and totalitarians on both sides." Secondly, many leaders spent significant periods of time outside the country. Their experiences, then, were markedly different from that of the ordinary Southern Sudanese. This does not automatically negate their ability to lead, but it would present a significant distance between leaders and led that would hamper the exchange of influence. Beshir (1968: 84-85) uses the fact that "SANU did not have a close relationship with the sufferers of the South" to explain why the Anya-Nya rebellion garnered more sympathy and support. Similarly, this is a trend that would carry throughout southern Sudan's history and will come to the fore after its secession, when the common enemy of the North is no longer present to manufacture mutuality between leader and led. The recent conflict in South Sudan has placed in the limelight the significant gap between followers and leaders in South Sudan.

In addition to this, disunity amongst the Southern leaders was a common problem. During the first Juba Conference of 1947, the Southern leaders brought together found "they had little in common with one another" (Howell 1973: 164). After the 1964 riots, a peacemaking conference failed in part due to southern factionalism (Natsios 2012: 45). During the conflict, Southern leaders struggled to build a "united political movement", resulting in the Anya-Nya forces "operat[ing] quite independently of the politicians and their factions" (Ruay 1994: 154). Similarly, the Anya-Nya forces themselves faced disunity (Ruay 1994: 154). The organisation itself acknowledged the lack of leadership and the need for a single, visionary leader who would act as a "brand figure" in the movement (Voice of the Nile Republic 1969: 2). Mayen was described by the *Voice of Southern Sudan* (the mouthpiece of SANU) as "one of the most popular men in southern Sudan" in the hopes that he

might emerge as such a person (Voice of Southern Sudan 1969: 2). This did not occur and the leadership remained fragmented until Israel became involved in their training in 1969, when the Israelis also chose Joseph Lagu as the leader of the forces (Ruay 1994: 154). Natsios (2012: 46) sums up the leadership challenge as follows:

> The first leadership of the South in the First Civil War was hampered by several constraints. No single figure emerged with the moral authority, experience, intellectual capacity, or fighting ability to lead Southern forces in the civil war. The poisonous Southern tribal rivalries were reflected in the factional intrigue among Anya-nya commanders and politicians, who were unable to form a unified military command structure or political organisation, advance a single political ideology, or develop a coherent plan to defeat the North. The division between the military commanders in the bush and southern exiled political figures—whom the commanders often dismissed as armchair rebels—weakened the effectiveness of the Southern forces.

The preference for federation was reportedly held by the majority of Southerners, across all leaders (including the educated political class and the traditional leaders) and down to their respective followers (Oduho & Deng 1963: 27). The broad acceptance of this vision stemmed from a collective fear of the Arab North (Oduho & Deng 1963: 27). Therefore, the dominant experience that was used to build mutuality in order to drive collective will, was a response to an external threat. There are two key challenges with such an approach. First, while identity is relational, an identity that is primarily dependent on "the other" is likely to be fragile as context changes. It also lacks the peace-supporting elements of nationhood identified in Chapter Two, particularly its ability to foster cooperation and create a sense of predictability. This will be illustrated in the fluctuating sense of unity and internal strife identified throughout this thesis.

Secondly, this strategy, used by Southern leaders throughout the struggle (as illustrated in the following chapters), was often effective in the short-term but lacked vision. In other words, it was responsive to the situation at hand but failed to prepare for a changed situation once their actions yielded results, as seen in South Sudan's post-secession experience. The shared history of oppression, the common enemy in the North and the mutual goal of self-determination provided the foundational blocks for a nation to emerge. However, without leadership based on true mutuality with the people of the South and with each other, this failed to mutate into collective will and political

action. It also failed to translate into a sense of collective responsibility to one another as Southerners that would surmount other identity divisions. At this point, Southerners had a collective goal but not collective will, in large part due to a leadership crisis.

3.3.4 Independence and the First Civil War in Sudan: A leadership analysis

In section 3.2 the Mahdist revolution was used as an example of how certain situations and challenges can engender cooperation. The independence process in Sudan is a different example of how situations can build divisive identities rather than unifying ones. This is because the situation did not demand leaders who raised broad support based on collective identity, but rather those who were politically adept at navigating regional and global geo-politics. As a result, the situation did little to call for a sustained process of national identity construction and rather allowed leaders to raise support based on narrower identity groups and traits. This would set the foundation for leader response after independence, as the need for a unified nation-building project became ever more apparent. In other words, while the situation prior to independence may not have required leaders to raise broad collective will and responsibility, their continued survival as leaders did demand this post-independence. Their inability to maintain this loyalty and sense of unity resulted in a tumultuous political system with multiple coups and struggling democratic periods. Therefore, the move to an independent Sudan signalled a change in situation, while at the same time many continuities remained. Sudan was now an independent state, theoretically capable of ruling itself after over a century of external rule. However, while the context had changed, the leader-follower relationship remained fraught with the same challenges. Namely, followers were fragmented and remained fragmented due to leaders' mobilisation tools; leaders sought to exert influence primarily through coercive and reward power; and mutuality between the leaders and the led remained weak.

In addition, an analysis of the leader-follower relationship can shed some light on identity construction processes. Sudan's geographical, political and social experience resulted in a highly diverse group of potential followers. The Sudanese people ranged in terms of educational background, socio-economic status and demographical make-up. As a result, leaders did not only have in-group and out-group followers at the political elite level, but were also able to split their followers in society amongst those whose needs, beliefs and interests they represented and those they did not. This was a pattern established in Sudan's early years that has been carried throughout its history. Unfortunately, as leaders and followers were largely chosen based on narrow identity lines (which often overlapped with socio-economic and political divisions), this severely hindered the development of a national identity. As a result, mutuality was seen to exist when leaders and followers bore the same narrow identity markers used to determine group identity at the time. This, unfortunately is a

superficial mutuality that rarely extends beyond early mobilisation, although it holds significant emotive power. The continuation of this pattern of leader-follower relationship in Sudan would pose significant problems in the future.

Regarding the construction of identity, it has already been noted that, due to contextual factors, Sudan's independence and nationalist process did not instil the same sense of collective identity that other national struggles have done in the past. The nationalist struggle in the South, however, did foster a sense of collective southern identity. This is because, due to Northern opposition to Southern independence or autonomy, leaders had to mobilise a broader segment of the respective population than Northern leaders had to prior to Sudan's independence. In order to mobilise sufficient support to meet this challenge, leaders had to create a sense of collective identity. This collective identity was based on a sense of collective oppression, which was felt by most Southerners across various ethnicities and by most leaders. As a result of this mutuality, Southern leaders were able to exert their influence in constructing southern identity and Southerners were able to accept the narrative offered. However, beyond this, leaders faltered in building a sense of national identity amongst Southerners due to internal strife and the large gap between leaders and followers. Therefore, the experience of oppression, while holding a certain emotive power, lacked the depth of shared experiences, values and beliefs that would build a sense of collective identity. This is a trend that would carry throughout South Sudan's history and come to a head in the 1990s and in 2013, discussed in Chapter Four and Five.

With reference to the state, it is clear that the borders of Sudan were not constituted to encompass a fully-fledged nation. However, the idea that modern Sudan was created by the attachment of two entirely distinct entities is also not true (Arnold & LeRiche 2013: 2, 8-9). As discussed in the previous section engagement between Northerners and Southerners, was limited but not non-existent prior to conquest. The type of state(s) that would have emerged in this geographical region without external conquest is impossible to predict. Nevertheless, Sudan was undergoing a long and slow state-building and nation-building process whose trajectory was likely altered and sped up by external intervention. Therefore, upon independence, Sudan was faced with a classical nation-building challenge of ensuring the borders of the state and nation coincide (see 1.2.2).

The state is often equipped with the institutional tools to build a sense of nationhood, such as educational establishments, mass media and the military.[11] However, the way in which these tools are

[11] See the discussion of Modernists (2.2.1)

used are determined by leaders. In Sudan, the state apparatus was used by leaders to impose a narrow perception of national identity on followers. This suffered two key challenges. First, the identity pushed by leaders through the state reflected only a segment of the population — Arab and Muslim. In other words, the cultural identity of a specific in-group of followers was being promoted over the identity of others, creating resentment rather than unity. Secondly, the use of coercive power to build national identity rather than expert, referent or legitimate power, for example, created opposition to rather than acceptance of said identity. In fact, it likely furthered an existing distrust of the state rather than fostering identification with and loyalty to the Sudanese state. This illustrates the importance of understanding the leader-follower relationship in nation-building. The examples of slave soldiers given above illustrates that assimilation into Northern Arab culture was possible. Yet, despite their efforts, leaders were not able to manipulate Southerners into assimilation not only because they did not identify with the cultural values being imposed, but because of the act of imposition itself. Therefore, the process by which nations are built is as important as the characteristics used to delineate it.

Finally, despite facing a situation of collective oppression, Southern leaders struggled to form a movement that was unified in its efforts and illustrative of collective will and collective loyalty. The goal of an independent southern Sudan was fairly widely held, as discussed above. This solution to the nation-building crisis in Sudan was founded on a perception of Northerners and Southerners as inherently different. This narrative was promoted by Southern leaders' rhetoric and reinforced by Northern leaders' inability to respond to southern needs. But it was the followers who chose to reject Northern leaders' influence and accept that of Southern leaders on this matter, leading to their support in the rebellion. This example of collective action was founded on mutual oppression on the part of both leaders and followers. However, the oppression felt by leaders and followers, while originating from the same collective enemy, permitting the illusion of a collective identity, was often different between leaders and followers. The educated classes in southern Sudan rebelled largely due to their political and economic exclusion. They were marginalised in the Sudanisation process, administrative and military positions and political representation of the South in Khartoum and other national forums (see 3.3.2, 3.3.3). The oppression faced by the everyday Southerner was likely of a different sort.

The lack of a shared experience between leader and led would in future conflicts become a serious challenge. In the First Civil War, it resulted in an inability to find a cohesive leadership accepted by the broader southern population, leading to fragmentation of the movement. Without such a leadership, southern Sudan was unable to build a vision that looked not only towards the past oppression

but also to the future southern Sudanese nation. In other words, there was little engagement with what the nation would entail beyond self-government, as this was the primary concern and interest of Southern leaders. Therefore, nation-building requires a reciprocal exchange of influence between followers and leaders. Leaders need followers to accept and internalise the narrative of national identity they promote, which followers can and do at times reject. At the same time, followers require leaders that can frame social reality to guide the group in unified action towards a shared goal.

3.4 Interlude between wars: The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the "return" to conflict

The period from 1972 to 1983 held several elements of continuity in Sudan. The nature of the Sudanese state remained a matter of great debate. Sudanese identity remained highly contested. And Sudan's leadership process continued to suffer from a flawed relationship between leaders and followers. This resulted in leaders often taking action and framing issues based on political situations that confronted their own interests rather than the social and economic situations facing the Sudanese people as a whole. The divisive process of identity construction continued in this period, the structure of the Sudanese state became a bargaining chip in political competition rather than an expression of the Sudanese nation and Southerners grew increasingly suspicious not just of the North but of their own leaders as well.

While the shared suffering of conflict did not yet generate a mass nationalist movement in the South, it provided the foundations for the formation of a southern identity and its associated political goals (Howell 1973: 175). The capitulation on regional autonomy for the South also furthered the perception of the South as a separate political entity (Rolandsen 2011: 555), based on the perception of Southerners as a separate identity group. As a result, the period between the First and Second Civil War did not drastically change the path of identity construction in the country. The South remained divided from the North and political discourse and actions continued to fuel this divide. Southern demands for an independent state persisted. In fact, a splinter group opposed to anything but self-determination formed a second rebellion in 1978, referred to as Anya-nya II (Young 2005: 538).

In addition, the debate in the North about the character of the Sudanese state continued on its identity-based path, with religion becoming an increasingly divisive issue. The historical memory of the Mahdi played a role in this continued relevance of Islamic ideology in Sudanese politics. For example, when exiled Islamist poitician Hassan al-Turabi returned to Sudan, he was likened to the Mahdi himself, and he was instrumental in the development and imposition of *Shari'a* law (Natsios 2012:

54-55). The narrowing of Sudanese identity to not only religion, but a specific interpretation of religion, would create significant rifts in society. It is impossible to know the true motivations of individual leaders who pushed for an Islamic state, but it is clear that they were largely disengaged from the citizens in the South at the very least.

This lack of mutuality between Northern leaders and the South also manifested in economic policies. Nimeiri's development schemes primarily targeted the North (Natsios 2012: 52). In addition, the discovery of oil would exacerbate the fragile truce between North and South. Southern leaders and their followers wanted an oil refinery built in the South, but Nimeiri and his colleagues chose to build it in the North, without consultation (Natsios 2012: 59). This sparked protests amongst Southern students (Natsios 2012: 59). Consequently, many Southern Sudanese, particularly the elite, felt frustration with their inability to raise their social status, which was exacerbated by the return of many refugees from Uganda in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Johnson 2013: 108).

This is one of the typical pre-conditions of nation-building — where frustrated elites who find their path on the socio-economic ladder blocked raise and pursue a nationalist agenda to further their cause (Horowitz 2001: Chapter One; Hroch 1996: 66-67). Southern leaders had managed to slowly build Southern consciousness by invoking the common enemy of the North, but they failed to build a common vision beyond this at the time. In addition, by the 1970s, political and ethnic divisions within the South had deepened significantly (Johnson 2013: 108), while the two key leaders (Alier and Lagu) faced accusations of tribalism (Mayen 1982: 9-11, 17-19). This would lead to nationalist politics often being driven by situational factors, such as the discovery of oil and political factionalism, rather than by engaging in a robust project to identify commonalities amongst various Sudanese, or even Southern Sudanese. The use of the common enemy of the North as the defining characteristic of the South, as opposed to creating awareness amongst Southerners of common values, histories and a future, therefore also pre-empted any solution to Sudan's identity crisis beyond separation.

Shortly after the Addis Ababa Agreement, Nimeiri drafted a new constitution that was secular in nature and "declared Sudan to be both Arab and African" (Natsios 2012: 52). Nimeiri's secular stance, however, united factional Islamic parties in their opposition to him, eventually forcing him to change tactics (Natsios 2012: 52). As a result, the fragile peace of the Addis Ababa Agreement came under threat when Nimeiri welcomed back several Islamist politicians who sought an Islamic state (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 66). Over the years, Nimeiri had failed to gain popular support, alienated the Islamic parties and maintained power through repression (Natsios 2012: 54). When it

became clear that he was losing his grip on power, Nimeiri changed his secular approach for Sudan to an Islamic one, and traded his commitment to the Addis Ababa Agreement for an alliance with his opposition (Natsios 2012: 54). As a result, Nimeiri and his government reinstated Islamic law across Sudan in 1983, including the South (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 66). At the same time, due to ongoing tensions between various ethnic groups in the South, there had been a debate regarding the division of the South into separate provinces. One side viewed it as a way to prevent Dinka domination while the other feared it would allow the North to practice a divide-and-rule strategy (Natsios 2012: 60). In the end, Nimeiri single-handedly divided the South into three provinces with his signing of Republican Order Number One, which largely undid much of the political and cultural autonomy that had been given to the South in the peace agreement (Natsios 2012: 60).

As a result, while the Addis Ababa Agreement provided a space to re-engage the Sudanese state and its correlation with a Sudanese nation, leaders' commitment to its content and the space it provided was superficial at best. At this point in time, the state had become a tool for leaders to gain political and economic access rather than a mechanism for the nation to assert its collective will on itself and the outside world. In addition, the inconstancy in Nimeiri's approach to the South illustrates a failure in leadership that would have disastrous consequences. His shift in ideology indicates an inability to build a narrative that was inclusive and resonated with the Sudanese people, while also confronting the volatile political climate. It also indicates that his interests were centred on regime security rather than the needs and interests of the Sudanese nation, indicating a lack of mutuality. Finally, his source of power depended on coercion and therefore was unsustainable. In the end, Nimeiri's vision for Sudan was ill-suited to the context at the time and his approach to building this vision was flawed in its coercive nature.

Many Southerners were unhappy with the outcome of the First Civil War. The compromise made by accepting regional autonomy rather than full independence was not well received (Young 2005: 538). In addition, many in the South viewed the Addis Ababa Agreement with suspicion and cynicism (Johnson 2013: 101; Natsios 2012: 58). John Garang, the future leader in the Second Civil War, had raised concerns about the agreement which were summarily rejected (Akol Interview 2017). These fears proved well founded. The regional autonomy granted to the South did not allow the South to govern itself in its own manner, preventing the exercise of collective will. There also did not appear to be a significant increase in responsibility and loyalty to the Southern government or between Southerners. Despite being granted regional autonomy, Nimeiri maintained a tight control over the South's political and economic future, which was strengthened by the factional fighting between Alier and Lagu (Natsios 2012: 57-58).

Alier and Lagu struggled during their respective terms as President of the southern region. Both Alier and Lagu courted Nimeiri's support in their competition with each other, indicating implicit acceptance of Khartoum's interference in southern politics (Johnson 2013: 107). Alier lost popular support because of his inability and/or unwillingness to stem Northern interference in the South (Johnson 2013: 107-108). His leadership was rejected when he appeared to side with Nimeiri's oil policies (Mayen 1982: 10) Lagu, on the other hand, came into conflict with the legislature and judiciary due to his "unconstitutional use of power" (Johnson 2013: 107-108). Gordon M. Mayen (1982: 19) suggests that the corruption scandals surrounding Lagu forced him to rely on identity-politics to maintain his position. This indicates another problematic gap between Southern leaders and their followers. After the agreement, their interests no longer aligned as clearly with the Southern people's interests. Therefore, both leaders were unable to build and maintain mutuality with their followers, resulting in their use of other sources of power to maintain their influence. Unfortunately, this highlighted ethnic difference, illustrating the challenges of maintaining collective will and a sense of collective identity that was not initially built on a strong foundation of mutuality.

3.4.1 Interlude between wars: A leadership analysis

Similar to the transition to independence, the Addis Ababa Agreement, while meant to signal a new situation, did not result in a significant change in the leadership process. First, the mutuality gap between leaders and followers persisted. The widespread distrust of the peace agreement amongst Southerners contrasted with the leaders' actions, who began to compete with each other for the positions the Agreement offered. Nimeiri's fluctuation on his policies were driven by elite political competition rather than being dependent on the challenges confronting the Sudanese people. These examples illustrate the problem of mutuality in Sudan. As a result, Southern leaders were unable to formulate a vision for Southern Sudanese, while Nimeiri's secular vision of Sudan proved to be superficial and unable to withstand a threat to Nimeiri's individual interests.

A lack of exchange and mutuality between leaders and followers can be particularly problematic in a peace deal. Peace agreements often provide a road map for the post-conflict state structure. The structure of the state should ideally reflect the needs, values and interests of its citizens (i.e. the nation). However, peace deals often shift the state-building process from a conversation between the state and its people to a negotiation amongst elites. This was reflected in the Addis Ababa Agreement. In this case, although independence had been the goal, Southern leaders acquiesced to regional autonomy (Young 2005: 538). However, this arrangement and the subsequent state structure

was rejected by Southern followers for the reasons discussed above. This challenge of leaders' interests being addressed in a peace agreement but not that of followers would be repeated in subsequent peace agreements. The rejection of the agreement was also likely linked to the promises of independence made during the civil war by Southern leaders and the further division between North and South cemented by the violence.

Therefore, the experience of conflict likely deepened the division between Northerners and Southerners. The violence and its associated rhetoric fostered resentment, embedded the differences between the North and the South in collective consciousness, and reinforced the view that Southerners would never be free under Northern Arab rule. The resolution of the conflict furthered the perception of North and South as two separate nations (Rolandsen 2011: 555). So, by this time, much of the debate about the Sudanese state became centred on a contestation of Sudanese identity. However, rather than searching for and building a secular, inclusive identity, leaders and their respective followers chose exclusive identity attributes such as religion, race and region. These attributes, though constructed, were perceived as inflexible. As these markers became associated with the state, the potential for an inclusive state structure became all the more elusive.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter confirms much of what is known about nationalism and identity, while also providing some new insights. First, regarding identity construction, Sudan's experience confirms that identity is highly fluid, subjective, constructed and context-dependent. The use of identity construction in conflict and conflict in identity construction is also evident. By using the leadership process approach as a framework, some additional issues are brought to light. Much of this is centred on the notion of mutuality. Leaders are often central in building a narrative that drives a nationalist project. However, due to contextual factors, Sudan's leaders did not have, and did not need to, build mutuality with their followers. As a result, their nationalist vision was centred on their own individual identities (Arab and Muslim) rather than that of the Sudanese people (Sharkey 2008: 30).

Following independence, as the context changed, these leaders found themselves unable to address the needs of the broader citizenship of the country, leading to a turbulent political system driven by military dictatorships and intermittent and chaotic democratic periods. Instead of changing tactics, these leaders then chose to employ coercive power to impose their vision of Sudan onto the South, resulting in resistance. Another important point to make regarding identity is the role it plays in leadership selection. In a society as diverse as Sudan, there was no prototype leader (see 2.4.1) that

could emerge as a representative of Sudanese society. In such situations, where a society is in transition and given the opportunity to re-define itself, it is important to find a leader who understands the needs of the entire populace. Unfortunately, this is a small window of opportunity and once identity politics becomes the norm, it is a difficult process to reverse, as the following chapters illustrate.

In addition to an analysis of identity, this chapter explores the relationship between statehood and nationhood in Sudan. This is not a linear relationship. In other words, the state does not only construct the nation from above using education, bureaucracy and the military, nor does the state emerge naturally from pre-existing nations. Attempts to impose the state over existing identity groups often provoked violent reaction in Sudan. At the same time, attempting to define the state along a narrow identity (Muslim Arab) had similarly disastrous consequences. The challenge is to build a state that includes all its citizens in its structure. This is often reduced to debates about federalism and representivity, but includes other state institutions such as the bureaucracy, the military, educational systems and state symbols as well. The danger, as illustrated in Sudan, is when state structures become tools for leaders to impose an agenda that does not stem from a mutuality with the population. Finally, the independence process in Sudan illustrates the dangers of bringing a state into being based on elite plans that are self-interested, which hold no vision for the nation as a whole. It is a lesson that was unfortunately not used in the South Sudanese independence process.

On the issue of collective will and collective responsibility, the above discussion demonstrates the importance and challenge of influence exchange in the nation-building process. Loyalty to specific identity groups often fluctuated based on specific situations and the perceived common enemy. As a result, leaders were often able to inspire collective action when a group was under threat but the continued ability of said leader to influence the population often waned when leaders revealed their inconstancy. This inconsistency on the part of leaders was often the result of a stark difference between their interests and the interests of their followers. As the Southern experience illustrates, invoking the common enemy can be an effective tool in building loyalty and support, but when said enemy becomes an ally of the leaders, the same does not necessarily occur amongst followers. This will become even more evident in the discussion of Sudan's Second Civil War and South Sudan's secession in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR: SUDAN'S SECOND CIVIL WAR AND THE ROAD TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (1983-2005).

4.1 Introduction

On 16 May 1983, following Nimeiri's policies retracting the Addis Ababa Agreement, an order was given for Southern troops to transfer to the North — a further violation of the peace agreement that resulted in a mutiny by the former Anya-nya soldiers of Battalion 104 in Bor and Battalion 105 in Ayod (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 67). The government responded with force (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 67). This was the spark that reignited sustained armed conflict in South Sudan that would last until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 67). The second Sudanese civil war would hold several continuities with the first, while also containing several key departures from previous political practice and rhetoric. This chapter explores these continuities and divergences in order to trace the events in the war that would contribute to future nation-building opportunities and challenges. As discussed in section 1.1, it is important to understand not only the causes of a conflict but how its processes alter a society as well.

This civil war is discussed in three sections, while acknowledging that there is significant overlap. First, it explores the beginning of the war up until the early 1990s, focussing on the formation and rise of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The second section discusses the turbulent period in the 1990s, which entailed a continuation of the North-South conflict and the emergence of a South-South conflict. This South-South conflict would have important repercussions in South Sudan's post-secession civil war (see 5.4). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the peace process that formally ended the civil war in 2005. In each of these phases, events and processes related to nation-building, through the construction of identity, the role of the state and the ebb and flow of collective will and collective loyalty, are described and subsequently analysed using the leadership process approach.

The chapter concludes that the dominant nature of the leader-follower relationship, which was replicated at multiple levels in Sudan, played and will continue to play a significant role in the nation-building challenges of South Sudan. It will show that competing narratives of and visions for the collective identity of Sudanese populations and for the Sudanese state were played off against each other in a political game of elite interests. The lack of mutuality between leaders and followers meant that these interests often did not correlate with the needs of the followers. As a result, com-

mitment to espoused visions was often superficial on the part of both leaders and followers. In addition, leaders often responded to situations that more directly influenced their interests rather than those that confronted the Sudanese population. Because of this, the formation of a collective identity was set aside when narrow identity markers became politically useful. Narratives and visions of Sudanese identity and statehood were often determined by international events, and collective will and loyalty was constantly changing and fluctuating.

4.2 A return to civil war (1983-1991)

Following the mutiny of 1983, soldiers fled to Ethiopia where they re-grouped and a new leader emerged, John Garang de Mabior (Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 67). Garang, at that time in the Sudanese military, had been engaged in the planning of the mutiny and rebellion (Johnson 2011b: 10). He had been a member of the Anya-nya rebellion during its final stages and had opposed the Addis Ababa agreement (Johnson 2011b: 10). Garang proceeded to become a central character in the civil war to follow and was responsible for many of its departures from established practice. The issues in this conflict were broadly similar to the first conflict, with differences in emphasis and mutation due to a changing national and regional context. The discussion below will illustrate that while some narratives persisted, new narratives also emerged. The debate about the nature of the Sudanese nation was more robust in this conflict than before.

4.2.1 Fluctuating narratives and perceptions of identity in the midst of conflict

A key event that started the war and subsequently became the dominant issue in the conflict was Nimeiri's imposition of *Shari'a* law (Deng 1995: 12-13; Interview D 2017; Sharkey 2008: 36; Sunday Interview 2017). However, tensions and small-scale conflict was ongoing prior to this, so it cannot be viewed as the cause of the conflict (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017). Nevertheless, this war would take on a more religious dimension where the previous conflict leaned towards dramatising racial differences. Perspectives differ on the depth, reality and source of these tensions. Amb. Hassan (Interview 2017) argues that people of different religions lived in a state of peaceful co-existence in Khartoum. Sunday (Interview 2017), on the other hand, describes the treatment of Southerners in Khartoum and the North as that of "second-class citizens" and that people were being "forced" into an Islamic tradition. In addition, the tensions surrounding race and language remained (Deng 1995: 13; Sharkey 2008: 36-37). Racism was reportedly widespread in northern Sudan, with southerners or African Sudanese often being referred to as *abeed*[12] (De Waal 1998: 140; Copnall

[12] The arabic word for slave (Copnall 2014: 19)

2014: 19). Some have argued that this sense of superiority, which resulted in the Arabisation project, stems from a place of insecurity amongst Sudanese Arabs, who were in fact a minority in Sudan and whose Arab heritage was called into question outside Sudan (Sharkey 2008: 40). This constructed Arab identity has already been discussed in Chapter Three. Yet, due to this perception of superiority, to Northerners, the conflict in the South was portrayed as part of a "divine duty" and a "manifest destiny" (Martin 2002: 121).

With regards to language, in the 1980s and 1990s, Arabic began to spread throughout Sudan, including southern Sudan. This, however, did not necessarily translate into the widespread construction of an Arabic identity (Sharkey 2008: 24-25). As discussed in Chapter Two, the indicators used to construct identity are dependent on context and the meanings attributed to those indicators by the members and non-members of a group. While a shared language may indicate a shared identity, it did not do so in this case. This was because of the history and meaning associated with the Arabic identity. In reality, Khartoum's imposition of an Islamic Arabic identity resulted in the strengthening of an opposing identity in the South that combined Africanism, Christianity and Western values (Glickman 2000: 270). As a result, a counter-movement to Islamism and Arabism had emerged — that of "Africanism" (Ayers 2010: 161). The coercive way in which the government sought to assimilate and homogenise the Sudanese population therefore provoked resistance instead (Sharkey 2008: 24-25).

This is important to note because it highlights the way in which an identity is accepted and rejected not by its intrinsic qualities but by circumstance and leadership. The acceptance of Christianity as a central part of nation-building and Western ideals as the foundation for the political organisation of that nation (discussed below) indicates that the South's opposition to an Arabic and Islamic identity does not only stem from its external nature. Rather, it relates to a failure on the part of the Khartoum elite to exchange influence with Southerners. This was rooted in a lack of mutuality, forcing Khartoum to adopt a coercive strategy. The Southern elite and Church leaders, mostly educated by Western missionaries, were able to relate, to a degree, with the everyday struggles of the Southern people. Therefore, as will be shown throughout this chapter, they were able to frame the struggle within the narratives of Western democracy and religious persecution.

The tactics used by Khartoum also furthered the perception of the conflict as a religious and racial one. The Sudanese government mobilised Arab militias on the North-South border to target the Southern population (De Waal 1998: 136-137; Martin 2002: 117). The Baggara Arab militias (*Mu-*

rahaliin) in the South-Western regions, who largely targeted the Dinka with whom they had existing grazing disputes, were accused of engaging in slavery (De Waal 1998: 136-137). In 1987, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (associated with the SPLM/A), released a report on the Dhein massacre, which included accounts of slavery (Mahmud and Baldo 1987). As discussed in Chapter Three the practice of slavery and the rhetoric that stems from it have been central in the construction of identities in Sudan. Militia raids in south-western Sudan utilised language and terminology reminiscent of historical slavery and drew comparisons between contemporary and early slave raiders (De Waal 1998: 139-140). This served to induce fear amongst Southerners that stemmed from the historical experience of their forefathers (De Waal 1998: 140).

The narrative of slavery also served to simplify the relationship between Northerners and Southerners, providing a historical foundation for southern identity and a justification for independence from those who had enslaved them (De Waal 1998: 146). As a result of this historical relationship between those who engaged in the slave trade and those who suffered its consequences, which appeared to be repeating itself in the 1980s, the rift between North and South was deepened. The history of Northerners and Southerners, while intertwined, was one of confrontation that developed opposing narratives of self and group destiny. The use of these narratives in a contemporary conflict only served to further this division.

Slavery is just one instance where a shared historical experience produced differing identities. Deng (1995: 16-17) discusses the way in which opposing but similar political movements emerged in the North and the South based on a shared “traditionalism” and “conservatism”:

> In the North, conservatism follows Arab-Islamic lines, while in the South it follows indigenous African lines. In both, society is largely dominated by family or kinship ties and an ancestrally oriented lineage system that stratifies people according to descent, age, and gender. Leaders tend to be from politically and religiously dominant families; men dominate women; and children must show filial piety.

Therefore, while key religious and racial differences were constructed between Northerners and Southerners through historical, socio-economic and political processes, when broken down into its functional role, whereby identity determines the rules and norms for social and political life, certain patterns emerge across the North-South divide. Unfortunately, key aspects of this conservatism fur-

thered division by creating a system which favoured a core social group or made individuals dependent on networks of identity and kinship in order to further their status. This would be replicated at multiple levels in Sudan, as will be shown in Chapter Five.

An important shift in the thinking of Sudanese identities occurred in this period, however. As the leading intellectual guiding SPLM/A ideology, Garang developed his philosophy of Sudanism. Sudanism championed the diversities of identities in Sudan and discouraged the use of such identities in politics (Idris 2013: 98). This is important because multiple levels of identity can co-exist and the chosen identity markers of a nation can vary (see 1.2.2, 2.2.1.3). Therefore, certain identity markers such as religion, ethnicity, language and race can be separated from the public sphere (i.e. the state) and therefore the nation. Garang often advocated for a "multi-nationality country, separating religion […] from the state" (Novicki 1989: 46) within a political system that respected the "democratic and human rights [of] all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all relgions [sic], beliefs and outlooks" (Garang ed. by Khalid 1992: 23).

This presented a significant change in Sudanese nationalist thinking which had been driven by narrow and exclusive identity markers (Idris 2013: 98). Garang also aimed to build what he often termed a "new Sudanese identity and commonality" (Novicki 1989: 44; SPLM 1994a: 15). Therefore, he went further than mere multi-culturalism in his attempt to build a new "[…] national identity which embodies its own unique historical and cultural heritages" (Idris 2013: 99). In short, he embarked on a nation-building endeavour. His rhetoric underscored an understanding of and need for nation-building not previously demonstrated in Sudanese politics. Part of this nation-building is the need to build a sense of collective loyalty. In an interview with Novicki (1989: 44, 47), Garang on several occasions refers to the need to build a "Sudanese commonality to which we all pledge our allegiance and our patriotism". However, while the theory regarding identity construction appears sound, it is difficult to implement in practice due to the multitude of uncontrollable variables. The secession of South Sudan and recent events indicate that Garang was unsuccessful in this project. This failure also serves as further evidence that leaders do not act in a vacuum and therefore cannot easily act as puppet-masters in the nation-building process. The following discussion will seek to trace his efforts and understand why his vision failed.

A final note must be made regarding religion and identity. As mentioned, this would be a prominent feature of the Second Civil War. While Southern opposition to Islam was clear, however, a tension between secularism and Christianity was evident in the South. For most of the 1980s, the SPLM/A,

driven by its Marxist ideology, was hostile to not only Islamisation but Christianity as well, illustrated in their kidnapping of foreign priests (De Waal 1998: 143; Rolandsen 2005: 76). Part of this antagonism stemmed from the Church's threat to SPLM/A legitimacy as the sole representative of the Southern people (Rolandsen 2005: 76-77). Yet, the Church was a key institution at the local level and played an important role in the organisation of social life (Rolandsen 2005: 75). In addition, Christianity gained significant ground in this period and in the 1990s (when foreign missionaries returned to southern Sudan) (De Waal 1998: 143; Rolandsen 2005: 75-76). This growth can be attributed to multiple factors — the adaptation of Christian teachings with traditional values, the need for spiritual and religious meaning to explain the suffering of Southerners, and the role of the church in relief and aid operations and activities (De Waal 1998: 143).

In addition, the growth of Christianity has been described as a reaction, and a form of protest, to the Islamisation policies of the state (Sharkey 2008: 24-25). This was one of the reasons the SPLM/A softened their stance on the Church, believing it would strengthen Southern identity in the face of Northern Islam (Rolandsen 2005: 76). Eventually, in the 1990s, the SPLM/A shifted its stance on the Church in recognition of their humanitarian role, but some leaders retained a distaste for religion (De Waal 1998: 143). Christianity also took on a form of myth-building, with the Southern struggle being compared to Biblical stories and the Southern people being directly linked to Biblical prophecies (Achiecque & Guarak 2011: 562; *BBC News* 2013b; Copnall 2014: 31; Frahm 2012: 38). This type of myth building is typical of a society building a nation and constructing an identity. It is also not surprising that the source material for such myths would be a religion that both crossed ethnic boundaries and, remembering that identity is relational, represented a resistance to the historical "enemy" in the North.

The above discussion illustrates the importance of influence in the formation and construction of identity. The Khartoum elite lacked significant influence amongst southerners, and what little they had relied on coercion as its source of power. Their attempts at expanding the Arabic and Islamic identity therefore failed. The Southern elite, whose power stemmed from more mutuality with the Southern population, was able to exercise more influence amongst southerners. Their mutuality allowed them to construct a narrative of oppression and exclusion, based on a historical experience that was used as the basis for southern identity. However, there were tensions between Southern leaders and their narratives. The population was often influenced more by the leaders and structures that held a presence in their lives, primarily the Church, traditional leadership (based on ethnicity) and later humanitarian organisations (see 4.3.2, 4.4.4, 5.2.4, 5.3.2). As these leaders held more influence amongst southerners, their identity narratives often held greater sway.

Similarly, while Garang rhetorically promoted Sudanism, little was done to actually build this Sudanese identity (as will be shown throughout the discussion below). Rather, his rhetoric often reiterated the history of oppression and exclusion while his vision for the future centred on the state and socio-political structure of the "New Sudan".[13] The first, his rhetoric, resulted in a superficial Southern identity that would easily falter (discussed below) and reinforced divisions between North and South. The second, his vision, failed to build a national identity and promoted a vague political vision that few Southerners believed in. In short, identity construction is determined by the influence relationships within a society. Identities are constructed by the leaders who can exchange influence with a population, and this requires mutuality.

4.2.2 Contradictory narratives of statehood and nationhood

While the crisis of identity between North and South had reached perhaps insurmountable levels in Sudan, the violence that emerged was driven, in no small part, by the continuities and contradictions between state and identity. First, identity was used to indicate a level of belonging to the state, with non-Arabs being seen as "subjects" or "second-class citizens" (Sharkey 2008: 42; Sunday Interview 2017). Religion, similarly, was seen to "determin[e] who gets what from the system" (Deng 1995: 16). Second, the question of the identity of the state had reached a tipping point. As shown in Chapter Three, the debate in the First Civil War, while it included religion, was centred on the question of race. But since independence an Islamist ideology propagating the establishment of an Islamic state had slowly gained significant ground. It began with the Muslim Brotherhood and culminated in the National Islamic Front (NIF) party under the guidance of its ideologue Hassan al-Turabi (Glickman 2000: 273). While Islamisation and Arabisation policies were not new in independent Sudan, the NIF brought a new fervour to the project (Natsios 2012: 55, 72-73, 98).

The NIF came into power on the back of a military coup on 30 June 1989 (Arnold & Le Riche 2012: 74). This followed a brief democratic period that emerged from a popular overthrow of Nimeiri in 1986 (Burr & Collins 1995: 3; Khalid 2003: 167). The democratic government, however, struggled during its short life (Burr & Collins 1995: 3). Following the *intifada* in 1986, the leaders neglected to address the grievances surrounding the economy, the civil war and Nimeiri's policies and instead diverted their attention to winning elections (Khalid 2003: 168). This is a trend that

[13] For examples of the first see: Novicki (1989: 44), SPLM/A (1994: 9-10, 13-15, 17), Garang ed. By Khalid (1992: 19-21, 50). For examples of the second see: Novicki (1989: 44, 46), SPLM/A (1994: 21-22, 25-26), Garang ed. By Khalid (1992: 26-27).

would be repeated after the CPA. In the end the weak democracy quickly crumbled, and a new military regime was installed (Burr & Collins 1995: 3). The NIF, which would later become the current ruling National Congress Party (NCP), was led by Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi. Iyob and Khadiagala (2006: 102) state that "[…] Bashir and Turabi symbolised and solidified the two central pillars of the NIF — Islamism and militarism […]." As mentioned, *Shari'a* law was and would remain a key source of conflict (Deng 1995: 12-13). It embodied Khartoum's efforts to merge religion and state. In doing so, Khartoum signalled an assumption of what the Sudanese nation was and/or should be. This did not ring true with Southerners' perception of themselves and the state they wished to reside in. The SPLM/A, in response, strongly advocated for secularism. Al-Turabi, however, viewed religion and the state as inseparable (Glickman 2000: 273), and other leaders in Khartoum, such as Ali Osman Taha, maintained a firm belief in the Islamic project (Johnson 2011b: 15).

However, Southern grievance was not only centred on the issue of religion and state. Rather, it was representative of a wider concern in which the state was controlled by and served to benefit a select group of people who were identified by their ethnic and racial identity. In other words, there was debate on both the role of the state in identity (e.g. the issue of *Shari'a* law) and the role of identity in access to the state. While this may have resulted in the racialisation of the conflict at the grass-roots level (see 4.2.1), Garang was more nuanced in his explanation of the conflict. He viewed the situation in a more holistic manner and sought to reform the governance structures in Sudan as a whole (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017). A recurring theme in Garang's rhetoric is that of the power structures of Sudan. In various speeches and interviews he refers to the movements' aims to achieve "a radical restructuring of the power of the central government," (Garang ed. by Khalid 1992: 26); or "[…] the restructuring of power in Khartoum […]" (Novicki 1989: 44, 47); and identifies the "Jellaba" as the "real enemy" due to their hold on "economic and political power" and "state organs" (SPLM 1994a: 14). Garang, in this case, explained that the "Jellaba" referred to the ruling class who viewed themselves as Arab (SPLM 1994a: 14). However, "Jellaba", originally a derogatory term for Arab merchants, evolved into a label used for all Northerners and it was used to personify the enemy of the struggle, despite Garang's more inclusive rhetoric of "New Sudan" and "Sudanism" (Young 2005: 536). Therefore, while Garang often reflected a nuanced and intellectual understanding of Sudan's challenges, his followers also framed the struggle narrative based on their own experiences (e.g. the militia raids and cases of slavery discussed above).

Regarding the more fundamental question of whether Sudan should constitute one state or two, in a departure from the Anya-nya rhetoric (Ayers 2010: 161), The SPLM/A's stated objective was "[…]

the liberation of the whole Sudan, and to the unity of its people and its territorial integrity […]" (Garang ed. by Khalid 1992: 26). In a symbolic expression of this vision, the SPLM/A would refer to the territories under its control as "New Sudan" (Johnson 2011b: 12). This vision drove the SPLM/A towards seeking support and alliances outside the South. Its main political ally was the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of opposition parties and movements in Sudan, while militarily the SPLM/A allied with militant groups in other marginalised regions outside the South throughout the war (Deng 2006: 158; Nasong'o & Murunga 2005: 67; Rolandsen 2011: 553). Writing in 1995, Deng (1995: 13-14, 19-20), expressed reserved optimism for this "vision of a united, pluralistic, democratic Sudan," as it had begun to gain ground in the North and provided Sudan with a "counterforce" to Khartoum's Arab-Islamic vision of the state.

However, some have argued that Garang's initial rejection of a separatist goal, his promotion of the "New Sudan" vision and his adoption of a vaguely Marxist ideology was influenced by Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam, a key supporter of the SPLM/A (Young 2005: 538). Mengistu was facing his own separatist demands at home and therefore could not be seen supporting a secessionist movement (Young 2005: 538). In addition, just like most insurgencies, the SPLM/A needed international support in a global climate that was opposed to secession (Deng 1995: 20). Nevertheless, most leaders within the SPLM/A favoured self-determination[14] as the end goal but refrained from opposing Garang directly (Young 2005: 539).

Deng (1995: 21) describes how structures of political organisation and ideologies have evolved in Sudan. The North moved from traditional structures to sectarianism to the Islamist ideology exemplified in the NIF. The South, on the other hand, underwent a transformation in the educated elite with Christian missionary education that eventually evolved into an ideology with significant Western elements. This resulted in competing visions of the Sudanese state — one Arab-Islamic and one "the Western model of a secular pluralistic state" (Deng 1995: 21). The Second Civil War was therefore a conflict between these two visions. However, neither vision seemed appealing to their respective targeted followers, as will be discussed in the next section. In theory, the state should act as a form of political organisation and governance for the nation and society within its borders (see 2.3.1). However, in this case, the state became a tool in political competition. The visions propagated by both sides were driven by situational factors that influenced leaders' political position rather than followers' aspirations. As a result, ideologies and allegiances were often momentary and

[14] The term self-determination in this case was used to refer exclusively to secession (Young 2005: 539).

the development of a cohesive ideology of the Sudanese state that was coherent with a Sudanese nation failed to develop.

4.2.3 The emergence of collective will and collective responsibility?

Despite the portrayal of "the North" as a monolithic enemy it was hardly united or homogenous. This is seen in the repeated cycles of coups, popular revolts and short-lived democratic regimes. It has also been argued that Islamism's ability to gain prominence in Sudanese politics was more a result of elite politics than of "religious conviction" (Glickman 2000: 274). In short, Al-Bashir's allegiance with the NIF was a result of his alienation of other political powers in Khartoum (Martin 2002: 113). And the NIF/NCP, despite its domination of the political sphere since its rise to power, did not hold an equal amount of support amongst the Sudanese population (Glickman 2000: 274; Martin 2002: 120). In the 1986 elections, prior to its ascent to power through coup, the NIF only received six percent of the vote (Martin 2002: 113, 120).

Similarly, despite the Islamisation policies of the government, their implementation was slow or uneven, due to the lack of support amongst society, and Islamist values and cultures struggled to take hold amongst everyday Sudanese (Martin 2002: 120). Finally, the diversity of political visions is illustrated in the formation of the NDA, in which both sectarian and secular parties allied with the SPLM/A to overthrow Al-Bashir's regime and install a democratic system (though there was still disagreement on the role of religion in the state) (Deng 1995: 21). The NDA signed the Asmara Declaration with the SPLM/A in 1995. It indicated the goals of the parties as that of democracy, regime change and a new constitution, followed by a referendum on secession; yet it also entailed a commitment to unity (Young 2012: 85).

The South was also not united in its political vision. By the start of the Second Civil War political consciousness had spread to the local population, where conversations on political events in Sudan were far more common than in the colonial and pre-colonial era (Rolandsen 2005: 33). This consciousness was also cross-ethnic in nature, where leaders were eventually able to mobilise Southerners from different ethnic groups, not only their own (D'Agoot Interview 2017). However, while political consciousness had spread there were some differences of opinion on the vision for southern Sudan. This in itself is not problematic — collective will does not require the entire population of a nation to agree all the time. It does, however, require structures and norms that permit the nation to reach a collective decision (Weilenmann 2010: 43). This appears to have been lacking in the struggle. For example, while the SPLM/A would go on to become the prominent leader of the struggle, their legitimacy was hard-won.

It has been argued that early mobilisation in the SPLM/A was driven by local inter-communal conflicts, arising from border disputes that emerged out of the Nimeiri's policy to divide the South, rather than in response to a call for liberation (Nyaba 2000: 25-26). The SPLM/A used these conflicts to recruit soldiers who initially joined the movement to get access to weapons they could use in such inter-communal conflicts (Nyaba 2000: 25-26). In addition, the Second Civil War began with multiple rebel movements in the South, including Anya-nya II, who had to be co-opted or defeated by the SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005: 29, 36). Some of these soldiers held little loyalty to SPLM/A leadership and would join the future rebellion against the movement, discussed in the next section (Rolandsen 2005: 36). In this way, the SPLM/A initially emerged as the leader of the South through a process of coercion and reward. They would go on to gain legitimacy through other means.

Garang's followers – the Southerners – largely rejected, or were at least skeptical of, his vision of "New Sudan" (Hutchinson 2001: 307; Idris 2013: 100-102; Young 2005: 538). This vision, did, however, resonate with other marginalised communities in Sudan, specifically in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile, who would join the SPLM/A in armed struggle (Idris 2013: 100-101). Deng (1995: 20) summarised this tension of objectives as follows:

> Tactically, the leadership of the SPLM-SPLA is following a multifaceted policy that does not exclude and indeed discreetly prefers separation as the ultimate goal. What is remarkable is the degree to which the leadership has made the rank and file understand and accept this rather complex reasoning and strategy. At one point, the rhetoric of liberating the whole country seemed to be taken seriously and was emphatically reflected in the SPLA morale-boosting martial songs. But the driving force for the fighting men and women has clearly been separation. This was often expressed in the words, "We know what we want," a popular response to the question, "What is the SPLA fighting for?"

In fact, despite its official rhetoric, Southerners are said to have conferred legitimacy on the SPLM/A on the tacit understanding that it would pursue an agenda of self-determination (Rolandsen 2011: 555). In this situation, an exchange of influence is apparent between the SPLM/A and the Southern population, which permitted the South to exercise collective action. Despite the complexity of the unity or separation question, leaders were able to generate a sense of collective purpose and will in the pursuit of a common goal, even though it was in an implicit manner. Internal disagreement about the movements vision, therefore, did not prevent the SPLM/A from winning significant military victories in the 1980s, nearly capturing Juba before the movement fractured in 1991

(Hutchinson 2001: 307-308). Therefore, while collective will was lacking in the North, there was more unity of purpose in the South, which allowed for initial success.

4.2.4 A return to civil war: A leadership analysis

Once again, a key dimension of the leadership process approach that sheds light on these dynamics is that of the leader-follower relationship. The competing processes of identity construction, disparate visions of the Sudanese state and challenges of collective will and loyalty often reflected a leader-follower gap. In particular, the discussion above illustrates the various ways in which leaders and followers struggled to influence each other in their search for a nation that would serve their values, needs and interests. This may stem from the lack of mutuality discussed in Chapter Two, illustrating a fundamental challenge in Sudan's leadership process that would plague the nation-building process throughout its history. This is seen in the way that both Garang and the Khartoum elites' visions were rejected, though the first less violently than the latter.

Nevertheless, John Garang provided what southern politics had lacked until then, a strong leader who "virtually personified the struggle of the South" (Young 2005: 535). However, there are competing narratives of John Garang's leadership. On one side, he is portrayed as the undisputed, charismatic, principled leader of the South, while others highlight his dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies that prevented the emergence of other leaders (Interview C 2017; Johnson 2011b: 9-13; Martin 2002: 121; Young 2005: 539). Garang himself emerged as a leader through skilled networking inside and outside southern Sudan (Johnson 2011b: 10). In addition, Rolandsen (2005: 29) states that "John Garang used force and intrigue to bolster his position as supreme leader of the Movement." This is affirmed by Hilde Johnson (2011b: 1, 11), who had a "close relationship" with the leader. She says, "In [Garang's] view, a liberation movement and army could not take decisions by consensus" (Johnson 2011b: 11).

While this may be true, his use of coercion raises questions about Garang's legitimacy and that of his vision. In other words, was his vision rejected because of an inability to exercise influence based on mutuality? As discussed above, Garang's vision for a "New Sudan" was not widely accepted by Southerners. Similarly, a Marxist ideology did not resonate with a Southern population composed primarily of small landholders and "fiercely independent pastoralists" (Young 2005: 538). In fact, the Marxist ideology was quickly set aside in the 1990s as its utility wore out (Young 2005: 539). Therefore, Southerners' acceptance of Garang's vision was temporary and stemmed from political necessity rather than a mutual belief in the value of a "New Sudan". While interests converged mo-

mentarily to allow Garang to influence the population, the needs, beliefs and values remained distinct. This, therefore, re-affirms the school of thought which argues that nations cannot be created solely by elites.

This can be seen in many of the processes discussed above. While Garang attempted to construct a more inclusive and broad-based Sudanese identity, competing realities on the ground (such as the use of identity-based militias) and historical narratives (such as slavery) allowed followers to accept a different narrative of their identities. The political expediency driving many of the narratives espoused by the SPLM/A also led to some contradictions. For example, the SPLM/A used the contentious issue of slavery to mobilise international support (De Waal 1998: 145-146). This use of the slavery narrative by the SPLM/A has been criticised by De Waal (1998: 145-146), who saw it as a reactive narrative that could hinder peace and unity. It produced sentiments and identity narratives that ran counter to the Sudanism ideal. Therefore, while Garang provided the charismatic leadership needed to mobilise and guide the struggle, he did not develop an ideology suitable to the local context, due to his need to balance a complicated array of interests at the local, sub-national, national, regional and international level. Followers and other leaders were also able to assert their own choices in the identity construction process. This is perhaps best exemplified by the growth of the Christian church, which ran counter to the SPLM/A's rhetoric. This occurred because of the responsiveness of the Church to the local context and situation, another important aspect of the leadership process.

Similarly, the effort to make the nation and the state congruent appears to have been an exercise in power and not influence exchange. This is most clearly seen in the continued imposition of an Arabic-Islamic identity from Khartoum but is also reflected in the South with regards to Garang's almost unilateral framing and dispatch of the SPLM/A vision. The visions espoused by either side also often stemmed from an orientation to a regional and international audience rather than a negotiation with Sudanese society. In short, while followers often sought to influence the Sudanese state through popular uprisings and revolt they were largely excluded from the negotiation of state and nation. The result — a continued inability of the state to understand and reflect the nation — led to persistent instability and failure to foster a sense of collective will and loyalty to the state.

4.3 The conflict turns inward: North-South and South-South war (1991-2002)

In August of 1991, several senior members of the SPLM/A, Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong, staged an unsuccessful coup against John Garang (Hutchinson 2001: 308; Rolandsen 2005: 35). The stated reason for this coup was a disagreement with Garang's approach to unity and self-

determination (Arnold & LeRiche 2012: 44; Rolandsen 2005: 35). In addition, supporters of the coup claimed to be acting out of frustration with Garang and the SPLM/A's inability to bring about democratic reforms and in response to a threat of Dinka domination (Nyaba 2000: 1-3; Rolandsen 2005: 35). Up until this point, promises to hold meetings of the Political-Military High Command (PMHC) of the SPLM/A had gone unfulfilled, centring power and decision-making around Garang and his in-group (Rolandsen 2005: 29). After failing to oust Garang, Machar and his allies formed a splinter rebel movement, named SPLM/A-Nasir, while Garang's faction was referred to as SPLM/A-Torit or SPLM/A-Mainstream (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 126). As a result, the SPLM/A was militarily and politically weakened (Rolandsen 2005: 38). The 1990s was then an exceptionally turbulent time in the South and the legacy of this rift would have far-reaching consequences. Below is a discussion of this internal Southern conflict alongside an analysis of the ongoing North-South conflict.

4.3.1 A multiplicity of identities: new fault-lines (re-)emerge

The resulting conflict in the South, while it was centred on elite interests, significantly affected the civilian population. In the months following the coup attempt, Nuer militias loyal to Machar targeted Garang's home region of Bor, killing and displacing civilians and provoking similar attacks on Nuer communities (Hutchinson 2001: 308). Ethnic identity was subsequently used to identify, target and attack civilians in a vicious cycle of revenge attacks (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 126, 131). The dominant rift occurred between Garang's Dinka ethnic group and Machar's Nuer ethnic group (Gerenge 2015: 94). However, other ethnic militias also emerged, especially when the Nasir faction split and Lam Akol sought support amongst his own ethnic group, the Shilluk (Rolandsen 2005: 38). While the Dinka and Nuer had historically taken part in small-scale and sporadic cattle-raiding practices, this war severely escalated the violence between the two groups (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 131-132). Jok and Hutchinson (1999: 130-133), using interview data, provide a description of how this historical but limited conflict between the Dinka and Nuer changed in the 1990s. Key changes included the use of advanced weaponry, the attack of vulnerable groups (women, children and the elderly), the deliberate destruction of property, the duration of the conflict (previously of short duration due to the intervention of traditional leaders) and the political motivation (as opposed to traditionally economic motives) (Jok and Hutchinson 1999: 130-133). This conflict quickly grew to overshadow the North-South conflict. By the end of both conflicts in 2005, more people had been killed in South-South violence than North-South violence (Copnall 2014: 26).

The dominant narrative of this conflict, while certainly containing an ethnic dimension, is that of SPLM/A elites manipulating ethnic identities in a political dispute (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 126,

130-133). Previous conflicts between the Dinka and the Nuer were not driven by a competition for political power, due to the lack of a centralised political organisation or state (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 132-133). As the SPLM/A elite were now fighting over political goods, they "[…] began to arm their respective ethnic groups with more powerful weapons […] in their bid to eliminate the civilian support base of the other side" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 134). Leaders activated ethnic identities in this conflict by arguing that "tribal wealth was under threat", since this was the only way they could raise support from the largely rural population (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 133; Rolandsen 2005: 35). This represents, again, a lack of mutuality between leaders and followers. In the view of southern politician Peter Adwok Nyaba (2000: 6) ethnicity was a "straight jacket" for southern intellectuals. He says, "They have become so conscious of it that they exploit it in the struggle to satisfy their petty needs and ambitions" (Nyaba 2000: 6). As violence escalated, so did the narrative. In the end, the Nasir faction argued that they were fighting "Dinka domination" while the Nuer were labelled as "enemies of the Southern revolution" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 133). At the same time, Khartoum stoked this and similar inter-communal conflicts by arming ethnicity-based militias in a strategy of "divide-and-rule" (Ayers 2010: 166).

While this conflict raged in the South, the North-South conflict continued. The rhetoric of *Jihad* was used to muster support amongst the Muslim youth (Martin 2002: 117). This provided a religious and identity-based justification for a political war, which is not easily reversed and is likely to entrench differences. However, warlords and militia leaders have been said to lack this *jihadist* fervour and rather viewed the militia as "an extension of business" (Johnson quoted in Ayers 2010: 167). In this way, the North-South and South-South conflicts mirrored each others' use of identity rifts to instigate significant violence on behalf of leaders whose interests and motivations were often divergent from their followers' needs. As expected, the conflict therefore hardened racial and religious rifts (Deng 1995: 15-16; De Waal 1998: 136; Rolandsen 2011: 552). Religion, in particular, became a key fissure in Sudanese society and provided further fuel for the separatist agenda (Deng 1995: 13). As these societal rifts hardened and crystallised, politics and conflict in both the North and South became driven by fundamentalist and radical ideologies (Deng 1995: 15-16). This ran contrary to Garang's vision of mending rifts to form a new Sudanese identity.

The events described above seem to endorse the instrumentalist view of identity and conflict. However, one must also interrogate why identity proved so instrumental for leaders to mobilise large groups of people. As one interviewee indicated, ethnicity is the most efficient way to raise awareness around a set of interests, which is aggravated by a lack of education (Interview D 2017). Some also view these as historical conflicts (Interview A 2017; Interview B 2017; Interview E 2017) and

argue that this is how society has always been configured (Oola Interview 2017). While this is debatable, due to the constructed nature of ethnic identity, the perception of ethnic identities and conflicts as more ancient is important. In the South, social and political life was largely structured on the basis of ethnic identities, through the traditional leadership instituted by the colonial regime (discussed in the previous chapter), and as a result of the dominant kinship networks (discussed above). It is plausible that ethnic identity, therefore, provided an easy and ready conduit for leaders to exchange influence. However, this influence exchange lacked mutuality. Prototype leaders, who are chosen based on their identity (see 2.4.1), can have very limited mutuality with their followers in terms of interests and needs. This was the case here. As a result, the ability to influence the population was momentary and driven by short-sighted elite interests, which would prevent the development of a future-looking and widespread ideology and identity. Instead, a divided society was fractured further.

4.3.2 Statehood and nationhood in the midst of war

The Khartoum elite continued their drive for an Islamic state in the 1990s. Between 1992 and 1996 this was exemplified in the Comprehensive Call (*da'wa*), which sought to implement and enforce an Islamic ideology across all sectors of society (De Waal 1998: 140; Rubin 2010: 46-47). This included the forcible relocation of African Sudanese to "peace camps", where they were provided with severe working conditions and taught the Qur'an (De Waal 1998: 141; Rubin 2010: 46-47). It also entailed the abduction or relocation of children to Qur'anic schools, where they were forced to convert to Islam and indoctrinated with the NIF's Islamist ideology, thereby producing military recruits for the Popular Defence Forces (De Waal 1998: 141). However, while the South was facing internal factionalism, the NIF was plagued by political rifts and competition between elites. In a political battle between Hassan al-Turabi, the party's ideological leader, and President Omar al-Bashir, its political leader, al-Bashir emerged the victor, resulting in a shift from fundamentalism to pragmatism in the early 2000s; yet some members, such as Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, did maintain an Islamist ideology (Rolandsen 2011: 553).

Another shift in this period was the SPLM/A's official stance on self-determination. Eventually, Garang grew more open to the idea of secession – a shift some attribute to Mengistu's downfall, though this is uncertain (Young 2005: 539; Young 2012: 81-82). The first time the SPLM/A openly introduced the idea of secession was during negotiations in Abuja in 1992, almost a decade after the conflict had begun (Young 2012: 82). The shift in position is clearly seen in Garang's rhetoric. In 1986, Garang stated that "if anybody wants to separate even in the North, we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It should not be allowed to disintegrate or fragment itself" (Garang with

Khalid 1992: 137). At the first SPLM/A National Convention of 1994, Garang's speech, while still promoting unity, demonstrated a softening of this position, promoting self-determination as a viable option if unity fails (SPLM 1994a). In one instance, he says:

> […] it must be categorically stated that a solution within the context of one Sudan is only possible if the cardinal issues are addressed, and if and only if the Sudan moves away from its present basis of Old Sudan to the New Sudan, for otherwise the country will break up and none of us in the SPLM/SPLA would shed any tears. (SPLM 1994a: 37)

In short, while Garang was effective in deploying his strategy and vision, he was also aware of practical concerns on this issue (Akol Interview 2017). He continued to promote his vision of a unified New Sudan but ensured that secession was a viable option both for bargaining purposes and to ensure support from Southerners.

At the same time, the SPLM/A, with significant territory under its command and in positioning itself as future rulers in a united Sudan or of an independent South Sudan, had to look towards implementing its vision of a democratic state. It is in this area, however, that Garang received perhaps the most criticism. In its early phase, the SPLM/A, driven by its Marxist ideology, largely dismantled the traditional institutions which formed the backbone of local society and served as the bridge between state and people (Young 2005: 540; Leonardi 2013: 8). Nevertheless, in many areas in southern Sudan, the chieftainship system, which was hardly universal, proved resilient and the only system of governance (Rolandsen 2005: 72-73). These institutions were often responsible for providing services and organising communities around public projects (Rolandsen 2005: 72). The weakening of these institutions, however, would have a significant impact on future peace-building challenges (see 5.2.2, 5.3.2), which demonstrates how institutions are influenced by the leadership process. While these traditional institutions were dismantled in response to a specific situation (the need to maintain foreign support through a Marxist ideology), leader actions in this regard would have an important impact on future state-building and institution-building efforts.

In 1994, the SPLM/A held a National Convention that established, at least on paper, key structures reflective of a democratic and functional state (with allowances made for the war-time context in which they were operating). This included the proposal of executive, legislative and judicial bodies within the SPLM/A and the South (SPLM 1994b: 1-8, 10-12). According to Young (2005: 540-541), Garang viewed the establishment of more robust institutions as a threat to his authority. He therefore reportedly opposed this convention, prevented much of it from being implemented and

blocked any subsequent conventions from occurring (Young 2005: 540-541). In fact, Rolandsen (2005: 39) argues that the National Convention was a propaganda move used to win support in its competition with the Nasir faction. He goes on to argue that, while the National Convention was retrospectively seen as a landmark event, it suffered many issues of representation and its elections were largely "*pro forma"* (Rolandsen 2005: 82). Therefore, while Garang was a "strong leader", he failed to "nurture a democratic culture" (Interview C 2017).

Nevertheless, the SPLM/A attempted to establish some institutions, such as elected "Liberation councils," which served to instil a degree of inclusivity in the SPLM/A movement for the Southern population, even though these were widely seen as ineffective, poorly organised and in competition with other local structures (Leonardi 2013: 159). In short, it could be argued that these moves were driven by political factors and a need for the SPLM/A to maintain its supremacy, rather than an effort to form a state that was responsive to citizens' needs. This indicates that if leader and follower interests are not in sync then the state (driven by leaders) and the nation (driven by followers) are unlikely to converge.

Finally, a brief discussion of the military is important due to the traditional role of this institution in nation-building. In the internal SPLM/A conflict, the two factions established, used and armed ethnic militias which often lacked training, discipline and a clear command structure (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 134). At the same time, the NIF had formalised and legalised the use of militias, such as the *Murahaliin* (in the South-West) and the *Rufa'a* (in the southern Blue Nile), through the Popular Defence Act of 1989 (Ayers 2010: 166; De Waal 1998: 138). Such armed forces are unlikely to produce the same unifying and socialisation effect as a distinct military. In the end, it would lead to a proliferation of militias, interests, loyalties and conflicts that would become a severe challenge in the post-CPA and post-secession period, discussed in the next chapter.

4.3.3 The disintegration of collective will and collective responsibility?

Despite the internal conflict in the South, followers across the divide held the same goals of fighting Khartoum (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 130). According to Nyaba (2000: 5-6) fighting the North was more appealing and understandable amongst the Southern population because "[Southerners could] still see the 'Jellaba' controlling the market and exploiting them through unequal exchange." However, this unity of purpose did little to ease the South's continued struggle with building and exercising collective will, action and loyalty. In fact, the allegiances of various militant groups were highly dynamic and shifting (Glickman 2000: 270). By the early 2000s the civil war, while still a

political conflict between Khartoum and the South, was being fought largely by and amongst Southerners (Martin 2002: 112). This was the product of internal rifts in the SPLM/A, the proliferation of various militia groups (often with an ethnic loyalty) and Khartoum's ability to practice a policy of "divide and rule". The Nasir faction itself also mutated, first forming SPLM-United with other SPLM/A-Mainstream defectors, and then splintering into the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A) led by Machar and the SPLM-United led by Akol (Rolandsen 2005: 37-38).

What this internal conflict did do was stimulate a discussion about the decision-making structures of southern Sudanese society (i.e. how the will of the people is determined). Since the defecting factions portrayed themselves as more democratic, the SPLM/A was forced to respond with more democratic practices in order to maintain the support of the Southern intellectuals and populace (Rolandsen 2005: 39). This is discussed in the section above. The competing factions subsequently engaged in a "propaganda war" to win support of Southerners, intellectuals and foreigners (Rolandsen 2005: 39). While the Nasir faction had early support from intellectuals, this faded as they proved unable to implement their promises of a more democratic movement (Rolandsen 2005: 39). In general, therefore, a pattern appears to emerge in which elite interests trumped the need to foster a collective identity, build a responsive state and engender collective will and loyalty.

More evidence of this is seen when the Nasir faction, while it had separated from the SPLM/A on the basis of seeking a harder stance on self-determination, subsequently and paradoxically allied with Khartoum (Deng 1995: 20; Rolandsen 2005: 37). Faction leaders were heavily criticised for this (Deng 1995: 20-21). Peter Adwok Nyaba (2000: 3-4), a member of the Nasir faction who later returned to the SPLM/A-Mainstream, argues that this collaboration with Khartoum was done in secret, without the knowledge or approval of other leaders in the faction. The decision to cooperate with Khartoum, however, was driven by logistical necessity. In particular, Machar lacked access to other neighbouring countries from which to import military supplies (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 129). Machar then negotiated a separate deal with Khartoum in 1996, which prompted many of his Nuer followers to reduce their support for his faction (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 129). This reiterates the centrality of personal ambitions in the SPLM/A rift.

Central to this discussion, therefore, is the issue of leadership. As explained, the South-South war was not driven by the needs or grievances of society at large, nor were most civilians from either ethnic group interested in continuing this conflict (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 127, 130-132; Nyaba 2000: 5). However, the collective desires of the people were over-ridden by elite interests and the military strength of "regional commanders and warlords" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 127, 130). For

example, communication and cooperation between Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups were reportedly suppressed by military leaders of both factions (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 130). Yet, this narrative risks simplifying the situation into one of "elite puppet-masters", discussed in Chapter Two, and neglecting the agency of followers.

Laying the blame for the conflict solely at the feet of the SPLM/A leadership does not explain why ethnic identity interests (e.g. "tribal wealth"), ethnic structures (e.g. ethnic militias) and ethnic loyalties were able to over-ride the reportedly widespread enmity with the North and secessionist aims. In other words, it is interesting to note that soldiers' and community members' loyalty appears to have been determined by ethnicity rather than ideology. For example, Young (2005: 539) points out that most Southerners supported the Nasir faction's stated reason for rebelling – seeking a harder stance on self-determination than Garang was providing at the time. Insight into this phenomenon may come from De Waal's (1998: 136) argument that the SPLM/A was predominantly a military organisation and therefore failed to form a "practical social politics of liberation." In other words, the SPLM/A did not provide the ideology and social and political structures that long-standing ethnic identities did. These structures provide the norms and mechanisms for collective action as well as the protection and services that generate loyalty in return. It could be argued that this contributed to the domination of ethnicity as the guiding indicator for loyalty and action.

In the end, the SPLM/A-Mainstream emerged the more powerful party due to Garang's logistical advantage (Young 2005: 539). Therefore, in this case, ideology appears to hold less loyalty than ethnic identity and outcomes were determined less by popular support and more by contextual factors. This indicates that despite the unity of purpose in opposing the North, Southerners lacked the foundations and leadership to rally behind a collective ideology. As a result, by the late 1990s, both factions of the SPLM/A had splintered further, resulting in a proliferation of militia groups and a military stalemate (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 135). While struggling to maintain a sense of unity in the South, the SPLM/A turned its efforts towards a broader movement encompassing the whole Sudan (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 102).

4.3.4 The conflict turns inward: A leadership analysis

The conflict arising from the 1991 split of the SPLM/A has been characterised as a "war of the Southern educated elite," with Garang and Machar being referred to as "the two doctors" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 125, 128). This would reflect a general rift in Southern society regarding the issue of education and rural and urban communities, discussed below. As an example of the distaste

held for the leaders during this conflict, Jok and Hutchinson (1999: 131) quote a Nuer chief as saying:

> They used to tell us that the reason why Nuer and Dinka fight each other was because we are ignorant. We don't know anything because we are not educated. But now look at all this killing! This war between the Nuer and Dinka is much worse than anything we experienced in the past. And it is the war of educated [elite] — It is not our war at all!

Similarly, Nyaba (2000: 6) explains how during "…the Akobo conference of 1994, one elder asked why the wars instigated by the intellectuals don't seem to end." Leaders of both sides were accused of starting and fomenting this war solely for their personal political interests and rivalries (Deng 1995: 20; Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 136). Peter Adwok Nyaba (2000: 1) claims that Machar and Akol only began advocating for democratic reforms once they "fell out" with Garang. In the end, this factional war had the effect of reducing followers' faith in both Garang and Machar's leadership (Jok & Hutchinson 1999: 130).

As discussed, both Khartoum and Southern leaders used existing, small-scale economic disputes such as cattle-raiding and grazing land disagreements to mobilise militias in their cause. Military activity was driven less by a mutual goal between leaders and followers and a collective understanding of group identity than separate interests that momentarily converged. It is fairly evident that, while influence was exchanged in the short-term, there was no mutuality of interests and needs, which forced leaders to resort to identity narratives to mobilise collective action. In the long-term, this ran counter to leaders' stated goals by fragmenting society further. As a result, the leader-follower gap led to a disjuncture of goals and action, as action became driven by short-term situational factors that primarily affected leaders. The ease with which allegiances were shifted also implies limited commitment to the visions espoused by their respective leaders.

A discussion of Garang's leadership is also important at this time. The source and degree of Garang's legitimacy is difficult to determine. Understandably, no election or similar exercise was conducted during the conflict to gauge his popular support (Martin 2002: 121), though he is viewed as a unifying figure (Interview D 2017). And while it could be said that Garang and the SPLM/A emerged as the dominant representative of the Southern people, the discussion above illustrates that this was not a simple relationship. There appears to be a certain acceptance of the SPLM/A amongst Southerners as necessary to lead them to independence, but also a degree of contempt for the elite, particularly the educated, urban elite. It is possible that Southerners held a similar regard for

Garang. Nevertheless, Garang appeared adept at shifting tactics and building support when necessary. While this seemed evidence of a skilled politician at the time, it would result in long-term nation-building challenges. Young (2005: 539) says of Garang:

> His rule has been tough and high-handed, but many argue necessary in the difficult political environment of south Sudan. However, the costs of his leadership have been high. The SPLM/A has never developed an ideology that was coherent and acceptable to its followers because it always had to be subject to the dictates and needs of Garang. By calling for a united Sudan and at the same time giving support to southern self-determination, Garang has been able to be all things to all people. In the Arab world and for Northerners his rhetoric has been strongly in favour of a united and democratic Sudan, while in the South he presented himself as a true son of the soil.

While the above description may be reflective of a skilled politician and even charismatic leadership, when understood within the context of the leadership process it reveals several challenges. Garang likely used multiple sources of power, including referent, expert and legitimate power. Garang's referent power and charisma is hard to dispute. This is particularly evident in the spiritual myths he would come to embody — being likened to Moses leading his followers to the promise land (Frahm 2012: 38). Garang's oratory skills are described by Hilde Johnson (2011b: 11):

> He was a master of crowds, mobilising thousands with speeches that could go on for hours. He spoke in the popular idiom, with analogies and stories the people knew. People would roar with laughter, and cheer in anticipation and appreciation, "SPLM Oyeeee". Even during his first visit to the Nuba Mountains, at Kauda, Dr. John got everyone's attention with his knowledge of Nuba history and use of old myths, proverbs and traditions. He was an entertainer of sorts.

The use of myths and stories that resonated with his audience demonstrates an understanding of his followership and a degree of mutuality. It also reflects referent power in that his followers were able to see themselves in him. His speeches likely also contributed to myth-building processes and an affirmation of southern identities that had historically been neglected. It therefore contributed to the continued process of identity construction found in nation-building.

However, Garang's use of coercive power to maintain his position and his vision indicates two things. First, his vision and perhaps even his leadership, lacked the political and popular support

needed to form the collective will and collective loyalty indicative of a nation. As a result, leaders and followers failed to act as a collective even in the face of a common enemy, evidenced in the shifting alliances and inter-communal conflict characteristic of the 1990s. While Garang's coercive power may have managed some of these rifts, it did not mend them. And, since coercive power cannot transcend the leader's death, South Sudanese politics and society would fracture to a disastrous degree in the future.

Secondly, the use of coercive power is indicative of a lack of mutuality and, as a result, a failure to exchange influence beyond short-term goals. Garang may have provided the guidance necessary to confront Khartoum and mobilise support for this confrontation, but his espoused values and norms of unity, non-racialism, non-discrimination and respect for human rights were not reflected in those of his followers. Therefore, the leader-follower relationship appears almost transactional, despite his portrayal as a transformational leader. Leadership in southern Sudan, however, appears to have a tradition of transactional leadership. Traditional leaders, for example, were historically chosen largely on the basis of their wealth, allowing them to provide for the community, and later on their status and education, permitting them to act as a mediator between state and people (Leonardi 2013: 162-163).

In this way, the case of John Garang illustrates that nation-building requires more than charismatic or transactional leadership. First, nations cannot be built through the use of coercive power where a mutual vision of the nation, espoused by both leader and led, is lacking. Secondly, where a mutuality of norms and values is lacking, the construction of a national identity that promotes cohesion and the formation of a substantive ideology that drives collective action and forms the basis of the state, is very difficult. While the "costs" of Garang's leadership are not readily apparent at this stage, they would become critical in the post-CPA and post-secession phase, discussed in the next chapter.

4.4 Negotiating peace

Throughout the events discussed in the previous sections, the peace process experienced several stops and starts. Under Nigerian leadership, peace negotiations took place in Abuja in the early 1990s, with little success (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 101-102; Young 2012: 82). The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) stepped in to lead the peace process in 1993, with the 1994 Declaration of Principles being hailed as its first success (Rolandsen 2011: 553). Surprisingly, this declaration included an acknowledgment of the South's right to self-determination in the event that democracy and secularism failed in Khartoum (Young 2012: 84). The declaration was therefore

rejected by the Sudanese government (Young 2012: 84). The peace process faltered after this, with new actors becoming involved while others lost interest (Rolandsen 2011: 553). For example, a Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative was launched in response to, amongst other things, "African domination of the peace process" (Young 2012: 87). These efforts were seen as competing with the IGAD process (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 101).

IGAD then reinvigorated its peace process in 2001 and 2002 (Rolandsen 2011: 553). Hilde Johnson (2011: 1-3), a key mediator in the peace process, details how Vice-President Ali Osman Taha initiated direct talks with John Garang in 2003, which would make significant contributions to an eventual agreement. The resulting Machakos Protocol of 20 July 2002 would pave the way for the CPA of 2005 (Rolandsen 2011: 551). The final CPA included the Machakos Protocol (which provided for an interim period of six years and the Southern Sudanese referendum) a Power Sharing Agreement signed on 26 May 2004, a Wealth Sharing Agreement signed on 7 January 2004, resolutions on the Abyei, Southern Kordofon and Blue Nile conflicts signed on 26 May 2004 and an agreement on security arrangements signed on 25 September 2003 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005). This section will analyse these events and identify some of the processes that hampered future nation-building processes.

4.4.1 The influence of identity narratives on the peace process

Despite what appeared to be an irreparable rift between Northern and Southern identities, Northern elites were initially resolute in their position on self-determination and an Islamic state, which some argue was because the Islamist leaders of Khartoum believed that the South would inevitably transform into an Islamic and Arabic society (Rolandsen 2011: 555). At the same time, identity had become so entrenched in the conflict that it began to bleed into the peace process. For example, the appointment of an ordained Episcopalian minister, Senator John Danforth, as the United States' special envoy, was received with suspicion from Khartoum who viewed it as a subtle signal of support for the South (Martin 2002: 124). However, the focus on the issue of religion and the North-South conflict would lead to a peace process that failed to understand the myriad of identities at play. Therefore, as much of this discussion will tend towards an analysis of the North-South conflict it is important to briefly also highlight other identity issues that were neglected in the peace process but would come into play in the future.

First, another important identity to which reference has implicitly been made is that of urban and rural identities. A clear division between rural and urban populations, and the less educated and ed-

ucated populations in southern Sudan meant that the "educated elite" and their development initiatives were viewed with antagonism, "resentment" and "suspicion" by many rural Southerners (Leonardi 2013: 161-162). At the same time, the educated, urban population often looked to the rural dwellers with a paradoxical sentiment of both "idealised [nostalgia]" and "disdain" (Leonardi 2013: 162). These distinct identities are exemplified in the statement by an urban-dwelling Southerner that:

> It is not good for chiefs to be in town. If we mix things in the town, there will be no difference between outside people and town people — we need to differentiate; this is one of the most important things now. The town is supposed to be only for soldiers, students, the educated, traders, technical people and government. (Quoted in Leonardi 2013: 162-163).

His emphasis on the need to keep the urban and rural population distinct from each other is telling. It also re-affirms the growing evidence that, despite the near universal opposition to the North and the dominant narratives of oppression and exploitation that united Southerners, there were many competing identities in the region. In addition, this reflects the distrust between the educated and less educated peoples of Sudan, which inevitably mirrored the leader-follower gap discussed above. This would make ensuring an inclusive peace process difficult. However, the exclusion of such a core identity group (the rural population) from a peace process that would determine the future identity of state and nation would pose significant challenges in the future.

In addition to this, the peace process' focus on religion centred on the question of Islam. However, as discussed above, the Church had grown substantially in southern Sudan by the 1990s. The Church subsequently played a significant role in South-South reconciliation: The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) engaged local communities and leaders to promote Dinka-Nuer dialogue and some have attributed the eventual reconciliation between Garang and Machar to the NSCC led *Wunlit* process which brought hundreds of representatives of the warring communities together to reach an agreement (Moro 2015: 6). The proceedings of this conference indicated the hybrid Christian and Animist religion of the South, with rituals from both being used (Moro 2015: 6). However, the Church, and in fact civil society in general, was excluded from the North-South peace process, which was largely an elite affair between the NCP and the SPLM/A (Akol 2014: 3; Moro 2015: 4).

While the conflict in southern Sudan had taken on and entrenched various identities, including religious, class and ethnic identities, the peace process placed a spotlight on religion (Johnson 2011b: 46, 49; Machakos Protocol 2002: 3-4, 6, 8, 12-13). Specifically, it centred on the role of religion in

the state (discussed below). Once again, this reveals a leader-follower gap, where leaders' interest in identity would rise and fall based on how it would influence their access to power and the state structures they were a part of. However, their use of identity was founded on and contributed to the social reality of their followers. Identity difference and conflict in South Sudan reinforced each other. However, due to a lack of mutuality between leaders and followers, this dangerous cycle of identity construction was not addressed in the peace process.

4.4.2 Statehood and nationhood: Laying the groundwork for the future state(s)

The international context played a significant role in the peace process. Neighbouring states, depending on their interests, acted as parties or mediators in the conflict. Ethiopia's central role in the development of the SPLM/A has already been alluded to above. A key global player in the trajectory of the conflict was the USA, for various reasons.[15] US policy shifted from first supporting Khartoum as part of its wider Cold War strategy, to directly and indirectly supporting the SPLM/A and adopting a "diplomacy of famine and human rights" in an effort to counter the increasingly radical Islamist NIF regime, to pursuing peace when oil interests entered the conflict landscape (Ayers 2010: 162). On its side, Khartoum, which was labelled a pariah and sponsor of terrorism during the 1990s, began to renegotiate its relationship with the West (Ayers 2010: 162; Martin 2002: 111-112, 115-116; Rolandsen 2011: 552). In other words, after nearly two decades of conflict in which both sides appeared immovable, international events rather than domestic circumstances, are attributed with moving the peace process forward.

The two key sticking points throughout these years was that of the role of religion in the state and self-determination for the South (Johnson 2011b: 42-50; Rolandsen 2011: 555; Young 2012: 82). The Declaration of Principles of 1994 affirmed the right to self-determination in the event that democracy and secularism failed, but also prioritised unity (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 105; Young 2012: 84). This declaration was eventually rejected by Khartoum (Young 2012: 85). Hilde Johnson (2011b: 42-54), describes how the final negotiations nearly failed because of these two points. In her analysis, the SPLM/A was unwilling to compromise on a referendum and wanted Sudan to be a secular state in the interim period, while Khartoum was unwilling to relinquish the Islamist agenda and *Shari'a* law if the South was likely to secede in any case (Johnson 2011b: 46, 49). A breakdown in negotiations was averted, however, and a breakthrough was achieved with the Machakos Protocol (Johnson 2011b: 49-55).

[15] This is broadly related to security and economic interests and domestic sentiments. This has been extensively discussed elsewhere. See Campbell 2015 and Allen 2015.

The Machakos Protocol, similar to the Declaration of Principles, made provision for a Southern referendum with the condition that efforts would be made to maintain unity (Machakos Protocol 2002: 2, 12-13, 17). It also dedicated significant space to the issue of religion, highlighting Sudan's diversity and the need for freedom of religion, while also indicating that areas outside southern Sudan "shall have as its source of legislation *Shari'a* and the consensus of the people" (Machakos Protocol 2002: 3-4, 6, 8, 12-13). Both issues relate to the state and whether and how the state will represent its citizens. In other words, those around the peace table had to determine what the relationship would be between the nation and the state. However, there was no consensus on what constituted the Sudanese nation(s), and the document primarily focused on religion rather than other aspects of Sudanese identities. In the end, the CPA would lay out the nature of the Sudanese state and not the nation.

An important change in the Second Civil War was the introduction of oil as a key interest. The discovery and extraction of oil in the South added an economic element to the conflict, within a wider context of an economy in turmoil. In an effort to "depopulate" oil-rich regions, Khartoum began a "scorched earth" policy in the 1980s that would continue throughout the war (Ayers 2010: 167). Khartoum's efforts to achieve a military victory, at least in the oil producing areas, were intensified in the 1990s and early 2000s because of this (Martin 2002: 119). Some have argued that Khartoum was unwilling to compromise on the issue of self-determination due to the resulting loss of the South's oil revenues (Martin 2002: 118-120; Rolandsen 2011: 555). However, oil only became a factor in the Second Civil War. Oil was discovered in the 1980s in southern Sudan, which sparked some debate about how this resource would be developed and shared (Ayers 2010: 165; Mayen 1982: 7). Sudan only began exporting oil in 1999 (Ayers 2010: 165). Therefore, this argument that the conflict is resource driven negates the decades of federalist and separatist demands of the South that had been blocked since pre-independence by the Khartoum elite.

As discussed in Chapter Three, a key historical commonality amongst many Southern Sudanese has been their resistance to the state. In its early days, the SPLM/A had an ambivalent or even antagonistic relationship with "civilian organisations", including NGOs and traditional institutions (Leonardi 2013: 1, Rolandsen 2005: 30; Young 2005: 540). Yet, by the end of the Second Civil War, the SPLM/A was perceived by many Southerners "as the new *hakuma*"[16] (Leonardi 2013: 159). As the war progressed, the nature of the state and the perception of the state amongst South-

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[16] An arabic term used to denote the government and state structures (Leonardi 2007: 394)

erners began to change. As the SPLM/A sought to include more of the population in its "state", expectations of service delivery increased (Leonardi 2013: 160-161). However, some have noted that while expectations rose, there was not a corresponding increase of responsibility for the sustainability of the state, its institutions and its infrastructure amongst the population (Leonardi 2013: 160-161). This is indicative of a failure to generate collective responsibility.

In this way, the SPLM/A had to consider how to build a state in a war-torn society in preparation for peace. This intention was signalled in a statement signed by John Garang and released in 2003. The statement primarily blamed "a lack of resources" for poor institutionalisation up until then (SPLM/SPLMA 2003: 2). However, in the 1996 *Conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in the New Sudan*, Lawrence Luay Akuey accused the SPLM/A of a "lack of interest" in building a system of education (SPLM 1996: 3). In addition, due to the colonial legacy discussed in Chapter Two and the SPLM/A's own actions discussed above, there was not a strong foundation on which to build a state (Interview C 2017). Some Southerners accused the SPLM/A of destroying historical "relations of dependency and clientage," that had previously ensured the protection of vulnerable members of society, shifting the responsibility to the state (Leonardi 2013: 161).

Of course, within the context of conflict and with limited resources, the SPLM/A was unable, and perhaps unwilling, to fulfil this task. The SPLM/A appeared to frame their vision of the state on a hybrid of traditional structures used by the colonial government and Western models of democratic states. Therefore, in the late 1990s and 2000s, the SPLM/A began to acknowledge the role of traditional leadership, reversing their earlier antagonism to the system (Leonardi 2013: 1; 159). This is likely because traditional leadership was one of the few mechanisms through which the state had historically reached its citizens (Interview C 2017; Leonardi 2013: 9). While urban dwellers viewed traditional leaders as separate and distinct from government, the system of traditional leadership was in fact an extension of the state and served as an intermediary between the state and the rural population (Leonardi 2013: 9, 162-163).

In short, with a peace agreement now imminent, the SPLM/A had to confront the many contradictions between nation and state in southern Sudan. However, the leader-follower gap made this a challenging endeavour. There was no extensive dialogue or consensus on what constituted the nation that the state was meant to represent and indeed what the purpose of the state would be. This followed nearly two decades of shifting SPLM/A ideologies and policies driven by external factors and elite interests rather than a mutual exchange of influence with the Southern people. As a result,

at independence South Sudanese leadership would lack a guiding ideology from which to move forward (Interview C 2017).

4.4.3 Continued challenges of collective will and collective responsibility

Following the “reconciliation” between the warring factions of the SPLM/A, the movement was able to present a more unified front at the negotiating table (Rolandsen 2011: 553). The organisation was also able to negotiate on behalf of other regions beyond the South, as it was the strongest single actor in the NDA (Rolandsen 2011: 553). Yet, the final peace agreement indicates that the SPLM/A was negotiating primarily for the South, and even there, it may have been negotiating primarily for the Southern elite. Briefly, as discussed above, the SPLM/A had conducted the war on the basis of a “New Sudan” in conjunction with other political forces and armed rebellions in the country. However, the peace agreement largely excluded these conflicts (Rolandsen 2011: 552). For example, the questions of Abyei, the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan were handled in separate chapters of the agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 63-84). Similarly, many members of the NDA were opposed to various elements of the Machakos Protocol, requiring Garang to personally contact these members to explain the SPLM/A’s signing of the agreement (Johnson 2011b: 56). Therefore, while southern Sudan was able to act collectively with other regions and peoples of Sudan, this appeared superficial and did not signal the collective will of a nation. Again, this is likely explained by the divergence of leader and follower interests.

In addition, the SPLM/A’s leadership crisis was far from resolved. From 29 November to 1 December 2004, amidst growing opposition to Garang's leadership style and rumours that he was planning to remove and arrest Salva Kiir, SPLM/A leaders held a meeting in Rumbek to confront Garang regarding “his autocratic style of leadership, failure to consult, ethnic favouritism, and the corruption of some of those nearest him” (Young 2005: 541). Hilde Johnson (2011: 163-164) describes this as a very tense period and questions the timing as it occurred towards the end of negotiations. She also argues that Salva Kiir was acting largely under pressure from other leaders (Johnson 2011b: 163-164). Yet Salva Kiir apparently “accused Garang of carrying the SPLM/A in his briefcase” (Young 2005: 541). Garang’s critics were silenced, as they often were in the past, by the argument that open dissent and disunity amongst leaders was counter-productive to the movement’s goals, a theme that would be repeated in the succession battle after his death (AUCISS 2014: 29; Rolandsen 2015: 168; Young 2005: 541-542).

The peace process was an exclusive one. By bringing in the top leaders of both parties, mediators were able to end over a decade of gridlock in the negotiation process (Johnson 2011b: 1-2). At the

same time, it prevented the inclusion of a range of voices which, arguably, may have had different demands. Civil society, for example, was excluded (Akol 2014: 3; Moro 2015: 4). It is also unclear whether the SPLM represented the interests of other Southern elites who were excluded (D'Agoot Interview 2017). Consultations, however, did take place (D'Agoot Interview 2017). It is therefore difficult to gauge how well the interests of Southerners were represented at the negotiating table. As is well established by now, the one thing that seemed ubiquitous was the desire for secession. In this at least, "the SPLM did represent the collective sentiment of the people of South Sudan" (D'Agoot Interview 2017). Hilde Johnson (2011b: 49-50) describes how rural school children were taught and performed songs that promoted self-determination by portraying the Addis Ababa Agreement as a betrayal. She also discusses how early negotiations were jeopardised by this issue when not only leaders but commanders in the field began to suspect that Khartoum would not compromise on self-determination (Johnson 2011b: 47). In the end, when the process was reaching conclusion, Garang had to "[embark] on a highly successful three-week tour" to "sell" the agreement to Southerners (Johnson 2011b: 149).

It is fair to ask why, after decades of stalemate and continuous conflict the two sides, or rather the leaders of the two sides, were willing to enter a peace agreement. Proposed arguments include war fatigue, oil production and the heightened role of the US (Rolandsen 2011: 551). The central role of international actors in pushing for peace begs the question of popular support and collective will amongst the population. In other words, if the international environment was a determining factor in the parties' willingness to pursue peace, as some have indicated (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 101-102; Martin 2002: 112, 115-116, 118-120, 123-127; Rolandsen 2011: 552-555), it indicates that the influence being exchanged was more between national and international leaders rather than between Sudanese leaders and their followers.

In summary, while the signing of the CPA in 2005 could be seen as a success, a leadership analysis reveals some concerns. Specifically, the exclusion of other actors (i.e. civil society and other political parties), the suppression of internal dissent in the SPLM/A and the dominant role of the international context may be indicative of a lack of not only representation but an exchange of influence as well. In other words, to what degree did the Southern population's interests and needs influence leaders' decisions at the negotiating table?

4.4.4 Negotiating Peace: A leadership analysis

The motives of leaders during the peace process must be analysed in order to assess the level of mutuality and influence exchange with their respective followers. Early efforts at negotiations were

seen as disingenuous and "public relations rhetoric" (Deng 1995: 16). The IGAD peace process was begun on the invitation of al-Bashir. His reasons for doing this were largely pragmatic, including a "need to preempt foreign intervention" (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006: 103). This included not only a suspicion of UN-led mediation but also US military intervention (Young 2012: 83). Garang was accused by some of not being serious about the peace process since peace was not seen to be in his interests (Martin 2002: 121). In addition, when direct talks were first proposed, Garang was hesitant, believing that the top leaders should only be brought in at the end of the negotiation process (Johnson 2011b: 1).

By the time peace was achieved, the peace agreement provided Garang with "a virtual hegemonic position in the South and the holding of a strong vice presidency nationally" (Young 2005: 535). One can infer that how and when leaders engaged in the peace process was often driven by elite interests and situational factors. This further exemplifies the inability to develop a sense of collective purpose and, particularly in this case, a collective future. Yet, this does not mean that leaders acted without any influence from the population. The issues of secession for the South and *Shari'a* for the North were problematic precisely because a compromise on these issues would lead to "political suicide" for the respective parties (Johnson 2011b: 49).

Nevertheless, the peace process remained largely an elite affair. The negotiations leading to the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002 reveal the leadership dynamic in both Khartoum and the SPLM/A. The four delegates — Said al-Khatib and Yahia Husein Babikir for Khartoum and Deng Alor and Nhial Deng for the SPLM/A — were left alone to negotiate the text of the document (Johnson 2011b: 50-54). However, they appeared to spend more time making calls with their superiors, rather than negotiating, leading some to conclude that they did not actually have the mandate to negotiate and make decisions (Johnson 2011b: 50-54). This reiterates the centralised nature of leadership in Sudan and southern Sudan. Combined with what has already been discussed regarding the leader-follower gap it confirms that decisions, visions and narratives that would determine the nature of the Sudanese nation and state were driven by a select few whose interests did not necessarily align with society as a whole.

The role of the international context has already been discussed. This is important because the increased international involvement interrupted the leader-follower exchange, by compelling leaders to cater to international needs and interests, often neglecting that of their followers. It may even be argued that mutuality existed between leaders of Sudan and their regional and international counter-

parts rather than between leaders and followers. This is important because nations require a collective choice and will amongst the people of the nation, which was not reflected in a peace process that would determine the fundamental character of that nation. The role of humanitarian aid is also important in understanding the leader-follower gap in southern Sudan. With services being provided by humanitarian agencies, some have argued that this allowed leaders to continue the war without having to take into account the costs (Martin 2002: 123). In fact, in the eyes of many Southerners, NGOs, government organisations, SPLM institutions and the UN agencies formed a collective *hakuma* (Leonardi 2013: 160). This further allowed leaders to function and survive in a situation where they were not confronting the needs and narratives of the population. It also indicates that the desire for peace, and the nature of said peace, was driven by elite interests, rather than that of the population.

4.5 Conclusion

While compromise and changing tactics in response to context are natural and necessary amongst political leaders, the ease and degree of shifting alliances and ideologies in Sudanese politics is less illustrative of a good reading of context and more indicative of political opportunism that neglects the interests of followers. If the leadership process in a society is characterised by such a disconnect between leaders and followers, the resulting inconsistencies and contradictions in leader narratives and actions are likely to hinder the formation of a nation. Simply put, if there is a gap between leaders and followers based on a lack of mutuality and therefore a limited exchange of influence, a peace-sustaining nation is unlikely to form.

In the nation-building process, leaders often act as the framers of identity and followers can choose to reject or act upon this framing based on their lived experience. Leaders also formulate the institutions of the state and act as the interlocutors between the nation and the state, but followers are required to implement and comply with state policies and institutions. Leaders can be the instigators or the conduit through which followers can express collective will, but followers are required to act upon this expressed will through going to war or choosing peace. Leaders also need, command and seek collective loyalty from followers to themselves and the political organisation they seek to build. This needs to be a continuous process rather than a momentary allegiance of converging interests.

Building a collective identity, however, is difficult if leaders and followers hold different identities (such as the rural-urban identity divide in southern Sudan), or have different perceptions of identity

(such as the discrepancy between Garang's Sudanism and the dominant ethnic identity amongst followers), or if identity is used for different purposes (as leaders used it for mobilisation but followers used it as a way to structure social life, identify enemies and build trust). In determining the nature of the state leaders may install institutions, laws and policies, such as the Islamisation policies emanating from the North and SPLM/A's attempts at building local institutions. They may develop philosophies and ideologies such as Sudanism and Islamism. But without institutionalised bureaucracies to implement such policies and followers to adhere to and accept laws and the ideologies they represent, leaders had to rely on coercive power or witness their efforts fail. As evidenced above, this tends to fracture rather than build a nation. Also, if the laws, policies and state structures reflect the interests of the leader, followers may opt out or rebel. In this case, the South opted out of a unified Sudanese state.

On the matter of collective will, leaders can request collective action (such as rebelling against the North, targeting opposing ethnic groups or moving towards peace) but followers are likely to act based on their own interests and needs, with the exception of coercion. Ideally, the leaders' call for action should be an expression of collective will. But if they are in fact expressing their individual will, as occurred in the SPLM/A rift, then followers may cooperate momentarily, while also ensuring that collective action is temporary and easily changed. This makes maintaining a society that makes collective decisions together as a nation difficult. Finally, while Sudanese leaders sought loyalty by espousing specific visions, the shifting alliances and regular rebellions on both sides indicates that they failed to do this. The lack of mutuality may explain this. Collective loyalty therefore needs to be based on a mutual sense of destiny and purpose.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROAD TO SECESSION AND THE DESCENT INTO CIVIL WAR

5.1 Introduction

Following the CPA agreement, John Garang was greeted in Khartoum by crowds of celebrating Sudanese; he would die three weeks later in a helicopter crash (Johnson 2016: Chapter One). The peace agreement would now have to be implemented without the charismatic leader who was so central to the struggle. While a document had been signed, much still had to be done to achieve sustainable peace. An immense peace-building and nation-building challenge now confronted the Sudanese people and their leaders. This chapter traces the ensuing process from the interim period, to secession, to the current South Sudanese civil war. These three phases are analysed through the lens of the leadership process with a focus on identity construction, the role of the state in nation-building and the fostering of collective will and loyalty. It is argued that many of the trends in the leadership process that have been observed in the previous two chapters would persist and be replicated in the new South Sudan. These patterns include a flawed leader-follower relationship and a failure to respond to situations that affected followers. It will be shown that the expansive mutuality gap observed throughout South Sudan's history has resulted in an untenable nation-building challenge that is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

5.2 Implementing peace (2005-2011)

In July 2005, Sudan's interim constitution was signed and John Garang became first vice-president of Sudan (Rolandsen 2015: 168). Southern Sudan was given regional autonomy as per the CPA agreement (Akol Interview 2017; Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 12-13, 32). What followed was the six-year interim period that was meant to further a democratic and social transformation in Sudan. At the end of this period, southern Sudan was to be given a referendum to decide whether the region would separate from Sudan (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 3-8). However, the implementation of the CPA and its milestones were repeatedly delayed (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 121; Johnson 2011b: 177). In fact, the only milestone not delayed was the referendum (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 121). In addition, the peace agreement is not perceived to have been implemented fully (Bereketeab 2014: 312). This incomplete implementation was supported by both sides as they delayed and renegotiated the agreement based on their specific interests (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 119). This section will analyse the interim period to illustrate how these actions laid the foundations for future challenges in an independent South Sudan.

5.2.1 Defining the nation(s) and reconciling conflicting identities

With reference to identity, the primary matter at hand during the interim period was reconciling the conflict-hardened identities of Sudan towards a national, unified Sudanese identity, or accepting that these identities were irreconcilable within a single political unit. Little effort was made to achieve the first, and a *prima facie* acceptance of the second led to the separation of the country without confronting the multiple contradictions in Sudanese and Southern Sudanese identities. On paper, the CPA acknowledges Sudan's multi-cultural and diverse nature (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 5). Nevertheless, the peace process served to further foster a reductionist understanding of identity in Sudan, by highlighting the binary identities of Arab/Muslim and African/Christian (Bereketeab 2014: 313). It failed to take into account the significant and multi-layered diversity in the country (Medani 2011: 143). In addition, the SPLM/A's Northern allies viewed the movement's signing of the agreement as a "sell-out" or abandonment of the Sudanism ideal (Young 2012: 156). The eventual secession would leave said allies to confront the National Congress Party (NCP) alone (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 133). While a few SPLM leaders continued to support unity, others chose to decrease pressure on the NCP for democratic transformation in exchange for pursuing independence (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 117). Subsequently, rather than trying to realise Garang's vision of a unified Sudanese identity, the NCP and the SPLM/A instead embedded the North-South divide during the interim period (Bereketeab 2014: 314).

By this time, identity had also become inextricably entwined with politics. A few examples serve to illustrate this point. When the SPLM selected Yasir Said Arman to run for the Sudanese presidency, concerns were raised that Southerners would not be willing to vote for an Arab (Young 2012: 151). On the part of Northerners, Yasir was branded as a "racial traitor" (Young 2012: 151). Similarly, when Lam Akol decided to run against the SPLM in the South, his primary support base was his own ethnic group, the Shilluk (Young 2012: 162). Garang and Kiir's identities also influenced political relationships, as seen in this statement by an NCP leader: "People looked upon Garang as a Sudanese, not a Southerner, like Salva" (quoted in Young 2012: 141). Finally, a census was conducted in 2008, the results of which were rejected by the SPLM (Young 2012: 138). Believing that Southerners had been under-counted, they feared the impact this would have on the referendum and the division of oil resources (Medani 2011: 143-144). This shows that identity became a tool in elite political competition. Elites were more concerned with ensuring official figures reflected favourably on their political goals than with understanding the actual social landscape of Sudan for the purpose of pursuing nation-building in a unified country.

Within southern Sudan itself, divisions in identity were also apparent. As the SPLA withdrew from certain regions, inter-communal conflict escalated (Pendle 2014: 236). This withdrawal left a weakened traditional authority system in charge of "a militarised and armed population" (Awolich 2015: 11). In addition, ethnic militias continued to be sponsored by the NCP government through the Khartoum sponsored South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) militia (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 128). The Juba Declaration of 2006 had unified the SSDF and the SPLA, but splinter units continued their activities (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 128; Young 2012: 14). Much of these conflicts formed along ethnic divisions and signalled an effort by groups to position themselves in power in preparation for an independent South Sudan. For example, in 2009, Dinka members, sanctioned by the SPLA, began systematic attacks against Shilluk members in the Upper Nile in order to take control of Malakal (Young 2012: 162). In addition, some leaders who failed to win seats at the 2010 elections used existing ethnic tensions to mobilise and respond with rebellion (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Thus, as Gerenge (2015: 95) states:

> The CPA Interim Period as well as the secession offered beneficial conditions for the Dinka and Nuer to define a form of political settlement which justified their grip on political power and determined the accompanying socioeconomic entitlements. The state-building process that favoured formal institutional development sustained this mode of settlement.

In other words, the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups manipulated the peace process and state-building process in order to ensure their supremacy in South Sudan, indicating that ethnic or sub-national identities were already starting to take a more predominant position than national identity. The peace process, which would determine the nature of the Sudanese and South Sudanese state, was dominated by the Nuer and Dinka-dominated SPLM, to the exclusion of almost all other voices (Gerenge 2015: 94; Moro 2015: 4). The way in which the state would be constructed would not only further their hold on power, but also crystallise and deepen ethnic divisions. As a result, state-building and identity construction would interact as these conflicts would continue into the independence era. This is discussed further in section 5.3 below. The evidence, therefore, was clear that southern Sudan did not yet hold a national identity. The CPA process, and the leaders implementing it, did little to confront this reality as attention was diverted to more elite interests.

5.2.2 Statehood and nationhood: Unity or secession?

These elite interests tended to centre on the state, which is where most peace-building efforts were directed. However, this was a largely technical and unsuccessful affair that did little to reconcile nation and state. A key reason for this was the elite-centred nature of the process. The CPA provided

the South with regional autonomy and Southern politicians with access to central government (Medani 2011: 142). In short, it created a situation of "one country and two systems" (Akol Interview 2017). A concerted effort at state-building followed (Gerenge 2015: 87). At the same time, aid agencies and NGO's filled the void that decades of civil war had created in state services (Ajak 2015: 8). During this period, the Government of Southern Sudan endeavoured to build the necessary administrative structures for a functional state (Panozzo 2011: 24). However, these institutions were insufficient, plagued by corruption and dominated by the SPLM (Panozzo 2011: 24).

As a result, the limited progress made in building the South Sudanese state produced only poorly functioning institutions by the time it would secede (Ajak 2015: 4-5; Interview C). A key reason for this failure is the replication of a Sudanese pattern whereby resources become centred at the capital and the peripheries are neglected (Thomas 2015). The government adopted an approach of "decentralised democracy", where oil revenues would be transferred to the states which produced little resources on their own (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Very little, however, was actually transferred to said states, a problem that would persist into the independence era (AUCISS 2014: 45; Interview B 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). In short, the reliance on humanitarian aid and the failure to distribute resources indicate that elites were less concerned with ensuring the state served the people than their personal interests. It would, however, also result in a situation where leaders held little influence over followers and *vice-versa.* This would lead to serious challenges in the post-independence era.

Regarding unity and secession, the intended purpose of the interim period was to form a Sudan in which southern voters would wish to remain (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 116). Bereketeab (2014: 313-314) argues that the real intention behind the CPA was different from that stated. Rather than pursuing substantial reforms in Sudan as a whole, the primary goal appears to have been a smooth separation of northern and southern Sudan (Young 2012: 134). Although the CPA stated that efforts must be made to "mak[e] the unity of Sudan attractive", many viewed this to be the responsibility of the NCP and not the SPLM/A (Akol Interview 2017; Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 4; Deng 2010: 6). Akol (Interview 2017) argues that the NCP instead sought to "buy" peace. The 2010 elections were meant to signal a transition to democracy, in support of this bid to make unity appealing (Medani 2011: 136, 143). Instead, they served the purpose of entrenching the SPLM and NCP in power, while providing the apparent legitimacy of being democratically elected (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 131; Young 2012: 134-135). This democratic legitimacy is often desired to please an international audience rather than building actual legitimacy with the population (Young 2012: 9-10).

In addition, it was general knowledge that the “vast majority” of Southerners preferred separation over unity (Deng 2010: 6-7, 9). In fact, it has been contended that this was the primary reason southerners voted for the SPLM in 2010, rather than a true sense of mutuality with the party (Young 2012: 174). After Garang’s death, the SPLM all but abandoned the unity vision (Akol Interview 2017; Amb. Hassan Interview 2017; Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 116). Then, when the head of the party, Kiir, deferred from running for the Sudanese presidency in 2010 it was seen as a signal that the SPLM was aiming for independence (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 130; Young 2012: 150). The same conclusion was drawn when the SPLM boycotted the Sudanese presidential elections and turned their focus solely to southern elections (Young 2012: 152-153, 156). In short, for the SPLM the elections were a means to ensure their hold on power in the soon-to-be independent South rather than a way to overthrow the NCP to build a new Sudan (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 130). However, the initial success of the SPLM candidate, Yasir Arman, is evidence that Garang’s “New Sudan” vision held sway in many people’s minds (Young 2012: 156). This unity versus secession debate remained volatile and led to violent demonstrations in Khartoum in the run-up to the referendum (Medani 2011: 143).

Meanwhile, there were other state-building measures that would, or were meant to impact nation-building. Overall, these efforts were uncoordinated and often contradicted each other, leading to a further fragmentation of society. The reason for this can be found in leadership again. Many of the policies or laws that were implemented or neglected received the respective attention based on elite interests. As has been demonstrated throughout Chapters Three and Four, these interests were often divergent from that of followers because of the mutuality gap present in society. Consequently, the resulting state-building actions often ran counter to the nation-building ideal. One example of this is the politics of borders, which was often related to political competition, explained below. The most hotly contested issue and one that dominated elite debate was the demarcation of borders, because of its impact on “power-sharing quotas, sharing oil wealth, undertaking force redeployment and preparing for the election and referendum” (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 122-123). Border disputes were also seen as essential for each party to maintain their legitimacy. As a result, both sides were uncompromising on these issues (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 125).

At the same time, in 2009 a Land Act was signed that permitted land rights to be determined by ethnic groups, sparking violent conflict over county borders in southern Sudan (Pendle 2014: 237). Here, the conflicts were often driven by a need to access resources for livelihoods (Pendle 2014: 238). Linking such an essential resource to ethnicity allows for the persistence of ethnic identity

over national identity. While communities were fighting over land for reasons of livelihood, however, elites were doing so for political interests. The state and its borders thus remained a prize over which elites were competing rather than a form of political organisation that would enable the nation to govern itself. Borders were being debated and drawn based on their ability to ensure elite access to the state and economic resources rather than to reflect social reality or ensure greater functioning of the state.

Other instances where state-building was unable to foster nation-building are more related to elite apathy. For example, as people began to return to southern Sudan, they were reliant on ethnic and kinship networks to settle and navigate the new space; government assistance was not forthcoming, with only ten per cent of returnees being assisted between 2005 and 2008 (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). This has contributed to the persistence of ethnic structures in society, as people often returned to their ethnic communities who provided the social and economic safety nets needed to re-settle (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). As a result, sub-national identity groups were providing much of the services of the state, which would likely foster loyalty to these identity groups rather than the state and the nation. Similarly, in a non-committal attempt to begin the integration of the armed forces, Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were created (Akol Interview 2017; Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 125-127). These units, however, were not a priority for either the NCP or the SPLM and the units proved ineffective (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 125-127). At the same time, The SPLA was tasked with Southern nation-building through the formation of ethnically mixed units using an ethnic quota system (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Therefore, neither side was particularly committed to building a new Sudanese nation. This lack of commitment stems from a lack of leadership in the sense that Garang was no longer present to guide the vision of a unified Sudan, that leaders were pursuing their own interests, and that leaders were responding to the overwhelming support for secession in the South.

5.2.3 Collective will and collective responsibility: A divergence of leader and follower interests?

While the previous chapters have indicated the limited ability to foster collective will and responsibility through conflict, peace-building also requires this through collective action, trust, and decision-making. However, the peace-building process created little of this. The peace-building approach taken in this case has been characterised as liberal peace-building or state-building (AUCISS 2014: 37-38; Cumming 2015: 477; Gerenge 2015: 87; Young 2012: Preface, 1, 4, 7, 9-10;). As part of this liberal peace-building philosophy, the “appearance of democratic accountability” was important, while the actual concern was that of stability (Young 2012: 135). Justice, a key demand amongst the people of southern Sudan, was also neglected for the sake of stability (AUCISS 2014:

29; Deng et al. 2015: 26-27, 37-39). Immense international aid was provided for state-building and humanitarian aid but failed to yield results in alleviating the daily challenges faced by Southerners (Ajak 2015: 2-5; Gerenge 2015: 87).

The pattern here is that of neglecting the voice, views and needs of followers, respectively, indicating some weaknesses in the liberal peace-building model. The purpose in pursuing self-determination is to ensure that people have a say in the way they are governed (UNGA 1970), but as will be shown throughout this chapter, this did not occur. Self-determination also presupposes that a collective will exists or can be formulated through collective dialogue and decision-making. This did not occur in Sudan and southern Sudan because leaders held more mutuality with each other than with their followers, and the primary pathways of influence were between leaders and the international community rather than between leaders and society. Liberal peace-building, which is primarily conducted by international actors, creates challenges by inserting other actors into the state-society social contract. This chapter will demonstrate the consequences of some of these liberal peace-building challenges.

In this way, the elite-centred nature of the CPA led to several problems. First, the allocation of seats as stipulated in the CPA was determined by the two parties rather than through any systematic, objective or consultative process (Young 2012: 138). Also, despite the CPA's demands for significant national reforms, much of this was not implemented, as the SPLM was primarily interested in gaining South Sudanese independence (Medani 2011: 148). In addition, parties on both sides viewed the CPA less as a binding agreement and more as a guideline for ongoing negotiations (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 120). After the CPA, the SPLM directed its efforts towards building the consensus needed to gain independence (Pendle 2014: 228). In fact, despite the many prescribed milestones of the CPA, the primary, and for some only, concern was the referendum (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 122). There was little collective desire or will to pursue a social and democratic transformation in Sudan, at least amongst the elites of the two key parties.

As a result, much of the focus in the post-CPA era was on reconciling the North-South differences to prepare the country for secession. Contentious issues included borders, oil and security (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 119). Since the conflict had been framed as a North-South conflict, this is where attention appears to have been diverted. Little attention was given to building a cohesive South Sudanese nation beyond ensuring a vote for independence. In addition, the CPA neglected reconciliation in favour of security and negative peace (Medani 2011: 144). Forty per cent of the budget in southern Sudan was allocated to security institutions (Ajak 2015: 3). Peace-building initiatives, on

the other hand, were "ad hoc" and "reactive" (Ajak 2015: 4; Kisiangani 2015: 9). Also, much of the development and peace-building plans initiated by international actors were "transplanted" from established practices rather than tailored to the local context (Ajak 2015: 5).

At the same time, despite the collective goal of independence, the South remained divided as it had throughout the liberation struggle. Inter-communal violence continued, much of which was part of a continued strategy of proxy war by Khartoum (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 128). During the 2010 elections, 357 SPLM members chose to run as independent candidates (Panozzo 2011: 24; Young 2012: 148). This was in response to the poor party procedures in selecting candidates, the widespread maladministration in the region and inter-communal disputes (Young 2012: 148-150). The candidate list, in particular, had not been selected in a transparent manner (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). The disagreement amongst elites, therefore, was not a response to a disagreement of visions or ideology (Young 2012: 150). The political process, then, was not conducive to forming a sense of collective will but rather an arena for elite disputes to be resolved.

While the interim period was tense, a return to North-South war did not occur (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 125). Some may perceive this as a success and this achievement should not be negated. However, the establishment of negative peace between North and South did not mean peace had been achieved in the South. It also represents a disproportionate focus on the reductionist understanding of the conflict as a North-South issue. Violence continued in southern Sudan in the form of smaller rebellions and violent cattle raiding (Frahm 2015: 260; Panozzo 2011: 25). Cattle raiding would often escalate into violence against "people and property" (Pendle 2014: 236). Jonglei state was one arena in which conflict would often resurge (Johnson 2016: Prologue). For example, prior to the 2010 elections a former SPLA General George Athor rebelled against the SPLM/A and was subsequently convinced to sign a cease-fire until after the referendum, at which point he rebelled again (Panozzo 2011: 25). Jonglei state remained highly unstable after independence (Thomas 2015: Chapter Eight & Conclusion). Inter-communal conflicts also occurred at sub-ethnic levels, and gradually escalated after the CPA (Pendle 2014: 236). While not all group members engaged or approved of conflict, it has been argued that these conflicts represent collective action on the part of ethnic groups who engage in "collective decision-making" and benefit from the spoils of the conflict (Pendle 2014: 234). As such, it appears evident that southern Sudanese were unable to maintain a sense of collective will when not faced with a crisis in the form of a clear and well-defined enemy. Without this enemy, elite interests began to divert from that of followers, leading to a fragmentation of southern society.

5.2.4 Implementing peace: A leadership analysis

The peace agreement signalled a significant change in situation in Sudan and southern Sudan. With the cessation of North-South hostilities, and a working plan to resolve the North-South conflict, the situation now demanded leadership that would confront the immense economic, humanitarian and social challenges in society. Elite attention, however, was directed towards the building of state institutions and ensuring a hold on said institutions, while these challenges were outsourced to international actors (Ajak 2015: 1-4). Southern identity, which had been used to mobilise the South against the North, now seemed a secondary concern. Such influence over the population was no longer needed as the competition for power became a negotiation between two elite parties with an international referee. As the primary exchange of influence drifted more towards other elites and the international community, identity as a mobilisation tool lost its utility, to be called upon primarily for the referendum. Nevertheless, the identities that had been constructed during the conflict remained essential to the daily lives of followers. Competition for state institutions that served elite interests also eroded collective will and collective loyalty, while state functions were provided by external actors. In the end, the nation-building conversation between leaders and followers that should have determined Sudan's future became a dialogue and negotiation between two leaders. This stemmed from a flawed leadership-follower relationship that lacked mutuality and the ability of followers to influence their leaders.

As pointed out previously, the CPA was an elite pact between the SPLM/A and the NCP. In an effort to make the process more inclusive after the fact, meetings were held with the NDA in Cairo after the signing of the CPA but faced several obstacles because of the way in which the CPA had already distributed power primarily to the NCP and SPLM (Johnson 2011b: 177). In the end, the NDA failed (Bereketeab 2014: 313). Similarly, following a law passed in 2007, only parties that supported the CPA were permitted to compete in the national elections (Young 2012: 137). This precluded any further negotiation of the CPA (Young 2012: 137). Also, the NCP and SPLM, both being undemocratic, did not necessarily represent the interests of their respective followers in the peace process (Medani 2011: 136). The events that would unfold after the CPA signing would confirm this. The SPLM/A has been accused of "mov[ing] expeditiously to […] manipulate the transition and interim constitution-making process and entrench itself in power" (Kisiangani 2015: 4). In this way, despite decades of conflict, the NCP and SPLM entered into an alliance to ensure their respective goals of maintaining NCP power and seceding from the North through referendum (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 117; Medani 2011: 144). The fact that elites shared more in common with each other than their respective constituencies allowed such an alliance to occur. It acts as another illustration of the lack of mutuality between leaders and followers in Sudan.

The 2010 elections, in particular, illustrated this. These elections were repeatedly delayed because elites were concerned about their success at the polls (Young 2012: 136). The SPLM went so far as to claim that, as a liberation movement, they did not need their legitimacy confirmed through a democratic mandate (Young 2012: 136). In addition, there is evidence that the SPLM and the NCP colluded to influence the outcome of the election (Young 2012: 151-153). The elections in the end were rife with irregularities that were set aside for the sake of maintaining peace (Medani 2011: 136, 143; Young 2012: 134-177). These irregularities were instigated by both parties and included, *inter alia,* arrests, intimidation and problematic voter registration (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 130-131; Interview B 2017; Young 2012: 134-177). In the end, both the NCP and SPLM/A won the elections with significant margins (Johnson 2016: Chapter One). This should not be seen as resounding evidence of their support. As a result of the SPLA's dominant presence in rural areas during the civil war, the SPLM held a significant advantage in the elections by being the only political actor most people were familiar with (Young 2012: 159).

The elections then served to entrench and confirm the SPLM/A and NCP in power rather than promote democratic transformation or provide the people of Sudan with a voice in the country's future (Young 2012: 9-10, 134-177). In addition, the division amongst Southern elites was overcome with the help of oil revenues (Pendle 2014: 228). This indicates a lack of representation of followers and their needs by these elites, and consequently a lack of mutuality. While there are some legitimate reasons not to rush into elections following a peace agreement, the more important point here is that leaders were conscious of their limited support amongst the population. Rather than confronting this legitimacy crisis, elites sought ways to manipulate the system in their favour. In this way, the focus on institution-building after a conflict can fail when there is no contract between followers and leaders to uphold the institutions and influence leaders to maintain the integrity of the process.

Following the CPA, Garang became vice-president of Sudan and president of southern Sudan (Medani 2011: 142). For this reason, the peace agreement is also seen as a tool to enhance Garang's hold on power (Young 2005: 535). In addition, Garang's popularity across Sudan made him a threat to al-Bashir's presidency in any election (Deng 2010: 10). A strategy to push out al-Bashir with Garang as the new Sudanese president was supported by the US government (Young 2012: 142). However, on 30 July 2005, he died in a helicopter crash in the Imatong Mountains (Johnson 2016: Chapter One). This event sparked riots in Khartoum and Juba, which quickly devolved into Arab-African racial violence (Medani 2011: 143). Some have argued that unity and democratic transformation would have been possible had Garang lived (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017; Deng 2010: 10).

He was seen as the only one able to reconcile the desire for secession with the unity vision (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 116). In addition, without Garang the SPLM/A lost its "unity of purpose" (Ajak 2015: 5). This again illustrates a lack of mutuality between Garang and his followers. If his vision and purpose had been based on a mutual understanding of the challenge and how to face it, his death, while it may have hindered the SPLM/A vision, should not have de-railed it.

After Garang's death, he was immediately succeeded by Salva Kiir in order to prevent a succession crisis (Johnson 2016: Chapter One). Yet, the divisions in the SPLM came to a head in its 2008 national convention where Riek Machar and Nihal Deng were prevented from challenging Kiir's leadership in an effort to maintain a public face of unity (Young 2012: 141-142). At the same time, Kiir's attempt to centralise control and reduce the number of deputies was blocked (Young 2012: 141-142). In the end, politicians agreed to set these divisions aside, along with the concurrent nation-building challenges in southern Sudan, in favour of "deal[ing] with the enemy first" (AUCISS 2014: 29; Oola Interview 2017). As a result, a fragile consensus had emerged amongst the Southern elite to focus attention on independence, which was possible with Garang's death (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 119). These problems, however, remained unresolved and would re-emerge after independence, demonstrating a reliance on a common enemy for unity to prevail and an inability to form a cohesive "us" without "them".

The six years provided by the interim period were by no means sufficient time to deal with the nation-building challenges created by centuries of "othering" processes, state formation and societal fragmentation. Yet, it did provide a space to set in motion a more concerted nation-building process. But Sudan-wide nation-building was a non-starter. After Kiir took control of the helm, he diverted his attention primarily to southern issues (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 118). Even so, despite the opportunity the interim period presented, leaders failed to use it to prepare for life after independence (Johnson 2016: Prologue). Rather than confronting the many social and economic challenges facing the country, the SPLM focused its efforts on disputes over borders and government positions (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). In other words, they turned their attention to the state because this was the entity that would serve their interests, rather than to ensure the state served the interests of the nation.

Further evidence of elite interests trumping that of the population includes the majority of the security budget for southern Sudan being directed towards "highly inflated salaries", while doing little to actually improve security (Ajak 2015: 3). This pattern was also replicated at lower levels. General Athor's rebellion, for example, was driven by his own interests and disagreements with other

leaders rather than any attempt to fight for his followers' interests (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Similarly, the "most significant crisis" of the CPA occurred when the SPLM abandoned the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on 11 October 2007, following disputes over oil revenues (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 127). The SPLM returned to the GoNU due to international pressure and NCP compromise on oil, troop deployment and borders (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 127). The fact that it was oil revenues that proved most contentious is telling. The issue of religion, so central to the peace negotiations, hardly signified in its implementation. As discussed in Chapter Four, the impact of oil on the North-South conflict has been exaggerated. Also, in hindsight, it is evident that Southern elites primarily sought oil revenues to enrich themselves rather than to ensure Southern economic development, discussed below. One can presume, therefore, that Southern leaders were no longer as concerned with the identity issues they had used to mobilise the Southern masses during the conflict. Now that mobilisation was less needed, elites abandoned the original narratives in favour of pursuing personal interests.

The GoNU walk-out and return once again raises the issue of international influence, briefly discussed above. While international involvement diverted influence from leaders and followers to leaders and the international community, it also created a pathway of influence between followers and the international community. In short, international involvement in various aspects of peacebuilding interrupted the exchange of influence between leaders and followers. For example, the political implementation of the CPA was handled primarily by the NCP and SPLM, while issues of security, development and humanitarian aid were relegated to the international community (Johnson 2011b: 177). In this way, leaders were permitted to continue the pattern of seeing to their own needs and interests with little concern for the wider needs of society. A continuation of this pattern post-independence would result in a flawed relationship between state and society, discussed below. In short, dissociating the political from the social in this way prevents the development of mutuality. This hinders nation-building as leaders are driven to frame identity and nationhood in terms that suit their political goals while negating the broader needs and realities of society.

5.3 Secession and building a new nation-state (2011-2013)

In January 2011, the South Sudanese people voted for secession with an overwhelming 98.83 per cent of the vote (Frahm 2015: 253). Fifty-six years after the Torit mutiny the dream of independence had been realised. However, over half a century of fighting for liberation had not prepared southern Sudan and its leaders for what would come next. South Sudanese would continue to fragment along identity lines, now without the imminent Northern threat to provide the little cohesion available. The momentous task of state-building in itself failed, not to mention ensuring said state

would coincide with the nation. Finally, with the war at an end, the primary driver for collective will faded, leading not only to divergent visions and actions but an erosion of the limited sense of collective loyalty and responsibility. Much of this emerged from a continuation of the leadership challenges discussed above. Particularly, as the ability to mobilise against the North faded, leaders had to find other ways to gain support. These pathways of influence, which relied on narrow identities and coercive and reward power, led to transitory societal relationships determined by thin leader-follower relationships.

5.3.1 "Us" without "Them": In search of a new national identity

The new country of South Sudan is highly diverse, with over sixty ethnic groups (Frahm 2015: 253). While this diversity invoked pride amongst Southerners, it also presented a challenge to building a collective South Sudanese identity (Johnson 2016: Chapter Two). The country had some foundations for a unified identity in a shared history of a liberation struggle, a shared Christian religion and a shared (though disliked) Arabic language (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). The presence of these attributes, however, does not ensure the construction of a unified identity. How these attributes are framed, experienced and perceived is important. Regarding the first, the collective desire to secede from the North is insufficient as an indicator of national unity and identity (Frahm 2015: 253). In this case, it illustrates more a sense of difference from the North than sameness amongst South Sudanese. While the inter-ethnic conflict discussed in Chapter Four is evidence of this, it was brought to the fore in South Sudan's post-secession experience.

Leaders and commentators were not oblivious to the nation-building challenge that lay before the new country (Copnall 2014: 25). The public discourse that followed on identity and nation-building has been dominated by issues surrounding sub-national rivalries and loyalties, remembering the struggle, language politics and religion (Frahm 2012: 21). Nevertheless, despite surveys indicating that people identify as "South Sudanese first", the dominant identity attribute that drives debate and determines loyalty is ethnicity (Frahm 2015: 253; Interview B 2017; Interview D 2017). This is not surprising as ethnicity provides people with key social networks, capital and safety nets (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). While ethnicity dominates social and political life in rural areas, it also plays an important role in urban society, where ethnic associations are used to navigate urban life, and urban spatial organisation often mirrors ethnic groupings (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). In addition, ethnicity remains the primary means and structures through which South Sudanese identify their representatives, despite the civil war (Interview A 2017; Interview B 2017; Interview C 2017; Interview D 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Leaders are both perceived to serve the interests of their

own community and expected to do so by fellow community members (Interview B 2017). The liberation struggle, therefore, failed to mould a supra-ethnic identity.

Also, little was done to address the societal rifts caused by war (Johnson 2016: Prologue, Chapter Two). Even more, efforts to reconfigure South Sudanese identity towards a more cohesive nation were non-existent beyond shallow rhetoric and symbolism. It is important to note that leaders are not able to manipulate the population solely through rhetoric. There were multiple attempts by civil society and political leaders to urge national unity after independence (Frahm 2012: 28-29). At South Sudan's independence celebrations, President Kiir said:

> Let all the citizens of this new nation be equal before the law and have equal access to opportunities and equal responsibilities to serve the motherland. We are all South Sudanese. We may be Zande, Kakwa, Nuer, Toposa, Dinka, Lotuko, Anyuak, Bari and Shilluk, but remember you are South Sudanese first! (Gurtong 2011)

Such statements were not able to overcome the social reality of ethnic divisions and ring hollow in the face of Kiir's future actions. Similarly, attempts at unification by leaders were not completely lacking, but struggled in the face of other contradictions. For example, regarding the SPLA, senior officers are quoted as saying:

> The SPLA will remain as an example towards unification of the whole south […] It's an example that can bring the people of South Sudan together — we have all representation within the SPLA together. And we've opened up. Whatever damage you have done to SPLA you are forgivable. When you come you are transformed. (Quoted in Thomas 2015: Chapter 5).

Subsequent events discussed in this chapter will indicate that this was a fairly optimistic view, particularly as the SPLA easily fragmented along ethnic lines in 2013. Cross-ethnic trust evidently remained weak (Gerenge 2015: 98; Interview D 2017). Evidence of this is found in the diaspora community, which has been involved in inciting hatred against other ethnic groups. Their rhetoric was used when violence broke out between the Lou Nuer and Murle in 2011, although the causes of the violence were more local (Thomas 2015: Introduction, Chapter Five). Similarly, interviewees spoke of an increased fear currently amongst South Sudanese of living or working amongst people from a rival ethnic group (Interview D 2017; Interview E; Sunday Interview 2017).

Ethnic groups also use their respective roles in the struggle to justify greater access to peace dividends, particularly government positions (Gerenge 2015: 85, 87; Sunday Interview 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). They now have to negotiate the "spoils" of war and many communities are trying to determine what benefit they can derive from an independent South Sudan (Oola Interview 2017). This has resulted in narratives of ethnic supremacy emerging, particularly amongst the Dinka and Nuer, which has prevented the formation of cross-ethnic norms and cooperative mechanisms (Gerenge 2015: 87). As such, the same logic of superior and inferior identities that was used to exclude Southerners in Sudan has been replicated in South Sudan (Gerenge 2015: 95). This illustrates three things. First, while the struggle is a unifying narrative, it has been used in a divisive way. Secondly, the struggle narrative is often used by leaders for personal gain, rather than a nation-building purpose. Third, the cause of the conflict was not a fundamental difference of identity as the struggle narrative often espoused, but an endemic practice of "othering" that sustains politics. In other words, a sense of "us" and "them" was created between Northerners and Southerners in an effort to both make sense of political and economic conflicts and mobilise support in these conflicts. It was not the incompatibility of Northern and Southern identity that caused the civil war. This practice of "othering" is persistent in South Sudan because of the flawed leader-follower relationship which relies on identity rather than mutuality to build legitimacy and raise support for leaders.

Much of the focus on identity was therefore placed on ethnicity, highlighting the divisions cemented during the Second Civil War. In particular, concerns were raised about Dinka dominance in post-CPA southern Sudan (Bereketeab 2014: 312; Medani 2011: 143). This perceived domination of the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups has raised concerns of exclusion or extermination amongst other groups such as the Equatorians and the Murle (Frahm 2015: 260). In particular, Equatorian communities, with a history of marginalisation and land dispossession under the SPLM/A (Medani 2011: 143), felt excluded from the benefits of an independent South Sudan (Gerenge 2015: 95-98). These were often the groups that had been favoured by colonial authorities (Johnson 2011a: 12-15, 17-18). In this example, it is important to note that Equatoria is a regional identity rather than an ethnic one. While the alliances of Equatorian communities often shifted, the recent perception of domination by larger ethnic groups has prompted these smaller groups to find common interests and experiences to forge a regional identity in order to earn recognition and space in the political arena (D'Agoot Interview 2017; Oola Interview 2017; Sunday Interview 2017;). Equatorian communities, however, remain relatively fragmented (Oola Interview 2017). This continues a pattern of identity construction determined by and reliant on "the other".

There was a clear perception of favouritism being given to Dinka members in the allocation of government positions in the new state (Frahm 2012: 29). This perception was driven by symbolism as well. For example, during independence celebrations in Upper Nile, where the Dinka and Shilluk had been fighting for dominance, the preference given to Dinka dance performances was seen as politically significant (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Also, some Southerners in Khartoum were hesitant to return or move to South Sudan because of this domination of the Dinka (Schultz 2014: 316). This ethnic favouritism is important because of the link between ethnicity and the state, discussed further in the next section. In short, just as Khartoum did, the South Sudanese central government organised its relationship to the peripheries, and the way in which resources are allocated, using ethnicity (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five).

A key indication of the nation-building challenges facing the new country is the question of returnees and the challenges and debates that arose from it. For example, despite retaining little of their "original" ethnic cultures, returnees were forced to first settle in these communities, which indicates that the state's understanding of identity was being driven first by ethnicity and regionality (Frahm 2015: 261). Similarly, many in the diaspora community who have engaged in development projects tend to target their own ethnic group (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). In addition, many Southern Sudanese living in Khartoum now perceived the city as their home, despite being officially viewed as "displaced" (Schultz 2014: 305-306). Schultz's (2014) study highlights the tensions that arose from a political discourse that glorified the South as "home" for Southerners and an escape from oppression, when the realities of migration and identity construction were far more complex. This tension is exemplified by Schultz' analysis of her data below:

> By saying that she feels "somehow", she indicates that she feels at home in Khartoum without contradicting the idea that the home(land) of all Southerners lies in the South. Therefore, most of my respondents do not address the issue of "feeling at home" in Khartoum in a direct way, but rather address it indirectly. This is due to the powerful discourse on home and homecoming in the context of displacement (Schultz 2014: 312).

As discussed in Chapter Two, Christianity is one of the few identity markers that crosses ethnic groups. However, leaders have understandably shied away from using this as a tool for nation-building considering South Sudan's history with imposed religion (Frahm 2015: 254). And, while Christianity is fairly widespread, it likely does not include all South Sudanese. Therefore, using it as a basis for membership to the South Sudanese nation would be highly problematic. However, lead-

ers' recent rejection of the Church's voice is also problematic. Church leaders who warned of imminent conflict were ignored in 2013 (Moro 2015: 4-5). With the return to conflict, these leaders have reportedly been challenged and even attacked for speaking out against the conflict and political leaders (Patinkin 2014a). Rejecting the representatives of such a large identity group when faced with criticism is further evidence of the half-hearted nation-building effort on the part of elites. At the same time, the Church has begun to lose the trust of many communities as they have become politicised and manipulated by leaders (Interview D 2017; Sunday Interview 2017). In short, religious markers of identity are less salient now (D'Agoot Interview 2017). The removal of Islamisation as a threat likely contributes to this as well.

In the end, the independence struggle remains the dominant narrative that transcends various identity groups in South Sudan. However, this can also hold an exclusionary purpose. For example, those outside South Sudan during the struggle are seen as "second-class citizens" who did not participate sufficiently in the liberation movement and are seen to have adopted external cultures from northern Sudan or East Africa (Frahm 2015: 254). Similarly, ethnic groups (such as the Dinka and the Nuer) that dominated the liberation movement have been accused of claiming a right to greater benefits because of this role (Gerenge 2015: 85, 87; Sunday Interview 2017). This narrative is summarised in a statement from one interviewee: "You don't have the security of being South Sudanese if you are not a Dinka." (Interview D 2017). This continues amid increasing accusations of President Kiir favouring those of his ethnic or sub-ethnic group in government (Interview A 2017). Other groups, however, also participated in and were affected by the liberation struggle (Gerenge 2015: 99; Sunday Interview 2017). In addition, the negative and "reactive" nature of South Sudanese identity is illustrated in the national identity debate which is dominated by "what the national identity is *not* supposed to look like" (Frahm 2012: 22, 27; emphasis added). This prevents the formation of a positive identity that serves its purpose of developing norms and values that guide social interaction and conflict management.

Finally, the struggle narrative's use of Africanism to distinguish the South from the North furthered a reliance on ethnic governance structures, in the name of preserving African customs (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). As will be discussed below and as illustrated in Chapter Four, these structures inspire complex perspectives and responses and therefore should not be viewed as an inherently "good" or "bad" form of governance. Nevertheless, such traditional governance structures have contributed to the persistence and predominance of ethnicity as the guiding framework for societal interaction and relationships. Therefore, an identity premised on a narrative of oppression is prob-

lematic on several levels. First, it is too relational. It remains dependent on the presence of a common enemy and fails to bind a nation when the context changes. Secondly, it can easily be used to exclude certain group members on the basis of their actions during this oppression, which may be used to deny said members certain privileges and even rights. Finally, while it indicates a shared history, it does not necessarily provide the values and beliefs that frame the future vision of the nation and drive future collective action.

5.3.2 The demarcation, contestation and limitation of the South Sudanese state

With the creation of a new state, a key concern was securing the borders of said state. This refers to both the Sudan-South Sudan border and internal boundaries. The main challenge in determining the Sudan-South Sudan border was the status of oil-rich Abyei (Medani 2011: 145). The disagreement over this region had been a key point of contention during the interim period (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 123). Abyei is home to a significant number of Dinka who sided with the SPLM during the conflict but is also important to the nomadic Arab Messiria community, who use the lands for grazing and migration (*BBC News* 2013a; Johnson 2007: 2; Medani 2011: 145; Pantuliano 2010: 7-8). The key point of contention for elites, however, was the oil in the region (Frahm 2015: 257; Johnson 2007: 7). Abyei's future was meant to be determined by a separate referendum (Medani 2011: 145). This never occurred due to a disagreement on who was eligible to vote in such a referendum (*BBC News* 2013a). The area thus became a hotspot for violent conflict with militia attacks from both sides and an invasion in 2011 by Khartoum (Medani 2011: 145). Abyei illustrates the challenges that arise when the state is equated with a narrow vision of the nation that is determined by a narrow identity. Due to the fluidity and permeability of identity, separating identity groups along state lines is near impossible. However, advocating for narrow interpretations of the nation allowed elites to pursue their particular interests. In this way, the lack of mutuality prevented leaders from addressing the complex identity landscape of the Abyei region but rather allowed them to exploit that landscape for their narrow interests.

The attention paid to resolving border disputes with Sudan was also a tool to maintain a nationalist sentiment in the face of poor service delivery (Frahm 2015: 256-257). In other words, leaders tried to keep the memory of the collective enemy at the forefront of people's minds in order to maintain support. Therefore, in order to maintain its own legitimacy, the SPLM/A adopted the nation-state ideal and turned their attentions to "establishing, securing and maintaining the state's territory" (Arnold & Le Riche 2013: 125; Frahm 2015: 255). In this way, the purpose of the South Sudanese state was co-opted by the elites to serve their interests, rather than that of society. This is further evidenced by the patronage system in state institutions. Access to the state and bureaucratic positions

provide a leader and his followers (largely determined by kinship) access to state resources, particularly oil profits (Awolich 2015: 4; Gerenge 2015: 98-99; Rolandsen 2015: 165). As a result, debates surrounding administrative borders spark conflict because of their impact on state access (Frahm 2015: 261; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Similarly, leaders in the SPLA would often choose the location of a barracks as their home areas, which provided the local community with economic resources (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). The state has thus become a highly pursued commodity rather than an entity that exists to protect and serve the people it houses.

After the CPA, administrative units increased significantly as part of a decentralisation strategy that was meant to increase rural development, urbanisation and service delivery (AUCISS 2014: 48-52; Pendle 2014: 237; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). These states, counties and *payams* usually ran parallel to ethnic groups, leading to an equation of ethnic and geographical boundaries (Pendle 2014: 237; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Ethnic identities have thus been validated by the creation of internal states and counties, hindering cross-ethnic nation-building (Frahm 2015: 261). As Frahm (2015: 261) states,

> […] the process of local boundary making emphasises and incentivises group definition in opposition to other groups because the very fact of difference has much more practical import than a group's internal cohesion or positive group identity.

As a result, instead of resolving the tension between nation and state, the creation of a new state enhanced competition over territory as smaller ethnic and regional groups sought to "assert their claims to territory, status and recognition" (Frahm 2015: 260-261; Oola Interview 2017). In this way, the decentralisation of government disrupts local power relations between identity groups by re-drawing borders and determining access to resources (Pendle 2014: 230). The state thus became a source of destabilisation rather than the arbiter of societal relationships.

In addition, competition for power at the centre was replicated at the local level due to the patronage networks that dominate South Sudanese politics (Pendle 2014: 228). Elites encouraged boundary disputes in their pursuit of state access, as they sought to draw boundaries in such a way as to increase their chance of election (Interview E 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Ensuring group access to land and other economic resources has been identified as the key driver of border conflicts amongst followers (Pendle 2014: 238). These conflicts are organised along ethnic lines because social and political life, and consequently the way resources are dispersed, is organised along ethnic lines. It is also interesting to note the resilience of land in ethnic imaginary. Some border disputes,

such as those between Shilluk and Dinka, originated from before the Second Civil War, despite many individuals being unaffected by these disputes (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Such disputes were then "imaginatively linked to the ethnicity of leaders" (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). This persistence affirms the importance and strength of the "homeland" narrative in nation-building. Unfortunately, in South Sudan, homelands are linked to ethnicity rather than the South Sudanese nation. As migration and displacement continues, these narratives and conflicts are likely to persist and grow ever more complex. At the same time, if these narratives and conflicts continue to be used by elites to determine access to power and the structures of governance, the narratives are unlikely to change.

The repatriation of "displaced persons" discussed above also illustrates the problems of viewing nationhood as fixed to a certain territory. Schultz (2014: 305-307) points out the problematic way in which identity and belonging was reduced to place of origin when dealing with this challenge. She goes on to say that "People [were] mobilised in line with essential collective identities, which make other forms of belonging invisible," leading to the perception of "southern Sudan as the home of all Southerners" (Shultz 2014: 306-307). In reality, however, this repatriation process was actually a migration or even displacement to those who had lived in Khartoum for a long time or had been born there (Schultz 2014: 317). In short, the immense amount of migration and displacement of peoples in South Sudan has and will continue to complicate nation-building as belonging remains linked to territory. And, because territory is closely associated with the state, leaders are likely to maintain this narrative in their pursuit of elite interests.

On the other side of the coin, the limited reach of the state leads to the persistence of traditional authority and structures in determining social relations (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017; Frahm 2012: 28). To many communities, particularly in the rural areas, traditional authority is the more legitimate and more present authority (Akol Interview 2017; AUCISS 2014: 270; Interview C 2017; Interview D 2017). Discontentment and conflict does arise, however, when the government is seen to appoint a traditional leader that lacks legitimacy amongst the people (Interview D 2017). There is also some evidence to suggest an ambiguous attitude at the least to such authority, especially with regards to justice mechanisms (Deng *et al.* 2015: 28, 37-40; Maxwell et al. 2014: 26). Nevertheless, the state has attempted to co-opt these structures by recognising traditional authority. Both the 2005 and 2011 constitutions used traditional structures as the guideline for rural administration (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Yet, traditional authority had been significantly weakened during the civil war (Awolich 2015: 11). They are also primarily tasked with governing and resolving intra-ethnic issues rather than larger inter-ethnic disputes (Maxwell et al. 2014: 25), limiting their ability to contribute

to nation-building. In addition, these structures rarely cross ethnic boundaries and therefore reinforce divisions rather than foster unity, as the state is expected to do. In fact, the southern Sudanese government had already "deepened the linkage between ethnicity and administration" during the interim period (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five), which was continued by this reliance on traditional authority.

Meanwhile, inter-communal conflict and cattle raiding continued with little intervention from the state (Pendle 2014: 228). The primary concern for many South Sudanese was the persistent insecurity in regions such as Jonglei (Maxwell et al. 2014: vii, 8-9, 16, 20-22). The SPLA and the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) did little to increase security, despite a significant portion of the state budget being allocated to these institutions (Ajak 2015: 3-4; Maxwell et al. 2014: vii, 8-9, 16, 20-22). Instead of providing security, these institutions were often distrusted and viewed as incapable of preventing or even party to violence (Maxwell et al. 2014: 16; Sunday Interview 2017). One of the reasons for this is the over-lap between party and state, specifically party and military (Kisiangani 2015: 5). The SPLA never converted into a national military as intended and remains closely tied to the ruling party (AUCISS 2014: 24; Interview C 2017). It's primary interest, then, has been to protect and serve the interests of the party rather than the state and nation. As party interests are disconnected from that of the people, the SPLA does little to promote a sense of loyalty or national pride.

Similarly, estimates indicate that NGO's provide eighty per cent of services (Kisiangani 2015: 3). Ajak (2015: 5) characterises South Sudanese communities as "idle consumers of donor aid" because of the little input they were given in the design of development and aid projects. This limits the ability of the state to create a sense of collective loyalty and responsibility. In addition, many of these NGO's are international aid organisations (South Sudan NGO Forum, 2015). As a result, leaders often cater to external needs, perspectives and ideas as opposed to confronting the needs and realities facing their followers (Ajak 2015: 6). This, similar to the way in which leaders were influenced into signing peace agreements by the international community, creates an interruption in the exchange of influence between state and society and leaders and followers. Some research even indicates that some South Sudanese would lay blame on the international community rather than the state for failed service delivery (Reeve 2012: 51). This resonates with Leonardi's (2007: 394; 2013: 160) findings in which government is viewed to encapsulate the military, the SPLM and international aid organisations.

Many have attributed the continued conflict in the country to the weakness of state institutions and, as a result, most attention was dedicated to state-building efforts (Interview C 2017; Gerenge 2015: 87; Pendle 2014: 228). Pendle (2014), however, argues against this. She rather acknowledges the existing governance systems present in local society and views conflict as a consequence of state actions disrupting the existing power dynamics in said society. Pendle (2014: 242) also says:

> As post-CPA reforms attempt to strengthen the state through initiatives such as the division of administrative units and the introduction of judicial initiatives, the negotiation of the balance of power between groups can be interrupted. This has often tipped the scales in favour of one group over another. Groups have then taken up arms to display their power and to renegotiate a balance.

Similarly, the patronage system that dominated the new system meant that access to the state and its benefits (state resources, oil revenues, civil service jobs and political office) was often determined by ethnicity (Awolich 2015: 4; Gerenge 2015: 98-99; Rolandsen 2015: 165; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Also, by using an ethnic quota system, leaders are forced to mobilise support using ethnicity (Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). This has proved disastrous in the current conflict where leaders used the threat of communities losing government positions to mobilise along ethnic lines (Interview D 2017). The lesson learned here is that the state must avoid representing one group of citizens over another. This is less likely to occur when there is a sense of nationhood that creates a sense of collective responsibility and rights amongst all citizens.

It is important to acknowledge that some legal efforts were made to ensure a cohesive nation. However, as with elite rhetoric discussed above, these proved hollow. For example, the draft constitution for South Sudan defers from delineating South Sudan's national identity according to any specific group or attribute (Frahm 2012: 28). This, despite the reality in which identity was used to justify the creation of the state, exclude certain citizens and fuel political debate. Evidently, a discrepancy between formal institutional structures and social reality is present. Therefore, South Sudan's experience of secession illustrates the limitations of separation and statehood as a solution to identity-related conflict. Such an approach shows an understanding of identity as fixed and clearly defined. Separation, however, is unlikely to ever create a homogenous state (Guelke 2012: 11, 94-102). Separation may only foster further conflicts of identity as it validates a politics based on identity. A better approach is to understand the dynamism of identity and how it can be constructed for peaceful purposes.

5.3.3 Collective will and responsibility without the collective threat

Gerenge (2015: 100) describes the 2011 referendum as follows:

> The overwhelming vote by the Southerners to secede from the North therefore indicated the level of spontaneous cohesion where the people acted in collective resolve towards a common goal.

At first glance, this resonates with the type of collective will necessary in a nation. Yet, while this provided the illusion of a unified nation, this was not the case. The decades of struggle against the North resulted in the primary goal driving collective action being that of liberation (D'Agoot Interview 2017; Oola Interview 2017). Now that liberation was achieved, the primary goal was peace-building and development. This proved a true test of collective will. It requires a more nuanced understanding of the nation than a collective enemy does. A collective enemy provides the impression of mutuality by simplifying collective needs to the elimination of the perceived threat. Peace and development, however, require a complex understanding of the situation, society and its varied needs in order to develop a collective vision that drives collective action. Limited mutuality makes this even more difficult as elites struggle to understand and respond to societal needs that may be divergent from their own.

This landmark moment of independence was also seen as the beginning of a "new era of peace and prosperity" (Kisiangani 2015: 3). The liberation struggle had partly been founded on the uneven development between Khartoum and southern Sudan despite the South's wealth of resources (D'Agoot Interview 2017; Johnson 2011a: 7, 16, 45-47). Many South Sudanese expected life to improve upon independence, but this did not occur (AUCISS 2014: 27-28; Interview D 2017; Kisiangani 2015: 3). Oil profits were directed to the central government with little trickle-down effect (Interview B 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). The severe underdevelopment facing South Sudan did not abate. Service delivery was slow and inconsistent (Ajak 2015: 1-4; Interview B 2017; Rolandsen 2015: 165). And cattle raiding continued to increase in scope and violence (Frahm 2015: 260). Such inter-communal conflicts and cattle raiding would result in hundreds of deaths every year and would prevent economic activity (Pendle 2014: 228). Consequently, the elation and euphoria that accompanied the successful referendum did not last (Gerenge 2015: 96). A dominant perception is that leaders used their newfound power to enhance their own wealth with the state's oil revenues rather than channel these revenues and the country's sovereignty towards economic and social development (Interview B 2017; Interview D 2017; Johnson 2016: Prologue; Kisiangani 2015: 5). The

previous chapters in this thesis have indicated that the mutuality gap has resulted in leaders using the liberation struggle to pursue their own interests. Such accusations appear to confirm this.

Also, as discussed in Chapter Four, the SPLM failed to develop a clear ideology that would guide governance in the country they sought to achieve. This lack of ideology, vision and strategy persisted in the independence era (Interview C 2017; Kisiangani 2015: 3-4). In addition, little effort was put into furthering co-operation and reconciliation between identity groups (Gerenge 2015: 102; Johnson 2016: Prologue, Chapter Two). Peace actors primarily approached the problem of social division through the two approaches discussed in Chapter Two. Namely, they debated the appropriate constitutional and state structure and sought inter-communal reconciliation through peace processes. The first has been discussed above and below. Regarding justice, in this case, peace and stability was favoured over punitive justice. The primary approach to reconciliation and dealing with inter-communal conflicts was therefore through peace conferences (Reeve 2012: 56; Wilson 2014: 3, 5-7). These meetings, ranging in size and actors, are used to promote dialogue aimed at resolving potential or existing conflicts between communities (Wilson 2014: 5). South Sudanese and observers, however, have become skeptical of these conferences' efficacy, partly because of a failure to include the relevant communities and actors and because of disingenuous participation (Reeve 2012: 53, 56-58, Wilson 2014: 6-7). Such a reactionary and incomplete approach to conflict resolution and peace-building has done little to alter perceptions of "the other" and promote a sense of collective will and responsibility.

As it is, the most effective mobilisation tool to drive collective action across South Sudan appears to be a narrative invoking a common enemy (Frahm 2015: 254). For example, Schultz (2014: 314) links the sense of belonging given to the geographical entity of the South to this narrative of "discrimination and marginalisation in the North." In other words, there was no other identity unifying Southerners beyond being located in the South, which is "why [they] are called South Sudanese" (D'Agoot Interview 2017). Similarly, at a sub-national level, South Sudanese politicians have relied on narratives of "ethnic demotion" to build and mobilise their follower base (Interview D 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). The common enemy has often shifted based on context. After independence, "the enemy changed face from what was external to the community to what was reconstructed from within" (Interview C 2017).

Such narratives of oppression or fear, however, are only useful in driving collective action in times of crisis with a clear enemy. It does not allow for collective action towards peace. In fact, it has re-

sulted in a situation where interests are being determined by regional rather than national collectivities (Interview B 2017). In addition, it suggests a political culture reliant on “othering" that is troubling. If “othering” is the best, and possibly only tool available for leaders to mobilise followers then a lack of mutuality is evident. This forces leaders to manufacture mutuality by using “the other”, creating a temporary sense of affinity with the leader. Such affinity may result in collective action but is often superficial and temporary, while also creating divisions that further conflict. In addition, the experience of South Sudan suggests that as this becomes an entrenched practice it tends to fragment society at ever smaller levels. The absence of an external collective enemy forces leaders to look for internal enemies to raise support. Leadership founded on mutuality, on the other hand is likely to be more effective in building collective will and collective responsibility without fragmenting society, since leaders are forced to respond to the actual challenges and situations facing a society.

Dialogue is another essential part of creating collective will, which is dependent on a leadership process that allows for the exchange of influence between leaders and followers. This has remained a challenge in South Sudan, however. In drafting the South Sudan Development Plan, central government conducted limited consultations, over a period of only three days, with lower levels of government and communities (Ajak 2015: 5). Civil society was similarly given a limited time to comment on recent policies (Sunday Interview 2017). Also, the constitution-making process could be central to the nation-building process by fostering cross-sectional societal debate on the nature of the state and nation (Bereketeab 2014: 309). The processes involved in formulating a constitution are meant to be part of an ongoing nation-building process that allow people who find themselves bound in a geographical area to determine how they will govern themselves (D'Agoot Interview 2017). However, this did not occur. The drafting of South Sudan’s new constitution was delayed and did not follow the public consultation process outlined in the transitional constitution (Akol 2014: 5; AUCISS 2014: 41-44). Up until the time of writing, South Sudan has found itself governed repeatedly by transitional and temporary constitutions (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017).

The National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was formed predominantly of SPLM members (Republic of South Sudan 2012: 2-3). In addition, rather than appointing technical experts, Kiir largely appointed representatives from political parties (44 out of 55 members), which turned the commission “into an economically and politically accommodating venture” (Akol 2014: 4). Only 9 out of the 55 seats were given to civil society members (Akol 2014: 4). In fact, when it became clear that the government was not going to fulfil its obligations to hold widespread public consultations, it fell to civil society leaders to take up this role, under the leadership of the South

Sudanese Law Society (AUCISS 2014: 42-43). In some of these consultations, held at the University of Juba, a participant is quoted as saying, “My mother will not come to Juba; she is waiting where she is — *but she is waiting for you*” (Tier *et al.* 2013: 16). At the same session, the audience expressed a resounding feeling of not having been consulted (Tier *et al.* 2013: 16).

The unwillingness on the part of leaders to converse with followers demands a strong civil society. Civil society leaders and organisations hold greater mutuality with followers and have consequently played an important role in key efforts to build collective will. While civil society has been excluded from national peace processes, they have been instrumental in local peace-building initiatives (Moro 2015: 1; Sunday Interview 2017). However, they have been limited by elite actions. Leaders had been open to an active civil society when they were mobilising support for the referendum (Moro 2015: 4). After 2011, however, popular attention turned to governance and reaping the rewards of a hard-fought independence (Moro 2015: 4-5). In response, politicians became much less open to civil society activity, as it had become more critical of Southern elites (Moro 2015: 4-5). In addition, civil society has come under increasing criticism for not being impartial (Amb. Hassan Interview 2017; Sunday Interview 2017). Without the mutual goal of independence, which was not founded on mutual needs, leaders and followers were less able to engage in collective decision-making. As discussed in previous chapters, this poor mutuality results in leaders responding to situations based on their own interests. This has permitted this treatment of civil society determined by context. The end result is an inability to formulate collective decisions and actions and a limited sense of loyalty and responsibility to fellow citizens.

While the low level of collective loyalty and responsibility was evident in the previous civil war, the perceived sense of nationhood at independence and the nationalist rhetoric created the impression that South Sudanese viewed each other as equal members in a new society. This illusion was quickly shattered. As elites sought to consolidate or expand their hold on power without a common enemy, they shifted towards a system of reward and coercive power. Loyalty in the military, for example, was maintained through patronage. While this promoted a cohesive SPLM/A for a while, it proved unsustainable (Gerenge 2015: 99). Collective loyalty was thus fostered primarily through reward power. Once these rewards were depleted or in dispute, the facade of unity quickly faded. The optimistic view of the SPLA as a unifying force provided above was unfounded. Had loyalty been built on other bases of power and mutual values and experiences the results may have been different.

Therefore, support for a leader was often based on coercive or reward power. Such power is not conducive to producing collective will and loyalty because people act out of personal interest or coercion rather than a fundamental agreement of the problem, solution and goals. Referent power, often based on sharing an identity with the leader, is also superficial if not founded in mutual experiences, needs and values. In South Sudan, such power was used to fragment society as leaders increasingly resorted to ethnicity as a foundation for support. Sub-national identity attributes were dramatised. The state became an increasingly ethnicised commodity. The collectivity of South Sudan disintegrated. Individual leaders are often blamed for this (Kisiangani 2015: 3), but the systemic and cyclical nature of these issues indicate a problem in the leadership process.

South Sudanese leaders have come under extensive criticism for their leadership of the new country and the ongoing conflict (Interview B 2017; Interview C 2017; Interview D 2017; Kisiangani 2015: 3; Sunday Interview 2017). Despite the changing situation after secession, much of the SPLM and its leaders have retained a "military mind-set" (Frahm 2015: 259; Interview C 2017; Oola Interview 2017). The party has been accused of continuing to function as a military organisation whose undemocratic tendencies did not cease with the liberation struggle (Johnson 2016: Chapter Two; Kisiangani 2015: 4). In addition, since the CPA, corruption has continued unabated and unaddressed (Kisiangani 2015: 2). For example, in Unity State, which received two per cent of oil profits under the CPA, Taban Deng was chosen as Governor by Salva Kiir despite losing the state party election and running a "virtual gangster dictatorship" in order to loot oil revenues (Young 2012: 148-149). In short, the SPLM/A fell into the trap many liberation movement-turned-rulers fall into (Johnson 2016: Chapter Two; Oola Interview 2017).

Frahm (2015: 256) states that "The SPLM's main claim to leadership of the nation and thence to govern is to have liberated the country from Northern oppression and to have brought peace to the country." This provided the leaders with a sense of entitlement not only to power, but to the economic benefits of said power as well (Johnson 2016: Chapter Two). As leadership is situational, this is an insufficient claim. Leadership is based on the leaders' ability to respond to a situation. While the SPLM/A may have been best suited to respond to a situation of oppression and conflict, this does not necessarily mean they are best suited to a peace-building situation. In addition, oppression and conflict permits leadership to be founded on the narrative of "the other", as discussed above. This is not the ideal form of creating legitimacy and mutuality in a peace-building situation. In order to lead the country a change in this pattern is necessary.

The problem of reward power has already been alluded to above. This approach created a dual problem of over-stretching the resources of the state (to keep up with the "rewards") and entrenching a pattern of leadership emergence that does not rely on mutuality but rather coercion. The SPLM's chief strategy for dealing with rebellion was its "Big Tent" approach whereby rebel leaders and warlords were provided with amnesty and co-opted into government (Ajak 2015: 3; AUCISS 2014: 38; Awolich 2015: 9; Frahm 2015: 260). As a result, South Sudan has an inflated security sector, as seen in its holding the second-highest number of generals in the world (Ajak 2015: 3). The purpose of South Sudan's security institutions, as a result, was to "buy peace" rather than ensure the safety of the population (Ajak 2015: 3). This indicates a preference on the part of elites to employ a strategy that would ensure their continued hold on power rather than dealing with the root causes of discontent and conflict. It also illustrates the limitations of institutionalisation without understanding the leadership dynamics.

A similar approach is reflected in Kiir's handling of corruption and poor performance. The failure to act against such leaders, who could subsequently rebel against the government, was justified on the basis of needing to maintain stability (Kisiangani 2015: 3), which is indicative of the challenges associated with choosing between peace and justice (see 2.2.2.3). Both these strategies have created a dangerous precedent where political and military office can realistically be achieved through insurgency (Awolich 2015: 9; Interview B 2017; Interview E 2017). This political culture, however, is extremely detrimental to not just peace-building but nation-building as well. As these leaders rely on ethnic mobilisation to build support, because of the ethnicised nature of social and political organisation, the cyclical use of rebellion to achieve leaders' personal ambitions continues to cement identity differences in society at large. Therefore, the use of reward and coercive power is detrimental to the development of a collective identity, collective will and collective loyalty.

Regarding the issue of borders and boundaries, Thomas (2015: Chapter Five) points out that "leaderships of smaller ethnic groups want smaller divisions." As a result, gerrymandering is occurring along ethnic lines as leaders who lack political prospects in bigger administrative units seek smaller units in which they will "be the king" (Interview E 2017). Thomas (2015: Chapter Five) also argues that the debates that have emerged from these disputes are primarily conducted amongst elites, with little to no dialogue with followers. Therefore, while decentralisation and federalism is portrayed as a way to protect the interests of minorities, it has been used as a tool for the enhancement of elite interests. The ethnic challenge was thus approached through constitutional design, as is standard in peace-building (discussed in Chapter Two). Yet, institutional design was co-opted by elites whose

interests did not lie in nation-building. Consequently, South Sudan's experience illustrates the limits of institutional design in nation-building when a flawed leadership process is present.

In the absence of mutuality between leaders and followers to ensure the efficacy of institutions, other leaders must step into this role. Civil society should bridge the gap between state and society, bringing the needs of society to leaders and ensuring an exchange of influence between leaders and followers. As discussed above, while the SPLM has encouraged the participation of civil society in service delivery, it has been less welcoming of civil society participation that "foster[s] citizenry participation in policymaking and governance" (Moro 2015: 3). In other words, leaders have accepted civil society as long as they have permitted leaders to escape their responsibility to serve the needs of their followers. When fostering influence between followers and leaders by holding leaders accountable, however, they are less accepting. As a result, the mutuality gap persists while collective will suffers.

How then do leaders engage with their followers? The way in which influence is exchanged is telling for a nation. In a unified nation, where collective will exists, followers across the nation should be able to influence leaders and *vice versa.* However, the channels for communication between leaders and followers is almost non-existent in South Sudan. Elites communicate with their rural constituents primarily through sub-national ethnic organisations and associations, and rarely travel to said areas personally (Interview B 2017; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). At the same time, ethnic organisations hold significant influence over leaders. The Jieng Council of Elders of the Dinka ethnic group, for example, is said to hold significant sway over the president and government (Interview A 2017; Interview B 2017). This serves the dual purpose of continuing the ethnicisation of politics by limiting influence to one's ethnic group, and preventing the development of mutuality between leaders and broader society. Rather, mutuality is manufactured when it is in the interest of leaders to do so. The way in which disparate interests are linked to create mutuality is illustrated by Thomas (2015: Chapter Five) in the statement below:

> The interests of the urban salariat and rural pastoralists and cultivators are not synonymous, but the emerging political order in South Sudan links them, and this linkage helps shapes [sic] some of South Sudan's political contests, such as the arguments over administrative boundaries. Urban groups participate in these arguments over distant borders in underpopulated peripheries — because of awareness of subterranean resources there, and because new counties mean new posts for which they or their families might compete.

Such a system creates a similar problem to that of the liberation struggle. While a mutual goal is evident (independence or a new administrative boundary), it is not founded on mutual interests and needs. As a result, when said goal is achieved leaders are not compelled to continue serving the interests of followers. Consequently, collective will becomes a volatile and elusive goal when mutuality is lacking.

5.4 The descent into civil war (2013-2014)

In July 2013 Salva Kiir removed Riek Machar as vice-president and dismantled the cabinet (Kisiangani 2015: 6). Six months later, during the SPLM's National Liberation Council (NLC) meeting, which would determine the party's leaders, fighting broke out within the SPLMA's Presidential Guard in Juba (AUCISS 2014: 25-26). There were several rumours surrounding the cause of this violence. The two dominant narratives were that (1) there was a failed coup by Machar's supporters or (2) that reports of Nuer members being dismissed from the Presidential Guard caused a rebellion (AUCISS 2014: 26-27; Johnson 2016: Chapter Six). The AU Commission of Inquiry in South Sudan (AUCISS) (2014: 26-27) found that there was little evidence of an attempted coup. Despite appearing to be a simple political dispute, relatively uncomplicated compared to the North-South conflict, it proved disastrous and inexplicably difficult to resolve (D'Agoot Interview 2017).

The conflict quickly escalated into a civil war. Hilde Johnson (2016: Prologue), then the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), says that while the conflict was not a surprise, its spread and magnitude was. Eventually, Machar started a rebellion under the banner of the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) (Rolandsen 2015: 164). While a peace agreement was signed in August 2015, it has faced several obstacles and significant violence continues. In fact, in November of 2016, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng warned of a potential genocide (UN 2016: 1). This section presents a brief account of the conflict and the state of nation-building in South Sudan at the time. It confirms much of the analysis above regarding the leadership process in South Sudan.

5.4.1 New dog, old tricks: the continued use of identity in conflict

When the conflict broke out Hilde Johnson received a call from former deputy defence minister Majak D'Agoot, whom she quotes as saying:

> If this is what it seems […] it can trigger major ethnic killings. Hilde — you have no idea what can happen in this country, but this can set off ethnic violence between the Dinka and

> the Nuer which can drive us all down. This can become another Rwanda. (Johnson 2016: Chapter Six).

This heavy warning proved well-founded. As rumours spread that Nuer members were being attacked in the capital, retaliatory attacks occurred in other regions (ICG 2015a: 10; Gerenge 2015: 96). During the ensuing conflict, rebel and government forces "deliberately targeted" people of opposing ethnic groups (Frahm 2015: 259). At the same time, Machar and Kiir's supporters were formed primarily of their respective ethnic groups (AUCISS 2014: 26; ICG 2015a: 10-12; Kisiangani 2015: 6-7). As a result, some commentators characterised the ensuing conflict as an ethnic one (Pendle 2014: 227). Others were quick to minimise the role of ethnicity and caution against labelling the conflict as such (Akol Interview 2017; Kisiangani 2015: 7; Rolandsen 2015: 163). These commentators perceive identity primarily as a mobilisation tool in a political conflict (Akol Interview 2017; Kisiangani 2015: 7; Sunday Interview 2017). It is interesting to note that few interviewees showed the same hesitation in describing the North-South conflict as identity-related.

Because the conflict began in Juba, as opposed to the rural areas where inter-communal conflicts have traditionally emerged, and because the initial dispute was over power, Akol (Interview 2017) argues that this is not an ethnic conflict, though it has developed an ethnic dimension. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, identity-related conflicts need not be caused by identity difference in order for identity to become an important factor. Similarly, the presence of people from so-called hostile ethnic groups in opposing parties (e.g. Nuer members in government) can also be used to argue against the role of ethnicity but this often occurs as a result of political trading (D'Agoot Interview 2017). So, rather than viewing this as evidence that identity is un-important in the conflict, it should be seen as evidence of the wide gap between elite and follower interests, where followers are driven to violence based on ethnic narratives while their respective leaders are able to co-operate when it is politically expedient to do so. Nevertheless, this caution is justified because the complex structural and economic issues cannot be ignored. These issues overlap with identity issues. The polarisation of society and its affects remains something that must be addressed. While leaders may only be using ethnicity as a mobilisation tool, the role of ethnicity in the lives of citizens is very real. This reiterates what has been stated in sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.3, where perceptions of identity are as important as reality.

D'Agoot (Interview 2017) succinctly describes the mobilisation process by saying that leaders do not engage in their political battles in an "isolated boxing arena." So, they are forced to alter the narrative to make their conflict appear to be about the people (D'Agoot Interview 2017). Thus, as in

the past, in the absence of ideology leaders turned to ethnicity to raise support (Akol Interview 2017). The new civil war mirrored that of the 1990s (Kisiangani 2016: 6). This is not a coincidence. The efficacy of ethnic mobilisation was demonstrated in the South-South conflict and the experience of said conflict remain in the minds of citizens (Kisiangani 2016: 6-7). As a result, memories of this conflict were called upon for mobilisation (Interview D 2017; Kisiangani 2016: 6-7). This likely produced a cycle of entrenching ethnic differences. Both the Dinka and Nuer groups have developed "victim-liberator narrative[s]" that are used to avert blame, ignite fears and mobilise ethnic militias (Gerenge 2015: 96-97; Interview B 2017; Interview D 2017). These narratives, in turn, produce different perceptions of the conflict. For example, one interviewee characterised the current conflict as political and the 1990s conflict as ethnic due to the Bor massacre of Dinka in 1991 (Interview B 2017), while another placed more emphasis on the targeting of Nuer in the current conflict while minimising the importance of the Bor massacre (Interview D 2017). This has served to solidify ethnic identities while eroding the limited cross-ethnic norms and trust that were present (Deng et al. 2015: 33-34; Gerenge 2015: 98; Interview D 2017; Interview B 2017).

As a result, perceptions of identity in general also differ and produce contradictions. One interviewee argued that identity has not changed and has remained consistently ethnic, while later acknowledging that in 2011 people momentarily viewed themselves as South Sudanese (Interview B 2017). Another argued that the Dinka had never been united as an ethnic group but would become more so in response to an existential threat like that seen in the current conflict (Akol Interview 2017). Others claim their South Sudanese identity and are discontented with the ubiquitous need to identify one's regional or ethnic heritage (Sunday Interview 2017). In short, perceptions differ on whether ethnic, geographical or regional (including North-South) identities are reflective of traditional and antiquated social realities or constructed through and for political processes. Identity markers have fluctuated in their dominance both to fuel conflict and in response to it. Currently, the dramatisation is leaning towards ethnic difference, which, considering the irreconcilability of the North-South identities following decades of conflict, presents a danger of becoming irreversible.

In addition, the human rights violations of the 1990s were still strong in social memory and had gone unaddressed (AUCISS 2014: 29). This has contributed to continued human rights violations in the new conflict, potentially as a form of retribution (Interview C 2017; Interview D 2017). As one civil society member summarised, "The killing occurs because people want you to suffer what others have suffered. […] There is a hatred there" (Sunday Interview 2017). In this way, the ethnic mobilisation resulted in a high level of brutality and human rights violations (Gerenge 2015: 95-96). A UN protection camp in Bor was attacked in which Nuer were targeted specifically (Patinkin 2014b;

UNMISS 2015: 18-22). Reports of violence recount how people were identified and killed based on their ethnicity during violent attacks (Arensen 2016: 14, 37; Interview D 2017; UNMISS 2017: 3; UN 2016: 1, 3-5). The AU and the UN have released multiple reports detailing the violence which includes rape, forced cannibalism, and mass murders (AUCISS 2014; Human Rights Council 2016; UNMISS 2017). Both sides have been accused of such atrocities, though the more recent reports place a greater burden of guilt on the government (Human Rights Council 2016: 3-4, 12-13). This supports the claims made in Chapter Two regarding the emotive and often destructive impact of identity-related mobilisation and conflict. However, it should also be noted that many human rights violations on the part of the government occurs in response to dissent rather than based on ethnicity (Interview B 2017). Similar to the co-operation that occurs between politicians of opposing ethnic groups, discussed above, this serves as further evidence of the continued disjuncture between elite and follower motivations.

Also, as in the previous war, violence has been outsourced to ethnic militias (Fleischner 2015: 16-18; Reeve 2012: 41-43, 64). This serves to further fragment society. It is also one of the likely reasons why the liberation movement failed to build a collective identity as the armed forces were not formed of a single, cohesive guerrilla army. This use of ethnic militias and local grievances also allows leaders to minimise the costs of war to themselves. However, it also leads to the proliferation of goals and motives as ever more actors become involved. Leaders often lose control of the conflict narrative and collective goals as a result. For example, non-Dinka and non-Nuer militant groups became involved in the conflict through a "widening circle of reprisal and revenge" (Gerenge 2015: 96). As the conflict progressed, ethnic groups not connected to the original dispute began to take part in violence to express their own grievances at being excluded (Foltyn 2015; Interview D 2017). At the same time, other inter-communal disputes unrelated to the broader conflict and driven by local political and resource competition also persist in the background (Gerenge 2015: 101). These, however, are severely aggravated and less easily managed when there is conflict at the centre (Oola Interview 2017; Interview D 2017). In the end, South Sudan finds itself in a state of deep, violent and apparently irreconcilable identity differences that have been constructed over decades of "othering" through political and armed conflict.

5.4.2 Building a state for whom?

Following the trend in Sudanese history, where the South sought autonomy due to its perceived primordial difference from the North, the obvious divisions in South Sudanese society fuelled a debate of federalism. The idea of federalism was partly raised in response to the felt sense of domination by the Dinka (Bereketeab 2014: 312). The argument given was that federalism would allow groups

to maintain their ethnic identity while promoting a national identity as well (Frahm 2012: 31). In addition, federalism is meant to bring the state closer to the people (AUCISS 2014: 44-48, 51; Interview B 2017). The AUCISS (2014: 48-52), however, argues that the structure of the state is less important in this regard than addressing the problems of corruption and mismanagement. Some experts also contend that decentralisation is only likely to aggravate the issue by proliferating conflicts over ever smaller boundaries (Frahm 2012: 31; Frahm 2015: 261; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). This is possible because of the fluidity of identity. For example, Pendle (2014: 233-234) describes how the boundaries of sub-ethnic Dinka groups (Auok, Apuk and Kuac) crystallised during violent conflicts in the post-CPA era, but would decrease in salience when faced with an inter-ethnic conflict with the Nuer. Therefore, supra-identities are quickly set aside when "the other" is no longer a clear and present threat. Once again, the dominant approach to dealing with a perceived identity difference was to reconfigure the state. And, as in the Sudanese civil war, this became an elite concern.

Therefore, while some feel that federalism would reduce identity-related conflict by separating groups into their respective administrative units (Interview B 2017), "federalism can't be the cure for nationhood" (Interview E 2017). In fact, bringing ethnicity into the federalism debate appears to have complicated matters. While federal discussions should be centred on questions of viability and territory, they have been incorporated into what is described as "historical conflicts" between various identity groups (Interview E 2017). D'Agoot (Interview 2017) argues that defining borders should be the final concern of the debate and focus should rather be placed on defining the functions and character of the unitary and federal states. He also argues that conflating federal states with ethnic communities is dangerous as "homogenous units are an inherent danger to national unity" since they are more likely to fuel irredentist and separatist agendas than heterogenous units. In order to avoid a situation of unity at the centre and fragmentation at the periphery, D'Agoot (Interview 2017) contends that diverse administrative units would "administer diversity from the source […] [by bringing] groups together and giv[ing] them power."

In the end, the state often served to unbalance inter-group power relations (Pendle 2014: 227). As the state is captured by the elite, converting administrative units into "tribal fiefdoms" and promoting inter-ethnic conflict, the societal structures and norms that managed conflict in the past have been eroded (Gerenge 2015: 97-98). As a result, state-building in the South Sudanese case actually led to an erosion of cross-ethnic ties and nation-building foundations, while further fragmenting society (Gerenge 2015: 100). Meanwhile, the current conflict has emerged in part because of this identity-based patronage system. The political conflict between Kiir and Machar threatened their respective ethnic groups' access to the state (Awolich 2015: 4). Because of the blurring of party and

state, the struggle over control of the SPLM equated to a struggle over the state (Kisiangani 2015: 5). Discontented leaders could not easily leave the party and start a new party because of the continued loyalty towards and value of the SPLM name (Akol Interview 2017). Thus, with ethnicity as the primary pathway to influence leaders and gain access to state resources, the stakes of ethnic representation are high.

The return to conflict is also evidence that the state-building and institution-building approach promoted by the international community and embraced by the SPLM has failed to address the needs and grievances of the ordinary South Sudanese (Gerenge 2015: 87; Interview B 2017; Young 2012: 7). Many policies and laws that are meant to address the challenges of service delivery and good governance are not adhered to. The local government act, which is meant to link the central state to local communities, is one such example (Interview B 2017). As a result, local administrative leaders are being appointed rather than elected, failing to bridge the gap between leaders and followers (Interview B 2017). Parliamentary oversight is often circumvented by the executive (Interview B 2017; Sunday Interview 2017). Technocrats "have no appetite" to consult society when decisions are largely made by generals in senior positions (Oola Interview 2017). Leaders are accused of preventing the passage of laws that may pose challenges to their interests in the future, such as the Human Rights Bill (Interview B 2017). And, with regards to justice, the many parallel systems present in the country allows people to forum shop between local and formal systems, based on where they have influence, in order to "defeat justice" (Oola Interview 2017).

Some have pointed out that building social capital that furthers inter-group cooperation is more the product of a shared identity and outside the purview of the state (Gerenge 2015: 103). This is not necessarily true. As discussed in Chapter Two, certain state institutions, such as education and the military, can be instrumental in building a collective identity. Also, if a state serves the needs of its citizens, it is likely to foster a sense of loyalty and responsibility. However, this is not a one-way street. State-building also requires a degree of loyalty and responsibility on the part of citizens, and institutions must reflect accepted norms and values to avoid imposing an identity. This is therefore a delicate balance that requires a leadership process that fosters collective decision-making.

5.4.3 Collective will and collective responsibility: The illusion of South Sudan

Perhaps the best indication of the lack of collective loyalty in South Sudan is the speed with which violence spread across the country in 2013. The conflict had reached the eastern provinces within ten days (Pendle 2014: 227). Gerenge (2015: 87, 96-98) argues that this was the result of low social capital, which he defines as trust-based norms that foster cooperation, which was eroded in part by

the “victim-liberator narratives” discussed above. This type of social capital emerges from a sense of collective identity, loyalty and responsibility. The high instance of human rights violations is also a clear indication that cross-ethnic collective responsibility, which assumes all members of a group hold certain rights, is nearly non-existent. The sources of this lack of collective will, loyalty and responsibility can be seen in the leadership process as shown above.

The primary problem rests in a lack of mutuality. As in the Second Civil War, the recent conflict mobilised the large number of ethnic and civilian militias already present in South Sudanese society. Also, as in the North-South civil war, these soldiers’ motives for mobilising were often separate from those of national leaders. These militants are often driven by economic grievances and intercommunal conflicts that escalate into a cycle of revenge attacks (Fleischner 2015: 16-18; Reeve 2012: 41-43, 64, 69). Many soldiers also join such militias because of a lack of other economic opportunities or as a form of community self-defence in a volatile context (AUCISS 2014: 28; Fleischner 2015: 16; Foltyn 2015; Reeve 2012: 41-43, 64, 69). Such interests are far removed from and little served by the power struggle that sparked the conflict. Therefore, unlike the previous civil war, there is no collective goal being pursued in this case. This makes peace even more elusive, especially as peace-making approaches are constrained by the need to negotiate amongst elites.

At the same time, few South Sudanese support the ongoing conflict (AUCISS 2014: 27; Fleischner 2015: 9; Interview B 2017; Maxwell *et al.* 2014: 16). In other words, just as in the 1990s, this conflict is largely an elite affair. This can be linked to the problem of mutuality, where those pursuing conflict are little affected by it. One interviewee (Interview B 2017) used regional identity to illustrate this, arguing that most people in government are from a region (Bahr-el-Gazhl) which has been less affected by violence. He argues, “Maybe if there is fighting in Bahr-al-Gazhl we will find that they don’t want war” (Interview B 2017). Considering the collective cross-ethnic grievances that most Southerners face, one must question why there has not been a cross-ethnic movement opposed to government. No “third voice” has emerged from the people to challenge the elite and express the will of the people (Oola Interview 2017).

Some have argued that this is partly the result of poor journalism, which further polarises society by generalising whole ethnic groups rather than addressing individual actions (Frahm 2012: 29-30). This is an insufficient explanation. Others point to a hostile government that suppresses discontent, often violently (Interview D 2017). Another reason may be found in an argument made by Akol (Interview 2017) that South Sudanese are accustomed to poor service delivery and unaware of the duties of the state. Another explanation may be found in leadership emergence. No leader has yet

emerged that shares mutuality with the South Sudanese population as a whole and is capable of responding to the situation at hand. This is hampered by a context that is unfriendly to new actors and contains entrenched leadership patterns. The result, however, is a situation in which people feel no ownership in the national project and no sense of future in the country, which makes building collective will and collective responsibility near impossible. As one interviewee states, “Many people do things on the idea that tomorrow I will go to another country” (Interview B 2017).

In addition, the two sides to the conflict must also be understood as non-homogenous entities that struggle with collective will. As in the 1990s, the SPLM-IO began to fragment (Sunday Interview 2017). For example, Machar was accused by a defector, General Peter Gadet, of being a “power-monger” (ISS 2015a). Kiir’s actions have also been restricted by hard-liners opposed to compromise, such as the Jieng Council of Elders (Fleischner 2015: 11-14). This has created spoilers to the peace process (Marima 2015). Another important group to note is the Former Detainees. This is a non-militant group of leaders who had been arrested by Kiir and subsequently went into exile (ICG 2015b: 1; Rolandsen 2015: 164). The important thing to note is that these remain elite factions fighting over elite interests with little evidence that these leaders have engaged in a process of collective-decision making with the South Sudanese people or even their respective “in-group” followers.

The peace process for the new conflict mirrored many elements of the CPA peace process. Once again, IGAD took the lead and the primary participants were the key belligerents, with international envoys (ICG 2015b: i, 1, 3). Yet this time, in response to significant international pressure, civil society was brought into the peace negotiations (Moro 2015: 1). This inclusion, however, was superficial since they were kept from key meetings in Addis Ababa (Akol 2014: 3, 5-13). Also, many South Sudanese were unaware or skeptical of this peace process (Deng et al. 2015: 21-22). Another key difference is found in the negotiation process and the international community. The CPA process was a culmination of extensive dialogue between leaders over a period of several years (D'Agoot Interview 2017). This allowed for a “thrashing out of issues” (D'Agoot Interview 2017).

The recent agreement, on the other hand, did not include such a process, was drafted by external actors and was hastily signed in response to external pressure (Akol Interview 2017, D'Agoot Interview 2017). As a result, the agreement is perceived by many as imposed (Akol Interview 2017; Interview E 2017). Similar to the CPA, though, the final peace agreement also served as another elite pact. Its key focus was on determining the power-sharing arrangement between the factions of the SPLM. Like the CPA, it provided the main rebel leader, in this case Machar, with the position of

first vice-president (IGAD 2015a: 8). It followed with a quota system for a transitional government that would move towards an eventual election (IGAD 2015a: 5-18). The fundamental leadership and nation-building challenges, however, remain unaddressed. Consequently, the peace agreement was slow to be implemented, repeatedly violated and quickly fell apart (IGAD 2015b; *Sudan Tribune* 2016; UN News Centre 2016).

5.4.4 The descent into civil war: A leadership analysis

As South Sudan continues to descend into an intractable civil war, the hopes of sustainable peace seem ever more elusive. How did a country that less than three years previous appeared so full of hope fragment so quickly? The leadership process trends that have been traced throughout this and previous chapters provides some indication. In particular, the lack of mutuality between leaders and followers, the limited pathways of influence between leaders and followers and the reliance on coercive and reward power contributed to a failure of the leadership process when the situation changed from war to peace.

The actions of leaders just before and during conflict present some of the clearest evidence of elite interests over-ruling that of their followers. Prior to the conflict, accusations had emerged characterising Kiir's leadership as authoritarian (AUCISS 2014: 21-27). These were not unfounded. To date, no post-independence elections have been held in South Sudan. Considering the severe irregularities in the 2010 elections, it is difficult to argue that the SPLM holds a democratic mandate. It is also difficult to determine who leaders represent and whether they reflect the aspirations of their claimed followers (Interview C 2017). The democratic process within the party had also stalled, with no NLC meeting since 2008 (Rolandsen 2015: 169). Kiir's removal of Machar and other leaders, such as Pagan Amum, from their positions was attributed to their bid to run against Kiir for president of the SPLM (Kisiangani 2015: 6). Kiir's response to accusations of authoritarianism and criticism is encapsulated in his opening speech at the NLC meeting, in which he chose to call up memories of the 1991 South-South conflict and the inter-ethnic violence that followed:

> I must warn that this behaviour is tantamount to indiscipline which will take us back to the days of the 1991 split. We all know where the split took us from that time. This could jeopardise the unity and the independence of our country and we must guard against such things, my dear comrades. I am not prepared to let this happen again. (Quoted in Johnson 2016: Chapter Five).

After violence broke out, Hilde Johnson (2016: Chapter Six) describes her efforts to try and get both Machar and Kiir to renounce the violence: Both avoided or obfuscated. Machar considered releasing a statement only if Kiir did the same while Kiir responded with a statement claiming that the security situation was being handled, failing to address the serious threat to civilian lives that had emerged (Johnson 2016: Chapter Six). He did so in full military uniform (Johnson 2016: Chapter Six). Neither Machar nor Kiir were willing to come out strongly against ethnic targeting or the killing of civilians (Johnson 2016: Chapter Six). In this situation, both leaders were responding based on their personal interests, while citizens suffered.

This attitude appears to become more evident as the war progresses and the massive costs of war to civilians continues to grow, while elites continue to focus attention on factional battles. To date, reports indicate that 50 000 people have lost their lives and 3.5 million people have been displaced (OCHA 2016; Reuters 2016). Having lost the hope brought on by secession, it now appears many South Sudanese are choosing to leave the country (Interview 2017; Interview B 2017; Sunday Interview 2017). The widely publicised Sentry report uncovers the extensive wealth that South Sudanese elites have accumulated through the formalisation of their power in the post-CPA era and the "kleptocratic" networks that have thrived in the conflict (The Sentry 2016). In addition, most of the country's oil revenues have been re-directed to fighting the conflict, squandering much of the nation's wealth on a war that is not being fought for the nation's interests (ICG 2015a: 20).

In August 2015, the parties to the conflict signed the Agreement to the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. After Kiir initially refused to sign the peace agreement, the US proposed targeted sanctions (ISS 2015a). Some have argued that international pressure was the key determinant in getting Kiir to sign the agreement (Akol Interview 2017; Fleischner 2015: 13). Therefore, just like the CPA, the new peace agreement was a negotiation between elites and the international community, rather than between leaders and followers. The motivation for signing was not an effort to stop the widespread suffering or pursue sustainable peace-building. The widespread desire for peace amongst the population was unable to influence leaders. It was influence from the international community, most likely determined by reward and coercive power, that swayed leaders.

However, there was some indication that this was a more inclusive agreement, at least on paper. For example, unlike the CPA, the new agreement made extensive provisions for justice by mandating a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and a Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) (IGAD 2015a: 40-45). The true test, however, is in the implementation and leader commitment, which is unpromising. Leaders have

taken an ambivalent and pragmatic approach to the agreement (Interview E 2017). Despite survey evidence suggesting the majority of South Sudanese desire justice (Deng et al. 2015: 37-57), Machar and Kiir were quick to back-track on their commitment to set up a hybrid court (Kiir & Machar 2016). In response to pressure to set up the court, the government then announced the National Dialogue to "divert attention" (Sunday Interview 2017). There appears to be little faith in this process, however (Interview D 2017; Sunday Interview 2017).

Similarly, Kiir unilaterally decided to create twenty-eight new states after signing the peace agreement (UN News Centre 2016). This disrupted the power-sharing arrangements in the agreement (Associated Press 2015; Al Jazeera 2015). It was justified as a fulfilment of the federalism desire, though this is debatable (Sudan Tribune 2015). Machar, who was originally a staunch supporter of federalism was now against this move (Associated Press 2015; SSNA 2016; Thomas 2015: Chapter Five). Once again, elite positions proved highly flexible based on situational changes. However, the situations that changed their positions were those that affected their interests rather than that of their followers. Therefore, nations cannot be easily formed through a specific constitutional and institutional framework when said institutions are only framed a certain way to suit leader interests. This would be less likely if mutuality exists between leaders and followers.

The decades of conflict have severely depleted societal trust in South Sudan. The failure to build mutuality founded on trust has aggravated this. If trust exists between leaders and followers, then it is likely that that trust will extend to fellow followers under the guarantee of the leader. Leadership, then, is essential in maintaining societal trust. These actions described above indicate that trust will not be forthcoming as elites continue to pursue their own interests and the mutuality gap widens. The sources of power and pathways of influence between leaders and followers are eroding at alarming rates. As a result, society continues to fragment as individuals turn to ever smaller communities where trust, mutuality and influence is evident and is likely to protect individuals in a dangerous environment. If this continues, the limited foundations for a cross-ethnic identity and collectivity may disappear altogether.

5.5 Conclusion

The cautious optimism that South Sudan would form a cohesive and peaceful nation has quickly faded. This peace-building failure stems from a leadership process that encourages the irresponsible use of identity narratives in politics, prevents the formation of a state that is conducive to nation-building by commodifying it, and discourages the formation of collective will and loyalty through its inherent prevention of dialogue. Two key findings can be pulled from this analysis. First, it has

been shown that the mutuality gap has resulted in the pursuit of elite interests to the detriment of society as a whole. This has contributed to the capture of the state and the ethnicisation of politics. In short, collective will and collective action has tended to occur when there is a momentary convergence of leader and follower interests. But, as this chapter illustrates, those interests are not embedded in mutual values and lived experiences, resulting in a subsequent divergence of interests when situations change. An enduring sense of collective destiny and will is not present.

Throughout Sudan's history, it is evident that the interests of followers are only capitalised upon when they converge with the interests of elites who require mass mobilisation to achieve their goals. At other times, engagement with followers is exceptionally minimal. The Mahdi raised support from southern groups to rebel against the Turko-Egyptian regime and subsequently proceeded to oppress these groups (Deng 1995: 10-11). A mass nationalist movement was not needed for Sudan to gain independence and for the elites to ensure power in independent Sudan, so the Sudanese people were not consulted on the nature and character of an independent Sudan (see 3.3.1, 3.3.2). The South was mobilised against the North during the Anya-nya rebellion, but the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the ethnicisation of politics during the interim period were done in the interests of elites (see 3.4). Mass support was raised for the Second Civil War but quickly descended into inter-communal violence when elite factionalism outweighed the common enemy in the North (see 4.3). Following the signing of the CPA and the 2011 secession elite competition for power superseded any nation-building efforts and often ran counter to them. The 2013 conflict erupted as the ultimate illustration of the superficial commitment to South Sudanese nationalism amongst elites, who quickly turned to identity politics in their pursuit of the state.

The second conclusion is that the limited means and pathways to exchange influence between leaders and followers has been detrimental to nation-building. The interruption of influence by the international community has prevented the formation of collective will and a social contract between state and society. It makes leaders accountable to international actors rather than their followers by (a) guiding leader actions in response to international pressure rather than a sense of collective will with the people and (b) providing services to the population that should be the responsibility of leaders. As a result, peace-building initiatives are much harder to implement because they are not founded on a collective desire for peace, and leaders are not required to build mutuality with their followers since the state no longer becomes the primary service provider in the country. This aggravates the problem of power in South Sudan.

Due to the lack of mutuality in the society, leaders have few sources of power amongst the population. The lack of power bases have forced leaders to resort to narrow identities, reward and coercion to maintain stability and cohesion. This is unsustainable and easily fragmented as situations change — most evident in the disintegration of South Sudanese society after separation from the common enemy of the North. Identity-based power is most easily called upon in a crisis, when there is a clear common enemy. When this was no longer the case in South Sudan, leaders resorted either to coercion and reward power or sought to create a new identity-based enemy, thereby further fragmenting society along identity lines. In short, many of the leadership patterns that prevented Sudan from forming a cohesive, sustainable and peaceful nation have been replicated in South Sudan, resulting in the same challenges. These patterns run the risk of being replicated at ever smaller levels. As this chapter illustrates, such patterns cannot be mitigated by a state-building approach alone.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FOR NATION-BUILDING AND PEACE-BUILDING

6.1 Introduction

South Sudan remains embroiled in a civil war with no end in sight and represents a failure of liberal peace-building and state-building approaches. The peace-building approach used in South Sudan is representative of some of the key problems associated with liberal peace-building discussed in the introduction (see 1.1; 1.2.3). In particular, it reflects an over-reliance on state- and institution-building without understanding the broader leadership and nation-building challenges of the society. The peace-building approach used in South Sudan also demonstrates the problematic assumptions that (a) building a state will lead to a peaceful nation and that (b) addressing the root causes of the conflict will lead to peace (see 1.1). However, the creation of a new state, in this case South Sudan, did not lead to peace nor did it address the root causes of the conflict, as they were far more complex and dynamic than a political and identity difference between northern and southern Sudan. This is why a new framework of analysis is needed to provide a holistic understanding of identity-related conflicts (including the root causes and other inhibitors to peace that emerge during the conflict), that also moves beyond a state-centric approach towards understanding a society and nationhood as a whole. The primary purpose of this study was to develop and test such a framework that would also enhance the understanding of nation-building as a core component of peace-building, and leadership in Political Sciences.

The central question posed in this thesis was to examine the suitability of the leadership process approach in such a framework, and whether this would better explain South Sudan's peace-building failure. In order to answer this question, three key elements of the nation-building process, that can contribute to either peace or conflict, were explored using the leadership process approach — the construction of identity, state-building, and the formation of collective will and responsibility (see 1.3). Four objectives were identified for this study — (a) to develop the conceptual and theoretical framework that would form the new framework of analysis, (b) to apply this framework to the South Sudanese case study, (c) to use the results to explain South Sudan's nation-building and peace-building challenges and determine if these conclusions may be relevant to other identity-related conflicts, and (d) to assess the utility of the proposed framework.

The analysis of South Sudan illustrates not only that a new framework for analysing identity-related conflict is necessary, but also that the leadership process approach does provide valuable insights and tools for understanding such conflicts and the nation-building challenges associated with them.

It has used a historical approach to provide some perspective into the peace-building and nation-building challenges of South Sudan that has led to the ongoing conflict that erupted in 2013. The analysis has also provided some insights into the academic and theoretical understanding of nation-building and peace-building. Using the conceptual framework of nationhood developed in Chapter Two, the researcher has been able to trace South Sudan's nation-building trajectory. The leadership process approach was used simultaneously as a theoretical framework to understand this trajectory by analysing each of the elements of nationhood in turn (identity, statehood and collective will and responsibility). This new approach has allowed for a nuanced and holistic understanding of peace and conflict and its interactions with nation-building, which permits the researcher to draw three distinct analytical conclusions regarding nation-building and peace-building (see 6.3). This chapter draws this study to a close by discussing these findings.

6.2 Summary

Chapter One introduced this study by providing its intellectual and political context. It argued that a new framework, drawing on conceptualisations of nationhood and theories of leadership, would advance the understanding of identity-related conflicts, which would expand peace-building thinking beyond its traditional liberal and state-building model. An introductory review of the three key fields of study relevant to this research (Leadership Studies, nationalism and nation-building, and peace-building) was then covered. This review demonstrated that peace-building thinking is at a cross-roads and requires new approaches to move beyond the stagnant state it finds itself in. A better understanding of nation-building and its interaction with conflict may lead to such a new approach. The leadership process approach was argued to provide a framework that will lead to this better understanding of nation-building. The chapter then provided the research questions guiding this study and its main objectives, followed by an explanation of the methodology — a single case-study.

Chapter Two proceeded to deepen the literature review that was begun in Chapter One, with a particular focus on the complex relationship between identity and violent conflict. It explored the key debates surrounding the origins, formation and content of national identity, arguing that the leadership process approach may shed some light on these debates. Following this, a discussion of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the construction of identity and conflict, before, during and after conflict, was presented. Again, the potential uses of the leadership process approach in understanding this relationship was highlighted. Finally, this chapter served the primary purpose of developing and articulating the conceptual and theoretical framework that forms the cornerstone of this study. The concept of the nation was developed by identifying the key elements of nationhood

found in existing literature and a theoretical framework of leadership based on the leadership process approach was explained, along with the intersections between leadership and nation-building. This serves as the framework used in Chapters Three, Four and Five.

The analysis of the case study — South Sudan — was begun in Chapter Three. This chapter stretched from southern Sudan's early history up to 1983. It was divided into three key periods — early and colonial history, independence and the First Civil War, and the interim period following the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. Evidence and analysis provided in this chapter served to illustrate the subjective and constructed nature of the dominant divisive identities in Sudan (e.g. Arab/African, Muslim/Christian, Ethnicity). The processes leading to the formation of these identities was demonstrated to be a product of specific contexts and leaders' responses to certain situations. In addition, the early relationship between statehood and identity groups was analysed to illustrate the challenges that arise from a contradiction between nation and state and the ineffectiveness of addressing such a contradiction in a top-down and coercive manner. Finally, this chapter concluded that a lack of mutuality between leaders and followers prevents the formation of collective will and responsibility, as the interests of followers and leaders are often divergent.

Chapter Four continued to use the framework of analysis developed in Chapter Two to analyse the second Sudanese civil war. The three key periods discussed in this chapter were (a) the early years of the war (1983-1991), (b) the years of the South-South conflict (1991-2002), and (b) the peace process that ended the war. The analysis of Garang's Sudanism vision and inter-ethnic violence amongst Southerners was used to demonstrate how identity construction is formed from an exchange relationship between leaders and followers, and that this relationship can grow destructive when mutuality is lacking between the two. A discussion on the challenges in harmonising the state and nation, begun in Chapter Three, was continued here. Finally, the importance of mutuality in collective will and responsibility was again identified in this chapter by explaining the differing interests of leaders and followers with regards to visions of the Sudanese state, the South-South conflict and the shifting alliances of leaders.

The final chapter analysing South Sudan with the proposed framework is Chapter Five. Here, the interim period after the signing of the CPA in 2005, the post-secession period and the beginning of the 2013 civil war was analysed. The key conclusions reached in this chapter relate to the leader-follower relationship. The lack of mutuality between leaders and followers in South Sudan was used to explain the ethnicisation of politics in South Sudan and the rapid decrease of unity once the common enemy of the North was no longer an imminent threat. A gap in mutuality was also used to

demonstrate the use of the state in pursuit of elite interests during the peace process and after secession. This contributed to the failure of the state-building approach and its ability to contribute to nation-building. Similarly, the inability to exchange influence between followers and leaders was used to explain the inability to form a social contract and collective will. Finally, this was related to the limited sources of power for leaders, forcing them to rely on identity, rewards and coercion, which has been demonstrated to be both unsustainable and destructive.

6.3 Key findings

This thesis has investigated the reasons why South Sudan has been unable to build a nation that sustains peace. As indicated in section 1.1, nation-building is formed of three key processes — identity construction, state-building and the formation of collective will and collective responsibility. The way in which these processes unfold and interact with one another determines whether nation-building is likely to take a violent or peaceful form (see Figure 1). As the South Sudanese case has shown, when there are tensions or contradictions between the three nation-building processes conflict is likely to emerge. For example, when state formation and state-building efforts are in direct contradiction with the dominant perceptions and trends of social identity, groups may reject or revolt against the state (as seen in the Arabisation and Islamisation policies of Sudan). When collective responsibility is determined by narrow identities, peace-building and state-building efforts suffer because loyalty and collective action is driven by sub-state identity markers (as seen by the ethnicisation of politics in post-secession South Sudan). It is important then, to understand how these processes unfold and emerge. The leadership process approach has proven useful in this regard in two ways — by providing a nuanced understanding of the leader-follower relationship in nation-building processes and by allowing a situational analysis of nation-building processes.

The first sub-question of this research sought to better understand identity construction using the leadership process approach. An analysis of South Sudan has shown that identity is formed and changed by the interaction between leaders and followers in response to a specific situation. The second sub-question centred on understanding the relationship between statehood and nationhood. The main finding in this regard is that it is important to distinguish between statehood and nationhood and understand the consistencies and inconsistencies between the two in a given context. In particular, a leadership analysis allows the researcher to identify some of the sources of these inconsistencies that primarily emerge from a lack of mutuality and poor influence exchange. The final sub-question concerns the formation of collective will and collective responsibility. Social consciousness and action that promote peace or conflict is determined by a complex array of societal relationships. These relationships include those between leaders and followers, different leaders,

institutions and people, and amongst groups. The leadership process approach makes understanding and analysing this multitude of relationships feasible and has shown how mutuality is critical in the formation of collective will and responsibility. This section discusses these conclusions in more detail and identifies some insights that may be relevant to other identity-related conflicts.

6.3.1 A leadership analysis: How is identity constructed and what is the relationship between identity construction and peace and conflict?

Chapter Two discusses the various debates surrounding the construction of a collective identity. These centre around whether nations are old or new phenomena, formed by the elites or masses and delineated by objective or subjective attributes (see 2.2.1). As illustrated throughout this thesis, the trajectory of identity construction in South Sudan reflects many of the complexities addressed in this debate. Identities are clearly constructed through complex processes of social, political and economic change. However, identities are also rooted in certain historical narratives. Similarly, while elites have clearly manipulated and utilised identity narratives, the populace would often reject elite narratives of identity, illustrating the agency of both elites and masses in constructing social identities. Finally, while many identity attributes (such as religion, race and ethnicity) are perceived as objective and immovable, history and changing circumstances have shown that they are in fact very fluid. Using the leadership process as a theoretical framework to understand these complexities and contradictions has shed some light on this process of identity construction.

The various processes of identity construction discussed throughout Chapters Three to Five have illustrated the fluid and dynamic nature of identity construction in South Sudan. Nevertheless, these identities are perceived as real and have very real consequences. This includes the impact they have on conflict processes. The most evident example is the Arab-African binary created through centuries of conquest and exploitation. Chapter Three discussed how the Arab-African divide had been created through a specific historical process rather than an objective racial distinction (Gray 1963: 1; Sawant 1998: 345). This distinction became more embedded after Sudan's independence, though it fluctuated between a racial and religious distinction due to changing contexts and leader actions. This perceived difference was used to justify and legitimise both oppression and violent conflict. So, while identity was not the sole cause of the conflict, its interaction with political and economic processes did influence the conflict trajectory in a way that is indicative of more than a simple mobilisation tool.

The situational understanding of leadership explains these changes and fluctuations in identity. The way in which identity narratives oscillated between racial, religious, ethnic and clan markers

throughout South Sudan's history was generally determined by situational factors. However, identity is not simply a dependent variable that changes in a unilateral way when the situation changes. A key component of this was the way in which leaders chose to respond to those situational factors, and whether this response and the identity markers being dramatised responded to the realities facing followers. For example, in times of crisis, Southern leaders relied on the narrative of a common enemy to mobilise support. This reflected the reality of Southerners who held the experience of oppression and slavery in their collective memory. Garang's vision of unity and Sudanism, on the other hand, did not do this. As identity is relational, this use of "the other" was key in crystallising the Northern and Southern identities.

At the same time, the situational factors driving this use of the common enemy were often experienced differently by leaders and followers. The motivations for leaders often centred on political and state access, while followers were largely concerned with an improvement in daily life. The way in which the oppression narrative was used did not bridge this divide of interests. Thus, when situations changed, it often became evident that a broader collective identity did not exist. This is particularly evident in the periods following the Addis Ababa and CPA agreements, when formerly competing elites became allies and their followers' interests became a secondary concern (see 3.4, 5.2). The ethnicisation of politics in South Sudan reflects a similar pattern. Followers accepted the narratives of ethnic domination and fear because it reflected their realities in local resource competitions (see 5.4.1, 5.4.3).

However, leaders were primarily pursuing elite interests. This process results in fluid and highly volatile identity boundaries. In other words, certain situations may lend themselves to influencing identity narratives. Leaders and followers respond to these situations based on their individual experience of said situation. Leaders may choose to frame identity a certain way or institute certain actions that are aimed at re-framing identity boundaries. Followers may choose to accept or reject such actions and narratives. This leads to the perpetuation of certain identity markers, a deepening of their divisions or the emergence of a more dominant identity marker. From this, as shown in a situational understanding of leadership (see 2.4.2), a new situation emerges that will impact future processes of identity construction. Because of this, identity cannot be re-framed at random but is dependent on the results of previous experiences of this cycle. This also helps explain why the re-framing of identity after conflict is so challenging.

More importantly, however, the dominance of narrow identity markers in the identification of political allegiance and organisation has entrenched certain identities and complicated peace-building

efforts by normalising the use of identity in political and social structures. In particular, politics became driven by narratives of a common enemy. While identity is relational (Eley & Suny 1996: 32; Guibernau 2007: 10, see 2.2.1.3), this heavy reliance on "the other" proved destructive in South Sudan. By centring societal attention on a common enemy, South Sudanese society failed to form an understanding of what would bind members together. This would make unity dependent on the presence of an enemy, which led to the fragmentation of society after secession (Martin 2002: 122; Young 2003: 423). In addition, it created a political culture and leadership process that is dependent on "othering". Combined with the continuous cycles of conflict and violence this proved highly destructive to social cohesion and nation-building.

Another important contribution from Leadership Studies to nation-building is the role of power in identity construction. The South Sudanese experience shows that the success or failure of a certain identity narrative is often less dependent on the substance of said narrative than on the way it is transferred from leaders to followers. Multiple sources of power can be used to influence the nation-building process. Some are more successful than others and it is likely that various sources of power are necessary. The use of coercive power to impose an identity, as most clearly evidenced in the Arabisation and Islamisation programmes of Khartoum (see 3.3.1), are likely to be rejected by the population. This is especially true when the promoted identity is already linked to a history of oppression. The use of reward power, as seen in Kiir's "Big Tent" strategy (see 5.3.4), has the ability to create the illusion of unity but does not foster a sense of collective identity. Followers and leaders only cooperate on a transactional basis and not on the basis of an identity that stems from shared experiences, values, norms and visions.

Referent power, on the other hand, often fosters a deepening of identity borders when leaders are chosen because of their identity characteristics. As often happened throughout Sudan and South Sudan's history, leaders were chosen and identified based on a similarity of identity. In other words, prototype leaders emerged (see 2.4.1). These leaders, however, struggled to gain a cross-sectional following of multiple identity groups (with the exception of key leaders like John Garang who used other sources of power). As a result, the formation of a widespread Sudanese or South Sudanese identity was difficult since leaders served either their individual interests or those of their respective followers. Charismatic power also plays a role in identity construction, as seen in the example of John Garang. However, charismatic power, while useful in myth-building and mobilisation does not necessarily build deeper norms and ideologies that are needed in a national identity. This is perhaps where expert power is needed in the form of intellectuals, philosophers and artists. South Sudan was lacking in this regard. In addition, the mutuality gap between the educated and less educated, and

between the rural and urban (see 4.4.1), makes it difficult for such "experts" to influence the population.

This leads to perhaps the most important contribution that the leadership process can bring to the study of nation-building — the concept of mutuality. Throughout this study, the importance of the mutuality gap in South Sudan's nation-building failure has been explained. In short, South Sudan's experience illustrates the limitations of narrow and inflexible identity attributes (e.g. ethnicity. language, and religion) in building mutuality. Such similarities between leaders and followers often create the illusion of mutuality but is not necessarily founded on shared experiences, needs, values and norms. Yet, in the absence of such a depth of mutuality, leaders and followers are often forced to identify and influence each other based on narrow identity markers. This mutuality rarely extends beyond early mobilisation for conflict to more complex and systematic action for peace-building. Because of the emotive power of identity in conflict, especially where identity groups are central to social interaction and structuring this process serves to further entrench narrow identity divisions (Kauffman 1996: 137). Thus, the process of identity construction continues. However, as shown in Chapter Five, because of the lack of mutuality, this process fragments and continues at ever smaller levels rather than a broader, national identity construction process. This occurs as leaders are forced to resort to narratives that are reliant on a common enemy rather than mutuality, building identity on notions of difference rather than sameness. Yet, in current peace-building practice, which is elite-centred, the common enemy often becomes an ally. This is often to the detriment of followers when mutuality is lacking to ensure elites maintain a focus on follower interests. As a result, the lack of mutuality leads to a dependency on "common enemy" narratives and fosters contradictions in vision when situations change, both of which contribute to conflict rather than peace.

The nature of mutuality between leaders and followers determines the way in which they influence each other. This is important in the nation-building process to understand how identity is constructed through an exchange of influence between elites and followers rather than being an exclusively top-down or bottom-up process. Where mutuality exists, leaders and followers are likely to exchange influence in such a way as to ensure a sense of collective identity is formed which reflects common experiences, values and norms of both followers and elites. This would develop a shared understanding of what and who the nation is. Where it is absent, however, the nation-building process is likely to be fragmented and interrupted by other influences and actors.

The various efforts at nation-building from the top-down in South Sudan have illustrated the importance of follower acceptance in nation-building. This is seen in the rejection of the Arab-Islamic

State vision and Garang's Sudanism vision (see 3.3.1, 4.2.3). The growth of the church (De Waal 1998: 143; Rolandsen 2005: 75-76), and the rapid ethnicisation of politics in South Sudan (Frahm 2015; Gerenge 2015), show that a key determinant of follower acceptance of identity narratives is the degree to which the proposed identity marker responds to followers' needs and daily experiences. Again, this returns the notion of mutuality. Where mutuality is not present, leaders are unlikely to articulate a vision of identity that reflects the shared experience of followers. The vision is then likely to be rejected by followers. However, the use of identity as a mobilisation tool does reflect the power that leaders do hold to influence followers and therefore the identity construction process. Yet, this influence can often be destructive when formed from a superficial or manufactured mutuality.

6.3.2 A leadership analysis: How does the relationship between the nation and the state build and sustain peace or conflict?

The previous chapters have also highlighted the constant tension found between the nation and the state in Sudan and South Sudan. In large part, the decades of war represent an effort to resolve this tension and the contradictions between statehood and nationhood. One thing that has made this particularly challenging in the case of South Sudan is the general animosity felt towards the state, from early opposition to the state to the more recent tension between urban and rural in modern South Sudan (see 3.2.2, 4.4.1). At the same time, conflict has often arisen as a result of exclusion from the state, a consequence of the failure to correlate the state and the nation. The North-South civil wars were driven in part by the exclusion of Southerners from the political and economic centre in Khartoum (Thomas 2015), while the current civil war in South Sudan was sparked by a disagreement over access to the benefits of the state (Awolich 2015: 4; Rolandsen 2015: 164-165). As these lines of exclusion and inclusion were often framed by identity markers (Deng 1995; Frahm 2015: 260; Gerenge 2015; SPLM 1994a: 14; Young 2012: 3), it represents a failure to incorporate the whole nation into the state, or to define the nation and state clearly. The post-secession experience, however, illustrates the complexities of aligning statehood and nationhood. Self-determination clearly entails more than the creation of a *de jure* state to represent a perceived nation. It requires a clear and collective understanding and imagination of the nation.

As discussed in section 2.3.1, an important distinction between nations and other forms of identity is its link to the state or some claim on political autonomy. This is why one of the definitions for nation-building involves ensuring "the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide" (Mylonas 2012: xx). Doing this, however, involves more than redrawing state borders, as the South Sudanese case illustrates. It requires a dialogue and exchange of influence between state and society to ensure

the state is structured and functions in such a way as to represent the will of the nation, the ultimate goal of self-determination (UNGA 1970). This research has shown that correlating the state and nation cannot be achieved where a leader-follower gap is present, which hinders an exchange of influence between leaders, who represent and control the state, and followers, who make up the nation. Despite various attempts at renegotiating the state structure through policy and constitutional adjustments, South Sudan continually failed at nation-building and state-building due to this leader-follower gap. In short, as the negotiation of the state shifted from one between leaders and followers to one amongst leaders, the ability to ensure congruency between state and nation decreased significantly. This contributed to conflict as key sections of society were excluded from the state-building and nation-building process.

Another important aspect of the state in nation-building is the way in which the state is used for a nation-building purpose. The way in which Modernists theorise the role of the state and industrialisation in nation-building has been discussed (see 2.2.1, 2.3.1). Indeed, the state holds several key institutions that can play a part in nation-building, such as education, the civil service and the military (Hearn 2006: 82-83). However, the way in which these institutions are used is essential to understanding their ability to direct the nation-building trajectory of a society. The leadership process provides some insight into this with its understanding of power. In particular, the use of coercive power by the state to impose a nation-building narrative is likely to lead to a rejection of the state and, as seen in South Sudan, a violent division of said state. The state can also be used for reward power, as seen in the way leaders were often co-opted into the state to quell rebellion (see 5.3.4). This proved effective only in the short term as compliance with and loyalty to the state became dependent on the availability of rewards, not an ideological or emotional connection to the state. Therefore, the state-centred aspect of nation-building should not be an exercise in power but rather one of influence exchange. In order for this to occur, the state must be influenced by followers as much as leaders, which requires a move away from inter-elite dialogue and negotiations.

To achieve this, mutuality is needed. This has been found so for various reasons. First, without mutuality, the state may be used for elite interests as seen in South Sudan where the military was used to "buy peace" rather than ensure the security of the nation and its people (Ajak 2015: 3). The federalism debate throughout southern Sudan's history has also been used to ensure elite access to the state rather than state access to the people (see 5.3.2, 5.3.4, 5.4.2, 5.4.4). The failure of state-building efforts has been a recurring challenge in global peace-building. This case study illustrates one of the reasons for this challenge. When mutuality is not present between leader and follower, well-in-

tentioned and well-planned state-building efforts are likely to fail because those tasked with building the state seek to form one that serves their interests rather than that of the nation as a whole. In this way, the pathways of influence are critical in reconciling the tension between nation and state in the peace-building process. If followers are excluded from the state-building conversation or if external actors interrupt said conversation, then it is difficult to ensure a state that reflects the nation. As this is the key purpose of self-determination and nationalist conflicts, a failure of the state to reflect the nation may lead to further conflict.

6.3.3 A leadership analysis: How does collective will and collective responsibility form to promote either peace or conflict?

The last sub-question guiding this research refers to the final element of the nation, collective will and collective responsibility. In section 2.3.1, it was argued that forming a nation requires the coordination of a collective identity, political organisation, territory, collective will and collective loyalty and responsibility. It was also proposed that the last two of these is likely the most challenging. South Sudan appears to reflect this. While there were periods of unity and foundations for collective identity, and the state was eventually divided to reflect perceptions of identity, the consistent problem appears to have been that of collective will and collective responsibility. The contradictions between all five elements, as a result, proved irreconcilable. It is also in these elements of the nation that the value of the leadership process approach is most evident.

It has been shown that collective will in South Sudan was most present during times of conflict and in response to Northern oppression. However, evidence also suggests that this is superficial, as even during conflict South Sudan struggled with disunity and fragmentation of its liberation movements (see 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 4.3). In addition, the rapid fragmentation of South Sudanese society during the interim periods after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA, and the post-secession period illustrate that this collective will was almost wholly dependent on the presence of "the other" as a threat. Similarly, the significant human rights violations and intermittent inter-communal and inter-ethnic violence (see 4.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.3) demonstrate a low degree of collective loyalty and responsibility. In this way, Sudan and South Sudan's struggle to form a collective identity, reconcile state and nation and develop the means to build collective will and loyalty have resulted in the inability to build a nation that sustains peace. The reasons for this failure have been discussed throughout this thesis using the leadership process.

The situational approach to leadership serves as a measure of collective will. While most societies will have moments of collective action, this does not necessarily reflect collective will. Collective

will, or the ability to reach a collective decision (Weilenmann 2010: 43), needs to outlast a situation in order to be demonstrative of a nation. For example, the ability to mobilise for secession in South Sudan was a moment of collective action driven by leaders that were able to respond to a specific situation. However, because of the limited mutuality driving this action, the ability for leaders to continue the formation of collective will did not live beyond the moment of secession. The same can be seen in the Mahdist revolution's loss of Southern support post-revolution (Collins 1962: 23, 29-30), and the rapid loss of legitimacy by Southern leaders after the Addis Ababa Agreement (Johnson 2013: 107-108, 404). Peaceful nation-building, therefore, requires more than individual leaders that respond to specific crises. It needs a leadership process that is founded on a functioning relationship between leaders and followers which allows for the appropriate leaders to emerge at the right time to represent the collective desires and visions of followers.

Another important contribution of the leadership process approach is in the role of power in producing collective will and ensuring collective responsibility. Collective will ensures that society is able to determine and take a collective action (Weilenmann 2010: 43). Collective responsibility ensures that members of the nation are loyal to the state and fellow members in times of crisis and that fellow members are seen to hold equal rights and responsibilities in the nation (Deutsch 2010: 11-12; Miller 2000: 27; Smith 1998: 196). Neither of these can be achieved through coercive or reward power. The persistent rebellion by the South to external rule and the state in general is evidence of the limits of coercive power.

Similarly, Kiir's "Big Tent" approach was an effort to prevent rebellion by providing leaders with access to the state (Ajak 2015: 3; Awolich 2015: 9; Frahm 2015: 260). In other words, he sought to build collective will and loyalty through reward power. This failed for two reasons. First, he was unable to maintain the rewards indefinitely. Second, this strategy excluded the multitude of followers who did not benefit from their leaders' access to the state. Influence based on this type of transactional leadership is not conducive to nation-building, especially if it becomes the norm for collective action. Referent power, as seen in John Garang and the various leaders that emerged through ethnic identification, appears to be more effective at building collective will and loyalty. However, it suffers from the problems of sustainability when situations change, as discussed above. It is possible that a combination of expert, legitimate and referent power can be used to form collective will and collective loyalty, but there is little use of this power in South Sudan and therefore more research would need to be conducted in another context to determine this.

Finally, mutuality is critical in the formation of collective will and collective responsibility. The ability to form a collective will requires some collective understanding of the key challenges and needs of the nation and how to address them. The secession solution appeared a straightforward one but it was founded on a collective understanding of the common enemy and not of the nation and its needs. This stems from a rebellion that was driven by leaders whose needs and interests were far removed from that of their followers. Collective will, therefore, is relatively easy in the face of a clear, external enemy, which allows for mobilisation that creates the illusion of a nation. In the face of more complex challenges such as economic stagnation and low-intensity inter-communal conflict, it is more difficult, particularly when these challenges do not impact leaders and followers in the same way or to the same degree. This is because leaders are important in guiding collective action but rarely succeed when there is no mutuality present, which is further complicated when external actors interrupt the relationship between leader and follower, as occurred in South Sudan. Such a situation allows leaders to escape the demands of followers and for external actors to determine the direction of collective will. Therefore, a collectivity needs to be founded on a vision that addresses the reality and needs of everyone within it.

6.4 Leadership lessons learned for conflict, nation-building and peace-building

Peace-building and conflict have been discussed throughout this thesis, but it is important to return to it explicitly. Using the above conclusions and the evidence provided in the previous chapters, this section seeks to highlight the lessons that have been learned for peace-building. It is important to move beyond a mere critique of liberal peace-building. This research presents an alternative model for analysing identity-related conflicts in order to pursue a relevant peace-building solution. Of course, further research is required to apply this approach to alternative contexts. The South Sudanese experience, however, shows the importance of a broader analytical approach to peace-building to ensure that identity divisions formed in conflict are addressed, the appropriate state emerges from the conflict and a collective will that supports peace-building develops; and that these processes do not contradict one another. Also, while the leadership process does not present all the answers to the peace-building challenges in the field, its application to the nation-building challenge has brought to light some important conclusions.

First, on the issue of identity, the South Sudanese case has confirmed much of what is known about identity. In particular, it has illustrated the constructed nature of identity as well as the notion that identity difference cannot be said to cause conflict in and of itself. Yet, using the leadership process approach has proven useful in understanding the nuances of the relationship between identity, peace and conflict. It assists analysts in understanding the role of identity in a conflict without ignoring its

relevance or over-exaggerating its importance. The focus on both leaders and followers, their relationship and their response to situations allows one to identify when and how identity is used as a mobilisation tool, how it drives action amongst different actors and how it is perceived differently by these actors. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of how identity interacts with peace and conflict, how it can be harnessed for either violence or peace-building, and therefore how it can be addressed.

Second, the state-building process, which has been a central concern of peace-building, has also been better understood with the use of the leadership process. The state remains an important part of nation-building and therefore should not be ignored in peace-building. However, using the leadership process approach it is evident that the state-building process entails more than institution-building if it is to achieve sustainable peace. It must be closely aligned with a broader nation-building process that is founded on mutuality and an exchange of influence between leaders and followers. In addition, this research has shown that the type of state that is formed is not the primary concern but rather how it is formed to ensure that it correlates with the collective will of the nation. This requires a functioning leadership process. Similarly, a re-configuration of the state in itself does not lead to sustainable peace when a flawed leader-follower relationship is simply replicated at multiple levels and in multiple systems. A destructive leadership process, not founded on mutuality and which favours inter-elite influence exchange is likely to lead to conflict relapse no matter what the state-building approach.

Finally, sustainable peace requires a sustainable collective will. This requires a leadership process that allows for leaders to emerge that can guide collective action that represents the needs, vision and values of the collective society. In order to achieve this, the society requires mutuality to ensure a collective understanding of the challenges facing society and an influence exchange process that allows leaders and followers to engage in a conversation that determines the collective will. This is essential in both peace and conflict, both of which require collective action. In addition, collective loyalty and responsibility is more likely to be found where the collective will is founded on collective values and needs. In short, the collective decision to move to peace or war must be founded on mutual interests or needs, otherwise the liberation movement or peace process is likely to fall apart when situations change.

In this way, it is evident that identity-related conflicts stem from and produce complex situations and processes that require a more nuanced understanding of peace-building than is currently availa-

ble. In particular, a nation-building approach is needed, not to highlight or over-exaggerate the importance of identity in conflict, but to understand and address the complex interaction between the two. The leadership process approach allows for a holistic and complex analysis of nation-building and conflict. In particular, if leadership is analysed using a process approach, it prevents the reduction of conflict to simplistic explanations and solutions related to “ethnic hatred”, the “resource curse” or failed states. It then would support the pursuit of a nation-building approach which promotes peace rather than conflict. In short, understanding leadership helps analysts and practitioners to better understand a society’s nation-building challenges that can positively or negatively impact the pursuit for sustainable peace.

As discussed in section 1.4, a key methodological challenge of a case study is its generalisability. While the analytical conclusions reached in this study may be relevant to other identity-related conflicts, further research using other case studies is necessary to confirm this and provide further testing of the proposed framework of analysis. Also, one of the key issues that this study was not able to resolve is why and how followers identify and choose their leaders. This is important to understand the mobilisation process, which often aggravates identity difference. While this question was raised with interviewees, few were able to provide a suitable answer. Such a question requires a larger empirical study that generates new data on the selection and emergence of leaders. This would further enhance the understanding of the leader-follower relationship and why leaders are followed even when mutuality is not present, which is demonstrated to be one of the most destructive processes to nation-building in this research. In addition to this, while this research has provided a better understanding of identity-related conflict, which is aimed at improving peace-building thinking, there is not enough scope in this study to propose a new peace-building approach. Further research to develop a new understanding of peace-building that pursues a nation-building agenda founded on an understanding of leadership is needed.

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