

AAD1-5

AADI

ASSESSOR.

BEN "AADI" 12

AADI

NATIONAL GENERAL COUNCIL

5, 6, 7 APRIL 1988

POINTS FROM THE KEYNOTE ADDRESS:-

serious crisis in our ranks - we must break down indiscipline like regionalism - we must build unity amongst regions and factions.

The NSF has successfully mobilised against the new constitution. No 10 and the Kooakof Bills we have seen the state strategy of 4/2/87 co-opted and repression. The NSF has done the following: destroyed the myths of the homelands, made Black local authorities unworkable, and destroyed the credibility of the Tricameral system.

dividing line between our people and our enemy shifts continuously. We must, therefore, win others over to our struggle and draw them into positions of support.

In the East Cape, cooption of unions failed. There are also worker organisations who sincerely discourage workers from the broader struggle. Yet, these same workers face various problems in communities, weaknesses of NSF: lack capacity to build organisations based on issues; through inadequate training, our activists lack clarity and, therefore, have different conceptions; and we need to improve on decision-making so that we have a balance between participation and quick response.

Road Ahead: 'to challenge' and 'to organise'. Must take on the state, frustrate it in its attempt. Where challenges are spontaneous we must learn to give coherence and direction to them. We must understand the weak links of the apartheid chain so that we challenge them.

Main Tasks: ① Understand our country and the world; ② Define stage of struggle, organise and challenge; ③ Education of our nation members; ④ Kinshasa front - get our roots to our people; ⑤ Develop experienced leadership.

8. THE SECRETARIAL REPORT:

(refer to hand-out with pre-NGC package).

C. REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONS:-

1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:-

Points of consensus: Maintain and initiate such relations to advance struggle against, apartheid. Discussion on international relations should be democratic. We must not be used by groups like CIA. Such internal contact not be at expense of internal and regional relations. Points of difference: imperialist goals are incompatible with ours. Our struggle could be subverted. What advances the struggle is OK, but we must maintain our independence.

2. EDUCATIONAL CRISIS:-

Issues: Democratic representation at schools, linked to social representation rejection of the prefect system or schooling conditions. Victimization of progressive teachers and pupils.... Role of the NSF: Could form co-ordinating structures of student bodies (ex- parents and teachers) without decision-making power. NSF must try to organize teachers. Education Charter Campaign: we must popularise it - take it all over SA. Fight SADF in schools.

3. ORGANISATION:-

Limitations to development of U: insufficient analysis, therefore, inadequate strategies; absence of clear programmes; overstitching NSF officials; no overall strategy to draw in non-affiliates; no clear demands in some campaigns; and too much high-profile activity at expense of grassroots. How to minimise conflict in NSF: need for ongoing training nationally co-ordinated - may cause uniform approach. Develop code of conduct to ensure constructive debate and criticism. Need for national forum to debate and discuss. Restructuring: need to incorporate specific portfolios in NEC's. National Working Committee to ensure development and shifting terrain of struggle.

4. BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND TRICAMERAL PARLIAMENT:-

on from the game and awareness of the BIA campaign.
 Problems which face us: repression and lack of venue. Also need for alternative - replace BIA with community organisations. But there is a need to develop fuller concept of the community organisation - we must work so that these organisations are recognised eg. the education minister was forced to liaise with community organisations.
 The total destruction of BIA is a priority in white communities, whites must be shown uselessness of parliamentary structure. Resist Form. Write our response to Black Forum. Establish People's Judicial Commission to record crimes of collaborators.

5. REPRESSION:-

Aimed at killing extra-parliamentary opposition to create space for opponents to operate. Need for a counter campaign - we must win in people and groups like churches. We must also mount international pressure around repression. Activists must be disciplined and security-conscious. Build organisations at various levels to ensure that no complete smothering of the USF takes place. Activities must not be localized - they must be widespread eg stayaways. Our unity in such cases will stretch the state's defence. People must know their legal rights, detainees must take action to secure rights. Jailied and detained must be freed - this is a demand. Our people must understand why the state acts in this way.

6. THE WORKING CLASS:-

USF and non-USF unions: talk to members (shop-stewards about the USF. Address worker issues in the community - our programmes must be appropriate to workers. But there is also a need to work formally with officials. USF and unemployment: the unemployed workers must be organised around issues like Unemployment Funds (UIF), initiatives, things like built-buying in communities, self-help projects. But the reasons for this situation and the time in

economy which causes this must be explained.
 Working Class leadership: we must develop this by providing opportunities for workers to express themselves in our meetings, to encourage union members to play an active role in USF, by distributing skills to workers; and by officials and activists of USF having a working class character to their conduct. What the new federation: we must encourage a working relationship between USF and federation - establish USF labour sub-committee. 'USF unions' shouldn't form own federation but should work towards joining this federation.

7. BANTUSTANS, BUREAU AGENTS AND FORCED REMOVALS:-

Need for major anti-bantustan campaign to fight problems in those areas and to promote national unity. Politicisation of people through the linking of bantustans and things like pass laws. Forced removals: how continue such campaigns, generate publicity around it, USF volunteers must show their support to threatened communities. We must build relationships with organisations dealing specifically with Forced Removals.

Rural areas: need for full-time organisers. Also address rural areas through politicisation and organisation of migrant workers. People here must be educated about assistance, but there is also a need to focus press attention so as to lead protection. Need for central contact between rural areas.

8. COST OF LIVING: see resolution.



9. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:-

- Nat. Pres: Archie Gumede, Alantaria Sisa.
- Exec. Chairperson: Curvick Ndlovu.
- Gen. Sec: Popo Molefe.
- Publicity: 'Terror' Mkhata

ADDITIONAL MEMBERS:-

- Z. Malindi, Trevor Mamund (U. Cap)
- Steve Tshwete, Rev. U. Stofile (Botswana)
- Y. Mhammed, Rev. Xundu (Natal)
- Edgar Ngopi, Derrick Swan, E. Cross

WE CELEBRATE 30 YEARS OF THE FREEDOM CHARTER



Our demands remain the same

UDF 15

DIE VRYHEIDSHANDVES - LEEF VOORT

30 jaar gelede het 3000-verteenwoordigers, gekies deur 7 miljoen Suid Afrikaners, 'n lys van eise opgestel, bekend as die Vryheidshandves. Die Vryheidshandves praat van die soort SA wat die meeste Suid Afrikaners graag sal wil hê

Vandag is ons eise nog steeds dieselfde.




Die Vryheidshandves sê : Suid Afrika behoort aan almal wat daarin woon.

Maar die apartheid regering probeer ons verdeel. Sommige word gestoot na tuislande, en word gesê dat hulle nie in Suid Afrika behoort nie. Andere word beforsier na verskillende group areas as tweede klas burgers.

Die Vryheidshandves sê - die rykdom van die land moet ten volle verdeel word.

Maar vandag is 'n paar uitgevrete base nog steeds baie ryk, terwyl werkende mense nie genoeg geld het vir

ordentlike voedsel nie, ook nie vir busgelde en huur nie.



Die Vryheidshandves sê - daar sal werk vir almal wees. Maar vandag is een uit elke vier werkers sonder werk. Die wat wel werk het die dreigement van afsittings wat gedurig oor hulle koppe hang. Tog is SA 'n ryk land, en daar is; geen rede waarom daar nie werk vir almal is nie.



Die Vryheidshandves sê - daar sal huise vir almal wees, en mense sal die reg hê om te woon waar hulle wil. Maar vandag word die mense van

Crossroads, soos baie ander, bedreig en teen hul wil verskuif na plekke waar hulle nie wil woon nie.

Die Vryheidshandves sê huur sal afgebring word maar vandag kry miljoene mense swaar as gevolg van hoe huur. In Atlantis word mense uitgesit na die ope veld as hulle nie hul huur kan betaal nie.



Die Vryheidshandves sê - SA sal in vrede leef met sy buurstate. Maar vandag baklei die apartheidsweermag oral - Namibia, Angola, Botswana en ander plekke.

Maar belangrikste van alles sê die Vryheidshandves - die mense sal regeer! Die tuislande, driekamer parlement, die community councils en management committeees is almal puppets van die goewerment.



Ons eis een nie-rassige regering waarvoor almal die reg het om te kan stem.

Hierdie eise wat 30 jaar gelede gemaak is deur miljoene Suid Afrikaners leef nog steeds voort.




Weg met apartheid!
Weg met swaarkry in hierdie land van rykdom!
**VOORWAARTS NA 'N SUID AFRIKA GEBAS-
EER OP DIE VRYHEIDS
HANDVES!**

Come to the mass meeting!

Venue: Athlone Civic Centre

Date: Sunday 30 June

Time: 2.30pm



ASSESSO 2

Sen AAD4

AAD4

ONCE AGAIN THE SA FACIST REGIME HAVE LIKE VULTURES QUENCHED ITS THIRST WITH INNOCENT BLOOD OF OUR COMRADES. THEY HAVE DONE IT AT SHARPVILLE, SOWETO, UJITENHAGE, MASERU, MATOLA AND MOST RECENT BOTSWANA.

BUT THE STRATEGISTS MISCALCULATED IN THINKING THAT THEY CAN STRANGLE OUR LIBERATION BY SHIFTING THE ARENA OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF SA. OUR DESTINY CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED BY US HERE IN OUR COUNTRY AND BY US THE PEOPLE OF SA INCLUDING US THE PEOPLE OF NATAL WHO HAVE FAR TOO LONG NOT BEEN CONFRONTING THE ENEMY. LET US CLOSE OUR RANKS AND ATTACK THE REGIME WITH ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL. TODAY WE MUST TAKE IT UPON OURSELVES TO MAKE NATAL ALSO UNGOVERNABLE AS OTHER PATRIOTS HAVE DONE IN OTHER PARTS OF OUR COUNTRY.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE ????????


THE ENEMY IS HERE OUTSIDE THE DOORS

LET US FURTHER DESTROY THE PUPPETS AND COLLABORATORS OF THE ENEMY

AMANDLA NGAWETHU!!!!
FORWARD TO PEOPLES POWER!!!!!!



EK SERTIFISEER DAT HIERDIE DOKUMENT 'N WARE AFERUK IS VAN DIE OORSPRONKLIKE WAT DEUR MY PERSOONLIK BESIGTIG IS EN DAT, VOLGENS MY WAARNEMINGS, DIE OORSPRONKLIKE NIE OP ENIGE WYSE GEWYSIG IS NIE.



W43168W S/A/O

E.P. DUTTON.

(19)
27/8/87

at d s the NEC mean when it talks about UDF moving from "Protest to Challenge?" Some comrades have expressed surprise at the idea that the UDF has ever been a "protest" movement. But it must be remembered that the UDF was launched as a front to protest against and oppose the new constitution and the Koornhof Bills. It is history now that this issue orientated opposition to particular measures rapidly escalated into a movement challenging the state on a whole range of fronts. So in one sense the NEC theme describes a process which has already taken place in the UDF.

But in another sense the NEC theme points the way forward: in its short history the UDF has played an important role in opening up the battle against apartheid in new areas, and intensifying the struggle in existing areas; however many of these actions have remained localised, fragmented, issue-orientated and unco-ordinated. The transition to Challenge points the way forward to a conscious, coherent, national offensive to challenge the state on all fronts, based on a systematic and scientific assessment of current conditions and future prospects of our struggle. This of course, suggests a far higher level of organisation.

Where challenges have been fragmented and localised "challenge" ~~would be national and co-ordinated~~. Where challenges have been spontaneous or sporadic, "challenge" would now be a conscious process, part of a coherent strategy. Where challenges have had limited political content, "challenge" would now aim at fundamentally transforming society. We now need to look at what the elements of this challenge are and what this will mean for the Front:

1. CONSCIOUS and CO-ORDINATED CHALLENGE

When we say that the challenge will have to be a conscious process, this implies a far higher level of political understanding in the Front, the ability to assess limits and possibilities, to develop and apply appropriate strategies and tactics.

The need to develop a co-ordinated challenge raises a number of questions about the front and its future development. Does the Front have the dynamic potential to meet the organisational tasks implied here? Is it appropriate at this point to develop other organisational forms?

2. FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE.

(19)
27/8/87

We are talking about a challenge to the whole system of oppression and exploitation, not a piecemeal challenge. We are not attempting to reform unreformable structures, but are fighting for complete social transformation. The people of S Africa have never governed the country: we are fighting to realise this most basic right, the right to self-determination. Therefore ours is not a civil rights struggle. It is a struggle for NATIONAL LIBERATION.

The govt. (state) is
(2) described as "the enemy"?

3. CHALLENGING the STATE

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Challenging the state means far more than responding to the measures of the state in a sporadic way. It means engaging the state on as many fronts as possible, fragmenting and dispersing its forces at the same time as strengthening and broadening our forces. It means frustrating the state's efforts, preventing its advances, forcing it to retreat, and if possible cutting off its lines of retreat.

At the same time, we must be able to realistically assess our strengths and the state's weaknesses (and vice versa), and deploy our forces accordingly. There is no point in challenging the state on terrain where it is strongest and we are weakest. This does not mean lapsing into passivity, since we must seek at all times to seize the initiative and retain it, even if we are sometimes forced to fight battles on terrains which are not of our choosing. This means that we have to constantly adopt a flexible and creative approach to the struggle, in accordance with the concrete conditions facing us at any particular point.

In challenging the state, we have to combine two objectives
1) making state programmes and institutions unworkable
2) and isolating the state from all support

1) It is one thing to oppose the state's evil schemes. It is quite another thing to prevent them from being implemented or to render them ineffective. For example, the tricameral parliament was very effectively opposed by the UDF and rendered totally illegitimate in the eyes of the people. This scheme, however, has only been frustrated in so far as the people have rejected it. It continues to operate in the Indian and Coloured communities and the danger is constantly present of it becoming a powerful force there, just as the bantustan structures have, despite popular rejection, become a powerful force in the rural areas. The masses in the African townships on the other hand have rendered the black local authorities inoperative in large areas of the country. Since August last year 150 councillors have resigned and only 5 out of the 34 councils set up nationwide are still functioning. This is not necessarily an irreversible process and the state will attempt to reimpose these unpopular bodies on the people. Struggles of popular organisations must develop to the point where the state can no longer impose its undemocratic structures on oppressed communities in any area. Conversely, democratic organs of the people must start to replace these structures, as embryos of a future democratic Peoples' S.A.

2) ISOLATING THE STATE FROM ALL SUPPORT

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At one level, this means isolating the state from effective support within the ruling alliance by disorganising and frustrating the enemy; and neutralising it. The dividing line between the people and the enemy is not static, but changes as the struggle intensifies- something we see daily in the townships. It is our task to isolate the state from these vacillating allies (collaborators) in the townships, and where

possible to win them over to our side.

At another level, it means frustrating attempts by the state to co-opt elements into its ranks i.e. win allies. At yet another level we have to loosen the hold of conservatising forces (ZCC, Inkatha) on the masses and transform their *potential support or passive support into actual support for the struggle. Clearly, effective isolation of the state hinges on the mobilisation of the masses into our organised ranks, and on our degree of unity and cohesiveness. Just as we attempt to fragment the state's forces, so is the state constantly working to fragment and disorganise our forces. This is something we constantly have to fight against.

* is the masses

We mentioned that both components of challenging the state (frustrating and isolating it) must be combined. Exclusive emphasis on one or the other aspect leads to certain dangers: if activists focus exclusively on immobilising state structures for example, without isolating the state from the community, they run the risk of being reduced to a militant political clique, themselves isolated from the masses. Alternatively, if progressive organisations have mass support but don't pose an effective challenge to organs of state power in their area, they face the risk of themselves being immobilised in the long run.

4. NATIONAL CHALLENGE

It is inevitable that the level of challenge will be uneven in different parts of the country at different times. But the challenge as far as possible has to take on a national character. UDF has already played an important part in this regard. But vast areas of the country remain unmobilised and unorganised. Some of the most vicious arms of the apartheid state, in particular, remain largely unchallenged- that is, the Bantustan machinery.

To assume a national character, the challenge not only has to spread geographically. It also has to be cohesive and therefore co-ordinated at a range of levels, with one central national thrust and direction. This entails firstly geographical co-ordination, from local, regional to national levels. Secondly different organised sectors of the people have to develop structures of co-ordination ranging from student to trade union to civic organisations. This could also develop at the local, regional and national levels. The structures of the front, whether area committees or the NEC, will have to develop appropriate relationships to these various structures.

5. MASS-BASED

To be effective, challenge needs to be rooted in the masses. It has to be taken up by as broad a section of the people as possible. This means both drawing vast numbers of unorganised people into progressive organisations and incorporating increasing numbers of these organisations into the central thrust of the struggle, - the National Democratic Struggle.

Only then will the challenge be a fundamental one and fully take on a mass African and working class character.¹

To achieve this the peoples organisations will have to become fully responsive to the challenges spontaneously emanating from the masses themselves.

6. FROM CHALLENGE TO ALTERNATIVE

Having established the illegitimacy of the S.African regime, it is necessary to project a popular alternative based on both the present and the future.

The present in the sense that our organisations have to become living and viable alternative organs of peoples power. Therefore, for example, in situations where the apartheid puppets are no longer able to effectively function in the townships, a stage could be reached where the people's organisation assumed responsibility for organising the community to govern itself in a variety of ways from setting up health clinics to crime prevention.

This will help to project and make people fully understand, our vision of a future democratic South Africa. At one level, because it will demonstrate that people can create democratic alternatives to an undemocratic system. At another level, experience will demonstrate the limits of even the most democratic structures while the relations of domination in society at large remain intact. (It is for this reason that we must be very careful of the use of the notion of "liberated zones", however attractive it may seem). As long as utopian illusions aren't created amongst the people (leading to inevitable disillusionment) what these embryos of democracy will give birth to is a vision of a totally alternative society, based on the realisation that to be ultimately meaningful, popular control of society as a whole will have to be asserted. This vision of a totally alternative South Africa needs to be actively discussed and propogated by our organisations, however, It is not something which will automatically spring from our opposition to, or even our challenge of, the current system.

1 This is a necessary prerequisite, but not a sufficient condition to ensure African and working class leadership.

No 19

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No 19

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The brief period since the front was launched has seen the flowering of organisations throughout the country. Yet in the same period we have seen relatively spontaneous mass mobilisation sweep the country like wildfire. The relationship between the processes of mobilisation and organisation is a very complex and dynamic one. One thing is clear, however; the process of mobilisation has far outstripped that of organisation. What is being suggested by the NEC slogan is a shift in emphasis from mobilisation, to organisation. These processes can never be completely separated, but the tasks implied by the two are relatively distinct.

We must be clear what we mean by a shift in emphasis to organisation. It is not being suggested that we stop mobilising the masses, that we retreat from the masses to a narrow organisational approach. This would be cutting off the lifeblood of the struggle. What is being suggested is a constant movement from mobilisation to organisation. That we mobilise the masses into our organisations : mass mobilisation must be converted into mass organisation.

A two-pronged approach flows from this analysis: On the one hand a mass approach, without which our organisations are doomed to become relatively small bands of activists (no matter how well organised). On the other hand a serious organisation-building approach, by which we mean the development of strong structures and disciplined cadres, without which our organisations will be prone to collapse (no matter how mass-based). Clearly then these two prongs of our approach are equally important if we are going to build effective mass-based organisations. This is the direction the NEC slogan points to.

At the same time we must acknowledge that the process of building mass organisation is a slow and uneven one. Spontaneous mass action will continue to coexist with disciplined mass action spear-headed by the progressive movement. Our problem has been that we have been unable to respond effectively to the spontaneous waves of militancy around the country. Spontaneous and organised mass action are both essential components of the struggle and have to be combined into a dynamic unity.

1. THE FRONT AND ORGANISATION

The various campaigns of the Front have galvanized the political consciousness of the masses. People who were afraid to associate with politics in the past are now doing so openly. This atmosphere has helped to broaden and deepen the process of mass mobilisation. At the same time it has helped create the space for organisations to take root and develop. Large numbers of organisations have sprung up and existing organisations have grown stronger.

The UDF has played the role of a Front in areas where there is a fairly high level of organisation, bringing organisations under one banner.

Yet in other parts of the country, where there is little formal organisation, the UDF has played the role of an organisation. Because of this dual role the Front is in a vastly better position to command influence among the masses than if we just had individual membership. Campaigns such as the MSC and the anti-BLA/anti-election campaign have led us to areas where virtually no political organisation or consciousness existed. In this way the UDF has become a household name, and the mass nature of our cause has been projected.

If the Front formation creates many organisational possibilities it also places certain limits on us. In particular, the fact that the UDF is a front of many different organisations each with their own structures and discipline, makes it difficult to ensure the full participation of affiliates in decisions of the Front, at the same time as acting quickly and efficiently. The Front is however a dynamic form of organisation. It can achieve a higher or lower level of democratic participation and its decision-making process can tend to be effective or cumbersome. Obviously our goal is to ensure the highest degree of democracy, combined with swift and effective decision-making.

It is also more difficult to achieve a high level of organisational co-ordination, ideological cohesion and tight discipline within a Front formation than say, within a political party. To achieve these organisational standards within the UDF will require an exceptional degree of commitment amongst the affiliates to advancing the Front, a shared conception of our struggle, our strategy and the tasks at hand. It will also require a far higher level of discipline. The Front formation puts a heavy responsibility onto activists and affiliate organisations because of its decentralised nature.

In conditions which aren't conducive for the creation of a unitary political organisation, it is essential that we creatively develop our various structures to achieve the aims set out above. For example, representation of various constituencies through specific portfolios on the Transvaal REC (e.g. Youth, women...) expresses a tendency towards greater centralisation and co-ordination withⁱⁿ constituencies, although this process is only really beginning. This development can be harnessed to help create the cohesiveness which we now lack.

We need to ask ourselves whether the UDF structures themselves can't start to play a more aggressive political role. Is there for example, place for the UDF Area Committees to play a more directly organisational role rather than a low-level co-ordination role? Could these committees, or similar structures play a role in co-ordinating political activities in the area, and help build a more cohesive political unit dealing with both theoretical and organisational questions? Or would other structures be more appropriate to these tasks?

2. MASS WORK AND BUILDING ORGANISATION

We said earlier that our approach to organisation involves two components: mass work and building of strong organisational structures. If we are to take the process of Mobilisation to Organisation seriously, we need to consider how these two aspects of organisation need to be approached and what some of the major obstacles to their realisation are.

3. MASS WORK

Organising across Social Divisions

There are obstacles to organising certain sections of the community because of the social conditions which divide us. Apart from the problem of race which divides one community from another, there are obstacles within our communities because of the social position of various sectors, and reactionary attitudes towards those sectors.

There are very real obstacles to the full participation of women in the struggle. Firstly, the conditions of social oppression which women face means that they are denied the time and resources to participate fully in our organisations. Secondly, reactionary social attitudes about the ability of women to be involved in the struggle are widely held in the community, both among men and women. The involvement of the mass of women in the Front therefore depends on breaking down reactionary attitudes in the community at large and within our own organisations; and we have to take active steps to deal with the practical problems which prevent progressive women from participating in the work of the Front.

At another level, serious obstacles to organisation have been created by the cheap labour system. In particular, the system has made it difficult to organise the mass of hostel dwellers. Where our unions are able to organise migrants and non-migrants fairly easily into the same organisation, the situation is more complex in the communities. Although hostel dwellers and other residents live in the same townships, there are many things which separate them into two different communities. Most obviously, migrants are separated from their families, and live in large numbers in 'hostel communities'.

Because of this brutal system of separation, reactionary attitudes have developed amongst both hostel-dwellers and other residents to each other. This is something which has deliberately been exploited by the forces of reaction. In addition to this the hostel and non-hostel residents, to a certain extent, face different problems (for example, hostel dwellers concern about lack of cooking facilities in the hostels; or other residents concern about township education). On the other hand there are many common problems, such as the Black Local Authorities, police raids and rent increases.

We have seen that it is possible to bring hostel dwellers into our organisations. But we have also seen that ^{where} ignorance and reactionary attitudes exist amongst hostel-dwellers and other residents alike, differences have been exploited by the system. It is the duty of our

organisations to break down such negative attitudes, and to begin to take seriously the particular concerns of hostel-dwellers, unless we are prepared to abandon the most exploited section of the working class to reactionary forces such as Inkatha. If we adopt the correct approach, there is no reason why hostel dwellers should not fill the ranks of the Front in large numbers.

Another problem is the so-called 'generation gap' in our communities. Many of the older generation were uninvolved in political work from the early sixties to the mid-seventies. When the June uprisings were led by school students, the idea developed that the children would win liberation and that the parents time had passed. Many children were unaware of the rich tradition of struggle which their parents had participated in.

To a certain extent this gap between the youth and their parents has persisted. Our organisations have mobilised greater numbers of ~~parents~~ today in the civics and in the trade unions. But our Front still has the image to a certain extent of being a relatively youthful movement. It is important that our activists appreciate the necessity of bringing parents into the Front, and breaking down misunderstandings that may exist between the parents and the youth. It is important that the youth understand that without the full participation of their parents, our organisations will be weak and our forces divided. For example where youth take up issues which affect the whole community, all sections of the community must be consulted and involved.

The serious and mature nature of our Front must be projected. It is not a youth movement, although the youth represent a vital section of the Front. We must make it possible for older people to fully identify with and participate in the Front, and in our organisations. Important steps have already been taken in this direction with the parent-student committees and the joint community bodies of civic, youth and students.

Responding to Mass Struggles

Our inability to respond effectively to spontaneous mass struggles represents a stumbling block to drawing the masses into our organisations. One of the reasons for this is the failure of our organisations to mobilise their resources to assist in crisis situations. When mass struggles broke out in the last eight months, the structures of local affiliates were hammered and stretched beyond limits. Yet we were not able to send people from elsewhere to assist.

Unless the Front is able to pull together its resources as and when necessary, and deploy these where they are most needed, we will be unable to mobilise the masses into our organisations in such situations. To a certain extent this involves better structures of co-ordination. We won't deal fully with this problem however until we overcome a sectional approach to the struggle. That is, the attitude by activists that ^{they} are active only in one or other section or area of the struggle, and don't have a duty to assist where the Front most needs assistance.

Organising the Rural Areas

The bantustans trap a large portion of the masses in political and economic servitude, The feudal-like tribal authority system makes open organisation very difficult. Peoples' very existence- their jobs their houses their pensions their land- is subject to the totalitarian control of the bantustan petty tyrants. People in the bantustans are physically isolated from popular struggles in the urban centres. Where rural people have attempted to organise they have been subjected to even heavier repression than activists in the townships. The Front and a number of its affiliates have been banned in several bantustans. All these factors have thus far more or less effectively stifled open mass work in these areas.

This does not mean at all that we abandon these areas as "impossible to organise" ! What it does mean is that we have to adopt a creative organisational approach which is appropriate in these conditions. Before we can even do this, there has to be a recognition that organisation in these areas is a priority. Where there are organisational developments in the bantustans, it is essential that the Front and its affiliates provide the necessary assistance - from training to resources.

Although it is obviously not possible to prescribe guidelines for breaking down organisational barriers in the bantustans, a couple of possible approaches spring to mind: Where there are UDF affiliates active in bantustan townships, they could attempt to spread their organisational work to neighbouring villages. Where there is no UDF organisation in these townships, the Front should attempt to establish a presence - although these townships are repressive, there is probably more space to establish an organisational base there, than in the areas governed by the Tribal Authorities. At the same time we must constantly attempt to keep in touch with conditions in the Tribal Authority areas, and investigate possibilities for establishing organisational networks or helping to build existing ones.

At another level the Front must draw larger numbers of hostel dwellers into the ranks of its affiliates. Apart from establishing unity between the hostel dwellers and other township residents, this would have the added advantage of developing a closer political link between the urban centres and the rural areas. By organising migrants we could help popularise the Front in the bantustans and heighten consciousness of the National Democratic Struggle in these areas. On the other hand, such contact would help put the Front more closely in touch with the concerns and conditions of rural people. This could be an important aid to rural organisation, but not a substitute for it.

Countering State Repression

The states repressive strategy has shifted as our organisations have assumed an increasingly mass character, and particularly with the emergence of the UDF. While the state still attempts to remove our leadership, it increasingly focuses on driving a wedge between our organisations and the masses; and isolating activists from their community. One important aspect is the attempt to spread misinformation and false rumours about our organisations. We are familiar with the numerous scurrilous pamphlets attempting to discredit our organisations and mislead the masses. We know that the Front has been the prime target.

Another important tactic has been to deny venues to our organisations throughout the country. Today there are very few townships where halls are available to our organisations, thereby making mass work very difficult. When meetings do go ahead, every attempt is made by the system to scare people away from them. As well as disrupting our daily functioning, this makes it very difficult to forge disciplined mass action in periods of intense struggle.

Many other methods are used in an attempt to distance our organisations from the masses. One such method is to make people afraid of associating with our activists, thereby isolating them. Examples of this would be police maintaining a deliberate high profile presence outside activists' homes, spreading rumours about individual activists etc.. Attacks by the forces of reaction on activists homes are as much designed to frighten other people, as they are intended to intimidate activists.

We need to develop creative ways of responding to these, and other obstacles to mass work. In the face of misinformation, we must always put our position clearly to the masses. Where venues are denied to us, we must find other ways of meeting with the people whether by way of house meetings, door to door work or whatever is most appropriate. We must also find ways of struggling for popular control of these venues. Where attacks are made on our activists, we must develop ways of defending them and involve the community in this process. We must always be conscious of the need for our organisations and the masses to become one, so that an attack on our organisations or activists becomes an attack on the masses, and is dealt with as such.

Related to the above is the problem of fatalism and passivity amongst the masses. By fatalism we mean the idea that "there is nothing we can do about the situation", by passivity we mean the attitude that "others will do something". These attitudes which are particularly widespread amongst certain sectors of the population, present a serious obstacle to getting the unorganised masses actively involved in our organisations.

Clearly political conditions in South Africa have tended to generate these sorts of attitudes in the past, and will continue to do so. The apparent indestructibility of the apartheid regime and the heavy price paid by those who oppose it help create the atmosphere of hopelessness which sometimes grips the masses.

Yet this veil of unshakeable strength and total control is now beginning to crumble. The possibility of creating an alternative society is becoming increasingly real. The possibility of the organised masses swinging the balance of power in our favour is daily becoming less remote.

In this context it is very important that our organisations demonstrate in practical ways the effect of united, organised action. This is so, whether we win major victories or minor victories. A dynamic organisational approach will also answer most directly the needs and aspirations of the masses, and demonstrate the necessity of becoming involved in organisation, rather than its futility. In our propaganda work we must constantly link organisational gains to the fact that victory is possible as is an alternative society, if the masses become involved in shaping their own destiny.

Creating Peoples Unity

A major obstacle to mass work is the disunity and divisions between organisations commanding some respect and following among the masses. The Front has been subjected recently to attacks by Fosatu and other organisations. As a result ordinary people are thrown into confusion, and certain people justify inactivity in our organisations because of this problem. The system often exploits differences to try and create fully-fledged political antagonisms, disorganising us further and discrediting our organisations in the eyes of the masses. The end result is demoralisation and disorganisation of the people.

Our first duty in the UDF is to the masses. We have to demonstrate to them that the Front is a responsible organisation of the people. While we may have differences with other organisations, we will always operate on the basis that we can't afford to alienate any person or organisation in the camp of the people. In practical terms, this means continuing to draw more people, groups and organisations into the Front. There are numerous organisations still outside the Front who form part of the peoples' camp. Our doors must remain wide open to them.

Where peoples organisations do not, for one reason or another, join the Front, it remains our duty to develop co-operative relations with them. In this way we can develop political contact not only with the leadership but also with the rank and file, thereby familiarising larger and larger numbers of people with the politics of the Front. This will also make it more difficult for the forces of reaction to drive wedges between our organisations and organisations outside the Front. Joint campaigns such as the UDF-unions anti-election rallies in the Western Cape and PE, and the Transvaal stay-away are examples of such co-operation.

Where we find it impossible, for one reason or another, to work jointly with other organisations, we must make sure that antagonisms which develop are as far as possible neutralised. If we fail to do this, the current Azapo -type situation could become a permanent feature of the political scene. This could have serious negative effects on the willingness of the masses to become involved in political organisation.

4. BUILDING ORGANISATION

We said earlier that a serious organisation-building approach involves the development of strong structures, political cohesion, and disciplined cadres. If we are to build powerful organisations, we have to frankly examine our weaknesses in these areas, and take firm action to remedy them.

Discipline

Organisational discipline is fundamental. Without it organisations can't make progress, and in fact degenerate. With it, we are able to take the struggle to a higher level. Discipline is a political concept, which expresses the commitment of activists to collective democracy, accountability and organisational unity.

At our April National General Council the dangers of indiscipline were emphasised: "Unless indiscipline is eliminated, our organisations are threatened with disunity, division and suspicion. All forms of factionalism, regionalism, individualism and cliquism must be stopped. We are working not in our individual capacities but as activists of a people's front".

Discipline does not mean sheepishly taking orders from our leadership. Rather it is a way of arriving democratically at collective decisions and ensuring that these decisions are effectively carried out. "Arriving democratically at collective decisions" involves the frank discussion and airing of differences, but this is subject to certain political constraints. Firstly differences must be discussed in a comradely manner, respecting others viewpoints. Secondly, contributions must be constructive. This excludes negative and divisive approaches, as well as arguments which violate the basic principles of our struggle. Thirdly, comrades must always be sensitive to the security situation facing our organisations, restraining themselves from making dangerous interventions which are ill-considered.

A decision is made once a line has been democratically established. The second phase of discipline consists of effectively carrying out that line. This is crucial. Everyone is bound to stand by the collective decision, and to defend it, regardless of their position during the discussions. All activists have a duty to explain the decision to others, or if they do not understand it, to discuss it and come to an understanding. Any person or group who attempts to subvert such a decision, or to criticise it outside the forums of that organisation, is being factionalist. Fully democratic practices, on the one hand, and organisational discipline on the other are our weapons against factionalism.

This is not a static process. If activists are unhappy with a line or decision they can raise this in a responsible and comradely fashion through the democratic process. In this way, a disciplined approach allows an organisation to develop a dynamic relation to political questions, rather than constantly having to protect itself from undisciplined and divisive activists. A level of discipline also enables us to develop a clear direction and direct our forces in the most concentrated and powerful way possible.

Just as we require such discipline in order to advance, activists must realise that any act of indiscipline is an act against the struggle, against the people, and an act that aids the enemy. To repudiate discipline is to disarm the masses and voluntarily assist

the enemy. To avoid or neglect discipline, whatever one's intention, has the same effect. The enemy takes advantage of any signs of indiscipline, any symptoms of disunity, and every weakness within our organisations.

Organisational discipline is not only an internal discipline. We must always adopt a correct and disciplined approach in our contact with the masses. Our cadres are seen as representatives of our organisation and our organisations will be judged by the standard of their behaviour. If we want to build our organisations as democratic alternatives, they have to enjoy the highest reputation among the people.

Political Cohesion

The lack of discipline is partly based on inadequate political understanding and cohesion. Higher levels of discipline, on the other hand, will create space for thorough political discussion and the adoption of common positions. Political cohesion in the Front requires full discussion of key political questions at all levels. Education forums such as these can help further this process. It is important that such discussions are not confined to leadership level, but that organisations make them a basic part of their training. Since the Front structure is not centralised it is essential that we reach a high level of political understanding and cohesion within and between the affiliates. Without this, the Front's direction and unity will be jeopardised.

Presently, a lack of political clarity in our ranks has meant that there is a limited grasp of basic issues: an unequal development and differences in the way we see issues such as National Democratic Struggle, working class leadership, etc. It is essential for our unity and our effectiveness that we overcome this.

We must build greater cohesiveness/agreement on questions of:

- the nature of our struggle
- our organisational approach
- our style of work.

If we fail to do this we will work at crosspurposes.

Development of Activists and Infrastructure

"Out of the mobilised mass support our current organisations must develop cohesive structures capable of analysing their own situation and dealing with any challenge at any time of the day. Our affiliates must develop the capacity to identify and to address the needs of the masses of our people. We must increase mass participation in our organisations. Skills must not be limited to a few people, but rather spread and shared. The level of cadreship and leadership must be enhanced." (Report of General Secretary, UDF NGC)

Because of the rapid growth of organisations and the mobilisation of the masses into our organisations in recent periods, we have had an injection of many inexperienced activists and young organisations into the Front. Most organisations have therefore experienced a quantitative growth because of effective mass work. This has not been equalled however by a shift in the quality of our organisational structures and activists. Rapid growth has made it difficult for organisations to consolidate.

Training of activists and development of strong organisational infrastructure therefore becomes a priority in the "Mobilisation to Organisation" process. The development of disciplined and politically clear activists are aspects of training which we have already touched on. There are many skills however which are necessary for the running of organisations. We must make sure that activists develop these skills and share them with others.

Examples of such skills which need to be developed are media skills, how to run meetings, financial skills, administrative skills, mass work (eg. door to door), planning campaigns, research and information, publicity work and many others. It is important that organisations develop and spread these skills if they are to be effective. Such organisational development will also help organisations to weather periods of intensive struggles and state repression.

By the same token, organisations should not be run by a few activists, but should have structures rooted in the masses, whether this is at factory, school or street level. At one level this will make our organisations strong. At another level it will ensure that the composition of our organisations reflects the main content of the National Democratic Struggle - the participation of the African masses and the leadership of the African working class.