

# Aligning South Africa's National Development Plan with the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals: Guidelines from the Policy Coherence for Development movement

Willem Fourie

Department of Business Management, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

## Correspondence

Willem Fourie, Department of Business Management, University of Pretoria, Lynnwood Road, Pretoria, South Africa 0028. Email: willem.fourie@up.ac.za

## Abstract

Sustainable development depends on coherence between the development policies of recipients and the providers of development assistance. Yet achieving coherence is difficult. This paper examines the extent to which the Policy Coherence for Development movement offers guidelines for aligning national development priorities with global development priorities. This qualitative paper focuses on alignment between South Africa's National Development and its Medium-Term Strategic Frameworks and the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals. Based on an analysis of policy documents and peer-reviewed research on the Policy Coherence for Development movement, it is argued that five guidelines might be of relevance for South Africa, namely (i) prioritizing political buy-in, (ii) safeguarding country ownership of development priorities, (iii) using and improving existing institutional structures and processes, (iv) stimulating cooperation across government departments by using an issue-based approach and (v) including a long-term and transnational perspective when considering policy impacts.

## KEYWORDS

2030 agenda, PCD, policy coherence for development, SDGs, sustainable development goals

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development signifies a sea change in development planning. For the first time both developed and developing countries have committed to domesticating and implementing the same set of development goals (United Nations, 2015). However, implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a complex endeavor, as it requires finding coherence between the 17 goals and strengthening their means of implementation (see Spangenberg, 2017). However, the search for coherence goes beyond the 17 goals themselves. Aligning existing national development priorities with the SDGs (see, e.g., Bernstein et al., 2015; Moomaw, Bhandary, Kuhl, & Verkooijen, 2017 regarding the importance of policy coherence) is an important yet complicated requirement for their realization. In Africa a plethora of homegrown development goals, encapsulated in national development plans and visions, have emerged in the last decade. Kenya, for example, adopted its Vision

2030; Nigeria has its own version, called Vision 20:2020. On a continental level the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, a development vision consisting of seven aspirations. In most cases these national or continental development plans are accompanied by detailed implementation plans. Kenya's Vision 2030 is implemented with Medium-Term Plans, and the African Union's Agenda 2063 is implemented with Ten-Year Implementation Plans. In some cases the distinction between implementation plan and replacement development vision is not clear—Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan is a case in point.

The challenge of aligning its own National Development Plan—which preceded the adoption of the 2030 Agenda—is also felt in South Africa, particularly as it prepares for its first Voluntary National Review in 2019. This paper identifies and discusses these challenges. It is argued that the Policy Coherence for Development movement, the industry standard for development policy coherence, may provide helpful guidelines for the alignment of South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) and the 2030 Agenda's SDGs.

In accordance with the methodology conventionally used in the Policy Coherence for Development movement, this theoretical paper adopts a qualitative approach. It uses the Policy Coherence for Development movement to identify five guidelines for South Africa's attempts aimed at ensuring policy coherence between the NDP and its Medium-Term Strategic Frameworks (MTSFs) and the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs. The paper bases its conceptual argument on three sources of evidence: policy documents related to South Africa's NDP, policy documents related to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and a mixture of policy documents and peer-reviewed research related to the Policy Coherence for Development movement.

Because of the nature of the data and research question, an interpretivist approach is adopted in this paper (see, e.g., O'Donoghue, 2007). The first section is based on an analysis of the NDP and the 2030 Agenda, with the aim of identifying features of the NDP, and of its adoption and implementation that complicates alignment with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. The second section introduces the Policy Coherence for Development movement by discussing its first iteration, Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), and its most recent version, Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). In the third section impulses from this movement are used to formulate guidelines for processes aimed at aligning the NDP with the 2030 Agenda.

## 2. THE CHALLENGE OF ALIGNING SOUTH AFRICA'S NDP WITH THE 2030 AGENDA

When viewed from the perspective of policy coherence, the 2030 Agenda has two distinct thrusts. On the one hand, the 2030 Agenda describes its SDGs as “universal” (United Nations, 2015: articles 1 and 5), “indivisible” (United Nations, 2015: articles 5 and 18) and “global” (United Nations, 2015: article 55). This universalizing thrust reflects the underlying assumption that developmental challenges transcend national and even continental boundaries—in part at least because of the global scale of climate change (United Nations, 2015: articles 31 and 34). Unsurprisingly, the SDGs are presented as the all-encompassing global solutions to these challenges. By contrast, the 2030 Agenda also emphasizes the national and subnational particularities of developmental challenges. The Agenda explicitly seeks to take “national realities, capacities and levels of development” into account, and seeks to “[respect] national policies and priorities” (United Nations, 2015: articles 5 and 21). This domesticating thrust is especially clear in documentation related to Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs). Emphasis is placed on national ownership and respect for national “policy space and priorities” (United Nations HLPF, n.d.).

Calling for global solutions to global challenges, while requiring implementation regarding national priorities, does of course make sense. However, it presents national governments with the challenge of retaining the integrity of national planning processes, while aligning national development plans with the 2030 Agenda's SDGs. In preparing for its planned VNR at the High-Level Political Forum in 2019, the government of South Africa is faced with the challenge of

aligning its NDP with the 2030 Agenda. Three features of the NDP and its adoption are of relevance for this paper.

Firstly, South Africa's NDP was finalized before the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. In June 2011 the National Planning Commission presented its Diagnostic Report, outlining the country's achievements and shortcomings following the political transition in 1994 (National Planning Commission, 2011a). This formed the basis for the NDP, which was adopted in September 2012 (National Planning Commission, 2011b). The NDP has nine focal points, namely (i) creating employment, (ii) expanding infrastructure, (iii) transitioning to a low-carbon economy, (iv) transforming urban and rural communities, (v) improving education and training, (vi) ensuring quality healthcare, (vii) building a capable state, (viii) fighting corruption and improving accountability, and (ix) consolidating social cohesion (National Planning Commission, 2011b, pp. 10–27). It seeks to realize these aims by 2030.

The peculiarity of the political sequencing of the NDP and the 2030 Agenda is interesting in at least two respects. The first relates to finding coherence with a global agenda that was adopted after the national long-term development planning process. It would not be possible to disregard the political consensus expressed by the NDP in favor of the global development agenda, which would also be against the spirit of this very agenda. The second relates to the role of South Africa during the negotiations that led to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. During the final phases of the negotiations South Africa served as Chair of the Group of 77 plus China, playing an important role in finalizing the 2030 Agenda (Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, 2018). As Chair, South Africa had the responsibility of representing fairly the views of the rest of the organization. However, it also had the responsibility of acting within the mandate given by its national constituency—and this mandate included the NDP. It is fair to assume that South Africa could not have overseen a process which would have contradicted its own development plan, thereby moderating the challenge presented by the political sequencing of the adoption of the NDP and the 2030 Agenda.

A second relevant feature of the NDP is the way in which it is implemented. The South African Government's MTSFs are essentially the NDP's implementation vehicles. An MTSF can be seen as “a five-year building block towards the achievement of the vision and goals of the country's long-term plan” (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, n.d., p. 5), with the NDP bringing “coherence and continuity to the planning system” (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, n.d., p. 4). Within the government system, and over the medium term, the goal of the MTSF is “to ensure policy coherence, alignment and coordination across government plans as well as alignment with budgeting processes” (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, n.d., p. 5).

The current MTSF planning cycle commenced in 2014 and concludes in 2019. It consists of 14 outcomes, which are measured by numerous indicators. An MTSF gives a strong indication of the sociopolitical climate in which the NDP is implemented. In addition to covering the focal points of the NDP, it is noteworthy that the current MTSF indicates one of the outcomes to be safety and security (Outcome 3); it emphasizes rural development and land reform (Outcome 7) as well as housing provision (Outcome 8) and focuses on specifically improving the local government system (Outcome 9).

An MTSF provides the South African Government with the means to focus and contextualize the NDP. In theory, the 2020–15 MTSF cycle has the potential to strengthen policy coherence with the SDGs.

Thirdly, however, differences in emphasis between the NDP, its current MTSF and the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs remain. The NDP explicitly acknowledges the particularities of the context to which it is responding. “Redressing the injustices of the past” (National Planning Commission, 2011b, p. 2) requires, among other things, improving the poor quality of education of most black learners, correcting the poor location of infrastructure, and altering unjust “spatial patterns,” addressing the fact that “South Africa remains a divided society,” in addition to changing the resource-intensive nature of the economy, creating employment and eliminating corruption (National Planning Commission, 2011b, p. 5).

The links between the different focal points in the NDP reflect as much the perceived developmental context, challenges and causes as they reflect perceived solutions to these challenges. The peculiarities of the national developmental context become even clearer when one considers the current MTSF. The SDGs’ focus on sustainable cities and communities, for example, seems to be at odds with the NDP’s explicit focus on rural development (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, n.d.: appendix 7). In fact, none of the 14 outcomes of the current MTSF prioritizes the development of cities. The focus on rural development provides the NDP with a framework for organizing development goals included in other SDGs. Rural development, according to South Africa’s NDP, is about improved food security (SDG2), sustainable agriculture (SDG2), increased access to infrastructure and services (SDG9), and the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in rural areas (SDG8). The ultimate aim is to reduce poverty and inequality (SDG1) in sustainable ways (SDG13).

In some cases the difference in the underlying development logic is more subtle. The focus of Outcome 3 on preventing crime and ensuring that all South Africans feel safe, for example, broadly overlaps with the priority that SDG16 places on creating strong and responsive institutions, coupled with its focus on reducing violence and conflict. However, the NDP’s MTSF seems to prioritize combating crime in a way that is at odds with the emphasis on reducing crime in the SDGs. The same goes for Outcome 11, which places a marked emphasis on furthering South Africa’s geopolitical interests as a means to an end. This might seem at odds with the SDGs, namely ensuring that global multilateral institutions are made more representative, illicit flows of finances and other goods are combated, migration is adequately dealt with, and Africa’s political and economic integration is accelerated.

Alignment between the NDP and the 2030 Agenda is clearly possible, but not uncomplicated. A key element in aligning these development plans is the creation of policy coherence. In this paper the industry standard for creating policy coherence—previously PCD and later PCSD—will be used as a basis for distilling guidelines and good practices. In our view, PCSD has the potential to strengthen more recent approaches to aligning national development plans with the SDGs. This is specifically the case for the United Nations Development Group’s Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS) approach (United Nations Development Group, 2018).

### 3. POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT AS INDUSTRY STANDARD FOR POLICY ALIGNMENT

The Policy Coherence for Development movement is arguably the industry standard for creating policy coherence. To consider its potential contribution to alignment between national and global development priorities, it is important to take note of its genesis, subsequent development and key tenets.

The genesis of the Policy Coherence for Development movement lies in the discussions of the High-Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee Secretariat, or the Development Cooperation Directorate (DAC-DCD), in 1991 (Verschaeve, Delputte, & Orbie, 2016, p. 47). These discussions were based on the acknowledgment that incoherent policies have a detrimental effect on development in recipient countries, lead to the ineffective disbursement of aid and should therefore be avoided. Drawing from Hoebink’s now virtually seminal work, Stocchetti identifies two forms of development policy incoherence that this movement seeks to correct (Stocchetti, 2016, p. 78). It seeks to correct incoherence, firstly, within the development policy of an OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) member country or multilateral collection of providers of development assistance, such as the European Union. Narrow incoherence also includes incoherence within “external relations.” Broad incoherence, the second dimension, relates to the ways in which “development policy goals” are “thwarted” by other policies in, or of relevance to, recipient countries.

Although the emphasis was on eliminating incoherence in the policies of providers of development assistance, there was an acknowledgment that policy coherence should, in some sense, also include coherence “within the framework of donors” policies vis-à-vis the developing world’ (Vershaeve et al., 2016, p. 47). To develop policy coherence into a fully fledged political program, the DAC-DCD decided that a “clear-cut definition” of PCD was necessary, and that a methodology to assess the costs of policy incoherence should be developed, bolstered by examples of PCD best practices and institutional support within the OECD.

However, despite the high-level commitment to PCD, no clear-cut definition was developed in subsequent years. In fact, the response to PCD within the OECD was “lukewarm” (Verschaeve et al., 2016, p. 45). PCD only became a central issue within the OECD in the mid-2000s (Verschaeve et al., 2016, p. 48). A dedicated PCD unit was established and PCD was taken up into the DAC’s renewed mandate (OECD, 2008). PCD, at least partly because of these developments, was also included in the OECD’s strategy on development. Enhancing PCD was now acknowledged as “one of the [OECD’s] primary objectives” (OECD, 2012, p. 5). In realizing this objective, it was decided that work on the costs and benefits of (in)coherent policies should continue, and that indicators to monitor the progress on PCD should be developed.

The initial authoritative definition of PCD appeared in a ministerial statement of the OECD. According to this definition, PCD is in the first instance aimed at “understanding the development dimensions of member country policies and their impacts on developing countries.” PCD should therefore “consider trade-offs and potential synergies across such areas as trade, investment, agriculture, health, education,

the environment and development cooperation" (OECD, 2002). Key to understanding this definition is recognizing its point of reference. The primary audience of this definition is providers of development assistance who are members of the OECD. This means that the point of reference of PCD is determined by the policies—one might even say interests—of providers of development assistance.

Some theorists go so far as to maintain that the origins of PCD should not be sought in anything other than the so-called North-South paradigm (Knoll, 2014, p. 2). The perceived dominance of the interests of providers of development assistance is supported by studies on, for example, PCD in the security development nexus (Chandler, 2007). Other theorists all but equate the interests of providers with the maintenance of a neoliberal economic order and thus see PCD as an instrument that entrenches the neoliberal economic paradigm and its unequal relationships (Thede, 2013).

A related line of thinking can be seen in the work of Siitonen (2016), in the sense that PCD should not merely be thought of as the outcome of the actions of specific actors. PCD should, in his view, be seen in the context of the "political and institutional contexts that mould the outcomes" (Siitonen, 2016, p. 3). He emphasizes that PCD is a process that takes place amidst "mechanisms of global development that create and sustain poverty and inequality" (Siitonen, 2016, p. 3). Although it is acknowledged that PCD is about the developmental potential of coherence between policies, the "combined effect of those policies on objective processes that create and sustain poverty and inequality" should also be explored (Siitonen, 2016, p. 4). Even policy coherence within the policies and programs of one actor, or even coherence in the policies between a provider and recipient of development assistance would not guarantee transformative developmental outcomes. The "mechanisms of global development," which go beyond the actions of particular governments, play a major—if not determining—role in the efficacy of policies.

PCD typically encompasses four dimensions (Picciotto, 2005, p. 312). It refers, firstly, to the "internal coherence" of aid-related policies or programs carried out by providers of development assistance. It also refers, secondly, to the coherence between aid and nonaid policies of OECD members in a development partner country. This is typically called intracountry coherence. The underlying logic is that all policies should contribute to the same developmental outcomes by minimizing duplication and eliminating divergent goals. Inter-country coherence is a third dimension of PCD and refers to the coherence between the development policies of all of those OECD member countries that are active in a recipient country "in terms of their aggregate contribution to development." The fourth dimension goes beyond the scope of OECD member countries' programs and policies, and seeks to establish "donor-recipient" coherence. It is assumed that donor and recipient countries should have certain shared developmental goals, and that the relevant—ideally all—policies and programs should be aligned to reach these goals.

The post-2015 development era, signified by the 2030 Agenda's SDGs, led to important changes in emphasis and amendments to PCD. On a superficial level, PCD now came to stand for policy coherence for sustainable development, or PCSD. From the perspective of recipients of development assistance, arguably the most significant

development was a move away from a donor-centric definition of policy coherence. PCSD acknowledges that the 2030 Agenda signifies that "we are no longer in a MDG world divided between donors and recipients" (OECD, 2016, p. 46). More specifically, it recognizes that "all countries face difficulties in addressing the sustainable development challenges ahead," and SDG-related targets therefore "need to be adapted to the specific context, capacities and needs of each country" (OECD, 2016, p. 46).

This development echoes much of the work done by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), of which the OECD cohosts the Secretariat. In this respect, the PCSD seems to integrate key elements of the GPEDC. After its establishment in the wake of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Korea, in 2011, it sought to bring together providers and recipients of development assistance around four principles: development priorities should be owned by recipients of development assistance; the focus of development cooperation should be on results; development partnerships should be inclusive and thus characterized by openness, trust and mutual respect; and transparency and mutual responsibility are key to transformative development (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011, p. 3).

Arguably its most important leitmotiv is the notion that development priorities should be owned by recipient countries. This leitmotiv is clearly evident in PCSD. It seems to echo, for example, the GPEDC's *Accra Agenda for Action*, in which providers and recipients agree that "developing country governments will take stronger leadership of their own development policies" with providers "[supporting] them by respecting countries' priorities, investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their systems to deliver aid, and increasing the predictability of aid flows" (*Accra Agenda for Action*, Article 8).

PCSD differs from PCD also with regard to its whole-of-government approach. It acknowledges that policy coherence needs engagement of "the whole government beyond foreign affairs, development ministries and aid agencies" (OECD, 2016, p. 15). In its analytical framework it consequently maps the roles of all relevant government departments before commencing with identifying "enabling and disabling conditions that influence policy performance and outcomes" (OECD, 2016, p. 58ff).

A further notable feature of PCSD, which seems to expand on impulses already present in PCD, is its comprehensive approach to the effects of policies. Whereas PCD emphasized the efficient disbursement of development assistance, and in this way ensuring that provider taxpayers' money is spent in line with provider governments' priorities, PCSD has a different view. Policy coherence, according to this expanded view, is not primarily about how overseas development aid is disbursed. It is also not merely about the immediate effects of policies in one country. PCSD acknowledges that national policies also affect "people living in other countries," and typically have enduring effects that also affect "the well-being of future generations" (OECD, 2016, p. 62). Policy coherence should therefore factor in the "transboundary" or "international" dimensions of sustainable development, and should ensure that current generations leave behind adequate economic, natural, human and social capital for future generations (OECD, 2016, p. 62).

PCSD expands on PCD also in a fourth respect by emphasizing the multidisciplinary nature of policy coherence for sustainable development. Policy coherence should not only integrate planning processes across government departments, but it should also develop policy coherence across sectors. This means that mechanisms for “[fostering] synergies and address trade-offs” between sectors should be developed (OECD, 2016, p. 76ff). This partly explains why PCSD strongly argues for an “issues-based” approach to policy coherence (OECD, 2016, p. 85). Most developmental challenges are cross-cutting, and focusing on these issues will require cross-sectoral integration.

#### 4. GUIDELINES FOR ALIGNING SOUTH AFRICA'S NDP WITH THE 2030 AGENDA

What guidelines can South Africa draw from PCSD? More specifically, can guidelines from PCSD assist South Africa in its attempts aimed at aligning the NDP and its MTSFs with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs? This section argues that key elements of PCSD do seem to be of assistance when reflecting on how to address the challenges discussed in the previous sections.

PCSD emphasizes, firstly, that policy coherence depends on political buy-in. It is informative to note that different elements of political buy-in, or political will, permeate the OECD's PCSD framework. These range from building awareness (OECD, 2016, p. 63) to ensuring political commitment “at the highest level” (OECD, 2016, p. 65) and ensuring “leadership of the centres of government” (OECD, 2016, p. 66). This emphasis resonates with numerous studies on policy coherence. Olsen (2008), for example, found that political will plays an important role in the coherence of the European Union's policy toward Africa. In an impressive review article on PCD, Sianes (2017, p. 136) similarly emphasizes the importance of political will. In the context of South Africa, it might be helpful to rekindle the political momentum of the important role the country played in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. Coupled with the political commitment expressed by the NDP and the flexibility provided by the 5-year cycles of its MTSFs, this could provide a foundation for finding constructive coherence between the NDP and the 2030 Agenda.

The second guideline emerges from one of the main weaknesses of PCD, which was subsequently corrected by PCSD. Policy coherence proceeds from the assumption that national ownership of development priorities is key for development effectiveness. Country ownership of development priorities is a function of both intentional changes to development policies and a changing development cooperation landscape. As discussed above, the transition from “aid effectiveness” to “development effectiveness” at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011) can be seen as the genesis of the GPEDC, and spearheaded national ownership (see, e.g., Kim & Lee, 2013). However, at the same time, the global development landscape is changing, giving developing countries more control over the sources of development finance (see, e.g., Greenhill, Prizzon, & Rogerson, 2016).

Although South Africa is by no means a development aid-dependent country, the changes in global development thinking

impacted on the final form of the 2030 Agenda, and will continue to impact on how it is implemented. This means that in finding coherence between the NDP and the 2030 Agenda, South Africa has the opportunity to draw on elements of the 2030 Agenda and within the global development discourse to use its own development context and priorities as starting points for policy alignment.

PCSD emphasizes, thirdly, the importance of using existing institutional structure and processes. Based on its emphasis on cross-sectoral and whole-of-government approaches, this might sound counterintuitive. Upon closer investigation, however, it becomes clear that this approach seeks to harness and improve the strengths of existing structures, rather than seeking to superimpose a completely new structure. One motivation for this approach is that in any government numerous actors are engaged in activities relevant to policy coherence, even before any coordinated attempt aimed at improving policy coherence (see, e.g., OECD, 2016, p. 67). The multistakeholder engagement approach promoted by the 2030 Agenda (see, e.g., Frost et al., 2016 for the benefits of such an approach) assumes that identifying relevant actors with valuable contributions precedes any attempt at creating new structures. This is why using “existing co-ordination mechanisms to steer sustainable development integration” should be prioritized (OECD, 2016, p. 69). In South Africa such coordination capacities already exist in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. As custodians of the NDP, and by virtue of their location at the center of government, this Department is positioned particularly well to play a role in championing policy coherence between the NDP and the 2030 Agenda. This does not, of course, detract from the importance of using existing coordination capacity in other government departments. The national statistical institution, Statistics South Africa, for example, plays an important role in coordinating indicator alignment and domestication, whereas the Department of International Relations and Cooperation coordinates the country's international obligations related to the 2030 Agenda.

Fourthly, an issue-based approach to policy coherence stimulates cooperation across government departments and across sectors. The notion that development priorities are intimately interconnected is a defining characteristic of the SDGs (see Le Blanc, 2015). Water resource management is one example of the need for integrated approaches to sustainable development (Ikhlayel & Nguyen, 2017). Within the PCSD movement, food security is regarded as an exemplary case for illustrating the need for integrated approaches. Food security encompasses the availability of food, access to food, food utilization and stability of food supplies (OECD, 2016, p. 96). Ensuring food security necessarily involves synergies with departments beyond those that focus on agriculture. It also implies trade-offs. Food security, for example, should decrease poverty and inequality. However, it may require trade-offs with attempts aimed at creating clean energy, specifically by means of biofuels. Its impact on biodiversity may not necessarily be positive, and increased ecosystem protection might also impact negatively on land available for agriculture. Trade-offs can also be seen with regard to water and sanitation: improved agricultural output requires increased access to clean water. At the same time, water security in water-scarce environments require

limiting water use (OECD, 2016, p. 108). It is clear that food security cannot be ensured without a sense of ownership and cooperation across government departments.

The NDP's MTSFs and the SDGs have the potential to stimulate such issue-based cooperation, as both sets of development goals focus on shared developmental challenges. Moreover, an acknowledgment of the complexity of these development challenges and thus the need for collaboration across government departments has the potential to increase government efficiency and effectiveness. The absence of collaboration, however, will have the opposite effect.

The fifth and last guideline that emerges from the PCSD movement is its complex view of the impact of policy-making. Policy coherence, according to this view, is not merely about reaching a particular government department's goals for a particular year. Policy coherence is a tool that enables reflection on the effects of policies beyond the present generation and beyond national borders (OECD, 2016, p. 58). These elements are already strongly emphasized in the 2030 Agenda, and are possibly its most important contribution to national policy-making processes. Interestingly, Outcome 11 of the current MTSF has the potential to resonate with this line of thinking. Its first element focuses on "[advancing] South Africa's national priorities through structured bilateral engagements" (suboutcome 1). However, its other elements focus on ensuring economic integration in southern Africa (suboutcome 2), and a peaceful (suboutcome 4) and economically prosperous Africa (suboutcome 5).

## REFERENCES

- Bernstein, S., Gupta, J., Andresen, S., Haas, P. M., Kanie, N., Kok, M., ... Stevens, C. (2015). Coherent governance, the UN and the SDGs. In *POST2015/UNU-IAS policy Brief # 4*. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability.
- Chandler, D. (2007). The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 10(4), 362–386. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800135>
- Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (n.d.). *Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014–2019*. Pretoria, South Africa: The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.
- Frost, L., Hinton, R., Pratt, B. A., Murray, J., Arscott-Mills, S., Jack, S., ... Kuruvilla, S. K. (2016). Using multistakeholder dialogues to assess policies, programmes and progress for women's, children's and adolescents' health. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 94(5), 393–395. <https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.16.171710>
- Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. (2011). Outcome Document of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November to 1 December 2011. New York, NY: UNDP.
- Greenhill, R., Prizzon, A., & Rogerson, A. (2016). The age of choice: Developing countries in the new aid landscape. In S. Klingebiel, T. Mahn, & M. Negre (Eds.), *The fragmentation of aid: Concepts, measurements and implications for development cooperation*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ikhlayel, M., & Nguyen, L. H. (2017). Integrated approaches to water resource and solid waste management for sustainable development. *Sustainable Development*, 25(6), 467–481. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1683>
- Kim, E. M., & Lee, J. E. (2013). Busan and beyond: South Korea and the transition from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. *Journal of International Development*, 25(6), 787–801. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2938>
- Knoll, A. (2014). Bringing Policy Coherence for Development into the post-2015 agenda—Challenges and Prospects. European Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper No. 163.
- Le Blanc, D. (2015). Towards integration at last? The Sustainable Development Goals as a network of targets. *Sustainable Development*, 23(3), 176–187. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1582>
- Moomaw, W. R., Bhandary, R. R., Kuhl, L., & Verkooijen, P. (2017). Sustainable development diplomacy: Diagnostics for the negotiation and implementation of sustainable development. *Global Policy*, 8(1), 73–81. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12350>
- National Planning Commission (2011a). *Diagnostic Overview*. Pretoria, South Africa: The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.
- National Planning Commission (2011b). *National Development Plan: Vision for 2030*. Pretoria, South Africa: The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa.
- O'Donoghue, T. (2007). *Planning your qualitative research project: An introduction to interpretivist research in education*. London, UK: Routledge.
- OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2002). Final Communique OECD Council at Ministerial Level, 15–16 May 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecdouncilatministeriallevel15-16may2002.htm>.
- OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2008). OECD ministerial declaration on policy coherence for development. Paris, France: OECD.
- OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2012). OECD strategy on development. Paris, France: OECD.
- OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2016). Better policies for sustainable development: A new framework for policy coherence. Paris, France: OECD.
- Olsen, G. R. (2008). Coherence, consistency and political will in foreign policy: The European Union's policy towards Africa. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 9(2), 157–171. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15705850801999644>
- Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations. (2018). South Africa at the Group of 77. Retrieved from [http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/SA\\_G77.html](http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/SA_G77.html).
- Picciotto, R. (2005). The evaluation of Policy Coherence for Development. *Evaluation*, 11(3), 311–330. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1356389005058479>
- Sianes, A. (2017). Shedding light on policy coherence for development: A conceptual framework. *Journal of International Development*, 29(1), 134–146. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2977>
- Siitonen, L. (2016). Theorising politics behind Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). *European Journal of Development Research*, 28(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2015.76>
- Spangenberg, J. H. (2017). Hot air or comprehensive progress? A critical assessment of the SDGs. *Sustainable Development*, 25(4), 311–321. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1657>
- Stocchetti, M. (2016). A perfect post-2015 partner? Analysing EU's development and trade agendas for global development partnership. *European Journal of Development Research*, 28(1), 76–90. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2015.78>
- Thede, N. (2013). Policy Coherence for Development and securitisation: Competing paradigms or stabilising North–South hierarchies? *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5), 784–799. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800752>
- United Nations (2015). *Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York, NY: United Nations.
- United Nations Development Group (2018). Mainstreaming the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development: Reference guide to UN country teams. Retrieved from <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/>

2017/03/UNDG-Mainstreaming-the-2030-Agenda-Reference-Guide-2017.pdf.

Verschaeve, J., Delputte, S., & Orbie, J. (2016). The rise of policy coherence for development: A multi-causal approach. *European Journal of Development Research*, 28, 44–61.