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## Introduction

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We meet at a ~~time~~ very crucial period in the history of our struggle, at a time when the state is responding with harsh repression in a desperate attempt to hold the apartheid system which is in a serious crisis as ~~the~~ result of a determined and consistent challenge by the masses of our people.

We need to take the opportunity and creative initiatives to build unity with the UDF and progressive forces as a whole. Together we need to develop a clear programme which will address the growing need to build organisations to challenge the state and forge forward to democracy.

We need to look ~~back~~ honestly at our past and examine the conditions that obtain. In doing so, we should make an objective assessment of our overall activities and subject ourselves to constructive criticism which will enable us to correctly locate and rectify our weaknesses.

In attempting to discuss the role and future of the UDF, it is

important to recall some of the fundamentals that guide us in our work

10.10 2. Our Objective is:

To dismantle apartheid and replace it with a more just and democratic system.

Often in ~~our~~ the day to day heat of the struggle, we forget that ~~the~~ our enemy is the apartheid system and not those whose views differ with ours.

2.1 Approach to struggle

Clarity to the question of what is the most appropriate form of organisation for our struggle at this stage, it is important to have increasing 'clarity' among our ranks of questions such as:

- 2.1.1 What is wrong with apartheid?
- 2.1.2 What kind of society do we want?
- 2.1.3 How are we going to bring about change?
- 2.1.4 What is the role of organisation in this process?
- 2.1.5 What are the stages in the development of organisation and struggle?

The next question on which we require clarity is the question of how this

Change will come about?

Folly - is it through the actions and work of the few like ourselves - or the many - the masses?

## 2.2 Our view

The masses are the makers of history. If they also must become active participants in the struggle - without this there cannot be any successful victory.

It therefore becomes imperative to evaluate our organisational activities in such a way that we draw the maximum participation of the broad masses - through mobilization, education - and by snapping out in clear terms the need for unity, to reject attempts by the enemy to divide our forces on racial lines:

### 2.2.1 Second Question

~~The clear question~~

The second question is how do the masses become effectively historical forces for change?

2.2.2 - by each ordinary man and woman acting on his or her own, without common goals purpose etc. - etc

2.2.3 By become a highly cohesive / united body - with resilience, dedicated and experienced leadership etc. - in other words by becoming ORGANISED

### 3. Organisation - a vital role

3.1 There can be no "struggle" against apartheid with an organised people.

3.2 Our success must be measured against the criterion - to what extent have we mobilised and organised our people?

3.3 The task of organising then will be an added task of the front

3.4. Appropriate resources need to be allocated for this purpose.

The way in which people become organised, the form that the organisation takes place and its particular style of work is determined by the particular historical circumstances in which the organisation developed - so that <sup>at</sup> different stages in our struggle, our people's organisations have taken different forms.

The crucial question to be addressed ~~is~~ ourselves to is, how much of

our time and energy do we spend towards organisational work? How many among us are prepared to sacrifice and seriously take as a priority the need to place in the background individual interests - in an effort to maximise greater mass participation in the day to day organisational decisions.

There are two categories of organisations they also serve different roles in our struggle We need to understand what they are and how each contributes

### 3.2. Political Organisation

A political organisation has:

- 3.2.1 a unitary cohesive structure;
- 3.2.2 a single, common ideological position
- 3.2.3 a wide ranging programme

### 4. Type of Political Structure

To assess what type of political structure was necessary and possible, we had to understand and examine some of the characteristics of a unitary political organisation.

- 4.1 High level of ideological cohesion;
- 4.2 Presence of experienced activists and leadership;
- 4.3 Capacity to build organisational structures throughout the country;
- 4.4 An appropriate mass political consciousness and readiness for active participation;
- 5.5 The level of repression and what space there was for legal mass organisation;
- 5.6 The level of disciplined political conduct among activists and leadership.

## 5. Mass Organisation - v

Structurally not bounded by any parameters - could be national or very localised - no fixed ideological position;

- x it arises out of day to day issues affecting people - e.g. rent, transport.
- it responds to a limited particular area of people's experiences -
- not a political organisation although it responds to issues that may be political in nature.

We must remember that the question of organising our people is in



historical process. It is a long and hard road. Our glorious heroes of the past have taken us some distance along this road.

Whilst it seems unnecessary for us to go into details about the history of our struggle for liberation:

from the formation of the ANC in 1912, the Congress Alliance etc, until the banning of the peoples organisations in 1960, it is, however, significant to examine the political situation from the 70's

#### 6. 1970's.

We saw the emergence of organisations of all type and at all levels:

Students, political, workers, women community etc.

#### 6.2. 1980's

We saw the growth in organisations:  
Political Organisations:

NIC, TIC, RMC, Anti-Community Council Committees and eventually the UDF.

Youth <sup>clubs</sup> Organisations and Congresses

Women's organisations throughout the Country e.g. FED, Trade Unions

(Although there appears evidence of the lack of worker participation in C.D.F.

Students : COSAS, AZASO

There was also a growing need to:

- build national unity and working relationships
- take up certain issues affecting our people at a national level eg rent &
- challenge the apartheid system through some national structure rather than on a fragmented basis.
- begin the first stages of building a national non-racial 'democratic' political structure.
- in 1983, to challenge the new constitutional proposals.
- This led to the formation of the U.C.C

These then were the conditions in which we as democrats began to look at in 1983; - how best to offer the most substantial political resistance with maximum participation of all our people against the new constitutional proposals.

However, the following considerations actually determined the form that we

organised resistance took in: 1983

- The regional nature of the development of resistance with minimal, if any interprovincial links. This gave us the regional structures in the UDF
- The low level of political organisation in the country, which gives us more non-political organisations in the UDF than political organisations
- The large number of mass organisation which grew out of mass action of the 80's on all sorts of issues: community, workers, students etc;

These then act as a major base of the UDF to-day.

Fragmented, unco-ordinated resistance providing the urgent need to launch a national political structure which would lend cohesiveness cohesiveness to resistance, but at the same time help organise the unorganised areas.

That is why the UDF today plays both the role of a front in certain ~~as~~ parts of the country and the role of an organisation in other parts.

### 6.3 Our Subjective Weakness

Inexperience in handling front politics -  
 no highly developed layers of activists  
 throughout the country -  
 inexperience in political mobilization  
 techniques - resulting in the need for  
 the UDF to provide resources and  
 skills to train personnel, but also the  
 recognition that organic leadership  
 will grow from the campaigns of the UDF

These are the conditions among others, which  
 led to the establishment of a front political  
 structure. It is the actual conditions,  
 as spelled out that determine the precise  
 form that the political structure takes

~~As that~~ As a front (in SA conditions) is

- The coming together of a number of existing  
 organisations - each maintaining its  
 autonomy - but also the creation of  
 more organisations where they do not  
 exist
- The adoption of a broad program  
 and ideological position - compatible  
 with attracting the largest number  
 of persons / organisations
- Having a clear focus on campaigns -



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until we reach our goal of a highly organised people capable of swinging the overall balance of forces in our favour - so that when we finish our reflection, we must plan to move to the next stage of the road: to become highly organised

This will only materialise if the progressive forces in the front realise and are ready to meet the challenges confronting them:

- proper and constant communication;
- Co-ordinating and sharing of experience
- preparedness to correct our shortcomings in the interest of a broader democratic struggle.

The next important consideration for us to understand clearly is, that the change of an organisation from one form to another - e.g. front to unitary political organisation is by and large, determined by whether all development that is possible within that form has been achieved before one can consider the transformation to another - more cohesive form e.g. (National political organisation).

## 9. General Plan

In the light of the foregoing consideration we need to pause - reflect and formulate our strategy to ensure that we are on the correct path.

There is no better way than to refer to our ~~found~~ fundamental principles in relation to change.

### 9.1. Style of work.

The nature of repression and minimal scope to work within the legal organisational structures, forces us to be:

- conscious and ensure that our conduct reflects the type of discipline required to maintain security at all levels and at all times;
- Accountability on the part of both the leadership and activists to preserve the image of ~~our~~ our organisations and the UDF;
- Highlight those positive aspects which unite us as against points of differences which are negative and divisive;
- differences to be discussed frankly in a comradely manner.

(which is constructive)

- Discourage gossiping;
- to be patient, tolerant, respect one another's viewpoints.
- to ensure collective responsibility, leadership and democratic decision-making;
- to fight against individual tendencies which are not exposed to criticism;
- discourage regionalism and provincialism - which tend to create cliques that undermine our national unity;

#### 10 Focus on crucial issues

The present political situation in R.A. today demands that we review our strategical and objective approaches. It would appear that our immediate focus in the future of our liberation struggle for the total liberation of the oppressed should be the

- liberation of the African masses.
- The recent campaign has exposed our weakness in this regard; we should refer to
- Trade Unions (harbour fields)
  - Rural organisations
  - the creation of UDF Support Committees.



We need to:

- build a liberation Alliance
- to take up broad political issues such as:
  - Removals, Government Urban Strategy, Black local Authorities -
- continue to challenge the implementation of the Constitution
- to take up Education country wide
- to improve the level of our organization and its leadership;
- We need to mobilize and organize our people to enable them to clearly identify the true enemy.

## 11. Programme of Action

Our decision to draw up a programme of action, brings to the fore important considerations:

- to pull out energy, both mentally and physically - and direct our skills and resources towards the realisation of our programme
- to promote our objectives
- to organize our people
- to expand the front
- to train personnel

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- to challenge the State much more vigorously
- take definite steps to defend ADF.
- set proper guidelines to improve our relationship with all affiliates.
- Guidelines for taking up issues.
- Restructuring the Front.
- We need to have a structure which is more cohesive - to enable us to arrive at quick decisions.

1. INTRODUCTION

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At this stage of our struggle, we need to reflect on the past year or so of activity and plan ahead. This is also an opportunity to clear up misunderstandings and build greater cohesiveness amongst all of us - not only within the Transvaal, but throughout the country.

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This presents us with an immediate challenge of not only focussing our attention towards the building of organisations, but also to draw together, in a clear and united action, all those forces engaged in the struggle for democracy in South Africa.

① In attempting to discuss the role and future of the UDF - it is important to recall some of the fundamentals that guide us in our work.

2.1 OUR OBJECTIVE: is to dismantle apartheid and replace it with a more just and democratic system (as in the Freedom Charter, for those of us who subscribe to it).

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Often in the day to day heat of the struggle we forget that our enemy is the apartheid system not those whose views differ with ours.

The next question on which we require clarity is the question of how this change will come about.

3.1 Firstly is it through the actions and work of the few like ourselves or the many ; the masses?

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OUR VIEW - the masses are the makers of history. It is they who must become the active participants in the struggle - without this there cannot be any successful victory.

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It therefore becomes imperative to evaluate our organisational activities in such a way that we draw the maximum participation of the broad masses - through mobilisation, education, and by stating in clear terms, the need for unity, the need to reject attempts by the enemy to divide us on racial lines.

The second question is how do the masses become effective historical forces for change?

by each ordinary man and woman acting on his or her own, without common goals or purpose? OR

- by becoming a highly cohesive/united body, with resilience, dedicated and experienced leadership etc - in other words, by becoming ORGANISED.

The crucial question to address ourselves to, is, how much of our time and energy do we spend on organisational work? How many among us are prepared to sacrifice, and seriously take as a priority the need to place in the background individual interests, in an effort to maximise greater mass participation in the day to day organisational decisions?

The way in which people become organised, the form that the organisation takes and its particular style of work is determined by the particular historical circumstances in which the organisation developed. So that during different stages in our struggle our peoples' organisations have taken different forms.

#### 4.1 BEFORE 1912

- Armed resistance against dispossession
- Change to non-violent forms of struggle after the Bambata Rebellion (so-called).

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#### 4.2 1912-1949 - FORMATION OF THE ANC

- Petitions by the ANC leadership to the British Government
- Urbanisation, Industrialisation played an important role in bringing together various African tribes under the banner of the ANC

The role played by the I.C.U. with regard to organising the workers. ANC programmes such as the African Claims - and the Programme of Action. The Doctors' Pact (XUMA - NAICKER - DADOO).

#### 4.3 1950's : Formation of the Congress Alliance ; Defiance Campaign - ANC becomes a mass organisation.

- Launching of campaigns - against Bantu Education, Passes, Bantu Authorities.
- Beer Halls destroyed, Potatoe/Bus boycotts.
- Destruction of Dipping Tanks (rural resistance against cattle culling) etc.
- Womens' organisations (Federation)
- ~~Anti-Pass activities - (anti-passion bombings)~~
- ~~Freedom Charter - (Treason etc)~~
- ~~State repression - Bans and banishments~~

#### 1960's: Following the Sharpeville incident ;

- Organisations are smashed.
- The rise of the reactionaries.
- The PMB. 'All-in African Conference' preceeded by the coming together of African leaders in Orlando.
- The 3-day National stay-at-home protest against the formation of the Republic.

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- The formation of M.K.
- House arrests, Detention without Trial (90 Days)
- Mass arrests - Imprisonment

4.5 1970's; Organisations of all types and at all levels begin to grow again - Students, Political organisations, Workers, Women, Community organisations etc.

4.6 1980's - We saw the growth in organisations: Political Organisations - NIC, TIC, RMC, the Anti Community Council Committees and eventually UDF.

Community Organisations: Soweto Civic Association and others - DHAC, PEBCO, CAHAC, etc.

Youth Organisations - youth clubs and Congresses -

Womens' Organisations throughout the country eg FED

Trade Unions .....?? (their lack of participation in UDF)

Students: COSAS - AZASO

These was also a growing need to

- build national unity and develop working relationships
- take up certain issues affecting our people at a national level - rents etc.
- Challenge the apartheid system through some national structure - rather than on a fragmented basis.
- begin the first stages of building a national, non-racial democratic political structure.
- challenge the new Constitutional proposals (in 1983)
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5.1 These then, were the conditions in which we as democrats began to look at ~~how~~ best to offer the most substantial political resistance (with the ~~maximum~~ participation of all our people) against the new Constitutional ~~proposals~~.

To assess what type of political structure was necessary and possible, we had to understand and examine some of the characteristics of a unitary

-political- organisation.

These characteristics included ;

- 6.1 High level of ideological cohesiveness.
- 6.2 Presence of experienced activists and leadership in most parts of the country.
- 6.3 Capacity to build organisational structures throughout the country.
- 6.4 An appropriate mass political consciousness and readiness for active participation.

We also had to take into account ;

- 6.5 The level of repression and what space there was for legal mass organisation.
- 6.6 The level of disciplined political conduct among activists and leadership.

An awareness of the nature of repression and minimal scope to work within the legal organisational structures, forces us to be conscious, and to ensure that our conduct reflects the type of discipline required to maintain security at all levels and at all times.

- Accountability - leadership and activists to preserve the image of our organisations and the UDF.
- Highlight those positive aspects that unite us - as against points of difference which are negative and divisive.
- Differences to be discussed frankly in a comradely manner (which is constructive)
- Fight against gossip.
- To be patient, tolerant, and to respect one another's viewpoints.
- To ensure collective leadership and democratic decision making.
- To fight against individualistic tendencies which are not open to criticism.

If most of the above were highly developed (points 6.1 - 6.6) we could have conducted something other than a front.

However the following considerations actually determined the form that our organised resistance took in 1963.

#### 7.1 The regional nature of the development of resistance ; with minimal, if

any, interprovincial links.

This gave us the regional structures in the UDF.

7.2 The low level of political organisation in the country - which gives us more non-political organisations in the UDF than political organisations

7.3 The large number of mass organisations which grew out of the mass action of the 80's on all sorts of issues - community - worker etc.

These then act as the major base of the UDF today.

7.4 Fragmented, unco-ordinated resistance - providing the urgent need to launch a national political structure which would lend cohesiveness to resistance; but at the same time help to organise the unorganised areas. This is why the UDF today plays both the role of a front -in certain parts of the country- and the role of an organisation in other parts.

#### 7.5 Our Subjective Weaknesses :

Inexperience in handling front politics; no highly developed layer of activists throughout the country; inexperience in political mobilisation techniques, resulting in the need for the UDF to provide the resources and skills to train personnel; But also the recognition that organic leadership will grow from the campaigns of the UDF.

These are the conditions, among others, which led to the establishment of a certain type of political structure; a United Front. It is the actual conditions, as spelt out, that determine the precise form that the political structure takes.

#### Therefore a Front is (in South African Conditions)

1. The coming together of a number of existing organisations, each maintaining its autonomy. But also the creation of more organisations where they do not exist.
2. The adoption of a broad program and ideological position - compatible with attracting the largest number of persons/organisations.
3. Having a clear focus for campaigns - eg the new Constitution etc.

And a Political Organisation is an organisation that;

- ~~Has~~ a unitary cohesive structure.
- ~~Has~~ a single, common ideological position.
- ~~Has~~ a wider ranging program.

We must remember that the question of organising our people is a historical process - it is a long and hard road.

Our glorious heroes of the past, have taken us some distance along this road. The UDF is merely another stage along this journey - it is not the end of the journey itself. We must still continue until we reach our goal of a highly organised people capable of swinging the overall balance of forces in our favour. So that when we finish our reflection, we must plan to move to the next stage on the road to becoming highly organised.

This will materialise only if the progressive forces in the Front realise, and are ready, to meet the challenges confronting them :-

- proper and constant communication.
- Co-ordinating and sharing of experiences.
- and preparedness to correct our short comings in the interests of the broader democratic struggle.

The next important consideration for us to understand, is that the change of an organisation from one form to another - eg front to unitary political organisation - is determined by whether all the development that is possible within that form (in our case the front) has been achieved ; before one can consider the transformation to another, more cohesive form (eg. National Political Organisation).

#### Key Factors To Be Assessed

1. Our actual organisational capabilities and weaknesses.
2. Our level of discipline and development of activists.
3. Our limited experience in handling national campaigns.
4. Our ability to challenge the state and the strength required to do so.
5. The readiness of our people to be organised and the urgent need to develop the resources to do so.
6. International support.
7. Level of cohesiveness achieved and still to be achieved.



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
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Zone 7 area Com VCA

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The Secretary  
Naal Civic Association

90 F.A.S.

P.O. Box 2126

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This presents us with an immediate challenge of not only focussing our attention towards the building of organisations, but also to draw together, in a clear and united action, all those forces engaged in the struggle for democracy in South Africa.

In attempting to discuss the role and future of the UDF - it is important to recall some of the fundamentals that guide us in our work.

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① UDF : *John*  
offer

② Acc 19 - "letter sent to  
address only."

Acc (19) ~~3~~ acc 10 : 4/2/87  
10/8/87

②0 → 16/9/87 24/9/87

# UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

JDF UNITES! APARTHEID DIVIDES!



NATIONAL OFF

KHOTSO HOUS  
42 DE VILLIERS  
JOHANNESBURG  
P.O. BOX 10366  
TEL: 29-1916  
29-1917

No 19  
10/9/87

13 September 1984

The UDF President  
P O Box 658  
KING WILLIAMSTOWN  
5600

Dear Comrade Steve

RE: PAPER ON FRONT

No 19  
10/9/87

Since its formation on 20th August, 1983, throughout its national and regional formations, the United Democratic Front has been grappling with the problem of developing a common understanding of front politics, as well as a common approach at the level of tactics and strategy. Today, over twelve months later, this seemingly mammoth task remains unfulfilled.

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16/9/87

Experiences of the past eight months at the National Conference indicate very clearly the seriousness of this problem and the urgent need to resolve it. Besides it doth appear like the resolution of this problem holds for us best prospects of building the Front into a powerful Democratic Movement with a well defined direction and program. The opposite can only spell doom for the Young Democratic Movement.

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24/9/87

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16/9/87

To my mind the developments at the P E conference are not alien to a new Front, especially when taking into account the fact that most of those leading it as well as most of its affiliates are completely new to Front politics. Given the inherent strains and stresses of fronts, it can be expected that the UDF with a lot of young and experienced leaders, should manifest these problems more glaringly. Above all, most of our activists know very little about the Congress Alliance. They belong to the post 1976 era. It is therefore, definitely going to take a lot of persuasion on the part of those with experience or at least those who had the opportunity to study and discuss issues pertaining to Fronts to educate our activists on these key questions.

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16/9/87

Having attempted to highlight the problem, I now take this liberty on behalf of the N.E.C to ask you to workout a paper on United Fronts. I suggest that whilst your paper may draw on the experiences of fronts in other countries it must take into account the peculiarities of the South African situation. You must also draw on the experiences of the United Democratic Front itself.

2/.....

Presidents: Oscar Mpetha, Albertina Sisulu, Archie Gumede  
Eastern Cape President: Edgar Ngoyi

National Treasurers: Cassim Saloojee, Mewa Ramgobin  
National Publicity Secretary: Mosiuoa 'Terror' Lekota  
National Secretary: Poppo Molefe

*No 10  
4/1/87*

I think it will be helpful if in the course of discussing your topic you could attempt to show the different types of alliances and why it is necessary to form a particular type in each case. Also attempt to show what influences transformation from one type of a front into another. Also attempt to show the balance between the profile of the Front and that of its affiliates.

I think this aspect is very important because many of our activists are beginning to ask the following questions:-

- (a) Why does the UDF not become a Freedom Charter Front?
- (b) Are we to compromise Freedom Charter for the sake of tiny liberal non-Charter organisations?
- (c) Now that the elections are over, is the UDF going to transform into a United Democratic Movement (UDM)?
- (d) Why does the UDF take a soft line in the face of attacks by the Black Consciousness organisations like AZAPO? *4/1/87*

Once completed, your paper will be circulated amongst the activists and affiliates of the UDF for discussion. To this extent therefore yours is likely to be one of the most important documents of the Front. I therefore advise you to work out quite a comprehensive paper.

Please forward your paper to the National Office on or before the 25 September, 1984.

Sorry for the short notice. We are under pressure and would like N.E.C. members to discuss the draft before the N.E.C sitting on 29-30 September, 1984.

Congratulations on success against elections.

We are looking forward to even greater successes in the post election period.

Yours in the struggle,

POPO MOLEFE  
GENERAL SECRETARY

*Q What success has UDF had in that area?*

Adam

Forum Apo.

Lulla Meyer, East London  
REC Burton, Regina ADF

No 10 = 4/2/87

No 19 = 10/8/87

= 11/5/87

No (20) 16/9/87

22/9/87

Ben C 4"

No 19  
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

From the outset I want to dispel some silly notions in the heads of leading members of the ruling clique and their henchmen on the nature and role of the United Democratic Front in the struggle for national liberation. With all the fanaticism of a reactionary, they cling to the word "Front", twist its meaning and then attach connotations to prove the lie that the organisation is nothing else other than a display window of some banned organisations. But we know that they are feeding their gullible audience with false information. We are clear in our minds that the position they have taken against the UDF is a position typical of all undemocratic and fascist cliques throughout the world. We have seen it in Hitler's Germany, in Spain and in Portugal. The peoples of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa, Latin America and Asia have gone through similar experiences. Fortunately for the democratic movement in South Africa, there is nothing new in the allegations which are intended to drive us to the

V.T.P.?

I.P. stand where we should watch the march past of the forces of reaction, oppression and exploitation without lifting even a finger. In the period preceding its ban in 1960, the ANC was branded a communist organisation - some front of the Communist Party of South Africa. Not that the Nationalist Party intellectuals did not know that long before the coming into being of the CPSA, and five full years before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Tsarist Russia, the ANC was already hatched by the incubator of racist oppression and exploitation right inside South Africa. The situation has not changed from what it was then. Instead it has become even worse. But they would like everybody else to believe in the myths of an "agitator" behind any genuine resistance against the barbarism of apartheid society. They would not accede to the fundamental truth that the "agitator", in fact, is political deprivation, economic strangulation, the squalor in the ghettos, forced removals and resettlements, the group areas act, the pass laws, unequal and ethnic education, migrant labour, the balkanisation of a fatherland into dust-tracks called homelands, increased rentals, etc., etc. Yes that is the "agitator". The Nationalist Government has arrogated to itself the position of a god, and has elevated the greenery around its residence in Cape Town to some Garden of Eden of some sort. There, and in the tranquility of comfort and plenty, they must sit down, and, in their own image, carve an ideal model the type of man they want. In that arrogant innocence, they parade stark naked before the god of impartial history without even a scrap of morality to cover their nakedness.

2. THE FRONT

We are a front organisation. No apologies. Like any other front anywhere in the world, we are a mouthpiece of a number of organisations whose short and long term aspirations are given expression and authenticated in the unity in action which we alone, at this point in time, can effectively forge. The organisations we represent are all lawful and operate within the four corners of this country.

Not a single one of those organisations has descended, ready made, from outer space upon the democratic and peace-loving people of South Africa. On the contrary, these organisations are the direct product of objective reality in a country that has gone strange to democracy. Though we cannot boast of any ideological homogeneity as a front, the organisations at our command are none the less committed to the ideal of a united, free and democratic non-racial South Africa, in which the will of the people, and not the will of a clique, shall bear sway. That is the primary thrust of the UDF.

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It is not the first time that the apartheid regime has brought together different organisations of diverse political persuasions to take a common stand against itself. In 1936, for instance, the then South African Native Congress extended an invitation to all organisations and individuals of the oppressed to attend a convention in Bloemfontein, and there to adopt a common position against the notorious Hertzog Bills. It was a popular indaba, comprising political, cultural, religious, and sports organisations of the oppressed and exploited masses. It might not have been destined to take on a permanent form, but certainly it did prove one point of particular significance to the UDF: that there is always room for the oppressed and fighting democrats to pool their individual efforts. Points of difference are not overriding. We can always submerge these and project those aspects which bring us together. Over the passage of time, with persuasion and discussion, the edges may become blunted, suspicious dissipated and unity achieved. And the best workshop where such unity can be hammered is the field of action. As long as we agree to resist and work together to attain certain immediate goals, so long will the possibility of ultimate unity be ascertained. My point here is vindicated by the campaigns that were mounted by our people during the second world war. I want to single out the Alexandra bus boycott - one of the longest and bitterest in living memory. Without clogging you with much detail, the outstanding achievement in so far as this campaign was concerned is the fact that, perhaps for the first time in the history of the liberation struggle, we witnessed a spontaneous expression of solidarity, in particular by the Indian community in Johannesburg, with the people of Alexander. We are told that some members of the Indian community would wake up early in the morning, walk the long distance from Fordsburg to Alexander to catch up with the throng of marching commuters. The process would be repeated in the evening. What is of relevance to us in this example is the fact that this expression of solidarity was not as a result of a resolution by the South African Indian Congress. On the contrary, the response must be seen as a product of their objective reality in South Africa at a time when the popular slogans in Afrikanerdom were: "Kaffir op sy plek" and "Koelie uit die land". In the circumstances "Kaffir" and "Koelie" had enough cause to come together against the common enemy in spite of whatever other difference might have been there between the two. And of importance again is the fact that the unity of the two was not wrenched in a conference room, but that it was forged in the theatre of a practical struggle. When doctors Xuma and Dadoo came together in 1946 as leaders respectively of the ANC and the Indian Congress to inaugurate the Congress Alliance in the name of Dadoo-Xuma Pact, they were merely giving formal endorsement of an idea already clinched at mass level. This Pact was in a very realistic sense a front. It was designed to co-ordinate and direct campaigns. The two communities could speak with one voice and march forward in one step. Consultation, oh! yes! consultation, discussion, patience and persuasion are some of the outstanding attributes which gave a long span of life to the front. In due course, and again as a result of two fascist bent in South Africa after the seizure of power by the Malan clique, the 1946 front was enlarged immediately after the 1952 Defiance Campaign to comprise such organisations as the Congress of Democrats, and the Coloured Peoples Congress. This formation was called the Congress Alliance. In 1954 the South African Congress of Trade Unions was to be the 5th member. The most significant difference between this front and the UDF is the fact that all affiliate organisations, SACTU excepted, were political organisations with one ideological persuasion.

That is not the case with our UDF. That, of course, does not mean that the Congress front did not have problems. They were there and some of them had an ethnic tinge. But these problems could and were surmounted - and not by confrontation and abuse. Consultation and constant consultation, discussion and persuasion formed the open sesame.

For it is important, comrades, to understand that differences between the people cannot and should not be solved in any other way. Of course we need to distinguish here between healthy and unhealthy differences. The former are genuine and struggle-orientated while the latter are a product of selfcentredness, reaction and mischief making and carry all the attributes of a clique. As a matter of principle we do not waste our time and sacrifice progress once this reactionary trend has been diagnosed. It is precisely on that score that the Leballo clique had to be dealt with all the contempt they deserved at the Congress of the People in 1955.

One other difference between the UDF and the Congress Alliance consisted in the fact that the latter had a spearhead in the name of the ANC, whereas the UDF cannot boast of such a fact. This is a glaring omission. Should we briefly look at other front organisations elsewhere in the world to follow the argument of a spearhead! Let's take the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. It was a tremendously huge alliance of all political, cultural and religious persuasions. Normally it would be difficult to bring these groupings together for any sustained period of time in the absence of the common enemy - French and later American imperialism. But the Lao Dong party not only brought them together, but also served as spearhead - the pace setter of long term objectives. In that position it understood that the Buddhists, for instance, would not go beyond the expulsion of imperialism and the establishment of a People's Democracy.

Similarly with the Partisan Fronts in eastern Europe during Hitler's occupation of the continent. The various communist parties in these countries served as spearheads of extremely broad fronts, some affiliates of which had no sympathies at all with issues like the dictatorship of the proletariat. And significantly enough for us the marxist parties in all these fronts did not project their own programmes over and above those of affiliates. Whilst the working class position had to be strengthened it was observed that in a compromise position like a front, tact and skill must take precedence. You don't denounce that other wing as bourgeois and retrograde. You don't call that one a lackey of so and so and dub that one as a centre-piece of progress and beauty in the front. You must just understand his weaknesses and shortcomings. Once these have been discovered and once, therefore, the distance he is prepared to travel in the long march to a Peoples Day of South Africa, has been determined it is your responsibility to persuade him to take another short mile with you. It is persuasion all the way. In most instances, depending on the prevailing circumstances, it is possible to win doubtful starters, for the entire distance to be travelled. The successes of the Congress Alliance up to the time of the banning in 1960, and those of the great Vietnamese people and the Partisan Fronts in eastern Europe and elsewhere can be attributed to this essential understanding of the compromise nature of a front. As I have pointed out initially, we are a peculiar front in the sense that we do not have a spearhead organisation; and as things are at the moment I do not see ourselves commanding one. What then becomes our strategy? For it is a spearhead organisation that most politically advanced, that most conscious factor in an alliance which is historically endowed with the clearest perception of the next step. Which political organisation in the UDF can arrogate to itself that task of leading the Front? For, let us not bluff ourselves, imperialism would like to influence the course of events in South Africa which is their workshop in the continent.



They are heavily invested in this country and since they know from the own bitter experience that apartheid is not here to stay, they would like to so manipulate things that when ultimately apartheid does go they have secured a jockey from within the democratic movement to safeguard their interests. They have tried in the past to win to their side such organisations as the PAC and the black consciousness herd. But all these groupings proved incompetent, and in 'despair, imperialism thought they had got their man in one Bantustan puppet who has also proved a disaster. My worry, comrades, is that imperialism may see the UDF as a hunting ground for its potential champion which puts me back to my question as to what should be our strategy in the absence of a spearhead. May I therefore suggest the following alternative:

- (a) Sink individual leaders and project a collective leadership as suggested in the preceding NEC;
- (b) Evolve a coherent and more functional executive committee;
- (c) Project the progressive symbols of our struggle and highlight the anti-imperialist nature of the democratic struggle.

For lack of space and time I beg not discuss the three.

### 3. DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE FRONT

So much has been said about this at various levels that I find it superfluous to belabour the point. None the less allow me to make the following comment.

I have designated a front organisation as a compromise position. That implies a give-and-take situation. Don't be over-exerting and over-demanding. Allow a certain measure of flexibility within the broad framework of our policy. As an executive committee we should be able to take decision and formulate policy. At no single point in time should we ever address ourselves to affiliates without a particular bias on any given issue. This is important and allows you the privilege of influencing the course events. It is a privileged position because the perspective of any executive at any level will always be wider than that of affiliates who necessarily must be able to see only as far as their limited affiliate horizons. Once you have communicated your view to your affiliates you must not entertain ideas that is is gospel. The affiliates must discuss your viewpoint, criticise it, reject it or endorse it. In turn their own standpoint is transmitted to the executive which, in turn, after determining the most popular viewpoint go back to the affiliates and acquaint them with the latest detail. No matter how strongly one felt about one's particular point of view once a popular decision has been struck it becomes immediately binding on all affiliates. No dissent will be allowed. Otherwise if one continues to cling to one's standpoint against the majority view and continues to canvas the defeated position then one is operating a clique and obstructing action and progress. This tendency must be exposed to all affiliates in a political analysis which must underline the destructive nature of cliques in a people's front, and within the affiliate organisation's themselves. At the same time no organisation must usurp its popularity and unilaterally decide on a campaign without consultation with the most relevant organisation in relation to that campaign. To illustrate: COSAS cannot unilaterally decide on a stay-away without prior consultation with the sister labour union affiliates, nor can any trade union unilaterally call upon students to boycott classes. Mistakes of this nature are bound to rock the front and cause disunity. We must not undermine the various leaderships of the diverse organisations at our command if we seek to advance revolutionary work. The working class, the spearhead of the struggle in South Africa today, has evolved its own leadership over the years, and in order to promote working class

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consciousness we are historically obliged to invest a lot of trust in our union leaders, and by so doing we shall have closed the doors against opportunist agitators and demagogues who might be inspired with the idea of derailing our struggle. Similarly with other affiliate organisations. At the same time no individual member of the UDF - no matter how prominent his profile must be allowed to take upon himself the responsibility of negotiating behind the backs of the workers leaders since that is one surest way of disarming the toiling masses. The key word is always and everywhere CONSULTATION. In this way we shall have ensured democracy within the affiliate organisation and consequently strengthened the UDF.

#### 4. TRANSFORMATION OF THE UDF.

Recently, and possibly currently, ideas have been flung that the UDF in the post-Koornhof and tricameral situation must be transformed into a political party. My own persuasion in this regard is that the necessity is forced upon us by the dictates of objective conditions then we have no alternative but to do so. But I want to believe that at the moment, such a move could only spell danger for the good work has been done and the lot that remains to be accomplished in the foreseeable future. The advantage of the present poise is that we are in a position to command vast influence among the broad masses of our people by reason of organisational membership. In this way access to the people is far more enhanced than it would be in a situation where we relied on individual membership. In the current year - thanks to the MSC and the anti-election campaign - we have traversed even those areas where politics was a strange concept. We have been able to temper our people in the urban and platteland areas in a manner that has no parallel in history. Through affiliate organisations the UDF became a household word. In that manner we had taken our struggle to almost every home and thereby projected the mass nature of our cause. It would have been difficult to score these resounding victories had we been constituted otherwise. The task that lies ahead is quite momentous: we have to reach those thousands of our people wherever they are, appeal to them not as individuals but as organisations. In the Karoo, Northern Transvaal and the O.F.S. effective UDF presence can only be made when the popular organisations that were set up during the anti-election campaign are consolidated and given direction, the rallying point at all material times being the conditions under which the people find themselves on a day to day basis. So that in so far as the future of the Front is concerned my feeling is that we maintain front nature and broaden our scope of activity. The anti-election campaign has enhanced the prestige of the Front. The government and its puppets were on the run, as they always must as long as they remain strange to truth. The clampdown on the UDF leadership and the brutal shooting of our people in the Rand and Vaal Triangle are an expression of frustration and impotence. At the same time it has been amply demonstrated that no force on earth can conquer the combined mass action of the oppressed and fighting people of South Africa. Even on the international plane the UDF position has been tremendously enhanced by the success of the campaign, which the racist government has become more of a skunk. But this does not mean we should be victory drunk. It means more work, more mobilisation and more vigilance against opportunists who may seek to climb on the crest of the present wave of anger.

#### 5. THE UDF AND THE FREEDOM CHARTER.

Comrades I cannot see how any organisation can be in a position to up with a better set of demands than those enshrined in this ever green document. At the same time any attempt to formulate a watered-down version of those demands is certainly a sell-out position in the

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context of the present struggle. The people of South Africa have gone a very long way to reach the Kibbutz pinnacle in 1955. For us, 35 years later, to shun these demands would be outright reconciliation with the status quo and imperialism. I agree that Le Grange's linkage cause would be strengthened but, we know and everybody in his right senses knows that the Freedom Charter is and was never an ANC document. The ANC had its own documents like the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and African Claims. The FC belongs to the people of South Africa and at this point of our struggle there is no reason why we should not adopt it as an alternative to the racist constitution. Everyone of those 10 points can be used to rally our people anywhere in South Africa. It has been hailed throughout the African continent as a piece of realistic document. The progressive international mankind has applauded it at various forums as an ideal alternative. Nelson Mandela and Anderson remain fascinated with it right up to now. The masses have coined moving songs out of every point in the 10. The masses of our people love it and need to know it deeper. Those of our affiliate who may still entertain aversions against it need to be educated about it in a persuasive and tactical manner.

TO SUM UP:

LONG LIVE UDF

LONG LIVE OUR PRESIDENTS

A THOUSAND YEARS MANDELA!

AMANDLA!

THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY -  
STEVE TSHUETE.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

From the outset I want to dispel some silly notions in the heads of leading members of the ruling clique and their henchmen on the nature and role of the United Democratic Front in the struggle for national liberation. With all the fanaticism of a reactionary, they cling to the word "Front", twist its meaning and then attach connotations to prove the lie that the organisation is nothing else other than a display window of some banned organisations. But we know that they are feeding their gullible audience with false information. We are clear in our minds that the position they have taken against the UDF is a position typical of all undemocratic and fascist cliques throughout the world. We have seen it in Hitler's Germany, in Spain and in Portugal. The peoples of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa, Latin America and Asia have gone through similar experiences. Fortunately for the democratic movement in South Africa, there is nothing new in the allegations which are intended to drive us to the U.T.P. stand where we should watch the march past of the forces of reaction, oppression and exploitation without lifting even a finger. In the period preceding its ban in 1967, the ANC was branded a communist organisation - some front of the Communist Party of South Africa. Not that the Nationalist Party intellectuals did not know that long before the coming into being of the CPSA, and five full years before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Tsarist Russia, the ANC was already hatched by the incubator of racist oppression and exploitation right inside South Africa. The situation has not changed from what it was then. Instead it has become even worse. But they would like everybody else to believe in the myths of an "agitator" behind any genuine resistance against the barbarism of apartheid society. They would not accede to the fundamental truth that the "agitator", in fact, is political deprivation, economic strangulation, the squalor in the ghettos, forced removals and resettlements, the group areas act, the pass laws, unequal and ethnic education, migrant labour, the balkanisation of a fatherland into dust-tracks called homelands, increased rentals, etc., etc. Yes that is the "agitator". The Nationalist Government has arrogated to itself the position of a god, and has elevated the greenery around its residence in Cape Town to some Garden of Eden of some sort. There, and in the tranquility of comfort and plenty, they must sit down, and, in their own image, carve an ideal model the type of man they want. In that arrogant innocence, they parade stark naked before the god of impartial history without even a scrap of morality to cover their nakedness.

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Similarly with the Partisan Fronts in eastern Europe during Hitler's occupation of the continent. The various communist parties in these countries served as spearheads of extremely broad fronts, some affiliates of which had no sympathies at all with issues like the dictatorship of the proletariat. And significantly enough for us the marxist parties in all these fronts did not project their own programmes over and above those of affiliates. Whilst the working class position had to be strengthened it was observed that in a compromise position like a front, tact and skill must take precedence. You don't denounce that other wing as bourgeois and retrograde. You don't call that one a lackey of so and so and dub that one as a centre-piece of progress and beauty in the front. You must just understand his weaknesses and shortcomings. Once these have been discovered and once, therefore, the distance he is prepared to travel in the long march to a Peoples Day of South Africa, has been determined it is your responsibility to persuade him to take another short mile with you. It is persuasion all the way. In most instances, depending on the prevailing circumstances, it is possible to win doubtful starters for the entire distance to be travelled. The successes of the Congress Alliance up to the time of the banning in 1960, and those of the great Vietnamese people and the Partisan Fronts in eastern Europe and elsewhere can be attributed to this essential understanding of the compromise nature of a front. As I have pointed out initially, we are a peculiar front in the sense that we do not have a spearhead organisation; and as things are at the moment I do not see ourselves commanding one. What then becomes our strategy? For it is a spearhead organisation that most politically advanced, that most conscious factor in an alliance which is historically endowed with the clearest perception of the next step? Which political organisation in the UDF can arrogate to itself that task of leading the front? For, let us not bluff ourselves, imperialism would like to influence the course of events in South Africa which is their workshop in the continent.

They are heavily invested in this country and since they know from their own bitter experience that apartheid is not here to stay, they would like to so manipulate things that when ultimately apartheid does go they have secured a jockey from within the democratic movement to safeguard their interests. They have tried in the past to win to their side such organisations as the PAC and the black consciousness herd. But all these groupings proved incompetent, and in despair, imperialism thought they had got their man in one Santustan puppet who has also proved a disaster. My worry, comrades, is that imperialism may see the UDF as a hunting ground for its potential charge which puts me back to my question as to what should be our strategy in the absence of a spearhead. May I therefore suggest the following alternative:

- (a) Sink individual leaders and project a collective leadership as suggested in the preceding NEC;
- (b) Evolve a coherent and more functional executive committee;
- (c) Project the progressive symbols of our struggle and highlight the anti-imperialist nature of the democratic struggle.

For lack of space and time I beg not discuss the three.

### 3. DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE FRONT

So much has been said about this at various levels that I find it superfluous to belabour the point. None the less allow me to make the following comment.

I have designated a front organisation as a compromise position. That implies a give-and-take situation. Don't be over-exerting and over-demanding. Allow a certain measure of flexibility within the broad framework of our policy. As an executive committee we should be able to take decision and formulate policy. At no single point in time should we ever address ourselves to affiliates without a particular bias on any given issue. This is important and allows you the privilege of influencing the course events. It is a privileged position because the perspective of any executive at any level will always be wider than that of affiliates who necessarily must be able to see only as far as their limited affiliate horizons. Once you have communicated your view to your affiliates you must not entertain ideas that is is gospel. The affiliates must discuss your viewpoint, criticise it, reject it or endorse it. In turn their own standpoint is transmitted to the executive which, in turn, after determining the most popular viewpoint go back to the affiliates and acquaint them with the latest detail. No matter how strongly one felt about one's particular point of view once a popular decision has been struck it becomes immediately binding on all affiliates. No dissent will be allowed. Otherwise if one continues to cling to one's standpoint against the majority view and continues to canvas the defeated position then one is operating a clique and obstructing action and progress. This tendency must be exposed to all affiliates in a political analysis which must underline the destructive nature of cliques in a people's front, and within the affiliate organisation's themselves.

At the same time no organisation must usurp its popularity and unilaterally decide on a campaign without consultation with the most relevant organisation in relation to that campaign. To illustrate: COSAS cannot unilaterally decide on a stay-away without prior consultation with the sister labour union affiliates, nor can any trade union unilaterally call upon students to boycott classes. Mistakes of this nature are bound to rock the front and cause disunity. We must not undermine the various leaderships of the diverse organisations at our command if we seek to advance revolutionary work. The working class, the spearhead of the struggle in South Africa today, has evolved its own leadership over the years, and in order to promote working class

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consciousness we are historically obliged to invest a lot of trust in our union leaders, and by so doing we shall have closed the doors against opportunist agitators and demagogues who might be inspired with the idea of derailing our struggle. Similarly with other affiliate organisations. At the same time no individual member of the UDF - no matter how prominent his profile must be allowed to take upon himself the responsibility of negotiating behind the backs of the workers leaders since that is one surest way of disarming the toiling masses. The key word is always and everywhere CONSULTATION. In this way we shall have ensured democracy within the affiliate organisations and consequently strengthened the UDF.

#### 4. TRANSFORMATION OF THE UDF.

Recently, and possibly currently, ideas have been flung that the UDF in the post-Koornhof and tricameral situation must be transformed into a political party. My own persuasion in this regard is that the necessity is forced upon us by the dictates of objective conditions then we have no alternative but to do so. But I want to believe that at the moment, such a move could only spell danger for the good work that has been done and the lot that remains to be accomplished in the foreseeable future. The advantage of the present poise is that we are in a position to command vast influence among the broad masses of our people by reason of organisational membership. In this way access to the people is far more enhanced than it would be in a situation where we relied on individual membership. In the current year - thanks to the MSC and the anti-election campaign - we have traversed even those areas where politics was a strange concept. We have been able to temper our people in the urban and platteland areas in a manner that has no parallel in history. Through affiliate organisations the UDF became a household word. In that manner we had taken our struggle to almost every home and thereby projected the mass nature of our cause. It would have been difficult to score these resounding victories had we been constituted otherwise. The task that lies ahead is quite momentous: we have to reach those thousands of our people wherever they are, appeal to them not as individuals but as organisations. In the Karoo, Northern Transvaal and the O.F.S. effective UDF presence can only be made when the popular organisations that were set up during the anti-election campaign are consolidated and given direction, the rallying point at all material times being the conditions under which the people find themselves on a day to day basis. So that in so far as the future of the Front is concerned my feeling is that we maintain the front nature and broaden our scope of activity. The anti-election campaign has enhanced the prestige of the Front. The government and its puppets were on the run, as they always must as long as they remain strange to truth. The clampdown on the UDF leadership and the brutal shooting of our people in the Rand and Vaal Triangle are an expression of frustration and impotence. At the same time it has been amply demonstrated that no force on earth can conquer the combined mass action of the oppressed and fighting people of South Africa. Even on the international plane the UDF position has been tremendously enhanced by the success of the campaign, which the racist government has become more of a skunk. But this does not mean we should be victory drunk. It means more work, more mobilisation and more vigilance against opportunities who may seek to climb on the crest of the present wave of anger.

#### 5. THE UDF AND THE FREEDOM CHARTER

Comrades I cannot see how any organisation can be in a position to come up with a better set of demands than those enshrined in this ever green document. At the same time any attempt to formulate a watered-down version of those demands is certainly a sell-out position in the

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context of the present struggle. The people of South Africa have gone a very long way to reach the Kli town pinnacle in 1955. For us, 35 years later, to shun these demands would be outright reconciliation with the status quo and imperialism. I agree that Le Grange's linkage cause would be strengthened but we know and everybody in his right sense knows that the Freedom Charter is and was never an ANC document. The ANC had its own documents like the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and African Claims. The FC belongs to the people of South Africa and at this point of our struggle there is no reason why we should not adopt it as an alternative to the racist constitution. Everyone of those 10 points can be used to rally our people anywhere in South Africa. It has been hailed throughout the African continent as a piece of realistic document. The progressive international mankind has applauded it at various forums as an ideal alternative. Nelson Mandela and Anderson remain fascinated with it right up to now. The masses have coined moving songs out of every point in the 10. The masses of our people love it and need to know it deeper. Those of our affiliate who may still entertain aversions against it need to be educated about it in a persuasive and tactical manner.

TO SUM UP:

LONG LIVE UDF

LONG LIVE OUR PRESIDENTS

A THOUSAND YEARS MANDELA!

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A. Goalsetting

It is necessary for us to set our sights high, but we should also be realistic. An incorrect assessment of what is possible can lead to public embarrassment for the Front and can be used to undermine the confidence of the people in the Front. Our activists also become demoralised if they had worked very hard and failed to attain goals we've set for ourselves.

In future proper assessment and planning should take place in all structures which will be expected to contribute to the attainment of a particular goal. Logistics should be worked out as far possible before we commit ourselves firmly.

We should also define far more clearly what objectives we have i.e whether the emphasis is on depth or high profile activity. During the elections we also learnt that is not possible to sustain two intensive campaigns with different profiles at the same time (i.e elections & MSC).

B. Criteria for affiliation

1. Organisations. The UDF must continue to encourage as many kinds of organisations with their interests, irrespective of their size or constituency. We should be realistic about the fact that we will rely more on some affiliates to do the mass work while that of others are valuable in other respects.

Where we need to make a distinction, is in terms of decision-making. A formula should be found where numerical representation at decision-making. Forums like G.C should be commensurate with the capacity of an affiliate to take practical responsibility to implement decisions of the Front.

2. Regions. We should critically assess what the point is at which regional status is accorded. It appears as if our earlier motivation that inclusion into national structures will stimulate the development of regions, has had some adverse effects. Very often this has drained those areas, because of the demands placed on them. They are often compelled to respond to activities which were decided on by national structures where the pace is determined by the stronger region. In the long run this can undermine development.

We should accept that the core of the UDF will always exist around urban areas like Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth & Cape Town. However, fairly substantial structures are developing in some of the rural areas which form part of our existing regions. We need to find ways of incorporating those areas more directly into decision-making of the UDF, because distances from the towns responsible for them often makes this impossible.

Possible guidelines for the future:

- ~~Conditions~~ must have been allowed to develop to the extent where there is a general council which can meet regularly and consist of affiliate organisations

- Organisations in the geographic area, must launch the region and apply for national status once they feel they are in a position to take responsibility for (i) surrounding area  
(ii) national campaigns
- Re-assess existing regions l.t.o. above criteria
- Assess whether regional boundaries should be re-defined to create smaller more manageable regions.

C. Decision-making:

1. Processes:

We need to strike a balance between the need for UDF to respond speedily to crisis and the need for all our affiliates to be party to and committed to decisions we take.

Practical proposals in this regard are that agendas of national gatherings be sent out timeously and that allowance be made for discussion thereof in affiliates and that affiliates be encouraged to make suggestions l.t.o N.E.C agendas. We should accept that we will have to respond to urgent issues and take decisions without following this procedure. The nature of such discussion and decisions should however be disseminated as soon as possible to all affiliates.

2. Autonomy of affiliates in relation to decision.

It is unhealthy for any of our affiliates to actively go against majority decisions taken. We should however understand when some affiliates are not in a position to participate actively in some of our campaigns. Such affiliates should however be encouraged to look at means of playing a supportive role.

In terms of our past practice, we need to assess flexibility/autonomy and its implications for unity in the Front.

D. Accountability:

The formation of the UDF marked a new era of closer co-operation between progressive forces in S A. Most of our affiliates do not have the experience of having worked in an alliance like the UDF. While we encourage affiliates to take up campaigns, we must bear in mind that the work of our affiliates will invariably have a bearing on the work of the rest of the Front. As affiliates, we should feel duti-bound to consult with or at least inform the rest of the Front about all campaigns we propose to tackle, particularly when campaigns will be mass based. This can only serve to strengthen such campaigns and contribute to unity in action.

## E. Discipline

Because we are a Front and not a political organisation, the only basis in terms of which we can take disciplinary measures against any affiliate or individual, is the principle enshrined in our declaration, resolutions and working principles. We should endeavour to foster sound relationships among our affiliates but we should be aware of the UDF's limitations to try and resolve differences among organisations especially where those differences arose because of dynamics outside of the Front.

If such transgression does occur, R.E.C's & N.E.C should not be structures which decide on the form of discipline. Such matters are best dealt with collectively through forums like Regional G.C's.

UDF has no real discipline over individuals in the Front - organisations must take responsibility for their membership. We should however bear in mind that the best guarantee for discipline is to inculcate a sense of trust and a strong loyalty towards the front and its objectives. Drastic disciplinary measures should only be considered after comradely attempts to explain to those at fault, had failed or if the fundamental principles of the UDF had been consciously flouted.

## F. Structures

We need to assess whether our existing structures are appropriate for the work it is intended to do. The following are some practical proposals:

- NGC - should gather only once a year and serve the purpose of an AGM
    - should only take place after regional AGM's
    - representation per region should be determined l.t.o numbers only. Regions should decide how best they and their affiliates can be represented.
    - we should determine how national formations will be represented if the above proposal is accepted
  - NEC - to be held less often
    - its work should revolve largely around policy and broad guidelines for work
    - emergency NEC's to be called only if regional feedback is not the best method at arriving at a national position. Practical decisions to be taken by appropriate structures e.g Treasury, Secretariat, Publicity dept
    - all reports to be circularised prior to NEC and only matters arising to be discussed
- ~~Given~~ given the logistics and finances involved in having an NEC, ~~we~~ should assess its size.

## G. Education & Training

We are very conscious of the need for far more systematic education & training of our activists as well as new people who are being drawn in. We need to assess whether this is best done through permanent, high structures or more informally.

There are two categories which are not necessarily related.

- 1) Equipping our activists with organising skills. This is best done when based on practical experience e.g briefing, before going into areas & assessments afterwards.
- 2) Broadening the political understanding of those within the front. Regular open discussions or forums should be encouraged as long as these do not become substitutes for structures like GC to discuss policy matters.

We should look at how experience in this regard can be shared.

## H. Relationship to non-affiliates

Our emphasis should always be to seek those areas where co-operation is possible. It is important that we should continue to try and win over all progressive organisations.

As far as other political tendencies are concerned, our most serious consideration should be those which have a mass base. By now we should be able to be realistic about the areas and nature of co-operation which is possible. It is our task to ensure that we and those not affiliates never lose sight of the fact that the apartheid state is the enemy and that if any ideological differences do exist, we should respect those and not allow it to undermine the potential areas of unity.

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Rev "Cb"

SECOND PAPER : CDE NKENKE STOFIE:

"THE ROLE OF THE YOUTH IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE"

No 10  
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COMRADES,

My point of departure is that we cannot speak of the Liberation Struggle without first acquainting ourselves with the issues involved in our oppression. Nor can we speak of the role of the youth unless we have a clear perception of the actors involved in the oppression-liberation scene. Our confidence in final victory rests not on the wish or the dream, but on our understanding of our own conditions and the historical processes. This understanding must be deepened and must spread to every level of our movement.

Our fundamental starting point, I think, is to have a clear perception of the international nature of the struggle (although I do not intend going into that today). When we have seen that, it becomes clearer to us that we are caught up in the classic situation of the exploiter versus the exploited; of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat; of the capitalist versus the worker. These two are therefore the two major actors in the situation. It is true that we have other sub-classes like the peasants; the petty-bourgeois (artisans; handicraftsmen; small shopkeepers, etc) and also the intelligensia (professional workers; cultural workers; office workers; students and other employees). But all these groups fall within the two basic class structure: Capitalists and workers, or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Some of you might be saying that I forgot at least one class, the "youth class." My categorical answer to such doubts would be, there is no such class as a youth class. The group of people usually referred to are members of the two main classes and also of the sub-classes I mentioned above. But the youth we are concerned with for our purpose today obviously does not come from the bourgeoisie. They usually come from the working class; the peasants; the intelligensia, and the petty bourgeoisie. They are not a youth as a result of any exploiter-exploited situation. They exist as a result of other factors — age. Now age is no respecter of class, nor is it a non-variable. The infant of today will be the youth of twenty years to come and the adult of fifty years to come.

So the youth is an actor in the Liberation Struggle not as a distinct class but as a member of the working class. This does not mean that the young worker or young student or young intelligensia is obsolete to the struggle. By no means. We will come to that later.

The nature of our struggle in this country is also basically two-fold. The main content of the present stage is the national liberation of the most oppressed group — the Black people. This national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. The second aspect is the complete economic emancipation of the oppressed.

Even within these two facets of the struggle we should not be blind to the reality of our situation. The African majority is the most oppressed within the Black majority. If this is so, then the African worker is



doubly-oppressed and doubly-exploited. The racist laws of this country have tried to cushion the "white" worker through numerous discriminatory laws. Of course it would be silly and naive that such laws are promulgated for the good of the "white" worker. The capitalist benefits more from a lulled "white" worker who sees very little in common between himself and the Black worker. On the other hand the Black worker is angry at being discriminated against. The truth of the matter is that ALL workers are exploited. In our context the degrees of exploitation are complicated by the race issue.

So our struggle necessarily has to address the situation from the two fronts: Race and Class, in that order.

20 But we are revolutionaries and not narrow nationalists. We accept fully the idea of a unity in action between all the oppressed groups as being fundamental to the advancement of our liberation struggle. How could we forget the proud record of such patriots and comrades as Basil February; Abdurahmann; Gandhi; Kathrada; Fisher; First; Aget and many others! Our struggle being for a non-racial, democratic South Africa we cannot delay our non-racial approach.

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But we must not be ambiguous on the question of the primary role of the most oppressed African masses. But, of course, those belonging to the other oppressed Black groups and the white revolutionaries who show themselves ready to make common cause with our aspirations must be fully integrated on the basis of individual equality. There can be no second or third class participation in the democratic movement of our liberation. It is for the enemy that we reserve our assertiveness and our justified sense of grievance.

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In the vanguard of this struggle is the working class. Their cherished aim and purpose is to destroy the exploiting monster that is capitalism. The workers have nothing to lose but their chains. They stand to gain the whole world; the means of production and political power. With these they will earn the right to enjoy all the achievements of material and spiritual culture.

The workers should be the most organised; the most disciplined and the most politically-conscious class. This because of the very conditions in which production develops. They usually work together in large bodies. They see that they live and work in deplorable conditions and everywhere they are opposed by the same and one exploiter: The capitalist. Hence the emergence and development of their class consciousness.

But the working class is not alone. Other sections of society also suffer exploitation. Sections like the working peasants; the working intellectual; the student and also the petty urban bourgeoisie are allies of the working class.

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But, for all these to work well together for the same goal - liberation -- there must be a directing organ. The struggle has to be won in all-round political mobilisation. This includes education and agitational work throughout the country to cope with the sophisticated torrent of misleading propaganda of the enemy. The enemy is as aware as we are that the side that wins the allegiance of the people wins the struggle.

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is therefore all the more vital that the revolutionary leadership is nation-wide. To ensure that when victory comes it is not a hollow one, the masses must be brought to power at the head of which stands its organised political leadership. But this leadership will be followed if the people had disciplined themselves during the struggle to subject themselves to their leadership.

It was within such a framework that in 1944 the Youth League was formed that became a model of the role the youth should play in the struggle. A group of young people came from different walks of life (most of them from the young intelligensia) to become a disciplined; committed and vital part of the liberation movement.

A very important historical fact about the Youth League is its pledge to make its services available to the broad movement of the people. They were not cessationists or breakaways. They realised that it was not good for the struggle to stop at being noisy in condemning and criticizing the leadership that went before it. Defects in the organisation of the people cannot be cured by mouthing criticisms and not putting our heads together to build what has been damaged or mismanaged. We must find ways of removing the present suffering together. The name of the game is DISCIPLINE; COMMITMENT and CO-OPERATION. A lack of these leads to the co-option of the oppressed to swell the ranks of the enemy camp. This has become an obvious fact in our own times of the Bantustans; Community Councils; Presidents Councils; Constitutional Proposals, etcetera.

All these should be seen as ploys to make some of the oppressed junior partners in the oppression machine. The youth are also major targets as they are conscripted to be defenders of an unjust and sinful system. To excuse the opportunists on the basis of their colour is to be short-sighted and politically mischievous, to say the least.

You might say that this paper did not deal much with the role of the youth. I repeat what I mentioned earlier; the role of the youth has already been mentioned as we outlined the role of the various sub-classes, and especially the workers, in the struggle.

But of course the youth is unique in so far as it has youth and vitality on its side. These are vital characteristics for the field work of education and mobilising. Of course there are other obvious tasks that the youth should be masters at doing. But all this under the political leadership and in a disciplined manner.

If the youth of our land cannot understand these truths, they run the risks of being confused and hijacked by other enemy agents. Once our youth see themselves as heroes rather than ready raw material for the struggle, then our efforts and those of our forebears are in vain. The youth must be willing to make creative criticism. But they must also be ready and willing to be guided and led. From such a humble but dedicated youth will emerge leaders of the calibre of the founders of the Youth League.

Our struggle is for a new South Africa where racism and class exploitation will be things of the past; where human dignity shall prevail for all. But that new order will be borne after a lot of repression and even loss of life. We must be ready to meet that challenge with an unbreakable will and determination of the oppressed masses. Racist domination and imperialist exploitation must be resisted at all fronts by the youth:

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The workers; the mothers; the church and the mosque must all unite in unleashing blows against apartheid. Let us mobilise our black labour force and liberate ourselves from the capitalist bondage. It is our power that sustains the lifespan of the oppressor. It is our opportunism that keeps the skeleton in the apartheid cupboard rattling with years of injustice. Let us mobilise; organise; be organised and fight for a free; democratic and non-racial South Africa where the people shall govern and there shall be peace and friendship.

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## THE YOUTH IN THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT.

### I. INTRODUCTION.

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This paper is not intended to answer all questions in relation to the role of the youth in the on-going process of national liberation. On the contrary, it has been occasioned by a number of specific issues that I have personally come across inside the UAF. These, in the main, are disorders which cannot seriously be attributed to any fundamental ideological differences. The problem, in so far as I have been able to look at it, emanates from a lack of a clear perspective in advancing correct and appropriate tactics to come to terms with the situation we wish to influence. This is the real problem that faces the young cadres in the democratic front.

In our day to day task of mobilisation and giving direction and guidance we come across certain concepts.

It is quite true that some of these concepts are new to some of us. We immediately get excited with the discovery. Nothing wrong with that.

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After all any field of study has its own concepts. They are very useful in so far as they are a precondition for a proper grasping of that field of study, But once we begin to be enslaved by these concepts and start using them blindly, without relating them to the objective conditions, then we run the risk of not only losing our perspective, but also the risk of bringing about confusion and disorder in the popular front.

## 2. YOUTH AND CLASS

Much has been said and done to demonstrate the fact that the youth constitute a very important section of the liberation movement. Without the involvement of the youth in the struggle nothing can really be achieved. They represent continuity in a protracted confrontation with the forces of reaction, and in recent times they have proved beyond doubt their preparedness to bring the dawn of a People's South Africa nearer every hour. In order, therefore, not to allow their

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energy to work itself it is necessary that at all material times they be armed with proper instruments of analysis - a theoretical armour that will enable them to face and understand all odds in the concrete field of practical struggle. In this regard I want to correct certain misunderstandings in relation to certain concepts which nearly caused some problems for the Border Region of the UAF. It has been argued, for instance, that the youth constitute a class of their own, and that ipso facto, they are the vanguard of the national democratic movement. It does not surprise me much that a view of this nature did in fact surface if one takes into account the concerted attempts by bourgeois intellectuals to throw a lot of confusion around this concept. It could well happen that some of us have fallen prey to the confusion.

What is meant by the concept "class"? Bourgeois sociologists tell us that one's class position in society is determined by one's life-style, i.e. they way

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you go about doing things. According to this definition which sees one's class in terms of one's tastes and mannerisms a worker who adopts a bourgeois lifestyle becomes a member of the bourgeoisie. The trick behind this class definition is obvious: the preservation of capitalist relations of production by blunting working class consciousness. We must, therefore, reject this definition and examine the working class intellectuals' definition which states as follows: a class is that large group of people who have the same material interests by reason of their peculiar relationship to the means of production. In other words one's class position is not determined by the way he lives, but by one's relationship to the means of production. The starting point in defining a class is one of economic relationship. Do you own the means of production? Or do you not own them? If you do own them, then you have a



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peculiar relationship to the means of production: the relationship of ownership and you therefore belong to the class of owners. If you don't own the means of production, then your relationship to them is one of non-ownership. This is the sole determining factor of one's class position. For instance, in a capitalist society class division will take along these lines: -

1. The capitalist class: A large group of people who own the entire means of production and distribution - the captains of industry.

2. The petty bourgeoisie who constitute small businessmen and the peasantry.

3. The working class - by far the largest and whose fate consequently tends to become fused with that of humanity.

Of course, there are other group formations that one will find in a class divided society.

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These are:

1. Religious groups comprising the Christian, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists etc., etc.
2. The intellectuals
3. The youth.

All three of them are not classes because, taking each one of them, their members are not similarly related to the means of production. There are bourgeois Christians and working class Christians, bourgeois intellectuals and working class intellectuals, bourgeois youth and working class youth, for example. What are they, therefore? They are social groups. It is important that we understand this categorisation for purposes of prosecuting the democratic struggle.

### 3. ORGANISATION.

This is an important aspect of any liberation movement anywhere in the world and the role of the youth in this task cannot be overemphasized. As long as our



people remain unorganised so long will talk of freedom remain a pipe-dream. And before we can even start talking about organising we must have the vehicle for the job. Set up youth organisations throughout the country. These must be properly constituted organisations with clearly articulated objectives. All the organs of administration must be seen to be in motion at the right time and at the right place. As we go about doing our work it must never escape our minds that we are a detachment of a broad national democratic movement. So immediately we adopt an approach which is compatible with the nature of the struggle we are waging in order to maximise our efforts and weaken the strength of the reactionary forces. The areas to be traversed are quite wide and infested with a lot of pitfalls for the unwary youth cadre. You have, for instance, not only the working and student youth to go to. There

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is the unemployed township youth and the youth in the church. All these people must be ~~one~~ woven into the popular struggle, for if we neglect them the ruling clique is going to pitch them against the popular movement. But once again we must guard against being slaves to our concepts and slogans. At every turn of the road we must stop and examine the terrain. Assess your situation and audience correctly before you act because a single mistake can cost you a good membership. Your approach, for instance, to a hostel (Indokwenza) youth group must necessarily differ from your approach to a student group. At every point you are going to be guided by the historical situation of the group to be organised. You rally around the most basic - the simplest - issues which face the particular group. Take a township situation, for instance. You will find the youth here playing ball in the

- 9 -

streets. No adequate recreational facilities are provided. You will find some of them leaning against toilet walls; hungry and lonely. Some will be gambling at street corners with huge knives protruding from their ~~sheath~~ "gat sakke". They are oppressed and they must be brought to the struggle before they join the reactionary and puppet armies out of desperation. And you will not win them once you start bombarding them with high sounding phrases like "victims of capitalist exploitation and oppression", etc. Organise them to fight for proper and adequate recreation, proper and adequate housing, their right to earn a decent living. ~~Let us not undermine these~~ seemingly small aspects of the struggle. For apartheid is not a big monster that must be hunted down with knobkerries and spears. On the contrary apartheid is separate entrances here and there, forced

removals and resettlements, racially segregated residential areas with all the deprivation that this means for that group and the affluence and comfort it means for that one (whites), to cite just a few instances. So the civic aspect of the struggle must not be belittled. We must disregard those who look with scorn upon rallying around civic issues. We must start at the right place for the right people. For when you temper these people against local government you are actually setting them against the status quo. The trade union is good teacher in this respect. An experienced union organiser's starting point is the economic conditions at factory floor level. The worker's political consciousness is developed from this elemental basis and not from grandiose conceptualisation. Because it is organic, this consciousness develops. Always start

from the known and obvious. The student movement offers another example of good organisation. These the starting point is the classroom situation; lack of teaching equipment; underqualified teachers, excessive corporal punishment; prefect system etc., etc.

You need, also, to organise a lot of cultural activity. Plays that depict, say, the effects of group areas act, migrant labour, conscription and the tricameral sell-out, the pass laws etc., etc. In your cast you can include some talented members of the street gang. Give him a script on the fraud of conscription. Let him do the preaching against conscription on the stage. He becomes a convert and you shall have won a cadre and a host of supporters from among the audience. The stage, then, becomes very important in the national democratic

struggle. Choral groups and  
cumbos might equally prove  
~~pro~~ equally effective. These  
are areas of organisation  
which have been neglected  
by the youth, both the  
working and student youth,  
in our region. How about  
a try!

#### 4. DISCIPLINE

Forget about the struggle, stay  
at home and play with  
the cat if you do not want to  
be subjected to any form of  
discipline. In the context of  
the struggle discipline cannot  
be confined to being  
good-mannered and always  
showing a friendly disposition.  
No. It means a proper  
understanding of the task in  
hand: of what is to be  
done and how. It is an  
awareness that the ideal  
for which you are prepared  
to die is abstract and  
can only be given concrete  
existence in you. This



means that wherever you are, in whatever circumstances, ~~the~~ you reflect the aspirations of the oppressed, exploited and fighting masses of our people. That is discipline. Don't sell out when things become tough in case the people turn around and say: "Sis! These people are unreliable" Don't drink and get drunk in the streets; get picked up from the gutter by the masses. You are soiling the good name of the democratic front. Be on time for the meeting or whatever assignment and do to completion all what you have been assigned to do. Disagree with comrades on any issue as much as you can, but remain bound by the majority decision. I know the majority can be wrong. Always bear in mind that it is very easy for an organisation to correct itself and very difficult for an individual to be

converted.

As a member of an organisation you no longer belong to the masses. You embody consciousness. This means that all your actions are pre-planned and well-calculated; that all your actions can be predicted with a fair amount of precision. You are quite clear of ~~the~~ your overall strategy and that of the retrograde forces. That is discipline. It becomes complete once you are also aware of the tactics that you have to use from time to time, place to place, in pursuit of your strategy. The vast unorganised masses embody ~~spontaneous~~ spontaneity. This means the direct opposite of consciousness. Decisions are taken on the spur of the moment without any long-term strategy being set out. Spontaneity in a sense is mass anger and reaction to acute instances of injustice and oppression. It is what

one revolutionary writer referred to as "social moulds" — an outward expression of bad blood in the system. The recent outbreaks of unrest in the Vaal Triangle and elsewhere in the country are typical examples of spontaneity — mass spontaneous response to brutal and naked oppression and exploitation. The duration of the unrest cannot be predicted and the various forms it may take from place to place and time to time cannot be subjected to any measure of precision. It is therefore the responsibility of the conscious factor — i.e. the organised cadreship — to direct this mass anger in the interests of the ultimate objective of the struggle. The oppressor makes things easy for the cadre, for it is the oppressor himself who organises spontaneous uprising by the masses.

From time to time the oppressor must increase rents and bus fares without corresponding wage increases. From time to time he is going to keep education racialised and educational facilities for the oppressed ill and inadequate, he is going to remove and re-settle, detain, ban and banish. He organises energetically and without stop - in the factories, in the townships and in the rural areas - he is ever active. And the masses respond in their own way. As a cadre - the conscious factor - you cannot be taken by surprise. You integrate the spontaneous mass action into your overall tactical armour. This is an instance of discipline.

### CONCLUSION

I have attempted here to

address myself and to the youth  
of our country on their role  
in the struggle for democracy.

In the process I focussed  
on certain areas of theory  
and practice as guide  
lines to meaningful  
action and courageous  
conduct. There is

nothing conclusive in  
the paper and I am  
looking forward to being  
improved and even  
corrected here and there.

Wishing you an eventful  
1985.

Amanda.

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CDF office  
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→ Never seen it before  
was W.F. Palmy document

## 1. WHAT IS THE UDF ?

new "C 8"

The UDF is a front, an alliance of organisations that have come together on the basis of a minimum programme namely the opposition to the "new deal". It unites people through their organisations in opposition to the new constitution and the Koornhof bills. Individuals join through their organisations not as individuals. This ensures that the Front is controlled by organisations not by a clique of activists. In this way the UDF is not only championing the struggle against the new constitution, but also a symbol of unity of our people.

### 1.1 NATURE OF ALLIANCE :

The nature of alliance that UDF is, is a tactical one. This means that organisations under the banner of the UDF may be uniting on the basis of as little as (5%) five percent. What matters therefore is the five percent (5%) that has the capacity of uniting hundreds of organisations (600) and millions of people. Our emphasis therefore is not on the 95% differences but on the 5% that unites the people and lay the basis for :

1. Opposition to the "New Reforms"
2. Common experience of working together amongst organisations and different classes.
3. Building confidence and deepening consciousness and organisation through active participation in mass campaigns.
4. Building of greater and lasting unity, born out of struggle and experience of working together.

Because the UDF is a tactical alliance it has the capacity to unite a broadest possible spectrum of people across class and colour lines. Organisations must simply accept the UDF Declaration and be prepared to oppose the "New Deal". The autonomy of organisations is abrogated only in so far as opposition to the "New Deal" is concerned. Ofcourse these must be organisations operating outside government structures - such as community councils, Bantustans/Homelands systems, Black Local Authorities, Coloured Management Committees, South African Indian Council etc.

The nature of front formation of the UDF does not deny organisations the right to retain their programmes, policies and ideologies. Instead they unite on the basis of a common cause of anguish and a common threat to the hard won unity of the oppressed and all other freedom loving South Africans who are prepared to stake their privileged positions by fighting side by side with the oppressed majority. It means that sport bodies, youth organisations, cultural groups, womans organisations, trade unions, professional organisations church and political organisations would have a broad basis for unity in action and under the banner of one Front. This the UDF has proven, it is possible.

There are forms of alliances such as strategic and classical or principle alliances. The former makes it possible for organisations with similar policies e.g. cultural isolation of South Africa to work together on common campaigns. Recently AZASO, AZAPO, TAC and SOWETO CIC ASSOCIATION mobilized KAIZER CHIEFS, ORLANDO PIRATES and MOROKA SWALLOWS to boycott the SAB XI (ELEVEN) competition. However this kind of alliance is very limited in terms of broadening its base. It can only be as big as the number of organisations committed to church, ordinary professional, trade union organisations etc. together unless they have taken the same posture regarding cultural contact with South Africa.

The latter - i.e. principle alliance brings together only those organisations with same or similar principles. This kind of alliance is normally formed by organisations waging a military struggle. It is also limited to those organisations that have a lot in common in terms of their outlook e.e. understanding of the kind of society they want etc. Because of this its potential to broaden itself is very limited.

## 1.2 WHY DID WE OPT FOR TACTICAL ALLIANCE ?

The "New Deal" of the government was threatening the unity of the Africans - it was threatening to divide Africans into urban and rural. It was threatening to destroy the unity between the Africans and their allied groups - the Coloured and the Indians. It was necessary that a form of Front formed must have the potential to bring together a maximum number of organisations of the people. It was important to accumulate a maximum amount of energy to defend our hard won unity, the unity that took centuries and innumerable sacrifices to build. A tactical alliance with its potential for broadest unity was forged as the only instrument appropriate to protect to protect gains scored by our people. The UDF nature of Front influenced by conditions obtaining in the country.

## 2. FACTORS AND/OR CONDITIONS LEADING TO FORMATION OF UDF

What conditions and factors led to the formation of the UDF ?  
Where was the state and the people's organisations at that point ?

### 2.1 STATE CRISIS

The post 1976 era witnessed the state go through a profound crisis. A crisis that deepened continually - challenging the state to adapt its Apartheid rule. The growing crisis on various fronts was threatening white domination and continued capitalist exploitation. The state realised that the only way out of the problem was the restructuring of its rule. Old methods were no longer an adequate guarantee perpetual white rule. New methods had to be sought to preserve and maintain the Apartheid system. Apartheid had to change its face. It had to be reformed refashioned and given a new appearance whilst its content remained unchallenged. The reshaping of Apartheid would broaden its state base and increase its resilience thereby giving its structures more time to consolidate.

### 2.2 WHAT IS THE CRISIS REFERRED TO ABOVE ?

#### 2.2 .1 EDUCATION

Students teachers organisations challenged and discredited

/the unequal.....



the unequal and discriminatory system of education. They called for single, unitary, non racial system of education for all South Africans. Strikes and boycotts at high schools and universities increased. Education system was collapsing.

#### 2.2.2 LABOUR

The industrial council system of the government lost credibility as many unions refused to join it. Industry became a ~~source~~ <sup>scene</sup> of a series of strikes, particularly during the period 1980 to 1983. These labour strikes forced the government to shelve its pension preservation bill. The same period saw more and more unions force management to sign recognition agreements.

#### 2.2.3 COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

At political and community levels the government <sup>Faced</sup> forced pressures. The demand for a non racial, democratic South Africa, for more houses, low transport fares, abolition of puppet bodies, freedom of movement, lower food prices etc. became increasingly loud. Our peoples organisations engaged the authorities at various levels challenging their self imposed rule. In each struggle our organisations won respect for their ideals and rendered the government propaganda ineffective.

#### 2.2.4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Because of its oppressive policies and its harsh actions the government lost tremendous respect abroad. It lost almost all its friends save the USA and Israel. Because of this, and other factors SA faced serious economic problems as many countries found it difficult to trade freely with her. African countries established the Southern African Development and Economic Co-ordinating Conference with a view to lessening their dependency on SA. This affected SA'S trade with Africa. The calls for economic sanction against SA by SWAPO and several African countries increased the threat against SA.

#### 2.2.5 DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

As the state crisis increased people's organisations emerged with more democratic demands and programmes that deepened the crisis. They challenged the relations of domination at almost all levels. Asserting as the authentic voices of the people. They demanded that the people take their destinies in their own hands. However one point we must make is that, although, the post 1976 period witnessed emergence and growth of new organisations they fought isolated struggles. It was important for them to begin to weld their struggles together if they were to make any impact.

/the governments .....

The government's "new reform" accentuated this need. The UDF was a response to this need for unity. It was a culmination of building an organisation that started during the previous six years. It was not imposed. Its formation was influenced by material conditions. The dictates of history gave rise to its birth. The kind of response from the masses bears testimony to the fact that a body uniting a majority of people had long been awaited. It is clear that it is a kind of answer that many of our people had been expecting. The UDF is therefore a symbol of unity in building.

### 3. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE UDF

Having started with only three (3) regions and four hundred (400) organisations and a capacity to mobilize more than 15 000 people. The UDF has today more than five structured regions, and an interim committee in the Northern Cape and small committees in the OFS, and, a total of 6 00 organizations.

The structured regions are Transvaal, Western Cape, Natal, Eastern Cape and the Border regions.

In its five months of eventful existence the UDF has already established for itself a proud history of glorious victories against Civic, Community Councils and to an extent the New Constitution. For instance the Front forced the Government on the retreat on the question of the referendum for Coloureds and Indians. The UDF has been clearly on the offensive and leading resistance against reforms.

Recent campaigns against the Black Local Authorities elections, Coloured Management committees, Ciskei repression and the people's weekend rallies are evidence of the Front's increased capacity to mobilise and its growing support. Despite these gains not all has been rosy for the UDF. As expected attacks on the Front came from apologists of Apartheid, the government and some un-identified elements. Surprisingly, organisations claiming to be most revolutionary rode on the backs of Apartheid tricksters, wire pullers and quislings and from there, launched attacks on the UDF. An unholy alliance of ideas became very clear between some organisations, state agents and self confessed apologists of Apartheid. This enabled our people to draw a clear difference between the UDF as people's front on one hand and Cliff Saunders's of this world and their bedfellows on the other. Desperate to win support, some pseudo revolutionaries mouthing empty slogans, typical of all criminals of the first order shifted their focus from the Apartheid from the Apartheid system to the UDF. It is not because they do not understand where the major contradictions lie but because there are no fundamental differences between themselves and the Apartheid masters. They are articulating personal interests not those of the majority.

Anyway no dog has ever barked at a car that is not moving. It is the motion of a car that provokes dogs because they realize that they cannot move as fast as the car. However, a driver in the car never changes the direction of the car or stops it and concentrate on the dog. What he does is give it just one cold look and move on. Only when the dog comes in front of the car that it gets hurt. The attitude of the UDF therefore is that of a driver in a moving car. The Front will not be side tracked by detractors. It will only deal with them when they become obstacles. It is a stupid hunter who leaves a gemsbok and follow a polecat for there is nothing he can do with a polecat. Experience has taught the UDF that when its work becomes a effective opponents and opportunists will have cause to worry. They worry because they can not keep with the Fronts work.

The Front has clearly understood the forces ranged against each other as the people on one side and the apartheid regime and its allies on the other. All other differences are secondary ones and must not be given unwarranted attention. With a little more discipline, determination and purposeful style of work the UDF is confident to win the day. Our weapon is unity, organisational skills and capacity to mobilize.

Our task is to take the UDF to the people. It is to build the most significant front in decades. It is to build and strengthen our first organisations, it is to deepen and increase political understanding and consciousness of our people. It is to halt the implementation of the new constitution and the Black Local Authorities. It is our task to increase our mobilisation capacity and to develop new organisational methods within this scenerio, we will sing our song and win our victory by uniting in action and acting in unity.

FORWARD TO UNITY :

FORWARD TO ACTION :

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## REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT TO THE UDF NGC.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Rev. "C9"

Today, almost a year after the germ of the United Democratic Front was conceived, and just a few days before the beginning of a new year, we are gathered here in all our hundreds as delegates from various centres of South Africa, to synthesize and decide on very crucial questions in our history. This now demands of us a very careful evaluation of our work, tactics and strategies. This conference promises therefore, to be a truly momentous event in the life of our Front. Decisions and resolutions adopted by this conference are going to be decisive in terms of the future direction of the UDF and, indeed, the way forward of the national democratic struggle in South Africa.

However, to be able to arrive at a correct political decision, we need to take a synoptic look at a number of factors influencing our tactics, strategies and programmes. This report will, therefore, attempt to cover the following :

- a) The State Crisis and its strategy
- b) The Democratic movement
- c) Our gains and problems
- d) Our future strategy

### 2. SOUTH AFRICA .

South Africa is today in a state of crisis. This crisis has manifested itself on all fronts -- in education, on the labour front, within political structures and within economic circles where inflation and recession have assumed alarming proportions. These are but a few of the areas of crisis. Also worth mentioning here, is the housing backlog, which is today a permanent contradiction and a political issue in our country.

The state crisis, we must point out, continues to deepen as the forces of resistance develop and become stronger. Our organizations have, over the last few years, organized high forms of resistance - around education, around housing, rentals, high transport fares, against puppet state bodies and for better pay and working conditions on factory floors. All forms of resistance in the different sites of struggle challenged and frustrated relations of domination and oppression.

#### 2.1. State response to the crisis :

The government realised that it could no longer rule by the same methods. It had to adapt to new conditions and situations. It responded by starting on a process of restructuring its rule. A process essentially calculated to maintain the relations of domination, exploitation and oppression. As far as the government was concerned, the most effective and viable strategy was to weaken the forces of resistance by resorting to sophisticated methods of divide and rule. In short, what they hoped to do, was to co-opt a tiny middle-class sector and in this way to isolate the working class.

To realise its objective the government appointed a number of commissions on various aspects to determine the most effective methods of control, e.g. Wiehahn and Biekert on Labour relations, Rabie on security, de Lange on education. Similarly, the PC proposals and the new housing policy are some of the state's attempts to survive, and preserve Apartheid and the current economic relations.

Apart from all these, we have seen in recent years, a close alliance developing between big business and the military. The State Security Council, a body making the most important and strategic decisions for the country, is today effectively controlled by the military and big business. We see here a systematic shift of from the hands of parliament to those of unelected bureaucratic structures. Having succeeded in drawing big business into its ranks, the state has clearly broadened its base and increasingly its resilience. Over the past few years, as well, the state has increasingly attempted to crush democratic forces outside South Africa, through its policy of destabilization. More and more, it has hit out at those countries on its borders which have dared not only to sympathize with the struggle against Apartheid, but who also, within their own countries, have tried to build a new society..

We see, then, that although in a state of crisis, the government is certainly not in a state of collapse. To believe otherwise, would be an illusion..

However, as the state is restructuring itself, our organizations too have responded to the challenge and are also restructuring. We think that the growth of our organizations and resistance to oppression is particularly important to us because if the state's restructuring is unopposed, it could weaken our struggle, and our organizations. It is, therefore, very important that we effectively defend our hard won unity, the unity that took years and great sacrifices to build.

#### THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Our response to the state strategy has been to oppose the division of our people. We see the unity of our people as paramount: it had to be fought for, it has to be defended. Our response, therefore, was the formation of the United Democratic Front.

At the same time, though, the UDF was not simply a response to a call for unity. It was a culmination of building organizations which fought struggles affecting all our people in various parts of the country. Although these struggles were unco-ordinated, they all challenged the relations of domination. In this way, the UDF grew out of the development of organizations and the need to co-ordinate isolated struggles into broader forms of national campaigns and resistance.

#### 3. WHAT WERE OUR OBJECTIVES WHEN WE FORMED THE UDF?

- (i) to take the ideological initiative out of the hands of the state
- (ii) to unite our people across class, colour, ethnic and organizational lines to oppose the Apartheid reform offensive of Botha.
- (iii) to co-ordinate the activities of all organizations opposed to Apartheid.

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- (iv) to advance the mobilization and to deepen the organization of our people
- (v) to prevent the state from implementing its so-called reforms or at least, to make it difficult for them to do so.
- (vi) to deepen the understanding of our people on issues affecting their lives, such as the P.C. Proposals and Koornhof Bills, the Community Councils and Black Local Authorities, the Coloured Management Committees and the new housing policy, etc.
- (vii) to establish a broad front to serve as the voice of our people.
- (viii) to link politics with the day to day experience of our people
- (ix) to draw into the front groupings operating outside the government structures.

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4. THE TRACK RECORD OF THE UDF..

Although we started the front with only 3 regions, namely, Natal, Transvaal and Western Cape, we have, during the last three months, extended to other regions. Two regions of the UDF have been formed in the Eastern Cape and the Border. An interim committee has been formed in the Northern Cape which is a largely rural area. Inroads have been made in the Orange Free State where Area Consultative Committees have been formed. We are confident that by the end of the first quarter of the new year we shall have extended to all regions of South Africa.

The last three months has also seen a mushrooming of new civic and youth organizations. These organizations were not only inspired by the UDF, but were initiated by the UDF itself.

This has  
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We have also been able to increase our capacity to reach the people and to win some amount of legitimacy for the ideals of the Front as well as to provide an alternative for a democratic South Africa. We can see this from the thousands who have responded to our newsletters, mass meetings, etc. For example, 15 000 people attended the UDF National Launch, over 30 000 attended our Peoples' Weekend rallies, and more importantly, thousands are reached daily in our areas by our affiliates.

In addition, we have scored major successes in a number of campaigns over recent months :

- \* Following a UDF call in the Western Cape, there were very low polls in the Coloured Management Committee Elections.
- \* Similarly, people responded throughout the country to the UDF call to boycott Community Council and Black Local Authorities elections,
- \* The UDF focus on the Ciskei evoked national and international attention.
- \* Thousands of people attended the NIC meeting to challenge the Botha/Rajbansi meeting.

We have made these gains in a climate in which the state is engaged in a battle to win support for its initiatives. We can say without fear that we have, for the moment, gained the upper hand in this battle. And, at no stage can we afford to take a step back.

To ensure that this does not happen, we need to look not only at our gains, but also at our problems..

Before the launch of the UDF, organizations had been engaged in their day to day activities and struggles.. The emergence of the UDF presented new problems. The fast rate of growth created excitement and interest which drew more and more of the leadership of the affiliates into UDF campaigns. The result was that the activities of the affiliates were subsumed by the UDF activities and organizations were drained of their leadership. In essence, this meant that consolidation became very difficult for many first level organizations. This poses a threat to the long-term activities of these organizations and the entire democratic movement. The challenge facing this conference is to evolve a programme of action which will allow scope for growth and development of these organizations; a programme of action that will link our day to day work in our organizations with the work of the UDF in a way that will build both..

We have also not been able to facilitate affectively the process of consultation and democracy. We need to ensure that all decisions are taken or understood by the membership of organizations, taking into account the masses we still have to organize. This problem must be addressed in order to prevent mistaking the consciousness of the leadership for mass consciousness. This is important because we know that over the years, people have developed a scepticism and a fear of politics. We cannot pretend that the excitement the UDF has created has put an end to these feelings. We must take the prevailing consciousness as a baseline and take people through a process that will overcome their scepticism and fear. Again, this means that we must take the day to day concerns with which people are familiar, and link them to our political work..

These organizational problems must be addressed seriously. When we ask ourselves - "Where are all the people we have reached? Have they come into our organizations?" we find ourselves unable to answer precisely because we have not been able to channel effectively the people we have won over into our organizations.

The other difficulty which we face is that the different aspects of the 'New Deal' affect different sections of our society differently. In fact, the constitution and Koornhof Bills are designed to fulfil the specific function of sowing division. How do we approach these matters? Do we act as though we are affected similarly? Do we act as though divisions on the basis of race are non-existent? On the other hand, do we through our practice encourage and entrench these divisions?

What are the factors which guide us? Is there a difference between campaigns initiated by us and those which are responses to state initiatives? To illustrate, when we responded to the Black Local Authorities Elections, our campaigns were directed primarily, or even exclusively at affected communities. However, when we initiate the signature campaign, we cannot afford the risk of entrenching divisions. The underlying objective of such a campaign must be the building of unity. These questions will assume increasing importance in the future. In answering them, it is important that we understand the conditions at a given point and that we take decisions that will fulfil the aims and objectives of the UDF.



## THE FUTURE:

As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this conference is primarily to plot a course for the months ahead. We do this with an understanding of our successes and failures as detailed earlier. We should also take account of where the government is and what can be expected from those quarters.

We operate in a period in which PW Botha believes that he has a strong mandate from the white electorate following the 66% YES vote in the white referendum. PW Botha believes that this mandate allows him to proceed with his attempts at restructuring. This confidence results in a strategy which rules out naked repression as an immediate option. We see therefore that even though the UDF has made major gains, gains which threaten the implementation of the 'new deal', Botha has not yet resorted to mass detentions and individual bannings, or the banning of the UDF itself. Instead, we have seen a shift to harassment which involves threatening telephone calls to leadership and an increasing number of arrests involving little more than technical offences eg motorcades, distributing leaflets, demonstrations etc. This is coupled with various attempts to isolate the UDF by attempting to project it as a front for the banned ANC. In relation to the previous years of harsh repression, these moves indicate a strategy of gentle persuasion, to create the conditions whereby the democratic movement can be isolated and cast out.

Yet, all is not rosy for the state. At an international level, Pik Botha has been largely unsuccessful in attempts to win support of European governments, support so necessary for the state to regain entry into the international fold.

Also, the state has grossly over-estimated the strength of the junior partners. Neither Hendrickse nor Rajbansi have sufficient confidence to face a referendum. Together with Botha they are trying to manoeuvre their way out of this situation by using flimsy arguments about the cost of a referendum. They wish to hide behind 'scientific surveys' the results of which they hope will be less embarrassing than the results of a referendum.

The sum total of this is a realisation by the state that it is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of our community; a battle which will determine whether or not it can rule by consent, or whether the big stick must be hauled out and it must rule by coercion. It is for this reason that the state is now desperately trying to prop up its allies, Rajbansi and Hendrickse. It has set up, in the case of the Labour Party, a specialist unit for conducting the campaign within the so-called Coloured community. Already, Rlm has been collected. With such backing, the Labour Party hopes to lay the basis for an acceptance of the constitution by so-called Coloureds.

Within this framework, we need to understand the scope of our work in the year ahead. We need to identify certain characteristics of our campaigns in order to make our task more efficient and effective.

Our campaign against the Constitutional and Koornhof Bills must be intensified. We must direct our energies towards a fuller understanding at a mass level of the need for unity and an absolute rejection of this so-called new deal.

The base of the UDF is largely urban. Yet, repression is at its worst

in the rural areas. It is these people who are increasingly faced with barbaric forced removals to bantustans and an increased police and military presence.. To be effective and truly national, the UDF must try to include these farflung communities and thereby extend our base.. Already we have made some gains. The period ahead calls for an intensification of this.

Our future work is going to be crucially affected by the manner and extent to which we address the Koornhof strategy. The continued denial of Section 10 rights to Africans, the removals and relocations and the incorporation of areas into the bantustans are all part of a strategy designed to force Africans into bantustans. Our people in Magopa, Driefontein, Crossroads, KTC, Lamontville and Hambanathi are under the threat of either being removed or of having their areas incorporated into these backyards of Apartheid..In addition, those who cannot acquire Section 10 rights, are forced to the bantustans to starve there.

On the other side of the resettlement/relocation coin is Koornhof's attempt to co-opt a select few through the Black Local Authorities. Yet already we have made substantial gains here: we have successfully mobilized for a boycott; we have created informal organizational structures; we have created organizations opposed to those government created institutions, and we have discredited the Black Local Authorities.

But, we must recognize too, that the Black Local Authorities are a reality. They are being implemented and they will affect the daily lives of our people. What is the next phase of our campaign? Are we going to relax now that we have organized an effective boycott? Or are we going to find new ways to frustrate the Koornhof Bills, and in doing so, develop a coherent strategy against these bills.

Even though we understand the UDF to be a broad front, we must recognize that it is not nearly broad enough. There are many organizations which remain outside our front, organizations which have not been part of the mainstream of the democratic movement over the last few years. We cannot accept this situation as it is these organizations who will become the targets of co-option. Our task is to bring them into our fold.

At the same time, this expansion must not happen at the expense of our organizations. The previously mentioned tasks relating to democracy and the building of organizations must be made concrete.

This is the scenario of the next few months. We see the UDF fulfilling these tasks by applying itself to the issues which will dominate discussion at this conference: namely, our response to the referendum/elections, the signature campaign and our campaign against conscription. Unfortunately we will not have time to deal with the question of removals and resettlement, but they must be built into our campaign.

For these reasons, the decisions which we take will be crucial to the future of our work. These decisions, must above all, build both the unity of our people, and of our front.

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BROADENS DEFENCE TERRAIN

RECEIVES THAT ARMY IS NON-RACIAL  
& DEFENDS PEOPLE'S INTERESTS

## STRUCTURE

1. Region must know what structure to draw on the military issue. Without burdening

2. Categorising

Field of education. Youth to be involved  
& education  
revolve mainly around education

3. Shouldn't be seen as coloured & Indian issue & leave all African youth without education here.

Through unemployment crisis they can be easily lured.

Communication between youth & student be factually maintained.

Adm

Found cp. 0.

S Mabaso (Soweto)

Q. Is <sup>without</sup> ~~dit~~ discepte as B6 ✓

• Campbell (as co-author)

by No 16

No 19 : 1078787

A QUEST FOR TRUE SELF DETERMINATION

*" AND THE PICKS IN OUR HANDS TURN INTO MALLETS OF JUSTICE*

*THEY MUST WIELD NEW POWER TO GUIDE THE TRUTH*

*AND LEAD THE WAY THROUGH TO LIGHT AND FREEDOM"*

Comrades and friends I greet you all in the name of our revolutionary struggle and our beloved mother Azania. It is my belief comrades that the spirit of our gathering here reflects our sincerest desire to seek and foster National Unity of the oppressed. History has taught us that the most potent weapon the oppressed can use against their oppressors and exploiters is Unity. It therefore, becomes incumbent on us to seek and find the basis upon which this unity can be built.

Our struggle has been long and protracted. Along the way we have learned some lessons and it will be very disastrous and foolish of us to repeat the mistakes of yester year. There are several factors that have adversely affected our struggle amongst which the following rank very high:-

1. Lack of sound priorities tailored to an objective revolutionary situation

We have failed to put our struggle into context. In our desire to internationalise our struggle we have failed to respond to issues of race and class obtaining in our own existential situation. Most of the time we have tried to explain away the horrors of racial oppression and capitalist exploitation existing in our society.

2. Structural and organisational forms that lagged far behind the context of the Azanian Revolution.

In each and every stage of our revolution there is a demand for certain "particular" structures and organisational forms and these, no matter how successful they are in a particular time, have to change to conform with developing society. When changes occur in society so should our methods. Organisational fixations will only delay our revolution. Fragmentation of our people leads to sectional and sectarian politics.

3. The prevalent ideological shortcomings and retrogressive methods and styles of work and organising.

There is no need to spend all our energies on trying to reconstruct yesterday when issues, at hand are of today and tomorrow. With pain in our hearts we have noticed the developments where the black community, through conditioning by the system, makes its well-considered resistance to fit with the system both in terms of the means and of the goals. We are witnessing the re-emergence of ethnicity on one hand and bantustans on the other, endorsing the system of apartheid. There is also an urgent need in our search for unity to look into ideologies operating within our organisations and societies because in the final

analysis these will determine the road which we will ultimately have to follow .  
An ideology has aptly been defined as a system of ideas and beliefs on which social organisation and action are based. It is, therefore, a guide to political action. Broadly speaking, an ideology becomes a means to an end and not an end in itself; through an ideology we can determine who gets what, when and how. It is in the same vein that the thoughts and ideas of Karl Marx, V.I. Lenin, Mao-Tse-Tung, Franz Fanon etc are used as guides to social action. Guides can at times be partial or even irrelevant to a given situation, hence, for instance Lenin had to supplement Marx in the Russian context, Mao had to supplement both Lenin and Marx in the Chinese context. This confirms the statement that "ideology develops in the process of struggle! Regis Debres had this to say; "A Revolution cannot be exported or imported."

Apr 10/04

Another writer further described ideology for revolutionary imperialism as "the tendency in revolutionary circles for those that have led successful revolutions first to want to prescribe their 'guide' for revolutionary contexts elsewhere."

We have to take into cognisance that each and every society has its own major/primary contradictions and it is the synthesis of these which gives birth to an ideology. The pre-occupation with economic factors by some doctrinaire neo-Marxists in explaining the cause of white - black tensions in Azania and elsewhere, while quite appreciable and helpful at most serve to justify the ideological leadership of countries that are otherwise far removed from our African experience.

We believe that any ideology which will be acceptable to the masses has to be an ideology which "emerges from the people as a result of their aggregate experience in concrete economic, political, cultural, and socio-psychological terms". It is for this reason that we insist that the interests of the oppressed and exploited are best kept by the oppressed and exploited themselves and within the confines of Azania itself and never from outside. It should originate and find its inspiration from concrete contradictions within our country. We should be protectors of our interests. We are our own Liberators. "We have to guard against imperialism. It uses seductive and altruistic concepts such as, CIVILISE! LIBERATE! Both mean COLONISE!" Our organisations involved in the Azanian Liberation struggle should guard against following religiously ideologies which have no material base in our own existential situation.

4. The Scourge of Reformist Platforms: Experience has taught us that increased verbalisation of black militant demands, miseries and complaints has much appeal in the oppressive and exploitative world, and hence this world is susceptible to making its leaders those who are the most vocal. This was the criteria used to choose "bantustan leaders" let us not fall into the trap of staging a performance for the media. Some black lions of the 60's are the puppet leaders of today.

scientific analysis of the objective situation. Our own subject forces and the balance of forces between the opposing sides:-

Historically most of our organisations have gone through various splits and this gives rise to the need to understand correctly the nature of our struggle. We are faced with issues of power, class and race and the way we relate to these is of utmost importance. Racial oppression exists side by side with capitalist exploitation with all its imperialistic implications, and the two are directly responsible for the dispossession of the indigenous people of their land which was the source of their livelihood, and ultimately reducing them to the black working class <sup>which</sup> today is the vanguard of the Azanian revolutionary struggle.

Racial capitalism is maintained and sustained by the white middle class - petty bourgeoisie who are themselves aspirant capitalists and the "white working class" which is satisfied with the status quo and feel they have nothing in common with their counterparts i.e. the black working class. The latter remains the only politically viable class who can wage a committed and successful struggle. The "white working class" on the other hand remains a supportive class to the capitalists and because of the privileges they enjoy in having the franchise and job reservation has become even more conservative than the capitalists themselves.

All these things point to one thing: that is the unity of the oppressed. Unity should therefore be regarded as a prerequisite for all organisations and people involved in the Liberation movement. We should develop a healthy and positive respect amongst organisations. After all, there are more things of common interest, things which should bring us together than those which tear us apart. Our organisations should realise that it is the authentic grievances of the authentic people which brings about authentic organisations to work towards redressing them. Our attitudes towards our organisations cannot be determined by the outside world or just external factors, even the AOU has had to learn a bitter lesson in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and recently in Zimbabwe to mention but a few. The imperialistic press or even the international world cannot dictate to us about the significance of our organisations. Any such attempt should be regarded and dismissed as impractical and militating against the struggle as a whole.

Different organisations may exist in society but that does not mean that organisations in society cannot work together, jointly and severally, and especially on things which they agree. In our organisations magnanimity and cautious vigilance must always be the mark of leadership, because in political struggle there is the tendency by power aspirants to deliberately confuse issues of tactics and principles or just simply prostituting principles in tactics.

In a complex struggle such as ours it is necessary to identify "who the enemy is" and to understand his workings in our midst or ranks so that we may not find ourselves forced

fight him on his own terms and within structures created by him.

We are at a time where the white minority government has built its base by recruiting from within the ranks of the oppressed and has introduced a confusion within the ranks of the oppressed. The urgent nature of this crisis has tempted the oppressed in certain quarters to form dangerous and opportunist political alliances of the workers, petty-bourgeoisie, liberals and sheltered workers in the hope of consolidating against the oppressors. Such alliances seldom have a sound political content and at best they tend to blunt the anger and the militancy of the workers and they are counter-revolutionary. Our alliances should not be dictated to us by the system. It should come from the people, the toiling masses, themselves - not from the air conditioned offices in the cities or the posh mansions in the exclusive suburbs. Even though Unity is a *sine qua non* to our struggle we correctly reserve the right to scrutinise the conditions on which our unity is based. We should find out who the enemies of our struggles are. We mean the obvious and the less obvious ones - who should be the first to be flushed from our midst. It is a proven fact that it is the "less obvious enemies of the revolution who compromise and destroy the revolution". They are more dangerous than the secret police. Unless we can consciously and conscientiously identify the enemy in our ranks, we are not going to ably perceive imperialism and effectively destroy it and its tentacles from our ranks. The first task of a true revolutionary is to identify the enemy closest to him, and this includes himself and his colleagues. In the name of unity, self-criticism and scrutiny both necessary and essential. Self interests must take a back seat.

The system of capitalism is conflict-prone and in our country the conflicts inherent within this economic system are worsened by legislature. We have been thrown into a real jungle where survival of the fittest is the order of the day. Judging from the manner in which various institutions of society articulate with one another we find conflict inherent in all of them. Competition is the rule. I should at this moment state that I do not however, suggest that conflict in itself is not in the order of life. It plays a very important and constructive role in the drama of man's life.

So often have tribal and racial barriers been imposed on our country that sometimes even our organisations find themselves tempted to use the same lines. One needs only to take a glance at so-called Coloured, Zulu, Swati's, Venda, Tswana and Indian "Political Organisations". The Liberation movement should examine again any move applauded by the oppressors even if the move is made by organisations which consider themselves progressive.

One can dare say even the church did not bring unity in our midst because of the artificial divisions that have come along with the church - the converted and the unconverted.

This therefore, implies that our churches, sporting fraternities, activists, teachers, workers and organisations must pay the price for closing the gaps that separate the nation.



It would be naive for forum delegate, participants, observers and the nation as a whole to entertain the view, that this National Forum can at one shake, achieve unity for the oppressed and exploited Azanians. At best this forum should rise with renewed determination and dedication to foster black solidarity, group cohesion and unity within the liberation movement. This is the message which we must carry back to our constituencies, allies, and the world at large. Unbridled and unprincipled alliances are not synonymous with unity.

The quality of leadership in our organisations must have bearing on our unity. As much as we are aware that politics pre-supposes some form of power struggle but that in itself does not mean position-mongering. It is expected of leadership to bring about the unity of focus of all oppressed people of Azania - so that we can address with courage the issues that face us.

In conclusion I would like to impress upon this forum the words of the most respected African leaders and thinkers Amilcar Cabral in "Unity and Struggle". "...For the struggle against the colonialist enemy, let all forces we can bring together come. But not blindly; We must know what is the position of each one in relation to the colonialists".

In unity we must strive forward towards

ONE PEOPLE ONE NATION

ONE PEOPLE ONE NATION

FORWARD TO A SOCIALIST, DEMOCRATIC ANTI-RACIAL AZANIA

(This paper was a joint effort of Lybon Mabasa, Tom Manthatha and Lebamang Sibidi)





Ben C 11 11  
**UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT**

**BORDER**

P.O. Box 7087  
East London  
5200

1985/02/22

SECRETARIAL REPORT TO THE N.E.C. OF THE 23 - 24/2/85.

The following is a synopsis of the situation in the Border Region of the U.D.F. This report covers the period of Jan - Feb. 1985 in particular. As such, it merely serves to supplement the one submitted at the last Secretarial meeting last month.

POLITICAL CLIMATE:

The situation in this region has moved from bad to worse if one looks at it from the angle of repressions. But when we look at the effects of such repression on the people, we must confess that we are at our best so far, organisationally,

1. We are still finding it difficult to hold meetings. Mass meetings and rallies have become an impossibility. They are either banned or venue is refused.
2. Activists have become targets of harassment by the enemy and its satellites, especially the community councillors, the security police and some employers. We are being detained for questioning, detained for long spells without trial, we are being banned and banished and even being fired from work for our role in the Front. Houses of activists are being searched, some wounded and others killed by the enemy. The last funeral was yesterday - last only thus far. The latest total onslaught has not left us unscathed. Some comrades have been detained and our documents taken away by the security police. This is the role of the 'combined forces' of Ciskei and S.A.
3. The ban on all meetings of more than 20 people is still effective in Ciskei.
4. The busboycott still continues at Mdantsane - although it is not as intense as last year and 1983. Some members of the Committee of 10 are still being harassed.
5. The 'education crisis' is still serious at Fort Beaufort where there is still a total boycott from pre - school to high school.
6. People are still threatened with removal in areas like Mgwali, Mooiplaas, Hillside, Wartberg, Committees' Drift and surrounding farms. Again both S.A. and Ciskei are involved here.
7. The Cape College of Education (C.C.E.) has been closed down after only two of operation this year. Students are resisting the political purges which this institution is engaged in. (The same purges have been effected at Fort Hare and the nearby Thubalethu High School - which does not prove to be our chance at all, contrary to its name).

THE PEOPLE'S RESPONSE:- RESISTANCE !

## 2.

1. The people have responded with a resolute effort at organising themselves. This has seen more and more organisations coming into existence and engaging the enemy at all fronts - in the true nature of our people.
2. Despite the conspiracy of silence on the side of the commercial press, and despite untold suffering being caused by the violence meted out against them, the people continue to resist forced removals, community councils, inferior education and its undemocratic structures, conscription ploys and propaganda.
3. The co - operation between student and community organisations has been outstanding. So has been the comradeship between urban and rural organisations.

### GROWTH:

1. From the 6 organisations that launched the Border Region of the U.D.F. in 1983, we have grown to 34 organisations as at 17/02/85 (our last R.G.C. This is a clear indication of the mood of the people around here. A detailed break-down of the affiliate organisations follows separately. Our organisational strategy of organisations being on area rather than regional basis has paid well.
2. The greatest victory so far has been the consolidation of women's organisations in E.L. and Queenstown. We now have one Democratic Women of East London where we had Border Women and National Women's Association. We also have a better organised Queenstown Women's Organisation where we had UWO and NWA factions.
3. Our Youth Organisations have also had a tremendous growth. From a mere 2 in 1983 we now have 5 in 1985. We could have 6 if one of the original 2 did not disaffiliate.
4. A number of organisations are still consolidating their organisational strength and will soon be affiliates. They are already our supporters and some attend our meetings as observers.

### FUTURE PLANS:

1. Our region has been busy consulting with affiliates to consolidate solidarity and to work out better organisational structures. Some workshops have been organised by some units for the youth and other affiliates. More of these will be organised at regional level.
2. We are busy compiling data on repression and forced removals.
3. The bus boycott at Mdantsane and the education crisis at Fort Beaufort are being reviewed.
4. The following campaigns will be keeping us busy:
  - a. I.Y.Y.
  - b. Anti - conscription.
  - c. Anti - removals.
  - d. Education Charter.
  - e. Freedom Charter.
  - f. Adequate Housing.
  - g. Detainees' Week of Prayer.

### NEEDS:

1. There is an urgent need for two full - time organisers (rural).
2. Fines continue to handicap our programmes.
3. We still need a permanent office.
4. There is a dire need for legal aid and assistance. Most of the lawyers down here are not very helpful for the needs of our activists. They tend to be too bureaucratic when we what we need is prompt action and presence.



**C12**

*Adm :-*

*Found UDF office Jhs*

Bew<sup>9</sup>C12"

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT WESTERN CAPE-REGION

7 JANUARY 1985

PREPARATION FOR THE UDF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The following is a summary of an Executive assessment. We hope that it will serve as a basis for preparing ourselves for the AGM.

1. The UDF (Western Cape) during 1984.

The UDF has made a tremendous impact on the history of struggle. Important gains were made for the progressive movement especially in areas where there had not been a tradition of struggle like the rural areas and some "coloured" communities.

Our people identify the UDF with resistance to the government. We should now change this passive support into active support where people see that they need to be actively involved in changing their-lives.

This broad acceptability needs to be-deepened; our organisations must be strengthened.

There has not been even participation of all our-affiliates in the work of the UDF.

At times there has been disunity in the ranks of activists which also led to poor participation in our work.

Differences which had existed prior to the formation of the UDF continued to exist and caused tensions within the Front. The UDF has, however laid the basis for resolving these. We are now bound by a common discipline within UDF structures and have common responsibilities to a national movement.

2. The Regional Executive Committee

At the moment only 10 of the 15 executive members are active, and attend executive meetings regularly. Others like Imam Hassen Solomon and Rev. Chris Nissen are playing valuable roles elsewhere.

Not all REC members have been successfully drawn into UDF activities. Only some REC members were fully in touch with UDF campaigns, sub committees and structures. As a result it was often the younger members who were central to most of the campaigns and day to day running of the Front.

In planning for a new Executive we need to consider the following:

- \* political clarity
- \* time to do UDF work
- \* balance between symbolic figures on the executive and those who can give guidance and take responsibility for work
- \* balance between UDF work and work within organisation

3. Assessment...

## Assessment of Portfolios

President : Should be a symbol of unity and have a history of struggle. Must be broadly acceptable. Should be more than just a figure head. Should be active in decisionmaking and guidance in the Front.

Vice-presidents : Should be more than just substitutes for the President. Should, together with the President and Secretaries be responsible for planning meetings, co-ordinating work and communicating with organisations.

Secretaries : Tasks must be more clearly defined. Overall responsibility for the Front to be shared by others. Possible solutions to the overburdening of the Secretaries are to divide up the tasks and to involve non portfolio members in tasks like minutes, finding venues, agendas etc.

Publicity Secretaries : We should consider separating publicity and media because they are very different jobs which require different skills. We should also consider having an older person who could project a mature image of the Front. The public spokesperson for the UDF must be somebody who can respond to a wide range of issues within the policy framework of the UDF.

Treasurers : We only have one active treasurer now. We need to have a treasury which functions properly. The treasurer must be able to make UDF fundraising a priority. Organisations must also take more responsibility for UDF funds. We should also look carefully at how we spend our money in UDF.

Additional Executive members : Must assist with the tasks of other executive members. Should share responsibilities for Sub-committees and play a more active role in the UDF.

#### 4. Relationship of REC to affiliates

Contact between the executive and affiliates should take place outside of GC as well. Perhaps certain REC members should be given the responsibility to liaise with organisations regularly. Meetings with executives of our affiliates is another possibility. This will be important especially before we take crucial decisions and during intense campaigns.

The REC needs to play a far greater role in ensuring that regions function properly and are participating in UDF work.

#### Other important matters which had been discussed in our GC assessment and which we must look at carefully:

##### Structures and decisionmaking

How do we take decisions in the UDF? We have often called emergency GC's at very short notice because we had to respond to an urgent issue. This meant that all our members in all our organisations were not always involved in taking decisions. How can we find ways of taking democratic decisions which will allow us to respond quickly?

How can we ensure that EVERYBODY in the UDF accepts majority decisions and participates in the implementation thereof?

What role do the following structures play in decisionmaking?  
GC, the executive, regions, sub-committees and activist forums?

Education .../



Education and training

How do we see education and training taking place?

- \* Should it take place on a regular basis?
- \* How should it be done - by a permanent sub-committee?, by REC members who co-ordinate and draw in, with the consent of our structures, others from time to time?
- \* What kind of education should take place?

Rural Areas

There is now a properly functioning Rural Council. How do we include these areas in our decisions? Due to the problem of distance, what links can be established between our GC and the rural Council? Worcester and Paarl are part of our GC as well as the Rural Council. How do we see this?

We also include an NEC input paper which was delivered at an NEC workshop and the Working Principles of UDF (W.C.)

Other important aspects to be looked at in preparation for the AGM:

- Broadening the Front : Starting afresh to include more organisations into the UDF at central level as well as at a local level.
- Fundraising to pay off our debts. Also for 1985 at a local/central level.
- Our regions and area committees.
- Our working principles and resolutions must be reviewed.
- The proposed date for the AGM is March.
- What kind of AGM do we want? Should we have an open AGM, should only some sessions be open?
- Should we have a rally as part of the AGM?
- Should we have a theme? If so, what?
- The executive wishes to meet with all organisations before the GC if possible, but certainly before the AGM.

Conclusion

Comrades, the last half of the year has seen the destruction of the lies told by Botha, Hendricks, Sebe, Rajbansi and others like them. We also came out stronger after the referendum debate.

We are, however, also painfully aware that there are still many shortcomings in the Front. Let us prepare ourselves properly to enter the AGM and the year which faces us with a positive spirit. Let us rise to the challenge and march ahead stronger than we were on the 20 August 1983.

## INPUT ON ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS OF UDF - FROM NEC WORKSHOP

A. Goalsetting

It is necessary for us to set our sights high, but we should also be realistic. An incorrect assessment of what is possible can lead to public embarrassment for the Front and can be used to undermine the confidence of the people in the Front. Our activists also become demoralised if they had worked very hard and failed to attain goals we've set for ourselves.

In future proper assessment and planning should take place in all structures which will be expected to contribute to the attainment of a particular goal. Logistics should be worked out as far possible before we commit ourselves firmly.

We should also define far more clearly what objectives we have i.e. whether the emphasis is on depth or high profile activity. During the elections we also learnt that is not possible to sustain two intensive campaigns with different profiles at the same time (i.e. elections and MSC).

B. Criteria for affiliation

1. Organisations The UDF must continue to encourage as many kinds of organisations with their interests, irrespective of their size or constituency. We should be realistic about the fact that we will rely more on some affiliates to do the mass work while that of others are valuable in other respects.

Where we need to make a distinction, is in terms of decision-making. A formula should be found where numerical representation at decision-making. Forums like GC should be commensurate with the capacity of an affiliate to take practical responsibility to implement decisions of the Front.

2. Regions We should critically assess what the point is at which regional status is accorded. It appears as if our earlier motivation that inclusion into national structures will stimulate the development of regions, has had some adverse effects. Very often this has drained those areas, because of the demands placed on them. They are often compelled to respond to activities which were decided on by national structures where the pace is determined by the stronger region. In the long run this can undermine development.

We should accept that the core of the UDF will always exist around urban areas like Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. However, fairly substantial structures are developing in some of the rural areas which form part of our existing regions. We need to find ways of incorporating those areas more directly into decision-making of the UDF, because distances from the towns responsible for them often makes this impossible.

Possible .../

Possible guidelines for the future:

- Conditions must have been allowed to develop to the extent where there is a general council which can meet regularly and consists of affiliate organisations.
- Organisations in the geographic area, must launch the region and apply for national status once they feel they are in a position to take responsibility for (i) surrounding area  
(ii) national campaigns.
- Re-assess existing regions w.r.t above criteria
- Assess whether regional boundaries should be re-defined to create smaller more manageable regions.

C. Decision-making:

1. Processes:

We need to strike a balance between the need for UDF to respond speedily to crisis and the need for all our affiliates to be party to and committed to decisions we take.

Practical proposals in this regard are that agendas of national gatherings be sent out timeously and that allowance be made for discussion thereof by affiliates and that affiliates be encouraged to make suggestion w.r.t. NEC agendas. We should accept that we will have to respond to urgent issues and take decisions without following this procedure. The nature of such discussion and decisions should however be disseminated as soon as possible to all affiliates.

2. Autonomy of affiliates in relation to decisions:

It is unhealthy for any of our affiliates to actively go against majority decisions taken. We should however understand when some affiliates are not in a position to participate actively in some of our campaigns. Such affiliates should however be encouraged to look at means of playing a supportive role.

In terms of our past practice, we need to assess flexibility/autonomy and its implications for unity in the Front.

D. Accountability:

The formation of the UDF marked a new era of closer co-operation between progressive forces in S.A. Most of our affiliates do not have the experience of having worked in an alliance like the UDF. While we encourage affiliates to take up campaigns, we must bear in mind that the work of our affiliates will invariably have a bearing on the work of the rest of the Front. As affiliates, we should feel dutibound to consult with or at least inform the rest of the Front about all campaigns we propose to tackle, particularly when campaigns will be mass based. This can only serve to strengthen such campaigns and contribute to unity in action.

E. Discipline .../

E. Discipline:

Because we are a Front and not a political organisation, the only basis in terms of which we can take disciplinary measures against any affiliate or individual, is the principle enshrined in our declaration, resolutions and working principles. We should endeavour to foster sound relationships among our affiliates but we should be aware of the UDF's limitations to try and resolve differences among organisations especially where those differences arose because of dynamics outside of the Front.

If such transgression does occur, REC's and NEC should not be structures which decide on the form of discipline. Such matters are best dealt with collectively through forums like Regional GC's.

UDF has no real discipline over individuals in the Front - organisations must take responsibility for their membership. We should however bear in mind that the best guarantee for discipline is to inculcate a sense of trust and a strong loyalty towards the front and its objectives. Drastic disciplinary measures should only be considered after comradely attempts to explain to those at fault, had failed or if the fundamental principles of the UDF had been consciously flouted.

F. Structures:

We need to assess whether our existing structures are appropriate for the work it is intended to do. The following are some practical proposals:

- NGC - should gather only once a year and serve the purpose of an AGM  
 - should only take place after regional AGM's  
 - representation per region should be determined w.r.t. numbers only. Regions should decide how best they and their affiliates can be represented.  
 - we should determine how national formations will be represented if the above proposal is accepted
- NEC - to be held less often  
 - its work should revolve largely around policy and broad guidelines for work  
 - emergency NEC's to be called only if regional feedback is not the best method at arriving at a national position. Practical decisions to be taken by appropriate structures e.g Treasury, Secretariat, Publicity department  
 - all reports to be circularised prior to NEC and only matters arising to be discussed  
 - given the logistics and finances involved in having an NEC, we should assess its size.

G. Education and Training:

We are very conscious of the need for far more systematic education and training of our activists as well as new people who are being drawn in. We need to assess whether this is best done through permanent, high structures or more informally.

There are two .../

There are two categories which are not necessarily related.

- 1) Equipping our activists with organising skills. This is best done when based on practical experience e.g briefing before going into areas and assessments afterwards.
- 2) Broadening the political understanding of those within the Front. Regular open discussions or forums should be encouraged as long as these do not become substitutes for structures like GC to discuss policy matters.

We should look at how experience in this regard can be shared.

#### H. Relationship to non-affiliates:

Our emphasis should always be to seek those areas where co-operation is possible. It is important that we should continue to try and win over all progressive organisations.

As far as other political tendencies are concerned, our most serious consideration should be those which have a mass base. By now we should be able to be realistic about the areas and nature of co-operation which is possible. It is our task to ensure that we and those not affiliates never lose sight of the fact that the apartheid state is the enemy and that if any ideological differences do exist, we should respect those and not allow it to undermine the potential areas of unity.

## WORKING PRINCIPLES OF UDF (W.C. REGION)

1. The name of the front will be UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)
2. The Declaration adopted at the launching on, 24 July, will form the basis for unity. All organisations accepted into the UDF will be required to endorse the declaration.
3. All meetings, publications and activities in the name of UDF will be conducted on the basis as outlined in the Declaration. No UDF platform, publication or activity should be used to publicise any particular organisational programme.
4. Organisations will have the autonomy to call their own meetings, publish their own publications and undertake their own activities within their own constituencies. In these cases, the discipline of the UDF will not necessarily apply. Organisations may act on directive from their members and posit their own programme as an alternative to the government's proposals.
5. Initial membership of the UDF will be those present at the inaugural meeting at the St George's Cathedral Hall 24 July 1983. Membership will be determined by the general Council of the UDF. This will consist of two representatives of the mass based regional organisations one representative from the other constituent organisations, and one representative from each regional committee. The regional committees will consist of representatives of area committees grouped together in a co-ordinating structure. This general Council will be the highest decision-making body and will meet at least once every three months.
6. An executive committee consisting of :
  - a) A President
  - b) 2 Vice-Presidents
  - c) 2 Joint Secretaries
  - d) A Publicity Secretary
  - e) 2 Joint Treasurers
  - f) 7 Additional members

will be elected from the General Council of the UDF. This executive will be responsible for the day-to-day running of the UDF and will meet as often as necessary.
7. Any sub-committees such as media, organising, finance, deemed necessary by the General Council will be set up by members of the mass-based regional organisations. The members of these sub-committees do not necessarily have to be members of the General Council, but their co-option must be approved by the General Council.
8. The General Council shall have the power to disband the UDF at a meeting attended by two-thirds of the organisational and regional representatives on the General Council when they feel that this is necessary.
9. The treasurers shall open a banking account in the name of the UDF into which all monies shall be deposited. Withdrawals from the account shall be signed by a treasurer, a secretary and at least one additional member of the executive.

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GLIMPSES OF OUR STRUGGLE

PERTINENT ASPECTS & THEIR RELEVANCE TO-DAY  
BY: MEWA RAMGOBIN      LEMASIA      6-4-84

Our history of struggle against colonial<sup>ism</sup> capitalist development and Western imperialism is a record spanning over more than three hundred years. This record of heroic struggles, severe trials, deprivation and epoch making victories of the oppressed was characterised by violent armed aggression by the ruling class and armed resistance by our people.

At the beginning of the twentieth century we entered the historical arena, when the forces of our dispossession and oppression unified to keep us down.

The first major, organized and united onslaught on our people, in this century, was the introduction of the 1913 Land Act, which dispossessed our people of their land. In terms of this Act 13% of the total land area of our country was "earmarked" for 87% of the total population - i.e. Blacks.

It was as a response to the Bill and events that gave rise to the 1913 Land Act that the African National Congress was founded in 1912. This was a challenge to the ruling class, who did not only design:-

- i) guaranteed White domination and
- ii) the convulsion of our people as urban workers but it also masterminded the introduction of Pass Laws as an instrument of control of movement of our black brothers, who were needed as mine workers and most important of all to prevent the entry of black people in any area, where land rights were denied to them.

Thus/...      PAGE TWO



Thus, the introduction of migrant labour, pass laws, Poverty wages, victimization at work with unfair dismissals, unemployment, repression and imprisonment and over and above all Death - these became the ingredients of exploitation by the ruling class - a class that had determined, and continues to do so to-day, the lives of some 20 million black people,

The ANC opposed this kind of oppression with delegation, memoranda and mass meetings.

By 1913 Gandhi had already left S.A. back to India. Between 1893 and 1913 Gandhi had succeeded in mobilizing the Indian sector of the S.A. population. Satyagraha, resistance without violence, was launched in this country against unjust taxation, marriage laws and freedom of movement. After Gandhi's departure there was no organization on the Indian front. There was a dissipation in movement.

During the war years 1914-1918 S.A., which was created in 1910, witnessed and experienced a new kind of growth. Racial capitalism though in its crude form demanded cheap labour, which the Blacks provided. In response to this our struggle took a new form in the twenties. Though the ANC existed and exerted what ever pressures it could, through negotiations and protests, the 20's witnessed a new form of struggle - wherein a nationally - based African workers organization and political movement was launched in January 1919, with the establishment of the ICU (The Industrial and Commercial Union of S.A.) with Clements Kadalie as its head.

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For/... PAGE THREE

For the first time in S.A.'s history Black workers came out in strike action at the Cape Town docks in 1919. Over 2000 workers came out, wage increases of nearly 100% were secured within 6-12 months. In 1920 the ICU and the ICWU (Industrial and Commercial Workers Union) under Selby Msimang's leadership, merged in Bloemfontein and gave rise to the ICWU of Africa. The activities of the ICWU and that of the African Native National Congress sometimes overlapped in the 20's; for example the ICU passed resolutions and attacked the Pass Laws and the system of contract labour. The rise of the ICU within the African and Coloured population workers can be sighted in the patterns in the political economy following the 1st World War. The ICU was the first mass-based movement, notwithstanding the ANC, after the consolidation of White dominance, with the Union of S.A. in 1910. The last armed rebellion was forcefully beaten in 1906.

The industrialization which followed after the war facilitated the growth of a black working class. As a result the "reserves" were disrupted as a result of migrant labour, which faced poverty wages and Authoritarian rule. Their discontent was manifest in strike actions between 1918 and 1920. It was this working class militancy which was the basis of our struggle in this period.

In response to the working class militancy the State introduced the now notorious Industrial Conciliation Act in 1927.

The dominant feature of this Act was that all pass bearing Africans were denied Trade Union Rights. But, it must not be forgotten that only Pass-bearing Africans could come to the cities to work on the mines and in industry.

Whilst this was "happening" in the quarters of government there emerged a conflict within the ICU. Whilst the leadership pronounced on both the economic and political fronts and the desirability of working with the C.P.S.A. (Com. Party of S.A.), the CPESA sought disciplined, industrial unions. The ICU was a wide, general workers union, with many organizational pitfalls. Whilst the Communists were purged from the ICU, Clements Kadalie turned to the British Labour Party for assistance. And, when in Europe he was trying to get recognition of the ICU, the centre of power of the ICU had shifted to Natal, where it fell under the leadership of AWG Champion.

In Natal the ICU re-identified the areas of struggle and for instance won a legal battle in the Supreme Court, that outlawed a Durban City by-law, that demanded all Africans to be dipped in disinfectant tanks (like cattle) before they were allowed to enter the city. After this victory the emphasis was on African "squatters" who were being removed from White owned land. As a result, the labourers of rural Natal flocked to the ICU in large numbers and there were times when traditional chiefs "delivered" their entire tribes to the ICU as members. It was soon after the "takeover" of the ICU, that AWG Champion assumed the leadership of the ANC in Natal. Trade union activity was linked to ANC political demands.

It has/... PAGE FIVE

It has been recorded that personality cult approaches to Trade Union work and rivalries between Kadalie and Champion led to the disintegration of the ICU on the national level.

What could have been a truly mass workers movement to challenge the ruling class as a whole became impotent for, among other reasons, the leadership did not grow organically out of the working class. Even though the ICU was hindered by opportunistic leadership at the National level, many trade union leaders were born and trained in the struggles undertaken by the ICU. It is rather an irony in organization that the regionalised ICU gained what the ICU had lost nationally and these were:-

- i) the introduction of working-class leadership;
- ii) clarity in respect of the political struggle and
- iii) the ability and the facility to organize trade unions along industrial lines.

Between 1927 and 1929, after the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act, there was a massive onslaught against and on the ICU and with this assault on the ICU the ANC itself was in ways immobilised.

After this immobilisation, conditions changed for a re-assessment of strategy and tactics to build a trade union movement amongst Africans and Indians. The 1930's saw a qualitative break in the structures of trade unionism from the 1920's. Organization along industrial lines became the order of the day. It was proven correct that through this kind of organization workers could directly challenge the employers as the cause of their exploitation and in this way, with the political alliances, their organization/... PAGE SIX

their organization could reflect and challenge the overall changes in the political-socio-economic spheres, which were the products of rapid industrialization.

The process of industrialization resulted in the manufacturing sector contributing a greater proportion to the G.N. Income than the agricultural sector in 1930. By 1943 manufacturing had outstripped mining. The urban working class increased dramatically - all skilled, unskilled and semi-skilled. The stabilization and organization of the working class had begun in the 1930's on a very serious level- both to mobilize worker power and with the new kind of leadership to inject the political content in worker struggles.

From 1930 onwards the whole world was facing the challenges of Mussolini and Hitler. The Fascists and Nazis were mouthing Socialism through their calls of National socialism. They attempted to rally their working class on the principles of facism. Thus the S.A. oppressed had to marshall its own struggles against Fascism, because S.A. was giving rise to it's own internal kind of Fascists. Thus the call for a National Democratic struggle, with the clear direction that to fight Nazism and Fascism, the world had to fight colonialism in Africa and Asia first. Between 1934 and 1938 the first signs of co-ordinating the N.D.S. were seen in S.A. The Non-European United Front was established in 1938. The immediate campaign was launched to unite all the oppressed peoples.

It was in 1936 that leaders like Yusuf Dadoo and Monty Naicker had returned to S.A. after qualifying as doctors.

With people/...PAGE SEVEN

With people like Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, Yusuf Dadoo, H.A. Naidoo, George Poonen and others<sup>in leadership positions</sup>, the bloodline of the N.S.U.F. was the organized Trade Unions - And, this front challenged all forms of political oppression against the black community. In 1935 when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, South African black dockworkers in Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth refused to service Italian ships and they downed tools. Such conduct on the part of workers was a clear demonstration of our awareness that the struggle was not for higher wages and more fringe benefits only. Between 1936 and 1945 at least 27 Unions for Blacks were organized in Natal alone. Most of these covered Indian and African workers. The sugar industry was organized in the late 30's under the leadership of H.A. Naidoo. The newspaper "Guardian" was circulated regularly and in many ways became the most powerful organizer of the working class. The union building campaigns did not only radicalize Indians as workers but also as oppressed citizens, with a common destiny with the majority of the oppressed peoples of the land. During the war years the area of organization and resistance became concentrated on the Reef. After decades of organizational work, with different levels of successes and failures, the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) was formed in November, 1941, with Moses Kotane of the ANC and CPSA as the convening Chairperson. This council, was infact, the co-ordinating body of the emerging, strong Black Unions.

By 1945/... PAGE EIGHT

By 1945 the Council had a membership of 158,000 in 119 Unions.

A strike wave by militant workers in 1942 highlighted the realities of wartime labour conditions in all fields of employment. By the late 30's and early 40's the ANC resolved that it's strength and it's future depended on the maximum participation of workers, in the struggle for liberation. In 1941 the Transvaal ANC initiated the formation of a Mine Workers Union. Eighty delegates from 41 organizations, such as the CNETU, the CPUSA and SAIRR resolved to organize mine workers on the mines and also in the reserves before recruitment. At this meeting in August 1941, the African Mine worker's union was born with J.B. Marks as President. After 1941 a series of demands by workers were made. The most dominant demands were regular wage increases; a statutory minimum wage; cost of living allowances; abolition of the Compound system; the abolition of the racial division of the labour force and the abolition of the restrictions on the freedom of movement. When these demands were not met agitation and strikes took place. The Landsdowne Commission, set-up by the government investigating the demands of the workers exposed in December 1943 the Chamber of Mines hold on the government. Nonetheless, the demands made by the Workers were rejected both by the State and the mining companies.

The AMWU responded by calling a conference in 1944 of 700 delegates from every mine and some 1,300 rank and file workers, the President-General, <sup>of</sup> the ANC, Dr. Xuma and hundreds of other trade unionists/... PAGE NINE

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rade unionists<sup>met</sup> to discuss the implications of the Landsdowne Commissions report.

In August 1946 some 100,000 African mine workers put down tools and went on strike, shutting down 21 mines. Whilst the State responded with 1 600 police on duty and the sealing off of the compounds with armed guards, the support got for the strikers was unprecedented in worker strike history.

During this time in Natal and the Transvaal the Passive Resistance Campaign was launched by the Indian Passive Resistance Council against the Pegging Act. Thousands of Indians had courted imprisonment, voluntarily. But on August 13th. the Council of Non-European Trade Unions, with support from the ANC, the Indian Congresses agreed to aid the Mine Workers Strike and also to call a general strike within 48 hours. The S.A. police intervened - they broke up the co-ordinating meetings, arrested J.B. Marks; they shot six strikers at Nigel, whilst six more were trampled to death in the pandemonium of shootings, 87 trade unionists were arrested and charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act and the entire executive of the CPSA was charged with sedition. However, the extent of state endorsed violence on the workers indicated to what extent the S.A. system was shaken. The workers held out for a week before they were overwhelmed by the superior force of the government which used machine guns and batons to drive the workers back to work.

The strike had another major victory. It forged a new alliance, in struggle, of progressive forces with a re-newed emphasis on mass mobilization and mass action. The results were historical.

For the/... PAGE TEN



For the first time in many years African Trade Unionists came into contact with ANC leaders. With the repression against African trade unions, following the strike, many unionists moved into key positions in the ANC. Also, following the lead given by Moses Kotane, members of the CPSA took prominent positions in the ANC.

These major shifts were directly and deliberately oriented to the African working class. The suspension, for example, of Passive Resistance by Indians and their throwing in their lot with the mine strikers, was an acknowledgement that the African working class was and had to be in the vanguard of the struggle for national liberation. Therefore, the mass action demanded by the Youth League of the ANC had to be rooted in the urban working class reflecting the structural changes that had characterised the country politically and economically. Indeed, it was the African Trade Union movement that radicalised the ANC which took the historical position of leading a non-racial struggle.

The 1922 White mine workers strike galvanised an alliance between White Capital and White Labour. It is not an exaggeration to note that the 1946 mine workers strike created the conditions for a progressive alliance between all those sections of our society that suffered both class exploitation and national oppression - thus changing the course of S.A. history.

When we talk of changing the course of S.A. history,  
What is it that we actually mean?

Firstly,/. . . PAGE ELEVEN

Firstly, the assessment and new direction that the struggle for liberation is against class exploitation and national oppression. And that the objective was a non-racial democratic S.A. for all who lived in the country.

Secondly, in order to achieve this objective there has to be maximum participation by all those who subscribed to this ideal, in unity.

Thirdly, in order to channel this unity there has to be organization and

Fourthly, that this organization or these organizations have to be rooted in the masses of people.

It is on the basis of these features that we have to view what followed.

Between 1946 and 1952 there was consolidation of progressive forces in the country. The leadership of the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress was taken over by trained radicals. The Youth League of the ANC provided the nexus between radical African organization and radical Non-African organizations. There were constant consultations, planning and executions of plans to fight oppression. From 1912 to 1949, the ANC and her allies had pursued Constitutional peaceful means to bring basic changes in S.A. In the 1940's under the newly formed Youth League of the ANC, with the NIC and the TIC, introduced new blue prints and methods of struggle. A Program For Action was drawn up by the Youth, Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu, Lembede and others and this program was adopted at the 1949 ANC conference. The Program included such methods as boycotts, strikes/... PAGE TWELVE

strikes, civil disobedience and non-co-operation. As a result, a national stoppage of work for one day was called for on 1st. May, 1950. Chief Luthuli became Press General of the ANC in 1952. It was under the banner of this new movement that the Defiance of Unjust Laws was launched in 1952. Here, now in conjunction with the Passive Resistance movement, was the first active intervention by the people on a mass, nationwide scale. Men and Women of all racial groupings, defied selected unjust laws. During this campaign 8000 volunteers were jailed. It is now history that as a result of this campaign the membership of the ANC, jumped from 7000 to 100,000, indicative of the fact that the people were prepared to engage in mass action. Mass action, once again, took another dimension. With the accumulated experience of the preceding 30 years or so, aspirant, progressive trade unionists from all over S.A. announced their intention of organizing and uniting the enslaved workers in the mines, docks, farms, factories and wherever they were with the design to attack and bring down the pillars of White supremacy. At this meeting SACTU was born. This bold step was designed to co-ordinate the activities of all workers regardless of race or colour and from the history of SACTU activities it is clear that it committed itself to an alliance with all progressive forces fighting for the total liberation of their country; the solidarity and common purpose expressed in the work and pronouncements of SACTU and the ANC are now legion.

Following/... PAGE THIRTEEN

Following the successful Defiance Campaign of 1952 a nation-wide movement was launched to convene a Congress of the People. At Kliptown on 25th June, 1955 the ANC formed an alliance with the SAIC (Congress), SACPO, SACOD, and SACTU - with 3000 delegates. For some sixteen months before this conference circulars were sent out to people soliciting their views, meetings and consultations during struggles to ascertain views on the new social order for all S. Africans - were sought. The Freedom Charter was the end product.

With the advent of the Congress Alliance Campaign and struggles were jointly undertaken. Boycott was a tactic that became well used in the struggle of the people. From as early as 1953 Bantu Education was boycotted and then in 1954 local racist shops were boycotted in the Port Elizabeth region.

Under the aegis of the Alliance, women marched in unity to Union Buildings in Pretoria protesting against introduction of Passes to women. Some 10,000 women of all races marched.

In January 1957 the Alexandra Bus Boycott was launched successfully and this boycott lasted for days.

On the 26th June, 1957 the Congress Alliance called for a "Stay At Home", and almost simultaneously the 11, a day Campaign was launched by SACTU.

On 16th April, 1958 Congress called for a national Stay At Home. 31st. May, 1959 saw the beginning of the Potato boycott. This boycott stands out as one of the most successful of all joint Congress Campaigns undertaken. The effectiveness was such that it paralysed the potato farming industry.

An important/...PAGE FOURTEEN

An important consequence of the boycott tactic was the participation of the international community. Dock workers and consumers boycotted ships laden with S.A. goods and consumers boycotted S.A. products. They were encouraged to do so by the Congress Alliance. Women in Durban burnt beer-halls.

In March, 1960 men and women protested, once again, by threatening and in fact to burn their passes.

The Sharpeville massacre was one result. But on the heels of Sharpeville the ANC and the PAC were banned and a State of Emergency was declared.

In 1961 the now famous Port Elizabeth bus boycott was launched and in May 1961 a National Stay at Home was called for.

After the banning of the ANC, Umkonto We Si we was formed and the struggle in S.A. took a new form - Sabotage.

In 1963 the Rivonia Arrests were made after which leaders like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and others were charged and imprisoned for life.