

**Boko Haram and Nigerian insecurity: religion and the failure of governance
as causal factors**

by

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Terms of Reference

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Almajiri | Street people |
| Christian | Those of the Christian faith. The faith has different denominations i.e. Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostals, Charismatic etc. |
| Fitna | Civil strife |
| Jihad | Armed struggle/ a holy Islamic war |
| Muslim | Those of the Islamic faith. The faith is represented by different schools i.e. Ahmadiyya, Sanusiyya, Tijanniyya and Quandriyya. |
| Sufi Orders | These are orders or congregation that have a direct link back to the Islamic Prophet, Muhammad. |
| Usman dan Fodio | He was a Muslim man who advocated for the emancipation of northern Nigeria from secular Christian rule. |
| Wahhabist | It is Islamic doctrine founded on the principles of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is sometimes considered as a strict and orthodox version of Salafism |
| Wicked problem | It refers to problems that that difficult to resolve due to four factors: incomplete and often contradictory knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the economic burden and the interconnected nature of the problem. As such, no one entity can fully resolve or rectify these problems on their own, as the problem may affected many different states in different ways. |

Chapter 1: Introduction, Overview and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide the overall basis and introduction to the study. It will serve as a general overview of the study, providing the underlying themes for this research. The study is focused on the conflict and instability that is being caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria. It will provide a link between religion, governance, and the evolving insecurity taking place in Nigeria. As such, governance, security and religion will form thematic areas of focus in this study. These issues will serve as the preliminary background and context to the research problem, as they will identify and clarify the choice, scope and focus for this research. Finally, this chapter will provide a review of the literature, the methodological basis, chapter demarcation, and research design to be used in this study.

1.2 Identification of the Research Theme

The focus of this study is centred on the internal conflict within Nigeria, which threatens the stability, security and survival of the state. The Nigerian state is plagued by a host of insecurities and inequalities that not only threaten the state, but also the West African region. Nigeria is a state with a contentious and violent history that has contributed to growing instability within its borders. With over 500 different languages and cultures; Nigeria is host to a complex and volatile mix of ethnic and tribal unrest that have further exacerbated the instability. This has resulted in an increase in transnational, radical groups that seek to redress these issues and change the socio-economic and political environment within the country.

The 1960s to the 1990s were a particularly volatile period in Nigeria's history. The country experienced six violent military coups (BBC News 1999). Additionally, religious tensions between the Muslims and the Christians were particularly fierce and divisive (Ruby and Shah 2007). Both religions harbour a fierce, 'sustained culture' of suspicion and 'rivalry' for the other, which has ultimately culminated in sectarian violence in 1999 (Campbell 2013 and Sampson 2012). This led to 14 000 deaths, property damage and thousands of Nigerians being displaced (Campbell 2013). Efforts to reconcile the differing religious interests have proven to be unsuccessful, and as a result politicians, religious leaders and even the military, often, and actively, use religion as a political tool to incite, exacerbate and further divide the country

(Agbibo 2013: 7). Alongside this, Nigeria suffers from socio-economic, political and military issues which have increased the rising discontentment and instability. In particular, the country faces four drivers which have fuelled the growing instability. These four drivers are poverty, corruption, marginalisation and inequality.

Poverty is global security challenge, and it is particularly challenging in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria, 112 million out of the 167 million people live in abject poverty (Udo 2014). This translates to roughly 72% of the Nigeria's poor population, a 'quarter' of the African population living in poverty and about 7% of the global poor population (Chandy 2015, Eke 2016 and Gabriel 2014). Despite high levels of wealth and abundance of natural resources, ordinary Nigerians, especially those who live in the north of the country, are still 'struggling' (Omoju and Abraham 2014 and Cocks 2014).

Map 1: Geographical and Political map of Nigeria




<http://slideplayer.com/slide/8517965/>

Map 1 illustrates the geographical divisions within Nigeria. In the north west, poverty levels sit at 77%, in the north east poverty sits at 76.3%, while in the north central, the poverty levels are at 67.5% (Cocks 2014, Ngbea and Achunike 2014: 268). This is comparatively higher than poverty levels in southern Nigeria. From 2009 – 2010, the southern states of Imo, Osun, Lagos and Rivers fared comparatively better, recording poverty levels of 39.4%, 37.5%, 40.3% and 47.2% respectively (National Bureau of Statistics 2010). This therefore presents a very real security challenge to Nigeria. The ever increasing poverty levels have contributed to feelings of disgruntlement and dissatisfaction in Nigeria. This has also allowed for the rise of radical groupings that prey on the negative feelings that the populace have towards a government which is seemingly unable to provide and govern effectively.

As of 2015, ‘197.1’ million people were unemployed globally (ILO 2016). Maps 2 and 3 provide graphical illustrations of unemployment levels globally and continentally. What is interesting to note is the fact that Nigeria is highlighted on both maps, as it ranks within the top 50 of countries with high unemployment rates.


Map 2: Global unemployment levels



<https://en.actualitix.com/country/wld/unemployment-rate-by-country.php>

Map 3: Unemployment levels in Africa

Unemployment Rate (%)



<https://en.actualitix.com/doc/maps/afri/africa-map-unemployment-rate.jpg>

Nigerian unemployment grew from 9% in 2015 to 12.1% in 2016 (Knoema N.D, Statista N.D., and Udo 2016). In 2016, an estimated ‘58.3%’ of young Nigerians were unemployed nationally (Akande 2014). This translates to roughly ‘11.2 million’ youth being unemployed within Nigeria (Trading Economics N.D. and Ventures Africa N.D.). This represents a significant proportion of the global and African unemployment rates. Traditionally, the largely Muslim north has been marginalised and suffers from ‘underdevelopment, poverty’ and high ‘unemployment’ (Persson 2014: 16). Like poverty, there is a wide distortion of unemployment between northern and southern Nigeria (Esene 2012). Northern states like Zamfara, Bauchi, Niger, Gombe, Nasarawa, Jigawa, Edo, Yobe, Adawa and Kaduna, have unemployment levels of over 30% (Esene 2012). In comparison, the southern states of Osu, Kwara, Lagos and Oyo have unemployment rates of below 10% (Esene 2012).

In addition, Nigeria faces social and regional inequality and marginalisation (Persson 2014: 15). As of 2013, the global adult illiteracy levels totalled ‘773.5 million’ people (UNESCO 2013). Of this amount, an estimated ‘30%’ of the African continent, particularly in ‘Burkina Faso, Niger and South Sudan’ are illiterate (Roser and Oritz-Ospina ND). In West and Central Africa, ‘youth literacy rates’ are below 50% (UNICEF N.D.). In Nigeria, literacy rates are between ‘14.5% - 49.3%’ in north and the east of the country (Akanbi et al. 2013). The low literacy rates are due to a number of factors such as inadequate funding, ‘curricula’, ‘teacher training’, infrastructure, poor leadership & management, especially in northern and eastern Nigeria (Abdukadir 2014, Akanbi et al. 2013, Akande 2014 and Hoffmann 2014: 5). This has contributed to the failure of educational institutions to provide their students the appropriate skills to make them employable, thus contributing to the high unemployment levels.

The third driver of Nigerian insecurity is historic corruption. Corruption is one leading cause of the economic disparity and inequality in the country. Despite a large abundance of ‘natural resources’ i.e. ‘37.2 billion barrels’ worth of oil reserves, and a further ‘184 trillion cubic feet’ of gas reserves, Nigeria has high corruption rates (Agbibo 2014: 390 and Salinas 2012). In 2014, Nigeria was ranked 135 out of 175 countries in terms of the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International N.D.). It slipped down the rankings in 2016 to 136 out of 175 countries (Transparency International N.D.). This ranking deems Nigeria as a highly corrupt state. To support this, from 1960 – 1999, US\$400 billion was stolen by government leaders, as well as ‘the military and other security agencies’ (Ikita 2014 and UNODC N.D.). In 2012, an estimated ‘N14 billion’ was uncovered, stashed away in the ‘personal accounts’ of top officials of the ‘Pension Scheme’ in Nigeria (Omotose 2013: 125). Since then, a further estimated ‘US\$11 billion’ was reported as stolen by ‘prominent political figures’ in Nigeria (Omotose 2013: 125). This systemic corruption has negatively affected the country by increasing the high poverty levels and inequality in the country (Persson 2014: 16). Despite extenuating factors, corruption is the greatest factor that has rendered the Nigerian state incapable of ensuring effective implementation of policy and basic service delivery to its citizens (Persson 2014: 18). As a result, the state has fallen prey to gross mismanagement of national funding (Osaghae 2001: 28). According to reports much of the military spending budget goes to ‘top military officials’ and

‘defence and security contractors’ (Hoffmann 2014: 15). In 2016, the defence and military spending was at an estimated ‘N294.556 billion’ (Agency Report 2016). In 2017, the defence budget increased to ‘N465.87 billion’, and it is one of the top four allocations of the national budget (Agency Report 2017 and Copley 2016). Because the defence budget is being siphoned to personal accounts through corruption, it has resulted in poor funding and mismanagement. As a result, the police have been unable to deal with and quell the violence and conflict caused by insurgent groups like Boko Haram (Osaghae 2001: 28). This has in turn contributed to a distrust and lack of credibility of public administration (Osaghae 2001: 29).

1.2.1 The importance of religion in Nigeria

As indicated in the previous section, religion is a thematic area of importance to this study and to security thinking. It has an impact and influence on the political behaviour of states and transnational actors within the international arena and within the discipline of international relations.

During medieval times, religion and politics in Europe were ‘deeply integrated’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284). The hierarchy of power during this era was divided between the Pope and other ‘political’ rulers i.e. kings (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284). The Pope was at the helm of this hierarchy, with unrivalled and supreme political authority, especially in the mediation of political disputes (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284). However, with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the end of the 30-year war, this power hierarchy was significantly disrupted. These events signalled the exclusion and separation of religion from the political arena (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284). The creation of the modern Westphalian state placed greater emphasis on modernisation and secularisation, as opposed to religious authority (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284 & Fox 2004: 716). With the dawn of the 20th century, religion triumphantly returned to the political arena. The outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s heralded the revival of religion as a prominent and influencing issue on the ‘political agenda’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 284 & Fox 2004: 717).

As with the separation of religion and politics, religion has also been excluded from cohesive governance mechanisms. Tolerance and diversity, especially in heterogeneous societies, are

largely excluded from the literature on governance. This has resulted in a complex interplay and struggle between religion, politics and governance. In the case of Nigeria, religion is a tool and a primary source of friction, division and conflict between the two dominant religions of Islam and Christianity (Ruby and Shah 2007). Particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, there has been constant distrust, ‘tensions’ and conflict between the two groups (Ruby and Shah 2007). Significant areas of contention between the two religious groups were Nigeria’s inclusion and membership to the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1986 and the implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria in 1999 (Ruby and Shah 2007).

This re-emergence of religion, the inherent weaknesses of the state and the failure to govern, have led to a ‘religionisation of politics’ in Nigeria i.e. the wholesale inclusion and influence of religion in the political arena. Particularly in reference to the election of heads of state in Nigeria, religion has been a powerful and ‘sensitive’ conduit for exercising control (Campbell N.D.). Every election sees a rotation of leadership between the Christian and Muslim leaders, in a bid to gain power and authority in the Nigerian political environment (Ruby and Shah 2007). This stems from the formalised, regional rotation of the presidency in Nigeria (Baldauf 2010). This pattern and arrangement is enshrined in the Nigerian constitution, and was instituted in an effort to dispel the tensions between Christians and Muslims. In addition to this, there is also an informal rotation between Muslim and Christian presidencies every eight years (Baldauf 2010 and Nwosu and Ugwuera 2014: 51). This ‘informal’ arrangement has been in place from 1999 to 2011 (Campbell N.D). It is however not enshrined within the constitution, and this creates the perception and fear that the arrangement can be susceptible to political abuse (Campbell N.D. & Nwosu and Ugwuera 2014: 51).

In 2010, Muslim President Yar’Adua died (Hoffman 2014). As enshrined in the constitution, Yar’Adua’s deputy was expected to assume the role of President of Nigeria. However, with the ascension of a Christian President, Goodluck Jonathan, the delicate rotation of presidencies in Nigeria was disrupted (Hoffmann 2014: 12). This fuelled the flame of rising discontent in Nigeria, due to the fact that a Christian had assumed the role that a Muslim should have completed during this period (Kimenyi 2015). The 2011 presidential elections were mired in controversy in regards to the tradition of rotational presidency (BBC 2011 and Human Rights

Watch 2011). The ‘incumbent’, President Goodluck Jonathan won the elections by an overwhelming majority and this led to many fierce and ‘violent riots’ in northern Nigeria (BBC 2011 and Human Rights Watch 2011). The riots were based on the fact that supporters of the contender, Muhammadu Buhari, felt that the elections were ‘rigged’ (BBC 2011). The northern cities of ‘Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto Yobe and Zamfara were particularly affected by the violence (Human Rights Watch 2011). The subsequent 2015 presidential elections were considered as ‘historic’ (Gander 2015 and Kimenyi 2015). This was due to the fact that an incumbent was ousted from office by a contender (Kimenyi 2015). Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari won the presidential elections and took over leadership from President Jonathan (Kimenyi 2015). One would assume that with this historic victory, much of the growing agitation within Nigeria would have abated. However, this was not the case. In fact there was ‘widespread’ violence and security risks during the run up to the elections (Kimenyi 2015). As a result of this on-going political arrangement, there has been a ‘religious capture’ of the Nigerian state. This is due to the fact that domestic political entities wield religion as a means of influencing the state’s decision-making for their own benefit, especially in regard to the office of the presidency (Lugon-Moulin ND). This has precipitated the formation and emergence of radical groups within Nigeria.

1.2.2 The threat of Boko Haram

Given this background, it is therefore no small wonder that different actors resort to the use of violence to achieve their aims. Because of the high prevalence of violent activity, Nigeria can thus be considered as a state plagued by ‘serious’ internal security threats (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 296). As such, transnational, radical groups, like Boko Haram have become important actors within Nigeria. They pose a challenge to traditional and new understandings of security, as they challenge the primacy and ‘legitimacy’ of the state and the ‘international order’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 287).

Like many predecessor groups such as *Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)*, *the Maitatsine*, *the Yan Izala* and *Tariqah*, Boko Haram seeks to establish a counter narrative to the Nigerian state. More often than not, these groups have tended to be religious in nature and Muslim in identity. Muslim groups like *the Yan Izala*, *the Maitatsine* and *Boko*

Haram, have used religion as a means to challenge the authority, legitimacy and hegemony of the secular Nigerian state. This has only further weakened governance within Nigeria, as these groups strive to de-legitimise the traditional (secular) forms of statehood. Often the alternative narratives they offer are linked to self-determination, secession, and even a militarised attempt at statehood. It is an alternative form of solidarity and self-governance based on religious identity (Osaghae 2001: 27). As such, religious fundamentalism becomes an important vehicle for Boko Haram's exit from the Nigerian state. This exit will allow for the establishment of an alternative social, cultural and political system outside the Nigerian state; one in which it establishes an Islamic caliphate not only in Nigeria, but also in West Africa (Osaghae 2001: 21). These groups often employ the use of violence, militancy, fear, terror and extremist tactics which serve to further fuel the growing insecurity, thus making them particularly dangerous and unpredictable.

1.3 Motivation for the Study

With a contentious and violent history, as well as the myriad of socio-economic, political and military issues, Nigeria faces serious internal turmoil. These issues have fuelled tensions within the state and have made Nigeria difficult to manage and govern. This has allowed groups like Boko Haram to agitate for change, albeit through violent means. This research is therefore quite salient, as it will outline and assess the emerging security challenge posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram's violent actions and activities pose a direct challenge and serious threat to the wellbeing and health of the Nigerian citizens and the state. The emergence of Boko Haram is also a cause for concern in West Africa and the international arena, so much so, that a coalition has been formed to combat the group. A five state coalition between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin was formed in 2015 to 'fight' Boko Haram (Dawber 2015).

As a result, security will be an important area of focus in this study. In particular, national security and human security will be used as conceptual tools to investigate and analyse the threat that Boko Haram poses in Nigeria and the wider international context. This research will also further explore the four drivers that have fuelled insecurity within the Nigerian state. These will be used as a means of providing a situational and historical background on the development of the Nigerian situation. Nigeria's inability to effectively mediate and govern its territory has rendered state institutions incapable of governing and managing tensions, state services and

infrastructure. This has ultimately allowed for radical groups to take root and threaten the legitimacy of the state and the political environment.

The re-emergence of religion also represents a growing security concern within the international arena. Events like 9/11, the Bosnian War, and the Iranian Revolution have heralded a fundamental shift in security thinking. Due to actions related to human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and even genocide, religion has once again been brought to the fore, as a symptom of the prevailing global insecurity. These events highlight citizens' vulnerabilities to state level insecurity and 'violent intentions' from state actors and transnational actors (Jackson and Sorenson 2013: 284 & Booth 2007: 101). This also shows how religion can be used as a means of 'preventing and provoking' conflict (Otis 2004: 15). It also provides a reminder that state level insecurity has trickle-down effects on individual security (Jackson and Sorenson 2013: 284).

1.4 Literature Overview

This study will make use of a conceptual analysis to provide clarity to the complex phenomena of security, governance and other related concepts. This 'research strategy' will employ five tools to assist with the explanation of concepts (Baldwin 1997: 7 and Yin 1981: 59). To begin, concepts should be operationalised in their 'broadest sense' (Baldwin 1997: 7). This allows for the researcher to 'establish definitional connections with other terms' which will provide additional clarity around the meaning and context for the concepts (Baldwin 1997: 7). In this way, this will highlight, 'explore' and focus the research towards to the 'important aspects of the subject matter' (Baldwin 1997: 7, Baxter & Jack 2008: 545 and Yin 1981: 59 & 61). Scholars should take note to use 'ordinary language', so as to 'remain reasonably close' to the original meaning of the concept (Baldwin 1997: 7). Finally, to preserve the integrity of the concept, researchers should 'not preclude empirical investigation' (Baldwin 1997: 7). Here, Baldwin refers to allowing the concepts and research to be open to interpretation by undergoing rigorous 'empirical inquiry' (1997: 7).

However, even though the multiplicity of terms and definitions allows for a richer and nuanced understanding, it is also fraught with disagreement. A number of political terms, like security, do

not have scholarly consensus over their meaning and understanding (Wight 2015: 2). As such, scholars may become constrained and restricted to particular sets of theoretical and conceptual perspectives. Scholars can be unable to deviate, explore or investigate new and emerging understandings of concepts. Additionally, these concepts can be easily made ambiguous which can result in a much more blurred understanding of complex phenomenon.

As an illustration of the above section, there is a preponderance of literature on governance within the study of international relations. It relates to the way a state functions and ‘regulates’ its day to day activities within its borders (Fukuyama 2016: 90). Key authors like Francis Fukuyama, and organisations such as the World Bank, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) have worked extensively on measurements of governance. These measurements broadly focus on three factors: quality of institutions, administrative capacity and the relationship between the state and society. Various indicators have been constructed to measure and assess governance levels within a state i.e. accountability and participation, political stability, absence of violence, rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, human rights and development, economic development, legitimacy, decisional efficiency, civil order and disorder (Cilliers and Sisk 2013: 18, Fukuyama 2016: 97, Fukuyama 2013: 1 and Macridis & Burg 1991: 210 – 221). As illustrated above, traditional governance focuses primarily on the state and institutions linked to it, as well as the capabilities the state has. There is therefore very little focus on institutions that serve the society from outside of the ambit or funding of the state. In addition, there is very little in the way of understanding alternative mechanisms that may influence and contribute to the overall governance of a state. While governance can relate to the way in which a state functions, this functioning can be enhanced by the inclusion of alternate groups and institutions aside from the state i.e. civil society.

The ineffective governance within a state can severely hamper a state’s capability to protect and ensure its own safety and integrity, as well as that of its citizens. Without the effective functioning of governance within a state, groups with strong ‘anti-establishment’ sentiments can emerge, target, infringe on and perpetuate instability and insecurity within a state. As such, security is a secondary pillar within this research. The ‘absence’ or lack of security has

increasingly become an area of focus in security studies, statehood and governance. Security refers to an 'absence of threats' and insecurity within a state (Booth 2007: 100 & Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43). Seminal texts on security by authors such as Booth, Louw, Hough and Du Plessis present a traditional and state-centric approach to security. It is a military endeavour focussed on ensuring a state's national security (Louw 1987: 10, Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 & Schoeman 2004: 17). The state is free from an 'external physical' threats to its existence, 'sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity' (Louw 1987: 10, Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 & Schoeman 2004: 17). As a result, a state's preoccupation is mainly to ensure its survival through largely violent and 'physical' confrontation (Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 and Louw 1987: 11).

More recently, the idea of security has evolved to account for the prevalence of new 'non-military' threats to the state's survival and security (Acharya 2015: 494, Snyder 2012: 1 & 2 & Baylis Smith and Owens 2015: 493). Alongside the Human Development Report (1994), scholars like Booth and Weaver began to realise the limited value of traditional approaches to security. This realisation gave way to a growing need to scrutinise, broaden and deepen security thinking. This culminated in the re-definition of security to include new concerns i.e. community, economic, health, food, environmental, personal and political security (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 492, Peoples, Vaughn-Williams 2015: 22 and Snyder 2012: 1). This re-definition is representative of the fact that there is a broadening of the meaning and understanding of security. However, in both definitions, citizen security is often ignored, downplayed or abused by the state and other non-state entities. As a result, the state can thus be accused of being unable to ensure its security, to defend its borders from internal and external threats and ensure the safety of its citizens.

1.5 Research Methodology

This study will be conducted using a qualitative and conceptual research design. This will be done in order to gain a detailed description and analysis on how to identify and explain Boko Haram as a religious fundamentalist group, with the nationalist ambition of establishing an Islamic caliphate within Nigeria and West Africa. Boko Haram's emergence has become an issue of importance in traditional and new understandings of security, as it highlights how religion has

increasingly become an area importance to security thinking. In addition to the outlined framework above, this study will be a research based study. It will make use of available primary and secondary sources to analyse the level of governance and insecurity within Nigeria. This will require a comprehensive literature study of the historical, geographical and political environment of Nigeria. These will be important tools to understanding the features and characteristics of Boko Haram, and will allow for a nuanced understanding of the group and its brand of radicalisation. This will contribute to the development of counter measures that address the political and socio-economic problems that have enabled Boko Haram to emerge.

For these outlined objectives, this research will rely on the use of a single analytical case study, as explained by Scott and Garrison (1995: 235). This has a two-fold function of providing thick description, as well as a comprehensive analysis (Scott and Garrison 1995: 235). This study will also make use of a political analysis (Scott and Garrison 1995: 188). This will require conducting a comparative analysis of Nigeria's insecurities over time and tracing the root causes of the country's insecurity. Due to the instability, unpredictability and uncertainty of the situation in Nigeria, the researcher is unable to conduct research in the field. As a result, the study relies on journal articles, books, internet articles, opinion and editorial pieces, as well as press releases. These sources will provide background information, analysis and evaluations of the type and level of threat that Boko Haram poses.

1.6 Research Structure and Demarcation of Chapters

This mini-dissertation will comprise of five chapters that will focus on exploring how governance and religion can be considered as key factors in the rise and emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This study will therefore analyse how these factors have resulted in the creation of an enabling and unstable environment, ripe for Boko Haram to thrive upon.

Chapter one introduces this study. It presented the general overview of the study by providing the background and context to the research problem. It presented a review of the literature to be used in this study, as well as provided the methodological basis and research design for this study. This chapter also provided clarity on the demarcation, scope and focus for this research.

Chapter two provides the theoretical framing of the study. This forms the basis of the discourse to be explored in this research. This chapter focuses on the major concepts that will form part of this study. It presents a theoretical overview, as well as definitions of the concepts to be used in the study. It analyses the concept security, by providing the historical background of the use and evolution of national and human security. These concepts are useful to understanding the insecurity within Nigeria. An overview of the character and features of several other concepts will also be introduced to provide working definitions that will guide the rest of the study. These concepts include religious fundamentalism, religious nationalism, religious extremism, militancy, and terrorism. The use and operationalization of these concepts allows for the development of working definitions that will guide and focus the analysis on statehood, governance and security.

Chapter three comprises of a descriptive analysis and assessment of the development, nature and challenges of the Nigerian state. These challenges include marginalisation, inequality, poverty and corruption. This will entail the provision of a brief overview of the political and security developments within Nigeria. In providing this assessment and analysis, this research presents an overview of the drivers that have fuelled the insecurity being experienced in Nigeria. These drivers provide the conceptual and contextual identification of the insecurities Nigeria is facing. Against this, this chapter employs the use of a functional evaluation of governance using five criteria: political stability, absence of violence, control of corruption, decisional efficiency and legitimacy. This further analysis will determine the extent to which Nigeria's deficiencies have compounded on the enabling environment that has allowed for Boko Haram to emerge.

In chapter four, the research focuses on a comprehensive analysis of Boko Haram, its origins, objectives, actions and strategies. This assists with providing a detailed account of the group's ideology, functionality and methodology. As such, this study analyses Boko Haram as a religious fundamental group. This will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the group and the effects it has had on the security of Nigeria.

Finally, chapter five serves as a summary and analysis of the key findings of the previous chapters. It provides an explanation of the links between the deficiency in governance, the re-

emergence and importance of religion, as well as the growth and development of violent and radical non-state actors in Nigeria. This chapter explains how these non-state actors have become existential threats to the credibility, integrity and legitimacy of the Nigerian state.

Chapter 2: Conceptual and Theoretical Clarification

2.1 Introduction

The focus of this study is to explore how the lack of governance and the influence of religion have had a role on the rise of instability and insecurity in Nigeria. It seeks to explore how these factors may have been an influence and impact on the emergence of the radical fundamental group, Boko Haram, which is a major instigator in the insecurity and instability in Nigeria. Boko Haram has exploited the vacuum in governance, safety, security and leadership that the Nigerian state has failed to fulfil.

This chapter therefore seeks to expound on the notions of security and governance. The explanatory detail provided in this chapter will allow for a deeper understanding of the concepts to be used in this study. While chapter one provided the contextual background, this chapter will develop and interrogate the concepts that will form an important explanation of how the Nigerian state has failed in its mandate to provide safety and security within its borders, and to its citizens. This has had ripple effects on the overall state of security of the West African region and the international arena. It is therefore important to begin with providing clarity on key concepts that will drive this research. This will allow for a more accurate and nuanced engagement with the issues which lie at the heart of Nigeria's insecurity. This chapter will therefore provide the operational definitions for the concepts to be used throughout this research. It will also explore the historical background, and evolution of the core concepts of security and governance. In addition, this chapter will provide an overview of the character and features of several additional concepts which will be used as a basis of discussion in the subsequent chapters.

2.2 Security

Security is one of the important concepts that will be discussed frequently throughout this study. It is more than just a concept or definitional tool. In academic literature, it is often referred to as a 'goal' and a 'consequence' (Baldwin 1997: 9 and Ullman 1983: 133). However, like many other political concepts, security is 'essentially contested' (Baldwin 1997: 10). This is due to the fact it is an ambiguous and 'value-laden' concept (Baldwin 1997: 10). There is therefore no consensus and no correct version or definition of what security means (Baldwin 1997: 10 and

Leffler 1990: 144). This stems from the act of trying to accurately define what security is (Baldwin 1997: 12).

Despite these concerns, security, its presence and more commonly its absence, has always been a concern within the international arena. It can be traced back to antiquity, as far back as the writings of Cicero and Lucretius (Brauch 2005: 7). During these times, security referred to a 'philosophical and psychological state of being' whereby one was free from 'sorrow' (Brauch 2005: 7). In its more modern iteration, security is the preoccupation of political and security studies. It refers to an 'absence of threats' and insecurity from entities which seek to 'challenge', threaten or 'take away' 'acquired values' (Booth 2007: 100, Brauch 2005: 8, Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 & Ullman 1983: 133). It is therefore based on three pillars (Booth 2007: 100):

- a) the existence of a referent object i.e. the entity being threatened
- b) the presence of an impending or actual danger
- c) a need to prevent or escape from harm

As such, the idea of threat plays an important role in understanding security and is a recurring idea across all definitions of the term (Baldwin 1997: 15). One way to define security would be the 'pursuit of freedom' from that which causes 'anxiety', that which is threatening, harmful, fearful and dangerous (Brauch 2005: 9 and Buzan 1991: 432). However, security is more than just mere 'survival' or even the threat of 'losing' security (Buzan 1991: 433 and Ullman 1983: 133). In the political arena, it is the capability of 'states and societies to maintain' their independence and 'integrity' in the face of hostile forces (Leffler 1990: 144). Security is therefore a 'valued' endeavour to 'individuals, families, states and other actors' (Baldwin 1997: 18). No matter the definition used to conceptualise security, one can see that its definition encompasses a 'substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence' (Buzan 1991: 433). In this chapter, two primary security concerns will be discussed, that of national security and human security.

2.3 Traditional National Security Thinking

The more traditional and narrow understanding of security is that of national security. At its core, it is a state-centric, 'military' endeavour (Louw 1978: 10, Paris 2002: 89 and Ullman 1983: 129). It is therefore seen as a 'process' and 'objective' for the protection of the 'core national interests' of a state, from 'external' and rival threats (Goldman 2001: 43). This definition belies not only a narrow and specific focus, but also portrays a 'false reality' and perception of security thinking (Ullman 1983: 129). This preoccupation primarily stems from a Cold War mind-set which fostered a 'total security' framework for securing the state (Leffler 1990: 129). As a result, states armed themselves in an effort to ensure more protection. This resulted in a security dilemma and thus drove up 'global insecurity' and instability (Leffler 1990: 129).

As highlighted above, one can see that the basis for national security is modelled on realist thinking (Booth 1999: 318). A large amount of national security thinking is also derived from American Cold War thinking, and much of the scholarship is based on the United States engagements 'with the rest of the world' during this time (Leffler 1990: 129). This was driven by three elements, namely the presence of military threats, an international system based on state centrism and the need for the maintenance of the status quo (Booth 1999: 318). Therefore security during this era was based on the preoccupation of safeguarding the state from any 'external physical', 'military and political' threats to its existence, 'sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity' (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 492, Goldman 2001: 43, Louw 1978: 10, Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 & Muller and Fortman 2004: 17).

As a process, national security is the 'pursuit of the core values' of the state (Leffler 1990: 146). In this pursuit, the objective of the state is to safeguard and protect itself. It therefore employs several methods i.e. economic and military capabilities, to achieve this pursuit (Leffler 1990: 146). Power therefore plays an important role, not only in safeguarding the state, but also in the 'behaviour of nations and the functioning of the international system' (Leffler 1990: 143). Power is used to secure and maintain the state (Leffler 1990: 146). Coupled with this, is the use of force, used as a means of protecting the state and its 'national interests' from 'external aggression' (Paris 2002: 89). The use of force thereby ensures that the state is able to defend itself and ensure its own security (Paris 2002: 89). This is why national security is often

associated with violence and conflict. It is because 'military' prowess is considered a tool to ensuring a state's survival from external 'physical violence' (Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 43 and Louw 1978: 11). The reality of this narrow view of security brought about the realisation that insecurity in the international arena could also be caused by entities other than states. It therefore presented a challenge to the traditional understandings of security and brought about the need for a brand of security that focussed on addressing the concerns of citizens' i.e. human security, as opposed to that of the state i.e. national security.

2.4 Human Security

The critique against the traditional definition of security was due to the multidimensional specifications within its understanding (Baldwin 1997: 23). This was even truer after the Cold War, as security thinking vastly evolved to include additional parameters (Baldwin 1997: 23). The critique of national security prompted an enquiry into the idea of how to account for the 'forgotten' and 'legitimate concerns' of ordinary individuals (Paris 2002:89). In the face of the more dominant national security concern, human security brought about a rekindling into the 'debate over what security means' (Acharya 2001: 442). This additionally added a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the field of security studies.

The end of the Cold War helped to increase the awareness of the fact that security could refer to more than just a physical, state-centric threat. It marked a changing 'international climate', where inherent 'state sovereignty' no longer had absolute dominance (Acharya 2001: 445). More and more, security was broadened, culminating in the introduction of human security. The basis for this scholarship can be traced to the debate over the 'disarmament–development nexus' (Acharya 2001: 444). This debate questioned the priority of allocating the majority of state expenditure to military endeavours as opposed to development issues (Acharya 2001: 444). Aside from this, there is also an 'authoritative' framework for human security derived from the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (Acharya 2001: 444 and Paris 2002: 89). This report recognised the 'growing' reality and importance of 'non-military threats in global issues' (Acharya 2001: 444). It therefore brought forward a 'people oriented' approach to the study and understanding of security (Acharya 2001: 444). The Human Development Report provides seven additional areas of concern to security thinking. These areas

link specifically to a more human based approach to security and include economic security, environmental security, political security, health security, food security, personal security and community security (Acharya 2001: 445).

This broadened scope was due to two factors. It highlighted dissatisfaction with the orthodox and 'narrow military focus' of security, one that prioritised defence and military expenditure over development issues (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 493 & Booth 1999: 318). Scholars noted a need to take greater cognisance of new pressures arising from complex interdependency within the international system, as well as the increasing global instability (Booth 1999: 318). The developers of the Human Development Report, identified the limited value of the traditional scope of security and the growing need to scrutinise security thinking, not only to account for the 'military realities', but also to explain the prevalence of new 'non-military' realities (Snyder 2012: 1 & 2). New and prevailing issues gained a strategic and 'strengthening' claim for inclusion on to the security agenda (Booth 1999: 318). The new issues i.e. economic meltdown, repression and suppression of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalry, among others, have had a 'profound significance' on the international arena (Booth 1999: 318). Additionally, the daily threats to ordinary individuals and communities have become a reality and this has led to the shift in security thinking (Acharya 2001: 449).

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1989, had a twofold impact on the international arena. It vertically expanded the number of new actors active within the international arena. New states, largely from Eastern Europe gained political independence from the USSR. With the inclusion of more states on the international arena, there has also been an increase in the number of non-state actors. Terrorist groups, insurgent groups, criminal organisations and multilateral corporations began to have more of a political role within the international arena. Due to this, there has also been a horizontal increase in the plurality of issues on the international agenda. The 1970s and 1980s heralded a host of new development realities due to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. New issues like poverty, inequality, diseases, violent conflict and restriction of political freedom emerged in the wake of the new political environment. This allowed for the broadening,

deepening and redefinition of security (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 492, Peoples and Vaughn-Williams 2015: 22 & Snyder 2012: 1).

As highlighted above, many of these emerging issues are ‘non-military’ issues, largely from the newly independent states and non-state actors who had now become a part of the global arena (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 492). This plurality is in direct opposition to the nature and scope of national security; one that emphasised a traditional, state-centric view of security. For Africa, the end of the Cold War meant more ‘liberalisation’ within African states (Ellis 1996: 6). Like their Eastern bloc counterparts, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 signalled the birth of ‘democratisation’, ‘liberal constitutions’ and popular ‘multi-party’ rule (Ellis 1996: 6). For many African states, this happened through ‘armed insurrection’ (Ellis 1996: 8). Along with this, there was a gradual removal of ‘superpower influence’, ‘patronage’ and moderation within Africa (Howe and Urell 1998: 42). This ‘withdrawal’ was both a negative and positive influence (Howe and Urell 1998: 42). On the positive side, African states could now dictate and control their own territories without the influence of superpowers or outside forces (Howe and Urell 1998: 42). Negatively, there was an increase in ‘collapsed’ or failed states due to the withdrawal of patronage, support and foreign donor aid from the superpowers (Howe and Urell 1998: 42).

The immediate consequence of all these changes was that the state was no longer the primary referent object of security. Not only did this redefinition of security challenge ‘the state-centric’ preoccupation of security; it also allowed for the introduction of a new referent object: that of the individual (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 492). Thus the security of citizens and people grew in salience and importance. It also showcased the limitations of national security, which was incapable of explaining and accounting for the numerous dangers that not only threatens states, but also threaten societies, citizens and the ‘international community’ (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 494). At the same time, this re-definition created ‘dangerous instability’ within the international arena (Booth 1999: 318). At the domestic level, the end of the Cold War led to increased ‘violence’, ‘refugees’, and increased incidents of intra-state conflict, all of which have regional and ‘international implications’(Booth 1999: 318). There was also a rise in incidents of armed conflict and civil wars around issues of race, culture, religion and ethnicity especially

from newly independent states in areas like ‘Eastern Europe, Africa and Central Asia’ (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2015: 493).

It is important to note that though human security is more broadly focused on different attributes to national security, it cannot ‘substitute’ or replace national security as there are still ‘threats that fall within the scope and mandate of national security (Oberleitner 2005: 191). Human security is therefore different from national security, as it prioritises ‘common values’ as opposed to ‘national interest’ (Oberleitner 2005: 190). It should therefore be used as tool to complement national security, as human wellbeing is just as important a goal of protection as ‘state protection’ (Oberleitner 2005: 191). By promoting and protecting human security, this places ‘limitations on warfare’ and the pursuit of ‘military objectives’ as espoused by national security (Oberleitner 2005: 191).

2.5 Threats to National and Human Security

As mentioned above, threats are interlinked with security thinking. A threat is defined as a risk, challenge and vulnerability. In security thinking, threats are important as they alert states to challenges and vulnerabilities which may compromise and negatively affect the stability and integrity of states. Specifically to national security, threats traditionally arise from beyond the borders of the state and can be identified by two factors (Ullman 1983: 133). They are ‘actions or sequence of events’ that can ‘degrade quality of life of inhabitants’ i.e. rebellions, epidemics, natural disasters (Ullman 1983: 133). Secondly, threats can severely limit and ‘narrow’ the ‘range of policy choices available to state and government and other entities’ (Ullman 1983: 133).

This definition can often be misleading, as it presupposes that threats from outside the state are ‘more dangerous’ than those from within (Ullman 1983: 133). However, with the changing international environment, threats can emanate from internal and external sources (Brauch 2005: 24). Increasingly, ‘non-military threats’ have been shown to ‘undermine’ and degrade the ‘stability’ and governability of the state (Ullman 1983: 133). More often than not, threats stem from ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ambiguity of the nature of threats’ (Goldman 2001: 45). This therefore means that threats have become asymmetrical in nature and no longer only stem from just other

states. They stem from other actors, as well as a host of new issues within the international arena. The concern and focus of human security threats are attributed to ‘risks of sudden change’ (Parr 2003: 171). These risks affect everyone i.e. individuals, societies, states and other actors (Parr 2003: 171). Since the end of the Cold War, these risks have expanded exponentially to include issues like global crime, human trafficking, instability of financial and economic markets, job and labour market insecurity, the spread of disease, and intra-state conflicts (Parr 2003: 171 – 177). As such security, that of national and human security are salient tools to use in understanding the instability within Nigeria and the threats that challenge the safety and governability of the state.

2.6 Governance

Governance is another important aspect within this research. Though there is a preponderance of literature on governance, it is more specifically focused on the concept of good governance. Governance relates to the way a state functions and ‘regulates’ its day to day activities, and also how a state provides for and distributes resources within its borders (Cilliers and Sisk 2013: 19, Fukuyama 2015: 90, Turiansky 2016: 13). Governance also relates to the making and enforcement of ‘rules’ within a state (Fukuyama 2013: 3). It is derived from Greek, Latin and French verbs and can be used to describe the way in which an entity functions i.e. the ‘steering’ or regulation (Fukuyama 2016: 90). Political scientists like Francis Fukuyama have lamented at the ‘vagueness’ of the term governance, as it can be used to refer to any type of ‘steering’ or regulation by any entity within a state (2016: 90). However, there is now an overall consensus that governance does contribute to and is ‘critical’ to ‘development’ (Cilliers and Sisk 2013: 18).

Key authors like Francis Fukuyama, as well as organisations like the World Bank Group, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and GIBS have worked extensively on measurements and indicators of governance. These include indices like the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index and the African Peer Review Mechanism. These broadly focus on three factors: quality of institutions, administrative capacity and the relationship between the state and society. While these measurements are useful in measuring and identifying areas of concern within a state, the inherent problem with them is trying to create ‘generally accepted’ models which can be adopted by all states (Fukuyama 2016: 97).

In this study, five indicators will be used to evaluate the levels of governance within Nigeria and assess whether this has been a contributing factor to the rise and emergence of Boko Haram. The first indicator to consider is the level or control of corruption within a country. Corruption is an especially ‘worrying’ and ‘negative’ trend, especially in Africa (Ibrahim Index 2016(b): 33). It refers to the ‘extent’ to which state officials and ‘elites’ take advantage of public office to ‘capture’ and take hold of ‘power’ for their own ‘private gain’ and ‘interests’ (Ibrahim Index 2016(a): 14, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4 and World Bank N.D.). Attached to this is the idea of ‘cronyism i.e. the appointment of friends and relatives to positions of power (Ibrahim Index 2016(a): 14). In many instances, especially in Nigeria, accountability mechanisms and ‘penalties’ have been imposed, but they have not had any effect on the officials and elites who ‘abuse their positions’ (Ibrahim Index 2016(a): 14). According to a recent study conducted by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, between 2006 - 2015 there has been a ‘deterioration’ of accountability mechanisms in Africa to counteract corrupt behaviour and ‘cronyism’ by state elites (Ibrahim Index 2016(b): 33).

Legitimacy and decisional efficiency in a state refer to the ability of ‘political representatives’ to effectively ‘govern’ a state (Ibrahim Index 2016(a): 15). It presupposes that processes like ‘public services’, and ‘policy implementation’ are free from ‘political pressures’ (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4). Both legitimacy and decisional efficiency encompass many different facets i.e. poverty, marginalisation and inequality, the youth and the influence of religion. It is specifically focused on the extent to which ‘quality’ conditions are provided for the public (Ibrahim Index(a) 2016: 17). These include ‘living conditions’, adequate ‘food’, ‘clean water’ and ‘fuel to cook’ and stay warm (Ibrahim Index(a) 2016: 17). According to the Mo Ibrahim Index on Governance in Africa, inequality and marginalisation are defined as the ‘extent to which significant parts of the population are fundamentally excluded from society (Ibrahim Index(a) 2016: 17). This is in part ‘due to poverty and inequality’, and it takes cognisance of several actors i.e. ‘income’, ‘educational inequality’, religion, ethnicity and ‘gender exclusion’ (Ibrahim Index(a) 2016: 17).

The absence of violence is wide ranging governance indicator. It often refers to the ‘perceptions’ of government upheaval by ‘unconstitutional or violent means’ (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4). It also refers to the ‘prevalence of violent social unrest’, as well as the ‘level of violence or violations of physical integrity rights’ by the state on its own citizens (Ibrahim Index(a) 2016: 14). In addition, it includes the levels and presence of ‘internal conflict’ or the ‘likelihood’ of a ‘civil war’ erupting within a state (Ibrahim Index 2016: 14). This includes ‘political-motivated violence’, acts of ‘terrorism’ by ‘rebel groups, political militias and identity militias’ (Ibrahim Index 2016: 14 – 15 and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4).

As is illustrated by these factors, governance predominantly focuses on the state, its capabilities and institutions that are linked to it. However, there is very little focus on institutions that serve the society from outside of the ambit of the state i.e. religious groups. In addition, there are disagreements over whether governance should be limited to the state or if it can be applied to the international arena (Fukuyama 2016: 98). There is thus very little in the way of understanding alternative mechanisms that may contribute to overall governance within a state i.e. civil society and their wealth of knowledge and expertise as being ‘boots on the ground’ (Cilliers and Sisk 2013: 20). While governance can relate to the way in which a state functions on a daily basis, this functioning can be enhanced and made easier by the inclusion of other groups and factors. Various indicators have been constructed to measure and assess the level of governance within a state i.e. accountability and participation, political stability, absence of violence, rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, human rights and development, economic development, legitimacy, decisional efficiency, civil order and disorder (Cilliers and Sisk 2013: 18, Fukuyama 2015: 97, Fukuyama 2017: 1 and Macridis & Burg 1991: 210 – 221). In chapter three, these five governance indicators will be used to explain, analyse and measure levels of governance and instability in Nigeria. These indicators include: political stability, absence of violence, control of corruption, decisional efficiency and legitimacy.

2.7 Additional Concepts

This study will also employ the use of several other concepts that will be used to define and characterise the features and activities of Boko Haram within this study. These include religious fundamentalism, religious nationalism, extremism, terrorism, and militancy. Within the

literature, fundamentalism is defined as a ‘religious phenomenon’ (Iaanaccone 1997: 100 & 114). It can be traced back to publications from ‘1910 and 1915’ which were predominantly ‘anti-secular’, reactionary and ‘oppositional’ (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2015: 378, Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996: 1 & Iaanaccone 1997: 104 - 105). As such, it is often contrasted to modernism and the need to return to a previous idealised existence (Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996: 6 and Iaanaccone 1997: 114). Much of the discourse on fundamentalism, especially the religious variant, is largely attached to ‘derogatory’ ‘stereotypes’ (Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996: 4). This is due to the fact that it is attached to a combination of religious and the intense actions of believers (Falola 1998: 11).

Another concept to be used in this research is that of religious nationalism. It can be defined as more than just a ‘fusion’ of the concepts of religion and nationalism (Rieffer 2003: 225). It is a form of collective ‘representation’, in which identity is articulated through a desire for the self-determination (Friedland 2001: 126, Friedland 2002: 387 and Rieffer 2003: 225). Like fundamentalism, religious nationalism is anti-secular, and at its core, it posits a concern for the ‘rationale’ of having a state as a ‘moral basis’ for politics (Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996: 8). It therefore attempts to modify and reform the modern politics, by providing an alternative narrative to the current state (Liska 2001: 100). Religious fundamentalism and religious nationalism form the basis of the features and characteristics of Boko Haram. They inform on their brand and type of radicalism that they utilise within the Nigerian political environment.

Three additional concepts will be used to define the actions, activities and strategies employed by Boko Haram. Militancy is the aggressive and violent use of religion as a tool to ‘re-order society, combat ills and reform religion’ (Falola 1998: 11 & 17). As with fundamentalism and religious nationalism, militancy is a ‘religious revolt’ against secular existence (Juergensmeyer 2008: 6). Both militancy and fundamentalism ‘adopt rhetoric and language’ as tools of escape from an ‘oppressive state’ (Falola 1998: 14). Religious extremism is a strategy that embraces the use of ‘murder’ and the adoption of ‘theologies that sanction violence in the service of God’ (Iaanaccone and Berman 2006: 109). Extremists are ready to sacrifice their lives in the expectation of a reward in the afterlife (Iaanaccone and Berman 2006: 109). Finally, religious terrorism, is a strategy, tactic and ‘motivation for the organisational structure’ based on a

religious foundation (Juergensmeyer 2003: 7). It employs ‘public acts of violence’ to incite fear, terror, ‘harm or damage’ (Juergensmeyer 2003: 7 and Ibaba 2013: 191). It is classified as a ‘new’ and ‘distinct’ type of political violence (Agbiboa 2013: 69). Religious terrorism is also ‘anti-modern’, ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘anti-progressive’, as it seeks to return to ‘idealised version of the past’ (Agbiboa 2013: 69 - 70). The central core of all these concepts in relation to Boko Haram is that they allow for an understanding of the behaviour and the functioning of the group. These concepts illustrate and showcase the aspiration of Boko Haram to create ‘a new kind of society’ for Nigeria based on ‘religious principles’ (Falola 1998: 14).

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has provided conceptual clarity on key concepts that will be used in chapters three and four. It has provided clear definitional parameters for the use of the concepts of governance, national security and human security. These analyses will allow for a better framing and understanding of the current status of the Nigerian state. It will also allow for a critical analysis on whether or not the Nigerian state has reneged on its duty to provide for and protect its citizens. This chapter has also provided insight into how and what Boko Haram will be defined and characterised throughout the remainder of this research. These concepts will provide the operational guidelines to understanding how the threats and insecurities in Nigeria have begun and continue to manifest within the country. In chapter three, there will be a detailed analysis on the political and security developments within Nigeria. It will present the drivers that threaten and challenge the governance, security and stability of the Nigerian state.

Chapter 3: Governance in Nigeria

3.1 Introduction

Chapters one and two provided the conceptual basis and theoretical justifications of this study. They provided the context and parameters which will guide the remainder of the research. As such chapter three will provide an analysis of the Nigerian context. It will explore the historical underpinnings that have underscored the Nigerian situation. It is through this historical background that one can gain true understanding of the enabling factors that have given rise to the instability within Nigeria.

Map 4: Geographical Map of Nigeria



<http://doctorpence.blogspot.com/2015/08/map-on-monday-nigeria.html>

As illustrated in Map 4, Nigeria is located on the west coast of the African continent on the Gulf of Guinea, in the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria the most populated African state, and is a considerably wealthy nation (BBC News 2017). It is a country rich in natural resources with ‘37.2 billion barrels’ worth of oil reserves, and ‘184 trillion cubic feet’ of gas reserves (Agbiboa 2014: 390 and Salinas 2012). It is also the ‘5th largest exporter of oil’ in the world, as well as Africa’s ‘biggest oil producer’ (Agbiboa 2014: 390 - 391 and Salinas 2012). Nigeria is a formidable state

within West Africa, with changes and circumstances within the state ‘heavily’ affecting other West African states (Premium Times 2017). Nigeria makes considerable contributions to ECOWAS, being the biggest donor of funds to the regional body, having contributed an estimated R918.7 million between 2003 and 2011 (Udo and Ekott 2013). It is also host to three ECOWAS institutions (Udo and Ekott 2013).

Despite all this, Nigeria suffers from a violent past, an equally troubling present and a political and socio-economic environment that is in constant flux. It is the most ‘populous’ state in Africa, home to ‘one-sixth’ of the African continent (Idahosa 2015: 19). Nigeria is also ‘crippled’ by a variety of socio-economic and political challenges i.e. ‘lack of legitimacy’, corruption, a lack of ‘development’, insecurity, a stagnant democracy, systemic marginalisation, high poverty and a lack of governance (Adesoji 2010: 96, Danjibo 2009: 16, Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 42 & Shenhav 2007: 6). These factors have built up over the course of the state’s history and have contributed to the instability currently being experienced in the country. These factors have thus contributed to the increasing insecurity within Nigeria. The Nigerian state epitomises Thomas Hobbes’ famous quote, that of a state whose existence can be characterised as being ‘solitary, nasty, brutish and short’ (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78). As a result, the ‘survival’ of Nigeria and that of its citizens is at stake (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78).

This chapter will provide a descriptive analysis and assessment of the deficiencies and challenges of the Nigerian state. This basis will provide comprehensive detail into the drivers which have fuelled the insecurities in Nigeria. Against this backdrop, this chapter will also review the state of governance within the country. It will evaluate Nigerian governance using five governance indicators: political stability, absence of violence, control of corruption, decisional efficiency and legitimacy. These indicators will be used as a basis to understand and explore the lack of governance and preponderance of insecurity within the Nigerian state. This overview and analysis will be important tools to understanding ‘the security issues and problems’ that have plagued and created an enabling environment for Boko Haram to flourish within Nigeria (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78).

3.2 Governance Indicators

In this research five key indicators will be used to explain, measure and identify the levels of governance within Nigeria. These include: control of corruption, decisional efficiency, the absence of violence, legitimacy and political stability.

a) Control of Corruption in Nigeria

Nigeria is known as the ‘country of corruption’, a fact which has made development (socio-economic and human) difficult to achieve (Aluko 2002: 394, Akinola 2015, Ijewereme 2015: 1 and Ogbeidi 2012: 3). The corrupt practices of government officials and employees have been used as a means of securing and retaining ‘power’, as well as ravaging and crippling the country of its natural growth and development (Aluko 2002: 395, Rogers 2012: 3 and Ogbeidi 2012: 3 & 5). Corruption takes on ‘various forms’, ranging from ‘petty bribery’ to the siphoning of illegally gotten gains into private offshore ‘bank accounts’ (Ijewereme 2015: 1 and Akinola 2015). Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, and through successive administrations, corruption has ‘grown continually’ within government and state infrastructure (Ogbeidi 2012: 5). As a result, Nigeria has thus developed a ‘vast system of institutionalised political corruption’, stemming from the top politicians, military and even civilian leaders (Aluko 2002: 395 & 396 and Ogbeidi 2012: 5). This problem has become so endemic that corruption is a popular ‘euphemism’ to explaining Nigeria’s style of ‘political leadership’ (Aluko 2002: 395 and Ogbeidi 2012: 3). As a result there have been little ‘management of national wealth’ to services and sectors that really need these funds (Ogbeidi 2012: 3). Instead these public funds have been diverted to the coffers of corrupt officials (Ogbeidi 2012: 3).

Corruption in Nigeria predates its independence from British colonial rule, and has been a negative and ‘perverse influence’ on the Nigeria ‘society’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 5 and Sergei & Johnson 2015). Corruption is used as a means of ‘aggrandisement and self-glorification’, and as a way of pursuing ‘selfish and personal goals at the expense of broader national interests’ by government officials (Agbibo 2014: 392, Awojobi 2014: 152, Ijewereme 2015: 1, Brownsberger 1983: 215 and Ogbeidi 2012: 3). These corrupt practices draw their roots from the colonial era, where documented cases of ‘misuse of resources’ by public officials have been recorded i.e. ‘gift-giving’ (Brownsberger 1983: 222 and Ogbeidi 2012: 6). It was only during the

civilian leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Nnamdi Azikwe (the First Republic) that corruption became more pronounced and ‘widespread’, as state wealth and resources were ‘looted with impunity’ (Awojobi 2014: 151, Ijewereme 2015: 4, Ogbeidi 2012: 6 and Osoba 1996: 375). The government of the First Republic witnessed ‘gross’ manipulation of government and military ‘contracts’, which led to ‘inflation’ in the Nigerian currency (Awojobi 2014: 151 and Osoba 1996: 376). Since then, Nigeria has seen the ‘institutionalisation of corruption’ in all spheres of public service including ‘the Nigerian Railway Corporation, Nigeria Ports Authority’, the ‘Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and Nigeria Airways’ (Ogbeidi 2013: 3 & 7). This situation was so endemic to the point where corruption was ‘elevated to an instrument of state policy’ (Akinola 2015 and Ogbeidi 2012: 3 & 7). This has seen politicians, civilian and military administrations make use of state funds, ‘salaries and allowances’ to buy lavish cars i.e. ‘Pontiacs and Chevrolets’ (Akinola 2015 and Ogbeidi 2012: 1). These actions have led to the country’s underdevelopment, ‘socio-economic stagnation’, and its indebtedness to the ‘IMF’ during the First Republic (Akinola 2015, Ogbeidi 2012: 3 and Osoba 1996: 376).

The institutionalised corruption of the First Republic led to the first Nigerian military coup in 1966 (Awojobi 2014: 151, Ogbeidi 2012: 7 and Osoba 1996: 375). The resulting military regime instituted commissions of inquiry to investigate and punish perpetrators of the ‘ineptitude’, ‘misrule’ and ‘misappropriation of funds’ within Nigeria (Agbiboa 2014: 396, Awojobi 2014: 151, Ogbeidi 2012: 7 and Osoba 1996: 375). However, these efforts yielded very little, and the new military regime succumbed to the very same crimes they sought to root out (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). During this military administration, many state and military officials committed similar acts of corruption, most commonly through the use of ‘white elephant projects’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). These projects were used as a ruse to further loot ‘public funds’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7).

The start of the 1970s, led to the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta. Nigeria experienced an ‘unprecedented’ increase in its mineral wealth (Ijewereme 2015: 7 and Ogbeidi 2012: 7). However this discovery also led to the further entrenchment of corruption and ‘mismanagement’, as oil was used as a new avenue and source to loot from (Ogbeidi 2012: 7 & 8). In 1975, a second military coup was instigated to curtail these corrupt practices (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). Under the leadership of General Murtala Mohammed, Nigeria made its first positive strides towards

rooting out and eradicating corruption. General Mohammed boldly declared ‘his assets’ and asked the same from all ‘government officials’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). Like the previous military regime, he instituted several commissions of inquiry, as well as ‘probes of past leaders’ (Agbibo 2014: 396, Ijewereme 2015: 4 and Ogbeidi 2012: 7). These measures resulted in several ‘immediate dismissal(s) of several corrupt officials’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). However, for all his zeal, General Mohammed was assassinated ‘six months’ into his term (Ogbeidi 2012: 7). As a result, the steps he took to reduce corrupt practices lost traction, and there was a ‘resurgence of corruption’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7).

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were no serious efforts made to quell corruption in Nigeria (Ogbeidi 2012: 9). During the Babangida and Abacha regimes, corruption was blatantly flaunted by ‘high-profile individuals and groups’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 15 and Osoba 1996: 382). As a result, corruption was only further ‘enmeshed’ within the state (Agbibo 2014: 396, Aluko 2002: 396 and Ogbeidi 2012: 7 & 9). Government officials brazenly looted the national treasury with impunity, as they had no ‘fear of detection or punishment’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 7 & 9 and Osoba 1996: 382). As a result, the Nigerian economy suffered (Ogbeidi 2012: 15). Gas and oil subsidies were removed and this led to ‘nationwide’ strikes and a loss of investor confidence (Oluwadayisi and Oluwakayode 2016). Between 1988 and 1994, an estimated ‘\$12.4 billion’ was siphoned from the country and held in foreign ‘external reserves’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 15). This meant that Nigeria found itself indebted to France and London (Ogbeidi 2012: 15).

It was especially during the Abacha regime that there was a ‘total lack’ and disregard of ‘discipline’ and ‘accountability’ by state officials, as there were no real accountability mechanisms or penalties to prosecute offenders (Osoba 1996: 376). Corruption was used as a means of ‘settling opponents’, bribing individuals and enriching government ministers and their cronies (Akinola 2015). It is during this time that an estimated ‘USD 4 billion’ worth of public funds was lost to ‘embezzlement’ and ‘corruption proceeds’ by the Abacha family and the Nigerian administration (Ogbeidi 2012: 9). Since then, a further ‘N14 billion’ was stolen in 2012, while an additional ‘US\$11 billion’ was reported as stolen by ‘prominent political figures’ (Omotoso 2013: 125).

Through ‘successive’ regimes and administrations, Nigeria has sustained very high levels of ‘systemic corruption’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 10). This is coupled with a ‘weak’ and underfunded judiciary system, incapable of adequately prosecuting these offences (Campbell and Harwood 2012). This corrupt behaviour has continued into the post democratic era (Ogbeidi 2012: 18). As a result, the wealth and resources of the Nigerian state have become an economic ‘chessboard’ for different administrations to seize ‘power’ and ‘enrich themselves’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 10). This form of poor mismanagement has had very ‘devastating effects’ to the governance of the country (Ogbeidi 2012: 10). It has effectively set back ‘sustainable growth’, ‘development’ and ‘socio-economic advancement’ within the country, as well as ‘retarded’ multiple sectors and industries (Ogbeidi 2012: 15, 18 - 19 and Osoba 1996: 383). Essential sectors and services, particularly health and education, are ‘substandard’, ‘inadequate’ and near collapse (Ogbeidi 2012: 19). The ‘social services’ sectors i.e. ‘electricity’, transportation, and ‘water supply’ have been poorly equipped (Ogbeidi 2012: 15). The corrupt practices have also ‘discouraged’ foreign ‘investments’ for ‘social’ and ‘infrastructure development’ (Ogbeidi 2012: 15 & 18 and Osoba 1996: 383). Ultimately, this has effectively worsened the ‘political and social instability’ of Nigeria by adding pressure to an already strained and fragmented environment (Osoba 1996: 383).


b) Decisional Efficiency and Legitimacy

i) Poverty in Nigeria

As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, Nigeria is a country rich in natural resources i.e. oil and gas (Agbibo 2014: 390). However, due to poor management, governance and corruption, these resources have been siphoned for the personal gain of public officials. As illustrated in the previous section, this has contributed to lack of development and financing to essential sectors and services. This has also contributed to the fact that Nigeria is considered as one of the ‘world’s poorest populations’; with ‘70%’ of the population living ‘below the poverty line’ (Danjibo 2009: 16, Magnowski 2014a, Ogbeidi 2012: 3 & Sergei and Johnson 2015). Studies conducted in 2013 show that ‘767 million people’ of the global population are living in poverty (Roser and Orit-Ospina 2017 and World Bank 2016). Of this amount, an estimated ‘383 million’ people originate from Africa, with Nigeria housing the largest number of the poor within Africa (Roser and Orit-Ospina 2017).

There is a long standing history of ‘unequal distribution’ of resources which have served to exacerbate the ‘persistent inequality problem’ and the poverty within Nigeria (Magnowski 2014a). Due to poor governance and corrupt economic mismanagement, poverty levels have been increasing nationally from 52% to 61% between 2004 and 2010 (Magnowski 2014a).

Map 5: Distribution of Poverty in Nigeria



<http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/insurgencies/poverty-root-cause-boko-haram-violence>

As illustrated by Map 5, the hardest hit regions include much of northern Nigeria i.e. Sokoto and Borno, where there is severe poverty and impoverishment (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 59). As of 2015, 72% of northern Nigerians lived in poverty (Sergie and Johnson 2015). More specifically, in the North-Central, poverty levels were at 67%, while the North-West experienced 71.1% poverty rates, and the North-East experienced 72.2% poverty rates (Danjibo 2009: 16). This is comparatively higher than most of southern Nigerian and the Niger Delta which recorded poverty levels of 27% and 35% respectively (Sergie and Johnson 2015).

The poverty within Nigeria stems from historical foundations. After independence, the Nigerian government pursued ‘contradictory’ policies to economic liberalisation, one of which was the rejection of foreign donor aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 59). At the same time, the Nigerian government instituted cuts and freezes to ‘public expenditure’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 59). Nigeria also made reductions in ‘state subsidies’ for the ‘mass consumption of goods’ and ‘sold public enterprise(s)’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 59). As a result of these policies, Nigeria experienced declines in growth and development which seriously threatened the ‘economic and political stability of the country’ (Magnowski 2014a). An immediate effect of this was a strain on the job market. As of 2014, ‘23.9%’ of the working population in Nigeria was ‘unemployed’ (Magnowski 2014a). This therefore put an economic strain on communities, especially in the north of the country. As a result, northern Nigeria became more ‘vulnerable’ to high levels of poverty (Magnowski 2014a).

Historically, the education system in northern Nigerian is ‘fractured’ and inconsistent (Hoffmann 2014: 5). Northern Nigeria has relied heavily on traditional ‘religious education’ (Yola 2014). This focuses primarily on ‘learning the Quran and Islamic values’ (Antoninis N.D: 5 and USAID/Nigeria 2013). As a result secular and western education has been side-lined due to the ‘doubt’ and mistrust of the merits of this form of education (Yola 2014). Northern Nigerian communities deem western education as ‘enslavement’ (Yola 2014). As a result, many northern Nigerian schools are often ‘unregulated’, and the educators are ‘untrained’, and thus unable to provide ‘a decent level’ of education to students (USAID/Nigeria 2013 and Yola 2014). This has contributed to ‘almost two-thirds’ of northern Nigerian children being illiterate i.e. in Bauchi state where literacy levels are recorded at 48.9% (Global Partnerships for Education N.D. and Omoju and Abraham 2014). In comparison, southern states, like Imo, perform comparatively better i.e. 99% literacy levels (Omoju and Abraham 2014).

The low literacy levels and attendance rates in northern Nigeria are due to multiple factors. Firstly, it has also been shown that school going children (ages of 6 – 11) do not attend school in northern Nigeria (Quranic or otherwise) (Hoffmann 2014: 6). This means a mere 40% of northern Nigerian children attend school (Hoffmann 2014: 6). This is comparatively lower than the 92% school attendance of southern Nigerian children (Hoffmann 2014: 6). Another reason is

the fact that many northern Nigerian girls are ‘married’ off at an early age i.e. age 15 (Abdukadir 2014 and British Council 2014: 26). This is done in a bid to prevent pregnancy and shame on a ‘girl’s honour’ (Abdukadir 2014 and British Council 2014: 26). An additional reason for early marriage is due to the fact that ‘westernisation’ and secular education is deemed as a harbinger of loose morals by traditional Muslim believers in northern Nigeria (British Council 2014: 25). Despite the above reasons, the most common cause of low attendance is as a result of a ‘lack of financial’ and ‘emotional’ support for education, especially for young women and girls (Ahmed 2013).


Low school attendance and low literacy levels are further compounded by the fact that there is ‘political insecurity’ in northern Nigeria (Global Partnerships for Education N.D.). Schools in northern Nigeria are frequently under ‘threat’ of attack by armed and insurgent groups like Boko Haram (Global Partnerships for Education N.D.). The attacks by Boko Haram on schools, education and attendance have had a ‘devastating effect’ (Sheppard 2015). In Borno state alone, an estimated ‘28%’ of schools have been ‘destroyed’ (Winsor 2015). These attacks have ‘forced’ an estimated ‘one million’ school children ‘out of school’ in north-eastern Nigeria (Kermeliotis 2015 & Sheppard 2015). School children – as in the infamous abduction of 200 school girls from Chibok in 2011 - have been ‘targeted’ and often end up as ‘victims of sexual abuse, forced marriage, abductions and brutal killings’ (Kermeliotis 2015 & Winsor 2015). Boko Haram has also threatened teachers from ‘returning to classes’ (Kermeliotis 2015). Since 2009, over ‘600 teachers’ have been killed or kidnapped, while some ‘19 000’ teachers and students have been ‘displaced’ (Kermeliotis 2015 & Winsor 2015). This has effectively discouraged teaching and it has greatly ‘undermined’ and hampered the ‘educational process’ in northern Nigeria (Premium Times N.D.).

ii) Marginalisation and Ethnicity in Nigeria

Nigeria is particularly prone to high levels of marginalisation and inequality. As illustrated in the previous section, the high poverty rates have effectively divided the state into two: the North and the South. Northern Nigeria is predominantly under resourced and underdeveloped as compared to southern Nigeria. This has effectively led to deep divisions within Nigeria. In fact, Nigeria is considered as one of the most ‘deeply divided’ states within Africa (Osaghae and Suberu 2005:

4). With over 350 ethnic groups within its borders, it is unsurprising that Nigeria has a ‘long’, ‘perennial’ and ‘complex history’ of tensions around issues concerning ‘ethnicity’ and religion (Adebanwi 2005: 342, Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 63, Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 4 & Sergie and Johnson 2015).

Map 6: Ethnic map of Nigeria



<http://www.nairaland.com/2453728/map-ethnic-groups-nigeria-it>

The resulting environment has led to ‘divisions’ as well as ‘uneasy relations’ within Nigeria (Adebanwi 2005: 342 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 4). Much of the intrastate tensions stems from the exclusionary policies and the ‘alienation’ of groups within Nigeria (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 59 & Solomon 2013: 30). After independence, Nigeria actively pursued ‘exclusionary’ policies which conferred different rights to those living in specific states (Solomon 2013: 29). In some localities, ‘marked distinctions’ between those who are native born and those who are foreign born, only served to accentuate the already simmering and fractious tensions (Solomon 2013: 29). Because of divisions and tensions in language, ethnicity, culture and religion, Nigeria has been rendered ungovernable, ‘fragile’ and ‘unstable’ (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 4 & Solomon 2013: 29). Nigeria therefore finds itself in a very susceptible position

to acts of ‘disintegration, secession, civil strife, civil war, minority agitation and violent conflict’ (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 4 & Solomon 2013: 29).

Ethnicity is a key influencing factor in the inequality and marginalisation in Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 9). In particular, issues around access to ‘power’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘resources’ have contributed to much of the tensions (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 9). During the 1960s till the 1980s, northern Nigeria was gripped by ‘ethnic politics’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 61). The early 1990s saw the Niger Delta struggling to resolve the political ‘power imbalances’ of marginalised minority groups within the region (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 42). These tensions severely ‘underdeveloped’ northern Nigerian (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 49). In fact, in terms of its socio-economic indicators, northern Nigeria is ranked very low on ‘all measurements of development’ (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 49). Due to years of government ‘neglect’, ‘deprivation’ and ‘insensitivity’, many instances of unrest, ‘agitation’, ‘conflict’, protests and violence have erupted within northern Nigeria (Adebanwi 2005: 339, Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 45 & 49). The main outcry for this behaviour is a demand was for greater equity and ‘treatment’, especially in regards to the booming oil reserves that emerged in the 1970s (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 42). The discovery of oil served as a source of ‘marginalisation and balkanisation’ in Nigeria (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 42). As a result, there have been several calls by political activists for ‘greater local control’ over natural resources (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 60).

In addition to this, there is an additional layer of division arising from regional divisions within Nigeria. The federal system in Nigeria laid the foundations for much of the tensions, marginalisation and ‘conflicts’ within the country (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 60 & 61). In 1946, Nigeria was sub-divided into three ‘unequal’ regions: the North, East and West (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 41 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 12). By 1953, these regional divisions were elevated to grievances (Idahosa 2015: 11). Understandably, this created pressure and tension between the different regions, especially between northern and southern Nigeria (Idahosa 2015: 11). In fact, this ‘destabilising’ flaw has created ‘marginalisation of the minority ethnic nationalities’ that live in the three dominant ethnic regions (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 41). In 1963, an additional tension arose with the creation of the Mid-West

region, which further added to the already frayed 'regional structure' (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 12). These regional divisions permanently established the Niger Delta as the 'largest' and most impoverished ethnic minority within Nigeria (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 41). The federal and regional structure reduced the country to 'North for Northerners, East for Easterners and West for Westerners', and was a source of discrimination and marginalisation (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 12). Because of this, minority groups and people from other regions were 'deprived' of their 'rights and privileges', and were often 'excluded from the political process' (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 12). This exclusion was adapted and integrated into the 'new political-administrative structures', which only further entrenched the divisions between the local and federal state functions (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 12). As such there have been calls for a re-negotiation of the Nigerian Federal Constitution, to allow for the devolution of power to the 'states, local authorities and local communities' (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 60).

The unrest and marginalisation in Nigeria stems from the government's failure, inability, and its 'abdication' to carry out core duties in governing the state (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 47). In some 'extreme cases', the government has been accused of being guilty of 'insensitivity' as a means of perpetuating the 'economic and political disparities' in the country (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 47 & Welch 1995: 635). With such strong 'ethnic dominance' within regional states, it is no wonder that 'smaller' minority groups feel dispossessed and excluded (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 47 & Welch 1995: 635). This has consequently created a 'volatile atmosphere' which has been exploited by groups such as Boko Haram (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 45).

iii) The Youth in Nigeria

'Youth politics' plays a pivotal role in Nigeria (Nolte 2004: 63). It straddles and bisects 'a number of popular and traditional, religious, historical and political discourses' (Nolte 2004: 62). Like poverty, inequality and marginalisation in Nigeria, youth politics 'cuts across' its length', 'breadth' and age spectrum (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857). This has allowed for the harbouring and festering of feelings of discontent and mistrust towards the Nigerian state (Rogers 2012: 3). Among the aggrieved and excluded groups in Nigeria are the youth. Youth politics is thus a form of 'refuge' for those who have been alienated and excluded from

‘educational, political and economic opportunities’ (Nolte 2004: 69). With the ever increasingly numbers of ‘qualified and unqualified youths’, there is a high competition in the already ‘saturated labour market’ (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 80). As a result of repeated ‘marginalisation and neglect’, ‘poverty, a poor environment and a lack of facilities’, the jobless youth of northern Nigeria have become an important and vulnerable group (Arowosegbe 2009: 576 & Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 46). They have become known as the ‘*Almajiri*’, due to the fact that they are ‘unemployed’, and are always willing to ‘get involved and perpetuate violence’ for some sort of payment (Danjibo N.D.: 15). Their plight has become increasingly ‘widespread’, and has resulted in increased restlessness and violent behaviour, especially in the Niger Delta (Arowosegbe 2009: 576 & Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 46).

During the 1990s, youth activity and restiveness was particularly ‘violent’, as it was closely associated with ‘ethnic, religious and other forms of communal violence’ (Nolte 2004: 74). The youth in northern Nigeria felt that they were denied of ‘opportunities’ and a ‘sense of belonging’ (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 46). Young and unemployed men were drawn into the fray of ‘bitter’ political contests and the ‘growing economic inequality’ in Nigeria (Nolte 2004: 74). As a result, there was an inevitable increase in violent behaviour, ‘clashes and uprisings’ between the northern locals and the federal government (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857 & Nolte 2004: 74).

While much of the plight of the youth is driven by legitimate ‘grievances’ against an ineffective government, there is also an element of ‘self-agendas and greed’ (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857). Unfortunately, radical, transnational groups, like Boko Haram, have gained a foothold to manipulate, ‘engage in and try to influence’ the tense situation for their own benefit (Danjibo 2009: 7 & Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 80). There has therefore been an upsurge in the youth joining these groups, as these groups have shown the capacity to understand and address the concerns of the youth (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 54). Therefore, the youth have become more easily prone to perpetuating ‘violence’ and ‘crime’ (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 54 & Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 80). This is a scenario which has ‘persisted’ for many years and has led to protest action, as well as the ‘destruction’ of property and

government facilities i.e. ‘schools, health centres, roads, water and other utility systems’ by transnational groups (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 54).

c) Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria has had a long, violent and repetitive history (Adesoji 2010: 96 and Danjibo 2009: 16). It is a state synonymous with violence, authoritarianism and ‘military’ rule (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 44). Over the years, violence has been used, deployed and ‘unleashed’ within the state (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78). Consequently, there has been a build-up of waves of discontent, ‘violent communal conflicts’, police torture, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and even detention (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 21 & Nolte 2004: 61). These acts have contributed to challenging ‘the legitimacy of the state’, and have created ‘physical, structural and psychological’ insecurity within Nigeria (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78 & Nolte 2004: 61). This is a result of a number of factors i.e. weak governance and ‘infrastructure’, ‘ethnic and religious diversity’, ‘poverty’ and ‘insurgency’ (Danjibo 2009: 16, Nolte 2014: 61 and Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 5).

During colonisation, police violence was ‘a recurring’ problem in Nigeria (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 18). Under colonial rule, the police would often ‘suppress’, injure and ‘kill’ those who ‘opposed colonial rule and policies’ (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 18). As a result the police were seen as an ‘instrument of riot, opposition and suppression’ (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 33). The police often abused their ‘power’ and were guilty of ‘despotism’ (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 20 and 33). This ‘punitive’ style of deployment instigated negativity and resentment toward the police forces (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 33). In more recent years, this ‘legacy’ has been re-perpetuated by the police and the security forces, especially towards opposition and rebel groups (Adesoji 2010: 96 & Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 18). For instance, in 2011, troops were deployed on roads in a ‘combat ready fashion’ (Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78). This resulted in reactionary responses and a ‘culture of impunity’ towards the police and security forces (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 37).

The end of colonial rule saw the ‘militarisation’ and consolidation of the police and the military (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 34). During the colonial period, the police and military were

'local' and 'decentralised' units (Human Rights Watch 2005). Their mandate was the promotion of the 'economic and political agenda of the colonisers' (Human Rights Watch 2005). Under this strict 'dictatorial' rule, violence became a more commonplace occurrence (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 19). For 30 years after its independence, Nigeria has had several successive regimes of 'protracted military rule' with a similar violent nature as the colonial period (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 21 & Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 44). During this period, Nigeria also experienced 'high degree(s) of violence and insecurity' (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 856).

From 1958 to 2008, there were 'acts of state terrorism' and human rights violations across Nigeria (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857). In fact, since the 1980s, violence and conflict are also 'closely associated with the economic and political marginalisation' of minority groups, and the youth (Nolte 2004: 61). In some instances, these groups were 'manipulated' by the federal government, so as to help maintain and consolidate power for 'their own agenda' (Nolte 2004: 61). As a result, during the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria has continually experienced 'violent conflagrations and acts of terrorism' due to the 'repressive' regimes (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 856 & Arowosegbe 2009: 576). During the 1990s, youth politics and the regional and ethnic tensions resulted in a build-up of bitter relations and growing discontent towards the Nigerian state. As a result, the Nigerian government was forced to 'beef up' their 'military presence' in the country to 'maintain the peace' (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 50 & 53). However, the inclusion of the military has only served to 'aggravate' and worsen the 'restiveness and violence' (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 50). The inclusion of the military also triggered 'widespread killing', 'destruction of property', and the 'displacement of people' (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 50 & 53). The actions of the Nigerian state therefore served to reinforce the idea that the state was insensitive to the plight of its own citizens (Nseabasi, Akpan, and Akpabio 2003: 50). In these instances, the Nigerian state has been at fault for perpetuating and inciting violence, due to its inability to 'secure itself' and the rights of the 'common man' (Human Rights Watch 2010, Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 61 & Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent 2012: 78). This same pattern continued into the late twentieth century and early twenty first century. The police and military continued to make use of 'lethal' and 'disproportionate' force against its citizens (Human Rights Watch 2005). Incidences of 'extortion, embezzlement' and

corruption undermine human rights and perpetuate the lawless behaviour within the police force (Human Rights Watch 2010).

In response to these incidents, there has been an ‘emergence and ascendancy of militia organisations, struggles and movements’ (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857). These groups have sought to alleviate the ‘political and economic inequities’, and ‘exploitative economic relations’ dating back to the colonial era (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 19 & Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 42). As a result, these groups have also made use of violence to pursue their own ‘ethno-political agendas’, as a means of correcting the Nigerian state’s exclusionary policies (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 857). Since 1999, violence levels have increased and ‘tens of thousands’ have died due to ‘politically, ethnic’ or ‘religious violence’ (Amnesty International 2011: 30). With the emergence of Boko Haram, the death toll has only increased (Amnesty International 2011: 30). Between 2009 and 2015, 20 000 people have died, while a further 2 million have been displaced by the on-going conflict (Amnesty International N.D., Human Rights Watch 2016, Uhrmacher and Sheridan 2016). Boko Haram has also affected neighbouring West African states, like the killing of citizens in Chad (Al Jazeera 2017). This history of violence seriously questions Nigeria’s capacity to lead and govern its territory (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 62). Due to poor governance, corruption, as well as the ‘mismanagement and the under-resourcing of key state functions like policing’, Nigeria is now in a state of crisis (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 62).

Over the course of its history, the police, security forces and the military have used ‘extra-judicial killings, and ‘crude brutality’ against Nigerian citizens and opposition leaders (Danjibo 2009: 13). These acts have been used as a crude method of ‘crisis management’, as well as an ‘aggressive means’ to resolving the growing ‘threats of instability’ within Nigeria (Danjibo 2009: 13). There have been reports of ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘extrajudicial killings and disappearances’ attributed to the police (Amnesty International 2011: 8, Sergie and Johnson 2015 & Campbell and Harwood 2012). In 2009 alone, an estimated 1049 people were reportedly killed by the police (Amnesty International 2011: 8). These acts are a clear ‘violation of fundamental human rights’ as prescribed and enshrined in International Law (Danjibo 2009: 13). Many of those killed, died while in ‘police detention’ or during arrests (Amnesty International

2011: 8). It has also been reported that torture has been used as a tool to ‘extract information (Amnesty International 2011: 8). This highlights the disregard and ‘absence of the rule of law’, where human rights have been disregarded by the Nigerian government (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 33 & Danjibo 2009: 13). It has also cultivated a culture of fear and anger towards the governing authority (Danjibo 2009: 13).

The many years of military rule have made Nigeria a weak and ‘corrupt’ state, incapable of delivering on development, peace, governance and stability to its citizens (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 44). The Nigerian state has failed to control the ‘simmering conflicts’ within its borders which has in-turn led to increased violence (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 61). This has only contributed to additional conflict and violence within the country due to the ineffective leadership and poor management of issues like the allocation and distribution of resources (Amnesty International 2011: 8 & Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 42 and 44). Often state services like the police and military are ill equipped and ill trained to deal with ‘complex crimes’ (Amnesty International 2011: 8). This is due to the corrupt practices of the Nigerian government, as well as the lack of governance of resources within Nigeria (Amnesty International 2011: 8).

d) Political and Religious Stability

i) Political History in Nigeria

It is important to situate and illustrate Nigeria’s history, as a means of mapping, tracing and pinpointing the causal source for the state’s insecurity.

Table 1: Timeline of political unrest in Nigeria

| Date | Incident |
|-------------|--|
| 1850s | The United Kingdom establishes its presence in Lagos. |
| 1861 – 1914 | The United Kingdom consolidates its hold and governance over the ‘Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’. |
| 1960 | Nigeria gains independence and Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa leads a coalition government. |
| 1962 – 1963 | A controversial census is issued and this fuels regional and ethnic tensions. |
| 1966 | January – Prime Minister Balewa killed in a coup. A military government is formed under the leadership of Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. July – General Ironsi is killed in a counter-coup, and is replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. |
| 1967 | Beginning of the Biafran war – a bloody war in which three eastern Nigerian states secede as the Republic of Biafra. |
| 1970 | Biafran leaders surrender to the Nigerian military government. |
| 1975 | General Gowon is overthrown by Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed. The federal capital is moved to Abuja. |
| 1976 | General Mohammed is assassinated in failed coup attempt. Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo replaces him and introduces US-style presidential constitution. |
| 1983 | August-September - President Shagari is re-elected amid accusations of irregularities. |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| | December – a bloodless coup is instigated and Major General Muhammad Buhari seizes power. |
| 1985 | Ibrahim Babangida seizes power in bloodless coup and curtails political activity. |
| 1993 | June – The 1983 elections are annulled by the military. August - Power is transferred to an Interim National Government. November - General Sani Abacha seizes power and effectively suppresses the opposition. |
| 1998 | General Sani Abacha dies and is succeeded by Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Chief Moshood Abiola dies in police custody a month later. |
| 2000 | Islamic Sharia Law is instituted in several northern Nigerian states. This results in hundreds of deaths in clashes between Christians and Muslims. |
| 2001 | A tribal war erupts in Benue state (east-central Nigeria). Hundreds are displaced and government troops are dispatched to quell the fighting. This results in the deaths of more than 200 unarmed civilians. |
| 2002 | February – Ethnic clashes erupt in Lagos between the Hausas and Yorubas result in the deaths of 100 people. November – More than 200 people die in Muslim rioting over the planned Miss World beauty pageant. The event is eventually relocated to Britain. |
| 2003 | 12 April – Nigeria’s first legislative elections since 1999. The People’s Democratic Party manages to win the parliamentary majority. 19 April – Nigeria’s first civilian-run presidential elections. President Olusegun Obasanjo elected for second term with more than 60% of vote. This is a controversial win, as EU observers cite several ‘irregularities’. |
| 2004 | State of Emergency declared in the central Plateau State. More than 200 Muslims killed by Christian militia. Subsequent revenge attacks are launched by Muslim youths in Kano. |
| 2006 | January – Rebel militants (Niger Delta) commit acts of sabotage i.e. attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities, as well as the kidnapping of foreign oil workers. They demand more control over the region’s oil wealth. February – More than 100 Muslims killed in flares of religious violence in the city of Onitsha. April - Nigeria manages to pay off its debt to the Paris Club of rich lenders. This is largely due to record oil prices. |
| 2007 | Umaru Yar’Adua of the ruling People’s Democratic Party wins the presidential election. |
| 2008 | Rebel militants in the Niger Delta step up their attacks on oil installations. They cite this behaviour to the unprovoked attacks by the military on their bases. |
| 2009 | The radical Islamic movement, Boko Haram, launches series of violent attacks in north eastern Nigeria. This is done in a bid to impose Islamic Sharia law over the whole state. This results in hundreds being killed. Security forces storm the group’s stronghold and kill their leader. The government frees Henry Okah. He is the leader of the Niger Delta militant group MEND. This is done after he accepts an amnesty offer. |
| 2010 | After a long illness, Muslim President, Umaru Yar’Adua dies. Christian Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan succeeds him. |
| 2011 | President Goodluck Jonathan wins the presidential elections. However his rule is mired in controversy as it did follow the pre-arranged rotation between Muslim and Christian presidencies. |
| 2015 | President Muhammadu Buhari manages to win the presidential election. He becomes the first opposition candidate in Nigerian history to do so. |
| 2016 | June – the Nigerian currency (Naira) is ‘floated’. This done in order to stem off the financial crisis caused by low oil prices. November – In a bid to renew the southern insurgency, the Niger Delta Avengers rebels bomb three oil pipelines. |
| 2017 | The Nigerian air force accidentally bombs a refugee camp. This camp was mistakenly assumed to be a Boko Haram base in Rann. This error results in scores dying. |

www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world/africa-13949550

ii) Political Protest in Nigeria

There has been a long history of political protest by ‘non-state political’ actors in Nigeria (Falode 2016: 41). It is not a new phenomenon, and stems from Nigeria’s violent pre- and post-colonial history (Rogers 2012: 1). Several jihads by radical reformist groups have been staged in northern

Nigeria (Danjibo 2009: 3 & Loimeier 2012: 139). A predominant feature of these ‘new movements’ is the fact that Islam has been the backbone i.e. *Maitatsine, the Yan Izala, Boko Haram, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta rebels*, as well as a host of other groups and religious riots in the northern Nigeria (Adogame 2010: 483).

The first instance of political protest began in the ‘early nineteen hundred’ with Usman dan Fodio, who advocated for Muslim movements in northern Nigeria to pursue emancipation from secular rule, through the ‘establishment of the rule of religious scholars’ (Loimeier 2012: 139). Dan Fodio derived his mandate from ‘theological argumentation’ (Loimeier 2012: 139). This mandate ‘consequently’ became ‘a *sine qua non* for participation’ and reform in the northern Nigerian political arena (Loimeier 2012: 139). This participation ‘seriously challenged’ Westernisation and its ‘hegemonic position’ in the governing of northern Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 139). Westernisation was seen as a ‘threat’, and was considered as a corrupting influence due to the fact that it was expropriated from an ‘alien, colonial’, and predominantly ‘Christian’ perspective (Loimeier 2012: 139). This form of rule thus served as a continual reminder of a colonial and military rule that had been inefficient at governing and mitigating conflict within Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 139).

Following this first political protest, there has since been a rise of similar protests, especially in northern Nigeria. Since 1914, there have been a growing number of radical reformist groups of various forms in northern Nigeria (Rogers 2012: 1). During the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria saw a host of crisis break out: *the Kano metropolitan crisis (1982), University of Ibadan (1986), the Organisation of Islamic Conference crisis (1986), the debates on Sharia Law (1988), Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots (1987), Kaduna polytechnic riot (1988), the national debate at Bayero University crisis (1989), Bauchi/Katsina riots (1991), the Kano riot (1991), the Zangon-Kataf riot (1992), the Kano civil disturbance (1991), the Jos riots (1994, 2001, 2002, 2004 & 2008), the Shagamu conflict (1999)* (Adesoji 2010: 96 - 97). By the 2000’s, an ‘increasing’ number of fragmented and ‘ultra-radical groups’ i.e. *MEND* (2000 – 2010) and the *Ombatse* (2013), had begun to form in the northern Nigeria political landscape (Falode 2016: 41 & Loimeier 2012: 148).

This increase in the number of radical reformist groups was a result of multiple and ‘interlinked’ factors (Rogers 2012: 1). As illustrated in the preceding sections, the Nigerian political and socio-economic landscape has been one that is volatile and in constant flux. The heterogeneity of the Nigeria in terms of ethnicity, language and religion has created a particularly volatile enabling environment (Adesoji 2010: 96). ‘Fear and animosities’ have been a source of tension among Nigerians (Adesoji 2010: 96). Coupled with this, Nigeria also suffers from ‘religious sensitivity’ (Adesoji 2010: 96). With the dawn of the early 2000s, the number of fragmented, ‘ultra-radical’ and religious groups rapidly increased in Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 148). A number of these groups began to take on the ‘religious-political spectrum’ of northern Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 148). The by-product of this is an inevitable increase in ‘violent uprisings, riots and disturbances’ and an ‘unhealthy rivalry’ between groups, which have become a ‘recurring pattern’ over the course of Nigeria’s history (Adesoji 2010: 96 & 97 and Danjibo 2009: 15). Much of these tensions and disturbances also stem from a history shadowed by violence, government ‘ineptitude’, greed and corruption (Adesoji 2010: 96 & Danjibo 2009: 16).

iii) Religion in Nigeria

Religion is also a focal point in this research. Historically, religion did not hold as much importance as it was ‘considered to be a private affair’, especially in international political affairs (Danjibo 2009: 2). With the rise of secular thought and Enlightenment, the ‘potency of religion in public life’ was drastically reduced (Danjibo 2009: 2). For much of the 20th century, religious influence was ‘diminished’ to make room for secularisation, ‘consumerism and hedonism’ (Danjibo 2009: 2). However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, religious thought was effectively re-invigorated within the international arena. The subsequent 9/11 attacks on the ‘twin towers of New York’, cemented ‘global prominence’ and re-emergence of religion onto the international arena (Adesoji 2010: 96 and Danjibo 2009: 2). It therefore becomes important to acknowledge and explain the significance of the interlinkages between religion, governance, conflict and statehood (Danjibo 2009: 2).

There is an inherent presupposition of the distinct separation between ‘religion and government’ in Nigeria (Idahosa 2015: 1). In fact, the contrary is true for Nigeria, as religion plays a strong role in every facet of public and private life. Religion has been guaranteed in the Nigerian

constitution (Adesoji 2011: 99). The religious make-up of Nigeria consists of Muslims making up 50% of the population, while Christianity consists of 40% of the population, and the remaining 10% forming part of traditional religious groups (Solomon 2013: 29). As illustrated by Map 7, one can see how this tension has virtually split the state into two, with southern Nigeria predominantly occupied by Christians; and northern Nigeria predominantly by Muslims (Idahosa 2015: 1). As such, religion is a highly charged arena and shares a tenuous platform with that of the political environment. It is an equally divisive force within Nigeria, with the mainstay of religious conflict waged between Christian and Muslim identities (Sergei and Johnson 2015). This conflict was particularly tenuous during the 1980s (Adogame 2010: 483). It resulted in numerous ‘violent clashes’ between the two groups over the years (Campbell and Harwood 2012). This ‘cleavage’ is so deep that it cleanly divides the country into the ‘North-South’ (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 11). It has subsequently resulted a power struggle, as well as ‘religious politics’ within Nigeria (Adogame 2010: 486).

Map 7: Religious map of Nigeria



<https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21636771-politics-and-religion-make-combustible-electoral-mixture-church-state-and>

Though religion is guaranteed within Nigeria, there is no formal provision for ‘state religion’ (Idahosa 2015: 1). However with the way in which religion is wielded and used, it would be easy to think that religion is a formal part of the Nigerian state. Since the 1970s, religion has had a strong role in Nigeria (Adesoji 2011: 99). The political environment can be classified as being religionised, as there is an open competition to ‘shape and define’ the Nigerian state along a religious framework (Adogame 2010: 487). As explained above and in chapter one, Islam and Christianity have tried to assume a ‘greater access to resources and political influence’ (Idahosa 2015: 2). Particularly in reference to the election of heads of state in Nigeria, religion has been a powerful and ‘sensitive’ conduit for exercising control (Campbell N.D.). Every presidential election in Nigeria sees a rotation of leadership between the Christian and Muslim leaders, in a bid to gain power and authority (Ruby and Shah 2007). This stems from the formalised, regional rotation of the presidency (Baldauf 2010). This pattern and arrangement is enshrined in the Nigerian constitution and was instituted in an effort to dispel the tensions between Christians and Muslims. In addition to this, there is also an informal rotation between Muslim and Christian presidency’s which is done every eight years (Baldauf 2010 and Nwosu and Ugwuera 2014: 51).

This ‘informal’ arrangement has been in place from ‘1999 to 2011’, however it is not ‘enshrined’ within the constitution and is thus susceptible to political abuse (Campbell N.D & Nwosu and Ugwuera 2014: 51). With the death of President Yar’Adua in 2010, this ‘delicate’ political balance was disrupted (Hoffmann 2014: 12). It led to the ascension of a Christian President, Goodluck Jonathan to replace Yar’Adua at his death (Hoffmann 2014: 12). Although this was a constitutional requirement, it resulted in the political environment becoming more politically charged (Hoffmann 2014: 12). The predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria felt greatly snubbed by this arrangement, as they felt that a Muslim candidate should have continued the role of presidency in the place of Yar’Adua (Kimenyi 2015). In the 2011, President Jonathan won the presidential elections (BBC 2011 and Human Rights Watch 2011). In the 2015 presidential elections, President Buhari overthrew President Jonathan in a hotly contested election (BBC News 2017 and Kimenyi 2015). This was a significant win, as it was the first time that an opposition candidate had beaten a sitting president (Gander 2015 and Kimenyi 2015).

It is also interesting to note that this divide is not only limited to the main religious groups. There are ‘sub-cleavages’ within these religious groupings (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 11). There are divisions amongst Christians between ‘Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostal’; as there are divisions amongst the Muslims between the ‘Ahmadiyya, Sanusiyya, Tijanniyya and Quandriyya’ (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 11). These divisions represent the multiplicity of inter-faith interests, which subsequently represent the fractious nature of interests and relations that are at play in Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 11). There is therefore no more controversial area of concern in Nigeria as religion, as it is both a ‘crucial’ and ‘influential’ force in society (Danjibo 2009: 3). It has a role in the ‘political development’ of the pre-and post-independent state (Danjibo 2009: 3). However, it is viewed with much negativity and scepticism, due to the fact that there have been ‘several religious crises’ in Nigeria by radical transnational groups i.e. *the ‘Maitatsine’ and ‘Boko Haram’* (Danjibo 2009: 3).

These religious tensions are even more complex than the simple Muslim/ Christian divide. There are more intricate and interwoven divisions. It is often difficult to ‘differentiate between the religious and ethnic conflict’, as the country is divided into ‘ethno-religious’ and ‘ethno-regional’ groupings (Danjibo 2009: 17 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 19). Therefore the ‘line’ between religion and ethnicity is ambiguous and blurred (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 19). Nigeria is thus home to a ‘dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities’ that run deep (Adogame 2010: 487 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 19). There are ethno-religious ‘grievances’ over the ‘distribution of power’, resources and privileges (Adogame 2010: 487). As a result there have been multiple ethno-religious clashes. These are often violent, especially around the ‘borderline states’, and particularly between the ‘Muslim North’ and the ‘Christian South’ of Nigeria (Danjibo 2009: 17 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 19). In the 1980s, the Maitatsine brought in an element of ‘religious fundamentalism’ to the northern Nigeria which led to a general ethno-religious conflict within Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 7 & 8). This led to clashes and riots, most notably in the northern cities of Kaduna (2000) and Jos (2001) (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 19). In addition, the Nigerian state increasingly began to politicise religion. With the introduction of Islamic penal code in several Northern states in 1998, this only served to further increase ‘long served’ and ‘implicit criticism of political corruption in the north’ of Nigeria (Nolte 2004: 76).

iv) Significant radical religious groups in Nigeria

As illustrated by the section above, the Nigerian peninsula has been plagued by numerous instances of political protests during the course of its history. Since 1960, the number of ‘aggrieved segments of society’ has steadily risen, and they have begun to mobilise and compete with each other, and with the government, for legitimacy in the Nigerian state (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007: 60 & Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 4).

Map 8: Terror group activities in Nigeria



<https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21590909-terrorist-insurgency-has-deepened-poor-regions-already-grave-problems-why>

As shown on Map 8, radical religious groups, mainly from northern Nigeria, have taken center stage in the political and socio-economic arena. These groups have sought change and reformation within Nigeria, particularly in the form of a type of Islamisation. Of great significance to this study are the activities of two prominent Islamic groups: *the Maitatsine and the Yan Izala*. These two groups were pivotal catalysts to the birth and formation of Boko Haram. One can even classify them as forerunners to Boko Haram’s ideology, mandate and tactics.

- The Maitatsine

The name Maitatsine is derived from Hausa, and means ‘the one who dams’ (Adesoji 2011: 101). There is an irony in the meaning of this name, as it serves to illustrate the frustration of its adherents. The emergence of the Maitatsine represents a major fault line in northern Nigerian history. The Maitatsine are a ‘paradigmatic example’ for Boko Haram (Loimeier 2012: 140). This is due to the fact that both groups have ‘ultra-fundamentalist’ and reformist ideology (Loimeier 2012: 140). This was based on their ‘social roots’, as rejections of westernisation (Loimeier 2012: 140). Coupled with this, both groups are ‘radical and militant’ in ‘character’ (Loimeier 2012: 140).

The Maitatsine were formed in the 1960s, following the country’s independence (Rogers 2012: 1 & Loimeier 2012: 140). Created and led by the ‘Cameroonian Muslim scholar Muhammad Marwa’, the Maitatsine represented a ‘radical rejection’ of everything ‘non-Qur’anic’ (Danjibo 2009: 6. Isichei 1987: 196 & Loimeier 2012: 140). This included western ‘materialism’ and ‘technology’ (Isichei 1987: 196). Marwa sought to purify Islam of the corrupting influence of ‘modernisation (Danjibo N.D. 6). Most of its membership consisted of the ‘poor’, ‘homeless’ and ‘unemployed urban youths’ of northern Nigeria, mainly from its home base in the Kano region (Danjibo 2009: 6, Isichei 1987: 201 & Rogers 2012: 1).

The height of the Maitatsine’s political protest was staged during the 1970s and 1980s (Loimeier 2012: 140). They were ‘convinced’ of the need for ‘violent confrontation’ (Isichei 1987: 196). The protest action by the Maitatsine consisted of ‘clashes with the police in Kano, as well as a number of ‘uprisings’ in the 1980s (Adesoji 2010: 96, Isichei 1987: 196 & Rogers 2012: 1). The Maitatsine clashed with ‘state security’ forces on a number of occasions during this period i.e. in *Maiduguri and Kaduna (1982), Yola (1984), Gombe (1985), and Funtua (1993)* (Loimeier 2012: 140). This gained them the label of the ‘heretics’, a nickname created by ‘Kano’s scholarly establishment’ (Loimeier 2012: 140). These ‘clashes’ marked the beginning of ‘ferocious’ civil strife as well as the ‘first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria’ (Rogers 2012: 1 & Adesoji 2010: 96).

- The Yan Izala

At the same time as the Maitatsine were operating, another radical reformist group called the Yan Izala emerged (Loimeier 2012: 141). They were created in 1978, in the ‘city of Jos’ and are the ‘largest’ and ‘most influential’ reform group in northern Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 140 & 141 and Mantzikos 2010: 58). A direct translation of their name translates to a breaking away from a secular, ‘established society’ (Loimeier 2012: 141). The Yan Izala were founded on the ‘struggle’ of Abubakar Gumi and the 1960s reform ‘against the Sufi orders’ (Loimeier 2012: 140). They were the reason for the ‘un-Islamic innovations’, as the Yan Izala openly opposed and ‘rejected the constitution’ (Adesoji 2011: 103 and Loimeier 2012: 141). Like the Maitatsine, the Yan Izala membership was drawn largely from the ‘poor’ (Isichei 1987: 203).

Their founder was a ‘former army iman’ named Ismaila Idris (Loimeier 2012: 141). Like the Maitatsine, they rejected ‘all manifestations of allegedly un-Islamic character’ (Loimeier 2012: 141). The Yan Izala advocated for ‘substantial’ reformation that was ‘emancipatory’ in nature (Loimeier 2012: 141). It would cut across all sectors and advocated for the modernised mobilisation of the ‘political’ and the ‘religious’ (Loimeier 2012: 141). The Yan Izala represented an attempt to spread and ‘popularize’ the tenets of ‘social liberation and religious rebellion against the established authorities’ (Loimeier 2012: 143). This contributed in an ease of access to their teachings, as well as their spread to different ‘arenas’ (Loimeier 2012: 143). They were particularly hostile to ‘established Sufi orders’ (Loimeier 2012: 141). Thus they employed the use of force and ‘violence’ to enforce their dogma (Loimeier 2012: 141). The Yan Izala also supported the formation of ‘proper reformist organisations’ to fight in whole of northern Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 142). The greatest significance of the emergence of Yan Izala was that it brought about a religious ‘commodification’ of preaching and activities in northern Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 142).

However from the 1970s to the early 2000s, Yan Izala experienced leadership turmoil between Abubakar Gumi and Ismaila Idris (Loimeier 2012: 145). This was largely due to issues of spiritual significance (Loimeier 2012: 144). In addition, there were a number of leadership in-fighting and ‘rebellions’ (Loimeier 2012: 145). This led to multiple ‘splits’ within the Yan Izala and the development of groups counter to the Yan Izala i.e. *ahl al-sunna* and *Daawa* (Loimeier

2012: 146). This was due to the marginalisation of certain factions, the support of the Babangida government, 'financial mismanagement' and 'authoritarian' leadership styles within Yan Izala. As a result, the Yan Izala lost 'influence', especially in the city of Jos (Loimeier 2012: 146).

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided a brief historical timeline and guide of the deficiencies and challenges which have plagued the Nigerian political and security landscape. These threats and insecurities serve as the basis to understanding the rise and emergence of Boko Haram, as a result of the deficiencies of successive Nigerian administrations inadequacy in maintaining security, order and governance. Nigeria has thus been unable to 'enthroned and consolidate' civilian rule, 'democracy and good governance' (Alemika and Chukwuma 2000: 19). Despite 10 years of civilian rule, the militarisation of the Nigerian state has continued to 'manifest itself in different forms and different times' (Danjibo 2009: 16). This prevented Nigeria from fully enjoying and developing 'a culture of democracy' (Danjibo 2009: 13). It is from this overview that five deficiencies: corruption, poverty, violence, marginalisation, the youth, and the impact of religion, present a threat to the stability of the Nigeria. These deficiencies are also some of indicators and drivers of the insecurities which threaten to destabilise West Africa. They also provide the conceptual and contextual identification and reasoning behind the emergence of Boko Haram, as a means of filling the gap left open by the Nigerian governing authorities.

Chapter 4: The Nigerian State

4.1 Introduction

With the guide of the preceding chapters, this study can now conduct a comprehensive analysis of Boko Haram. This will allow for the inclusion of a brief outline of the group's origins, objectives, actions and strategies. This will allow for a deep insight into Boko Haram's ideology, functionality and methodology. This chapter will identify Boko Haram as a religious fundamental group. Through this lens, Boko Haram can be understood as a group that uses religion as a functional mechanism to undermine governance and the legitimacy of Nigerian state. It is through these tactics that Boko Haram also seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate within Nigeria and West Africa.

4.2 Boko Haram: History, Mandate and Objectives

The following chapter will provide a timeline of events that will enhance the understanding of Boko Haram within Nigeria and West Africa. It is through this that one can trace Boko Haram's origins, development, and behaviour, as conditioned by the ineffective governance within Nigeria. It also allows for one to see how Boko Haram has radicalised its brand under the banner of religion, which is wielded as a tool to manipulate, impose and enforce its objectives. The table below provides a summative look at the incidents and attacks perpetuated within Nigeria.

Table 2: Timeline of incidents and attacks by Boko Haram

| Date | Incident (Boko Haram claims responsibility) |
|-------------|--|
| 2010 | December – Bomb attacks on Christmas Eve in the city of Jos. An estimated 80 people were killed. An additional 200 were killed in 'reprisal attacks' and clashes between Christians and Muslims. |
| 2011 | August – bomb attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja. An estimated 23 people killed. December – Christmas day bomb attacks on Christian churches. An estimated 40 people killed. A state of emergency is ordered by President Jonathan. |
| 2012 | January – targeted bombings and shootings in the Kano region. 100 people are reported to have died. |
| 2013 | May – the northern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa are placed under state of emergency. The government sends military troops to battle Boko Haram in these states. September – roadside attacks that leave more than 150 dead in northeast Nigeria. |
| 2014 | April – 200 Chibok school children are kidnapped in northern Nigeria. November - Boko Haram declares its 'allegiance to Islamic State. It proceeds to launch attacks on north eastern Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. |
| 2015 | February-March – a military coalition (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger) is formed to combat Boko Haram. |

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696>

4.2.1 Origins of Boko Haram

As highlighted in Chapter 3, page 51, the emergence of radical reformist groups highlights the ‘divided’ nature of Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 152). Tensions and divisions in Nigeria are particularly strenuous, because the state is not ‘homogeneous’ (Loimeier 2012: 152). The Nigerian state is an amalgamation of ‘numerous larger and smaller movements and groups’ (Loimeier 2012: 152). Each group has its own agendas and ambitions which ‘mirror’ the ‘social, political and religious orientations and divisions’ within the country (Loimeier 2012: 152). While some i.e. Boko Haram, have ambitions to ‘fight against the Nigerian state’, others seek to navigate the ‘governmental dynamics and politics of positioning’, in a quest for more equitable relations (Loimeier 2012: 152). With all of these different and competing ideals, it is small wonder that there is much tension, ‘competition’ and conflict within Nigeria (Loimeier 2012: 152).

This study primarily focuses on the actions, activities and strategies of one such group within Nigeria: Boko Haram. The diverse nature of Nigeria has brought about an inevitable clash of ideas on the rule and governance of the state (Adesoji 2010: 96). Along with this, Nigeria’s contentious and violent past, as well as the inefficiencies in governance, as discussed in chapter 3, have allowed for and cultivated a unique environment for radical religious groups to flourish and challenge legitimate authority. Drawing its roots from the early nineteenth century with *Usman dan Fodio* and through subsequent early iterations of radical Islamic groups i.e. *the Maitatsine and the Yan Izala*, Boko Haram have been catapulted to the Nigerian, West African and global international arena (Adogame 2010: 483, Danjibo 2009: 3 and Loimeier 2012: 139). At each of these junctures, the Nigerian state has failed to effectively mitigate and remedy the challenges and grievances raised by the northern Nigeria. This has thus raised the level of insecurity within Nigeria and allowed for aggrieved groups to take a stand in the political arena of Nigeria. Corrupt practices by the successive Nigerian administrations and society, marginalisation, inequality and brutal police tactics have also played a role in perpetuating the economic and political divide between northern and southern Nigeria. In particular the informal rotational presidency arrangement has not been administered accurately to placate and appease the northerners i.e. the ascension of Goodluck Jonathan at Yar’Adua’s death (Kimenyi 2015).

As illustrated by the above section, it is therefore not surprising that Boko Haram is ‘not the first Muslim movement’ in northern Nigeria to pursue a mission or a ‘*jihad*’ (Falode 2016: 41 and Loimeier 2012: 139). Boko Haram’s emergence is a testament to the continued ‘ineptitude’ and inefficiency of the Nigerian government. Dating back to the colonial era, the Nigerian state has failed to provide for the needs of all its citizens i.e. health, education, and it has failed to quell the ‘regular outbreaks of violence’ that have erupted during the course of the nation’s history (Adesoji 2010: 96, Loimeier 2012: 139 & Sergei and Johnson 2015). This has contributed greatly to the instability within the country.

The origins of Boko Haram, its inception and exact emergence are ‘controversial’ (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 858, & Onuoha 2012: 2). Boko Haram is often compared to the Maitatsine, and is often thought of as an ‘extension’ of the group (Idahosa 2015: 4 - 5). This is due to the fact that both groups sought to eradicate the ‘heresies’ of secular society, and to impose ‘Sharia’ law on the whole of Nigeria (Idahosa 2015: 5, Mantzikos 2010: 61 and Solomon 2013: 28). There is consensus that the ‘outbreak’ of the group in 2009, is the by-product of a ‘recurring pattern’ of ‘violent uprisings’, ‘divisions of wealth and poverty’, perverse ‘corruption’ and ‘abusive security forces’, as addressed in chapter 3 (Adibe 2012: 12, Adesoji 2010: 96, Loimeier 2012: 138, Rogers 2012: 2 & Sergie and Johnson 2015). Boko Haram is also a by-product of the ‘social, political and generational dynamics’ in northern Nigeria (Adesoji 2010: 96, Loimeier 2012: 138, Rogers 2012: 2 & Sergie and Johnson 2015). Boko Haram is thus a ‘symptom’ of the failure of the Nigerian government (Adibe 2012: 12).

Boko Haram has a ‘strong Wahhabist Islamist’ character based on teachings of *Usman dan Fodio*, as explained in Chapter 3, page 47 (Solomon 2013: 28). Their brand of religion seeks to correct the ‘repressive’ and immoral Nigerian state which is the main source of the ‘socio-economic condition’ (Idahosa 2015: 13). They can therefore be said to have a ‘political and social programme’ targeted at emancipation (Mantzikos 2010: 58). Boko Haram is said to have been founded in 1995, by Abubakar Lawan in the state of Borno (Adibe 2012: 11, Falode 2016 & Onuoha 2012: 2). Lawan’s vision for the group was a ‘non-violent’ and peaceful movement (Onuoha 2012: 2 & Sergie and Johnson 2015). It was ‘rooted’ in a strict adherence to ‘orthodox

Islam' (Onuoha 2010: 57 & Onuoha 2012: 2). It was one that abhorred 'western education', 'culture and modern science', hence the adoption of the group's nickname of Boko Haram (Adesoji 2011: 106, Danjibo 2009: 7 & Onuoha 2012: 2). However, in a statement released by the then acting leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru, in August 2009, he stated that Boko Haram, does not consider 'western education' to be 'a sin' (Onuoha 2012: 2). In this statement, Umaru referred to the fact that 'western civilisation' should be 'forbidden' within Nigeria (Cook 2011: 3, Danjibo 2009: 6, Mantzikos 2010: 58 & Onuoha 2012: 2). The reasoning for this is based on the fact that Boko Haram believes 'in the supremacy of Islamic culture' (Onuoha 2012: 2). This means that Islamic civilisation should not be governed or 'determined by western education' (Onuoha 2012: 2). However, this statement is confusing in itself, as one can argue that education can be considered as a part of culture and civilisation. As such, this shows one of the ways in which the Boko Haram can contradict and exploit Islamic teachings and ideology to suit its needs and agenda. This is indicative of Boko Haram's fundamentalist character as illustrated in chapter two, page 25.

Thus based on the above section, one can observe the 'ideological mission' and guiding principles of Boko Haram i.e. an 'overthrow' of the Nigerian state and the imposition of strict Islamic sharia law in Nigeria (Danjibo 2009: 7, Friedland 2011: 2, Liska 2001: 100 and Onuoha 2012: 2). This highlights Boko Haram's religious nationalist character. During its early years, Boko Haram sought to emancipate and enlighten 'devout Muslims' from a 'morally bankrupt' Nigerian state (Onuoha 2012: 2). One of the arguments for the emergence of Boko Haram is due to 'state-neglect, 'relative deprivation' and 'increasing' levels of 'poverty' and 'unemployment', key drivers of the insecurity and instability in Nigeria (Idahosa 2015: 2). This was based on the group's belief that fact that the Nigerian society is 'devoid' of social and political morality, and the fact that the Nigerian state was promoting 'idolatry' (Campbell 2014 and Onuoha 2012: 2). The Nigerian state had a long history of social, moral and 'political' depravity, as illustrated by in chapter 3 (Onuoha 2012: 2). 'Social vices and corruption' have thrived without check or restraint, and as a result the Nigerian state has been rendered ineffective and ill-equipped to curtail and manage the social degradation and governance within its borders (Onuoha 2012: 2). This has thereby destabilised the functioning and efficient running of the Nigerian state, tasked with providing for the largest populous on the African continent.

Membership to Boko Haram is derived from '19' northern Nigerian states, as well as the neighbouring West African states of Cameroon, 'Niger', 'Chad and Sudan' (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 858, Idahosa 2015: 4 & Onuoha 2012: 2). Its membership consists of the 'jobless youth', unemployed graduates, and former *almajiri*' (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 861, Falode 2016: 41, Onuoha 2012: 2 & 3 and Zenn 2013: 16). This phenomenon is similar to the membership quota of *the Maitatsine and the Yan Izala* as illustrated in chapter 3, page 51 and 52. This membership is particularly 'vulnerable to recruitment' and 'indoctrination', due to the fact that they are often 'illiterate', 'religiously-inclined youths' who live in 'appalling conditions' (Falode 2016: 41, Mantzikos 2010: 58, Onuoha 2012: 2 – 3 and Salaam 2013: 43). Boko Haram also consists of well-off, 'educated' and 'influential' people i.e. 'university lecturers, business contractors and politicians', who serve as financial backers for the group's activities (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 858 & Onuoha 2012: 2 & 3). This shows Boko Haram's skill at tapping into the long held 'public resentment' within many spheres of the citizenry (Salaam 2013: 48). As a result the Nigerian state's legitimacy as the sole governing institution has been compromised by its inability to address the needs of its population.

Boko Haram's activities and operations are largely centered in northern Nigeria, however there are documented cases of the group appearing in 'neighbouring Chad, Cameroon, Niger and even Mali' (Loimeier 2012: 138). This illustrates the great regional ramifications that Boko Haram has wrought to West Africa. It has also aided in Boko Haram's recruitment drive into West Africa i.e. Cameroon and Chad (Mantzikos 2010: 58). The external nature of Boko Haram is particularly troubling, as it showcases the extent to which the Nigerian state is incapable of securing its own borders, and well as the movements of its own citizens. It also highlights the inability of the Nigerian state to solve its own domestic problems which have now spilled over into neighbouring West African states i.e. Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Mali. Due to these factors, analysts have found it difficult to characterise the group either as an insurgency or a terrorist group (Sergie and Johnson 2015). As illustrated by Chapter 2, page 25, there are a variety of ways to classify Boko Haram i.e. based on its ideology or even its activities and behaviour. For the purposes of this research, Boko Haram will be described as a religious fundamentalist group. This is based on the premise that the group uses religion as a functional

tool to effect change and to conduct its activities. However there is agreement that Boko Haram is an ‘effect’ and symptom of a much larger and ‘long-festering’ of unresolved issues within Nigeria (Sergie and Johnson 2015). This re-emphasises the deficiency in legitimacy and decisional efficiency of the Nigeria government to mitigate and remedy the long standing challenges in the state. This has therefore allowed for an opening in which religious fundamentalist group’s like Boko Haram have gained a foothold to threaten and manipulate the Nigerian situation.

4.2.2 The Early Years of Boko Haram (2002 - 2009)

Despite the group’s peaceful beginnings in 1995, Boko Haram quickly evolved into a much more dangerous and violent movement (Campbell 2014 and Idahosa 2015: 4). With its founder Lawan pursuing studies in Saudi Arabia, a power vacuum emerged, which was filled in by the ‘charismatic’ Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 (Onuoha 2010: 55 & Onuoha 2012: 2, Rogers 2012: 1 & Salaam 2013: 47).

In the early years (2002 – 2009), Boko Haram was isolationist (Onuoha 2012: 3). Members of the group lived in remote areas ‘far’ from the corrupting influence of society (Onuoha 2012: 3 and Salaam 2013: 49). This strategy is in line with the Boko Haram’s founding philosophy of the ‘supremacy of Islamic culture’ (Onuoha 2012: 2). This strategy was also used as a means of indoctrinating members into the ‘anti-secular ideologies’, as means of solidifying the religious fundamentalist and religious nationalist character of the group (Onuoha 2012: 3). Yusuf’s ‘emergence’ as leader of Boko Haram is credited as the significant reason for the group’s subsequent use of militant tactics, which is a growing ‘concern’ in Nigeria, West Africa and the international arena (Adesoji 2010: 96, Loimeier 2012: 138, Onuoha 2012: 3 & Rogers 2012: 1). It is at this juncture that Boko Haram began its steadfast pursuit and ‘commitment’ towards waging a ‘military war’ against the Nigerian state (Adesoji 2010: 96). This thereby highlights the group’s militant nature within Nigeria and West Africa.

On ‘24 December 2003’, Boko Haram launched its first series of attacks against ‘police stations and public buildings’ in the northern state of Yobe (Danjibo 2009:7 & Onuoha 2012: 3). This culminated in several ‘violent clashes’ between Boko Haram followers and the ‘northern

Nigerian security forces' in Yobe (Loimeier 2012: 149 - 150). By January of 2004, Boko Haram was now targeting 'police stations on a massive scale' (Loimeier 2012: 150). As a result, Boko Haram was labelled as the 'Nigerian Taliban' by Nigerian media outlets, and this was quickly adopted by western media outlets (Loimeier 2012: 150). In September of 2004, Boko Haram launched a series of attacks on police stations in the northern state of Borno (Loimeier 2012: 150). In ensuing clashes with the Nigerian army, a total of 27 Boko Haram members were killed (Loimeier 2012: 150). Yusuf managed to flee to the Sudan and eventually to Saudi Arabia (Loimeier 2012: 150). His brokered return to Nigeria was a highly criticised event (Loimeier 2012: 150). This was due to the fact that it was solicited by Adamu Dibal, the 'deputy governor of Borno state' (Loimeier 2012: 150). It was labelled as hypocritical as Yusuf had to use 'modern' and secular tools to get back into Nigeria i.e. 'a passport, visa and airplanes' (Loimeier 2012: 150). This usage is contrary to Boko Haram's 'anti-modern and ultra-fundamentalist ideas' (Loimeier 2012: 150). However, upon further and closer examination, it appears that Boko Haram is both economical and selective with the type of doctrine it adheres to (Salaam 2013: 50). As explained in the previous section, Boko Haram's origins are founded upon a 'strict' adherence to orthodox Islam which prohibits Westernisation (in all forms and types). However, as is illustrated by Yusuf's use of western technological advancements, Boko Haram does not condemn the use of 'technological products' (Salaam 2013: 50). What is even more of an irony is the fact that Boko Haram has made use of and 'enjoyed' the benefits of Westernisation i.e. technology, communications and 'medical services' in its operations, raids and activities (Adesoji 2011: 106, Loimeier 2012: 150 & Onuoha 2012: 2). This indicates a selfishness and a contradictory nature to the group's ideology and philosophy (Adesoji 2011: 106 and Salaam 2013: 50 & 51). It also shows how they manipulate this in order to pursue its own gains (Adesoji 2011: 106 and Salaam 2013: 50 & 51). The actions and activities of Boko Haram during this period show the diverse 'toolkit' and arsenal of tactics at the disposal of the group. It showcases how well small groups are able to effectively target and destroy state infrastructure. In fact, during this period, the Nigerian police services and military were unable to stop or quell the activities of Boko Haram. The group's activities also show the military challenge towards the Nigerian state.

From 2002, Boko Haram maintained ‘hit-and-run attacks on security posts’ in Borno and Yobe (Onuoha 2012: 3). It was only in 2009 when the group launched its first ‘major anti-government revolt’ (Onuoha 2012: 3). From 2009, Boko Haram staged a series of revolts across ‘five northern states’, that of ‘Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina and Yobe’ (and Loimeier 2012: 150 & Onuoha 2012: 3). These revolts ended with the capture of Yusuf and over a ‘1000’ Boko Haram members who were either ‘detained for formal trial’ or killed (Loimeier 2012: 150 & Onuoha 2012: 3). In July of 2009, Yusuf was killed while in police custody (Loimeier 2012: 150). His ‘extrajudicial killing’ served as a catalyst to the cementing of Boko Haram’s violent activities and action (Onuoha 2012: 3).

4.2.3 The Evolution of Boko Haram (2009 - 2017)

With Yusuf’s death in 2009, Boko Haram morphed and grew into a more formidable, ‘highly decentralised’ and sophisticated armed group (Campbell and Bunche 2016, Loimeier 2012: 150 & Zenn 2013: 10). Instead of ‘poorly planned open confrontation’, Boko Haram made use of ‘new’ and modernised ‘violent tactics’ i.e. ‘improvised explosive devices, guerrilla warfare, and targeted assassination’ to achieve its goals (Loimeier 2012: 150 & Onuoha 2012: 4). This once again illustrates the group’s selective use of ideology in regards to Westernised weaponry and technology. With the death of Yusuf in 2009, Boko Haram begun to pursue a more violent escalation of its brand of radicalisation (Loimeier 2012: 152). This was also in part ‘inspired’ by the tactics of other kindred groups such as i.e. ‘Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ‘Al Shabaab’, which also advocated for ‘an armed struggle against the enemies of Islam’ (Loimeier 2012: 152 and Kane 2015). Thereafter, Boko Haram ‘grew in strength and effect’, armed with militant and religious terrorist tactics (Rogers 2012: 1).

Under the new leadership of Abubakar Mohammed Shekau, Boko Haram perpetrated more ‘coordinated’ and ‘sophisticated’ attacks (Onuoha 2012: 4 & Rogers 2012: 1). In 2010, they staged a ‘dramatic prison escape’, where 700 inmates were set free (Smith 2010). This was after the Boko Haram broke into the prison, broke open cell locks and started a fire (Smith 2010). Boko Haram also started ‘drive-by shootings and hit-run attacks’ against the police and other targets (Loimeier 2012: 151 & Rogers 2012: 1). Many of Boko Haram’s attacks were centered on state authorities i.e. ‘police, soldiers, civil defence and prison wardens’ (Onuoha 2012: 4).

They committed more ‘large scale attacks in 2011 and early 2012’ i.e. a suicide car bombing at the UN offices in Kano (Rogers 2011: 1). This resulted in the deaths of 185 people (Rogers 2012: 1). As a consequence of this, state authorities instituted ‘police roadblocks’, bans on ‘night driving for motorbikes’, and enforced the use of helmets for motorcyclists (Loimeier 2012: 151).

Between 2011 and 2012, Boko Haram evolved even further. It began to target Christian ‘churches’, as they were seen as a ‘major threat to Muslim claims of hegemony’ (Loimeier 2012: 151). Up till this point, Boko Haram had largely left ‘centers of worship, community, religious leaders, politicians and other civilians’ alone (Onuoha 2012: 4). However, the 2011 attack on the UN building, served as a ‘departure from the traditional target set of the group’ (Onuoha 2012: 4). This ‘change of strategy’ was largely due to the directive of ‘Sufi leaders’ (Loimeier 2012: 151 & Onuoha 2012: 4). The Sufi leadership advocated for attacks on the ‘real enemy’ i.e. Christianity (Loimeier 2012: 151). It proposed focussing attacks on this enemy as opposed to the ‘fitna’ amongst Muslims (Loimeier 2012: 151). Therefore, the shift in attacks allowed for Boko Haram to expand its theatre of operation into new areas (Loimeier 2012: 151). As a result, Boko Haram began to launch attacks outside of its ‘home base’ of Borno and Yobe, and rather into the regions of Kano, Jos and Gogola and the Federal Capital Territory (Loimeier 2012: 151).

Boko Haram tactics changed once again in 2016 with the inclusion of female suicide bombers (Al Jazeera 2016). After the successful capture of the 300 Chibok girls in 2014, ‘women and girls’ were forcefully ‘abducted’ and ‘trained’ to carry out attacks for the group (The Guardian 2017 and Pricopi 2016:48). The abduction of the Chibok girls propelled Boko Haram once again into the international spotlight (Khoshroo 2014 and The Guardian 2017). Many were ‘forced’ to both ‘marry’ and ‘give birth’ to the children of their captors, while others were used as ‘suicide bombers’ (The Guardian 2017). Boko Haram also raided several villages and towns, pillaging, abducting and killing citizens (Pricopi 2016: 48 & Zenn 2013: 10). This newly added dimension showcases how adept Boko Haram is to changing circumstances (Al Jazeera 2016). It also shows the range of tactics Boko Haram can use, from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare i.e. asymmetrical and guerrilla tactics on places of worship and ‘security services’ like police stations and government buildings (Al Jazeera 2016 & Falode 2016 47, Kane 2015). Between 2009 to 2012, Boko Haram conducted ‘260 separate attacks’ which resulted in the deaths of over

‘1000 people’ (Onuoha 2012: 4). Most of these attacks were centered in the northern state of Borno, particularly in the capital Maiduguri; however an increasing number of the attacks were reported in ‘Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Niger plateau and Yobe states, the federal capital territory, Abuja’, as illustrated by Map 9 (Onuoha 2012: 4).

Map 9: Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria



<https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart-10>

More recently, Boko Haram has ‘emerged’ within the regional and international context (Rogers 2012: 1). Similar to other radical groups like Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, Boko Haram now has a growing ‘political agenda’, albeit not with the ‘same intellectual origins’ (Rogers 2012: 1). Due to its ‘persistence of the Islamist outlook’, Boko Haram has been linked to Al Qaeda, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan’, for support and ‘technical expertise’ (Falode 2016: 45 & Rogers 2012: 2 & Siegle 2013: 87). With such backing, Boko Haram has been able to launch ‘devastating’ attacks on police stations and civilians, companies in ‘Niger, Chad and Cameroon’ in 2014 and 2015 (Falode 2016 46). This has created a ‘climate of fear’ within the West African region (Kane 2015).

In 2015, Boko Haram pledged ‘allegiance’ to the Islamic State (ISIL) and this has afforded them ‘international sources’ of finance, weapons and fighters (Al Jazeera 2016 & Falode 2016: 45, Kane 2015). Additionally it has raised the threat level of Boko Haram (Al Jazeera 2016 & Falode 2016: 47, Kane 2015). As a result of this, Boko Haram has gained much traction and ‘spotlight’ (Al Jazeera 2016 & Onuoha 2012: 2). This ‘connection’ has been met with much concern as to the growing influence and territory of ISIL (Al Jazeera 2016). Boko Haram’s ‘affiliation’ has also raised the group’s stature, and has garnered them the label as the ‘world’s deadliest terror group’ (Inboden and Waterfield 2016). Such close proximity with similar groups has allowed for the broadening of the Boko Haram’s tactics to ‘attacks on western targets’ (Inboden and Waterfield 2016). This alignment has only further radicalised Boko Haram and spurred its activities in West Africa (Sergie and Johnson 2015). Boko Haram’s incursions into the neighbouring West African state of Chad, Mali and Cameroon also show how religious revivalism is currently sweeping across Western and Northern Africa (Campbell and Bunche 2016). This change of focus is in line with the Boko Haram’s changing morphology. Not only does Boko Haram want a ‘change’ within Nigeria, but it also ‘sees itself as part of a global struggle’ i.e. a ‘pan-Africanist jihadist’ movement (Freeman 2012 and VOANews 2011). Attacks on the regional front have thus ‘externalised’ Boko Haram’s war (Falode 2016: 45). It has also provided shelter to war combatants and have provided a source of ‘supply of men and material’ to Boko Haram (Falode 2016: 47). It can be argued that the linkages to external powers are a part of a ploy to ‘attract international sympathy’, as well as ‘technical’ and financial support for the Nigerian government (Adibe 2012: 13). It may also be a ploy to get Boko Haram to the negotiating table if they knew that large powers like France and the United States of America were aiding the Nigerian government (Adibe 2012: 13).

The ever ‘evolving threat’ of Boko Haram has taken a toll on the ‘image’ and reputation of the Nigerian state (Onuoha 2012: 4). To date, Boko Haram is responsible for the deaths of ‘ten thousand’, as well as the displacement of a further 1.5 million people (Sergie and Johnson 2015). Boko Haram has fractured ‘family structure’, discouraged ‘local and foreign investment’ and ‘threatened the territorial integrity’ of Nigeria (Onuoha 2012: 4). The rise of Boko Haram has negatively impacted on the state of Kano, the ‘economic hub’ of northern Nigeria (Siegler 2013:

86). It has also served to isolate northern Nigeria even further (Siegle 2013: 86). It is therefore prudent not to view Boko Haram in a narrowly defined manner, as doing so would limit scholarly engagement on how to understand the ‘true character’ of the group (Loimeier 2012: 138).

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the background to the emergence of Boko Haram. Using the analysis derived from chapter three, it is clear to see that Boko Haram’s rise has been a long brewing cocktail of public discontentment, religious and ethnic tensions and the inability of the Nigerian state to govern effectively. This chapter has also provided comprehensive overview of the history, mandate and objectives of Boko Haram. As a result of the volatile cocktail, Boko Haram has laid violent siege to the Nigerian state, conducting violent raids, attacks on the state and on civilian targets. This has greatly multiplied the instability and human security of the state. In addition, Boko Haram has made powerful allegiances and has infringed on neighbouring states, which has had a ripple effect in terms of peace and security within the West Africa region.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Findings

5.1 Introduction

Chapter five serves to summarise the key findings of this study. It will summarise and explain the links between the lack of governance and the influence of religion, as catalysts to the growth and development of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This chapter concludes the research by providing and contextualising the impact and value of this research to the broader debate on security, governance and statehood. As a non-state actor, Boko Haram has established itself as a credible and existential threat to the integrity and legitimacy of the Nigerian state. It poses a challenge and threat to the Nigerian state and the West African region. This research provides an analytical focus on governance within Nigeria, and how this affects the overall security and stability of the state and West Africa.

5.2 Overview of the Chapter Findings

Based on the findings provided in the preceding chapters, there is clear evidence to support the premise that governance and religion are two core catalysts to the emergence and formation of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Over the course of Nigeria's political and socio-economic history, these two aspects have been critical factors that have created the enabling environment that has allowed Boko Haram to thrive.

Chapter one provided the introduction to the study. It set out the contextual guidelines for the study, mapping out the areas of interest, as well as the methodological parameters to be used within this research. The chapter also provided the contextual framework to understanding the rationale and motivation for this research. The chapter also provided an outline of the literature that informed the research, paying particular focus on the value of conceptual meaning, to establish the basis for common knowledge and understanding.

In chapter two, the study provided the conceptual framework in support of the research. The chapter expanded on the concept of security, providing clarity on the distinction between national and human security. These two distinctions are important, as they delineate the types of challenges that the Nigerian state faces. In this research, Boko Haram can be classified as both a threat to the national and human security of Nigeria. Boko Haram presents itself as a threat to the

very existence of the Nigerian state, challenging the very idea of statehood. Boko Haram also challenges the Nigerian state's ability to protect and safeguard the security of its citizens, as it threatens human security by launching attacks on civilian targets like churches and schools. The Nigerian state is also guilty of inflicting fear and harm to its citizens, by instituting extrajudicial killings on citizens.

This chapter also explored the nuanced understandings of the concept of governance. It outlined the history of governance within the international political arena, as well as different understandings of the concept as illustrated by the non-governmental organisations like the World Bank Group, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and GIBS. In addition, chapter two explored a number of indicators that are used to measure governance i.e. political stability, absence of violence, control of corruption, decisional efficiency and legitimacy. These indicators were used as a basis for discussion and assessment of the level of governance within Nigeria. Finally, this chapter introduced additional concepts that were used to understand, contextualise, and frame Boko Haram. These concepts can be used to understand the way in which Boko Haram behaves and operates in the Nigerian, regional and international political and security environment.

In chapter three, the study focussed on an exploration of the Nigerian political and socio-economic environment. It provided an analysis of drivers that have propelled and instigated the instability being experienced within Nigeria. The chapter made use of a functional evaluation of five governance indicators, identified in chapter two, to evaluate and assess the level of governance in the Nigerian state. Based on this, the chapter explored the history of social, economic and political turmoil, marginalisation, inequality, violence and corrupt practices within Nigeria. As a result of these factors, the state has been rendered weak and insufficient in meeting the governing demands of Nigeria. It has also cultivated a fertile condition which has allowed for the rise and emergence of groups such as Boko Haram.

As illustrated in chapter three (page 30) there is evidence to corroborate the fact that the wealth of the Nigerian state has been taken by powerful individuals i.e. government officials and the military through corrupt practices. The benefits of this wealth and prosperity have been inequitably distributed and have not been used to provide adequate services to effectively govern

Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that feelings of discontent and anger have been fostered within Nigeria, particularly from the growing numbers of young and jobless youth, as explained in chapter three (page 39). Significant to these simmering tensions is the legacy of protracted military rule in Nigeria. This has meant that the outbreaks of violent behaviour by radical groups were constantly met with force and violence by the Nigerian state, as illustrated in chapter 3 (page 41). As a result of all these factors, the Nigerian state has been compromised. Its legitimacy, territorial integrity and its ability to effectively govern have been consistently challenged over the course of its history. Encompassing all these factors is the religious revivalism, particularly that of the rise of Islam within Nigeria, and the world. This has resulted in an upsurge of groups like Boko Haram. It has also provided a justification for their presence in northern Nigeria. The rapid growth of these groups can be considered as threat to the territorial integrity and legitimacy of the state. Boko Haram's emergence can be cited as a forceful attempt to impose their religious ideology on a largely secular and democratic Nigerian society. In the case of Boko Haram, their effects are far-reaching, as they intend to widen the scope of Islamic revivalism to West Africa.

Chapter four provides an overview of the history, mandate and objectives of Boko Haram. Over the course of the country's history, radical reformist groups like *the Maitatsine*, *the Yan Izala*, and now *Boko Haram*, have used this weak environment i.e. political and socio-economic instability, to pursue their own ideological ideals. Though differing in some respects, these groups have sought to ameliorate the neglect and suffering of northern Nigeria. All have sought to engage in political, collective action in an effort to emancipate the largely Muslim northern Nigeria. Though noble in nature, these attempts ultimately failed due to infighting and rivalry amongst the different groups. However, Boko Haram is credited as being the first strong articulation of religious fundamentalism since the Biafran War of the 1960s. For Boko Haram, there is a moral, ideological and spiritual need to establish an Islamic state, purified of the morally corrupt secular state. This ideal not only refers to the Nigerian state, but also includes the West African region. Boko Haram therefore represents an example of politicised religion, and have openly called for a *jihad* against the Nigerian state in an attempt to achieve these goals. In this sense, Boko Haram has exhibited a strong desire for self-determination and the requirement

for Nigeria and the West African region to adopt the Islamic faith. The alternative that they present is that of a state be strictly governed by orthodox Islamic Sharia law.

However, despite the somewhat legitimate reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram, there is a sinister element to the group. As illustrated in chapter four, Boko Haram is very much at ease with twisting its dogma and ideology to suit its needs. The 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok school girls is one such instance. It has been labelled as an inhumane and a radical interpretation of the teachings of Islam. The use of modern western technology i.e. weapons, medicine, transportation and communication devices have been criticised as a contradiction to the teachings of orthodox Islam. There is little doubt that Boko Haram has caused much damage and destruction in Nigeria and the West African region. Boko Haram has also caused many deaths and the displacement of hundreds of others in Nigeria and the neighbouring West African states. Boko Haram has also evolved and morphed from its humble and peaceful beginning, to a largely radical and violent group. Over the course of its history, Boko Haram has changed its tactics adopting conventional and unconventional warfare tactics. Boko Haram's actions and activities have terrified the establishment, shaken the regime and allowed for the group to threaten at the helm of power within Nigeria.

5.3 Recommendations and Conclusion

Through the research, the study makes use of some commonly understood concepts, understandings and perspectives, to understand Nigeria, Boko Haram, governance and security. Though common understandings were used, it would be inaccurate to make generalisations in regards to other similar states and groups. The Nigerian socio-economic and political environment is a unique one. Burdened by a contentious and troubled past, the democratic state has been plagued by years of corruption, inequality, marginalisation and deep seated divisions and tensions. It is small wonder that the Nigerian state is able to function given these circumstances. Nigeria can thus be classified as a state that has failed to secure peace, stability and governance within its own borders.

Based on the research conducted in this study, one can make the following observations about the Nigerian state. The three scenarios listed below range from immediate consequences to more long term consequences:

a) The continued instability in northern Nigeria will greatly affect the West African region. It will weaken the state's hegemony and status within West Africa and the continent. No longer will Nigeria be considered as a dominant state and actor within the continent.

b) It is out of this quagmire of challenges that Boko Haram has seized the opportunity to take political centre stage in the Nigerian state. The group's emergence has rocked the very foundation of the Nigerian state, and its presence can be felt within the West Africa and the international arena. With the group's subsequent allegiance to Islamic State, Boko Haram poses a very real threat and challenges to regional and international security. This has given the Islamic State a foothold, base of operations and a possible theatre of war in Africa. The new linkages can also easily change the Boko Haram's motives and incentives. As shown in chapter four, Boko Haram is easily able to adapt its strategies and focus. The additional, external support to Boko Haram will make any subsequent changes much easier.

c) With no real changes and remedying of the socio-economic and political challenges within the country, Nigeria may fall prey to secessionist claims. The endemic corrupt practices within Nigeria are a cause for concern. This culture of corruption is pervasive and has permeated throughout Nigerian society. The inequitable distribution of resources within Nigeria and the historic marginalisation of northern Nigeria will be additional catalysts to a further radicalisation of northern Nigeria. This may ultimately result in a stronger attempt at a two state solution.

To prevent these potential and projected scenarios, the Nigerian state will need to employ several stringent measures to strengthen governance within the state. It should be noted that these measures cannot be implemented all at once. They must be implemented in stages, and over the course of Nigeria's future. This researcher recommends that the Nigerian state employ these five measures to address the Nigerian situation:

a) An immediate measure that the Nigerian government would need to institute is the implementation of a series of counter-terrorist initiatives and programmes. The primary concern and responsibility of a state is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. As highlighted in this study, the Nigerian government has failed in this mandate. As a result, there has been increased instability and insecurity within the country. Although counter-terrorist programmes and initiatives exist in Nigeria i.e. mercenary forces, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and the Joint Military Task Force (JTF), these should be further strengthened and should employ a multi-pronged strategic response to the insurgency of Boko Haram. It should be noted that the creation of these Task Forces shows how difficult it has been for Nigeria to root out Boko Haram as a single state. The Nigerian government, with the aid of regional and international support should support measures to push back against militancy, armed resistance and terrorism within its borders. Without this military component, rooting out Boko Haram and other similar groups will be difficult to accomplish.

The Nigerian government should address the political and socio-economic disparities between northern and southern Nigeria. Strategies should include addressing humanitarian, educational and economic reform in northern Nigeria. Another strategy would be for the Nigerian government to build on and strengthen its institutional capacity, especially in regards to the judiciary, the police, the military and other elements linked to governance in the country. Law enforcement officials and personnel should be well equipped and trained. Acts of terrorism should also be criminalised and prosecuted, as this requires institutional capacity to succeed. In addition to this, the flow of capital, resources, materials and support that Boko Harm received should be stemmed domestically, continentally and globally. This will put pressure on states and non-state actors who are assisting Boko Haram. The counter-terrorist effort will also require the added element of force to be successful. It will involve collaborative and precision tactical operations between different stakeholders and vested parties to tackle and root out the threat of Boko Haram. This outlined strategy will require much coordination, cooperation, financial capital and political will to succeed.

b) Next, the informal rotational presidencies should become a formalised and constitutional provision. This will allow for the true representation of the country's interests by the two

religious factions within Nigeria. While this may dispel tensions in the short term, it may also permanently divide the Nigerian state, giving rise to a two-state situation. The root solution to this problem may lie in addressing the socio-economic challenges between northern and southern Nigeria.

c) With the above two objectives instituted with Nigeria, the state can turn its attention to conducting a complete and transparent overhaul of all public service institutions in Nigeria. As alluded to in this study, the judiciary, the police, the military, as well as political leadership are all highly corrupt. Therefore, commissions of inquiry should be created to dispel of corrupt practices and those who engage and profit from these practices. While this is a noble endeavour, the process would be a costly and time consuming endeavour. It could then take away from the essential functioning of the state and thereby perpetuate the dissatisfaction within Nigeria. However, such an endeavour would go a long way to creating trust and credibility in the Nigerian government, system and society.

d) As an added measure, the Nigerian state can institute commissions of Truth and Reconciliation throughout the entire Nigerian state. The commissions should only be instituted after the completion of the first three outlined measures. Without this, it will be difficult to manage and maintain the stability of the Nigerian state. These commissions should be instituted at local, federal, regional and national level. This will allow for the remedying of divisions within Nigeria, and especially between the north and south of Nigeria. As with the first option, this would also be a costly and time consuming process. Even more than that, it may lead to the build-up of resentment, as citizens will have to 're-live' the trauma they faced. In addition, it may create expectations that the commissions will resolve all the issues that have been raised. These commissions should therefore be carefully planned and should temper expectations by fully explaining the purpose and need for these commissions.

e) The government must allow for the growth of local civil society groups alongside governance mechanisms of Nigeria. While this will undoubtedly unburden the Nigerian state from the role of being the sole provider of governance within the country, it may also warp the traditional distinction between the public and private sphere. Perhaps the Nigerian state can make use of a

hybrid form of statehood or political order to support state infrastructure in maintaining peace and security within the state. To minimise this overlap, the Nigerian state can outsource some functions and services i.e. sanitation, education. It can allow for informal and special interest groups to determine governance structures within remote areas. That way these groups may have a positive impact on the functioning of the Nigerian state.

This attests to the fact that though Boko Haram is a Nigerian challenge, it is not an entirely unique phenomenon that the Nigerian state will be able to deal with on its own. The consequences of a flourishing Boko Haram have far reaching implications to the West African region, the African continent and the international context. As such, Boko Haram is testament to the idea of 'wicked problems'. It therefore calls for collaboration and partnership by multiple stakeholders to find creative solutions to resolve these problems. Therefore, while Boko Haram may be 'unique' to the Nigerian context, the resolution of this problem will have benefits that can be used by other states which may face similar circumstances. In conclusion, this study has provided a link between governance and religion in the formation of Boko Haram. The value of this research is that it adds to the literature of security, and it provides two additional factors worth further consideration within security studies. With this research, other states may be able to stem and prevent similar circumstances and circumstances from taking place within their borders.

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