RETHINKING THE CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: POST-9/11 TO THE PRESENT

by

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ABSTRACT

The rise of terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC) post-9/11, two previously separate phenomena, are now both a plague of the 21st century. The emergence of unconventional forms of terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State (IS) indicates new features in the crime-terror nexus. This requires rethinking of the conventional crime-terror convergence frameworks; including the crime-terror continuum (CTC) model, which is used to explain and categorise the relationships between organised crime (OC) and terrorism. The original 2003-2004 CTC model suggests that the relationship between crime and terrorism is not static but has evolved into a continuum. The CTC tracks down how the organisational dynamics and operational nature of both terrorism and OC changes over time. A single group can slide up and down between OC and terrorism, depending on the operational environment.

Contemporary terrorism practices suggest that post-9/11 terrorist organisations have undergone significant transformations, and that the boundaries between organised crime and terrorism have become blurred. This brings into question the explanatory power and applicability of the conventional convergence trends, which are depicted in the 2003-2014 versions of the CTC model, to the reality of the transformation of terrorist organisations post-9/11. The conventional convergence trends revolve around 'realities' of relationships between OC and terrorism in the form of alliances, appropriation of tactics, integration, hybridisation, and transformation from terrorist to criminal entities or *vice versa*.

The current realities raise several questions about the applicability of the CTC model, as an explanatory tool. Terrorist organisations can originate as criminal organisations, using ideological motives as a recruiting poster for criminal activities. This points to gaps in the relationship of contemporary terrorism and OC, which are found in the crime-terror nexus and its discourse. These gaps pave the way for rethinking and critical evaluation of the explanatory power of the CTC model in the post-9/11 period and lay the basis for the development of an alternative framework as a foundation for further research.

This study aims to critically rethink the explanatory power and revisit the applicability of the CTC to changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism post-9/11. This study employs a systematic literature overview design followed by critical evaluation. It isolates key works on the

crime-terror nexus and convergence phenomenon, and assesses their limitations, so as to better understand and tackle terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

KEY WORDS

The post-9/11; globalisation; terrorism; terrorist organisations; crime; organised crime (OC); transnational organised crime (TOC); transnational criminal organisations (TCOs); the crime-terror interface; the crime-terror nexus; the crime-terror convergence; the crime terror continuum (CTC) model; GWOT; LE; decentralisation; deterritorialisation; fragmentation of vertically integrated industries (VIIs); hybrid; hybridisation; *a priori*; *milieu*; *modus operandi*; the IS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AQ	Al-Qaeda
ASG	The Abu Sayyaf Group
1GW	First-Generation Warfare
2GW	Second-Generation Warfare
3GW	Third-Generation Warfare
4GW	Fourth-Generation Warfare
3G2	Third-Generation Gangs
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear materials
CTC	Crime-Terror Continuum
CVO	Clandestine Violent Organisations
D-Company	Dawood Company
EU	The European Union
FARC	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
GWOT	The Global War on Terrorism
ICSR	Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IRA	The Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
KLA	The Kosovo Liberation Army

LE	Law Enforcement
OC	Organised Crime
PIRA	The Provisional Irish Republican Army
TCOs	Transnational Criminal Organisations
TOC	Transnational Organised Crime
VIIs	Vertically Integrated Industries
WMDs	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In the aftermath of 9/11, and with the recent emergence of the IS, the symbiosis of contemporary terrorist organisations and OC has become a significant domestic and global threat. This provides challenges in conceptualising, understanding and devising means to confront contemporary terrorist organisations. It has provided an opportunity for rethinking the conventional crime-terror nexus discourse and especially the CTC model. Hence, the research statement of this study notes that the CTC model fails to account for the possibility that contemporary terrorist organisations are capable of originating out of criminal aspirations and motivations.

Despite scholarships'[1] recognition of the linkages between criminal and terrorist organisations, the probability of the evolution of the crime-terror nexus has been overlooked. It is only in recent literature and analysis[2] that a possibility for a deeper merger of crime and terrorism has been indicated in relation to the birth of hybrid organisations from the same *milieu*. This depicts the development of a new crime-terror nexus, which significantly undermines the explanatory power of the CTC model.

To explore the applicability of the CTC model to the current dynamics of the new crime-terror nexus, this study has undertaken a preliminary systematic literature search, selection of most dominant publications and the synthesis of the CTC, its alternative approaches, a more recent research and analysis. The sample of literature was selected that specifically explains modelling, the explanatory power of models and the criteria against which a model can be assessed. The study design is based on a systematic literature overview followed by critical evaluation. This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is a contextual one in that it highlights the focus and scope of the research. Chapter 2 explores the changes in conceptualisation of crime and terrorism, their operation and organisation, in line with the changes brought about by the post-9/11 period and the advancement of globalisation. Chapter 3 provides the background to account for the establishment

[1] Levi (2006; 2008), Dishman (2001,2005,2016), Makarenko (2003; 2004; 2009; EP 2012), Shelley and Picarelli (2002, 2005), Stern (2003), Sanderson (2004) etc.

[2] Von Drehle (2015); Warrick (2015); Stern (2016); Gallagher (2016); Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017); Government of the Netherlands (2017) etc.

and evolution of the crime-terror nexus and its discourse post-9/11. It identifies the potential gaps in the crime-terror nexus discourse and contextualises the CTC. Chapter 4 tracks the evolution of the CTC model, provides a review of the works challenging the 'conventional wisdom' of the CTC model, and presents the latest research highlighting the weaknesses in the CTC's explanatory power. Finally, Chapter 5 delivers the summary of the study's findings, conclusions and recommendations.

1.2 Literature overview

The knowledge developed to account for the concept of ***terrorist organisations*** originates from the intrinsically political terms of ***terror*** and ***terrorism***. Despite the lack of consensus on what modern ***terrorist organisations*** precisely entail, scholars[3] agree on the origins of the modern concept of terrorism.

The Reformation and the Age of Absolutism brought forth ***tyrannicide***, that characterised the assassinations of political leaders. And the modern understanding of ***terrorism*** dates back to the French Revolution and the Reign of la Grande Terreur. Ironically enough, in the original context, terrorism was a counterpart of righteousness conducted to oppose and suppress the enemies of the people, for the sake of the triumph of democracy (Solomon 2015; Hoffman 2006: 4; Neumann 2009: 6).

Scholars emphasise that the definitions of terrorism are not fixed and can change over time in line with the political vernacular in a particular era. Merari (1993), Snow (1996), O'Neill (2005), Metz (2007), Sullivan (2002; 2006; 2010), Brooker (2010), Wilkinson (2011) and Makarenko (2012) argue that originally, due to the specific strategic context of the pre- and Cold War period, terrorism was used to attain political or ideological goals. During the Cold War era, the main source of sponsorship and support of terrorism was the state. Although, scholars suggest that in the 21st century, under conditions of globalisation and the retrenching of the old-world forms of order, terrorism is used to achieve non-ideological goals. These goals are economic, criminal, ethnic, cultural and ethno-religious.

[3] E.g. Schmid (2004), Hoffman (2006), and Neumann (2009) Solomon (2015) etc.

Max Weber in *Politics as a Vocation* (1919) applies the classical notion that a state possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Consequently, Grabosky and Stohl (2010) suggest that Weber's (1919) definition highlights the illegitimacy of the use of violence by non-state actors. Van Schendel and Abraham (2005) support the argument that the "state's claim to monopoly of regulated predation and redistribution of proceeds[4] is based on the deligitimisation of other forms of predation" (Van Schendel & Abraham 2005: 7). Hence, Grabosky and Stohl (2010) suggest that states ideally do not act as criminals. States divide and develop legislation on terrorism or crime. Contrary to Grabosky and Stohl (2010), some radical scholars[5] conclude that taxation in a state is a theft in itself. Thus, terrorism and state making both qualify as examples of organised crime (OC) in the contemporary world (Tilly 1985: 161).

Similar to terrorism, ***OC*** has numerous definitions, which are subject to change, depending on the social and political circumstances (Quinney 1970). Grabosky and Stohl (2010) suggest that crime is whatever government declares it to be. Some of the literature[6] on OC focuses on an analysis of the goals and properties of criminal organisations. Other literature[7] focuses on the structure or changes in organisational life. Additional literature[8] attempts to explain methods and tools in OC, or merely focuses on activities of criminal organisations.

The majority of the literature[9] on OC and terrorism agrees that originally there is a rudimentary difference between criminal and terrorist organisations; the motives and goals of these organisations differ completely from each other. Criminal organisations focus on generation and maximisation of profit. In contrast, terrorist organisations focus on delivering political changes.[10] In other words, this difference is characterised as an orthodoxy of profit versus ideology dichotomy.

[4] E.g. taxation and state expenditure.
[5] Tilly (1985) suggests that in 21st century the distinctions between the lawmaker and lawbreaker, cop and robber, taxation and extortion are blurred, and state actors act in criminal fashion.
[6] Schmid (1996); Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007); Asal, Forest and Nussbaum (2015) etc.
[7] Laqueur (1999); Napoleoni (2004); Love (2009); Picarelli (2012); De Bie, de Poot and Van der Leun (2014) etc.
[8] Grabosky and Stohl (2010); Forest (2012; 2013) etc.
[9] Snow (1996), Makarenko (2003; 2004), Napoleoni (2004) Shelley and Picarelly (2005), Tupman (2009), Wang (2010), Grabosky and Stohl (2010) Forest (2012), Akchurina and Lavorgna (2014), Carrapico, Irrera and Tupman (2014), De Bie et al. (2014), Lewis (2014), and Rossi (2014).
[10] Such as the overthrow of the government, replacement of the government, delivering of the specific political/ideological agenda and political message.

As a result, the literature is dominated by arguments which are characterised by this orthodoxy of profit versus ideology dichotomy. However, in the face of recent developments,[11] a growing number of scholars are focusing more extensively on the fading of the distinctions between crime and terrorism. Grabosky and Stohl (2010), for example, emphasise that the "crime-terror interface is not new, but it has certainly received a lot of attention lately" (Grabosky & Stohl 2010: 7). Laqueur (1999) suggests that the previously clearly existing lines between OC and terrorism have morphed into a complex symbiosis that was previously non-existent.

The innovative attempt to analyse and categorise the crime-terror interface in the post-9/11 period was made by Tamara Makarenko (2003; 2004). She developed the CTC model in the form of a continuum. It was later revised in 2009 (2012) and 2014. Makarenko (2003; 2004) argues that the development of the specific CTC model makes provision for the most effective state responses to the evolving and periodically converging threats.

However, there are several key tenets which opened up the debate about the applicability of the CTC model to the present realities of the relationship between crime and terrorism. These tenets are namely the persisting orthodoxy of the profit versus ideology dichotomy, the differentiation and separation of crime and terrorism (as concepts, activities and entities), the conventional approach to the categorisation of relationships between crime and terrorism, as well as a dogmatic viewpoint on aspects, circumstances and environments impacting on the consolidation of the crime-terror nexus.

Therefore, the CTC treats crime and terrorism as mutually exclusive terms and entities; instead of considering their complementarity and their origin from a joint *milieu*. Due to the perceived mutual exclusion of the terms, the model has a conventional position on the dynamics of the relationships between crime and terrorism and their categorisation. It conveys this mutual exclusivity into a variety of crime-terror relationships; namely alliances, integration and hybridisation of 'one entity and another', as well as appropriation of tactics and transformation 'from one to another' along the continuum. The CTC uses terrorist and criminal organisations, as well as states as the primarily units of analysis. Making use mostly of organisational, and at times, operational levels of analysis,

[11] Such as expanding forces of globalisation, decentralisation, the changes in the structural organisation (flattening of hierarchies – emergence of networks, nodes, cells), changes in communication and transaction processes etc.

the model considers entities as monolithic bodies lacking any other units or actors that could comprise them or which might be involved in the crime-terror nexus. Despite the conditions of globalisation, the CTC continuously refers to states as the main operational spaces, actors and environments which makes them susceptible to the development of the crime-terror nexus; operational environments are also narrowed down to stable, unstable or conflict-ridden states. Additionally, irrespective of several upgrades to the model, there is a lack of debate between the model and alternative perspectives.

Groups of scholars[12] agree about the intertwined nature of crime and terrorism, the increase in focus on the crime-terror nexus, as well as the need to revise the crime-terror nexus discourse. However, certain divisions persist. Peter Grabosky and Michael Stohl (2010) systematise the crime-terror convergence frameworks and divide them into two schools of thought. The first school, which includes Stern (2003), Makarenko (2003; 2004) and Dishman (2005), is firm about the presence of the crime-terror convergence and its permanent nature. The second school of thought, comprising Schmid (1996), and Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), asserts that there is an infrequency of convergence due to the fundamentally different motivations of crime and terrorism. This school argues that the infrequent interaction is merely an alliance of convenience (usually short-term and once-off). In line with very recent analyses and research concerning the scope and depth of the new crime-terror nexus, this study is inclined towards the first school of thought.

Despite a reasonable consensus among academics with regard to the conditions which favour the transformation of the crime-terror nexus, there is still some disagreement about the internal dynamics between crime and terrorism. Scholars such as Stanislawski (2004: 159), and Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007: 1098) suggest that crime and terrorism are different concepts. In this sense, OC (and TOC) and terrorism should remain distinguished from one another since they have organisational and ideological differences. However, post-9/11, Dishman (2001: 44) was suggesting that the transformation of terrorism and criminal organisations is not grounded on the pattern of mere partnership or the merging of TOC and terrorist organisations but is rather grounded on the transformation where political motives are used to merely gain financial wellbeing. Makarenko (2003; 2004; 2009; (EP 2012)) revises Dishman's (2001; 2005) approach

[12] Schmid (1996), Laqueur (1999), Napoleoni (2004), Hoffman (2006), Oehme III (2008), Picarelli (2012) Williams (2009), Rapoport (2001; 2002), Bobic (2014), Carrapico et al. (2014), and Forest (2012) etc.

and develops a more comprehensive and systematised approach of the crime-terror nexus consolidation, and the evolution of criminal organisations. The author suggests that the lines between politically and criminally motivated violence have become blurred. Ballina (2011) provides an even more comprehensive response to Makarenko's (2003; 2004; 2009; (EP 2012)) two-dimensional CTC approach and presents a Clandestine Violent Organisations (CVO) three-dimensional model.[13] Ballina (2011) is the first scholar within the field of the crime-terror nexus to discuss the possibility of terrorist organisations simultaneously originating as criminal organisations, without any façade to conceal greed (e.g. criminal motivations). Dishman (2001) and the CTC model suggest that the convergence between crime and terrorism develops under this lucrative façade. Ballina (2011), on the other hand, argues that criminal and terrorist entities are born[14] as hybrids without the presence of a lucrative façade that conceals criminal motivations and financial gains. Ballina (2011) however, does not acknowledge the possibility that the concepts of crime and terrorism have become completely morphed. Thus, the phenomenon of terrorist organisations originating as criminal organisations, as well as the probability of the two entities or activities completely merging, are largely overlooked.

Some of the abovementioned scholars and their respective convergence frameworks, attempt to make a shift from a state-centric lens of analysis to postinternationalist perspective, human security, as well as the International Political Economy (IPE) approach. The conventional state-centric lenses of analysis are limited in depicting the complexity and depth of the contemporary crime-terror nexus. The state-centric frameworks often limit the crime-terror nexus to the conventional profit versus ideology dichotomy, or else the 'conventional wisdom'[15] of 'methods not motives' argument (Picarelli 2006; 2012). Hence, Picarelli (2006, 2012) suggests that there is a need to consider all levels (and their respective units and actors) of analysis. These include the

[13] Ballina's (2011) three-dimensional CVO model implies that: first, profit and ideology elements can change over time, but it does not mean that they cannot coexist in one organisation (they do not compromise each other; there is no zero-sum game when one renounces the other); second, there can be internal factors, not necessarily external (e.g. interaction with other groups), that influence group's sliding from criminal to terrorist along the CTC; and lastly, Makarenko's (2003; 2004) CTC is merely unidirectional – the model does not include the possibility that "ideology can be adopted by a criminal organisation without becoming a façade to conceal greed" (Ballina 2011: 129). The latter explanation challenges Dishman's (2001) assumption that ideology adopted by criminal organisation serves as a façade, or later Dishman's (2016) notion of façade that conceals hybridity of organisation.

[14] These entities do not merely merge, integrate or transform from one to another and to a hybrid, but they originate as hybrid entities (criminal and terrorist simultaneously) from a single background.

[15] This implies that crime and terrorism are either prone to a short-term collaboration due to the fundamental differences, or if one entity transforms into the other, the transformations are limited to changes in the methods not motivations.

individual, organisational and international levels, coupled with the impact of operational environments in the framing of the crime-terror nexus.[16] Similarly, Bobic (2014) also insists on shifting from the state-centric approach by focusing more on the operational environment of terrorists and criminals in non-state spheres.

Drawing from the literature and prior research there is the emergence of a distinctly different character of the new crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations. It can also be argued that there is a lack of correspondence between the CTC and the present realities of the crime-terrorism relationship.[17] Altogether, these aspects reveal major weaknesses in the CTC's methodology which impact on its explanatory relevance. These shortcomings create a gap in the literature and provide the space for further research.

1.3 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

The main research problem for this study lies with the CTC's ability to explain the changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period. This poses a problem in one's ability to understand the essence, organisation and operation of contemporary and emerging terrorist organisations, such as the IS. Additionally, it significantly impacts on our understanding of the causes behind the origins of contemporary terrorist organisations. Moreover, it affects our ability to forecast the potential security threats which terrorism poses.

The CTC, as a model, and as an explanatory tool intends to summarise, simplify, generalise and abstract, as well as schematically depict the existing knowledge of the relationships between crime and terrorism. Yet, the CTC fails satisfy several of these aspects - namely generalisation and abstraction, and the depth of the contemporary crime-terror nexus, at large. This shows inaccuracies in the progression of the CTC model.

The CTC model it is not fully representative of the realities of the relationship between OC and terrorism in the real world. One of the limitations of the model is that it is based on a state-centric approach. Hence, the CTC focuses on the conventional units of analysis – criminal and terrorist

[16] E.g. sub-national, national, international, and transnational levels. The postinternationalist perspective, used by Picarelli (2006), suggests individuals and collective actors comprising of individuals, as units of analysis. Later, Picarelli's IPE (2012) approach focuses on specific operational environments that serve as facilitators of the crime-terror nexus.

[17] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), Von Drehle (2015); Stern (2016), Clarke (2016), Hemmingsen (2016), Gallagher (2016), Böckler et al. (2017).

groups or organisations, and states, without taking into consideration the changes in the scope of these units of analysis and their operational environments. Also, the CTC does not adequately represent the role and impact of human security in the contemporary crime-terror nexus. Despite regular reference to the model in the literature in the crime-terror nexus field, the latter lacks inclusivity and correspondence between key elements (e.g. isomorphism)[18] inherent to the crime-terror nexus and its discourse. The CTC is unable to provide a consistent generalisation, explanation and forecasting of the new developments in the crime-terror nexus post-9/11. This raises serious questions about the applicability of the knowledge provided by the CTC model to real life changes and the distinct probability of criminal and terrorist organisations completely merging.

The CTC treats crime and terrorism as completely divergent phenomena. The model continues to follow the orthodoxy of profit versus ideology dichotomy. The CTC is based on the organisational and to some extent operational levels of analysis, drawn from already examined case studies. The model does not account for the probability that there is a new and more complex crime-terror nexus, as more recent studies have indicated. Convergence of crime and terrorism has progressed beyond the mere integration or transformation from one entity to the other. The revised CTC model provides a gap for further research as to what arises following the transformation of crime and terrorism. The research problem will be addressed by assessing the explanatory power and applicability of the CTC model in the post-9/11 period so as to highlight its limitations.

Drawing from the works of Isaak (1985) and Shelley et al. (2005), the key facets that ensure successful regular modelling are the ability to summarise, simplify, generalise, and abstract. Thus, modelling involves: summarisation – adequate representation and synopsis of key elements drawn from theories in correspondence with empirical evidence; simplification – selection, narrowing down and concretising of key elements to specific patterns or concepts of phenomenon at stake; generalisation – deduction from specific cases and identification of concrete widespread patterns on the basis of which general broader assumptions are made; and abstraction – move of concrete widespread patterns to the level of abstraction which helps to comprehend the past and forecast

[18] Isomorphism is inherent to regular modelling. Modelling assumes that certain relations are held between the elements of one theory and the elements of another theory. The CTC lacks this isomorphism, which is the one-to-one correspondence between elements of present alternative perspectives in the field (in the absence of an overarching theory).

the future of a phenomenon. Hence, a model can be evaluated based on the extent to which these four components have been achieved. The CTC achieves the tasks of the summarisation and simplification of crime and terrorism relationships fairly well.[19] However, in terms of the other two important facets of modelling - generalisation and abstraction, the CTC is lacking in explanatory power and applicability.

Despite several upgrades to the model, it does not adequately capture and characterise developing realities. These realities are characterised by the new depth in the nexus and the transformed character of contemporary terrorist organisations. Therefore, the CTC model will be assessed in terms of the generalisability and of the crime-terror nexus phenomenon. Additionally, the model will be evaluated in terms of the inclusivity and correspondence between several key elements[20] from the alternative perspectives that are reflected in more recent analyses and research. Finally, the depth of the CTC's explanatory power and the model's ability to forecast the development of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, will be assessed by reference to these rival approaches.

In particular, the study aims to answer the following main research question:

Does the CTC model sufficiently serve as an explanatory tool and framework of analysis, to account for the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period?

In response to the main research question, the proposition and research statement is that the CTC model fails to account for the possibility of terrorist organisations originating as criminal organisations. Thus, this study will propose that there is a probability, that post-9/11 terrorist organisations might originate as criminal organisations, *a priori*. It will be argued that the post-9/11 environmental context, and the advancing forces of globalisation have resulted in the emergence of a transformed typology of threats to human security in particular terrorism and crime. The emergence of organisations such as the IS, and the transformation of the typology of threats to human security, suggests a probability that the two concepts, entities and activities, can become completely merged. On account of this, the search for and gathering of updated

[19] The CTC captures, summarises, simplifies and schematically depicts the majority of the realities of the crime and terrorism relationships pre-9/11 with a few examples of post-9/11.

[20] E.g. units of analysis, levels of analysis, drivers and facilitators of convergence, specificities of crime-terror relationship 'realities, and lastly, convergence of old and new inherent to contemporary terrorist organisations.

knowledge, critical evaluation, and the isolation of key alternative perspectives coupled with a re-evaluation of the CTC model is needed to assess the extent of the applicability of the CTC to the new and developing crime-terror nexus. The latest analyses and research clearly suggest that the character of terrorist organisations and the crime-terror nexus has transformed. The CTC model as an explanatory tool, fails to forecast and accommodate these recent developments on the continuum. Therefore, a thorough examination of the developing contemporary crime-terror nexus is a prerequisite for understanding, preventing and combating terrorism in the 21st century.

1.4 Research design and methodology

The initial interest for this research was triggered by the ideologically unusual nature of contemporary terrorist organisations,[21] such as the IS. Additionally, the researcher's own life experience[22] reinforced the interest in examining the 'true' character of contemporary terrorism. Upon the encounter with the work of Jessica Stern (2003), the researcher gained greater clarity on the possible deeper triggering factors behind the complex nature of developing contemporary terrorist organisations. Stern's (2003) work uncovered a variety of deeply rooted social and economic issues that are difficult to tackle with a conventional military approach. These issues led the researcher in the direction of literature on the relationships between crime and terrorism, the crime-terror nexus discourse, the convergence perspectives, and lastly, to the CTC model.

The crime-terror nexus discourse pointed to the presence of two schools of thought (Grabosky & Stohl 2010). Additionally, the discourse revealed that the evolution of the relationship between crime and terrorism impacted on the development of contemporary terrorist organisations. This led the researcher to the use of a systematic approach to the preliminary literature search. The preliminary systematic literature search helped to identify and isolate texts such as Makarenko's (2003; 2004) CTC model, and various influential publications, which methodologically claimed to explain the origins and evolution of the relationship between crime and terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.

[21] E.g. seeming criminalisation of contemporary terrorist organisations

[22] Almost four years in a highly traditional and religiously fundamental country, which in accordance to the accounts of the local community and empirical evidence is the home to the world's renown terrorist and ideologue.

The preliminary systematic search helped to identify a sample of literature that directly referred to the crime-terror relationships, the nexus and its discourse, the CTC, as well as its explanations and gaps.[23] Subsequently, the systematic literature overview examined how the CTC and its rival approaches were presented, and how explanatory power was claimed by each. This uncovered the important features of the transformation of the relationship between crime and terrorism, that the CTC did not fully account for.

Initially, the preliminary search began with identification of the broader spectrum of Cold War and post-Cold War literature, [24] which focused mainly on criminal insurgencies, drug cartels, TOC, and terrorism - with an emphasis on regions such as Latin America, Southern Europe, and Central and East Asia. This literature represented the dominant texts in the crime-terror relationships discourse. The literature was selected to familiarise the researcher with the context, background, and roots of the relationship between OC and terrorism.[25]

After, the researcher familiarised herself with the background and evolution of the relationship between OC and terrorism, a further systematic literature search led the researcher in the direction of the crime-terror convergence, nexus, and ultimately the CTC model. More specifically, the literature on the relationship between OC and terrorism revealed that the dynamic and evolving nature of this relationship has an impact on the character of contemporary terrorist organisations. A subsequent step was conducted to identify whether there were noticeable changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period. These changes in the relationship lie at the core of the issue of combating terrorism in the 21st century. In addition, this step was conducted to isolate texts that were focused more on the phenomenon of crime and terror convergence, the deeper morphing of crime and terrorism, and its transformation.

[23] Tilly (1985), Merari (1993), Schmid (1996, 2004), Snow (1996) Laqueur(1999), Sullivan (2002; 2006; 2010), Brooker (2010) and Wilkinson (2011), Napoleoni (2004); Sanderson (2004), Stanislawski (2004); Makarenko (2004; 2009; (EP 2012)), O'Neill (2005), Schendel and Abraham (2005), Hoffman (2006), Levi (2006; 2008) Ranstorp (2007), Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), Metz (2007), Ballina (2011), Forest (2012; 2013); Picarelli (2006, 2012), Hesterman (2013); Bobic (2014), Carrapico et al. (2014); Rossi (2014); Shelley (2014); Sekulow et al. (2014); Cockburn (2015); Cronin (2015); Smith (2015); Stern (2003; 2016), Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), Clarke (2016), Hemmingsen (2016), Gallagher (2016), Böckler et al. (2017); Byman (2017); etc.

[24] E.g. Schmid (1996); Snow (1996), Laqueur (1999) etc.

[25] As to a certain extent works of Makarenko (2004; 2009; (EP 2012)), Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Metz (2007), Grabosky and Stohl (2010); Ballina (2011), Forest (2012), Picarelli (2006; 2012) etc. attempt to address and explain the transformations in the relationship between crime and terrorism in post-9/11 period.

It was noticed that the crime-terror nexus discourse lacks an overarching theory. Additionally, the nexus discourse is a disorganised and contested field of knowledge. For example, Grabosky and Stohl (2010) only name a few works, and divide them into two schools of thought within the crime-terror nexus discourse: one, involving Stern (2003), Makarenko (2004) and Dishman (2005), who suggest the existence and permanency of convergence; another, involving Schmid (1996) and Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), who suggest differences in motivations of crime and terrorism, and the infrequency of convergence between them.[26] While the works from both pre- and post-9/11 periods equally influenced the expansion of the crime-terror nexus discourse post-9/11, only a few of them influenced the evolution of Makarenko's CTC model.[27]

The CTC model was selected as a pertinent explanatory tool since it aims to depict the realities and the historical progression of the relationships between crime and terrorism. In the classical interpretation, a model is usually based on isomorphism which is the one-to-one correspondence between elements of two theories. A model assumes that certain relations are held between the elements of one theory and the elements of another theory. That is, models have a heuristic value. In the absence of overarching theory,[28] regular modelling implies a summarised, simplified, generalised and abstracted conceptual scheme of a theory (Isaak 1985: 171; Shelley et al. 2005: 85). Similarly, in the absence of an overarching theory on the relationship between crime and terrorism, the CTC model is an alternative to the conventional understanding of a model. Thus, the CTC model is a summarised, simplified, generalised and abstracted conceptual scheme of case studies and patterns (not summarised conceptual scheme of the theory) that are drawn from dominant perspectives and arguments of the crime-terror nexus. Regular modelling compromises complexity by using simplified assumptions. However, simplified interface does not automatically equate with representativeness and applicability. Therefore, the limitations of a model, as a methodological tool, are that because of its deductive logic it could convey an untested or untestable theory; it is a simplified version of the complex phenomenon in the real world; it is less

[26] E.g. the emphasis is on alliances of mere convenience (short-term and once-off cooperation)

[27] The works of Manwaring (1991), Metz (1993), Reno (1993); Snow (1996), Schmid (1996; 2004), Keen (1998) Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 1999) Laqueur (1999), Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Shelley and Picarelli (2002; 2005), Shelley et al. (2005), Shelley (2002; 2005; 2014; 2017),Stern (2003; 2016), Napoleoni (2004), Sanderson (2004), Picarelli (2006; 2012), Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), Metz (2007), Ballina (2011); Bobic (2014) and many others contributed to the crime-terror nexus discourse, and only a few of them influenced the evolution of Makarenko's (2003; 2004; 2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260)) CTC model.

[28] There a few works in literature on modelling, as a methodological tool, that provide concrete conceptualisations and variables on regular modelling.

of an explanatory tool rather than an arithmetical representation of idealised and abstracted theory (Isaak 1985: 171). Makarenko's (2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260)) several revisions of the CTC justify significant limitations of the model as an explanatory too. The non-static, continuum form of the CTC model leaves the space open for further updates and accommodation of newly emerging patterns. Thus, it assumes the possibility of unrealistic assumptions. Additionally, several upgrades of the CTC model are signalling that the author questions its explanatory power in relation to recently developing dynamics of the crime-terror nexus post-9/11. [29]

The systematic approach in the preliminary systematic literature search resulted in the synthesis of the key works[30] of Makarenko (2003; 2004; 2009; (EP 2012)), Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Picarelli (2006; 2012), Ballina (2011), Bobic (2014) and Stern (2016). These works were considered key as they are regularly cited in the crime-terror nexus discourse, as well as because they examine the relationship between crime and terrorism, their convergence and the specifics surrounding this. These works claim to address the understanding of the transformations in the relationship between crime and terrorism, as well as the depths and complexities of this relationship. Additionally, the specific elements, drawn from these works, namely the actors and alternative units of analysis, drivers, facilitators, contemporary operational environments susceptible to convergence correspond between these alternative perspectives. These elements provide the variables in the evolution and transformation of the crime-terror nexus, as well as the CTC's modelling (as methodological approach) is assessed against these variables. Additionally, these variables closely correspond to the features identified in recent analyses, research, media accounts and empirical findings literature, that were also selected through preliminary systematic search. These more recent analyses and research are also reflective of the overall dynamic of the new crime-terror nexus.[31] It is argued that a critical evaluation of the transformations taking place together with the aforementioned corresponding variables holds the key to understanding and combating terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

[29] Thus, the extent to which the CTC model is representative of and applicable to realities in the real world.
[30] E.g. methods and approaches literature on crime-terror nexus
[31] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), Von Drehle (2015), Hemmingsen (2016), Gallagher (2016), Böckler et al. (2017), Warrick (2015), VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016), CNN (2017), Government of the Netherlands (2017).

Consequently, this study employs a research design based on a systematic literature overview (primarily Chapters 1-3) followed by critical analysis (Chapters 4-5).[32] It incorporates Ballina's (2011) alternative CTC model, Picarelli's (2006; 2012) postinternationalism, IPE, conventional versus contemporary nexus perspectives, Bobic's (2014) human security approach, Dishman's (2001; 2005; 2016) critical analyses and Stern's (2016) critical outlook on the organisational survival approach. The literature is employed to systematically highlight the limitations in explanatory power of the CTC model. The CTC model is examined on the basis of abstraction, generalisation, systematisation and simplification dimensions which are regular components of a successful modelling approach. Case studies and empirical research fall outside the scope of this study. For critical evaluation of validity and reliability of the CTC model some reference is made to current research, analyses[33] and media accounts[34] with respect to the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations, such as the IS. This is done to systematically overview and critically evaluate to what extent the knowledge developed on the contemporary nexus and organisations, such as the IS, is generalisable, applicable to, and reflected in the CTC model.

1.5 The structure of the research

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter served as the introductory chapter. It introduced, contextualised, and motivated the choice for the crime-terror nexus, crime-terror convergence frameworks and the CTC model. The chapter highlighted the focus and the scope of the research. It incorporated a preliminary literature overview, the formulation and demarcation of the research problem, research design and methodology.

Chapter 2: Post-9/11 transformations: crime, terrorism, TOC, and terrorist organisations

This chapter is exploratory and further looks at the literature on the evolution of conceptualisations and of the crime-terror nexus; the concepts of crime, terrorism, criminal and terrorist organisations. It also examines the recent developments and changes these conceptualisations went through in

[32]This is closely related and reflective of the research question, which is both effectiveness (limitations) and conceptual (applicability) question (Booth, Sutton & Papaioannou 2016: 13).
[33] Such as Von Drehle (2015), Basra, Neumann & Brunner (2016), Gallagher (2016), Gerges (2016); Hemmingsen (2016), Warrick (2015), Böckler et al. (2017), Government of the Netherlands (2017) etc.
[34] Media accounts, reflecting the realities on the ground, are VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016), CNN (2017) etc.

the post-9/11 period. The contemporary criminal and terrorist organisations are compared and contrasted to the conventional forms. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to examine the background and set the context for the crime-terror nexus, its discourse and the emergence of the CTC model.

Chapter 3: The turbulent crime-terror nexus: rise of the crime-terror convergence frameworks and the CTC

This chapter incorporates the preconditions, background, development, origins and motivations of the crime-terror nexus and its discourse. Finally, this chapter provides a detailed overview of the transformations that the crime-terror nexus and the discourse went through in the post-9/11 period that is the rise of crime-terror convergence frameworks and the emergence of the CTC. All of this is done to examine how the variation of linkages between crime and terrorism developed, what changes they underwent post-9/11, and how they were reflected in the CTC model. This is explored to determine the extent to which the CTC model accommodates the emergence of the new crime-terror nexus.

Chapter 4: The CTC: still going strong in post-9/11?

This chapter offers a critical evaluation the CTC, followed by recent developments, preconditions in rethinking of the CTC, as well as the alternative convergence perspectives. The chapter examines the extent to which the CTC model is applicable to explaining the reality of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. This chapter concludes with brief digest of the applicability and limitations of the CTC to the knowledge being developed on the new crime-terror nexus. This enables the gradual and logical transition to Chapter 5.

Chapter 5: Findings and analysis

The chapter contains a summary of the study's findings, an assessment of the information extracted from the literature collected, followed by brief conclusions and recommendations for further research.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced, motivated, and contextualised several important and interdependent areas of this research. These areas include the development and evolution of post-9/11 relationships

between crime and terrorism, the crime-terror nexus, the range of crime-terror convergence frameworks and the CTC model. The preliminary literature overview suggests that the CTC model is certainly an innovative attempt at modelling. Regular modelling implies the summarised, simplified, generalised and abstract visual scheme of theories' elements. Although, the CTC model is an unconventional model it still makes an attempt to achieve the aforementioned characteristics. The abstraction and generalisation dimensions of the CTC model cannot account for the contemporary dynamics of the crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations. This represents a research gap which demarcates the scope and purpose of this study.

The historical background, and earlier concepts of crime, terrorism, criminal and terrorist organisations are briefly reviewed in Chapter 2. This is done for the purposes of identifying the changes in the relationships between crime and terrorism pre- and especially post-9/11. Also, this is done so as to characterise the old and new forms of crime and terrorism, as well as to assess the scope and range of organisational and operational linkages between crime and terrorism post-9/11. Thus, the main goal of Chapter 2 is to set out the context for crime-terror nexus and convergence frameworks' analysis. This is crucial to the understanding of the nature and internal dynamics of contemporary terrorist organisations.

CHAPTER 2

POST-9/11 TRANSFORMATIONS: CRIME, TERRORISM, TOC, AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

2.1 Introduction

Similarly to other forms of human activity which are driven by results and need for survival, criminal and terrorist entities change and adapt over time to exploit new opportunities, mitigate risks, remain competitive and survive in an ever-changing global environment. Consequently, several developments in the global environment are responsible for triggering the transformation of crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period. On the one hand, AQ's 11 September 2001 attack on the US prompted a multifaceted international response. The response included the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),[35] as well as draconian counter-terrorism measures in law enforcement (LE), finance, intelligence and security. This forced terrorist organisations to decentralise, form flatter networks and search for new niches. On the other hand, the nature of globalisation, its constraints, and liberties, simultaneously provided new opportunities for criminal and terrorist organisations. These developments led to a desperate search for alternative sources of financing, for other channels and niches of lucrative activities, and an overall search for survival measures on the part of terrorist organisations. As a result, this led to the further narrowing in the 'jump' between crime and terrorism.

Negative indicators of terrorist incidents,[36] and the growing complexity of contemporary terrorist organisations, point to the worsening of conditions thus favouring the growth of a complex symbiosis between crime and terrorism. The evolving complexity and adaptability of contemporary terrorist organisations highlights the need to understand the transformation in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 world. These transformations are deeply rooted in history and in the conceptual evolution of crime and terrorism as meanings, concepts, activities and entities.

[35] The Bush administration has retooled the labelling of the fight against AQ and other terrorist organisations. In addition to military approach, GWOT implies more diplomatic, political, and economic approach (Schmitt & Shanker 2005).

[36] Almost four times more terrorist incidents of diverse character occurred in the past sixteen years (2001-2016: 98773 incidents) than in earlier three decades taken in total (1970-2001: 73484 incidents) (GTD 1970-2001; GTD 2001-2016; IEP GTI 2016).

Therefore, this chapter examines the roots of the conceptual, organisational and operational overlaps of crime and terrorism. This is done to contextualise and better understand the extent and capacity of the crime-terror relationships and their discourse. Additionally, the impact of environmental changes, and in particular, globalisation's role in fostering of the crime-terror nexus, is examined. Finally, the chapter concludes with an in-depth examination of the nature of the contemporary crime-terror nexus.

2.2 Evolving nature of terrorism, crime, terrorist and criminal organisations

Developing precise definitions of terrorism, crime, and their respective entities is outside of the scope of this research. Despite this it is still necessary to establish conceptual clarity of terrorism and crime as entities and activities so as to contextualise the origins of the crime-terror nexus and its discourse, as well as to be able to track its further evolution and progression. Conceptual clarity involves the accurate use of terminology, drawing logical linkages between concepts, as well as coherence within an argument (Punch 2014: 25). Whereas crime is less contested conceptually, terrorism is a loaded concept.

To overcome the above problem whilst pursuing conceptual clarity, one may focus instead on the evolutionary changes in meanings, concepts, operations and organisation of crime and terrorism, as well as changes in their political vernacular over time. Consequently, tracing the evolutionary patterns and the background of crime and terrorism, their entities behaviour, operation and organisation can inform our understanding of the causes and future dynamics of the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations. It allows one to distinguish and better comprehend the similarities and differences between the conventional and contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations, as well as the overlaps in the new and old character, forms and modus operandi. Altogether, it ensures a better understanding of the nature of the contemporary crime-terror nexus.

The concepts of crime, terrorism and later criminal and terrorist organisations, extend back to antiquity and span various periods of human civilisation. They have recurred historically, and their meanings are evolving with time, influenced by the operational environments in which they exist (Grabosky & Stohl 2010: 3-6; Lawrence 2016: 17-37; Martin 2017: 12; LaFree & Freilich 2017).

The ancient world was often ruled by means of systematic political violence and state repression or ***terror***.[37] The first prototype of today's ***state terrorism***, characterised by psychological warfare,[38] dates back to the time of the Roman Empire (Gibbon 2000; Harries 2007; Solomon 2015; Martin 2017: 23). Similarly, the first prototype of ***terrorist movements/groups/organisations***, which were characterised by what we today call ***terrorist tactics***,[39] originated in the time of the ancient and medieval Middle East.

Scholars[40] generally agree that the closest prototype to the modern concept of ***terrorism*** emerged at the time of the French state under Robespierre. Furthermore, the ideological ancestry of modern terrorism, especially of a left-wing nature, dates back to 19th century Europe, when the anarchist and communist philosophies advocated for the struggle against imperialist and capitalist societies and championed the rights of lower classes (Combs 2016: 22; Martin 2017: 24).

During the Cold War, terrorism was mainly state sponsored and used to attain specific political and ideological goals.[41] In 1983, the term of ***narco-terrorism***[42] emerged for the first time, which was used by terrorists to self-finance politically motivated violence. In that regard, scholars of the time, such as Tilly (1985), saw a blurring of the lines in the distinction between the lawmaker and lawbreaker, cop and robber, as well as taxation and extortion. The author points out that it was possible for state actors which possessed a monopoly on legitimate violence and coercion to behave in a criminal fashion.

Similarly to terrorism, ***crime*** is not frozen in time or place. Sociologist Richard Quinney (1970) suggested that crime is prone to changing in line with the political and social circumstances of the time. However, there is disagreement regarding the time when the first incident of crime occurred (Knepper & Johansen 2016: 9). It is known that in prehistoric and ancient times human beings were involved in activities distorting social order (Grabosky & Stohl 2010: 4). In ancient times the

[37] Terror derives from Latin *terrere* - fear, panic, alarm, fright or to frighten.
[38] *Regicide* - killing, assassination of kings. Majority of Roman emperors died a violent death: either suspiciously or were assassinated. Julius Caesar assassinated in Senate (c.44 BCE), Caligula (c.41 CE), Galba killed by Praetorian Guard (c.68 CE), Domitian was stabbed (c.96 CE), Commodus killed by gladiator (c.193 CE), Caracalla, Elagabalus etc.
[39] Terrorist tactics were associated with the use of guerrilla warfare, destruction of symbolic property, assassinations of authorities, killings in the broad daylight in front of witnesses and mass suicides in the face of surrender (D'Alessio & Stolzenberg 1990; Suetonious 2003; Katona 2006; Anderson & Sloan 2009; Solomon 2015; Martin 2017).
[40] Schmid (2004), Hoffman (2006), Burke (2007), Neumann (2009), Solomon (2015), Martin (2017) etc.
[41] Merari (1993), Snow (1996), O'Neill (2005), Metz (2007), Sullivan (2002; 2006; 2010), Brooker (2010) and Wilkinson (2011), Martin (2017).
[42] Peruvian President Belaunde Terry first used it to depict the war of drug traffickers against antidrug agencies (Martin 2013).

interpretation of crime varied. It signified the liability for an offence against the community or an intellectual mistake. Thereafter, crime became equivalent to an offence against an individual, the community or the state.[43]

Other scholars link the development of the modern prototype of the term of crime to 16th century Europe, with the subsequent emergence of authority and later the state. With the emergence of states, crime became directly associated with whatever a government[44] declares it to be (Allum et. al. 2010; Grabosky & Stohl 2010: 4; Rousseaux 2013: 38-54).

The term **OC** appeared in modern times (c. 19th century). It is also a very loose concept. Dozens of definitions focus on various aspects ranging from organisational goals, properties of organisations, changes in structure, methods or tools, and or activities. Although, during the last few decades of the 20th century, OC became more globalised. Similarly to contemporary terrorism, crime is less state-oriented.

In the post-9/11 world, and with the advent of globalisation, both crime and terrorism have undergone significant transformations. Terrorism has undergone a shift from ideological, towards ethno-religious and criminal objectives. Globalisation, its and accompanying decentralisation, the decomposition of a state's authority, respatialisation, and the presence of an illicit market segmentation has pushed contemporary terrorist organisations to decentralise, to network, and to occupy accessible niches in unconventional operational spaces. OC has also expanded and diversified its operational and organisational space,[45] which includes illicit black markets, segmented vertically integrated industries (VIIs), the Dark Web, cyberspace, and other types of unconventional non-state space. As a result, contemporary terrorist organisations have become prone to a complete merger with OC. Today, terrorists' agenda is completely aligned with the personal needs and interests of criminals (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016).

[43] E.g.in line with the Hellenic law's torts, or private wrongs
[44] Thus, crime "presupposes the existence of an authority, the state, that is interested in identifying and punishing offenses" (Knepper & Johansen 2016: 23).
[45] E.g. non-traditional; non-state space of operation and organisation

2.3 Expanding forces of globalisation in the post-9/11: a flourishing environment for the crime-terror interface

The literature on the crime-terror interface attributes the further consolidation of the crime-terror relationship to the post-Cold War period, coupled with the expansion of globalisation. Central to the literature on globalisation is the notion that the world is 'shrinking'. Coupled with this is the idea that modes of organising, communication technologies, media and monetary transactions are evolving. Additionally, the sites of power and the subjects of power result in decentralisation and deterritorialisation. This means that criminal and terrorist organisations can exercise power within, across and against states. Furthermore, the advance of globalisation impacts on the VIIs' fragmentation and the segmentation of illicit markets. This potentially creates a niche for the emergence and operation of malevolent polymotivated non-state actors (Dishman 2016: 144).

According to Makarenko (2008), globalisation can be characterised by five categories. These most recognised are internationalisation,[46] liberalisation,[47] universalisation (e.g. cultural globalisation), modernisation or westernisation,[48] and finally, respatialisation[49] or deterritorialisation (Scholte 2005: 16). Additionally, Lutz and Lutz (2017), suggest that globalisation primarily revolves around economic interrelatedness. The economic aspect of globalisation gives push to social, political and cultural spheres, that is, the presence of multiple globalisations. Still, globalisation should not be reduced merely to the economic aspect, since it influences all spheres of human activity. Previously unconnected processes and events have a mutual impact on each other. For instance, the literature emphasises the mutual influence of the events of 9/11 events and globalisation on each other.

There is a disagreement amongst scholars in respect of whether globalisation is a positive or negative phenomenon. However, in order to understand what factors gave rise to the development of the new terrorism[50] and which impacted on the new crime-terror nexus consolidation, then one

[46] E.g. growth in the cross border activity, exchange and interdependence; emergence of non-state actors whose activities can no longer be controlled within the state borders

[47] E.g. presence of mostly open, borderless global economy

[48] E.g. (it also produces grievances and disenchantment) terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda pursuing the decolonisation from Western influence, as well as organisations such as the IS following the Sharia for liberation from the decadent Western lifestyle

[49] E.g. space is no longer mapped in terms of territorial locations; the development of cyberspace etc.

[50] Neumann (2009) raises an important question with regards to the labeling of the new terrorism as new; whether 'new' is seen as unprecedented or 'new' as of continuity, influenced by processes of globalisation.

has to acknowledge both sides of the globalisation coin. Pro-globalisation arguments[51] emphasise the following: interdependence of economy;[52] fundamental revolutionisation of communications and media;[53] global polity;[54] and finally, the development of a cosmopolitan culture. Contra-globalisation arguments highlight that globalisation is: uneven, and that its depth is overestimated; a Western imperialist project which carries merely exploitative relations; global governance bears a lack of responsibility;[55] and finally, that the term is not new, it is merely a continuing process.[56]

Globalisation is often characterised by the mirroring of the licit and illicit environments. The simultaneous emergence of winners and losers[57] in the uneven conditions of globalisation is unavoidable. Additionally, higher levels of globalisation are often associated with higher levels of terrorism and illicit economic activity (Lutz & Lutz 2017: 3). This occurs because the state's authority and control decrease which leads to opportunities for crime and terrorism and the crime-terror nexus (Picarelli 2012: 191). It is important to note that various features inherent in globalisation are portrayed simultaneously as constraints and liberties of globalisation. These constraints and liberties also simultaneously facilitate the development and evolution of the crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations.

With regard to the constraints of globalisation in the post-9/11 period, Dishman (2016) emphasises the fragmentation of the VIIs, and the economic interdependence and segmentation of the illicit markets.[58] These processes which are inherent in globalisation create opportunities for nefarious non-state actors to occupy the niches in the black economy. This also creates the space for the further consolidation of crime-terror nexus and hybridisation of OC and terrorism. The segmentation of the illicit markets and the emergence of a variety of spaces within which these markets run,[59] transcends the borders of the state and is beyond the control of the state. This makes it more strenuous to tackle the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations.

[51] Giddens (1990); Scholte (2005); Held and McGrew (2007), Makarenko (2008); Shelley (2014); Martin (2017); Lutz and Lutz (2017) etc.
[52] E.g. acceleration of transactions, cross-border trade and financial flows
[53] E.g. altered realisation of distance or space; ideas of chronological time and geographical space are collapsing
[54] E.g. emergence of global governance; transnational social and political movements; global risks are beyond control of states and are managed by the means of cooperation at international and transnational levels
[55] E.g. demise of state power; lack of accountability for democratic control
[56] Such as the internationalisation of economy is not historically unique.
[57] E.g. presence of grievances, inequalities, as well as disenchanted communities and individuals etc.
[58] This process mirrors the segmentation of the licit markets.
[59] E.g. conflict territories, uncontrolled territories, or stable states, cyberspace, Dark Web etc.

The revolutionisation of communications and media once again contributes to the blossoming of illicit markets.[60] Communication technologies and media enhance the decentralisation and establishment of criminal-terrorist networks, allowing for the further consolidation of crime and terrorism. Moreover, this makes it easier for contemporary terrorist organisations such as the IS to communicate its massive propaganda and branding to the global masses.

Drawing from Stern (2016), who echoes Kissinger (2014), it is interesting to note the following paradox. Contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, reject the principles of Westphalian sovereignty. Such organisations perceive the Westphalian principles and statehood as exploitative and deviant. Such actors offer as an alternative counter-culture approach[61] which at the same time retains elements of Westphalian-like, state-centric perspectives.[62] Also, entities such as the IS, develop capabilities stronger than governments' armed forces. Therefore, such organisations establish (and claim a right to) an exploitative and oppressive authority of their own over a certain territory, which is even more aggressive than the Westphalian state. This allows such entities to legitimise and shield criminal pursuits. Claiming the right to sovereignty allows them to simultaneously pursue the legitimisation of terror.

The expanding forces of globalisation enable contemporary nefarious actors, including terrorist organisations, to take control of ungoverned and uncontrollable territories, which are also fertile grounds for illicit economies. The development of information technologies has transformed geo-spatial locations so that now OC and terrorist organisations can gain control and take advantage of the non-traditional, non-state space such as cyberspace.

Picarelli (2006), echoing Shelley's (2005) old and new OC groups, emphasises the broadening of the scope and the widening of diversity in the crime-terror nexus. Picarelli (2006) differentiates between the sovereign-bound and the sovereign-free OC and terrorist groups. The sovereign-bound OC and terrorist groups were mostly the dominant actors during the Cold-War, and the

[60] The vivid examples are the IS making use of cryptocurrency, as well as a maintenance of close ties with, receiving of aid and exploitation of the diaspora communities (Charles 2014; Manheim et al. 2017; Darrah 2017; ITIC 2017; Gallagher 2016; Hemmingsen 2016).

[61] In other words, 'cosmopolitan culture' – the establishment of (plebeian) jihad and the Islamic state. This counter-culture offers the redemption narrative for the recruitment and radicalisation, which is closely aligned with the personal needs and interests of the criminals. The membership for 'plebeian' jihad is drawn from the pool of criminals lacking firm ideological motivations (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016).

[62] They claim to replace the oppressive Westphalian state, by adopting ideology and agenda that claim to establish the alternative governance – state-like entity.

sovereign-free are currently dominating the international arena after the Cold War. The former, if they converge, form the state-centric crime-terror nexus, and the latter are converging in the multi-centric crime-terror nexus.[63] Although, Picarelli (2006) suggests that in line with the advancing forces of globalisation there is a possibility for the simultaneous co-existence of both state-centric and multi-centric crime-terror nexuses. Thus, drawing from the literature, another product of the intensification of globalisation is the co-existence and intersection of the old and new forms and *modus operandi* of the crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations.

Therefore, contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, display greater convergence (particularly hybridisation) of crime and terrorism and the emergence of a new crime-terror nexus. Beyond that, the nature of such contemporary organisations also reveals the convergence of the new and old forms and *modus operandi* of crime and terrorism, and the crime-terror nexus. Stern (2016) reaffirms that the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, exist in the form of the hybrid and simultaneously portray the features of the apocalyptic cult and proto-state. For example, the IS operates from its territorial base, by attempting to replace and provide an alternative to existing governance, and at the same time the organisation strives to expand its influence across the world (expansion of sovereignty and religious authority beyond immediate territory; global governance) (Williams 2016: 38). Therefore, such entities not only demonstrate the hybrid criminal-terrorist nature from their origin but also, they exhibit merger of old and new features of organisation and operation.

2.4 Old versus New argument: conventional versus contemporary terrorist and criminal entities

Conventional conceptualisations of terrorism were driven by the profit versus ideology dichotomy. The empirical realm of the post-9/11 environment shows that a significant shift has appeared away from traditional to new terrorism. Moreover, inherent changes have also occurred within the concept of new terrorism itself. Thus, it becomes important to differentiate between old definitions of terrorism, and the post-9/11 conventional and contemporary definitions within the new concept of terrorism.

[63] The multi-centric crime-terror nexus revolves around variety of (non-state and state) actors; such nexus does not necessarily aim to overthrow the government, replace the state or cooperate with the state.

For example, old terrorism can be defined as an "act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim or wider audience for the purpose of achieving political ends" (Stohl 1988: 3). A classical example of old terrorism is the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that came into existence in 1969. The IRA went through several mutations though the years. However, it kept a traditional form of structure. It continued to revolve around one centre of gravity and maintained military hierarchy. While the IRA adopted a cell system, no changes occurred in its chain of command. Additionally, the IRA's aims remained consistent though the conflict, with the establishment of an Irish Republic, as the ultimate and conventional goal. Finally, the IRA's method aligned with targeting 'legitimate targets' and followed strict rules of engagement. Thus, the IRA will be remembered as an extremely violent organisation. However, the number of its mass-casualty attacks is lower in comparison to new terrorism (Neumann 2009: 28-38).

The early 1990s saw the rise of a new and more dangerous form of terrorism. Examples of this form of terrorism include the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack and the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Al-Qaeda too is an example of this new terrorism. In the absence of a concrete systematisation of the concepts of new and old terrorism, Peter Neumann (2009) proposes using Martha Crenshaw's methodology (see **Table 1.**). New and old terrorism is characterised in accordance with three main variables which are structure, aims, and method. Neumann (2009: 15) suggests that is the best choice to explain and systematise the transition from the old to new terrorism.

Table 1.: Old and new terrorism: 'ideal types'

Figure 2.1 Old and new terrorism: 'ideal types'		
	Old terrorism	**New terrorism**
Structure	Hierarchical; geared towards one centre of gravity	Networked; transnational reach and orientation
Aims	Nationalist and/or Marxist	Religiously inspired
Method	'Legitimate targets'; rules of engagement	Mass-casualty attacks against civilians; excessive violence

(Neumann 2009: 29)

With the occurrence of 9/11, the division in timeline between the end of old and the beginning of new terrorism has shifted. Thus, the starting point of new terrorism was moved to 9/11, and the era pre-9/11 was coined as an era of old terrorism that was characterised by relative predictability and simplicity. Therefore, the following key elements characterise the old terrorism: a relationship

with the state (e.g. state support; working in tandem); ideological or nationalist motives justifying violence; distinguishable organisations or movements; the employment of conventional weapons (e.g. explosives, small arms etc.); championing the grievances of ethnonational groups or specific classes; and finally, a comparatively thorough selection of targets (Neumann 2009: 28-38).

Post-9/11, new terrorism is characterised by: the loss of state support;[64] the loss of clarity in motivations justifying the use of violence;[65] loose, flattened cell-based networks;[66] the desired acquisition of WMDs and high-intensity weapons as well as an interest and intent in CBRN capabilities (e.g. the IS); the advanced use and manipulation of social media and various communication technologies; and finally, the maximisation of casualties using asymmetrical methods (Shelley 2014: 107-132; Martin 2017b: 162-169).

Initially, there were numerous debates among scholars about various technical aspects of the emergence of the ***new terrorism*** concept (Copeland 2001; Spencer 2006). The labelling of the concept as 'new' received criticism because it undermined the notion that most of the conceptualisations and phenomena are ones of continuity. Thus, the disagreements were alleviated by the assumption that the labelling of terrorism as 'new' eliminates previously existing continuities of organised political violence (Kurtulus 2010: 476-500). Accordingly, Neumann (2009) states that linguistically, 'new' does not describe unprecedented phenomena, but rather the meaning attached is that of continuity, or evolutionary change. Neumann (2009) suggests a following example: "When the fax machine was invented, it was not talked about as the 'new fax' because there had been no fax machine prior to it being invented" (Neumann 2009: 12). Thus, new terrorism, as well as new forms and characteristics of OC in the post-9/11 period signify that current manifestations of them are not unprecedented, and they have evolved with history and environmental circumstances of the time. Because of this it is important to examine the background, as well as wider context in which they are evolving today in order to better account for changes in nature of contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations.

Globalisation post-9/11 has been an uneven and asymmetrical process. The concepts of crime and terrorism and the changes in their organisational characteristics are mirroring the process of

[64] E.g. there is a pressure to search for the new sponsors
[65] E.g. politically vague, religious or even mystical motivations
[66] E.g. minimal lines of control and command

globalisation.[67] Thus, the transformation of concepts and changes in major characteristics of criminal and terrorist organisations have not been homogenous. However, similar to the characteristics of globalisation above, it is important to pinpoint the transformation of the concepts of crime and terrorism that contributed to the consolidation of the crime-terror interface in the post-9/11 period.

This specific categorisation could however be outdated in the context of the post-9/11 period with the origin of organisations such as the IS. Still, it offers a solid base for further systematisation. It also guides research to the potential identification of the main trends in new terrorism post-9/11.

Defining terrorism is a troublesome and never-ending process. There is no uniform definition of terrorism. However, a certain degree of consensus on characteristics exists. According to Walter Laqueur (1996; 1999), the rudimentary characteristic of terrorism generally agreed upon, is that terrorism always involves violence, or a threat of violence. Governments, private agencies, academia, and decision-makers developed dozens of differing concepts. According to Gus Martin (2017b: 152), the number of European states, governments, private and individual agencies, faced with terrorism, have formed their own definitions. For example, terrorism is seen as: the use of threat "…for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property"; "enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes"; or "..the use, or the threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims" (Martin 2017b: 152). According to Enders and Sandler (2012) terrorism can be defined as the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups, though intimidation of a large audience beyond the immediate noncombatant victims, to achieve a political or social objective (Enders & Sandler 2012: 4).

Looking at the abovementioned characteristics and definitions of old and new terrorism, and terrorist organisations, it is evident that the emergence of new actors such as the IS and the evolution of terrorism post-9/11 cannot be classified within Neumann's (2009) 'ideal types', nor within the range of definitions. The irony is that the definitions of new terrorism are very much

[67] E.g. illicit markets segmentation and niche allocation; the illicit processes and organisations are mirroring the licit ones

infiltrated by the old school approach, especially with regard to the differentiation between political, ideological and lucrative aims. Also, they offer examples of organisations such as Al-Qaeda within the category of new terrorism. Thus, drawing from above literature it is becoming evident that due to the expansion of globalisation forces and in the face of emerging contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, organisations such as AQ can be moved to a category of a conventional form of terrorism within the domain of so called new terrorism. While, at the same time, new terrorism can also be characterised by co-presence and bifurcation of old and new features.

There is more supporting evidence to suggest that there is a convergence between old and new forms and the *modus operandi* of terrorism and crime, and terrorist and criminal organisations. This is reflected in Picarelli's (2006) analysis of the new and old crime-terror nexus.[68] The author suggests that the old forms of entities were sovereign-bound[69] and new forms are sovereign-free.[70] This convergence of old and new forms and their *modus operandi* is particularly evident in the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. This entity benefits from both globalisation opportunities and its constraints (as opportunities; it is highly adaptive under the pressure of globalisation's constraints). The IS is a hybrid entity that aims to be a proto-state and apocalyptic cult, simultaneously. Finally, it actively spreads propaganda and conducts recruitment by the means of most advanced communication and media technologies.

In comparison to terrorist organisations, OC entities and TCOs are easier to define and identify, and to track their evolutionary changes. Allum and Gilmour (2012) provide the definition of organised criminal group (based on the FBI's definition) as: "any group having some manner of a formalised structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position with actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole" (Allum & Gilmour 2012: 7). A digest of the definitions based on the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime suggests that an organised

[68] E.g. or the multi-centric nexus and the state-centric nexus
[69] E.g. the conventional criminal and terrorist organisations were working against or with the state, and were aimed at replacing the government
[70] E.g. they exist in the form of networks and lack interest in the state; they focus more on the illicit markets and cyberspace, as well as on finding niches in the ungoverned, uncontrolled, and conflict territories

criminal group is "a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences…in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial [or] other material benefit" (Allum & Gilmour 2012: 7; Shelley 2014: 12). Transnational crime, which is linked to the new crime phenomenon, is committed if: it transcends the borders, and it is perpetrated in more than one state; its preparation, planning, direction or control are conducted in another state; and finally, a perpetuated crime in one state affects another state (Allum & Gilmour 2012: 7; Shelley 2014: 12).

Louise Shelley's (2014) analysis explores the 'dirty link' between crime, terrorism, and corruption, and accurately reflects the nature of the relationship between crime and terrorism in the globalised post-9/11 environment. Shelley (2014) reaffirms that the complex symbiosis and linkages between crime and terrorism are better understood though a comparative analysis of old crime and terrorism versus new forms, which examine their structural and conceptual changes. Traditional OC is characterised by: a nationalistic character; a parasitic relationship with the state (it grows with it; substitutes, depends on it); it uses symbolic violence, and rarely conducts violent attacks on a state authority; it uses corruption as an operative tool to influence state authorities; it is not keen to associate with terrorists. The examples of the traditional OC can be Japan's Yakuza OC syndicates, the Italian Mafia, and the Russian Mafia in the 1990s. The new TOC, on the other hand, is characterised by: differing interests with the state; it thrives from and within unstable environments; it applies violence to destabilise the state; it thrives on high institutionalised and systemic corruption; it may sell services, form alliances, or cooperate with terrorists for services. Mexican cartels, Balkan criminal gangs, TOC in Caucasus and Afghanistan[71] are all examples of contemporary TOC (Shelley 2014).

Shelley (2014) suggests that the increase of globalisation in the post-9/11 period has created a new political environment which is characterised by the diffusion of political and economic power and the retreat of the state. As a result, the new TCOs and new terrorist organisations are major beneficiaries of this environment and both seek to become part of new governance structures.[72] At times they even attempt to substitute the state. Both TOC and terrorist organisations thrive in chaotic environments and are reinforced by them. Additionally, both types of organisations seek

[71] E.g. remaining largest producer of opium in the world
[72] They are unlike the old forms that were cooperating and working in tandem with the state - parasitic cooperation.

to mirror contemporary licit organisational structures; they exist in forms of networks, they have developed operational flexibility, they use outsourcing and adapt quickly, and they respond to obstacles, as well as they have a more restricted connection to their leadership. According to Shelley (2014), the new terrorist and TOC organisations are not simply globalised versions of their predecessors and that their functionality on the global scale is fundamentally different.

Therefore, new terrorist organisations and TCOs are no longer opposites. TOC is becoming stronger and more politically involved, and terrorist organisations are increasingly preoccupied with finance and financial gains (e.g. the IS had two billion annual turnovers in 2015). Therefore, shifts and changes occurring in the conceptualisations and characteristics of crime, terrorism, and their entities post-9/11, as well as the emergence of new TOC and terrorism, spiked interest, and paved the way for the rise of the crime-terror interface discourse.

2.5 Transformations in the crime-terror interface post-9/11: from marriage of convenience to hybrid forms

The post-9/11 crime-terror interface's evolution began with discussions on the relationships between crime and terrorism as mere marriages of convenience; short-term or long-term, sporadic cooperation, alliances, convergences, as well as hybrid forms. Graphically, the transformation of post-9/11 discourse and practice of the crime-terror nexus can be seen through the CTC model revision (see **Figure 1-3**) as a response to some of evolving crime-terror convergence frameworks. Makarenko's (2003; 2004) CTC model has significantly evolved from the time of its introduction in the aftermath of 9/11. The CTC model has evolved in terms of variety of operational environments susceptible to the crime-terror nexus,[73] as well as in terms of its scope, depth and variety of linkages between crime and terrorism.[74]Makarenko's (2003; 2004) first basic linear CTC model (see **Figure 1**), along one single plane, is divided into four categories of crime-terror intersections: first, the formation of alliances between criminal and terrorist organisations; second, collaboration between organisations based on their operational motivations; third, convergence

[73] E.g. from merely conflict-ridden states to inclusion of stable states in the scope of operational environments

[74] The model has evolved from depicting the realities of relationships between crime and terrorism in terms of alliances, cooperation and integration, to inclusion of hybridisation and transformation patterns.

between criminal and terrorist organisations; and finally, the black holes, convergences between entities in a failing state (geospatial dimension).

Scholars, such as Metz (1993), Snow (1996), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Keen (1998) and Kaldor (1999) were among the first to identify the decline of ideological motivations in post-Cold War conflicts. This blurred the lines between economic and political motivations for violence, and the proximity of terrorism and OC, empirically and theoretically. Later, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) focused on analysing the economic profitability and the extraction of profits out of conflict and violence. They concluded that criminal and terrorist organisations considered it profitable to contribute to and preserve unrest. Collier (2000a) further explored the use of grievance for the purposes of recruitment and membership retainment in criminal and terrorist organisations, and how the incitement of grievances for business could be profitable (Collier 2000a: 850). Duffield (2000) focused on the political economy of post-Cold War internal wars. The author contributed to the further development of the discourse by analysing war economies. Duffield (2000) examined the networked structures of war economies, their partnerships with other networks, as well as the operation of parallel transborder trade (Duffield 2000: 73-74) Thus, violence used by contemporary terrorists often carries a 'purely business nothing personal' character; violence is used for economic gain and at the same time it carries an economic profit in itself.

As evident in the above accounts, several efforts were made to define and summarise the body of knowledge on the crime-terror nexus between the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the Information Age. Although, it is Tamara Makarenko's (2003; 2004; 2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)) CTC model, that proved to be a fairly innovative attempt and new starting point at summarising and systematising the progression of post 9/11 crime-terror interface; the crime-terror nexus and it discourse. It introduced a fairly innovative modelling approach in the form of continuum, as a methodological tool. The model generated a response from several social science fields, academia, and policy-makers. This resulted in several alternative lenses and perspectives being developed in the crime-terror nexus discourse post-9/11. These perspectives revised the reality of the crime-terror interface to accommodate its recent developments. Consequently, this had some impact on the redevelopment and upgrade of the CTC model (see **Figures 1-3**).

Figure 1.: The original CTC model of 2003, 2004



(Makarenko 2003; 2004)

Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012: 15)) redeveloped the original CTC model (see **Figure 2.**) to account for the expansion of linkages between terrorism and OC, and to accommodate the evolution of the relationship in various operational environments (a failing state is not necessarily a precondition). The redeveloped CTC model depicts a gradual progression, a more sophisticated phenomenon (development of hybrid is a possibility) existing along the series of planes: operational (one or two forms: adoption of tactics or functional merging); conceptual (emergence of hybrid simultaneously displaying ideological and economic motivations); evolutional (transformation of motivations and tactics of one entity into another).

Figure 2.: Redeveloped CTC model of 2009, 2012



(Makarenko 2009; (EP 2012: 15))

The latest version of the CTC model (see **Figure 3.**) in the work of Makarenko and Mesquita (2014: 260) draws more attention to the distinct nature of OC and terrorist organisations, moving along the separate strands. OC and terrorism transcend their respective planes, intersect in the hybrid form, and can progress further into evolutionary convergence.

Figure 3.: The refined CTC model of 2014



(Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260).

As can be seen from **Figures 1-3** above, today's crime-terror nexus evolved and is focusing on the complete merger of crime and terrorism, in organisational and operational terms; profitability in the use of politically motivated violence (as a disguise) and even the emergence of hybrid forms containing political and ideological aspects simultaneously (from dichotomies crime vs terrorism, profit vs ideology, to the meeting and coexistence of both at one dot).

Finally, the transformations are visible not only in the empirical and theoretical realms but can simultaneously influence transformations in policy and LE. Concerns deriving from the crime-terror nexus, and real-life transformations on the ground, in relation to the crime-terror interface post-9/11, as well as emergence of the organisations such as the IS, received more attention among policy practitioners and LE, across domestic, international and transnational levels. To illustrate this trend, in 2011, the US government launched the 'Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security' (President Barak Obama 2011; Shelley 2017: 107).

The old way of fighting TOC and terrorism separately and using distinct tools and methods, is perceived to be insufficient to overcome the challenges posed by convergence and hybridisation. In December 2014, the UNSC passed two resolutions concerning the crime-terror nexus. Resolution 2195 (S/RES/2195: 2014) focuses on illicit trade and the relationship between crime and terrorism that undermine the world order and prolong conflicts. Resolution 2199 (passed in February 2015), specifically targets the funding of the IS, "emphasizing the terrorist financial supporting mechanisms including the trade supporting mechanism…focused not only on the crimes that generate funds for the terrorist group but particularly on the trade as well as the trade-based money-laundering that supports ISIS" (S/RES/2199: 2015). Furthermore, it pays attention

to concerns of trade facilitation and the commodities that harbour value for terrorists (Shelley 2017: 107-108; S/RES/2195 (2014); S/RES/2199 (2015)).

2.6 Conclusion

Crime and terrorism are neither static, nor are they entirely new concepts. So is the crime-terror interface, which has continuously re-emerged and evolved throughout history. The conceptualisation of crime and terrorism portrays both as a form of activity and organisation. The relationship between the two fluctuated in the earlier epochs in line with the time and political vernacular. The emergence and increase of globalisation in the post-9/11 period has had a significant impact on further shaping the conceptualisation of crime and terrorism and the evolution of their relationship. Globalisation and the events of 9/11 are mutually reinforcing. The acceleration and expansion of globalisation in the post-9/11 period created simultaneously created restrictions and opportunities for the development of the relationships, alliances, cooperation and complex symbioses between crime and terrorism.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the rise of interest and draconian LE measures against terrorism financing, hawala banking, and AQ, pressured criminal and terrorist organisations to decentralise, to form networks, and to fill in the niches in the illicit market imitating licit activities. Globalisation, decentralisation, individualisation of authority, fragmentation of VIIs and the segmentation of the illicit markets coupled with rapid communications and technological advancement, are major contributing factors in the emergence of the new crime-terror nexus. The new crime-terror nexus is characterised by the complete morphing of criminal and terrorist interests, needs and *milieus*.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURBULENT CRIME-TERROR NEXUS: RISE OF THE CRIME-TERROR CONVERGENCE FRAMEWORKS AND THE CTC

3.1 Introduction

The orthodoxy which suggests dissimilarity in motivations and the agendas of crime and terrorism, has long dominated the crime-terror nexus discourse. In the wake of the 9/11 and with the expansion of globalisation, this orthodoxy continued to affect the further development of the discourse. As a result, the crime-terror nexus discourse has been divided into two schools of thought: the first acknowledges the convergence between criminal and terrorist entities as well as its permanency, and the second insists on focusing on the differences in motivations and the temporary marriages of convenience between criminal and terrorist entities. The more recent nexus discourse and research gravitates towards the first school of thought.

The crime-terror nexus and its discourse received a spike in attention post-9/11 with the rise in efforts to define it, and a shift away from its orthodoxy so as to gain more clarity in systematising the relationship between crime and terrorism. One of the innovative attempts to account for the variation of these relationships and the historical progression of the crime-terror nexus was made by the development of the CTC model.

However, in line with the enduring changes in the international environment, security, and LE initiatives post-9/11, the nexus has evolved. The very recent studies and analyses[75] on the crime-terror nexus highlight the complete narrowing of the 'jump' between crime and terrorism, as activities and conceptualisations, as well as the emergence of the new crime-terror nexus. This chapter highlights the background, motivations, nature, dynamics, evolution, and transformation of the crime-terror nexus to point out the inconsistencies within the crime-terror nexus discourse.

3.2 Background, origins, and motivations: the crime-terror nexus pre-9/11

[75] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Gallagher (2016); Stern (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017) etc.

The discourse on the crime-terror nexus is not new. Although, the nexus has received increased attention lately, its scope and terminology have since evolved. The origins and motivations of the crime-terror nexus stem from various scholarships, which examine the changes in the perception of threats, motivations and forms of conflict, as well as the changes in world order, and national and international security environments. The timeline for the origins and motivations of the crime-terror nexus discourse can be divided into two major periods, namely the Cold War and the post-Cold War which was accompanied by globalisation.

In the late 1980's, military professionals and analysists, in particular Lind at al. (1989), distinguished between four generations of warfare (1GW, 2GW, 3GW and 4GW). They suggested that the Cold War period was characterised by a fourth-generation warfare (4GW) mode of conflict. In the post-9/11 environment, the 4GW gained focus once again.[76] According to Lind et al. (1989) the 4GW represented the 'changing face of war' argument. This argument was characterised by an increase in the decentralisation of the conflict, and the blurring of the lines between war and politics, and civilians and combatants. 4GW denoted the loss of monopoly of the nation states over combatant forces and the rise of violent non-state actors as major participants in this mode of warfare.

Having made this distinction, the progression of the discourse on the crime-terror nexus, as well as the evolution of relationships between crime and terrorism, are organised along the following subthemes in terms of the aforementioned time periods. The Cold War crime-terror nexus debates revolved around two subthemes, namely narco-terrorism[77] and the decentralisation of the conflict. These two subthemes are characterised by the blurring of the lines between war and politics, as well as the emergence of 4GW and third-generation gangs (3G2).[78] The post-Cold War crime-terror nexus debates can be characterised by five subthemes. The first subtheme is the 'greed vs grievance' debate, marked by the decline of state sponsorship and the establishment of the 'new'

[76] The contemporary 'malevolent non-state actors', terrorist organisations, such as the IS are characterised by the 4GW, and the hybrid mode of warfare (Rasheed 2015: 84).
[77] Ehrenfeld (1990); Cohen (1996); Makarenko (2005) etc.
[78] Despite the concept being developed by the late 1980's, 4GW experienced the spike in interest within the crime-terror nexus post-9/11, especially in the connection to development of 3G2 (as a representation of 4GW mode of warfare), netwars, networks and netwarriors. Simultaneously, it resulted in development of the debates on the comparative analyses of 3G2 to TCOs, criminal insurgencies and terrorist organisations (Lind et al. 1989; Sullivan 1997; 2000; Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001; Sullivan & Bunker 2007; Brands 2009; Manwaring 2006 etc.).

security environment.[79] The second subtheme is the changing nature of conflict, coupled with the division between criminal and ethnic/spiritual insurgencies. The third subtheme is the differentiation and integration of political, and criminal motivations of entities in the debate.[80] The fourth subtheme focuses on war economies, networks, netwars and netwarriors.[81] The final subtheme revolves around comparative analyses of criminal gangs and terrorist organisations.[82]

The early debates on the crime-terror nexus originated in the early 1970s-1980s, with the emergence of the discourse on narco-terrorism. The narco-terrorism debates aimed to account for the simultaneous development of political insurgencies and drug trade in Latin America (Ehrenfeld 1990). Here, narco-terrorism is defined as the tactics used by Latin American terrorist groups, political insurgencies and drug cartels; and the coexistence and cooperation between them primarily for operational purposes (Makarenko 2005). The former Peruvian president, Fernando Belaunde Terry, first used the term to refer to the attacks on the counter-narcotic police by the Peruvian communist guerrillas "Sendero Luminoso" (the Shining Path) (Clarke & Lee 2008: 377). In addition, Lewis Tambs, the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, used the term to describe the actions of the Colombian drug cartels.[83] One more example is the Nicaraguan Contras, who at the time supported their insurgency through cocaine trafficking (Cohen 1996: 1-21). In 1986, Ronald Reagan applied the term to the relationship between terrorism and international drug trafficking by Nicaragua and Cuba; that is, to describe the convergence between two groups despite differing purposes and ideology (Chouvy 2004). Another example of narco-terrorism is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) funding the Taliban (Labrousse 2005).

The period between the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the Information Age, accompanied by globalisation, was characterised by the emergence of the 'new' security environment. During this time, the crime-terror nexus became consolidated. It became problematic to define the exact nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era and to distinguish between ideologically motivated

[79] Metz (1993); Schmid (1996); Snow (1996); Collier & Hoeffler (1998; 1999)
[80] Manwaring (1991); Metz (1993); Reno (1993); Snow (1996); Keen (1998)
[81] E.g. revival of 4GW and 3G2; manipulation of political in the interest of economic gain
[82] Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 1999); Kaldor (1999); Collier (2000); Duffield (2000); Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001)
[83] During 1990's the situation in Columbia was characterised by the coexistence and cooperation of paramilitary organisations, illegal drug traffickers and insurgents or a "Hobbesian Trinity" (in 2000's, similarly branded as 'the trifecta threat' formed by DTOs, TCOs and terrorists), creating unbearable conditions in the national security environment (Manwaring 2002: 1). For example, Cali and Medellin cartels were hiring guerillas from M19 or FARC to ensure security on cocaine plantations. Thus, terrorists generated finances for their operations, and cartels efficiently secured their narco enterprises.

violence, economically motivated violence, and violence without a cause. This phenomenon was conceptualised as a 'grey area' (Manwaring 1991).

The post-Cold War period witnessed the decline of state-sponsored terrorism together with the opening of territorial borders and the expansion of the marketplace. Additionally, the new security environment in this period saw the establishment of parallel economies in various regions, the surge in arms trade, the diversification of legal and illegal ways of living, and the legitimisation of new forms of criminality (Manwaring 2002).

Scholars such as, Metz (1993), Schmid (1996), Snow (1996) Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 1999) developed the 'greed vs grievance debate' to characterise the security environment in the post-Cold War period. The 'greed vs grievance debate' outlined the political economy of violence. The political economy of violence was characterised by the rise of non-state actors aiming and growing their capability to replace the state[84], the rise of intrastate violence and grievances, and the emergence of cross-border security threats emanating from terrorism and TOC.[85]

Metz (1993), Snow (1996) and later Kaldor (1999) emphasised that the lines were becoming blurred between political and economic motivations for violence. There was a clear diminishing of ideological motivations which were dominant features in post-Cold War conflicts. In light of this, Metz (1993) suggested the need to differentiate between spiritual and commercial insurgencies. Spiritual insurgencies, which were facing the problems of modernisation,[86] can be seen to be the characteristic of the Cold War era. On the other hand, commercial insurgencies were driven by wealth and profit maximisation.[87]

Similarly, Snow's (1996) framework on the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War period targets criminal and politically motivated violence, and the almost absolute disappearance of the ideological bias in traditional conflict. The author suggests that post-Cold War conflict is characterised by 'uncivil wars' (Snow 1996). 'Uncivil wars' are a type of internal conflict which is no longer dominated by political philosophies. The achievement of political ideals among these

[84] Similarly, Picarelli (2006) emphasises the shift occurring in the crime-terror analysis from the sovereign bond to the non-sovereign bond actors (the state-centric versus multi-centric nexus).
[85] As a non-conventional military might.
[86] E.g. spiritual insurgencies were in pursuit of justice and search of meaning
[87] E.g. commercial insurgencies were in pursuit of power, status, and mere profit maximisation for personal gain

conflicts is in decline, or completely absent. In their very essence, these 'uncivil wars' are no more than rampages within states with little or a complete absence of any ennobling purpose or outcome (Snow 1996: 2). Mirroring Metz's (1993) spiritual vs commercial insurgencies argument, Snow (1996) develops a framework on ethnic vs criminal insurgencies. Criminal insurgencies seek to remove authority, destabilise the state, and terrorise the population. They serve as a preface for involvement into criminal activity.[88] The ethnic insurgencies mostly stem from the unresolved disputes of ethnic differences. Their purpose is the mere destruction of existing governance systems, whilst not offering alternative governance solutions.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 1999) later suggest that the civil wars in the post-Cold War era are motivated by economic factors. For example, the rebellions in both Colombia and Angola demonstrated that the prospect of military victory for warring parties has become significantly outweighed by the possibility of capitalising on prolonged conflicts. In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 1999) and Collier (2000b) emphasise that rebel leaders were employing grievance for the recruitment of followers, by continuing to instigate grievance for profitability purposes and the generation of income.[89] This is reflected in Keen's (1998: 44) argument that the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War, and the victory of capitalism did not create even and peaceful conditions for everyone, which led to economic violence, or a so-called 'self-help to help oneself' approach.[90]

The works of the aforementioned scholars contribute to contextualising and motivating the development of the crime-terror nexus and have become reinforced by the later works on the political economy of internal wars in the post-Cold War era. Thus, Duffield (2000: 69-74) characterises war economies as the adaptive structures that have acquired networked forms of parallel transborder trade. Influenced by the decline of the state, the development of networked structures and the rise of globalisation, parties involved in conflicts have moved beyond the state-centric approach, and they pursue wider alternative economic networks. The changes in the

[88] E.g. the examples of criminal insurgencies are found in Bolivia, Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone etc.
[89] Once more this reinforces that the crime-terror nexus is not new, it is a phenomenon of continuity. As previously grievance and sense of perceived injustice were used to lead followers to a rebellion, today with contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, (alike grievance) the redemption narrative is used for the recruitment purposes (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016).
[90] E.g. violence (terrorism) became profit in itself

international environment[91] provided even greater unrestricted access for non-state malevolent actors to the global economic system, state institutions and various logistics nodes. The decentralised mode of conflict was coined as netwar.[92] Non-state warring parties were and are continuing to experience decentralisation, the breakdown and flattening of their hierarchical structures, and are now evolving into networks, presenting non-conventional asymmetrical threats.[93]

3.3 The crime-terror nexus post-9/11

In the wake of 9/11, resulting changes, and the spike of interest in terrorism has led to further research on the dynamics of the crime-terror nexus. The close attention on AQ in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 has provoked interest in hawala banking, the abuse of resources, finances of charities and diasporas, and the use of legitimate businesses by terrorist groups (Makarenko 2004: 130). As dynamic entities, criminal and terrorist organisations were learning, adopting, and continuing to form relationships in line with the changing global environment. The rise of the accessibility to technological advances, financial and global market structures, diaspora communities, weak states or ungoverned spaces[94] has had a significant impact on the further deepening of the links between criminal and terrorist organisations. The takeoff of GWOT's draconian LE measures, a 'witch hunt' on the financial sources and the core leadership of terrorist and criminal organisations had led to the decentralisation and formation of networks. The decentralisation of structures and harsh financial control measures of terrorist and criminal organisations further blurred the lines between politically and criminally motivated violence.

3.3.1 Progression of the crime-terror nexus and its discourse post-9/11

Although there is a persisting dispute amongst scholars and policy circles on the existence and definition of the relationship between crime and terrorism, the crime-terror nexus generally has come to constitute the durable alliances between crime and terror groups (Picarelli 2006: 1). Clarke

[91] E.g. the breakdown of a state authority
[92] E.g. the evolution of 4GW
[93] The non-state actors, contemporary terrorist and criminal organizations mirroring the structures of the licit world. With the emergence of networks and outsourcing, individual cells have no direct connection to the leadership. These features are frustrating for the intelligence and LE bodies, and significantly complicate identification of the organisation's leadership. Decentralisation impacts blurring of the boundaries between crime and terrorism (Dishman 2005).
[94] E.g. geographical safe heavens

(2016) suggests that the nexus represents the junction between terror and crime and it takes several forms, namely; once-off encounters, temporary marriages of convenience, or lasting partnerships (Clarke 2016). Tamara Makarenko (2012) also suggests that the crime-terror nexus is about non-state actors, which constitute LE and the security problem, by learning, adjusting and adapting to their constricted environment (Makarenko 2012: 238).

Similarly to the disorganised and unsystematised body of knowledge on the crime-terror nexus developed in the post-9/11 period,[95] there is a confusion among scholars with regards to definitions and the labelling of the crime-terror nexus. Therefore, the crime-terror nexus can be seen in terms of the alliances, relationships, intersection, merger, convergence or hybridisation of crime and terrorism.[96] Additionally, the nexus incorporates the discourse,[97] as well as the language of its discourse (not only what is said but how it is said).[98]

Grabosky and Stohl (2010: 7) suggest there is a controversy and disagreement on the convergence of crime and terrorism among scholars. Thus, the two schools are identified in the relation to the convergence debate. The first school includes Stern (2003), Makarenko (2004) and Dishman (2005), who suggest that convergence exists, and it could be permanent. The second school includes Schmid (1996), and Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007), who suggest that terrorism and crime have different motivations, that convergence is uncommon, and that the nature of its relationship is merely a 'marriage of convenience' (Grabosky & Stohl 2010: 8).

[95] On the contrary to the contemporary crime-terror nexus, the revision of the pre-9/11 crime-terror nexus was grouped or organised thematically in clusters of scholarship. There is clearly a larger diversification of angles of analysis and research directions post-9/11.

[96] E.g. in terms of both operation and organisation

[97] The crime-terror nexus discourse has been established though years by works of Dishman (2001; 2005; 2010; 2016), Sanderson (2004), Shelley and Picarelli (2002; 2005), Ballina (2011), Picarelli (2006; 2012); Hutchinson and O'Malley (2007); Makarenko (2004; 2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)), Bobic (2014) etc.

[98] It is important to pay attention to the crime-terror discourse and the language of the discourse. In the recent work of Makarenko and Mesquita (2014: 260), redeveloping for the third time the CTC model, the CTC was labelled as the crime-terror nexus model, which breaks the consistency, systematisation, dynamics of succession and creates unnecessary confusion, in already chaotic body of knowledge. On the other hand, it is highly interesting to pay close attention (not only to inconsistencies but also) to the progression of analysis on the crime-terror nexus through consecutive works (developed in various years) of the same scholar, it gives a sense of changes and developing trends in the crime-terror discourse. It is highly important for the young, newly emerging professionals in the field, to better understand, adapt, refocus, and reorient themselves well in line with the emerging trends in the discourse. The examples of such scholars, whose lens of analysis were reinvigorated and adjusted though several consecutive works can be Picarelli (2006; 2012) or Dishman (2001;2005;2010; 2016), Makarenko (2004; 2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)).

In line with this reasoning, the post-9/11 discourse on the crime-terror nexus can be organised along several arguments. Some of these arguments also emphasise the pattern of continuity and transformation in the discourse. Particularly, it is the Hobbesian trinity argument - crime, terrorism and drugs, that evolved in the so-called post-9/11 'dirty entanglements' argument[99] - the crime, terrorism and corruption nexus (Shelley 2014). The war economies theme grew in the 'new economy of terrorism' argument[100] that was highlighted by Napoleoni (2004) and Rosenthal (2008). The netwars, networks and netwarriors argument evolved in the decentralisation and the 'leaderless nexus' argument (Dishman 2005). Lastly, the greed versus grievance argument resurged in the eschatological narrative of 'the chosen few', or else the 'redemption narrative'[101] and the new crime-terror nexus (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016; Gallagher 2016; Hemmingsen 2016).

Therefore, the abovementioned arguments, from pre-9/11 discourse, experienced an evolution and rebirth in the contemporary crime-terror nexus discourse. It is evident that both transformation and continuity are inherent characteristics of this. Similarly to the concepts of new and old crime and terrorism, and the crime-terror nexus, these arguments and themes due to their evolutionary and enduring nature cannot be strictly categorised on old and new arguments. Thus, not only the concepts and entities of crime and terrorism, as well as the new crime-terror nexus, but also the entire post-9/11 discourse on the crime-terror nexus is characterised by the convergence of old and new patterns, themes and arguments.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, scholars were preoccupied with the changes in the global world order, as well as with globalisation and the technological advancement that has opened up larger accessibility to the global market. The majority of scholarship linked the increase in terrorist organisations' involvement in OC[102] or the development of in-house capabilities, to the loss of state sponsorship (Dishman 2001). In 2004, Makarenko (2004) made the first attempt to summarise

[99] The debate about the influence of corruption and its impact on the susceptible to crime-terror nexus environments has gained attention in the post-9/11 environment.

[100] Also it is labelled as the 'gross criminal product', 'for profit terrorism' or 'armed entrepreneurs' argument. Although, the lens of this debate differs from the war economies, it still focuses on the parallel economies and illicit markets - operational environments susceptible to the crime-terror nexus. Additionally, it draws attention to the economies established by the new modes of conflict.

[101] The redemption narrative (redemption from sins) is used by contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, for the purposes of radicalisation and recruitment of members, from prisons and the pool of disenchanted.

[102] E.g. mostly for the purposes of operational security

the knowledge on the crime-terror nexus, by providing the basic linear CTC model.[103] Additionally, there was a revival of the argument on collaboration and alliances between the criminal and terrorist organisations which was influenced by the flattening of the organisational hierarchies (under pressures of the GWOT) and the formation of networks. This crime-terror nexus argument witnessed the expansion of decentralisation as the major cause of the alliances and cooperation between criminal and terrorist entities. Eventually, this led to the emergence of notions such as the 'leaderless nexus' [104] and hybrid entities (see **Figure 4.**) (Dishman 2001; Picarelli 2006, 2012).

Figure 4.: New dynamic of the strategic alliances between decentralised criminal and terrorist organisations



(Dishman 2005: 245)

Later, the notion of the 'new economy of terrorism' emerged. This spoke of the establishment of parallel economies (Napoleoni 2004). Other scholars began to pay attention to the LE and the crusade against the funding of terrorist organisations (Sanderson 2004). The concern further grew with the emergence of ideologically motivated insurgencies, which had access to the criminal marketplaces, as sources of instability across the globe (Hutchinson & O'Malley 2007; Grabosky & Stohl 2010). The impact of some of these analyses and themes led to the evolution of the CTC model into a more sophisticated continuum that covered the larger complexity of the relationships between crime and terrorism.

[103] The original model depicted the transformation of one entity into another on a single plane, with the convergence placed at the middle of the continuum.

[104] The new dynamic where low- to mid-level criminals and terrorists develop strategic alliances with each other. These members are the cornerstones of decentralised criminal and terrorist organisations in a form of networks. These alliances are significant security threats, as well as they pose challenges to the LE and authorities in tackling criminal and terrorist entities.

The thesis on the hybridity of crime and terrorism, consolidated the crime-terror nexus even further. Whilst acknowledging the importance of the environment and background in which such organisations rise from, this also led to the reconsideration of the theoretical lenses[105] for the analysis of the hybrid entities (Ballina 2011; Picarelli 2006; 2012; Bobic 2014; Stern 2016). In response to the conventional CTC model, a three-dimensional CVO model[106] was developed. This model more comprehensively addresses the background and dynamics of more recent terrorist organisations (Ballina 2011).

Very recent perspectives, analyses and research on the crime-terror nexus (introducing the contemporary case studies such as the IS)[107] draw attention to the deepening internal complexity of the new crime-terror nexus. The latest analyses and approaches emphasise on units and levels of analysis, operational environments, facilitating factors and drivers, decentralisation of authority and the individualisation of religious authority, plebeian ideology, background of the contemporary terrorist organisations and *milieu*, all of which advance the consolidation of the crime-terror nexus. These elements play major role in the deepening merger between crime and terrorism and are key to understanding and analysing the new crime-terror nexus. Although, the CTC did not fully accommodate these factors in its approach. This had a major impact on weakening its application in explaining the contemporary crime-terror nexus in the post-9/11 period.

3.3.2 Shaping the CTC

In addition to the aforementioned body of knowledge on the crime-terror nexus pre- and post-9/11, the works of Williams (1998; 2002), Shelley and Picarelli (2002; 2005), Shelley et al. (2005) Jackson et al. (2005) and Rosenthal (2008) had an impact on shaping and re-developing the CTC model. Makarenko's (2004) original CTC model was influenced by the works of Williams (1998; 2002) and Shelley and Picarelli (2002).

[105] E.g. postinternationalism or the human security framework
[106] It is a more flexible model, which recognises that the CVO can be born hybrid. Thus, hybrid organisations can circulate throughout the spectrum at different moments of their evolution (Ballina 2011).
[107] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Gallagher (2016); Stern (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017) etc.

In his approach, Williams (1998) identifies three types of relationships between terrorist groups and TOC. These are the influence of TOC on the operational approaches of terrorist groups, alliances and the full integration between the two entities. Two types of cooperative modalities are identified between TOC and terrorist groups. At the end of the spectrum, the long-term (strategic) cooperation incorporates the operational linkages and mutual expectations, which characterises the continued cooperation, underpinned by formal tacit agreements. At the other end of the spectrum are one-off (tactical) arrangements, or 'spot deals'. This is when terrorist groups and TOC come together for a specific transaction without an expectation that the relationship will persist (Williams 1998). Williams (1998) incorporated this into his later work too. In the later work, so as to account for the larger diversity of the relations between terrorism and crime, Williams (2002) examined the nexus with regards to entities and activities,[108] and the number of more complex relationships between the TOC and terrorist organisations were defined (Williams 2002).

In addition, the works of Shelley and Picarelli (2002; 2005) and Shelley et al. (2005) established the terror-crime interaction spectrum[109] that pinpointed a number of indicators. This aimed to show that the cooperation between TOC and terrorist organisation is taking place. The terror-crime interaction spectrum identifies the symbiotic relationships between criminal and terrorist organisations, the activity appropriation, the emergence of the hybrid entities with hybrid activities, and finally – the transformation.[110]

Makarenko (2012) cites several of the works of Jackson et al. (2005) and Rosenthal (2008), focusing on the organisational learning dynamics. This helps to better understanding of crime-terror relationships and it influenced the evolution of the CTC. Jackson et al. (2005) identify eight features that have an impact on the terrorist organisations' learning abilities. These features assist in identifying the nexus and help one to understand the nexus at each step of the interaction. The eight features the authors identify are: the group culture; the relationships of structure and command; the resources allocated to learning; the relation to the sources of knowledge; the group's

[108] The direct connection between the two entities; a terrorist entity adopting the criminal activity; the indirect connection through criminal activities; a criminal entity appropriating terrorist activities; and finally, the connections between TOC and terrorist groups, and activity to a hybrid entity (Williams 2002).
[109] The spectrum is developed on the studies conducted earlier by Williams (1998), Dishman (2001) and later reinforced by Makarenko (2004).
[110] Shelley and Picarelli (2005) came to a conclusion, similar to others, that there is no sole evolutionary path for the crime-terror nexus.

operational environment; the stability of membership; the consuming capacity for knowledge; and finally, the nature of the communication mechanisms.

Rosenthal (2008) believes that criminal and terrorist organisations are fluid and capable of evolving, adapting and transforming with time and circumstances. He suggests three main factors that influence the transformation of politically motivated organisations into becoming economically oriented. These three factors are: the collapse of leadership structure; the political transformation, which debunks the ideology of the organisation; and finally, greater financial gain opportunities.

The aforementioned works influenced the evolution of Makarenko's (2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)) CTC from the basic linear model to the depiction of the relationships between crime and terrorism on a series of planes, such as: operational, evolutionary, and conceptual plane. Operationally, the nexus became understood in terms of adoption of tactics of the 'other' or the functional merging of both entities.[111] The evolutionary plane is characterised by the transformation of motivations and tactics of one entity into the other. Finally, in terms of the conceptual plane, the nexus occurs when both criminal and terrorist activities occupy the same time and space, and the hybrid entity develops simultaneously possessing economic and ideological motivations. Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)) also eliminates the 'black hole' and arrives at the conclusion that the relationship between crime and terrorism is highly dependent on the characteristics of the geographic region in which the nexus is developed. However, throughout the evolution of the CTC model crime and terrorism continue to be treated as completely separate phenomena. This serves to preserve the deeply rooted orthodox profit versus ideology dichotomy in the model.

3.3.3 'Realities' of the relationship between TOC and terrorism

The literature presented systematically in the CTC model pioneered by Tamara Makarenko (2004; 2009; (EP 2012)), aims to explain and identify the common 'realities' or variations of relationships between crime and terrorism that developed historically.

[111] E.g. an ad-hoc alliance or integration of one entity into the other

The widening of the scope in the crime-terror nexus discourse, coupled with the updated CTC model, has led to the evolution of variations of relationships between crime and terrorism. More recent scope and account of the relationships has grown. It has become more detailed aiming to accommodate the variety of features and case studies. According to Sanderson (2004) the relationships between crime and terrorism were previously characterised by the following three factors: partnerships, convergence and transformation. As summarised and simplified by Makarenko (2012) the current nature of knowledge suggests the existence of the following relationships between crime and terrorism (reflected in the **Tables 2-6.**): alliances, appropriation of tactics, convergence (integration and hybrid) and transformation (Makarenko 2012: 238).

The alliances (see **Table 2.**) between terrorist and criminal organisations can take one of the following forms: once off, short-term, and long-term. The main benefits for terrorist organisations from an alliance with TOC may include access to specialised knowledge[112] and operational support.[113] These alliances closely resemble the relationships existing in licit business settings. The characteristics of these alliances are: practicality (time and finances), efficiency as well as the longevity that depends on the attainment of the specific goals. Shelley (1999) suggests several reasons why cooperation with terrorist organisations is beneficial for OC. These benefits include: the destabilisation of the political system, which undermines LE, and poses limitations for the international structures. Examples of these types of alliances include: alliances between insurgents or terrorist groups in Latin America (narco-terrorism), also Colombia's FARC and Peru's Shining Path cocaine cartels.[114] Similarly, there were alliances of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with Mexican and Russian criminal groups (e.g. drugs-for-arms). Another example of alliances can be found in South East Asia, namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) establishing ties with Indian mafia. Moreover, beyond the mere provision of services, some alliances would generate more complex relationships[115] which would facilitate criminal activities (Makarenko 2012: 239).

[112] E.g. forgery, money laundering etc.
[113] E.g. an access to the ready-to-use smuggling routes etc.
[114] They offered security services to the drug laboratories and for this collected local tax from the drug trade.
[115] For example, AQ linked militants developed alliances with Bosnian criminal organisations to pave a route into Europe for Afghan heroin trafficking, though Balkans (Eichenwald 2001).

Although, Dishman (2001) suggests that historical evidence points to the previously existing alliances (for mere operational purposes), more often than not OC and terrorist organisations aim to avoid alliances. In the 1990's, criminal and terrorist organisations would usually advance their organisation and structure, and rather mutate,[116] and only then establish partnerships with organisations already effective in those activities. This aided in avoiding essential problems with alliances, namely: differences in strategies and priorities, danger of defection, alliance competition and distrust (Williams 2000).

Table 2.: Alliances

Al-Qaeda and cells	*Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)*	*FARC*	*Hizb'Allah*	*Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)*	*LTTE*
Caucasian criminal syndicates	Italian mafia	Mexican cartels	Lebanese syndicates	Afghan drug mafia	Thai organized crime
Pakistani transport mafia		Criminal facilitators (Bout, Al Kassar)	Criminal facilitator (Al Kassar)	Pakistani criminal groups	Indian mafia
Camorra and 'Ndrangheta		Russian organized crime	Mexican cartels	Central Asian criminal groups	Tamil diaspora gangs
Russian organized crime					
West African drug trafficking syndicates					
Criminal facilitator (Viktor Bout)					

(Makarenko 2012: 238)

Makarenko (2012) points out the emergence of terrorist and criminal groups in the 1990s, who were appropriating both criminal and terrorist tactics. Therefore, there are terrorist groups internalising criminal operations, and criminal groups adopting terror tactics as a part of operational strategy (see **Table 3.** and **Table 4.**). These appropriations do not impact the primary aims, and goals of a group. While the cases of criminals using terror, tactics have occurred throughout the history of OC, terrorists' involvement in OC for the mere purposes of operational security began mainly in the 1990s.[117]

[116] Criminal and terrorist organisations would acquire in-house capabilities merely for organisational and operational security.
[117] It is the same time of the crime-terror nexus consolidation.

The end of the Cold War era, the demise of state funding, globalisation, the emergence of new actors and modes of organisation has affected the shift in tactics and the operational focus of criminal and terrorist groups. Criminal organisations were becoming involved in political activity in order to manipulate the operational conditions in failing and weak states. At the same time, terrorist organisations, which were faced with the loss of state sponsorship, were searching for alternative sources of funding and therefore internalised criminal tactics. Both conventional types of TOC and terrorist organisations, at the time, were appropriating tactics merely for the specific operational aims.[118] Dishman (2001) suggests that the violent attacks conducted by criminal organisations at the time were not politically motivated. These attacks were solely aimed at either eliminating competitors or threatening authorities combating OC.[119] The cases of criminal organisations appropriating terrorist tactics and their historical evolution are summarised by Makarenko (2012: 249) in the following table (see **Table 3.**).

Table 3.: Criminal organisations appropriating terrorist tactics

	1980s	*1990s*	*+ 2001*
Motives	Eliminate competition Disrupt anti-crime efforts	Eviscerate legal/political power Challenge political elite	Territorial control
Targets	Government personnel	State symbols Citizens/public symbols	Indiscriminate
Methods	Assassinations, targeted bombings	Indiscriminate violence	Insurgent-like operations
Case studies	Colombian cartels Italian mafia	Italian mafia Balkan mafia Chechen mafia	Mexican gangs Somali pirates Iraq (e.g. Maysan region)

(Makarenko 2012: 249)

After the end of the Cold War, and in the absence of state sponsorship, terrorists similarly to criminal organisations, turned to crime, merely for the purposes of self-financing and securing future terrorist operations. Makarenko (2012) suggests that terrorist organisations are prone to preserving their political objectives as an *a priori* motivation. Thus, crime is merely used as means to an end. Additionally, the type of criminal activities appropriated by terrorist groups depends on

[118] Thus, their main goal was not to change the status quo but to provide stable and secure means to an end.

[119] For example, in 1980s-90s the atrocities of the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia were matching to those of Colombian terrorist groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) or FARC. These atrocities were a response to the government countering the drug trade. Another example is of 1990s Italian mafia that applied terror tactics to threaten government and create obstacles to anti-mafia campaign. Therefore, it was a tactical tool to force tolerance upon authorities. In the post-9/11 environment, the example of criminal organisations that use terrorist tactics is the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

geographical location.[120] For example, in the mid 1990's, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was generating $6-15 million a year from criminal activities.[121] It was conscious of the damage done to its reputation and public image, and it was trying to conceal and publicly deny its engagement in crime (Horgan & Taylor 1999: 10). Moreover, supporters of the Islamist terrorist organisations in Europe and North America are known to send funds from 'charities' to militant organisations in Chechnya and Afghanistan, as well as for the fraud and forgery of false documents (Mullins & Wither 2016: 73). The cases and evolution of terrorist organisations' engagement in crime can be seen in the following table (see **Table 4.**).

Table 4. Terrorist groups internalising criminal operations

	1980s	*1990s*	*+ 2001*
Motives	Material and logistical support	Replacement of state sponsorship – financial necessity	Recruit criminal expertise Profit maximization
Methods	Extortion, petty crime	+ smuggling, trade in counterfeit goods, illegal trade of commodities	+ money laundering
Case studies	FARC, AUC Hizb'Allah LTTE Palestinian groups	Al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf IRA offshoots ETA Chechen groups	Predominantly militant Islamist groups (al-Qaeda motivated)

(Makarenko 2012: 240)

If the previous two relationships of alliance and appropriation are straightforward to identify, then drawing conclusions about convergence is a complex task. According to Makarenko (2012), evidence of the convergence of criminal and terrorist organisations is derived from LE and/or security service operations, and it is based on the assessment of activities of these organisations. LE and security service operations do not focus on the group's motivations or strategic priorities; the methods not motives approach persists. In the context of the crime-terror nexus, convergence is divided in two scenarios: first, the convergence, or integration, of terrorist and criminal entities; second, the convergence of the political and criminal motivations within one entity (in other words, a hybrid criminal-political entity). The first scenario, that of convergence or integration, is the most recent scenario to be incorporated into the crime-terror nexus framework. Makarenko (2012)

[120] Petty crime (e.g. mortgage, credit card fraud, small drug sale etc.) is dominant in more politically and economically stable environments, such as Western democracies. More complex illicit operations (e.g. illicit smuggling operations conducted by FARC, Basque Homeland and Freedom, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), PKK etc.) in unstable environments (Makarenko 2012).
[121] E.g. drug trade, robbery, extortion, smuggling, money laundering, fraud, contraband etc.

suggests that there are no cases of terrorist groups integrating into criminal groups. However, there are some cases where criminal groups have integrated into terrorist groups.[122] Neither the profit maximisation, nor the securing of an unstable operational environment, are the main drivers behind criminal groups' integration. This is a result of a more complex combination of factors. These factors include the emergence of sympathetic feelings or loyalties (e.g. religious, ethnic etc.) that proved to be the key drivers behind the criminal groups' integration into the terrorist groups. This pattern has proved to be consistent though Western Europe and North America, and it is most relevant to the radicalisation and conversion within prisons.

The second scenario of hybrid criminal-political entities (convergence of motivations), consists of two configurations: the first is criminal groups that appropriate terrorist tactics and seek to achieve political goals (the criminal-terrorist hybrid); the second is terrorist groups appropriating criminal activities to the extent that they begin to use their political or ideological motivations as a mere façade for shielding the criminal activities (the terrorist-criminal hybrid). The formation of terrorist or criminal groups into the hybrid entity is influenced by several factors, and often involves a combination of these factors. These factors include: structural changes in leadership; changes in the membership base;[123] the loss of centralised control;[124] and finally, the absence of leadership or leadership rivalry at the ground level. **Table 5.** provides examples of the hybrid entities that at one point or another have been driven by political (ideological) and economic motivations (Makarenko 2012: 242).

TOC achieves political power by either disrupting the judicial processes or by blocking anti-crime legislation. Thus, when a criminal group appropriates terrorist tactics it becomes a criminal-terrorist hybrid.[125] The criminal-terrorist hybrid aims to: secure political control;[126] and/or use terrorist tactics to gain control over profitable economic sectors of the state.[127] Here, it is further necessary to identify if the criminal group is engaged in crime purely for personal gain or if the criminal activity is auxiliary to political violence.

[122] The study of 2004 Madrid train bombings revealed that the drug traffickers' radicalisation and integration into the terrorist cell provided necessary skills and contacts for the realisation of attacks. Another example includes French authorities, in 2005, uncovering illicit network consisting of radicalised delinquents, militants and common criminals.
[123] It is often due to the new recruitment technique.
[124] It is either due to the internal fragmentation or rise of independent branches.
[125] The criminal-terrorist hybrid's interest in the political realm is far beyond mere 'corruption and collusion'.
[126] This signifies the direct involvement into institutions and political processes of the state.
[127] E.g. strategic natural resources.

Table 5. Hybrid groups

Entity	*Timeframe*	*Description*
Criminal:		
Russian mafia	1990s	Sought political and economic control, especially in the Russian Far East.
La Familia	+ 2007	Recruits follow strict moral code and pseudo-religious beliefs decreed by leadership. Stated purpose is to do the 'work of God' by bringing order to the state. Heavily involved in the drug trade.
Albanian mafia	1990s	Sought political control – interchangeable membership with the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Terrorist:		
Abu Sayyaf	+ 2000	Focus on kidnapping operations after the death of leader Janjali (1998).
IMU	1999–2002	Began with simultaneous underpinnings: Namanganiy (military commander) interested in drugs trafficking, while Yuldashev (ideological leader) interested in militant Islamist 'cause'.
IRA offshoots	1990s	Rhetorical political stance, focus on criminal activities.

(Makarenko 2012: 243)

According to Harmon (2000: 54), if one considers the restructuring of the international system in the 1990's, then criminal groups were increasingly involved in the political sphere within states. The goal of these criminal groups was to undermine political stability. The establishment of such a climate within states enabled the criminal-terrorist hybrids to build alternative or parallel governments. Metz (1993) suggests that criminal organisations realised the necessity to advance their organisations beyond pure criminalism (that was limiting the appeal to citizens), and to include elements of political protest in their agenda to gain enough power to resist the state. An example of a criminal-terrorist hybrid can be found in the early 20th century Italian mafia,[128] and in the 1990's, in Albania's and Russia's criminal organisations.[129]

The principles underpinning the formation of a criminal-terrorist hybrid are similar to a terrorist-criminal hybrid, which is the second scenario of hybrid criminal-political entities. The terrorist-criminal hybrid retains its political and ideological stance. Although in this scenario, the terrorist entity is prone to undergo a complete transformation. Dishman (2001) suggests that the terrorist

[128] Italian mafia established military control (though the use of terrorist tactics) over territories in the Western Sicily. This military control developed the power system that was in the direct confrontation with the state; the mafia practically took over state's functions, undermined state's sovereignty and ability to develop, military and judicial control. The ability of the mafia to legitimise the use of violence, (though control) within the specific territory, secured the existence and consolidation of the mafia system. The functionality of this system was ensured though: the accumulation of resources for investment into illicit markets, and through obtaining of consent for the infiltration of the legitimate society.

[129] (E.g. Albania, or Russian Federation, Maritime Province of the Russian Far East). From 1990s criminal and political activities of Albania's criminal organisations were highly interrelated (e.g. panalbanian ideals, military activities, and terrorism). These organisations used profits from the criminal activities to purchase military equipment and arms for Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

entity will support its public façade, but below this it will be a completely different type of organisation, with a different end game in mind. Nevertheless, this 'terrorist' group will continue to use terrorist tactics as part of its *modus operandi*: as an assertion tool among competitors, and to divert the focus of the government and LE authorities to political issues instead of proceeding with criminal investigations. Such an entity can manipulate a previously established terrorist support network by continuing to display political features to the public. Additionally, such an entity can manipulate the application of terrorism by switching from one to the other, or multiple applications at the same time. This type of entity can focus simultaneously on terrorist and criminal goals while using both networks (Makarenko 2012: 244). Some examples of the terrorist-criminal hybrid include loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, the KLA, the ASG in the Philippines, the Afghan Taliban and the IMU.[130]

According to Dishman (2001), the transformation of an organisation occurs when its' original motivations and aims have altered to such an extent that the organisation loses its original characteristics which made it political or criminal in the first place. Thus, it is a change in the very nature, as opposed to degree, of the entity. Typically, this change is accompanied by the following processes: rationalisation;[131] the decline in political demands and public profile; changes in recruitment; evading harming innocent victims;[132] a decline in attacks; a rise of political statements[133] and plunging into criminality. For example, after the loss of its leader in the 1990's, the ideologically driven FARC in Colombia completely abandoned its revolutionary virtue and transformed into a criminal organisation.[134]

Makarenko (2012) emphasises that transformations from criminal organisations to terrorist entities are less frequent. However, if they do occur, usually several parallel changes accompany them. These changes may include; changes in a political and/or ideological justification for criminal

[130] From 1970's, loyalist terrorist groups were involving into the criminal activities for the operational support. However, in some of the geographical hotspots, despite brokered ceasefires these groups continued to engage in the criminal activities, thus involvement into crime was no longer the means to an end, it became the end in itself. The ASG, after the death of its leader in 1998, became increasingly involved into crime; it began to use the ideological agenda as a façade.

[131] E.g from conduction of violence to the profit maximisation.

[132] E.g. unless it is profitable then piracy.

[133] E.g. that point to the termination of the attacks.

[134] FARC completely transformed from the mere protector of the drug crops to the liaison between cartels and farmers; by 2000 it controlled 40% of the territory; it generated millions from the drug trade, extortion, kidnapping etc.; by 2009 - 60% of cocaine exports to the US. FARC extended its criminal networks to Europe, Ecuador, and Brazil.

activities; the embracing of political rhetoric; illicit commodities-for-weapons trade; changes in the group's nature, membership, and recruitment patterns;[135] and, the reliance on donations for political causes (Makarenko 2012: 246). The D-Company can be seen as an example of a criminal organisation transforming into a terrorist entity.[136] A more complete picture of the cases of transformation is provided in the following **Table 6.**

Table 6. Transformation

Entity	*Description*
Terrorist – Criminal	
FARC	Asserted control over cocaine production, and diversification of involvement in drug trafficking.
17 November	Decreased political demands, replaced by growing involvement in smuggling operations, extortion and fraud.
Sipah-e-Mohammed	Ideological front used to recruit and engage in criminal activities.
Revolutionary United Front	Diamond smuggling became motivation for continued violence.
Irish National Liberation Army	Focused on criminal activities, ties to Irish mafia in the United States; no evidence to indicate involvement in operational planning of terrorist events.
Criminal – Terrorist	
D-Company	Deep involvement in smuggling through South Asia, eventually leader (Dawood Ibrahim) adopted extremist and militant ideology after witnessing perceived Muslim persecution. Began to support then organize terrorist attacks in the region.

(Makarenko 2012: 245)

3.4 A new crime-terror nexus?

The accounts for the crime-terror nexus, its origins, as well as observations pertaining to its evolving nature, as well as variations in the emerging relationships – all re-confirm that the merging of terrorism and crime is not a completely new phenomenon. However, the literature and research tracking the crime-terror nexus over nearly four decades indicates that the "international community is historically reluctant to do anything more than speculate on AQ involvement in organised crime" (Bove-LaMonica 2011). The body of knowledge developed on the crime-terror nexus up to now only partially accounts for the deeper complexity of the relationship between crime and terrorism. There is an overall lack of understanding of this phenomenon. The majority of literature employs a deeply embedded notion that terrorist organisations are founded on strong ideological principles which are considered to be inherently different from that of criminal

[135] E.g. systematic association between members and militants.
[136] From 1975 the D-Company grew as a criminal enterprise, later supported militant groups, and adopted an extremist Islamist ideology; it organised the 1993 Bombay attacks.

organisations. The literature also says that these differences can be reconciled by cooperation, integration and/or even the mutation of crime and terrorism on certain levels.

Recent research[137] on contemporary 'malevolent non-state actors'[138] reveals a lack of inclusiveness in crime-terror nexus discourse of various angles, prisms of analysis and levels of analysis which are vital for understanding the dynamics of the new nexus. This research exposes the prioritising of the overarching profit versus ideology dichotomy in the crime-terror nexus discourse. As confirmed by recent studies, the consequences of these 'failures of imagination' in explaining the crime-terror nexus, are that the CTC model has largely ignored the existing complex, multilayered realities regarding contemporary terrorist organisations and the new crime-terror nexus.

Prior to more recent analyses, research and literature the patterns of the new crime-terror nexus were unaccounted for. The works of authors like Ballina (2011), Picarelli (2006; 2012) Bobic (2014), and Shelley (2014) hinted at the key patterns which accounted for the deeper complexity in the relationship between TOC and terrorism. These works were drawing attention to the larger complexity undermining the 'conventional wisdom' of practitioners and policy makers. They were insisting on establishing a more comprehensive, multilevel, and multidisciplinary approach. Thus, recent research and analyses reaffirm that the assumptions and predictions which were being developed were pointing in the right direction.

Current studies conducted in Europe[139] indicate that the conventional crime-terror nexus discourse partially lost its relevance considering the present dynamics and the new crime-terror nexus which has been emerging. The new crime-terror nexus does not merely consist of the convergence of terrorists and criminals in terms of their organisations, but also, specifically, in terms of their social networks – their *milieus*. That is, the convergence of spheres where the very first stages of recruitment and formation of the nefarious entities takes place. Therefore, rather than being one or the other, as an entity or as an activity, there is a pattern of criminal and terrorist organisations recruiting members from exactly the same pool of people that generates often unintended

[137] Oftedal (2015); Warrick (2015); Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017), Reitano, Clarke and Adal (2017) etc.
[138] Picarelli's (2006) characteristic for the non-state actors such as TCOs and terror groups, their relationships' dynamic, challenges, and threats they pose to the state and human relations.
[139] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017); Reitano et al. (2017)

interactions and overlaps. This has a significant impact on the patterns of recruitment, radicalisation, operation, and later reintegration.

The current structure of some of the contemporary terrorist organisations, for instance AQ and especially the IS, does not represent as a strict hierarchy. Rather, these organisations are scattered into a form of autonomous cells or networks which pursue strategies and tactics that are not necessarily aligned with the objectives of the core leadership (Dishman 2016; Stern 2016). In addition, recruitment into contemporary terrorist organisations is often conducted in prisons, which are often seen as a breeding ground for contemporary jihadists, and from strata of European 'underclasses' – individuals, who previously engaged in illegal acts, from petty to violent crime.[140]Another disturbing trait of the new crime-terror nexus is the prospect of a criminal 'skills' transfer from a criminal group to a terrorist organisation which is potentially achieved through a process of networking in prisons. In these instances, an ideological narrative is often used as a source of redemption for recruits, and in some cases, it is used to legitimise crime. In these instances, allegedly religious grounds justify crime.[141] The research also shows that continued involvement in violence, as a criminal, significantly lowers the psychological threshold for terrorist violence (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016; Hemmingsen 2016; Böckler et al. 2017).

Additionally, these disturbing patterns of the new crime-terror nexus and using the example of the IS, have serious implications for national and international security. This can manifest in terms of potential returnees and veterans from the battlefield in the Middle East, who engaged in terrorist activities of the IS, and their prospects of being reintegrated back into their respective societies. Therefore, more recent research and analyses on terrorist profiles and backgrounds suggests that in the new crime-terror nexus the 'jump' from crime to terrorism is now the closest that it has ever been. This exposes the deeply embedded synergies between criminals and terrorists and demonstrates the constraints of the crime versus ideology dichotomy, as well as the conventional convergence approaches, including the CTC model (Warrick 2015; Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016; Hemmingsen 2016; Böckler et al. 2017; Reitano et al. 2017).

[140] More than half of the recruits were incarcerated prior to the recruitment (Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016).
[141] E.g. raising money though ordinary criminality is also a part of jihad in the 'lands of war'.

3.5 Conclusion

The crime-terror nexus is not a new phenomenon. It existed and continues to evolve even after more than four decades. In the Cold War era, the analysis of the emerging nexus followed the relationship between crime and terrorism. This relationship was perceived in terms of key actors, such as states, on the international arena. As a result, ideological and economic motivations were analysed though the conventional prism of the superpower balance. In the aftermath of the Cold War, coupled with the structural changes occurring in the international world order such as a decline of the state sponsorship and parallel globalisation processes, the dynamics of the relationship between crime and terrorism has changed. Consequently, the lines have begun to blur between economically motivated and politically motivated violence.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and in the wake of renewed interest in AQ, hawala banking, and the GWOT's draconian measures, coupled with globalisation and decentralisation, the violent clandestine organisations developed networks and were searching for more intricate, alternative sources of financing. These changes provoked the development of largely unsystematised crime-terror nexus discourses. The innovative attempt to organise the crime-terror nexus debate was initiated by Tamara Makarenko (2004), by developing the CTC model to account for the historical progression and variation of linkages between crime and terrorism.

Makarenko subsequently (2004) made numerous efforts to redevelop the CTC model to account for the changes in the crime-terror nexus. Several other scholars made similar attempts to revitalise the topic, by developing alternative lenses of analysis. Despite the new developments and visible evolution of the crime-terror nexus, the whole decade in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was dominated by the traditional, orthodox, and analytically limiting crime versus ideology dichotomy. Crime and terrorism were differentiated, separated, and treated as completely opposing phenomena. Only recently, have a few works been able to develop alternative lenses and combinations of the CTC model, which challenge 'the conventional wisdom'. Finally, the latest research in the field has shown that not only the traditional crime versus ideology dichotomy and the CTC model are becoming less relevant, but that the new crime-terror nexus has been established in practice.

CHAPTER 4

THE CTC: STILL GOING STRONG IN POST 9/11?

"Sometimes people with the worst pasts create the best futures" (ISIS recruiting poster (Rayat al-Tawheed, "Banner of God"))

"He who does not live in the way of his beliefs starts to believe in the way he lives" (Umar ibn Al-Khattab, the second caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate)

"Revolutionaries frown upon suggestions that they are just "common criminals"" (Dishman 2001: 49)

4.1 Introduction

The preceding systematically overviewed literature shows that in the aftermath of 9/11 with the rise in the focus on AQ, the emergence of GWOT coupled with draconian counter-terrorism measures and state regulations of illicit markets, changed the dynamics of the crime-terror nexus. The further advancement of globalisation, coupled with decentralisation, the fragmentation of markets, as well as the draconian LE measures after 9/11 has intensified competition among a variety of malevolent non-state actors. Today, under such conditions, TCOs and terrorist organisations are pushed further towards decentralisation and the legitimisation of criminal pursuits. These entities are pushed more than ever to avert the attention of security services and competitors. Additionally, both entities are pressured to survive and find their niche by attempting to gain authority in the legitimisation of violence in pursuit of financial gain.

In the face of these contextual changes and with the emergence of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, various scholars kept referring to the development of a deeper complexity in the crime-terror nexus. The CTC model, through several upgrades, aimed to accommodate these changes in the crime-terror nexus. Despite these efforts, the abstraction and generalisation aspects of the CTC model, which are the two remaining variables of its applicability, remain inadequate. They still fail to account for the new crime-terror nexus, the complex nature of contemporary terrorist organisations and the depth in the relationship between crime and terrorism. This leads to an overall perception that the CTC model's validity and reliability are in demise. The CTC provides a fairly innovative and competent schematic representation of the crime-terror nexus, as a base for further research. However, the CTC, as an explanatory tool, does not accommodate key elements, such as units of analysis and levels of analysis, drivers, facilitators and operational environments, as well as co-existence and merging of old and new forms of organisation and *modus operandi*. The CTC model does not account for the latest developments

in contemporary terrorist organisations and the new crime-terror nexus. Finally, as a model, it also shows methodological weaknesses in modelling.

4.2 The applicability and limitations of the CTC

Recent research and analyses,[142] as well as available evidence from media accounts on the ground[143] indicate a more appropriate direction. The crime-terror nexus perspectives and approaches of Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Picarelli (2006; 2012), Ballina (2011), Bobic (2014), and Stern (2016) were steering the crime-terror nexus discourse towards the debate on the deeper merging between crime and terrorism, for nearly two decades. Despite the CTC model being a capable attempt in summarising and simplifying the knowledge, in the presence of more recent research and analyses, it falls short in achieving the two other important facets of modelling namely, generalisation and abstraction.

The Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) produced a report on study by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016). This study is based on a database consisting of the profiles of 79 European jihadists[144] with criminal pasts. It is acknowledged that this work is limited in terms of the geospatial dimension, which makes it a relatively unrepresentative survey of the European 'gangster' jihadists.[145] Nonetheless, the outcomes of this report are an important material source, as they uncover the new deeper dynamics in the crime-terror nexus and tell us something about the nature of contemporary terrorist organisations. The report's findings, echoed in analyses by Von Drehle (2015); Warrick (2015); Stern (2016); Gallagher (2016); Hemmingsen (2016) and Böckler et al. (2017), reinforce the higher validity of the direction in which the perspectives and approaches of Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Picarelli (2006;2012); Stern (2016), Bobic (2014) and especially Ballina (2011) were attempting to steer the crime-terror nexus discourse. In addition, across these works, sporadically, one finds crucial aspects that significantly contribute to the better understanding of the major aspects that facilitated and contributed to the emergence of the new

[142] Von Drehle (2015); Warrick (2015); Stern (2016); Gallagher (2016); Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Böckler et al. (2017); Government of the Netherlands (2017)
[143]Warrick (2015), VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016), CNN (2017)
[144] The individuals who joined ideology based on jihad (as well as converted to Islam). They have been radicalised and either travelled to the battlefront in Iraq and Syria as a jihadist fighter (e.g. have been active as jihadists after the wave of 2011) or been involved in terrorism in Europe. Also, these individuals had criminal background prior to summoning to extremism.
[145] The previous waves of jihadists were mostly drawn from middle class or intellectuals. Contemporary jihadists are recruited from immigrant gangs that combine jihadism with gangster criminality.

crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations. However, through all its revision stages, the CTC model remained non-inclusive of these important facets. This feature significantly undermined the validity of the CTC's modelling approach and its explanatory power. Therefore, the empirical evidence produced indicates that the CTC model continues to be fundamentally grounded on the state-centric approach and orthodox crime versus ideology dichotomy. The CTC model demonstrates its originality and innovation in terms of its modelling approach, because it was developed in the form of the continuum.[146] However, regardless of the CTC's originality, the model lacks adequate explanatory power and applicability to current developments.

The report by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), enhanced by further recent research and analyses[147] all demonstrate the development of the new crime-terror nexus and the emergence of unconventional terrorist organisations. The research and analyses coupled with media material[148] suggest that the interspace between criminality and terrorism has become even smaller than it was commonly perceived. The existing evidence completely discards the conventional wisdom of 'methods not motives' in the crime-terror nexus, the orthodox profit versus ideology dichotomy of the CTC model, as well as the CTC's mutual exclusivity of crime and terrorism - progression along continuum 'from the one to another'. This evidence reveals that the contemporary crime-terror nexus originates from a single *milieu*. It is formed from the same demographics, and it stems from the same social environment. One can therefore argue that Ballina's (2011) CVO three-dimensional model is of a higher validity than the CTC, in terms of its applicability to the empirical evidence. Ballina's (2011) model correctly captures the crime-terror nexus with regards to the generalisation and abstraction modelling patterns. Also, Ballina (2011) is accurate in terms of placing a priority on the analysis of the character of entities, by assuming that the terrorist and criminal entities can be born hybrid - they stem from the same cultural and social background. Thus, Ballina (2011) sees the categorisation, which is prioritised by the CTC, as secondary to modelling.

[146] For example, the CTC model by being a continuum allows and provides space for the future possible upgrade. It is not a conventional example of modelling, which is a static model.
[147] Von Drehle (2015); Warrick (2015); Stern (2016); Gallagher (2016); Hemmingsen (2016) and Böckler et al. (2017)
[148] E.g. CNN (2017) special report about Belgian IS recruit, or Channel 4 (2015) material about the role of women in the IS recruitment in Britain etc.

In addition, evidence from media accounts and recent research[149] uncovers important truths about radicalisation and recruitment. This evidence reveals that the disenchanted individuals, criminals and persons in prisons are considered to be the most likely candidates for radicalisation, and recruitment. Additionally, the evidence suggests that the radicalisation and recruitment offer a self-aligned version of the jihad and Islam, it provides consent to financial crime,[150] and the 'redemption narrative'[151] to these individuals. All these incentives are completely aligned with the personal needs and desires of the criminals. Often, recruits within the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, belong to a criminal true believer type. A criminal true believer is a subtype of a violent true believer, who is neither believing or investing truly in ideology, nor having an interest in the cause fought for – usually they are psychopaths (Böckler et al. 2017: 75). This reasoning is closely aligned with Basra, Neumann, and Brunner's (2016) conclusion regarding skills transfer. Individuals with a criminal past, whether intentionally recruited or not, develop and retain skills useful for terrorist groups,[152] as well as criminals having a 'useful skill' for terrorism which is the lower psychological threshold for violence.

The CTC model perceives crime and terrorism as diverse and mutually exclusive phenomena, and the model holds onto orthodoxy of merger or transition 'from one to the other' along the continuum. The model is inapplicable to the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations, due to the modelling pitfalls and the lack of inclusivity of the important patterns identified in alternative perspectives and analyses. The CTC model falls short in its accommodation of the aforementioned more complex dynamics and depth of the new crime-terror nexus and the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. The alternative perspectives in the crime-terror nexus discourse were attempting to steer the CTC into the more appropriate direction by placing emphasis on several key elements, namely actors, units of analysis, levels of analysis, drivers and facilitators of the crime-terror convergence, various angles of crime-terror morphing specifics, and finally the convergence of old and new forms and modes. Despite several subsequent revisions and evolution of the model, surprisingly, there remains a lack of the dialogue

[149] VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016), Warrick (2015); CNN (2017); Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), Hemmingsen (2016), Gallagher (2016), Böckler et al. (2017)
[150] Such as, the permission to steal from infidels for the purposes of self-financing – the lone wolf terrorism financing.
[151] E.g. the forgiveness of past sins for execution of terrorist attacks
[152] E.g. forging documents, easier access to weapons, staying 'under radar' and handling discreet logistics, familiarity with LE and limits of police power, they are innovative and handle well pressure and nerves.

between the model and alternative perspectives,[153] as well as between alternative perspectives, in the highly contested field of the crime-terror nexus discourse.

4.3 The evolution of the CTC

The CTC model (2004) was developed in a form of continuum. It depicts how criminal or terrorist groups, placed at the opposite ends of the continuum, can slide back and forth down the scale depending on the operational environment these groups are situated in. The original CTC model was developed in a simplified manner (Makarenko 2004). It is a linear model, progressing along a single plane, with a probability of convergence of both entities at the centre. This model is limited by its reliance on the orthodoxy of the crime-terror nexus scholarship, which prioritises the profit versus ideology dichotomy. Thus, on a continuum, OC and terrorism are found on the opposite sides of the spectrum, each holding distinct and opposite positions. The centre of the CTC culminates in the point of convergence, where a single entity is simultaneously displaying criminal and terrorist characteristics (Makarenko 2004). Through an assessment of the case studies and patterns of relationships drawn from the crime-terror nexus discourse, Makarenko (2004) pinpoints the relationships developed between criminal and terrorist groups and summarises them in seven distinct points along the continuum. The seven points are encapsulated in four groups, namely alliances, operational motivations, convergence, and the 'black hole' (Galeotti 2005: 131).

Makarenko (2004) suggests that the first point on this continuum is the alliance. The alliance represents criminals forming close relationships with terrorists, and *vice versa*. The alliances involve once-off, short-term, and long-term interactions. They are formed for the purposes of accessing specialised knowledge,[154] or for operational support.[155] Makarenko (2004) suggests that both groups benefit from these alliances,[156] and both entities obtain the capacity to get involved in criminal and terrorist activities. The second point on the CTC refers to the operational motivations of these groups (Makarenko 2004). More specifically, it refers to criminal organisations using terrorist tactics to ensure the security of their operational environment. Further along the

[153] Despite the progression of the crime-terror nexus debate majority of the authors retain their reference to the original CTC model only, seldom reference is made to the upgrades in the CTC model, or even at times the CTC itself.
[154] E.g. bomb making
[155] E.g. access to smuggling routes
[156] Both thrive in unstable environments; it allows criminals to engage in a variety of activities without danger of retaliation and it helps terrorists to undermine legitimacy of the authority they seek to overthrow.

continuum is a convergence point, which refers to the possibility of a merger between a criminal and a terrorist group into a single entity, which holds characteristics of both. As a result, the newly formed group has the potential to transform into any other type of entity, on the opposite end of the CTC, from which it began. Two parts form the convergence point. First, an OC group can change its motivations and can become politically inclined. This part of the convergence has two further subcategories. In the first subcategory, the OC group uses terrorist tactics to distort legal processes, obstruct anti-crime LE or to seek a direct involvement in state institutions or judicial processes. In the second subcategory, OC groups use terrorist tactics to take control over the state's profitable economic sectors.[157] The second part of the convergence point refers to a terrorist group that engages in criminal activities but continues to use a public terrorist façade to shield these criminal activities.[158]

Makarenko (2004) emphasises that in the post-9/11 period, such terrorist groups are on the rise, and that their persistent involvement and unwillingness to abandon terrorist activities (simultaneously with criminal) can be explained in two ways. First, it is to ensure that the LE authorities are focused on the political aspects of a group's operation, and therefore do not proceed with an investigation into entity's criminal activities. Second, terrorist tactics are used to intimidate and eliminate competitors.

The last point on the CTC represents a 'black hole'[159] scenario, which characterises an environment where weak or failing states provide a fertile ground for a convergence between terrorist and criminal groups (Makarenko 2004). This leads to the development of a hybrid organisation that exists in the 'safe haven' of a weak and/or conflict-ridden state. The 'black hole' scenario has two variations. The first involves a hybrid organisation that takes control over an entire nation; the second involves the political aims of a civil conflict completely changing into criminal ones. It is important to note that the original CTC model links a higher probability of the convergence scenario to mostly unstable or conflict operational environments (Makarenko 2004). The re-worked model however, reveals less bias of linking convergence merely to the conflict

[157] Here, an economic influence becomes a prerequisite for a political power.
[158] Makarenko (2004), who echoes Dishman (2001), suggests that these groups will maintain their political façade as a sole motivation for the public image to use previously established supporting terrorism network.
[159] E.g. the 'black hole state'. According to Makarenko (2004) the examples of the 'black hole' are: North Korea, Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Tajikistan, and Sierra Leone. Also, the Northwest Frontier province (NWFP) in Pakistan, India and Thailand were demonstrating probability of the emergence of the 'black hole state'.

operational environment, by showing the link to the moderately stable operational environments as well.

Grounding her work in the original CTC model, Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012: 15)) has later redeveloped the model into a more sophisticated continuum, to account for the larger complexity in the relationship between crime and terrorism. Although, crime and terrorism remain being treated as separate concepts. Instead of a one-plane linear CTC, the new model functions along the three planes: operational, organisational, and evolutionary.

Along the operational plane, the crime-terror nexus signifies either a functional merger between criminal and terrorist groups, or the adoption of tactics of one by the other. Along the organisational plane, the crime-terror nexus emerges when both criminal and terrorist activities occupy the same time and space. Therefore, a link between crime and terrorism displays a convergence and an emergence of a hybrid organisation, that exhibits patterns of economic and ideological motivations at the same time. In respect of the evolutionary plane, the crime-terror nexus displays the transformation of motivations and tactics of one group into the other. Thus, on the evolutionary plane, an organisation is experiencing a complete shift in its original agenda. An entity completely transforms from one type of the organisation to the other. This is characterised as a conceptual transformation.

In addition, Makarenko's (2004) earlier mentioned phenomenon of a 'black hole' proved unsuitable to the redevelopment of the CTC model (Makarenko 2009). The 'black hole' is neither generalisable nor applicable to the more economically and politically stable environments, and especially, to the emerging crime-terror nexus in the EU. Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012)) emphasises that LE and intelligence agencies recognise the existence of the operational linkages between crime and terrorism, regularly taking place within the EU, which is often coined as a 'marriage of convenience'. The updated version of the CTC (2009) model suggests that the crime-terror nexus is mostly limited to an operational plane within Western democracies. Therefore, the nexus in Western democracies revolves around terrorist organisations engaging in criminal activities for the purposes of funding their operations - the means to an end.

While operational linkages[160] between criminal and terrorist organisations are mostly found in stable states, organisational linkages[161] between these entities are dominant in post-conflict transitional states.[162] As such, Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012)) emphasises that the crime-terror nexus is most established in post- and conflict territories.[163] However, Makarenko (2009; EP 2012) relies on earlier examples of the criminal-terrorist hybrids in Europe. The author does not accommodate any recent examples of the criminal-terrorist hybrids. While redeveloping the CTC model, Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012)) recognises the problem with the way in which LE tackles the crime-terror nexus. There is, namely, the lack of knowledge on the nexus among the trained security services specialists. Additionally, there is a persistent problem of identification and differentiation of the crime-terror nexus relationships.

In comparison to the earlier analysis, Makarenko (2009; (EP 2012)) argues that OC-terrorist alliances result in an appropriation or integration of tactics, and the development of 'in-house' capabilities. These shifts ensure organisational and operational security of an entity. At the time, similarly to Shelley (2005), Makarenko (2009) did not find any recent terrorist group within the EU that evolved into the criminal-terrorist hybrid or terrorist-criminal hybrid without the preservation of an ideological façade. On the contrary, Makarenko (2009) clung to the problem of the assessment of evolution in motivations and strategic priorities of the group.[164]

In 2014, Makarenko (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260) redefined the CTC model even further.[165] The redefined CTC has advanced from the two earlier versions in explanatory and graphical terms. Although the three planes remained identical to the CTC model of 2009, the depth of explanation, analysis, and the variations within the categories of relationships have significantly advanced along the three planes. However, these improvements did not have a significant impact on the important

[160] E.g. the tactical alliance and an appropriation of methods and tactics.
[161] E.g. integration of one entity into another, or merger of both into a hybrid.
[162] Here, Makarenko (2009) suggests Balkans as an example of the transitional states in Europe (e.g. shared borders, ease of access into the EU).
[163] E.g. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Northern Mali, Somalia etc.
[164] Makarenko (2009) provides an example of Albanian OC, as the criminal-terrorist hybrid in the 1990s. She fails to indicate the contemporary examples of such hybrid. The KLA is presented as the terrorist-criminal hybrid, retaining ideological motivation as a façade for the criminal activities, which prevents the criminal investigation and aids to maintain access to the already established support network.
[165] In this work, Makarenko (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260) coins the CTC as 'the crime-terror nexus model'. The nexus represents both the relationship between crime and terrorism and its discourse. Thus, there is some confusion in the labeling, instead of continuum it is suddenly the nexus model (continuum characterises mobility and room for an update, while nexus model is label for a more static representation of the model).

components inherent to modelling such as generalisation and abstraction[166], and applicability of the CTC to the contemporary terrorist organisations.

OC and terrorism are viewed consistently along all three models as distinct phenomena in terms of their conceptualisations, motivations, organisation and operation. Thus, an operational plane signifies the tactical alliance and an appropriation of methods and tactics from one entity by the other. On the organisational plane (two modalities), an integration occurs either in terms of one entity being integrated into another, or both entities merging into a hybrid. On the evolutionary plane, one type of the group evolves into a group of the other type, which is termed a conceptual transformation (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014: 260).

Makarenko and Mesquita (2014) suggest that the alliances, which are occurring mostly along the operational plane in the EU, are formed namely for financial reasons[167], for operational support[168] and for easier access to specialised knowledge and services.[169] Furthermore, similarly to Shelley (2005), Makarenko ((EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014)) suggests that particular alliances of criminal and terrorist organisations are prone to exploit their interests within diaspora communities.[170]

Makarenko's (2004) original CTC model proved to be a fairly competent starting point in terms of summarising, simplifying, and depicting the original crime-terror nexus phenomenon. The CTC is an atypical model, which is developed in form of a continuum, instead of a static model. As the CTC model's revisions indicate, continuum eases and leaves open the possibility of future upgrade. However, making provisions and understanding the need for an upgrade of the model does not guarantee that these upgrades are better accommodating the present realities of the crime-terror nexus, as it is seen in the CTC model. Although, the CTC's originality carries elements of a bias, it managed to develop and retain some of the features of the regular modelling fairly well. For example, the CTC manages to achieve the summarisation pattern rather well, by providing a brief

[166] Once again, drawing from Isaak (1985) and Shelley et al. (2005) the components that are key to the regular modelling are ability to summarise, simplify, generalise, and abstract.
[167] E.g. smuggling of illicit goods
[168] E.g. an easier access to smuggling networks
[169] E.g. counterfeiting and/or money laundering
[170] The ties (e.g. cultural, religious) and grievances (e.g. vulnerability, poverty, oppression, discrimination or political grievances) of immigrant communities, diaspora and ethnic minorities are exploited for the purposes of recruitment to and monetary support of such merged entities. Such communities and diaspora are prone to 'sheltering' OC, consider involvement in political violence and OC, as well as attempt to justify their actions.

outline of convergence phenomena. In terms of simplification, the CTC accurately narrows down and concretises the concepts or key points and joins them into variety of crime-terrorism relationships. Additionally, the influence of globalisation, and processes accompanying it, is reflected in the development of the crime-terror nexus discourse in the post-9/11 world. The changes in the dynamics of the nexus are recognised by the majority of scholars, analysts and LE practitioners, but they are not accommodated in the CTC model.

The recent scholarship, research and analyses in the crime-terror nexus field reinforce each other's argument and pinpoint the further direction of the CTC model. While, the CTC remains noninclusive of these references and direction. Despite the upgrades to the model, it still does not fully incorporate the ever-evolving modalities of the crime-terror nexus and its discourse in the past several decades. Here, the CTC model does not achieve the other two key features of proper modelling, namely generalisation[171] and abstraction.[172] Thus, a few of the post-9/11 developments pushed the CTC model to rethink its assumptions.

The original basic linear CTC model of 2003-2004 categorises crime-terror relationships along the continuum. The CTC offers in-depth explanations and examples of an interaction between criminal and terrorist organisations, within each form of a relationship. The linear model shows that the strength of the links between the two entities fluctuates over time, circumstances, and across geospatial characteristics. Thus, the original CTC model depicts the 'black hole' phenomenon as the culmination point of the crime-terror convergence (Makarenko 2004).

Later, an updated CTC model of 2009-2012 is revised by eliminating the 'black hole' scenario and accommodating the diversity of the geospatial characteristics – the almost complete convergence of entities is no longer restricted to the weak or failing states. Additionally, it depicts the possibility of the transformation beyond the convergence point by adding three planes, namely operational, evolutionary, and conceptual (Makarenko 2009; (EP 2012)).

Finally, the 2014 CTC variant illustrates the relationship between crime and terrorism on the series of upgraded planes to account for even deeper complexity in linkages along each plane and specific

[171] E.g. existing and possible evolving convergence trends
[172] E.g. the ability to move concrete convergence trends to the level of abstraction and forecast its future trends

geospatial features. The relationships established along the planes correlate[173] to the specific geospatial characteristics (Makarenko & Mesquita 2014). Additionally, the latest version of the CTC model accommodates the phenomenon of the emergence of hybrid organisations, and a complete transformation from one entity to the other. The latest CTC is an improvement because it considers the possibility of the deeper proximity between crime and terrorism. And yet, the CTC model continues to divide crime and terrorism as separate phenomena. The acknowledgement of even closer proximity and the possibility of the hybridisation of crime and terrorism does not accommodate the real dynamics captured by scholars such as Ballina (2011), Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) and others[174] which is the merger of the criminal and terrorist social networks, environments, or *milieus*.

Thus, the CTC is based on already developed knowledge, and the same case studies of other convergence frameworks that existed prior to 9/11. Only a few case studies are drawn by Makarenko from the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Additionally, no recent case studies or empirical evidence are brought forward by the CTC, on the basis of which more adequate generalisation about the current dynamics and complexity of terrorist organisations could have been made. Unlike Basra, Neumann and Brunner's (2016) research, the CTC mostly refers to criminal and terrorist organisations as well as states. It only very infrequently refers to non-state actors, units of analysis and operational environments. The CTC depicts organisations as monolithic entities, and the model relies primarily on the organisational level of analysis.[175] This significantly limits the model's ability to explain the development of contemporary terrorist organisations, their origins, composition, operation, nature, including their radicalisation and recruitment mechanisms. With the lack of reference to more recent case studies and empirical evidence, the CTC model "…cannot deal with the 21st century's problems by applying methods, strategies, principles and tactics rooted in the last century" (Wang 2010: 11). Thus, recent evidence and knowledge, developed on the new crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations, is contrary to the generalisation and abstraction patterns of the CTC's crime-terrorism relationships realities. Hence, the CTC model

[173] For example, in Western democracies the relationships between crime and terrorism are restricted to the operational plane.
[174] Von Drehle (2015); Gallagher (2016); Hemmingsen (2016); Stern (2016); Warrick (2015); Böckler et al. (2017)
[175] The CTC analyses criminal and terrorist organisations as a single, solid body, rather than focusing on entities consisting of individuals (e.g. Picarelli's (2006) postinternationalist approach) or focusing primarily on individuals (e.g. Bobic's (2014) human security framework).

seems to be joining the realm of the present-day 'conventional wisdom'[176], by ignoring realities on the ground in its analysis.

4.4 Challenging the contemporary 'conventional wisdom'

Based on the ICSR report by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), the analyses by Von Drehle (2015), Hemmingsen (2016), Gallagher (2016), Böckler et al. (2017), narrative by Warrick (2015), the empirical evidence from the media accounts on the ground,[177] coupled with the alternative perspectives by Shelley and Picarelli (2006; 2012), Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016), Ballina (2011), Bobich (2014), Stern (2016) one can firmly state that the new crime-terror nexus has been established. As a result, contemporary terrorist organisations emerge in a significantly transformed mode in the post-9/11 world.

Notwithstanding the rising importance and recognition of the crime-terror nexus post-9/11, Picarelli (2012) suggests that the field remains dominated by the 'conventional wisdom'. By 'conventional wisdom' Picarelli (2012) refers to the scholarly assumption regarding the divergence of criminal and terrorist motives that precludes the long-term cooperation between the two entities. However, in the case where cooperation takes place, it is merely short-term and solely for the purposes of attaining interim goals.

The CTC model does acknowledge that long-term cooperation and even complete transformation from the one entity to the other is possible. Thus, it firmly gravitates towards the first school of thought, [178] identified by Grabosky and Stohl (2010). Once again, this school is certain about the presence of the crime-terror convergence and its permanent nature. However, the CTC remains deeply rooted in a number of orthodoxies, such as: profit versus ideology dichotomy; conceptual separation of crime and terrorism; a conventional outlook on the progression of the crime-terrorism relationships;[179] a biased standpoint in terms of units, levels of analysis, and how operational

[176]Once again, by 'conventional wisdom' Picarelli (2006; 2012) implies the short-term collaboration of entities due to fundamental differences between criminal and terrorist organisations, or transformations that are limited to changes in methods not motivations ('methods not motives' argument). The last revised CTC model acknowledges the possible transformation of motives but does not see that the motives and methods of terrorism and crime can be born in a hybrid form and originate from the same *milieu*.

[177] VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016), Warrick (2015); CNN (2017); Government of the Netherlands (2017)

[178] E.g. Stern (2003), Makarenko (2003; 2004) and Dishman (2005)

[179] Once again, there are either alliances of 'one and another', integration, or transformation 'from one to another'. The CTC treats crime and terrorism as mutually exclusive concepts and entities in terms of organisation and operation. It does not acknowledge the possibility of origin of both entities from the same milieu.

environments are susceptible to the development of the nexus.[180] In addition to the 'methods not motives' arguments that previously dominated the nexus field, a deeply rooted orthodoxy can be found in the way the CTC model portrays the progression of the relationship between criminal and terrorist entities. More specifically, it portrays the entities, activities and concepts of crime and terrorism as mutually exclusive, rather than focusing on their complementarity.

Drawing from the literature (see Chapter 1), it is understood that the inclusivity of alternative analyses and approaches of the crime-terror nexus might not be an inherent feature of the CTC model. However, it still corresponds to some of the core facets of regular modelling. In the absence of an overarching theory, the highly contested field of the crime-terror nexus relies on the unorganised variety of analyses, alternative perspectives, and a combination of their key elements. Drawing from the above, more recent analyses and alternative perspectives, one might say that the CTC fails to accurately depict the correspondence between key elements regularly circulating through the crime-terror nexus discourse. The failure to include the generalisation and abstraction dimensions also resulted in the demise of the CTC's applicability towards the development of the new crime-terror nexus and the contemporary nature of terrorist organisations.

Based on the literature from the field of the crime-terror nexus, the following alternative approaches and analyses contribute to a more comprehensive explanation mapping of the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations. Several elements from the following alternative perspectives are employed. For one, Dishman's (2001) notions of transformation, permanency of convergence, factors contributing to the crime-terror nexus[181] and the environments susceptible to it (Dishman 2005; 2016). Additionally, Picarelli's (2006) non-state centric perspective[182] outlines the units of analysis, their composition and the levels of analysis. Picarelli (2006) suggests an all-encompassing approach that explains and helps us to understand the key features of the crime-terror nexus - Rosenau's (1990) postinternationalist paradigm, which speaks to the evolution of the nexus beyond the 'marriage of convenience'. Moreover, Picarelli (2012) later suggested IPE as another applicable framework of analysis. Thus, IPE focuses more on the non-state actors and non-state operational environments, such as illicit markets, that impact

[180] The level of analysis used is primarily organisational (organisations are seen as solid bodies lacking the units comprising them). Also, the operational space susceptible to the formation of nexus is narrowed down to either stable or unstable states.
[181] E.g. drivers and facilitators of convergence such as decentralisation of authority resulting into increase of the 'nodal motivation'
[182] E.g. bifurcation of the crime-terror nexus, and the larger diversity of non-state actors enabling and participating in the nexus

consolidation of the crime-terror nexus. The IPE approach, in line with the works by Dishman (2016), Stern (2016) and Bobic (2014), draws attention to actors, operational environments, drivers and facilitators of the crime-terror nexus. Furthermore, Bobich (2014) proposes another non-state centric perspective - the human security framework, that places importance, once again, on the units of analysis (individuals), the role of gender, as well as the drivers, and facilitators of the crime-terror nexus.

Contrary to alternative perspectives that indirectly challenge selected aspects of the CTC's applicability and explanatory power, Ballina's (2011) work directly addresses the validity of the CTC model. For one, Ballina offers an alternative to the CTC – a CVO three-dimensional model. This model is aligned with recent research and analyses, and it draws attention to the complementarity and shared background of crime and terrorism (see **Figure 5**). [183]

Figure 5.: A CVO three-dimensional model



(Ballina 2011: 131)

The core elements found across the alternative perspectives and analyses, which challenge the applicability of the CTC model to the new crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations, can be grouped in a specific manner. These elements include: units of analysis; levels of analysis; drivers and facilitators, and operational environments susceptible to the nexus; discrepancies in views on the specifics of crime-terrorism merging; and finally, the feature of the

[183] As the CVO evolve, they become influenced by the various elements linked to the pursuit of the ideology or profit. Contrary to the orthodoxy in the crime-terror nexus and the CTC, the pursuit of the ideology and profit are not mutually exclusive, they flow in more than one direction and they are mutually influential (Ballina 2011).

contemporary terrorist organisations and the crime-terror nexus – bifurcation and eclipsing of the old and new forms, and modes of organisation and operation.

4.4.1 Units of analysis

With regard to units of analysis, Dishman (2005), in his leaderless nexus thesis, suggests that post-9/11 criminal and terrorist organisations are characterised by networked forms, decentralised cell structures or even leaderless resistance.[184] Picarelli (2006), building on Rosenau's (1990) postinternationalism paradigm, suggests that the units of analysis are individuals and collective actors. These collective actors are also comprised of individuals. The collective actors "are thus conceived as social networks comprised of roles linked via relational ties" (Picarelli 2006: 7). Hence, the roles and changing capabilities of individuals have an impact on the dynamics of the crime-terror nexus. Similarly, Bobic (2014), drawing from the human security approach, also emphasises the importance of individuals as a unit of analysis, and draws specific attention to gender roles. As the empirical evidence and analyses later indicate, gender plays one of the leading roles in the redemption narrative,[185] and the radicalisation and recruitment patterns[186] of contemporary terrorist organisations.

Dishman (2016) suggests that the dominant non-state actors and units of analysis are polymotivated networks that are the catalysts for a more complex morphing between crime and terrorism, that will eventually bring about 'the dystopian future' and 'deviant globalisation'. Additionally, Picarelli (2012), Dishman (2016) and Stern (2016) emphasise the role that illicit activities play as well as the unconventional spaces though which these activities are managed. The unconventionality of the nature and *modus operandi* of the contemporary illicit markets impacts and facilitates the deeper merger between crime and terrorism.

The illicit markets deserve special attention. Due to the advancement of information and communication technologies, the illicit markets have become capable of existing in variety of

[184] E.g. long-wolf terrorism; the evolution of the information technologies and economic sphere has a major impact on the nature and structure of the contemporary terrorist organisations,

[185] Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), Stern (2016); (e.g. sexual slavery in IS provides explanation for and redemption from the sins)

[186] VICE News (2014), Channel 4 (2015), France 24 (2015), Expressen TV (2016) all of these media reports demonstrate the role of the women-recruiters in the cell nodes, the impact of gender roles and construction of gender in recruitment and radicalisation processes.

forms and modes. They are one of the forms of activity and organisation that truly transcend space and time. Drawing from Picarelli (2012), Dishman (2016) and Stern (2016), the illicit markets can be unconventional operational environments, facilitators of the convergence and units of analysis. Thus, drawing from alternative perspectives, the recent empirical evidence and analyses on the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations are better assessed by the non-state centric perspectives. The major actors in the international arena and the units of analysis influencing the deeper merger between crime and terrorism are now polymotivated individuals, polymotivated networks, and illicit markets.

Contrary to Makarenko's views (2004; 2009; (EP 2012); (Makarenko & Mosquito 2014)), Böckler et al. (2017) pay attention to the type and role played by individuals that are radicalised against the background of contemporary terrorist organisations,[187] such as the IS. Similarly, Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) in the ICSR report highlight the development of the new crime-terror nexus, as well as the role of the individual actors that correspond to the criminal true believer subtype. In contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, the members are recruited from the same *milieu* with the use of redemption narrative.[188] The redemption narrative[189] that is offered is closely aligned with the personal needs and desires of the criminals. If one would attempt to depict it, the following **Figure 6.** demonstrates it as closed-circle unbreakable pattern.

Figure 6.: Circular motion of the redemption narrative



Source: Author's own elaboration

[187] The criminal true believers are involved in terrorist organisation for a very short period of time. They are either excluded by an organisation due their impulsivity or they reach their deaths earlier. Often, they do not invest much into advancement of their religious beliefs nor strongly believe or follow organisation's ideology. Additionally, they usually have no interest in the cause they are fighting for. The leadership of organisation often uses them to establish discipline within the organisation or carry out the most brutal violent acts (this type is also usually dreaded by other members of the organisation).

[188] E.g. the new crime-terror nexus

[189] E.g. once more, this is the redemption from all sins to individuals with criminal pasts for execution of terrorist acts

In other words, this phenomenon is referred to by Gallagher (2016) and other scholars and analysts,[190] as "gangster jihad" or "gangster jihadism".[191] The author draws attention to the radicalisation and re-criminalisation of individuals, such as IS veterans (seen **Figure 7**). Gallagher (2016) describes the process in which individuals from the criminalised Western Muslim Diaspora are joining the battlefield in the Middle East and engaging in terrorist activities of the IS. These individuals rejoin the criminal world upon their return home. Similarly to Böckler et.al. (2017), focusing on a criminal profile of individuals engaging in terrorism, Warrick (2015) emphasises the criminal profile of the IS leadership. Hemmingsen (2016) refers to the way contemporary terrorist organisations exploit the disenchanted individuals, and the grievances within the diaspora communities.

Figure 7.: A cycle of radicalisation to re-criminalisation



(Gallagher 2016: 63)

Therefore, the role of individuals, their psychological profile, their background, *milieu*, and their networks are important to consider in the analysis of the crime-terror nexus. Placing an emphasis

[190] Burke (2015: 207); Faiola and Mekhennet (2015), BBC Magazine (2016); Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), CBS News (2016)
[191] Gangster jihadists are individuals that are usually drawn from immigrant gangs that incorporate jihadism with gangster criminality.

on these actors and units of analysis brings the crime and terrorism link even closer. This has important implications for labelling and understanding the morphing of crime and terrorism in contemporary terrorist organisations.

4.4.2 Levels of analysis

Secondly, one must consider the levels of analysis. Picarelli (2006) suggests that for a better assessment and understanding of the relationship between crime and terrorism, the analysis must incorporate the sub-national, national, international and transnational levels of analysis. This relationship and its changes are reflective of the organising and operating of contemporary terrorist organisations. Furthermore, according to Picarelli (2006), the comprehensive framework that incorporates all these four levels is based on James Rosenau's (1990) postinternationalist paradigm.

Drawing from the literature one can conclude that the mentioned units of analysis closely correspond to all four levels of analysis suggested by Picarelli (2006). Thus, one can link individuals to polymotivated converging networks they comprise. Also, the illicit markets can be linked to and correspond to national, sub-national, international and transnational levels of analysis.

4.4.3 Drivers, facilitators, and operational environments of the crime-terror nexus

Thirdly, there are a number of drivers, facilitators and unconventional operational environments to be considered in relation to changing dynamics of the crime-terror nexus. Most of the alternative perspectives and analyses of the crime-terror nexus discourse identify globalisation as the key driver of deeper convergence and even the complete morphing of crime and terrorism. Dishman (2001; 2005; 2016) emphasises globalisation, coupled with the segmentation of illicit markets, decentralisation, individualisation and decomposition of authority,[192] as well as hybridisation.[193] Similarly, Picarelli (2006; 2012) suggests decomposition of state's authority, development of unconventional environments susceptible to the crime-terror nexus (once again – illicit markets),

[192] Such as an emergence of nodal motivation. The new actors on the arena – decentralised networks with the flattened hierarchical structure, where the traditional centre of command is no longer present. This results in the development of the leaderless nexus in the post-9/11 period.

[193] E.g. development and expansion of polymotivated malevolent actors

as well as the new feature of the contemporary nexus – convergence of old and new forms and *modus operandi* of the nexus and terrorist organisations.[194] Stern (2016) draws attention to the process of globalisation, coupled with decentralisation, the rapid development of information and communication technologies, as well as the diversification of illicit activities.

Bobic (2014) emphasises two drivers of the crime-terror nexus; namely the decomposition of the state's authority and state-building. Despite the fact that these two drivers oppose (and almost negate) each other, both drivers result in the development of a new crime-terror nexus. Drawing from Bobic (2014), the decomposition of the state's authority, coupled with decentralisation, creates niches for illicit activity; activities transcending the borders, and which evade state control. State building implies the establishment of greater state regulations, draconian LE measures, as well as the control and regulation of illicit markets. These measures pressure terrorist and criminal entities to decentralise, to flatten their hierarchies, form networks and to seek even more covert ways of operating.

In terms of facilitators, Ballina (2011) suggests that a hybrid organisation does not necessarily emerge as a result of a merger between criminal and terrorist groups. In other words, crime and terrorism are capable of a deeper merger resulting from endogenous influences, which originate from the same cultural and social context. Similarly to Ballina (2011), Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) characterise the development of crime and terrorism as arising from the same social environment (or the convergence of environments) – a single *milieu.*

Additionally, there are other facilitators of the crime-terror nexus. Picarelli (2012), similarly to Gallagher (2016) and Hemmingsen (2016), suggests that the process of individualisation in religious authority, diaspora communities, some businesses, third parties and front companies can enable the deeper morphing of crime and terrorism.

Dishman (2016) suggests that the fragmentation of the VIIs[195] eases the process of segmentation of the black market into 'micro-economies'. This provides an opportunity for other nefarious actors to adapt and adjust (e.g. multiple motives and hybridity), to enter the black market and fill

[194] For example, the eclipsing of the old state-centric nexus with new multi-centric nexus, based on Shelley's (2005) division between old and new criminal organisations.
[195] Dishman (2016) emphasises that the VIIs were previously controlled by the single TCO.

in an available niche.[196] Both Dishman (2016) and Stern (2016) also argue that constantly evolving information and communication technologies facilitate the morphing of crime and terrorism. This process enables the establishment of unconventional operational spaces for contemporary terrorist organisations, which transcend time and space.[197] Additionally, technological advancements influence the diversification of the investment portfolios of the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS.[198] Altogether, this ensures a complex symbiosis of crime and terrorism, and a longer survival of these organisations (Stern 2016).

The aforementioned key drivers, facilitators and specificities of the operational environments of the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations are reflected in recent analysis and empirical evidence available from the media accounts on the ground. Drawing from these accounts, it is becoming evident that globalisation, decentralisation and state-building have resulted in: the flattening of the conventional hierarchical structure, the emergence of the nodal motivation, and the individualisation of religion and authority in the contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. For instance, Böckler et al. (2017) regards the type of individuals joining such organisations as criminal true believers, who are prone to the accelerated process of conversion to Islam and radicalisation. This is also reflected in the individualisation of religious authority, nodal, and cell motivation, and the development of "plebeian jihadism" in Denmark (Hemmingsen 2016).

CNN's (2017) special report (the documentary about one Belgian foreign fighter who joins the IS and later returns home) also highlights the access of members of such contemporary terrorist organisations to illicit networks and markets, and skills sharing between crime and terrorism. This is reflected in the ICSR report by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) with regards to complete alignment of the interests of those radicalised with the interests and motives of criminals. Another example of the flattening of hierarchies and cell, nodal or even individual motivation, as well as

[196] "Thus, the size of the industry "pie" is still the same, but it is now cut into more slices with the income generated more broadly distributed" (Dishman 2016: 145). This entire process can be compared to Ford's assembly line, where nefarious actors, including TCOs and terrorist organisations (especially their various cells and nodes) add up to this illicit 'assembly line', and they mutually benefit from this fragmentation. This results in an even deeper convergence between crime and terrorism.
[197] E.g. development of cyberjihad (Schori Liang 2015). The examples of unconventional operational environments are Dark Web, Deep Web, WhatsApp etc.
[198] E.g. the endangered wildlife, antiquities, investment or receiving donations in cryptocurrency

the role of gender in radicalisation is found in media accounts[199] which reflect on the leaderless nexus. They also reveal the role of women in recruitment and radicalisation in contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. Additionally, these accounts, Stern's (2016) analysis, and a number of recent news reports demonstrate the convergence of unconventional operational spaces with the conventional ones in the new crime-terror nexus.[200] They also demonstrate the presence of all aforementioned drivers, facilitators and operational environments in the new crime-terror nexus (Charles 2014; Manheim et al. 2017; Darrah 2017; ITIC 2017; Gallagher 2016; Hemmingsen 2016).

4.4.4 Disparate views of crime-terror convergence and hybridisation: presence of façade shielding lucrative activities

Fourth, one needs to consider the discrepancies in the views on the specifics of crime-terrorism merging, in the way in which the crime-terror nexus relationships take place. In the early in-house transformation thesis, Dishman (2001) suggested the existence of temporary alliances between criminal and terrorist entities; and a possibility of the complete (exogenous) transformation of one entity (criminal) into another (terrorist). This resulted in the emergence of a different entity with a different end game, supporting a mere façade of a terrorist group for shielding its purely criminal activities. Later, Dishman (2005) shifted to Makarenko's camp and rethought the temporary marriages of convenience between crime and terrorism. He suggested a permanency of convergence between the two entities by highlighting their chameleonic nature – 'terrorist by day criminal by night'. Later, Dishman (2016) returned to the idea of a façade concealing criminality, suggesting the polymotivated nature of contemporary terrorist organisations.

Picarelli (2006; 2012) emphasised the morphing of crime and terrorism, not in organisational terms, but in the form of a threat convergence. Ballina (2011) in her three-dimensional CVO model, broke the myth of the operational or organisational morphing, by emphasising the birth of the contemporary terrorist organisations as hybrids, without any façade aimed at concealing

[199] Channel 4 (2015); France 24 (2015); Expressen TV (2016) etc.
[200] Contemporary terrorist organisations are making use of stable states and conflict territories, as well as the cyberspace simultaneously.

criminality. Thus, for Ballina (2011) crime and terrorism are complimentary concepts, and not mutually exclusive.

Conclusively, Stern (2016), corresponding with the works of Mullins and Wither (2016: 74), Ballina (2011) and the ICSR report by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016), confirms the hybrid nature of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS. This hybrid organisation does not develop from the integration or appropriation of tactics, as the CTC model suggests, but rather it is born as such, from the convergence of the social networks and single *milieu*. There is a complete merger of the environments from which such hybrid organisations stem from. However, Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) remain uncertain about the *a priori* origins of contemporary terrorist organisations out of the criminal motivations. The report remains inconclusive regarding whether there is specific targeted approach to the criminals at the recruitment and radicalisation stages; whether there is a presence of façade shielding lucrative activities. Thus, it creates a window of opportunity for further research and exploration of this phenomenon.

4.4.5 Another hybridity: convergence of old and new forms and *modus operandi*

Finally, there is the merger of old and new forms of organisations, and the *modus operandi* in the contemporary crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations. For one, Picarelli (2006) noted the bifurcation of the state-centric crime-terror nexus[201] and multi-centric nexus[202] in the globalised international environment, which is based on Shelley's (2005) differentiation between old and new terrorist organisations. Stern (2016), following the number of recent analyses and researches confirms this bifurcation. She emphasises that contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, aim to exist in the form of the quasi-state, as well as combining the hierarchical and network or cell structure. Furthermore, such hybrid organisations simultaneously occupy and transcend the conventional[203] and unconventional[204] operational space. And finally, contemporary terrorist organisations make use of and combine both types of weaponry. These are the more advanced

[201] The state-centric crime-terror nexus is the inherent feature of the Cold War era, when states were the main operational environments (superpowers). Also, the ideologies gravitated towards the state as the principal actor (and unit of analysis) on the international arena.
[202] The multi-centric nexus is the inherent feature of the post-Cold War period and expansion of globalisation. This nexus was influenced by the emergence of multiple actors and centers of gravity on the international arena.
[203] E.g. stable, unstable states, conflict and uncontrollable territories.
[204] E.g. cyberspace, illicit markets (including these markets in the Dark Web)

(although not CBRN or WMD's as forecasted by analysts and scholarship) and the conventional 'garden variety' weapons (Government of the Netherlands 2017).

Drawing from these alternative perspectives and the key elements identified between them, it is clear that contrary to the CTC model, contemporary terrorist organisations are born as hybrids. Contemporary terrorist organisations in the form of hybrid entities share and originate from a joint, completely morphed background, as well as sharing the same social networks and social environments – *milieu* with criminals. Individuals comprising contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, are often associated with the criminal true believer type. These individuals are usually rapidly radicalised, and their interests and needs are completely aligned with the needs and desires of criminals. Additionally, members of contemporary terrorist organisations simultaneously have joint access to criminal networks, they share and exchange their criminal 'skills', and have a lower psychological threshold for violence.[205] The operational environments in which contemporary terrorist organisations function unify conventional and unconventional spaces. The organisational structure and *modus operandi* represent a complex merger of new and old features.

It is important to note that the CTC and Dishman's (2001; 2016) arguments point to the possible presence of a façade in formed hybrid or transformed terrorist organisations, shielding lucrative and criminal activities. Contrary to that, the ICSR report by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) emphasises that contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, certainly originate from the same social environments (most often prisons and disenchanted communities) or *milieus*, that are shared with individuals with a criminal past. However, the ICSR report concludes that it is unclear whether individuals with criminal pasts are specifically targeted (e.g.in prisons) in the very beginning of the radicalisation and recruitment stages to contemporary terrorist groups.

4.5 Problematics of the CTC: inclusivity and correlation of elements

The above key elements, and their correlation were crucial for the successful modelling of the new crime-terror nexus in the post-9/11 period. These elements were important for a more efficient exposing, generalisation and forecasting of the fundamentally changed nature of the new crime-

[205] This makes it easier for these individuals to commit violent attacks.

terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations. If the CTC would had considered and depicted linkages and correlations between these elements, its significant weaknesses in the generalisation and abstraction variables of its modelling methodology, could have been avoided.

Due to the fact that the CTC model failed to include and depict the correlation between the above key elements suggested by alternative approaches, the model's applicability and explanatory power has been significantly weakened. Despite the CTC's attempts at revision to accommodate the changing realities of the crime-terror nexus, it is still embedded in the recently emerging realm of 'conventional wisdom'. The conventional crime versus ideology dichotomy included in the CTC model is becoming inapplicable to present realities of the relationship between crime and terrorism, as well as the new crime-terror nexus, which is characterised by a fundamentally transformed nature. This has had an impact on CTC not reaching its full potential with regards to generalisation and abstraction variables of modelling. Additionally, the lack of or at times, the complete absence of dialogue between the CTC and alternative perspectives was noted. It is paradoxical, that in this highly contested crime-terror nexus field the CTC model seems to be developing in its own vacuum. Altogether, this not only undermines the model's generalisation and abstraction patterns, but also casts doubt on the validity of the entire CTC model and its overall approach to modelling.

4.6 Conclusion

The CTC model is a fairly innovative attempt and a solid base for the analysis of the dynamics of the new crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations. However, the research conducted by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) on the development of the new crime-terror nexus, by Gallagher (2016) on the radicalisation and reintegration of criminalised terrorist veterans, by Böckler et al. (2017) on the typology of the terrorist personality linked to radicalisation, as well as the analyses by Von Drehle (2015) and Stern (2016), and Warrick's (2015) narrative with more focus on the IS, and recent documentaries and speeches – all suggest that the CTC model, is not applicable in terms of explanation to the new crime-terror nexus. Also, it does not explain the nature of the transformation of contemporary terrorist organisations.

The critical analysis, following the systematic literature overview, of the alternative perspectives, and more recent research and analyses demonstrates that the post-9/11 crime-terror nexus

discourse has had a limited impact on the CTC model. There has been a significant weakening of the CTC's validity and reliability as an explanatory tool. This is evident both, in practice, and in terms of how subsequent authors have attempted to account for the extent of the CTC model's applicability. Additionally, the overall impression from critical evaluation of literature on the crime-terror nexus is that there is a noticeable lack of correspondence and dialogue between the scholars in this relatively contested field.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

There are several reasons that triggered and motivated this research. These include the distinctive character of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, a visible spike in the criminalisation of terrorism post-9/11, as well as the researcher's own life experience in an environment riddled by religious fundamentalism prone to radicalisation, extremism and ideologically motivated violence. These reasons reinforced the researcher's interest in examining the main causes and nature of contemporary terrorist organisations, as well as the phenomenon of these organisations becoming more criminal in nature.

The encounter with Jessica Stern's (2003) work shed light on the deeper causes of the complex nature of contemporary terrorism post-9/11. This led the researcher to the understanding that the rise of post-9/11 terrorism and TOC is deeply rooted in the larger spectre of social and economic issues that are reinforced by globalisation. This 'deep pie' of causes, including political and economic grievances, has no clear-cut boundaries and these causes are often inseparable. Taking into consideration the post-9/11 international military campaign and GWOT's revitalised approach these causes have proven to be unresolvable using regular military, political or economic methods. The unresolved underpinning of the causes of terrorism post-9/11 has resulted in the emergence of a transformed and more complex typology of threats to human security. This has led to the emergence of contemporary terrorist organisations, such as the IS, and the further consolidation of the symbiosis between crime and terrorism – the crime-terror nexus.

It is this distinct nature and the internal dynamics developing in the relationship between crime and terrorism post-9/11, that has impacted on the development of contemporary terrorist organisations. The deepening complexity of the crime-terror nexus post-9/11 underpins the transformed nature of contemporary terrorist organisations. Therefore, to comprehend and develop adequate mechanisms to tackle contemporary terrorist organisations it is necessary to carefully examine the nature of contemporary terrorist organisations and the causes behind their development by focusing on the crime-terror nexus. Therefore, the internal dynamics, contributing factors and the types of environments that are susceptible to the development of the nexus needed to be explored.

It became evident that a systematic overview of the literature and its critical evaluation are key to further research, framework development, as well as recommendations for the formulation of programmes and policy. The notion that the dynamics of the relationship between crime and terrorism, especially the crime-terror nexus, impacts the development of contemporary terrorist organisations, led the researcher to employ a preliminary systematic literature search, isolate certain texts dealing with crime-terror nexus and synthesise this sample of literature.

The preliminary systematic literature search allowed the research to identify and isolate the predetermined justifying sample of literature focusing on crime and terrorism, as entities, activities and organisations, allowing the research to focus on a variety of linkages and relationships between crime and terrorism. The systematic literature search allowed the researcher to consciously look for particular types of literature speaking to the nature of terrorist organisations, which was reflected in the crime-terror nexus discourse. The preliminary search of the literature on this discourse has revealed that the crime-terror nexus field is full of diverse perspectives, angles and lenses of analysis, but also that it is a field which is contested in nature. The synthesis of isolated texts has revealed that the crime-terror nexus field lacks an overarching approach or theory. Thus, one of the dominant and most cited works in the crime-terror nexus field - Makarenko's (2003; 2004) CTC model was isolated and selected as an approach which is reflective of the contemporary nature of the crime-terror nexus and terrorist organisations post-9/11. Additionally, the preliminary systematic literature search allowed one to look for and isolate specific types of literature on model thinking, such as Ballina's (2011) CVO three-dimensional model, and alternative approaches, such as Dishman (2001; 2016), Picarelli (2006; 2012) and Bobic (2014). Moreover, it helped to identify the scope of literature on more recent research, analyses, as well as media materials containing information from the ground.[206] It also allowed the researcher to identify the specific criteria, variables and elements against which to assess the visible weaknesses of the CTC model.

The preliminary synthesis of the literature identified the scope of the crime-terror nexus discourse and indicated the presence of two debates on convergence between crime and terrorism. The first debate confirms the existence of convergence between criminal and terrorist entities, and the

[206] E.g. media reports about role of gender and women in radicalisation and recruitment

permanency of their convergence. The second debate emphasises the temporary nature of convergence between crime and terrorism and the dominance of short-term, once-off transactions or collaborations between criminal and terrorist entities. The preliminary synthesis of the literature emphasised that the CTC model firmly gravitates towards the first debate.

Additionally, the synthesis of literature revealed that the CTC model is unconventional and an innovative attempt at modelling. The CTC is not a static regular model, because it is developed in the form of a continuum, which gives the model a room for regular updates to accommodate and forecast the realities of the relationships between crime and terrorism. However, the findings resulting from the systematic literature overview and subsequent critical evaluation later revealed that the CTC model has fails to accommodate and forecast the present realities of the crime-terror nexus due to the weaknesses in its methodology.

The synthesised texts revealed that a regular model is of heuristic value. Thus, the model does not guarantee that it is optimal or perfect. Also, the maximum inclusivity of various patterns and approaches might not be an inherent feature of the model, especially the CTC model. Additionally, it revealed that there is no overarching approach or theory on methodology of modelling. Thus, drawing from works of Isaak (1985: 171) and Shelley et al. (2005: 85) this study identifies that regular modelling involves summarised, simplified, generalised and abstracted conceptual schemes of a theory. Additionally, regular modelling usually involves the inclusivity and correspondence between elements of one theory and the elements of the other theory (e.g. isomorphism). Although, the CTC model is an unconventional model, it still corresponds to the methodology of modelling. Thus, the variables of regular modelling, as well as the inclusivity and correlation of elements from alternative perspectives are major indicators upon which the applicability of the CTC to the contemporary crime-terror nexus is assessed.

The isolation and synthesis of the dominant works and rival approaches to the CTC led to the preliminary assumption that there is a possibility that contemporary terrorist organisation *a priori* originate out of criminal motivations. Additionally, there were indications of a greater depth of merging of crime and terrorism that did not correspond to the realities of the relationship presented by the CTC model. As a tool, the CTC model was demonstrating significant weaknesses in its

modelling approach. Moreover, the model did not seem representative of the phenomena and dynamics in the real world in the post-9/11 environment.

The main research question of this study is based on a problem statement, supported by the preliminary systematic search and synthesis of the literature. Specifically, the question is focused on the evaluation of the sufficiency of the CTC model as an explanatory tool and framework of analysis, and the model's ability to account for the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period.

In response and supported by the synthesis of the isolated texts, the proposition and the research statement of this study is that the CTC model is insufficient to account for the possibility of terrorist organisations originating as criminal organisations. Taking into consideration that the advancing forces of globalisation in the post-9/11 period were influencing the transformation of typology of threats namely terrorism and crime. Additionally, the emergence of arguments in the crime-terror nexus discourse on the presence of possible lucrative façade, shielding maximisation of financial gains, and lastly, deeper complex symbiosis of crime and terrorism reinforce this proposition.

Thus, the aim of this study was to systematically rethink and critically evaluate the explanatory power and applicability of the CTC model to changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period, as well as lay the foundation for further research.

The aim of this study was achieved by evaluation of the CTC's modelling methodology against the changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period. This was achieved by assessing the inclusivity of the key elements and their correlation drawn from the most dominant perspectives (regularly circulating in the discourse). These key elements were identified, and they correlated with a more recent analyses and research found in literature (including few key media reports). The modelling variables of the CTC were assessed against the extent of inclusivity of these elements. The critical evaluation of these elements revealed significant weaknesses in the generalisation and abstraction patterns of the CTC model.

For analytical convenience, this study employs a design based on a systematic literature overview. The systematic overview is followed by critical evaluation that responds to the research question and examines the effectiveness of the CTC model. This research design aided with revealing several key findings in this study.

First, in a response to the main research question, the CTC model does manage to accurately summarise and simplify the knowledge in the patterns of relationships between criminal and terrorist entities in the Cold war and the post- Cold War period (e.g. in a form of alliances and cooperation). However, the CTC fails to achieve an accurate generalisation and abstraction, due to its focus on the criminal and terrorist organisations as monolithic entities (major actors and units of analysis). The CTC remains biased in the orthodoxy of the profit versus ideology dichotomy. The model also uses already explored case studies in the literature, without an attempt to examine new evidence with regard to contemporary terrorist organisations. The CTC model proves to be state-centric in its approach and does not consider the influence of non-state actors, unconventional operational environments, drivers, and facilitators in the consolidation of the relationship between crime and terrorism. The only environmental factor considered by the CTC is the impact of globalisation on the development of the crime-terror nexus. Yet, the model fails to convey several key features inherent in globalisation that have the main influence on the consolidation of the crime-terror nexus; namely decentralisation, disintegration of authority and individualisation of the religious authority, the advancement of the communications technologies as well as the segmentation of the illicit markets (e.g. fragmentation of the VIIs). The CTC does not depict the present variety of the non-state and non-organisational actors namely individuals, polymotivated networks comprising of these individuals and illicit markets contributing to furthering the crime-terror nexus.

The CTC does not demonstrate inclusivity and the correlation between these key elements in its modelling approach. This significantly impacts on its explanatory power with regards to the present realities of relationships between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period. This also leads to the conclusion that models are a good starting point for theorising because they provide a summarised and simplified conceptual scheme – a very basic outline for the development of all-encompassing theory. However, simplification compromises complexity, by selecting specific levels of analysis and variables for concise schematic depiction.

The systematic literature overview and the subsequent critical evaluation of the CTC and alternative perspectives create an overall impression of a lack of a dialogue between approaches in a highly diversified (but also surprisingly contested) crime-terror nexus field. There is an impression that consecutive versions of the CTC model are developed and revised in their own

vacuum. This is a disturbing sign for recently expanding and growing field because the lack of the dialogue significantly undermines the possibility of the theory development.

Second, one of the consecutive findings that undermines the CTC's applicability and explanatory power to the current realities of the relationships between crime and terrorism post-9/11, is that contemporary terrorist organisations are born as hybrid entities. However, the critical evaluation indicates that it is not clear whether contemporary terrorist organisations, contrary to the CTC and Dishman (2001; 2016), have a façade either over its hybrid nature or mere criminal motivations. Despite this fact, this research detects from the recent research and empirical evidence that contemporary terrorist organisations are born hybrid. They originate from the same social networks, environments or *milieus* (e.g. prisons, disenchanted emigrant communities etc.). These contemporary terrorist organisations, or hybrid criminal-terrorist organisations, are characterised by skills and knowledge sharing among individuals within them. These individuals are characterised by their extremely fast radicalisation, and general lack of interest in the religious agenda (e.g. plebeian jihadism). Also, their interests are completely aligned with the interests and desires of criminals. The membership base of such hybrid organisations is also characterised by the presence of individuals often associated with the criminal true believer type. Thus, these members have a lower psychological threshold for violence and are easily used in committing highly violent (and sadistic) terrorist attacks. Therefore, it can be stated, contrary to the CTC model, that Ballina's (2011) three-dimensional CVO model more accurately forecasts the birth of such hybrid organisations, by focusing on complementarity and the shared background of crime and terrorism. The CTC model, instead, takes an incorrect direction by focusing on the mutual exclusivity and diversification of crime and terrorism.

Finally, after a careful examination of the origins and evolution of crime and terrorism, the crime-terror nexus, and globalisation, it has become evident that terms of crime and terrorism, the crime-terror nexus and its discourse, as well as contemporary terrorist organisations experience the convergence of new and old forms, the re-emergence and evolution of arguments, and lastly organisational structures and *modus operandi.* In previous periods in history, such as Cold War and post-Cold War, criminal and terrorist organisations, the crime terror nexus and its discourse were more clearly identified and separated in relation to: differing organisational structures (hierarchical vs non-hierarchical), the nexuses are differentiated between state-centric and multi-

centric. Also, the discourse revolved around clear-cut themes that emerged with the evolution of political vernacular and practice at the time. Thus, in the previous eras there have been much clearer boundaries between different concepts, activities, processes, forms, and modes of organisation. Globalisation, which is today more associated with the new world order rather than a process, is characterised by bifurcation, eclipsing and simultaneous co-existence of opposite, and at times mutually exclusive phenomena. This research concludes that not only is there a strict hybrid nature of contemporary terrorist organisations in terms of complete convergence in origins of criminal and terrorist entities, but there is another form of hybridity to take note of. This hybridity is characterised by the convergence of old and new forms within contemporary crime and terrorism. The crime-terror nexus witnesses the hybrid nature in terms of convergence and the simultaneous co-presence of state-centric and multi-centric nexuses – the crime-terrorist hybrid entities operating as apocalyptic cults, illicit markets and candidates that are offering alternative governance approaches. Such hybrid entities and nexuses are simultaneously operating and consolidating within the state and against the state, collaborating with a variety of non-state actors. Lastly, they are operating in completely unconventional environments, such as cyberspace. This pattern of convergence and hybridity of old and new forms and the *modus operandi* makes it extremely difficult to tackle contemporary terrorism.

Thus, there is a need to focus less on military approaches in the post-9/11 world. Rather, a combined multi-levelled approach and efforts in tackling the variety of cultural, social, political, economic and technological causes, drivers, facilitators and issues[207] that underpin the contemporary terrorism need to be implemented.

[207] E.g. grievances, poverty, disenchantment with life, technological issues – cybersecurity, hacking, personal information access and fraud etc.

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SUMMARY

RETHINKING THE CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

POST-9/11 TO THE PRESENT

by

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The aim of this study is to rethink and critically evaluate the sufficiency of the CTC model as an explanatory tool and its applicability to changes in the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period, and consequently prepare the foundation for further research. Therefore, the main research question of this study is: *Does the CTC model sufficiently serve as an explanatory tool and framework of analysis to account for the relationship between crime and terrorism in the post-9/11 period?*

In response to the main research question, the study shows that the CTC model is a fairly innovative unconventional approach to modelling. It manages to accurately summarise and simplify the developed knowledge on the pre-9/11 relationship variations between crime and terrorism. Additionally, the CTC is a solid base for the analysis of contemporary dynamics in the new crime-terror nexus and more recent terrorist organisations, as well as a good starting point for theorising and developing an all-encompassing theory on the crime-terror nexus. The CTC fails to reach its full potential with regards to the generalisation and abstraction variables of modelling.

The design of the study is a systematic literature overview which is followed by a critical evaluation of the literature sample - including more recent research, analyses, narratives, and documentary media material that focuses on the example of contemporary terrorist organisations such as the IS. Altogether this systematised and critically evaluated body of knowledge reveals that the new crime-terror nexus has been established, and that the CTC model is not applicable to explaining the transformed nature of this nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations post-9/11.

Contemporary terrorism and crime originate from the same social networks, environments, or *milieu*. More recent terrorist organisations, such as the IS, have a hybrid nature. The new crime-terror nexus and contemporary terrorist organisations are witnessing the convergence, and the simultaneous co-presence and hybridity of old and new forms and their *modus operandi*. Although, the research remains inconclusive with regard to the possible presence of the façade shielding lucrative activities of contemporary terrorist organisations.

The CTC model fails to accommodate the above patterns. The critical evaluation of the CTC, more recent analyses, research, and alternative perspectives suggests that there is a lack of a dialogue in the contested field of the crime-terror nexus. This demonstrates a disturbing feature of the recently growing and expanding field, which significantly undermines the possibility of the theory development.

Finally, this study emphasises the key role played by a variety of cultural, social, economic, and political issues that are located at the very core of the crime-terror nexus. Thus, a combined multi-level approach to tackling these issues is key to combating post-9/11 monstrous hybrid terrorism.

KEY WORDS

The post-9/11; globalisation; terrorism; terrorist organisations; crime; organised crime (OC); transnational organised crime (TOC); transnational criminal organisations (TCOs); the crime-terror interface; the crime-terror nexus; the crime-terror convergence; the crime terror continuum (CTC) model; GWOT; LE; decentralisation; deterritorialisation; fragmentation of vertically integrated industries (VIIs); hybrid; hybridisation; *a priori*; *milieu*; *modus operandi*; the IS

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I declare that this thesis / dissertation / mini-dissertation is my own original work. Where secondary material is used, this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance with university requirements.

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