

Radicalization of European Citizens and ISIS Terrorism

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Abstract

The growing numbers of terror attacks in Europe in recent times has made the concept of radicalization a sensitive phenomenon, most especially, Islamic radicalization. The activities of Islamic extremists and terrorists have been identified with a good number of European citizens, who have joined the Islamic State (IS) and engaged in acts of terror against their own citizens and governments. Radicalisation has been used as a weapon by the Islamic State to recruit some European citizens as its members in order to perpetuate its objectives in Europe. The objective of this project is to examine how the Islamic State has been able to radicalize some European citizens as its members and build its network across the continent. It seeks to critically analyse the influence of the Islamic State ideology on European citizens, which has consequently led and could further lead to the participation of some European citizens in terrorist engagements. This work seeks to respond to the puzzle: how is it possible for the Islamic State to secure the interest of some Europeans into terrorism, considering the distance between Europe and the Middle East and the high standard of living as well as education that is available in Europe? In this mini-dissertation, the relevance of the study is pointed out in today Europe as far as peace and security development of the continent is concerned. This research makes use of secondary sources of data collection to investigate the study and its theoretical analyses is drawn from social network and contagion theories in order to shed more light on the discourse of the radicalisation of European citizens as Islamic State members. Specifically, this mini-dissertation discusses a brief origin and objectives of the Islamic State, the ideological perspectives of the group, reasons behind the radicalization of Europeans citizens as well as channels of radicalizing European citizens.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Background to the Study

The Islamic State is a Sunni Salafist group of global reach. While its base of operations is in eastern Syria and western and northern Iraq, it has supporters and fighters from North America, Europe, Russia, Africa, Asia, the Pacific Rim and Australia. In its self-proclaimed status as a caliphate, it claims religious authority over all Muslims across the world and aspires to bring all of the Muslim-inhabited regions of the world under its religious and political control, beginning with Iraq, Syria and other territory in the Levant region. ISIS took root in the new era created in Iraq after the Americans took control of the country in 2003. The Second Gulf War led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the destruction of the existing governmental structure. As a result, a security and governmental vacuum was created and the country's fragile social fabric (in the middle of which was the volatile Sunni-Shi'ite schism) was severely damaged (ITIC, 2014).

During the time the United States army was stationed in Iraq, the US failed to establish effective Iraqi army and security forces to fill the newly-created security vacuum in the country. While in Iraq, the US encouraged the establishment of what was supposed to be a democratic national Shi'ite regime headed by Nouri al-Maliki. However, the regime alienated the Sunni population, which had traditionally controlled the country, even though they were a minority, about 22% of the Iraqi population is Sunni Arabs — alongside the Kurds, who are also Sunnis — while about 60% of Iraqis are Shi'ites (ibid). The advantage of the increasing Sunni alienation became an important factor in the insurgent organizations fighting the American army and this became stronger after the withdrawal of the American troops at the end of 2011 and spread to Syria after the civil war began in March 2011. Originally founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), what is now the Islamic State participated in the Iraq War fighting against American forces after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In 2013, they joined the Syrian Civil War, but rather than focusing on defeating the regime of Bashar al-Assad, they focused on building the Islamic state. On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate with its leader being Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph (ibid).

1.2. Aim and rationale

The concept of radicalization has become sensitive in connection with the act of jihadist motivated terrorism. This has been especially evident in Europe, where Islamic extremists have become perpetrators of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ideologies and engaged in acts of terrorism against their own governments and fellow citizens. Radicalism poses a threat, and particularly Islamist radicalism, which is the main concern of this work, since it involves the active subversion of democratic values and the rule of law. In this sense, radicalisation is understood as socialisation to extremism, which can manifest itself in the perpetration of acts of terrorism (European Commission Expert Report, 2008). Radicalization has been used as a weapon by ISIS to recruit a significant number of European citizens as its members in order to perpetuate its ideologies in Europe. In other words, radicalisation entails an individual submitting himself or herself to an ideological orientation with time. It is connected to a belief system that is based on a specific or set of ideology. Radicalisation is not forceful or a sudden event; neither does it happen in a vacuum. It takes time and processes before its actual manifestation. For the purpose of this research, the definition of the European Commission Expert Report (2008) will be maximised in the description of, radicalisation of the European nationals in the engagement of the Islamic State's motivated or inspired terrorism. According to this definition, "Radicalisation is understood as socialisation to extremism, which can manifest itself in the perpetration of acts of terrorism".

This research project is aimed at investigating how radicalization, in the context of ISIS, is being used by the group to capture the interest of European citizens and build its network. It seeks to critically analyse the impact of ISIS radical ideology, commonly known as Salafi-Jihadism, on some European citizens which can lead to the participation of some in terrorist activities. This work is also aimed at contributing to the existing scholarship on how Europe can prevent radicalisation of its citizens.

This study is timely because of the rising number of terrorist operations in Europe, mostly motivated or inspired by ISIS in recent time. Terror acts had occurred in European countries such as: France (7 Jan 2015), Germany (19 Dec. 2016), Belgium (22 March 2016), Norway (22 July

2011), the UK (22 March 2017) and Sweden (7 April 2017). Terror attacks in Europe include the twin attacks in Brussels, Belgium, where at least 30 civilians were reportedly killed and over 200 injured in a series of bomb attacks targeting Brussels Airport and Maelbeek Metro station. Similarly, Paris also suffered a terrorist attack in November, 2015 which killed over 100 civilians (The Guardian, 2015). Similarly, the Nice terror attack was another case in point. On the evening of 14 July 2016, a 19 tonne cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France, resulting in the deaths of 86 people and injuring 434. The driver was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a resident of France. The ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, saying Lahouaiej-Bouhlel answered its "calls to target citizens of coalition nations that fight the Islamic State" (Wikipedia 2016, Nice attack). More recently, the Westminster Bridge terror attack in London carried out by Khalid Mashood was another case of the rising occurrence of terrorist activities on the continent as well as the presence of thousands of European nationals as foreign fighters and members of ISIS in Iraq and Syria call for academic investigation.

1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions

In a 2015 publication by the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Alex Schmid refers to a statement made by a ISIS top spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, "The best thing you can do is to make an effort to kill an infidel, French, American, or any other of their allies....Smash his head with a rock, slaughter him with a knife, run him over with a car, throw him from a high place, choke him or poison him" (ICCT, 2015:8). Considering the strategy of ISIS to infiltrate Europe in pursuit of its radical Salafist ideologies and looking at thousands of the European nationals as its members, this research seeks to respond to the puzzle: how is it that the Europeans, who are steeped in secularism and enjoying relatively high standards of living and education, have become radicalized into ISIS extremism? Therefore, this research will investigate the following specific questions:

1. What is radicalisation in the context of ISIS terrorism?
2. Why do European nationals become radicalised ISIS members?
3. How do European nationals become ISIS members?

1.4 Methodology and theoretical framework of the study

This study utilizes descriptive qualitative research method. Descriptive qualitative method is a research procedure that obtains descriptive data in written or spoken form from people and their behavior which is being observed. This approach is purposed to seek the understanding of a phenomenon or other certain problem by focusing on the total picture rather than breaking it down into variables. The goal is a holistic picture and depth of understanding rather than a numerical data analysis (Moleong, 2010:4). In other words, descriptive research is aimed at casting light on current issues or problems through a process of data collection that enables them to describe the situation more completely than was possible without employing this method. Against this backdrop, the descriptive qualitative method is appropriate in the context of examining the complexities associated with the subject of this study: the rationale and channels behind the European nationals' engagement in ISIS terrorist activities in Europe.

1.5.1. Data collection

Data for this study is generated mainly through secondary sources. The secondary sources of data collection will be based on both manual and electronic materials, with heavy reliance on books and academic journals. Furthermore, online news sources, magazines, newspapers - both local and international, as well as cases relevant to the study will be employed as a triangulation to the study.

1.5.2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical requirement of this work is drawn from contagion theory order to shed more light on the discourse of the radicalization of European citizens as ISIS members. This theory is relevant in understanding radicalisation of citizens from Europe in the context of ISIS terrorism. The theory is equally helpful in finding out responses to the queries off this research to find out why and how European nationals become ISIS members, as well as different techniques or channels maximized by the Islamic State in the radicalization process of its European members. The contagion theory refers to the observed phenomenon that high levels of terrorism in one country often are associated with increased incidents of terrorism in neighbouring or distant states, whether by the same organization, by 'second-generation' groups, by foreign sympathizers and coalition partners, or simply by imitators (Crenshaw, 1981). This implies that a terror, inspired or planned by ISIS and perpetuated in a country like France, the same method can

be used to carry out a terror act in a nearby country such as Germany or Belgium or another country in Europe. A successful terror incidence in a European country has the capability to influence the occurrence of a similar terror act in another country in the same region. Such as: the use of a lorry or trailer to ram over people in Berlin, Stockholm, London and Barcelona by terrorists.

Social contagion theory further suggests that individuals adopt the attitudes or behaviours of others in the social network with whom they communicate. It explains that individual perceptions are influenced by the perceptions of members in their social or friendship network. Social contagion theory is applicable to the motivation of the radicalization of European nationals as they perpetuate transnational ISIS terrorist ideology throughout Europe. The contagious factor of terrorism helps ISIS-inspired terror attacks to occur in France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the UK, making use of European nationals. In other words, the development of Islamic radicalisation in Europe and its consequent terror acts across the continent has a contagious connection. This has been demonstrated by terror acts in the aforementioned European countries.

In addition, ISIS is also of the view that the West is all out to counter its ideology and kill Muslims in Iraq and Syria, hence membership recruitment from diverse European countries into ISIS agenda is necessary in order to have a foothold in Europe and advance its objective in the continent. ISIS members with European identity also take advantage of Schengen free and open border access within Schengen zones to perpetuate their objectives in Europe.

1.6. Outline of Chapters

This research work is organized into five chapters. Chapter one provides background to the study, problem statement, research questions, aims and rationale, methodology and theoretical framework of the study. Chapter two attempts to explain related literatures, conceptual clarifications in the context of the subject of the research study. Chapter three responds to the question why do European nationals become radicalised by ISIS members. Chapter four explores how European nationals become radicalised by members of ISIS. Chapter five summarizes the findings, conclusions and makes recommendations

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

2.1. Related literatures

David Rapoport (2004) enumerates the historical antecedents of modern terrorism in his article, “Four Waves of Terrorism”. For Rapoport, modern terrorism involves four specific waves, which include: first wave: anarchist (1880s-1920s), second wave: anti-colonial (1920s-1960s), third wave: new left wing (1960s-1990s) and the fourth wave, religious wave (1990s-present day). A wave, according to Rapoport, is a cycle of activity in a given period, characterised by expansion and contraction phases. It is then concluded that terrorism is not something that is different for each group, but is an evolution. Each wave pattern shows that the groups involved have tried to learn from the previous and evolved their tactics to reflect the evolution of counter-terrorism strategies enforced by states (Rapoport, 2004). However, it is not indicated in Rapoport’s analysis of waves of terrorism whether there is going to be an evolution of another wave of terrorism after religious wave period is probably over. In his claim the world is currently experiencing a fourth wave of terrorism which is religious wave.

Living Safe Together (LST), an Australian government organization on Islamic radicalisation and terrorist activities, argues that radicalization happens when a person's thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. According to an LST finding, only small numbers of people radicalize and they can be from a diverse range of ethnic, national, political and religious groups. As a group of people radicalize, they may begin to seek to change significantly the nature of society and government (Living Safe Together, 2015). This description is relevant to ISIS, which has been using radicalisation to secure the interest of European citizens into perpetrating terrorist activities on the continent, in order to bring significant transformations into European societies and governments based on its salafist ideological orientation.

Looking at why European nationals submit to Islamic radicalization,

Oliver Roy (2007) sees the European citizens' radicalization into terrorism as a generational development. In his article, "Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe", Roy argues that there is no clear-cut sociological profile of the radicals or anything that could link them to a given socio-economic situation. More precisely, the reasons that may push them towards violence are not specific enough, but are shared by a larger population that deals with such a situation in a very different way. Explanations based on poverty, exclusion, racism, acculturation, etc., are simply not specific enough. There is clearly a generational dimension: Islamic radicalism is a youth movement. Frustration is obviously a key element in their radicalization, but has more to do with a psychological than a social or economic dimension. For Roy, the Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional societies *and* cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations. And their vision of a global ummah (a universal world order, ruled by an Islamic government (the Caliph) in accordance with the "Law of God"-the Shariah, and patterned after the community founded by Muhammad at Medina in 622 AD) is both a mirror and form of revenge against the globalization that has made them what they are, Roy asserted. Furthermore, Roy concludes that Al Qaeda and consorts offer a narrative of revolt and violence that appeals to an unmoored youth and gives a religious and political dimension to youth revolt that could have been expressed in other forms of violence (Roy, 2007:60). The Islamic State equally uses part of the Al Qaeda system which consequently captures the interest of many unmoored youths from European countries and presents them with what they claim to be an original Islam in its religious and political forms.

In 2015 publication of The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Alex Schmid in "Foreign Fighters with ISIS- a European Perspective," claims that a major reason for the success so far of ISIS has been its foreign fighters— some of them battle-hardened such as between 2,000 and 5,000 Chechens. Others, with no battlefield experience, are eager to sacrifice themselves by means of martyrdom operations (suicide attacks), that, as they are told, will allow them the pleasures of paradise (jannah) if not the spoils of war on earth. Many foreign fighters are driven by an apocalyptic end-of-days strategic vision (ICCT, 2015:10). Such a millenarian fanaticism is not without historical precedents; it could also be found in the Europe of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation. The Salafist-jihadist ideology of IS has a coherence and plausibility that is

attractive for many young Muslims who search for identity and meaning in life or want to break with a past characterized by petty crime or drug use. It provides some of those unsure about their place in Western society with a simple belief system and clear rules while promising them an active role as part of a victorious revival of what they are told is original Islam.

Meanwhile, Ogochukwu (2013), referring to the view of Claver (2002) on terrorism, maintained that, terrorism is a contested concept that resists precise definition. Since the term is both elastic and emotionally powerful, it lends itself to subjective interpretation driven by political rather than analytical purpose. It is also difficult to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence including guerrilla warfare or criminal activities. If terrorism is defined in terms of the intention behind the action, is it possible to know those intentions? What is the relationship between religion and terrorism, by non-combatants for example? Are attacks on security targets an act of terror? Therefore, bringing to our understanding that ISIS is pre-occupied with carrying out various degree of attacks on civilians, usually used by the powerless against powerful; Claver (2002:302) argues that terrorism is the use of force to impact fear with a view to bring about political, economic or social change. Recently, terrorism has been endemic in some nations of the world. Claver went on to explain that: It is true, as it is often repeated that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter is an extreme example of an essential contested concept and its preacher finds to polarize at extent that renders it extremely difficult to return to normal politics.

Daniel Pipes' article, "Muslim Europe" published by the Middle East Forum sheds more insight on the factors that motivate Europe to open its doors for more Muslim immigrants and how this might affect the continent in socio-cultural and political term. Pipes remarked that Europe is becoming more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam (Pipes, 2004). Christianity's ancient stronghold of Europe is rapidly giving way to Islam, he said. According to Pipes, two factors mainly contribute to this world-shaking development in the continent. The first factor is the hollowing out of Christianity. Pipes stresses that Europe is increasingly a post-Christian society, one with a diminishing connection to its tradition and its historic values. The numbers of believing, observant Christians has collapsed in the past two generations to the point that some observers, according to Pipes, call it "the new dark continent." Already, analysts estimate Britain's mosques host more worshippers each week than does the Church of England. The second factor is the anemic birth rate in Europe. Indigenous Europeans are dying out. Sustaining

a population requires each woman on average to bear 2.1 children; in the European Union, the overall rate is one-third short, at 1.5 a woman, and falling. One study finds that, should current population trends continue and immigration ceases, today's population of 375 million could decline to 275 million by 2075. To keep its working population even, the EU needs 1.6 million immigrants a year; to sustain the present workers-to-retirees ratio requires an astonishing 13.5 million immigrants annually. Pipes claimed that into the void are coming Islam and Muslims. As Christianity falters, Islam is robust, assertive, and ambitious. As Europeans under reproduce at advanced ages, Muslims do so in large numbers while young, Pipes concluded. Pipes' might be attributed to socio-economic conditions, individual interest or family decision.

In his article, "Europe's 'Jihad Capital' a Warning against Islamization", Chris Mitchell refers to how some neighbourhoods in Europe, are gradually becoming Jihadis hotbeds. He mentions that Molenbeek in Brussels is, of course, the most famous example in this category and it is now being called jihad capital of Europe. He thinks that it is also correct to say that some parts of London or Paris as well as Marseilles, are well-known examples of Jihadi zones in Europe. Making reference to the comments of Claude Moniquet, a counterterrorism expert, who said, "Today, we have a clear and imminent threat on Europe," emphasizing that the numbers add up to a massive threat. "Based on the official European Union figures, we have between 7,000 and 10,000 European people, residents, led to the jihadist desire. To those people you must add probably between 5,000 and 10,000 followers and sympathizers who could radicalize and become terrorists tonight or tomorrow morning", he concluded (Mitchell, 2016).

2.2 Radicalization in the context of ISIS

Participation of European citizens in the ISIS enterprise has made the subject of radicalization become an important subject of academic discourse. Chris Angus (2016), for example, in his article, "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses" claims that Radicalization happens when a person's thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. Alex Schmid (2013) argues in his research paper, "Radicalization, De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization" that the concept of radicalization is by no means as solid and clear as many seem to take for granted. Above all, it cannot be understood on its own. The Expert Group on Violent Radicalization established by the European Commission in 2006, tasked to analyse

the state of academic research on radicalization to violence, in particular terrorism, noted in 2008 that ‘radicalization is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, sociological and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones’. This expert group utilised a concise working definition of violent radicalization, ‘socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism’.

Furthermore, Schmid stresses that the term radicalization, as a concept, has become very politicized, i.e. it has been used in the political game of labeling and blame attribution. Academics too have come up with multiple definitions that often lack precision (ibid). To defend his argument, he pinpoints specific samples of academic definitions and descriptions of the concept of radicalization, which includes the following:

Taaraby (2005) sees radicalization as ‘the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to Militant Islamist’. Jensen (2006) looks at radicalization as ‘a process during which people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimization of political violence’. Ongerling (2007) defines as ‘process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods’. According to Demant et al (2008), radicalization is ‘a process of de-legitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society’. Ashour (2009), ‘Radicalization is a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals’. Olesen (2009), radicalization is ‘the process through which individuals and organisations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to achieve political goals’. Githens-Mazer (2009), radicalization is ‘a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in ‘direct action’ (legal or illegal – as opposed to ‘apathy’)’. Horgan & Bradock (2010) see radicalization as ‘the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology’. Kortweg et al (2010) look at radicalization as ‘the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to the

democratic structures and institutions’. Mandel (2012) describes radicalization as ‘an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals’ (ibid).

By and large, the dominating point or the common agreement in the description of radicalisation by academia is that ‘radicalisation is a process’. In other words, radicalisation entails an individual submitting himself or herself to an ideological orientation with time. It is connected to a belief system that is based on a specific or set of ideology. Radicalisation is not forceful or a sudden event; neither does it happen in a vacuum. It takes time and processes before its actual manifestation. For the purpose of this research, the definition of the European Commission Expert Report, (2008) will be maximised in the description of, radicalisation of the European nationals in the engagement of the Islamic State’s motivated or inspired terrorism. According to this definition, “Radicalisation is understood as socialisation to extremism, which can manifest itself in the perpetration of acts of terrorism” (European Commission Expert Report, 2008).

Critical observation of ISIS system of operations reveals that the group took advantage of the conflicts and civil unrests in Iraq and Syria to recruit its members into its extremist religious agenda and ideological pursuits, which eventually culminated into perpetuating diverse acts of terror actions across the nations of the world, including Europe by its supporters. Robert Spencer (2015) expands this point in his book, “The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS”. Spencer refers to the message of the Islamic State’s Caliph-Al Baghdadi to the Muslims worldwide, appealing to them to identify with the oppressions of oppressed Muslims worldwide, challenging them to rise and fight against the infidels globally.

According to the new caliph, said Spencer, “this warfare was necessary because Muslims are everywhere oppressed, being afflicted with the worst kinds of torture. Their honor is being violated. Their blood is being spilled. Prisoners are moaning and crying for help. Orphans and widows are complaining of their plight. Women, who have lost their children, are weeping. Mosques are being desecrated and sanctities are violated. All this was happening worldwide: “Muslims’ rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, Sham (the Levant), Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ahvaz, Iran by the rafidah (shia), Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, in the East and in the West.” What to do in response? Fight: So raise your ambitions. O soldiers of the Islamic State!

For your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue and are anticipating your brigades.” (Spencer, 2015:180)

Spencer stresses that Al-Baghdadi predicted that the oppression would soon be over and the Muslims would rule everywhere: “Soon by Allah’s permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved. Anyone who dares to offend him will be disciplined, and any hand that touches him will be cut off.”(ibid)

In my view, could it not be possible that this type of message serves as an influencer to capture the hearts of some Muslims, whether in Europe or elsewhere, who do not really have a good understanding of Islam? This consequently can motivate them to commit themselves to any action that would display loyalty to this fanatical insinuation by the Islamic State Caliph, in the name of Islamic religion. It is not a surprise therefore, to see that a number of Europeans in particular are yielding to this call by carrying out diverse terror acts in Europe; to the extent that some even went as far as Syria and Iraq to support the Islamic State way of life.

2.3 Objectives of the Islamic State

Responding to the emergency of the Islamic State, the Clarion Project 2015 article titled, “The Islamic State”, sees the Islamic State as a terrorist group and a political and military organization that holds a radical interpretation of Islam as a political philosophy and seeks to impose that worldview on Muslims and non-Muslims alike across the globe. Expelled from Al-Qaeda for being too extreme, the Islamic State claims to be the legitimate ruler of all Sunni Muslims worldwide. They have established what they regard as a State which includes large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, governed from Raqqa in Syria. The Islamic State advances a number of theological opinions to support its claims. Its adherents hold that they are merely practicing Islam fully, pronouncing those who disagree with them takfir (heretics). This designation is used as religious justification for killing the Islamic State’s opponents (Clarion Project, 2015:6).

In his recent book, ‘Islamic State and the coming global confrontation’, Hussein Solomon (2016) pinpoints the driving force of the Islamic State. Solomon, (making reference to the differences in objectives of both Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda of Iraq (AQI) turned the Islamic State), mentions that tactically, there were differences specifically as it related to the ambitions between AQI-the

Islamic State and its parent body-Al Qaeda. Vengeance largely is what drove Al Qaeda, to give the Americans and other occupiers a bloody nose in Iraq, AQI's (the Islamic State) agenda was far more ambitious, seeking not mere revenge, but to govern the areas they controlled under Islamic sharia law like a state. According to Solomon, the tension between these two organizations grew to such an extent that Al Qaeda cut off all ties with the group in 2014 (Solomon, 2016:4-5).

Furthermore, the Islamic State pursues more than establishment of a Caliphate. This is revealed by Alex Schmid (2015) in his research on "Foreign Fighters with ISIS- a European Perspective". Schmid indicates additional driven objective of the Islamic State. According to Schmid, "some members of the Islamic State are driven by "an apocalyptic end-of-days strategic vision". John Hayward in his article, 'The Truth about the Islamic State and end of days Prophecy' makes clearer the Islamic State's apocalyptic end-of-days-idea. Hayward referring to the work of Graeme Wood, claims that the Islamic State's long-term objectives involve preparing themselves for apocalyptic end-of-days vision. As Woods tells the story: An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the Caliphate's fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus – the second-most-revered prophet in Islam – will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory (ICCT, 2015:5).

2.4. Explaining ISIS' Salafism and the concept of the Caliphate

2.4.1. ISIS Salafism

The Clarion Project sees the ideology of the Islamic State as that of Salafi-jihadism. According to Clarion Project, it is important to remember that for the Islamic State, there is no distinction between religion and state. All decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), which is brutally enforced in the areas controlled by the organisation. The ideology is almost exactly the same as that of other groups such as: Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It differs in its approach to the proper timing and the conditions necessary to establish a caliphate. Groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in the Syrian Civil War) believe that although the long term goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate, the time is not yet right for such a move. Salafist ideology is based on the idea of returning to the supposedly pure form of Islam

practiced by the successors of the founder of Islam, Mohammed, and the earliest Muslims. The Islamic State rejects any later additions as *bid'ah* (innovation) and un-Islamic. Their doctrine allows them to proclaim as *takfir* (Muslims who deviate) from their strictly defined interpretation of Islam. The penalty for heresy according to Salafists' ideology is death.

In another dimension, as described by Mohammed Al-Sudairi (2014) in his article titled, "Chinese Salafism and the Saudi Connection", Al-Sudairi gives a better historical antecedent of Salafism. For Al-Sudairi, Salafism, or *Salafiyya*, as a doctrinal and intellectual current within Islam espouses a return to the ways of the *Salaf As-Salih* (the Pious Ancestors), the first three generations of Muslims who lived during and after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Often described as being rooted in the works of the medieval scholars, Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Salafism seeks to establish a more authentic religious experience predicated on a presumably correct reading of the Quran and the *sunnah* (the sayings and practices of the Prophet) and away from the supposed *bid'ah* (innovations) and heretical practices that have "polluted" it (The Diplomat, 2014).

Al-Sudairi stresses that the Islamic State embraces to a certain extent, a rejection of the *madhhab* (legal school) Sunni traditions that had emerged in Islam's early centuries, as a relatively modern phenomenon, building on the Sunni orthodox revivals of the 18th century, the failures of traditional Muslim authorities to contend with mounting internal and external challenges, as well as the spread of new modernistic discourses (*ibid*). Salafism found a popular following across many Muslim societies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its growth was facilitated by Saudi Arabia – which embraced its own idiosyncratic brand of Salafism rooted in the mid-18th century religious revivalism that swept central Arabia (usually denoted by its detractors as Wahhabism after its "founder" Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) – especially after its annexation of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25 and the subsequent influx of oil wealth, which endowed the country with the religious authority and means (universities, charities, organizations, preachers, and communicative mediums) to promote this ideology globally (*ibid*). In sum, radicalization of European nationals by the Islamic State implies initiating these Europeans into Salafist ideological philosophy. The Islamic State's desire is to see that the Salafi way of life permeates the entire European society and the best way to achieve this objective is to recruit European citizens, who will be willing to promote this idea on the continent.

2.4.2. ISIS and the Caliphate

On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State proclaimed itself as the caliphate to the Muslim community worldwide. In order to understand in a deeper sense the European citizens' radicalization by the Islamic State, it is significantly crucial to understand the ISIS concept of the caliphate and how this impacts, compels or appeals to the interest of the European Muslims, who consequently join the Islamic State or become its sympathizers.

Robert Spencer (2015) states in his book, "The complete Infidel's Guide to ISIS" that the Caliphate in Islamic theology is the Islamic nation, embodying the supranational unity of the Muslim community worldwide under a single leader, the caliph, or successor-that is, the successor of Muhammad as the spiritual, political, and military leader of the Muslims. It is important to understand that the Islamic State leaders are individuals who know what may appeal to the interest of many Muslims throughout the world. Therefore, the concept of the caliphate is extraordinarily important for Muslims worldwide, deriving its power from the fact that the Quran repeatedly exhorts Muslims to obey not only Allah, but Muhammad as well (Spencer, 2015:167). By implication, it implies that the call to join the caliphate by someone, who is regarded as a Successor of Muhammad is a direct call from Allah, as instructed by Muhammad. Hence, joining the Caliphate is an obligation to every Muslim worldwide. Consequently, the establishment or proclamation of the caliphate by the Islamic State appeals to some European Muslims in order to fulfill their religious duty.

Stressing the significance of the caliphate to the Muslims, Spencer (2015:168) notes that Muslims can read about Muhammad's deeds and words in the hadith, obey his words, and emulate him, in accord with the Quran's designation of Muhammad as the "excellent example" (33:21)-that is, the perfect model for Muslim behavior. But this obedience to Muhammad is also expressed in obedience to his successor-the caliph. As the successor of Muhammad, the caliph does not hold the Prophet's status as an exemplar, but he does command the obedience of all Muslims, and loyalty to him transcends all ethnic and national loyalties (ibid). If this is the case, it is not surprising therefore to hear that some Europeans and nationals from other hemispheres swear allegiance to the Islamic State's caliph-Al Baghdadi and commit themselves to the goals

of the Islamic State, to the extent that some even burnt their national passport, demonstrating an absolute commitment to the vision of the caliphate otherwise, called, the Islamic State.

Daniel Pipes' opinion on the subject of the Caliphate is compelling; Pipes states that when a Caliphate suddenly appeared on June 29, 2014, announced by an "Islamic State" and headed by Caliph Ibrahim, it was unanticipated. The announcement was followed by spectacular military victories, especially Mosul, which gave it unique a global prestige. Groups such as Boko Haram paid it homage and it had an electrifying effect on (some) Sunni Muslims. The potential impact of the Islamic State as a Caliphate is that it boosts the dream of a single rule across "Islamdom" and beyond, inspires others to do the same, and radicalizes Islamist movements.

From another perspective, Hussein Solomon (2016) in his book titled, "Islam State and the coming global confrontation", gives a deeper understanding of the relevance of the caliphate and the centrality of this concept to the Muslims worldwide. According to Solomon, given the ongoing civil war in Syria which began in 2011 and the resultant political vacuum created, the organization soon established itself there, prompting a name change once again in 2013, the Islamic State and Greater Syria (*Al Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham or ISIS*). With increasing confidence in its global reach, ISIS saw itself as a global caliphate and renamed itself in 2014 simply as the Islamic State. From this development, writes Solomon, "the new name suggests two things. First, that there are no geographic boundaries. Second, "the" implies that it is singular, the only Islamic State-one to which all 1.5 billion Muslims owe their loyalty. This was made emphatically clear when Al-Baghdadi announced, "Rush O Muslims to your State. Yes, it is your state. Rush because Syria is not for the Syrians and Iraq is not for the Iraqis". By implication, here then was a state that knew no territorial boundaries and encompassed 1.5 billion Muslims wherever they were (Solomon, 2016:3). This is one of the fundamental motivations of travelling to Syria and Iraq by some European Muslims, in order to answer the call of the caliph in the new caliphate.

Similarly, the proclamation of the caliphate by the Islamic State was not accidental in nature; it was a planned event by members of Al-Qaeda, who eventually split from the group and became the Islamic State. The antecedent, plans and strategy that facilitate the emergence of the ISIS 'caliphate' is made clearer by in a book published in 2005 by a Jordanian journalist Fouad

Hussein, titled *Zarqawi – Al-Qaeda’s Second Generation*. Hussein had interviews with Al-Qaeda members such as, Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, a prominent Al-Qaeda ideologue, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Swaqa prison in Jordan. Hussein book, as indicated by Radwan Mortada (in his article, ‘Al-Qaeda’s 20-Year Plan: From 9/11 to Final Victory’). Mortada’s article sheds light on the objectives, plans, and stages through which Al-Qaeda wants to take power. The plan calls for expanding jihadi activities to cover the entire world, “to amplify ‘Islamic’ nation’s strength and terrorize its enemies.” The plan is divided into seven phases, and covers two decades, from 2000 to 2020, the year “final victory” would be achieved, Mortada stresses. Al-Qaeda group’s twenty year plan, with its seven different phases comprises the following:

- **Phase 1: The Muslim Awakening (2000-2003)**

Beginning with 9/11 and ending with the US invasion of Iraq, this phase was aimed at provoking the West. The first phase was judged by the strategists and masterminds behind Al-Qaeda as very successful,” Hussein reported. “The battlefield was opened up and the Americans and their allies became a clear and easier target” (Hussein, 2005).

- **Phase 2: Opening Eyes (2003-2006)**

The second phase was the “mainstreaming” of Al-Qaeda’s cause within the Muslim world. The terrorist organization becomes a broader ideological movement, the vanguard for a political effort to reawaken millions of followers of Islam and return them to the foundations of their faith. This phase is primarily accomplished through propaganda broadcasts around the world and with tactical battlefield victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq in particular is to become “the center for all global operations, with an army set up there and bases established in other Arabic states.”

- **Phase 3: Arising and Standing Up (2007-2010)**

The fight expands from Iraq and the assault begins on neighboring Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Israel, where secular and anti-Islamic governments reign. Special priority would be placed on Syria, Hussein reported.

- **Phase 4: Collapse (2010-2013)**

Revolution begins to sweep the Middle East and the infidel governments, such as Egypt's, begin to fall. These hated regimes are to be swept away by popular revolts. The creeping loss of the regime's power will lead to a steady growth in strength within Al-Qaeda, wrote Hussein. Attacks continue against the United States, with a special emphasis on cyber-attacks to target America's economic might.

- **Phase 5: Caliphate (2013-2016)**

An Islamic State will be formally declared. The West will begin to lose much of its will to fight, allowing Al-Qaeda and its allies to re-create the Caliphate for the first in nine decades. Because Western resistance is so limited, the Caliphate will grow over time in strength and territory. It is the first step in replacing the world order of sovereign nation-states with a new world order divided between the Caliphate and the Muslim community of believers (dar al-Islam) and the unbelievers (dar al-harb), or house of war.

- **Phase 6: Total Confrontation (2016-2019)**

The shocking rise of the Caliphate will "instigate the fight between the believers and non-believers." This, Al-Qaeda's view, will be the West's final, dying breath to confront the growing Islamic armies. The West will muster all of its technological capabilities and advantages to destroy the Caliphate and the many thousands of Muslims who have volunteered to fight on its behalf.

- **Phase 7: Definitive Victory (2019-2020)**

The last phase will have a stunning victory over the West by the Caliphate. Beck concluded that as of 2015, a decade after the plan was first published by Hussein, the first five phases have been right on schedule.

2.5. Conclusion

The above literature review has been helpful to give a glimpse and dimensions of understanding of the subject of radicalization in the context of the Islamic State. It has assisted to create a platform to further look into potential areas for research on the discourse of radicalization, the Islamic State's goals and objectives, Islamic extremism in European countries, which also connect with developments in Iraq and Syria crisis. Similarly, the above chapter indicates and explains a few conceptual clarifications (such as the Islamic State caliphate vision and radicalisation from European citizens' perspectives), which are necessary to give a deeper understanding of the radicalization development of the European citizens and the Islamic State ideological pursuit in 21st century Europe. It has identified previous work done within the area of radicalisation and extremism, compared previous findings as well as criticised existing claims on the subject. These elements are significant as they give space for knowledge gaps that demand further investigation and studies on the challenge of radicalization and Islamic oriented fundamentalist activities in European countries in recent time.

CHAPTER THREE

WHY ARE SOME EUROPEAN CITIZENS BEING RADICALIZED BY ISIS?

3.1. Introduction

David von Drehle, in Time Magazine, listed a number of Europeans who have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight along with the Islamic State. In his article, Drehle enumerated the list as follows: France-1200, United Kingdom-600, Germany-500/600, Belgium-440, Netherlands-200/250, Sweden-150/180, Denmark-100/150, Austria -100/150, Spain-50/100, Italy -80, Finland-50/70, Norway-60, Switzerland-40, and Ireland-30 (Time Magazine, 2016).

Considering the fact that Europeans are steeped in secularism and enjoying relatively high standards of living and education; and in geographical term, looking at the distance between Europe and the Middle-East, the question therefore is; why are some Europeans, with availability of the aforementioned, being radicalized into the Islamic State's agenda? This question is not only important to the subject of radicalization of European Citizens and ISIS terrorism, but also, this query has become a puzzle in the heart of many European leaders and people across the continent. In responding to this, it is significant to state that there is no singular factor that motivates these Europeans to become part of Islamic State enterprise. Factors that motivate an individual into radicalization in Europe are multi-dimensional in nature. In other words, this chapter attempts to explore the multi-dimensional causes of radicalisation in connection with European citizens and ISIS inspired terrorism. The chapter, among things, explains Europeans radicalisation in the context of the Islamic State, as a process whereby a citizen of European embraces ISIS violent ideology as a possible, perhaps even legitimate course of action to achieve the group objectives. It is worthy of note to mention that the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has a combination of religious, social and political undertones, due to the Islamic ideological principles (of Salafism and caliphate vision of ISIS), which are catalysts for some European Muslims, who believe in the enterprise of the Islamic State. Social, due to the discrepancy between the Shiites and Sunni Muslims in the region. Political, due to the internal political challenges in Iraqi leadership and Syria and notably, the meddling of the West in the Middle East matters.

Radicalization in itself might necessarily lead an individual to advocate, act in support of or engage in terrorism, such as those who support ISIS caliphate, but not engaging in violent activities of the group. There is, however, no clear-cut pathway towards radicalization. Radicalization may occur in different circumstances, ways and at different levels. That is to say, radicalization does not happen in a vacuum. Each case of terrorist radicalization and recruitment for terrorism results from a unique condition(s) of an individual. Nevertheless, the radicalisation that is being analysed in this chapter is the type that leads an individual or a group into violent and terror acts, such as the cases of Europeans who become radicalised and engage in some acts of terror across the continent. Attempt is therefore made in this chapter to look into possible influences responsible for the development of radicalization of European citizens and their consequent involvement in the ISIS motivated terror acts in Europe. In doing this, this chapter examines the roles that certain socio-cultural, religious, psychological and political drivers play in luring some Europeans into the arena of radicalisation and eventually move them in engaging in terror actions.

3.2. Identity Crisis and Social Meaning

In *Journal of Terrorism Research* (2017), Yusoufzaim et al argue that identity issues are prominent challenges within the Western Muslim community. The authors stress that second and third generation Muslim immigrants have to manage a Western identity, while simultaneously inheriting an ethnic identity from their family. The effort of finding a balance in between two completely different cultures and belief systems is continuously challenged by social as well as political factors (JTR, 2017:69). Among other things, the ongoing culture of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment that is growing in Western societies (such as: Germany, Sweden, Hungary and France) as well as the foreign policies of Western countries (see section 3.3) are leading uncertain Muslim adolescents to attach more salience to the Islamic part of their existence, thus making ‘Muslim’ their primary identity. To buttress this point, Mubin Shaikh, a former radicalized Muslim explains on the Kyle Kulinski Show why he became radicalized and recruited others. According to Shaikh, “identity crisis and the challenge of navigating myself in the western culture motivated me to become radicalized. “How much Muslim am I supposed to be and how much western am I supposed to be and how this conflict with each other was part of the entanglement I found myself” (YouTube: Kulinski Show, Sep. 2,

2014). In the midst of this contradiction, you will eventually go to those who welcome you with open-arms, Shaikh concluded (Ibid). This example reveals the concept of othering and identity theory as illustrated by Amartya Sen. The socio-cultural disparity between certain individuals in Europe with Islamist values and how they view themselves differently, and not as a people belonging to a European society reveals othering and identity crisis. This factor further explains how othering and identity differences can propel conflict and struggle among groups and individuals within a polity. According to Amartya Sen (2007:xii), “when we shift our attention from the notion of being identical to oneself to that of sharing an identity with others of a particular group (which is the form the idea of social identity very often takes), the complexity increases further. Indeed, many contemporary political and social issues revolve around conflicting claims of disparate identities involving different groups, since the conception of identity influences, in many different ways, our thoughts and actions”.

In a different dimension, Olivier Roy, (a French scholar on Islamic terrorism) argues in Haaretz Online News that “An estimated 60 percent of those who are exposed to violent jihadism in Europe are second-generation Muslims who have lost their connection with their country of origin and have failed to integrate into Western societies” (Haaretz Online News, 2017). Roy stresses that the Europeans who become radicalized are subject to a process of deculturation that leaves them ignorant of and detached from both the European society and the one of their origins. The result, Roy argues, is a dangerous identity vacuum in which violent extremism thrives. Roy cited the example of Salman Abedi, the man behind Manchester’s terror incidence in the UK. Born in Britain in 1994, Abedi would later be drawn to violent fundamentalism after a life in limbo. On the one hand, he tried to reconnect with Libya, where he traveled shortly before he carried out his terror plan, while on the other; he strove to emulate the same British young people he killed, Roy concluded (ibid).

3.3. Grievance against Western Policies in the Muslim World

A significant catalyst for the radicalization of European citizens and their consequent engagement in terrorist activities in European countries is connected to grievance against policies of the Western Power in some Muslim countries. Many of the Western decisions and policies in the Middle Eastern countries have propelled Islamic extremists’ reaction against Western

countries and this has manifested itself in the radicalization enterprise spearheaded by the Islamic State, (which has led to the engagement of few European citizens in various terror acts). Shireen Hunter in “Muslim Radicalization in Europe: Roots and Resolution” stresses that since the early 1990s, the linkage between events in predominantly Muslim countries and the radicalization of Muslims in Europe has deepened. Such events include, but not limited to, the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Algerian civil war of 1991-1997, the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now the civil war in Syria. According to Hunter, “among other things, these wars have produced new extremist groups and ideologies that have then established links with European Muslims” (Hunter, 2017).

Robert Spencer, building on the above point refers to the inaugural address made by the caliph of the Islamic State-Abu Bakr al Bagdadi to the Muslims worldwide where he asserted that the Muslims were defeated after the fall of their khilafah (caliphate). Then their state ceased to exist, so the disbelievers (the West) were able to weaken and humiliate the Muslims, dominate them in every region, plunder their wealth and resources and rob them of their rights” (Spencer, 2015:181). In a different view, a Republican member, Jim Himes criticized the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as one of the biggest US mistakes of this century and as part of the motivation for the emergence of the Islamic State. Analysts have also argued that the US invasion of Iraq, coupled with the US policies in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein have equally triggered the rise of the Islamic State group, which invariably has promoted radicalization phenomenon of some European Muslims and inspired terrorist attacks in Europe to avenge the Western countries’ policies in Muslim populated countries, such as invasion of Iraq (The Guardian, 2016).

It is important to state that radicalization of European nationals and their engagement in the Islamic State terrorism has a connection to resentment of the Islamic fundamentalists against Western countries and their values. To many Islamic extremists, those in the West are seen as oppressors, colonial masters, tyrant rulers and impostors. Bernard Lewis (1990) in his article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” pinpoints why some Muslims resent the West and why their resentment may not be easily mollified. According to Lewis, “For a long time now, there has been a rising tide of rebellion against the Western paramount and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness” (The Atlantic, 1990:49-50). Lewis stresses that the Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world to the

advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country through an invasion of foreign rulers or settlers and enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third was the challenge in his own house from emancipated women and rebellious children (ibid). In “Fortress Europe: Terrorist Threats in the Context of ISIS”, an article by Monika G. Bartoszewicz, the author argues that, the emergence of Islamic terrorism dates back to 1980s and is marked, as Paul Wilkinson underlies, by bitter resentment not only to the United States or Israel, but to all Western countries. This recognition is shared by many authors who point towards different political, economic, and socio-cultural factors feeding into this animosity and maintaining the polarized reality of “the West and the rest”. Bruce Hoffman, Bartoszewicz stresses, went as far as to estimate that “the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of activity today, “an appraisal consistent with David Rapoport’s theory of the fourth wave of terrorism (Bartoszewicz, 2017:3).

3.4. Islamic Resurgence Movement

In his thesis, Ikechukwu Ikerionwu (2014) in his thesis, “Global Islamic Resurgence and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria”, refers to the definition of Islamic resurgence as expressed by Muzaffar that “Islamic resurgence is a description of the endeavour to re-establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to re-create an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order, at the vortex of which the Islamic human being is guided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Ikerionwu, 2014:10). Radicalization of European citizens and their consequent terror acts across Europe is part and parcel of the pursuit of the Islamic State’s objective in the continent and other hemispheres. It is a global movement of the so-called Islamic fundamentalists from Syria and Iraq to synthesize the interest of other Muslims worldwide towards the establishment of a Caliphate. Jim Denison (2014) expressing his view on the emergency of the Islamic State states in Denison Forum that the Islamic State is following the strategy set out by Sayyid Qutb, known as the “intellectual godfather” of radical Islam. Qutb’s book, *Milestone (1964)*, is the primer that helped lead Osama bin Laden into terrorism and influenced al-Baghdadi as well. According to Denison, “Sayyid Qutb argues in ‘Milestone’ that every person on earth deserves a chance to become a Muslim. However, he believes that this opportunity exists only if the person lives in a nation that is truly Islamic, one governed solely by sharia. Thus, Muslims must topple every

government and impose strict sharia law on every civilization. Only then can people see true Islam and have an opportunity to choose it (Denison Forum, 2014:10). Denison, making reference to Thomas Friedman analysis of the Islamic State, further states that today's Islamic State is made up of three loose factions: One comprises foreign volunteers—some are hardened jihadists, but many are misfits and adventure seekers. A second comprises the group's backbone—former Sunni Baathist army officers and local Iraqi Sunnis and tribes giving IS passive support. They are united in their hatred for the Shiites who oppressed them under Iraq's previous Shiite-led government. A third faction is composed of true ideologues such as al-Baghdadi, with their own apocalyptic version of Islam (ibid:5).

Similarly, Islamic resurgence is a global agenda that is being pursued by Islamic extremists; part of whose goals includes recruitment and radicalizing willing individuals into their vision. It is important to stress that radicalization, Islamic radicalization in this sense, is not only peculiar to the Europeans, but has equally manifested itself in almost all the continents of the world. Robert Spencer (2016) expanding this point in his book, "The Complete Infidel's Guide to ISIS" makes reference to the message of the Islamic State's Caliph-Al Baghdadi to the Muslims worldwide. According to Spencer, Al Baghdadi is appealing to Muslims to identify with the Caliphate and oppressions of Muslims worldwide, challenging them to rise and fight against the infidels globally. According to the new caliph, said Spencer, "this warfare was necessary because Muslims are everywhere oppressed. "Muslims' rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, Sham (the Levant), Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ahvaz, Iran by the rafidah (shia), Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, in the East and in the West." What to do in response? Fight: So raise your ambitions. O soldiers of the Islamic State! For your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue and are anticipating your brigades. Apparently, the caliph is not a big fan of democracy, Spencer noted (Spencer, 2016:181).

With this call, many Europeans buy into it and decide to identify with the struggle of the Islamic State by either travel to Syria and Iraq to fight or carry out a lone wolf or coordinated terror attacks in their home country as well as in their country of residence. However, the question is: how true is the claim of Muslim oppression by the caliph of the Islamic State? Are the Muslims really oppressed? Who, where and how are they oppressed and who is oppressing the Muslims?

Or is this claim only based on the propaganda interest of the Islamic State to see Islam dominate the world?

3.5. Weakness in Europe

Similarly, some forms of weakness in Europe have also been maximized by the jihadists to get rooted in their activities in the continent. This dimension of weakness is demonstrated in the handling of the radicalization challenge in some European countries. A good example initial style of handling the challenge of radicalisation way the UK government had handled the subject of radicalization that leads to terrorism has directly or indirectly backfired on the country with repeated occurrence of terror attacks in cities like London and Manchester. A French scholar on fundamentalist Islam and the author of “Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West”, Gilles Kepel was quoted by Haaretz Online News that “The British state has made the mistake of subcontracting the management of its Muslim population to the local community brokers, an attitude rooted in the Raj system in India,” Kepel told Haaretz. “In places like Manchester and Birmingham, they relied on Salafi community leaders while cutting back the highly fragmented police force’. In other words, the UK preferred to use Salafist leaders to handle the scourge of radicalization in these communities. On the contrary, the Jihadists took advantage of this platform to become more radical. Kepel claims that in London or Londonistan as he calls it, “They gave shelter to radical Islamist leaders from around the world as a sort of insurance policy against jihadi terrorism (Haaretz Online News, 2017).

3.6. The “Books” Factor

Among other reasons responsible for the radicalization of European citizens and the Islamic State terrorism is the “Books” Factor. In an interview conducted by Kayhan London and published by Dorr TV on Youtube, Seyed Mostafa Azmayesh (an Iranian–French Scholar) commenting on Islam, Extremism and Democracy at a conference organized by the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, Azmayesh was of the view that the version of Quran that is embraced by Muslim immigrants in Europe is a major cause for extremism. In his words, “the primary reason for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism is that a large Muslim immigrant population in Europe has come to know the version of Islam associated with a tribal

interpretation of the teachings of Quran”. “On the other hand, the European and Western countries have also accepted this particular interpretation of the Quran prevalent amongst Muslims as the main teachings of the Quran”, Azmayesh asserted (Dorr TV, 2016). This implies that, there are two versions of Quran. There is one which supports violence in form of Jihad and there is another part which advocates for tolerance. In Azmayesh’s view, the first version has been embraced by a number of Muslim immigrants in Europe and this is causing the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the continent.

In a different perspective, Raymond Ibrahim, (a Judith Friedman Rosen Fellow at the Middle East Forum), in his article, “Islamist Terror: 'The Real Bomb Is in the Books’”, argues that one of the factors that motivate Islamic radicalism is the Four Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. Making reference to the claims of an Egyptian Islamic Scholar- Islam Al-Behery who argues that consensus of the *ulema*-Muslim scholars and the four schools of jurisprudence is a motivating platform for Islamic radicalism-be suicide bombing or other Islamism inspired terror acts. According to Ibrahim, Islam Al-Behery reacts against the claims of some Western analysts who follow this line of thinking—that "radicalism" only came after thinkers like Bana, Qutb, Mawdudi (in Pakistan) or Wahhab (in Arabia) came on the scène. However, Al-Behery maintains that blaming radicalism on these men is very delusional. Responding to the terror attacks by the Islamic State supporters, he said, the man who kills himself (Islamic suicide bomber) today doesn't kill himself because of the words of Hassan al-Bana or Sayyid al-Qutb, or anyone else. He kills himself because of what the consensus of the ulema, and the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence have all agreed to. Hassan al-Bana did not create these ideas (of jihad against infidels and apostates, destroying churches, etc.); they've been around for many, many centuries.... I am talking about Islam [now], not how it is being taught in schools”. According to Ibrahim, “In his analysis, Islam Al-Behery further states that if anyone today walks into any bookstore and asks for a book that contains the rulings of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, "everything that is happening today will be found in them; killing the people of the book (Christians and Jews) is obligatory”. Let's not start kidding each other and blaming such thoughts on Hassan al-Bana!" Moreover, Al-Behery said, ‘there is a short distance between what is written in all these old books, and what happened yesterday, he argued. The real bomb is in the books, which repeatedly call the People of the Book "infidels," which teach that the whole

world is infidel..... Hassan al-Bana and Sayyid al-Qutb are not the source of the terror, rather they are followers of these books”, Ibrahim concluded (Middle East Forum, 2017). It therefore implies that there is a dimension of understanding among Islamic scholars that certain Islamic references such as: the consensus of ulema and the Four Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence can become a catalyst for engaging in acts of terror by Islamists as pointed out by Islam Al-Behery?

3.7. ISIS Specific Plan to Conquer Europe

Critical examination reveals that the interest of some Europeans in the Islamic State enterprise is not a coincidence at all, but it is a deliberate event based on the objectives of the Islamic State itself. Robert Spencer (2015:252) indicates that the Islamic State has the conquest of “Rome” (Europe) as part of its agenda. Spencer argues that in 2015, the Islamic State released an e-book entitled, “Black Flags from Rome (Europe)”, as part of its series detailing its plans for world conquest. Other titles in the series included *Black Flags from the East*, *Black Flags from Syria*, *Black Flags from Arabia* and *Black Flags from Persia*. These e-books detail why and how the various areas specified in their titles can and must be conquered by ISIS. *Black Flags from the East*, *Black Flags from Syria*, *Black Flags from Arabia* and *Black Flags from Persia* detail the Islamic State’s plans for the conquest of the Muslim areas outside its domain, with particular emphasis on two of its most formidable foes - Saudi Arabia and Iran. *Black Flags from Rome (Europe)* explains how the ISIS Jihad will also be extended into non-Muslim domains-and details how it will succeed in Europe. Spencer stresses that *Black Flags from Rome* begins with a quotation from the Quran that sets the tone for the whole thing: “And I Allah wanted to do a favour to those who were weak and oppressed in the land, and to make them rulers.....” (Quran 28:5). “The theme of the whole piece is that the Muslims in Europe are weak and oppressed,” and that they can and will rise up against non-Muslim Europeans and conquer Rome and Europe for the sake of Islam”, Spencer asserted (Spencer, 2015:252).

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the present challenge of Europeans’ radicalization into ISIS terrorism and extremism is no way an accident. It is a conscious pursuit of the vision of the Islamic State to dominate the global hemispheres, including Europe, with its ideas and values, and the way to achieve this goal is by selling its ideas to willing individuals who buy into this vision and its objectives.

3.8. Socio-economic conditions of Some European Muslims

Sarah Teich argues in her article on “Islamic Radicalization in Belgium”, that socio-economic conditions of some European Muslims could be a catalyst for Islamic radicalization in Europe. Teich cites a combination of factors that have created a strained environment for Belgium’s Muslims in particular and consequently resulted to their engagement in Islamic radicalization. According to Teich, “Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile ground for Islamic radicalization? Responding to this question, Teich enumerates factors such as: low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community (ICT, 2016:47). To buttress her claim, Teich stresses that foreign-born Belgian residents have unemployment rates more than twice that of native-born Belgian citizens and it is clear that employment discrimination is rampant in the country. Many Muslims in Belgium with professional degrees remain unemployed for years, and see their applications for both jobs and homes rejected based on their Muslim names (ibid).

In the same vein, Teich notices the problem of integration in some European countries, citing the example of Belgium; she asserts that establishing integration legislation in Belgium is complicated because of the country’s dual linguistic and political reality. Teich argues that from the mid-1990s, Wallonia and Flanders held separate integration policies, with Wallonia consistently focusing on general social inclusion and Flanders shifting focus from minority policies to overall inclusive policies. Until recently, there was a lack of integration legislation at the federal level. This may be because, at the very beginning, Belgian authorities believed that the foreign workers would come to Belgium, do their work, and return to their home country. Consequently, there was a noticeable lack of preparation, program, or means of integration. Beginning in 2012, integration legislation became a national priority. New legislation (passed in 2012 and implemented in 2013) stipulated formal integration requirements for naturalization, including minimum residence of five years, proof of economic participation, knowledge of at least one of the national languages, and proof of social integration. However, it should be noted

that irrespective of the soundness of integration policies in European countries, to many radical Muslims turned jihadists, solidarity with Muslims around the world, and their identity as Muslims took precedence over their identity as European citizens.

In another perspective, few scholars are of the view that discrimination and poor integration in some European countries is a factor that has facilitated the development of European citizens' radicalization into Islamic terrorism. For instance, Katrine Anspaha (2008) writes in her article "The Integration of Islam in Europe: Preventing the radicalization of Muslim diasporas and counterterrorism policy" that the Muslim diaspora communities now constitute the largest immigrant population in the EU. Anspaha stresses that contrary to expectations that Muslim immigrants would successfully assimilate, they are reaffirming their Islamic identity, as a new political identification, and some of them turn to terrorism against their adopted country. Ineffective Muslim integration and political representation, as well as the social exclusion, unemployment and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their adopted countries- all have led to their deeper exclusion and marginalization, facilitating the development of Islamic radicalism and home-grown terrorism", Anspaha concluded (ibid).

Another scholar, Shireen Hunter argues that ever before the development of radicalisation reaches a noticeable point in Europe, immigrants with Islamic origin has been discriminated against. Hunter's article, "Muslim Radicalization in Europe: Roots and Resolution", remarks that even before the rise of radical Islam and the sharp increase in the number of Europe's Muslim population, immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, and Africa were disliked because of their ethnicity and race. In Great Britain of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the term "Paki-bashing", referring to Pakistani immigrants, became common. Even those Muslim immigrants who want to integrate face rejection and obstacles. Hunter stresses that this rejection, in turn, forces the Muslim immigrants to become more insular and focused on their community. This also makes them resentful of their host country, which sometimes leads them to extremism. Sadly, even today, anti-Muslim expressions often hide racist and ethnic prejudice in some European countries, she concluded.

3.9. Conclusion

The development of a strategic plan to establish a caliphate spearheaded by the Islamic State along with its salafist ideologies has drawn thousands of men and women across the globe to Iraq and Syria. This also includes hundreds of European citizens, who made their way to the Islamic State. Even those who could not travel to Iraq and Syria, openly sympathize and identify with the ideologies and objectives of the Islamic State in their home lands by engaging in terror acts in the name of ISIS against their governments and citizens. Terror acts had been carried out in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Stockholm, London, Manchester and Barcelona between 2015 and 2017. The ideologies of the Islamic State, based on salafi jihadism, represent a direct challenge to the key principles of Europe including; democracy, human rights, tolerance, diversity, and the rule of law. The question of what could be the driving force behind the Europeans who become radicalized and buy into the Islamic State ideologies has become a puzzle to many. Mono causal explanation in explaining radicalisation drive of European citizens will be incorrect. Multi-dimensional forces have been indicated as propellers to this development. This fact is supported by a study carried out by Change Institute, titled, “Studies into violent radicalization: the beliefs, ideologies and narratives”. Alienation and other socio-cultural, political as well as psychological drivers are key summaries in understanding motivations in ‘turning’ against one’s own family, community and wider society as it has been characterised with the Europeans who became radicalised and engaged in ISIS motivated and inspired terror acts. To support the words of Oliver Roy, the challenge of radicalization of European nationals and ISIS narrative is a youth revolt against European society, expressed on an Islamic religious narrative of jihadism, which is rooted in Salafist ideological orientation. Radicalization of European citizens is not the instigation of Muslims, who have economic challenges and racial discrimination problem in European countries: but it is a development, which is sky-rocketed by the emergence of the Islamic State agenda and unfortunately, ignorant and ambitious European citizens fall prey of its ideologies.

CHAPTER FOUR

HOW DO THE EUROPEAN NATIONALS BECOME ISIS MEMBERS?

4.1. Introduction

Despite being Europeans, which by implication, is an open-door to certain privileged opportunities in the continent as far as a living standard of life is concerned, including exposure to Western cultures, values, freedom and human rights provisions; nevertheless some Europeans, born and raised in the continent have chosen the path of radicalization, based on the Islamic State's ideas. Terror acts have become a global phenomenon and a common place particularly in Europe in recent time, with various attacks occurring in France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium and the UK. This development has raised a lot of questions, queries and debates in the hearts of many individuals as to know not only why are these Europeans taking this path, but also how do they arrive to the state of becoming radicalized to the extent of carrying out terror actions against their governments and citizens. Therefore, this abnormality has required an academic investigation. This chapter attempts to answer the latter and examine specific channels through which the European nationals, who identify with the Islamic State's objectives, chose to accept the terror group's ideological orientation. In other words, the focus of this chapter is to specifically look into major channels by which who embrace ISIS ideology became radicalised. These channels or methods are multifaceted in nature and effort is therefore made in this chapter to categorize them into environmental, socio-cultural, psychological and political channels.

4.1.1. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANNELS:

4.2.2. Nature of radicalisation and its terror tendency

The challenge of radicalisation of European citizens, which has manifested itself in various terror acts, sometimes inspired and motivated by ISIS on European soils can be linked to the contagious phenomenon that is characterised with the concept of radicalisation and terrorism. The contagion theory of terrorism authenticates this fact. Contagion theory of terrorism argues that high levels of terrorism in one country often are associated with increased incidents of

terrorism in neighbouring or distant states, whether by the same organization, by ‘second-generation’ groups, by foreign sympathizers and coalition partners, or simply by imitators (Crenshaw 1981:15). This theory further suggests that individuals adopt the attitudes or behaviours of others in the social network with whom they communicate. It explains that individual perceptions are influenced by the perceptions of other individuals in their social or friendship network. This implies that the proximity of two actors in a social network is associated with the occurrence of interpersonal influence between those actors. In other words, social contagion theory explains that behaviours and perceptions initiated by one member of the network will influence others in the network. It can therefore be explained that the outbreak of ISIS terror operations in Iraq and Syria, and its eventual internationalisation to European communities has a contagious undertone from Islamic terrorist network members who share and are driven by the same objectives and ideological beliefs that are based on Islamic extremist objectives to undertake a global jihad.

In the same vein, looking at the successful terror attacks of other Islamist-oriented groups in Africa and other continents of the world can equally serve as a motivation to further express and advance the Islamic State ideologies in Europe. It should be noted that the common ground of Islamism terror groups such as: Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, Boko Haram is extremism and insurgent activities. Importantly, the ideology of these groups is closely similar to one another. Their attack to opposing values or civilizations, as well as upholding of Sharia law is well acknowledged.

4.1.3. European free movement, open border and human rights policies

The European systems of free human movement within Schengen zones, open borders and human rights policies have all become advantages to the radicalised Europeans, which they have maximised to perpetuate their interests on the continent. For example, a European Passport of any of the Schengen countries or a Schengen visa, creates an easy travel possibility for Europeans and radicalised Europeans also maximise this platform to pursue their objectives. In other words, the free movement and open border policy in Europe provides opportunity for human movement from one country to another in the Schengen zones without immigration obstruction or control. That was why a terrorist like Salah Abdeslam, who was suspected of

masterminding and taking part in the deadly November 13 Paris attacks, could move between France and Belgium and hid for four months before his final arrest. The perpetrator of the Germany Christmas Market terror attack, Anis Amri was also able to maximise the free movement opportunity and open border advantage to escape from Germany to France, and then crossed from France to Milan in Italy, where he was eventually killed. Le Pen Marie (leader of the French far-right National Front), commenting on Amri's ability to cross from one country to another said, "This escapade in at least two or three countries is symptomatic of the total security catastrophe, that is, the Schengen agreement". Telegraph News reported on the 23rd of December, 2016 that the Berlin attack suspect (Anis Amri) 'pledged allegiance to Isil', as questions arose over how he was able to travel 1,000 miles across Europe before he was shot dead by the police in Milan (The Telegraph News, 2016).

By implication, free open borders within Schengen zones could serve to the advantage of some criminals and extremists to move from one place to another, whether to hide from security watch or in the pursuit of their objectives. For example, it was found that the one of the masterminds behind the November 2015 Paris attacks in France, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, had travelled repeatedly between France and his family home in Belgium and had previously fought with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria before he participated in the Paris attack.

As stated by Skjølberg and Lia, making reference to the view of Martha Crenshaw, members of terror groups receive trainings from other networks with which they share similar orientation or ideology. Communication through social networks usually assists terror members to exchange information and opinions about their plans, targets and operations within and outside a national boundary. Significantly, extensive collaborative arrangements, trans-border networks and personal relationships of trust between terrorist groups are other key factors in explaining the contagiousness of terrorism. The authors stress that terrorist organizations frequently have direct, physical contacts with other terrorist groups and with foreign countries. Collaboration extends to buying weapons, finding asylum, obtaining passports and false documents, acquiring funds, and sometimes rendering assistance in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. It means that transnational connection among members of a terror group with shared aims make terrorism in one state likely to lead to terrorism in nearby states.' This theory is applicable to the transnational-boundary nature of European citizens who are ISIS members, stationed in Europe.

The contagious factor helps the increasing level of terror attacks in Europe (France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, the UK, Russia) carried out mostly by European nationals, who were members of ISIS or its sympathisers. This factor also assists ISIS in terms of membership recruitment from diverse European countries in order to perpetuate its ideology on the continent.

4.1.4. Lapses within European Security Systems and Intelligent Agencies

One of the factors that has promoted European citizens' radicalisation enterprise and their consequent engagement in terror acts on European soil is the weak environment within European security apparatus and intelligence sharing. Oldrich Bures (2016) states that terrorist attacks in Belgium and France indicated the contradiction between the seemingly free movement of terrorists across Europe and the lack of EU-wide intelligence sharing. Due to their earlier criminal activities, most perpetrators of the terror acts in both Paris and Brussels were initially known to the various security agencies in several EU member states. For instance, the Abdeslam brothers had run a café in Brussels that was notorious for drug peddling. In early 2015, Belgian police questioned Abdeslam brothers about a failed attempt to travel to Syria, but they were not detained. Soon after, Dutch police stopped them during a routine traffic check, fined them €70 for carrying a small quantity of hashish and then released them because they were not listed in their national information system. Unfortunately, neither the French security agencies nor the EU coordinating agency, Europol, were informed of either of these incidents prior to the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015 (Springer, 2016:58).

Another significant challenge within European security apparatus is the obstacle faced by Europol in respect to counterterrorism. The fact is in some EU member states, terrorism is dealt with by police agencies, while in others intelligence agencies are responsible for counterterrorism. Cooperation across intelligence and police agencies can be difficult because they tend to be interested in different types of information: 'police institutions tend to be interested in specific information about suspects in order to make an arrest, whereas intelligence agencies are very broadly interested in general information without prosecutorial purposes' (ibid). Moreover, some experts have also argued that given their different esprit de corps, 'security services as a group do not think highly of police agencies and vice versa. Within the EU, difficulties with both police and intelligence cooperation are further compounded by the cultural and linguistic diversity that exists across the 28 EU member states.

Bures, referring to Griff Witte and Loveday Morris (2015), argues that unlike in the United States after the 9/11, when the US officials vowed to do whatever it took to prevent a repeat, Europe's leaders can offer few guarantees. They face enormous structural holes in their security networks and they have few obvious solutions to a threat, more potent than the continent has confronted in decades. Failure to stop Paris attacks, which left 130 people dead, reveals fatal flaws at the heart of European security. Poor information-sharing among intelligence agencies, a threadbare system for tracking suspects across open borders and an unmanageably long list of homegrown extremists to monitor radicalised gave the Paris plotters an opening to carry out the deadliest attack on French soil in more than half a century (ibid).

4.1.5. European Enabling Environment

It is a fact that radicalization takes time and requires an enabling environment to fully manifest, which may eventually lead to terror acts. Radicalization does not happen in a vacuum, it thrives when it finds a supporting condition and conducive environment. In Europe, there are countries with neighborhoods tagged as, 'no go zones'. A no go zone by description is an area that has a reputation for violence and crime which makes people frightened to go there. This term has also been used recently to refer to areas undergoing insurgent attacks where ruling authorities have lost control and are unable to enforce a form of government authority. These neighborhoods exist in France, Belgium, Sweden and the UK. It is not a surprise that Jihadists or extremists have taken advantage of these kinds of environments to perpetuate their activities. Specific places in France such as in Paris, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Marseille, Grenoble, Avignon districts have been identified with a mix of drug traffickers, Salafist zealots and Islamic youth gangs. In the same vein, neighbourhoods in Belgium such as Molenbeek has been described as a place where gang violence and Islamic fundamentalism had fed on marginalisation, despair and festering resentment of Belgian authority. It is also common knowledge in Brussels that Kalashnikovs and other weapons favoured by terrorists as well as ordinary criminals can be bought from dealers in an area bordering Molenbeek and neighbouring Anderlecht. Belgium's Prime Minister, Charles Michel undoubtedly caught the popular mood when he accepted after the Paris attacks that investigation of such events often led to Belgium. "I notice that each time there is a link with Molenbeek," he said. "This is a gigantic problem", he concluded (The National, 2015).

4.1.6. Prisons' Environment

Prisons are meant to serve as incubators of peaceful change and transformation of inmates, but have however played an enormous role in the narratives of radical and militant movement in modern time (ICSR Report, 2010). The issues of prison radicalisation and Islamic extremism in Europe have become a major problem across the continent in recent time. Prisons have become a far more potent breeding ground for the proliferation of extremist views (Ahmed, 2015). The state of imprisonment itself has been maximised as a tool for radicalisation, with radicalisers presenting incarceration as society's rejection of an individual and what they stand for. This invariably builds a perceived sense of victimisation that catalyses an extreme stand ideology (ibid).

The phenomenon of Islamic radicalization and recruitment of citizens from European countries has manifested itself in a series of terrorist attacks and extremist activities in recent time both in Europe and beyond. Measures taken to combat this transnational challenge have made it more difficult for extremist groups to recruit through mosques, and so the search for new and different areas of opportunity to expand their ranks is constant and outpacing many efforts to combat this threat (Cilluffo et al, 2007:114). Prisons are understudied channels but fertile grounds for radicalization in Europe. Until the bound of the challenge of prison radicalisation is better understood, effective and appropriate prevention as well as responsible measures cannot be formulated and implemented (ibid).

Historically, prisons have served as incubators of extreme ideas, and jihadists would not be the first to infiltrate and recruit from prisons. Right-wing extremist groups, including Posse Comitatus, the Order, Aryan Nations, and various militia movements, have been formed or recruited from prison populations. This is because prisoners make inviting targets for extremists. Prisoners form a captive audience and often exhibit many characteristics that render them vulnerable to radicalization, including alienation, anti-social attitudes, cultural disillusionment, social isolation, and violent tendencies. Moreover, prisoners may be forced to join gangs in prison for the purpose of protection and giving extremists another opportunity to exert influence. Jihadists have adopted the efforts of other domestic extremist groups in order to advance their objectives in prisons (ibid).

In a European context, Patrick Dunleavy explains the connection between terrorists and imprisonment in his article titled, “Brothers, Prison, and the Reign of Terror”. He narrates the deadly, coordinated attacks on the Brussels airport and Metro line, which marked the third major terrorist attack to have rattled the Europe Union since the beginning of 2015. Each attack was carried out by terrorists sharing the radical Islamist ideology pushed by the Islamic State. According to him, “the attacks all featured brothers who had spent time in prisons”. Bombings in Brussels, Belgium were caused by suicide bombings by brothers Brahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui. Both had extensive criminal histories and spent time in prison. In 2010, Ibrahim was sentenced to prison for armed robbery. The next year, Khalid received a prison sentence for carjacking and possession of a weapon (Dunleavy, 2016).

Moreover, in his recent article on the Westminster terror attack, which led to the death of four and injured fifty people, Dunleavy claims that Khalid Manhood’s (a UK citizen, who carried out the terror attack) troubles started with a 1983 arrest for property damage. He spent at least two periods in three different HMPS correctional facilities, including for assault. It was there in prison, where he was believed to have been radicalized. The susceptibility of an inmate in British prisons to Islamist radicalization is well documented. Extremist literature like, ISIS’s inspired magazine, is present, as well as convicted terrorists who exert undue influence on the general prison population. Dunleavy comments in IPT News, referring to Hanif Qadir (a former jihadist) that prison chaplains are unable to address the problem. Many of them may sympathize with a form of Islam that is both Wahhabi and Salafist in nature (IPT, 2017).

Lia and Nasser (2016) discussing the emergence of a home-grown Muslim extremism in Norway called, “The Prophet’s Ummah (PU)”. Lia and Nasser remark that this development first caught headlines in Oslo in 2006. The Prophet’s Ummah (PU) extremist group in Norway was pioneered by Arfan B., a onetime inmate in one of the Norwegian prisons, turned Islamist. According to Lia and Nasser’s report, in September 2006, eleven shots were fired at the Jewish synagogue in Oslo, and Arfan B., a former gangster-turned Islamist, was suspected; later he was convicted of complicity. A Norwegian national of Pakistani origin, B. had been drawn towards radical Islam since the early 2000s. Following his release from prison in 2009, he emerged as a central recruiter and leader for young Islamist extremists in Norway, a milieu that later became known as The Prophet’s Ummah (PU).

4.2.0. SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANNELS

4.2.1. Social Media

Among the principal channels of radicalization of European citizens into ISIS activities is the use of social media connection. With access to the internet, there is less need to be physically engaged with the Islamic State radicalizers or mentors. According to a research conducted by RAND Europe, “Radicalizations in the digital era (The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism)”, it was confirmed by the researchers that the internet plays a key role in the radicalization of 15 case-studies of radicalized terrorists that were interviewed. According to the research report, the internet has brought extensive change in peoples’ lives. It has revolutionised how we communicate and simplified the way we create networks among like-minded individuals. We live in an era in which 84 percent of the EU population uses the internet daily, including 81 percent of whom access it from home (Rand Europe, 2013). This development has led to important changes in the organization and functioning of society, and as violent extremists and terrorists form part of this society, it is widely assumed that the internet plays a particular role as a tool of radicalization. From the outcome of their interview with the human case studies which are anonymous for security purpose, it was gathered that the internet creates more opportunities to become radicalized, it acts as an ‘echo chamber’: a place where individuals find their ideas supported and echoed by other like-minded individuals, it accelerates the process of radicalization, it allows radicalization to occur without physical contact, it increases opportunities for self-radicalization (ibid).

4.2.2. Friends and Family Members

Another channel of radicalization is through friends and family members. Human organisation has always involved a structure of social network or the other. Terrorism has a form of social connection. People become interested in ideas, ideologies and activities, even appallingly destructive ones, because other people are interested in them. Jason Burke (2015) indicated in his

article “Jihad by family’: Why are terrorist cells often made up of brothers?” that militants often call each other “brother”, which refers collectively to the “brothers” in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq or France. This is done to affirm solidarity, attachment to their common cause, a sense of shared identity and objectives. A research by Pennsylvania State University examined the interactions of 120 supposed “lone wolf” terrorists from all ideological and faith backgrounds, and found that, even though they launched their attacks alone, in a large majority of the cases others were aware of the individual’s commitment to a specific extremist ideology.

The role of family and friends is well pronounced in the terror acts that Europe has experienced in recent time. For instance, Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary, a British aspiring rapper turned ISIS recruit, is the son of Adel Abdel Bary, an Egyptian militant who came to the UK in 1991 and was later convicted in New York for his role in al-Qaeda’s attack on US embassies in East Africa in 1998 (The Guardian, 2015) . In the UK, along with siblings, parents of jihadis have been detained and some charged with terrorism-related offences (ibid). Fraternal ties are also common among those who travelled to Syria, Iraq or other war zones, even if they do not turn to terrorism at home. Few of them travel alone: while almost all make the journey with close friends or family members. For example, three brothers aged 17 to 21, from Brighton, left the UK to join al-Nusra Front, an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. There was also the case of Aseel Muthana, a 17-year-old schoolboy in Britain, who travelled with his elder brother, a medical student, to join ISIS. In October 2015, a British court found that two brothers of Iftekhar Jaman, who spoke of “five-star jihad” on the BBC, had spent two years giving help and advice to people seeking to travel to Syria to establish an Islamic State (ibid).

Moreover, Salah Abdeslam and Ibrahim Abdeslam were both terrorists and brothers; Cherif Kouachi and Said Kouachi, who were involved in the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo magazine terrorist attack were both brothers. The two suicide bombers (Khalid and Brahim El Bakraoui), who attacked Brussels’ Airport in 2016 were both family members. It was reported by The New York Times that the two brothers were previously known to Belgian police, and Khalid El Bakraoui was believed to have rented an apartment, where police found the fingerprints of Paris terror suspect, Salah Abdeslam (The New York Times, 2016).

4.2.3. Group Identity

Moreover, a number of studies have found that personal identity issues and wider problems of marginalization, racism and social exclusion can act as a catalyst for radicalization and potentially, violent extremism. Victoria University's 2013 study identified a broad range of personal and socio-cultural factors that may act as channels for radicalization and extremism. These included the implications of lack of belonging; the tensions of multiple cultural allegiances and loyalties; rebellion against family or community norms; the yearning for cultural and religious authenticity; the need for approval and attention, particularly for those whose fractured self-esteem or sense of self-worth makes them strive to feel like a 'somebody' rather than a 'nobody'

Socio-cultural factor is another case in point in the domain of marginalization, racism and social exclusion. This included the rejection or marginalization of minority groups by mainstream society; the phenomenon of self-exclusion and insularity by minority groups from the mainstream in an effort to preserve a coherent cultural identity; and the corrosive experience of discrimination and racism in the community, particularly for Muslims with African backgrounds in Europe (Victoria University, 2013).

4.2.4. Sub-Cultural Platform

Another significant channel is the role that subculture factor plays in the radicalization phenomenon of European nationals in the Islamic State terrorism. Paul Keys (2012) explains in his essay on "Religion and Terrorism", that the factor of subculture drive can promote radicalization of Europeans. He particularly refers to radicalization development of the UK citizens and their eventual engagement in terrorist activities. In his essay, referring to the work of Bunglawala et al (2004), he mentions that of the two million Muslims in the UK, 46% were born in the UK. The various levels of affiliations increase the problem of identity within the Muslim community and bring to the fore cultural issues, including those of national identity and ethnicity. In Keys argument, he mentions the view of Gilbert on national identity which influences choices and perceptions and therefore is a form of personal identity that has much in common with others with the same national identity (Keys, 2012:20). In the 2001 census, religion was considered important to self-identity by over half of the adult Muslim population in

the UK, but by just one fifth of Christians (ibid). The relegation of religion within mainstream society has only served to further cultural differences and fuel mistrust of those for whom religion is a way of life. However, some studies and surveys challenge some misconceptions about identity and social integration. A Gallup poll (2009) suggests Muslims can be just as supportive of British identity as the general public. The poll's findings represent a direct challenge to the popular myth that Muslims are less patriotic than the country at large. The vast majority are content to live and work in the UK and feel at home. However, some wish to establish a separate Muslim identity, including the use of Islamic family law and legal system and conformation to certain cultural norms. This response to social and cultural conditions shows how a subculture has been created not only within mainstream society, but also amongst the Muslim community, which is a motivational channel for Muslims in Europe, who decided to join the Islamic State (ibid).

4.3.0. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANNELS

4.3.1 Belief system

Belief system has been found out to be an important channel that aids radicalization of European citizens by the Islamic State. This type of belief system connects to the concept of Ummah in Islamic injunction. The concept of Ummah might seem to correspond to an understanding of a nation, but there are important differences. The nation is a strictly political concept; it may be defined as a community of peoples possessing a given territory with their own government; citizenship involves giving allegiance to the State, independently of a person's religious commitment. By contrast, citizenship in the ummah very much involves commitment to a particular religion. In Islamic thought, the only Ummah that counts is the Ummah Islamiyyah, which means, a nation with common ancestry or geography. Thus, it can be said to be a supra-national community with a common history. In other words, the concept of Ummah is an entity that theoretically comprises all Muslims throughout the world, irrespective of their national origin. In Islamic thought, "The Ummah" represents a universal world order, ruled by an Islamic government (the Caliph) in accordance with the "Law of God" (the Shariah-Islamic religious law), and patterned after the community founded by Muhammad at Medina in 622 AD (CBN News). It is not a surprise therefore that some Muslim Europeans are motivated by this concept

of ummah; and in order to fulfill this religious duty, they strive to become part of this religiously-based and politically motivated Islamic community-the Islamic State, and which required them to travel from Europe to Syria and Iraq to identify with this community. This influences their journey or attempted journey to Syria and Iraq to demonstrate their support to the Islamic State 'government'. It also motivates some of them to carry out terrorist attacks in the name of the Islamic State's Caliphate and their allegiance to the self proclaimed Caliph-Abubakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State.

4.3.2. Ideology Platform

Ideological influence is another platform for the radicalization of some European citizens into the Islamic State terrorism. Emphasis in this case is being laid on the Salafist ideological orientation. This point clearly indicates that not all Muslims in Europe submit themselves to this extremist ideological orientation, even though they are aware of it. In the article titled, "Middle East Salafism's Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe", Stemmann (2006) discusses the influence of Salafi ideology behind the terror attacks in Europe, including the Madrid (March 2004) and London bombings (July 2005) and the role of such attacks in the radicalization process among certain sectors of European Muslim communities. For Josi and Stemmann, the Madrid terrorist bombings showed that Europe is no longer just a logistics base or shelter for international terrorism but has instead become one of its main battlegrounds. Jihadi ideology, in particular, the proselytizing conducted by radical preachers, has led to the emergence of groups capable of carrying out independent terrorist attacks in Europe (Stemmann, 2006:1).

Ely Karmon (2016) makes a claim in his article, "Europe, slowly waking up to Islamist terror" that four hundred German police, "after months of preparation," conducted raids on July 27, 2016, at a German-speaking Islamic circle (DIK) mosque and eight apartments in Hildesheim, a town described as "a hotbed of radical Salafist" activity (ICT, 2016). According to Karmon, from this scenario, the Islamic State's Salafist ideology is now present in Europe and the group encourages its members to carry out terrorist acts in Europe and elsewhere under this ideological influence. As it has been pointed earlier in this essay, Salafis' aim is to eradicate the impurities introduced during centuries of religious practice of Islam, Karmon stresses. Interpretations not based on the original sources of Islam are viewed as distortions that lead Muslims to stray from

the path of God. The Islamic State upholds this point and consistently emphasizes this ideological orientation to its members.

One of the European students I interviewed on the subject of radicalisation in Europe and who requested to be anonymous is a Somali-Norwegian PhD student at the institute of European Studies, Strasbourg University, France. As a European, with African descent, he cited the example of how he and his friend had the opportunity to join a terrorist group in East Africa, called Al- Shaabab. Both of them, he said, had exposure to its fanatic religious fundamentalist ideological orientations, however, he decided to turn it down and instead decided to pursue his academic studies, while his friend went on in the radicalisation processes and later travelled to Somalia to fight along with Al-Shaabab members and was later killed in the struggle. His friend, he said, believed in the ideological objectives of the terror group. Hence, he pursued that agenda, until he met his death, he concluded.

4.3.3. Hate Preaching and Extremists Messages

Hate preaching and messages inside Mosques by radical Muslim clerics is another platform that promotes radicalization in European countries. This has become a concern to many governments in Europe and they look for every avenue to combat this development inside Mosques. A notable example is the UK effort to discontinue hate preaching inside various Mosques in the region. The UK government plans to legislate against hate preachers from having access to Mosques, Universities and groups, so that these preachers would not continue their radicalization enterprise through their hate preaching. David Anderson, the Government's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in the UK, advised that European government should consider tightening the law to avoid incidence of hate preaching like that of the UK based preacher-Anjem Choudary, who had engaged in hate preaching, that has promoted radicalisation in the UK and influenced radicalization in other hemispheres for almost 20 years before he was convicted in 2016 and imprisoned on terrorism linked charges. Anderson said the government of the UK is now considering measures to tackle the problem of radicalization through banning hate preaching. The UK is taking steps to ban known hate preachers from attending certain mosques, community groups and universities. Another similar measure would see radicals barred from speaking to groups of a certain size in public. A third measure radicalization through hate

preaching is giving the security services more powers to order Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites to take down extremist materials (The Telegraph, 2016) .

4.3.4. Propaganda Messages

The Islamic State propaganda is a channel that gives a dimension of attraction to an individual who wishes to become part of the group. Since its inception, the Islamic State has been releasing diverse extremist messages to appeal to Muslims and interested individuals to engage in Jihad and Ummah for the sake of Allah. The group has different websites and web-pages that articulate its objectives. The Islamic State produces Dabiq-a magazine in its region and An-Naba' Newsletter. The group sometimes claims responsibility for a successful terror acts by any of its member or sympathizers through its websites. Examples of the Islamic State propaganda messages are stated below as indicated in the ICCT 2015 publication by Alex Schmid:

According to ISIS top spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “The best thing you can do is to make an effort to kill an infidel, French, American, or any other of their allies.... Smash his head with a rock, slaughter him with a knife, run him over with a car, throw him from a high place, choke him or poison him”.

“...we will conquer Europe one day. It is not a question of if we will conquer Europe, just a matter of when that will happen. But it is certain.... For us, there is no such thing as borders. There are only front lines. Our expansion will be perpetual.... And the Europeans need to know that when we come, it will not be in a nice way. It will be with our weapons. And those who do not convert to Islam or pay the Islamic tax will be killed”– “Abu Qatada” (Christian Emde) German Foreign Fighter in Syria (2014).

“We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah”. – Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani al-Shami, Deputy of Al-Baghdadi, in Islamic State propaganda video.

Moreover, according to the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), Georgetown University’s comment about the use of propaganda messages by the Islamic State, “the Islamic State claimed in its An-Naba’ Newsletter that their Brussels military campaign was successfully executed. In the newsletter, they praised their fighters’ efforts and how bravely they

completed their mission to attack against the heart of Europe (Belgium). They referred to the Brussels attacks as their “Brussels military campaign.” They also challenged the West with the following statements:

“ISIS soldiers are from now on from the countries we are attacking. Why? Because it is easier for us to carry out those attacks simply because they know the terrain, culture, language and basically all the necessary information regarding that country.

In my interview with (Camille A), a Political Science Master’s student, who lives in Paris; Camille cited the factor of propaganda messages as a reason that motivates some Europeans to connect with the Islamic State objectives. In his analysis, he explained how the Islamic State’s magazine called, Dabiq, (published in different European languages such as; French, English, Spanish, Italian, German, Swedish and others) is used as a means of propaganda, which invariably captivated the interest of these Europeans, who consequently connected with the Islamic State enterprise. Camille further stated that with the availability of Dabiq in different European languages, it is obvious that European citizens are parts of the main recruitment targets of the Islamic State. Moreover, with online access of the magazine, this also promotes a quick and attraction to the minds of the Europeans, who have a feeling of belonging to the kind of way of life and society the Islamic State claims and projects to them in Dabiq and this advisement consequently appeal to their minds to support the Islamic State Caliphate vision.

4.3.5. Foreign Fighters’ Role Modeling

Alex Schmid (2015) in his research on “Foreign Fighters with ISIS- a European Perspective,” claims that a major reason for the success so far of ISIS (The Islamic State) has been its foreign fighters – some of them battle-hardened such as between 2,000 and 5,000 Chechens. Others, with no battlefield experience, are eager to sacrifice themselves by means of martyrdom operations (suicide attacks), that, as they are told, will allow them the pleasures of paradise (Jannah) if not the spoils of war on earth. Again, some of members of the Islamic State are driven by “an apocalyptic end-of-days strategic vision. Such a millenarian fanaticism is not without historical precedents; it could also be found in the Europe of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation. Schmid believes that the Salafi-jihadist ideology of the Islamic State has a coherence and plausibility that is attractive for many young Muslims in Europe, who search for

identity and meaning in life or want to break with a past characterized by petty crime or drug use. It provides some of those unsure about their place in Western society with a simple belief system and clear rules while promising them an active role as part of a victorious revival of what they are told is original Islam (ICCT, 2015).

4.4.0. POLITICAL CHANNELS

4.4.1. Western Policies in the Middle East/Muslim World

Extremist opposition to Western values, interest and policies in the Middle East has been on for many decades. In the work of Bernard Lewis (1990), “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, the author refers, among other things, to the effort of Islam to dominate the West in particular and the world in general. Lewis historical reference on the aforementioned is helpful in explaining radicalisation of European citizens in the Islamic State motivated and inspired-terrorism in Europe. Radicalisation of Europeans by the Islamic State fulfils this goal. Sayyid Qutb, known as the “intellectual godfather of radical Islam” argues in his book “Milestone” (1964) that every person on earth deserves a chance to become a Muslim. However, he believed that this opportunity exists only if the person lives in a nation that is truly Islamic, one governed solely by sharia. Thus, Muslims must topple every government and impose strict Sharia law on every civilization. The Islamic State desires to fulfill this mission in European countries. It is not a surprise therefore that thousands of Europeans had travelled to Syria and Iraq as commitment to this mission and pay allegiance (“baya”) to the Caliphate. Moreover, opposition to Western policies in Muslim dominated countries by Islamic fundamentalists and around the world has also promoted the radicalization development of a number of European citizens into the Islamic State ideological enterprise. Shireen Hunter stressing this claim maintains that since the early 1990s, the linkage between events in predominantly Muslim countries and the radicalization of Muslims in Europe has deepened. Such events include, but not limited to the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Algerian civil war of 1991-1997, the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now the civil war in Syria. According to Hunter, “among other things, these wars have produced new extremist groups and ideologies that have then established links with European Muslims”.

4.4.2. The Pursuit of Islamic State's Objectives

Determination of the Islamic State to take over Europe with its ideas and ideology is something that can fuel radicalization and this should not be taken for granted. The group is determined to make its presence felt in all European countries. For instance, there was an Islamic extremist group in Belgium called Sharia4Belgium, which was recently dissolved. This Islamic extremist group was led by a 32 years old Fouad Belkacem who has been spending jail term sentence for the next 12 years in prison since 2015. Sharia4Belgium was a Belgian radical Salafist organisation which called for Belgium to convert itself into an Islamist state. In February 2015, the group was designated a terrorist organization by a Belgian judge - Luc Potargent. The group's leader, Fouad Belkacem, alias "Abu Imran", repeatedly made controversial comments in Brussels. He preached in favor of death penalty for LGBT people and was said to be in support of late Osama Bin Laden. In 2010, the group was said to have disrupted a lecture of Benno Barnard of the University of Antwerp. The point is with this kind of radical and extremist group in Belgium, the tendency was that some European Muslims would probably have been radicalized. More particularly considering the Salafist ideologies on which the group was based. No wonder, eventually, the terror attacks in Brussels happened! From a Salafist-jihadi perspective, Muslims must strive to disseminate and implement Islam in all areas of life by liberating the lands of Islam from other cultures (especially Western culture) through jihad (holy war), which is perceived as the personal duty (fard 'ayn) of every Muslim. Thus Muslim must fight the enemies of Islam through violent and uncompromising military struggle. Moreover, according to the Salafist-jihadi perception, the enemies of Islam are not only external (the West), but also Arab regimes that cooperate with the Europeans or secular Arab regimes that are considered "infidel." Therefore, according to Salafi-jihadism, Islamic religious law justifies overthrowing the infidels (ITIC, 2014).

4.4.3. External Conflicts' Phenomenon

The important role of external conflicts in fuelling radicalization in Europe should not be ignored. The Israeli-Palestian conflict is an obvious case and other conflicts such as the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan as well as the involvement of some European countries (like France and Belgium) in the US-led Coalition attack in Syria and Iraq could be a connected platform why and

through which radicalization of Europeans is occurring on the continent. Indeed, a recurring element in the radicalization process of some terrorists who have been active in Europe has been their direct contact with persons involved in armed action in conflict zones such as: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Syria, Iraq and Libya. These individuals serve as role models for young Muslim radicals in Europe, causing in them a desire to emulate their devotion and dedication to pursue their cause (European Commission, 2016).

4.4. Conclusion

Without any contradiction, terrorist activities, on a global scale, have increased tremendously after 9/11. Particularly, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has undoubtedly inspired and promoted the use of terror as a means of political expression, with terror acts, via different methods, becoming a common occurrence in Europe in recent time. As a result, hundred of civilians have become victims of terror attack, perpetuated by extremist European citizens, who often identify themselves with the Islamic State' objectives and ideological orientation. The question of what could have motivated the terror actors, to consistently engage in terror actions on European soils has become a debate within academia and in public discussion. This development has led to the need to undertake an academic enquiry not only on why this is happening in Europe, but also looking at how are some European citizens are becoming radicalised. Attempt has been made in the above chapter to examine possible channels through which European citizens are being radicalised and engaging in ISIS inspired terror acts on the continent. Couples of channels such as socio-cultural, psychological, political and enabling environments in Europe have made radicalisation development to thrive as it is being identified with European nationals. The Islamic State, in its smartness, is maximising these possible channels to capture the interest of Europeans as its members and sympathisers in its radicalisation enterprise, with capability of terror actions.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. Conclusion

The increasing development of terror attacks in European countries in recent times has raised questions of why and how does an individual engage in acts of terror. This challenge has therefore motivated indepth academic investigations to better understand the concept of radicalisation, among which is, but not limited to, Islamist-motivated radicalisation in Europe. Importantly, this research, making use of descriptive qualitative method, has examined the concept of radicalisation in a new dimension as it relates to European engagement in the Islamic State inspired and motivated terrorism; a development that has added a new perspective to the study of transnational terrorism in the 21st century study of terrorism. This research notes that the European radicalisation development is unique in the sense that it is uncommon to see thousands of individuals -- men, women and their families from Europe and other continents, navigating their way to another region to demonstrate their support for a common objective to a group, driven by a set of ideological pursuits and declaring what it stands for through various propaganda messages.

This research indicates that radicalisation is a process, which means, radicalisation does not happen in a vacuum, but it is a process through which a person passes into an act of terror. That is to say, radicalisation might begin as socialisation that develops into extremism, which consequently ends in committing terror acts. This description has show-cased itself in different terror acts that had occurred in European cities between 2015 and 2017. The terror occurrences in Europe had resulted to the death of many innocent civilians, while many are being injured as a result.

In addition, this research shows that there is no mono-causality to radicalisation or terrorism. It points that the radicalisation of Europeans and their consequent terror engagement has been premised on chain of motivations such as: the challenge of identity and social meaning, grievance against Western policies in the Muslim world, Islamic resurgence narrative, European weakness in confronting the problem of radicalisation, the influence of certain Islamic texts that provoke violence, marginalisation of some Muslim communities in Europe, as well as ISIS vision to conquer the world with its ideology. All these factors have formed connections that

arouse the interest of Europeans, who are radicalised and engaged in terror acts. This justifies the fact that multi-dimensional factors are responsible for the development of terror acts in Europe and looking for one and only reason pushing someone into radicalisation, will be an effort of futility. Radicalisation is motivated by combination of socio-cultural, religious, psychological, political and environmental factors and these had influenced the Europeans, who belong to ISIS, to carry out violent activities and terror acts between 2015 and 2017.

Moreover, looking at the distance between Europe and where ISIS “caliphate” was located (Iraq and Syria), how is it possible then for the Islamic State to radicalise the Europeans? This is possible because the Islamic radicalisers have taken advantage of strategic channels to capture the interest of these Europeans to accomplish part of the Islamic State’s objectives, which includes its vision of conquering Europe. This is being explicitly indicated in chapter four of this research. Specific channels such as; social media, propaganda messaging, prison environment, friends and family members, hate preaching, European policies of open borders and free movement and others have been taken advantage of by the Islamic State to win the hearts of its European supporters and turn them into its members.

The Islamic State, based on its salafist theological teaching, influences the European to become its supporters and builds its cells across the continent. Hence, it will be difficult to comprehensively understand the engagement of the European citizens in terror acts, without properly examining the Islamic State ideological orientation that is rooted in salafi doctrine. It should be understood that the European citizens, who are radicalised are being specially radicalised into something. So, the question is, into what are they being radicalised? They are being radicalised into a belief system, an ideology, strategic objectives and pursuits of the Islamic State. In this sense, if salafism is the driving force of the Islamic State, then researchers in the field of radicalisation have a platform to examine deeply the role salafism play in turning an individual into a terrorist and this would also help to better understand the mind-set of Europeans, who are radicalised.

Someone might ask, but why is Europe, in particular, experiencing repeated terror acts and how could this be happening at this time on the continent? The fact is radicalisation of Europeans is a

new initiative, orchestrated and pursued by a ‘new Al-Qaeda group’ commonly known as the Islamic State. The group uses the opportunity of the crisis in Iraq and Syria to launch part of the plans of Al-Qaeda, just as it is being brought to light by some authors and this has been explicated in this research (see sections 2.2.4. and 3.7). Therefore, the radicalisation development of the Europeans and their consequent terror engagement in the continent is not an accident or coincidence. It is a deliberate set of actions, which unfortunately are being supported through varieties of channels that make it suitable for the Islamic State to perpetuate its objectives. It would be incorrect to assume that the radicalisers are ignorant of what they are doing. It should be noted that the Islamic State does not shy or hide from its objectives, values, goals and pursuits. It is not their concern whether the whole world takes them seriously or they are being taken for granted. Their pursuit of Islamic resurgence, which by simple description, is an endeavour to re-establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere over Western values as well as establishment of a caliphate, is well established in its publication, ‘Black Flags from Rome (Europe)’. The Islamic State group, through Islamic religion, entices and captivates misguided Europeans, who bought into its ideological orientation, to perpetuate its objectives against the peace and security of the West in general and Europe in particular.

5.2. Recommendation

Radicalisation, as a subject, coupled with terror acts is broad, more especially, analysing the radicalisation development from European continent’s experience. Hence, it is clear that research on radicalisation of Europeans and ISIS terrorism is undoubtedly significant considering the threat this phenomenon poses to peace and security in Europe. As a result, it is therefore important for the governments in Europe to holistically understand the complex nature of radicalisation and the ideological orientation that is being poured into the minds of innocent and misguided Europeans, who have identified with the Islamic State agenda. Radicalisation of the Europeans has content and it is expedient to start first by looking into the content, as attempts are made to proffer solution to this menace. Therefore, there is need to answer the question: into what are these Europeans being radicalised?

Critical observation of ISIS system of operations reveals that the group took advantage of the conflicts and civil unrests in Iraq and Syria to recruit its members into its extremist religious pursuits. This eventually culminated into perpetuating diverse acts of terror actions against civilian populations, not only in Europe, but in other parts of the world. Radicalised individuals and ISIS sympathisers have often made reference to the involvement or intervention of the West or Europe in the Middle-East affairs. Europe needs to watch its decisions and actions on the socio-economic and political developments of the Middle–East. The alienation of the Sunni in the governmental structure of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the dismantling of the Iraqi Army brought about a security gap and added to the internal government crisis in the region. This consequently resulted to insurgent organizations fighting the American army and its coalitions. The manner in which the West handled Iraq and Syria crisis created more room for radicalisation of individuals and further motivated terror acts in and outside of the region.

As it is being argued in this research, belief system is also a propeller for radicalisation. However, exclusion from socio-economic and political opportunities creates a good environment for radicalisation to thrive. This affects young people the most. European governments need to look into providing a conducive environment for their youth. Terrorists take advantage of disillusioned individuals and recruit them into radicalisation. Majority of perpetrators of terror acts in Europe are young people, who are in their twenties and may be in their early or late thirties. Some of these youths became ISIS members, foreign fighters and sympathizers due to the way their societies treated them. These young people became radicalized for ISIS, directly or indirectly and were ready to perpetuate its ideology in their home countries. Socio-economic deprivation and hardship can facilitate and push a number of youth to become radicalised. This has found expression in Molenbeek, a neighbourhood in Belgium, which has been referred to as Brussels’ jihadi centre.

Importantly, the way to counter radicalisation challenge in Europe and beyond is not primarily through military capability, as it is being done in Syria and Iraq; although this may be part of the solution processes of defeating the Islamic State agenda. Islamist motivated terror acts via radicalisation in Europe, I believe, needs to be confronted ideologically by discouraging every

and any extremist Islamic teachings capable of radicalising European Muslims and others, ultimately leading these individuals into violent extremist activities. The defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq does not imply the end of radicalisation phenomenon; because there is an ideology that is involved in this war and that ideology needs to be defeated as well. The question now is, how would the West do this?

Moreover, the security intelligence in Europe needs high level of tactics in the handling of the returnees from Syria and Iraq as well as those known to be radicalised in Europe and those who are willing to leave the radical group. Importantly, a rehabilitation process of integrating the radicalised Europeans back to our normal society must be taken into consideration, and not incarceration, now that prisons are being turned into another arena of radicalising inmates. Lastly, other lines of research, complementing this project and other researches on violent extremism will be necessary, in order to holistically proffer solution to the threat that radicalisation, that leads to violent activities and terror acts, poses to Europe in particular and the whole world in general.

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